This is a Petition for Review1
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court whereby
petitioner Galo Monge (petitioner) assails the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 June 2005 which affirmed his conviction as well as the discharge of
accused Edgar Potencio (Potencio) as a state witness.
The factual antecedents follow. On 20 July 1994, petitioner and Potencio were
found by barangay tanods Serdan and Molina in possession of and transporting
three (3) pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City.
Right there and then, the tanods demanded that they be shown the requisite
permit and/or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) but neither petitioner nor Potencio was able to produce
any.3 Petitioner fled the scene in that instant whereas Potencio was brought to
the police station for interrogation, and thereafter, to the DENR-Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO).4 The DENR-CENRO
issued a seizure receipt for the three pieces of lumber indicating that the items,
totaling 77 board feet of mahogany valued at P1,925.00, had been seized from
Potencio.5 Later on, petitioner was arrested, but Potencio's whereabouts had
been unknown since the time of the seizure6 until he surfaced on 3 January
1998.7
An information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35
charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 68 8 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 705,9 as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277, series of
1997. The inculpatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of [July 1994], at about 9:30 o'clock in the
morning, in Barangay Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating with each other, without any authority of law, nor armed with
necessary permit/license or other documents, with intent to gain, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, transport and have in their possession
three (3) pieces of Mahogany of assorted [dimension] with a[n] appropriate
volume of seventy-seven (77) board feet or point eighteen (0.18) cubic meter
with a total market value of P1,925.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the DENR in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
At the 26 November 1996 arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea. 11
Trial ensued. On 17 June 1997, Serdan testified on the circumstances of the
apprehension but for failing to appear in court for cross examination, his
testimony was stricken out.12 On 16 January 1998, Potencio was discharged to
be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor. 13 Accordingly, he
testified on the circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee
he was merely requested by petitioner, the owner of the log, to assist him in
hauling the same down from the mountain. Potencio's testimony was materially
corroborated by Molina.14 Petitioner did not contest the allegations, except that it
was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber. He lamented that contrary to
what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the
log from the site to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces. 15
The trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner was imposed nine
(9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years and eight (8)
months of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and ordered to pay
the costs.16
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where he
challenged the discharge of Potencio as a state witness on the ground that the
latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was no absolute
necessity for his testimony.17 The appellate court dismissed this challenge and
affirmed the findings of the trial court. However, it modified the penalty to an
indeterminate prison sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor as
maximum.18 His motion for reconsideration was denied, hence the present appeal
whereby petitioner reiterates his challenge against the discharge of Potencio.
The petition is utterly unmeritorious.
Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto transporting, and thus in
possession of, processed mahogany lumber without proper authority from the
DENR. Petitioner has never denied this fact. But in his attempt to exonerate
himself from liability, he claims that it was Potencio, the owner of the lumber,
who requested his assistance in hauling the log down from the mountain and in
transporting the same to the sawmill for processing. The contention is
unavailing.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, criminalizes two
distinct and separate offenses, namely: (a) the cutting, gathering, collecting and
removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority;
and (b) the possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing laws and regulations. 19 DENR Administrative
Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of
timber and other forest products. Section 3 thereof materially requires that the
transport of lumber be accompanied by a certificate of lumber origin duly issued
by the DENR-CENRO. In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting,
gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products may be proven
by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it
is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products
without the requisite documents consummates the crime. 20
It is thus clear that the fact of possession by petitioner and Potencio of the
subject mahogany lumber and their subsequent failure to produce the requisite
legal documents, taken together, has already given rise to criminal liability under
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, particularly the second act punished thereunder. The
direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes petitioner's liability.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber
found in his possession nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by
Potencio to provide the latter assistance in transporting the said lumber. P.D. No.
705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum prohibitum.
As such, in prosecutions under its provisions, claims of good faith are by no
means reliable as defenses because the offense is complete and criminal liability
attaches once the prohibited acts are committed. 21 In other words, mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal
documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal. 22 It would therefore
make no difference at all whether it was petitioner himself or Potencio who
owned the subject pieces of lumber.
Considering the overwhelming body of evidence pointing to nothing less than
petitioner's guilt of the offense charged, there is no cogent reason to reverse his
conviction.
Petitioner's challenge against Potencio's discharge as a state witness must also
fail. Not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so
he may turn state witness is left to the exercise of the trial court's sound
discretion23 limited only by the requirements set forth in Section 17, 24 Rule 119
of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the accused offered to be discharged
appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively an absolute
necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial
court, it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of
the trial court with respect this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by
the appellate courts except in case of grave abuse of discretion. 25 No such grave
abuse is present in this case. Suffice it to say that issues relative to the
discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be
addressed for the first time on appeal. 26
Moreover and more importantly, an order discharging an accused from the
information in order that he may testify for the prosecution has the effect of an
acquittal.27 Once the discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future
development showing that any or all of the conditions provided in Section 17,
Rule 119 have not actually been fulfilled will not affect the legal consequence of
an acquittal.28 Any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution, therefore, in
moving for the discharge and of the court in granting the motion no question of
jurisdiction being involved will not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit
of acquittal and of his right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule would
certainly be unfair to the discharged accused because he would then be faulted
for a failure attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that the rule has
adopted the abhorrent legal policy of placing the fate of the discharged accused
at the mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution. 29 Indeed, the only
instance where the testimony of a discharged accused may be disregarded is
when he deliberately fails to testify truthfully in court in accordance with his
commitment,30 as provided for in Section 18, Rule 119. Potencio lived up to his
commitment and for that reason, petitioner's challenge against his discharge
must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
