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Aristotle's Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and Determinism.

Article  in  American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly · January 2013

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Mariusz Tabaczek
Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum)
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When looking at the universe in which we live, one is struck by an amazing regularity and
precision of the fabric of the cosmos. All of its changes, cycles and processes follow certain paths
of regularity that make prediction and planning possible. In fact, most of our human activity is in
a sense an imitation of the regularity of nature. Yet, in our day-to-day experience we
spontaneously attribute certain events to chance, speaking of good and bad luck. Chance is
present in plots of innumerable works of literature, in mathematics and statistics standing behind
economy, marketing, and gambling industry. Moreover, natural science, which had always been
searching for regularity in nature, has announced recently that the world is in fact an empire of
chance and probability. Such is the conclusion of many physicists, geneticists and molecular and
evolutional biologists.

But what is chance? A real absence of a determining cause? A misleading term with no content? A
name for a surprising event, which is nonetheless caused necessarily? A name of an unknown
cause? A space for God’s providence? Or maybe a way to explain human free choice? The question
of the nature of chance has been puzzling thinkers throughout the history of philosophy and
human thought. In his book Aristotle’s Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and
Determinism, John Dudley goes back to the author of the most advanced theory of causation in
antiquity, offering an exhaustive and detailed study of chance and necessity in his philosophy.

As Dudley himself notices, “No previous treatment of chance has brought together the concept of
chance in the physical and ethical works of Aristotle” (359). In fact, the author brings together and
confronts Aristotle’s physics, metaphysics, biology, and ethics, dealing also with some other
contexts in which the philosopher speaks about chance and necessity. As a result of his research
Dudley presents several textual conclusions, some of which should be addressed here at first. In
chapter 2 Dudley offers an intriguing exegesis of Phys. II, iv-vi. Based on the distinction between
τύχη and ταὐτόματον, he claims that originally, in Phys. II, iv-v, Aristotle referred all chance events
to τύχη. Later on the philosopher wrote Phys. II, vi, in which he introduces the concept of
ταὐτόματον, a general category of chance events as distinguished from τύχη which from now on
means ‘luck’ and is limited to rational beings of whom we say that they can have good or bad
fortune. Dudley concludes that Phys. II, iv-v and Phys. II, vi were eventually conflated and Phys. II,
iv-v revised. In chapter 3 Dudley continues his exegesis providing a commentary to all of the major
texts dealing with chance outside Phys. II, iv-vi, and ethical works of Aristotle (EE VIII, ii and MM
II, viii) which he analyses in separate part of the book. His aim is to propose a hypothesis of dating
Phys. II, iv-vi. He claims that Phys. II, vi was written at the same time as Met. Z(VII), vii-ix and
Met. Λ(XII), iii, that is towards the end of Aristotle’s career (but before De An. And De Gen. An.),
whereas Phys. II, iv-v should be dated among earlier works of the philosopher.
These textual conclusions serve Dudley for his remarkable synthesis of Aristotle’s doctrine of
chance and necessity in physical works of the philosopher presented in chapters 1, 4, and 5. He
shows that the Stagirite’s account of chance is both metaphysical and epistemological in its
nature. Substances and events can be explained only through per se causes, which come from
nature (φύσις) or intellect (νοῦς). However, per se causes alone are never sufficient. There are
innumerable accidental causes involved in occurrence of every substance and event, which we
tend to neglect at large. Aristotle classifies among them also chance events, saying that if we tend
to perceive them as the most important part of the explanation, it is because we find them
relevant to man’s goals in life. Thus, although chance can be indeed regarded a cause, it is never a
per se cause, but only an accidental one. In this way, says Dudley, Aristotle explains chance
satisfactorily in terms of his hylomorphic theory. He adds that in his opinion the philosopher
rightly holds that chance always refers to a teleological context, although as an accident it does
not itself have a purpose. Moreover, the way Aristotle contrasts necessity and chance, attributing
the ‘usual’ in nature to hypothetical necessity (necessity in function of an end) rather than to
material necessity, may be considered a significant contribution to philosophical and scientific
thought. In conclusion, Dudley notes that because Aristotle sees chance events as intrinsically
unpredictable, they cannot be objects of science understood as an instrument for predicting the
future in order to achieve goals.

The second part of the book (chapters 6-7) deals with chance in ethical works of Aristotle (NE, EE
and MM). Dudley examines at first the concept of chance as the source of external prosperity,
which is a condition of happiness. In this case chance means nothing more than ‘the haphazard’,
as there is no per se cause of chance as the cause of noble birth, beauty etc. At this point Dudley
introduces a distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ meaning of chance in Aristotle. The latter refers
to the metaphysical explanation found in Phys. II, iv-vi. The former is attributed to the material
cause, purely inexplicable, for which no metaphysical account is available. Dudley suggests that at
the beginning Aristotle was not aware of the incompatibility of chance in NE and EE with the
explanation in Phys. II, iv-vi, and that the use of the term in his ethical works was pre-
philosophical, as he seemed to adopt uncritically the popular use of chance as a substitute for the
material cause. In chapter 7, Dudley investigates Aristotle’s analysis of good fortune and his idea of
intuition. He traces the way in which the philosopher begins to attribute to chance an external
prosperity or success that comes about unexpectedly as a byproduct of a morally virtuous action,
based on a good and directed by the final causality of God. He shows that in MM Aristotle is
finally aware of the fact that the hard meaning of chance is incompatible with the soft meaning.
He suggests that at the end the philosopher embraces and develops the latter, metaphysical theory
of chance. As an outcome of this research, Dudley proposes the following historical chronology:
NE, Phys. II, iv-v, EE, Phys. II, vi, MM.

In the third part of the Book Dudley analyzes some further implications of Aristotle’s concept of
chance. In chapter 8 he shows how Aristotle rejects determinism by providing epistemological and
metaphysical explanations for its inadequacy. He argues that for Aristotle not only human free
choices, but also all other events in the universe that cannot be predicted by science are in the
 final analysis contingent, since they can be tracked back to a contingent starting-point, be it free
choice, accident, or chance. Science is therefore for Aristotle a limited reduction of events to per se
causes. In the last chapter Dudley makes a preliminary attempt at relating Aristotle’s concept of
chance to contemporary questions of the order in the universe, the origin of life, the theory of
evolution, and quantum mechanics. He shows that Aristotle holding that the experience of chance
is possible in the context of a process only if there exists a goal-oriented per se cause, in which
accidents can inhere, stands in opposition to the Democritean account of the order in the universe
coming by chance, the Empedoclean explanation of evolution by random chance, and the
Epicurean explanation of certain physical events by indeterminist occurrences. All three
explanations are based on the material cause, which means that there is no further explanation
available. This is the position that Aristotle would never embrace.

Overall, Dudley’s work is an example of excellent scholarship, precision, coherency, and clarity. It
contains a bibliography, an index of all works by Aristotle and other ancient and medieval authors
mentioned, and separate indexes of names and subjects. A reader may feel a bit disappointed with
a rather sketchy reference to Aristotle’s possible answer to contemporary philosophical and
scientific debates about the meaning and role of chance. However, it is not the primary subject of
the book. Dudley wants to clarify Aristotle’s teaching on chance, accidents, causality, necessity,
and determinism. He does it masterfully, providing his readers with remarkable tools applicable in
further philosophical and scientific debates. Highly recommended for all interested in the recent
revival of Aristotle in the philosophy of nature and science.

Mariusz Tabaczek, O.P.

Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA, USA

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