Agency Problem and Solutions Company
Agency Problem and Solutions Company
Based on these two cases, we can see there are two problem that arise about agency
problem. Firstly, on the Enron scandal. Enron's directors were required by statute to
protect and support investor interests, but they had few other motivations to do so.
However, several critics conclude that the company's board of directors refused to
perform its regulatory position and rejected its enforcement obligations, allowing the
company to participate in criminal conduct. Basically, Enron's leadership fooled
regulators with fake holdings and off-the-books accounting practices.
Second, case is on Bernie Madoff. Where by, Ponzi schemes simply prey on investor
mistrust and distrust of the banking industry, despite the fact that existing financial
institutions mitigate risk by providing supervision and implementing legal practices. This
investment establish an atmosphere in which the buyer cannot be certain that the agent
is behaving in the best interests of the principal. Therefore, many investors fall into Ponzi
schemes thinking that taking fund management outside a traditional banking institution
reduces fees and saves money.
Solution
1. Performance evaluation and compensation
The main way of aligning the needs of all sides is by the agent's payout. To solve the
principal-agent dilemma, pay must be related to the agent's output. Subjective appraisal
is commonly used to evaluate the agent's output because it is a more versatile and
balanced measurement tool for complex workers. Stock options, profit-sharing, and
contingent pay are all common forms of agent compensation. Integrating the agent's fee
for the incentives received by the principal aids in the elimination of conflicts of interest.
2. Contract design
The primary goal of contract design is to provide a contract structure between the
principal and the agent in order to solve problems of knowledge asymmetry, stimulate
the agent's desires to behave in the best interests of the principal, and provide
mechanisms for controlling agents.