House of Commons

Defence Committee

Afghanistan—Camp
Bastion Attack
Thirteenth Report of Session 2013–14

Report, together with formal minutes

Ordered by the House of Commons

to be printed 26 March 2014

HC 830
Published on 16 April 2014
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£6.50
The Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the

expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its
associated public bodies.

Current membership
Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP (Conservative, North East Hampshire) (Chair)
Mr Julian Brazier MP (Conservative, Canterbury)
Rt Hon Jeffrey M. Donaldson MP (Democratic Unionist, Lagan Valley)
Mr James Gray MP (Conservative, North Wiltshire)
Mr Dai Havard MP (Labour, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney)
Adam Holloway MP (Conservative, Gravesham)
Mrs Madeleine Moon MP (Labour, Bridgend)
Sir Bob Russell MP (Liberal Democrat, Colchester)
Bob Stewart MP (Conservative, Beckenham)
Ms Gisela Stuart MP (Labour, Birmingham, Edgbaston)
Derek Twigg MP (Labour, Halton)
John Woodcock MP (Labour/Co-op, Barrow and Furness)

The following Members were also members of the Committee during this
inquiry.

Thomas Docherty MP (Labour, Dunfermline and West Fife)

Penny Mordaunt MP (Conservative, Portsmouth North)
Sandra Osborne MP (Labour, Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock)

Powers
The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of
which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No
152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications
The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery
Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press
notices) are on the internet at www.parliament.uk/parliament.uk/defcom.

The Reports of the Committee, the formal minutes relating to that report, oral
evidence taken and some or all written evidence are available in a printed
volume. Additional written evidence may be published on the internet only.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are James Rhys (Clerk), Dougie Wands
(Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Ian Thomson (Committee
Specialist), Christine Randall (Senior Committee Assistant), Rowena Macdonald
and Carolyn Bowes (Committee Assistants).

Contacts
All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Defence Committee,
House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general
enquiries is 020 7219 5745; the Committee’s email address is
[email protected]. Media inquiries should be addressed to Alex Paterson
on 020 7219 1589.
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 1

Contents
Report Page

Conclusions and recommendations 3 

1  Introduction 5 
Background 5 
US accountability review 5 
Our inquiry 5 

2  Accountability review 7 
US Department of the Army report (redacted), 19 August 2013 7 
UK accountability 7 
Memorandum of Understanding between USCENTCOM and PJHQ 8 
The burning man incident 8 
Security incidents recorded in Helmand Province 10 
Security and force protection operations in Camp Bastion 10 
Camp Bastion Guard towers 11 
Perimeter security 12 
Risk assessment of intruder access to the flight line 13 
Force protection projects and expenditure 14 

3  Conclusion 15 

Annex – List of abbreviations 16 

Formal Minutes 17 

Witnesses 18 

List of written evidence 18 

List of Reports from the Committee in Session 2013–14 19 

 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 3

Conclusions and recommendations

Background
1. We pay tribute to the bravery of all those ISAF personnel who engaged the enemy
during the attack on Camp Bastion that night. We express our deepest sympathy to
the families of Lieutenant Colonel Raible and Sergeant Atwell for their profound loss.
(Paragraph 3)

The burning man incident

2. At the time of the attack the Memorandum of Understanding between
USCENTCOM and PJHQ had not been revised, despite the fact that all parties
appeared to agree on the necessity to make revisions in the aftermath of the “burning
man incident”. Witnesses were neither able to explain to us which members of the
Executive Steering Group rejected the revised draft MOU nor what the reasons for
the rejection were. The delays to the process of revision allowed weaknesses in
command and control arrangements for force protection to persist. It is an enduring
characteristic of conflict that the enemy fights back. ISAF personnel were exposed to
unnecessary risk. In response to our report the MoD must explain why the failure to
revise the MOU prior to the September 2012 attack should not be regarded as an act
of omission. (Paragraph 24)

