History and Theory 59, no.

2 (June 2020), 188-209 © Wesleyan University 2020 ISSN: 0018-2656

DOI: 10.1111/hith.12154

KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME

JUHAN HELLERMA1

ABSTRACT

In the scholarly reception of his work, Reinhart Koselleck’s notion of modernity and his
theory of multiple times have been cast as essentially at odds with each other. This article
argues that although these positions are valid, Koselleck’s writings can also accommo-
date an interpretation according to which the theory of multiple temporalities, or “layers
of time,” provides theoretical ground for the modern understanding of time and history.
Elaborating on this insight, the article shows the linkages sustaining the unity between
Koselleck’s formal theory of multiple times and his interpretation of modernity. To
that end, I outline the main premises of the temporalization thesis that lies at the heart
of Koselleck’s theory of modernity, scrutinize his notion of Historik  within which the
framework “layers of time” belongs, and explore Niklas Olsen’s and Helge Jordheim’s
interpretive accounts on how to conceive of the relationship between the two strands in
Koselleck’s thought. Ultimately, I argue that “layers of time” entails the formal conditions
for historical acceleration, which is crucial for explaining the emergence of a specifically
modern temporality wherein experience and expectation increasingly grow apart. 

Keywords: temporalization, historical time, acceleration, periodization, historical anthro-

pology, conceptual history

This article will survey the relationship between Reinhart Koselleck’s account
of modernity and his theory of “layers of time” that is contained in his theory
of conditions of possible histories in his Historik. For Koselleck, the latter
notion indicates primarily his interest in various ontological and anthropological
conditions under which histories unfold, and is thus different from the concep-
tualization of the term handed down by Droysen that, foremost, engages with
the epistemological presuppositions of historical knowledge. Among commen-
tators, two strategies stand out with respect to how to conceive of the mutual
relationship between Koselleck’s account of modernity, on the one hand, and his
theory of multilayered history, on the other. According to the first interpretation,
Koselleck’s theoretical endeavors are a critical response to the singular notion of
history that, originating in the eighteenth century, eventually sustained violent
political regimes of the twentieth century (Niklas Olsen’s emphasis). On the

1. Research for this article was supported by the Dora Pluss Scholarship, funded by the European
Regional Development Fund, and the Kristjan Jaak Scholarship, funded by the Estonian Ministry of
Education and Research. In addition, the research is related to work done at the Centre of Excellence
in Estonian Studies (European Union, European Regional Development Fund) and research project
IUT20-5 (Estonian Ministry of Education and Research). I am also thankful for the Yale Baltic
Studies Program, which provided the conditions for completing the article.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 189
second reading, the framework of “layers of time” is to be regarded as a form of
self-criticism by which Koselleck challenges the idea of distinct epochs, and his
own account of modernity in particular (Helge Jordheim’s point). In the face of
these two interpretations, I will suggest that Koselleck’s works include a third
dimension that enables depicting the framework of layers of time as accounting
for the individuality of what can be labeled as the modern age, thus giving rise
to an interpretation that views the relationship between the two frameworks not
necessarily in terms of opposition and exclusion, but rather as complementary.

I. MODERNITY AS TEMPORALIZATION

According to Koselleck, semantic shifts occurring between 1750 and 1850, a

period he also called the Sattelzeit, testify to the breakthrough of a dynamic and
developmental vision of history. This vision establishes the future as an open-
ended horizon of possibilities, while setting it distinctly apart from a past that
comes to be regarded as increasingly superseded. For Koselleck, modernity mani-
fests primarily in the appearance of an unprecedented constellation of the cat-
egories of past, present, and future. In particular, he claims that with modernity,
the earlier static understanding of history was superseded by a model that brings
about the break between past and future. Crucial here is that time itself is viewed
as a particular process that carries and drives history forward. Or, as Koselleck
puts it, “Time is no longer simply the medium in which all histories take place; it
gains a historical quality. Consequently, history no longer occurs in, but through,
time. Time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right.”2 Of course,
Koselleck’s emphasis on the emergence of newness as a central feature of moder-
nity does not mean that, previously, nothing new could occur. Rather, the differ-
ence is that, whereas previously the occurrence of something new was embedded
within a static concept of time, starting in the eighteenth century the passing of
time is itself treated as a historical force of change and transformation.
To further elucidate his point, Koselleck deploys two anthropological catego-
ries—the “space of experience” (Erfahrungsraum) and the “horizon of expecta-
tion” (Erwartungshorizont)—arguing that with modernity, expectations about
the future were increasingly detached from everything that experience had to
offer.3 By way of empirically validating his thesis, Koselleck introduces a num-
ber of semantic investigations that are contained in the lexicon Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe. In addition, Koselleck’s collection of essays, Futures Past, fur-
ther probes his thesis about the formation of the modern experience of time. Here
he describes the main target of the essays in the book:
They direct themselves to texts in which historical experience of time is articulated either
explicitly or implicitly. To be more precise, texts were sought out and interrogated that,
explicitly or implicitly, deal with the relation of a given past to a given future. . . . These

2. Reinhart Koselleck, “Neuzeit: Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of Movement”

[1977], in Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, transl. Keith Tribe (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 236.
3. Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation’: Two Historical Categories”
[1976], in ibid., 266-267.
190 JUHAN HELLERMA

essays will constantly ask: how, in a given present, are the temporal dimensions of past
and future related?4

Koselleck’s core thesis—that conceptual changes occurring between rough-

ly 1750 and 1850 testify to the breakthrough of the developmental vision of
history—entails a process he labels temporalization (Verzeitlichung).5 The
latter is a metahistorical concept (therefore not taken from the historical texts
he is studying with the method of Begriffsgeschichte) that Koselleck deploys
to define the structural shift in the experience of time beginning around the
eighteenth century. Various examinations of particular concepts that Koselleck
undertakes to prove his point should therefore be regarded as signs and expres-
sions of a particular temporal structure. Next, I briefly discuss some of the
semantic features Koselleck examines.

Temporalization and Semantic Analysis

According to Koselleck, one of the defining semantic features in the development
of modernity is the suspension of metaphors that draw from natural growth and
aging. The use of natural metaphors implies that various stages of history eventu-
ally come to an end. Both ancient and Christian models of history remain within
the parameters of naturalist assumptions. It is only in the eighteenth century that
a new sensitivity toward time is conceptually articulated, the term Geschichte
serving here as the primary example. In short, historical time is an open-ended,
dynamic movement that cannot be reduced to any configuration drawing from
natural phenomena—hence the formation of historical time is possible only
through the process of denaturalization.
That concepts become more general and abstract evinces in Koselleck’s
account a further semantic transformation indicative of modernity, which in turn
widens their scope of applicability, leading eventually to the formation of what he
calls the collective singular (Kollektivsingular). Koselleck’s most famous exam-
ple in this regard is the concept of Geschichte, which, during premodern times,
was used primarily in the plural form, thus denoting the sum of individual stories
of the past. It is only toward the eighteenth century that the concept of history
came to mean a singular, overarching process encompassing all three dimensions
of time: past, present, and future. In other words, whereas the earlier use of the
notion of history was tied to a specific subject (history was a history of something
or somebody), the modern interpretation did not denote any concrete substance.
Instead, it captured the totality of existence, thereby opening the possibility of
thinking about history as history in itself or history as such. Thus, for the first
time, history could be interpreted as a dimension of reality in its own right. Such

