BAR

BRITISH ARMY REVIEW

NUMBER 177 WINTER/SPRING 2020

BAR 177
BAR 177

WINTER /
SPRING 2020 The Journal of British Military Thought
ADR009205
Contents
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Contributions from overseas commands must be cleared by
the relevant Command Headquarters before submission. Professor Sir Michael Howard 4 BRITISH ARMY REVIEW
BAR assumes such clearance has taken place. OM CH CBE MC FBA FRHistS The Review is intended to provide a forum for the discussion
Submissions: Articles should not normally exceed 3,000 of all matters of professional interest to the soldier. Articles
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THEME: CONSTANT having a special knowledge of military affairs. Controversy
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COMPETITION promote thought and discussion and is therefore welcomed.
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| The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Cover photo: Mr Jack Eckersley

Ignoring the Calls for 54 BOOKS

Korean Unification
Major Mike Churchman America’s Modern Wars 102
WO1 John Hetherington
Making the Army Better 62
with 360 Degree Reporting Hurricane: The Last Witnesses 104
Captain Robin Winstanley Nick Smith

Psychometric Diversity, Creativity 70 Fight to the Finish 106

and The Open Plan Office John Peaty
Major James Ashton
Why We Fight 108
Empowerment and Mission 76 Major David Hoey
Command - Uneasy Bedfellows?
Lieutenant Colonel Simon Graham Mission Command: Who, What, 110
When, Where and Why? 1 & 2
Dr Martin Samuels
EDUCATION
Sceptical Christianity 112
A British View of International 86 David Benest
Attachment at the German
Officer School Cornerstones 114
Lieutenant Conor Patrick Colonel Toby Bridge

Command: 116
HISTORY The 21st Century General
Colonel Alistair McCluskey
Managing the News during 94
the Battle For Rome 1944 How Armies Grow in the Age 118
Brigadier (Ret’d) Richard Toomey of Total War 1789-1945
Captain Steve Maguire

The Nazi Hunters 120

Ian Palmer

BAR CONTENTS | 1
Editorial

W elcome to the British Army Review

(BAR) 177, winter and spring 2020.
We open this edition with an obituary for
Not to be outdone, Russia made moves
in the Information Manoeuvre arena
during the same period. On 1st November
Professor Sir Michael Howard who sadly the Kremlin’s Sovereign Internet Law
passed away in December last year. As came into force which enables the
the pre-eminent figure in British military disconnection of the Russian Internet
history, Sir Michael was a driving force from the World Wide Web and forces the
in the development of War Studies as an use of national IT infrastructure.
academic discipline in the 20th Century. This was exercised on 27th December
His insight illuminated many debates, and when RuNET was unplugged from the
to the great relief of many Army Officers, World Wide Web and tested. While this
his pen was both eloquent and concise. has been described as an essential
Notwithstanding his wide academic defence capability against external
achievements, those who had the threats, critics suggest it will pose an
privilege to meet him, were received with equal constraint to Russian opposition
humility, interest and encouragement. groups by providing Putin’s Government
We will miss him. with a de-facto censorship capability
in the future. In addition to these
When we chose the theme of ‘Competing developments, on 27th December Russia
in the Constant Competition’ for this declared that the Hypersonic Avangard
edition, we could not have predicted missile system was now operational.
that it would reflect the recent dramatic While there remains some debate about
developments in the conduct of the true capability of the system, its
international relations as closely as deployment supports the strong national
it has. narrative emanating from Moscow and
plays to audiences both at home and
The delivery of drone strikes by Iran (or abroad. We await the further development
their Houthi proxies) on the Saudi oil of these events with interest.
facility at Abqaiq in September illustrated
the increasingly transparent fusion of As we begin to explore the requirement
state-provided military technology with for us to ‘operate’ as well as ‘fight’, the
non-state actors to execute a strategic articles in themed section of this edition
attack. Tehran repeated the trick capture some of the emerging thinking
throughout November and December, by our personnel. Will Davies reports
with an escalating campaign of missile on his impressions working alongside
strikes on Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the Peshmerga in Iraqi Kurdistan,
bases in Iraq. These actions culminated highlighting, in particular, the strategic
in the US decision to kill Major General opportunities that can be exploited if
Soleimani, the Commander of the IRGC we develop our capability in this area.
Al-Quds Force with its own drone strike Perhaps the key to that is improving
on 3 January. our ability to understand the operating

2 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

environment in its widest context. much remains at stake on the Peninsula,
This is the role of 77 Brigade and is suggesting that global interests are
described for the uninitiated by James best served by maintaining a ‘two-state’
Chandler’s article. As part of 77 Brigade’s solution in the future.
Outreach Group, Thammy Evans’
article reminds us that perception is We also have three articles which look
always ‘in the eye of the beholder’ and at personnel aspects of life within the
that gender plays a critical role in this British Army, followed by an excursion
respect. It’s difficult to believe that we to our Bundeswehr colleagues in
will fully understand the human terrain Dresden. James Ashton explores the
if we exclude this critical aspect of the effect of ergonomics on creative thinking
community perspective. There’s no doubt in a modern military workspace, while
that these aspects of our operational one of our younger generation, Robin
repertoire will become an increasingly Winstanley, provides a ‘shop-floor’
important area of development in the perspective of 360-degree reporting. It’s
coming months and years. We close an interesting point for ‘self-reflection’
the themed section with an article for some of us ‘old sweats’. Similarly,
republished from AGILE WARRIOR Simon Graham outlines some of his
reports which highlights how we may insights into ‘empowerment’ within the
choose - or be required - to fight in the Army. His research has some thought-
future. While this may seem incongruous provoking conclusions and observations;
in a theme of constant competition, it it is essential reading. Meanwhile, from
gives pause for thought about how we will Germany, Conor Patrick reports his
transition between the constant need to experiences on the Offizierlehrgang 2 at
‘operate’ and the episodic requirement to Dresden, comparing it to the education
fight. This needs serious consideration if we give our YOs through JOTAC.
we are to outmanoeuvre our adversaries.
We will watch and report. Finally, we return to Information with our
historical article on the Battle for Rome
In the main section, we lead off in a in 1944 before we close with another
similar vein with the second part of selection of book reviews. As ever, a
James Derleth’s article on Stability diverse set of observations and opinions.
Operations. This is followed by an article We hope you enjoy them.
that picks up the threads of BAR 176 on
‘Victory’ from Michael C Davies, a PhD
student at KCL who highlights 10 themes
through which we could reflect on victory.
Strategic outcomes are also discussed
by Mike Churchman. As we approach
the 70th Anniversary of the Korean
War, his article is a timely reminder that

BAR EDITORIAL | 3
Professor Sir Michael
Howard OM CH CBE MC
FBA FRHistS, 1922-2019

This photo of Sir Michael Howard is reprinted here by kind permission of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

4 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 OBITUARY

As BAR published an interview with Professor Sir Sir Michael educated several generations of military
Michael Howard a few issues back we felt it was only history scholars at King’s and Oxford. I myself had
fitting that we publish his obituary, written by William the good fortune to be taught by him as a final-year
Philpott, the President of the British Commission for undergraduate shortly before his retirement from Oxford
Military History. - his special subject on British strategy in the First World
War era directed me onto the path which I have followed

I t is with sadness that I have to report the death, aged

97, of Professor Sir Michael Howard, a long-standing
and in later years honorary member of the British
as a scholar - and thereafter he supported my application
for doctoral studies and took a kind interest in the
development of my career. Many other BCMH members
Commission for Military History. Sir Michael was the will have had similar experience of his warmth and
foremost military historian of the second half of the encouragement to students and scholars. Those who had
twentieth century. After wartime military service in the chance to hear him speak, which he did with verve
the Coldstream Guards in Italy and studies at Oxford well into his 90s, will remember his engaging, witty and
University, he embarked on an academic career at King’s thought-provoking lecturing style.
College London. Here he founded the War Studies
Department in the early 1960s, from which root grew To an older generation he was a colleague and mentor,
the expansion and diversification of military history in to the younger generation an inspiration or legend.
British universities over the last sixty years. I commend to you his autobiography, Captain Professor
(Continuum, 2006). The modern military history
An advocate of what he called ‘total history’, he believed profession has lost its creator and colossus.
that the history of strategy and military operations could
not be properly understood separately from the history
of the societies that went to war. This philosophy was
reflected in his scholarly output, such as his masterful
history of the Franco-Prussian war published in 1961.

An official historian and translator of Clausewitz,

generations of students will best know his work from
his short but seminal textbook, War in European
History, which I was encouraged to read in the 1980s
and which is still recommended today. He had the gift
of summarising the complexities of history in short,
erudite and readable texts: two published collections of
lectures, War and the Liberal Conscience (1977) and The
Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence
Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (1971) remain
widely read and cited. After leaving King’s Sir Michael
was Chichele Professor for the History of War and Regius
Professor of Modern History at Oxford University. His
final academic post was Robert A. Lovett Professor of
Military and Naval History at Yale University.

OBITUARY | 5
Competition in
the Periphery
Colonel Will Davies, CGS Fellow, Chatham House, uses a case
study of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to argue that competition
extends to peripheral regions with global effects.

A British Army trainer gives instruction during land navigation training at the Kurdistan Training Coordination Center (KTCC) near Erbil, Iraq.
Photo: Sergeant Tracy McKithern, Crown Copyright.

6 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 COMPETITION IN THE PERIPHERY

Major powers have entered a more intense period of terrorism and capacity-building to the strategic, political-
strategic competition for regional and global advantage, military level. I saw patterns and made connections
played out below the threshold of armed conflict. This where I had previously been blind, particularly in terms
paper uses the author’s experiences in the Kurdistan of the region’s geopolitics, the UK’s long-term strategic
Region of Iraq (KRI) to argue that this competition interests and opportunities, and the competing interests
extends to peripheral regions like the KRI where, beyond of other international actors. The lens through which I
the current focus on Daesh and counter-terrorism, there viewed my role had changed.
are opportunities to gain (and lose) strategic advantage
over major rivals such as China, Russia and Iran in the As I left the KRI after 12 months, I had several
longer term. However, these can only be realised if the unanswered questions. Beyond counter-terrorism
UK and its allies view their overseas activities, including objectives in the KRI, is the UK configured to achieve
those of the British Army, through the lens of enduring, competitive advantage over other actors? Does it have
constant competition and re-frame the design and long-term goals beyond the defeat of Daesh? Had my
delivery of these activities accordingly. role supported these long-term goals? Are the UK’s
competitors gaining relative advantage in the KRI?

T he concept of constant competition features

prominently in current debates amongst the military,
academia and think tanks alongside the related concepts
CONSTANT COMPETITION?
Definitions of competition in international relations are
surprisingly hard to find, let alone definitions of constant
of the grey zone and hybrid warfare. The phenomenon is competition.1 Received wisdom is that major powers
not new in international relations; nations have always have entered a more fluid era of enduring competition
sought competitive advantage over each other. Its current for strategic advantage. This is an unpredictable form of
prominence reflects the rise of major power challengers competition with no conventional state of war or peace,
to the post-Cold War unipolar world order and doctrine no start or end, and no winning or losing.2
of liberal hegemony, particularly from China and Russia,
and their quest for strategic advantage over the US and In this infinite game of influence and advantage, rival
its allies. states are employing national levers of power to get ahead
and avoid falling behind their rivals, often in cooperation
As I deployed to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2018 for with partners and usually below the threshold of armed
12 months as an adviser on the reform of the Peshmerga, conflict. For the US and its allies, the principal competitors
constant competition was far from my mind. Funded by on the global stage are China and Russia who are ‘shaping
the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), my role a world consistent with their authoritarian model.’3
was to advise the regional government on developing a
more effective, accountable and affordable Peshmerga The US has recently published guidance on a
with greater institutional capacity and resilience. ‘Competition Continuum’ which sets out a conceptual
This was supporting the operational defeat of Daesh framework to shift thinking onwards from the current
in the short-term and building capacity to prevent the artificial, binary distinction between the state of armed
emergence of new extremist threats in the longer term. conflict and peace.4 And the UK is currently working on
future operating concepts that address this phenomenon.
Working in a Foreign and Commonwealth Office However, there is little consensus on what constant
environment lifted my horizons from the level of counter- competition actually means for the US, UK and their allies.

