Communication Studies

ISSN: 1051-0974 (Print) 1745-1035 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcst20

Climategate: A Case Study in the Intersection of

Facticity and Conspiracy Theory

Brett Jacob Bricker

To cite this article: Brett Jacob Bricker (2013) Climategate: A Case Study in the Intersection
of Facticity and Conspiracy Theory, Communication Studies, 64:2, 218-239, DOI:
10.1080/10510974.2012.749294

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2012.749294

Published online: 11 Mar 2013.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1000

View related articles

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcst20
Communication Studies
Vol. 64, No. 2, April–June 2013, pp. 218–239

Climategate: A Case Study in the

Intersection of Facticity and
Conspiracy Theory
Brett Jacob Bricker

In 2009, the Climate Research Unit had over 1,000 private e-mails stolen and made
publicly available. Quickly, several of the e-mails were widely reported in the media:
supposedly providing proof of conspiracy among scientists supporting the Anthropogenic
Climate Change hypothesis. Despite the inaccuracy of the accusations, the charge of con-
spiracy stuck. In this essay, I argue that a set of interrelated variables (existing
anti-elitism, the consistency of the charge with existing ideology, the perceived accuracy
of the narrative, and the poor rhetorical response by the accused) caused the Climategate
conspiracy to resonate even after the charge was proven false. This essay adds to contem-
porary rhetorical theory about conspiracy theory by considering variables beyond
paranoid style and accuracy of the charge.

Keywords: Climategate; Conspiracy Theory; Public Opinion; Rhetoric

In November of 2009, over 1,000 illegally obtained e-mails from the Climate Research
Unit at the University of East Anglia were made public via the Internet. The subjects
of the e-mails pertained to climate research that was conducted between 1996 and
2009. Although most of the e-mails covered highly technical climate jargon, a small
subset of the e-mails became widely publicized by the blogosphere and news media
for their supposed discordance with the Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC)
hypothesis and their suggestion that there had been interference with the inde-
pendence of the peer-review process (Flam, 2009, para. 4–5). Within days, James

Brett Jacob Bricker is a lecturer in the Department of Communication Studies at the University of Kansas.
Correspondence to: Brett Jacob Bricker, University of Kansas, 1440 Jayhawk Blvd., Lawrence, KS 66046,
USA. E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 1051-0974 (print)/ISSN 1745-1035 (online) # 2013 Central States Communication Association
DOI: 10.1080/10510974.2012.749294
 Climategate 219

Delingpole, a libertarian journalist at The Telegraph, coined the incident ‘‘Climate-

gate’’ (2009b, para. 35), analogizing the e-mails to the suppression and manipulation
of evidence in the Watergate scandal of the Nixon administration in the United
States. Climate skeptics declared that the e-mails were the ‘‘final nail in the coffin’’
for the ACC ‘‘myth,’’ because they showed the ‘‘conspiracy behind [italics added]’’
the evidence supporting the scientific consensus in favor of ACC theories
(Delingpole, 2009b, para. 1).
Despite these charges of conspiracy and scientific inaccuracy, climate skeptics
could not have been more incorrect. Six distinct and independent scientific investi-
gations (Pennsylvania State University, House of Commons, University of East
Anglia Scientific Assessment Panel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
Department of Commerce, and National Science Foundation) were conducted over
the allegations, and each of them found that no scientific misconduct occurred
(Cook, 2010, para. 2). In many instances, the ‘‘American people were lied to about’’
(Romm, 2011, para. 6) the content of the e-mails, because, snippets were ‘‘taken
completely out of context’’ (Romm, 2011, para. 25). However, public discontent
was not ameliorated by these exonerations of the climate scientists. Although the
‘‘accusations thrown at the researchers involved [had] been proven baseless,’’ and
the evidence for ACC remained ‘‘as it was a year ago,’’ ‘‘huge damage’’ had been done
‘‘to the reputation of climate science’’ (Nature, 2010b, para. 2). Specifically, the
charge of conspiracy ‘‘really hurt’’ the ‘‘public perception’’ of climate science (Baker,
2010, para. 5).
Although simple disagreements over climate science have influenced public opi-
nion by sending the signal of scientific uncertainty, the charge of conspiracy strongly
influenced public opinion (Diethelm & McKee, 2009, pp. 2–3). The immediate effect
of the news media coverage of the e-mails on public opinion was substantial: ‘‘over
half (53%) said that the stories had caused them to have much less (29%) or some-
what less (24%) trust in scientists’’ (Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, &
Dawson, 2010, p. 6). In particular, 69% of respondents in a nationally representative
survey agreed with the statement: ‘‘scientists changed their results to make global
warming appear worse than it is’’ (Leiserowitz et al., 2010, p. 6). The charge of con-
spiracy had a lasting negative effect. Independent investigations were virtually
ignored by the news media and the United States public, and, consequently, the
Climategate conspiracy undercut public ‘‘trust in climate science’’ (Ward, 2011,
para. 7). Surveys taken throughout the year following the release found that
‘‘Climategate had a significant impact on belief and concern of climate change in
the US,’’ and as many as ‘‘1 in 4 Americans’’ were persuaded by the skeptical
media coverage of the incident (Johnson, 2010, para. 6). It is striking that the charge
of conspiracy stuck, even after the scientists were cleared of any suspicion of scientific
misconduct.
Despite the negative public perception, the science supporting the ACC hypothesis
remained intact. Anderegg, Prall, Harold, and Schneider (2010) provided strong evi-
dence for consensus supporting ACC theories, especially at the most qualified levels
of climatology. These scholars developed a database of 1,372 climate scholars and
220 B. J. Bricker
their works. Climate scholars were ranked based on their technical expertise: A
method that looked at a variety of widely accepted standards for determining
‘‘quality, productivity and prominence’’ (Anderegg et al., 2010, p. 12109) of a scho-
lar’s work (e.g., number of publications, number of times cited, etc.). Each of the
1,372 climate scholars was given a label: Climate skeptics were labeled UE (uncon-
vinced by the evidence) and supporters of the anthropogenic climate theory were
labeled CE (convinced by the evidence). This study found that only 3% of the top
200 climate scholars were labeled UE, and 97% of the top scholars agreed with the
basic tenants of ACC theories (Anderegg, 2010, p. 12107). Thus, whatever disagree-
ment did exist among climate scientists, it occurred very much on the fringe of the
field.
In this essay, I argue that the lasting effect of Climategate on public opinion was
primarily related to the charge of conspiracy by news commentators and conservative
pundits. The resonance of the charge was amplified by rampant anti-elitism, the
charge’s consistency with existing ideology, the perception of an accurate charge,
and the failure of scientists to effectively respond to the charge of conspiracy. Given
that the e-mails were selectively released and reported with the goal of undercutting
the neutrality of the scientific method, scientific investigations proving innocence
failed to counteract and, in fact, fell prey to the charge of conspiracy. In developing
this case, I shed light on the power of conspiracy as a form of rhetoric, the interaction
between rhetoric and science, and the importance of a well-crafted response to
accusations of conspiracy.
The essay follows in three sections. First, I discuss the rhetorical power of the
accusation of conspiracy. In particular, I look at historically recurring charges of
conspiracy in several fields. Here, I extend contemporary theories of conspiracy,
arguing that the scholarly focus on paranoid style and facticity of the charge (the
claim that the accusation does not represent the facts of the case) is insufficient to
explain the resonance of a charge of conspiracy. Second, I argue that the charge of
conspiracy is particularly powerful when a specific set of factors is present: anti-
elitism, ideology consistent with the charge, a perception of accuracy because of a
well-crafted narrative, and a poor rhetorical response by those charged. I map these
four factors onto a variety of contemporary conspiracy theories related to the killing
of Osama Bin Laden, the death of Princess Diana, the citizenship of President
Obama, and the moon landing. Next, I apply these factors to the Climategate inci-
dent. In particular, I analyze the text of the e-mails most commonly reported in the
blogosphere and by the news media. I show how specific e-mails were used to manu-
facture a charge of conspiracy in climate science. Finally, I argue that this case study
reveals an inherent weakness of scientific argument when a conspiracy charge is
made. It is difficult to respond to accusations of conspiracy within the conventions
of science because of the impossibility of proving a negative. Thus, in order to effec-
tively respond to such an accusation, scientists must expand their vocabulary and
leave the scientific field, something that did not occur in this case. Climategate thus
serves as an important example of ‘‘how not to respond to a crisis’’ (Pearce, 2009,
para. 1).
 Climategate 221

