Report

Evaluating the use of a

Fire Fighting Helicopter
in the Netherlands
 This report, evaluating the use of a Fire Fighting Helicopter in the
Netherlands, was carried out by the Netherlands Institute for Fire
Service and Disaster Management (Nibra) at the request of the Fire
Fighting Helicopter Project Group in the Netherlands. The report is
a translation of the Dutch report ‘Evaluatie van de pilot
‘Helikopterblussing Nederland’.

Author
Astrid Scholtens

Thanks are due to

Sander Bekhuis (Nibra)
Wouter Kaihatu (Dienst Luchtvaartpolitie)

Translated by
Erica Peters
Cliff Sear

 Nibra, May 2002

The Netherlands Institute for Fire Service

and Disaster Management
PO Box 7010
6801 HA ARNHEM
The Netherlands
Telephone: +31 (0)26 3552400
Fax: +31 (0)26 3515051
E-mail: [email protected]

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Preface
The Netherlands Institute for Fire Service and Disaster Management
(Nibra) provides a key source of expertise, developing and sharing
knowledge in both fire service operations and disaster management.
Evaluation projects in both areas form an important part of the
activities of the Nibra research team.

Innovative ideas regarding fire fighting, could form an important

contribution towards improving the way we currently deal with
fires. New methods of extinguishing fires more quickly could
improve efficiency and decrease the risk to personnel.

In addition, risks in society are rapidly changing, fires in complex and

high-rise buildings are increasingly more difficult to deal with. This
prompted the Project Group in 2000 to evaluate the use of a
Helicopter equipped with the IFEX-system, to establish whether its
use would add value when fire fighting in buildings that are complex
or with difficult access.

Nibra contributed to this project by evaluating the results of the

tests undertaken during the pilot project.

We trust that this evaluation will provide a useful and constructive

contribution when considering the implementation of a fire fighting
helicopter in the future.

Arnhem, May 2002

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Table of contents
Abbreviations 06

1 Introduction 07

2 Aims and objectives of the pilot project 09

3 Outline of the evaluation 11

4 Evaluation of each attack 13

4.1 Exercise at Nederhorst den Berg 15
4.2 Fire in a warehouse containing paper 17
4.3 First real attack at the fire at Leusder Heath 19
4.4 Fire in office building Ballast Nedam 22
4.5 Dune fire in Velsen 22
4.6 Roof fire VNU building in Hoofddorp 23
4.7 Barn fire in Oterleek 25
4.8 Fire in the restaurant of Hotel Akersloot 27
4.9 Three exercises in the ‘Bijlmer’ 28

5 Technical evaluation 31

6 Overall evaluation 35

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1 Background information 49

B.1 The extinguishing effect of water 49
B.2 The IFEX-system and the helicopter 50
B.3 The development and lead in to the project 50
B.4 Preparation of the pilot project 52
B.5 Carrying out the pilot project 53
B.6 The fire fighting helicopter 55
B.7 The Operational tactics and procedures 58

Attachment 2 The Attacks 63

Attachment 3 Participants 73

Attachment 4 The trial area 75

Footnotes 77

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 Abbreviations
The following abbreviations will be used in the report:

IC Incident Commander (Fire Officer in charge of fire

fighting operations at the scene)
KLPD Korps Landelijke Politiediensten (National Police
Services Agency)
OPS Operations (The National Police Aviation Authority)
PLD Politie Luchtvaartdienst (National Police Aviation
Authority)

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

1 Introduction
In 1997 an innovative way of fighting fires was devised. This involved
equipping a helicopter with an experimental extinguishing system1
(IFEX-system2, developed in 1994) and provided a new way to fight
fires in high-rise or complicated locations. Having been equipped,
the helicopter was technically fit for fighting fires but had yet to be
operationally tested.

By the end of 1997 the Chief Fire Officer of the Maarssen Fire
Brigade took the initiative to set up a pilot project for the fire
fighting helicopter. The objective of the fire fighting helicopter was
“to provide support to the fire service when dealing with fires in
high-rise buildings or fires in locations which are difficult to access”
(see protocol attachment 1, section B.7).

The pilot project was unique as it was the first to assess this
combination of equipment in operational situations. Many
participants were involved in the project providing financial
resources, specific expertise, equipment and by creating support for
the practical benefits of the helicopter.

The participants were:

• The College of Chief Officers of Regional Fire Brigades (CCRB)
• European Commission
• Royal Netherlands’ Association of Fire Brigades (KNBV)
• Police Aviation Authority of the National Police Services Agency
• Fire Service and Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations
• Orgainfo Advies en Management (consultancy)
• Maarssen Fire Brigade
• The Civil Aviation Authority of the Transport and Water
Management Inspectorate
• Royal Naval Institute (Academy) in Den Helder
• AMEV Nederland (Insurance company - main sponsor)
• the Elf Provinciën (property developer)
• Waterleidingbedrijf Midden-Nederland (Water company)
• Netherlands Institute for Fire Service and Disaster Management
(Nibra).

Their input, together with the co-operation between police force

and fire service, has made this an exceptional pilot project.

By the end of 1999, which was later than originally planned, nine of
the representatives above signed an agreement to co-operate in the
pilot project. In the agreement they formally declared their
commitment to take part in the project that became known as the
‘Fire Fighting Helicopter Netherlands’. The pilot project
commenced on 3 April 2000 and was concluded on 3 October
2001.

7
 The Netherlands Institute for Fire Service and Disaster Management
(Nibra) evaluated the pilot project and has presented the resulting
conclusions in this report. This evaluation sets out to establish
whether the use of a fire fighting helicopter is an effective way to
support fighting fires in high-rise buildings and whether it could form
a useful addition to fire fighting equipment in the future.

It has to be emphasized that research has been done the fire fighting
helicopter concept as a whole. That is to say the combination of the
helicopter and the IFEX-system. The operation of the IFEX-system
on its own has not been a part of the research carried out by Nibra.
Therefore an opinion has not been given regarding the system in
this evaluation.

The evaluation was carried out in co-operation with the Police

Aviation Authority of the National Police Services Agency (PLD).

Structure and contents of the report

The evaluation consists of three parts
• Evaluation of operational use (chapter 4 and attachment 2)
• Technical evaluation (chapter 5)
• The overall evaluation of the pilot project (chapter 6).

Chapter 6 contains the overall conclusions of the evaluation and can

be read in isolation as a summary.

Chapter 2 deals with the objectives of the pilot project.

Chapter 3 describes the methodology of the evaluation.

Attachment 1 contains background information and details about

significant aspects of the pilot project. This information might be
useful when reading the evaluation.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

2 Aims and objectives of

the pilot project
The basic principle behind the pilot project is that the fire fighting
helicopter would support the fire service in extinguishing fires in
high-rise buildings and locations that are difficult to access (see
Operational tactics and procedures – attachment 1, section B.7).
Support in this context means that the fire fighting helicopter (in
theory) will be able to control the fire in first instance until the fire
service take over. It was not originally assumed that the fire fighting
helicopter would extinguish the fire completely3. This aspect is not
included in the in the Operational tactics and procedures.

The participants and others were aware before the project began
that the fire fighting helicopter would not always be able to provide
effective support. The IFEX-system is based on the cooling and
smothering effect of water vapour and this system has proved to be
more efficient in a confined space than in the open air (see
attachment 1, section B.1 en B.6) these circumstances would not
always exist.

It was agreed that the National Police Aviation Authority (PLD)

would adopt a flexible approach regarding requests for the fire
fighting helicopter. This meant that requests not entirely meeting
the aims of the project could still be acknowledged, even in
circumstances where the IFEX-system could perhaps not operate at
its optimum level (see introduction of chapter 4). By adopting a
flexible approach4 it was anticipated that the fire service would be
encouraged to request the fire fighting helicopter. This would enable
sufficient mobilization opportunities for the pilot project to be
successful.

The evaluation intends to support decision-making regarding the

possible introduction of the fire fighting helicopter in specific
situations mentioned. Consequently the ‘central question’ in the
evaluation is whether the fire fighting helicopter demonstrates
added value in cases of fire in high-rise buildings or locations that
are difficult to access.

‘Designated’ attacks
In this evaluation a ‘designated attack’ is an attack that meets the
objective of the pilot project. Namely the fire fighting helicopter had
to support the fire service during (suppressive) fire fighting in high-
rise buildings or fires which were difficult to access. Only designated
attacks are of importance when determining whether its operational
use has been successful. The decision whether to introduce the fire
fighting helicopter should be based on the objectives of the pilot
project. If the fire fighting helicopter proves to be successful for
different reasons, the project group will have to determine whether

9
 the benefits identified make use of the fire fighting helicopter
desirable.

The project group may gain valuable information from attacks which
do not meet the criteria or are unsuccessful.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

3 Outline of the
evaluation
Questionnaires
Two different questionnaires were designed for the evaluation.
After each attack the questionnaires were sent to the Fire Officer
requesting the helicopter and the Pilot and Operator of the
National Police Aviation Authority (PLD)5. At the commencement
of the project the questionnaires were sent to the National Police
Aviation Authority and several Fire Officers for comment. The
demonstration of the fire fighting helicopter in Nederhorst den Berg
(see section 4.1) was used by Nibra to validate the questionnaires
which, after minor amendments, were ready for use at the first
operational deployment on 12 May 2000.

The five main topics for the fire service and the National Police
Aviation Authority (PLD) in the questionnaires were:
• Alarm, mobilization and deployment of the helicopter
• Type, location and severity of the fire at the time of the request
and during the attack
• Communication, coaching and provision of information
• Use of the helicopter (e.g. influence of the ‘down-wash’ – that is
the draught caused by the rotors)
• Opinions regarding the use of the helicopter in general

In the questionnaires for the National Police Aviation Authority

(PLD) some additional categories were included:
• Landing zones
• Water intake/re-filling
• Shots using the IFEX-system.

Interviews with Fire Officers at random

Nibra interviewed approximately fifty Fire Officers in general terms
regarding the use of the fire fighting helicopter during the pilot
project as well as after each attack. The Fire Officers, who where
chosen at random, had not made a request for the fire fighting
helicopter themselves. The purpose of the interviews was to get an
overall impression of the fire service’s opinion regarding the fire
fighting helicopter. This was important because it was the fire
service who had to make a request for the helicopter. The image
the fire service formed of the helicopter, for example through the
media, may have an influence on the project’s outcome.

Police Aviation Authority

As already pointed out the evaluation is also based on the
experiences of the Police Aviation Authority (PLD). They were
closely associated with the project (see attachment 1, sub section
B.5.2). The PLD evaluated each attack internally, on some occasions
together with the Fire Brigade concerned. The PLD included the

11
 results of their evaluations in the Nibra questionnaires. In addition
to the questionnaires Nibra personnel interviewed the pilots, in
some cases, after the attack.

Attendance at demonstrations
A number of Nibra researchers attended demonstrations and tests
with the fire fighting helicopter in Nederhorst den Berg on 2 May
2000 and in Amsterdam on 18 October 2001 amongst others. By
attending the demonstrations the researchers gained a clear
understanding of operation of the fire fighting helicopter and
practical procedures used.

Video recording
During some attacks video-recordings were made and footage has
been used for the evaluation.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

4 Evaluation of each
attack
In this chapter, divided into sections, the most important
conclusions for each attack are provided. The conclusions are based
on the questionnaires completed by the Fire Officer, Pilot and
Operator, additional interviews with the people involved and
available video-recordings.

If a decision is be made to continue using the fire fighting helicopter

through a second pilot project or by incorporating the helicopter in
to the service, important information could be extracted from the
evaluation report to amend and improve the Operational tactics and
procedures.
For a more detailed abstract of the attacks see attachment 2.
During the pilot project the PLD received many requests from the
fire service for demonstrations of the fire fighting helicopter at
‘Open Days’. The PLD never agreed to these requests6. The
exercises and demonstrations that took place outside the pilot
project were held at the air base in Den Helder or at locations
where there were no risks7 to spectators.

However, the exercises held on 18 October 2001 were an

exception. These exercises were originally planned to take place on
13 September 2001 but were cancelled as a mark of respect
following the terrorist attacks in America on 11 September 2001.

Diagram 4.1 contains a list of the attacks included in the evaluation.

Column 3 indicates whether or not an attack can be regarded as
‘designated’. As previously explained a ‘designated attack’ is an
attack that meets the criteria of the pilot project. Namely, the fire
fighting helicopter had to support the fire service during fire fighting
in high-rise buildings or fires which were difficult to access. The
designated attacks are particularly important for the pilot project to
be successful.
It should be re-emphasized that valuable information may be gained
from attacks which do not meet the criteria or are unsuccessful.

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 Date Location Designated Description of the Activities of the
attack fire helicopter
2 May Nederhorst den Yes Fire in cabin in yacht on Blussing van de
2000 Berg (exercise) the ‘Spiegelglas’ brandhaard
12 May Purmerend No Fire in warehouse Test of penetrating
2000 containing paper (status ability
of the fire at time of
attack: smouldering)
12 May Leusderheide No Bush/heath fire (status Damping down
2000 (no open at time of attack: Fire
fire) out on arr.)
03 May Utrecht No Fire in high-rise building None
2001 (no attack for
safety reasons)

14 May Wijk aan Zee No Bush fire in dunes Damping down

2001 (attack initiated by
PLD)
9 July Hoofddorp No Roof fire in VNU- Extinguishing seat of
2001 building (status at time the fire (very late
of attack: blaze) attack)
3 August Oterleek No Fire in barn (status at Extinguishing seat of
2001 time of attack: blaze) the fire (after signal
was given that fire
was under control)
5 August Akersloot Yes Fire in restaurant in Extinguishing seat of
2001 hotel (status at time of the fire
attack: severe blaze)
18 Amsterdam Yes Simulated fire in flat (1) Extinguishing seat of
October (Bijlmer – area the fire
2001 of Amsterdam)
18 Amsterdam Yes Simulated fire in flat (2) Extinguishing seat of
October (Bijlmer – area the fire
2001 of Amsterdam)
18 Amsterdam Yes Simulated fire in flat (3) Extinguishing seat of
October (Bijlmer – area the fire
2001 of Amsterdam)

Diagram 4.1: outline of the attacks

Five ‘designated’ attacks were carried out during the pilot project
but only one of them was not simulated.

The following conditions were of importance for a successful

‘designated’ attack:
• The fire fighting helicopter must be functioning correctly,
specifically the IFEX-system.
• Optimum conditions are required for the IFEX-system to
function correctly. The specifications of the IFEX-system
require:
o The seat of the fire must be accessible and the fire
should not be surrounded by obstacles. The fire
fighting helicopter has to be able to get sufficiently
close for the water cannon to reach the seat of the
fire. The extinguishing capacity of the system is based
on the fact that the shots of water will reach the seat
of the fire effectively.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

o There should only be short intervals (a few seconds)

between each shot. With every shot the fire will be
slightly reduced and the next shot must follow
quickly. Otherwise the fire will flare up again.
o The IFEX-system is based on the cooling and
smothering effect of water vapour and this system
has proved to be more efficient in a confined space
than in the open air8.
(see attachment 1, section B.1 and B.6).

4.1 Exercise at Nederhorst den Berg

Description of the fire

On 2 May at approximately 1900hrs, one day before the official
start of the pilot project, an exercise with a helicopter took place in
Nederhorst den Berg. The area contains a large amount of water
(lakes) and the Brigade considered that sailing boats and leisure craft
could be classified as risks with difficult access. They wanted to
establish whether the fire fighting helicopter could be a useful asset
to their fire fighting equipment in such circumstances. The exercise
was carried out on the Spiegelplas (lake) and took approximately
one hour. The target of fifteen shots was not achieved and the
Nibra researchers present at the time decided to include this attack
in the evaluation.

A pleasure yacht of approximately 8 meters was set on fire,

although initially the fire did not develop large quantities of smoke
were produced. The Fire Brigade’s diving team rescued a simulated
casualty from drowning near the yacht and shortly after the rescue
an explosion on board resulted in a well developed fire. The
windows of the yacht were mainly melted away and the hatch was
open giving free access to the cabin area. The yacht was moored by
two anchors approximately 30 meters off shore.

