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738 EASTERN AFRICA LAW REPORTS. [1962] B.A.
There is no principle better recognised than that a man is not to be a judge
in his own cause; and in the case of magistrates it is well established that,
if there is any reason which, it can be suggested, would influence the minds
of ordinary persons, and induce them to think that the magistrates might
be biased, that will be sufficient to render the tribunal incompetent. But
where the parties choose their own tribunal the case is very different. In
the present case it is of the essence of the submission that questions shal!
be submitted to the engineer as arbitrator which must involve the decision
of matters connected with his own competency, care, and caution, and with
the way in which he discharged his duties under the contract. The parties
agree that the arbitrator is to adjudicate on matters in which he has an
interest.”
Here the umpire was in the position of a judge and the very strict rule should
be applied. It is only in the case of a named arbitrator that suspicions of bias
will not suffice: Bright v. River Plate Construction Company (2), [1900] 2 Ch. 835.
The umpire’s link with the respondents may have been tenuous but he was in
some sort of agency relationship with them and that should have been disclosed.
In Vineberg v. Guardian Fire and Life Assurance (3) (1892), 19 A.R. 293, a
Canadian case which is noted in 2 Digest 682, /520, it was held that arbitrators
must be indifferent, and an award made by arbitrators one of whom was at
the time of the arbitration subagent for an agent of the defendants in obtaining
risks, was void, although he only acted in that capacity to a small extent. On
the affidavit evidence as it stands the facts here are not dissimilar. I am satistied
that there is a prima facie case. Accordingly, I made the umpire and the
respondents parties to the objection proceedings which after any further ob-
jections or cross-objections have been filed within twenty-one days shall be
set down for hearing. Costs in those proceedings.
Order accordingly
Advocates: R. E. Hunt, Kampala (for the applicant): Y. V. Phadke, Kampala
(for the respondents).
PREMCHAND NATHU & CO. LTD. v. THE LAND OFFICER
[Privy Counc: (Lord Morton of Henryton, Lord Keith of Avonholm and
Lord Pearce), November 6, 7 and 27, 1962.]
Privy Counci ApreaL No. 24 oF 1961.
(Appeal from E.A.C.A. Civil Appeal No. 67 of 1960 on appeal from H.M. High
Court of Tanganyika—Murphy, J.)
Statute—Crown—Intention to bind Crown—Inference from circumstances—Land
Ordinance (Cap. 113) (T.)—Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881,
s. 14 ()—Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance (Cap. \14),
i TD.
Landlord and tenant—Crown land—Right of occupancy subject 10_ building
conditions—Extension of time for compliance with conditions—Failure to
erect buildings within extended time—Revocation of right of occupancv—
No notice of revocation served—Whether purported revocation invalid—Lard
Ordinance (Cap. 113), s. 2, s. 3, s. 4, 5. 6, s. 7, 5. 8, s. 10, s. 11, s. 13 and
s. 21 (T.)}—Conveyancing and Law of Propeety Act, 1881, s. 14 (1)—Land
(Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance (Cap. 114), s. 2 and s. 10—
Law of Property Act, 1925—Crown Lands Ordinance (Cap. 155), s. 83 (K.).BC, PREMCHAND NATHU & CO. v. LAND OFFICER 29
The appellants occupied land under a certificate giving the appellants a right
of occupancy for ninety-nine years from 1952, subject to the building conditions
contained in the certificate of occupancy. There was considerable delay in
compliance with these conditions, and certain extensions of time were granted.
Although the appellants built a godown on the plot they did not commence
construction of the main buildings, namely shops and flats, and the right of
occupancy was revoked in May, 1957. The appellants refused to give up
Possession and the respondent took proceedings for inter alia possession.
The High Court held that the right of occupancy had been lawfully revoked,
and ordered the appellants to deliver possession to the respondent. On appeal
the Court of Appeal dismissed the occupiers’ appeal and on further appeal
it was contended that s. 14 (1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act,
1381, applied to the exercise by the Governor of any rights of revocation and,
therefore, since no notice had been served in compliance with Urat sub-section,
the purported revocation was invalid. It was further submitted that as s. 14 (1)
‘of the Act was imported into the law of Tanganyika, the courts should infer,
from all the surrounding circumstances, that it was intended to bind the Crown
although s. 14 (1) did not bind the Crown in England.
Held: there was not in the law of Tanganyika any necessary implication
that s. 14 (1) of the Conveyancing and Property Act, 1881, bound the Crown,
and accordingly the right of occupancy was validly revoked without notice.
Appeal dismissed.
