2020 NOTES IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

A. Principles of local autonomy

1. Constitutional Provisions:

a. Sec.25, Art. II: The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
b. Sec. 2, Art. X: The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

2. Cases

a. Basco vs. PAGCOR

The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law
until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption
clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose
taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of
local autonomy. 

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution  simply means
"decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in
Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It
does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state

which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can
only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be
an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)

As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local
government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political
question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA
539).  (Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corp., G.R. No. 91649, [May 14, 1991],
274 PHIL 323-346)

b. Limbona v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786, relative to the establishment of the

autonomous region governments in Regions in IX and XII under the 1973 Constitution, the
Supreme Court declared:

“Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the
 2

central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in

order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."  At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law."  He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of

political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-
immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency  (Limbona v.
Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, [February 28, 1989], 252 PHIL 813-830)

c. Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 93252 August 5, 1991, the SC distinguished
decentralization of administration and of power:

Decentralization of Administration, Administrative Autonomy. There is

decentralization of administration or administrative autonomy when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process, to make local
governments “more responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress.”

Decentralization of Power, Political Autonomy. Decentralization of power or

political autonomy, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities.

d. Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001,

Synopsis:

Private respondent applied for a mayor's permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro,
Laguna. It was denied on the ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995
 3

dated September 18, 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna prohibited gambling in
the province, including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his application, private
respondent filed an action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent
enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution. Motion for its
reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse. Petitioners contended that "the resolution is
a policy declaration of the provincial government of Laguna on its vehement opposition and/or
objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the lotto operation" and
thus it is valid. On the other hand, private respondent argued that the same curtailed the
power of the state since the legislature itself had declared lotto as legal and permitted its
operation around the country.

The Court found that the questioned ordinance merely stated the "objection" of the
council to all forms of gambling including lotto. It is a mere policy statement and could not
serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of lotto, which is a legitimate business activity
duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. In our system of
government, the power of the local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and
resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress and these should not
contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress as the delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. Petition was denied and the
assailed order was affirmed.  (Lina, Jr. v. Paño, G.R. No. 129093, [August 30, 2001], 416 PHIL
438-451)

Ruling:

The Supreme Court said that the basic relationship between the national legislature and
the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous constitutions. The power to create still includes
the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True,
there are some notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
local government units of the power to tax (Sec.5, Art. X),which cannot now be withdrawn by
mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principle of local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. Ours is still a unitary form
of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local
governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central
authority.

e. Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002

Synopsis:

In 1986, petitioners as RTC and MTC judges stationed in Mandaue City received a
monthly allowance of P1,260 each pursuant to the yearly appropriation ordinance. Eventually,
 4

in 1991, it was increased to P1,500 for each judge. However, on March 15, 1994, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55)
which provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit
should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Acting on the said
DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners in
excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Thus, petitioners filed with the Office of the City
Auditor a protest. However, it was treated as a motion for reconsideration and was endorsed to
the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred
the said motion to their Head Office with recommendation that the same should be denied.
Accordingly, it was denied by the COA. Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition. They
argued, among others, that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City
by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional
allowances to judges stationed therein. cADSCT

The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner judges. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160,
the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does
not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges.
Thus, this Court need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow
the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city
government exceed its annual expenditures. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of
additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458,
par. (a)(l)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over local
government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to
implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis.

Ruling:

1. However, even as we recognize that the Constitution guarantees autonomy to

local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control
by Congress, and the power of general supervision by the President.

2. The president can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government
unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
President’s supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his
alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts
within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore by the
President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on
local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of
local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and the
legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. [Judge Dadole v. Commission on
Audit, supra.].

f. Drilon vs. Lim GR No. 112797 August 4, 1994.

 5

Presidential power over local government is limited by this 1987 Constitution to the
exercise of general supervision “to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.”
General supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. In
administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

g. Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, G.R. No. 130775, September 29, 2004

Like local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the
Chief Executive or his alter ego. As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s
authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed; it cannot lay down such rules
itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace them. In this case, the most that
the DILG could do was to review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of
the elections to determine if there was a violation of the Liga’s Constitution and By-laws and its
implementing rules. If the National Liga Board violated the rules, the DILG should have ordered
the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with the Liga’s rules, not in obeisance to
DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither does the DILG have the authority to remove the incumbent
officers of the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.

h. Mandanas vs. Ochoa, GR No. 199802, July 3, 2018

Based on the foregoing delineation, decentralization can be considered as the decision

by the central government to empower its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally
constituted, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational
units, and is typically a delegated power, whereby a larger government chooses to delegate
authority to more local governments.  It is also a process, being the set of policies, electoral or
constitutional reforms that transfer responsibilities, resources or authority from the higher to
the lower levels of government.  It is often viewed as a shift of authority towards local
governments and away from the central government, with total government authority over
society and economy imagined as fixed. 

As a system of transferring authority and power from the National Government to the
LGUs, decentralization in the Philippines may be categorized into four, namely: (1) political
decentralization or devolution; (2) administrative decentralization or deconcentration; (3)
fiscal decentralization; and (4) policy or decision-making decentralization.

Political decentralization or devolution occurs when there is a transfer of powers,

responsibilities, and resources from the central government to the LGUs for the performance of
certain functions. It is a more liberal form of decentralization because there is an actual transfer
 6

of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to the LGUs in cognizance of
their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative
and technical capabilities.  It is an act by which the National Government confers power and
authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities.  It
encompasses reforms to open sub-national representation and policies to "devolve political
authority or electoral capacities to subnational actors."  Section 16 to Section 19 of the LGC
characterize political decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs empowered to address the
different needs of their constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of the regional units is
more expansive because they are given the authority to regulate a wider array of subjects,
including personal, family and property relations.

Administrative decentralization or deconcentration involves the transfer of functions or

the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and local
offices.  Consistent with this concept, the LGC has created the Local School Boards, the Local
Health Boards and the Local Development Councils,  and has transferred some of the authority
from the agencies of the National Government, like the Department of Education and the
Department of Health, to such bodies to better cope up with the needs of particular localities.

Fiscal decentralization means that the LGUs have the power to create their own sources
of revenue in addition to their just share in the national taxes released by the National
Government. It includes the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities. It thus extends to the preparation of their budgets, so that the local officials have to
work within the constraints of their budgets. The budgets are not formulated at the national
level and imposed on local governments, without regard as to whether or not they are relevant
to local needs and resources. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the
harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials, who in any case are partners
in the attainment of national goals, is recognized and addressed. 