The fire fighting helicopter was already on its way when a request
was made by the Fire Brigade. After six shots the down-wash of the
helicopter caused the stern mooring to snap. Shortly after this the
second mooring snapped allowing the burning vessel to drift in the
direction of the observers. A fire boat, present in case of
emergency, quickly extinguished the fire producing large quantities
of smoke.

Main conclusions

• ‘Designated’ attack?
The fire fighting helicopter supported the fire service during an
attack on a fire that was difficult to access in the suppression phase.
The criteria of the pilot project were met and the attack can be
regarded as ‘designated’.

The circumstances allowed for optimum use of the IFEX-system.

The seat of the fire was accessible as the windows of the yacht were

15
 mainly melted away and the back of the yacht was open. However,
the fire took place in a reasonably confined space.

• Communications between the IC and Helicopter crew

During the attack there was no direction given by the IC. According
to the Operational tactics and procedures extinguishing a fire may
only take place under the direction of the IC, who is in charge
during the operation. While the fire being extinguished the IC and
the Helicopter crew must maintain direct communication with each
other (see attachment 1, B.7).

However, the Helicopter pilot pointed out that it was not useful for
the IC to direct the shots carried out by the Operator during the
attack.

The Helicopter pilot was of the opinion that the IC on the ground
did not have a view of the location or the fire that could assist the
Pilot or Operator. The Pilot suggested that the assessment was best
left to the Pilot and Operator in the cockpit to decide how and
where shots should be applied. The system is fitted with a camera
and display for the Operator to see were the shots had to be fired
and the Pilot is too pre-occupied during the attack to communicate
with people other than the Operator. (Nevertheless, before the
attack the IC should brief the Pilot about the attack strategy, see
section 4.6.)

After the project was finished Helicopter pilots were asked if they
shared this opinion. Their response was that they did. This would
mean that the attack strategy has to be adjusted to avoid false
expectations on the part of Incident Commanders, who would
expect to direct operations themselves.

• Refilling speed versus smothering effect

According to the PLD, the refilling speed of the water canons
(approximately 10 – 20 seconds) was too slow, this led to a reduced
effectiveness of the IFEX-system. With every shot the fire will be
slightly reduced in size and the next shot must follow quickly
otherwise the fire will flare up again. It was not possible to re-fill
quickly enough to reduce the time between shots. This, together
with the down-wash of the helicopter, allowed the fire to re-ignite.

• Distance between helicopter and target

The helicopter approached the target at low “taxi” speed when
approximately 10 meters away to minimize down-wash. An
alternative method was to apply shots from the hover position
although this produced a greater down-wash effect.

The shots were not powerful enough because of the low pressure
in the IFEX-system, this meant that the helicopter had to quickly
approach the target and to hover approximately 5 meters away. The
seat of the fire must be reached to extinguish the fire effectively.
According the specification of the IFEX-system the effective

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

extinguishing distance is a maximum of 50 meters from the target.

The helicopter had to stay close to the yacht and there was an
adverse down-wash on the fire and the yacht. The beneficial effects
of the low speed approach method was not achieved in practice.

The other attacks have proved that the effective distance is a

maximum of 15 meters, in which case there will always be a
negative effect caused by the down-wash of the helicopter.

Apart from the IFEX-system and the Helicopter crew there was still
some carrying capacity left for water/additives and fuel: 50% fuel,
200 litres of water and 25 litres of additives (see attachment 1, sub
section B.6.2). The limited amount of fuel had an effect on the flight
time. The helicopter could not be permitted to stay in the air any
longer than was strictly necessary (see also section 4.6).

• Opinion of Fire Service personnel

After the exercise the fire service personnel involved were
interviewed with regard to the attack. Their opinion was not a very
positive one. It became clear that they expected the fire fighting
helicopter to put the fire out after a few shots. As this did not
happen this raised doubts about the effectiveness of the
extinguishing method.

4.2 Fire in a warehouse containing paper

On 12 May 2000 a blaze took place in a warehouse containing paper
in Purmerend. The Fire Brigade dispatched a company of 8 fire
engines. The warehouse burnt down completely. At 4am the Fire
Brigade made a routine request for the ‘heat’ helicopter. This
helicopter is used to locate the seat of the fire or to establish the
development of the fire. The request was made between midnight
and 6am and during this period the PLD personnel are not physically
present at the air base, but are on call. This meant that it would
take at least an hour before the helicopter could leave the air base.
After discussion with the IC it was decided to cancel the request, as
by this time the fire was practically under control.

At 6.40am a message was sent that the fire was under control. The
IC decided to make a second request for the fire fighting helicopter
to test the penetrating ability of the IFEX-system on the paper mass
(actually the Fire Brigade wanted to test the IFEX-system and not
the fire fighting helicopter). The PLD complied with this request
despite the fact that the attack would not meet the criteria of the
pilot project (no high-rise building or location with difficult access).
Also the circumstances for an optimum use of the IFEX-system
were not present (accessible location, enclosed fire). The reason
why the PLD complied with this request was that it would be an
opportunity to test the Operational tactics and procedures. There
was no emergency at the time the helicopter was requested and the
helicopter did not immediately turn out to the fire.

17
 When the helicopter arrived at the scene the paper mass was still
smouldering. The mass was about 6 meters high with a surface of
approximately 40 meters by 70 meters.

The Fire Brigade allocated and prepared the landing zone where the
helicopter had to touch down after arrival. After arrival of the
helicopter the crew and the IC discussed the attack strategy and it
was decided to apply two shots with pure water, two with additives
(Coldfire) and two ‘double shots’ (this means that two shots from
both canons were applied at the same time).

Main conclusions

• ‘Designated’ attack?
The attack in Purmerend shows that the PLD adopted a flexible
approach regarding mobilization (see chapter 2). As it was clear that
the attack did not meet the criteria of the pilot project. There was
no fire in a high-rise building or on a location which was difficult to
access. Also there was no open fire still burning. The helicopter has
only been used to test the penetrating ability of the IFEX-system
and not to assist during the suppressive phase of a fire.

At the commencement of the attack the PLD and the IC suspected

that the fire fighting helicopter would not add value in this situation.
This was confirmed during the attack.

Consequently the attack could not be considered as ‘designated’.

• Down-wash versus effectiveness

The effect of the shots was mainly noticeable in the centre of the
burning surface area, especially when the shots with the additives
were applied. The fire flared up again after the shots, even in places
where before the shots the paper was only smouldering. This was
caused by the down-wash of the helicopter. As a consequence, the
beneficial effects of the shots were not achieved.

The IC observed that the down-wash restricts the usefulness of the

fire fighting helicopter.

• Withdrawal of personnel
The IC pointed out that the use of the fire fighting helicopter in an
emergency situation in the future will have a negative effect on the
continuity of operations because of the need to withdraw personnel
when it is in use. This will slow down the operation.

• Publicity
The media were not very positive in the way they reported the
attack, omitting a few essential principles. It was not clear in the
news coverage that it was an exercise enabling the fire brigade to
test a few aspects of the fire fighting helicopter. It had been
established that this exercise was not a ‘designated’ attack according
to the aim of the pilot project. However, the media conveyed the

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

impression that the attack was real: “the helicopter was used to
speed up the extinguishing process.” This was a totally wrong
assumption (for example: “the test in the open air went all wrong”)
and was not viewed in the proper context. It is remarkable that the
press at the scene did not attempt to interview the participants.

It could be questioned whether it is desirable to carry out attacks

when it is obvious beforehand that the fire fighting helicopter will
not add any value. Perhaps it would be preferable to regard this
attack as an exercise. The participants, who were clear about the
aim of the exercise, would probably agree. During the attack in
Purmerend it was demonstrated by the PLD and the IC that the fire
fighting helicopter had nothing to add when used for extinguishing a
smouldering fire in the open air. Such results can, however, be of
importance for the pilot project. In addition to an opportunity to
practice the operational and strategic tactics the attack produced
important technical data for the PLD.

It is questionable if the experience gained from the exercise is

outweighed by the negative publicity. This will not improve the
perception held by the fire service who, in general, is very sceptical
about the fire fighting helicopter. This became clear during the
interviews held. The fire service sees its suspicions proved, however
for the wrong reasons: “the fire fighting helicopter has no additional
value.”

• Additives
As will be discussed in relation to the attack at the Leusder Heath,
the use of additives proved to have a more positive effect compared
with pure water. Nevertheless, it was decided fairly shortly from
the start of the pilot project to stop carrying additives. As a whole,
the benefit of additives proved to be limited. It became clear that
the additive ‘Coldfire’ and also the ‘ox blood’ had a negative
influence on the effectiveness of the IFEX-tsystem (see chapter 5,
technical evaluation). In view of the fact that the balance between
the fuel, water supply and additives had an effect on the available
flight time it, was decided to stop carrying additives but more fuel
and water instead. After the third attack (the heath fire at the
Leusder Heath) the fire fighting helicopter no longer carried additives
(see attachment 1, B.6.2).

4.3 First real attack at the fire at Leusder Heath

On 12 May 2000 the fire fighting helicopter was used for the first
real attack. At the end of the afternoon there was an outbreak of
fire at the Leusder Heath. While en route to the incident, the first
commanding officer from the Leusden Fire Brigade requested the
attendance of a specialist unit of vehicles designed for forest and
heath fires.

After a discussion between the IC from the Leusden Fire Brigade and
the Senior Fire Officer of the Amersfoort Fire Brigade, at 1718 hours
a request was made for the fire fighting helicopter. The request

19
 asked for the fire fighting helicopter to locate the seats of the fire
and to extinguish them immediately. The Senior Fire Officer made
this request as it was difficult to gain access to the area, particularly
for heavy fire appliances. Also, there were no accessible water
supplies for fire appliances in the area. The PLD were informed at
the time of the request that there was forest/heath fire with a
surface of one kilometer square consisting of several seats. The
request was accepted by PLD.

When the fire fighting helicopter reached the location (at 1742hrs)
the indicated area turned out to be far smaller than reported. The
affected area was 150 by 150 meters. The “fire under control”
message had not been sent but the fire was quite manageable due to
natural features of the area having a positive effect. The fire was
surrounded on three sides by areas of sand causing a natural break
and preventing the fire from spreading. There fire itself was quite
small but produced large quantities of smoke.

At the scene a request was made for the helicopter to land, to

enable the IC to make a reconnaissance flight. As the fire was
almost out by this time it was no longer necessary to use the fire
fighting helicopter to extinguishing the seats of fire. However, the IC
pointed out that the Fire Brigade was not able to reach the tops of
trees and it was decided that the helicopter would be used to keep
the tops of the trees wet as a preventive measure.

Main conclusions

• ‘Designated’ attack?
Ultimately the fire fighting helicopter was not used according the
original request. The fire fighting helicopter did not support the Fire
Brigade during the suppressive attack (the request: “to immediately
extinguish the seats of the fire”) but only during the damping down
phase. Therefore, it is still not clear what contribution can be made
or restrictions apply during forest/heath fires or how to slow down
or prevent ‘crown burning’. This was not a ‘designated’ attack within
the scope of the pilot project. Despite the fact that useful
information was gained.

• Effectiveness IFEX-system
It is difficult to make comment with regard to the effectiveness of
the IFEX-system during the damping down phase. According to the
PLD all applied shots were successful, which meant that they
reached the trees. However, this was refuted by the IC. He found
that the shots did not reach the trees sufficiently. It is questionable
however if the IC was able to draw this conclusion considering the
distance fire personnel had to remain during the attack. The
preferred attack strategy (applying two shots at the same time)
caused a lot of smoke and the PLD was unable to establish the
effectiveness of the shots.

20
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

• Communication
At the request of the regional control room, radio communication
took place via channel 7 instead of channel 10 (this is not in
accordance with the Operational tactics and procedures). Initially
this led to problems. It must be established in the first instance that
communications take place via channel 10 and only switched to
another channel later at the scene if necessary.

During the attack it became clear that the PLD and the fire service
worked with different geographical co-ordinates when referring to
the landing zone. The PLD used the geographic co-ordinates while
the fire service worked with the so called ‘RDM co-ordinates’9. This
explains why the Helicopter pilot could not find the landing zone in
first instance. This confusion led to a ten minutes delay.

In the IC’s opinion the Helicopter crew ignored his instructions

especially with regard to the approach and location10.

• Landing zone
In the first instance it is the fire service who decides the landing
zone11. In general it is the fire service who are at the scene first (and
initiated the fire fighting helicopter project). However, it is the
Helicopter pilot who eventually decides whether the landing zone is
acceptable or not.

The attack at the Leusder Heath and the attack in Purmerend (see
attachment 2, section B.2.2.) have shown that it is hard for the fire
service to decide where the landing zone should be and to prepare
the zone for the helicopter to land. The fire service is not familiar
with the manoeuvrability of the helicopter and the amount of space
required. Consequently, the first landing zone identified by the fire
service was declined by the Helicopter pilot as it was deemed to be
too small and had insufficient space for take-off which could lead to
damage.

• Down-wash versus effectiveness

It is remarkable that during the incident at the Leusder Heath, in
contrast to all the other attacks, the PLD reported that there were
no negative effects brought about by the down-wash. This is
probably because the fire had already been extinguished and was
too cool to be re-ignited. The down-wash did cause some damage
to one of the landing zones during landing and taking off (external
seating area of the pancake restaurant, see attachment 2).

• Validity of the initial request

After the incident the IC expressed doubts regarding the validity of
the request for the fire fighting helicopter, mainly due to the
changing circumstances. As previously explained the fire fighting
helicopter was not used for the purpose stated in the original
request i.e. extinguishing the seats of the fire.

21
 4.4 Fire in office building Ballast Nedam
On 3 May 2001 – a year after the attack at the Leusder Heath, a
request for the fire fighting helicopter was made by the Utrecht Fire
Brigade. It concerned a fire in a Ballast Nedam office building under
construction (approximately 7 floors, 60 meters high) at the
‘Liebosch’ industrial estate. The seat of the fire was located in the
technical area in an extension on the roof.

The fire crew and the IC have a different opinion with regard to the
status of the fire at the time of the request. According to the IC it
was a severe fire, while the fire crew stated that it was a minor fire
already under control. The crew commander managed to reach the
fire via the roof. According to the fire crew the fire service wanted
to use the fire fighting helicopter regardless of the need, to enable
tests to be undertaken.

Ultimately the fire fighting helicopter was not used. The pilot
decided against the use of the helicopter at this incident because of
the presence of high tower cranes and loose building materials close
to the scene.

Main conclusions
The decision not to use the fire fighting helicopter for safety
reasons was an easy one to make. The fire service was able to
extinguish the fire from the roof, making the use of the fire fighting
helicopter unnecessary, there was no emergency. However, this
raises the following question: would the risks have been acceptable
if the fire service had not been able to extinguish the fire themselves
via the roof? In such circumstances the risks for the fire fighting
helicopter would have been the same.

4.5 Dune fire in Velsen

On 14 May 2001 there was a small outbreak of fire in the dunes
near Wijk aan Zee. At approximately 1500 hours the control room
of the ‘Kennemerland’ police made a request to the PLD for the ‘tele
helicopter’ to record video footage of the fire. The PLD advised the
use the fire fighting helicopter instead. On arrival at the scene the
situation was discussed with the Fire Officer. It was not possible to
agree on an attack strategy but it was decided that the fire fighting
helicopter would assist during the damping down operation.
The fire was suppressed and had covered an area of 50 by 50
meters. The fire fighting helicopter applied water for ten minutes,
until the supply was used, and left as agreed.

Main conclusions
There are two important conclusions to be drawn. Firstly, the
attack can not be classified as a ‘designated’ attack. The fire was
already extinguished at the time of the attack and the use of the fire
fighting helicopter was not urgent.

Secondly, the fire fighting helicopter was involved in this incident

somewhat by chance. The fire service had not requested the fire

22
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

fighting helicopter, but instead the PLD had initiated its use. This
demonstrates that is not automatically the fire service who
considers the possibility of using the helicopter. On the other hand
it is questionable if this was a fire where the fire fighting helicopter
should have been used. It was not clear from the information gained
from the completed questionnaires whether the fire was difficult to
access.

