672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

*
G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING, respondents.

Labor Law;  Remedial Law;  Injunctions;  Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.—Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the
protection of one’s substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional
remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the
injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be
regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the
complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on
the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal
rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is also a special equitable relief granted only in cases
where there is no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law.
Same; Same; Same; The power of the National Labor Relations Commission to issue an injunction writ
originates from “any labor dispute” upon application by a party thereof, which application if not granted
“may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such
party”; Labor dispute Defined.—From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an
injunctive writ originates from “any labor dispute” upon application by a party thereof, which application if
not granted “may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor
of such party.” The term “labor dispute” is defined as “any controversy or matter concerning terms and
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless of whether or

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.”
Same; Same; Same; Controversy and justiciable controversy defined.—The term “controversy” is likewise
defined as “a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or
in equity; a justiciable dispute.” A “justiciable controversy” is “one involving an active antagonistic assertion
of a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical
question or issue.”
Same; Same; Same; It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the
contending parties before the labor arbiter.—Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential
requirement that there must first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter.
In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has
yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against the
petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; National Labor Relations Commission exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Order granting private respondents’ petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate
private respondents.—On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the
NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the private
respondents’ petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner. Article 218(e) of the
Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its divisions to issue writs of
injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC makes
injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes.” Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction
when it issued the assailed Order granting private respondents’ petition for injunction and ordering the
petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed
employee is to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter.—Under the Labor

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ANNOTATED

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded this rule and
directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from
enforcing its dismissal orders. In Lamb vs. Phipps, we ruled that if the remedy is specifically provided by
law, it is presumed to be adequate. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by the
private respondents in their petition before the NLRC can also be entertained by the labor arbiter who, as
shown earlier, has the ancillary power to issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders as an incident
in the cases pending before him in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the pendency of the
case.
Same; Same; Same; When an injury is considered irreparable.—An injury is considered irreparable if it
is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a
court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury when
it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or the nature of the
right or property injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for the measurement of
damages.
Same;  Same;  Same;  An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in Labor Law.—An
injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law considering that it generally has not
proved to be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage the
parties to use the nonjudicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and arbitration. Thus,
injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly established, after
due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are
clearly absent in the present case.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Ferdinand D. Macaibay for petitioner.
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Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

     Factoran, Tria & De Leon Law Office for private respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:

Can the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), even without a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ
enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against
private respondents, and ordering petitioner to reinstate the private respondents to their
previous positions?
This is the pivotal issue presented before us in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court which seeks the nullification of the injunctive writ dated April 3, 1995
issued by the NLRC and the Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the said Orders were issued in excess of jurisdiction.
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both were dismissed from the service
for their alleged involvement in the April 3, 1993 currency smuggling in Hong Kong. 1
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the NLRC a petition  for injunction
praying that:

“I. Upon filing of this Petition, a temporary restraining order be issued, prohibiting
respondents (petitioner herein) from effecting or enforcing the Decision dated Feb. 22,
1995, or to reinstate petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being undertaken;
“II. After hearing, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondent
to reinstate petitioners to their former positions pending the hearing of this case, or,
prohibiting respondent from enforcing its Decision dated February 22, 1995 while this
case is pending adjudication;

_______________
1 Annex “3,” pp. 134-147, Rollo.

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Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

“III. After hearing, that the writ of preliminary injunction as to the reliefs sought for be made permanent,
that petitioners be awarded full backwages, moral damages of PHP 500,000.00 each and exemplary damages
of PHP 500,000.00 each, attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of whatever amount is awarded, and the
costs of suit.”

2
 2
On April 3, 1995, the NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction   enjoining petitioner to
cease and desist from enforcing its February 22, 1995 Memorandum of dismissal. In granting the
writ, the NLRC considered the following facts, to wit:
“x x x that almost two (2) years ago,  i.e. on April 15, 1993, the petitioners were instructed to attend an
investigation by respondent’s ‘Security and Fraud Prevention Sub-Department’ regarding an April 3, 1993
incident in Hongkong at which Joseph Abaca, respondent’s Avionics Mechanic in Hongkong ‘was intercepted
by the Hongkong Airport Police at Gate 05 xxx the ramp area of the Kai Tak International Airport while xxx
about to exit said gate carrying a xxx bag said to contain some 2.5 million pesos in Philippine Currencies.
That at the Police Station, Mr. Abaca claimed that he just found said plastic bag at the Skybed Section of
the arrival flight PR300/03 April 93,’ where petitioners served as flight stewards of said flight PR300; x x the
petitioners sought ‘a more detailed account of what this HKG incident is all about’; but instead, the
petitioners were administratively charged, ‘a hearing’ on which ‘did not push through’ until almost two (2)
years after, i.e. ‘on January 20, 1995 xxx where a confrontation between Mr. Abaca and petitioners herein
was compulsorily arranged by the respondent’s disciplinary board’ at which hearing, Abaca was made to
identify petitioners as coconspirators; that despite the fact that the procedure of identification adopted by
respondent’s Disciplinary Board was anomalous ‘as there was no one else in the line-up (which could not be
called one) but petitioners x x x Joseph Abaca still had difficulty in identifying petitioner Pineda as his co-
conspirator, and as to petitioner Cabling, he was implicated and pointed by Abaca only after respondent’s
Atty. Cabatuando pressed the former to identify petitioner Cabling as co-conspirator’; that with the hearing
reset to January 25, 1995,