4. Koselleck, “Author’s Preface” [1979], in ibid., 3.

5. In explaining the term Verzeitlichung, Koselleck states: “It is certainly inexact, or at least it
calls for caution, to speak of the temporalization of history, since all histories, wherever they are to
be found, are always concerned with time. Nevertheless, use of the expression as a scientific term
seems appropriate and justified since, as has been demonstrated, the neuzeitliche experience of his-
tory led to theoretically enriched concepts of time which required that the whole of history be read in
terms of temporal structure” (Koselleck, “Neuzeit: Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of
Movement,” 245-246). See also Koselleck, “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos
into the Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process” [1967], in Futures Past, 37, 40.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 191
a notion of history also becomes subject to various political and philosophical
interpretations. Henceforth, “history” could be regarded as having an overarching
aim or telos that can be used to justify various patterns of action.
A similar process occurs in 1800 with the term “progress” when the plural form
of the term [Fortschreitens] is overshadowed by a singular version: “‘Progress”
becomes a historical concept that assembles all epoch-specific experiences only
when it takes on the form of a collective singular that encapsulates the sum of
all individual progress.”6 By virtue of this transformation, the subject of progress
moves from particular entities or spheres of life into a certain totality that encom-
passes all individual occurrences: “Thus in the eighteenth century all spheres of
human life came to be regarded from the vantage point of progress: Rushing
ahead and leaving behind become the core temporal pattern of all history.”7
For Koselleck, these and other semantic changes are indicators of a new space
of experience: “In the medium of concept formation, thus, a new space of experi-
ence was disclosed that was about to shape everything that followed.”8 Or, put
differently: “The word ‘creation’ attests to as well as promotes the profound
transformation of experience and consciousness. The traditional space of experi-
ence, and the horizon of expectation thus far derived from it, grow apart.”9
On the one hand, changes in semantics reflect the changed experience of time;
on the other hand, they condition and make possible further developments in
both theoretical reflection and political action. According to Koselleck, the latter
is observable, for example, in the case of modernisms—such as liberalism and
socialism—that by the time of their coinage in the beginning of the nineteenth
century did not denote any real circumstances, but rather opened a perspective
onto potentially different futures: “These key words stood for alternative ways
of organizing society in the future. . . . The concepts were invented before any
reality corresponded to them.”10
As we have seen, Koselleck’s account of historical time stems from his inter-
pretation of certain concepts and is informed by the conceptualization of certain
patterns of the experience of time as not necessarily simultaneous with the chang-
es in the realm of experience and existence more generally. In addition to refer-
ring to changes yet to be achieved, it is also important that semantic innovation
reflects tendencies that might have unfolded long before the respective concepts

6. Christian Meier and Reinhart Koselleck, “Fortschritt,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe:

Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, ed. Otto Brunner, Werner
Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1975), II, 388: “Zu einem geschichtlichen
Begriff, die epochale Erfahrungen in sich versammelt, wird ‘Fortschritt’ freilich erst, wenn er als
Kollektivsingular die Summe aller Einzelfortschritte in sich bündelt.”
7. Ibid., 392: “Im 18. Jahrhundert werden dann alle Bereiche des menschlichen Lebens in diese
Perspektive der Fortschreitens einbezogen: Das Vorauseilen und Zurücklassen wird zum zeitlichen
Grundmuster aller Geschichte.”
8. Odilo Engels, Horst Günther, Christian Meier, and Reinhart Koselleck, “Geschichte, Historie,”
in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, II, 652: “So war im Medium der Begriffsbildung ein neuer
Erfahrungsraum erschlossen worden, der die folgende Zeit prägen sollte.”
9. Christian Meier and Reinhart Koselleck, “Fortschritt,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, II,
389: “Die Wortschöphung belegt einen tiefgreifenden Erfahrungs- und Bewusstseinswandel—
und treibt ihn voran. Der Überkommene Erfahrungsraum und der—bislang—daraus abgeleitete
Erwartungshorizont treten auseinander.”
10. Koselleck, “Some Reflections on Temporal Structure of Conceptual Change,” in Main Trends
in Cultural History: Ten Essays, ed. Willelm Melching and Wyger Velema (Amsterdam and Atlanta:
Rodopi, 1994), 11.
192 JUHAN HELLERMA

were created to describe them: “Experience and expectation have certainly been
increasingly growing apart since the Renaissance, but only in the term ‘progress’
is this distinction conceptualized.”11
Once the subjects of progress and history are universalized, the temporal
phenomena of the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous (Gleichzeitigkeit des
Ungleichzeitigen) appears. In other words, when the totality of history is con-
ceived in terms of progress, the inequality of the progress achieved in different
parts of the world emerges, enabling a comparison of different rates of develop-
ment. In this sense, Kollektivsingular and Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen
belong together.

Temporalization, Progress, and the Modern Discipline of History

According to Koselleck, viewing history as a singular process consisting of
individual and nonrepeatable events is one of the essential characteristics of
temporalization. He further argues that a temporalized understanding of history
underlies both the modern discipline of history and the discourse of progress. The
progressivist interpretation of history is predicated on the premise that the flow
of time engenders change and novelty, and this is precisely what temporalization
captures. With regard to historical studies, Koselleck demonstrates that tempor-
alization likewise sustains both the didactic and methodological premises of the
modern discipline of history.
According to Koselleck, the predominance of the doctrine of historia magistra
vitae, which regards history as providing teachings for life and endures almost
unbroken into the eighteenth century, implies that the general conditions of
human experience and action remain the same throughout time. Such an account
of history is bound to an assumption that there is no principal break between past
occurrences and those that are going to happen in the future, meaning that future
possibilities are always pregiven—or at least to a large extent implicit in what has
already occurred: “Knowledge of what had been and foreknowledge of what was
yet to come remained connected through a quasi-natural horizon of experience,
within which nothing essentially new could occur.”12 In short, stories of the past
are seen as possibly illuminating the future because the past, present, and future
are regarded as forming a more or less continuous space of experience.
With modernity, Koselleck argues, this continuous space of experience is
broken apart. If everything that happens in history is singular and unique, the
past can no longer shed light on the future. According to Koselleck, the fact that
historia magistra vitae loses its position is most clearly evinced in a particular
terminological shift already noted above. During this shift, the German term
Geschichte—designating historical process (history itself)—ascended to primacy
over the term Historie—which had stood for a primarily written representation of
historical events: “History as unique event or as a universal relation of events was

11. Meier and Koselleck, “Fortschritt,” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, II, 389: “Freilich haben
sich Erfahrung und Erwartung seit der Renaissance zunehmend differenziert: aber erst im ‘Fortschritt’
wird diese Differenz auf ihren Begriff gebracht.”
12. Koselleck, “Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution” [1969], in Futures Past,
57.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 193
clearly not capable of instructing in the same manner as history in the manner of
exemplary account.”13 Or: “History, processualized and temporalized to constant
singularity, could no longer be taught in an exemplary fashion.”14 In short, as
history turns into a singular process that consists of individual events, exemplary
stories of the past inevitably lose their credibility.
Furthermore, Koselleck also addresses the issue of how the change in tempo-
ral framework provokes the collapse of the premodern methodological model of
history.15 In particular, he shows that whereas in premodern historical discourse
the authenticity of a historical report was based on an immediate perception of a
given present (eyewitness), in the case of the modern historicist outlook the event
to be recorded loses its status as epistemologically feasible. Instead, the object
of historical research shifts from the recent past—retained in the memories of
eyewitnesses—to a distant past that lies beyond living memory and can be rep-
resented only by interpreting traces of the past. Hence the need for a historical
methodology radically different from the one characteristic of premodern histori-
cal discourse.

