AC. No.

10912, January 19, 2016

PAULINA T. YU, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA

CRUZ, Respondent.

Facts: Atty Dela Cruz agreed to represent YU in several cases with

accepotance fee for each case.
After establishing Atty-client relationship, Atty delacruz borrowed jewelry
from complainant and pledged with a promisory note with deed of pledge.
He also issued checks from a closed bank acct.
Several Demand letter for refund of acceptance fee and of jewelry value was sent but with no
avail.
Complaint was sent to IBP-CBP, where complainant prayed for the disbarment of
respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath

He also failed to file an answer and appear before the IBP .

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Delacruz should be disbarred?

Held:
Yes. He should be disbarred.
Based on the evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to have
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
proscribed the borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests
were fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Worse, respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation
of law which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct."

In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and

P15,000.00, respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in
which respondent lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this
oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding
that aside from her bare allegations, complainant failed to present any
evidence showing that respondent lawyer committed abandonment or
neglect of duty in handling of cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for
the return of the subject acceptance fees.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of

violating Canons 1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING

A.C. No. 9807, February 02, 2016

ERLINDA SISTUAL, FLORDELISA S. LEYSA, LEONISA S. ESPABO AND

ARLAN C. SISTUAL, Complainants, v. ATTY. ELIORDO
OGENA, Respondent.

Facts:
Siblings of the late Manuel Sistual filed a case at bar against atty. Ogena legal counsel of their
late father for  wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified several documents
which included, among others, a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate, Affidavit of Identification of Heirs, Deed of
Donation, and a Deed of Absolute Sale by making it appear that all the
children of Manuel and their mother, Erlinda Sistual (Erlinda), executed the
documents; that as a result of the falsification of the said documents,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 60467, registered in the name of
"Heirs of Martin Sistual, represented by Manuel Sistual,"3 was cancelled and
was subdivided into several lots; and that these lots were sold to interested
buyers.

In its Report and Recommendation,24 the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline

(CBD) stated that it is bereft of any jurisdiction to determine whether Atty.
Ogena committed forgery in the aforementioned documents. It,
however, found several irregularities in the documents notarized by Atty.
Ogena. First, in the SPA, the signatures of Flordelisa Sistual and Isidro
Sistual were absent and the Community Tax Certificates (CTC) of the
signatories namely: Bernardina Sistual Anson, Jesusa Sistual Español, and
Erlinda, were not indicated. In the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Manuel, although all the heirs signed, only the CTC of Erlinda and
Flordelisa were indicated. In the Affidavit of Identification of Heirs of Martin
Sistual, the CTC of Solfia S. Maribago was absent; and in the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Dolores Sistual with Waiver of Hereditary
Shares, only the CTC of Domingo Tulay was indicated. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Atty. Ogena's notarial commission be revoked and that
he be permanently disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public; and
that he be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Ogena violated the notarial practice rules and should be barred from practicing as
notary public?

Held:

Yes.

Atty. Ogena, however, violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

specifically Rule IV, Section 2(b), which provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 2. Prohibitions. - (a) x x x

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by

the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
Doubtless, Atty. Ogena was negligent in the performance of his duty as a
notary public. He failed to require the personal presence of the signatories of
the documents and proceeded to notarize the aforementioned documents
without the signatures of all the parties. Likewise, Atty. Ogena failed to
comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do -to require
the parties to present their residence certificates or any other document to
prove their identities.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is invested with

substantive public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a
private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. A notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of the document would be
undermined.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eliordo Ogena is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for two (2) years and is BARRED PERMANENTLY from
being commissioned as Notary Public.
 A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016

JUDGE GREGORIO D. PANTANOSAS, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ELLY L.

PAMATONG, Respondent.

Facts:
It all started when a case handled by Judge Pantanosas Jr. RTC of CDO, with Atty. Pamatong as
a legal counsel. During one of the hearing, Judge Pantanosas asked atty. Pamatong to remove
his Copia in open court. Respondent Pamatong requested to be exempted
allegedly due to religious grounds and embarrassment towards his "bald
pate".6 Complainant Pantanosas thereafter obliged with a caveat that at the
next hearing, he would no longer tolerate the wearing of the copia inside the
courtroom.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Three (3) days after, or on September 11, 2006, respondent Pamatong filed
an Extremely Urgent Motion/Demand for Inhibition or Recusal in Civil Case
No. 2006-176 (Motion for Inhibition), which contained the following
remarks:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

6. Finally, in my thirty (30) years of law practice, I never encountered a

Judge who appears to be as corrupt as you are, thereby giving me the
impression that you are a disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who
does not deserved (sic) to be a member of the Philippine Bar at
all.8cralawred

Pantanosas denying the allegations.

Upon investigation:  it is recommended that for violation of the lawyer's oath
and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elly V. Pamatong be SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.37cralawred

Issue:
WON Atty. Pamatong violated the lawyers oath and the code of professional responsibility?

