Case Index – Supreme Court

JUDGES
Administrative complaint against  — A mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient because bias and partiality
can never be presumed; since bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party,  it is incumbent
upon the complainants to prove that respondent judge was manifestly partial against them. (Biado vs. Hon. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No.
MTJ-17-1891, Feb. 15, 2017)

—      An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a Judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available; it must be underscored that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action; he cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, provided he acts in good
faith. (Biado vs.  Hon. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, Feb. 15, 2017)

—      Awards for outstanding performances as a professional and as a judge, far from accenting her good qualities as a person, rather
highlighted her unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her misconduct and general bad attitude as a member thereof has
put the awards and recognitions in serious question. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14,
2017)

—      Good faith implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing; based on the totality of respondent’s acts and actuations, her
claims of good faith and lack of intent to commit a wrong cannot be probable. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No.
MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)

—      It is well-settled that “in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the acts complained of rests
on the complainant; extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error
that may be inferred from the decision or order itself.” (Rizalado vs. Judge Bollozos, OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ, June 19, 2017)

—      Misdemeanor as a member of the bench could also cause expulsion from the legal profession through disbarment. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)

—      Respondent voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainants and their witnesses and evidence during
the administrative investigation. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)

—      The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone
beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists. (Rizalado vs. Judge Bollozos, OCA IPI No. 11-3800-RTJ, June
19, 2017)

—      Voluminous records of cases constituted proof of administrative wrongdoings and sufficed to warrant the supreme action of
respondent’s removal from the judiciary. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813, Mar. 14, 2017)

Archiving of a criminal case –– A.C. No. 7-A-92 enumerated the circumstances when a judge  may order the archiving of a criminal
case as follows: (a) If after the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the accused remains at large for six (6) months from the delivery of
the warrant to the proper peace officer, and the latter has explained the reason why the accused was not apprehended; or (b) When
proceedings are ordered suspended for an indefinite period because: (1) the accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand  the charge against him and to plead intelligently, or to undergo trial,
and he has to be committed to a mental hospital; (2) a valid prejudicial question in a civil action is invoked during the pendency of the
criminal case unless the civil and the criminal cases are consolidated; 3) an interlocutory order or incident in the criminal case is elevated
to, and is pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which has issued a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction; and 4) when the accused has jumped bail before arraignment and cannot be arrested by his bondsman.
(Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)

Bias and partiality — The totality of the circumstances and the actuations of the respondent judge attendant to the case, clearly lead
to the inescapable conclusion that the respondent judge evidently favoured a party is a clear indicium of bias and partiality that calls for
a severe administrative sanction. (Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)

Conduct of  –– A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails
to establish probable cause; that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24,
2017)

––      Although a motion to dismiss the case or withdraw the Information is addressed to the court, its grant or denial must always be in
the faithful exercise of judicial  discretion and prerogative; for the judge’s action must neither  impair  the  substantial  rights  of  the
accused  nor  the right  of the State and  the offended  party  to due process of  law. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)

––     Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence; they are likewise
mandated to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence at all times. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)

––      Courtesy is likewise expected of him, in his conduct and language, towards his subordinates; the use of vile and demeaning words
should be completely avoided. (Judge Barcena vs. Clerk of Court II Abadilla, A.M. No. P-16-3564, Jan. 24, 2017)

––      Judges are duty bound to render just, correct and impartial decisions at all times in a manner free of any suspicion as to his
fairness, impartiality or integrity; public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges; the
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
(Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)
—      Presiding judges of all trial courts are mandated to wear a judicial robe during court sessions; penalty for violation. (Mclaren vs.
Hon. Gonzales, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876, April 26, 2017)

—      Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct themselves in a dignified manner
befitting the public office they are holding; judges should avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the authority of
the Supreme Court. (Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, A.M. No. 14-
10-339-RTC, Mar. 07, 2017)

—      Undue delay in the disposition of cases and motions erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and
unnecessarily blemishes its stature. (Marcelo-Mendoza vs. Peroxide Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 203492, April 24, 2017)

— The act of a judge of demanding for complainant’s firearms and in an aggressive manner effectively harassed the already nervous
police officer; regardless of the reason or motive behind the altercation, a judge should observe judicial temperament which requires him
to be always temperate, patient, and courteous, both in conduct and in language; penalty. (PO1 Marcelo vs. Judge Barcillano, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2450 , June 07, 2017)

Delay in rendering a decision  — A judge is expected to keep his own listing of cases and to note therein the status of each case so
that they may be acted upon accordingly and without delay; he must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in
order to monitor the flow of cases for a prompt and effective dispatch of business. (Gamboa-Roces vs. Judge Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-16-
1887, Jan. 09, 2017)

—      Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions
for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into
disrepute; failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge. (Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8, La Trinidad, Benguet, A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 7, 2017)

—      Judges and clerks of court should personally conduct a physical inventory of the pending cases in their courts and personally
examine the records of each case at the time of their assumption to office and every semester thereafter; judges should know which
cases are submitted for decision and are expected to keep their own record of cases so that they may act on them promptly. (Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)

—      Lower courts have three months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution; guidelines in SC
Administrative Circular No. 13 provides, inter alia, that judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Art. VIII, Sec. 15, of
the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts; all cases or matters must be decided
or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts, while all other lower courts are given a period of
three months to do so. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)

Duties  — Judges are expected to closely follow the development of cases and in this respect to keep their own record of cases so that
they may act on them promptly. (Rapsing vs. Judge Walse-Lutero, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894, April 04, 2017)

—      While domestic concerns deserve some consideration from the Supreme Court, such circumstances could only mitigate the liability
of the respondent judge. (Rapsing vs. Judge Walse-Lutero, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1894, April 04, 2017)

Gross ignorance of the law — Gross ignorance transcends a simple error in the application of legal provisions; in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous; to be liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed orders of a judge, who acts in his official capacity, should not
only be erroneous; it must be established that his actuation was attended by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or other similar motive.
(Biado vs.  Hon. Brawner-Cualing, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1891, Feb. 15, 2017)

—      Not every error or mistake committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions renders him liable, unless his act was
tainted with bad faith or a deliberate intent to do an injustice; to hold a judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the
assailed decision, order or act of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law or
jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption on his part.           (Ortega, Jr. vs. Judge
Dacara, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2423, Jan. 11, 2017)

—     Respondent judge manifested gross ignorance of the law as to the propriety or impropriety of issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction despite absence of basis in fact and in law. (Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)

—     Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules and that when committed in good faith does not
warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment; when the law or the rule
is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Dr. Sunico vs. Judge
Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)

Gross inefficiency — An inexcusable failure to decide a case or motion constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of
administrative sanctions such as suspension from office without pay or fine on the defaulting judge. (Dr. Sunico vs. Judge Gutierrez,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, Feb. 21, 2017)

—      Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. (Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
La Trinidad, Benguet, A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 07, 2017)

—         Failure to decide cases that were the subject of requests for extension of time to dispose constitutes gross inefficiency; fine of
₱100,000.00, imposed. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, April 18, 2017)

—      On delay in rendering judgment, Sec. 15(1) and (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases and matters must be
decided or resolved by the lower courts within three months from the date of submission of the last pleading; Sec. 5, Canon 6 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary  mandates judges to “perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness”; also, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct exhorts
judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases within the required periods. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)

Gross misconduct — Violation of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a case of; penalty. (Re: Anonymous Letter
Complaint vs. Judge Divina T. Samson, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabini-Pantukan, Compostela Valley, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870, June
06, 2017)

Gross neglect of duty — Gross neglect of duty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal; the penalty of dismissal carries with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil
service examinations. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)

—      Gross neglect of duty refers to negligence that is characterized by a glaring want of care; by acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally; or by acting with a conscious indifference to consequences
with respect to other persons who may be affected; it is the omission of that care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to
take on their own property; in cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)

Gross violation of Administrative Circular No. 43-2004  —When committed; fine of ₱100,000.00, imposed; the Administrative
Circular required, among others, that the judge applying for optional retirement should already cease working and discharging his
functions as judge even if on the date specified in the application as the date of the effectivity of the optional retirement, he has not yet
received any notice of approval or denial of his application. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-
2212, April 18, 2017)

Incompetence –– When the inefficiency springs from failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, law or principle in the discharge
of duties, the judge is either insufferably incompetent and undeserving of the position she holds or is too vicious that the oversight or
omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No.
RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)

Judicial clemency — Judicial clemency is an act of mercy removing any disqualification from the erring judge; it can be granted only if
there is a showing that it is merited; thus, proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable;judicial
clemency is not a privilege or a right that can be availed of at any time,  as the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is
merited; clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in
the courts. (Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs.  Presiding Judge Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, Feb. 14, 2017)

—      Requirements to grant judicial clemency: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation; these shall include but should not be
limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity; a subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation; 2. sufficient time must
have lapsed from the  imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation; 3. the age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself; 4. there
must be a showing of promise such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills, as well as potential for public service; and 5. there must be
other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. (Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan vs. Presiding Judge Villalon-
Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183, Feb. 14, 2017)

Liability of –– Although judges are generally not accountable for erroneous judgments rendered in good faith, such defense in
situations of infallible discretion adheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the basic issues are
so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and basic as to be beyond permissible margins of error. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon.
Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)

 —      Cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to dismiss the case filed against her at the
time that she was still in the public service. (Re: Findings on the Judicial Audit Conducted in Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, La Trinidad,
Benguet, A.M. No. 14-10-339-RTC, Mar. 07, 2017)

—      Judges cannot be excused by the acts of their subordinates because court employees are not the guardians of a judge’s
responsibility; judges should not merely rely on their court staff for the proper management of the court’s business; being in legal
contemplation the head of his branch, he was the master of his own domain who should be ready and willing to take the responsibility
for the mistakes of his subjects, as well as to be ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in his court. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)

—      Making a drawing of a vagina and a penis and thereafter showing it to an employee of the court of which he is an officer
constitutes sexual harassment; it is an act that constitutes a physical behavior of a sexual nature; a gesture with lewd insinuation.
(Judge Arabani, Jr.  vs. Arabani, A.M. No. SCC-10-14-P, Feb. 21, 2017)

––     When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be constitutive of
gross ignorance of the law. (Judge Marcos vs. Hon. Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2472, Jan. 24, 2017)

New Code of Judicial Conduct  —  Enjoins the judges to devote their professional activity to judicial duties and to perform them,
including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness. (Gamboa-Roces vs. Judge Perez, A.M.
No. MTJ-16-1887, Jan. 09, 2017)