The Power of Conspiracy

Scholars have studied conspiracy theories in a number of disciplines. In particular,
Richard Hofstadter played a prominent role in theoretical development about the
concept. Hofstadter (1996) traced charges of conspiracy from the fear of Illuminism
in the late eighteenth century through McCarthyism of the mid-twentieth century.
With each example, he noted that enemy creation, apocalypticism, and imaginative
leaps defined conspiracy theories (Hofstadter, 1996, p. 37). He labeled the typical
rhetoric found in conspiracy theories as the paranoid style. Those employing the
paranoid style were most often ‘‘overheated, oversuspicious, overaggressive, grandi-
ose and apocalyptic’’ (Hofstadter, 1996, p. 4). They felt as if a ‘‘conspiratorial world’’
was ‘‘directed against a nation, culture’’ and ‘‘way of life’’ for millions of people
(Hofstadter, 1996, p. 4). For Hofstadter, the term ‘‘paranoid style’’ was intentionally
‘‘pejorative’’ and had ‘‘a greater affinity for bad causes than good’’ (p. 5). Although
Hofstadter admitted that the paranoid style might be ‘‘ineradicable’’ (1996, p. 6),
elimination was clearly his goal.
Unfortunately, this influential essay ‘‘fixed scholarly attention’’ on ‘‘marginal men
and women whose personality disorders caused them to project their problems, sta-
tus grievances, and wounds into public affairs’’ (Goldberg, 2001, p. xi). For example,
Pipes treated the paranoid style as a ‘‘way of seeing life itself’’ and a ‘‘hidden-handed
mentality’’ (1999, p. 22). Similarly, Johnson argued that the charge of conspiracy is
mostly derivative of a ‘‘twisted’’ ‘‘paranoia’’ (1983, p. 52). G. S. Wood noted that
Hofstadter’s emphasis on psychological traits caused ‘‘most historians’’ to assume
that such fears were ‘‘mainly rooted in nonrational sources’’ (1982, p. 403). Although
Hofstadter’s work is insightful, his reliance on the term paranoid is unfortunate.
Contrary to scholarship that conceives of conspiracy theories as irrational, most
conspiracy theories are based on more than a pathological fear.
Conspiracy theories aren’t crazy; sometimes they are correct (Austin, 1995; Goert-
zel, 1994; Keeley, 1999; Smith, 1997, p. 275). For example, it ‘‘is a matter of historical
record that the Reagan administration illegally funded the Nicaraguan Contras,’’ that
‘‘foreign covert actions’’ employed manipulation of revolutionary movements and
assassination strategies, and that the Jim Crow era ‘‘required covert, conspiratorial
acts’’ (Fenster, 1999, p. 10). Even Hofstadter noted the ‘‘frequent historical recur-
rence’’ (1996, p. 7) of the paranoid style throughout political history in the United
States. Given the historical precedent for collusion and conspiracy, it is not surprising
that conspiracy accusations sometimes resonate. In fact, they can be found across a
wide variety of popular genres in contemporary United States—literature, cinema,
folk, journalism, and politics. In each of these genres, the charge of conspiracy is
emotionally appealing because it motivates a ‘‘gravitational pull into a world of sus-
picion’’ (Fenster, 1999, p. viii). Because of the historical frequency of conspiracies,
the current need is not to label the rhetoric as paranoid but to understand its power.
Moreover, Hofstadter was primarily focused on locating the form of paranoid
style. He carefully traced historical accounts of charges of conspiracy but did little
to explain why some conspiracy theories resonated while others did not. Taking a
222 B. J. Bricker
similarly formal approach, Fenster presented a compelling case that influential con-
spiracy theories ‘‘share certain [formal] qualities’’ (1999, p. 9): An alleged truth hid-
den by existing order; a heroic investigative reporter; and, although the underlying
truth remains hidden, anyone with enough fortitude can find the evidence. Looking
only at form, however, might lead one to conclude that the charge of conspiracy
alone has power to transform public opinion. A focus on form alone is clearly not
adequate since many charges possessing the form of a typical conspiracy have failed
to resonate. For example, the Clinton Body conspiracy accused President Clinton of
murdering ‘‘colleagues, advisors and citizens’’ (Mikkelson & Mikkelson, 2007, para. 1)
who were set to testify against him. Despite possessing all of the attributes of the
paranoid style and the conspiratorial form, the charge did not stick. In fact, there
are ‘‘thousands of conspiracies’’ (Magubane, 1986, p. 50) that exhibit these formal
characteristics circulating in public discourse, yet very few are widely believed. There-
fore, a formulaic approach to conspiracy theory, arguing that the rhetorical form of a
charge of conspiracy will likely produce a specific audience response based on that
factor alone, is insufficient. Instead, when analyzing a charge of conspiracy, rhetorical
scholars may find greater insight in ‘‘identifying factors that jointly [italics added]
shape these discourses’’ (Benoit, 1999, p. 265).
Attempting to account for more than form to explain resonance, scholars have
focused on the accuracy of the charge of conspiracy. For example, Roeper critically
analyzed a series of conspiracies, intending to ‘‘mock, lampoon and debunk’’ (2008,
p. xii) these phenomena. The overriding assumption in Roeper’s approach was that
‘‘the conspiracies aren’t real’’ (2008, p. x), thus, merely highlighting their inaccuracies
should be sufficient to undercut their resonance. Also employing a strategy of
debunking, Griffin explained the beliefs of the 9=11 Truthers, focusing almost
entirely on the inaccuracy of the accusations that the government colluded with
the attackers (2007, p. 309). For these scholars, explanations of resonance ‘‘start
and end with the facts’’ (Dunbar & Reagan, 2006, p. xiv).
Merely focusing on accuracy, however, does not adequately explain why some
conspiracies have great resonance and others do not. For example, M. Wood,
Douglas, and Sutton determined that conspiracy believers often draw their conclu-
sions based on the central belief that ‘‘authorities and officials engage in mass decep-
tion of the public to achieve their malevolent goals’’ (2012, p. 6). In fact, many
conspiracy believers are willing to disregard evidence that contradicts their beliefs
or believe two contradictory positions. For example, ‘‘believing that Osama bin
Laden is still alive is apparently no obstacle to believing that he has been dead for
years’’ (M. Wood et al., 2012, p. 6). Given these examples, it is clear that analyzing
merely the form of the charge and its accuracy is insufficient.
The deficiencies of the above approaches are obvious. First, there is too great of a
focus on the form of the charge. The various case studies fail to explain why some
conspiracy charges resonate, and others that are similar in form do not. Second, there
is too great of a focus on the accuracy of the charge. Historically, nonfactual charges
often have had great power. For example, conspiracies relating to UFO abductions,
TWA flight 800, the Atlanta Olympic bombings, and the arrest of Timothy McVeigh
 Climategate 223

