SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 168220 : August 31, 2005]
SPS. rudy Paragas and Corazon B. Paragas, Petitioners, v. Hrs. of Dominador
Balacano, namely: Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette and Cyric, all surnamed
Balacano, represented by NANETTE BALACANO and ALFREDO
BALACANO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks to annul the Decision1 dated 15 February 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048, affirming with modification the 8 March
1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, of Santiago City, Isabela,
in Civil Case No. 21-2313. The petition likewise seeks to annul the Resolution3 dated 17
May 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents were synthesized by the Court of Appeals in its decision.
Gregorio Balacano, married to Lorenza Sumigcay, was the registered owner of Lot
1175-E and Lot 1175-F of the Subd. Plan Psd-38042 [located at Baluarte, Santiago City,
Isabela] covered by TCT No. T-103297 and TCT No. T-103298 of the Registry of Deeds
of the Province of Isabela.
Gregorio and Lorenza had three children, namely: Domingo, Catalino and Alfredo, all
surnamed Balacano. Lorenza died on December 11, 1991. Gregorio, on the other hand,
died on July 28, 1996.
Prior to his death, Gregorio was admitted at the Veterans General Hospital in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and stayed there until July 19, 1996. He
was transferred in the afternoon of July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in
Quezon City where he was confined until his death.
Gregorio purportedly sold on July 22, 1996, or barely a week prior to his death, a
portion of Lot 1175-E (specifically consisting of 15,925 square meters from its total
area of 22,341 square meters) and the whole Lot 1175-F to the Spouses Rudy ("Rudy")
and Corazon Paragas (collectively, "the Spouses Paragas") for the total consideration
of P500,000.00. This sale appeared in a deed of absolute sale notarized by Atty.
Alexander V. de Guzman, Notary Public for Santiago City, on the same date - July 22,
1996 - and witnessed by Antonio Agcaoili ("Antonio") and Julia Garabiles ("Julia").
Gregorio's certificates of title over Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were consequently cancelled
and new certificates of title were issued in favor of the Spouses Paragas.
The Spouses Paragas then sold on October 17, 1996 a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting
of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for the total consideration of P60,000.00.
Domingo's children (Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette and Cyric, all surnamed Balacano;') filed
on October 22, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale and partition against Catalino
and the Spouses Paragas. They essentially alleged - in asking for the nullification of the
deed of sale - that: (1) their grandfather Gregorio could not have appeared before the
notary public on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City because he was then confined at the
Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City; (2) at the time of the alleged execution of
the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill, in fact dying at that time, which vitiated his
consent to the disposal of the property; and (3) Catalino manipulated the execution of
the deed and prevailed upon the dying Gregorio to sign his name on a paper the
contents of which he never understood because of his serious condition. Alternatively,
they alleged that assuming Gregorio was of sound and disposing mind, he could only
transfer a half portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F as the other half belongs to their
grandmother Lorenza who predeceased Gregorio - they claimed that Lots 1175-E and
1175-F form part of the conjugal partnership properties of Gregorio and Lorenza.
Finally, they alleged that the sale to the Spouses Paragas covers only a 5-hectare
portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F leaving a portion of 6,416 square meters that
Catalino is threatening to dispose. They asked for the nullification of the deed of sale
executed by Gregorio and the partition of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F. They likewise asked
for damages.
Instead of filing their Answer, the defendants Catalino and the Spouses Paragas moved
to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the plaintiffs have no legal
capacity - the Domingo's children cannot file the case because Domingo is still alive,
although he has been absent for a long time; (2) an indispensable party is not
impleaded - that Gregorio's other son, Alfredo was not made a party to the suit; and
(3) the complaint states no cause of action - that Domingo's children failed to allege a
ground for the annulment of the deed of sale; they did not cite any mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence or fraud, but merely alleged that Gregorio was seriously
ill. Domingo's children opposed this motion.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, but directed the plaintiffs-appellees to
amend the complaint to include Alfredo as a party. Alfredo was subsequently declared
as in default for his failure to file his Answer to the Complaint.
The defendants-appellees filed their Answer with Counterclaim on May 7, 1997, denying
the material allegations of the complaint. Additionally, they claimed that: (1) the deed
of sale was actually executed by Gregorio on July 19 (or 18), 1996 and not July 22,
1996; (2) the Notary Public personally went to the Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya on July 18, 1996 to notarize the deed of sale already subject of a previously
concluded covenant between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas; (3) at the time
Gregorio signed the deed, he was strong and of sound and disposing mind; (4) Lots
1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorio's separate capital and the inscription of Lorenza's
name in the titles was just a description of Gregorio's marital status; (5) the entire area
of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were sold to the Spouses Paragas. They interposed a
counterclaim for damages.