—      Judges are charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official documents in their custody are
intact; they must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of
business. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Mar. 07, 2017)
—      Sec. 3, Canon 2 of the New Code of JudicialConduct provides: Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary
measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware; the judge should
have caused the investigation of the unprofessional conduct committed by the court personnel under his supervision. 
(Anonymous vs. Namol, A.M. No. P-16-3614, June 20, 2017)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/case-index/2017/january-2017-june-2017/judges-2/
JUDGES
Administrative complaint against — A party’s recourse, if prejudiced by a judge’s orders in the course of a trial, is with the proper
reviewing court and not with the OCA, through an administrative complaint. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467,
Oct. 18, 2017)

—      An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial
remedy exists and is available; a judge cannot be civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, provided he acts in good faith. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

—      Ordinary remedies and extraordinary remedies  against error or irregularities, enumerated; disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary; only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that
the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed; application. (Atty.
Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

Bribery — Whether direct or indirect, can seriously affect the public’s trust in every subdivision and agency of government, more so in
the judiciary. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Alinea, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574, Nov. 07, 2017)

Code of Judicial Conduct — A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in
court management, and facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and court personnel; a judge
should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170,
Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

—      Requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times in order to preserve public confidence in the judiciary. (OCA vs. Judge Buyucan,
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

Conduct — Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is insufficient because bias and partiality can never be presumed; bad
faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-
16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

Conduct unbecoming of a judge –– Judges must at all times conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach to ensure the public’s
continued confidence in the judiciary; the judge’s act of attempting to sell rice to his employees and to employees of other branches was
highly improper; imposable penalty. (Mendoza vs. Hon. Diasen, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-17-1900, Aug. 09, 2017)

Direct bribery — Involves the act of a public officer in accepting an offer or promise, or receiving a gift, by himself or another, with a
view to perform a crime or an unjust act, or commit an omission, which is connected to his official duties; it is a crime involving moral
turpitude, an act which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, and involves an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals, and which renders any
person convicted of the said offense unfit to continue discharging his duties as a public official or a lawyer. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Alinea, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-05-1574, Nov. 07, 2017)

Discipline of — A disciplinary case against a judge or justice brought before the Supreme Court is an administrative proceeding; it is
subject to the rules and principles governing administrative procedures. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-
1886, July 25, 2017)

—      Proceedings for the discipline of judges and justices of lower courts may be instituted in three ways: by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, through a verified complaint, and through an anonymous complaint; a verified complaint must be supported by affidavits of
persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged or by documents which may substantiate the allegations; an anonymous
complaint, on the other hand, should be supported by public records of indubitable integrity; while anonymous complaints should always
be treated with great caution, the anonymity of the complaint does not, in itself, justify its outright dismissal. (Anonymous
Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

Duties — As the administrative officer who has authority over the office of the clerk of court, judges should be familiar with the different
circulars of the Court as his duty is not confined to adjudicatory functions, but includes the administrative responsibility of organizing and
supervising the court personnel to secure a prompt and efficient dispatch of business. (OCA vs. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854,
July 11, 2017)

—      Includes the administrative responsibility of organizing and supervising the court personnel to secure a prompt and efficient
dispatch of business; it is his responsibility to see to it that the clerk of court performs his duties and observes the circulars issued by the
Supreme Court. (OCA vs. Judge Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

—      Should exercise judicial temperament in all dealings and must maintain composure and equanimity at all times. (OCA vs. Judge
Buyucan, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1854, July 11, 2017)

—      The acting judge may no longer promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already assumed the position; Circular No. 5-98,
however, provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge, despite the assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an
acting presiding judge, shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter’s assumption or designation.
(Chua vs. People, G.R. No. 195248, Nov. 22, 2017)
—      The judge must, at all times, remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala and should adopt a firm policy against
improvident postponements; importantly, he should follow the time limit set for deciding cases. (Sps. Sibay vs. Sps. Bermudez, G.R. No.
198196, July 17, 2017)

Grave misconduct — Misconduct is considered grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rules are present. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

—      Wanton disregard and mockery of the proper procedure in mediation of cases, as correctly held by the OCA, was tantamount to
misconduct; the misconduct committed by the judge was grave since the circumstances obtaining established her flagrant disregard of
the rules on referral of cases for mediation. (Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Bandong, former Presiding Judge, RTC, Br.
59, Lucena City, Quezon Province, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507, Oct. 09, 2017)

Gross ignorance of the law — A judge not assigned to the province, city, or municipality where the case is pending but approves an
application for bail filed by an accused not arrested is guilty of gross ignorance of the law; for purposes of determining whether or not
the accused is in custody of the law, the mode required is arrest, not voluntary surrender, before a judge of another province, city, or
municipality may grant a bail application; it is gross ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal case
outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is
pending. (Prosecutor Tejano vs. Presiding Judge Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, Sept. 26, 2017)

—    A serious charge, punishable by dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. (Recto vs. Hon. Trocino, A.M.
No. RTJ-17-2508, Nov. 07, 2017)      

—      Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; under Sec. 11(A) thereof, it is
punishable by: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave credits and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary or other benefits for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. (Alfelor vs. Hon. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-16-
1883, July 11, 2017)

—    The disregard of the basic rules and settled jurisprudence; a judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law when the law or a
rule is basic and the facts are evident; not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
(Recto vs. Hon. Trocino, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2508, Nov. 07, 2017)

—      The fact that he had served more than 21 years in the judiciary meant that he should have known better than to haphazardly
render a decision in a criminal case without regard to the specific allegations in the offense charged and his jurisdiction, or lack thereof,
to take cognizance of the case. (Alfelor vs. Hon. Diaz, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017)

—      There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious; it may
also be committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption; gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith. (Alfelor vs. Hon. Diaz,
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017)

Gross negligence –– The leniency of a judge in the administrative supervision of his employees is an undesirable trait; the judge’s
failure to meet the exacting standards of his position, as evidenced by the number and different irregularities discovered to have been
occurring in his court, as well as his failure to eliminate these irregularities, establish that he was grossly negligent in the performance of
his duties. (OCA vs. Retired Judge Chavez, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2219, Aug. 01, 2017)

Immorality — A judge was dismissed from service for siring a child outside of wedlock and for engaging in an extramarital affair; the
absence of a public and private dichotomy when it comes to the ethical standards expected of judges and justices has since become an
unyielding doctrine as consistently applied by the Supreme Court. (Anonymous Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July
25, 2017)

—      Immorality is a valid ground for sanctioning members of the Judiciary because it: (1) challenges his or her capacity to dispense
justice; (2) erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice; and (3) impacts the Judiciary’s legitimacy; while
a disciplinary case for immorality may proceed even without the participation of the spouse, the children or the alleged paramour, steps
must be taken to protect their decision not to air out their grievances in administrative proceedings before us. (Anonymous
Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

Liability of — A judge becomes liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent disregard for well-known rules so as to
produce an inference of bad faith, dishonesty and corruption. (Erice vs. Presiding Judge Sison, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, Nov. 22, 2017)

—      Absence of criminal liability does not preclude disciplinary action; as in the case of disciplinary action of lawyers, acquittal of
criminal charges is not a bar to administrative proceedings; Supreme Court has reminded judges that their acts of immorality are
proscribed and punished, even if committed in their private life and outside of their salas, because such acts erode the faith and
confidence of the public in the administration of justice and in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Anonymous
Complaint vs. Judge Dagala, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886, July 25, 2017)

—      Penalty may be increased where the judge had been previously found guilty of gross ignorance of the law. (Prosecutor
Tejano vs. Presiding Judge Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, Sept. 26, 2017)

—      To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of
judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad
faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice; absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good faith in exercising his
judicial functions. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC,
Sept. 05, 2017)

—      Use of an improvised system of counting the applicants  (instead of the applications) in the special raffle is simply unacceptable, as
the Executive Judge, much less the Clerk of Court, has absolutely no discretion to deviate from the prescribed ratio for the raffling of
cases without prior approval from this court. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City,
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

Misconduct  — A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by a public office; the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in
the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

Neglect of duty — Gross neglect of duty is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service, even for the first
offense, while simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense, punishable by suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months for the first offense. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br. 170, Malabon City, A.M. No.
16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

—      Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
the consequences, in so far as other persons may be affected. (Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in the RTC, Br.
170, Malabon City, A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC, Sept. 05, 2017)

New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary  — Canon 6, Sec. 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary mandates that “judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness”; the speedy disposition of cases is the primary aim of the Judiciary; rationale. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge
Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

Serious misconduct and gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure  — The Judge utterly failed to decide the cases submitted
for decision or resolve pending incidents within the reglementary period as well as within the time frame that he himself fixed in the
initial Action Plan; the judicial audit team also found errors or irregularities in several orders he issued and noted that his wife meddled
or interfered with the court’s business; penalty. (Re: Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 20, Cagayan de Oro City, Misamis Oriental,
A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC, Dec. 05, 2017)

Simple neglect of duty — For failure to observe the procedure on the raffle of cases pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, judge is guilty
of simple neglect of duty which is defined as the failure to give attention to a task, or the disregard of a duty due to carelessness or
indifference; simple neglect of duty is listed as one of the less grave offenses. (Ferrer, Jr. vs. Judge Dating, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2478, Nov.
08, 2017)

Undue delay in rendering a decision or order — Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and
observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the
Judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute; failure to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration within the 30-day
reglementary period is not excusable and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge
Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

—      If the judge found himself unable to comply with the mandatory 30-day reglementary period for resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration, he could have asked the Court for a reasonable extension of time to do so, but he made no such request; a judge
cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

—      The 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory; failure of a judge to decide a case within the prescribed period is
inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a disciplinary sanction; the Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time
needed to decide cases, but such extensions must first be requested from the Court; penalty. (Fajardo vs. Judge Natino, A.M. No. RTJ-
16-2479, Dec. 13, 2017) 

—      Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge; penalty. (Atty. Tamondong vs. Judge Pasal, A.M. No. RTJ-16-
2467, Oct. 18, 2017)

Violation of Supreme Court Circulars, Rules and Directives — In Executive Judge Apita v. Estanislao, the Court had the occasion to
explain that: While the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court which defines the general functions of all court personnel in the judiciary
provides that court personnel may perform other duties the presiding judge may assign from time to time, said additional duties must be
directly related to, and must not significantly vary from, the court personnel’s job description; Sec. 7, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel expressly states that court personnel shall not be required to perform any work outside the scope of their job
description. (Re: Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah Bandong, former Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 59, Lucena City, Quezon
Province, A.M. No. RTJ-17-2507, Oct. 09, 2017)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/case-index/2017/july-2017-december-2017/judges-3/