Held:
Yes.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the
dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and
not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.45 (Emphasis supplied)cralawred
In closing, we find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right, both
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.56 However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition that
criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety.57 To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his client's success is
wholly subordinate to the administration of
justice.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

True, lawyers must always remain vigilant against unscrupulous officers of

the law. However, the purification of our justice system from venal elements
must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting of the
very system that it seeks to protect.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Elly L. Pamatong from the practice of law

for two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We STERNLY
WARN the respondent that a repetition of the same or similar infraction
shall merit a more severe sanction.
ECRAELA V. PANGALANGAN (A.C. NO. 10676; SEPTEMBER 8, 2015)
CASE DIGEST: ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
PANGALANGAN. (A.C. No. 10676; September 8, 2015).

FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty. Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession."

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University
of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or
barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being
admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon
City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has
three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a
series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried women between
the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992,
which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite
being already married to Jardiolin;
3, CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved
with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to
Jardiolin and while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until
the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.

ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?

HELD: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for grossly immoral conduct.

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY

AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life.
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

FABAY v. RESUENA

A.C. No. 8723 | January 26, 2016

By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:

A Complaint for Disbarment filed by Gregory Fabay (Fabay) against

respondent Atty. Rex A. Resuena for Gross Misconduct due to the
unauthorized notarization of documents.
Virginia Perez, Marcella Perez, Amador Perez, Gloria Perez, Gracia Perez and Valentino
Perez (plaintiffs) filed a complaint for ejectment/forcible entry against Gregory Fabay
with respondent Atty. Resuena as their counsel.
Atty. Resuena notarized a special power of attorney (SPA) with plaintiffs as grantors, in
favor of Apolo D. Perez. However, it appeared that it was only Remedios Perez who
actually signed the SPA in behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and
Gracia Perez.
The ejectment case was later on decided in favor of the client of Atty. Resuena. On
appeal, the RTC ordered the case to be remanded to the court a quo to try the case on
the merits. The trial court noted that both Amador Perez and Valentino Perez have
already died.
Complainant alleged that Atty. Resuena violated the provisions of the
Notarial Law by notarizing a special power of attorney notwithstanding the
fact that two of the principals therein were already dead long before the
execution of the SPA. 

Complainant added that Atty. Resuena likewise notarized a complaint for

ejectment in 2003 where Apolo Perez was made to appear as attorney-in-
fact of Amador Perez and Valentino Perez when again the latter could not
have possibly authorized him as they were already dead. 

Further, complainant averred that Atty. Resuena, as counsel of the plainfiffs,

participated in the barangay conciliations which is prohibited under the law.

Atty. Resuena explained that although it was just Remedios Perez who signed the SPA
on behalf of Amador Perez, Valentino Perez, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, there was
no misrepresentation since Remedios Perez is the spouse of Amador Perez and she was
likewise previously authorized by the other co-owners, Gloria Perez and Gracia Perez, to
represent them.

Atty. Resuena denied that he participated in the barangay conciliations and presented
the certificate issued by the barangay captain showing that there was no record of his
attendance during the confrontations of the parties before the barangay.

IBP-CBD found Atty. Resuena to have violated the provisions of the notarial law. The
IBP-CBD recommended that his notarial commission be revoked and that he be
disqualified to be commissioned as notary public for one (1) year.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Resuena was guilty of Gross Misconduct due to the unauthorized
notarization of documents.

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the
necessity of the affiant’s personal appearance before the notary public:

xxxx

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document –

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by

the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Resuena violated not only the
notarial law but also his oath as a lawyer when he notarized the subject SPA
without all the affiant’s personal appearance. 

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this
requirement is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party’s free act and
deed.

A graver responsibility is placed upon Atty. Resuena by reason of his solemn

oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.
The Code of Professional Responsibility (Rule 1.01 of Canon 1) also
commands lawyers not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.

Moreover, the Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice require a
duly-commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial
Register and to refrain from committing any dereliction or act which
constitutes good cause for the revocation of commission or imposition of
administrative sanction. Unfortunately, Atty. Resuena failed in both respects.