Security incidents recorded in Helmand Province

3. The inference we drew from the Chief of Joint Operation’s evidence was that the
number of security incidents was unusually high in Helmand Province in 2012.
Unfortunately the MoD declined to provide us with comparable details of the level of
security incidents recorded in Helmand for previous years as this information was
classified. This would have allowed us to make an informed assessment of the
relative threat levels in the area at the time. (Paragraph 26)

Camp Bastion Guard towers

4. The arrangements for manning of the guard towers around the perimeter of Camp
Bastion were exposed by the attack as inadequate. The decision not to man Tower 16
on the night of 14–15 September 2014 contributed directly to the failure to detect the
insurgents at an early stage which might have limited the impact of their assault. We
note that all guard towers are now manned constantly. (Paragraph 33)

Perimeter security
5. We were concerned to learn of the number of breaches of the perimeter fence of
Camp Bastion in the two years prior to the attack and the apparent tolerance of
poppy cultivation immediately outside the fence. We consider that the failure to take
concerted action to prevent these activities increased the risk of surveillance and
4 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

intelligence gathering by Afghan nationals which could have assisted insurgent

planning for an attack on the base. (Paragraph 38)

Force protection projects and expenditure

6. Media reports suggested that prior to the September 2012 attack additional security
measures at Camp Bastion were denied funding by the MoD on cost grounds. We
have seen no evidence that proposals for improved force protection measures were
turned down by the UK chain of command. (Paragraph 45)

7. The “burning man” incident in March 2012 prompted a review of security measures
around the perimeter of the Bastion airfield. We consider that the decision by the
Executive Steering Group to create a ditch and berm defensive obstacle rather than
erect additional fencing was a proportionate response to the threat of an insider
attack through vehicular incursion onto the airfield from within the base. It is
unlikely that additional fencing around the airfield perimeter would have presented a
significant impediment to the insurgents on 14-15 September 2012 and altered
significantly the outcome of the attack. (Paragraph 46)

Conclusion
8. The MoD were wrong to refuse to share the report on the attack prepared by
Lieutenant General Bradshaw, in his capacity as Deputy Commander ISAF. As this
was the highest level UK report into the attack, its status as an ISAF document
should not have prevented its release to us. The MoD has been obstructive and
unhelpful to us as we tried to establish the facts surrounding the attack. (Paragraph
48)

9. We are concerned that the perimeter security and force protection measures in place
at the time of the attack were inadequate. We were told that the focus of ISAF
commanders had been on security incidents elsewhere in Helmand Province and on
threats from insider attack. Insufficient attention was given to the fundamental
requirement of defending Camp Bastion from external assault. We believe that this
was complacent. Given that the attack took place in the British sector of the camp,
British commanders must bear a degree of responsibility for these systemic failures
and associated reputational damage. (Paragraph 49)

10. We note the acknowledgement by the MoD that errors were made which,
collectively, created the vulnerabilities which were so devastatingly exploited by the
enemy. From the evidence we have received, we are satisfied that as far as possible,
these vulnerabilities have now been addressed. (Paragraph 50)

11. We recommend that the MoD capture the lessons identified from this extraordinary
attack as part of its wider efforts to learn lessons from Afghanistan for future
operations. It should explain how it intends to do so in its response to our report.
(Paragraph 51)
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 5

1 Introduction
Background
1. On 14 September 2012, at around 2200 local time, 15 heavily-armed Taliban insurgents
dressed in US Army uniforms cut the perimeter wire on the eastern perimeter of Camp
Bastion, Afghanistan and commenced a coordinated attack on the Camp Bastion airfield.
The ensuing engagement with ISAF forces which lasted into the early hours of 15
September resulted in the deaths of US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Christopher
Raible and Sergeant Bradley Atwell, the wounding of eight other US personnel, eight UK
personnel and one civilian contractor, the destruction of six US Harrier jets, and significant
damage to several other aircraft, vehicles and the infrastructure of the base.

2. Quick Reaction Forces, supported by other US and UK personnel and helicopters, killed
14 of the Taliban attackers and wounded the remaining attacker, who was detained and
interrogated.