ignored substantial contrary evidence and violated basic conceptions of reality and
common sense but were believed by a large group (Dean, 1998, p. 8). As discussed
below, conspiracies concerning the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Princess Diana
resonated despite the lack of accurate evidence to support the charge. Therefore, a
theory that avoids a simple focus on merely form or facticity but, rather, integrates
a concern with form and other situational characteristics to explain resonance is
necessary in order to explain the power of conspiracies.
A number of scholars have developed a more nuanced explanation of resonance
based on a consideration of audience and situation, as well as form and facticity.
For example, social psychologists point to a large number of possible causes for wide-
spread belief in conspiracy: Individuals are unable to use reason to understand com-
plex situations; individuals seek confirmation with existing beliefs and reject
information that contradicts already strongly held beliefs; individuals are easily per-
suaded by rumors and speculation; and political group membership can skew beliefs
in an extreme direction consistent with many conspiracy theories (Fenster, 1999,
p. 18). Similarly, rhetorical scholars have focused on a variety of characteristics that
help explain the resonance of a charge of conspiracy. Melley found the most perni-
cious conspiracy theories occurred in postwar cultures disenchanted with the govern-
ment and coinciding with widespread alienation (2000, p. 185). Gil-White discovered
that conspiracy theories almost universally ‘‘stipulate that the ruling elite is doing bad
things in secret’’ (2005, para. 33). Thus, the most powerful charges of conspiracy
often tap into anti-elitism and thrive on fear. McGee argued that the propensity
for public belief in conspiracy theory is dramatically increased by the quick spread
of information through the Internet and news media (2011, p. 63). These new media
decrease the importance of facticity, because it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish
between experts and nonexperts on the Internet (Adamic, Zhang, Bakshy, &
Ackerman, 2008, p. 2). One result is that it is almost impossible for an average
Internet user to determine whether a charge is true or false. Given the rapid spread
of information through the blogosphere and the instant access to news, a contempor-
ary charge of conspiracy has the propensity to spread quickly and to take on a life of
its own. The choice by one writer to make an accusation of conspiracy creates a cas-
cade effect, because ‘‘a lot of people will be directly influenced to use the term in pre-
cisely the same manner, and their usages will influence others’’ (Gil-White, 2005,
para. 3). In this case, the initial framing of Climategate as a conspiracy, particularly
by sources cited in articles in widely read newspapers like the New York Times, shaped
the way that the broader audience perceived the incident, because the content of these
articles was ‘‘reproduced in many other news venues’’ (Gil-White, 2005, para. 3).
The primary deficiency of these rhetorical approaches is that they overlook the
importance of the dialectic between accuser and accused for determining resonance.
For example, each case study examines the dissemination and uptake of the charge
but ignores the response of those accused of committing conspiratorial acts. How-
ever, there are some cases when an effective response by the accused undercuts the
resonance of the conspiracy charge. In Rhetorical Criticism, Black argued that one
way to build theory is to identify underlying strategic characteristics that link genres,
224 B. J. Bricker
such as conspiracy rhetoric and audience response (1965, p. 147). This insight sug-
gests that previous case studies can be used to identify audience characteristics found
in resonant conspiracy rhetoric. I have used such an approach to identify five stra-
tegic and functional characteristics defining resonant conspiracies. At first glance,
it may seem as if social scientific methods offer the best approach for developing such
a model. However, it is difficult with a purely social scientific approach to look at the
underlying characteristics that link symbols and audience in a pragmatic fashion. In
the case of conspiracy theory, where there is no recurrent situation, scholars must
look at the complex relationship between audiences, symbols, and environments.
The goal is not to produce a theory, in the falsifiable sense, but, rather, it is to pro-
duce propositional anecdotal claims based on the problems, needs, and constraints of
conspiracy accusations (Simons, 1978, p. 26).
The existing literature suggests that several key factors should be considered in
crafting a theory explaining the resonance of a charge of conspiracy. Specifically,
an accusation of conspiracy is more likely to resonate if

1. It fits with the form of conspiracy;

2. It taps into existing anti-elitism;
3. It is consistent with an existing ideology;
4. It is perceived as accurate and is based on a well-crafted narrative;
5. There is a poor rhetorical response from those implicated by the charge.

This model is distinct from contemporary theories about conspiracy in three ways.
First, its focus on the content of the accusation breaks from the Hofstadter tradition
that was primarily concerned with formal characteristics of a conspiracy charge.
Second, it emphasizes the multivariable and contextual nature of the resonance of
conspiracy charges. Finally, it underscores the importance of the argumentative dia-
lectic between accuser and accused.
In the next section, I develop this model, focusing on the four nonformal factors as
a starting point for outlining an emergent theory that explains why some conspiracy
charges are likely to resonate while others are not.

Factors Present in Resonant Conspiracies

The pervasiveness of this charge was not a random occurrence; rather, the confluence
of a constellation of factors added resonance to the charge. Climategate had all of the
formal characteristics defining conspiracy but also the situational characteristics that
completed the constellation. In particular, it concerned an alleged truth hidden by
elites, presented a narrative of an investigative reporter being punished by elites and
suggested that any normal person with enough fortitude could uncover and interpret
the evidence (Fenster, 1999, p. 9). However, unique interaction of anti-elitism, exist-
ing ideology, a well-crafted charge, and a poor rhetorical response by those accused
gave the charge of conspiracy in the case of Climategate particular resonance.
 Climategate 225

Anti-Elitism
First, the accusation directly assaulted the elite establishment of climate science. The
‘‘day-to-day attacks on scientific integrity’’ (Young, 2011, p. 11) undercut the
perceived neutrality of the scientific method and turned critical skepticism into
the perception of outright fraud on the part of Climate Research Unit scientists.
By framing climate science as ‘‘unassailable dogma’’ (Nerlich, 2010, p. 15), skeptics
argued that elite scientists were not simply ‘‘ignoring scientific evidence’’ (Nerlich,
2010, p. 16) but also fraudulently manufacturing data to support ACC theories.
‘‘Intentionally illogical’’ (Young, 2011, p. 11) arguments against the ACC hypothesis
(cold nights, large amounts of snowfall, etc.) that would have otherwise been viewed
as mere personal commentary now were reported to call the whole scientific project
into question. Climate deniers used the event as a justification to criticize and bypass
peer review, while still attracting substantial media attention (Trenberth, 2011, p. 2).
Representations of a corrupt cabal of climate scientists manipulating data to justify
the ACC hypothesis consistently recurred. In the following months, the ‘‘links that
[were] forged between climate change . . . and anti-elitism’’ were so outrageous that
they ‘‘push[ed] the boundaries of acceptable journalism’’ (Young, 2011, p. 14).
Fenster presented a compelling case that influential conspiracy theories ‘‘share
certain qualities’’ (1999, p. 9), especially drawing on anti-elitist sentiments. Clarke
agreed, noting that ‘‘conspiracy theorizing has long been favored by Populists, who
are almost invariably anti-elitist’’ (2002, p. 131). In concurrence, Vankin and Whalen
chronicled the 80 Greatest Conspiracies of All Time and found that, in nearly every
instance, the most resonant conspiracy theories were based on suspicions about elites
(2004, p. 353).
A number of explanations for the power of anti-elitism have been developed.
Goldberg found that conspiracies draw power by ‘‘reinforcing traditional American
values’’ (2001, p. 20) that are intimately skeptical of elite power. M. Wood et al.
claimed that anti-elitism acts as a ‘‘monological belief system’’ (2012, p. 1); a
worldview so strong that it shapes other unrelated beliefs. For example, someone
who believes in the 9=11 Truth conspiracy is also more likely to believe that elites
covered up the cause of Princess Diana’s death because of a ‘‘view of authority as fun-
damentally deceptive’’ (M. Wood et al., 2012, p. 2). In some instances, this
anti-elitism is so strong that it causes believers to agree with mutually contradictory
conspiracy theories. One survey found that if a participant believed in the conspiracy
theory that Princess Diana faked her death, the same participant was also likely to
believe in the conspiracy theory that Princess Diana was killed by rogue British Intel-
ligence; even though belief in both of these conspiracies is contradictory (M. Wood
et al., 2012, p. 3). The same study found that if a participant believed in the con-
spiracy theory that Osama Bin Laden is still alive, the same participant was also likely
to believe in the conspiracy theory that Osama Bind Laden had been dead for years
(M. Wood et al., 2012, p. 3). The common thread supporting all of these ‘‘mutually
incompatible’’ beliefs is ‘‘deception by officialdom’’ (M. Wood et al., 2012, p. 3).
Corroborating these findings, Berlet identified a common thread among resonant
226 B. J. Bricker
conspiracy theories: an ‘‘individualistic populist anti-elitism which facilitates’’ (2009,
para. 40) the movement of conspiracy theories into the mainstream. Clearly, sus-
picion of elites adds to the resonance of many conspiracy theories. However,
anti-elitism alone is not a sufficient condition for a powerful conspiracy theory.
Clearly, many anti-elitist conspiracy narratives fail to resonate. Moreover, some
powerful conspiracies do not posit elites as corrupt or deceptive. For example,
many anti-Semitic conspiracy theories are ‘‘notable and historically important’’
exceptions to the assumption that conspiracy theories are all based on ‘‘deceptive
officialdom’’ (M. Wood et al., 2012, p. 6). Historically, theories of Jewish conspiracy
have not focused on an elite or powerful group hiding information from the aver-
age citizen; instead, they have detailed attempts by a minority group to seize power
from existing elites (M. Wood et al., 2012, p. 6). Given these counterexamples, it
is important to consider additional factors that influence the resonance of a
conspiracy charge.