Cases referred to:
(1) Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay, (1947] A.C. 58
(2) Bashir v. The Commissioner of Lands, [1960] A.C. 44; [1960] 1 All E.R.
117.
(3) Director of Lands and Mines vy. Sohan Singh, | T.L.R. (R.) 631
Dingle Foot, Q.C. and Dick Taverne (both of the English Bar) for the appellants.
Raymond Walton (of the English Bar) for the respondent.
November 27. LORD MORTON OF HENRYTON: This is an appeal
from @ judgment of the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, dismissing an
appeal from an order of the High Court of Tanganyika, ordering the appellants
to deliver up possession of a plot of land at Moshi to the respondent.
The appellants were occupiers of the plot in question under a certificate of
occupancy signed by both parties to this appeal, giving the appellants a right
of occupancy for a term of ninety-nine years from April 4, 1952, at a rent of
Shs. 435/— a year, subject to revision as therein mentioned.
The conditions of occupancy contained in the certificate provided (inter alia),
as follows.
The occupier undertakes:
(i) To erect buildings on the said land of a value of not less than Shillings
sixty thousand (Shs. 60,000/-).
(ii) Within a period of six months from the date of commencement of
the said right of occupancy to submit to the township authority,
Moshi (hereinafter called “the said authority”), such plans of the
proposed buildings (including block plans showing the position of
the buildings) drawings elevations and specifications thereof as will
satisfy the said authority and as will ensure compliance with the
building covenant contained in sub-para. (i) supra. Such plans
and specifications shall be submitted in triplicate.740 EASTERN AFRICA LAW REPORTS [1962] E.A.
Gii) To commence building operations within a period of three months
from the date of notification in writing by the said authority of ap-
proval of the plans and specifications, such buildings to conform to
a building line decided upon and notified by the said authority.
(iv) To complete the buildings according to the said plans and speciti-
cations so that the said buildings are ready for use and occupation
within a period of twenty-four months from the date of commence-
ment of the said right of occupancy.
“6, Failure to comply with any of the terms or conditions herein
contained or implied will be deemed to constitute good cause for revocation
of the said right of occupancy.”
The words “good cause for revocation of the said right of occupancy” refer
tos. 10 of the Tanganyika Land Ordinance of January 26, 1923 (Cap. 113)
which their lordships will quote later.
There was considerable delay in compliance with these conditions, and
certain extensions of time were granted. On March 11, 1954, the respondent
wrote to the appellants extending the time for submission of detailed plans
to April 30, 1954, and saying that if this was not done the right of occupanc:
would be revoked. The appellants complied with the requirements of thi
letter by submitting detailed plans for a godown or store on April 11, 1954.
and detailed plans for the whole plot on April 29, 1954. These two sets of plans
were approved on May 3, and May 20, 1954, respectively.
‘On January 26, 1955, the respondent wrote to the appellants extending the
time for completion to July 31, 1955, and indicating that the right of occupancy
would be revoked if the building was not completed by that date. This repre-
sented an extension of nearly sixteen months beyond the original date for
completion. By September, 1955, the godown had been completed and the
appellants had received permission from the township authority to occupy it.
But the building of the shops and flats shown on the detailed plans had not
been commenced and on November 21, 1955, the respondent granted a further
extension of time to January 31, 1956, for completion of these buildings. The
appellants then submitted altered plans, which were subsequently approved
by the township authority on February 15, 1956. The appellants also asked
the respondent, through their architects, for an extension of six months in which
to erect the remainder of the buildings.
The respondent in a letter dated January, 1956, replied that this was not
approved. He granted the appellants an extension up to February 29, 1956,
to have their plans approved and commence building operations, stating that
he would call for a further report during the first week of March, 1956, and
unless building operations were by then under way he would recommend to
the Governor that the right of occupancy should be revoked. If the report
revealed that building was proceeding satisfactorily a further short extension
of time would be granted to complete the erection of the building. The appellants
replied in a letter dated February 8, 1956, pointing out that they had already
built a store costing Shs. 60,000/- but had not yet received approval from
the township authority for shops; that they would require further time for
inviting tenders; that it would not appear economical to build shops at that
moment because there were many empty shops in the vicinity, and asking for
another six months to arrive at a final decision. On May 31, 1956, the respondent
wrote to the appellants giving them thirty days in which to inform him of the
reasons why construction of the main buildings had still not been put in hand
On May 4, 1957, the right of occupancy was revoked. The learned trial judge
said in his judgment:PC PREMCHAND NATHU & CO. ». LAND OFFICER 741
“I have no evidence of any further correspondence between these two
dates, It is not disputed that no building other than the godown has ever
been commenced on the plot.”