1  Mazaar, M., et al, Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, RAND Research
Report. In this vacuum, RAND has defined competition in the international realm as ‘the attempt to gain advantage, often relative to others
believed to pose a challenge or threat, through the self-interested pursuit of contested goods such as power, security, wealth, influence, and status.’
2  ADP Land Operations (2017), UK Doctrine and elsewhere.
3  Mazaar, op. cit.
4  US Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 7

A British soldier assigned to Task Force Besmaya teaches a class of Iraqi soldiers how to identify possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
locations during training at the Besmaya Range Complex, Iraq. Photo: Specialist Eric Cerami, Combined Joint Task Force, Released.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS and simultaneous cooperation and competition with the

Analysis from recent articles and my experiences in the same actor may also occur. The ultimate objective must
KRI point to four characteristics of constant competition. be to prevent relationships moving above coexistence and
cooperation through active dialogue, transparency, and
First, the need to understand the regional and local shared understanding, although history suggests harder
operating environment in terms of the actors and competition with some is inevitable.
competitors, their relative strengths and weaknesses,
the opportunities in the short and long-term, and Third, a mindset and commitment to enduring competition,
the obstacles. Clausewitz’s basic injunction on the with long-term goals: While activity is conducted in the
importance of establishing ‘the kind of war on which you short-term, goals and aiming marks must be sufficiently
are embarking’5 applies equally to a period of constant long-term to generate a sense of trajectory and avoid a
competition. reactive approach. A framework of ‘think long, act short’
should be embraced rather than any short-term, reactive
Second, the type and intensity of competitive activity: alternative. Commitments must be made and held over
Nations draw from a wide array of strategies for gaining time, even in the face of short-term setbacks and lack of
absolute or relative advantage - some will be cooperative, progress. Success requires a vision and national resolve
some neutral, and some competitive.6 As such, relationships to synchronize all elements of statecraft to work toward
fall on a competition spectrum, from basic coexistence an objective whose achievement may lie decades in the
to mutual cooperation to soft and hard competition and future.7 Premature withdrawal from the competition risks
finally to armed conflict. Relationships may alter over time, loss of advantage and forfeiture of opportunities.

5  Clausewitz, C., On War, translated by M Howard and P Paret, Princeton University Press, 1984.
6  Mazaar, op. cit.
7  Brands, H., The Lost Art of Long-Term Competition., The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2019.

8 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Fourth, an appropriate blend of strategic levers - political, Sources of tension in the near neighbourhood include
economic, security, and informational - within a supporting ongoing civil protests in Baghdad, Beirut and Tehran;
strategic and operational framework, which are tailored to Iranian infiltration of Iraqi institutions and growing
the local environment and employed in cooperation with regional hegemony10; unpredictable US foreign policy,
like-minded partners when applicable. The UK’s Fusion withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
Doctrine aims to achieve this. and a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran including
the recent assassination of Qassem Soleimani11; and,
GEOPOLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KRI growing Russian and Chinese influence in the region.12
The KRI and Iraq remain critical to the UK and its allies
for reasons of security, energy, and influence. The KRI’s geographic location, its relative stability
compared to its neighbours, and its socio-political
The KRI is an autonomous region in the north of Iraq cohesion make it a critical cog in the broader
rich in oil and gas8 and bordered by the geopolitical management of the region’s politics and security.
trouble-spots of federal Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. As central Baghdad falters again with a weak
It is a sensitive and unpredictable region at the heart of government, civil unrest, and cross-border tension
the Iranian/Shiite axis that is prone to instability and following the assassination of Qaseem Soleimani,
insecurity9, including in recent years the rise of Daesh the KRI remains relatively stable.
and the war in Syria.
The KRI’s outward-facing leaders, their more liberal,
reformist agenda, and economic resources offer
opportunities for the UK and its allies to gain competitive
advantage and influence in the region and advance
economic and security interests. However, these
opportunities are not unique to the UK with other actors
also having access to them.

Image shows a Kurdish Soldier during an exercise. The UK Training Team in ERBIL continues training soldiers from the Kurdish Security
Forces in order to better enable them to counter the threat of DAESH. Photo: Crown Copyright

8  The Oil and Gas Year: oil reserves 45 billion barrels; oil production 451,000 barrels per day; gas reserves 5.7 trillion cubic metres.
9  Milley, R., The Unwanted Wars: Why The Middle East Is More Combustible Than Ever, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 19.
10  Leaked Cables Reveal Extent of Iran’s Influence in Iraq, The Guardian, 18 Nov 19.
11  Hannah, J., US Deterrence in the Middle East Is Collapsing, Foreign Policy, 30 Oct 19.
12  Rumer, H., Russia in the Middle East: Jack of all Trades, Master of None, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Oct 19.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 9

COMPETITION IN THE PERIPHERY For Russia, the KRI offers opportunities to deepen its
There are 37 major diplomatic representations to the regional influence, continuing a decade-long trend of
Kurdistan Regional Government including the major encroaching on the US as the Middle East power-broker.14
global powers of the US, UK, China, Germany, EU nations, Recent Russian bilateral engagement with the KRI includes
Russia, and the regional powers of Turkey and Iran.13 Rosneft’s energy deals worth US$3.5 billion since 2017
A simple measure of the KRI’s geopolitical significance is and a long-term partnership with the regional government.
the number of high-profile inward political visits in recent The operations of Rosneft, Gazprom and Tatneft in wider
months that have included the US Vice President, French Iraq are clear manifestations of Russia’s use of state energy
President, and Russian Foreign Minister. companies as instruments of Russian foreign policy.15
These deals make Russia a key international investor; they
Most actors in the KRI are democracies that are instrumentalize Moscow’s foreign policy; and they develop
competing economically but whose interests otherwise Russian control over gas supplies, which Europe may
mostly converge. Cooperation is the baseline type of potentially depend upon in the future. Commercial deals
relationship, manifested most prominently in the current serve to lock the KRI into arms and trade deals and extend
unified approach to counter-terrorism and tackling Daesh. military cooperation as ways to expand Russian influence
However, other actors have strategic interests that are further. While some experts point to systemic long-term
divergent. The KRI is an attractive zone for the ambitions political and economic weaknesses that may limit Russian
of authoritarian regimes like Russia and China, and Iran regional advances in the longer-term, Russian influence in
regionally, to further their own national interests. the region is currently only increasing.16

A British army trainer gives instruction during training at the Kurdistan Training Coordination Center (KTCC) near Erbil. The KTCC is a Combined
Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve building partner capacity location dedicated to training partner forces and enhancing their effectiveness
on the battlefield. CJTF-OIR is the global Coalition to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Photo: Sergeant Tracy McKithern, Crown Copyright

13  Kurdistan Regional Government Website, Department of Foreign Relations.

14  Ferguson, N., Iran is too weak to start a world war, The Sunday Times, 5 Jan 20.
15  RE-DO - https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/russia-and-china-forced-cohabitation-over-syraq-energy-22471.
16  Wasser, B., The Limits of Russian Strategy in the Middle East, RAND, 2019.

10 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

China, as the world’s largest importer of crude oil since term motivations and objectives, their strengths and
2017, has been an investor in Iraqi oil and gas for 20 weaknesses relative to the UK and its allies, and
years and the largest consumer of Iraqi Kurdish oil. It has the local political economy in which they operate.
recently announced plans to expand its regional role and This would ensure that military ways and means are
deepen cooperation with the Kurdistan region in the fields optimally aligned to the local environment and adjusted
of energy and infrastructure within the framework of the as conditions change. Military personnel deployed to
Belt and Road initiative.17 the region must be selected, prepared and then assigned
in a way that maximises their understanding of local
Iran’s influence in Baghdad is well documented, and it culture, language, and the nuances of the operating
is now more actively seeking to expand its engagement environment. Current deployment lengths are short
and influence inside Iraqi Kurdistan, not just among its (mostly 6 months or less) meaning that developing true
usual proteges near the common border but also in the understanding and functioning networks is challenging,
capital of Erbil and in the ranks of the previously more and pre-deployment training and preparation is
reticent KDP party centred there.18 Kurds, keen for Western insufficiently specialist or detailed.
engagement yet disappointed by the lack of European
and US support during its independence referendum in Second, the type and intensity of competitive activity.
2017, are balancing their options. During my time in the KRI, the UK’s military focus was
on immediate counter-terrorism objectives, meaning
Against this incoming tide of foreign influence and I was mostly blind to the military activities of several
power, my experiences last year suggest the UK is potential competitors in the region, including China,
still well placed to continue generating influence and Russia, Iran and Turkey. This created a knowledge gap
competitive advantage in the KRI as a result of its on other competitors’ broader military activities and
language, sense of values and soft power, historical motivations, with potential for opportunities to be missed
connections, reputation for fairness and consistency, and and a sense of suspicion fostered. A broader perspective
influence amongst allies. on competitive activity would have been useful.

However, this level of influence cannot be assumed. Third, a mindset and commitment to enduring competition,
The UK’s strategy in the KRI and Iraq, along with many with long-term goals. Commitments in the KRI are often
of its allies, is still predominantly focused narrowly on undermined by the annualised MOD and CSSF funding
counter-terrorism and the defeat of Daesh. With the threat and review cycles, inducing uncertainty over the future
from Daesh diminishing and other nations adopting of projects. This does little to instil confidence amongst
broader strategies in the KRI and its surrounding region, partners and generate mutual commitment, while
the UK should re-configure its activities to be effective in creating space for potentially more malignant actors
a longer-term competition against rivals such as China, to gain influence with local partners. Instead, the UK’s
Russia and Iran. military commitments could be cast and communicated
in a way that generates maximum certainty and
MAXIMISING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE - commitment for its allies and partners, while also serving
THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION to demonstrate clearly the UK’s intent to rivals.
One way to analyse this is to imagine how the UK’s
current military activity in the KRI might look when Long-term objectives could be agreed in cooperation
viewed through the lens of constant competition and with partners and allies to enhance mutual commitment
reconfigured against its four characteristics. and ensure priorities are appropriately targeted and
resourced. The defeat of Daesh, for example, ought to
First, understanding the regional and local operating have been a short-term milestone within a longer-term
environment. In my role, understanding of the local 20-year regional security plan, not an end itself. Military
environment was often patchy and one-dimensional. activity should shift to be focused on building long-
To truly understand the operating environment, experts term institutional capacity and confidence in Kurdish
- local and regional, academic and technical - could be partners rather than basic infantry skills. The short-term
employed to understand and assess the environment inconvenience of force generating more specialist troops
more precisely and periodically, particularly in for these tasks would be outweighed by long-term gains
terms of the other actors in the region, their long- in-country.

17  China Vows to boost cooperation with Iraqi Kurdistan, china.org.cn, 1 Aug 19.
18  Pollock, D., Iraq’s Kurds Balance Their Options, Weighing the US and the Iranians, The Washington Institute, 20 Mar 19.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 11

Military goals in the region would be more useful in this
long-term competition if they were broad and strategic
rather than short-term and technical. For example, a long-
term goal might be to ensure the regional government
continues to view the UK as a military ‘partner of choice’
before other rivals.

Fourth, an appropriate blend of strategic levers.

Fusion Doctrine should be applied to operational,
regional activity in the same way it is fused strategically
in London; currently, fusion between UK government
departments is not fully effective in-country.
The military element of a fused approach would be
based in part on current high levels of influence and
standing of the UK military with its KRI partners.
Similarly, maintaining cohesion and cooperation with
like-minded allies would create a bloc against potential
rivals and further strengthen the UK’s position.