3. We pay tribute to the bravery of all those ISAF personnel who engaged the enemy
during the attack on Camp Bastion that night. We express our deepest sympathy to the
families of Lieutenant Colonel Raible and Sergeant Atwell for their profound loss.

US accountability review
4. On 30 September 2013, General James Amos, US Marine Corps commandant,
announced that following a review of the attack, focused on determining accountability, he
had asked for the retirement of Major General Charles "Mark" Gurganus, who was
commander of Regional Command Southwest (RC(SW)) in Afghanistan, and Major
General Gregg Sturdevant, who was commander of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (FWD)
at the time of the attack. 1

5. A redacted version of the US Department of the Army report (“the US report”) of the
investigation into the attack was published on the internet in October 2013 along with a
series of associated exhibits and enclosures.2

Our inquiry
6. We launched an inquiry to examine the events surrounding the insurgent attack on
Camp Bastion of 14-15 September 2012 and the subsequent response from the UK and
ISAF. Our purpose was to establish the authority, responsibility and accountability within
the UK chain of command for security and force protection at Camp Bastion at the time of
the attack.

1
“Two generals asked to retire in wake of Bastion attack”, USA Today, 30 September 2013
2
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
6 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

7. We held an oral evidence session on 17 December 2013 in which we took evidence from
the Chief of Joint Operations and senior officials from the Ministry of Defence. Following
the public evidence session, the meeting continued in private in order to examine details of
the attack which could not be discussed in public for security reasons. A redacted transcript
of this private evidence session has been published and is referred to in this report.

8. Following the evidence session, the MoD released a redacted copy of the Operational
Learning Account and After Action Report (OLAAAR) produced within 48 hours of the
attack.3 We asked the Secretary of State for Defence for access to a copy of the subsequent
Administrative Review conducted by Lieutenant General Bradshaw, then Deputy
Commander ISAF, but this was refused on the grounds that it was owned by ISAF.

9. Members of the Committee were able to view the location of the attack during a visit to
Camp Bastion in October 2013. Members visited guard towers close to the point where the
perimeter fence was breached and spoke to RAF Regiment personnel. This gave us a better
understanding of the topography between the perimeter and the airfield and the extent of
the security measures now in place.

3
Ministry of Defence, Operational Learning Account and After Action Report (redacted version), 16 September 2012
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 7

2 Accountability review
US Department of the Army report (redacted), 19 August 2013
11. Prepared by Lieutenant General William B. Garrett III, U.S. Army, Investigating
Officer, and Major General Thomas M. Murray, U.S. Marine Corp, Deputy Investigating
Officer, the report set out the circumstances surrounding the attack on Camps Bastion,
Leatherneck, and Shorabak, collectively referred to as the BLS Complex4, in Afghanistan,
that occurred on 14-15 September 2012. The investigating officers were also asked to
report any fault, negligence, or failure of responsibility.

12. The scope of the investigation was “to determine the accountability of US commanders
and staff at all levels for the planning and execution of force protection in relation to the
attack”. The scope of the investigation did not include a directive to assess any potential
responsibility of other coalition forces and so it did not include findings regarding the
effectiveness or efficiency of UK forces. 5

13. The review found that Major General Gurganus and Major General Sturdevant were
responsible for force protection in the BLS Complex and accountable for the failure to take
adequate measures to mitigate the vulnerabilities which the attack exposed. The review also
found that the underlying causal factor for the attack was the failure of Major General
Gurganus and Major General Sturdevant “to adequately ensure that an integrated, layered,
defense-in-depth was in place to protect US personnel and equipment on the Camp
Bastion airfield”.6 Three contributing factors were cited in the report:

 Underestimation of the enemy;

 A lack of overall unity of command and effort for anti-terrorism/force protection on

the BLS Complex; and

 A failure to provide adequate command direction and oversight.