Fiscal decentralization emanates from a specific constitutional mandate that is

expressed in several provisions of Article X (Local Government) of the 1987 Constitution,
specifically: Section 5;  Section 6;  and Section 7. 

The constitutional authority extended to each and every LGU to create its own sources
of income and revenue has been formalized from Section 128 to Section 133 of the LGC. To
implement the LGUs' entitlement to the just share in the national taxes, Congress has enacted
Section 284 to Section 288 of the LGC. Congress has further enacted Section 289 to Section 294
of the LGC to define the share of the LGUs in the national wealth. Indeed, the requirement for
the automatic release to the LGUs of their just share in the national taxes is but the
consequence of the constitutional mandate for fiscal decentralization. 

For sure, fiscal decentralization does not signify the absolute freedom of the LGUs to
create their own sources of revenue and to spend their revenues unrestrictedly or upon their
individual whims and caprices. Congress has subjected the LGUs' power to tax to the guidelines
set in Section 130 of the LGC and to the limitations stated in Section 133 of the LGC. The
 7

concept of local fiscal autonomy does not exclude any manner of intervention by the National
Government in the form of supervision if only to ensure that the local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with the national goals. 

Lastly, policy- or decision-making decentralization exists if at least one sub-national tier

of government has exclusive authority to make decisions on at least one policy issue. 

In fine, certain limitations are and can be imposed by Congress in all the forms of
decentralization, for local autonomy, whether as to power or as to administration, is not
absolute. The LGUs remain to be the tenants of the will of Congress subject to the guarantees
that the Constitution itself imposes.

B. Public corporations

1. Defined. An Artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and
the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its
existence.

2. Classification of corporations according to purpose.

a. Public: Organized for the government of a portion of the State.

b. Private: Formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end.
c. Quasi-public: A private corporation that renders public service or supplies public wants.

3. Criterion to determine whether corporation is public: The relationship of the corporation of

the State, i.e., if created by the State as its own agency to help the State in carrying out its
government functions, then it is public; otherwise, it is private.

3. Classes of public corporations:

a) Quasi-corporation. Created by the State for a narrow or limited purpose.

b) Municipal corporation. A body politic and corporate constituted by the incorporation of
the inhabitants for the purpose of local government.

Note: Municipal corporations are now commonly known as local governments. They
are the bodies politic established by law partly as agencies of the State to assist in the civil
governance of the country. Their chief purpose has been to regulate and administer the
local and internal affairs of the cities, municipalities or districts. They are legal institutions
formed by charters from the sovereign power, whereby the populations within
communities living within prescribed areas have formed themselves into bodies politic and
corporate, and assumed their corporate names with the right of continuous succession and
for the purposes and with the authority of subordinate self-government and improvement
and the local administration of the affairs of the State. 
 8

Municipal corporations, being the mere creatures of the State, are subject to the will of
Congress, their creator. Their continued existence and the grant of their powers are
dependent on the discretion of Congress  (Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 199802 &
208488, [July 3, 2018])

C. Municipal Corporations

1. Elements:

a) Legal creation or incorporation. The law creating or authorizing the creation or

incorporation of a municipal corporation.

b) Corporate name. The name by which the corporation shall be known.

i) The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippines

Historical Institute, change the name of component cities and municipalities,
upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned; provided that the same
shall be effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose
in the political unit directly affected [Sec. 13, R.A. 7160].

c) Inhabitants. The people residing in the territory of the corporation.

c) Territory. The land mass where the inhabitants reside, together with the internal and
external waters, and the air space above the land and waters.

2. Dual nature and functions: Every local government units created or organized [under the
Local Government Code] is a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be
exercised by it in conformity with law. As such, it shall exercise powers as a political
subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the
inhabitants of its territory [Sec. 15, R.A. 4160]. Accordingly, it has dual functions, namely:

a) Public or governmental. It acts as an agent of the State for the government of the
territory and the inhabitants. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
(Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme GR No. 52179 April 8, 1991)

As mere agents, local governments are vested with the power of subordinate
legislation. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they derived their powers in the first place, and
 9

negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statue. (Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties
and PAGCOR GR No. 111097 July 20, 1994.)

b) Private or propriety. It acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local

affairs. As such, it acts as a separate entity, for its own purposes, and not as a
subdivision of the State [Bara Lidasan v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 496].

3. Municipal corporations of the Philippines.

Constitutional provisions:

a. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras [Sec. 1, Art. X, Constitution].

b. Sec. 11, Art. X, Constitution, Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivision subject to a plebiscite set forth in Sec. 10, (but) the component
cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to
their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the
metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination.

LGC provisions:

a) Province. The province, composed of a cluster of municipalities, or municipalities and

component cities, and as a political and corporate unit of government, serves as a
dynamic mechanism for developmental processes and effective governance of local
government units within its territorial jurisdiction [Sec. 459, R.A. 7160].

b) City. The city, composed of more urbanized and developed barangays, serves as a
general-purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and
direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial
jurisdiction [Sec. 448, R.A.7160].

Note: Please read Sec. 12, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution: HUCs and component cities
with charters prohibiting their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent.

c) Municipality. The municipality, consisting of a group of barangays, serves primarily as a

general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and
direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its jurisdiction [Sec.
440, R.A.7160].
 10

d) Barangay. As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and
implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in
the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be
expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled
[Sec. 384, R.A.7160].

e) Autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras [Sec. 1, Art. X,

Constitution]. In Limbona v. Mangelin, supra., relative to the establishment of the
autonomous region governments in Regions IX and XII under the 1973 Constitution, it
was held that autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization
of power. The second is abdication by the national government of political power in
favor of the local government; the first consists merely in the delegation of
administrative powers to broaden the base of governmental power. The regional
governments in Regions IX and XII are of the first variety. In Datu Firdausi Abbas v.
Comelec, 179 SCRA 287, RA 6734, the organic act establishing the Autonomous
Regional Government of Muslim Mindanao was held valid. It was passed pursuant to
the mandate in Art X, Constitution. In Cordillera Broad Coallition v. Commission on
Audit, 181 SCRA 495, Executive Order No. 220, issued by President Aquino in the
exercise of legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR] was
held valid. It prepared the groundwork for autonomy and the adoption of the organic
law. In Ordillo v. Comelec, 192 SCRA 100, the sole province of Ifugao which, in the
plebiscite, alone voted in favor of RA 6766, cannot constitute the Autonomous Region of
the Cordilleras.

f) Special metropolitan political subdivisions. Pursuant to Sec. 11, Art. X, Constitution,

Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivision subject to a
plebiscite set forth in Sec. 10, (but) the component cities and municipalities shall retain
their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created
shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

4. Creation and dissolution of municipal corporations

a. Constitutional provisions:

Art. X, Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

b. LGC provisions

SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law
 11

enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political
subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.

SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensu- rate with the size
of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

i. Municipality : P2,500,000.00
ii. City: P100,000,000.00
(Yr. 2000 constant prices amended by R.A. 9009)
iii. Highly urbanized city: P50,000,000.00
iv. Province:P20,000,000.00

Note:

In Alvarez v. Guigona, 252 SCRA 695, it was held that the Internal Revenue Allotments
(IRAs) should be included in the computation of the average annual income of the municipality
(for purposes of determining whether the municipality may be validly converted into a city), but
under RA 9009, it is specifically provided that for conversion to cities, the municipality’s
income should not include the IRA.

(b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned;

i. Barangay: 2,000 inhabitants [except in metro Manila and other

metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities, where
the requirement is 5,000 inhabitants]
ii. Municipality: 25,000
iii. City: 150,000
iv. Highly urbanized city: 200,000
v. Province: 250,000

(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes
and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance with the foregoing indicators
shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO),
 12

and the Lands Management Bureau(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources(DENR).

i. Municipality : 50 square kilometers

ii. City: 100 square kilometers
iii. Province: 2,000 square kilometers

SEC. 8. Division and Merger. - Division and merger of existing local government units
shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local
government unit or units concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this
Code: Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local government unit or
units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. The income
classification of local government units shall be updated within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their financial position resulting from the
increased revenues as provided herein.

SEC. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be abolished
when its income, population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the
minimum standards prescribed for its creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the
national agencies mentioned in Section 17 hereof to Congress or to the sanggunian concerned,
as the case may be.cralaw

The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city,
municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be
incorporated or merged.

SEC. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. - No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

Notes: In Tan v. Comelec, 142 SRA 727, it was held that a plebiscite for
creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the
mother province in order to conform to the constitutional requirement. X x x BP
885, creating the Province of Negros del Norte, is declared unconstitutional
because it excluded the voters of the mother province from participating in the
plebiscite (and it did not comply with the area criterion prescribed in the Local
Government Code). X x x Where the law authorizing the holding of a plebiscite in
unconstitutional, the Court cannot authorize the holding of an new one. X x x
The fact that the plebiscite which the petition sought to stop had already been
 13

held and officials of the new province appointed does not make the petition
moot and academic, as the petition raises an issue of constitutional dimension.

Note: BAGABUYO VS. COMELEC (2008)

The holding of a plebiscite is not a requirement in legislative appointment

or reappointment; A plebiscite is necessary only in the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units.

Note: KIDA VS. SENATE (2011)

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted

supermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in
its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required
under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of
absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only
for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,
cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While
the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective, questions on the extent of
the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the
seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that
would result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.

c. Cases

Abbas vs. Comelec

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in
a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic
Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if
an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative
of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it||| (Abbas v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 89651 & 89965, [November 10, 1989], 258-A PHIL 870-885)
 14

Cordillera Broad Coaltion vs. COA

A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a territorial
and political subdivision.

We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners' assertion that E.O. No.
220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political subdivision. dctai

After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a
new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.

1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It
does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations,  e.g. the
power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its
own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.

The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of
services is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of
the law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later
increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and agencies
of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein. The
functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan are: (1)
to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the department or agency
in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective service to the people in
the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other departments, bureaus and agencies in
the area; (4) to coordinate with local government units in the area; and (5) to perform such
other functions as may be provided by law. [See Part II, Chap. III, Art. I, of the Reorganization
Plan].

We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions
created under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR
requires the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National
Government but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental
organizations in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for
that purpose.

2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the
CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable
participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered
more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Government, similar
 15

to the regional development councils which the President may create under the
Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to
strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth
and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a
more sophisticated version of the regional development council. LLpr

Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.

We find first a need to clear up petitioners' apparent misconception of the concept of

local autonomy.

It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the

Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or,
cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to
the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10].
And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted
the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which
ushered the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country
[Villegas v. Subido, supra.]

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant
of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the
provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec.
18].

As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy. (Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, 82217,
[January 29, 1990], 260 PHIL 528-541)

Ordillo vs. Comelec

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single
province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the
 16

absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of
regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small
area.
Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera
Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among
provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region. LibLex

If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall
then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having
two legislative bodies — the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan —
exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the
smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government
officials for so few people. (Ordillo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93054, [December 4,
1990], 270 PHIL 183-192)

Sema vs. Comelec

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,

through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a
law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC we held that the "power of
redistricting . . . is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws", and
thus is vested exclusively in Congress.

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion

legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must
be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for
regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. SaCDTA

The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.  (Sema v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628, [July 16, 2008], 580 PHIL 623-689)

Miranda vs. Aguirre

 17

The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local
government units belongs to Congress.  This power is part of the larger power to enact laws
which the Constitution vested in Congress.  The exercise of the power must be in accord with
the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of
Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the
approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on
whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of
the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this
reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political
units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional
requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more
reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986
EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past
whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the
vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the
local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide
on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru
people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of
the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. LibLex

The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The
city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The
resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the
Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared
with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes on the life of the people
of the city of Santiago
 (Miranda v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133064, [September 16, 1999], 373 PHIL 386-430)

Tan vs. Comelec

It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative
that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or
units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial
alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the
existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
 18

of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of
Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be
affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries
would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the
area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.||| (Tan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 73155, [July 11, 1986], 226 PHIL 624-651)

Padilla vs. Comelec

Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been superseded with the
ratification of the  1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling
in Paredes v. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan v. COMELEC was
based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer
applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the  1987 Constitution, especially since the latter
provision deleted the words "unit or." We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in
Section 10, Article X of the  1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of
the 1973 Constitution has not affected our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC. It stands to reason that
when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated
by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phrase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units
which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas
are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well
as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.||| (Padilla, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 103328 (Resolution), [October 19, 1992], 289 PHIL 356-361)

Umali vs. Comelec

Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an
HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province
will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City's
gain of independence. With the city's newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight
powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What
once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In
more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan City's severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost
5% of Nueva Ecija's 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the
alteration be "substantial." CcAITa

Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan

City's conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally
cannot take place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not
mutually exclusive, and more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the
reconfiguration of LGUs.
 19

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is
substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision
applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.  (Umali v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. Nos. 203974 & 204371, [April 22, 2014], 733 PHIL 775-821)

Aquino III vs. Comelec

The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population

requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be
entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to
be entitled to an additional district. 