II. KOSELLECK’S HISTORIK: HISTORICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND LAYERS OF TIME

Over the course of several decades, alongside Koselleck’s account of the emer-
gence of the singular notion of history and the related ideas of temporalization
and historical time, he develops his own Historik, a theory of possible histories,
which he conceived of in terms of a historical anthropology that seeks to articu-
late the conditions under which history—or, more precisely, the plurality of his-
tories—unfold.16 Although Koselleck never presents a systematic account of the
different formal criteria belonging to his Historik, what connects his theory is
the attempt to clarify “historical-anthropological presuppositions . . . which give
rise to individual histories.”17 More specifically: “Rather, Historik is the theory
of the conditions of possible histories. It asks about the theoretically discernible
presuppositions that make conceivable why histories occur, how they unfold,
and, likewise, how and why they must be examined, represented, or narrated.”18

13. Koselleck, “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective of a
Modernized Historical Process” [1967], in Futures Past, 32.
14. Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation”: Two Historical Categories”
[1976], in Futures Past, 268.
15. Koselleck, “Neuzeit: Remarks on the Semantics of Modern Concepts of Movement,” 243.
16. See also Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Koselleck, Arendt, and the Anthropology of Historical
Experience,” History and Theory 49, no. 2 (2010), 214. On Koselleck’s Historik, see also Jacob
Taubes, “Geschichtsphilosophie und Historik: Bemerkungen zu Kosellecks Programm einer neuen
Historik,” in Geschichte—Ereignis und Erzählung, ed. Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel
(Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), 490-499. See also Koselleck, “Im Vorfeld einer neuen
Historik,” in Neue Politische Literatur 6 (1961), 577-588.
17. Koselleck, “Transformations of Experience and Methodological Change: A Historical-
Anthropological Essay,” in Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing
Concepts (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 50.
18. Koselleck, “Historik and Hermeneutics” [1987], in Koselleck, Sediments of Time: On Possible
Histories, transl. and ed. Sean Franzel and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2018), 43.
194 JUHAN HELLERMA

In pursuit of outlining conditions of possible histories, Koselleck draws on

Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit by expanding on the formal notions of Geschichtlichkeit,
Erbe, and so on found in Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein. Introducing a set of
formal kinds (friend and enemy, inside and outside, war and peace, and so on),
Koselleck insists that, unlike Heidegger’s notions, his categories address the social
and intersubjective dimensions of historical reality and thus make it possible to
pinpoint the immovable crux that lies at the root of all historical movement through
conflicts, wars, and political action more generally: “Following Heidegger, these
are existential determinations—in a sense, transcendental categories—that name
the possibility of histories, without, however, thereby making concrete histories
sufficiently describable.”19
Besides anthropological categories, Koselleck also develops a theory of mul-
tiple times that he conceived of in terms of several distinct but overlapping layers
of temporal patterns. It is this latter part of Koselleck’s broader conception of
Historik that I want to focus on in what follows. Koselleck describes his approach
by comparing it to geological findings that are arranged into layers wherein each
layer has its own origin and duration. “Like its geological model, ‘layers of time’
refers to the plurality of time planes, each with varying durations and diverging
origin, that are nevertheless simultaneously present and effective.”20 Koselleck
maintains that history similarly unfolds on various levels, which in turn brings
about a temporal complexity that needs theoretical clarification. For example, in
his 1971 essay “Wozu noch Historie?” Koselleck explicitly calls on historians to
develop such a theory: “There is a complete lack of a theory that, if anything at
all, could set our discipline apart from the rest of the social sciences: a theory of
historical times.”21 As Koselleck further observes, insight into the formal quali-
ties of varying layers of historical reality provides the historian with a theory for
designing historical methodologies and modes of representation.22 It should be
noted that Koselleck engaged with the idea of multiple temporalities not only on
a theoretical level but also as a practicing historian. The latter framework was
present in his Habilitationschrift, which he completed following the principles
of social history and was thus informed by the insight on the plurality of concur-
rently existing time layers. To illustrate his approach, in the book’s introduction,
Koselleck states: “[T]he account corresponds to the different levels upon which
historical movement unfolded. From a theoretical perspective, it deals with dif-
ferent layers of historical time.”23

19. Ibid., 52.

20. Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in Koselleck, Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 9: “‘Zeitschichten’ verweisen, wie ihr geologisches Vorbild, auf mehrere
Zeitebenen verschiedener Dauer und unterschiedlicher Herkunft, die dennoch gleichzeitig vorhanden
und wirksam sind.”
21. Koselleck, “Wozu noch Historie?” [1971], in Koselleck, Vom Sinn und Unsinn der Geschichte:
Aufsätze und Vorträge aus vier Jahrzehnten, ed. Carsten Dutt (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2010), 48:
“Es fehlt völlig eine Theorie, die, wenn überhaupt, unsere Wissenschaft von den Theorien der übrigen
Sozialwissenschaften unterscheidet: eine Theorie der geschichtlichen Zeiten.”
22. Koselleck, “Representation, Event, and Structure,” in Futures Past, 105.
23. Koselleck, Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1967), 14:
“Die Darstellung entspricht vielmehr den verschiedenen Ebenen, auf denen sich die geschichtliche
Bewegung vollzog. . . . Theoretisch handelt es sich um verschiedene Schichten geschichtlicher Zeit.”
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 195
Over the course of several decades, Koselleck refined his conceptual tools
to best capture what is at stake. Whereas in his earlier works, illustrated in the
above passages, Koselleck deploys the term “historical times” as a main indica-
tion of the framework, in his later essays the expression “structures of repetition”
(Wiederholungsstukturen) moves to center stage. The shift in terminology is
most visible in one Koselleck’s latest essays, titled “Structures of Repetition in
Language and History,”24 which conceptualized a variety of temporal phenom-
ena (both natural and human-generated conditions) as modifications of a more
universal pattern, namely that of repetition. Following this and Koselleck’s later
writing on the subject, I will use the label “layers of time” to signify the temporal
schemas inherent to various structures of repetition.
In a recent collection of essays that makes available a number of Koselleck’s
thus far untranslated works to an Anglophone audience, the translators have
opted to render Koselleck’s key term Zeitschichten as “sediments of time.” In the
introduction to the book, the translators, building on the geological metaphor sug-
gested by Koselleck, explain their interpretive move as follows: “The metaphor
of sediments captures the gathering, building up, and solidifying into layers of
experience and events, as well as the tensions and fault lines that arise between
different kinds of sedimented formations. . . .”25 They further maintain that “it
is in good part to access this process of accretion (and erosion) over time that
we have chosen to translate Zeitschichten as ‘sediments’ of time rather than the
geologically precise ‘strata.’”26
Although the metaphor of “sedimentation” might very well capture the logic
particular to specific cases, it is nevertheless doubtful if it is suited to capture
the complexity of temporal processes occurring across the entirety of layers.
Sedimentation implies that all structures of repetition follow the path of solidifi-
cation, evolving from being more volatile and dynamic to a static and stable state.
Again, even if it applies in many of the cases, I question whether it applies univer-
sally. For example, under conditions of increasing acceleration—I will return to
this point later in the article—it seems that we are facing constant change where
very little solidifies into more stable and static patterns and is instead caught up
in the flux of ever-increasing transformations. Due to potential limitations of the
metaphor of sediments, I have chosen to stick with the more literal and neutral
translation of “layers of time,” which conveys the central idea of simultaneously
coexisting times, while also leaving open the nature of temporal processes occur-
ring within each particular layer.
Before delving into more concrete applications of the theory to Koselleck’s
account of modernity, I will first offer some insights into why Koselleck might
have chosen to move the term “repetition” to the center of his theory, as well as
illustrate the shift on a concrete, textual basis. One explanation for such a termi-
nological shift is that, in his later writings, Koselleck expanded the scope of his
theory so that, besides human-generated phenomena, it could also include natural

24. Koselleck, “Structures of Repetition in Language and History” [2006], in Sediments of Time.
25. Sean Franzel, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Introduction: Translating Koselleck,” in Sediments
of Time, xiv.
26. Ibid.
196 JUHAN HELLERMA

phenomena. In other words, he wanted to produce a theory that could account for
all possible durations and their respective modes of being. He found a common
denominator in the term “repetition,” which, for instance, he used to character-
ize both the recurring pattern of the movement of the sun, as well as the kind of
persistence that is characteristic of language and semantics.27
In the introduction to the collection of essays gathered under the title
Zeitschichten, Koselleck states that historical time should be distinguished from
natural time,28 and that both are in turn modifications of repetition.29 Koselleck’s
attempt to place the trope of repetition in the center of his theory is also evident in
his remark that Fernand Braudel’s distinctions with regard to different temporal
durations are reducible to a more universal phenomenon, that of repetition, which
in turn entails various layers.30 It is clear that a theory that aims to address such
a broad spectrum of phenomena must operate with a fluid definition of repeti-
tion. Indeed, Koselleck did not make his own definition of the term clear. This,
however, might not be a shortcoming considering that it is the very task of the
framework to inquire into various modes of repetition. Arguably, the key term
should be left open, since it is only then that it can perform its main function.
A second explanation might be that Koselleck wanted to achieve more con-
ceptual clarity across his different works. Since the term “historical time(s)” also
plays an important role in Koselleck’s elaborations on modernity and modern
temporal experience, it would be reasonable to establish a distinct theoretical
vocabulary within the boundaries of his own unique Historik. Even if Koselleck
did not intend this, it certainly helps to better structure the various parts of
Koselleck’s theorizing.

