Table 9.1.

The primary effect of exogenous variables on elite civil-military relations

Variable Primary effect

Societal legitimacy - Military trust of civilians

- External institutions

Civilian strategic culture - Military trust of civilians

- Civilian trust of military
- Civilian priorities

Military culture - Military trust of civilians

Administrative reform - External institutions

Popular militarism - External institutions

Individual skills and personalities - Military trust of civilians

- Civilian trust of military
- Civilian priorities
- Actual civilian and military skills

Threat level - Military trust of civilians

- Civilian trust of military
- Civilian priorities

Character of threat - Military trust of civilians

- Civilian trust of military
- Actual civilian and military skills

American elite civil-military relations after the Cold War

The framework can be used to give an overview of American elite civil-military relations after the
Cold War. This can only be a sketch of a wider and more extensive analysis and is mainly meant to
illustrate how the framework presented above works in practice.

In overall terms, American elite civil-military relations are very stable. Societal legitimacy is
of course very high. No-one, except the most extreme fringes of the political spectrum, would
question the legitimacy of the state or the democratic principle underpinning it. Though both

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Congress and administration have been criticized for being inefficient, their right to keep their offices
has not been questioned. Almost no-one consider a military putsch a likely or preferable option. 593

Culture is a relatively intangible variable, which is difficult to measure exactly. It is therefore

difficult to arrive at any final conclusions about the health of American civilian strategic culture. As
several scholars have shown, American strategic culture spreads wide and encompasses several
contradictory strains of thought. It is not simply liberal or realist. Instead, both of these trains of

thought are part of the wider tradition. 594 The last decade was defined by a willingness to use force
to achieve normative goals. In Iraq, this willingness led to elite civil-military problems, when officers
lost faith in a government that was not capable of bringing victory. Perhaps the biggest problem has
been a failure to make the goals match the means available.

In overall terms, American military culture is characterized by a relatively high level of

political neutrality in the period in question. The legitimacy of the state is high, bolstered by a strong
national identity and a strong domestic economy. There have been some causes for concern though.
As we saw above, demographic trends have made the American military more Republican. Some

scholars have highlighted the existence of a certain disdain for civilian life within military culture. 595
Others have shown that some groups within the armed forces have an incorrect understanding of
the relationship between top officers and their civilian masters that effectively questions the

legitimacy of the principle of civilian control. 596 However, none of these studies show that the

degree of political neutrality has changed within military culture. 597 Changing ideological patterns
within the ranks are not necessarily evidence of less political neutrality. A Republican officer corps is
not necessarily a politically meddlesome officer corps. The studies that look specifically at political
neutrality do not make a longitudinal comparison. Simply put, they only show that the officer corps is
not entirely politically neutral – they do not show that those tendencies were already present in
earlier decades. Though many authors have claimed that political neutrality has been disappearing

from military culture, no-one has presented any convincing evidence that this is the case. 598

There have been no major administrative reforms of the channels between civilian and
military elites since the end of the Cold War. Elite civil-military interaction is still governed by the

593 The one remarkable exception is Dunlap (1992).

594 See for instance, Mead, Walter R. (2002): Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the
World, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
595 Ricks, Thomas E. (1997): Making the Corps, New York: Simon & Schuster.
596 Gronke, Paul & Peter D. Feaver (2001): Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military
Relations, in Feaver, Peter D. & Richard H. Kohn (2001): Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National
Security, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 152-61.
597 For an excellent overview of the literature on the civil-military gap, see Cohn, Lindsey (1999): The Evolution
of the Civil-Military ‘Gap’ Debate, Durham: TISS working paper.
598 Kohn (2002), pp. 26-36.

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framework that was put in place with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. In relative terms, the
civilian principal is divided because of the separation of powers. Congress and the White House
share oversight over the military. The military agent is united in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Some scholars have complained that this allows a politically adept chairman – the example
used is typically Colin Powell – to outmaneuver his superiors and shape military policy beyond his

administrative purview.599 However, there are still several oversight mechanisms that ensure that
the civilians are capable of detecting and punishing military shirking. Altering these institutions
involves changes that may not be beneficial. Uniting civilian authority over military policy in the
White House would improve the civilians’ ability to control the military, but it would also diminish
Congress’ control with the executive. It would be a blow to the checks and balances that define the
American constitutional tradition. Similarly, separating the military agent along the lines of the pre-
1986 military would also make it easier to control the armed forces. However, it would decrease the
effectiveness of the armed forces, as more resources would be wasted in interservice rivalry.