UK accountability
14. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell, Chief of Joint Operations,
acknowledged that errors had been made by UK personnel but that “they were not
culpable errors”. He pointed out that the US investigation had determined that the two US
Generals, as general officers in command of RC (SW), were culpable:

Fundamentally, at the end of the day, that is why those general officers were found to
be accountable, because the causal errors evident in the aftermath contributed to that

4
In the UK, the BLS complex is commonly referred to as Camp Bastion but is in fact a complex of camps accommodating
UK (Bastion), US (Leatherneck), Afghan (Shorabak) and other coalition personnel and contractors.
5
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
6
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
8 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

vulnerability. That vulnerability cannot be put down to a single item that failed. The
single item that failed may or may not have had a British officer or serviceman in the
chain of command, but fundamentally they could not make judgments about the
whole picture. It is the business of general officers commanding in-theatre to make
that judgment. That was why the US determined the outcome that they did.7

Memorandum of Understanding between USCENTCOM and PJHQ

15. According to the redacted US report, a January 2011 Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the UK Permanent Joint
Headquarters (PJHQ), titled “The Command and Support Arrangements for UK/US
Forces Based at Bastion/Leatherneck Combined Operating Base Afghanistan” established
the anti terror/force protection command and control arrangements for the BLS Complex.
This MOU has not been published.

16. The US report stated that the 2011 MOU established that the separate camps would
“run on national lines,” and several personnel interviewed by the Investigating team
described the two camps as separate “sovereign” territory. The 2011 MOU established the
separate camps, in addition to the Bastion airfield, which was a UK-US shared airfield
located on Camp Bastion and operated by the UK 903 Expeditionary Air Wing, as the
Airfield Operating Authority. The 2011 MOU further specified that the US would protect
Camp Leatherneck and conduct security operations in Area of Operation Belleau Wood
(AOBW), which included the area surrounding the BLS Complex.

17. The MOU also specified that the UK was responsible for protection of Camp Bastion,
including the airfield, and for security patrols in AOBW. The MOU stated that US and UK
force protection standards would be in accordance with national command element
requirements, but it did not specify those standards. This arrangement “effectively created
two different camps with two different protection standards”.8

18. In the wake of the attack Lt Gen Bradshaw, the Deputy Commander ISAF, is reported
to have characterised the USCENTCOM-PJHQ MOU as a “sub-optimal C2 (command
and control) solution”.9

The burning man incident

19. On 14 March 2012, Major General Gurganus and other members of the RC(SW) staff
were waiting on the airfield for the arrival of US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta when a
local national interpreter working for coalition forces commandeered a vehicle and drove it
onto the airfield. He narrowly missed Major General Gurganus and his party before being

7
Q44
8
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
9
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 9

pursued into a ditch. The individual then set himself on fire, dying of his wounds that
evening. This became known as the “burning man incident”.10

20. A revised draft MOU, which, if agreed, would have unified command by providing one
commander for the base and for the security forces, was drafted following this incident, but
the BLS Executive Steering Group (ESG) did not agree to it. The ESG was a combined US-
UK board designed to integrate actions affecting both Camp Bastion and Camp
Leatherneck. Following the ESG’s decision, the command and control issue was escalated
to ISAF Joint Command (IJC) and ISAF. The US report stated that the proposals met with
“friction” from the IJC and ISAF staffs, and that neither were supportive of combining the
two camps, instead directing Commander RC(SW) to work on a supported/supporting
command relationship.11

21. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell told us that the MOU in force at the
time of the attack was the one which had been agreed in 2011. He described it as “very
adequate” but subject to “dynamic review” as circumstances changed and the size of Camp
Bastion grew over time. Rather than having been rejected by the ESG, Lieutenant General
Capewell considered that a revised MOU had been “under development”.12

22. Paul Rimmer, Chief of Staff (Policy and Finance), Permanent Joint Headquarters,
Ministry of Defence, tried to provide an explanation of the process:

My understanding at the time was that there was the MOU, which was signed in
2011. After the March 2012 incident, that shone some light on some of the command
and control arrangements within the broader complex. The Americans raised some
concerns about how that was reflected in the MOU, and that was discussed by the
Executive Steering Group, but I am not familiar with all the detail and the
argumentation at the time. The Americans then raised that up to ISAF Joint
Command (IJC), but it got pushed back. My recollection from the review is that it
didn’t go any further at the time, and that was one of the points that the American
accountability review raised. Having touched on an issue with the MOU, the
Americans did not pursue it as far as they might have done. What we can say
subsequent to the [September 2012] attack is that that MOU was annulled and the
issues that it covers have each been dealt with.13

23. We were not satisfied by the responses we received and asked further questions about
the MOU following the evidence session. In its response, the MoD told us that the
principal differences between the 2011 MOU and the revised MOU now in force related to
command relationships and organisation which had been streamlined under Commander
Regional Command (South West). Specifically, the Bastion-Leatherneck-Shorabak

10
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
11
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
12
Qq16-24
13
Q25
10 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

complex now operates under the command of the US Marine Corps Commander of
RC(SW).14

24. At the time of the attack the Memorandum of Understanding between

USCENTCOM and PJHQ had not been revised, despite the fact that all parties
appeared to agree on the necessity to make revisions in the aftermath of the “burning
man incident”. Witnesses were neither able to explain to us which members of the
Executive Steering Group rejected the revised draft MOU nor what the reasons for the
rejection were. The delays to the process of revision allowed weaknesses in command
and control arrangements for force protection to persist. It is an enduring
characteristic of conflict that the enemy fights back. ISAF personnel were exposed to
unnecessary risk. In response to our report the MoD must explain why the failure to
revise the MOU prior to the September 2012 attack should not be regarded as an act of
omission.

Security incidents recorded in Helmand Province

25. Lieutenant General Capewell told us that in 2012, prior to the attack on Camp Bastion,
the focus of attention for ISAF commanders in terms of security incidents had been
elsewhere in Helmand province:

The activity on the ground at the time in the Helmand area, the Sangin valley and in
the vicinity of the ISAF footprint in and around northern and southern Helmand
was a very high incident rate. Commanders’ minds were focused on that.15

26. The inference we drew from the Chief of Joint Operation’s evidence was that the
number of security incidents was unusually high in Helmand Province in 2012.
Unfortunately the MoD declined to provide us with comparable details of the level of
security incidents recorded in Helmand for previous years as this information was
classified. This would have allowed us to make an informed assessment of the relative
threat levels in the area at the time.

Security and force protection operations in Camp Bastion

27. According to the US report, security and force protection for Camp Bastion and the
airfield was the responsibility of UK Number 5 RAF Force Protection Wing (5 FP Wing),
who reported directly to Commander Bastion. It comprised members of: the Wing
Headquarters, 51st Squadron, RAF Regiment; 2622 (Highland) Squadron Royal Auxiliary
Air Force Regiment; RAF No 2 (Tactical) Police Squadron; the Tonga Defence Services;
and elements of the 16th Regiment Royal Artillery. The 5 FP Wing provided counter-
threat activity, airfield security, and air transport security for Camp Bastion.

28. Asked to clarify who was in overall charge of security and force protection for Camp
Bastion and the airfield at the time of the attack, the MoD told us:

14
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
15
Q2
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 11

In accordance with the then extant MOU (dated January 2011), Commander
Leatherneck was designated as the Battlespace owner of Area of Operations Belleau
Wood and a Security Force Commander (US Marine Corps officer) was responsible
for executing security operations in Area of Operations Belleau Wood, within which
Camp Bastion is located. The Bastion Force Protection Commander (a UK officer)
was responsible for providing perimeter and on base Force Protection of Bastion,
including Bastion Airfield. The Bastion Force Protection Commander worked for
Commander Bastion who was in turn the Commanding Officer 903 Expeditionary
Air Wing.16

29. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell told us that since the attack in
September 2012, there had been significant enhancements to force protection at the BLS
complex in terms of manpower, obstacles, defences and military capabilities, including the
deployment of additional personnel, improved command and control arrangements and
enhanced base surveillance measures.17