DISPOSITION: Atty. Rex A. Resuena is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary

public, and of violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is DISBARRED from the practice of law
and likewise PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public.
 VILLANUEVA VS. ATTY. DELORIA (A.C. No. 5018, January 26, 2007) FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Amado B. Deloria appeared as counsel for spouses De Gracia in the
HLRB case entitled "Spouses Conrado De Gracia v. Estate of Jaime Gonzales, et al.”
The said case was assigned to complainant Rogelio H. Villanueva as Housing and Land
Use Arbiter. Villanueva avers that a decision in that case was rendered, requiring the
Estate of Jaime Gonzales to refund to the spouses De Gracia P69,000.00 plus interest
at the prevailing commercial interest rates. Atty. Deloria filed a Motion for Issuance of
Substitute Judgment and for Consignation claiming that the Estate of Jaime Gonzales
does not want to pay interest based on commercial interest rates. This allegation is
belied by two motions filed by counsel for the Estate of Jaime Gonzales which merely
seek to clarify the precise interest rate applicable to the case in order for it to fully
comply with the decision. Moreover, according to complainant, respondent offered him
50% of the recoverable amount in the case if he resolves the latter's motion favorably.
Atty. Deloria also allegedly used his connections in the HLURB to prevent him from
releasing an Order denying the former's motion and to prevail upon the agency's Legal
Services Group to interpret the term "commercial rate of interest" in a way that is
favorable to his client's case. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent lawyer violated
Canon 19of the Code of Professional Responsibility. HELD: Atty. Deloria's
misrepresentation is allegedly a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Canons, including Canon 19: “A lawyer shall respresent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law”. However, The case was dismissed for lack of merit. The report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner appears to be based solely on the
Rollo of the case which the Court sent to the IBP. The Investigating Commissioner did
not conduct any hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations in Villanueva's
Complaint and the truthfulness of Atty. Deloria's answers

thereto. A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed

with except for valid and compelling reasons. The instant administrative case is
remanded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings. 

DELOS SANTOS ET AL vs. atty Robiso et al

A complaint for disbarment charges Atty. Romeo R. Robiso and Atty.

Napoleon Victoriano with malpractice, gross misconduct, dereliction of duty,
and acts gravely prejudicial to the interest of complainants.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Complainants were the plaintiffs-appellants in a case filed before the Court

of Appeals, docketed CA-G.R. CV No. 54136, entitled "Vicente delos Santos,
Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Fred Elizalde, Et Al., defendants-appellants;
Jesus delos Santos and Rosita Flores, first set intervenors; Gloria Martin, Et
Al., second set intervenors." The appeal was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP
No. 48475, entitled "Florencio D. Gonzales, Petitioner, v. Hon. Niovady M.
Marin, Et Al., Respondents," for the annulment of judgment in Civil Case No.
3683. On 11 May 1999, the appellate court rendered its decision; it
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE: 1) the appeal by plaintiffs-appellants, defendants-appellants,
and the second set of intervenors are hereby DISMISSED, and WITHDRAWN
as prayed for; and 2) the petition for annulment of judgment is DENIED DUE
COURSE and is ordered DISMISSED."cralaw virtua1aw library

The decision of the Court of Appeals was based on the "Joint Manifestation
and Motion" filed by defendant-appellant Fred Elizalde and the first set
intervenors Jesus de los Santos and Rosita Flores, stating that, on 27 May
1999, the parties entered into an agreement, said to be an amicable
settlement entered into by and between Fred Elizalde, as the first party, and
Jesus delos Santos and Rosita Flores, represented by Atty. Romeo Robiso, as
the second party. Instead of filing an appellant’s brief, an ex-parte motion to
withdraw the appeal was filed by Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, counsel of
record of plaintiffs-appellants (herein complainants), on the basis of the
compromise agreement.

Complainants would now aver that their signatures on the 27th May 1999
agreement were forged, presumably through the malicious and devious
scheme perpetrated by respondent Atty. Romeo R. Robiso. In turn, Atty.
Victoriano was faulted for his failure to file for the complainants an
appellants’ brief before the Court of Appeals, who, instead, filed an ex parte
motion to withdraw the appeal predicating this move on the 27th May 1999
agreement.

In his comment, Atty. Napoleon Victoriano explained that the instant

administrative case was indeed an offshoot of Civil Case No. 3683 filed by
complainants against Fred Elizalde before the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo,
Aklan. Complainants were originally represented by Attorneys Anastacio
Rufon, Manuel Patriarca, and Reynaldo Santos. When the three attorneys
later withdrew as counsel for complainants, Atty. Victoriano was engaged in
Civil Case No. 3683. The case was subsequently appealed to the Court of
Appeals (C.A. G.R. CV No. 54136). Atty. Victoriano received, on 15 June
1998, a "Notice to File Appellants’ Brief" from the Court of Appeals.
Complainants, however, furnished him with a copy of the agreement which
appeared to have been duly signed by them. In accordance with the terms
and conditions of the agreement, he then filed an ex parte motion to
withdraw the appeal.

Atty. Robiso, in his case, denied the accusations of complainants. He

contended that the agreement was prepared and acknowledged before Atty.
Edgar Calizo, a notary public in Boracay Island. Noting that Atty. Victoriano,
in his comment, stated that the complainants furnished him with a copy of
the agreement, Atty. Robiso called attention to the fact that complainants, if
indeed their signatures were forged, failed to file any complaint against the
notary public.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The Court, in its resolution of 07 June 2000, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety days from notice.