27. Koselleck’s later writing gives rise to an interpretation that the anthropological categories he
develops expanding on Heidegger—particularly insofar they represent specific conditions underlying
the occurence of concrete histories—likewise fall under the broadly conceived concept of structures
of repetition.
28. Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in Zeitschichten, 10: “One of my starting theses is that historical times
can be principally distinguished from times conditioned by nature, even though they interact with
each other in many ways.” Original: “Eine meiner Ausgangsthesen ist, dass sich historische Zeiten
von naturbedingten Zeiten grundsätzlich unterscheiden lassen, auch wenn sie -– auf sehr verschiedene
Weise—aufeinander einwirken.”
29. Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in Zeitschichten, 13: “Geographical and biological preconditions of
human histories cannot be completely controlled, even if this is increasingly the case in relation to the
advancements of natural sciences. Another mode of duration is animated by intentional and targeted
repetition. The latter is related to durability and stability of social behavior. Empirically, the border
between the natural and human-generated structures of repetition is fluid, but time-theoretically,
they should be kept strictly apart.” Original: “Geographische und biologische Vorbedingungen men-
schlicher Geschichten lassen sich nicht rundum beherrschen, auch wenn dies mit den Fortschritten
der Naturwissenschaften der Fall ist. Die andere Weise der Dauer lebt von gewollter und gezielter
Wiederholung. Sie verbürgt Dauerhaftigkeit und Stetigkeit gesellschaftlicher Verhaltensweisen.
Empirisch gehen die naturalen und die menschlich geregelten Wiederholungsstrukturen ineinander
über, aber zeittheoretisch müssen sie strikt voneinander getrennt werden.”
30. Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in Zeitschichten, 14: “Fernand Braudel’s methodological point of
departure is thus uncoupled from the parallel arrangement of long, short, and situational duration
and traced back to the common basic pattern that at the same time contains various layers of time.”
Original: “Der Methodische Ansatz von Fernand Braudel wird also aus der Parallelschaltung von
langer, kurzer und situativer Dauer herausgedreht und auf ein gemeinsames anthropologisches
Grundmuster zurückgeführt, das zugleich verschiedene Zeitschichten in sich birgt.”
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 197
A third reason that Koselleck opts to highlight the figure of repetition, as I
will later argue in more detail, is that, since it opens up the dynamic interplay
between repetition and innovation, it is more suited to accounting for the possibil-
ity of acceleration and delay in history than the conceptual toolbox suggested in
Koselleck’s earlier works.

Shift in the Use of the Term “Wiederholung”

Over the course of his writings, Koselleck shifts the primary use of the terms
“Wiederholung” and “Wiederholbarkeit.” In Futures Past, “Wiederholbarkeit”
is deployed mostly in relation to the premodern discourse of history (historia
magistra vitae), where it connotes the assumption that past and future form a
stable and continuous space of experience, enabling stories about the past to illu-
minate that which is yet to come. “Wiederholbarkeit” is therefore a feature of the
premodern experience of time, that, as Koselleck argues, loses its epistemologi-
cal feasibility in the face of modernity: “The thesis of the possible repetition of
events is discarded. If the whole of history is now unique, then to be consistent,
the past must be distinct from the present and the present from the future.”31
In his later texts, however, the primary meaning of “Wiederholung” has clearly
shifted, as it no longer describes the premodern experience of time, but instead
characterizes a more general structural persistence. Comparative analysis of
two of Koselleck’s essays—“Representation, Event, and Structure” (1973) and
“Concepts of Historical Time and Social History” (1982)—reveals that over time
Koselleck incorporates the term “Wiederholen” into his discourse on structural
duration. In these two essays, Koselleck has transposed a number of passages
from his earlier essay into the later one, occasionally editing the reused parts. For
example, consider this passage from the earlier text:
Such structures have names—constitutional forms, and modes of rule—which do not
change from one day to the next and are the preconditions of political action. We can also
take productive forces and relations of production that slowly alter, perhaps in gradual
stages, but which nonetheless condition and shape social life.32

Compare this with a modified version of the same passage found in the later essay
where the term “repetition” gains momentum: “
Let me mention some structures in this connection. Consider constitutional forms and
modes of power which are based on the repetition of well-known rules. Or take productive
forces and the relations of production, which change slowly, with sudden bursts at inter-
vals. Their effect derives from the repetition of certain procedures and from the rational
constancy of general market conditions.33

31. Koselleck, “Perspective and Temporality: A Contribution to the Historiographical Exposure of

the Historical World” [1977], in Futures Past, 139-140.
32. Koselleck, “Representation, Event, and Structure,” 107. Original: “Dazu seien einige
Strukturen genannt: Verfassungsbauformen, Herrschaftsweisen, die sich nicht von heute auf morgen
zu ändern pflegen, die aber Voraussetzung politischen Handelns sind. Oder die Produktivkräfte
und Produktionsverhältnisse, die sich nur langfristig, manchmal schubweise wandeln, jedenfalls
das gesellschaftliche Geschehen bedingen und mit bewirken.” (Koselleck, “Darstellung, Ereignis,
Struktur” [1973], in Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft: Zur Semantik historischer Zeiten [Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1995], 147.)
33. Koselleck, “Concepts of Historical Time and Social History” [1982], in The Practice of
Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, 124. Original: “Dazu seien einige Strukturen
198 JUHAN HELLERMA

Transposing the term “repetition” from one context to another can also be seen as
illustrating that, over time, Koselleck’s interest shifted from the temporal break
occurring with the onset of modernity to a more formal theory of multiple times.
In the next section I will look at two interpretations—Niklas Olsen’s and Helge
Jordheim’s—of how Koselleck’s account of modernity and layers of time relate
to each other. I will argue that although both accounts point out valid perspec-
tives—indeed, their respective arguments can be made even stronger—there is a
further dimension that is not part of the main argument Olsen and Jordheim are
advocating.

III. RECEPTION OF THE RELATION BETWEEN MODERNITY AND LAYERS OF TIME

Niklas Olsen’s book on Koselleck’s intellectual trajectories, History in the

Plural, places Koselleck’s work within the context of postwar historical thought,
in which the primary occupation was to engage with the origins of the atroci-
ties that arose in the first half of the twentieth century. Olsen argues that a large
part of Koselleck’s works can be understood against the background of a sin-
gular notion of history that underpinned utopian political ideologies, and that
Koselleck in turn sought to deconstruct by developing a set of formal categories
to account for the plural possibilities of the unfolding of history. Olsen writes that
“Koselleck found roots of totalitarianism in philosophical patterns of thought that
culminated in the Enlightenment and claimed the existence of an inevitable and
deterministic pattern to history.”34 In contrast, Koselleck developed a concept of
history that departed “from all utopian notions of history as a singular, unified,
and goal-directed process.”35
Olsen illustrates that Koselleck, on the one hand, draws from Heidegger by
expanding on existential features inherent to Heidegger’s notion of Dasein. He
writes that Koselleck intended to “rework Heidegger’s analysis of Being into a
larger anthropological system of human existence that emphasizes the impor-
tance of interpersonal and social relations in human life,”36 which in turn “aimed
to criticize and undermine the very foundation of the historical philosophies, the
idea of a unified and universal history, and to replace them with a framework that
thematized how human history unfolds in different ways, as histories, within the
described historical space.”37
According to Olsen’s interpretive schema, Koselleck’s engagement with social
history and the related notion of layers of historical time can be viewed as further
manifestations of Koselleck’s more general interest in developing frameworks that