CONCLUSIONS
The UK’s policy in the KRI has been understandably
focused on counter-terrorism and the campaign against
Daesh. With the threat from Daesh diminishing and
a new UK government in place, the UK governmental
review of foreign, security and defence policy offers
an opportunity to embrace new thinking surrounding
constant competition against major rivals. The MOD
and the Army are also now developing future operating
concepts in which the concept of constant competition
will feature.

In Iraq, there are also opportunities to enshrine this

thinking in the country plan. The MOD is now signing
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Iraqi
Government and defining its long-term Defence Offer to
Iraq, although its status may be in question following the
Soleimani assassination.

Beyond short-term counter-terrorism objectives, the KRI

sits on the periphery of a much broader and longer-term
competition for strategic advantage and influence against
rivals such as China, Russia and Iran. The KRI and other
similar regions offer opportunities in this competition;
however, these will only be available if the UK stays
engaged there, views its activity through a broader lens
of constant competition with a longer time horizon, and re-
frames the design and delivery of its activity accordingly.
In short, and by its very definition, this constant
competition is a longer-term game, and the UK (as with
any of the other players) would be most successful, if they
were to frame its activity within that context.

12 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

The last Tornado GR4 aircraft to take off from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus, bringing an end to four and a half years of the aircrafts
involvement on Op SHADER, the operation to destroy Daesh. Photo: Corporal Tim Laurence RAF, Crown Copyright

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 13

An Introduction to
77 Brigade
Lieutenant Colonel James Chandler, JSCSC, provides a brief
overview of the role of 77 Brigade.

A member of 77th Brigade’s Task Group prepares specialist equipment while deployed in the Belize jungle alongside the British Army’s
Specialist Infantry Group. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright

14 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

T he character of conflict is dramatically changing.
As recently noted by the Chief of the General Staff,
General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, the digital revolution
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Islamic State’s
blitzkrieg through northern Iraq and Syria. Building
on his experiences in Afghanistan, General Carter
has provided adversaries with a new dimension to gain a recommended the Army adopt a broader perspective
position of advantage over traditional Western militaries, on manoeuvre, one that incorporates non-lethal
like the British Army. Exploitation of the 21st Century’s levers of influence, like information activities and civil
information environment by irregular forces and hostile engagement. He believed that modern ‘wars among
states have shown that manoeuvre on the battlefield the people’ mean the Army must learn to focus on the
today involves more than just the fire and movement dynamics of local populations, their thoughts, fears and
of fielded forces. Furthermore, we now live in an era of desires, more than just where they live and what tribe
‘constant competition’, where the lines between war and they are part of. Complementing this thinking were a
peace, home and away, are blurred beyond distinction. range of initiatives to help the Army re-structure itself for
Adapting to this ‘grey zone’ or ‘hybrid’ warfare, where these challenges. One such initiative was the creation of
physical battles between massed armies may not be the 77th Brigade.
decisive moments in the minds of global audiences, is
the challenge of our generation. 77th Brigade is the British Army’s information activities
and outreach formation. Information activities concern
During his tenure as Chief of the General Staff, General any undertaking that seeks to understand and utilise
Sir Nick Carter encouraged the Army to consider the the information environment. Outreach is the Army’s
implications of this new era. An era, he noted, that had term to describe civil-military engagement and involves
witnessed the effects of ‘information warfare’ during anything from institutional capacity building to liaison

Information Activities and Outreach Teams provide practical information and outreach activity at Battle Group level, delivering a digital capture
and dissemination capability as well as local human terrain analysis and civil engagement. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 15

with international development agencies and charities. teams providing low-level support to Brigade and
Crucially, 77th Brigade is more than just the Army’s Battlegroup commanders. The Outreach Group develops
centre of excellence for non-lethal activities, it is the civil-military and capacity-building skillsets, while the
conceptual and physical driving force behind the Army’s Operational Media and Communications Group assists
development of a more integrated approach of lethal the Army with high-end media and communications.
and non-lethal effects to achieve influence in modern
military missions. While it is not the single answer to the Complementing its key outputs, the Brigade also delivers
challenges of today, it represents significant investment in other areas. Utilising the Land Intelligence Fusion
in new areas designed to support existing capabilities in Centre and the Specialist Group Military Intelligence,
finding effective ways to move forward. both under 77th Brigade command, it can assist
deployed commanders in understanding their area of
The Brigade’s structure reflects the delivery of its operations. An appreciation of local actors, audiences
outputs. The heart of the Brigade lies in the operations and adversaries can be achieved via social network
centre where all missions are planned and executed. analysis, information environment assessments and
It contains expertise from each part of the Brigade ‘human terrain’ studies. The Brigade also delivers civilian
organised into mission teams aligned to each Defence expertise. This initially stems from its reservists, many of
operational framework. It is supported by the Information whom have years of experience in the communications
Activities Group who provide content and production industry or international development. Further expertise
expertise. The Task Group is the Brigade’s deployable comes from the Brigade’s ‘special reserves’, a group of
element. Manned by officers and soldiers from the senior executives who provide top-level advice in areas
combat and combat support arms, it provides information from engineering and logistics to cyber, marketing and
and outreach support to the Army’s warfighting division. strategic communications. Importantly, the Brigade’s
This it does by forming part of the Divisional Information collective output aims to amplify and complement
Manoeuvre Group at headquarters and with tactical existing military capabilities, not replace them.

The Task Group is 77th Brigade’s deployable element. Manned by officers and soldiers from the combat and combat support arms, it provides
information activity and outreach support to the Field Army and Defence. Photo: 77 Brigade, Corporal D Knott, Crown Copyright

16 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

The Outreach Group develops civil-military and capacity building skillsets. Here, Major Charmaine Geldenhuys consults with local women in the
Democratic Republic of Congo whilst deployed as a Gender Adviser on Operation PERCIVAL. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright

The Brigade is a busy and exciting place to work. During NCOs are empowered to take calculated risks, enabling
the last two years it has played an important part in the them to ‘fail early and fail small’, before learning
UK’s contribution to a number of international events. quickly and exploiting lessons identified. By example,
These include: the fight against ISIS; NATO’s enhanced the Brigade plays an integral role in developing the
forward deployment to the Baltic states and Poland; Army’s emerging ‘information manoeuvre’ concept.
the humanitarian aid and disaster relief operation in This initiative seeks to combine information activities
the Caribbean; and the response to high profile events and outreach with a range of other capabilities, such
on the UK mainland. The Brigade has also maintained as counter-intelligence and cyber, in order to integrate
a near constant level of support to numerous defence cognitive and behavioural effects into the planning and
engagement initiatives in Africa and all the major defence execution of Army operations. This, and other projects,
exercises in the UK and abroad. For an organisation of aim to explore what ‘winning’ looks like for a 21st
only a few hundred, of which over 50% are reservists, Century military and how this might manifest itself in
this represents a significant level of commitment. As a practical terms.
result, the Brigade is a popular posting for those keen for
operational service and overseas travel. One area where 77th Brigade breaks new ground is
web operations. Stemming from the inspiration of one
Coupled with this busy programme, the Brigade is young officer and a handful of NCOs, the Brigade’s Web
also known for developing innovative ways of working. Operations Team is delivering capability in the virtual
Reflecting General Carleton-Smith’s new philosophy of space. Designed to provide detailed analysis of internet
‘prototype warfare’, the Brigade executes a ‘democratised’ activity and the ability to engage with friend and foe in
approach to experimentation, where young officers and the virtual domain, the Web Operations Team assists

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 17

A key component of 77th Brigade’s Information Activities Group is the Web Operations Team. Web Ops assists commanders at any level with
gaining an understanding of local sentiment and public opinion. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright

commanders with an understanding of local sentiment still trying to make sense of all the implications. The
and public opinion. From humble beginnings, the small creation of 77th Brigade is a brave and novel attempt
team now works on an almost permanent operational by the British Army to address these issues head-on
footing, often contributing to UK operations not widely and to ensure it remains a capable and credible force in
discussed or known about. The team is also typical the challenges of today. The success of this endeavour
of the 77th Brigade ethos. They are an eclectic bunch depends entirely on the quality and enthusiasm of the
of linguistic and social media experts, recruited on a young men and women who volunteer to serve in its
competency basis, who have gone a long way ranks. For those looking to help shape the nature of British
with nothing more than enthusiasm, energy and a Army operations in the information age, they should
positive attitude. consider a tour with 77th Brigade.

It is clear we live in a more complicated and interconnected During 2016-2018 Lieutenant Colonel James Chandler
world than ever before. The digital revolution has shifted led the 77th Brigade Research Unit. He has an MPhil
conflict into the information environment and morphed it in International Relations from the University of
into a near continuous ‘battle of narratives’ where skilful Cambridge, was Chief of the General Staff’s inaugural
manipulation of peoples’ perceptions has become of Army Visiting Fellow to Chatham House and is
strategic significance. It is possible we shall never see currently the Army Research Fellow at King’s College
contained military conflicts, like the Falklands and first London, where he is completing a PhD on Britain’s use
Gulf War, ever again. Traditional Western militaries are of information operations in Iraq.

18 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Members of 77th Brigade’s Operational Media and Communications Group capture a short ‘piece to camera’ with British troops
deployed in Estonia as part of Operation CABRIT. Photo: 77 Brigade, Crown Copyright

Elements of this article first appeared in The Light

Dragoon 7: 2 (2019) and are reprinted here by kind
permission of the editor.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 19

Trendy or Essential -
Gendered Analysis of the
Operational Environment1
Lieutenant Colonel Thammy Evans, Outreach Group, describes
how gendered analysis could be a game changer for operations.

A member of 77th Brigade, provides training on the international Military Gender and Protection Advisor (MGPA) course, Kazakhstan.
Photo: Author, Crown Copyright

1  An earlier version of this article appeared in the Intelligence Corps journal Cognitio (2019). Abridged version printed with permission. Further
discussion can be found on Defence Connect.

20 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 Long established as an essential analytical and For the purposes of this article, the following definitions
programmatic lens for international development work, apply: Gender refers to the social attributes associated
it is now high time for military operations to come with being male and female learned through socialisation
to grips with the implications of gendered analysis. and determines a person’s position and value in a given
Beyond the benefits of greater tactical access in the field, context. This means also the relationships between
gendered analysis should be a staple of the arsenal men, women, boys and girls, as well as the relations
of analytical tools available to military intelligence between women and those between men. Notably,
supporting command decisions. Outlining basic gender does not equate to an exclusive focus on women.2
definitions and the argument for why gender matters Gender analysis requires the systematic gathering and
to the military, this article charts the path from tactical examination of information on gender differences and
indicators to operational effects to strategic outcomes, social relations in order to identify and understand
and argues that gendered analysis could prove as inequities based on gender.3 Gendered analysis, by
fundamental a game changer for operations as the move comparison, is the application of gender perspectives
towards a Single Intelligence Environment a decade ago. (there are many, not just women) in the processing
Whilst not ‘innovative’ in the technological sense, the and exploitation of information to provide deeper
addition of a gender perspective to analysis is innovative and broader understanding of second and third order
as a methodological catalyst, resulting in potential consequences in a given situation. The aim is to produce
impact on root causes and conflict drivers in a way that a gendered assessment with impact on the operational
many technological innovations can’t hope to achieve. environment, the development of policy and plans, and
In today’s sub-threshold conflicts, a gendered analysis the achievement of strategic objectives.4
could additionally help provide the winning edge for
legitimacy in the information manoeuvre battle space for THE CASE FOR GENDERED ANALYSIS
hearts, minds, likes and clicks. Global recognition of the importance of the role of Women
in Peace and Security (WPS) is now 25 years old.5 Since

‘ Gender’ is an emotive word. In the military, where

the introduction of women into the armed forces
cuts into jobs that only a while ago were only open to
then the conversation about ‘sex and war’6 has widened
to include gender dynamics at play in some of the root,
structural, and proximate causes of conflict and therefore
men, the term gender is, as elsewhere in society, often its role in resolving conflict. The evidence to date mostly
mistakenly and perhaps even subconsciously willingly highlights a ‘correlation between gender and conflict,
confused with women. Whilst definitions of gender, rather than causation…[whereby] gender is never alone
gender analysis, and gendered analysis will follow, this as a cause or driver of conflict, and that it is always
article aims to take the conversation beyond ‘just add intertwined with other social, economic, cultural and
women and stir’ platitudes, to answer a commander’s political factors’.7 Understanding the degree to which
question ‘what utility does a gendered analysis have to gender dynamics, inequalities, and power relations are
achieve military strategic objectives?’ Moving from an embedded as structural and cultural drivers can give
understanding of gender analysis at the tactical level, powerful insight into how they exacerbate violent conflict.
further questions and examples will move the reader As in development work, understanding the (often hidden)
through the integration of a gendered analysis into forces at play in gender dynamics may therefore provide
operational assessments and then the policy, and moral valuable foresight for achieving operational objectives, as
implications for strategic level planning. the following sections will show.