_______________
2 Annex “A,” pp. 19-23, Rollo.

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‘Mr. Joseph Abaca finally gave exculpating statements to the board in that he cleared petitioners from any
participation or from being the owners of the currencies, and at which hearing Mr. Joseph Abaca
volunteered the information that the real owner of said money was one who frequented his headquarters in
Hongkong to which information, the Disciplinary Board Chairman, Mr. Ismael Khan,’ opined ‘for the need
for another hearing to go to the bottom of the incident’; that from said statement, it appeared ‘that Mr.
Joseph Abaca was the courier, and had another mechanic in Manila who hid the currency at the plane’s
skybed for Abaca to retrieve in Hongkong, which findings of how the money was found was previously
confirmed by Mr. Joseph Abaca himself when he was first investigated by the Hongkong authorities’; that
just as petitioners ‘thought that they were already fully cleared of the charges, as they no longer received
any summons/notices on the intended ‘additional hearings’ mandated by the Disciplinary Board,’ they were
surprised to receive ‘on February 23, 1995 xxx a Memorandum dated February 22, 1995’ terminating their
services for alleged violation of respondent’s Code of Discipline ‘effective immediately’; that sometime x x x
first week of March, 1995, petitioner Pineda received another Memorandum from respondent Mr. Juan
Paraiso, advising him of his termination effective February 3, 1995, likewise for violation of respondent’s
Code of Discipline; x x x”

In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the NLRC adopted the view that:
(1) private respondents cannot be validly dismissed on the strength of petitioner’s Code of
Discipline which was declared illegal by this Court in the case of PAL, Inc. vs. NLRC, (G.R. No.
85985), promulgated August 13, 1993, for the reason that it was formulated by the petitioner
without the participation of its employees as required in R.A. 6715, amending Article 211 of the
Labor Code; (2) the whimsical, baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents which
“caused them grave ad irreparable injury” is enjoinable as private respondents are left “with no
speedy and adequate remedy at law” except the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction;
(3) the NLRC is empowered under Article 218(e) of the Labor Code not only to restrain any actual
or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not restrained or
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Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party; and (4) the temporary
mandatory power of the NLRC was recognized by this Court in the case of ChemoTechnische
Mfg., Inc. Employees Union, DFA, et al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. [G.R. No. 107031,
January 25, 1993]. 3
On May 4, 1995, petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred:

1. . . . in granting a temporary injunction order when  it has no jurisdiction to issue an

injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article 218 of the Labor
Code if the case involves or arises from labor disputes;
2. . . . in granting a temporary injunction order when the termination of private respondents
have long been carried out;
3. . . . in ordering the reinstatement of private respondents on the basis of their mere
allegations, in violation of PAL’s right to due process;
4. . . . in arrogating unto itself management prerogative to discipline its employees
and  divesting the labor arbiter of its original and exclusive jurisdiction over illegal
dismissal cases;
5. . . . in suspending the effects of termination when such action is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor;
6. . . . in issuing the temporary injunction in the absence of any irreparable or substantial
injury to both private respondents.

On May 31, 1995, the NLRC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, ruling:
“The respondent (now petitioner), for one, cannot validly claim that we cannot exercise our injunctive power
under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code on the pretext that what we have here is not a labor dispute as long as
it concedes that as defined by law, a (l) ‘Labor Dispute’ includes any controversy or matter concerning terms
or conditions of employment.”  If security of tenure, which has been breached by respondent and which,
precisely, is sought to be protected by our temporary mandatory injunction (the core of contro-