JUDGES AND JUSTICES

Administrative proceedings against — There are three ways by which administrative proceedings against judges and justices of the
CA and Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity. (Re: Letter of Dimaano Requesting Investigation of the
Alleged Illegal Activities Perpetrated by Associate Justice Lantion of the CA, Cagayan De Oro City, and Atty. Cajayon of Zamboanga City,
A.M. No. 17-03-03-CA, July 11, 2017)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/case-index/2017/july-2017-december-2017/judges-and-justices-2/

Administrative complaint against –– An administrative complaint against a judge is not a substitute for a proper remedy taken in due
course to review and undo his or her acts or omissions done in the performance of judicial duties and functions. (See vs. Judge Mislang,
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454, June 06, 2018)
––      Notwithstanding respondent’s dismissal from the service, the case remains justiciable because other penalties, such as a fine, may
still be imposed if he is found guilty of an administrative offense; in Magtibay v. Judge Indar, involving a judge found guilty of undue
delay in rendering an order and conduct unbecoming a judge, the Court sustained the OCA’s recommendation of a fine against the erring
judge despite his prior dismissal from the service. (See vs. Judge Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454, June 06, 2018)

Code of Judicial Conduct –– For a judge to be liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision, order or
actuation in the performance of official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence; it must also be proven that the judge was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Jan. 16, 2018)

Conduct of –– A judge must at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his court and strictly observe the interdictions
against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases and pending incidents in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice; the moment he
dons the judicial robe, he is bound to strictly adhere to and faithfully comply with his duties delineated under the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, particularly Sec. 5, Canon 6 which reads: SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. (Atty. Mahinay vs. Hon. Daomilas, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-18-2527, June 18, 2018)

––      In Pacific Products, Inc. v. Ong, the Court categorically declared as illegal the garnishment of the receivable due a private entity
while still in the possession of the government; respondent’s action finds basis in Administrative Circular No. 10-2000, enjoining judges
“to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance of writs of execution to satisfy money judgments against
government agencies and local government units”; far from committing gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law, respondent
justifiably lifted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment considering the prematurity of the application for provisional relief. (See vs. Judge
Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2454, June 06, 2018)

Discipline of –– Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges;
a judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the
Court, and the Judiciary as a whole. (Antiporda vs. Judge Ante, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-18-1908, Jan. 16, 2018)

Disqualification of –– There is one allegation which, if true, might suggest some bias on the part of the judge; if it is true that he told
news reporters that he was expecting the Court of Appeals Temporary Restraining Order to be lifted within the day, this could suggest
that he was coordinating with respondent’s lawyers; however, no evidence was presented to support this allegation. (Chavez vs. Marcos,
G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018)

––      There was nothing remarkable about the denial of the Motion to Inhibit; it was not hasty, and whether to deny it orally in court is
the prerogative of the judge, who could have decided it as soon as its factual basis had been clearly laid; further, counsel for the
prosecution expressly agreed that the motion be submitted for resolution. (Chavez vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018)

––      Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit from hearing a case is a matter within the judge’s discretion; absent clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will dispense justice in accordance with law and evidence, this Court will not
interfere; second paragraph of Rule 137, Sec. 1; no concrete proof of the judge’s personal interest in the case was presented.
(Chavez vs. Marcos, G.R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018)

Duties  –– Respondent Judge’s explanation of having done so only out of pity for the complainant did not diminish his liability, but
instead highlighted his dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express statutory requirements instituted to secure the solemnization of
marriages from abuse; by agreeing to solemnize the marriage outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had nothing to do
with the performance of his duties as a Municipal Trial Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social institution of marriage;
Art. 8 of the Family Code, explained. (Keuppers vs. Judge Murcia, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 03, 2018)

––      The only exceptions to the limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of the
complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in accordance with Art. 29 of the Family Code, or where both of the complainant and
her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them
in their sworn statement to that effect. (Keuppers vs. Judge Murcia, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 03, 2018)

Executive judges –– As executive judge, he performs the functions of a court administrator within his administrative area; he was
supposed to provide leadership and coordinate the management of the courts, as well as implement policies concerning court operations
laid down by the Supreme Court. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Jan. 16, 2018)

Functions –– A judge’s foremost consideration is the administration of justice; judges must “decide cases promptly and expeditiously
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied; every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be
careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence
of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.” (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Arreza, A.M.
No. MTJ-18-1911, April 16, 2018)

––      Sec. 15, Art. VIII of the Constitution mandates that all cases and matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within
three (3) months or ninety (90) days from date of submission; in addition, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary directs judges to “perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness”. (Extra Excel Int’l. Phils., Inc. vs. Atty. Oliva, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 06, 2018)  

––      There is nothing in the law or the rules that prevented respondent judge from acting on the bail application submitted to him on a
weekend; accordingly, he acted in accordance with the rules in granting the application for bail. (Rodriguez vs. Hon. Noel, Jr., A.M. No.
RTJ-18-2525, June 25, 2018)

Grave misconduct  –– Defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Tomas, A.M. No. P-09-2633, Jan. 30, 2018)
––      The judge’s act, although not criminal, constituted grave misconduct considering that crimes involving moral turpitude are treated
as separate grounds for dismissal under the Administrative Code; given that the charge was committed with a wilful intent to violate the
letter and the spirit of Art. 7 and Article 8 of the Family Code, and to flagrantly disregard the relevant rules for the solemnization of
marriages set by the Family Code, the proper penalty was dismissal from the service; in view of the intervening retirement from the
service of respondent Judge, the Court forfeits all his retirement benefits except his accrued leaves. (Keuppers vs. Judge Murcia, A.M.
No. MTJ-15-1860, April 03, 2018)

Grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service –– Respondent Judge found guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband
outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City; such place of solemnization was a
blatant violation of Art. 7 of the Family Code. (Keuppers vs. Judge Murcia, A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 03, 2018)

Gross ignorance of the law –– A judge cannot excuse himself from the consequences of his action by invoking good faith; to approve
bail applications and issue corresponding release orders in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, constitute
ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence. (Altobano-Ruiz vs. Hon. Pichay, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893, Feb. 19, 2018)

––      A judge is allowed reasonable latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of facts and his
understanding of the applicable law on the matter; in this case, if there is any error committed by respondent Judge, the Court is not
inclined to characterize the same as so depraved as to constitute gross ignorance of the law, but may be tantamount to error of
judgment only which cannot be corrected through an administrative proceeding. (Atty. Mahinay vs. Hon. Daomilas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-18-
2527, June 18, 2018)

––      A judge is presumed to have acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of judicial functions; but a blatant disregard
of a clear and unmistakable provision of the Constitution upends this presumption and subjects the magistrate to corresponding
administrative sanctions; for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the
performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by
bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other similar motive. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-
2435, March 06, 2018)

––      Complete disregard of the settled rules and jurisprudence on self-defense and of the events that transpired after the first fight,
despite the existence of testimonial and physical evidence to the contrary, in the appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense casts serious doubt on his impartiality and good faith; such doubt cannot simply be brushed aside despite his
belated justification and explanation. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

––      Errors attributed to judges pertaining to the exercise of their adjudicative functions should be assailed in judicial proceedings
instead of in an administrative case; a judge cannot be subjected to any liability – civil, criminal or administrative – for any of his official
acts, no matter how erroneous as long as he acts in good faith; only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty and corruption, gross
ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. (Atty. Mahinay vs. Hon. Daomilas, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-18-2527, June 18, 2018)

––      Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence; the Court has ruled that “not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable”; for liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it
must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. (Atty. Mahinay vs. Hon.
Daomilas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-18-2527, June 18, 2018)

––      Ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice; judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to
have more than just a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules; they must know them by heart. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

––      Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws; they must know the laws
and apply them properly in all good faith; judicial competence requires no less; unfamiliarity with the rules is a sign of incompetence;
basic rules must be at the palm of his hand; when a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he betrays the confidence of
the public in the courts. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

––      Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable; for liability to attach for
ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found
erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like
motive. (Atty. Causing vs. Judge Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 07, 2018)

––      Respondent Judge’s act of granting the accused’s Motion for Preliminary Investigation did not constitute gross ignorance of the
law; there was no showing that respondent Judge issued the Order because of the promptings of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice,
ill-will, bad faith or a deliberate intent to do injustice. (Extra Excel Int’l. Phils., Inc. vs. Atty. Oliva, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 06, 2018)

––      Respondent Judge’s failure to conduct a hearing on accused’s Petition for Bail constitutes gross ignorance of the law; it is
axiomatic that a bail hearing is a must, despite the prosecution’s lack of objection to the same; hence, it is altogether of no consequence
that the Order granting bail “was made in the presence of the public prosecutor, and the latter made no objection or comment to the
oral manifestation of the defense counsel.” (Extra Excel Int’l. Phils., Inc. vs. Atty. Oliva, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 06, 2018)

––      Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC characterizes gross ignorance of the law and
procedure as a grave offense; penalties prescribed for such offense, enumerated; considering the judge’s previous administrative
infractions, maximum amount of fine imposed. (Altobano-Ruiz vs. Hon. Pichay, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893, Feb. 19, 2018)

––      The Court agrees that respondent extended the TRO beyond the period allowed by Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
considering that at the time he issued the order extending the TRO, the original 72-hour TRO  had already expired; thus, in conducting
the summary hearing and issuing the Order, respondent in effect revived what would have already been an expired 72-hour TRO and
extended the same to a full twenty (20)-day period beyond the Rules’ contemplation; under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge; mitigating circumstances;
penalty of reprimand. (Rodriguez vs. Hon. Noel, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525, June 25, 2018)
––      The disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence; a judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence. (Atty.
Causing vs. Judge Dela Rosa, OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 07, 2018)

(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

––      The judge must conduct his own personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the indictment, pursuant to
Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution; in the present case, respondent Judge should not
have waited for the accused to file an omnibus motion for a judicial determination of probable cause; Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, cited; his
failure to comply with this fundamental precept constituted gross ignorance of the law and procedure. (Extra Excel Int’l. Phils., Inc. vs.
Atty. Oliva, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 06, 2018)

––      Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanction, the same applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment; where the law is straightforward
and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

Gross inefficiency –– As “delay in the disposition of cases is tantamount to gross inefficiency on the part of a judge”, the judge found
guilty of gross inefficiency for his undue delay in rendering decisions and failure to act on cases with dispatch; penalty under Sec. 11,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; considering that this is the judge’s first offense, imposition of fine, proper. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Arreza, A.M. No. MTJ-18-1911, April 16, 2018)