It is difficult to pinpoint the degree of popular militarism in contemporary American society.

Gallup polls have consistently shown that more Americans have confidence in the military than in

Congress and the Presidency – a trend that has become even more significant in recent years. 600
However, such evidence is not sufficient to determine if the population’s trust in the military is
strong enough to change the relationship between soldiers and civilians. Though we do have some
indications that the military is somewhat popular, we do not have a clear picture of how deep this
popularity runs amongst voters. Neither do we know if it gives the military any leeway vis-à-vis the
government.

Individual leaders have had different backgrounds and expectations to elite civil-military
relations. For example, the contrast between the two Bush administrations and the Clinton
administration is stark. The first Bush White House contained several seasoned foreign policy
veterans and prioritized military policy highly. The President had of course served as Director of
Central Intelligence in the 1970s and Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Advisor, was a retired air
601
force general. The Clinton administration, on the other hand, did not seem to prioritize military

policy and his administration was generally thought to be thin on military expertise. 602 The second
Bush administration came into office feeling that the military had been left alone to languish and

599 Kohn (2002), pp. 14-21.

600 Gallup (2013): Confidence in Institutions, accessed August 14th 2013 on www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx.
601 Herspring, Dale R. (2005): The Pentagon and the President. Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W.
Bush, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, pp. 297-330; Herspring (2013), pp. 49-50.
602 Herspring (2005), pp. 331-76.

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had become institutionally and culturally dormant. Defense reform became a high priority. 603
Several of its members – which included two former secretaries of defense - had extensive
experience with defense policy. Changes in civilian leadership lead to different takes on military
policy. This affected the elite civil-military system.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer faced an immediate military
threat. The Soviet Union had collapsed and left the United States alone as the world’s sole
superpower. Although the United States still faced some minor threats, its long-term survival is no
longer in jeopardy. Though global terrorism should be taken seriously, it does not pose an existential
threat against the United States. Consequently, American policymakers have been given a somewhat
free hand to pursue the policy goals that they decided to prioritize. Without an international threat,
the domestic flaws of the American system have never delegitimized the government, the
constitution, or the state.

Post-Cold War conflicts have mainly been fought for political reasons. Their character has
largely been dictated by political reasoning. For instance, political considerations – concern for public
support, for support in the international community, and for the health of the Western alliance –
meant that the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were fought as air wars. Though the idea
of a land invasion was considered, it was eventually discarded because of the heavy political costs it

would entail.604 The United States could afford to pursue this type of war because of the lack of a
clear international threat. This led to some dissatisfaction and a minor loss of trust within the

ranks.605 The combination of a lack of overall threat and a lack of consensus over the way in which
606
military power should be used, did lead to some elite civil-military tensions. However, in spite of a
few episodes, this dissatisfaction was never strong enough to fuel a large-scale military resistance
against the government. 607

All in all, the fundamentals of American elite civil-military relations are healthy. Tensions are
largely caused by the unavoidable changing of civilian and military leaders and the changes in skill,
outlook, personality and visions that this entails. There are some factors that could be changed to
improve elite civil-military relations. The external control institutions split the civilian principal, while
uniting the military agent in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, altering this

603 Cohen (2003), p. 227; Stevenson, Charles A. (2006): Warriors and Politicians. US Civil-Military Relations
under Stress, London: Routledge, pp. 177-82.
604 Herspring (2005), pp. 355-60 & 363-73.
605 Herspring (2005), pp. 331-76.
606 Feaver(2003), pp. 225-26; Desch (1999), pp. 22-38; Weigley, Russell F. (2001): The American Civil-Military Cultural
Gap: a Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present, in Feaver, Peter D. & Richard H. Kohn (2001): Soldiers and
Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security, Cambridge: MIT Press, p.
217.
607 Herspring (2005), pp. 331-76.

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fundamental set-up has significant negative side-effects that would most likely make it a suboptimal
choice of policy. The civilian strategic culture has lacked a consistent understanding of when and why
force should be used. It seems obvious that a more prudent relationship to the use of force would
not only improve elite civil-military relations – it would also be beneficial for the overall national
security of the United States. However, our understanding of American strategic culture is not strong
enough to predict if the mistakes of the past years can be avoided in the future. Finally, it is not
entirely clear how deep the popularity of the armed forces runs or if this popular militarism allows
the military an excessive sanction against the government.