30. In a subsequent submission, the MoD explained that additional manpower had been
provided in 2009 to “mitigate the increased threat against air operations and increased
steadily from approx 110 personnel in 2009 to 293 personnel by September 2012”.18

Camp Bastion Guard towers

31. Eleven of the twenty-four guard towers on Camp Bastion were manned at the time of
the attack. The UK 5 FP Wing did not employ a dedicated security force on the Camp
Bastion perimeter. Instead, they relied upon a "camp tax" (tasking to provide guards) from
various UK tenant units at the BLS Complex to augment the Tonga Defence Services in the
perimeter guard towers. It was also typical on Camp Leatherneck to man approximately 50
percent of the existing towers.19

32. On the night of the attack Tower 16, in closest proximity to the point of incursion, was
not manned. Tower 15 did not have direct line of sight to the route taken by the insurgents
or the breach point due to high ground in between. Tower 17 was 250 metres from the
breach site and it was very dark with just two percent illumination on the night. The US
report stated:

it would have been difficult to observe an approaching attacker who was attempting
to conceal his movement, even on a night with better illumination, and even if the
guard was constantly scanning back and forth with a night vision device. The
attackers’ movement was partially obscured by the route through a shallow wadi, and
if the guards would have oriented their observation primarily east (forward from the

16
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
17
Q1
18
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
19
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
12 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

tower), the breach point, although definitely visible, would have been to the right
side of their vantage point in an area of low ground.20

33. The arrangements for manning of the guard towers around the perimeter of Camp
Bastion were exposed by the attack as inadequate. The decision not to man Tower 16 on
the night of 14–15 September 2014 contributed directly to the failure to detect the
insurgents at an early stage which might have limited the impact of their assault. We
note that all guard towers are now manned constantly.

Perimeter security
34. According to the redacted US report, the RC(SW) command knew of external fence
breaches before the 14-15 September 2012 attack, including a breach of the perimeter fence
in the Camp Leatherneck sector near Tower 40 or 41 that occurred in late June 2012 and
three breaches that occurred in the Camp Bastion perimeter in July-August 2012,
identified by UK patrols after the breaches occurred. The cause or purpose of the breaches
was unknown, but the 5 FP Wing had assessed them as “scrapping” activity by individuals
who would try to come near the base to take or steal metal to sell.21 Statements by US
personnel suggested that on at least one occasion intruders were able to enter unoccupied
guard posts.22 The US Army also released, as one of the exhibits associated with the
investigation report, surveillance video footage dated 18 July 2012 of a night time breach of
the perimeter by two individuals who moved near the cryogenics lab by the airfield and
then departed out of the same breach.23

35. The MoD told us that there had been around nine breaches in 2011 and 12 breaches in
2012 in both the UK and US sectors. The breaches were considered by UK personnel to be
low-level scrapping and criminal activity and any identified breaches had been repaired.24

36. Several US personnel, including Major General Gurganus and Major General
Sturdevant, expressed concerns they had about encroachment on the south east side of the
base by poppy farmers. Major General Sturdevant, interviewed as part of the US
investigation following the attack, stated:

We literally had poppy growing right up against the perimeter fence. That was
another thing that Maj. Gen. Gurganus tried to take action on, but he wasn’t able to
accomplish that. It was because the Afghans had to do it. We weren’t allowed to. The

20
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
21
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
22
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
23
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
24
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 13

biggest external threat to the base came from there, and Task Force Belleau Wood
was down there running patrols every single day.25

37. In oral evidence, Lieutenant General Capewell characterised the decision to allow
poppy cultivation close to the perimeter fence as a “minor tactical error” which had
contributed to the enemy’s success.26

38. We were concerned to learn of the number of breaches of the perimeter fence of
Camp Bastion in the two years prior to the attack and the apparent tolerance of poppy
cultivation immediately outside the fence. We consider that the failure to take
concerted action to prevent these activities increased the risk of surveillance and
intelligence gathering by Afghan nationals which could have assisted insurgent
planning for an attack on the base.