––      Respondent Judge was inefficient in failing to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order despite the lapse of 90
days; he ought to know the difference between a judge’s discretionary power to issue a hold departure order and his mandatory duty to
resolve all kinds of motions within 90 days; respondent’s failure to resolve complainant’s motion to issue a hold departure order
constitutes gross inefficiency which warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction. (Extra Excel Int’l. Phils., Inc. vs. Atty. Oliva,
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 06, 2018)

––      The respondent Judge demonstrated inefficiency in handling the pending incidents in the case, which resulted in undue and
inordinate delay in the resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction; the Order was rendered beyond the ninety (90)-
day period within which a judge should decide a case or resolve a pending matter, reckoned from the date of the filing of the last
pleading, in accordance with Sec. 15, paragraphs (1) and (2), Art. 8 of the 1987 Constitution; the delay of a judge of a lower court in
resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period as prescribed by the Constitution is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency. (Atty. Mahinay vs. Hon. Daomilas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-18-2527, June 18, 2018)

Gross inefficiency and delay in the administration of justice –– The judge failed to meet the expectation of promptness and
efficiency that is required of a trial court judge; she failed to act on the Motion to Expunge the Pre-Trial Brief for almost two years, which
is a clear delay in the administration of justice; failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes
gross inefficiency which warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions; fine, imposed. (Atty. Tacorda vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M.
No. RTJ-16-2460, June 27, 2018)

Gross misconduct –– Unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases; however, when the
inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he deliberately committed the oversight or omission
in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, Jan. 30, 2018)

Liability of –– Gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are serious
charges under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; justices and judges found guilty of these charges may be penalized by any of the
following: 1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months: or 3) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Jan. 16, 2018)

––     It is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases; however, when the
inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle, the judge is either too incompetent
and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he deliberately committed the oversight or omission
in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06,
2018)

––      Tampering of official receipts and over withdrawals from court funds clearly constitute grave misconduct and serious dishonesty.
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Tomas, A.M. No. P-09-2633, Jan. 30, 2018)

––      The judge violated the Supreme Court rules and directives which is considered a less serious offense under Sec. 9(4), Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, the applicable penalties are those under Sec. 11(B) thereof, to wit: (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. (Atty. Miranda vs. Judge Oca, A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899, March 07, 2018) 

––      The penalty of suspension for a period of three months on judges found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct; however, in a line of cases where the judges found guilty of the same offenses had already compulsorily retired from service
and therefore could no longer be penalized with suspension, a fine was ordered deducted from their retirement benefits. (Office of the
Court Administrator vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Jan. 16, 2018)

Misconduct –– A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by the public officer; to warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling; the misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect,
or failure to discharge the duties of the office. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06,
2018)

          (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, Jan. 30, 2018)

––      In order to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or
flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former; to hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were
committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

––      Refers to any unlawful conduct on the part of a judge prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause;
it entails wrongful or improper conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or deliberate purpose. (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Jan. 16, 2018)

Motion for inhibition –– Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the inhibition of a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter; the
presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or
favor, should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. (Rep. of the Phils. vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018) p.

––      Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do
not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. (Rep. of the Phils. vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

––      The right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression;
the movant must therefore prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from
participating in a particular trial. (Rep. of the Phils. vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)

New Code of Judicial Conduct –– Judges must always be courteous and patient with lawyers, litigants and witnesses appearing in
his/her court; judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. (Prosecutor Cahanap vs. Judge
Quiñones, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470, Jan. 10, 2018)       

––      Members of the bench must faithfully observe the prescribed official hours to inspire public respect for the justice system; Canons
of Judicial Ethics enjoins judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants,
witnesses, and attorneys is of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction in the administration of justice. (Prosecutor Cahanap vs. Judge Quiñones, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470, Jan. 10, 2018)

––      Under Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, impartiality applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by
which the decision is made. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Dumayas, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2435, March 06, 2018)

Simple misconduct –– Defined as an unacceptable behavior that transgresses the established rules of conduct for public officers.
(Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Cabrera-Faller, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2301, Jan. 16, 2018)

Undue delay in rendering an order –– Undue Delay in Rendering an Order is classified as a less serious charge under Sec. 9 (1), Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or
more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00; the Court, in a string of cases, has
recognized the presence of mitigating circumstances that may temper the penalty for the administrative infraction committed by an
erring magistrate, such as physical illness, good faith, first offense, length of service, admission of the offense, or other analogous
circumstances; penalty modified; Angelia v. Judge Grageda, cited. (Atty. Mahinay vs. Hon. Daomilas, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-18-2527, June
18, 2018)

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JUDGES AND JUSTICES

Administrative complaints –– Administrative complaints against judges of regular courts and special courts as well as justices of the
CA and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted: (1) by the Supreme Court motu proprio;(2) upon a verified complaint, supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations;
or (3) upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with
Attached Pictures) Against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

––      Circular No. 4 issued by the Court on 27 August 1980 provides that the attention of the Court has been invited to the presence of
some judges in gambling casinos operating under P.D. No. 1067-B; it reads as follows: (3-b) persons not allowed to play (a) government
officials connected directly with the operation of the government or any of its agencies; in accordance with law and pursuant to the
Resolution of the Court en banc in A.M. No. 1544-0, dated August 21, 1980, judges of inferior courts and the court personnel are
enjoined from playing in or being present in gambling casinos. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against
Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

––      The rationale for the requirement that complaints against judges and justices of the judiciary must be accompanied by supporting
evidence is to protect magistrates from the filing of flimsy and virtually unsubstantiated charges against them; this is consistent with the
rule that in administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial
evidence; if they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to
prove their exception or defense. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against Associate Justice Normandie B.
Pizarro, Court of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018) ––     The term “government official connected directly to the
operation of the government or any of its agencies” refers to any person employed by the government whose tasks is the performance
and exercise of any of the functions and powers of such government or any agency thereof, as conferred on them by law, without any
intervening agency; a government official connected directly to the operation of the government or any of its agencies is a government
officer who performs the functions of the government on his own judgment or discretion essentially, a government officer under Sec.
2(14) of E.O. No. 292. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint (with Attached Pictures) Against Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, Court
of Appeals, A.M. No. 17-11-06-CA, March 13, 2018)

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Grounds for Disbarment or Suspension of a Lawyer

1.    Deceit
Cham vs. Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro

A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005

A lawyer was subjected to disciplinary action for selling a non-disposable land of the
public domain. He violated his oath not to do falsehood and misrepresentation to the
buyer-complainant.

Co vs. Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102 [1998]

Lao vs. Medel, 405 SCRA 227 [2003]

For a lawyer to be dealt with by the Supreme Court, the transaction entered into
need not be in the performance of professional services. It can be in his private
capacity.

Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of

dishonesty and dishonor in other relations.

Case references:

Santos vs. Atty. Maria Vivane

Cacho-Calicdan, September 19, 2006

2.    Malpractice
Nakpil vs. Atty. Carlos J. Valdes

March 4, 1998

A lawyer violated the trust and confidence of the client when he represented
conflicting interest. He represented the creditors when his accounting firm prepared
and computed the claims of the creditors while his law firm represented the estate.

Case references:

Buted vs. Hernando, 203 SCRA 1

Maturan vs. Gonzales, March 12, 1998

Conflict of interest

(Pormento vs. Pontevedra, March 31, 2005)

A lawyer has to disclose to his client all the circumstances of his relations to the
parties in connection with the controversy which might influence the client in the
selection of counsel.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests except by express consent of all

concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

Tests to determine if there is conflicting interests:

1.            If the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first
client any knowledge acquired thru their connection;

2.            Whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

Reason for prohibition

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all
the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak points
of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred
and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of his
client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For, if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.

The prohibition applies however slight such adverse interest may be (Nakpil vs.
Valdes, 286 SCRA 758).

The essence of the rule is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain
from obtaining anything which will injuriously affect in any matter in which he
previously represented him.

3.            Grossly immoral conduct

Emma Dantes vs. Atty. Crispin Dantes

A.C. No. 6488, September 22, 2004

The wife complained that her husband was a philanderer, having illicit relationship
with two women. He was disbarred. A lawyer must demonstrate that he or she has
good moral character and should behave in accordance with the standards.
Case references:

Barrientos vs. Daarol, 218 SCRA 30

Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757

Obusan vs. Obusan, 128 SCRA 485

Terre vs. Terre, July 3, 1992

Santos vs. Tan, 196 SCRA 16

St. Louis Univ. Laboratory High School Faculty & Staff vs. Atty. Dela Cruz, A.C. No.
6010, August 28, 2006

Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the
end desired; hence, the penalty of two years suspension was more appropriate.

A lawyer got married again after his failed marriage. He never absconded his
obligations to his first wife and child. After the annulment of his second marriage, he
remained celibate. He was humble enough to offer no defense save for his lone and
declaration of his commitment to his wife and child. (Conjuangco vs. Palma, 438
SCRA 306; 462 SCRA 310 [2005]).

Zaguirre vs. Castillo

398 SCRA 658 [2003]

465 SCRA [2005]

4.            Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude

a.            In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings vs. Narciso Jaranillo, 101 Phil.
323

A lawyer was disbarred for having been convicted of estafa.

b.         In Re: Dalmacio delos Angeles, 106 Phil. 1

A lawyer was convicted of the crime of bribery. He was disbarred.

Case references:

In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, 203 Phil. 79

In Re: Atty. Isidro Vinzons, 126 Phil. 96

Barrios vs. Atty. Francisco Martinez, A.C. No. 4885,   November 12, 2004
5.            Violation of the Lawyer’s Oath
a.            Judge Ubaldino Larucon vs. Atty. Ellis Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10,
2006

In his motion, the lawyer stated:

The judgment is an “abhorrent nullity”, “legal monstrosity”, “horrendous mistake”,

“horrible error”, “an insult to the judiciary”, and “an anachronism in the judicial
process”.