In a letter, dated 02 April 2001, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP’s Director of

Bar Discipline, submitted to the Court (1) a notice and copy of the decision
of the IBP and (2) the records of the case consisting of two volumes
consisting, respectively, of 176 and 21 pages. The Notice of Resolution of
the Board of Governors, adopting the recommendation of Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan, read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"RESOLUTION NO. XIV-2001-78

Adm. Case No. 5165

Vicente Delos Santos, Et. Al. v. 

Atty. Romeo R. Robiso and

Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex ‘A;’ and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the
case against Respondents is DISMISSED for lack of merit."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The Court, in its minute resolution of 11 July 2001, noted the resolution of
the IBP, and thereby considered the case closed and terminated. A motion
for reconsideration was filed by complainants, alleging that the
recommendation of the IBP was issued without conducting any hearing on
the case. A review of the records of the case would indeed reflect that no
hearing was conducted by the IBP, and that the recommendation was solely
based on the pleadings, heretofore recited, filed by the parties.

The Court, in Felicidad L. Cottam v. Atty. Estrella Laysa 1 and Jesusimo

Baldomar v. Atty. Justo Paras, 2 has given relevant guidelines in disbarment
cases; thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the
Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit, it outrightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it
necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter
could not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a
referral is made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during
which the parties are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte
investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear
despite reasonable notice. Hereunder are some of the pertinent provisions of
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on this matter; viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"‘SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. — The National

Grievance Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of
the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.

‘x       x       x

‘SEC. 5. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious,

the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the
respondent, requiring him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from
the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer
shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not
meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his
recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the
complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu
proprio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from
notice of the dismissal of the complaint.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

‘No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the

desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.

‘x       x       x

‘SEC. 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the

respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed
with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue
subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be
heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

‘The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months
from the date of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the
Board of Governors upon prior application.

‘Willful failure to refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued
by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court. The
corresponding charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board
of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter
conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in
this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as
practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen
(15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action
and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.’

"The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the
innocents are spared from wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty
are meted their just due. Obviously, these requirements cannot be taken
lightly."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above guidelines were evidently missed by the IBP in proceeding with
the administrative case. Considering the serious nature of the charges
against respondents, it should have behooved the IBP to conduct a formal
hearing of the case and only thereafter could its decision or
recommendation, as the case may so be, be handed down.

In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory

requirement except in such extreme situations as when respondent fails to
appear at the hearing despite reasonable notice.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings, and it is directed to act on this
referral with dispatch.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Adm. Case No. 5094              August 6, 2002

NOEMI ARANDIA, complainant, 
vs.
ATTY. ERMANDO MAGALONG, respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

On July 16, 1999, complainant Noemi Arandia filed with this Court a complaint-affidavit
charging respondent Atty. Ermando Magalong of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility for making threats against her and her husband in connection with
complainant’s alleged debts to his client.1 

Complainant alleged that on August 26, 1997, she was summoned by respondent to his
office, where he threatened her that he would have her and her husband arrested if they
did not make good the checks they gave to respondent’s client, Jonelyn Bastareche.
Complainant averred that respondent’s actuations surprised her, since she was not
aware of any outstanding indebtedness on her or her husband’s part in favor of Ms.
Bastareche. On September 15, 1997, complainant received from respondent’s secretary
respondent’s August 26, 1997 letter addressed to a certain "SPO2 Bautista/warrant
officer" requesting that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against complainant and
her husband be held in abeyance pending the ongoing negotiations between them and
his clients, the Bastareche spouses. 2 

For fear that she and her husband would indeed be arrested by the police, complainant
obeyed respondent’s instructions to her and signed a document captioned Malinawong
Kasabutan (Amicable Settlement) before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their barangay.
Subsequently, when she verified from the trial court whether there was a pending
warrant of arrest against her, complainant discovered that no such warrant was issued
by the court.

In his Comment, respondent claimed that complainant had an existing obligation to pay
his client, Jonelyn Bastareche, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), the
amount corresponding to the two bouncing checks which she had earlier rediscounted
to Bastareche. Respondent contended that after Bastareche’s and respondent's efforts
to collect the said amount from complainant failed, they decided to file a criminal case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He instructed his client to go to the police
investigator and file a sworn complaint against complainant.3 

Respondent said that he was not able to talk to Bastareche for about a week after he
instructed her to file the complaint. He further alleged that on August 26, 1997,
complainant went to his office and submitted a proposal to settle the dispute between
her and Bastareche. Respondent informed complainant that about a week ago, he
ordered Bastareche to file a complaint against her (complainant). Upon hearing this,
complainant insisted that her proposal be relayed immediately to Bastareche, and that
the warrant of arrest against her, if such had already been issued, be held in abeyance.
Believing that Bastareche had already filed a complaint against complainant,
respondent wrote the letter addressed to "SPO2 Bautista/warrant officer" requesting
that the issuance of the warrant of arrest be held in abeyance.4 

On October 25, 1999, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.5 

In a letter dated March 20, 2000, the Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline, submitted to the Court a Notice of Resolution and the Records of the case
consisting of 26 pages. The Resolution of the Board of Governors, adopting the
recommendation of the investigating commissioner, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez,
states:

IBP Resolution No. XIV-2000-23

Adm. Case No. 5094

Noemi Arandia vs. Atty. Ermando Magalong

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the case against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP’s resolution.1âwphi1 She

alleged that she was not furnished a copy of said resolution and that it was respondent
who gave her a copy thereof. Complainant further claimed that she did not receive a
copy of the Answer filed by respondent with the IBP.