4.6 Roof fire VNU building in Hoofddorp

On 9 July 2001 there was a fire on the roof of the fitness area of the
VNU office building in Hoofddorp. The fire, probably caused by
roofers who where working there at the time, was accompanied by
three explosions (three gas cylinders filled with propane) and was
quickly designated a “severe fire”. Two fire appliances and an aerial
platform were used to attack the fire suggesting that this was an
“average”12 and not a “severe” fire. It was difficult to gain access to
the fire which was in a high-rise building of approximately 25 meters
in height.

However, the PLD initiated the use of the fire fighting helicopter. At
approximately 1645 hours the PLD “Operations” spotted a
substantial plume of smoke. After gathering information at the
control room of the ‘Kennemerland’ police the PLD offered
assistance with the heat helicopter and fire fighting helicopter. The
PLD decided to prepare the helicopters for take off in case they
were required by the fire service. Thirty minutes after arrival of the
IC (approximately at 1700 hours) a formal request was made for
assistance of the fire fighting helicopter and at 1705 hours the
helicopter was ready for take off from the air base.

Main conclusions
The circumstances present at this incident were not ideal for
achieving the optimum use of the IFEX-system. The location was
hard to access as it was in a high-rise building, but at the same time
the fire was very ‘exposed’ (see also section 4.2). This meant that a
successful attack was difficult to achieve.

• Communications/instructions
There was very little communication between the Helicopter crew
and the IC. The IC had asked the crew (via a police officer) to start
the attack at the northern side of the building and to move from
there towards the southern side. According to the Helicopter crew
they were forced to follow these instructions as the fire service is in
charge. The Helicopter crew suggested that they had not been able
to discuss the attack method with the IC initially, due to the fact
that communication with the IC had not been established. This was
not without risk. The wind direction at the time of the attack would
make the fire move towards the northern side of the building and
according to the Helicopter crew was “too strong for the tail”. The
IC was discontent about the way the Helicopter crew had carried
out his instructions and was of the opinion that they had not done
what was required.

23
 It has previously been established that the Helicopter crew does not
need instructions from the IC during an attack (see section 4.1).
However, the IC must brief the Helicopter crew regarding strategy
before the attack commences. Although the fire service is in charge
it is important that this is discussed and agreed with Helicopter
crew. The attack strategy or the fire fighting tactics may be obvious
for Fire Officers but they might not be possible for the Helicopter
crew to achieve. In addition, it became clear during earlier attacks
that the Helicopter crew has a better view of the fire, particularly
when it is difficult to access for the fire service, and consequently is
better informed than the IC present.
To exploit the full potential of the helicopter, achieve optimum fire
fighting efficiency and discuss the risks involved simultaneously, good
communications between the IC and Helicopter crew is absolutely
essential.

• Time span between arrival of the helicopter and actual attack

As previously discussed in section 4.1 the helicopter is capable of
carrying a fixed supply of water/additives and fuel: 50% fuel, 200
litres of water and 25 litres of additives (see attachment 1, sub
section B.6.2). The limited amount of fuel obviously restricts the
flying time. It will not be possible for the fire fighting helicopter to
stay in the air any longer than necessary. This issue has been
discussed during the instruction days for Incident Commanders.

After arrival of the fire fighting helicopter the IC required 25

minutes to decide whether the helicopter was needed or not.
When the IC had taken the decision to use the helicopter it took a
further 15 minutes to enable fire crews to retreat before the
helicopter could apply its first shot. The fire fighting helicopter,
which had taken off with 50% fuel supply and water for 8 – 10 shots,
had been in the air for 40 minutes before applying the first shot and
wasted valuable fuel.

It is clear from the video footage that the fire crew did not make
any attempt to extinguish the fire while the fire fighting helicopter
was present at the scene. The fire service was pre-occupied with
the preparations. This would have been a good opportunity to
establish the added value of the helicopter against the objectives of
the pilot project despite the fact that this was an open fire. In the
Operational tactics and procedures ‘providing assistance’ is intended
to mean that the fire fighting helicopter will stabilize the fire,
allowing the fire service to extinguish it fully. This is not explained in
more detail in the Operational tactics and procedures. However,
according to the PLD this implicit assumption was communicated to
the fire service during the instruction days (see also attachment 1,
section B.7).

• Withdrawal of the fire crew

After the decision was taken to use the fire fighting helicopter the
fire crew withdrew from the building apart from two attack units.

24
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

The fire crew received the order to withdraw from the roof and
building with disbelief. It was against their natural instincts to let to
allow somebody else to do the job and to be on the sideline.
Consequently the withdrawal took 15 minutes.

• Technical malfunction of the IFEX-system

During the attack the Operator had difficulties filling the water
canon. Consequently only every other shot was under sufficient
pressure. This meant that every other shot had insufficient power
and therefore did not reach the seat of the fire. According to the
PLD the effectiveness decreased by approximately 70%. The loading
time was too long. Loading the water canon should takes
approximately 10 – 15 seconds and in this case it took 30 – 45
seconds.

• Down-wash versus effectiveness

The down-wash of the helicopter caused the fire to spread through
wall cavities to the stores below.

• Familiarity with the Operational tactics and procedures

It is of importance that the fire service and its crew are familiar with
the Operational tactics and procedures. The IC wished to be on-
board the helicopter during the attack. The Helicopter crew
suspected that the IC was not aware of the Operational tactics and
procedures (especially where the RLD exemptions were concerned)
and had not been trained, as this was discussed during training
sessions. This could not be verified with the IC.

• ‘Designated’ attack?
It has to be emphasized that for various reasons, whether or not
deliberately, the fire fighting helicopter was not used to its full
capability during the attack.

However, it could have been a ‘designated’ attack as the fire was in

a high-rise building and the helicopter could have assisted the fire
service during the suppressive phase of the fire. The failure was
mainly due to poor communications (deployment of the helicopter
was too late and the fire had the chance to flare up) and
intermittent technical problems (one of the conditions for a
‘designated’ attack is a correctly functioning system). There had not
been many ‘designated’ attacks thus far and this could have been a
valuable chance which was missed.

The Fire Officer eventually decided to let the fire fighting helicopter
depart as the down-wash caused the fire to spread to the store
below. The fire fighting helicopter did not make a positive
contribution towards extinguishing the fire.

4.7 Barn fire in Oterleek

On 3 August 2001 there was an outbreak of fire in a packed barn in
Oterleek, municipality of Schermer in the province of North Holland.
Nearby, to the east, there was a residential property and on the

25
 north western side, a farm. The barn was surrounded by farmland
which was impassable because of standing crops.

There was a severe blaze in the barn and the direction of the wind
(southerly, later veering south westerly) increased the risk of fire
spread through flying sparks to the farm.

In the first instance four fire appliances and an aerial platform were
mobilized to the fire later assisted by a further four appliances.
According to the IC it was difficult to gain access, and there was a
lack of open water to re-supply the appliances. A request for the
fire fighting helicopter was made early in the evening.

It took a long time for the fire fighting helicopter to arrive at the
scene, more than an hour after the request was made, and by this
time there was no longer an acute situation. This emergency was
further reduced by the changing wind direction (south west)
meaning that the farm was no longer directly at risk. The barn
eventually burned down completely.

Main conclusions

• ‘Designated’ attack?
The attack did not meet the aim of the pilot project. When the fire
fighting helicopter arrived at the scene (more than an hour after the
request was made) a message had been sent that the fire was under
control. The helicopter could not assist the fire service during the
suppressive phase of the fire. It was not, therefore, a ‘designated’
attack.

Also, the metal roof of the barn had collapsed making it virtually
impossible for the fire fighting helicopter to reach the seat of the
fire. After four shots it was decided to cease the attack.

It is questionable if the fire fighting helicopter would have been able

to assist if it had arrived earlier. The chances were very slim
because of the size and the severity of the fire (see photograph in
attachment 2, sub section B.2.6). The priority of the fire service was
to prevent the fire spreading to the farm. According to the IC the
farm was not damaged because of the use of 8 fire appliances and
due to the fact that the direction of the wind changed. Assistance of
the fire fighting helicopter would not have been useful during this
stage as the 8 appliances and crews would have had to cease their
activities to allow the helicopter to operate.

• Withdrawal of the fire crew

A part of the fire crew was withdrawn by order of the Fire Officer.
As there was still a small chance that the fire would spread to the
farm, the fire service maintained a water curtain between the barn
and the farm and kept the surrounding buildings cool. During this
operation the risk to the remaining crews increased.

26
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

• Down-wash versus effectiveness

There were a lot of small burning particles in the air which
increased the risk of fire spread and also re-ignition. Consequently,
there was an increased risk for the fire crew.

• Expertise of the crew

The IC complimented the expertise and skills of the Helicopter
crew with regard to their flying and fire fighting expertise.

4.8 Fire in the restaurant of Hotel Akersloot

The last request for the fire fighting helicopter during the pilot
project was made on 5 August 2001. There was a fire in the
restaurant area of Hotel Akersloot. The building was approximately
17 meters high and consisted of four floors. The top floor had a
gabled roof. The severe blaze was on the third floor and in the roof
space.

Priority was given to the evacuation of the building. Fire appliances

and an aerial platform were used. It was difficult to gain access to
the fire from the inside and consequently it spread to the floor
below. Because of the construction of the gabled roof the fire was
also difficult to access from the outside using the aerial platform.

The fire service control room initiated the request for the fire
fighting helicopter 30 minutes after arrival of the IC, who was also in
charge during the incident in Oterleek.

When the helicopter approached the scene (over a meadow with

grazing cows who panicked and started to run) it appeared to the
crew that the fire was dying down. However, the IC pointed out
that the fire was in fact spreading inside the building and was hard to
suppress because of the high temperature.

After discussion with the IC five shots were applied into the
opening in the roof which largely extinguished the fire. Subsequently
the Fire Brigade was able to damp the fire down.

Main conclusions

• ‘Designated’ attack?
This was the first attack during the pilot project where the fire
fighting helicopter supported the fire service during the suppressive
phase of the fire at a location with difficult to access. Because of the
nature of the fire and the circumstances (i.e. fire in a confined space)
the IFEX-system was used to its optimum.

This attack can be classified as ‘designated’ and the fire fighting

helicopter provided a positive contribution to fire fighting.

However there are two qualifications.

27
 Firstly, the IC pointed out that the effect would have been the same
(although later) without the support of the fire fighting helicopter. If
there had been a risk of further fire spread the added value of the
fire fighting helicopter could have been better demonstrated.

Secondly, it was not the Senior Fire Officer on scene who thought
of making a request for the fire fighting helicopter but the control
room of the fire service. The IC, who had received instruction in
the use of the helicopter, of all people, should be aware of a
possible contribution of the fire fighting helicopter could make in
such circumstances.

• Request
The request has not been made according to the agreed operational
procedure on two points. This did not have a negative influence on
the attack.

Firstly, it was not the IC who made the request for the fire fighting
helicopter but the control room.

Secondly, the request was not complied with by the Flight

Commander but by Operations. There was little time left before
sunset and the standby crew decided to comply with the request
(i.e. a fire in a high-rise building). During the preparations for take
off, Operations informed the Flight Commander who decided that
the deployment could take place.

• Withdrawal of the fire crew

During the attack the fire crew had to cease their activities and as a
result the fire threatened to spread further through the building.

• Instruction during the attack

Instruction was been given during this attack which is unlike the
other attacks. The crew informed the IC about the results of the
shots and the IC was able to correct where necessary. This was a
positive experience for both parties.

• Expertise of the Helicopter crew

The IC praised the expertise of the Helicopter crew once again.

4.9 Three exercises in the ‘Bijlmer’

Unfortunately insufficient ‘designated’ attacks occurred during the
pilot project. Therefore, it was decided by the project group ‘Fire
Fighting Helicopter in the Netherlands’ that it would be desirable
for another exercise to be undertaken by the end of the trial. It was
hoped that this exercise would be a useful contribution the pilot
project.

On 18 October 200113 three exercises were produced. The

simulated incidents took place in three different residences on the
7th floor of a block of flats in the Bijlmer14. All fires consisted of a
standard ‘fire load’ (using wooden pallets) of approximately 50

28
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

kilograms per square meter, which is similar to an average fire in a

living room. An objective of the exercise was to enable the fire
fighting helicopter to suppress the fire, bringing it under control and
allowing the fire service to damp the fire down. With this in mind all
attacks could be regarded as ‘designated’.

The exercises concentrated on simulating the suppressive, fire

fighting attack only. Consequently, there were a few issues15 that
had not been dealt with and therefore could not be evaluated
(alarming, instruction, withdrawal of fire crews, etc). This means
that not all of the aspects described in earlier attacks will be
mentioned here.

General remarks:
• The location was rather difficult to access because of the high
trees on the approach route.
• The weather conditions were favourable, there was a
light/moderate breeze.
• The area was evacuated.
• The local residents were involved in the preparations for the
attack by the fire service.
• A water intake had taken place before the start of the exercise.
• Technically the IFEX-system did not work to its optimum.
There were problems with the filling of the canons.
• The distance between the fire fighting helicopter and the
building was approximately 10 meters (all exercises).
• Additives were not used.
• There was no effect on the fire caused by the down-wash. The
smoke however was blown away by the down-wash.

Main conclusions

First exercise
The first fire was reported as a minor blaze. It took the fire fighting
helicopter two shots to extinguish the fire shortly after it was lit. It
has to be said that the IFEX-system did not work well. The time
span between the two shots was approximately one minute.
It should be emphasized that this was not a realistic situation.
Normally, the fire fighting helicopter would not be able to arrive at
the scene so quickly after the outbreak of fire. The fire had not yet
fully developed in this exercise.

In the evaluation, the IC pointed out that the fire service would
have been able to extinguish the fire immediately by normal means.

Second exercise
The second fire was also reported as a ‘small blaze’ on two sides of
the residence. This fire was more developed than the fire during the
first exercise. The fire fighting helicopter applied seven shots of
which four shots were successful. This meant that four shots were
under sufficient pressure and hit the seat of the fire. After the

29
 successful shots the intensity of the flames decreased immediately.
However this was only a short-lived effect.

After seven shots it was decided to cease the attack as there was no
visible positive effect (caused by technical problems amongst
others).

The IC, as well as the Helicopter crew, were of the opinion that the
attack did not have the desired effect. It was the fire service who
eventually extinguished the fire with a 38mm low pressure hose line.

Third exercise
The third fire was also reported as a ‘small blaze’. The fire fighting
helicopter was only allowed to attack the fire after it was well
developed. The Helicopter crew tried to apply a shot at the back of
the building but this turned out to be impossible because of the
large quantities of smoke produced.

After two shots the fire was no longer showing on the outside of
the building. Seven shots out of ten were sufficiently powerful to
reach the seat of the fire. The fire visibly decreased in size where
the shots were applied. The attack was ceased after it became clear
that the fire fighting helicopter could not control the fire any
further.

The IC and the Helicopter crew regarded the last two attacks as
not particularly successful during the suppressive phase of the fire.
According to the crew this was probably due to technical faults in
the IFEX-system.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

5 Technical evaluation
The PLD has carried out a technical evaluation of the fire fighting
helicopter in addition to the Nibra evaluation. The PLD evaluation is
described in this chapter.

After operating the IFEX-system for 1year and 6 months the

following statistics can be quoted:
• 628 shots have been applied during exercises and attacks.
• The compressor has been operational for approximately 100
hours.
• The helicopter has flown more than 100 hours for training and
attacks.

It can be concluded from the above that the system has had
sufficient operational use to draw up a well-founded technical
evaluation. The following conclusions will mainly reflect the
technical results. This part of the report highlights operational
considerations that will be of important to the technical conclusion,
although opinions have been formed with regard to the actual use of
the canon.