Existing Ideology
Second, Climategate had the most significant effect on people who were already
ideologically disposed to question the accuracy of climate science (Johnson, 2010,
para. 7). The conspiracy charge was consistent with antiscience, antienvironment,
and conservative ideologies. Climategate took off precisely because of longstanding
ideological differences (Leiserowitz et al., 2010, p. 10). Even prior to Climategate,
issues surrounding global warming were intensely ideological (McWright & Dunlap,
2000, p. 499). The release of the e-mails and the subsequent charge of conspiracy
added fuel to the fire.
A conspiracy charge will be more likely to resonate if it is consistent with existing
ideology. Melley hinted at this when he pointed to anti-Marxism in the United States
as a possible explanation for the resonance of Chinese brainwashing conspiracies in
the 1950s (2008, p. 148). During this period, the cultural landscape of the United
States was laden with anti-Chinese sentiment. Thus, the charge that the Chinese
government was brainwashing civilians to support communism widely resonated
because it was consistent with the preconceived notion of Chinese as evil, corrupt,
and deceptive (Melley, 2008, p. 162). Pfau documented how ‘‘civic republican ideol-
ogy’’ (2005, p. 160) strongly supported the power of the individual to counter
government structures and thus shaped conspiracy discourse in the nineteenth
century. In each of these instances, conspiracies that were consistent with existing
ideology were more likely to be believed than those that weren’t.
There are several explanations for the resonance of a conspiracy charge that is con-
sistent with existing beliefs. First, individuals expose themselves to information that
‘‘they tend to already agree with’’ (Fog, 1999, para. 4). Second, when individuals are
faced with evidence that contradicts their beliefs, they often ‘‘rationalize their pre-
formed opinions’’ (Fog, 1999, para. 4) in such a way that contrary evidence can be
easily discarded. Just as anti-Chinese ideology helped support the salience of the
brainwashing conspiracy theories of the 1950s, antiscience ideology makes the charge
 Climategate 227

of conspiracy on behalf of climate scientists resonate much more powerfully (Gleick,

2011, para. 3, 4). Political, national, cultural, religious, and economic ideologies all
serve as powerful filters that limit the ability for individuals to process contradictory
evidence and to reach accurate conclusions based on the arguments presented.

Well-Crafted Narrative
Third, the conspiracy accusation was well crafted. At first glance, the e-mails seemed
very damaging. The content of the e-mails seemed consistent with the charge of con-
spiracy (Nature, 2010b, para. 6). Claims of tricking and hiding were easily assumed to
mean unscientific manipulation, while in fact this vocabulary was simply describing
data manipulation consistent with the scientific process. The claims were particularly
damaging to a nonscientific audience, unfamiliar with the exchanges typical in
peer-reviewed science (Nature, 2010b, para. 5).
Although ideology has a strong influence on the resonance of a conspiracy charge,
a well-crafted narrative that portrays the charge as accurate is an important factor as
well. In order to resonate, conspiracy theories must have a ‘‘kernel of fact’’ (Fenster,
1999, p. 33) that is often exaggerated to create a narrative of widespread collusion and
conspiracy. For example, the fluttering of the flag on the moon was, for some, enough
evidence to convince them that the moon landing never occurred (Wisnewski, 2007,
p. 276). Based on this anecdote, conspiracy theorists crafted a narrative that por-
trayed the entire event as falsified. Other times, the lack of evidence is sufficient to
create a believable narrative of conspiracy. For example, prior to the release of the
long-form birth certificate, one quarter of U.S. population had doubts about
President Obama being ‘‘natural born’’ (Gallup, 2011, para. 4). In this instance, the
absence of evidence was a primary factor motivating belief in the Birther conspiracy.

Rhetorical Response From Accused

Finally, the rhetorical response from climate scientists had a substantial effect on how
the release and characterization of the e-mails was perceived by the public. The ‘‘slug-
gish’’ (Nature, 2010b, para. 3) response from researchers at East Anglia, as well as
climate scientists more generally, failed to immediately contest the framing of the
e-mails as conspiratorial. By the time the scientific community responded, the situ-
ation had been defined in the minds of many. Within a year, no longer was just the
Climate Research Unit at East Anglia under attack but the public was growing
increasingly skeptical of the entire scientific process (Nature, 2010b, para. 1). Once
scientists did respond, they generally restated the accuracy of the data, in some
instances explaining the scientific jargon that was misquoted by the news media.
For example, the University of East Anglia’s official response emphasized that the
temperature trends predicted by the CRU team ‘‘remained largely consistent’’
(2010, para. 9) with data found by predictions made by other scientists. Similarly,
the response noted that ‘‘temperature reconstruction from Tree Ring Analysis’’
(University of East Anglia, 2010, para. 10.1) and ‘‘Land Station Temperatures’’
228 B. J. Bricker
(University of East Anglia, 2010, para. 10.2) were accurate. However, it wasn’t
‘‘enough to explain the facts of climate change very, very clearly’’ (Nature, 2010a,
para. 1), because those facts were perceived to be undercut by the conspiracy.
The resonance of a conspiracy ebbs and flows, and is greatly influenced not just by
the charge of conspiracy but also by the response that counters the claim. The Birther
conspiracy is an important example. After a long period of ‘‘vocal criticism of
Obama’’ for ‘‘withholding the document’’ (Morales, 2011, para. 3), Obama released
his long-form birth certificate on April 27, 2011. Not only was the picture of the
long-form certificate an effective rebuttal to the Birther conspiracy but Obama
crafted a rhetorically effective response by portraying the conspiracy narrative as
an outgrowth of extreme partisanship:

We’re not going to be able to do it if we spend time vilifying each other. We’re not
going to be able to do it if we just make stuff up and pretend that facts are not facts.
We’re not going to be able to solve our problems if we get distracted by sideshows
and carnival barkers. (Obama, 2011, para. 8)

A Gallup poll taken just eight days later found that ‘‘Obama’s release of his
long-form birth certificate . . . significantly reduced skepticism about his place of
birth’’ (2011, para. 5). This drastic change of opinion occurred across all political
groups, regardless of preexisting ideology. In this instance, the charge lost resonance
because the response effectively persuaded believers that the conspiracy was
inaccurate.
Each of the aforementioned factors—anti-elitism, consistency with existing ideol-
ogy, perceived accuracy of the narrative, and a poor rhetorical response from the
accused—influence the resonance of a charge of conspiracy. However, all factors need
not be present for a conspiracy theory to resonate to some degree. The four factors
function alongside the paranoid style as what Campbell and Jamieson (1978) called a
‘‘constellation’’ of characteristics defining a genre. As the Bin Laden and Princess
Diana conspiracies illustrate, some believers believe mutually contradictory positions
if they have an extremely strong distrust of those in power. Therefore, anti-elitism is
especially important. The stronger the anti-elitism, the more likely the narrative will
be perceived as accurate. If the charge is consistent with existing ideology, then a
believer may be more likely to view the response from the accused as a poor response,
even if it is factually accurate. Similarly, the weaker the rhetorical response, the more
likely the charge will be perceived as accurate. Moreover, this set of factors has a
cumulative effect. If all factors are present, the charge of conspiracy can be especially
powerful. Importantly, this model does not treat resonance of a particular charge as
static. Rather, the resonance is largely contingent on the dialectic between accuser
and accused. Although all of the factors need not be combined with the paranoid
style in any case, the presence of all or most of them substantially increases the like-
lihood that the conspiracy charge will resonate. The goal is not merely classificatory;
rather, ‘‘discourse formulations or constellations of strategies . . . provide us some
security that an utterance will end in a predictable way’’ (Schryer, 2002, p. 95). In
 Climategate 229

making this claim, this essay moves one step closer to an understanding of conspiracy
as a genre of rhetoric, not merely a rhetorical form.