2  NATO BI-Strategic Command Directive 40-001 (2017), p5.

3  Ibid.
4  Author’s working definition. See also Scottish Government (2007) The Case for a Gendered Analysis of Violence Against Women; Davies &
True (2015) Reframing conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence: Bringing gender analysis back in.
5  The Fourth World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, was the first major conference to identify women in armed conflict as a major
concern. See also UNSCR 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security; UNSCR 1820 (2009) declaring conflict related sexual violence as a war
crime; 2242 (2015) on doubling the number of uniformed female peacekeepers; 2272 (2017) on measures to prevent sexual exploitation and
abuse by UN peacekeepers, inter alia.
6  A provocative title used by Dr Malcom Potts and journalist Thomas Hayden in their book of the same name (2008), which takes a
historiographical and biological look at the phenomena of human nature, genes, warfare and terrorism.
7  Birchall, J (2019) Gender as a causal factor in conflict. K4D Helpdesk Report 549. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 21

An attendee of the Men, Peace and Security Symposium asks U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Ray Odierno a question regarding sexual assault
and sexual harassment in the Army in Washington, DC Oct. 28, 2013. The purpose of the symposium is to expand the scope of gender analysis to
include male-related issues in conflict, and acknowledges that gender roles are often in dynamic change during and after violent conflict.
U.S. Army photo: Staff Sgt. Steve Cortez / Released (Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Steve Cortez)

ANALYSIS - THE FIRST STEP IN SETTING TACTICAL stage to open up gender disaggregated insights:
INDICATORS AND SUPPORTING EFFECTS Examples of the use of gender analysis and gender
To date, guidance8 on gender at tactical, operational perspectives on military operations have tended to adopt
and strategic level focuses on what to do to be gender the approach of ‘just add women and stir’ in order to
compliant, including conducting a gender analysis. establish active tactical indicators, situational awareness,
Several models for gender analysis exist9, starting most and directly enhance a safe and secure environment, e.g.
notably with the Harvard Analytical Framework pioneered
in the 1980s for humanitarian and development work, • Mixed patrols in order to gain access and information
and most recently (2018) OSCE’s highly practical Gender from different parts of the population
in Military Operations: Guidance for Military Personnel • Patterns of movement of women and children as
Working at Tactical Level in Peace Support Operations, security indicators
which includes a section that starts to turn analysis into • Placing of roadblocks or road improvements to protect
assessment using a three column format (p.18). women and children.

A gender analysis (ie a systemic examination of gender In order to maximise the supporting effects being
relations) of the conflict is a first step in reviewing generated at the tactical level there are further questions
collated and evaluated information to identify significant that can be asked to enhance effectiveness: Have barriers
facts for subsequent interpretation.10 The table at Figure 1 11
been eliminated in order to facilitate Mixed Engagement
illustrates the type of questions that can be asked at this Teams (METs) and Female Engagement Teams (FETs)?

8  E.g. UN (2010) DPKO Guidelines: Integrating a gender perspective into the work of the United Nations military in peacekeeping operations.
9  See also Saferworld (2016) Gender Analysis of Conflict Toolkit; Conciliation Resources (2015) Gender and Conflict Analysis Toolkit; DCAF
(2020) Gender Toolkit (revised edition).
10  See AJP 2.1 for Intelligence Procedures (2016) for the full reference to analysis.
11  For examples of barriers, see DCAF, The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations: Baseline Study, 2018.

22 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 Not just asking: Also asking:

Who is talking? Who is listening?

What does the population do? Who does what?

Who is included? Who participates?

Who is invited? Who is present?

What has changed? Who is affected by the change?

Figure 1: Questions to help illicit sex- and gender-disaggregated data. Source: Nordic Centre for Gender in
Military Operations (NCGM, 2015) Whose Security? Practical Examples of Gender Perspectives in Military
Operations, p.8.

What is being done to integrate a gendered understanding INTEGRATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DECISIVE
into training, tactics, and procedures? What is being CONDITIONS OF OPERATIONS
done to mitigate against an escalation in gender-biased Beyond analysis is the integration of analysed
outcomes, e.g. against the rise in the severity of indicators information into the current picture of operations to
from potential, to impending ,to ongoing conflict-related reveal new significance to activities.15 For example,
sexual violence (CRSV)?12 gender analysis during Disarmament, Demobilisation
And Resettlement (DDR) often reveals that men and
As gender analysis becomes more common, as gender- women disperse differently as war-fighting ends.
disaggregated data becomes more commonplace, as Men who bonded in fighting, often re-assemble after
analysts and planners become honed to seeing the demobilisation, especially if there are no jobs to go to,
differences, this first step may become more part of our and remain a security concern. Women often return to
standard analytical tools and less of an endeavour in itself. families, but might not be able to if they are stigmatised
A gold-plated standard in analysis, using comparison from rape, or their husband has been killed. Child
with a Tier 1 Target Audience Analysis13, would see a soldiers who have been forced to commit atrocities
conflict and stakeholder analysis incorporate in-country against their own family members are equally rejected
local language analysis with stakeholders. Such a pursuit from reintegration. These men, women and children are
of excellence requires time and resources. Whilst military very susceptible to recruitment by Violent Extremist
intelligence might have a variety of means at its disposal Organisations (VEOs). Whether part of a clandestine
to achieve a Tier 1 analysis, analysis conducted for VEO or frustrated and feeling disempowered back at
peacekeeping, stabilisation or defence engagement could home, the tendency for violence can be exacerbated and
and should be done openly, as UK forces have been invited attempts to supress violence by the further application
at the request of a Host Nation to engage in partnering. of force can lead to a build-up of support for VEOs, and/
As a result, disaggregated data responding to Requests or a reversion to conservative values and domestic abuse
for Information (RFIs), Priority Intelligence Requirements of entire families. Cleansing rituals which have been
(PIRs), and Commanders Critical Information used to overcome problems with re-integration, such as
Requirements (CCIRs) could be gathered in a more in Burundi and Liberia16, have tended to reinforce gender
dispersed manner via ground troops, and in conjunction stereotypes and power relations, skirting the fundamental
with other players, as we implement greater cooperation issue of men feeling disempowered by women - who have
and coordination under Fusion Doctrine. Whether the increasing opportunities for jobs in schools, hospitals,
results are delivered as a gender overlay for an intelligence and traditional roles in markets and caring for family
preparation of the operating environment, or are simply - and the cycle of retribution in domestic and societal
mainstreamed into analytical reporting and decision briefs violence that can bring.
is a subject for further consideration.14

12  See https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/MatrixEarlyWarningIndicatorsCSV_UNAction2011.pdf

13  TAA is narrower than a Stakeholder Analysis, and already assumes a decision has been made/assumed on whom to target. For more on TAA
see http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/TAA.pdf
14  Results of a question on gender analysis posed to the latest Officers Military Intelligence course lend itself to mainstreaming. See Cognitio (2019).
15  AJP 2.1 (2016).
16  See Sharif, S (2018) A Critical Review of Evidence from Ex-Combatant Re-integration Programs, p9.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 23

British and French troops deploy together on EX CITADEL GUIBERT 18, a combined arms staff exercise designed to test the interoperability of
both nations. As well as learning about and testing the viability of French and British communications systems, 12 Armoured Infantry Brigade HQ
worked alongside French and Dutch officers exercising a scenario designed to practice the command and control of joint operation to stabilise a
region troubled by terrorism and humanitarian issues. Photo: Corporal Sam Jenkins

Understanding such considerations in the current diseased with Ebola continuing to demand sex from
operational picture allows commanders and planners partners or others.18
to reconsider timelines and options for supporting
resettlement programmes. This includes focusing more In a sub-threshold conflict fought among people,
effort on tracking and eliminating illegal weapons an exploration of the benefits of gendered analysis
because of the role they can play in perpetuating into more subtle operational effects and longer term
domestic violence and subsequently power relations in strategic outcomes could be revealing for at least four
communities, even when there are few overt external elements of a conflict analysis: the conflict profile, a
acts of violence.17 Integration of a gendered analysis can stakeholder analysis (ideally looking at changes over
also allow the operational commander the insight into time), root causes, and opportunities for de-escalation
potential change agents across the gender spectrum in and prevention of violent conflict.19 One tool to help
order to (sometimes) indirectly influence behaviours. integrate gender-disaggregated data is the NAPRI
An example here was the need during the Ebola crisis wheel20 (needs, access, participation, resources, impact
to inform women at the right times of day and location - see Figure 2). Together with a three column estimate
without men around because it was women who handled format, the NAPRI headings can help group factors in
the deceased. Women were more susceptible to transfer the first column, and so aid deductions in the second
of the disease sexually, whilst men disregarded the column, and finally implications and tasks in the third
information provided on safe handling because of local column categorised according to tactical, operational
taboos and cultural pressures on them, including men and strategic levels.

17  Birchall (2019).

18  MONUSCO (2016), Gender Analysis in Field Offices, Workshop Module, p.11.
19  The 2018 UN-WB report on Pathways for Peace has documented several existing resilience drivers, that are often overlooked and
disadvantaged by orthodox programming and analysis, in part because of a failure to take a gender perspective. See https://www.
pathwaysforpeace.org (last accessed 15 Nov 19).
20  See DCAF (2016) Integrating Gender in Security Sector Governance, p26.

24 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 Figure 2: The NAPRI wheel. Source DCAF.