_______________
3 Annex “1,” pp. 124-133, Rollo.

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versy in this case) is not a “term or condition of employment,” what then is?
x x x      x x x      x x x
 Anent respondent’s second argument  x x x,  Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code  x x x  empowered the
Commission not only to issue a prohibitory injunction, but a mandatory (“to require the performance”) one as
well. Besides, as earlier discussed, we already exercised (on August 23, 1991) this temporary mandatory
injunctive power in the case of “Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA et al. vs. Chemo-
Technische Mfg., Inc., et al.” (supra) and effectively enjoined one (1) month old dismissals by Chemo-
Technische and that our aforesaid mandatory exercise of injunctive power, when questioned through a
petition for certiorari, was sustained by the Third Division of the Supreme Court per its Resolution dated
January 25, 1993.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Respondent’s fourth argument that petitioner’s remedy for their dismissals is ‘to file an illegal dismissal
case against PAL which cases are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter’ is
ignorant. In requiring as a condition for the issuance of a ‘temporary or permanent injunction’—‘(4) That
complainant has no adequate remedy at law’; Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code clearly envisioned adequacy,
and not plain availability of a remedy at law as an alternative bar to the issuance of an injunction. An illegal
dismissal suit (which takes, on its expeditious side, three (3) years before it can be disposed of) while available
as a remedy under Article 217 (a) of the Labor Code, is certainly not an ‘adequate; remedy at law. Ergo, it
cannot, as an alternative remedy, bar our exercise of that injunctive power given us by Article 218 (e) of the
Code.
x x x      x x x      x x x
Thus, Article 218 (e), as earlier discussed [which empowers this Commission ‘to require the performance
of a particular act’ (such as our requiring respondent ‘to cease and desist from enforcing’ its whimsical
memoranda of dismissals and ‘instead to reinstate petitioners to their respective position held prior to their
subject dismissals’) in ‘any labor dispute which, if not x x x performed forthwith, may cause grave and
irreparable damage to any party’] stands as the sole ‘adequate remedy at law’ for petitioners here. Finally,
the respondent, in its sixth argument claims that even if its acts of dismissing petitioners ‘may be great, still
the same is capable of compensation,’ and that consequently, ‘injunction need

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not be issued where adequate compensation at law could be obtained.’ Actually, what respondent PAL
argues here is that we need not interfere in its whimsical dismissals of petitioners as, after all, it can pay
the latter its backwages. x x x
But just the same, we have to stress that Article 279 does not speak alone of backwages as an obtainable
relief for illegal dismissal; that reinstatement as well is the concern of said law, enforceable when necessary,
through Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code (without need of an illegal dismissal suit under Article 217 [a] of
the Code) if such
4
whimsical and capricious act of illegal dismissal will ‘cause grave or irreparable injury to a
party.’ x x x”

Hence, the present recourse.

Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s substantive rights or
interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main
suit. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The application of the injunctive
writ rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a special reason before the main case be
regularly heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that
the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a proper basis for
injunction and that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the injunction 5
is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation.  Injunction
is also a special equitable
6
relief granted only in cases where there is no plain, adequate and
complete remedy at law.
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC—
_______________
4 Annex “B,” pp. 24-46, Rollo.
5 DelRosario vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 152 [1996].
6 Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273 [1909]; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, et al., 29 Phil. 542 [1915].

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“(e) To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to
require the performance of a particular act  in any labor dispute  which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of
such party; x x x.” (Emphasis Ours)

Complementing the above-quoted provision, Sec. 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, pertinently provides as follows:
“Section 1. Injunction in Ordinary Labor Dispute.—A preliminary injunction or a restraining order may be
granted by the Commission through its divisions pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Article 218 of
the Labor Code, as amended, when it is established on the bases of the sworn allegations in the petition that
the acts complained of,  involving or arising from any labor dispute before the Commission, which, if not
restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual
any decision in favor of such party.
x x x      x x x      x x x
The foregoing ancillary power may be exercised by the Labor Arbiters only as an incident to the cases
pending before them in order to preserve the rights 7
of the parties during the pendency of the case, but
excluding labor disputes involving strikes or lockout.  (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to issue an injunctive writ
originates from “any labor dispute” upon application by a party thereof, which application if not
granted “may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision
in favor of such party.”
The term “labor dispute” is defined as “any controversy or matter concerning terms and
conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,

_______________
7 See also Pondoc vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 262 SCRA 632, 638 [1996].

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Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC

maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of employment regardless 8

of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees.”
The term “controversy” is likewise defined as “a litigated question; adversary 9 proceeding in a
court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute.”
A “justiciable controversy” is “one involving an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on
one side and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical question
10
 10
or issue.”
Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an essential requirement that there must
first be a labor dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the present
case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as there has yet
been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents
against the petitioner.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in reality an action for illegal
dismissal. This is clear from the allegations in the petition which prays for: reinstatement of
private respondents; award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees.
As such, the petition should have been filed with the labor arbiter who has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:

(1) Unfair labor practice;

(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

_______________
8 Article
212(l), Labor Code of the Philippines.
9 Federico
B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 1982 edition, p. 136.
10 Delumen vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 288, cited in Moreno, supra, p. 336.