The continuous thread running through the 18 months of the pilot

project was the fact that the installation was not user-friendly. In
particular the immediate use of the installation seemed to cause
difficulties. This appears to be due to two main causes:

• First cause
The installation’s computer generated very little information
regarding its status. This could be partially improved by providing
more intensive training during the use of the machine.

However, an adjustment to the computer system itself could

improve the supply of information to the Operator.
o The Operator is not provided with information while the tanks
are filling. As a result, the pumps switch off before the tanks are
full.
o It is not possible to see which of the two canon barrels is
loaded. If an empty barrel is loaded whilst the other is full, the
system will empty itself and consequently, pressure will be lost.
o The system can be switched off while the barrels are still
loaded. However, it is possible for the system to discharge
whilst it is switched off (which happened on one occasion). This
is potentially dangerous to anyone situated in front of the
helicopter when such an event occurs.

• Second cause
The design and the construction of the system does not reflect the
requirements for use on a helicopter. The level of vibration was
such that the following problems occurred in use:

31
 o Detached couplings, low pressure air system (25 bar).
o Detached couplings, water filling system.
o Cracked couplings near the water canon selector.
o Cracked cable on the compressor.
o Aluminum suspension to the front of the installation cracked.
o The barrel locking mechanism caused recurring problems.

Installation weight in combination with the Ecureuil AS-350 B2 helicopter

Apart from the issues listed above, the installation as it stands is not
technically suitable and the combination of the installation with the
chosen helicopter is far from perfect. Particularly in view of the fact
that the installation turned out to be heavier than initial specification
indicated. This meant that a difficult decision had to be made
regarding the ratio of fuel and water that could be carried. It
transpired that operating with a half full tank meant that a maximum
of 6 shots could be applied. After that, fully loading the water canon
(without air) would be difficult. A twin-engine helicopter with a
greater carrying capacity could be a solution under the given
circumstances.

Compressor - installation
The choice of the compressor on the installation is also far from
perfect. The use of a combustion engine (petrol) that is not visible
to the pilot or crew, with no warning indicators, does not fit in the
current philosophy of aviation authority requirements. Furthermore,
the inefficiency of the compressor is such that fully charging the air
tanks (300 bars) takes approximately 45 min – 1 hour. The capacity
needed to keep the large water tanks under pressure was also
significant and, as a consequence, the pressure decreased rapidly
with every shot applied. Because of the decreasing pressure, arming
the canons becomes less efficient.

It should also be mentioned that it is not advisable to start the

compressor from the cockpit, which is theoretically possible. The
cockpit starter quickly malfunctioned as the ‘loading pressure’ in the
compressor had not been relieved. This caused the starter to
overload.

“Snorkelling”
From an operational point of view “snorkelling” might be desirable.
However, in practice this may not be feasible. The tanks have to be
entirely de-pressurized. In view of the fact that it will take a lot of
time to re-charge the entire system, it is uncertain whether
“snorkelling” and the use of a compressor adds any value. Perhaps,
changing or refilling the pressure cylinders while the fire service is
filling the water tanks could be a solution. This would also yield a
considerable reduction in weight.

Additives
The use of additives did not prove to be very effective. It was
reported that an additive suitable for the IFEX-system would be
developed, but this was never achieved. The use of the additive

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

‘Coldfire’ turned out to have an influence on the effectiveness of the

installation i.e. too much foam was produced. Other additives, e.g.
Ox blood, clotted in the separate tanks and consequently influenced
the performance of the installation.

Conclusion
Technically, the installation must be upgraded to be suitable for use
in an aviation environment. There are too many technical
deficiencies which adversely influence the usability of the fire fighting
helicopter. The installation requires high maintenance. This could be
reduced by adopting a higher standard of quality during
manufacture. Increasing the quality level could also have a positive
effect on the durability (and corrosion resistance) of the entire
system. This, in combination with an increased carrying capacity
could also improve the helicopter’s usability and effectiveness.

33
34
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

6 The overall evaluation

This chapter provides the overall evaluation of the 'Fire Fighting
Helicopter in the Netherlands' project. The objective is to reach a
conclusion, assessing the value of the fire fighting helicopter in the
situations mentioned in the aim of the pilot project: i.e. to assist
during the suppressive phase of fire fighting in high-rise buildings or
locations where the fire service has difficulty gaining access. The
information gathered during the pilot project will be used to come
to an informed conclusion.

This overall evaluation is meant to reach a conclusion. Consequently

only the relevant details will be discussed and it is not intended that
the evaluation will form a summary analysis of the report. The
evaluations of each attack will be referred to (see chapter 4 and
attachment 2) as well as the technical evaluation (see chapter 5).
Also, the results of the interviews held with the Fire Officers, the
Helicopter pilot s and Operators of the PLD are incorporated in
this chapter.

It has to be emphasized that the fire fighting helicopter as a whole

will be evaluated and no opinion will be given with regard to the
capability of the IFEX-system on its own.

The overall evaluation can be read independently (which may lead

to a slight overlap with the previous chapters).

'Designated attacks'
During the pilot project period (3 April 2000 until 3 October 2001)
a total of seven requests were made for the fire fighting helicopter.
Six of them were actually responded to. In addition, the helicopter
was used four times shortly before the project began to support an
exercise (2 April 2000) and at a further three exercises (18
October 2001) after the project had finished. The four mentioned
attacks are also incorporated in this evaluation (see also chapter 4).
This means that there were ten attacks in total (from 7 requests)
and all evaluations were used for this report.

To answer the research question only the 'designated' attacks are of

importance. In this report a 'designated' attack is defined as an
attack which meets the aim of the pilot project. That is to say that
the fire fighting helicopter would provide support to the fire service
when dealing with fires in high-rise buildings or fires in locations
which are difficult to access. This objective is incorporated in the
Operational tactics and procedures (see attachment 1, section B.7).
It was intended that the fire fighting helicopter would provide
support and, in theory, would stabilize the fire enabling the fire
service to damp the fire down. It was not assumed that the fire
fighting helicopter would extinguish the fire16. This objective was not
incorporated in the Operational tactics and procedures.

35
 During the pilot project the fire fighting helicopter was mainly used
to provide assistance, which was not an objective of the pilot
project. On three occasions the fire fighting helicopter was used for
damping down, which was not an emergency situation. Examples are
the attacks in Purmerend, at the Leusder Heath and the dune fire in
Wijk aan Zee. The fire fighting helicopter has also been used in fire
situations where it was known that the extinguishing capacity of the
IFEX would not achieve its optimum effect. (see also paragraph
‘IFEX-system: the circumstances’). Examples are the attacks at the
Leusder Heath, the fire in the roof of the VNU building and the dune
fire in Wijk aan Zee amongst others.

The fire fighting helicopter was used for the fires mentioned above
as the steering committee, as well as the project group, wanted the
helicopter to be as accessible as possible. This would motivate the
fire service and add to the requests for the helicopter enabling
sufficient attacks to be carried and data gathered. Further to the
two first attacks in Purmerend and at the Leusder Heath it was
pointed out in newsletter no. 2 (July 2000) that “exceptionally the
fire fighting helicopter could be used for different attacks as well if
the PLD regarded the attack concerned as a useful experience”. The
PLD has always been flexible with regard to requests for the fire
fighting helicopter.

Conclusion
It has to be concluded that in many occasions that fire fighting
helicopter was used for fires where it was clear beforehand that
the helicopter could not contribute to the suppression of the fire.
On a few occasions the attack did not meet the objective of the
pilot project and/or the right circumstances necessary for the IFEX-
system. This was confirmed during the operations (see chapter 4,
evaluation per attack). Consequently, the attacks received a
negative assessment, not just from the Fire Brigade, who were
involved in the attack, but also by the media.

Therefore, in hindsight, it is questionable whether requests that did

not meet the objective of the pilot project should have been
accepted. Despite this fact it is understandable that they were. It is
possible that the attacks did not contribute to a positive image of
the fire fighting helicopter where the senior officers of the fire
services were concerned (see also heading ‘Limited amount of
requests’).

The project group estimated that at least five representative attacks

could be carried out in high-rise buildings during the pilot project.
This figure was based on the geography of the trial area. Eventually,
only one ‘designated’ attack was carried out. If the exercises and
trainings, which took place outside the pilot period, are included,
then five ‘designated’ attacks were achieved (for more details see
diagram 4.1).

36
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Excluding Inclusief
training/exercises training/exercises
Requests 7 7 (17)
Attacks 6 10
'Designated' attacks 1 5

Diagram 6.1: Number of requests, attacks and 'designated' attacks.

Requests (that is to say excluding training/exercises)

Purpose Request Number Request
made by accepted
Suppressive attack IC 3 2
Suppressive attack Fire Service 1 1
Control
Room
Suppressive attack PLD 2 2
Test IC 1 1
Total 7 6

Diagram 6.2: Breakdown of the requests per attack during the

pilot project.

Conclusion
It can be concluded that the number of ‘designated’ attacks carried
was insufficient to give a thorough opinion regarding the
possibilities of the fire fighting helicopter providing support during
fire fighting.

Useful information was gained from the pilot project to amend and
improve the Operational tactics and procedures (and therefore the
use of the fire fighting helicopter). However, this will only be
relevant if it is decided to continue using the fire fighting helicopter
by a second pilot project or by using the helicopter on a structural
basis. Sufficient information may then be gained from the evaluations
of each attack to improve the Operational tactics and procedures.

Ultimately, two attacks out of ten contributed in a positive way to

suppressive fire fighting. This was the real attack in Akersloot and one
of the three exercises in the Bijlmer. Both attacks can be regarded as
'designated'. During both attacks the circumstances were right for
an optimum use of the IFEX-system with the seat of the fire
accessible but in a confined space. However, the fire service pointed
out that the same effect would have been achieved by the fire
service without the assistance of the fire fighting helicopter.

The IFEX-system: the technique

An important condition for a successful 'designated' attack is a fully
operational fire fighting helicopter (i.e. with an effective IFEX-
system). Under optimum circumstances:
• the shots have to be applied with high velocity at the seat of the
fire and of course must reach the seat of the fire

37
 • the shots have to be applied at short intervals of only a ‘few’
seconds.
(See also attachment 1, section B.6).

However, the IFEX-system did not operate to its optimum capability

during the pilot project. Particular problems included filling the
canons and maintaining adequate pressure (see also technical
evaluation and the evaluations per attack). This had consequences
for reaching the seat of the fire and for quickly applying the shots.

It was assumed that the effective distance between the object and
the IFEX-system (see also Operational tactics and procedures) was
a maximum of 50 meters. The attacks during the pilot projects
made clear that under the current circumstances this was not
correct. The average distance during the attacks was approximately
10 – 15 meters from the target. Considerable capacity was needed
to keep pressure on the water tanks and this happened at the
expense of the shots, which became less powerful. Under these
conditions the fire fighting helicopter had to apply shots from less
than 15 meters from the target and needless to say, this was not
without risk.

On a few occasions difficulties with the power on the system caused

a delay refilling between the shots (varying from 10 – 20 seconds
up to approximately 60 seconds). In some cases the shots could not
bridge the distance between the helicopter and the target and
consequently the seat of the fire was not reached. As previously
explained, according to the specification, a fire can only be
extinguished effectively if a few shots are applied in quick succession
that reach the seat of the fire. When a shot reduces the size of the
fire, another shot has to be rapidly applied (according to the
specifications after 6 – 7 seconds and according to the PLD after
approximately 10 seconds) otherwise the fire will get the chance to
re-ignite.

Conclusion
The IFEX-system is an essential part of the fire fighting helicopter.
A correctly operating IFEX-system is necessary before one can
arrive at an objective opinion about the capabilities of the fire
fighting helicopter.

In general, it can be concluded that the system did not operate at

it’s optimum during the pilot project. Due to technical deficiencies
in the system it was necessary for the helicopter to work in close
proximity to the target, which increased the risks (see also heading
‘Safety aspects’). This was not in accordance with the specifications
of the system. Due to the technical deficiencies the system could
not operate to its optimum. This is one of the conditions for an
attack to be successful and could not be met.

Given the amount of attacks and the deficiencies of the IFEX-system

it could be said that it is not possible to reach a sound conclusion

38
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

about value of the fire fighting helicopter when assisting during fires.
Even so, the pilot project has provided sufficient information to
come to a sound conclusion with regard to the added value of the
fire fighting helicopter when assisting during fire fighting in high-rise
buildings or locations which are difficult to access.

Listed below are few observations and conclusion which must be

considered to reach a final judgement.

The IFEX-system: the circumstances

A ‘designated’ attack can be successful if the fire fighting helicopter
is working well and if the circumstances are right for the helicopter
to operate to its optimum. This has already partially been pointed
out under heading ‘IFEX-system: the technique’. An other important
aspect of the extinguishing capability of the system is that it is based
on the cooling and smothering effect of water. The extinguishing
effect is more effective in a confined space than in the open air. This
has been confirmed during the pilot project. In the sixth newsletter
(August 2001) this was also ‘announced’ to the public: “extinguishing
fires with the fire fighting helicopter has a ‘bigger’ effect when the
fire takes place in a confined space.”

It is essential that the shots are powerful enough to reach the seat
of the fire (see also attachment 1, section B.6). The seat of the fire
has to be accessible and consequently should not be shielded by
obstacles. This was proved during the fire in the barn in Oterleek.
For an optimum extinguishing effect, the fire has to take place in a
confined space but where the seat of the fire is accessible. Clearly,
these conditions are contradictory and as a result not commonly
encountered.

The pilot project demonstrated that the fire fighting helicopter

could only successfully deal with fires of a limited size (exercise in
Nederhorst den Berg, fire in VNU building Hoofddorp and the three
exercises in the Bijlmer). The preparation time required before the
fire fighting helicopter could depart (at least 30 – 45 minutes)
enabled the fire to develop in to a severe blaze. Under such
circumstances the use of the fire fighting helicopter is not suitable.

Conclusion
For the pilot project to be successful the fire has to meet the
following three conditions:
• the fire has to be small
• in a confined space
• the seat of the fire has to be accessible.
It would be extremely rare for all of these conditions to be met at
the same time.

Opinion of the fire service

As previously explained, Nibra interviewed approximately 50 Fire
Officers, some of whom had been trained in the use of the
helicopter, in general terms with regard to its value. The interviews

39
 took place during the pilot project. The purpose of the interviews
was to examine, in broad terms, the fire service’s view of the
helicopter formed by factors including media coverage. After all it is
the fire service who would make use of the helicopter and their
view could influence the project and therefore its future use.

The Fire fighters, who were selected at random, had never made a
request for the fire fighting helicopter themselves. Only one
indicated that he once thought about making a request for the
helicopter but eventually had decided against it. All the others had
the opinion that no incidents under their command had occurred
where the fire fighting helicopter could have been of value.

It became clear in general that the interviewees were sceptical

about the fire fighting helicopter and that they probably would not
consider using it. Not even for fires in locations with difficult access.
The safety risks being the main reason for them not to use the
helicopter. The interviewees expressed doubts about the safe use of
the helicopter particularly in city areas. The risks of extinguishing
fire by helicopter outweigh the risks of extinguishing a fire in a
conventional way (in high-rise buildings). As will be pointed out
below their doubts appear legitimate (see heading ‘Safety aspects’).

Another reason for the interviewees to be restrained in their

enthusiasm was that, in their opinion, their authority would diminish
if somebody else took over control during the attack. By this, they
did not mean the command and control during the fire, but the
withdrawal of the fire crew when the helicopter commenced
operation. For most of the interviewees it was hard to accept to
“walking away from the fire and waiting on the sidelines.” It was
believed that withdrawal would lead to unnecessary delay.

(As a result of the attacks during the pilot project it became clear
that withdrawal was not only regarded by the fire personnel as
unnatural but in a few occasions, was also irresponsible (see
evaluation of the attack VNU building Hoofddorp). It proved to be
irresponsible to let the fire service cease their activities while they
were trying to stop the fire from spreading. This has not happened
on a few occasions and is against the Operational tactics and
procedures (for example during the attacks in Oterleek, Akersloot and
Hoofddorp). ‘Withdrawal of fire personnel’ will require serious
consideration if it is decided to use the helicopter for fighting
structural fires in future.)