There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of

an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces.
Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an
additional district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to
an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
(Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, [April 7, 2010], 631 PHIL 595-652)

Mariano vs. Comelec

In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854,
which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it
happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at
that time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that
Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand," to wit: 

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in

Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the
 20

Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population

has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.

(Mariano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118577, [March 7, 1995]

LCP vs. Comelec, GR No. 176951, Feb. 15, 2011

➢ The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative

power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws,
and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of
the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to
Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses
plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be
legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the
Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all
subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

➢ Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers.
Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No.
9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress
enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided
for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local
government units — income, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit
to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of
municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an
amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources.
However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from
such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its
higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC,
which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for
these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective
provinces.

➢ Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the
Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned
municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are,
therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the
November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their
 21

strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption
clauses, are not found in the LGC.

➢ Verily, the determination of the existence of substantial distinction with respect

to respondent municipalities does not simply lie on the mere pendency of their
cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. This Court sees the bigger picture. The
existence of substantial distinction with respect to respondent municipalities
covered by the Cityhood Laws is measured by the purpose of the law, not by R.A.
No. 9009, but by the very purpose of the LGC, as provided in its Section 2 (a),
thus —

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.— (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the

State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units
shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The
process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the
local government units.

➢ Indeed, substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent

municipalities to become component cities of their respective provinces.
Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws, recognized this capacity and viability of
respondent municipalities to become the State's partners in accelerating
economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is the very
thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the
11th Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. Truly,
the urgent need to become a component city arose way back in the 11th
Congress, and such condition continues to exist.

Navarro vs. Ermita

It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the
creation of barangay, land área is not a requisite indicator of of viability. However, with respect
to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are
provided for.

But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists
of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a
 22

municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of

the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is
expressly stated under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.

There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form
part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was
inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly
provided in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC — and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then,
be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR. (Navarro v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 180050 (Resolution), [April 12, 2011], 663 PHIL 546-665)

4. Other constitutional limitations. e.g., provisions of the Bill of Rights affording

protection to rights, property and contracts of inhabitants.

5. Beginning of corporate existence. Upon the election and qualification of its chief
executive and a majority of the members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed
therefor by the law or ordinance creating it [Sec. 14. R.A. 7160].

6. De facto municipal corporations

a. Municipality of Malabang Lanao del Sur vs. Benito

In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the
fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest
on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the
organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time
when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation,
as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid
statute to give color of authority to its creation. Indeed, in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva, 
this Court granted a similar petition for prohibition and nullified an executive order creating
the municipality of Lawigan in Iloilo on the basis of the Pelaez ruling, despite the fact that
the municipality was created in 1961, before Section 68 of the Administrative Code, under
which the President had acted, was invalidated. Of course the issue of de facto municipal
corporation did not arise in that case.||| (Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, G.R. No. L-
28113, [March 28, 1969], 137 PHIL 358-370)
 23

b. Municipality of Jimenez vs. Borja

The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal
corporation is the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal
corporations is essentially a legislative matter and therefore the President was without power
to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been
reiterated in a number of cases  later decided. However, we have since held that where
a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso,
Quezon v. Mendez, Sr.,  this Court considered the following factors as having validated the
creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by
executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General:(1) the fact that
for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged;
(2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the
validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that
the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal
circuit court and considered part ofa legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the
seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might
be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), § 442(d) of which provides that
"municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which
have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least
a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and
acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years
when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No.
258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its
existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is
desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, § 16 of the
Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be
commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed.
On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized
Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this
Court, as reiterated by § 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg.
129),Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the
establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier
recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common
boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial
Board of Misamis Occidental.
 24

Indeed, Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to

the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which
considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following
the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., § 442(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the
creation of Sinacaban.(Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz, Jr., G.R. No. 105746, [December 2, 1996],
333 PHIL 1-19)

c. Pelaez vs. Auditor General

Upon the other hand, if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in
which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.  Thus, by
merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually
creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect,
exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to
interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include
the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureaus, or to create a new one.  As a
consequence, the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would
necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which
he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than
that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process
and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations
than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.

In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917,
must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is
utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment (Pelaez v. Auditor General,
G.R. No. L-23825, [December 27, 1965], 122 PHIL 965-989)

D. Powers of local government units

1. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed strictissimi juris and

any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. Thus, a permit may not be
revoked on the ground that a proprietor applied for two businesses in one permit where the
appropriate ordinance does not expressly require two permits for the conduct of two or more
businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. (Balanga
Development Corporation vs. Municipality of Balanga GR No. 83987 December 27, 1994.)
 25

2. Police Power/General Welfare [Sec. 16, R.A. 7160]: Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as
powers necessary, appropriate, or in incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective
territorial jurisdictions, local government unit shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among its residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

a) The general welfare clause is the statutory grant of police power to local
government units.
b) Limitations on the exercise of powers under this clause:

i) Exercisable only within territorial limits of the local government unit,

except for protection of water supply.

ii) Equal protection clause. (The interest of the public in general, as

distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the
power.)
iii) Due process clause. (The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on
individuals.
iv) Must not be contrary to the Constitution and the laws. Prohibited
activities may not be legalized in the guise of regulation; activities
allowed by law cannot be prohibited, only regulated. In Magtajas v.
Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, the Supreme Court
reiterated its ruling in Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, 207
SCRA 157, and in Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204
SCRA 837, that to be valid, an ordinance [a] must not contravene the
Constitution and any statute; [b] must not be unfair or oppressive; [c]
must not be partial or discriminatory; [d] must not prohibit, but may
regulate trade; [e] must not be unreasonable; and [f] must be general in
application and consistent with public policy.

3. Examples of exercise of police power

a. The declaring of a territory, area or zone as commercial zone through a

municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and general
welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the State, in order to promote the
general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, and with business and occupations. Thus, a
 26

person may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general welfare of the state and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the
individual of funeral homes has been adopted as part of the comprehensive zoning plan for the
orderly development of the area covered thereunder. (Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 104786 January 27, 1994.)

b. A local government council cannot prohibit the establishment of nighclubs and

cabarets. These are legitimate enterprises and under Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, local
governments are only empowered to regulate (not prohibit) their operations. (Dela Cruz vs.
Paras No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983)

Cases on General Welfare Clause

a. City of Manila vs. Laguio

Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged
in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. 5 It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism
as a hotel. 6 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a
Writ  of  Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order  7 (RTC Petition) with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L.
Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (CityCouncil). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance,
insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.