The Leaks and Response

The Climategate scandal offers a particularly telling example of the rhetorical influ-
ence of the charge of conspiracy, because the accusation tapped into anti-elitism, was
consistent with a strong ideology of skepticism towards climate science, was a
well-crafted story and was met with a poor response from climate scientists. In this
section, I first discuss the release of the Climate Research Unit e-mails. Second, I ana-
lyze the response in the news media and the blogosphere, emphasizing which e-mails
consistently show up throughout different articles as so-called proof of widespread
conspiracy and collusion. Finally, I trace the response of the climate science
community to show why it was ineffective.
On November 19, 2009, an anonymous hacker released over 1,000 e-mails
exchanged between international climate scientists onto a server in Tomsk, Russia.
Further analysis determined that these e-mails were selectively chosen and dissemi-
nated to give the ‘‘impression of impropriety’’ (Hickman, 2009, para. 3), conspiracy,
and collusion among climate scientists. Shortly after the post, the e-mails that nega-
tively portrayed climate scientists became widely publicized, but the messages and
works that established the integrity of the scientists were not reported (Revkin,
2009b, para. 9). On November 20th, only one day after the release, Andrew Bolt, a
conservative columnist at Melbourne’s Herald Sun and Sydney’s Daily Telegraph
and author of the most widely-read political blog in Australia, published a selection
of the e-mails that suggested ‘‘conspiracy, collusion in exaggerating warming data,
possibly illegal destruction of embarrassing information, organised resistance to dis-
closure, manipulation of data, private admission of flaws’’ (2009, para. 2) and ‘‘much
more’’ (2009, para. 2). This article highlighted a select few of the large set of e-mails,
which then became the most commonly cited by further reports by blogs and the
news media.
For example, one e-mail that was repeatedly cited in the news was sent by Phil
Jones, a professor of Climatology. He noted a ‘‘trick of adding in the real temps’’
to ‘‘hide the decline’’ in temperatures (Bolt, 2009, para. 1). Another, sent by Kevin
Trenbeth, the head of the Climate Analysis Section at the USA National Center for
Atmospheric Research, asked:

[W]here the heck is global warming ? We are asking that here in Boulder where we
have broken records the past two days for the coldest days on record. We had 4
inches of snow....The low was about 18 F and also a record low, well below the
previous record low. (Bolt, 2009, para. 10)

Noting evidence of ‘‘conspiracy’’ and a ‘‘huge scandal,’’ Bolt cited the following
comment by Tom Wigley, a climate scientist at the University Corporation for
Atmospheric Research: ‘‘we probably need to say more about this. Land warming
230 B. J. Bricker
since 1980 has been twice the ocean warming—and skeptics might claim that this
proves that urban warming is real and important’’ (Bolt, 2009, para. 13). In a sub-
sequent e-mail, Wigley hoped to ‘‘reduce the ocean blip’’ (Bolt, 2009, para. 22); a
statement interpreted as a manipulation of climate data to meet ideological ends.
The charge of conspiracy extended farther than just manipulation of data within
this single research unit. Bolt argued that an e-mail by Jones implicated the entire
peer-review process:

The other paper by MM [McKitrich and Michaels] is just garbage—as you knew.
De Freitas again. Pielke is also losing all credibility as well by replying to the mad
Finn as well — frequently as I see it. I can’t see either of these papers being in the
next IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] report. Kevin and I will
keep them out somehow—even if we have to redefine what the peer-review litera-
ture is! (2009, para. 24)

After further summarizing e-mails, Bolt concluded that these e-mails show clear
evidence of the ‘‘largest’’ (2009, para. 20), ‘‘most extraordinary’’ (2009, para. 20),
and ‘‘most disgraceful’’ (2009, para. 20) ‘‘conspiracy’’ (2009, para. 2) (a term used
seven times throughout the article) in the history of modern science.
Since this article was one of the earliest and most widely read, Bolt’s arguments
significantly shaped the following public discussion. The snippets publicized and
summarized by Bolt ‘‘went viral’’ (Trenbeth, 2011, p. 1) and became the ‘‘jewel in
the crown for conspiracy theorists’’ (Pearce, 2009, para. 8), given that they were
rhetorically powerful, ideologically driven, and largely devoid of context.
This ideologically driven exposé gained public attention. On November 28th,
Frank Furedi (2009) continued the charge of conspiracy theory in an article
published in The Australian:

Climate-change alarmists . . . live on conspiracy theories. They tell stories of hidden

forces that are sinisterly subverting the real science. They use the language of the
Inquisition to stigmatise their opponents, labelling [sic] them deniers, suggesting
they are lying about something they actually know to be true. Climate-change
alarmists always allude to the story behind the story and to the hidden agenda
of allegedly oil-funded deniers rather than face up to substantive arguments about
the politics of climate change. (2009, para. 5)

A November 28, 2009 article by Andrew Revkin in the New York Times noted:
‘‘evidence of conspiracy to stifle dissenting views and withhold data from public scru-
tiny’’ (2009a, p. 8). The same day, an article in the New Scientist claimed that the ‘‘e-
mails expose a conspiracy at work to make human-induced global warming a fact’’
(2009, p. 5). An Investor’s Business Daily article titled ‘‘Climate Con Job’’ claimed that
the scientists appear ‘‘guilty of fraud’’ (2009, p. A10) and that these e-mails show
‘‘attempts to conspire’’ (2009, p. A10).
Within one month, a narrative of a ‘‘global conspiracy’’ (Radford, 2009, para. 1)
based on fabricating the science supporting the ACC hypothesis had gained power.
 Climategate 231