At the trial, the parties proceeded to prove their respective contentions.
Plaintiff-appellant Nanette Balacano testified to prove the material allegations of their
complaint. On Gregorio's medical condition, she declared that: (1) Gregorio, who was
then 81 years old, weak and sick, was brought to the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and stayed there until the afternoon on July 19, 1996; (2)
thereafter, Gregorio, who by then was weak and could no longer talk and whose
condition had worsened, was transferred in the afternoon of July 19, 1996 to the
Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where Gregorio died. She claimed that
Gregorio could not have signed a deed of sale on July 19, 1996 because she stayed at
the hospital the whole of that day and saw no visitors. She likewise testified on their
agreement for attorney's fees with their counsel and the litigation expenses they
incurred.
Additionally, the plaintiffs-appellees presented in evidence Gregorio's medical records
and his death certificate.
Defendants-appellees, on the other hand, presented as witnesses Notary Public de
Guzman and instrumental witness Antonio to prove Gregorio's execution of the sale and
the circumstances under the deed was executed. They uniformly declared that: (1) on
July 18, 1996, they went to the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya - where
Gregorio was confined - with Rudy; (2) Atty. De Guzman read and explained the
contents of the deed to Gregorio; (3) Gregorio signed the deed after receiving the
money from Rudy; (4) Julia and Antonio signed the deed as witnesses. Additionally,
Atty. De Guzman explained that the execution of the deed was merely a confirmation of
a previous agreement between the Spouses Paragas and Gregorio that was concluded
at least a month prior to Gregorio's death; that, in fact, Gregorio had previously asked
him to prepare a deed that Gregorio eventually signed on July 18, 1996. He also
explained that the deed, which appeared to have been executed on July 22, 1996, was
actually executed on July 18, 1996; he notarized the deed and entered it in his register
only on July 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not find it necessary to state the precise
date and place of execution (Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, instead of Santiago City) of
the deed of sale because the deed is merely a confirmation of a previously agreed
contract between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas. He likewise stated that of the
stated P500,000.00 consideration in the deed, Rudy paid Gregorio P450,000.00 in the
hospital because Rudy had previously paid Gregorio P50,000.00. For his part, Antonio
added that he was asked by Rudy to take pictures of Gregorio signing the deed. He also
claimed that there was no entry on the date when he signed; nor did he remember
reading Santiago City as the place of execution of the deed. He described Gregorio as
still strong but sickly, who got up from the bed with Julia's help.
Witness for defendants-appellants Luisa Agsalda testified to prove that Lot 1175-E was
Gregorio's separate property. She claimed that Gregorio's father (Leon) purchased a
two-hectare lot from them in 1972 while the other lot was purchased from her
neighbor. She also declared that Gregorio inherited these lands from his father Leon;
she does not know, however, Gregorio's brothers' share in the inheritance. Defendant-
appellant Catalino also testified to corroborate the testimony of witness Luisa Agsalda;
he said that Gregorio told him that he (Gregorio) inherited Lots 1175-E and 1175-F
from his father Leon. He also stated that a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416
square meters was sold to him by the Spouses Paragas and that he will pay the
Spouses Paragas P50,000.00, not as consideration for the return of the land but for the
transfer of the title to his name.
Additionally, the defendants-appellants presented in evidence the pictures taken by
Antonio when Gregorio allegedly signed the deed.4
The lower court, after trial, rendered the decision declaring null and void the deed of
sale purportedly executed by Gregorio Balacano in favor of the spouses Rudy Paragas
and Corazon Paragas. In nullifying the deed of sale executed by Gregorio, the lower
court initially noted that at the time Gregorio executed the deed, Gregorio was ill. The
lower court's reasoning in declaring the deed of sale null and void and this reasoning's
premises may be summarized as follows: (1) the deed of sale was improperly
notarized; thus it cannot be considered a public document that is usually accorded the
presumption of regularity; (2) as a private document, the deed of sale's due execution
must be proved in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker; and (3) it
was incumbent upon the Spouses Paragas to prove the deed of sale's due execution but
failed to do so - the lower court said that witness Antonio Agcaoili is not credible while
Atty. Alexander De Guzman is not reliable.5
The lower court found the explanations of Atty. De Guzman regarding the erroneous
entries on the actual place and date of execution of the deed of sale as justifications for
a lie. The lower court said'
The Court cannot imagine an attorney to undertake to travel to another province to
notarize a document when he must certainly know, being a lawyer and by all means,
not stupid, that he has no authority to notarize a document in that province. The only
logical thing that happened was that Rudy Paragas brought the deed of sale to him on
July 22, 1996 already signed and requested him to notarize the same which he did, not
knowing that at that time the vendor was already in a hospital and [sic] Quezon City.