Ruling: 1. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to

the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good.  In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid
exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. Xxx It is
undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations
looking to the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy
aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through
means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an
absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
"allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes.
Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not  per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills ofprostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

2. The Ordinance disallows the operation of sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,

beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in
the Ermita-Malate area. In Section 3 thereof, owners and/or operators of the enumerated
 27

establishments are given three (3) months from the date of approval of the Ordinance within which "to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside the Ermita-Malate area or convert said
businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area." Further, it states in Section 4 that in
cases of subsequent violations of the provisions of the Ordinance, the "premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently." It is readily apparent that the means
employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty and property.

3. In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the

respondent of the beneficial use of its property.  The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the
running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its
owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said
businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it
can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.  It is intrusive and violative ofthe private property
rights of individuals.

b. White Light Corp. Vs. City of Manila

Facts: This Petition under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of
the Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).

Ruling: That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights.  It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.|||  (White Light Corp. v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, [January
20, 2009], 596 PHIL 444-472)

c. Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College

Facts: This case involves an ordinance requiring the school to comply with the 5-meter setback
requirement for the building of fence.
 28

Ruling: Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its
police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of
an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by
the Court — the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: 

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of
equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances
are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability
of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. 

Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994
must be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City's purpose. More
importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.

The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make
the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use
of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.|||  (Fernando v. St. Scholastica's College, G.R. No. 161107,
[March 12, 2013], 706 PHIL 138-166)

d. Batangas CATV vs. CA

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Batangas CATV, Inc. (petitioner herein) against
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Mayor of Batangas City (respondents herein) assailing the Court of
Appeals (1) Decision dated February 12, 1999 and (2) Resolution 3 dated May 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 52361.  The Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Judgment 5 dated October 29, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City in Civil Case No. 4254, 6holding that neither of the
respondents has the power to fix the subscriber rates of CATV operators, such being outside the scope
of the LGU's power.|||  (Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138810, [September 29,
2004], 482 PHIL 544-571)

Ruling: The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs.  Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly,
we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling,  the occupation of rig
drivers,  the installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of cockpits,  
the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds,  and the operation of hotels, motels,
 29

and lodging houses  as valid exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general welfare
clause.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation may be regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause. This is  primarily  because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties.
(It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of
constructing  CATV  system — the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the
parceling of large regions — allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over  CATV  operators.  This is
the same regulation that it exercises over all private enterprises within its territory.
But, while we recognize the LGUs' power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its
power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates
the State's deregulation policy over the CATV industry.   (Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138810, [September 29, 2004], 482 PHIL 544-571)

3. Basic services and facilities [Sec. 17, R.A. 7160]. [a] local government units shall
endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties
and functions currently vested upon them. [b] They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code [within
six months after the effectivity of this Code]. They shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
affective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated them.

4. Taxing Power/Power to Generate and Apply Resources [Sec. 18, R.A. 7160]. Local
government units shall have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be
responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program
objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and
charges which shall accrue exclusively to their use and disposition and which shall be retained
by them; to have a just share in the national taxes which shall be automatically and directly
released to them without need of any further action; to have an equitable share in the
proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth and resources within
their respective territorial jurisdictions including develop, lease, encumber, alienate or
otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their proprietary capacity and to
apply their resources and assets for productive, development or welfare purposes, in the
exercise or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions and thereby
ensure their development into self-reliant communities and active participants in their
attainment of national goals.
 30

a. Fundamental principles governing the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising
powers of local government units [Sec. 130, R.A. 7160].

i) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

ii) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall be equitable and based as far as
practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay; levied and collected only for public
purposes; not unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory; and not contrary to
law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade;
iii) The collection of local taxes, fess, charges and other impositions shall be in no
case be let to any private persons;
iv) The revenue collected shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to
disposition by, the local government units, unless specifically provided herein;
and
v) Each local government units shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive
system of taxation.

5. Eminent Domain [Sec. 19, R.A. 7160]. A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare fort he benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least 15% of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid
for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property.

a) The additional limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units are, as follows:

i) Exercised only by the local chief executive, acting pursuant to a valid

ordinance;

ii) For public use or purpose or welfare, for the benefit of the poor and the
landless;

iii) Only after a valid and definite offer had been made to, and not accepted by,
the owner.

b) In Moday v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 152, it was held that the Sanggunian
Panlalawigan cannot validly disapprove the resolution of the municipality expropriating
 31

a parcel of land for the establishment of a government center. The power of eminent
domain is explicitly granted to the municipality under the Local Government Code.

c) However, in Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 676, the
Supreme Court said that there was lack of compliance with Sec. 19, LGC, where the
Municipal Mayor filed a complaint for the expropriation of two parcels of land on the
strength of a resolution passed by the Sanggunian Bayan, because what is required by
the law is an ordinance. There are basic difference between an ordinance and a
resolution, viz: an ordinance is a law while a resolution is merely a declaration of
sentiment or opinion of a law-making body on a specific matter; a third reading is
needed for an ordinance, not for a resolution unless decided otherwise by a majority of
the members of the Sanggunian.

d) It is only after the deposit of the just compensation that a municipality may enter
and take possession of the property.(Tamin vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 97477 May 8,
1992.)

e) A complaint for eminent domain which made no mention of a valid and definite
offer and that such offer was not accepted but alleges that repeated negotiations were
made but failed is sufficient to show cause of action for the trial to proceed. (City of
Cebu vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 109173 July 5, 1996.)

5. Reclassification of lands [Sec. 20, R.A. 7160.].

a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed after conducting public

hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide
for the manner of their utilization or disposition:

i) When the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture, or

ii) Where the land shall have substantially greater economic value fore
residential, commercial or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian;
provided that such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of
the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:

b) Types of Land. The authority of the local sanggunian is limited to the

classification of agricultural lands. Such authority does not extend to all other public
lands – forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks, determined as such by
executive proclamation. Thus, the classification or reclassification of public forest land
(such as the area covered by Camp John Hay) is a prerogative of the President of the
 32

Philippines upon recommendation of the pertinent department head, not of the local
government unit.

c) Purpose of Reclassification. The power of cities and municipalities to reclassify

agricultural land into commercial, industrial, and residential status is only for the
purpose of assessment and real property taxation.