E-mails that implicated a handful of climate scientists at the Climate Research Unit
had been framed and redefined to prove a vast and wide-reaching climate conspiracy.
This conspiracy now threatened the public’s perception of climate science in totality.
Even Google was charged with conspiring to hide the buzz in the news and blogo-
sphere surrounding the leaked e-mails (Delingpole, 2009a, para. 1). Although pre-
vious scientific disagreements over the ACC hypothesis had received some public
attention, Climategate was unique in its lasting and pervasive impact on public opi-
nion. The immediate effect of the media coverage left over half of polled viewers less
trustworthy of climate scientists (Leiserowitz et al., 2010, p. 6). Leiserowitz (2012)
found that 13% of on-the-fence Americans reduced trust in climate science, despite
the fact that scientists were cleared of wrongdoing (as cited in Bagley, 2012, para.
9–10).
Equally as important as what was said by climate scientists, is what was not said in
response. During the week following the release of the hacked e-mails, defense of the
Climate Research Unit research practices were few and far between. Although Real-
Climate.org published a criticism of the blogopshere for choosing ‘‘out-of-context
phrases’’ (2009, para. 7), little was done to dismiss or answer the charge of con-
spiracy. Moreover, liberal and environmental Web sites had little success in spreading
their messages outside of their reader base, the group of the public that was already
least likely, because of ideological predispositions, to be persuaded by charges of con-
spiracy on behalf of scientists (Pearce, 2009, para. 5). Consequently, the media ran
with the charge of conspiracy theory, and the frame created in the immediate after-
math of the release was overwhelmingly skeptical of the entire project of climate
science.
The lack of media coverage can be partially blamed on the nonresponse from the
Climate Research Unit and their scientists. Indeed, the silence from the University of
East Anglia was deafening. In the nearly three weeks following the release of the e-
mails, there was a ‘‘failure of the University of East Anglia to respond substantially
to the avalanche of invective from climate skeptics’’ (Pearce, 2009, para. 15). Possibly
because of the nonfalsifiability of the charge, they found that the language of science
was incapable of contesting the charge of conspiracy theory with statements of proof.
Historically, scientists have been reticent to translate scientific findings into lay
discourse, instead choosing the comfort of the laboratory over entering a public dis-
course sharply divided by anti-intellectualism and partisanship (Madsen, 2007,
p. 166). Although there are notable counterexamples (e.g., the debates concerning
the link between chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) consumption and ozone depletion in
the 1970s and 1980s). scientists have found their discourse does not suit the public
sphere. To make matters worse, ‘‘even environmental campaigners kept quiet—
ostensibly because it was up to scientists to defend their own’’ (Pearce, 2009, para.
21). However, it was not just the East Anglia scientists whose reputations were at risk;
the charge of conspiracy threatened to undercut the scientific consensus. ‘‘Noticeably
absent’’ from the response was a defense of the ‘‘scientific method (including repro-
ducibility), research integrity and ethics, open minds and critical thinking’’ intrinsic
to scientific endeavors (Hui, 2009, para. 5). This silence created a ‘‘PR disaster’’
232 B. J. Bricker
(Pearce, 2009, para. 15) that ‘‘undermined the reputation’’ (Radowitz, 2010, para. 1)
of both the institution and denied science more broadly.
Although the scientists continued their silence, assuming that the facts could stand
up for themselves, the media director at Greenpeace UK stated that the ‘‘damage
[was] being done in newsrooms’’ (Pearce, 2009, para. 31). Even when the scientific
jargon was explained and defended, missing from these defenses was an explicit
answer to the charge of conspiracy. The facts of the e-mails mattered, but the PR
debate was decided. A spokesperson for a leading environmental organization,
wishing to remain anonymous, stated: ‘‘the e-mails represented a seminal moment
in the climate debate of the last five years, and it was a moment that broke decisively
against us. I think the CRU leak is nothing less than catastrophic’’ (Pearce, 2009,
para. 40). Although science qua science may be sufficient for environmental scien-
tists, environmentalists were frantically concerned about the effect that the news
reports of conspiracy would have on the upcoming Copenhagen negotiations and
subsequent congressional legislation needed to limit emissions in the United States
(Roug & Grieve, 2009, para. 1).
Ultimately, the widespread perception that the Climate Research Unit engaged in
conspiratorial practices played ‘‘a role in the debate over global warming legislation,
both in Congress and in California’’ (Baker, 2010, para. 8). Given that elected officials
create environmental policy, public disbelief in climate science makes substantial
regulation extremely unlikely. Myron Ebell, the director of energy and global warm-
ing policy for the Competitive Enterprise Institute, posited that ‘‘the scandal’’ ‘‘made
the opponents of energy-rationing legislation stronger and more confident,’’ which
undoubtedly had a negative effect on those hoping to achieve progressive environ-
mental gains (Baker, 2010, para. 9).
This is not to imply that even a perfect response from the scientific community
would have eliminated the resonance of the conspiracy charge among the broader
public. Jamieson and Cappella compellingly argued that conservative media insulate
audiences from the evidence in ways that make ‘‘Democratic views seem alien and
unpalatable’’ (2009, p. xi). Thus, conservative media outlets may have ignored even
the strongest rebuttals defending ACC theories. Moreover, Climategate was influenced
by a larger historical-political context that was already calling climate science into
question. During the previous three decades, industry and the conservative political
movement had joined forces to sponsor ‘‘think tanks’’ (Buell, 2003, p. 299) that helped
‘‘midwife the creation of antienvironmental counterscience’’ (Buell, 2003, p. 300).
Although Climategate was unique because of the narrative of conspiracy, it was
consistent with the trend of skepticism of ACC theories in popular consciousness.
Climategate is a strong example supporting the view that that an interaction of a few
key factors makes a conspiracy charge more likely to resonate. This example should
direct scholars away from solely looking at facticity or formal characteristics when
analyzing conspiracy theories. Instead, a broader critical approach that accounts
for anti-elitism, existing ideology, the perceived accuracy of the narrative, and the
rhetorical response in defense of the accused should be pursued. In the final section,
I discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.
 Climategate 233

Conclusion
Climategate represented a difficult challenge for climate scientists. Although previous
disagreement in the field had focused on scientific uncertainties, antiglobal warming
commentators used the release of the e-mails to make a much stronger charge: an
accusation of conspiracy and collusion. Several scientific investigations found no
wrongdoing by the climate scientists. However, because the Climategate accusation
called into question the viability of the entire scientific method, a response of scien-
tific certainty was insufficient to reverse public opinion. Consequently, the charge of
conspiracy stuck and continued to influence public opinion even after exoneration.
Following the scandal, a large portion of the public altered their perspectives, viewing
both climate science and climate scientists as less credible than before. Well over one
year following the Climategate conspiracy accusation, Ray and Pugliese found that
nearly half of polled U.S. adults continued to attribute ‘‘global warming to natural
causes’’ (2011, para. 2). Beyond illuminating this sequence of events, this case study
has substantial theoretical implications for understanding the relationship between
conspiracy theories and the public sphere, as well as practical implications for devel-
oping a rhetorical defense of climate science.
This essay suggests two conclusions concerning the relationship between con-
spiracy theory and the public sphere. First, Climategate reveals several core threats
to the public sphere and democratic governance. Since Hofstadter, accusations of
conspiracy have moved from the margins to the center of political discourse. Because
conspiracy accusations are a regular component of public debate, it is unhelpful for
rhetorical scholars to discard them as irrational or paranoid.
This conspiracy theory was particularly resonant because it had a potent mix of
complex scientific information, conservative ideology, powerful interest groups that
take a propagandistic approach to science, and anti-intellectualism. However,
Climategate is just one example of the challenges facing advocates of rational delib-
eration in contemporary political discourse. Too often, especially given the rising
influence of the Internet, the ideological nature of political discourse in the United
States and enormous industrial influence of some media outlets, reasonable argu-
ments fail to persuade. Because of the complex nature of scientific arguments, critics
may influence public opinion by merely demonizing scientists instead of making
rational arguments. Instead of inserting a level of healthy skepticism into a policy
debate, contemporary conspiracy theories are often manufactured by anti-
intellectuals to ignore well-established facts. These problems are magnified when
ideological issues like climate change, health care, and tax policy are debated publicly
and filtered through media groups that have more fidelity to their political ideology
than accuracy.
Despite these constraints on rational political discourse, scientists should not
abandon the use of public argument to achieve policy change. Quite the contrary,
it is precisely because of these constraints that climate scientists must publicize their
specialized knowledge to counteract the uninformed dogmatism that carries such
influence in the climate debate. By finding a way to break up the constellation, they
234 B. J. Bricker
may undercut the resonance of the conspiracy narrative. Second, Climategate offers
compelling evidence that the resonance of a charge of conspiracy is tied to more than
simply its relationship to facticity; rather, it is linked to a broader constellation of
factors. As well as being perceived as accurate, successful charges of conspiracy often
tap into anti-elitism, are consistent with an existing ideology, are based on a
well-crafted narrative that is perceived as accurate and are countered with an ineffec-
tive rhetorical response. Therefore, it is necessary to utilize more than just debunking
strategies when countering an accusation of conspiracy. Groups charged with pro-
tecting the lives of citizens, and the environment of our planet, must be armed with
not only fact but with the rhetorical tools to explain and defend these facts.
In addition to highlighting the tension between conspiracy accusations and
rational deliberation, this essay suggests a possible template for developing a rhetori-
cal defense of climate science. Science itself is under attack, but scientists have been
trained to not lend ‘‘false seriousness to far-fetched claims of research skullduggery
and corruption’’ (Nature, 2010b, para. 3). This is unfortunate since the strategy of
silence allows one side to frame the debate. An ‘‘intervention’’ is necessary to
‘‘redirect the lines of authority’’ influencing climate change communication in the
public sphere (Cox, 2010, p. 130).
Solutions to global warming, ‘‘being mostly preventive innovations’’ present a
particularly difficult ‘‘communication challenge’’ (Thakadu, Irani, & Telg, 2011,
p. 84). In response, scientists should craft an alternative narrative, or ‘‘new social
vision’’ (Brulle, 2010, p. 93), to break up the constellation of generic traits defining
ACC as a conspiracy. For example, engaged scientists can help overcome the assump-
tion that the scientific community is elitist by translating esoteric academic discourse
into lay terminology. Moreover, scientists can work to transform skeptical ideology
by using ‘‘vivid, understandable, believable, interesting, and personally meaningful’’
(Moser & Dilling, 2004, p. 41) persuasive messages. In specific instances of conspiracy
accusations, scientists can undercut the perceived accuracy of the charge with a
well-crafted rhetorical response in defense of those implicated by the charge.
Three particular emphases may be helpful. First, scientists must redefine the trope
of ‘‘unpredictability.’’ The indefinite nature of even the most precise science is being
used to undercut sound ACC theories, largely because climate scientists have not
countered the argument that unpredictability is grounds for inaction. Although
emphasis on scientific agreement about the ACC hypothesis is helpful, it may also
be useful to point to the risk of devastating impact from climate change, because
‘‘the fact that climate scientists can’t predict how bad the impacts might be’’ but agree
that catastrophe is nearly certain, could well motivate political ‘‘action’’ (Nature,
2010a, para. 8). In doing so, climate scientists can reverse the effect of one of the most
common arguments made by skeptics; that scientists can’t predict with absolute
certainty all of the impacts that climate change has on the environment. Given
the potential harms, they should argue that the appropriate response is to try to
minimize global warming.
Second, scientists should point to the peer-review process as transparent, acc-
ountable, and welcoming of healthy skepticism. By doing so, they may reduce the
 Climategate 235