Conclusion
The fire service was one of the key participants in the project. Not
only because the fire fighting helicopter is meant to assist the fire
service, but also because the fire service has to make a request for
the helicopter. It can be concluded that the fire service18 for
various reasons, had only a moderate enthusiasm for extinguishing
fires by helicopter. Although it would be hard to prove, it can be
assumed that the negative attitude had an influence on the

40
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

progress of the pilot project (see also heading ‘Limited amount of

requests’).

Limited amount of requests

It is an obvious question to ask why only five requests were made
by the fire service during the pilot project (1 year and 6 months).
One of the five requests was even made by the fire service control
room and not by the Fire Officer (see diagram 6.2). A possible cause
could have been that there were no fires in the Netherlands during
this period which met the objective of the pilot project (fires in
high-rise building or locations with difficult access). The researchers
do not have any facts at their disposal about the fires in the
Netherlands during this period. However, the PLD pointed out that
there have been several fire where the fire fighting helicopter could
have been used. During meetings of the project group some
members reported that a few fires had taken place in high-rise
buildings and in some cases their statements were supported by
newspaper articles. Also the fires in Wijk aan Zee and Hoofddorp,
where the PLD initiated the request for the fire fighting helicopter,
confirm this. If the PLD is right, this would suggest that the fire
service was not always aware of the potential use of the fire fighting
helicopter. This could be caused by the lack of enthusiasm or that in
the tense circumstances of fire fighting the officer19 just does not
think of using the fire fighting helicopter.

The latter is actually hardly surprising. Since 1735, when the ‘fire
hose and branch’ was invented, the fire service has focused on
attacking fires from inside the building (offensive fire fighting), little
has changed since then. The advent of motorized vehicles and
breathing apparatus did not cause a fundamental change. The
principle is still the same: enter, locate the seat of the fire and
extinguish20 . This implies that innovative methods of extinguishing
fires, like the helicopter, will not be easy to implement. Especially
when the fire service, in general, has no faith in the idea.

Recent research with regard to ‘Naturalistic Decision Making’21 has

shown that fire commanders tend to make their decisions under
pressure by recognizing a situation that they are used to and
applying known methodology. Deviating from the norm, for example
requesting the fire fighting helicopter during the suppressive phase
of the fire, does not fit into this model easily. Two out of the five
requests during the pilot project were made in the suppressive
phase and three in the aftermath of the fire. Interestingly, the fire
service has made many requests for the fire fighting helicopter to
perform during ‘Open Days’. Consequently, it will take a lot of
education and exercises22 to teach fire commanders to make
decisions that are outside their normal range of experience. This
has not been satisfactory for the pilot project. The trained Fire
Officers received only one morning or afternoon instruction. No
practice was provided or exercises undertaken23.

41
 This contrasts with the education, training and exercises the crew
of the PLD received. No less than 14 pilots and 8 Operators (who
operated the IFEX-system during the attacks) of the PLD received
distinctive and substantial training (see also attachment B.5).

The PLD was very involved in the pilot project, not only during the
project but also during the preparatory time. The PLD got closely
involved from the inception of the idea for a new extinguishing
method (1998). Throughout the pilot project the PLD has been very
constructive and enthusiastic. A few Fire Officers pointed out that
they had a lot of admiration and respect for the knowledge of the
Helicopter crew. Not only because they were able to skilfully
manoeuvre the helicopter but also because of their knowledge with
regard to fire fighting. It can be concluded that the PLD has done
everything within their power to make this pilot project a success.

Conclusion
It can be concluded that the fire service has not made many
requests for the fire fighting helicopter during the pilot project. The
most obvious reasons were the limited training and education given
and the fact that using the fire fighting helicopter deviates from the
‘normal’ routine method of operation.

Innovation and change with regard to the performance of the fire

service will be difficult to implement if:
• the way fire commanders take decisions under pressure is not
acknowledged
• there is limited involvement, training and education.

Down-wash
During most of the attacks (‘designated’ or not) the down-wash of
the helicopter had a negative effect on extinguishing the fire. The
down-wash is the wind caused by the rotors during flight. On some
occasions the fire did not only flare up again, but the down-wash
also made the fire spread through the building.

There was also a negative effect of the down-wash when the

helicopter was forced to approach the building because of the range
of the canon (see heading ‘IFEX-system: the technique’).The
effective range, according to the specifications should be 50 meters,
instead 15 meters was found to be practical. Achieving the specified
range could possibly diminish the difficulty with the down-wash.

Safety aspects
This sub section will briefly go into the risks encountered during the
flights with the fire fighting helicopter. The safety risks with regard
to the IFEX-system only are pointed out in the technical evaluation.

• Single-engine helicopter
The IFEX-system was prepared and certified in Canada for only one
type of helicopter, the single-engine Ecureuil AS-350 B2 (see also
attachment B.5). However, the PLD expressed an opinion that

42
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

another type of helicopter would have been more suitable for safety
reasons, namely the twin-engine Bölkow Bo-105. At the time of the
pilot project the PLD had the twin-engine Bo-105 in its fleet and
therefore this option was considered first. The fact that this
helicopter is equipped with two engines means that it can operate
above residential areas. If one engine fails it will be possible to make
a safe landing with the remaining engine. At the start of the pilot
project the possibility of equipping the Bölkow with the IFEX-
system was considered. However, it emerged that flying the Bölkow
helicopter equipped with the IFEX-system would also have
disadvantages (see attachment 1, section B.6.1). Therefore, it was
decided to fly with the Ecureuil during the pilot project as the
limited number of operations meant that the risks were deemed
acceptable by the PLD. Sufficient evaluation data could be gained
from the pilot project to produce a conclusion about the value of
the system as a part of an (unspecified) helicopter.

If it is decided to use the fire fighting helicopter in the future for

structural fire fighting, it will be necessary to convert to a helicopter
with at least two engines. This will involve new investment to make
the IFEX-system suitable for a twin-engine helicopter.

An exemption was obtained for the Ecureuil to be able to fly lower

and closer to ‘built-up’ areas during the pilot project, but only if it
was necessary for the actual attack.

• Flying close to ‘built-up areas’

A student at the Technical University of Delft has carried out a
(‘preliminary study’) research project to establish the effects of
turbulence on helicopters when flying round high-rise buildings. Her
dissertation is entitled “Helicopter response to the flow field
induced by high-rise buildings”. The research points out that the
turbulence round high-rise buildings has an effect on the stability of
the helicopter and therefore has consequences for a safe attack. As
a result the helicopter could hit the building. One of the student’s
conclusions is that for safety reasons a helicopter has to keep a
distance of at least 20 meters from a building.

As already described under heading ‘The IFEX-system’ the distance

between the object and the helicopter had to be less than 15
meters during all attacks (contrary to the IFEX-system specifications
of 50 meters) due to the low pressure in the system. This has not
led to any difficulties during the pilot project as only the exercises in
the Bijlmer took place in a high-rise building. The remaining fires
during the pilot project could be categorized as ‘locations that are
difficult for the fire service to access.’

It has been stated that this research is only introductory and further
work will be necessary to come to a well-founded conclusion with
regard to the danger of turbulence around buildings. To conclude
that operations during the pilot project were carried out
dangerously close to buildings based on existing research would be

43
 premature. However, it can be concluded that the risks could be
reduced if the IFEX-system operated effectively at the specified
range of 50 meters.

Notwithstanding the above, flying close to buildings will always

involve extra risks particularly when applying shots from an
extinguishing system. The effects of a recoil induced by use of the
IFEX-system when in close proximity to buildings could have serious
implications.

Conclusion
Flying with the fire fighting helicopter during the pilot project was
not without risks and this cannot be eliminated in operations
involving structural fires. Therefore, the key question is; does the
value added by the fire fighting helicopter in this type of operation
outweigh the risk?

Recap
As already stated there have not been enough ‘designated’ attacks
to come to a well-founded opinion about the added value of the fire
fighting helicopter during fire fighting in situations described in the
objective of the pilot project.

However, it has been proved that the fire fighting helicopter in its
current form has not been able to add significantly to operations in
high-rise buildings or locations with poor access. This conclusion is
based on the facts gained from the pilot project. A number of
attacks have not been successful and on a few occasions the fire
service has been of the opinion that the outcome would have been
the same if they had taken care of the fire themselves. A number of
reasons are apparent:
• The down-wash had a negative effect on fire fighting
• The Helicopter crew had to deal with technical faults in the
extinguishing system
• The circumstances were not ideal for optimum performance of
the IFEX-system.

It is uncertain whether these factors alone establish that the fire

fighting helicopter will not have any added value in the future.
Without any adjustments, the answer will certainly be yes. For a
successful fire fighting helicopter it will be essential to improve the
IFEX-system, otherwise the many technical faults will continue to
have an adverse effect on its use.

Does that mean that an improved fire fighting helicopter with an

IFEX-system operating efficiently will add value to fire fighting? This
question is difficult to answer on basis of the data gained from the
pilot project. Many aspects will remain theoretical. For example
with an efficient IFEX-system the effective distance between
helicopter and target could perhaps be extended. This means that
problems caused by the down-wash on almost all of the attacks
during the pilot project would diminish. A decreased down-wash

44
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

and an IFEX-system operating at its optimum might lead to a

successful attack.

Further consideration suggests that the technical question may not

be the decisive factor. The perfect circumstances for the IFEX-
system (and consequently for the fire fighting helicopter as a whole)
will not change. For an attack to be successful the fire should not be
too severe and the seat of the fire must be accessible. This means
that the target should accessible and free from obstructions.
Conversely, the extinguishing method works at it best when the fire
is burning in an enclosed space. This set of circumstances will not
occur very often.

In addition, the evaluation points out that the senior Fire Officers
interviewed were not inclined to make use of the fire fighting
helicopter. For a variety of reasons, they expressed a limited degree
of enthusiasm and this could not be changed during the pilot
project. The method of using the fire fighting helicopter deviates
from the ‘conventional’ method of fighting fires. The attitude shown
by fire service officers will have to change if the fire fighting
helicopter is to become a normal method of operation. This might
be achieved by providing the fire service with better information
and a fire fighting helicopter with an efficient and reliable
extinguishing system. Training and exercises would be necessary to
enable fire commanders to become accustomed to the helicopter
and to consider its use when under pressure in a crisis situation,
confident that the alternative tactics employed would be effective.

A decision will have to be made balancing the additional investment

needed for training the fire service bearing in mind that the
circumstances in which the fire fighting helicopter can operate
successfully will not occur very often. This is without considering:
• The costs for training the PLD Helicopter crew
• The purchase of a (new) twin-engine helicopter
• A suitable and improved IFEX-system
• The maintenance of the helicopter.

45
46
EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

BIJLAGEN

47
48
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Attachment 1 Background
B.1 The extinguishing effect of water
The fundamental principle of fire fighting is based on eliminating one
or more of the three elements essential for a fire to exist namely:
fuel, oxygen and heat. This is known as the Triangle of Fire.

The extinguishing effect of water is mainly based on cooling, as

water has the capacity to absorb a vast amount of heat. This
explains why water has been used for centuries to put out fires.

When water is exposed to the burning material, the heat energy

released during combustion will be absorbed by the water changing
from the liquid to the vapour-state. The heat absorbing capacity
results in the cooling effect. When sufficient water is applied, the
temperature of the burning material will decrease and will eventually
drop below the ignition temperature. At that stage heat has been
eliminated form the Triangle of Fire and the fire ceases to burn.

The energy absorbed by the water causes it to evaporate and

convert in to steam. In addition to the cooling effect, the plume of
steam created mixes with the burning gases displacing the
surrounding air. This will lead to an additional suffocating effect as
the oxygen supply to the flames blocked. As steam is lighter than air
the suffocating effect will be more effective on a fire burning in a
confined space than in the open air.

An important factor is the amount of water that reaches the fire.

Extinguishing water that is applied from too far away will evaporate
due to the high temperatures involved. The steam created will
immediately be pushed away by the radiated heat, significantly
reducing the cooling and suffocating effect. Also a lot of water will
not reach the fire. Consequently, a lot of unused water will be
drained away without evaporating.

Using a device that converts the water stream in to a mist or spray

can increase the combined cooling and suffocating effect. By doing
this many water particles are produced creating a far greater
capacity to absorb heat due to their increased surface area. This
means that more water will turn into steam. By using such a device,
a greater cooling effect will be achieved, producing more steam and
consequently a greater suffocating effect.

The IFEX-system is designed to maximize the cooling and

suffocating properties of water by converting water in to a fine
mist24 before it is applied to the fire reducing the amount wasted
and unused25. Frans Steur, a Dutchman, developed the system in
1994 (see sub section B.5.3). In this evaluation no comments are
made with specific regard to the IFEX-system as a fire fighting
method.

49
 B.2 The IFEX-system and the helicopter
The helicopter has been used in the Netherlands for emergency
work since the 1950’s. From that time on the Search and Rescue
Units (SAR) of the Air Force mobilized their helicopters for rescue
operations at sea and also for transporting patients from the West
Fresian Islands to the mainland. Additionally, “Trauma helicopters”
are an integral part of the Dutch Health Care System used for
mobilizing specialized medical teams to the scene of accidents,
where they can provide care beyond the capabilities of ambulance
personnel. While it is not intended to use this system to transport
patients by helicopter, this can be achieved if necessary.

Last year (2001) a pilot project examined whether it may be

possible to use two types of Army helicopter26 to assist with fighting
fires in forests, heath and grassland. It was proposed that the two
helicopters were equipped with “water baskets” enabling large
amounts of water to be carried. The water baskets would be
attached under the helicopter and can used to release water in an
accurate way on to the fire.

After the IFEX-system was introduced in 1994 a variety of

applications were devised. Different types were developed to use as
hand extinguishers and these were carried over the shoulder or
could be fixed to cars, motor cycles or other vehicles (used by the
former Yugoslavian army).

Steur, the designer of the IFEX-system, attempted to make the

system suitable for use in helicopters. His first attempt was
unsuccessful. By accident, Steur discovered a Dutch pilot living in
Canada who adopted the technique, offered support, funding and
the perseverance necessary to realize his project. In co-operation
Steur and the Dutch pilot developed the so-called “IFEX skid” for a
single-engine helicopter, the Ecureuil AS-350 B2 (see section B.6.1).
The IFEX skid is a gantry for attaching the IFEX-system to the
helicopter.

B.3 The development and lead in to the project

When it appeared to be technically possible to equip a helicopter
with the IFEX-system (in this report referred to as a ‘fire fighting
helicopter’) the journey to a new, innovative idea for fighting fires
had begun. There were no records of a similar fire fighting
helicopter elsewhere in the world and consequently scarce
information available with regard to the operational possibilities.

By chance, Steur met the Maarssen Fire Brigade’s Chief Fire Officer
and explained the concept of the fire fighting helicopter. From that
moment on, the idea had found a breeding ground in the
Netherlands as a result of an increasing number of high-rise
buildings. The fire fighting helicopter provided a possible means for
assisting fire fighting in such locations.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

By the end of 1997 the Chief Fire Officer of the Maarssen Fire
Brigade had approached industry, the business world and the Air
Force to assist in making his idea a reality. However, they were not
interested. As the police and fire service co-operate at the scene of
an incident, the Chief Fire Officer approached the PLD and KLPD
with the same request. The PLD was willing to co-operate which
meant that the fire service would lead the project and the PLD
would lend support.

In December 1997 the Chief Fire Officer of the Maarssen Fire

Brigade announced his idea for the first time during a seminar.

The experimental phase

In the first instance, the fire service and PLD co-operated to
establish whether it would be technically feasible to attach an IFEX-
system under a helicopter. Three members27 of the PLD traveled to
Canada where an IFEX skid had been developed for a single-engine
helicopter, the AS-350 Ecureuil.

While in Canada, the three PLD personnel received the training in

the use of the IFEX-system/helicopter combination. This was the
first time that any such training had taken place anywhere in the
world. Operators, (those who operate the IFEX-system in the
helicopter) from Asia, America and Europe also attended the
training. However, there were no exercises with fire involved.