genannt: Verfassungsformen und Herrschaftsweisen, die auf der Wiederholung eingespielter Regeln
beruhen. Oder die Produktivkräfte und die Produktionsverhältnisse, die sich nur langfristig, manchmal
schubweise wandeln. Aber ihre Wirkung beruht auf der Wiederholung bestimmter Verfahren und auf
der rationale Stetigkeit der allgemeinen Marktbedingungen.” (Koselleck, “Moderne Sozialgeschichte
und historische Zeiten” [1987], in Zeitschichten, 328-329.)
34. Niklas Olsen, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the Work of Reinhart Koselleck (New
York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), 44
35. Ibid., 42.
36. Ibid., 66.
37. Ibid.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 199
can accommodate a plural notion of history. In other words, the idea of history
that unfolds on a multitude of intertwined but analytically distinct levels “became
a central discursive feature in the unifying pattern and the common objective in
Koselleck’s writings, as it served to substantiate his critique of notions of history
in the singular and as a very operational framework to thematize history in the
plural.”38 Furthermore, whereas the anthropological categories Koselleck devel-
oped, drawing upon Heidegger’s existential analyses of Dasein, were intended
primarily to deconstruct the singular notion of history, the framework of layers of
time provided a means to account for how history in the plural could be written
in practice.39
Olsen rightly points out that the notion of history as unfolding in layers pre­
sents an alternative to the concept that depicts history as one-dimensional and
singular. However, he does not elaborate that Koselleck’s layers of time include
further resources that can make the position he is advocating for even stronger.
This can be achieved in reference to Koselleck’s analysis of structure and event,
wherein the two poles are viewed as interrelated but not linked causally. Even
though structures of repetition, as Koselleck notes, form the circumstances in
which individual events occur, they nevertheless do not entirely exhaust the
meaning of what unfolds, meaning essentially that there is no room for construct-
ing sequences that are based on necessity.
Our conceptual model aims at an aporia that opens up between the repeating conditions of
possible events and these events themselves, including their acting and enduring persons.
No event can be completely and sufficiently derived from synchronic conditions or from
diachronic preconditions, no matter whether these are economic, religious, political, psy-
chological, cultural, or whatever else.40

An event, therefore, is, on the one hand, inextricably tied to the structure, and,
on the other hand, remains relatively independent from that same structure. At
the same time an actual event manifests only one possibility that is enabled by
the structure that opens up a specific set of possibilities but does not necessitate
the occurrence of an individual event. Hence “the structures of repetition . . .
contain both more and less than what comes to light in the occurrences.”41 This
explanation serves to further substantiate Olsen’s argument that the framework
of layers of time calls into question the possibility of utopian visions of history,
particularly due to their deterministic commitments.
In Jordheim’s account, scholars in the Anglophone and German contexts have
viewed Koselleck’s theory of historical times predominantly as ultimately an
attempt to offer a periodization in which modernity as a particular epoch assumes
a central role.42 He writes that the theory of an “advent and specific temporal
qualities of the modern age, substantiated by his monumental endeavors in the
history of key concepts and social structures, has come to represent the main

38. Ibid., 143.

39. Ibid., 227.
40. Koselleck, “Structures of Repetition in Language and History,” 162.
41. Ibid.
42. Helge Jordheim, “Against Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities,”
History and Theory 51, no. 2 (2012), 152.
200 JUHAN HELLERMA

focus of Koselleck’s work to the extent that other parts have been explicitly or
implicitly ignored.”43 In contrast to interpretations that regard Koselleck pri-
marily as an advocate of a theory of periodization, and modernity in particular,
Jordheim points to the existence of a separate temporal framework in Koselleck’s
works. Drawing on John Zammito’s review article of the 2004 essay collection
on Zeitschichten, Jordheim contends that Koselleck’s theory of historical times
is much more complex and comprehensive than previous commentators have
suggested. By way of disconnecting the theory of historical times from a theory
of modernity, Jordheim transposes it into the context of a theory of multiple
overlapping temporalities, arguing that the latter represents Koselleck’s “real
theory of historical times.”44 Moreover, he insists that Koselleck’s primary inter-
est was not developing a theory of modernity, but to engage with a more general
theory of multiple times that “is even constructed with the purpose of defying
periodization.”45
It is true that one of Koselleck’s programmatic aims in Historik is to disrupt
the traditional periodization schema that posits a succession of epochs. Moreover,
already in his 1971 essay “Wozu noch Historie?” Koselleck explicitly questions
his own analyses of the modern concept of history, arguing that the discipline of
history should be premised on multiple temporalities, which would naturally lead
to a renegotiation of the borders between the modern singular concept of history
and the earlier plural form. “In any case we need a theory of historical times when
we want to clarify the relationship between ‘history in itself’ and the endlessly
many histories in the plural.”46 Inquiring into temporal structures, Koselleck
furthermore argues, “opens a doorway for arranging the entire field of history
according to its immanent principles without having to resort to the chronological
triad and without stopping at the semantic threshold of experience established by
the notion of history as such around 1780.”47
In his 1973 essay “History, Histories, and Formal Time Structures,” Koselleck
picks up the question he had posed in the essay “Wozu noch Historie?” and offers
concrete examples as to how theoretical scrutiny can shed light on common fea-
tures between modern and premodern histories. Koselleck makes a similar point in
other writings as well, repeatedly stressing that in the face of structural continuities
the otherness of modernity should not be taken for granted. For example, consider
this passage:
There are repeatable constellations, long-term effects, contemporary manifestations of
archaic attitudes, regularities of sequences of events, and the contemporary historian can
inform himself about their actuality from history. . . . Only when we know what can repeat
itself at any time (though not always all at once) can we ascertain what is truly new in our

43. Ibid., 154.

44. Ibid., 156.
45. Ibid., 157.
46. Koselleck, “Wozu noch Historie?,” 49: “In jedem Fall bedürfen wir einer Theorie historischer
Zeiten, wenn wir das Verhältnis der “Geschichte an sich” zu den unendlich vielen Geschichten im
Plural klären wollen.”
47. Ibid., 50: “eröffnet einen Zugang, das ganze Gebiet historischer Forschung sachimmanent zu
gliedern, ohne dass man sich an chronologische Triaden halten und ohne dass man an der seman-
tischen Erfahrungsschwelle einer Geschichte schlechthin seit rund 1780 stehenbleiben müsste.”
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 201
time. Indeed, this might be less than we would like to imagine.48

However, having demonstrated that despite the lack of the modern concept “his-
tory,” premodern histories exhibit temporal features similar to the ones found in
modernity, Koselleck flips his initial question, asking “by means of which cat-
egories can the specificity of modern history be distinguished from the regularity
of recurring sequences outlined above?”49 As a preliminary answer, he states:
“To deal with this, it is necessary to introduce into our hypothesis coefficients
of motion and acceleration which are no longer derivative of expectations of the
Last Judgment (as was the case earlier), but which instead remain adequate to the
empirical factors of a world increasingly technical in nature.”50
A similar pattern of argumentation occurs in his 1989 essay “Wie neu ist die
Neuzeit?,” where Koselleck initially questions whether the idea of modernity is
particularly different and new, but ultimately argues that modernity can neverthe-
less be distinguished from previous times because of the speed with which history
had changed over the previous two hundred years.51
In sum, Koselleck deploys his theoretical framework to argue against the
view of succession of distinct epochs, and modernity in particular, while at the
same time calling for a set of conceptual tools that accounts for different rates
of speed change. He thus reintroduces the idea of modernity as an era in its own
right insofar as it appears subject to unprecedented acceleration. It is the latter
perspective from which I propose to consider the significance of the framework
of layers of time.
Because different commentators set up the initial question regarding the rela-
tion between Koselleck’s notion of modernity and his account of layers of time
in diverging terms, we find variations in their respective points of emphasis.
Whereas Olsen emphasizes the critical potential of the notion of layers of time,
particularly as it opposes the singular concept of history, Jordheim has a differ-
ent point of departure, instead taking issue with the dominant vision of Koselleck
as an advocate of a periodization theory. In an attempt to show the limits of this
vision, Jordheim highlights Koselleck’s account of multiple temporalities, which
he argues facilitates a criticism of traditional periodization, and of modernity
in particular. I argue that we should not highlight the significance of layers of
time at the expense of downplaying the role of the specific shift in temporal
experience occurring in the eighteenth century, even if we have to admit that it is
problematic to accept it as a principle for periodization. By doing so, we would
not only be doing injustice to Koselleck’s entire oeuvre, as so many of his works
are concerned with the constitution and the origins of the modern world, but
most important, we would risk disregarding some of the key applications of the
framework of layers of time itself.
In contrast to approaches suggested by Olsen and Jordheim, who both depict
Koselleck’s account of modernity as being at odds with his theory of layers of

