ROWARD TUBOG JD -1
USJR-LAW SY: 2020-2021
SUBJECT: Constitutional Law 1
TOPIC: RA 7941 (Party-list System)
TITLE: BANAT v. COMELEC
CITATION: G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009
FACTS:
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because
"the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and
shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in
NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan
Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same
day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution a
mandatory or merely a ceiling.
2. Whether or not three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional.
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes
prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.
4. Whether or not participation of major political parties are allowed.
RULING:
1. It is merely a ceiling.
Party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% Party-list representatives from being filled.
2. It is constitutional
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified
party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that
prevents any from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure
used.
3. Partly unconstitutional.
The two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The Two percent
threshold frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
that members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is
where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in
Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total
number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum
number of available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives."
4. Yes.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any
permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that
participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral
party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties
in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion
of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation
of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or
form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political
purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal
Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal
ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors.
To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing
to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field
its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.