The following issues (amongst others) were considered during the

visit to Canada:
• the technical aspects, construction and the consequences for
flying28
• ‘weight and balance’ (configuration: crew, fuel and water)
• operational aspects of the flight (establishing necessary
amendments to the flight manual)
• processing and feasibility of the ‘Supplementary Type
Certificate’29
• training of crew, including exemptions from existing Aviation
Law.

As a result of this visit to Canada the PLD stated that the idea of
using a fire fighting helicopter could be viable. The experimental
phase went on to prove that it was technically possible for the fire
fighting helicopter to become operational and the IFEX skid was
returned to its manufacturer in Germany. The PLD drew up a list of
alterations and improvements that needed to be carried out before
the start of the second phase.

The test phase

After the experimental phase, the PLD and the fire service entered
into an agreement with each other for a second, test phase. During
the test phase a demonstration of the fire fighting helicopter was
organized at Crailo for a large party of representatives from the fire
service, police, press, Royal Air Force, sponsors related to the

51
 sector (AMEV amongst others) and the RLD. A number of ‘training
targets’ were set on fire and these were attacked by the fire fighting
helicopter. This demonstration can be regarded as a success, despite
some technical faults concerning the pressure in the extinguishing
system.

B.4 Preparation of the pilot project

Partially as a result of the successful demonstration in Crailo it was
decided to start a pilot project. The aim being to establish whether
the fire fighting helicopter could add value to extinguishing fires in
high-rise buildings and other locations that are difficult for the fire
service to access. The pilot project would have to prove whether
the fire fighting helicopter would be a possible asset to the existing
fire fighting equipment.

In May 1998, preparations for the start of the pilot project were
made. The Mayor of Maarssen Chaired the Steering Committee.
This consisted of representatives of the Ministry of The Interior and
Kingdom Relations (BZK), CCRB, Nibra, AMEV and PLD. The
members were concerned that procedures were properly followed
in respect of finance and the preparation of contracts amongst
other issues. By the end of 1999 the participants, later than planned,
signed an agreement in which they formally declared their
commitment to take part in the project known as ‘Fire Fighting
Helicopter Netherlands’.

A project group was also founded under Chairmanship of the Chief

Fire Officer of the Maarssen Fire Brigade. The Members of the
project group were representatives from BZK, PLD, the Ede Fire
Brigade, The Civil Aviation Authority of the Transport and Water
Management Inspectorate, Nibra and AMEV. Also representatives of
the Amsterdam Fire Brigade joined the meetings of the project group
at a later stage.
The project group was occupied with a variety of issues including:
• Who has to purchase what?
• When will the fire fighting helicopter be used?
• Under what conditions will the pilot project proceed?
• What legal exemptions are necessary and who will take
responsibility?

“OrgaInfo Advies and Management” provided the secretariat

resource for the pilot project and were represented on both
groups.

Potential sponsors were approached for financial backing with the

main sponsor being AMEV, an insurance company. Other sponsors
included ‘de Elf Provinciën’ (property developer), ‘N.V.
Waterleidingbedrijf Midden-Nederland’ (a water company). The
European Commission of the European Union was also prepared to
contribute financially.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Initially, it appeared that the project, officially planned to go ahead in

1999, was not financially viable. Eventually there were sufficient
sponsors prepared to contribute and the pilot project could
proceed on 3 April 2000. The duration of the pilot project was
scheduled to be 18 months or a maximum of 15 attacks.

Attachment 2 outlines the contribution made by the various

participants to the pilot project.

Operational and strategic tactics (see section B.7), a training

procedure and a ‘crew concept’ (for the PLD crew) were also
drawn up.

B.5 Carrying out the pilot project

The fire service (Incident Commander who makes the request for
the fire fighting helicopter) and the PLD (pilots, Operators and
engineers/technicians) played a very important role throughout the
pilot project.

B.5.1 The fire service

One of the main reasons for the pilot project was to test the fire
fighting helicopter’s ability to support the fire service when fighting
fires in locations that have poor access. Despite the fact that the
PLD is responsible for the actual attack (see sub section B.5.2) the
IC remained in charge with regard to the overall performance.
Consequently, the fire fighting helicopter was used under
authorization of the IC. Initially, it was the IC who instructed the
Helicopter crew with regard to the tactics to extinguish the fire
(see also section B.6).

Training for the fire service

The Netherlands has approximately 500 municipal fire brigades. Not
every IC was authorized to request or to use the fire fighting
helicopter during an incident. Only those ICs who had received
safety instructions and training were allowed to do so. For this
reason a number of training days were organized.

On 25 January 2000 the first training session took place at Nibra.

After that, another two days were organised in Den Helder on 28
and 29 February 2000 for the IC’s who had not been able to attend
the instruction at Nibra. The actual training took approximately 2
hours.

Training syllabus:

1.30p.m. Status of the pilot project

1.50p.m. Helicopter extinguishing methods and techniques

2.30p.m. Helicopter attack and emergency procedures

3.10p.m. Nibra evaluation of the pilot project

3.30p.m. Discussion and questions

4.00p.m. Viewing of the KLPD-helicopter

53
 Fire Officers, based in the regions, gave training to a wider group of
ICs at various fire brigade locations, a total of 241 Fire Officers
received instruction.

The Operators from regional control rooms were also provided

with training in respect of “deployment procedures”.

B.5.2 National Police Aviation Authority

The Netherlands is divided 25 regional police forces. There is also
one national force: the National Police Services Agency (KLPD). It is
the task of the KLPD to support the regional police forces when
they are carrying out their duties. This is achieved by providing staff,
equipment and technology.

The KLPD is divided into twelve operational departments, of which

one is the PLD. The PLD supervises compliance with Aviation Law,
investigates aircraft accidents and takes action with regard to
criminal use of airspace. The PLD also takes aerial photographs
when requested by the regional police forces and assist during
search operations (for missing persons or criminals).

These duties are carried out by means of helicopters and fixed-wing

aircraft. The PLD is operational 24 hours per day.

The PLD fleet consists of:

• 2 twin-engine aeroplanes (BN2T Islander)
• 2 twin-engine helicopters (Bölkow Bo-105)
• 3 single-engine aeroplanes (Cessna 182R)
• 2 single-engine helicopters (AS-350 Ecureuil).

In section B.3 it was explained that since the end of 1997, the PLD
was closely involved in the preparation of the pilot project. The PLD
did not only play an important role in this phase, but also made an
enormous commitment by offering its entire ‘flying platform’ for the
duration of the pilot project. This meant that the helicopter, pilots,
Operators and engineers for the maintenance of the IFEX-system
were all available on stand-by. This required a great deal of effort
and the PLD fulfilled a tremendously important role during the
entire project.

Despite the fact that the PLD only facilitated, no less than 14 pilots,
8 Operators (who operated the IFEX-system during an attack) and
engineers of the PLD underwent special, modular training. This
consisted of theoretical and practical parts all of which were
assessed.

At the start of the pilot project a number of exercises and training

sessions were carried out to test the fire fighting helicopter as well
as to train the Helicopter crew. Further practical training was held
for the crew at the training centre of the Royal Navy in Den Helder.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

B.6 The fire fighting helicopter

The fire fighting helicopter consisted of two main components: the
helicopter itself and an extinguishing system. Both will be discussed
in this section.

B.6.1 The Ecureuil AS-350 B2

As discussed, only one type of helicopter of the PLD fleet was
suitable for operating as a fire fighting helicopter: the single-engine
Ecureuil AS-350 B2. The IFEX-system was developed for this type of
helicopter only. The helicopter, manufactured by the French
company ‘Aerospatiale’, is generally suitable for carrying a maximum
of 6 passengers during a 3 hour flight with a maximum speed of 220
km/ph. The maximum starting weight of the Ecureuil AS-350 B2 is
2,250 kg and the fuel capacity is 427 kg.

During the pilot project the helicopter was based at Schiphol Airport.
This allowed the helicopter to arrive at the scene of an incident in
the Randstad between 10-30 minutes30 after take-off. The Ecureuil
AS-350 B2 received an exemption for the duration of the pilot
project allowing it to operate at lower levels and closer to
residential areas if necessary to enable training or an actual
extinguishing attack.

The PLD was of the opinion that a different type of helicopter

would have been more suitable, namely the twin-engine Bölkow Bo-
105. Because of its 2 engines, the helicopter is able to operate over
residential areas. For the pilot project the suitability of the Bölkow
was considered but proved to have a number of disadvantages (in
comparison to the Ecureuil). Firstly, the payload of the Bölkow was
less than that of the Ecureuil. The payload is the maximum weight
that can be carried in flight including: the weight of the pilot,
Operator, the IFEX-system, water, additives and mission fuel. As a
consequence of this restriction, the amount of water and additives
available for an attack would be severely restricted and major
adjustments would be required to increase this. Also the ‘auto
rotation’ capability of the Bölkow is poorer than that of the Ecureuil
‘Auto rotation’ enables the helicopter to “glide” in a controlled way
to a safe landing in the event of engine failure.

The twin-engine configuration of the Bölkow would have been more

suitable, but it was decided for the reasons mentioned above to use
the Ecureuil. As a consequence, the number of attacks carried out
over residential areas had to be kept to a minimum. The figure of 15
attacks was deemed to be acceptable by the PLD. This is why
training and exercises were carried out over non-residential areas.

B.6.2 The heli-IFEX-system

The heli-IFEX-system consists of two ‘extinguishing’ canons, two
water tanks and a cylinder containing compressed air.

55
 A water tank can contain a maximum of 155 litres of water and
each canon has a capacity of 18 litres (18 litres of water will be
released per shot). The compressed air cylinder is charged to a
pressure of 300 bars and this enables an operating pressure in the
canon of 25 bars. According to the specifications the maximum total
weight (without external load) of the installation is 280 kg.

The system can be mounted to the helicopter in approximately 20

minutes. In case of emergency the Operator can jettison the IFEX-
system with a single press release button.

During an attack the Operator can direct the shots using a colour
camera/monitor and the system is actuated by an automatic firing
mechanism. The canons can be depressed to a maximum of 90o.

As mentioned in section B.1 the principle of the IFEX-system is

based on the cooling and smothering effect of water. This effect is
optimized if the water particles are extremely fine. The IFEX-system
is able to produce water droplets of between 2-200 microns.31

When the Operator activates the system, by pulling the trigger, the
water will leave the canon at a velocity of approximately 120 meters
per second. The shot of water will reach the seat of the fire with

56
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

minimum waste. The shot is accompanied by a loud report as the

mist “shell” breaks the sound barrier when released.

One shot of water (18 litres) has a cooling surface of 1,000 square
meters and creates a ‘steam blanket’ of approximately 1,700 litres.
The steam interrupts the oxygen supply and consequently the fire
will smother the fire (see also section B.1). The next shot should be
applied when the ‘steam blanket’ has evaporated, which will take a
few seconds. The system specification suggests that the canon can
be refilled in 6-7 seconds32 and the maximum effective range is 50
metres33.

A critical part of the operating theory is that the shot has to reach
the seat of the fire. If this is not achieved the system will not be
effective. In practice, this is difficult and will be challenging for an
Operator in a fire fighting helicopter, trying to reach the seat of the
fire via an open window in a high-rise building (an objective of the
pilot project).
An important point to note is that the penetrating ability of the heli-
IFEX-system is almost non-existent. After the open fire is damped
down the seat will continue to smoulder at a high temperature,
water applied at this stage will immediately be converted into steam.

The heli-IFEX-system will hardly have any effect34 at this point as the
water particles will be converted directly into steam and cooling of
the seat itself will not take place. A solid jet will be required to
penetrate the core. In theory this means that the fire fighting
helicopter will only be able to bring the fire under control, but the
fire service, using a solid jet, will have to finally extinguish the fire.
The fire fighting helicopter will therefore only be used for support
(as outlined in the objective of the pilot project).

Configuration
Apart from the fixed weight of the IFEX-system and the two crew,
more weight can be added in terms of water, additives and fuel. It
was decided to opt for the following configuration:
• 50% fuel (as it is harder to obtain fuel than water) 216 kg Jet A1
kerosene.
• 200 litres of water (100 litres of water per tank – both tanks
half full). Each shot will take 18 litres of water so effectively 10
shots can be applied (during re/filling approximately 20 litres of
water will be wasted). After 10 shots the amount of fuel will be
reduced significantly. This means that the canons can be refilled
up to 100% in most cases.
• 25% litres of additive, carried in 2 containers.

This configuration was later amended. It turned out that the fire
service did not require any additives (see section 4.2) and the IFEX-
skid was 70 kg heavier than the certificate of airworthiness
indicated. Therefore it was decided not to carry additives. Also, the
percentage of fuel was reduced to 45% and the amount of water to
180 litres.

57
 B.7 The Operational tactics and procedures
During one of the demonstrations the operational and strategic
tactics were designed and agreed. The operational and strategic
tactics will be outlined below to provide an understanding of the use
of the fire fighting helicopter.

1 Aim
The aim of the fire fighting helicopter is to support the (regional)
fire services in the Netherlands during fire fighting in high-rise
buildings and on locations where access is difficult.

2 Availability
The duration of the pilot project was 18 months (3 April 2000 – 3
October 2001) or 15 attacks. In principle the fire fighting helicopter
was available for 7 days per week with the following restrictions.
• Initially the fire fighting helicopter was only available during
daylight.
• One helicopter was available during the pilot project.
• Weather circumstances can affect the ability to deploy. The
PLD makes the final decision.
• Based on availability and on the priorities of the PLD.

3 Operational command and authorization

The fire service has the operational command during the use of the
fire fighting helicopter and decides whether the helicopter should be
deployed. Also the fire service decides how the fire has to be
extinguished using the fire fighting helicopter. However, the Flight
Commander of the PLD is authorized and responsible for the
decision whether the fire fighting helicopter can comply with the
request or not. Operations will only be carried out according to the
operational and strategic tactics. The Flight Commander of the PLD
has to be notified of each attack as soon as possible. Only the IC
who has been trained and who is present at the scene of the
incident and trained PLD pilots and Operators are authorized to
carry out an operation with the fire fighting helicopter.

4 Fire ground and attendance time

The fire fighting helicopter was based at Schiphol Airport. The target
attendance time is approximately 10 minutes, with a maximum of 30
minutes, taken from the time of the first telephone call between the
trained IC and the Flight Commander of the PLD. Attachment 3
shows a map of the area where the fire fighting helicopter could be
deployed.

5 The decision to make a request

The decisions to make a request for the fire fighting helicopter will
be taken by the trained IC at the scene of the incident based on the
following criteria.
• A fire in a high-rise building (28 meters or more) access difficult
with equipment available.
• Other fires in locations with difficult access.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

For an effective and safe use of the fire fighting helicopter the
trained IC has to be able to establish that:
• the burning object is reachable within a radius of 50 meters, the
maximum distance for the effective use of the water canon
• there is no substantial risk of explosion
• there is no danger of hazardous emissions when the fire has to
be approached by the fire fighting helicopter in to wind.

6 The request for the fire fighting helicopter

The trained IC makes a request for the fire fighting helicopter via
the fire service Control Room. The Control Room passes the
request for the fire fighting helicopter on to PLD, Operations (OPS,
+31 (0) 20 5025635) stating the location of the incident and the
name of the IC involved. If required, the Control Room can pass on
further details via the above telephone number. The Control Room
also alarms the Police Control Incident Room. They will agree and
secure the landing area necessary for landing and take-off.

In addition, before take-off, the Control Room passes the following

details on to the PLD pilot and Operator.
• Exact location of the fire and relevant details with regard to the
location (residential area, approach/return route).
• Type and dimension of the fire, possible emissions, danger of
explosion, etc.
• First briefing with regard to the extinguishing tactics and the
possible use of additives.
• Wind direction at the scene.
• ‘Open water’ sources for refilling the water tanks or landing
zone for refilling.
• If possible at this stage: landing zone near the fire and its
cordon.

7 Cancelling of the fire fighting helicopter

If the trained IC at the scene establishes that the use of the fire
fighting helicopter will not be required or, if its use is not feasible
then the fire fighting helicopter has to be cancelled via the Control
Room.