48. Koselleck, “Constancy and Change of All Contemporary Histories” [1988], in Sediments of
Time, 115-116.
49. Koselleck, “History, Histories, and Formal Time Structures” [1973], in Futures Past, 104.
50. Ibid.
51. Koselleck, “Wie neu ist die Neuzeit?” [1989], in Zeitschichten, 238.
202 JUHAN HELLERMA

time, I propose that the two frameworks are not necessarily opposed to each other
but can be brought into a productive dialogue. Specifically, I will illustrate that
the theory of layers of time offers tools that ground the definition of modernity as
an age of increasing acceleration, which in turn facilitates Koselleck’s thesis that
modernity is the growing-apart of experience and expectation.

IV. LAYERS OF TIME AS A THEORY OF

HISTORICAL CHANGE AND MODERN ACCELERATION

One of the main functions that Koselleck attributes to his Historik is to clarify
theoretically the possibility of acceleration and deceleration. More specifically,
the theory of layers of time seeks to distinguish between the speed and pace of
change characteristic of different domains. Koselleck insists that even though
empirically different layers are intertwined, it is up to the theory to separate them
analytically and to determine their respective formal qualities.
One key distinction in Koselleck’s formal analyses is that between event and
structure repetition. Whereas the first is regarded as singular and unique, the other
forms the conditions in which events occur. “Within every singular action and
in every unique constellation that is performed or endured by similarly unique
human beings there are always repeatable layers of time. They make possible,
condition, and limit human possibilities for action as well as also set them free.”52
Events can be further analyzed by diachronic structures that repeat themselves
across various instances of a particular event (for example, revolutions), which,
as Koselleck stresses, does not affect their uniqueness. “Indeed, it may be surpris-
ing that events—which by definition presuppose or generate their own singularity
or even utter uniqueness—have repeatable regularities.”53
A model that combines singular events and recurring patterns also enables
Koselleck to make explicit the formal conditions for historical change. In so doing,
he seeks to discriminate between temporal schemas characteristic of different
structures of repetition. Ultimately, it is precisely the task of Historik to shed light
on the nature and speed of transformation within different layers, which in turn
makes it possible to illuminate tensions occurring between various layers.54
Furthermore, whereas events can be mapped onto a chronological scale, struc-
tures of repetition adhere to a different temporal logic that can be described with
the categories of acceleration (Beschleunigung) and delay (Verzögerung):
Acceleration would occur when, in a given set of cases, increasingly fewer cases were
found to repeat themselves and ever more innovations came about that departed from

52. Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in Zeitschichten, 13: “In jeder einmaligen Handlung und in jeder
einzigartigen Konstellation, die von ebenso einmaligen und einzigartigen Menschen jeweils vollzo-
gen wird oder ausgehalten wird, sind immer sich wiederholende Zeitschichten enthalten. Sie ermögli-
chen, bedingen und begrenzen die menschliche Handlungschancen und setzen sie zugleich frei.”
53. Koselleck, “Structures of Repetition in Language and History,” 168.
54. A good example in this regard is the debate on the formation of the new geological era, the
Anthropocene, which can be analyzed as an increasing intertwinement of ecological and geological
settings, on the one hand, and projects generated by modern society, on the other. Koselleck himself,
however, was interested primarily in tensions and interaction between human-generated patterns,
whereas Anthropocene discussion in contrast revolves around the impact of humans on the natural
environment eventually giving rise to the thesis about the collapse of the distinction between human
and nature.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 203
the old preconditions. Delays would arise when traditional repetitions grind into place or
solidify in such a way that every form of change would be inhibited or even made impos-
sible.55

Hence, the theory of layers of time articulates the formal conditions for all pos-
sible accelerations and delays. Differentiating among various kinds of structures
of repetition with regard to their pace of change is thus one of the essential
tasks of the theory: “The advantage of a [theory of layers of time]56 lies in its
ability to measure different velocities—accelerations or decelerations—and to
thereby reveal different modes of historical change that indicate great temporal
complexity.”57 Hence, depending on how fast structures of repetition transform,
history either speeds up or slows down.
A further formal, universally applicable premise is that, no matter the actual
circumstances, every history can be analyzed as an interplay between duration
and innovation. “All actual changes, whether faster, slower, or in long periods
of time (to make Braudel’s categories more precise) thus remain tied back to the
variable interaction between repetition and singularity.”58 Therefore, whereas
the historical interrelationship between continuity and innovation changes, the
formal relationship between the two categories remains intact and hence forms
one of the cornerstones of the discipline of Historik: “Even if modern inventions
evoke truly new experiences, the tension between innovation and repetition will
never be done away with. Only the determination of their relation changes over
the course of history.”59 Faced with these formal conditions, it is possible to pro-
vide a definition of modernity. In other words, besides scrutinizing the conceptual
changes in which he grounds his temporalization thesis, Koselleck argues that
modernity can be distinguished from earlier times by virtue of the accelerating
pace of change occurring in areas such as social life, politics, and technology.
It is in this context that the theory of layers of time can become an explana-
tory model that accounts for the acceleration of history particular to modernity.
Following Koselleck, modernity represents a specific variation of the universal
interplay between repetition and innovation. In particular, with modernity, struc-
tural change unfolds with an unprecedented intensity, leading to Koselleck’s
diagnosis of modernity as an age of acceleration.60 Here, the term “acceleration”
as a characterization of a specific time period does not designate a formal pos-
sibility, as it did within the theory of layers of time, but instead refers to the
concrete instance of the formal possibility being realized. In this way, layers of
time as a theory makes possible an account of modernity as a period of intense
acceleration.

55. Koselleck, “Structures of Repetition in Language and History,” 160.

56. Original translation modified.
57. Koselleck, “Sediments of Time” [1995], in Sediments of Time, 6.
58. Koselleck, “Structures of Repetition in Language and History,” 160.
59. Ibid., 165.
60. Koselleck suggests that the entire history of mankind can be divided into periods with respect
to the increasing rate of change and transformation. Hence acceleration as such is not a phenomenon
that appears with modernity. See Koselleck, “Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung. Eine Studie zur
Säkularisation” [1985], in Zeitschichten, 200-202.
204 JUHAN HELLERMA

More specifically, acceleration is the increasing shortening of the life span of

structural conditions that provide orientation for historical actors. Structural con-
ditions, Koselleck notes, start to change with a speed that lends them the quality of
an event: “To directly experience structural change is presumably a characteristic
feature of modernity. Structural change itself, as it were, takes on the quality of
an event.”61 Hence there are fewer and fewer conditions that remain unchanged:
“My hypothesis is that in the course of modernity, industrialization, acceleration,
the number of stable conditions that repeat themselves has decreased.”62
This in turn means that actors are forced to constantly readjust to ever new
situations. “The shortening of the spans necessary for gaining new experiences
that the technical-industrial world forces upon us can be described as histori-
cal acceleration.”63 The intensity with which change unfolds, Koselleck further
states, sets modernity apart from previous times: “The characteristic feature of
modernity—if we are to sum up it up in a single concept—is an acceleration that
is not contained by the natural preconditions of humankind. And this is what
fundamentally distinguishes every history since the eighteenth century from all
previous histories, because the structural preconditions are themselves changing
more quickly than had been previously possible.”64