Looking forward, the main question is if the elite civil-military system is capable of handling
the challenges that lie ahead. The international balance of power is changing and the long-term
security of the United States may soon be at risk. Will its elite civil-military system be up to speed
with the trials that arise? Answering this question requires a more extensive study of the exact
nature of the future problems of national security and the strength of the current American elite
civil-military system. A crude estimate would be that the current system is relatively well-
functioning. One should always hesitate to make ironclad predictions, but it seems likely that though
elite civil-military tensions will certainly occur, they do not pose a mortal danger to the long-term
survival of the United States.

Conclusion

Elite civil-military relations constitute a system of interrelated variables, the purpose of which is to
maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. Five key variables make up the
center of the system: the priorities of the civilian government, civilian trust of the military, military
trust of the civilians, the external control institutions available to the civilians, and the actual skills of
the military and civilian elites. The stability of the system can be affected when one or more of eight
exogenous factors are altered: the legitimacy of the state, constitution, and society; the strategic
culture of the civilian elite; military culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; skills and
personality of individual leaders; level of threat facing the state; the character of conflicts in which
the state is involved.

This model of the elite civil-military system illustrates the complexity of these relations. One
cannot say that one civilian control policy is superior a priori. Instead, it depends on a host of
different factors that determine if the government should pursue an assertive or an objective civilian
control policy. Furthermore, harmony between civilian and military elites is not a goal in itself.
Discord may be the correct policy if it creates more effectiveness in the long run.

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 - 10 -

Conclusions

This dissertation is about civil-military relations theory. What do we know about how the interaction
between soldiers and civilians affects the political governance of the state? What are the limits of
our knowledge? What is holding us back from knowing even more? How do we develop better
theories of civil-military relations? This concluding chapter answers these questions based on the
findings of this dissertation. It begins by outlining why the lack of a theoretical framework is the
primary stumbling block preventing the development of better theories of civil-military relations. It
then presents the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. Having done so, it then
shows why this theoretical framework is superior to any alternative framework, most importantly
the one presented by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State. Finally, it ends by highlighting
the blind spots within our understanding of civil-military relations, which have been exposed by the
theoretical framework.

The problem of contemporary theory

The social scientific study of civil-military relations is hampered by the lack of a coherent theoretical
framework. The concepts used within the field are simply not properly defined and scholars
therefore often talk past one another. Many studies focus on highlighting the weaknesses in the
classical works of the field – weaknesses that were often the result of an imprecise use of terms. The
solution was to develop a more exact terminology. In other words, the field needs a better
theoretical framework.

I sought out to remedy this problem in this dissertation. In the introduction, I compared this
venture with the task facing Kenneth Waltz, when he wrote Man, the State, and War: to explore how
scholars think about civil-military relations and make sure that the concepts used within the
discipline make sense. Using political and military sociology, I analyzed the meaning of the different
concepts used to explain the interaction between soldiers and civilians. Unpacking the scholarly
literature, it became obvious that the dominant theoretical framework was developed by Samuel
Huntington in The Soldier and the State. Later scholars have attacked Huntington, pointing to the
empirical faults of his theory, or the theoretical imprecision of one or more of his concepts.
However, none of them have provided an overarching theory; nor have they tried to significantly
challenge his theoretical framework.

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 This dissertation might be read as a denigration of Huntington’s work, but is meant to be
anything but that. Huntington brought much needed consistency to the civil-military relations field,
but was preoccupied by a need to solve several puzzles within one work. He simply tried to address
too many things at the same time. The Soldier and the State contained a theoretical framework of
civil-military relations, a discourse on Western military history, a theory of civil-military relations, a
theory of civilian control of the military, an overview of the fundamental policy problems facing
civilian leaders, and a set of policy recommendations for American Cold War policymakers. The
scope of his project forced him to multitask. While many of his findings were sound, and still stand
the test of time, his theory of civil-military relations, his policy recommendations for American Cold
War policymakers, and his theoretical framework were all somewhat off the mark.