The integration of a gendered analysis at the operational picture.22 Nevertheless, an increasingly broad academic
and campaign level opens up opportunities for more literature, especially in the related field of security
targeted interventions, for better understanding of sector reform and peacebuilding, support the case for
second and third order effects, mitigating associated bridging the gap between the simple tactical application
risks, and promoting potential resilience drivers. How of gender at one end of the spectrum and, at the other
can an operation be adapted to mitigate risks of gender end, understanding the full implications on operations
bias and gender-based violence (against women, men, of integrating and interpreting gendered analyses and
boys, girls and different Sexually-Oriented And Gender assessments.
Identity Expressions (SOGIE))? Have, for instance, the
UN Action Matrix of Early Warning Indicators of Conflict The lack of specifically annotated military or defence
Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) been incorporated into level examples of the incorporation of gendered
operational planning? Considerations can be held at the analysis in operational policy and plans in order to
planning level in a Gender Annex and included as part achieve strategic military and political outcomes,
of the equivalent of a UN Annex W, which should detail makes it difficult for planners to formulate and
the positive practical benefits in gaining second and third present commanders with courses of action and an
order consequences, which together may bring about the understanding of effects that they can action and
decisive conditions to achieve a campaign objective. implement. This is despite the growing body of national
and international policy and obligations. Greater diversity
FORESIGHT INTO THE STRATEGIC OUTCOMES DESIRED of subject matter experts at planning level, including
OF CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES inclusion of gender advisors, and greater understanding
Further interpretation is the final step in building an of operational and campaign planning by gender
operational assessment in which the significance of advisors would assist, but we are literally still growing
information is judged in relation to the current body of both sides of this equation. A lack of examples does not
knowledge.21 Such interpretation requires judgement and imply that the thesis does not hold water. Yet without
expertise in order to yield actionable operational effect relevant military examples the courage and leadership
to meet military strategic objectives. There appears to to forge plans based on gendered analysis seems on
be little relevant guidance for the military analyst and the back foot. Areas where a greater nuanced military
planner to integrate the insights of the growing number contribution to HMG objectives could be explored include
of gender advisors and their analysis into an assessment the engagement of thought leadership in patriarchal

21  Ibid.
22  As discussed at the Inaugural Operational Intelligence Conference, Nov 2019.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 25

societies in order to reduce violence, facilitating actively GROWING MOMENTUM
informed female electoral suffrage and correlation With the UK having had its first, if brief, appointment
of length of suffrage with decrease in violence, and of a female Secretary of State for Defence, the Right
facilitating long term gender equality (with implications Honourable Penny Mordaunt (who was also the Minister
for men and women) as a determinant of improvements for Women and Equality) in 2019, WPS and gender have
of wealth, stability, and prosperity.23 sharpened in focus. Her predecessor, former Secretary for
Defence Gavin Williamson, announced the establishment
Considerations at this level bleed into other government of a Centre of Excellence for Human Security25, in which
business, but such is the nature of cross-Whitehall gender, Children Affected By Armed Conflict (CAAC),
Fusion Doctrine24 and the role that a military campaign modern slavery, and Protection Of Civilians (POC) are
can play. Further questions for consideration in central tenets. The UK seeks a greater global role, not
campaign planning include – what role does gender play only to show its weight as one of the Permanent Five (P5)
in decision-making on conflict, security and peace in the members of the UN Security Council, but also as Defence
theatre of operations? Do women, men and SOGIE have works through being ‘international by design’.26 Today,
equal needs, access, participation, resources available ‘international by design’ also means ‘gendered by design’.
and impact on strategic outcomes and to build common
futures at political, structural, and grassroots level? In response to UN Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015),
How does this affect the direction and outcome for de- which urges gender analysis in operations, there is a
escalation of violent conflict and future prevention? catalytic role for military command, planning and

A Lieutenant Colonel from 77th Brigade, conducts a gender audit with members of the Kurdish Peshmerga. Photo: Author, Crown Copyright

23  Birchall (2019).

24  National Security Capability Review (2018), p10-11. Some would argue that Fusion Doctrine is just a rehash of the Comprehensive Approach
of the beginning of the century (see House of Commons (2010) The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make
a better peace), but the cross government mechanisms and processes now in place have developed significantly since then and the use of the
term doctrine rather than approach is more than just semantics.
25  On 4 Apr 19, see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/mod-to-establish-centre-of-excellence-for-human-security. See also JSP 1325 Human
Security in Military Operations.
26  As articulated in the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2015.

26 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Figure 3: The OECD-DAC Gender Marker

intelligence to lead the way on how to integrate gendered National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security
analysis into the fabric of military operations and showcase 2018-2022, and the Modern Slavery Act (2015).
the benefits that it brings. Gendered analysis could, and
arguably should, be part of the standard analytical palette CONCLUSION
of military intelligence. It is not a single agency sport, and Raising the bar of military planning and intelligence
would be bolstered and enhanced by working together more analysis through applying and setting the global
systematically with a broader analytical group of military standard for a gendered analysis of the operational
and cross-government subject area experts such as the environment is essential, for operational, moral, and
Stabilisation Unit, MOD’s International Policy and Strategy policy reasons. It might seem that a gendered analysis
Teams, and 77th Brigade’s Human Security capability, and is more relevant for the Engage, Secure and Support
the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU). Additionally, functions of Land Power. However, the ‘three block war’
capacity building activities27 and Defence activities other that characterises war fighting as we now understand
than operations28, which are seeking funding from the it, and the premise of this article that there is significant
Conflict, Security and Stabilisation Fund (CSSF) - a bleed from tactical to operational and strategic outcomes,
proportion of which is earmarked as Official Development indicates that we can’t relegate gendered analysis to
Assistance29 - will require a gender analysis 30to reinforce peacekeeping alone.
programming options.
While gender is not new, applying gender to the full
A gendered analysis of the operating environment would methodology of operational intelligence cycle to reveal
assist in meeting UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 tactical, operational and strategic military implications
on Gender Equality, and could contribute to the UK’s is innovative. It could be the catalyst to help bring
role in the Contact Group of the Elsie Initiative to remove actionable operational intelligence to invigorate
barriers to increasing women’s meaningful participation campaigns and fusion into cross-Government efforts.
in peace operations.31 More robust gendered analysis Such an all-pervading catalyst has not been seen since
at the operational level could be harnessed by wider the introduction of the Single Intelligence Environment.
Defence processes to illustrate military contribution to
an array of UK policy drivers, including the International The window of opportunity to lead the way and use
Development Gender Equality Act (2014), the UK a gendered analysis to give us a winning edge to

27  See CFA’s Capacity Building Directive, 2018.

28  See CDS Directive for the Delivery or Defence Activity Other than Operations (DAOTO), 2018.
29  Official Development Assistance (ODA) is subject to the requirements of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Gender Marker. See OECD-DAC, Handbook on the OECD-DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker, p6.
30  The OECD-DAC requires programming to undergo a ‘do no harm’ analysis, and consideration of gender constraints, resources, opportunities
and power as part of a gender analysis. See ibid, p6, footnotes 2 and 3.
31  In 2018, the UK became part of the Contact Group for the Elsie Initiative (led by Canada).

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 27

operations is now, as trends in WPS, gender, and human
security take hold, not just in UK but in our theatres of
operation. Undertaking a gendered analysis, including for
more gender inclusive (as opposed to gender neutral)32
interventions, are part of what the public and Parliament
can increasingly expect of UK operations and its
narrative for hearts, minds, clicks and likes as we fulfil
our commitment to be the ‘international by design’ and
the reference Army of choice.

32  Nomenclature has moved on from gender mainstreaming

(‘just add women’) and gender neutral or blind, to gender inclusive
(deliberately challenging bias). See DCAF, Teaching Gender in the
Military, p.118. Gender neutral or blind intervention usually
reinforce existing gender and power bias which are underlying
factors in conflict.

28 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Image shows the audience at the Army Servicewomen's Network (ASN) annual conference listening to Lieutenant General Tim Radford CB DSO
OBE, the ASN Champion and Army Gender Champion, as he gives a key-note speech to the conference in Churchill Hall, Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst. Photo: Corporal Mark Larner, Crown Copyright

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 29

Conceptual Force
(Land) 2035
The Army’s Concepts Branch looks at the Conceptual Force (Land)
2035 as a new way for the Army to fight and operate from 2030.

Pictured is a Black Hornet Mini UAV being tested at the Copehill Down training facility on Salisbury Plain. Leading industrial partners in
Robotic and Autonomous Systems (RAS) have been invited by the British Army to put their equipment in the hands of soldiers.
Photo: Sergeant Peter George, Crown Copyright

30 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

I n Dec 2017 the Executive Committee of the Army
Board (ECAB) directed that a Conceptual Force
(Land) 2035 (CF(L)35), be developed to offer a means
and Electro-Magnetic Activity capabilities which will
degrade the EMS and deceive/spoof our sensors and
communications; advanced computing; biological
of leapfrogging to a new way of fighting and operating enhancements of humans; and Robotic and Autonomous
from 2030. CF(L)35, the output of seven years of Agile Systems (RAS). The ethical and legal standards of
Warrior (AW)1 experimentation, is an analytical concept adversaries may lead to the use of mass propaganda,
which understands the key drivers influencing the case deniable operations, cyber capabilities, CBRN weapons,
for change as: increasingly complex threats; technological and sub threshold competition in a manner counter to
advancement; continued resource constraints; and an international norms. Hence, the British approach of
increasingly challenging urban environment.2 In light concentrating combat mass to achieve decisive effect,
of recent ECAB direction, to develop a New Operating may present greater risk than before by playing directly
Concept fit for the next decade and beyond, publishing the into the pacing threats hands.
CF(L)35 concept provides an essential reference point.
Technological Opportunities
The CF(L)35 is designed to face the pacing threat in non- Actors who exploit technology to develop novel
discretionary warfighting at scale, within a coalition. capabilities will derive significant advantage. Soldiers
It is unashamedly a high intensity force, but also has and commanders will need to be both digital natives,
utility in other contexts. feeling intuitively comfortable operating disaggregated
when connected, and able to operate without a network
The CF(L)35 was not endorsed by ECAB but has if it is disrupted. Developing a workforce that has the
been used for successive wargames for wider force intellectual and psychological aptitude to work within
development understanding as a future force. As such, an increasingly automated environment will present new
it is just one version of the future, but one that remains challenges,8 however failure to understand AI capabilities
compelling for 2030 and beyond. may create vulnerabilities and cede advantage to
competitors. This concept makes assumptions that
THE CASE FOR CHANGE there is enough time to develop machine learning and
Robotic and Automated Systems (RAS) to be credible and
Increasingly Complex Threats deliver the mass required for future warfighting. This will
CF(L)35 used DCDC publications to set the context, require adopting a more flexible system of procurement
threats and opportunities. The updated Global Strategic to achieve a shift from ‘exquisite and therefore few” to
Trends 63, the Future Operating Environment 20354, “inexpensive and therefore many’.
and the Future Force Concept5 have been synthesised
to describe the five-domain and three-dimension Continued Resource Constraints
environment that a CF(L)35 would operate within. The Current financial constraints compound the challenge.
pacing threats currently operate: fourth generation Human mass is increasingly difficult to resource;
aircraft6; capable AH; long-range Anti-Tank Guided personnel costs consume 55% of the Army’s budget
Weapons (ATGW); long-range and massed rockets/ and their rise is the single most significant contributor
artillery; and SF capable of either leading or facilitating to Defence inflation. This seems unlikely to change in
intelligence gathering, subversion and sabotage.7 the near future. The search for more mass assumes that
Future capabilities under development include: GLATGM numbers and size are the only solutions to threats. Using
providing overmatch at increased ranges; Cyber, Space Newtonian physics as a metaphor, combat Force may

1  Agile Warrior is the British Army’s intellectual programme to test an alternative force structures based upon the future operating environment
derived from DCDC. Full evidential reports held by Concepts Branch: http://cui1-uk.diif.r.mil.uk/r/852/Concepts/ AgileWarrior/Forms/AllItems.aspx
2  RUSI (2018). ‘The Utility of a Future Land Component in Megacities’DSTL/AGR/000616/01 (O), pp 12-13.
3  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-strategic-trends-out-to-2045
4  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-operating- environment-2035
5  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-force-concept-jcn-117
6  International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance, accessed 20 Oct 16; Flight International, World Air forces 2015.
7  Foreign Military Studies Office, ‘Getting Gerasimov Right’, dated 28 Feb 17, accessed 2 Aug 17.
8  Ministry of Defence, Global Strategic Trends, Version 6, 15.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 31

Pictured is the MRZR X, a modular multi-mission support mobility platform that has multiple modes of working from operator driving to
autonomous operation. Photo: Corporal Rebecca Brown, Crown Copyright

equate to the Mass of the force (size) multiplied by its war-fighters, therefore improving resilience and political
velocity squared (speed) in much the same way Newton utility. It should be noted that increased automation
declared f =mv2. If this is a valid assumption, then Force raises the premium on the human, a risk yet to be
may also be generated by speed as well as size and quantified through experimentation.
perhaps the future British Army should focus on Notice
to Effect (NTE), speed of decision-making and speed THE CF(L)35 DOCTRINAL PREMISE
across the ground, i.e. tempo, to offset pure mass.
New Ways
DEDUCTIONS The concept proposes a new way of operating, force
AGILE WARRIOR evidence points towards developing design, and capabilities to deliver a more effective
a new operating concept to outmanoeuvre the enemy force. A UK sovereign war-fighting division will remain
conceptually and simultaneously exploit emergent as the baseline offer to our allies. It does not consider
technology. The force could be reconfigured to establish offsetting capability to other nations and looks to support
more appropriate groupings and learn to fight in new a UK military industrial base capable of supporting a
ways that challenge the assumptions of our adversaries. divisional warfighting effort, possibly scalable to the
The force should be confident dispersed, generate corps level. We will deliver multiple, cross-dimension,
increased tempo while actively deceiving the enemy. dilemmas to the enemy so that we impose decision
The Land force should then focus on achieving more paralysis. Although consistent with the Integrated Action,
decisive effects at range, using precision strike, aviation Manoeuvrist Approach, and Mission Command, the
and area-effect, enabled by multi-spectral sensors while fundamental premise focuses on the following principles:
masking the force by decentralisation, dispersal and
deception. As technology enables automation the close • Dispersal. We will manoeuvre dispersed as the norm,
battle should initially be conducted, as far as possible, by which will increase protection, improve deception
automated platforms and sensors that preserve human and allow us to fight disaggregated when applicable.

