VOL.
209, JUNE 9, 1992 665
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 95229. June 9, 1992.
CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT
CUYUGAN, respondents.
Succession; Action; Action to compel recognition and a claim to inheritance may be joined in a single
complaint.—Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate
child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition
and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Statutes; Where a complaint for recognition was filed before the Family Code took effect, the
same should be resolved under the provisions of the New Civil Code.—Under the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the
complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We
herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we
held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the
same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that statutory changes in procedure shall apply to pending actions cannot be
applied where it will affect vested rights.—Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the
Family Code in question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure
may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation,
is not so pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect,
since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises
especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no
proper applica-
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
666
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
tion to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and,
consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of the
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil
Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Isnani, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lorenzo G. Timbol for petitioner.
Jose P. Bondoc for E. Cuyugan.
REGALADO, J.:
1
The instant petition seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, entitled "Corito Tayag vs. Hon. Norberto C. Ponce, Judge, Regional Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga and Emilie Dayrit Cuyugan," 2promulgated on May 10,1990,
and its resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Said decision, now before us
for review, dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction on the ground that the denial of the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7938 of the
court a quo is an interlocutory order and cannot be the subject of the said special civil action,
ordinary appeal in due time being petitioner's remedy.
In said Civil Case No. 7938, herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for
Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo. The operative allegations in said complaint are as follows:
________________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Asaali S. Isnani, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera and Luis
L. Victor Rollo 119-124.
2 Rollo, 142.
667
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 667
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
"2. Plaintiff is the mother and legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan, by the father of the
defendant, the late Atty, Ricardo Ocampo; and the defendant is the known administratrix of the real
and personal properties left by her deceased father, said Atty. Ocampo, who died intestate in Angeles
City on September 28, 1983;
"3. Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during
which time, plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that,
as a consequence thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with
the ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo;
"4. Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October
5, 1980 had been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative
father for being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late
Atty. Ocampo to herein plaintiff, excerpts from some of which are hereunder reproduced;
'x x x Keep good keep faith keep Chad and yourself for me alone and for me all the time. As I have now I shall save my
heart to you and to Chad/
'x x x Please take good care and pray to Sto. Niño for our sake and for the child sake.'
'x x x Keep him. Take good care of him.'
'x x x I'm proud that you are his mother ... I'm proud of him and you. Let me bless him by my name and let me entitle
him to all what I am and what I've got.'
'x x x I have vowed to recognize him and be my heir.'
'x x x How is CHAD and you . . .'
'x x x Why should we not start now to own him, jointly against the whole world. After all we love each other and
CHAD is the product of our love."
"5. The minor, Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the
intestate estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs;
"6. The deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and in the Province of Pampanga with approximate
value of several millions of pesos;
"7. The estate of the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been inventoried by the defendant and the
inheritance of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad has not likewise been ascertained;
"8. The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely:
Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O.
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose behalf this instant
complaint is filed;
"9. Plaintiff has no means of livelihood and she only depends on the charity of friends and relatives for
the sustenance of her son, Chad, such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative that said child be
extended financial support from the estate of his putative father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo;
"10. Several demands, verbal and written, have been made for defendant to grant Chad's lawful
inheritance, but despite said demands, defendant failed and refused and still 3
fails and refuses to
satisfy the claim for inheritance against the estate of the late Atty. Ocampo;"
xxx
Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render
an inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to
determine and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the estate of the deceased; and to give
him support pendente lite.
Petitioner, as defendant therein, filed her answer with counterclaim on June 3, 1987,
disputing the material allega-tions in the complaint. She maintained by way of affirmative
defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the action is premature;
that the suit is barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial
personality to bring the suit; that the lower court has 4no jurisdiction over the nature of the action;
and that there is improper joinder of causes of action.
After the hearing of the motion to dismiss on the grounds asserted as affirmative defenses, the
trial court issued the following order on October 20, 1987:
xxx
The Court is of the considered opinion that there is a need of further proceedings to adduce evidence on
the various claims of the parties so as to hear their respective sides.
_______________
3 Rollo, 43-45.
4 Ibid., 48-52.
669
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 669
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
"WHEREFORE, resolution on the preliminary hearing which partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss
requiring additional evidence is in the 5
meantime held in abeyance. The Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied
and the case is set for pre-trial x x x."
6
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, petitioner
filed on December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of
respondent court on August 2, 1989 and enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion
praying for the dismissal
7
of the complaint based on the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days
from notice thereof.
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter
denied the motion to dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses in Civil Case
No. 7938, in an order dated October 24,1989, resolving the said motion in the following manner:
xxx
"The Court now resolves:
No. 1. The complaint sufficiently shows that a cause of action exists in favor of the plaintiff. A cause of
action being the 'primary right to redress a wrong' (Marquez vs. Valera, 48 OG 5272), which apparently on
the face of the complaint, plaintiff has a right to enforce through this case. Defendant's protestation that
there is no sufficient cause of action is therefore untenable.
No. 2. The present action, despite the claim of defendant is not premature. It is exactly filed in order to
prove filiation, and then recognition. To go about the step by step procedure outlined by the defendant by
filing one action after another is definitely violative of the prohibition against splitting a cause of action.
No. 3. It is not the plaintiff that is now bringing the case before the Court. It is (her) spurious child that
she represents as natural guardian that is instituting the action.
No, 4, Prescription has not set in if we consider that a spurious child may file an action for recognition
within four years from his
_______________
5 Ibid., 68.
6 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 20222, 64.
7 Ibid., id., 65-68.
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
attainment of majority (New Civil Code, Art, 285, No, 2). Whether the letters of the putative father, Atty.
Ocampo, is evidence, that should be inquired into in a hearing on the merits.
No. 5. Several causes of action may be joined in one complaint as was done in this case. The defendant's
claim that there was a misjoinder is untenable.
