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Arceo, Jr. vs. People

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of petitioner for violating the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). The Court affirmed that: 1) The 90-day period in BP 22 is not an element of the offense and does not discharge the duty to maintain funds to cover the check. 2) Presenting the check 4 months after issue was still within the reasonable 6-month period. 3) The best evidence rule does not require presenting the check itself, as the issue was the circumstances around its execution, not its content. The elements of the BP 22 offense were met based on the facts of the case.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
83 views11 pages

Arceo, Jr. vs. People

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of petitioner for violating the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). The Court affirmed that: 1) The 90-day period in BP 22 is not an element of the offense and does not discharge the duty to maintain funds to cover the check. 2) Presenting the check 4 months after issue was still within the reasonable 6-month period. 3) The best evidence rule does not require presenting the check itself, as the issue was the circumstances around its execution, not its content. The elements of the BP 22 offense were met based on the facts of the case.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arceo, Jr. vs. People

*
G.R. No. 142641. July 17, 2006.

PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE


PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22); A person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a period of ninety
(90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the
drawee bank, shall be liable for violating the law on bouncing checks.—Section 1
of BP 22 provides: SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.—Any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment
of not

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 205

Arceo, Jr. vs. People

less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but
not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the
full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.

Same; Same; The 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the
offense, neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient
funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the check.
—In Wong v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 100 (2001), the Court ruled that the 90-
day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within
a reasonable time from the date indicated in the check. According to current banking
practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank
is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged
from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.

Same; Same; The presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days after
its issue was still within the allowable period.—Cenizal’s presentment of the check
to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was still within the
allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient
funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.

Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; The best evidence rule applies only where the
content of the document is the subject of inquiry, and not where the issue is the
execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its
execution.—Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a
condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his
argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence
of the document or the circumstances
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arceo, Jr. vs. People

surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.

Same; Same; The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a
worthless check, and not the fact of issuance or execution of the check.—The
gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence,
the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its
content.

Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The elements of the offense are: (1)
the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; (2)
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.—Based on the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged for
violating the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the offense are: 1. the
making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; 2.
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment; and 3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Edilberto B. Cosca for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People.
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 207
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

CORONA, J.:
1
This petition for review on certiorari
2
assails the April 28, 1999 decision and
March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
19601 affirming the trial court’s judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo,
Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise known as
the “Bouncing Checks Law.”
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals follow.

“On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino
Cenizal [ ] in the amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter, [petitioner]
obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in
favor of Cenizal, Bank of the Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255,
postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at Cenizal’s house located at 70 Panay
Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the
check immediately because [petitioner] promised [ ] that he would replace the check
with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When his patience ran
out, [Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed
[Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the
dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left the place. So,
[Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three
days from receipt thereof to pay the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to
make good the amount of the check. As a consequence, [Cenizal] executed on
January 20, 1992 before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his
affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and
[v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner].

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (retired) and concurred in by Associate


Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of the Supreme Court) and Bernardo P.
Abesamis (retired) of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 17-24.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales (now a member of the Supreme Court) and
Marina L. Buzon of the Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, p. 26.
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

After due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against
[petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question and the return slip were
however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on
September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed 3an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of
the check in question and the return slip.”

After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the
Court of Appeals. However, on April 28, 1999, the appellate court affirmed the
trial court’s decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him
despite the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored check during the
trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor of the
check because it was presented beyond the 90-day period provided under the
law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement was
not complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five banking
days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already paid his
obligation to Cenizal.
Petitioner’s contentions have no merit.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 90-DAY PERIOD


FOR PRESENTMENT OF THE CHECK

Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was
presented to the drawee bank only on December 5, 1991 or 120 days from the
date thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this was beyond the 90-day
period provided under the law in connection with the presentment of the check.
We disagree.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds.—Any person who makes or draws


and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency

_______________

3 CA decision, Rollo, pp. 17-24.


VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 209
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be
punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1)
year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall
fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under
this Act.
4
In Wong v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the 90-day period
provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it discharge
petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a
reasonable time from the date indicated in the check. According to current
banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the
drawee bank is six months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer
is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days
(four months) after its issue was still within the allowable period. Petitioner was
freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from
liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.

APPLICABILITY OF THE
BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a


condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors
his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of

_______________

4 G.R. No. 117857, 02 February 2001, 351 SCRA 100.


210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies
only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the
issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
5
evidence is admissible.
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless
6
check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of
the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently
established. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check, the
return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the
preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against
petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based
on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the
documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his residence on
September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due
execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of
loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never
denied that the check was presented for payment to the drawee bank and was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

PRESENCE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
7
Based on the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged for violating
the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the offense are:

_______________

5 Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Volume II, Seventh Revised


Edition, 1995, p. 555.
6 Tan v. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760; 383 SCRA 202 (2002).
7 The information read:
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 211
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or


for value;
2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason had
not the drawer,
8
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

All these elements are present in this case.


Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no.
163255 postdated August 4, 1991 in the amount of P150,000 in consideration
of a loan which he obtained from Cenizal. When the check was deposited, it
was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against insufficient
funds. There was sufficient evidence on record that petitioner knew of the
insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank at the time of the issuance of the
check.

_______________

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR. of


violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of JOSEFINO CENIZAL a check
no. 163255 drawn against the Bank of the Philippine Island[,] a duly established domestic
banking institution[,] in the amount in the amount of P150,000.00 Philippine Currency,
postdated August 4, 1991, in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of
issue that [he] did not have the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said
check to said bank for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer
thereof, accused Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr., did not have sufficient funds therein, and despite
notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to redeem
or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Josefino Cenizal in the
amount aforementioned and in such other amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 17-18).
8 Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 187; 298 SCRA 656 (1998).
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

In fact, this was why, on maturity date, he requested the payee not to encash it
with the promise that he would replace it with cash. He made this request and
assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to make good on his promises
despite the repeated accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.

NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO PETITIONER


AND PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION

The trial court found that, contrary to petitioner’s claim, Cenizal’s counsel had
informed petitioner in writing of the check’s dishonor and demanded payment of
the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand for
payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking
days from
9
receipt of notice of dishonor within which to pay the amount of the
check. While petitioner may have been given only three days to pay the value
of the check, the trial court found that the amount due thereon remained unpaid
even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor. This
negated his claim that he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be
relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim of payment was nothing more than a mere
allegation. He presented no proof to support it. If indeed there was payment,
petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check

_______________

9 Section 2 of BP 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of k nowledge of insufficient funds.—The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or
makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
VOL. 495, JULY 17, 2006 213
Arceo, Jr. vs. People

10
back in the ordinary course of business. Instead, the check remained in the
possession of the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioner’s obligation
when the check became due as well as when the check was dishonored by the
drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation)
were confirmed by the appellate court. This Court has no reason to rule
otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings
11
of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are not to be disturbed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999
decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ.,


concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—The act sought to be prevented by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is


the act of making and issuing a check with the knowledge that, at the time of
issue, the drawer issuing the check does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the bank. (Sia vs. People, 428 SCRA 206 [2004])
Knowledge of insufficiency of funds legally presumed from the dishonor of
the checks for insufficiency of funds. (Ty vs. People, 439 SCRA 220 [2004])
The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice
and intent in the issuance thereof is inconsequential. (Id.)

——o0o——

_______________

10 Tan v. Mendez, Jr., supra; Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506; 368 SCRA 436 (2001).
11 Miranda v. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 532.

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