On August 16, 2000, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant’s

motion.

On September 16, 2000, respondent filed his Comment and Manifestation whereby he
informed the Court that he was adopting the Comment which he submitted to the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP on September 28, 1999.

It appears that the report and recommendation of the IBP was based merely on the
Original Rollo of the case which was sent by the Court to the IBP pursuant to its
October 25, 1999 resolution. No hearing was conducted to determine the veracity of
complainant’s and respondent’s respective allegations.

In Baldomar vs. Paras,6 the Court held:

Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the Court. If, at
the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in merit, it outrightly
dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it necessary that further inquiry
should be made, such as when the matter could not be resolved by merely
evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is made to the IBP for a formal
investigation of the case during which the parties are accorded an opportunity to
be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to
appear despite reasonable notice. xxx7 (Emphasis supplied.)

It must be emphasized that a formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which

may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons.8 Thus, Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court which outlines the procedure for disbarment and
disciplinary cases against members of the Bar, directs an investigator or a panel of
investigators appointed as such by the IBP Board of Governors to investigate all
complaints referred by said body to him, or to the panel, as the case may be.9 In
conducting an investigation, the investigator or investigating panel must comply with the
following:

Sec. 5. Service or dismissal. – If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the

Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring
him to answer the same within fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint
does not merit action, or if the answer shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that
the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be dismissed by the Board of Governors
upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of dismissal shall be furnished the
complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the case motu proprio or upon
timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the dismissal of the
complaint.

"No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance,

settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.

"xxx

"Sec. 8. Investigation.—Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to

answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date
of its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon
prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the
Investigator shall be dealt with as for indirect contempt of Court. The corresponding
charge shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall
require the alleged contemnor to show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP
Board of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with
the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing
shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a period of fifteen
(15) days issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the
imposition of penalty.1âwphi1

The Court finds that the conduct of a formal investigation is necessary for the proper
resolution of the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is hereby REMANDED to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines for further proceedings.
[Adm. Case No. 1371. December 29, 1978.]

JOSE A. ARFAPO, Complainant, v. ATTY. TEODORO V. NANO,

SR., Respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent lawyer is charged with having prepared a deed of sale without

the knowledge and participation of the vendors and with having deliberately
altered the consideration of the deed of sale. Later the complainant executed
an affidavit of desistance, and when the administrative case was called for
hearing, the complainant reiterated on the witness stand the contents of his
affidavit of desistance, in view of which the fiscal recommended that the
case be dropped. The Solicitor General also recommended the dismissal of
the charges.

The Supreme Court, finding the recommendation to be meritorious,

dismissed the administrative charges against respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. DISBARMENT PROCEEDING; BURDEN OF PROOF. — The burden of proof

in disbarment proceedings rest upon the complainant, and for the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be
established by convincing evidence. Although the desistance of a
complainant or the withdrawal of the charges will not necessarily curtail the
authority of the Supreme Court to proceed further on the matter, such
circumstances will undoubtedly render the investigation of the case difficult.
In the case at bar, not only is respondent entitled to the presumption that,
as an officer of the Court, he has performed his duty in accordance with his
oath, but also no evidence has been submitted to substantiate the charges.

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

In this administrative case, respondent Teodoro V. Nano, Sr. is charged with

having prepared a deed of sale of a portion of a 15-hectare land with
improvements without the knowledge and participation of the vendors, the
Spouses A. Arfapo and Concepcion Mapalinta, and deliberately altering the
consideration of the deed of sale from P6,000.00 as agreed upon by the
parties to P5,500.00, making it appear that the remaining balance of the
consideration, after paying the agreed down payment of P1,500.00, was
P4,000.00 instead of P4,500.00, and with having appropriated for himself
the amount of P500.00 allegedly intended by the parties for the payment of
the realty taxes in arrears.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In his answer dated November 25, 1974, respondent vehemently and