No. 6. The Court being a court of general jurisdiction, and of special jurisdiction, such as a probate court
has capacity to entertain a complaint such as the one now before it.
'The nature of the case 'CLAIM FOR INHERITANCE' does not control the body of the complaint.
"From all the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaint is sufficient in form and substance and,
therefore, the motion to dismiss could not be granted until after trial on the merits in which it should be
shown that the allegations of the complaint are unfounded or a8 special defense to the action exists.
"WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED."
Petitioner's
9
motion for reconsideration of said order was denied by the trial court on January 30,
1990. As a consequence, another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction was filed by petitioner on March 12, 1990 with respondent court, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 20222, praying that the orders dated October 24,1989 and January 30, 1990 of the trial
court be annulled and set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On May 10,1990, as earlier stated, respondent court promulgated its decision dismissing the
petition, and likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
September 5, 1990, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
In elevating the case before us, petitioner relies on these grounds:
"a. The Honorable Respondent Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition in UTTER DISRE
_______________
8 Rollo, 69-70.
9 Ibid,, 81-83.
671
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 671
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
GARD OF APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT providing clear
exceptions to the general rule that interlocutory orders may not be elevated by way of the
special civil action of certiorari;
"b. Respondent Court refused to resolve certain issues raised by Petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court and before Respondent Court of Appeals involving QUESTIONS OF
SUBSTANCE not theretofore determined by this Honorable Court, such as the
interpretation and application of Art. 281 of the Civil Code requiring judicial approval
when the recognition of an illegitimate minor child does not take place in a record of birth
or in a will; of Art. 175, Par. 2, in relation to Art. 172, Par. 2 of the Family Code, providing
for the prescriptive period with respect to the action to establish illegitimate filiation; and
of Art. 285 of the Civil Code, providing for the prescriptive period with respect to the
action for recognition of a natural child; and
"c. Respondent Court has sanctioned a DEPARTURE10 by the Regional Trial Court from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings."
Petitioner contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein private respondent in
behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan, is premature and the complaint states no cause of
action. She submits that the recognition of the minor child, either voluntarily or by judicial
action, by the alleged putative father must first be established before the former can invoke his
right to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner asseverates that since there
is no allegation of such recognition in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then
there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim and, consequently, the complaint
should be dismissed. 11
The instant case is similar to the case of Paulino vs. Paulino, et al., wherein the petitioner, as
plaintiff, brought an action against the private respondents, as defendants, to compel them to
give her share of inheritance in the estate of the late Marcos Paulino, claiming and alleging, inter
alia, that she is the illegitimate child of the deceased; that no proceedings for the set-
_______________
10 Ibid., 8-9.
11 3 SCRA 730 (1961).
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
tlement of the deceased's estate had been commenced in court; and that the defendants had
refused and failed to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased. She accordingly prayed that
the defendants therein be ordered to deliver her aforesaid share. The defendants moved for the
dismissal of her complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action and that, even if it does,
the same is barred by prescription.
The only difference between the aforecited case and the case at bar is that at the time of the
filing of the complaint therein, the petitioner in that case had already reached the age of
majority, whereas the claimant in the present case is still a minor. In Paulino, we held that an
illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the putative or presumed
parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the
complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child
because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being
no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which
cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner
to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations
therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one
complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. 12
As early as 1992, we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al., wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex
action to compel recog-
________________
12 43 Phil. 763 (1922).
673
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 673
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
nition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which
in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words,
there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been
instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks
additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in
other cases. x x x.
"The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to
some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must
be considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate
of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary
for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition
suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and
the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings."
The next question to be resolved is whether the action to compel recognition has prescribed.
Petitioner argues that assuming arguendo that the action is one to compel recognition, private
respondent's cause of action has prescribed for the reason that since filiation is sought to be
proved by means of a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, then
under paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code, the action to establish filiation of the
illegitimate minor child must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged putative father. In the
case at bar, considering that the complaint was filed after the death of the alleged parent, the
action has prescribed and this is another ground for the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner
theorizes that Article 285 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar and, instead,
paragraph 2, Article 175 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect. The theory is
premised on the supposition
674
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
that the latter provision of law being merely procedural in nature, no vested rights are created,
hence it can be made to apply retroactively.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;"
xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
"Art. 175, Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of
the alleged parent"
Under the last-quoted provision of law, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of
the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child's filiation in a public
document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the child. However, if the action is based on the open and continuous possession by
the child of the status of an illegitimate child, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws, the 13view has been expressed that the action must be brought during the lifetime
of the alleged parent.
Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint
should have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be
dismissed on the ground of prescription. Private respondent,
_______________
13 Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, 1989 ed., 249.
675
VOL. 209, JUNE 9, 1992 675
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the alleged parent died
during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from the
attainment of majority of the minor child,
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an
action for recognition is a vested right or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint
14
in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein 15
adopt our ruling in the recent
case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of
filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can
no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending
actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operation, is not so
pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect,
since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure
arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family
Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a
right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which
have been vested with the filing of the
________________
14 The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, pursuant to the clarification in Memorandum Circular No. 85 of the
Office of the President, dated November 7, 1988.
15 G.R. No. 92326, January 24,1992.
676
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of
the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.
Finally, we conform with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the questioned order of the
court below denying the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition
for certiorari. The exceptions to this rule invoked by petitioner and allegedly obtaining in the case
at bar, are obviously not present and may not be relied upon.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ.,concur.
Nocon, J., On leave.
Petition denied; decision affirmed in toto.
Note.—Law in force at the time of recognition governs the act of recognition (Lim vs. Court of
Appeals, 65 SCRA 160).
Recognition must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document
(Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 160).
——o0o——