perception that the fox is guarding the climate science henhouse. This strategy,
although useful, may require additional approaches. Instead of solely taking ‘‘refuge
in peer review’’ and blaming climate skepticism on public illiteracy, climate scientists
must use all media available to counter the ‘‘campaign’’ of skepticism that mirrors
the ‘‘strategies honed by the tobacco industry’’ (Keller, 2011, p. 22). Researchers have
an ‘‘obligation to the public’’ to leave the ivory tower of climate science and to ‘‘con-
vey the results of their expertise to those likely to be affected by the implications of
those results’’ (Keller, 2011, p. 23).
Preparation is the key; rhetorically trained scientists will be essential in combating
future potentially lethal conspiracy theories. Scientific discourse, which relies on fal-
sifiable proof to argue, may be incapable of disproving the charge of conspiracy
absent a more rhetorically centered approach. Therefore, a response to the charge
of conspiracy based on a fusion of scientific and rhetorical theories may be much
more effective than a focus on scientific accuracy alone. In other words, scientists
need to be better rhetoricians.
Third, scientists must be willing to not just let the facts stand for themselves.
ACC theories must be defended rhetorically and criticisms must be combatted. Pro-
ducing an inducement to action among the public will require more than just
engagement on the part of scientists but will demand a rigorous examination of
which rhetorical tactics are the most effective in persuading the public. In fact,
‘‘more effective communication of climate change’s urgency . . . can help bring
about . . . public understanding of, and civic engagement with, the issue’’ (Moser
& Dilling, 2004, p. 34).
Unfortunately, the scientific community has avoided persuasive rhetoric in favor
of descriptive and neutral language because scientific training emphasizes sticking
strictly to the facts. An effective response must be immediate, because the charge
may develop a resonance absent a response, and focused not merely on facticity
but also on the underlying conspiracy narrative. These requirements for an effective
response have become even more important in the Internet age because of the speed
with which accusations can spread, and the decreased importance of who makes the
charge. Although not every accusation of conspiracy will induce such a substantial
public reaction, scientists should approach future situations with a radically different
response than was used in this case. Climate scientists must understand that,
although facticity does influence the resonance of conspiracy theories, proving the
accuracy of science is necessary but insufficient to influence public opinion.

References
Adamic, L., Zhang, J., Bakshy, E., & Ackerman, M. (2008, April). Knowledge sharing and Yahoo
Answers: Everyone knows something. International World Web Conference Committee
(pp. 665–674). Retrieved from http://141.213.232.243/bitstream/2027.42/58015/1/fp840-
adamic.pdf
Anderegg, W., Prall, J., Harold, J., & Schneider, S. (2010). Expert credibility in climate change.
National Academy of Sciences, 27(107), 12107–12109.
236 B. J. Bricker
Austin, R. (1995). Beyond black demons and white devils: Antiblack conspiracy theorizing and the
Black public sphere. Florida State University Law Review, 22, 1021–1046.
Bagley, K. (2012, September 10). Climate scientists face organized harassment in U.S. Bloomberg
News. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-10/climate-scientists-face-
organized-harassment-in-u-s-.html
Baker, D. (2010, July 19). ‘‘Climategate’’ fallout may impact legislation. San Francisco Gate.
Retrieved from http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-07-19/news/21988862_1_global-warming-
climategate-climate-change
Benoit, W. (1999). Attacking, acclaiming and defending in Presidential nominating addresses,
1960–1996. Quarterly Journal of Speech, 85, 247–267.
Berlet, C. (2009). Fears of federalisme in the United States: The case of the ‘North American Union’
conspiracy theory. Federalisme Regionalisme. Retrieved from http://popups.ulg.ac.be/
federalisme/document.php?id=786&format=print
Black, E. (1965). Rhetorical criticism: A study in method. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Bolt, A. (2009, November 20). Climategate: Warmist conspiracy exposed? Herald Sun. Retrieved from
http://blogs.news.com.au/heraldsun/andrewbolt/index.php/heraldsun/comments/hadley_
hacked/
Brulle, R. J. (2010). From environmental campaigns to advancing the public dialog: Environmental
communication for civic engagement. Environmental Communication, 4(1), 82–98.
Buell, F. (2003). From apocalypse to way of life: Environmental crisis in the American century.
New York, NY: Routledge.
Campbell, K. K., & Jamieson, K. H. (1978). Form and genre in rhetorical criticism: An introduc-
tion. In K. K. Campbell & K. H. Jamieson (Eds.), Form and genre: Shaping rhetorical action
(pp. 9–32). Falls Church, VA: Speech Communication Association.
Clarke, S. (2002). Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorizing. Philosophy of the Social Sciences,
32(2), 131–150.
Cook, J. (2010, March 18). What do the ‘‘Climategate’’ hacked CRU e-mails tell us? Skeptical Science.
Retrieved from http://www.skepticalscience.com/Climategate-CRU-emails-hacked.htm
Cox, J. R. (2010). Beyond frames: Recovering the strategic in climate communication. Environmen-
tal Communication, 4(1), 122–133.
Dean, J. (1998). Aliens in America: Conspiracy cultures from outerspace to cyberspace. New York, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Delingpole, J. (2009a, November 29). Climategate: Googlegate? The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://
blogs.
telegraph.co.uk/news/jamesdelingpole/100018263/climategate-googlegate/
Delingpole, J. (2009b, November 20). Climategate: The final nail in the coffin of ‘‘Anthropogenic
Global Warming’’? The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/james
delingpole/100017393/climategate-the-final-nail-in-the-coffin-of-anthropogenic-
global-warming/
Diethelm, P., & McKee, M. (2009). Denialism: What is it and how should scientists respond?
European Journal of Public Health, 19(1), 2–4.
Dunbar, D., & Reagan, B. (2006). Debunking 9=11 myths: Why conspiracy theories can’t stand up to
the facts. New York, NY: Hearst Books.
Fenster, M. (1999). Conspiracy theories: Secrecy and power in American culture. Minneapolis, MN:
University of Minnesota Press.
Flam, F. (2009, December 7). Penn State scientist at center of a storm. The Philadelphia Inquirer.
Retrieved from http://www.webcitation.org/5mOvPIAez
Fog, A. (1999). Cultural selection. Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
Furedi, F. (2009, November 28). Cool heads needed to turn climate-change heat into light. The
Australian News. Retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/cool-
heads-needed-to-turn-climate-change-heat-into-light/story-e6frg6zo-1225804731779
 Climategate 237