Risk assessment of intruder access to the flight line

39. According to the US report, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) (3d MAW
(FWD)) and RC(SW) chains of command were aware of the threat of both vehicle and
pedestrian access identified by the airfield incursion on 14 March 2012.27 In a written
submission, the MoD told us that following the incident a security survey had highlighted
the following:

The current Airfield perimeter defences, in place to defend against incursions onto
the flight line, are not appropriate for the size and number of personnel requiring
access.

And that:

The almost constant construction work and continuous redevelopment has seen the
airfield outgrow the previously recommended protective measures.28

40. Based on the assessed threat, the UK, in coordination with the 3d MAW (FWD) anti-
terrorism/force protection Officer, submitted a project request for vehicular and pedestrian
restrictions to the airfield.29

41. The MoD explained that this had led to proposals from the Executive Steering Group,
which had resulted in a request to PJHQ for authority to install a ditch and berm, which
was started in September 2012, just prior to the attack.30 Neither this nor the concertina

25
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
26
Q100
27
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
28
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
29
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
30
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
14 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

wire, which was breached using wire cutters, had presented significant obstacles to the
Taliban attackers on their way to the airfield.31

Force protection projects and expenditure

42. The main US report suggested that both the ESG and PJHQ had denied a request for
construction of a fence all the way around the airfield following the review conducted in
the wake of the “burning man” incident. However, associated interviews published by the
US Army provided clarification that the ESG had considered various options including
fencing, but instead approved measures designed to counter vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED),
through construction of an anti-vehicle ditch and berm obstacle, and to restrict pedestrian
access through the placement of concertina wire. The threat from a VBIED was considered
to be the biggest threat to the flight line at the time.32

43. Paul Rimmer told us that he had not seen any evidence that any proposals for
improved force protection had been turned down.33 Lieutenant General Capewell
expressed the view that additional fencing would not have prevented the attack.34

44. We asked what force protection projects had been implemented in the 12 months prior
to the September 2012 attack, the MoD explained that a total of 21 infrastructure projects
had been completed, covering, in the main, installation or modification of protective walls,
CCTV, additional fencing and a range of other enhancements. For those projects
completed under the in-theatre delegation of £500,000, the total contract value was around
£680,000.35

45. Media reports suggested that prior to the September 2012 attack additional security
measures at Camp Bastion were denied funding by the MoD on cost grounds. We have
seen no evidence that proposals for improved force protection measures were turned
down by the UK chain of command.

46. The “burning man” incident in March 2012 prompted a review of security measures
around the perimeter of the Bastion airfield. We consider that the decision by the
Executive Steering Group to create a ditch and berm defensive obstacle rather than
erect additional fencing was a proportionate response to the threat of an insider attack
through vehicular incursion onto the airfield from within the base. It is unlikely that
additional fencing around the airfield perimeter would have presented a significant
impediment to the insurgents on 14-15 September 2012 and altered significantly the
outcome of the attack.

31
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
32
US Department of the Army Report, Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Investigation of the 14-15 September 2012 Attack on
the Camp Bastion, Leatherneck, and Shorabak (BLS) Complex, Helmand Province, Afghanistan (redacted version), 19
August 2013
33
Q51
34
Q56
35
Ministry of Defence (ACB0001)
 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 15

3 Conclusion
47. The attack on Camp Bastion on 14-15 September 2012 by a group of heavily armed
Taliban insurgents was a carefully planned and orchestrated assault which exploited
serious weaknesses in the base’s perimeter security.

48. The MoD were wrong to refuse to share the report on the attack prepared by
Lieutenant General Bradshaw, in his capacity as Deputy Commander ISAF. As this was
the highest level UK report into the attack, its status as an ISAF document should not
have prevented its release to us. The MoD has been obstructive and unhelpful to us as
we tried to establish the facts surrounding the attack.