32 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 We will consequently challenge the enemy at more FORCE DESIGN
locations simultaneously, aiming to achieve decision AGILE WARRIOR experimentation provides evidence for
paralysis. This will place higher demand on our C2 and generating greater tempo, fewer casualties and requiring
sustainment but AW evidence suggests this is now less less sustainment thus:
of a risk than concentrating combat power.
To support both dispersal and generating tempo we • Command and Control. Fighting disaggregated
will refine our TASKORG to lower the level of combined- with the inclusion of RAS and AI for decision-making
arms grouping. generated more speed, aggression and surprise.
• Tempo. We should seek to generate tempo at the expense Exploiting developing AI technology will increase
of other factors. History and recent AW experimentation tempo, reduce the number of staff deployed in forward
has shown that whoever drives the decision-action cycle HQs and challenge the current concept of no more than
is more likely to win. On the basis that tempo is key, units five points of command.10
must not wait for supporting assets from higher levels. • Information and Intelligence. By leveraging RAS for
CF(L)35 task organises critical assets at lower levels so recce, ground and airborne, a considerably higher level
that tempo is easier to attain. of situational awareness was achieved. The enemy
• Deception. The force design includes elements whose was denied information by C-UAS capabilities and
focus is to deceive the enemy in both the physical and organic deception. Machine learning algorithms will
across the EMS. AW experimentation continues to point enable smaller HQs by managing the incoming data,
at the adversaries’ approach to deception and the UK preventing cognitive overload and providing a fused
lack of resource in this capability. ISTAR picture for commanders. Focus should switch
• Protection. We will seek protection by speed of from gathering to the exploitation of data.
manoeuvre and decision rather than just physical The Information Manoeuvre (IM) element within the
armour, so that our forces remain strategically Future Combat Teams (FCTs) will find information in
deployable. Evidence points towards ‘big, heavy and the cyber domain while placing disruptive information
slow’ migrating to ‘small, light and fast’.9 of its own.
• Dislocation. Current doctrine focuses on the • Manoeuvre. Deeper, more risky and aggressive
destruction of enemy combat power, specifically MBTs, manoeuvre with RAS unhinged the enemy and broke
artillery and infantry. The CF(L)35 focuses effort on cohesion. Employing RAS for reconnaissance to the
dislocation of the enemy by striking HQs, logistic bases point of destruction gained tempo at no human cost
and the narrative, to bring about cognitive dislocation Lack of mass can be off-set by exploiting tempo, both
and defeat. physically and cognitively. Multiple sensors will enable

Diagram of Force Design from the

Agile Warrior 2018/2019 Annual
Report. Image: Army Concept
Branch, Crown Copyright

9  Broster, M, Lowe, M (2016). ‘Future Land Challenges 2 (FLC2) Report’. Dstl, Fareham: 71
10  See ASC task provided by SparkCognition on the utility of AI

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 33

 greater mobility in complex terrain. The force design a flatter hierarchy, and have a better ratio of combat
maintains the premise of the ‘rule of four’ in its orbat to combat support and combat service support than
with a specific covering force, assault force, echelon today’s BG so that it is sustainable and can fight
force and reserve force. with all its assets simultaneously.12 Mass will be
• Firepower. With more dedicated organic Fires, the augmented by Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)
FCT increased tempo, making the dismounted close with the addition of RAS in the FCT, that with a degree
combat more achievable. Future forces should have of artificial intelligence, novel materials and next-
integral short-range indirect fire support, augmented generation power generation, provide direct and indirect
by brigade medium artillery for counter-battery fire and fire support, ISTAR, sustainment, communications, and
divisional long-range rockets for shaping the deep. deception, but without requiring as many personnel.
ATGW capability may off-set today’s MBT capability The platforms displace the soldier from the firefight,
with a suite of smaller vehicles which, when taken in until a time when DCC is decisive. The RAS, with a
combination, offer what today’s MBT achieves, but with person in the loop, allows for quicker manoeuvre, less
less cost, greater sustainability and better strategic and sustainment and more firepower.
operational mobility. • Brigade Combat Team (BCT). BCT organisation will be
• Sustainment. Compared with the average of the flexible, delivering full spectrum effects in the deep to
Armored and Strike JF 25 BGs the FCT required less shape with long range massed precision fires, CEMA,
food, water, fuel and ammunition. Contemporary and IM enabled by persistent ISTAR and resilient, high-
technology, such as power and water generation, will be bandwidth networks. Each BCT has sufficient CS and
used to reduce logistic demand. Additive manufacturing CSS to enable it to conduct operations independently of
technology will produce or repair some items. Sensors the Division or to provide mutual support to other BCTs
on equipment throughout the force, combined with AI, as part of a divisional-level operation.
will provide a common logistics picture and enable • Division. A CF(L)35 Division could contain circa 16,500
autonomous resupply when required, including health personnel rather than the 27,500 of the Joint Force
monitoring and the CASEVAC of personnel. Medical Division of 2025. The Brigade Combat Teams (BCT),
support will embrace health monitoring and rely upon each of 3,500 individuals, are supported by Joint Fires,
automated systems to remove casualties from the ISTAR, Manoeuvre Support, Aviation and sustainment
contact battle. However, this does not change the overall assets. Hence, the UK Land Force of 2019 could be used
need for MBTs. to deliver three war-fighting divisions’ worth of combat
power and adequate divisional troops using the FCT
FORCE STRUCTURE and BCT structure.13 The structural change is a balance
With an increasingly complex environment, new of manpower, offset by RAS and the grouping of former
technology and a new way of operating, the land force Divisional assets at the Corps level.
would require a new structure to make the most of the
new capabilities: IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPABILITY DELIVERY

• Future Combat Team (FCT). The new unit of force will Risks
be the FCT, consisting of approximately 500 personnel Exploiting the opportunities of AI development is in line
that will deliver the mission sets attributed to today’s with current Government policy.14 However, the ethical
Armoured Infantry (AI) Battle Group of circa 1,250. It considerations have only been analysed at the strategic
will be a combined arms force, with fewer personnel level.15 16 Reliance on a Single Information Environment
but increased manoeuvrability, firepower and sensors, (SIE) produces vulnerabilities when the EMS is easily
delivering more combat mass.11 The FCT will have interdicted. As technology is central to the proposition,

11  The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 6 Dec 2018
12  This specific FD is the amalgamation of many dstl wargames and force variation testing events over the last 7 years.
13  The FCT structure within CF(L)35 delivers 16 sovereign FCTs within the division and three comparable divisions; giving a total UK
manoeuvre force of 48 FCTs. This contrasts with the JF 25 modernised division which delivers 15 battle groups and assumes subordination
of a US BCT and DK BG.
14  Industrial Strategy White Paper, HM Government, 27 November 2017, accessed 10 October, 2018
15  AI in the UK: ready, willing and able? House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, HL Paper 100, published 16 April 2018,
accessed 10 October, 2018,
16  AI is not better, or somehow more objective, than any other approach by virtue of its ‘autonomy’ in decision-making. It’s still math, guided by
the choices of the humans who fine-tune it and the data it learns from—both of which are extremely vulnerable to bias.

34 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Image of a Broken Digital Egg from the Capability Directorate, Future Force Development Branch, Crown Copyright.

the ability to procure new systems will require human from the initial fire-fight. This is enabled by
behavioural and process changes.17 The proposition does a new doctrinal way of fighting with more flexibility,
not include detail on CBRN and it is acknowledged that trust and disaggregation and with a more flexible unit
transforming to a new structure is a significant challenge. of force, in the Future Combat Team. The CF(L)35
Furthermore the existing inability to visualise how the proposition offers three comparable UK Sovereign
Army will achieve modernisation objectives means that Divisions with Corps enablers while providing more
we do not understand where our choice points are. deployment options across the spectrum of conflict and
savings in supply. It provides HMG more opportunities,
Conclusion reduced risk and remains fundamental to collective
CF(L)35 generates greater tempo, requires less defence with NATO and broader coalitions. However,
sustainment, poses more challenges to the enemy while the CF(L)35 is focused 17 years away, it may be
and presents fewer targets, as it seeks to displace the available much sooner.

17  Marshall N (2017). ‘Conceptual Force (Land) 2035: The design of a Future Combat Team’. NorScot Consulting Ltd, Stoford Salisbury.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 35

This image shows a Boxer AFV that will form part of the Army’s Strike capability seen here at the 2019 Army
Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD) which took place around Copehill Down on Salisbury Plain from 28 – 30 Oct
2019. Photo Jack Eckersely, DE&S Photographer, Crown Copyright.

36 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Next Steps
CF(L)35 is an analytical concept providing an essential
waypoint for transformation. Developing a ‘New
Operating Concept fit for the next decade’ will require a
more applied concept, which considers constraints and
restraints to a greater degree. This focus will require
x-DLOD engagement internal and external to the Army.
Further research will try and quantify technology
feasibility, especially the utility of AI and RAS, while also
engaging further with industry on the practicalities of
pharmacological enhancements. Corralling the interest
and energy of soldiers and officers alike from across the
Army will be facilitated by the Force Development Nexus
(FD Nexus) and regular workshops.

BAR THEME: CONSTANT COMPETITION | 37

Fostering Stability:
Understanding Communities
in Complex Environments -
Part Two
Part One of this article was originally published in BAR 175, Summer
2019, and in this part, Professor James Derleth, a founding partner
of Complexas, a specialist advisory company, continues his analysis
of how to undertake successful stability operations using the Tactical
Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF).