Of course had he known, Atty. De Guzman would not have notarized the document. But
he trusted Rudy Paragas and moreover, Gregorio Balacano already informed him
previously in June that he will sell his lands to Paragas. In addition [sic, (,) was
omitted] Rudy Paragas also told him that Balacano received an advance of P50,000.00.
The intention to sell is not actual selling. From the first week of June when, according to
Atty. De Guzman, Gregorio Balacano informed him that he will sell his land to Rudy
Paragas, enough time elapsed to the time he was brought to the hospital on June 28,
1996. Had there been a meeting of the minds between Gregorio Balacano and Rudy
Paragas regarding the sale, surely Gregorio Balacano would have immediately returned
to the office of Atty. De Guzman to execute the deed of sale. He did not until he was
brought to the hospital and diagnosed to have liver cirrhosis. Because of the
seriousness of his illness, it is not expected that Gregorio Balacano would be
negotiating a contract of sale. Thus, Rudy Paragas negotiated with Catalino
Balacano, the son of Gregorio Balacano with whom the latter was staying.6
The lower court also did not consider Antonio Agcaoili, petitioner Rudy Paragas's driver,
a convincing witness, concluding that he was telling a rehearsed story. The lower court
said'
The only portion of his testimony that is true is that he signed the document. How could
the Court believe that he brought a camera with him just to take pictures of the
signing? If the purpose was to record the proceeding for posterity, why did he not take
the picture of Atty. De Guzman when the latter was reading and explaining the
document to Gregorio Balacano? Why did he not take the picture of both Gregorio
Balacano and Atty. de Guzman while the old man was signing the document instead of
taking a picture of Gregorio Balacano alone holding a ball pen without even showing the
document being signed? Verily there is a picture of a document but only a hand with a
ball pen is shown with it. Why? Clearly the driver Antonio Agcaoili must have only been
asked by Rudy Paragas to tell a concocted story which he himself would not dare tell in
Court under oath.7
The lower court likewise noted that petitioner Rudy Paragas did not testify about the
signing of the deed of sale. To the lower court, Rudy's refusal or failure to testify raises
a lot of questions, such as: (1) was he (Rudy) afraid to divulge the circumstances of
how he obtained the signature of Gregorio Balacano, and (2) was he (Rudy) afraid to
admit that he did not actually pay the P500,000.00 indicated in the deed of sale as the
price of the land?8
The lower court also ruled that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorio's and Lorenza's
conjugal partnership properties. The lower court found that these lots were acquired
during the marriage because the certificates of title of these lots clearly stated that the
lots are registered in the name Gregorio, "married to Lorenza Sumigcay." Thus, the
lower court concluded that the presumption of law (under Article 160 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines) that property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership fully applies to Lots 1175-E and 1175-F.9
Thus, on 8 March 1999, the RTC, Branch 21, of Santiago City, Isabela, rendered a
Decision10 in Civil Case No. 21-2313, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING as NULL and VOID the deed of sale purportedly executed by Gregorio
Balacano in favor of the spouses Rudy Paragas and Corazon Paragas over lots 1175-E
and 1175-F covered by TCT Nos. T-103297 and T-103298, respectively;
2. ORDERING the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-258042 and T-258041 issued in the name
of the spouses Rudy and Corazon Paragas by virtue of the deed of sale; and cralawlibrary
Declaring the parcel of lands, lots 1175-E and 1175-F as part of the estate of the
deceased spouses Gregorio Balacano and Lorenza Balacano.11
In the assailed Decision dated 15 February 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision of the trial court, with the modification that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were
adjudged as belonging to the estate of Gregorio Balacano. The appellate court disposed
as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the appeal is hereby dismissed. We AFFIRM the
appealed Decision for the reasons discussed above, with the MODIFICATION that Lots
1175-E and 1175-F belong to the estate of Gregorio Balacano.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for whatever
action her Office may take against Atty. De Guzman.12 (Emphasis in the original.)
Herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack of success when
it was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution13 dated 17 May
2005.
Hence, this appeal via a Petition for Review where petitioners assign the following
errors to the Court of Appeals, viz:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO PERFECTED AND PARTIALLY
EXECUTED CONTRACT OF SALE OVER LOTS 1175-E AND 1175-F PRIOR TO THE
SIGNING OF THE DEED OF SALE.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION
ON THE AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF SALE MADE BY THE
RESPONDENTS DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, BASED
ITS CONCLUSION THAT GREGORIO'S CONSENT TO THE SALE OF THE LOTS WAS
ABSENT MERELY ON SPECULATIONS AND SURMISES.