6. Closure and Opening of Roads [Sec. 21, R.A. 7160.]. A local government unit may,
pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park,
or square falling within its jurisdiction, provided that in case of permanent closure, such
ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of all the members of the sanggunian, and when
necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility shall be provided.

7. Local Legislative Power [Secs. 48-59, R.A. 7160.]. Exercised by the local
sanggunian.

a) Products of legislative action:

i) Ordinance – prescribed a permanent rule of conduct. It is intended to permanently

direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general.
ii) Resolution - of temporary character, or expresses sentiment (Garcia vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 111230, Sept. 30, 1994)

b) Requisites for validity. In Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authortiy, supra.,

reiterated in Tatel v. Municpality of Virac, supra., and in Magtajas v. Pryce
Properties, supra., the Supreme Court enumerated the requisites as follows: i) must
not contravene the Constitution and any statute; ii) must not be unfair or
oppressive; iii)must not be partial or discriminatory; iv) must not prohibit, but may
regulate trade; v) must not be unreasonable; and vi) must be general in application
and consistent with public policy.

c) Approval of Ordinances. Ordinances passed by the sanggunian panlalawigan,

sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall be approved:

i) If the local chief executive vetoed the same, and the veto is overridden by 2/3
vote of all the members of the sanggunian. The local chief executive may veto
the ordinance only once, on the ground that the ordinance is ultra vires, or that
it is prejudicial to the public welfare. He may veto any particular item or items
of an appropriation ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a
development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the
payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect
the item or items which are not objected to. The veto shall be communicated by
the local chief executive to the sanggunian within 15 days in case of a province,
 33

or 10 days in case of a city or municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be

deemed approved, as if he signed it.

d) Review by Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Procedure: within 3 days after approval, the

secretary of the sanggunian panlungsod (in component cities) or sangguniang bayan
shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review copies of approved
ordinances and resolutions and development plans submitted by local government
councils. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall review the same within 30 days; if it
finds that the ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such
ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. If no action is taken within 30
days, the ordinance or resolution is presumed consistent with law, and therefore,
valid.

e) Review of Barangay Ordinances. Within 10 days from enactment, the sangguniang

barangay, shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan for review. If the reviewing sanggunian finds the
barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the
sangguniang concerned shall, within 30 days from receipt thereof, return the same
with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangays for
adjustment, amendment or modification, in which the case the effectivity of the
ordinance is suspended until the revision called for is effected. If no action is taken
by the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan within 30 days, the ordinance
is deemed approved.

f) Enforcement of disapproved ordinances/resolutions. Any attempt to enforce an

ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public investment
program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension
or dismissal of the official or employee concerned.

g) Effectivity. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or resolution, the same shall
take effect after 10 days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board
at the entrance of the provincial capitol, or city, municipal or barangay hall, and in at
least two other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.

8. Corporate Powers [Sec. 22, R.A. 7160.]. Local government unit shall enjoy full autonomy
in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the management of their economic
enterprises, subject to limitations provided in the Code and other applicable laws. The
corporate powers of local government units are:

a. To have continuous succession in its corporate name.

b. To sue and be sued. The rule is that suit is commenced by the local executive
upon authority of the Sanggunian, except when the City Councilors, by
 34

themselves and as representatives of or on behalf of the City, bring the action to

prevent unlawful disbursement of City funds [City Council of Cebu v. Cuizon, 47
SCRA 325].

c. To have and use a corporate seal. Local government units may continue using,
modify or change their corporate seal; any change shall be registered with the
Department of Interior and Local Government.

d. To acquire and convey real or personal property.

e. Power to enter into contracts.

Requisites of a valid municipal contract:

i) The local government unit has the express, implied or inherent power
to enter into the particular contract.

ii) The contract is entered into by the proper department, board,

committee, officer or agent. Unless otherwise provided by the Code, no contract
may be entered unto by the local chief executive on behalf of the local government
unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned.

iii) The contract must comply with certain substantive requirements, i.e.,
when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual
appropriation and a certificate of availability of funds.

vi) The contract must comply with the formal requirements of written
contracts, e.g., the Statute Frauds.

a) Ultra vires contracts. When a contract is entered into without compliance with
the first and the third requisites (above), the same is ultra vires and is null and
void. Such contract cannot be ratified or validated. Ratification of defective
municipal contracts is possible only when there is non-compliance with the
second and /or the fourth requirements above. Ratification may either be
express or implied.

i) However, In Quezon City v. Lexber, Inc. G.R. No. 141616, March 15, 2001, it was
held that PD 1445 does not provide that the absence of an appropriate ordinance
ipso fact makes a contract entered into by a local government unit null and void.
Public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law, but also in
pursuance of other specific statutory authority. In this case, BP 337, the law which
was then in force, empowered the Mayor to represent the city in its business
transactions and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury and all bonds, contracts
and obligations of the city. While the Mayor has no power to appropriate funds to
 35

support the contract, neither does BP 337 prohibit him from entering into contracts
unless and until funds are appropriated therefor. By entering into the two contracts,
Mayor Simon did not usurp the city council’s power to provide for the proper
disposal of garbage and to appropriate funds therefor. The execution of contracts
to address such a need is his statutory duty, just as it is the city council’s duty to
provide for service. There is no provision in the law that prohibits the city mayor
from entering into contracts for the public welfare unless and until there is a prior
authority from the city council.

Note: Vergara vs. Ombudsman (2009)

When the local chief executive enters into contracts, he needs prior authorization or
authority from the Sanggunian and not ratification.

9. Liability of LGUs

a. Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death
or injury to persons or damage to property [Sec. 24, R.A. 7160].

1. Specific provisions of law making local government units liable:

a) Art. 2189, Civil Code: The local government unit is liable in damages for
death or injuries suffered by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings and other public works.

b) Art. 2180, Civil Code: The State is responsible when it acts through a
special agent. See Merritt v. Government of the Philippines Island, 34 Phil 311. See also
Municipality of San Fernando La Union v. Judge Firme, 195 SCRA 692.

c) Art. 34, Civil Code: The local government unit is subsidiary liable for the
damages suffered by a person of the failure or refusal of a member of the police force to
render aid and protection in case of danger to life and property

2. Liability for Tort. Despite the clear language of Sec. 24, R.A. 7160, that
local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death and
injury to persons or damage to property, it is unclear whether liability will accrue when
the local government unit is engaged in governmental functions. Supreme Court
decisions, interpreting legal provisions existing prior to the effectivity of the Local
Government Code, have come up with the following rules on municipal liability for tort:

a) If the local government is engaged in governmental functions, it is not

liable.

b) If engaged in proprietary functions, local government unit is liable.