‘The appellants refused to deliver up possession of the plot, and these pro-
ceedings were started by the respondent on April 8, 1959, claiming possession,
‘a revocation fee and damages. The appellants contested the validity of the
revocation on various grounds. The learned trial judge held that the respondent
was entitled to possession and ordered accordingly. He also entered judgment
for the amount of the revocation fee but awarded no damages, since the appellants
would have to yield up the godown which they had built.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants’ appeal. Of the defences
raised before the trial judge and the Court of Appeal one only has been argued
before their lordships’ board. The appellants contend that s. 14 (1) of the
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, is applicable to the exercise
by the Governor of any right of revocation and therefore, since no notice was
served in compliance with that sub-section, the purported revocation was
invalid. The sub-section just mentioned is in the following terms:
“14. (1) A right of re-entry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation
in a lease, for a breach of any covenant or condition in the lease, shall not
be enforceable, by action or otherwise, unless and until the lessor serves
‘on the lessee a notice specifying the particular breach complained of and.
if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the
breach, and, in any case, requiring the lessee to make compensation in money
for the breach, and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time thereafter, to
remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy, and to make reasonable
compensation in money, to the satisfaction of the lessor, for the breach.”
The relevant provisions of the Tanganyika Land Ordinance (Cap. 113)
are as follows:
“Section 2 ‘occupier’ means the holder of a right of occupancy
The ‘right of occupancy’ means a title to the use and occupation of
fand ss
“3. (1) The whole of the lands of the Territory, whether occupied or
unoccupied, on the date of the commencement of this Ordinance are hereby
declared to be public lands:
“Provided that . . . nothing in this Ordinance shall be deemed to affect
the validity of any title to land or any interest therein lawfully acquired
before the date of the commencement thereof and that all such titles
shall have the same effect and validity in all respects as they had before that
date.
“4, Subject to the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 3, all public lands and all
rights over the same are hereby declared to be under the control and subject
to the disposition of the Governor and shall be held and administered for
the use and common benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of the
Territory, and no title to the occupation and use of any such lands shall be
valid without the consent of the Governor.
“6. The Governor
interests of the Terri
(a) grant a right of occupancy to a native or a non-native whether
with or without the payment of a premium at the Governor's
discretion ;
ay, where it appears to him to be in the general
ory—742 EASTERN AFRICA LAW REPORTS. [1962] E.A.
(b) demand a rental for the use of any public land granted to any
native or non-native;
(c) revise the said rental at intervals of not more than thirty-three
years:
“Provided that before any public land in an area over which a native
authority has been established is so disposed of the said native authority
shall be consulted.
“7, Such rights of occupancy shall be for any definite term not exceeding
ninety-nine years, and shall be granted subject to the terms of any contract
which may be made between the Governor and the occupier not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Ordinance:
“Provided that the Governor shall not (save in the case of a right granted
in connection with @ mining lease) grant rights of occupancy to any non-
native free of rent or upon any conditions which may preclude him from
revising the rent at intervals of not more than thirty-three years.”
“10, It shall not be lawful for the Governor to revoke a right of occu-
pancy granted as aforesaid save for good cause. Good cause shall include—
(a) non-payment of rent, taxes, or other dues imposed upon the lan
(b) requirement of the land by the Government for public purposes;
(c) requirement of the land for mining purposes or for any purpose
connected therewith;
(d) abandonment or non-use of the land for a period of five year:
(e) breach of the provisions of s. 14;
(J) breach of any term or condition contained or to be implied in the
certificate of occupancy or in any contract made in accordance
with s. 75
(g) attempted alienation by @ native in favour of a non-native;
(i) breach of any regulations under this Ordinance relating to the
transfer of or other dealings with rights of occupancy or interests
therein.”
‘The Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance of January,
1923 (Cap. 114), provided as follows:
“2. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the law relating
to real and personal property, mortgagor and mortgagee, landlord and
tenant, and trusts and trustees in force in England on the first day of
January 1922, shall apply to real and personal property, mortgages, leases
and tenancies, and trusts and trustees in the Territory in like manner
as it applies to real and personal property, mortgages, leases and tenancies,
and trusts and trustees in England, and the English law and practice of
conveyancing in force in England on the day aforesaid shall be in force
in the Territory.
(2) Such English law and practice shall be in force so far only as the
circumstances of the Territory and its inhabitants, and the limits of Her
Majesty's jurisdiction permit.