V. MODERN ACCELERATION AND THE

GROWING-APART OF EXPERIENCE AND EXPECTATION

It should be noted that Koselleck operates with different notions of acceleration:

In addition to the structural notion of acceleration, he also uses the term to connote
experience. For my purposes, this distinction is significant. Koselleck talks about
acceleration as a “principle of experience” that denotes the “concept of experience
of modernity.”65 In this case acceleration is taken up as “part of a more general
question of what constitutes historical time.”66 “For if there is a world-immanent,
historical experience of time that is distinct from all rhythms of time bound to
nature, then it is undoubtedly the experience of acceleration by virtue of which
historical time qualifies specifically as a human-generated phenomenon.”67 In

61. Koselleck, “Wie neu ist die Neuzeit?,” 238: “Einen solchen Strukturwandel unmittelbar wah-
rnehmen zu können, das zeichnet vermutlich die Neuzeit aus. Der Strukturwandel wird gleichsam
selbst zum Ereignis.”
62. “Zeit, Zeitlichkeit und Geschichte—Sperrige Reflexionen: Reinhart Koselleck im Gespräch
mit Wolf-Dieter Narr und Kari Palonen,” in Zeit, Geschichte und Politik: zum achtzigsten Geburtstag
von Reinhart Koselleck, ed. Jussi Kurunmäki and Kari Palonen (Jyväskylä, Finland: University of
Jyväskylä, 2003), 18-19: “Meine Hypothese lautet, dass der Anteil der stabilen Bedingungen, die sich
wiederholen, im Zuge der Neuzeit, der Industrialisierung, der Beschleunigung geringer geworden ist.”
63. Koselleck, “Time and History,” in Practice of Conceptual History, 113. This can be compared
with Hermann Lübbe’s notion of the contraction of the present [Gegenwartsschrumpfung].
64. “Histories in the Plural and the Theory of History: An Interview with Carsten Dutt” [2001],
in Sediments of Time, 265.
65. Koselleck, “Does History Accelerate?” [partially 1985], in Sediments of Time, 87, 93.
66. Ibid., 89.
67. Koselleck, “Zeitverkürzung und Beschleunigung. Eine Studie zur Säkularisation,” 184.
Original: “Denn wenn es eine weltimmanente, geschichtliche Zeiterfahrung gibt, die sich von den
naturgebundenen Zeitrhythmen unterscheidet, so ist es zweifellos die Erfahrung der Beschleunigung,
kraft derer sich die geschichtliche Zeit als spezifisch von Menschen produzierte Zeit qualifiziert.”
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 205
contrast, the structural notion of acceleration attends to conditions themselves—
political, technological, and otherwise—that in the context of modernity are
interrogated primarily with regard to their being more fluid and adaptable than in
previous times. Hence, what is ultimately at stake is real historical change and its
various intensities, on the one hand, and acceleration as a mode of consciousness
of time, on the other. Although interrelated, the two perspectives should neverthe-
less be considered distinct. Indeed, Koselleck explicitly argues that “real historical
acceleration” should be kept apart from “subjective attitudes of expectation and its
failed or fulfilled targets.”68
The structural notion of acceleration is nevertheless tied to the coming into
being of a specifically historical mode of experience that goes beyond naturalist
assumptions. In other words, the linkage between the two domains—structural
and experiential—occurs when structural change gains in intensity such that it
evokes a new experience of time. “Change, mutatio rerum, is reported in all his-
tories. However, the kind of change that calls forth a new experience of time—the
sense that everything is changing more quickly than one had expected or experi-
enced up to that point—is modern.”69
Hence we arrive at the link between increasing structural change and shifting
categories of experience and expectation. Unlike structural change, experience
and expectation are categories that specifically capture the actor’s attitudes
toward past and future and are hence cognitive in nature. Whereas the theory of
layers of time accounts for historical change, experience and expectation account
for the actor’s perception of past and future and their interrelationship. The ques-
tion, then, is how we correlate a metahistorical vocabulary that targets diverging
domains. In other words, how should we think of the interrelationship between
the categories of repetition and change central to the framework of layers of time,
on the one hand, and the anthropological categories of experience and expecta-
tions, on the other?
To flesh out the precise connection between the two, one can say that modern
temporal experience is defined by the shortening of the life span of structures of
repetition that in turn destabilize spaces of experience to the point that the present
recognizes itself as merely transitory, that is, as being on its way to a yet different
tomorrow. The faster structures change, the shorter the life span of the conditions
under which experience can unfold. But, more precisely, what constitutes the
modern experience of time is the awareness that lifeworld conditions are prone
to change. Modern acceleration is thus distinct insofar as it precipitates a change
in the experience of time.
Since not every perceived change is conducive to rupturing experience and
expectation, how much change is needed for the alteration of the perception of
time to proceed? Apparently, the minimal condition for that is the possibility of
experiencing structural change. Koselleck notes that structural changes are per-
ceptible “so long as their temporal span does not exceed the memory of contem-
porary generations,” adding that there are also structures “which are so enduring
that they remain for contemporaries part of the unconscious or the unknown, or
68. Koselleck, “Einleitung,” in Zeitschichten, 15-16.
69. Koselleck, “Does History Accelerate?,” 90.
206 JUHAN HELLERMA

whose transformation is so slow that it escapes their awareness.”70 Eventually,

however, this question does not allow a logical answer, requiring instead an
empirical one. Thus it remains, to a certain degree, hypothetical. Koselleck has
provided the following explanation:
The world of politics, with its increasingly mobile instruments of power (two striking
examples are the Crusades and later the annexation of distant lands); the intellectual world
spawned by the Copernican revolution; and the sequence of technical inventions and
discoveries in early modernity: in all these areas one must presuppose a consciousness of
difference between traditional experience and coming expectation. . . . Above all, when
an experiential space was broken up within a generation, all expectations were shaken and
new ones promoted.71

Another passage similarly hints at the linkage under scrutiny: “For, where
formerly long-term processes became abbreviated through altering or even
accelerating speed, the spaces of experience were rejuvenated by the continual
requirement to adapt.”72 My general point, however, is that the concept of layers
of time can be construed as a theoretical framework, which permits an accounting
for the specificity of modernity by providing the formal conditions that underlie
a distinctively modern pace of acceleration. Furthermore, the acceleration thesis
can be connected to Koselleck’s earlier notion about modernity maintaining
increasingly divergent spaces of experience and horizons of expectations. In
other words, it is in light of Koselleck’s later elaborations of the framework of
layers of time that real historical change underlying the shift in the experience of
time can gain theoretical ground. This also shows that Koselleck operates with
two distinct but interrelated notions of modernity. From the perspective of lay-
ers of time, modernity is defined as an unprecedented pace of structural change.
As we recall, Koselleck suggests that every history is a version of a universal
interplay between repetition and innovation, and hence modernity viewed in this
context is nothing but a specific instantiation of this relationship. The second
definition regards modernity as a new experience of time where past and future
increasingly grow apart.
This idea that semantic changes testifying to the changed perception of time
reflect transformations occurring in the external world (but also facilitate them)
was present in Koselleck’s works from the very beginning. However, it is only
in light of the framework of layers of time that we can draw out the connection
in a more sophisticated fashion. To put it more schematically, given Koselleck’s
insights, one can analytically distinguish among three levels of analysis: the
objective level attending to the rates of transformation within different structures
of repetition; the level of analysis focused on the actor’s perception of time; and
the level of conceptual history that empirically validates transformations of tem-
poral experience.
In the light of what has been said, I briefly return to the discussion of the
translation of Zeitschichten. It seems that in the condition of modern fluctuations,
the rendering of Zeitschichten as “sediments” proves particularly problematic.