49. We are concerned that the perimeter security and force protection measures in
place at the time of the attack were inadequate. We were told that the focus of ISAF
commanders had been on security incidents elsewhere in Helmand Province and on
threats from insider attack. Insufficient attention was given to the fundamental
requirement of defending Camp Bastion from external assault. We believe that this was
complacent. Given that the attack took place in the British sector of the camp, British
commanders must bear a degree of responsibility for these systemic failures and
associated reputational damage.

50. We note the acknowledgement by the MoD that errors were made which,
collectively, created the vulnerabilities which were so devastatingly exploited by the
enemy. From the evidence we have received, we are satisfied that as far as possible, these
vulnerabilities have now been addressed.

51. We recommend that the MoD capture the lessons identified from this
extraordinary attack as part of its wider efforts to learn lessons from Afghanistan for
future operations. It should explain how it intends to do so in its response to our
report.
16 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

Annex – List of abbreviations

3d MAW (FWD) 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward)

5 FP Wing No. 5 Force Protection Wing RAF

AO Area of Operations

AOBW Area of Operations Belleau Wood

AT/FP Anti‐Terrorism and Force Protection

BLS Bastion, Leatherneck and Shorabak

C2 Command and Control

CO Commanding Officer

ESG Executive Steering Group

IED Improvised explosive device

IJC ISAF Joint Command

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOD Ministry of Defence

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

OLAAAR Operational Learning Account and After Action Review

PJHQ Permanent Joint Headquarters

RAF Royal Air Force

RC(SW) Regional Command – South West

TFBW Task Force Belleau Wood

USCENTCOM United States Central Command

VBIED Vehicle‐borne Improvised explosive device

 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 17

Formal Minutes
Wednesday 26 March 2014
Members present:

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr Julian Brazier Bob Stewart

Mr James Gray Ms Gisela Stuart
Mr Dai Havard Derek Twigg
Mrs Madeleine Moon

Draft Report (Afghanistan: Camp Bastion Attack), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 51 read and agreed to.

Annex agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Thirteenth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of
Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 1 April 2014 at 2.00p.m.

18 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack

Witnesses
(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/defcom)

Tuesday 17 December 2013 Page

Lieutenant-General David Capewell OBE, Chief of Joint Operations, Ministry

of Defence, Mr Paul Rimmer, Chief of Staff (Policy and Finance), Permanent
Joint Headquarters, Ministry of Defence and Dr John Noble, Head,
Afghanistan/Pakistan Current Communications Team, Operations
Directorate, Ministry of Defence Ev 1

List of written evidence

(published in Volume II on the Committee’s website www.parliament.uk/defcom)

1 Ministry of Defence Ev w25: Ev w27

 Afghanistan—Camp Bastion Attack 19

List of Reports from the Committee in

Session 2013–14
The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in brackets after the
HC printing number.

Session 2013–14
First Report MoD Supplementary Estimate 2012–13 HC 291 (HC 644)
Second Report Ministry of Defence Main Estimates 2013–14 HC 517 (HC 670)
Third Report and First Scrutiny of Arms Exports and Arms Control (2013): HC 205 (Cm 8707)
Joint Report Scrutiny of the Government’s UK Strategic Export
Controls Annual Report 2011 published in July 2012,
the Government’s Quarterly Reports from October
2011 to September 2012, and the Government’s
policies on arms exports and international arms
control issues
Fourth Report The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 3: HC 586 (HC 771)
Educating the Children of Service Personnel
Fifth Report The Armed Forces Covenant in Action? Part 4: HC 185 (HC 759)
Education of Service Personnel
Sixth Report The Defence Implications of Possible Scottish HC 198 (HC 839)
Independence
Seventh Report Towards the Next Defence and Security Review: Part HC 197 (HC 1175)
One
Eighth Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts HC 653 (HC 1198)
2012–13
Ninth Report Future Army 2020 HC 576
Tenth Report Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems— HC 772
current and future UK use
Eleventh Report Deterrence in the twenty-first century HC 1066
Twelfth Report UK Armed Forces Personnel and the Legal Framework HC 931
for Future Operations