ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST
versus
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA et.al
2008 Aug 14 En Banc G.R. No. 166715
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335(Attrition Act of
2005).RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition
challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation.
They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives,
the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of a
congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional.
HELD:
No. It is unconstitutional. In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno,
the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to
enhance its understanding of and influence over the
Implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-
enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic
compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. The power of
oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and
integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of
government With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an
encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact even
enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-accumulation of power
in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints
on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with
either executive or judicial power. And, when it exercises its legislative power,
it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified under the Constitution including the procedure for
enactment of laws and presentment. Thus, any post-enactment congressional
measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Any action or step
beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an
administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to
attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to
an agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's diagram of power
as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.