The lawyer was suspended. The language exceeded the vigor required of a lawyer
to defend ably his client’s cause.

b.            Almendrez vs. Atty. Minervo Langit, A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006

A lawyer was suspended for having appropriated the rental deposits for his client in
an ejectment suit.

c.            Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon
G. Maquera, 435 SCRA 417

A lawyer who was suspended from the practice of law abroad may likewise be
sanctioned in the Philippines for infraction he committed abroad. (Velez vs. De Vera,
A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006).
6.            Willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court
a.            People vs. Dalusog, 62 SCRA 540;

Luzon Mahogany Timber Ind., Inc. vs. Castro, 69 SCRA 384;

People vs, Medina, 62 SCRA 253;

Geeslin vs. Navarro, 185 SCRA 230

7.            Willfully appearing as attorney for any party without authority

(Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court; Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 
16, 2005)

a.            Porac Trucking Corp. vs. CA, 202 SCRA 674; Garrido vs. Quisumbing, 28  

SCRA 614

A lawyer was suspended from the practice of law in appearing for a party defendant
without authority.

A judge may require a lawyer to prove that he is authorized to appear for a client.

b.            Mercado vs. Ulay, 187 SCRA 720

https://batasnatin.com/law-library/legal-ethics-and-practical-exercises/legal-ethics/372-grounds-
for-disbarment-or-suspension-of-a-lawyer.html

Disbarment 101
By
 Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan
 -
October 2, 2017

‘The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege” (Bongolonta v. Castillo, 240 SCRA 310 [1951]).

“Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least 21 years of age, of good moral
character and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines”
(Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

“Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), upon the verified complaint of any person.  The complaint shall state clearly and concisely
the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits or persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.  The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the
Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against any
erring attorney, including those in the government service”. (Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).

Disbarment is the extreme measure of discipline of an attorney, which is taking away his/her license to practice law, often for life. 
The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys, and he does not have the right to put in his name the prefix
“Atty.” Neither can he sign pleadings even if he does not personally appear in court. Disbarment only comes after investigation and
opportunities for the attorney to explain his improper conduct.

The cause of permanent disbarment include 1) conviction of a felony involving moral turpitude, 2) forgery, 3) fraud, 4) a history of
dishonesty, 5) consistent lack of attention to clients, 6) abandoning several clients, 7) alcoholism or drug abuse, which affect the
attorney’s ability to practice, 8) theft of funds or 9) any pattern of violation of the professional code of ethics.

Singular incidents (other than felony conviction) will generally result in reprimand, suspension and/or a requirement that the lawyer
correct his conduct, show remorse and/or pass a test on legal ethics.

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Disbarment is not meant as a punishment to deprive an attorney of a means of livelihood but is rather intended to protect the courts
and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the proper administration of justice. Disbarment
proceedings are sui generis  (a class of its own).  Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
(In Re Almacen GR L-27654 [1970]) Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. (Dinsay v. Cioco, A.C. 2995,
November 27, 1966)  Double jeopardy cannot be availed of against an attorney, since disbarment does not partake of a criminal
proceeding. The In Pari Delicto rule is not applicable. (Samaniego v. Ferrer, A.C. 7022, June 18, 2008) There is no prejudicial
question in disbarment proceedings and neither is there prescription.  (Calo v. Degamo, A.C. 516, June 27, 1967)  It can be
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or the IBP; it can be initiated even without a complaint, it can proceed regardless of
lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.  It is, likewise, not a civil case and, thus, monetary claims cannot
be granted except restitution and return of monies and properties of the client given in the course of the lawyer-client relationship. 
An affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment or suspension case does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent.  The case may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit or grossly immoral conduct has been proven (Rayos-Ombac  v. Rayos,  285 SCRA 93 [1983]).

The burden of proof required in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension is “clearly preponderant evidence”, not “proof
beyond reasonable doubt”, which is necessary in criminal cases (Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool Inc. v.  Naldoza, A.C. 4017,
September 29, 1999). Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.  However, the final order of the Supreme
Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases (Rule 139-B, Section 18, Rules of Court).  This is not a restriction on the
freedom of the press.  If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true and accurate news
report of a disbarment complaint (Fortun v. Members of the Media, GR 194578, February 13, 2013).

There are currently around 40,000 lawyers on the rolls of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as of 2016.  For a population of more
than 100 million, this does not seem like a large number.  There is one lawyer for every 2,500 Filipinos, but even then people
complain that there are too many lawyers in the Philippines  (https://www.quora.com).
According to Supreme Court Bar Confidant lawyer Maria Cristina Layuza, there will be at least 7,000 applicants taking the bar
examinations this year. When Congress passed Republic Act (RA) 7662, or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, there were
only 59 law schools.  As of 2016 this has bloated to 125 law schools.  RA 7662 is aimed at “uplifting the standards of the education
in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling, problem solving and decision making, to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable
partner of the Bench in the administration of justice; and to develop social competence”.
(Section 2, RA 7662)

Perhaps the solution to deceit, malpractice, gross immoral conduct and moral turpitude of lawyers is not disbarment or suspension,
but a close monitoring and supervision of law schools to ensure that they are infusing in their law students the importance, nobility
and dignity of the legal profession so that when these law students are admitted to the Bar, they subscribe in solemn agreement to
dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice and swear to become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the
fair and impartial dispensation of justice.

Otherwise, William Shakespeare’s controversial famous line in Henry VI  (Part 2, Act IV, Scene 2),  “The first thing we do, let’s kill
all the lawyers”, may not actually be a bad idea!

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LECTURE ON THE RULES OF PROCEDURE IN THECOMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE

and CASE UPDATES ON THE IMPOSITION OFSANCTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS
 
By:
 
Atty. Dominic C.M. Solis
IBP National Director for Bar Discipline
 
I.                   Authority of Supreme Court to Discipline Lawyers
 
A.                 Constitution 
 
Article VIII, Sec. 5.  The Supreme Court shall have the followingpowers:
Xxx
               
(5)          Promulgate rules concerning xxx theadmission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar xxx
 
B.                 Rules of Court
 
Rule 139-B  Disbarmentand Discipline of Attorneys
 
II.                 Creation of the CBD; Brief Background
 
                On 13 April 1988,the Supreme Court enacted Bar Matter No. 356 superseding Rule 139 of theRevised Rules of Court entitled “Disbarment or
Suspension of Attorneys” to thatof Rule 139-B entitled “Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys”, wherein allcases pending investigation by the Office of the
Solicitor General shall betransferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors(BoG) for Investigation and disposition as provided in
the Rule.  The Rule took effect on 1 June 1988.
 
                Thus, the then 8thIBP BoG issued Resolution No. VIII-88-74 dated 3 May 1988, authorizing theCommittee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline and
Disbarment to come upwith the implementing rules, guidelines and policies on  Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules ofCourt.  On 24 June 1988, the BoG approvedResolution
No. VIII-88-100, renaming the Grievance Office as the Commission onBar Discipline.  During the term of the20th BoG, the CBD was renamed anew as the Commission on
Integrityand Bar Discipline. 
 
                The Commissionformally started its task on 16 August 1988, initially three investigatorsaddressed as Commissioners were appointed by the IBP
BoG and a Governor asChairman of the Commission.  On 18September 1988, an initial implementation budget of the Commission was releasedfrom the
Supreme Court Contingency Fund.
 
                On 26 April 2003,the 15th IBP BoG issued Resolution No. XV-2003-166 adopting theproposed “Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline
includingGuidelines for the Imposition of Sanctions” submitted by CBD Chairman Gov.Santos V. Catubay, Jr.  The said CBDRules was approved by the Supreme Court
through Bar Matter No. 1755 dated 27September 2007.
 
                On 26 April 2003,the 15th Board of Governors approved Res. No. XV-2003-166 adopting the proposed“Rules of Procedure of the Commission on
Bar Discipline including Guidelinesfor the Imposition of Sanctions” which was eventually transmitted to theSupreme Court for approval. The Court approved
the Rules of Procedure on 25September 2007 in Bar Matter No. 1755.
 
                The presentCommission on Bar Discipline is composed of the National Director, the DeputyDirector, plus forty-nine (49) Commissioners and six (6)
CBD staff members.
 
III.               Jurisdiction of the CBD
 
A.     In general
 
                Pursuant to Rule139-B, the IBP BoG was empowered to police its own ranks, investigate andpenalize erring members of the Bar either in
government and/or private serviceexcept judges and justices.
 
                But note that the Supreme Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction to regulate thepractice of law. It exercises such disciplinary functions through the IBP, butit
does not relinquish its duty to form its own judgment. Disbarmentproceedings are exercised under the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, andthe IBP's recommendations
imposing the penalty of suspension from the practiceof law or disbarment are always subject to this Court's review and approval. (Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6475, 30January
2013)
 
B.     Special Rule for Judges andJustices; Government Lawyers
 
Pursuant to Bar Matter 1645 (Re: Amendment of Rule 139-B) dated 5September 2006, all complaints for disbarment, suspension and discipline filedagainst incumbent
Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of TaxAppeals and judges of lower courts, whether or not they are charged singly orjointly with other respondents,
and whether or not such complaint deals withacts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions, shall be forwardedto the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
 
The same procedure shall beobserved with respect to complaints filed against retired justices and judges.
 
All similar complaints againstlawyers still in the government service, whether filed directly with the IBP ortransmitted to the IBP by the Office of the Solicitor
General, shall first bereferred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
 
IV.               Sources of CBD Rules of Procedure
 
A.                 IBP By-Laws
 
B.                 Rule 139-B, Rules of Court
 
C.                 IBP-CBD Rules of Procedure and IBP-CBD Guidelines for Imposing LawyerSanctions
 
D.                 IBP BoG Resolutions
 
E.                  SC Issuances (Bar Matters)
 
F.                  Case Law
 
V.                 CBD Facts and Figures
 
                As of 20 May 2014, there are1,287 original cases and 87 motions for reconsideration pending before theCBD. 
 
                Since the start of its term on 1July 2014 up to the present, the 21 st BoG has disposed of 96original cases and 265 motions for reconsideration.
 
                On average, since the start ofthe term of the 21st BoG, 37 cases are filed directly with the CBDor referred to it by the Supreme Court per month. 
                               
VI.                  Bar Discipline Proceedings
 
A.                 Nature
 
1.                  Private and confidential.  However, the final order of the Supreme Courtshall be published like its decisions in other cases (Rule 139-B, Sec.
8).
 