Eighty-six engineers from 59 Independent Squadron Royal Engineers and Royal Marine engineers from Plymouth built shelters in Bagh
District, Kashmir, as part of the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, programme of aid to Pakistan after the
earthquake on 8 Oct 2005. The troops travelled up to remote mountain villages up to 7,500 ft to construct shelters for medical and school
facilities. Photo: Phot Ian Richards, Crown Copyright

38 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 ARTICLES

STABILITY OPERATIONS PROGRAMMING

Effective stability programming requires a methodology
focused on identifying and diminishing local sources of
instability, NOT addressing the perceived ‘needs’ of the
population. Most developing countries have a myriad of
needs. Individuals or groups fostering instability aren’t
usually building roads, providing health care, or digging
wells. Yet they are able to gain support in the population.
What explains this phenomenon? Spoilers are able to
take advantage of the population’s grievances because
they understand the local community. Grievances are
issues a significant percentage of locals - not outside
experts - identify as important to their community.
Examples of erroneous assumptions in Afghanistan
included the lack of potable water, educational
opportunities, or infrastructure; insecurity; judicial
bias, corruption, etc. For example, in some areas of
Afghanistan the Taliban gained support because they
provided Sharia courts to deal with crime and local
disputes, both major grievances.1 As a member of the
Afghan Parliament noted: … people go to them [Taliban]
because their justice is quick and seen as more effective
than normal justice.2

Therefore, to stabilize an area, practitioners must be able Troops from 21 Engineer Regiment replace an important bridge to
to identify, prioritize, and diminish Sources of Instability assist the local population. The bridge links the main highways
and local communities within the city of Gereshk in Nahr-e Saraj,
(SOI). Sources of Instability are usually a small subset
Afghanistan. It also helps the Afghanistan National Army (ANA)
of priority grievances. They are SOIs because they (1) maintain communications and gives them the freedom to operate
directly undermine support for local authorities, (2) bringing further stability and security to the region.
increase support for spoilers, or (3) otherwise disrupt Photo: Corporal Jamie Peters RLC, Crown Copyright
the normal functioning of society. SOIs must be
identified through an analytical process. Noteworthy, SOIs cannot usually be addressed by a simple
analysis often finds that the actual source of instability infrastructure project, e.g. building a road. However,
is only tangentially related to a grievance cited by the a road may be a part of the solution. For example, if
community. For example, although locals might cite the two tribes are hostile, getting them to cooperate in the
lack of water as a grievance, analysis might show the process of building a road may help resolve the SOI.
underlying source of instability is competition between Note the infrastructure project is incidental to the
two tribes over a borehole. The lack of water and tribal problem. It’s the process of cooperating to build the road
tensions are two very different problems which require that is important. Another example: if the government’s
two very different solutions. failure to maintain an irrigation system is being turned

1  Rubin, Alissa J., Expanding Control, Taliban Refresh Stamp on Afghan Justice, New York Times, October 7, 2010. http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/10/08/world/asia/08taliban.html (accessed January 17, 2011) or Emma Graham-Harrison. ’Weak Afghan Justice Bolstering Taliban’
Reuters, December 17, 2010. http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-53620620101216 (accessed January 17, 2011).
2  Talbi, Karim, Shadow Taliban government rules Afghans' lives, AFP, January 26, 2010. http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5gWl9u3ZojrsONNK4l9tiX5TViJyA (accessed January 17, 2011).

BAR ARTICLES | 39
 into a SOI by spoilers, a project that simply brings in an integrated back into programming
outside contractor to fix the canals will not necessarily 5. Measures of effect based on behavioral change
increase support for the government. Why? If the are the only true indicators of success.4
government cannot maintain the repaired canals, then
it will continue to be seen as ineffective, increasing Through a five-step process (collection, analysis, design,
popular frustration. Instead, the project should be implementation, and monitoring and evaluation), TCAPF
conducted by the community - with government support identifies sources of instability, designs programs to
- in order to increase the government and/or society’s mitigate them, and measures the effectiveness of the
capability and capacity to maintain the canals in the programming in stabilizing an area.
future. In summary, the goal of stability programming is
identifying and targeting the local sources of instability, COLLECTION
i.e. the issues which undermine the government, The first step is to gain a stability-focused understanding
increase support for spoilers, and/or disrupt the normal of environment. At least three types of information are
functioning of society. Only after an area is stable required to understand an area:
can practitioners address needs through traditional
developmental assistance. To foster stability, there is an • Operational5
obvious need for a simple, standardized, framework that • ·Cultural (major groups, their interests, conflict
identifies and mitigates local sources of instability. resolution mechanisms, traditional authorities, limits
to their power, how spoilers leverage these factors)
THE TACTICAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT AND • local perceptions (crucial to understanding how
PLANNING FRAMEWORK (TCAPF) spoilers gain and maintain support)
Recognizing the need for a comprehensive framework
for civilian and military practioners, the Office of Civil- TCAPF uses surveys, social media and technology to
Military Cooperation at the U.S. Agency for International gather and analyze cultural factors, information about
Development (USAID) created the Tactical Conflict the local environment, and local perception data from a
Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF). It draws wide variety of sources across key population segments.
from the Theory of Change approach which is based One of the most effective ways of gathering perceptions
on the premise that in order to increase stability in an is the Tactical Conflict Survey (TCS). The TCS is a
area, the causes of instability must be identified and simple, four-question survey. When used consistently
mitigated.3 TCAPF is based on five premises: with a representative population sample, it helps identify
grievances, how spoilers use them to gain support and
1. Instability occurs when the factors fostering creates a baseline from which to measure change over
instability overwhelm the ability of the time. The latter is especially important. For as Lord
government or society to mitigate them Kelvin famously said: ‘to measure is to know.’
2. A standardized, replicable, data-driven
methodology is necessary to identify sources of The TCS questions were specifically designed to provide
instability stability-relevant information with a minimum amount
3. Local population perceptions are crucial to of effort.6 Note that they are open-ended questions,
identifying causes of instability which are much more informative than a typical survey
4. Stability programming must be constantly that uses closed-ended questions such as ‘Do you have
monitored, with changes in the environment enough water - yes or no?’ ‘How do you feel about

3  This framework is based on Theories of Change literature. The key premise is that problems must first be identified in order to apply the
expertise needed to solve them. While this seems obvious, too often programs are based on untested assumptions and approaches. Therefore,
it is important to base activities on observable results, e.g. changes in behavior. See Schon, Donald, The Reflective Practioner, New York, Basic
Books, 1983 and Shapiro, Ilana, Extending the Framework of Inquiry: Theories of Change in Conflict Interventions, Berghof Handbook
Dialogue, number 5, Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2006
4  A behavioral approach uses quantitative and qualitative social science methodologies to understand groups, measure their current behavior,
identify motivations, and predict future behavior.
5  A useful tool to collect and organize operational information about an area is the PMESII framework. PMESII stands for Political, Military,
Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information. This framework helps practioners identify key factors in each area and understand their
relevance to local stability.
6  Here is the rationale behind the four discrete questions:
1. In developing countries, the majority of people make their living from agriculture. As a result, their land is their livelihood, their wealth,
and their future. Unlike developed states where large portions of the population move every year (15% in the US alone); people in developing
countries only move if there is a very compelling reason to do so. Thus this question gives us insight into potential sources of instability

40 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Figure 2: TCS

your district government - good, bad, or indifferent?’ the world. As an example of the latter, a US Marine
‘How do you feel about the local police - good, bad, or battalion employing TCAPF in Helmand Province,
indifferent?’ The questions can be modified, removed, or Afghanistan, was surprised to learn that after security,
supplemented depending on the area. For example, if you the second or third biggest grievance (based on TCS
were using the TCS in a Syrian refugee camp, you could Question #4) was the lack of cell phone coverage. The
remove Question One. battalion commander said ‘this is something we had
never thought about, as we considered phones a luxury.’
Instead of having to anticipate all the possible issues However, when cell phone coverage kept coming up
and associated questions/answers that might be in the Tactical Conflict Surveys, the commander made
important in a community, these four open-ended his patrols focus on the ‘why?’ They discovered that
questions allow the local population to identify what for the local population, cell phones were their primary
is important to them. This means we can ask fewer means of swift and reliable communication. Without cell
questions, making the TCS a more useful tool in an phone coverage, it could take a couple of days to find out
unstable environment and minimizing survey bias and about the security situation in a neighboring area and/
respondent fatigue. Note an implicit ‘Fifth question’ or whether attacks might have injured family members.
after each of the others is ‘Why?’ This follow-up leads to This caused a lot of anxiety and fostered a perception of
a more in-depth conversation and deeper understanding insecurity, even though security was in many cases not
of the local grievances and key actors. Since being an issue. The battalion commander noted ‘without using
implemented in 2007 the TCS has been used by non- the TCS to understand the population’s perceptions, and
government organizations, development organizations, especially the ‘why,’ we would never had known about
and NATO military formations in numerous areas of this concern, understood why it was a concern, or done

that may be driving people from their homes, or into improving conditions that may enable people to return.
2. Notice that Question #2 is different than, ‘What do you want?’ or ‘What do you need?’ Unfortunately, those two questions reflect our usual
approach to stabilization or conflict resolution. When we ask those questions, the typical response is a wish list of several items; it’s like
Christmas for the village in which you ask that question, and you are playing Santa Claus. In contrast, when we ask about the most important
problems facing a specific population in a village or town (particularly in a clan-based, tribal society in which community is much more important
than the individual), we tend to get a much shorter and more focused set of responses which reflect actual grievances, not just wishes.
3. This question gives us insight into who is influential in the community and who people trust to address their problems. This effectively
replaces a much longer list of closed-ended questions, ‘Do you trust the government?’ ‘Do you trust the police?’ etc. It also identifies key
interlocutors we would not anticipate – e.g. the local imam, a schoolteacher, etc.
4. Finally, we not only ask the local population to identify their biggest problems in Question #2, but we ask them in Question #4 to prioritize those
problems - rather than us deciding for them what should be done first. This not only prioritizes things, but acts as a check on Question #2. If there
is a discrepancy, we follow up again with the ‘Why’ question to make sure we really understand the priority grievance(s) of the community.

BAR ARTICLES | 41
U.S. Army civil affairs team leader for Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Farah, unloads a box of school supplies during a visit to
a local returnee and refugee village, Feb. 9. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Farah visited the returnee and refugee village on the
outskirts of Farah City to conduct a site survey and deliver humanitarian assistance. PRT Farah's mission is to train, advise, and assist
Afghan government leaders at the municipal, district, and provincial levels in Farah province Afghanistan. Their civil military team is
comprised of members of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). U.S. Navy photo by Lieutenant J.G. Matthew Stroup/released

anything about it. For the population, cell towers were DESIGN
more important than jobs or clinics. The cell towers gave After identifying the sources of instability, the next step
the population a perception of security and the ability to in the TCAPF process is to design activities to mitigate
tell others about it. Without this baseline view of security, them. This is accomplished through a series of ‘filters.’
nothing else we did mattered in terms of popular support The first filter is ‘Stability Fundamentals.’ This means an
for us or the government.’7 activity must, for example, measurably:

ANALYSIS • Increase support for the government

As anyone who has been to a doctor knows, until the • Decrease support for spoilers
malady is diagnosed, the doctor can’t proscribe an • Increase institutional and/or the community’s ability to
effective treatment. Similarly, to implement effective solve societal problems
stability programming, we need to understand what
is causing instability. The Analysis phase of TCAPF If a proposed activity fulfills these three ‘Stabilization
uses the information gathered in the collection phase to Fundamentals,’ the next filter- ‘Stabilization Principles,’
identify and prioritize the local sources of instability. The is applied.8 These are widely accepted best practices
unique analytical methodology also identifies resiliencies which include local ownership, capacity building,
which can help mitigate the SOIs. This process is very sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results,
different from simply identifying societal needs or partnership, flexibility, and accountability. Unless
obstacles to development. activities are designed to mitigate sources of instability,

7  Interview with the author, Nawa District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan, May, 2009.
8  ‘Stabilization Principles’ was coined by the former USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios. See Andrew Natsios, ‘The Nine Principles of
Reconstruction and Development’ Parameters 35, (Autumn, 2005): 4-20.