vigorously denied the charge of malpractice against him. In defense, he
alleged that on December 5, 1972, upon prior agreement, the spouses-
vendors Jose A. Arfapo and Concepcion Mapalinta and spouses-vendees
Newton Nano and Hildegarda Ibañez went to his law office for the purpose of
signing the deed of sale of the spouses-vendors’ land in favor of spouses-
vendees; that the price of the land was already previously agreed upon by
the parties at P5,500.00 with down payment of P1,500.00 leaving a balance
of P4,000.00 payable after vendees-spouses shall have contracted with a
loan from any bank after the title of the land is transferred to vendees; that
taxes were never discussed by the contracting parties including respondent
herein; that complainant allegedly assured the respondent and vendees-
spouses that he had no arrears in realty taxes over the land subject of the
sale, that there were no encumbrances over the land, and that no other
person was claiming any portion of the land or improvements thereof; that it
was complainant who suggested the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale
instead of a contract with mortgage to guarantee the payment of the
remaining balance of P4,000.00 as complainant allegedly stated that it was
not necessary because he had complete confidence in the vendees-spouses;
that the contracting parties went to respondent’s law office and voluntarily
signed the contract of sale and promissory note without raising any objection
thereto; that he discovered that complainant had not been paying the
annual realty taxes of the subject land from 1969 to 1973 and as a
consequence, the spouses-vendees could not register their deed of sale; that
under date of June 16, 1974, said vendees filed Civil Case No. 442 for
specific performance and damages against complainant and his wife to
compel the latter to pay all the unpaid realty taxes over the land sold by
them and to settle the claims of third persons claiming payments of the
coconuts they planted in a portion of complainant’s land and to pay
damages; that under date of August 9, 1974, respondent filed a criminal
case for falsification of public document against complainant at the City
Fiscal’s Office at Davao City for making vendees-spouses believe that the
land they bought from him and his wife was "free of any lien or
encumbrances" ; that it was because of the filing of the two cases against
complainant by the Nano spouses (Civil Case No. 442) and by herein
respondent (of the criminal case), the threat to expose him for having
illegally acquired 275 hectares of land and for enriching himself through
corrupt practices while he was still in the government service, that
complainant is acting berserk; that complainant, in order to dissuade
respondent from exposing his ill-gotten wealth and prosecuting the
falsification case against him, allegedly filed the instant disbarment case;
and that the libel and slander cases filed by complainant against herein
respondent, and Civil Case No. 8376 filed by said complainant against the
Nano spouses for rescission of contract and damages were all
dismissed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
By resolution dated December 16, 1974, this Court referred the case to the
Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On December 15, 1978, the Solicitor General submitted his report,
recommending dismissal of the charges. According to said report, for
convenience of the parties who are all residents of Davao City, this case was
indorsed to the City Fiscal of Davao City to conduct the investigation of the
case, receive the evidence of the parties, testimonial and/or documentary,
and submit a report thereon.

Meanwhile, on December 10, 1974, the parties amicably settled Civil Case
No. 442, and on December 12, 1974, a joint affidavit was executed by the
Nano spouses and Arfapo spouses, together with respondent herein, stating,
among other things, that the Nano spouses, principal witnesses of
respondent in the criminal complaint for falsification of public document
against herein complainant and his wife, are no longer interested as
witnesses in said case and in further prosecuting the same. Moreover,
respondent herein likewise manifested his desistance from prosecuting the
same against complainant and his wife for want of witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. The said case was dismissed by the Court on December 16,
1974.

On May 12, 1975, complainant executed an "Affidavit to Dismiss the case"

subscribed and sworn to before Alfredo B. Santos, First Assistant City Fiscal
of Davao City, declaring among other things: (1) that he and his wife have
agreed to the amicable settlement of Civil Case No. 442 for specific
performance and damages filed by spouses Newton Nano and Hildegarda
Ibañez against them; (2) that respondent herein agreed and consented to
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1574 for falsification of public document
filed by him against complainant herein; and (3) that he has lost interest in
prosecuting the instant administrative complaint, and requesting that said
complaint be dismissed.

When the administrative case was called for hearing before Fiscal Alfredo B.
Santos, complainant reiterated on the witness stand the contents of his
affidavit of desistance, in view of which the Fiscal stated that he has "no
alternative but to recommend the dropping of this administrative
case."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is no question that the burden of proof in disbarment proceedings

rests upon the complainant, and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing
evidence. 1 In the case at bar, complainant, instead of proving his
affirmative allegations, submitted an affidavit of desistance, stating that he
has settled his differences with the respondent, and asked for the dismissal
of this administrative case. Although the desistance of complainant or the
withdrawal of the charges will not necessarily curtail the authority of this
Court to proceed further on the matter, such circumstance will undoubtedly
render the investigation of the case difficult. In the case at bar, not only is
the respondent entitled to the presumption that as an officer of the Court, he
has performed his duty in accordance with his oath, 2 but also no evidence
has been submitted to substantiate the charges. It appears also that the
deed of sale, which complainant claims to have been altered, appears on its
face to be regular and bears no traces of any alteration
whatsoever:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the

recommendation of the Solicitor General to be meritorious, hereby
DISMISSES the administrative charges against Respondent.

