Republic of the Philippines characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national

SUPREME COURT and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving
Manila livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an
investment of more than P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that
EN BANC on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-
G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967 Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the
City of Manila. (par. 3).
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,  forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers
vs. of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent- would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the
appellant.  City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee. Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent- impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
appellant. for second class motels; that the provision in the same section which
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee. would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from
FERNANDO, J.: entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or
other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the
court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the
date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with
held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such
showing to sustain an attack against its validity.
form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on representative, with such registration forms and records kept and
July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities
Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for
certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as
a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was
similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the reads:
portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a
dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged 1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc.,
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City,
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty 2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and
provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila
conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of charged with the general power and duty to enforce
the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary
and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
due process clause. ordinances;

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a 3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the
final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita
unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of districts in Manila;
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963. 4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on
In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the
the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent
the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b
business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of
but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This
grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent
action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement
to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not
before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to 5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor
privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with the assertion Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is
law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of attached hereto as Annex C;
the petition.
6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of
P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and
 motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
Manila.1äwphï1.ñët any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The
wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly
challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar
the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in
by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
what they considered to be applicable American authorities and property rights under the guise of police regulation.2
praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and
void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
injunction issued. validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here.
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading
petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and
remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned
the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We
submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method of
then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption
preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." aside.
Hence this appeal.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process
regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with
have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to
allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
and substantive aspects. substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow
the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local,
powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote
purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of
deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal
public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the
"that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or
prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such
society.7 exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The correction by the courts.
explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex
to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in
of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great which the objection is raised to the question of due process.16 There is
part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus though a standard to which the governmental action should conform
become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate
challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter,
prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates
shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness
guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action
city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as
facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea
ordinance, argues eloquently for it. of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges
the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of
seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception
pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close
halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines; 14 and pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.21
prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an
opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals. enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body
considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police
deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the
power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to
the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of
the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public
with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must purposes, just and uniform.25
be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has
does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to
petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license
to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely
hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in as a police power measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter
certain particulars, its alleged vagueness. may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city
yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the
municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case,
purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in the above Cu persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need
Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in
incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the legal exercise of that power."27
the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the
applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager,
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging
general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion
of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all
otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion.
important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against
license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to
declared unreasonable.23 the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be
arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence
Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the
affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be
unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due
liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or
Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that
of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or
the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well- should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or
being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for
renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily determining whether the companion or companions referred to are
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or
x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any
public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which
proper scope of the police power."28 cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is
dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to
then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked,
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance void on its face for
and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it.
in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes
the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from Justice
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit but there is no
that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
peace and order and happiness for all.29 they obviously mean."35

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due
because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for
the government of the right of intervention even in contractual constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly
relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.
sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measure is wider.32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due
process?
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro
and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on leave.