The goal of developing a theoretical framework for civil-military relations – which he

explicitly identified as his core task - disappeared in the jostling of his purposes. Huntington’s
nascent theoretical framework was developed by marrying different types of scholarly literature. He
combined political sociology with military sociology, military history, and military science. I decided
to replicate this route, but to take more time to explain the nature of each concept. Many advances
have been made in political and military sociology since Huntington wrote his book in 1957. Using
these advances helped me to paint a more thorough and coherent picture of the interaction
between soldiers and civilians.

The theoretical framework of civil-military relations

Here is the end product of that endeavor. Civil-military relations consist of two subtypes: elite civil-
military relations (the interaction between military and civilian elites within the state) and societal
civil-military relations (how and why the armed forces contribute to the survival of modern society in
general). Political science approaches to civil-military relations typically focus on elite civil-military
relations, but bring in societal civil-military relations to explain the general requirements that are
asked of civilian and military elites.

Policymakers in modern democracies have to choose between a palette of different civilian

control policies. They have the option of controlling the military directly or establishing external
control institutions. There are basically three types of direct control: objective control entails
allowing the military to handle policy details autonomously, assertive control involves some
meddling in the operational and tactical details of military policy, while subjective control involves
meddling in policy details and replacing the military elite with officers who share the values of the
civilian government. Subjective control is rarely pursued in advanced democracies and scholars
typically focus on the choice between assertive and objective control. Furthermore, policymakers

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may also choose to establish external control institutions. These help them detect and punish
military shirking. However, they typically entail a loss of military effectiveness. There is no easy
solution to this aim. Instead, all policy options have advantages and disadvantages. The choice of
policy depends on the circumstances under which the choice is made.

The policy options facing political leaders reflect the complex nature of civil-military
relations. Civil-military relations consist – as mentioned above – of elite civil-military relations and
societal civil-military relations. Elite civil-military relations constitute a system, based on five core
variables: the policy priorities of the civilian government, the civilians’ trust of the military, the
military’s trust of the civilians, the balance between civilian and military skills, and the external
institutional set-up that define the interaction between soldiers and civilians. The purpose of elite
civil-military relations is to maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. The
strength and health of the system is determined by eight exogenous factors: the general legitimacy
of the government, state, and constitution; the civilian strategic culture; the values defining military
culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; the skills and personalities of individual leaders;
the general level of threat; and the character of the conflicts in which the state engages. Together,
these factors make up the fundamentals of the elite civil-military system.

Essentially, the relationship between soldiers and civilians is essentially a classic information
asymmetry problem: because they do not know the details of the use of force as well as members of
the armed forces, civilian leaders have a hard time ensuring that the military is implementing their
policies completely. This problem is exacerbated by the secrecy required in military affairs.
Furthermore, the military also has significant and subtle informal power, which it can use to
destabilize the government. For example, military officers, whether retired or serving, have several
venues they can use to speak out against the government. Many of these conduits are impossible to
remove, as they are also used for legitimate purposes. Though clearly illegitimate if used to pursue
narrow, bureaucratic interests, such practices are hard to distinguish from legitimate usage
motivated by a genuine concern for the constitution. The military does not necessarily have to use
these options for them to be politically important because the very possibility of their usage may
influence the government’s course of action vis-à-vis the armed forces.

Students of elite civil-military relations focus on one of two analytical perspectives. Civilian
control refers to the civilian leadership’s ability to control the armed forces. It focuses on how the
military becomes motivated to accept civilian supremacy. Military effectiveness is the capacity to
generate military force from a state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and
human capital. It focuses on the effect of elite civil-military interaction.

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 Civilian control is established through a combination of external and internal mechanisms.
External mechanisms refer to the use of institutions to monitor and punish military actors. This
approach assumes that actors pursue their own narrow interests. Institutions essentially influence
the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. Institutions can delimit the incentive to act
against the will of the government by making it easier for the government to detect and punish such
behavior. Internal mechanisms are defined as the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The soldier
is more easily controlled if he feels loyal to the democratic institutions of the state. But neither
external nor internal mechanisms are a panacea that solves the problem of civilian control. Instead,
these mechanisms are typically combined to ensure that the military implements the will of the
government.