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF RESPONDENTS' LACK OF LEGAL
CAPACITY TO SUE FOR NOT BEING THE PROPER PARTIES IN INTEREST.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING ATTY. ALEXANDER DE GUZMAN AND ANTONIO
AGCAOILI AS NOT CREDIBLE WITNESSES.14
At bottom is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in upholding the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the nullity of the
Deed of Sale purportedly executed between petitioners and the late Gregorio Balacano.
To start, we held in Blanco v. Quasha15 that this Court is not a trier of facts. As such, it
is not its function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence supporting the
assailed decision. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, which are supported by
substantial evidence, are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court,16 and
carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial
court. Moreover, well - entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of
law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The foregoing tenets in the case at bar apply with greater force to the petition under
consideration because the factual findings by the Court of Appeals are in full agreement
with that of the trial court.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court, found that there was no
prior and perfected contract of sale that remained to be fully consummated. The
appellate court explained -
In support of their position, the defendants-appellants argue that at least a month prior
to Gregorio's signing of the deed, Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas already agreed on
the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F; and that, in fact, this agreement was partially
executed by Rudy's payment to Gregorio of P50,000.00 before Gregorio signed the
deed at the hospital. In line with this position, defendants-appellants posit that
Gregorio's consent to the sale should be determined, not at the time Gregorio signed
the deed of sale on July 18, 1996, but at the time when he agreed to sell the property
in June 1996 or a month prior to the deed's signing; and in June 1996, Gregorio was of
sound and disposing mind and his consent to the sale was in no wise vitiated at that
time. The defendants-appellants further argue that the execution or signing of the deed
of sale, however, irregular it might have been, does not affect the validity of the
previously agreed sale of the lots, as the execution or signing of the deed is merely a
formalization of a previously agreed oral contract.
...
In the absence of any note, memorandum or any other written instrument evidencing
the alleged perfected contract of sale, we have to rely on oral testimonies, which in this
case is that of Atty. de Guzman whose testimony on the alleged oral agreement may be
summarized as follows: (1) that sometime in the first week of June 1996, Gregorio
requested him (Atty. de Guzman) to prepare a deed of sale of two lots; (2) Gregorio
came to his firm's office in the morning with a certain Doming Balacano, then returned
in the afternoon with Rudy; (3) he (Atty. de Guzman) asked Gregorio whether he really
intends to sell the lots; Gregorio confirmed his intention; (4) Gregorio and Rudy left the
law office at 5:00 p.m., leaving the certificates of title; (5) he prepared the deed a day
after Rudy and Gregorio came. With regard to the alleged partial execution of this
agreement, Atty. de Guzman said that he was told by Rudy that there was already a
partial payment of P50,000.00.
We do not consider Atty. de Guzman's testimony sufficient evidence to establish the
fact that there was a prior agreement between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on
the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F. This testimony does not conclusively establish the
meeting of the minds between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on the price or
consideration for the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F - Atty. de Guzman merely
declared that he was asked by Gregorio to prepare a deed; he did not clearly narrate
the details of this agreement. We cannot assume that Gregorio and the Spouses
Paragas agreed to a P500,000.00 consideration based on Atty. de Guzman's bare
assertion that Gregorio asked him to prepare a deed, as Atty. de Guzman was not
personally aware of the agreed consideration in the sale of the lots, not being privy to
the parties' agreement. To us, Rudy could have been a competent witness to testify on
the perfection of this prior contract; unfortunately, the defendants-appellants did not
present Rudy as their witness.
We seriously doubt too the credibility of Atty. de Guzman as a witness. We cannot rely
on his testimony because of his tendency to commit falsity. He admitted in open court
that while Gregorio signed the deed on July 18, 1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, he
nevertheless did not reflect these matters when he notarized the deed; instead he
entered Santiago City and July 22, 1996, as place and date of execution, respectively.
To us, Atty. de Guzman's propensity to distort facts in the performance of his public
functions as a notary public, in utter disregard of the significance of the act of
notarization, seriously affects his credibility as a witness in the present case. In fact,
Atty. de Guzman's act in falsifying the entries in his acknowledgment of the deed of
sale could be the subject of administrative and disciplinary action, a matter that we
however do not here decide.