8 Daily operational activities of the PLD

The PLD (OPS) checks one hour before sunrise whether a
Helicopter pilot and Operator are available. They are appointed by
their direct supervisor and are trained to use the fire fighting
helicopter. The OPS notifies the Technical Department (TD) of the
availability of the Helicopter crew. The TD will then start preparing
the helicopter for its immediate use. The preparation involves:
• the daily checks/inspection of the helicopter
• supplying the helicopter with water and additive
• supplying the helicopter with a standard amount of fuel
• making sure there is sufficient air pressure in the system
• filling up the compressor with fuel (ready to be switched on)
• confirming that all systems have been checked.

59
 OPS notifies the Helicopter pilot and the Operator during their
daily briefing that operations for the fire service can be carried out.

9 Action by the PLD when a request for the fire fighting

helicopter is made
• OPS alarms the Helicopter crew and notifies the TD. TD
‘wheels out’ the helicopter and prepares it for take off. This
involves starting the air compressor, allowing the system to load
(the helicopter will then be ready to take off).
• OPS carries out a first check and verifies the name of the IC at
the scene of the incident against the list of Fire Officers who
have received training with regard to the fire fighting helicopter.
• OPS calls the Helicopter pilot and Operator and establishes
with them whether or not they can comply with the request.
• Before take off the crew monitors fire service channel 10.
• During the approach the Helicopter crew gets in touch with the
IC at the scene of the incident (or with somebody on behalf of
the IC, for example the Control Room). Communication takes
place via fire service channel 10. The IC (or Control Room)
reports to the Helicopter crew which channel they should use.
In principle this has to be one of the ten ‘disaster’ channels
allocated to the regional fire service (relating to the ‘5 TVO
Code’ system which provides a unique identifying code for each
region and unit in the Netherlands Fire Service).
• During the entire operation the helicopter keeps in touch with
the PLD in the usual way.

10 Safety at the fire ground

• The police and fire service are primarily concerned with safety
at the fire ground. Members of the public will not be allowed to
be present, in the open air, within a 50 meter radius of the
target.
• On the helicopter’s approach route a strip of 20 meters wide
must be free of ‘emergency service workers’ (fire fighters,
police, ambulance personnel).
• ‘Emergency service workers’ within 15 meters of the approach
strip must wear appropriate protective clothing. All emergency
service worker near the landing strip must to be familiar with
the use of the fire fighting helicopter.
• No fire fighters are allowed to be near the seat of the fire
during an attack.
• The instructed IC (or somebody on behalf of the IC) has to
notify the helicopter if there are any fire fighters present on the
other floors in the building. Fire fighters present in the building
must be notified that an attack will be carried out by the fire
fighting helicopter.

11 Actual attack of the fire fighting helicopter.

• After arrival of the fire fighting helicopter, the pilot contacts the
trained IC at the scene via the established communication

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

channel. If communication is not possible the Helicopter pilot

will communicate face to face with the IC after landing.

• If requested, a reconnaissance flight can be carried out to enable

the trained IC to observe the fire from the air. It is the task of
the IC to establish the desired attack method with the
Helicopter pilot . The following will be discussed:
• The nature of the fire and the possible use of additives.
• The accessibility and safety of the approach route and fire
ground.
• The angle from where the helicopter has to carry out the
attack.
• Exact location the burning object which has to be extinguished.
• During the attack only the Helicopter pilot and the Operator
are on board the helicopter. The Operator is the only person
who is authorised to operate the canon.
• The actual fire fighting will only take place under the direction
of the trained IC. The IC leads the operation.
• During the operation the IC and Helicopter crew will always be
in direct contact with each other.

12 Evaluation
• Each attack carried out by the fire fighting helicopter will be
evaluated. For this purpose the trained IC, the Helicopter pilot
and Operator will complete an evaluation form directly after the
operation. Completed forms have to be sent to Nibra. If
necessary Nibra will approach the people involved for an
interview.
• In the light of the evaluation report, the PLD Chief of
‘Helicopter’ Operations will personally debrief the PLD-
personnel.
• The evaluation report may lead to an amendment of procedures
during the trial period.

61
62
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Attachment 2 The Attacks

This attachment provides the key results of the questionnaires. The
information was taken from the Incident Commander (IC), the
Helicopter pilot and Operator. The specifications/descriptions of
the incidents and the main conclusions can be found in chapter 4.

B.2.1 Training on the ‘Spiegelplas’ at Nederhorst den Berg – 2 May 2000

Attack Training (not a real, but a ‘designated' attack)
Reason for request Fire with difficult access: fire in a yacht on a lake.
Time of arrival IC at the n.a.
scene of the incident
Time helicopter 1905 hours
requested by IC
Status of fire at the time n.a.
the request was made
Time helicopter took off 1915 hours
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 1925 hours
scene – helicopter
Time of departure from 1935 hours
the scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the Blaze in cabin of the yacht
time the helicopter
carried out the attack
Weather circumstances Clear with a moderate breeze (wind speed 10 knots,
approximately 18 km/ph)
Attack strategy In first instance it was decided to approach the object by
slowly taxiing. The fire fighting helicopter applied its first
shot from approximately 10 meters distance from the
yacht. However, the shot did not reach its target and the
fire fighting helicopter had to approach to approximately 5
meters. Eventually the shots struck the yacht mid-ships
(this is a reach of approximately 9 – 10 meters). The fire
fighting helicopter was forced to hover near the yacht
otherwise the yacht could not have been hit at all.
Distance between 5 – 10 meters
helicopter and object(s)
Number of applied shots 8
(according to the
Operator)
Number of successful 5 (that is to say that the intensity of the flames visibly
shots (according to the decreased)
Operator)
Added additives None
Intervals between the Approximately 10 – 20 seconds at least between each shot
shots
Landing (zone) The helicopter did not landed at the scene of the incident
nor did it re-fuel
Water intake n.a.
Communication between The attack strategy has been discussed via channel 10.
IC and the Helicopter Instruction by the IC did not take place.
crew
Effect of the IFEX-system By applying the shots the fire was slightly reduced but still
on the fire flared up again.

63
 (Continuation of training on the ‘Spiegelplas’ at Nederhorst den Berg)
Effect of the helicopter The fire flared up again mainly caused by the down-wash of
on the fire the helicopter.
Reason for withdrawal Water supply had been used and the down-wash caused
helicopter the stern mooring to snap. This made the yacht turn and
extinguishing the fire became almost impossible
View of the Fire Brigade After the training Nibra researchers asked a number of
on the attack fire fighters involved for their opinion on the attack. In
general the Brigade found it quite incomprehensible that
the fire fighting helicopter had not been able to extinguish
a minor fire. It was agreed that the fire fighting helicopter
could be useful for cooling purposes. The helicopter will
never be able to extinguish the fire.
View PLD on the attack The fire diminished as a result of the attack. There were
also a few restrictions/limitations:
• The loading speed of the canons was too slow and
the loading time therefore too long
• The reach was too small (9 metres) caused by the
low pressure in the system
• Balance between fuel (endurance/weight) and the
water supply was a restriction

B.2.2 Test attack during fire in a paper warehouse, Purmerend, 12 May 2000
Attack No ‘designated’ attack
The circumstances did not meet the criteria of the pilot
project: there was no open fire (no emergency). The
attack has to be regarded as an experiment requested by
Fire Brigade.
Reason for request The Fire Brigade wanted to test the penetrating ability of
the IFEX canon on a thick layer of smouldering paper.
The PLD wanted to check the Operational tactics and
procedures during a practical exercise.
Time of arrival of IC at A second IC was employed for the attack with the
the scene of the incident helicopter
Time helicopter 0640 hrs
requested by IC
Status of fire at the time Fire under control
the request was made
Time helicopter took off 0821 hrs
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 0830 hrs
scene – helicopter
Time of departure from 0949 hrs
the scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the Smouldering fire in paper mass after a fire in a warehouse.
time the helicopter Message ‘Fire under control’ was sent
carried out the attack
Weather circumstances Light cloud, no precipitation and bright. Wind speed 10
knots (18 km/ph)
Attack strategy Shots were only applied from one position (at the top,
from the side, in one corner of the paper mass). The shots
were applied from hover position
Distance between 5 – 10 meters
helicopter and object(s)
Number of applied shots • Two with pure water
(according to the • Two with additives (Coldfire)
Operator) • Two double shots (Coldfire)

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

(Continuation of test attack during fire in a paper warehouse)

Number of successful 6 (that is to say that the intensity of the fire decreased –
shots (according to the glowing)
Operator)
Intervals between the Not reported
shots
Landing (zone) The helicopter landed prior to the attack so that the
attack strategy could be discussed with the IC. The
helicopter did not land for water intake. The Fire Brigade
regarded the preparation of the landing zone as difficult.
Water intake n.a.
Communication between According to the PLD the communication went well.
IC and the Helicopter The Fire Brigade pointed out that the approach route was
crew not properly discussed. The Fire Service’s request to
chose a particular approach route was denied
Effect of the IFEX-system The fire went out where the IFEX branch hit the target.
on the fire The effect of the shots was especially visible in the centre
of the surface (certainly when the shots with additives
were applied)
Effect of the down-wash Places in the mass which were only smouldering flared up
on the fire again because of the down-wash. Because of this the effect
of the IFEX-system (fire extinguish) was negative.
Reason for withdrawal The test was finished. The set target of 6 shots as reached
helicopter
View of the Fire Brigade In the terms of the fire fighting the attack was
on the attack unsuccessful. They had to cease the usual fire service
deployment. But this was not felt to be a problem during
this operation. It was assumed that in case of emergency
the support of the fire fighting helicopter would have
slowed down the operation and possibly would have
caused some difficulties.
View PLD on the attack The assumption that the fire fighting helicopter would not
add any value during such an attack has been confirmed
during the operation. The attack was useful however, as a
lot of (technical) experience was gained
Report media “Fire fighting helicopter fans the fire”
(...)To speed up the extinguishing process it was decided
yesterday morning for the first time to make a request for
the fire fighting helicopter equipped with two water
canons. The test in the open air took a wrong turning. The
extinguishing water landed mainly next to the burning
bales whilst the rotors of the helicopter caused so much
turbulence that the situation deteriorated.

B.2.3 Forest/heath fire at the Leusder Heath – 12 May 2000

Attack No ‘designated’ attack: the helicopter was used for
damping down
Reason for request Large forest/heath fire in area which is hard to access.
There are no water intake locations in the area. The
request was to trace the fire and to extinguish the fire
immediately.
Time of arrival IC at the 1700 hrs
scene of the incident
Time helicopter 1718 hrs
requested by IC
Time helicopter took off 1728 hrs
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 1742 hrs
scene – helicopter

65
 (Continuation of forest/heath fire at the Leusder Heath)
Time of departure from 1850 hrs
the scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the Large forest/heath fire with various seats. It was reported
time the helicopter to the PLD that the surface concerned was one square
carried out the attack kilometer.
Weather circumstances Clear with a with speed of 10 knots (18 km/ph)
Attack strategy The IC was picked up at the scene of the incident to make
a reconnaissance flight in the effected area (this took 5
minutes). It was decided that the helicopter would keep
tree tops wet as a preventive measure (this took
approximately 15 minutes in total). Two attack methods
were applied: hovering and slowly taxiing above the trees
Distance between Hover: 10 meters
helicopter and object(s) Slow taxi speed: 5 – 10 meters
Number of applied shots 12 shots which included ‘runs’. That is to say that two
(according to the shots were applied rapidly after each other
Operator)
Number of successful 12 shots (that is to say the shots hit the top of the trees)
shots (according to the
Operator)
Intervals between the Two shots were applied rapidly after each other and the
shots interval between the 1st and 2nd shot was 5 - 10 seconds,
between the 2nd and 3rd shot 20 – 30 seconds, etc.
Landing (zone) Three landings were made: to pick up and take back the IC
and one for water intake. In the first instance the landing
zone was allocated by the Fire Brigade at the edge of the
heath. This caused the following difficulties:
• The fire service and PLD worked with different co-
ordinates (respectively the ‘RDM’ co-ordinates35and
geographical co-ordinates) which made it hard for the
Helicopter pilot to find the location. This caused a
delay of approximately 10 minutes
• The fire fighting helicopter was not able to touch
down as there were too many trees in the
surrounding area

Two landing zones were used:

• A landing zone was marked by the local police along
the motorway Amersfoort–Doorn, near the fire service
command-car. This was not an optimum location.
There was too much tail wind and there were too
many people present on the landing zone. The
helicopter could hardly take off because of the street
lights nearby. Damage was caused to the outside
seating area of a pancake restaurant.
• The second landing zone was near the scene at the
heath. The landing zone was easy to access and was
not marked as this was not necessary (a lot of space
and few spectators)
Water intake After 12 shots, water intake took place from a water
carrier from the fire service. However, the carrier did not
have a usual Pump and consequently decreased the
effectiveness of the water intake. The water intake took
approximately 15 minutes. The fire fighting helicopter was
not used again after the water intake.
Communication between On request of the regional fire brigade the communication
IC and the Helicopter took place via channel 7 (instead of channel 10). This
crew caused some difficulties in the beginning which were
resolved at the scene of the incident

66
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

(Continuation of forest/heath fire at the Leusder Heath)

Effect of the IFEX-system According to the Fire Brigade the water did not reach the
on the fire top of the trees sufficiently. According to the PLD each
shot caused a lot of smoke. Because of the runs it was
hard to establish the effect of the operation.
Effect of the helicopter Hovering: moderate/nil
on the fire Slow taxi speed: none

The down-wash caused the spread of smoke and dust and

damage had been done to the outside seating area of a
pancake restaurant during touch down.
Reason for withdrawal The fire was out (extinguished by water tenders). The
helicopter message ‘fire under control’ was sent.
View of the Fire Brigade The fire fighting helicopter was not used for the actual fire
on the attack fighting but for damping down. However, it is still not clear
what contribution can be made or restrictions apply during
forest/heath fires and to slow down or prevent ‘crown
burning.’
View PLD on the attack The water carrier at the scene of the incident contained
only 1,000 litres and the area was hard to access for heavy
fire appliances. In this respect the deployment was
successful

B.2.4 Dune fire near Wijk aan Zee

Attack No ‘designated’ attack: there was no open fire as the fire
was already extinguished. The fire fighting helicopter was
used for damping down
Reason for request The control room of the Kennemerland police made a
request for the ‘tele’ helicopter to record video footage of
the fire. The PLD advised to also the use the fire fighting
helicopter
Time of arrival IC at the Unknown
scene of the incident
Time helicopter n.a.
requested by IC About 1500hrs the helicopter was offered by the control
room of the police
Time helicopter took off 1520 hrs
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 1530 hrs
scene – helicopter
Time of departure from 1545 hrs
the scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the There was only smoke visible
time the helicopter
carried out the attack
Weather circumstances Light cloud, good visibility, light wind
Attack strategy After discussion with the IC it was decided that the
helicopter would apply its shots for damping down and
would then take off again (without load)
Distance between 20 meters
helicopter and object(s)
Number of applied shots 6
(according to the The penultimate shot got stuck in the barrel (for unknown
Operator) reasons). A few hours later this shot was released
spontaneously. The technical department did not find any
faults

67
 (Continuation of dune fire near Wijk aan Zee)
Number of successful 5 (the amount of smoke created by the initial down-wash,
shots (according to the visibly decreased)
Operator)
Intervals between the 30 seconds
shots
Landing (zone) The helicopter landed for discussions with the IC. This
took place without any difficulties
Water intake n.a.
Communication between Before fire fighting there was a brief discussion. This was
IC and the Helicopter sufficient considering the agreed attack strategy
crew
Effect of the IFEX-system The smoke decreased visibly
on the fire
Effect of the helicopter The smoke increased caused by the down-wash
on the fire
Reason for withdrawal This was agreed before the attack
helicopter
View of the Fire Brigade -
on the attack
View PLD on the attack -