 36

3. Liability for Violation of Law. Cases:

a) Abella v. Municipality of Naga, 90 Phil. 385. Where the

Municipality closed a part of a municipal street without indemnifying the person
prejudiced thereby, the Municipality can be held liable for damages.

b) Recto v. Municipality of Ilagan, Isabela. Lack of funds does not

excuse the Municipality from paying the statutory minimum wage of P120.00 a
month to its employees. The payment of the minimum wage is a mandatory
statutory obligation of the Municipality.

c) Moday v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 152. The Municipality of

Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, through the Mayor, was held in contempt and fined
P1,000.00, with a warning, because of the refusal of the Mayor to abide by a
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court.

4. Liability for Contracts.

a) Rule: A municipal corporation, like an ordinary person, is liable on

a contract it enters into, provided that the contract is intra vires. [In City of Manila v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra., the City was held liable in damages for breach
of contract, even if the contract does not contain a penalty clause]. If the contract
is ultra vires, the municipal corporation is not liable.

b) A private individual who deals with a municipal corporation is

imputed constructive knowledge of the extent of the power or authority of the
municipal corporation to enter into contracts.

c) Ordinarily, therefore, the doctrine of estoppels does not lie

against the municipal corporation.

d) The doctrine of implied municipal liability: A municipality may

become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the
benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to
contract [Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447]. The
doctrine applies to all cases where the money or other property of a party is
received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of an express
contract, implies an obligation to do justice with respect to the same

10. Settlement of Boundary Disputes

 37

a. Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as
possible, be settled amicably. The rules on settlement of disputes are:

i. Involving two or more barangays in the same city or municipality:

referred to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan.

ii. Involving two or more municipalities in the same province: referred to

the sangguniang panlalawigan.

By virtue of R.A. 7160, the Sanggunian Panlalawigan is vested with the

function, not only to bring the contending parties together and intervening or
assisting in the amicable settlement of the dispute, but with the original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations. The Regional Trial
Court can decide the case only on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the
decision of the Sanggunian elevate the same [Municpality of Sta. Fe v.
Municipality of Aritao, G.R. No. 140474, September 21, 2007].

In Municipality of Jimenez v. Borja, 265 SCRA 182, The Supreme Court

declared that the Regional Trial Court was correct when it ordered a relocation
survey to determine to which municipality the barangays belonged. The
agreement between the municipalities of Jimenez and Sinacaban which was
approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is invalid as it would effectively
amend Executive Order No. 258 (creating the municipality of Sinacaban). The
power of Sangguniang Panlalawigan to settle boundary disputes is limited to
implementing the law creating the municipality, and any alteration of boundaries
not in accordance with the law would exceed this authority

iii. Involving municipalities or component cities in different provinces:

jointly referred to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.

iv. Involving a component city or municipality o the one hand and a highly
urbanized city on the other, or two or more highly urbanized citites: jointly referred to
the respective sanggunians of the parties.

In National Housing Authority v. Commission on the Settlement of Land

Problems, G.R. No. 142601, October 23, 2006, where, in a boundary dispute between
the City of Caloocan and the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, a controversy over a
housing area administered by the National Housing Authority arose, and the
Municipality of San Jose Del Monte filed a case against the NHA with the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), the Supreme Court said that COSLAP is
without jurisdiction over the matter. The case should be referred to the sangguniangs
of the municipality and the city concerned.
 38

b. In the event the sanggunian fails to effect the settlement within 60 days from
the date the disputes was referred to it, it shall issue a certification to this effect. The dispute
shall then be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within
60 days from the date of certification.

c. Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may
elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the area in dispute which shall decide the appeal within 1 year from the filing
thereof.

11. Succession of elective officials

Rules on succession [Secs. 44-46, R.A. 7160]:

a) Permanent vacancies: A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local

official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of:

i) Governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice-governor concerned shall

become the governor or mayor.

ii) Vice-governor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in
case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, and
subsequent vacancies shall be filed automatically by the other sanggunian members according
to their ranking. Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion
of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding election.

iii) Punong barangay, the highest-ranking sanggunian barangay member, or in

case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian barangay member.
[Note: A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by
drawing of lots.]

iv) Sanggunian member, where automatic successions provided above do not

apply: filled by appointment by the President, through the Executive Secretary in the case of
the sanggunian panlalawigan or sanggunian panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities; by the Governor in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod
component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and by the city or municipal mayor in the case of
sangguniang barangay upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.
However, except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under
which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed. A
 39

nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the
political party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such
nomination and certificate shall be null and void and shall be a ground for administrative
action against the official concerned. In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a
sangguniang member who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall
upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the
vacancy.

v) Vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the

sanggunian; filled automatically b y the official next in rank of the organization concerned. In
Garvida v. Sales, 271 SCRA 767, the Supreme Court pointed out that under the Local
Government Code, the member of the Sangguniang Kabataan who obtained the next highest
number of votes shall succeed the Chairman if the latter refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, is convicted of a crime, voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is
removed from office, or has been absent without leave for more than three consecutive
months. Ineligibility is not one of the causes enumerated in the Local Government Code. Thus,
to avoid a hiatus in the office of the Chairman, the vacancy should be filled by the member of
the Sangguniang Kabataan choosen by the incumbent SK members by simple majority from
among themselves.

a) Temporary vacancies:

i) When the governor, city or municipal mayor , or punong barangay is temporarily

incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited to,
leave of absence, travel abroad and suspension from office, the vice governor, city or municipal
vice mayor, or the highest ranking sanggunian barangay member shall automatically exercise
the power and performs the duties and functions of the local chief executive concerned,
except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which can be exercised only if
the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty working days. [Said temporary incapacity
shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration that he
has reported back to office. Incase the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the local
chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents showing that the legal
causes no longer exists.]

ii) When the local chief executive is travelling within the country but outside his
territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three consecutive days, he may designate in
writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall specify the powers and
functions that the local office shall exercise in the absence of the local chief executive, except
the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees. [If the local chief executive fails or
refuses to issue such authorization, the vice-governor city or municipal vice-mayor, or the
highest ranking sanggunian barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right to
assume the power, duties and functions of the said office on the fourth day of absence of the
local chief executive, except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees.]
 40

12. Discipline of local officials

a. Elective Officials

i. Grounds for discipline

1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines

2. Culpable violation of the Constitution
3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence or
dereliction of duty
4. Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor
5. Abuse of authority
6. Unauthorized absence of 15 consecutive working days, except in the case
of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, panglungsod, bayan and
barangay
7. Application for, or acquisition of foreign citizenship or residence or the
status of an immigrant of another country.
8. Such other grounds as may be provided by law.

ii. Jurisdiction

1. Office of the President – for provincial, highly urbanized cities or

independent component city elective officials.