(3) When such English law or practice is inconsistent with any provision
contained in any Ordinance or other legislative Act or Indian Act for
the time being in force in the Territory, such last mentioned provision
shall prevail.””
GRC PREMCHAND NATHU & CO. v. LAND OFFICER 743
“10. The Governor may, if he thinks fit, from time to time by order
published in the Gazette declare that any English Act of Parliament or
part of an Act is or is not by virtue of this Ordinance in force in the
Territory, and every such declaration shall be conclusive.”
If regard is to be had only to the provisions of the two Tanganyika Ordinances
the revocation of the right of occupancy granted to the appellants would appear
to be entirely in order. The appellants were clearly in breach of condition 2 (iv)
in the certificate of occupancy, and this was “good cause” for revocation under
s. 10 (f) of the Land Ordinance.
Counsel for the appellants contended, however, that s. 14 (1) of the English
Act of 1881, was imported into the law of Tanganyika by s. 2 of the Land
(Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance, that the section bound the
Crown and that the certificate of occupancy had all the characteristics of a
lease. Consequently, as no notice was served in compliance with s. 14 (1) the
Governor could not validly revoke the right of occupancy. Counsel conceded
that the Act of 1881, as applied in England, did not bind the Crown, but
contended that when the provisions of section 14 (1) were imported into the
Jaw of Tanganyika the courts should infer, from all the surrounding circum-
stances, that they were intended to bind the Crown. He pointed out that all
the land in Tanganyika had been public land since the date of the Land
Ordinance of 1923, subject to the proviso in s. 3 (1) of that Ordinance, and was
vested in the Crown, and submitted that it was most likely that the legislature.
having imported the English law of landlord and tenant into Tanganyika,
should have intended it to apply only to the interests in land “lawfully acquired
before the date of the commencement” of the said Ordinance. Counsel suggested
that the lands coming within the proviso were small in extent compared with
the total area of Tanganyika. No evidence on this matter was called by the
appellants in the courts of Tanganyika, but their lordships are willing to assume
that by far the greater portion of the country was made public land by the Land
Ordinance of 1923.
The general principle to be applied in considering whether or not the Crown
is bound by general words in a statute is well established and it 1s common
ground between the parties that this general principle is applicable in Tanganyika.
The principle was stated by the board in the case of Province of Bombay v.
Municipal Corporation of Bombay (1), [1947] A.C. 58 at p. 61, in the following
terms:
“The maxim of the law in early times was that no statute bound the
Crown unless the Crown was expressly named therein . . . but the rule
so laid down is subject to at least one exception. The Crown may be bound,
as has often been said, ‘by necessary implication’. If, that is to say, it is
manifest from the very terms of the statute that it was the intention of the
legislature that the Crown should be bound, then the result is the same
as if the Crown had been expressly named. It must then be inferred that the
Crown, by assenting to the law, agreed to be bound by its provisions.”
There is nothing in the wording of the Conveyancing and Law of Property
Act, 1881, which manifests an intention that the Crown should be bound, but
counsel for the appellants submits that a necessary implication can arise from
a consideration of the Ordinances in force in Tanganyika, and relies upon
the decision of the board in Bashir v. The Commissioner of Lands (2), [1960]
A.C. 44 and upon the judgment of AperNerHy, J., in Director of Lands and
Mines v. Sohan Singh (3), 1 T.L.R. (R.) 631,
Their lordships will return to these cases later, but for the moment they
will assume, without so deciding, that counsel's submission is well-founded,
and will consider how far the provisions of the two Ordinances of January,1923, give rise to the implication for which counsel contends. Section 14 (1)
of the English Act of 1881, deals only with
“a right of re-entry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation in a
lease, for a breach of any covenant or condition in the lease”,
and it is to be ebserved at once that in the Land Ordinance of 1923, the word
“lease” appears to be deliberately avoided. It is discarded in favour of the
words “right of occupancy”, and there are other indications that s. 14 (1) of
the Act of 1881, was not intended to apply to the “public lands” of Tanganyika
For instance—
(1) the right of occupancy can only arise under a grant by the Governor:
(2) there is no mention in the Ordinances of a right of “re-entry or forfeiture”
This again appears to be a deliberate avoidance of the words in the
English statute:
(3) the right of revocation conferred upon the Governor is a right which
is quite unknown in the law of England and bears little resemblance
to a lessor’s right of re-entry or forfeiture. All that the Governor has
to do is to execute a document saying that the right of occupancy
revoked, and the list of “good causes” deals to a large extent with
maiters of public policy which have nothing to do with any “breach”
by the occupier of any “covenant or condition”.