Military effectiveness depends on the balance between need for a division of labor between
soldiers and civilians and the need for strategic coherence. The division of labor between soldiers
and civilians originate in the specific expertise that each group possesses. Soldiers are professional
experts in the art and science of warfare, while civilian politicians are experts in the art and science
of politics. None of these spheres of expertise are purely scientific, though the element of science is
more pronounced for the soldier than it is for the politician. This division of expertise informs the
division of labor between soldiers and civilians. Ideally, decisions should be made by the latter in
after an open and frank discussion, where both groups contribute. These deliberations are based on
information gathered by the military bureaucracy, which also has the task of implementing decisions
once they have been made.

This division of labor principle is balanced by a need for strategic coherence. The civilian
leadership has to ensure that the military bureaucracy gathers information and implements decision
in a way that reflects the overall strategy. This can only be done by interfering in tactics and
operations. Civilian control ensures strategic coherence. In other words, strategic coherence is
ensured by meddling in decisions within the armed forces’ purview. It necessitates compromising
the division of labor.

The two imperatives that define elite civil-military relations can only be understood by taking
a broader perspective and looking at how they originate in the processes that define society. In other
words, elite civil-military relations are shaped by societal civil-military relations. These relations are
characterized by a tension between a societal and a functional imperative. The societal imperative is
the degree to which domestic features of society obstruct the state from pursuing an optimal
political course. The functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to fulfill in
order to survive: the state needs to accumulate power to ensure that enemy states do not cut off its
access to material resources.

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 The need for military effectiveness grows out of the functional imperative. All states require
power to fend off enemies, and to keep order within their borders. Military force is one of the tools
through which the state generates power. Compared to earlier state forms, the modern state has
access to a wider range of power generation tools. Whereas earlier states depended largely on
continuous military campaigns, the modern state has the option of generating power through its
domestic economy. Thus, whereas pre-modern states relied on constant warfare, the modern state
can generate power through peace.

The need for civilian control originates in the legitimacy structures of the modern state.
Modern society is defined by a need for accountability. Members of civil society offer taxes,
manpower, and loyalty in exchange for protection and services. This need for accountability was less
pronounced in previous societies. In modern society, it is absolutely central. Since the military
revolution during the early modern era, the military competition between states has forced the state
to include a steadily wider group in the social contract. Consequently, the government needs to
control the armed forces, because it is part of the larger idea of accountability to which it owes its
legitimacy.

The societal imperative depends on whether or not the ideas and cultural categories that
determine the state’s course of action are compatible with the threats it faces. In other words, the
state’s ability to respond to foreign threats is influenced by the ideas within the government and civil
society and the degree to which the political system allows ideas to transfer from civil society to the
state. Because of the accountability principle that defines modern society, ideas fermented in civil
society may influence the state’s ability to respond to foreign threats. The societal imperative may
become problematic due to either excessive individualism or excessive elite militarism. In other
words, the elite may either under- or overestimate the importance of military force. Furthermore,
the armed forces may gather additional clandestine power if it becomes too popular in the
population at large (popular militarism). This can skew the relationship between civilian and military
elites.

Moving beyond ‘The Soldier and the State’

This dissertation is the first comprehensive meta-theoretical study of civil-military relations and the
first complete description of the theoretical framework of civil-military relations. Contemporary
theorists have been pre-occupied with exploring sub-dimensions of civil-military relations. The
present study collects all these insights into a coherent theoretical framework. The theoretical
framework that Samuel Huntington developed in The Soldier and the State did not fully define the
concepts, or describe the causal logic within the field. These limitations influenced his theory of civil-

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military relations. The result was a set of empirical predictions that did not pan out. I have
highlighted the most important conceptual inconsistencies throughout this dissertation.

Huntington did not explore the policy-dilemma facing policy-makers. When mapping out the
policy options facing civilian leaders, he only explored subjective and objective control, the two
extreme positions. He did not investigate the consequences of an assertive control policy, the middle
position between these extremes. Modern, advanced democracies rarely, if ever, pursue a policy of
subjective control. Instead, most policy-makers choose between assertive or objective control. This
study added this option to the framework of civil-military relations. Furthermore, Huntington did not
explore how civilian policymakers could control the military by establishing external control
institutions.

Huntington regarded professionalism as the pivotal factor in his theoretical framework. In his
view, the choice between different civilian control policies should be evaluated based on whether or
not they enhanced professionalism. Professionalism ensured both civilian control and military
effectiveness. But he did not distinguish between civilian control and the creation of military
effectiveness.