70. Koselleck, “Representation, Event, and Structure,” 108.

71. Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation,’” 264.
72. Koselleck, “Representation, Event, and Structure,” 113.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 207
Whereas the process of sedimentation implies solidification, structural changes
occurring in the age of modern acceleration arguably never achieve such a state.
On the contrary, they never cease to evolve in the continuous process of transfor-
mation. Since nothing appears be striving toward stability, it is hard to see how
sedimentation as a metaphor can do justice this process.

VI. REVISITING MODERNITY: THE SINGULARITY THESIS

AND THE REHABILITATION OF HISTORIA MAGISTRA VITAE

In an attempt to structure different parts of Koselleck’s theory, I have argued that

insofar as the framework of layers of time offers formal criteria to account for the
accelerating pace of various historical processes, it can illuminate the specifically
modern relationship Koselleck constructs between the categories of experience
and expectation. To pinpoint a further dimension wherein one framework can
be interpreted as providing foundation for another, I want to draw attention to
Koselleck’s insight whereby the more general experience of acceleration can
be interpreted as providing the perceptual basis for the conceptual articulation
of the thesis maintaining history as a succession of individual and unrepeatable
occurrences. If reality is perceived as speeding up and constantly bringing new
experiences, the same pattern is projected backwards and forwards, producing the
singularity thesis that, as already sketched above, underpins both the notion of
historicism and progress. Consider, for example, the following passage:
Historicism’s axiom that everything in history is singular—that each epoch stands in
immediate relation to God—and that history does not repeat itself but instead finds itself in
a state of constant development, is the epiphenomenon of the primary experience that ever
since the French and Industrial Revolutions, history seemed to be continuously changing
at an accelerated pace: in this sense, nothing was comparable and everything singular.73

Or, put differently: “In reality, though, historicism’s theory of uniqueness is a

result of an accelerating industrial and revolutionary society. . . .”74 Remarkably,
as we have seen, Koselleck also speaks about the uniqueness of events within the
framework of layers of time where events are characterized by their diachronic
unfolding, the potential to surprise and exhibit determinations of before and after.
However, these two uses of singularity should not be confused or conflated.
Whereas one is interpreted as an anthropological constant, the other is presented
as a trait of a specific notion of history. In other words, whereas Koselleck’s more
formal statement regarding the irreversibility of events seeks to articulate univer-
sally valid insight, the modern notion of singularity is a result of a particular inter-
pretation of history. At the same time, the two dimensions are also related insofar
as the first insight sustains the theoretically mediated notion of history. Indeed,
Koselleck suggests that the notion of history as a linear unfolding of events con-
stitutive of both the discourse of progress and the historicist interest in ordering
the past are grounded in and draw from the anthropologically given experience

73. Koselleck, “Constancy and Change of All Contemporary Histories,” 113.

74. “Histories in Plural and the Theory of History: An Interview with Carsten Dutt,” in Koselleck,
Sediments of Time, 264.
208 JUHAN HELLERMA

of irreversibility (Unumkehrbarkeit) and irretrievability (Unwiederrufbarkeit).75

More specifically, the anthropological notion of singularity that neutrally estab-
lishes the distinctiveness of events as they unfold sequentially discloses the pos-
sibility of interpreting these very same sequences as leading toward improvement
and progress: “Progress is conceivable and possible because time, insofar as it is
a succession of singularities, gives rise to innovations that can be interpreted as
progressive.”76 Hence the anthropological insight that events are experienced in
temporal sequence builds the foundation for the temporalization thesis according
to which history is viewed as a linear unfolding of unique episodes that poten-
tially precipitate progress.
However, besides layers of time being productive in terms of shedding light on
the singularity thesis constitutive of the temporalized notion of history, premises
pertaining to layers of time can also be employed toward critically scrutinizing
the very same singularity thesis: “There are diachronic and synchronic dimen-
sions at work at various temporal depths, about which historians from distant
epochs can still help us gain insight today, because history repeats itself structur-
ally, something that is often forgotten when ‘singularity’ is stressed.”77 Thus, with
regard to the modern experience of time, Koselleck’s layers of time functions
both as an explanatory model and a paradigm for critical evaluation. Specifically,
Koselleck contends that the notion depicting history as a sequence of singular
events overlooks the many continuities hiding, as it were, underneath the surface
of rapidly unfolding events. For example, with regard to the discourse of prog-
ress, Koselleck states: “Progress, which can only be thought of as a linear time
process, conceals the broad foundation of all those structures that have survived
and which, in temporal terms, are based on repetition.”78
One concrete result of this is the reintroduction of the idea of historia magistra
vitae, which Koselleck had analyzed earlier in connection to his temporalization
thesis, arguing that the modern notion of history deprives history of its possibil-
ity of providing guidance. Koselleck contends that insofar as modern history
relates to events and occurrences, it does not recognize the structural possibility
of teachings.
Individual history is thus no longer a model for its potential iterability, or for avoiding iter-
ability. It assumes, rather, a validity in a structural statement, for processual occurrence.
Even when the heterogeneity of ends is introduced as a constant factor of destabilization,
the structural-historical analysis retains its prognostic potential. . . . History indicates the
conditions of a possible future that cannot be solely derived from the sum of individual
events. But in the events which it investigates there appear structures which condition and
limit room for maneuver in the future.79

Hence, the idea of a multilayered history opens up the space for drawing analo-
gies from the past into the future by attending to structures rather than events.

75. Koselleck, “Was sich wiederholt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 167 (July 21, 2005).
76. Koselleck, “Sediments of Time,” 5.
77. Koselleck, “Constancy and Change of All Contemporary Histories,” 114.
78. Koselleck, “Concepts of Historical Time and Social History,” 123. Compare Koselleck,
“‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation,’” 275.
79. Koselleck, “Representation, Event, and Structure,” 114.
 KOSELLECK ON MODERNITY, HISTORIK, AND LAYERS OF TIME 209
Even though structures are also mutable, they nevertheless provide enough con-
sistency to delimit the potential boundaries for future action. In other words, the
framework of layers of time gives rise to a weaker a version of historia magistra
vitae that, consistent with the original thesis that events themselves have lost their
exemplary status, sheds light on various factors that condition the future space of
action. However, it remains unclear to what degree this modest optimism about
learning from history is compatible with Koselleck’s thesis on the modern insta-
bility of structures, since it is the persistence of structures that should serve as the
cornerstone of a more nuanced theory of historia magistra vitae.

CONCLUSION

This article has surveyed points of intersection between Koselleck’s Historik,

particularly his account of layers of time, and his analyses of modernity both
as a specific experience of time and as a concept of history. In contrast to the
accounts that depict the mutual relationship between the two frameworks in terms
of opposition and exclusion, my aim was to demonstrate that in addition to its
critical potential, the framework of layers of time also includes the resources that
enable us to identify the formal conditions on which to ground relevant aspects
of the modern experience of time and history. This leads me to my more general
conclusion that the answer to the original question posed in this article—what is
the relationship between Koselleck’s concept of modernity and his account of
multiple times—is at its core multidimensional. Depending on the specific con-
text and question, Koselleck scrutinizes the relevance of his multilayered account
of history from different perspectives. He thereby both facilitates interpretations
that undermine implications of his theory of modernity, and offer a valuable
explanation for how such a theory could arise in the first place. To illustrate this
point, the article considered three interpretive strategies. According to the first
one, Koselleck’s account of multiple times can be viewed as a critical response
to the singular notion of history because it offers the alternative of a multitude of
coexisting histories. A slightly different emphasis follows if one uses the question
of periodization as the point of departure insofar as layers of time establishes a
framework that enables us to trace continuities and overlaps that transcend the
division of history into distinct successive epochs. I have argued for the legiti-
macy of a third interpretation schema that, in contrast to the two others, does not
apply the theory of layers of time for the purposes of deconstructing the notion
of modernity, but instead uncovers its constitutive role vis-à-vis modernity.
Departing from that, Koselleck’s theory of layers of time, insofar it scrutinizes
basic categories underpinning historical change, fosters a theoretical foundation
for the account of modernity as an age of increasing acceleration, which in turn
produces a specific historical experience of time.

University of Tartu,
Estonia