B.2.5 Attack on the fire at the VNU building in Hoofddorp – 9 July 2001
Attack Real attack, but not ‘designated’ (see attachment 5.6)
Reason for request The fire on the roof was hard to access
Time of arrival IC at the 1630 hrs
scene of the incident
Time helicopter 1700 hrs (at 1645hrs the PLD initiated preparations to get
requested by IC everything ready for the helicopter to take off)
Time helicopter took off 1705 hrs
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 1708 hrs
scene – helicopter
Time of departure from 1800 hrs
the scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the Severe blaze (according to the report of the fire service36)
time the helicopter
carried out the attack
Weather circumstances No significant cloud, no precipitation and good light. Wind
speed is unknown but there was a strong wind. The
buildings nearby caused a lot of mechanical turbulence.
Attack strategy At the request of the IC the attack was started at the
northern side of the building and moved from there
towards the southern side.
Distance between 10 – 15 meters
helicopter and object(s)
Number of applied shots 8 – 10
(according to the The first shot was applied at 1749hrs. The IC needed 25
Operator) minutes to decided whether the use of the helicopter was
actually necessary. After that, it took at least another 15
minutes for withdrawal of the fire service personnel and
other emergency services personnel.
Number of successful All shots were fairly powerful with an extinguishing effect
shots (according to the
Operator)
Intervals between the 30 – 45 seconds
shots
Landing (zone) No landing was been made

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

(Continuation of attack on the fire at the VNU building in Hoofddorp)

Water intake The helicopter departed with 50% of fuel and water for 8
– 10 shots. An additional water intake did not take place.
Instruction and Fire service: according to the IC no communication had
communication between taken place. The instruction with regard to the attack
IC and the Helicopter strategy took place via a police officer at the CTPI (co-
crew ordination team at the scene of an incident) but is not
reported as such by the crew (see also ‘view of the PLD’
below)

Helicopter crew:
The communication via channel 10 was difficult during the
initial alarm37 phase and during the fire fighting. The
communication improved when switched over to the
control room of the police. The direction by the IC was
minimal. It was indicated when (1749hrs) and how
(northern side) the helicopter could start with its
operation and when it had to cease again.
Effect of the IFEX-system Where the shots were applied the fire extinguished
on the fire reduced but flared up again shortly after
Effect of the helicopter The down-wash of the helicopter caused the fire to spread
on the fire through wall cavities to the stores below
Reason for withdrawal • The negative effect of the down-wash (caused the fire
helicopter to spread through wall cavities to the stores below)
• Successful result had not been achieved
View of the Fire Brigade • The helicopter had a negative influence on the fire:
on the attack the fire flared up again and spread to the store below
• The final result was nil benefit
• The actual attacks of the helicopter took too much
time
View PLD on the attack • According to the PLD the northern side
(leeward/sheltered side) was not a good place to start
the attack. The wind would just make the fire spread
fire in that direction. Nevertheless the PLD reported
to have acted upon the advice of the IC
• The use of an additive had a positive effect
• As the helicopter was used unnecessary the attack
did not result in a positive contribution

B.2.6 Fire in barn, Oterleek – 3 August 2001

Attack No ‘designated’ attack: the message ‘fire under control’
was already sent
Reason for request The fire was surrounded by farmland which was
impassable because of standing crops
Time of arrival IC at the 1940 hrs
scene of the incident
Time helicopter 1957 hrs
requested by IC
Time helicopter took off 2045 hrs
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 2101 hrs
scene – helicopter
Time of departure from 2140 hrs
the scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the (Very) severe blaze with risk of spreading to buildings
time of the request nearby
Status of the fire at the According to the fire service: severe blaze
time of the attack According to the PLD: the message ‘fire under control’
was already sent

69
 (Continuation of fire in barn, Oterleek)
Weather circumstances A beautiful summer evening
Wind force 3 – 4
Attack strategy Unknown
Distance between 10 – 15 meters
helicopter and object(s)
Number of applied shots 4
(according to the
Operator)
Number of successful 0 (that is to say that the shots did not reach the seat of
shots (according to the the fire as the metal roof was collapsed but mainly still
Operator) intact)
Intervals between the 1 minute
shots
Landing (zone) The helicopter touched down as the Helicopter crew had
to discuss the strategy.
Water intake n.a.
Instruction and It was reported that the communication during the attack
communication between was satisfactory
IC and the Helicopter
crew
Effect of the IFEX-system Nill
on the fire
Effect of the helicopter The down-wash caused a lot of small burning particles in
on the fire the air which increased the risk of fire spread and also re-
ignition.
Reason for withdrawal
helicopter It was not possible for the helicopter to extinguish the fire
and was also not assisting.
View of the Fire Brigade • It took long before the helicopter arrived
on the attack • The attack was perfect/excellent. This type of fire is
less suitable for extinguishing by a helicopter
equipped with an IFEX-system
• There was a lot of respect for the expertise and skills
of the Helicopter crew
View PLD on the attack • The extinguishing operation had no effect at all on the
fire.

B.2.7 Fire in the restaurant of the Akersloot Hotel – 5 August 2001

Attack ‘Designated’ attack
After 5 shots the fire was extinguished and the fire was
further damped down by the fire service
Reason for request Fire in the roof space of the gabled roof which was hard to
access (from the inside as well as from the outside)
Time of arrival IC at the 2008 hrs
scene of the incident
Time helicopter 2036hrs (initiated by the control room of the fire service
requested by IC instead of the IC)
Time helicopter took off 2105 hrs
from Schiphol Airport
Time of arrival at the 2128 hrs38
scene – helicopter
Status of the fire at the Severe blaze
time of the request
Status of the fire at the Severe blaze
time of the attack
Weather circumstances Clear visibility, high cloud and dry, moderate wind
Attack strategy The shots were applied in the roof space while the
helicopter was taxiing over the hotel

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

(Continuation of fire in the restaurant of the Akersloot Hotel)

Distance between 10 – 15 meters
helicopter and object(s)
Number of applied shots 5
(according to the
Operator)
Number of successful 3, that is to say that the shots reached the seats of the fire
shots (according to the and largely extinguished the fire. (The were no obstacles
Operator) surrounding the gabled roof and the opening in the roof
was large enough)
Added additives None
Intervals between the 1 minute
shots
Landing (zone) The helicopter touched down on a grass area near the
building without difficulties. The approach route was over
a meadow with grazing cows. The entire herd panicked
and started to run. A number of cows stumbled over.
Contact was established with the owner of the cows and
the veterinary surgeon. The event had no adverse
consequences.
Water intake n.a.
Instruction and
communication between:

1. IC and the control 1. As the control room initiated the request for the fire
room fighting helicopter the communication was in first
instance not clear
2. Communications went well. As the IC gave a few
2. IC and Helicopter correcting instructions after the first shot the
crew following shots were direct hits
Effect of the IFEX-system The flames were largely extinguished
on the fire
Effect of the helicopter By the chosen attack strategy (taxiing) there was hardly
on the fire any negative influence caused by the down-wash
Reason for withdrawal • The flames were largely extinguished
helicopter • Dusk falling
View of the Fire Brigade • The helicopter arrived fairly quickly at the scene
on the attack (compared with the attack on 3 August)
• The attack could not have been better. However, it
was pointed out that the attack would have been
more effective if extinguished via the hole in the
outer wall instead of from above
• Without the use of the helicopter the same result
would have been achieved, although more slowly
• The fire service were complimentary about the
expertise and the skills of the Helicopter crew
View PLD on the attack • For a better result the request should have been
made earlier

71
72
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Attachment 3 Participants
In this attachment, an overview is given of the organizations who
made an important contribution to the project ‘Fire fighting
helicopter in the Netherlands.’

With a background as large ‘fire damage’ insurer, ‘AMEV Nederland’

made an important contribution as the main sponsor making the
project ‘Fire fighting helicopter in the Netherlands’ possible. Their
support included, amongst other things, the provision of knowledge,
experience in launching projects, and provided finance to help draw
up a communication strategy.

The Fire Service and Crisis Management Directorate of the Ministry

of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), was one of the
representatives who signed the agreement to co-operate in the
project. They supported the project with political, technical and
legal advice together with expertise, manpower and subsidies. The
Directorate also did pioneering work to obtain funding from the
European Commission.

The members of the European Union and the European

Commission unanimously supported the project by providing a
subsidy.

The National Police Aviation Authority of the National Police

Services Agency made a significant contribution to the trial by
providing personnel (Pilots, Operators and Engineers), equipment
and technology.

The Maarssen Fire Brigade supported the project by offering

facilities, including administrative support to the project team.

The Netherlands Institute for Fire Service and Disaster Management

(Nibra), one of the representatives who signed the agreement to
co-operate in the project, took care of the operational and safety
training for the Fire Officers and the evaluation of the pilot project.

The Royal Navy Training Institute made the facilities at the School
of the NBCD, in Den Helder, available for further training in the use
of the fire fighting helicopter and additional instruction for Fire
Officers.

Consultants of ‘OrgaInfo Advies en Mangement’ supported the

project by providing advice and by leading the project secretariat.
‘OrgaInfo Advies en Mangement’ also supported the project by
financially contributing to the communication program.

The College of Chief Officers of Regional Fire Brigades (CCRB), as a

representative of regional Chief Fire Officers and participant in the

73
 agreement, took responsibility for creating a positive image within
the regional fire brigades.

The Royal Netherlands’ Association of Fire Brigades (KNBV)

participated in the agreement as a member of the Board. Also the
KNBV administered the financial affairs of the project.

Property developer ‘De Elf Proviciën’ contributed financially to the

pilot project. ‘De Elf Provinciën’ is the owner of a shopping centre
in Maarssen.

Because of the water saving effect of the fire fighting helicopter

compared with other extinguishing techniques the ‘N.V.
Waterleidingbedrijf Midden-Midden (WMN) supported the test with
a financial contribution.

PR and Communication consultancy Paul Kok Consultants (PKC),

were responsible for the communication strategy from the start of
the project.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Attachment 4 The trial

area

White area: do not participate in the pilot project

Coloured areas: participate in the pilot project

75
76
 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

Footnotes
1
In this evaluation report this combination will be called ‘fire fighting
helicopter’
2
See attachment 1, section B.6
3
This is also based on the fact that the penetrating ability of the IFEX-
system is very limited. To extinguish the glowing seat of a fire (the flames
are almost out) a powerful solid jet is required. When the fire fighting
helicopter has stabilized the fire, the fire service will always have to damp
down (with a solid jet). The fire fighting helicopter can only be used to
assist during fire fighting operations (see also attachment 1, section B.6).
4
The Flight Commander of the PLD decides whether a request from the
fire service to use the helicopter can be accepted or not (see Operational
tactics and procedures, attachment 1, section B.7).
5
The questionnaires were completed under supervision of the Flight
Commander.
6
The reason was that the fire fighting helicopter had to be available within
the agreed response time.
7
In Canada the so-called heli-IFEX-system was adapted for only one type of
helicopter, the one-engine Ecureuil AS-350 B2. To fly with a single-engine
aircraft is not entirely without risk. A different type of helicopter would be
more suitable, namely the twin-engine Bölkow Bo-105. The fact that this
helicopter has two engines means that it can operate with less risk over
residential areas. For the pilot project the capabilities of the Bölkow were
considered equipped with IFEX-system. However, to fly with the Bölkow
equipped with the IFEX-system would have had various disadvantages
(compared with the Ecureuil, see attachment 1, section B.6.2). Eventually it
was decided to use the Ecureuil during the pilot project. The reduction of
risk was mainly achieved by a number of safeguards:
• A flight was only permitted for an actual (or expected) IFEX-attack
over built-up/residential areas. It was not allowed to prolong the
attack if this was not necessary.
• No more than 15 attacks will be carried out during the entire trial
period.
• The approach route had to be chosen so that the risks were reduced
to an absolute minimum.
8
The effect of the down-wash on a fire in a confined space is very limited.
Restriction of the down-wash can also be achieved by approaching the fire
at ‘slow taxi speed’ (see also section 4.1).
9
The system ‘Rijks Driehoeks Meting (RDM)’ (co-ordinate system) is only
applicable in the Netherlands. The ‘RDM grid’ is also known as ‘TOP grid’.
The ‘TOP grid’ is very simple to use and therefore the disaster relief
organization in the Netherlands decided to use this system.
10
It has to be stressed that this information is extracted from the
questionnaire completed by the IC. The PLD pointed out that the attack
was evaluated with the fire service. The fact that the PLD ignored the IC’s
instruction/directions was not discussed according to the PLD.

77
 11
The method required for the fire service to create a landing zone is not
explained in the Operational tactics and procedures. However, this did
come up during the training session for the fire service (see attachment 1,
section B.5). It was pointed out that a landing zone has to be at least 25 by
25 meters, free from obstacles, emergency workers and other people and
also the landing zone has to be cordoned.
12
The PLD reported that it was a moderate fire.
13
In first instance the exercises would take place on 13 September but as a
mark of respect after the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September the
exercises were postponed to 18 October.
14
In the Bijlmermeer a large number of flats were due to be demolished to
improve the area and to create more variation between high-rise and low-
rise buildings. It is hoped that this will improve the living environment. The
housing association was prepared to provide one of the blocks of flats (due
for demolition) for exercise purposes.
15
As a consequence the evaluation forms completed by the people
involved were very brief.
16
This is also based on the fact that the penetrating ability of the IFEX-
system is very limited. To extinguish the glowing seat of a fire
(of which the flames are mainly put out) a powerful, solid jet is required.
When the fire fighting helicopter has stabilized the fire, the fire service will
always have to damp down (with a solid jet). The fire fighting helicopter
can only be used to assist during an fire fighting operation.
17
The training and exercises are not included in the requests.
18
Based on the interviews held.
19
Crew Commanders and IC’s are intended here.
20
Extracted from: “En steekende de Spuitpyp door de deur” by E. Oomes
(Nibra essay prize 1999).
21
One of the main pieces of research in this field is the theory of the
‘Recognition-Primed Decisions (RPD), developed by R. Klein. Klein has
done research from 1985 onwards to investigate the way professionals
take decisions in stressful situations and under time pressure.
22
This philosophy was implemented in the ‘Leidraad Oefenen’ (training
guide) for the fire service.
23
However, the Fire Officers were kept informed on a regular basis during
the pilot project via news letters.
24
According to the manufacturer: “the smaller the size of the water
droplets, the greater their absorption capacity.”
25
According to the manufacturer: “the higher the droplet velocity, the
greater the amount of water that reaches the base of the fire.”
26
The Cougar and the Chinook.

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 EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING HELICOPTER

27
They were: the Chief Pilot -Helicopters, a Quality Insurance Inspector
(specialized in aviation techniques) and a maintenance/operational
Helicopter pilot.
28
For example the ‘load factor’, knowledge of the system, description of
the system, safety criteria with regard to the pressure cylinders that are
part of the IFEX-system (for example decreasing the air pressure in case of
a crash).
29
To use the helicopter in combination with the IFEX-skid an ‘optional’
certificate was required. The Canadian Aviation Authority provided a
temporary certificate. At that time they were trying to obtain a full
‘Supplementary Type Certificate’ (a certificate of airworthiness).
30
During the trial period the IFEX-system was mounted under the
helicopter and was therefore operationally available on stand by.
31
The mist particles shot from a distance of 4 metres will be approximately
100 microns, those shot from 6 metres will be 5 microns in size (research
The Fire Research Station in London).
32
The attacks proved that this was not feasible.
33
The attacks proved that the effective distance is not presently 50 meters,
but somewhere in the region of 10 to 15 meters.
34
This was also confirmed after the attack in Purmerend.
35
RDM co-ordinates = ’Rijks Driehoeks Meting – grid (only applicable in
the Netherlands).
36
The PLD reported a moderate fire. Considering the equipment used by
the fire service (2 appliances and an aerial platform) this suggests a
moderate fire.
37
During alarming, mobilization and take off, all happened at the same time,
the PLD tried to contact the IC. This proved to be difficult.
38
According to the PLD’s report this was ‘approximately 2110 hrs – 2115
hrs).

79