By contrast, the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation draws an important

analytical distinction between civilian control and military effectiveness. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to explore how the military comes to accept civilian supremacy and the consequences of
interaction between civilian and military elites concurrently. Studies typically look at just one of
these dimensions. Huntington did not explicitly distinguish between civilian control and military
effectiveness, and his description of each of these categories was incomplete. His implicit conception
of military effectiveness focused on the division of labor between civilian and military experts. He did
not emphasize the need for strategic coherence; nor did he describe how this entailed compromising
the aforementioned division of labor by allowing civilians to meddle in operational and tactical
details.

Similarly, his conception of civilian control focused excessively on internal mechanisms of

control, while largely ignoring the equally important external mechanisms. He did not see civilian
control as a combination of external and internal mechanisms. Instead, he offered a purely
internalist position. This argument was based on an imperfect conception of military
professionalism. Huntington believed that professional soldiers will automatically be loyal to a
democratically elected government. However, this is not necessarily the case. Even professional
soldiers are loyal to many different groups and communities and one cannot argue a priori that they
will remain loyal to the government in a time of crisis. Furthermore, many of the mechanisms that

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create modern military culture also lead to parochialism. Officers may just as well pursue the narrow
interests of the military bureaucracy as they may pursue the interests of the government.

Huntington did not provide a comprehensive definition of professionalism – the most

important variable in his scheme. He offered three empirical characteristics of the professional
soldier, yet he did not pinpoint the essential nature of professionalism. The framework presented in
this dissertation offers such a definition. Military professionalism is the spread of officers, who have
become experts in military science through specialized training in military academies, throughout
the armed forces. When looking at the development of the modern military, one finds that it is only
one of several factors that facilitate political neutrality within military culture. Other factors, such as
the development of bureaucratic modes of organization characterized by meritocratic promotion
structures and a strong and legitimate state, play an equally important role.

This limitation within Huntington’s framework was, to some extent, caused by an incomplete
conception of military expertise. He implicitly understood it as a scientific and universal knowledge
type, which can be taught at the military academy and which will not differ from officer to officer.
The framework presented in this dissertation offers a more nuanced portrayal of military expertise.
Clausewitz understood military expertise as both an art and a science. While it certainly contains
scientific elements, such as the calculation of troop movements and the performance of weaponry, it
cannot be reduced to a purely scientific type of knowledge. It also contains some elements of
intuitive and artistic thinking, which cannot be taught at the academy. Thus, different officers come
to different recommendations about the same issue. For that reason, military expertise is not of a
universal standard, and the military officer, though an expert in the eyes of the public, cannot claim
the authority of infallible skill. Instead, his judgments may be questioned by other experts, and
become the subject of debate.

Huntington’s framework also failed to paint an accurate portrait of societal civil-military

relations. The twin imperatives shaping these relations were not defined adequately. When
analyzing the societal imperative, he grasped how the state could be endangered if dominated by
anti-military ideology. However, he did not describe how militarism – the flip-side of the ideological
coin – could also cause significant problems. His analysis of the functional imperative overestimated
the importance of military force and failed to grasp how many states have other tools for power
generation at their disposal. Analyzing the American Cold War societal civil-military relations, he did
not understand that the United States occupied a privileged position in the international system,
which - combined with its strong domestic economy - allowed it to dominate even though it did not
direct all its available resources to the military. This latter mistake was transposed into his theory of

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civil-military relations and caused him to make inaccurate predictions of American Cold War civil-
military relations.

Based on the many problems with his theory and theoretical framework, the status of
Samuel Huntington’s work within the field should be reconsidered. Huntington’s writings – especially
The Soldier and the State –have hitherto been the starting point for exploring civil-military relations.
Huntington is certainly one of the field’s great masters. However, he can no longer be the starting
point for all scholarship. He should instead become a figure of primarily historical importance, whom
it is crucial to study to understand the historical background of the field, but who does not define the

