MILO v.
SALANGA
July 20, 1987 Gancayco, J.
SUBJECT MATTER: Arbitrary Detention
LEGAL BASIS AND APPLICABLE CONCEPTS:
ACTION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan
Petitioner(s): RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan,
and ARMANDO VALDEZ
Respondent(s): ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR.
SUMMARY: Tuvera, Sr., barangay captain, and several other men maltreated Armanado Valdez y hitting
him with the butts of their guns and by fist blows. Valdez was then locked un the municipal jail for 11
hours without legal grounds. Information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Tuvera, Sr. et al. Tuvera
Sr. filed a motion to quash on the ground that as a barangay captain he is not one of the officers who can
be charged with arbitrary detention and that he only sought the aid of the police and accompanied Valdez
to the municipal jail. The CFI granted the motion. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon Milo filed a petition
for review on certiorari of an order of the CFI of Pangasinan against Judge Angelito Salanga, granting
Juan Tuvera, Sr.’s motion to quash an information for Arbitrary Detention.
FACTS: (note: the dates are confusing because it is not logical if those are the correct dates. But I
still put in here the dates in mentioned in the decision. Best not to mind them. lol)
Apr 21, 1973(note: information said this happened in 1973 but the information was filed in 1972):
At around 22:00 in Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., (barrio captain),
Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and Dianong maltreated Armando Valdez by hitting him with the
butts of their guns and by fist blows. Valdez was immediately thereafter locked inside the
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan by Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza, and Pat. Rodolfo
Mangsat for 11 hours without legal grounds.
Oct 12, 1972: An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Tuvera, Sr., Mendoza and
Mangsat to which they were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
Apr 4, 1973: Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense and that the proof adduced in the investigation are insufficient to
support the filing of the information. Respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted the motion,
finding that Tuvera was not a public officer who can be charged with arbitrary detention.
Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following reasons:
(1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a
mere barrio captain;
(2) That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman,
(3) That he was not a public official;
(4) That he had nothing to do with the detention of Valdez
(5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police
Force;
(6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and
that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and
Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority;
(7) and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention
ISSUE/S, HOLDING, AND RATIO:
Was the quashal proper?
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RULING RATIO:
No, in resolving a All the elements are present.
motion to quash, Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal
courts cannot consider grounds, detains a person. elements of this crime are the following:
facts contrary to those 1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
alleged in the 2. That he detains a person
information or which 3. That the detention is without legal grounds
do not appear on the
face of the information. The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl.
This is because a Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force of
motion to quash is a Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about 11 hours in the
hypothetical admission municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of the
of the facts alleged in crime are present.
the information.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority
to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public
officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants
(who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were
recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them
as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio
Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to
look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the
municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio; to look after the general welfare of
the barrio; to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the
barrio and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same
may be necessary f or the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio.
According to Prof. Jose M. Aruego’s treatise on Barrio Government Law and
Administration, the barrio captain maintains the public order of the barrio, and
as such, may take preventive measures to address any threats or acts
disturbing said public order. He is a peace officer considered under the law
as a person in authority, and may make arrest and detain persons within legal
limits.
Other public officers, like judges and mayors, who abuse their functions, may
be guilty of arbitrary detention. A barrio captain has similar powers and
functions with the mayor, albeit within a smaller territorial jurisdiction.
Given that both have the same duty of maintaining peace and order,
both are vested with the authority to detain or order detention.
A motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the
information, therefore, it cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the
information or which are not on the information itself. The only exception is
when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. Tuvera, Sr.’s allegations
that there was no crime of arbitrary detention, that he only sought the aid of
the Manaoag Police Force, and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez
to town for his safety can only be raised as a defense at trial.
An order granting a motion to quash is a final order and is immediately
appealable. He cannot claim double jeopardy since the dismissal was
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secured at his instance.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be
remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
LAW 110 | PROF. LITONG