Rationale for the Rule:
 
. . . . Thepurpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigationsfree from any extraneous influence or interference, but also to protect thepersonal and
professional reputation of attorneys and judges from the baselesscharges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; itis also to deter the press from
publishing administrative cases or portionsthereto without authority. We have ruled that malicious and unauthorizedpublication or verbatim reproduction of administrative
complaints againstlawyers in newspapers by editors and/or reporters may be actionable. Suchpremature publication constitutes a contempt of court, punishable by either
afine or imprisonment or both at the discretion of the Court. . . . (Saludo v. Court of Appeals, 522 Phil.556, 561 [2006])
 
In Fortun v. Quinsayas, et al.(G.R. No.194578, 13 February 2013), Atty. Sigfrid Fortun filed a petition for contemptagainst Atty. Quinsayas and members of the media. 
Atty. Quinsayas had earlier  filed a disbarment case against Fortun inconnection with the “Maguindanao Massacre” and the latter’s alleged acts inobstructing justice.  Details
of thedisbarment case found its way to the media and were then published.  Atty. Fortun accused Atty. Quinsayas ofcirculating said details in violation of Rule 139-B and
the confidential natureof disbarment proceedings and that the respondent media personalities conspiredwith her.  The Supreme Court discussedthe ramifications of the
confidential nature of disbarment proceedingsvis-à-vis publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy andprotected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom
of speech.
 
As to themedia, the Supreme Court held that since the disbarment complaint was a matterof public interest (by virtue of it being connected with the
MaguindanaoMassacre which is of public interest), legitimate media had a right to publishsuch fact under freedom of the press (as opposed to a situation
where thedisbarment case was about a private matter).
 
However, Atty.Quinsayas, who was the complainant in the disbarment case and was the one whocirculated details of the disbarment to the media, was
“bound by Section 18,Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as complainant in the disbarment caseagainst [Atty. Fortun] and as a lawyer.” She was found
guilty of IndirectContempt and fined Php 20,000.00 Thus:
 
. .  . As a lawyer and an officer of the Court,Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarmentproceedings. However, instead of preserving
its confidentiality, Atty.Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner tomembers of the media which act constitutes contempt
of court. In Relativo v. DeLeon, the Court ruled that the premature disclosure by publication of thefiling and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a
violation of theconfidentiality rule. .  .
 
2.                  Sui generis– “Disciplinary proceedings against lawyersare sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involvea trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Courtinto the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflictpunishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there isneither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Courtmotu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real questionfor
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to beallowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinarypowers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for hisactuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving thepurity of the legal profession and the proper and
honest administration ofjustice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct haveproved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
andresponsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.” (Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C.
No. 6475, 30January 2013)
 
3.                  Summary in nature (CBD Rules of Procedure, RuleI, Sec. 4) - The respondent's failure to cross-examinethe complainant is not a sufficient ground to
support the claim that he had notbeen afforded due process as it is sufficient that he was heard through hispleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and
his oraltestimony during the mandatory conference. The complainant in disbarment casesis not a direct party to the case but a witness who brought the matter to theattention
of the Court. Flowing from its sui generis character, it is notmandatory to have a formal hearing in which the complainant must adduceevidence. (Ventura v. Samson, supra.)
 
4.                  Imprescriptible – Prescription does not lie inadministrative cases against lawyers.  (Williams, et al. v. Icao, A.C. No. 6882,24 Dec. 2008)
 
                Note that the CBDRules of Procedure used to contain a provision (Rule VIII, Section 1) for aprescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints which
waswithin two years from discovery. The Supreme Court in Frias v. Bautista-Lozada(A.C. No. 6656, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 345),struck down as void and of no legal
effect for being ultra vires. 
 
Rationale for the Rule:
 
“If the rule were otherwise, members ofthe bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,prescinding from the fact that as long
as no private complainant wouldimmediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exoneratedfrom whatever administrative liability they
ought to answer for. It is the dutyof [the Supreme] Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as wellas the administration of justice. No matter how
much time has elapsed from thetime of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institutionof the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape thedisciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed atunscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter
them from committing actswhich violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of JudicialConduct, or the Lawyer's Oath. . . .
 
Thus, even the lapse of considerable timefrom the commission of the offending act to the institution of theadministrative complaint will not erase the administrative
culpability of alawyer. . . .” (Heck v. Santos, A.M.No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329)
 
B.                 Construction
 
Subject to the requirements of due process, the CBD Rules of Procedureshall be construed with the objective of assisting any party in obtaining ajust
resolution of his case through an expeditious and inexpensive proceedingbefore the CBD (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule I, Sec. 2).
 
C.                 Suppletory application  and effect of the Rules of Court
 
In the absence of any applicable provision in the CBD Rules ofProcedure or in Rule 139-B in the interest of expeditious justice and wheneverpracticable and
convenient (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule I, Sec. 3).
 
D.                 Scope
 
Lawyers can be disciplined for any misconduct, whether in theirprofessional or private capacity. 
 
Rationale for the Rule:
 
The Supreme Court has in a number of casesdisciplined members of the Bar whom it found guilty of misconduct whichdemonstrated a lack of that good
moral character required of them not only as acondition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for theircontinued membership therein. No
distinction has been made as to whether themisconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional capacity or in hisprivate life. This is because a lawyer
may not divide his personality so as tobe an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to becompetent, honorable and reliable at all
times since he who cannot apply andabide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so inhis professional dealings nor lead others in
doing so. Professional honesty andhonor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor inother relations. The administration of
justice, in which the lawyer plays animportant role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree ofintellectual and moral competency on his part so
that the courts and clientsmay rightly repose confidence in him.  (Villatuya v. Tabalingcos, A.C. No. 6622, 10 July 2012) 
 
Lawyers, as officers of the court andinstruments for the administration of justice, are expected to maintain notonly legal proficiency but also a high standard
of morality, honesty, and fairdealing.  Since good moral character is an essentialqualification for the admission to the practice of law, maintaining such traitis
a condition for keeping the privilege. (Virtusiov. Virtusio, A.C. No. 6753, 5 September 2012)
 
Note that a lawyer can even be disciplinedor disbarred for immoral conduct made priorto his or her admission to the Bar.
 
In Garridov. Garrido (A.C. No. 6593, 4 February 2010) involving a disbarment case onthe ground of immorality, the defense of the lawyer was that the allegedimmoral
conduct of entering into sexual relations with a man who she knew wasmarried was committed while she was NOT yet a lawyer.  The Supreme Court held that this defense
willnot exempt the respondent from sanctions since good moral character is requiredas a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.   The Supreme Court held that
“[m]embership inthe Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by lawthrough the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn
wherecircumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of the essential qualificationsrequired of lawyers.”
 
E.                  Who may file
 
Any person may file a disciplinary case against a lawyer. 
 
Rationale for the Rule:
 
“A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civilaction, where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is adefendant. It involved no
private interest. The complainant or person whocalled the attention of the court to the attorney's misconduct is in no sense aparty and has generally no interest in its outcome
except as all good citizensmay have in the proper administration of justice. It affords no redress forprivate grievance.” (Tejan v. Cusi,57 SCRA 154)
 
F.                  How instituted
 
1.      By verified complaint of any person (Rule 139-B, Sec. 1)  – to be filed before the CBD or before theSupreme Court (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule II,
Sec. 1)
 
2.      Motu Proprio– by the Supreme Court or bythe IBP Board of Governors (Rule 139-B, Sec. 1) 
 
3.      By referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers –referral to be made to the IBP Board of Governors (Rule 139-B, Sec. 1) 
 
If initiated thru verifiedcomplaint, file in 6 copies (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule II, Sec. 1 and Rule139-B) but see effect of A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC or the Efficient Use of
Paper Rule  which applies to “all courts and quasi-judicial bodies under theadministrative supervision of the Supreme Court.” Presently, the CBD requiresthat 2 copies be
filed.
 
Note that the Supreme Court in Cadiz, et al. v. Hon. Presiding Judge(G.R. No. 178941, 27 July 2011) classified the IBP Board of Governors asexercising “delegated powers
to investigate” and that they cannot be chargedfor honest errors committed in the “performance of their quasi-judicial function.”
 
On the other hand, in Sambajon v. Suing (A.C. No. 7062., 26September 2006), the Supreme Court held that “[w]hile the Commission on BarDiscipline is not a court, the
proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, adisciplinary action being in reality an investigation by the Court into themisconduct of its officers or an
examination into his character.”
 
G.                Assignment of Cases to CBDCommissioner; Appointment, Powers, Disqualification and Removal of CBDCommissioner
 
All cases shall be assigned toan Investigating Commissioner by raffle (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule IV, Sec.2).
 
The Investigating Commissionershall be appointed from among the IBP members by the Board of Governors (Rule139-B, Sec. 2).
 
The Investigating Commissionerhas the authority to administer oaths on the conduct of the proceedings beforehim/her and may compel attendance of
witnesses and production of pertinentdocuments or papers by subpoena (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule VI).
 
The Investigating Commissionerhas the authority to adjudge any party or witness in direct or indirectcontempt for misbehavior or obstruction of proceedings including
disrespecttowards the Investigating Commissioner or disobedience to his lawful order orwrit.  Any person adjudged guilty ofcontempt may be fined not exceeding Php
1,000.00 (id., Rules VI & VII).
 
An Investigating Commissionermay be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree ofconsanguinity or affinity to any of the parties or their
counsel, pecuniaryinterest, personal bias, or his having acted as counsel for either party,unless the parties sign and enter upon the record their written
consent to hisacting as such Investigating Commissioner. Where the Investigating Commissioner does not disqualify himself, aparty may appeal to the IBP
Board of Governors, which by majority vote of themembers present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification (Rule139-B, Sec. 2).
 
An Investigating Commissionermay also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote of at least sixmembers of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the
Board of Governors in all cases of disqualificationor removal shall be final (Rule 139-B, Sec. 2).
 
H.                 Consolidation of Cases  – Where there are two or more cases pending before the Commissioninvolving the same parties, the same shall motuproprio be
consolidated with the first case filed to avoid unnecessarycosts or delay (CBD Rules of Procedure, Sec. 4).
 
I.                   Issuance of Summons; Answer andProhibited Pleadings
 
If the complaint appears to bemeritorious, the Investigating Commissioner shall direct that a copy thereof beserved upon the respondent, requiring him to
answer the same within 15 daysfrom the date of service (Rule 139-B, Sec. 5).
 
Answer must be verified andfiled in six copies (Rule 139-B but again, see effect of A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC) before the CBDInvestigator. 
 
The only pleadings allowed areverified complaint, verified answer and verified position papers.  The following pleadings shall not be allowed:
 
1.      Motion to dismiss the complaint or petition
2.      Motion for a bill of particulars
3.      Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of resolution or order
4.      Petition for relief from judgment
5.      Supplemental pleadings
                                (CBD Rules ofProcedure, Rule III, Sections 1 & 2)
 
                Whilea motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner’s Report might be a prohibitedpleading, it has to be clarified that the “said CBD rules of
procedure applyexclusively to proceedings before said CBD Commissioner and not to proceedingsbefore the IBP Board of Governors (BoG) which are
governed by Sec. 12, Rule139-B of the Rules of Court.”  (BarMatter No. 1755 dated 17 June 2008)
 
J.                   Summary Dismissal of Complaintor after receipt of Answer
 
1.                  If the complaint does not merit action, or
2.                  If the answer shows to the satisfaction of the InvestigatingCommissioner that the complaint is not meritorious
 
the same shall be dismissed by the Boardof Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator.
 