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(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the
employer-employee relations;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving
the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of
persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five 11
thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

The jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing legal provision to the labor arbiter is
both original and exclusive, meaning, no other officer or tribunal can take cognizance of, hear and
decide any of the cases therein enumerated. The only exceptions are where the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or the NLRC exercises the power of compulsory arbitration, or the parties agree
to submit the matter to voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the
pertinent portions of which reads:
“(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the
same.
x x x      x x x      x x x”

_______________
11 Article 217 (a), Labor Code of the Philippines.

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On the other hand, the NLRC shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by
labor arbiters as provided in Article 217(b) of the Labor Code. In short, the jurisdiction of the
NLRC in illegal dismissal cases is appellate in nature and, therefore, it cannot entertain the
private respondents’ petition for injunction which challenges the dismissal orders of petitioner.
Article 218(e) of the Labor Code does not provide blanket authority to the NLRC or any of its
divisions to issue writs of injunction, considering that Section 1 of Rule XI of the New Rules12 of
Procedure of the NLRC makes injunction only an ancillary remedy in ordinary labor disputes.”
Thus, the NLRC exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private
respondents’ petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
The argument of the NLRC in its assailed Order that to file an illegal dismissal suit with the
labor arbiter is not an “adequate” remedy since it takes three (3) years before it can be disposed
of, is patently erroneous. An “adequate” remedy at law has been defined as one “that affords relief
with reference to the matter 13
in controversy, and which is appropriate to the particular
circumstances of the case.”   It is a remedy which is equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient 14
which will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the acts complained of.
Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an 15 illegally dismissed employee is
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter.   In the case at bar, private
respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for
injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. In

_______________
12 Pondoc vs. NLRC, supra.
13 Mt. Vermon vs. Borman, 100 Ohio St., 2, 75, 125 NE 116 [1919].
14 See Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 885.
15 Article 217 (a) Labor Code of the Philippines.

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16
Lamb vs. Phipps,  we ruled that if the remedy is specifically provided by law, it is presumed to be
adequate. Moreover, the preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for by the private respondents
in their petition before the NLRC can also be entertained by the labor arbiter who, as shown
earlier, has the ancillary power to issue preliminary injunctions or restraining orders as an
incident in the cases 17pending before him in order to preserve the rights of the parties during the
pendency of the case.
Furthermore, an examination of private respondents’ petition for injunction reveals that it has
no basis since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private
respondents might suffer. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant 18 and
frequent recurrence that no fair and reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law,  or
where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy,
that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. It is considered irreparable injury
when it cannot be adequately compensated in damages due to the nature of the injury itself or
the nature of the right or property
19
injured or when there exists no certain pecuniary standard for
the measurement of damages.
In the case at bar, the alleged injury which private respondents stand to suffer by reason of
their alleged illegal dismissal can be adequately compensated and therefore, there exists no
“irreparable injury,” as defined above which would necessitate the issuance of the injunction
sought for. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed
from employment shall be entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, and to the payment of full backwages, inclusive of al-

_______________
16 22 Phil. 465.
17 Section 1, Rule XI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. See also Pondoc vs. NLRC, supra.
18 Allundorff vs. Abrahanson, 38 Phil. 58 cited in Phil. Virginia Tobacco Administration vs. De los Angeles, 164 SCRA

555 [1988].
19 Phil. Law Dictionary, supra, p. 321.

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lowances, and to other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
The ruling of the NLRC that the Supreme Court upheld its power to issue temporary
mandatory injunction orders in the case of Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. Employees Union-DFA,
et al. vs. Chemo-Technische Mfg., Inc. et al., docketed as  G.R. No. 107031, is misleading. As
correctly argued by the petitioner, no such pronouncement was made by this Court in said case.
On January 25, 1993, we issued a Minute Resolution in the subject case stating as follows:
“Considering the allegations contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for
certiorari, as well as the comments of both public and private respondents thereon, and the reply of the
petitioners to private respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, the Court Resolved to DENY the same for
being premature.”

It is clear from the above resolution that we did not in anyway sustain the action of the NLRC in
issuing such temporary mandatory injunction but rather we dismissed the petition as the NLRC
had yet to rule upon the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Thus, the minute
resolution denying the petition for being prematurely filed. Finally, an injunction, as an
extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor law20
considering that it generally has not proved to
be an effective means of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage
the parties21 to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and compromise, mediation and
arbitration.  Thus, injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal
grounds clearly established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at conciliation
are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in the present case.

_______________
20 48 Am. Jur. 2d 2071, p. 437, cited in Azucena. The Labor Code, vol. 2, 1996 ed., p. 430.
21 Ibid., p. 35.

687

VOL. 287, MARCH 20, 1998 687

People vs. Balmoria

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated April 3, 1995 and
May 31, 1995, issued by the National Labor Relations Commission (First Division), in NLRC
NCR IC No. 000563-95, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

     Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Petition granted; Assailed orders reversed and set aside.

Note.—The office of the writ of injunction is to restrain the wrongdoer not to protect him.
(Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 14 [1996])

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