Other striking differences between a right of occupancy and a lease are
contained in s, 7, s. 8, s. II, s. 13 and s. 21. In their lordships’ opinion the
intention of the Land Ordinance was to establish an entirely new interest in
land, similar to leases in some respects but different in others. They think
that the Act was intended to be a complete code regulating the respective
rights of the Crown and the occupier.
For these reasons their lordships are quite unable to find in the law of
Tanganyika any necessary implication that s. 14 (1) of the English Act of 1881
when incorporated therein, binds the Crown, even if it be assumed, in favour
of the appellants, that it is legitimate to look outside the terms of the 1881
Act for the purpose of seeking such an implication, It is true that if s. 14 (1)
of the Act of 1881 does not apply to Crown lands that section will have a some-
what restricted operation in Tanganyika, but this fact is not sufficient to create
a necessary implication that the Crown was to be bound thereby. They see
no reason to doubt thats. 14 (1) applies to any leases, properly so-called, coming
within the proviso to s. 3 (1) of the Tanganyika Land Ordinance. They have
not overlooked the fact that the Law of Property Act, 1925, expressly binds the
Crown, with certain immaterial exceptions, but that Act is not incorporated
in the law of Tanganyika by s. 2 (1) of the Land (Law of Property and Convey-
ancing) Ordinance, 1923, since that section applies the law in force in England
on January 1, 1922.
The cases of Bashir v. The Commissioner of Lands (2), and Director of Lands
and Mines v. Sohan Singh (3), already mentioned afford no assistance to the
argument on behalf of the appellants. The decision in Baslir’s case depended
on the interpretation of s. 83 of the Kenya Crown Lands Ordinance. That
section, so far as material, provides:
“.., if there shall be any breach of the lessee’s covenants . . . the
Commissioner may serve a notice upon the lessee specifying . . . the
covenmut of which a bieach has beeu coumuitied, aud . . . way commucuce
an action in the Supreme Court for the recovery of the premises, and,
on proof of the facts, the Supreme Court shall, subject to relief upon such
terms as may appear just declare the lease forfeited . . .”PS PREMCHAND NATHU & CO v, LAND OFFICER 745
“In exercising the power of granting relief against forfeiture under this
section the court shall be guided by the principles of English law and
the doctrines of equity.”
It was clear that the section, dealing as it did with Crown lands, was intended
to bind the Crown, and the board held that the reference to “principles of
English law” clearly applied to Crown lands, s. 14 of the Act of 1881. (See
pp. 61 Fin. and 62 of the report.)
In Sohan Singh's case (3), ABERNETHY, J., did not hold that s. 14 (1) of the
Act of 1881 applied to certificates of occupancy, but held that in the circum-
stances of the case before him the respondent “ought in all fairness to have
been given an opportunity” to answer an opinion which had been expressed
by the executive officer. ‘The learned judge continued
“It is entirely contrary to justice that a certificate of occupancy should
have been revoked on the mere opinion of someone that a building cannot
be erected by a specified date.”
In the present case it was not suggested that equity required the giving of notice
of revocation or of intention to revoke; consequently their lordships have
not considered whether such a defence would or would not have been open
to the appellants.
Their lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should
be dismissed. The appellants must pay the costs of the respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
Solicitors: Gibson & Weldon, London (for the appellants); Charles Russell
& Co., London (for the respondent).
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. CHIMANBHAI MOTIBHAI PATEL.
AND ANOTHER
[H.M. Supreme Court or Kenya aT Natront (Rudd, Ag. C.J., and Edmonds,
J.), October 1 and 4, 1962.]
CRmmmvaL AppeaL No. 862 oF 1962,
Criminal law—Case stated—Magistrate’s findings of fact in complex case not
suaced—Appellare court tnvired to refer to long record and judgment 10
establish facts—Whether case should be remitted to lower court for re-
statement of facts—Penal Code, s. 318 (K.}—Criminal Procedure Code,
5. 368 and s. 376 (K.).
Both respondents were acquitted by a senior resident magistrate on two
counts of conspiring to defraud contrary to s, 318 of the Penal Code. A case
was stated by the magistrate, on the application of the Crown, which contained
virtually none of the essential findings on which the Crown intended to rely
at the hearing but a copy of the record of evidence and of the judgment was
wttached, At the hearing counsel for the Crown stated that he would have to
refer to the file of the lower court and to many exhibits to establish the findings
‘of fact on which he relied as the basis of his argument and he invited the court
to refer to the original record and exhibits to establish the findings of fact
made by the magistrate which were net specified in the case as stated. These