A copy of the resolution of dismissalshall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review thecase motu proprio  or upon timelyappeal of the
complainant field within 15 days from notice of the dismissal ofthe complaint (Rule 139-B, Sec. 5).
 
K.                 Venue and Delegation ofFact-Finding Functions
 
The venue for all cases filedbefore or referred to IBP shall be heard by the CBD in its principal office atIBP Bldg., Julia Vargas St., Ortigas Center, Pasig
City but,uponagreement of the parties or upon meritorious ground, the InvestigatingCommissioner, upon endorsement of the Board of Governors, may refer to theChapter
President concerned reception of evidence from the complainant orrespondent or their respective witnesses. Such evidence shall then be forwarded by the Chapter President
to theInvestigating Commissioner for evaluation and consideration in the preparationof his report and recommendation (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule IV, Secs. 1& 4).
 
L.                  Procedure before theInvestigating Commissioner (CBD Rules of Procedure, Rule V)
 
1.      Mandatory Conference – to be set by the Investigating Commissionerimmediately upon receipt of the verified answer where the following mattersshall
be taken:
 
a.    Admissions
b.   Stipulationof facts
c.    Definition of issues
 
2.      Submission of Verified Position Paper with supporting documents andaffidavits – to be filed simultaneously within an inextendible period of tendays
from notice of termination of mandatory conference.
 
3.      Determination of necessity of clarificatory questioning – Immediatelyafter the submission by the parties of their respective position papers,
theInvestigating Commissioner shall determine whether there is a need to conductclarificatory questioning.  If necessary,a hearing date shall be set wherein
the Investigating Commissioner shall askclarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses to further elicitfacts or information.
 
4.      The minutes of the proceedings shall be recorded.
 
5.      Effect of non-appearance of parties and non-verification of pleadings–
 
a.      Non-appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatoryquestioning shall be deemed a waiver of the right to participate in theproceedings.  Ex
parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted.
 
b.     Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be givenweight by the Investigating Commissioner.
 
6.      Issuance of an Order submitting the case for Decision- to be made bythe Investigating Commissioner after the parties have submitted their
positionpapers or after the clarificatory questioning.
 
7.      Period to resolve case – The Investigating Commissioner shall submithis report or recommendation to the Board of Governors within 30 calendar
daysfrom the date the order declaring the submission of the case for resolution wasissued.
 
**Prescribed format in making CBD reportsand recommendation
 
VII. Review and Decision by the Board ofGovernors  (Rule 139-B, Sec. 12)
 
A.                 Every case heard by the Investigating Commissioner shall be reviewedby the Board of Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it
by theInvestigating Commissioner with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shallclearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based.  It shall be promulgated within a period notexceeding 30 days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submissionof the Investigating Commissioner’s report.
 
B.                 If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law,
ordisbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings andrecommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shallforthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
 
**In the case of Malonso v. Principe  (A.C. No. 6289, 16December 2004), the Supreme Court ruled that “before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of law
by theIBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigator’s report; (2) a formalvoting; and (3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board.”
 
C.                 If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinarysanction imposed by it is less than suspension or disbarment (such
asadmonition, reprimand or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondentor imposing such sanction.  The caseshall be deemed terminated unless
upon petition of the complainant or otherinterested party filed with the Supreme Court within 15 days from notice of theBoard’s resolution, the Supreme Court
orders otherwise.
 
**But see the case of Paguia v. Molina  (A.C. No. 9881, 4 June 2014) where the SupremeCourt, speaking through C.J. Sereno,  tookcognizance of a case that should already
have been deemed terminated forfailure of the complainant to seasonably file a petition for review with theSupreme Court to assail the Board of Governors’ resolution
dismissing hisdisbarment complaint. However, the Supreme Court did still affirm theresolution of the Board of Governors.  
 
D.                 Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given toall parties through their counsel.  Acopy of the same shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court.
 
Note that the Board of Governors mayinvalidate the proceedings conducted before the Investigating Commissioner ifthe defect therein may result in
miscarriage of justice.  Thus, “[n]o defect ina complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Reportshall be considered as substantial unless the
Board of Governors, uponconsidering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may resultin a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such
remedialaction as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entireproceedings.” (Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C.No. 6475, 30 January 2013)
 
VIII.           Motion for Reconsideration and/or Petition for Review under Rule 45 (Bar Matter No. 1755 issued on 17 June 2008, Re: Clarification On
Rules Of Procedure Of TheCommission On Bar Discipline)
 
In casea decision is rendered by the BoG [Board of Governors] that  exonerates the respondent or imposes asanction less than suspension ordisbarment, the aggrieved
party can file a motion for reconsiderationwithin the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, said party canfile a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court with [theSupreme] Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolvingthe motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision
shallbecome final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished thisCourt.
 
Ifthe imposable penalty is suspension fromthe practice of law or disbarment, the BoG shall issue a resolution settingforth its findings and recommendations. The
aggrieved party can file a motionfor reconsideration of said resolution with the BoG within fifteen (15) daysfrom notice. The BoG shall first resolve the incident and shall
thereafterelevate the assailed resolution with the entire case records to this Court forfinal action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for reconsiderationhaving
been filed, then the BoG shall likewise transmit to this Court theresolution with the entire case records for appropriate action.
 
                TheSupreme Court clarified further in Officeof the Court Administrator v. Atty. Liangco (A.C. No. 5355, 13 December2011) that:
 
1.                  If the IBP Board of Governors exonerates the respondent or metes apenalty other than suspension or disbarment, the exoneration of respondent orimposition
of minor penalties becomes final and executory when no motion forreconsideration is filed by a party. And when a motion forreconsideration is filed and then resolved by
the IBP Board of Governors, theaggrieved party may file a petition for review under Rule 45 to further assailthe IBP Board of Governors' disposition.
 
2.                  In case the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of lawor disbarment, the approval by the IBP Board of Governors for such sanctions
ismerelyrecommendatory, regardless of whether a party files a motionfor reconsideration or not, and the entire case records of theadministrative case is transmitted to the
Court for appropriate action on suchrecommendation.  In such a case, there iseven no need for the respondent to file a Petition for Review under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of
Court to assail said IBP resolution assuch is only recommendatory and is subject to immediate appropriate review anddisposition by this Court. “The Rules
clearly do not grant respondent theremedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 since such is not necessary forthe Court immediately reviews for
appropriate action all resolutions from theIBP Board of Governors recommending suspension from the practice of law ordisbarment.“  
 
Rationale for theRule:
 
The power to suspend or disbar a lawyer isjudicial in nature and can be exercised only by the courts.  "The practice of law is so intimatelyaffected with public interest that it
is both a right and a duty of the Stateto control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. TheConstitution vests this power of control and regulation in the
Court.” (Sevilla v. Salubre, A.C. No. 5235, 22March 2000)
 
IX.         Quantum of Proof Required
 
                Insuspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption ofinnocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly provehis or her
allegations by preponderantevidence. In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption ofinnocence of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him must
bedismissed. (Rodica v. Lazaro, et al.,  A.C.No. 9259, 23 August 2012)
 
                Preponderanceof evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means
evidencewhich is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which isoffered in opposition thereto (Id.).
 
X.                 Effect of Compromise Agreements, Affidavits of Desistance
 
                Rule 139-B asamended by Supreme Court Resolution dated 27 May 1993 re Bar Matter 356 statesthat: “No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by
reason of thedistance, settlement, compromise,restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant toprosecute the same, unless the Supreme
Court motu proprio  or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors,determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarmentor suspension
proceedings against the respondent.”
               
                An Affidavit ofDesistance cannot have the effect of abating theproceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law andthe nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. (Ventura v. Samson, A.C. No. 9608, 27 November2013)
 
                In Camara v. Reyes (A.C. No. 6121, 31 July2009), the respondent lawyer received Php 50,000.00 from complainant asacceptance fee but took no steps to protect
his client’s interests.  The client filed a complaint before the CBD.  In his Answer, respondent prayed that thecase be closed and terminated, simply because the matter has
already beenresolved by all the parties concerned. Both parties failed to attend the mandatory conference and to file theirposition papers.  Still, the CBD Commissioner,as
affirmed by the IBP BoG, adjudged the lawyer guilty of misconduct andrecommended the penalty of six months suspension.  The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
andheld:
 
“The alleged compromise betweencomplainant and respondent is not enough to exonerate the latter from thepresent disciplinary case. A case of suspension
or disbarment may proceedregardless of the interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What mattersis whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge ofnegligence has been duly proved.
 
Disciplinary proceedingsinvolve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. Theyare undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare, and for thepurpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration ofpersons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to
thecourt for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant is in nosense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome of the case. Thisis
also the reason why this Court may investigate charges against lawyersregardless of complainant's standing.”
 
XI.               Guidelines for the Application of Sanctions
 
A.                 Kinds/Types
 
1.       Disbarment – terminates the individual’sstatus as a lawyer.
 
2.       Suspension – removalof a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time.
 
Note, though, that the Supreme Court has imposed indefinite suspensionnumerous times.
 
Note also that the LIFTING OF ORDER OFSUSPENSION NOT AUTOMATIC UPON THE END OF PERIOD STATED IN THE SUPREME
COURT’SDECISION
 
                TheSupreme Court en banc in Maniago v. De Dios  (A.C. No. 7472, 30March 2010) clarified that the lifting of a lawyer's suspension is notautomatic upon the end
of the period stated in the Court's decision, and anorder from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period isnecessary in order to enable the lawyer to resume the
practice of hisprofession.
 
                TheSupreme Court set the following guidelines to be observed in the matter of thelifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
 
1)    Aftera finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law,the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2)    Unlessthe Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory uponreceipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion
forreconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decisionfinal and executory;   
3)    Uponthe expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a SwornStatement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant,
statingtherein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has notappeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4)    Copiesof the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP andto the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has
pending cases handledby him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5)    TheSworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance withthe order of suspension;
6)    Anyfinding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oathshall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment,
ordisbarment, as may be warranted.
 
3.       Interim Suspension – temporary suspension of alawyer from the practice of law pending imposition of final discipline.  It includes:
 
a.      Suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime” or
b.      Suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely tocause immediate and serious injury to a client or the public.
 