[A.C. No. 2427. May 8, 1992.]

ATTY. ONOFRE P. TEJADA, Complainant, v. JUDGE HAROLD M.

HERNANDO, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; NOTARY PUBLIC; NOTARIZING A DEED OF SALE

CONTAINING FALSITIES, A GROSS MISCONDUCT AND DISHONESTY;
PENALTY IS SUSPENSION. — The Complaint charges that on 29 October
1973, Respondent was charged with having prepared and notarized a Deed
of Sale which bore the forged signature of the vendor, Vitaliano Quetulio,
who died some eighteen (18) years before. It is evident then that Vitaliano
could not have affixed his signature on the Deed of Sale dated 29 October
1973. Other falsities are evident from that Deed. In Vda. de Guerrero v.
Hernando (Adm. Case No. 704, November 24, 1975, 68 SCRA 76), we
previously found the Respondent guilty "as a notary and "severely censured
him for the falsehood which he had committed and . . . barred or disqualified
him from acting as a notary public for a period of one year." The imposition
of that severer penalty on respondent is now in order for the commission of
a more blatant anomaly. He has miserably failed to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar (Bautista v. Gonzales (Adm. Matter No.
1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151, citing Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm.
Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638). His actuations amount to
gross misconduct and dishonesty, in violation of his lawyer’s oath and the
fundamental ethics of the profession (Merritt v. Cacanindin, Adm. Case No.
1422, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 286). He is therefore SUSPENDED from
the practice of law UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS.

2. ID.; COMPLAINT AGAINST LAWYER; A MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT

TERMINATE PROCEEDINGS. — Complainant’s Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw
Complaint hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature can
not be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same" (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In a verified Complaint, dated 19 February 1992, Complainant charged

Respondent with gross dishonesty and malpractice. Respondent was then
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, at Bangued.

In its Resolution of 22 July 1982, the Court resolved to docket said

Complaint as an administrative case for disbarment considering that the acts
complained of were apparently committed by Respondent when he was still
a practicing lawyer, prior to his appointment to the Bench on 25 October
1975. Pursuant to the same Resolution, the case was referred to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Respondent ceased to become a member of the Judiciary when he was not

re-appointed after the reorganization effected by Batas Pambansa Blg.
129.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The Complaint charges that on 29 October 1973, Respondent prepared and

notarized a Deed of Sale (Annex A, Rollo, 8) which bore the forged signature
of the vendor, Vitaliano Quetulio, who died some eighteen (18) years before
or on 15 August 1955 as shown in his Certificate of Death (Annex B; Rollo,
10). This fact could not but have been known by Respondent who was the
counsel of the widow of Vitaliano Quetulio, Felipa vda. de Quetulio, plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 4743-II, as she testified to her husband’s death when
Respondent himself called her to the witness stand in the said civil case
(Rollo, 18-19). He is thus charged with being the author of the forgery or, at
the very least, having authorized the same as he had notarized the
document himself.

It appears that the said forged Deed of Sale was discovered only when the
Decision in said Civil Case No. 4743-II was reversed by the Court of Appeals
and the disputed parcels of land were ordered placed in the possession of
the defendants therein. As it turned out, however, said properties were
already in the possession of one Fermin Edra to whom they had been sold
pending appeal by virtue of that same Deed of Sale supposedly signed by
Vitaliano Quetulio on 23 October 1973 and notarized by Respondent.

Complainant further alleges that, subsequently, Respondent signed as a

witness (Rollo, 29) in a Deed of Revocation and Acknowledgment of
Ownership (Annex D, Rollo, 25) executed by the vendee, Fermin Edra, and
members of his family on 2 July 1977, which purportedly revoked the forged
Deed of Sale. The Deed of Revocation was alleged to have been likewise
forged since Fermin Edra, the vendee, had died a month before or on 30
May 1977 as shown by his Certificate of Death (Annex E, Rollo, 26). The
alleged forgery is once more being imputed to the respondent, who had
signed as a witness in the Deed.

To refute the accusations, Respondent, in his Comment and Answer dated

15 March 1982 (Rollo, 30) and letter dated 20 March 1982 (Rollo, 29),
denied all the charges filed against him, contending that the alleged forged
Deed of Sale, the basis of the Complaint, "was totally revoked, cancelled and
considered destroyed and of no effects" by the Deed of Revocation and
Acknowledgment. The revocation has, therefore, "forever waived and
renounced any and all (their) claims, interest, causes of actions of whatever
nature which may arise from said document." chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

Respondent further claims that he had nothing to do with the questioned

signature of Fermin Edra in the Deed of Revocation and Acknowledgment of
Ownership which was notarized by Notary Publio Eligio J. Rios. Thus, any
complaint regarding the forged signature should be directed against said
Notary Public, he says.

On 9 November 1982, Complainant filed a Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw

Complaint on the ground that "he came to realize that his perception of facts
was a mistake done in good faith," and that he was fully convinced that he
could not substantiate the charges he had made.