Under A.O. No. 23, the President has delegated the power to investigate
complaints to the Secretary of the DILG. This is valid as what was delegated
was the power to investigate and not the power to discipline. (Joson vs.
Torres, 290 SCRA 279)

2. Sangguniang Panlalawigan – for elective municipal officials.

The decision of the sanggunian may be appealed to the Office of the

President.

Take note that an President can stay the execution of the appealed
decision. (Berces vs. Executive Secretary, 241 SCRA 539)

3. Sangguniang Panlungsod or Pambayan – for elective barangay officials.

iii. Preventive Suspension

 41

1. It may be imposed by the President, the governor or the mayor as the

case may be at any time after the issues are joined.
2. The authority to preventively suspend is exercised concurrently by the
Ombudsman. Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman can impose preventive
suspension of 6 months. (Hagad vs. Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, Dec. 12,
1995)
3. Suspension by the Sandiganbayan of local elective officials should not
exceed 60 days. (Rios vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129913, Sept. 26,
1997)
4. Suspension as penalty shall not exceed the unexpired term, or a period of
6 months.

iv. Removal

1. The penalty of removal from office may be imposed upon an erring local
elective official only by the order of the court.
2. The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative case
shall be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective local
office.

v. Administrative Appeal

1. Decisions of sangguniang panlungsod bayan are appealable to the

sangguniang panlalawigan.
2. Decisions of sangguniang panlalawigan and of HUCs and independent
component cities are appelable to the Office of the President.

vi. Doctrine of condonation

The re-election of a local official does not bar the continuation of the
administrative case against him, inasmuch as the re-election of the official is not
a ground for exonerating a public official from administrative liability (Carpio-
Morales vs. Court of Appeals, November 15, 2015)

b. Appointive officials

i. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints as

well as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance with the civil service
law.
ii. The local chief executive may preventively suspend for a period
not exceeding 60 days any subordinate official if the charge involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect.
 42

iii. The local chief executive may impose the penalty of removal and
other penalties. If the penalty imposed is suspension of 30 days, the decision is
final; if it is higher, the decision is appealable to the CSC.

13. Recall

a. It is exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the

local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
b. It is initiated upon a petition by at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters in the LGU concerned during the election in which the local official sought
to be recalled was elected, which must be filed with the Comelec. The said
petition shall be posted in public and conspicuous places of not less than 10 days
nor more than 20 days for purposes of verifying the authenticity and
genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters.
c. The Comelec shall then announce the acceptance of candidates to the position
and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the
official sought to be recalled.
d. The recall election shall be held not later than 30 days after the filing of the recall
petition for barangay, city or municipal officials, and 45 days in the case of
provincial officials.
e. The recall of the elective official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes cast during the recall election. Should the official sought to be
recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby
affirmed, and he shall continue in office.
f. The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign
while the recall process is in progress.
g. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.
h. No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumption
of office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular local election. “Regular local
election” refers to the election where the position of the official to be recalled is
actually contested. (Angobung vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 126571, March 5, 1997). SK
election is not within the contemplation of “regular local election”. (Paras vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, Nov. 4, 1996)

14. Term limits

a. The term of office of local elective officials is three (3) years. No local elective
official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
 43

b. The three-term limit on a local official is to be understood to refer to terms for

which the official concerned was elected. It is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. (Adormeo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002)

c. In Socrates v. Commission on Elections 391 SCRA 457 (2002), it was held that the
rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code, has two parts: (1) The first part provides that an elective
local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. (2) The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption
from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek

immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the
next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term.

➢ Abundo vs. Comelec (2013)

o Abundo ran for the position of Municipal Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes in the
years 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010. He was proclaimed winner of the 2001 and
2007 elections. In the 2004 election, however, Jose Torres was proclaimed the
winner of the electoral race and Mayor of Viga, performing the functions of the
office. Abundo protested Torres’ election and was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. He assumed office from May 9,
2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007.
o As provided for in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of
the Local Government Code, the three-term limit rule constitutes a
disqualification to run for an elective local office when an official has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and has
fully served those three consecutive terms.
o In the Court’s 35-page decision, written by Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., it
unanimously held that Abundo did not serve three consecutive terms as Mayor
of Viga, Catanduanes due to an actual involuntary interruption during the 2004-
2007 term. This was because he assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9,
2006 and served a little over one year and one month only. Thus, “the two-year
period which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered
 44

as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of

the three-term limit rule,” ruled the Court.
o The Court further ruled that the COMELEC erred in applying Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, which held that “service of the unexpired portion of a
term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered
as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit
rule” as the doctrine refers to a situation where the elected official is under
preventive suspension and is only temporarily unable to discharge his functions
yet is still entitled to the office as compared to the situation of Abundo where he
did not have title to the office. The Court emphasized that pending the favorable
resolution of Abundo’s election protest, he was relegated to being an ordinary
constituent and private citizen since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the
2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. While awaiting the pendency
of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over
the constituents of Viga and cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner. It
stressed that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the “effects of an
election protest because while Abundo was the winning candidate, he was the
one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constitutents.”

➢ Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs
in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position through succession,
his service for the unexpired portion of the term cannot be treated as one full term.
➢ Montebon v. Commission on Elections supplemented this by saying that if the official
runs again for the same position he held rior to his assumption of the higher office, his
succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary
severance or interruption.
➢ On the issue of recall elections, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v.
Commission on Elections held that an elective official, who has served for three
consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his
fourth trm, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the
official’s servicefor he had become in the interim a private citizen.
➢ Latasa v. Commission on Elections ruled that the abolition of an elective office due to
the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent official’s continuity of service.
➢ As mentioned above, Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections states that preventive
suspension is not a term interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although
he is barred from exercising the functions of the office during this period.
➢ Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections and Dizon v. Commission on Elections continued
on to rule that when a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and
assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is
ousted from office. An interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of service.
 45

➢ Lastly, Ong v. Alegre and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections declared when an official
is defeated in an election protest and decision becomes final only after the official had
served the full term for the office, then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish.
His full service should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term. (GR No. 201716,
Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013)

To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness

of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz.:

1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for
the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).

2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).

3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service (Latasa).

4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer's

continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of
suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period
(Aldovino, Jr.).

5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office,
his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for
any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
 46

constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).