field in the 21st century. His role should be akin to that which figures like August Comte or Ferdinand
Tönnies have within sociology. Comte was the father of modern social science and introduced
several of the categories that eventually turned into our modern social science vocabulary. Tönnies
introduced the distinction between traditional communal life and the rationalized existence of
modernity – Gemeinshaft and Gesellschaft – which has become central to most sociological theory
from Weber to Foucault. Reading Comte and Tönnies is crucial if one wants to understand the
intellectual history of the social sciences. It gives us a chance to understand from where our frames
of mind come. Anyone who would want to scrutinize our present concepts might go back to Comte
and Tönnies to understand their historical origins. However, no one would argue that one could
analyze today’s society in any satisfactory way using their categories alone. Instead, contemporary
sociologists have taken their notions and refined them through a long process of theoretical
discussion. In the same way, the civil-military relations field has to move beyond Huntington.
Challenging Huntington has been an important task – this dissertation has been doing just that – but
the field simply has to move on. This dissertation has shown that Huntington’s theory and theoretical
framework were both flawed. It has provided the field with a new and coherent theoretical
framework. The study of civil-military relations is moving into a post-Huntingtonian era.

The future of civil-military relations research

Theoretical frameworks help us to ask better questions about a field of study. For instance, Kenneth
Waltz’ theoretical framework of international relations - presented in Man, the State and War -
allowed scholars to pinpoint the gaps in their existing knowledge of international politics. Thus, the
theoretical framework of civil-military relations permits us to understand what we do not know
about how soldiers and civilians interact. I would therefore like to conclude this dissertation by
listing what I consider to be the five most promising avenues for future research. Firstly, and perhaps
foremost, the literature still lacks a comprehensive theory of elite civil-military relations. The
framework presented in this dissertation highlights the crucial factors that determine patterns of

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elite civil-military relations. However, it has not explored the relative importance of these factors.
Which of them determine how soldiers and civilians interact? Had it done so, it would have
presented a theory of elite civil-military relations. Such a theory, however, requires careful empirical
analysis, which was well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Analyzing empirical cases to develop a
theory of elite civil-military relations is perhaps the most important task facing students of civil-
military relations.

Secondly, we still need a greater understanding how civilian control is the result of internal
and external mechanisms for control. Civilian control is – as mentioned - one of the two major
subtopics within civil-military relations. By distinguishing between these two types of control
mechanisms, this dissertation showed that neither of these mechanisms can explain civilian control
of the military. Instead, civilian control is always instituted through a combination of external and
internal mechanisms for control. The literature has hitherto focused on either internal or external
mechanisms. Future research should explore how these mechanisms are combined.

Thirdly, we need a much better conception of how internal control mechanisms work. The
civil-military relations literature cannot explain why members of the military become politically
neutral. Political neutrality, the dominant literature argues, follows from the fact that modern
officers are professionals. This dissertation explored this idea and found it wanting. Professionalism
most often means a politically neutrality military. It covers a variety of different causal mechanisms,
which are rarely mentioned. The relationship between these causal factors – which constitutes the
underlying cause of political neutrality – is generally not explored. Understanding how and why
militaries become politically neutral should be a goal for future civil-military relations research. The
model presented in chapter 7 could be a starting point for that endeavor.

Fourth, we must gain get a better understanding of how military effectiveness – the second
area of study within elite civil-military relations - is generated. The literature on elite civil-military
relations and military effectiveness has focused on the empirical study of historical examples. It
yields several important insights about which patterns of civil-military relations are optimal for
military effectiveness. It generally argues that civilian meddling generates military effectiveness.
However, to be useful for the civil-military relations field, these historical insights need to be
captured in more general terms. The existing literature focuses on a few successful cases. Very little
research looks at cases where the civil-military interaction results in defeat. One could hypothesize
that there would be cases where civilian meddling had a detrimental effect.
Finally, this dissertation kept two variables – the character of war and the polity of the state

– more or less constant. It was shown that the relative importance of political and military expertise
is crucial for elite civil-military relations. However, I did not explore how different types of war entail

213
more or less political and military expertise. Future research can broaden the conclusions of this
dissertation by looking at that question. Furthermore, I only looked at elite civil-military relations in
advanced, Western democracies. In principle, one would expect that the processes uncovered in this
dissertation can be found in other types of societies as well. Merging this research with the vast coup
studies field that looks primarily on developing states is another avenue for future research.

With that outline of the future avenues for civil-military relations research, this dissertation
has gone full circle. We set out to understand how better theories of civil-military relations could be
developed, and if there were any stumbling blocks preventing this from happening. It was shown
that the lack of a coherent theoretical framework was the main problem. Such a framework was
then developed and the avenues for future research were highlighted. This framework will hopefully
serve as the foundation for more accurate analyses of civil-military relations.

214
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