Gallup Polling. (2011, April). Americans’ beliefs about Obama’s birth. Retrieved from http://
pollingmatters.gallup.com/2011/04/americans-beliefs-about-obamas-birth.html
Gil-White, F. (2005). What is conspiracy theory? Historical and Investigative Research. Retrieved
from http://www.hirhome.com/conspiracy.htm
Gleick, P. (2011, August). Why anti-science ideology is bad for America. Forbes. Retrieved from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/petergleick/2011/08/31/why-anti-science-ideology-is-bad-for-
america/
Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15, 733–744.
Goldberg, R. A. (2001). Enemies within: The culture of conspiracy in modern America. New Haven,
CT: Yale University.
Griffin, D. R. (2007). Debunking 9=11 debunking: An answer to Popular Mechanics and other
defenders of the official conspiracy theory. Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press.
Hofstadter, R. (1996). The paranoid style in American politics, and other essays. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Hickman, L. (2009, November 23). Climate change champion and sceptic both call for inquiry into
leaked emails. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/
nov/23/climate-sceptics-bob-ward-nigel-lawson
Hui, C. (2009). Consensus shifts ahead of Copenhagen. iStockAnalyst. Retrieved from http://
www.istockanalyst.com/article/viewarticle/articleid/3691816
Investor’s Business Daily. (2009, November 24). Climate con job. Investor’s Business Daily.
Retrieved from http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/112409-513436-climate-con-job.
htm?p=full
Jamieson, K. H., & Cappella, J. N. (2008). Echo chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the conservative media
establishment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, G. (1983). Architects of fear: Conspiracy theories and paranoia in American politics.
Los Angeles, CA: J. P. Tarcher.
Johnson, V. (2010). A year on from Climategate, what have we learnt? New Economics. Retrieved
from http://www.neweconomics.org
Keeley, B. (1999). Of conspiracy theories. Journal of Philosophy, 3, 109–126. Retrieved from http://
mugwump.pitzer.edu/~bkeeley/work/pubs/CT/CONSPIR.PDF
Keller, E. F. (2011, January 11). Stick to your guns, climate scientists. New Scientist, 22–23.
Retrieved from http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20927944.200-stick-to-your-guns-climate-
scientists.html
Leiserowitz, A. (2012). Gauging public opinion on climate change policy. National Public Radio.
Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/2012/05/04/152026803/gauging-public-opinion-on-
climate-change-policy
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Smith, N., & Dawson, E. (2010, January). Climate-
gate, public opinion, and the loss of trust. Climate Change Communication, 1–24. Retrieved
from http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/images/files/Climategate_Public%20
Opinion_and%20Loss%20of%20Trust(1).pdf
Madsen, C. (2007). When the dog must talk to the cat — Communicating science to politicians or
science and politics — Thoughts about a complex relationship. In A. Heck & L. Houziaux
(Eds.), Future professional communication in astronomy (pp. 161–170). New York, NY:
Springer.
Magubane, B. (1986). South Africa: On the verge of revolution. Ufahamu, 15, 22–57.
McGee, J. (2011). Conspiracy theory in the age of the Internet: The case of the ‘‘Birthers.’’ Aichi
Shukutoku University Faculty Cultural Exchange, 3, 53–66. Retrieved from http://aska-r.
aasa.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10638/1155/1/0041-001-201103-053-066.pdf
McWright, A. M., & Dunlap, R. E. (2000). Challenging global warming as a social problem:
An analysis of the conservative movement’s counter-claims. Social Problems, 47(4),
499–522.
238 B. J. Bricker
Melley, T. (2000). Empire of conspiracy: The culture of paranoia in postwar America. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Melley, T. (2008). Brainwashed!: Conspiracy theory and ideology in the postwar United States.
New German Critique, 103(35), 145–164.
Mikkelson, B., & Mikkelson, D. (2007). The Clinton body count. Snopes. Retrieved from http://
www.snopes.com/politics/clintons/bodycount.asp
Morales, L. (2011). Obama’s birth certificate convinces some, but not all, skeptics. Gallup Polling.
Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/147530/obama-birth-certificate-convinces-not-
skeptics.aspx
Moser, S., & Dilling, L. (2004). Making climate HOT. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustain-
able Development, 46(10), 32–46.
Nature. (2010a). A question of trust. Nature, 466(7). Retrieved from http://www.nature.com/
nature/journal/v466/n7302/full/466007a.html
Nature. (2010b). Closing the climategate. Nature, 468(345). Retrieved from http://www.nature.
com/nature/journal/v468/n7322/full/468345a.html
Nerlich, B. (2010). ‘‘Climategate’’: Paradoxical metaphors and political paralysis. Nottingham,
England: Institute for Science and Society at the University of Nottingham. Retrieved from
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/1371/1/Nerlich_final_26_5_2010_(2).pdf
New Scientist. (2009). Stay on the moral high ground: Researchers must treat their detractors fairly or
risk damaging science itself. Retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
Obama, B. (2011, April). Remarks by the president. The White House Press Room. Retrieved from
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/27/remarks-president
Pearce, F. (2009). Climategate: Anatomy of a public relations disaster. Environment, 360. Retrieved
from http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2221
Pfau, M. (2005). The political style of conspiracy: Chase, Sumner, and Lincoln. East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press.
Pipes, D. (1999). Conspiracy: How the paranoid style flourishes and where it comes from. New York,
NY: Free Press.
Radford, B. (2009). The ‘‘Climategate’’ conspiracy theories. Center for Inquiry. Retrieved from
http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blogs/entry/the_climategate_conspiracy_theories/
Radowitz, J. (2010). Confidence in scientists dropping as result of ‘‘Climategate.’’ Environmental
News Network. Retrieved from http://www.enn.com/top_stories/article/41034
Ray, J., & Pugliese, A. (2011). Worldwide, blame for climate change falls on humans. Gallup Polling.
Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/poll/147242/worldwide-blame-climate-change-falls-
humans.aspx#1
RealClimate.org (2009). The CRU hack. Retrieved from http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/
archives/2009/11/the-cru-hack/
Revkin, A. (2009a, November 28). Hacked e-mail data prompts calls for changes in climate
research. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/science/
earth/28hack.html
Revkin, A. (2009b, November 29). Hacked e-mail is new fodder for climate dispute. New York
Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/21/science/earth/21climate.html
Roeper, R. (2008). Debunked!: Conspiracy theories, urban legends, and evil plots of the 21st century.
Chicago, IL: Chicago Review Press.
Romm, J. (2011). Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on the media: More stolen
emails can’t stop catastrophic global warming, only we can. Climate Progress. Retrieved
from http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2011/11/22/374559/fool-me-once-shame-on-you-fool-
me-twice-shame-on-the-media-more-stolen-emails-global-warming/
Roug, L., & Grieve, T. (2009). Climategate distracts at Copenhagen. Politico. Retrieved from http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30406.html
 Climategate 239

Schryer, C. F. (2002). Genre and power: A chronotopic analysis. In R. Coe, L. Lingard & T.
Teslenko (Eds.), The rhetoric and ideology of genre (pp. 73–102). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton
Press.
Simons, H. W. (1978). In praise of muddleheaded anecdotalism. Western Journal of Speech
Communication, 42(1), 21–28.
Smith, C. A. (1977). The Hofstadter hypothesis revisited: The nature of evidence in politically
‘‘paranoid’’ discourse. Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42(3), 274–289.
Thakadu, O. T., Irani, T. A., & Telg, R. (2011). Communicating in the public sphere: Attitudes
toward different public instructional communication methods. Environmental Communi-
cation, 5(1), 83–103.
Trenberth, K. (2011). Communicating climate science and thoughts on Climategate. Paper
presented at the Joint Presidential Session on Communicating Climate Change, Seattle, WA.
University of East Anglia. (2010). The independent climate change e-mails review. CRU Statements.
Retrieved from http://www.uea.ac.uk/mac/comm/media/press/CRUstatements/independent
reviews/UEAreviewresponse
Vankin, J., & Whalen, J. (2004). The 80 greatest conspiracies of all time: History’s biggest mysteries,
coverups, and cabals. New York, NY: Citadel Press.
Ward, B. (2011). The S word: Has the impact of ‘‘Climategate’’ worn off? New Scientist. Retrieved
from http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/thesword/2011/02/has-the-impact-of-climategate.
html
Wisnewski, G. (2007). One small step: The great moon hoax and the race to dominate earth from
space. Forest Row, East Sussex, England: Clairview.
Wood, G. S. (1982). Conspiracy and the paranoid style: Causality and deceit in the eighteenth
century. The William and Mary Quarterly: A Magazine of Early American History and Culture,
39(3), 401–441.
Wood, M., Douglas, K., & Sutton, R. (2012). Dead and alive: Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy
theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 00(0), 1–6.
Young, N. (2011). Working the fringes: The role of letters to the editor in advancing non-standard
media narratives about climate change. Public Understanding of Science, 20(4), 1–17.