Similarly, there is no conclusive proof of the partial execution of the contract because
the only evidence the plaintiffs-appellants presented to prove this claim was Atty. de
Guzman's testimony, which is hearsay and thus, has no probative value. Atty. de
Guzman merely stated that Rudy told him that Rudy already gave P50,000.00 to
Gregorio as partial payment of the purchase price; Atty. de Guzman did not personally
see the payment being made.17
But, did Gregorio give an intelligent consent to the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F
when he signed the deed of sale? The trial court as well as the appellate court found in
the negative. In the Court of Appeals' rationale -
It is not disputed that when Gregorio signed the deed of sale, Gregorio was seriously ill,
as he in fact died a week after the deed's signing. Gregorio died of complications
caused by cirrhosis of the liver. Gregorio's death was neither sudden nor immediate; he
fought at least a month-long battle against the disease until he succumbed to death on
July 22, 1996. Given that Gregorio purportedly executed a deed during the last stages
of his battle against his disease, we seriously doubt whether Gregorio could have read,
or fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of the consequences of
his act. We note in this regard that Gregorio was brought to the Veteran's Hospital at
Quezon City because his condition had worsened on or about the time the deed was
allegedly signed. This transfer and fact of death not long after speak volumes about
Gregorio's condition at that time. We likewise see no conclusive evidence that the
contents of the deed were sufficiently explained to Gregorio before he affixed his
signature. The evidence the defendants-appellants offered to prove Gregorio's consent
to the sale consists of the testimonies of Atty. de Guzman and Antonio. As discussed
above, we do not find Atty. de Guzman a credible witness. Thus, we fully concur with
the heretofore-quoted lower court's evaluation of the testimonies given by Atty. de
Guzman and Antonio because this is an evaluation that the lower court was in a better
position to make.
Additionally, the irregular and invalid notarization of the deed is a falsity that raises
doubts on the regularity of the transaction itself. While the deed was indeed signed on
July 18, 1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the deed states otherwise, as it shows
that the deed was executed on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City. Why such falsity was
committed, and the circumstances under which this falsity was committed, speaks
volume about the regularity and the validity of the sale. We cannot but consider the
commission of this falsity, with the indispensable aid of Atty. de Guzman, an
orchestrated attempt to legitimize a transaction that Gregorio did not intend to be
binding upon him nor on his bounty.
Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual, property or other relations,
when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must
be vigilant for his protection.18
Based on the foregoing, the court of Appeals concluded that Gregorio's consent to the
sale of the lots was absent, making the contract null and void. Consequently, the
spouses Paragas could not have made a subsequent transfer of the property to Catalino
Balacano. Indeed, nemo dat quod non habet. Nobody can dispose of that which does
not belong to him.19
We likewise find to be in accord with the evidence on record the ruling of the Court of
Appeals declaring the properties in controversy as paraphernal properties of Gregorio in
the absence of competent evidence on the exact date of Gregorio's acquisition of
ownership of these lots.
On the credibility of witnesses, it is in rhyme with reason to believe the testimonies of
the witnesses for the complainants vis - Ã -vis those of the defendants. In the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, we are guided by the following well-
entrenched rules: (1) that evidence to be believed must not only spring from the mouth
of a credible witness but must itself be credible, and (2) findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witness are matters best left to the trial court who had the
front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the witnesses' demeanor, conduct, and
behavior while testifying.20
In the case at bar, we agree in the trial court's conclusion that petitioners' star witness,
Atty. De Guzman is far from being a credible witness. Unlike this Court, the trial court
had the unique opportunity of observing the demeanor of said witness. Thus, we affirm
the trial court and the Court of Appeals' uniform decision based on the whole evidence
in record holding the Deed of Sale in question to be null and void.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court declared as null and void the deed of sale
therein inasmuch as the seller, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, was
already of advanced age and senile. We held'
. . . She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed
was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were
entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10, 1966. The general rule is that
a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason
of physical infirmities. However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental
faculties so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting
her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of
Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the deed, Paulina
was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played
with her waste and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view
sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for
her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was paid to
and received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial court's finding and
conclusion on the matter: . . .
In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by Gregorio on his death bed
in the hospital. Gregorio was an octogenarian at the time of the alleged execution of the
contract and suffering from liver cirrhosis at that - circumstances which raise grave
doubts on his physical and mental capacity to freely consent to the contract. Adding to
the dubiety of the purported sale and further bolstering respondents' claim that their
uncle Catalino, one of the children of the decedent, had a hand in the execution of the
deed is the fact that on 17 October 1996, petitioners sold a portion of Lot 1175-E
consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for P60,000.00.22 One need not stretch
his imagination to surmise that Catalino was in cahoots with petitioners in maneuvering
the alleged sale.
On the whole, we find no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in CA-G.R.
CV No. 64048 that would warrant the reversal thereof.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision23 and
the Resolution,24 dated 15 February 2005 and 17 May 2005, respectively, of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
