Philippine Commercial International Bank, Petitioner, vs. Antonio B.
Balmaceda and
Rolando N. Ramos, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158143, 21 September 2011, (658 SCRA 33)
FACTS: PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages before the RTC
against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Manila branch. PCIB
alleged that between 1991 and 1993, Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as
branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed Manager's checks in the total amount
P10,782,150.00.
PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to implead Rolando Ramos as one
of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda's alleged fraud. PCIB also
increased the number of fraudulently obtained and encashed Manager's checks to 34, in
the total amount of P11,937,150.00. The RTC granted this motion.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand,
Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda's scheme. According to
Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling
fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money
from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda but
maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda's money.
RTC: The RTC found that Balmaceda, by taking undue advantage of his position and
authority as branch manager of the Sta. Cruz, Manila branch of PCIB, successfully obtained
and misappropriated the bank's funds by falsifying several commercial documents. The
RTC also concluded that Ramos acted in collusion with Balmaceda.
CA: On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient
evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter's fraudulent
manipulations.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Ramos, who received a portion of the money that Balmaceda took
from PCIB, should also be held liable for the return of this money to the Bank
2. Whether or not PCIB, as employer, is at fault in the perpetration of the fraud
committed by Balmaceda
RULING:
1. NO. On its face, all that PCIB's evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos'
name as a payee when he filled up the application forms for the Manager's checks.
But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the
payee on some of the Manager's checks is not enough basis to conclude that
Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda's fraud; a number of other people were made
payees on the other Manager's checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor
did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos' participation that would
justify his separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmaceda's
brother-in-law, their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable,
absent concrete proof of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme.
Moreover, the evidence on record clearly shows that Balmaceda acted on his own
when he applied for the Manager's checks against the bank account of one of
PCIB's clients, as well as when he encashed the fraudulently acquired Manager's
checks.
2. YES. PCIB itself is at fault as an employer in considering this case, one point that
cannot be disregarded is the significant role that PCIB played which contributed
to the perpetration of the fraud. We cannot ignore that Balmaceda managed to
carry out his fraudulent scheme primarily because other PCIB employees failed to
carry out their assigned tasks — flaws imputable to PCIB itself as the employer.
Ms. Analiza Vega, an accounting clerk, teller and domestic remittance clerk working
at the PCIB, Sta. Cruz, Manila branch at the time of the incident, testified that
Balmaceda broke the Bank's protocol when he ordered the Bank's employees to fill
up the application forms for the Manager's checks, to be debited from the bank
account of one of the bank's clients, without providing the necessary Authority to
Debit from the client. PCIB also admitted that these Manager's checks were
subsequently released to Balmaceda, and not to the client's representative, based
solely on Balmaceda's word that the client had tasked him to deliver these checks.
Despite Balmaceda's gross violations of bank procedures — mainly in the processing
of the applications for Manager's checks and in the releasing of the Manager's
checks — Balmaceda's co-employees not only turned a blind eye to his actions, but
actually complied with his instructions. In this way, PCIB's own employees were
unwitting accomplices in Balmaceda's fraud.
Another telling indicator of PCIB's negligence is the fact that it allowed
Balmaceda to encash the Manager's checks that were plainly crossed checks.
Based on jurisprudence, the crossing of a check has the following effects: (a) the
check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be
negotiated only once — to the one who has an account with the bank; and (c) the
act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has
been issued for a definite purpose and he must inquire if he received the check
pursuant to this purpose; otherwise, he is not a holder in due course. In other
words, the crossing of a check is a warning that the check should be deposited
only in the account of the payee. When a check is crossed, it is the duty of the
collecting bank to ascertain that the check is only deposited to the payee's
account. In complete disregard of this duty, PCIB's systems allowed Balmaceda to
encash 26 Manager's checks which were all crossed checks, or checks payable to
the "payee's account only."
The General Banking Law of 2000 requires of banks the highest standards of
integrity and performance. The banking business is impressed with public interest.
Of paramount importance is the trust and confidence of the public in general in the
banking industry. Consequently, the diligence required of banks is more than that of
a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence
is expected.
While we appreciate that Balmaceda took advantage of his authority and position
as the branch manager to commit these acts, this circumstance cannot be used to
excuse the manner the Bank — through its employees — handled its clients' bank
accounts and thereby ignored established bank procedures at the branch
manager's mere order. This lapse is made all the more glaring by Balmaceda's
repetition of his modus operandi more times in a period of over one year by the
Bank's own estimation. With this kind of record, blame must be imputed on the
Bank itself and its systems, not solely on the weakness or lapses of individual
employees.