4.       Reprimand– also known as censure orpublic censure, reprimand is a form of public discipline which declares theconduct of the lawyer improper, but
does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.
 
5.       Admonition– also known as privatereprimand, admonition is a form of non-public discipline which declares theconduct of the lawyer improper, but
does not limit the lawyer’s right topractice.
 
6.       Probation– a sanction that allows alawyer to practice law under specified conditions.  Probation can be imposed alone or inconjunction with a
reprimand or an admonition; probation can also be imposed asa condition of readmission or reinstatement.
 
7.       Other sanctions and remedies- other sanctions and remedieswhich may be imposed include:
 
a.       Restitution
b.      Assessment of costs
c.       Limitation upon practice
d.      Warning
 
8.       Readmission and Reinstatement -Wheredisbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established for a lawyer whohas been disbarred to
apply for readmission.
 
                InMacarubbo v. Macarubbo (A.C. No.6148, 22 January 2013), the respondent was disbarred for contracting a secondand even a third marriage while his first
marriage was subsisting.  Eight years from the time of his disbarment,he petitioned the Supreme Court for “Extraordinary Mercy” which the SupremeCourt granted and he
was thereafter reinstated. The Supreme Court mentioned the guidelines in resolving requests forjudicial clemency, to wit:
 
“1.  Theremust be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not belimited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s)
ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations andprominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity.
Asubsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similarmisconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
 
2.      Sufficienttime must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period ofreform.
 
3.    Theage of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productiveyears ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeemhimself. 
 
4.    Theremust be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legalacumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of
the legalsystem or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential forpublic service.
 
5.    Theremust be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
 
                Moreover, to be reinstated tothe practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admissionto the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character.”
 
B.                 Factors to be considered in imposing sanctions
 
                The Rule of Thumb - the power to disbar mustbe exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct thatseriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of theCourt and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such
astemporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should neverbe decreed. (Venturav. Samson, A.C. No. 9608, 27 November 2012)
 
                                In imposing a sanction after afinding of lawyer misconduct, a court should consider the following factors:
 
(a)    the duty violated;
(b)    the lawyer’s mental state;
(c)     the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(d)    the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.
 
1.                  Violations of duties owed to the clients
 
a.    Failure to preserve the client’s property
b.    Failure to preserve the client’s confidence
e.     Failure to avoid conflicts of interest
f.       Lack of diligence
g.      Lack of competence
h.     Lack of candor
 
3.                  Violations of duties owed to the public
 
a.      Failure to maintain personal integrity
b.     Failure to maintain the public trust
 
4.                  Violations of duties owed to the legal system
 
a.      False statements, fraud and misrepresentation
b.     Abuse of legal process
c.      Improper communications with individuals in the legal system
 
5.                  Violations owed to the profession
 
a.      Prior discipline orders
 
C.                 Aggravation and Mitigation
 
1.                  Generally – after misconduct has been established, aggravating andmitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to
impose
 
2.                  Aggravation – factors which may beconsidered in increasing the degreeof discipline to be imposed:
 
a.      Prior disciplinary offenses;
b.     Dishonest or selfish motive;
c.      A pattern of misconduct;
d.     Multiple offenses;
e.     Bad faith or obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding byintentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinaryagency;
f.       Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptivepractices during the disciplinary process;
g.      Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
h.     Vulnerability of victim;
i.        Substantial experience in the practice of law;
j.       Indifference to making restitution.
 
                In Bueno v. Rañeses  (A.C. No. 8383, 11December 2012), the Supreme Court modified and increased the IBP’s recommendedpenalty of indefinite suspension to
disbarment because of the respondent’smulti-layered infractions.  Not only didhe commit fraudulent exaction against his client, he also maligned both thejudge and the
judiciary by claiming that he would pay-off the judge.  These acts were exacerbated by his cavalierattitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case as he
practicallydisregarded its processes and even lied to one of the InvestigatingCommissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.
 
                Falsification ofa public document is a crime involving moral turpitude.  The conviction thereof by final judgmentmerits the disbarment of the accused-lawyer. (Re:
SC Decision dated 20 May 2008 v. Pactolin, A.C. No. 7940, 24April 2012)
 
                In Pesto v. Millo (A.C. No. 9612, 13 March2013), the Supreme Court increased the recommended penalty from suspension oftwo months to suspension of six
months because of the actuations of the lawyerin ignoring the administrative case against him before the CBD.
 
3.                  Mitigation - factors which may considered in reducing the degree ofdiscipline to be imposed:
 
a.      Absence of a prior discipline record;
b.     Absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
c.      Personal or emotional problems;
d.     Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectifyconsequences of misconduct;
e.     Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitudetoward proceedings;
f.       Inexperience in the practice of law;
g.      Character or reputation;
h.     Physical or mental disability or impairment;
i.        Delay in disciplinary proceedings;
j.       Interim rehabilitation;
k.      Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
l.        Remorse
m.   Remoteness of prior offense
 
Regret of the lawyer is a belated response if it cannot reverse theclient’s lost case and cannot erase the fact that the lawyer mishandled thecomplainant’s defense. (Somosot v.
Lara,  A.C.No. 7024, 30 January 2009)
 
The client’s own failings can be a mitigating factor like non-paymentof fees.  Thus:
 
“As a rule, law practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyer'ssensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are understandable; lawyers incurexpenses in running their
practice and generally depend, too, on their lawpractice income for their living expenses.” (Somosot v. Lara, A.C. No. 7024, 30 January 2009)
 
That the complainant never made any effort to contact the respondentattorney to follow up the status of his case, expecting instead the respondentto take full
and complete initiative in this regard was also seen as amitigating factor.Thus:
 
“While the respondent, as counsel, has theobligation to inform his client of the material developments in the case, particularlyof the aspects of the case that would require the
client's instructions orparticipation, this obligation is balanced by a complementary duty on the partof a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in order to
beinformed of the progress of the case.” (Somosotv. Lara,  A.C. No. 7024, 30 January 2009)
 
4.                  Factors which are neither aggravating or mitigating
 
a.      Forced or compelled restitution;
b.     Agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper behavior orresult;
c.      Withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
d.     Resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
e.     Complainant’s recommendation as to sanction;
f.       Failure of injured client to complain.
 
That there is no formal attorney-client relationship and the lawyer,in fact, extended his services for free is NOT a mitigating factor. (Brennisen v. Contawi, A.C. No. 7481,
24April 2012).   
 
XII.             Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Procedure in Bar Discipline Cases(BoG Resolution No. XX-2012-576, dated 29 December
2012)
 
XIII.           Creation of a Committee on IBPAffairs
(A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC, April 11, 2013, In The Matter Of the Brewing Controversies In The Elections Of TheIntegrated Bar Of The Philippines)
 
XIV.           Survey of Cases (2010 to 2014)
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lawyers/1571626126427114/

Judicial Clemency; requisites

See - Judicial Ethics: Clemency, As An Act Of Mercy Removing Any Disqualification, Should Be Balanced With The Preservation Of Public Confidence In The
Courts... - The Lawyer's Post

"x x x.
“This Court in A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial
Clemency) laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for
judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges
associations and prominent members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative
case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him
a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning
or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development
of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as
potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.  (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent’s petition is not supported by any single proof of his professed
repentance. His appeal for clemency is solely anchored on his avowed
intention to go back to the judiciary on his personal belief that “he can be
x x x an effective instrument in the delivery of justice in the Province of
Lanao del Sur because of his seventeen (17) years of experience,” and on
his “promise before the Almighty God and the High Court that he will
never repeat the acts or omissions that he had committed as a Judge.”  He
claims having learned “enough lessons” during the three years he became
jobless and his family had “suffered so much because of his
shortcoming.”
Apart from respondent’s own declarations, there is no independent evidence
or relevant circumstances to justify clemency. Applying the standards set
by this Court in A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC, respondent’s petition for judicial
clemency must be denied.
In the present case, the Court held that respondent exhibited gross ignorance
of procedure in the conduct of election cases in connection with petitions
for inclusion of voters in the barangay elections, resulting in delays such
that complainant’s name was not timely included in the master list and
consequently he was not considered a candidate for barangay chairman.
Such failure to observe fundamental rules relative to the petitions for
inclusion cannot be excused. Further, respondent was found to have
intentionally fabricated an order which supposedly granted a motion for
intervention by the counsel for the incumbent mayor whose re-election
complainant and his co-petitioners were allegedly not willing to support.
Respondent’s act of fabricating an order to cover up his official
shortcomings constitutes dishonesty, a reprehensible act that will not be
sanctioned by this Court.
 In the subsequent administrative case (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1791), respondent
was found to have misused his authority when he, over the vigorous
objection of complainants police officers, took custody of an accused then
detained in jail for carnapping charges, by merely issuing a signed
handwritten acknowledgment receipt with an undertaking to present the
said accused to the court when ordered.   Said accused was never
returned to jail and while the case against him was dismissed, there was
no order for release issued by the court.  Respondent endeavored to
justify his act in aiding the accused by virtue of his position as Sultan in
his hometown, but the Court found him liable for Grave Misconduct,
warranting his dismissal from the service.  But since the penalty of
dismissal can no longer be imposed on account of respondent’s
resignation, he was meted the penalty of six months suspension converted
to forfeiture of the corresponding amount of his salary.  This second
administrative offense committed by respondent also led to the OCA’s
filing of a criminal complaint for obstruction of justice against him.
Given the gravity of respondent’s transgressions, it becomes more imperative
to require factual support for respondent’s allegations of remorse and
reform.  As this Court previously declared:
Concerned with safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary, this Court has
come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the
judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial
conduct. This is because a judge is the visible representation of the law
and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct
must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to the
performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his
sala and as a private individual. His character must be able to withstand
the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and
sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
people’s faith in the judicial system.
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be
balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts. The
Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of
reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.
(Emphasis supplied.)”
x x x."

FIRST DIVISION, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505, November 27, 2013,  MAMASAW

SULTAN ALI, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA,
PRESIDING JUDGE, HON. PUNDAYA A. BERUA, ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE, HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, CLERK OF COURT AND
MANDAG U. BATUA-AN, COURT STENOGRAPHER, ALL OF THE
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, MUNICIPALITY OF
BALINDONG, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENTS. IN
THE MATTER OF: PETITION FOR ABSOLUTE JUDICIAL CLEMENCY
OF FORMER JUDGE BAGUINDA-ALI A. PACALNA, MTCC, MARAWI
CITY.
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