In an unverified Manifestation dated 10 January 1982 (should have been

1983), Respondent, in a complete turn-about, alleged that sometime in
1973, Vitaliano Quetulio who was supposed to have died on 15 August 1955,
personally appeared before him, together with his supposed widow to
acknowledge the due execution of the assailed Deed of Sale. Respondent
explained that Vitaliano Quetulio actually emigrated to the United States in
1936 and was unheard of until 1955. Consequently, Vitaliano’s daughter
presumed her father to have already died and registered him as already
dead on 16 August 1955, and even had a tomb constructed for him at the
municipal cemetery of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Thus, when Vitaliano reappeared
sometime in 1973, already under a new identity to enable him to re-marry
and have his own family while in the United States, the entire province of
Ilocos Norte was surprised.

On 16 March 1989, the Court en banc forwarded the records of the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) pursuant to the new Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court.

On 29 November 1990, after hearing, and notwithstanding the complainant’s

Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw Complaint and the Respondent’s
Manifestation, the IBP, through its Board of Governors, passed a Resolution
recommending the suspension of the Respondent from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months. At said hearing, Complainant did not appear
although notified. Only Respondent showed up and submitted the case for
resolution without further investigation.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On 13 January 1992, Respondent filed a Memorandum reiterating the facts

and circumstances he had previously presented and contending that the
aforementioned IBP Resolution "is also a concrete evidence of `corruption
and abuse of discretion and authority’," similar to what majority of the
members of the Board of Governors were facing in Bar Matter No. 565. 1 

The Court rejects Respondent’s submissions.

It has been sufficiently established that Vitaliano Quetulio died on 15 August

1955 as evidenced by the Certificate of Death (Annex B, Complaint). He was
then said to have been 71 years old. Respondent’s tale that Vitaliano had
migrated to the United States in 1936 and was unheard from until 1955 by
his daughter is a tall one, indeed. For one, Respondent’s Manifestation was
unverified and unsubstantiated. For another, if at all true, his widow would
have been a more authoritative source of information.

It is evident then that Vitaliano could not have affixed his signature on the
Deed of Sale dated 29 October 1973. Other falsities are evident from that
Deed. It recites that Vitaliano was single whereas in Civil Case No. 4743-II,
his widow, Felipa, on examination by Respondent himself, testified that
Vitaliano was her husband who died some fifteen (15) years before. Further,
the Deed recited that title to the property was "absolute" when in truth and
in fact it was under litigation, which fact Respondent himself could not but
have known as he was counsel in the civil case involved.

The records also bear out that Fermin Edra, who is supposed to have
executed the Deed of Revocation and Acknowledgment, died on 30 May
1977. He could not, therefore, have affixed his signature on said Deed on 2
July 1977.

And while there is no direct proof of forgery by Respondent, the IBP has
aptly observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"While there is not (sic) sufficient evidence to prove that respondent was the
one who actually forged the signatures of Vitaliano Quetulio in the Deed of
Sale and of Fermin Edra in the Deed of Revocation and Acknowledgment of
Ownership, the evidence does prove that he notarized the former document
fully cognizant of the falsities therein, thereby making possible the transfer
of the property to Fermin Edra. And the execution of the Deed of Revocation
and Acknowledgment of Ownership, rather than rectifying the effect of the
said Deed of Sale, only compounded respondent’s misdeeds in view of his
awareness that Fermin Edra was already dead when he (respondent) signed
as witness to the same."cralaw virtua1aw library

Complainant’s Motion to Dismiss or Withdraw Complaint hardly deserves

consideration as proceedings of this nature can not be "interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same" (Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court).chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

We recall this Court’s Resolution in Vda. de Guerrero v. Hernando (Adm.

Case No. 704, November 24, 1975, 68 SCRA 76), where we had previously
found the Respondent guilty "as a notary in making it appear in the jurat of
a tenancy contract that affiant Tranquilino Bernardo exhibited to him a
residence certificate when in fact he did not do so." He was then

"severely censured for the falsehood which he had committed and at the
same time . . . barred or disqualified from acting as a notary public for a
period of one year counted from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
He is warned that a more drastic punishment would be imposed on (sic) a
repetition of the same anomaly."cralaw virtua1aw library

The imposition of that severer penalty on respondent is now in order for the
commission of a more blatant anomaly. He has miserably failed to live up to
the standards expected of a member of the Bar (Bautista v. Gonzales (Adm.
Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990, 182 SCRA 151, citing Artiaga v.
Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638). His
actuations amount to gross misconduct and dishonesty, in violation of his
lawyer’s oath and the fundamental ethics of the profession (Merritt v.
Cacanindin, Adm. Case No. 1422, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 286).

WHEREFORE, respondent, Harold M. Hernando, is found guilty of grave

professional misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS.

SO ORDERED.