42 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

at best they will have no effect on stability and at worse, Effect, (MOE) and Overall Stability.
they will increase instability.
• MOP - identifies whether activities have been completed.
IMPLEMENTATION For example, if the objective was to ‘increase police
Even if practitioners identify the local sources of support in the community,’ an activity might include
instability and design appropriate mitigating activities, police training. The MOP for this activity would be ‘police
the way activities are implemented play a crucial role in trained.’ Note this only determines if an activity has been
determining whether they will foster stability. For example, completed, not whether the police have more support in
giving projects to one faction in a community will cause the community.
resentment from others, fostering instability. Funneling • MOE - assesses whether the stability objective(s)
money through the wrong contractors or corrupt officials has been achieved. Continuing the police example, a
may contribute to instability.9 Large influxes of cash in Measure of Effect might be more information provided to
an area can cause inflation and corruption, hurting the the police by the population.
poor. The lure of inflated salaries may also draw farmers • Overall Stability - helps determine whether the net effect
from their farms, teachers from schools, and doctors from of the activities improved stability in the area. A basket
clinics - leading to more instability when the projects end. of standardized stability-focused indicators - which can
be augmented by a few context area specific indicators
MONITORING AND EVALUATION - gives practitioners a good idea if an area is becoming
To determine their effectiveness, practitioners must be more stable.
able to not only measure whether their activities were
implemented, but also whether they fostered stability. Noteworthy, the number of indicators is not as important
Therefore, it is necessary to track three levels of as what is being evaluated.10 Since the goal is to prevent
assessment: Measure of Performance (MOP), Measure of conflict or stabilize an unstable area, metrics should

Members of 9 Squadron Royal Engineers and 23 Engineer Regiment are pictured building a road with the assistance of
local Afghans. The road links to a bridge across the Loy Mandeh Wadi. The bridge will then be rebuilt to enable access for
heavy goods vehicles, opening supply routes across the area. Photo: Corporal Mark Webster, Crown Copyright

9  Trusted local partners understand which individuals, organizations, and businesses should be avoided when implementing stabilization
activities. The TCAPF process identifies these partners, which can change over time.
10  Kilcullen, David, Measuring Progress in Afghanistan, (U.S. Military Manuscript, Kabul, 2009), 7

BAR ARTICLES | 43
focus on ‘indicators of change’ which show whether Stabilizing Helmand Province, Afghanistan
the populations’ behavior has changed.11 Crucially, this In 2006, the British 52nd Infantry Brigade (52 Bde)
information must be continually collected and analyzed was notified it would deploy to Helmand. Identifying
over a period of time. This allows field personnel to the reasons for the difficulties faced by previous units
create a baseline and measure the impact of activities in stabilizing the province, the Brigadier commanding
over time. A one-time gathering of perceptions is 52 Bde knew that they could not be successful without
meaningless as they will change as a result of events, a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the
activities, etc. In summary, TCAPF uniquely combines operating environment, particularly the challenge of
data analysis, qualitative assessment, and forecasting gaining data from communities that could be geo-located.
capabilities with data visualization techniques to Because of a dearth of reliable information on the non-
identify sources of instability, mitigate them, and prevent security aspects of the environment, a significant gap
their reoccurrence. between the perceptions of the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF) operating in the area and the
TCAPF IN ACTION local population was identified. For example, civilian
TCAPF has been employed by civilian, government, deaths, often referred to as ‘collateral damage’ by ISAF,
and military entities in areas as varied as Afghanistan, were having numerous negative consequences. Civilian
the Philippines, Nigeria, and Sudan. The following deaths decreased popular support for the Afghan
case studies demonstrate its effectiveness as a unique, Government and the ISAF. Consequently, expensive
analytical, comprehensive, replicable methodology. development projects had no impact in stabilizing the

Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 31 (CLB-31), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), place a water tower frame on to its base,
March 10. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and CLB-31, 31st MEU, servicemembers work together in rebuilding a two-room
classroom and a water tower at Marnay Primary School during exercise Balikatan 2010 (BK ’10). Photo: US Marines, Released

11  Church, Cheyanne and Rodgers, Mark, Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs,
Washington, DC: Search for Common Ground, 2006.

44 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

area. To mitigate this situation, a messaging campaign EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES
had been developed. However, it had no discernible impact In 2015 an NGO working in the Abubakar region of
because it had the wrong messages/images, targeted Maguindanao Province, the Philippines, was rebuilding
the wrong audience, and didn’t include any measures of villages which had been damaged in fighting between
effect. In essence, the military and civilian entities had government security forces and the Moro Islamic
lost sight of their end state, i.e. stabilizing the area. They Liberation Front (MILF). Realizing that instability was
were experiencing significant problems understanding the threatening their program, they asked IMPL Project, a
environment and much of the development and stabilisation US-based NGO specializing in Conflict and Stabilization,
work was making little progress or having no impact. to implement a stabilization program to support their
rebuilding work. Using TCAPF, IMPL Project quickly
To address this 52 Brigade decided its purpose was the identified some interesting dynamics: twice as many
‘Population was the Prize.’ In order to stabilize Helmand, girls were attending school as boys, there was a lack of
the Task Force had to understand the population and livelihoods because the community had experimented
gain its support. Thus ‘influence’ became the focal point with new crops which had failed, cattle and horse
of all of its operations. Central to this approach was a rustling were growing, and there was increasing fighting
thorough understanding of the operational environment. between clans. Analysis found these issues were linked.
Detailed population perception data from the TCS Desperate farmers had taken their sons out of school,
provided this information. Without coherent and relevant hoping the extra labor would increase profits. The out-
data, field personnel are often forced to implement of-school youths, depressed about their bleak futures,
programming based on the views of senior officials in would use methamphetamines at night. To support this
capital cities or corporate headquarters who conflate habit, the boys stole horses and cattle from neighboring
their values and experiences with what locals consider villages, fostering clan violence.
important. This was the case in Helmand. Within a
month of their arrival, TCAPF allowed 52 Brigade to Identifying the lack of livelihoods as the underlying
begin to identify the sources of instability with the source of instability, IMPL Project worked with the
TCS which were then geo-plotted. This led to a two- community to mitigate this challenge. The first step was
pronged campaign strategy based on mitigating SOIs to strengthen local resiliency by creating a livelihoods
(which differed throughout the province) and executing cooperative. Since farmers were losing significant
influence operations accompanied by precise messaging income as a result of a dilapidated agricultural
to foster behaviour changes. Within three months, the infrastructure needed to dry and store their crops, IMPL
Bde was able to accurately capture and view the effects Project and the cooperative identified a solar dryer as
of their activities, e.g. increasing support for the Afghan a way to minimize crop loss. This project resulted in
Government and decreasing support for insurgents. An farmers selling an additional five tons of crops. More
improvement in stability was identified both qualitatively profit led to a 60% increase in micro-enterprise, largely
- through changes in people’s behaviour garnered with in the form of crop diversification. More importantly,
the TCS; and quantitatively (people moving back to farmers stopped removing their boys from school, cattle
their villages, more civilian road movement, decreased and horse rustling stopped, and local religious council
security incidents, etc.).12 This first of TCAPF in a (Ulama) reported decreasing clan violence. The impact
combat environment identified important lessons that metrics were measurable and critically, there was data
were then integrated into the methodology. Recognizing to support this.
its value, TCAPF became an ISAF training requirement
for all NATO forces deploying to Afghanistan. For some The real test of both stability and desired impact came
combat units, TCAPF was their primary means of in December, 2016 when a Philippine military offensive
obtaining meaningful data and from the communities pushed an Islamic State affiliate, the Maute Group, out
they sought to influence. As a recent book about the UK’s of a neighboring municipality. They sought safe haven
involvement in Afghanistan noted, TCAPF was the best in Abubakar, but as the Conflict Opportunity Cost Model
effort by a British brigade in Helmand to understand the suggests, the community turned them away. Abubakar
population on whose behalf they were fighting.13 was stable and thriving and the community didn’t want

12  Wardlaw, Richard, 52 BDE’s use of TCAPF, Presentation given at Quantico, VA, October 2008, LTC Wardlaw was in charge of Reconstruction
and Stabilization for the British 52 Brigade during their Nov 2007 – April 2008 deployment in Afghanistan.
13  Farrell, Theo, Unwinnable, Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001 – 2014, Penguin Random House, 2017, 212 – 214.

BAR ARTICLES | 45
to undermine its progress.14 This is a good example of SUMMARY
using TCAPF to identify sources of instability, working To stabilize an area or prevent instability from fostering
with the community to mitigate them, and increasing violence, two things must happen. First, local sources of
community resiliencies to foster long-term stability. instability must be identified and mitigated. Second, local
These examples demonstrate the effectiveness of TCAPF resiliencies must be recognized and strengthened. Both
in both unstable and conflict environments. are predicated on understanding the environment from
the perspective of the community that lives there. Just
THE BENEFITS OF TCAPF like the human body, communities’ respond to changes
The Tactical Conflict and Assessment Framework was in the environment. Therefore, to facilitate stability,
designed by practitioners to prevent and/or mitigate communities need to be monitored and assessed
conflict, foster stability, and measure impact. It is unique regularly. The days of conducting a survey and then
because it: waiting 12 months to remeasure are gone. A simple, fast,
technological feedback loop integrated into an inclusive
• distinguishes between needs, grievances, and sources of planning framework, which identifies reactions to actions
instability taken and pinpoints course corrections is required.
• provides all entities in an area with a common Because of its emphasis on societal engagement and
understanding of local sources of instability metrics, which measure the impact of activities in terms
• is focused on mitigating the sources of instability, of environmental, financial, governmental, and social
improving the effectiveness of programming returns rather than simple outputs.
• is data driven, standardized, and uses population-
centric, behaviorally-based evaluation criteria which The TCAPF is the only comprehensive, behaviorally-
can be geo-located and placed in relational databases focused, data-driven, population-centric instability and
• uses data to measure impact conflict framework which has been used successfully
• creates a baseline which allows the effectiveness of in numerous environments. Its success is result of
stability programming to be measured over the short, making the local population, the people most effected by
medium and long term instability and conflict, the focal point for understanding
• fosters continuity, mitigating the desire to ‘reinvent and actions. This facilitates more effective decision-
the wheel’ making, as decisions are based on understanding rather
• empowers field personnel who can use quantifiable than assumptions. While specifically providing guidance
TCAPF data to influence higher-level planning and for NATO forces in Afghanistan, the words of General
decision-making Stanley McChrystal could apply to MNCs or governments
• reduces required staff and resources as they are focused working anywhere in the world: ‘understand the local
on stabilizing an area, rather than implementing grievances and problems that drive instability and take
ineffective projects action to redress them.’15
• greatly improves the effectiveness of strategic
communications. Because TCAPF identifies the issues
which matter most to the population, it helps identify
strategic communication themes which resonate with
the population. What is a better message than ‘We
understand your grievances and here is what we’re
doing to address them’.

Overall, TCAPF greatly improves the effectiveness of

conflict and stability programming operations because
it is based on a detailed understanding of the local
environment, not on assumptions about it.

14  The Opportunity Cost Model is based on the premise that instability and conflict will be reduced when it is ‘more costly’ for spoilers to
gain support from the community. Just as a healthy organism is more resistance to disease, a thriving community is less likely to support
spoilers. See Böhnke, J., Köhler, J., Zürcher, C., (2015), Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan 2007-
2013, Final Report, Bonn/Berlin: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.
15  McChrystal, Stanley A., ISAF Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance, August 25, 2009. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/
counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf (accessed January 17, 2011).

46 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Pictured is E.L. Simons Primary School being cleaned up ready to be repaired after the damaged caused by hurricane Irma. RFA Mounts Bay
offered support to Grand Turk island in the Turks and Caicos islands, in support of the Commando force from 3 Cdo Brigade personnel from 40
Commando Royal Marines and 59 Commando Royal Engineers. Photo: Corporal Darren Legg, Crown Copyright.

BAR ARTICLES | 47
The Contested Themes
of Victory
Michael C Davies, a Ph.D. candidate in Defence Studies at King’s
College, London looks at the ten most common themes when
considering victory and who the winners and losers are in conflict.

The 2019 Army Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD) took place on Salisbury Plain from 28 – 30 Oct 2019. It was set in and around Copehill
Down Village - the Army’s primary urban combat training facility - and showcased a variety of the Army’s most modern capabilities. Photo: Jack
Eckersley DE&S, Crown Copyright

48 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

I n early 2019, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli
Defense Forces, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi,
arranged a ‘Victory Conference’. He was bothered by
to power relations, or who rules a given territory and in
what ways.’ 3 Gideon Rose describes it as ‘establishing
[an] enduring political arrangement.’4 Basil Liddell Hart
Israel’s poor strategic performance of the past decades, famously called it a ‘better state of peace.’5 Most recently,
the inability to achieve a lasting peace in the region, Nadia Schadlow described it as ‘the consolidation of
and wanted to bring together experts in the hope of political order.’ 6 Sadly, instead of offering greater clarity,
finding a way out of its present situation. At the end of these terms only add to the confusion.
the 4-day conference, General Kochavi reportedly made
a punishing statement: ‘As always, the question was,
and is, what is victory and who defines it, and they
didn’t answer this in the workshop.’1 For those who have
delved into the topic of victory, this is not a surprise.
Innumerable definitions, concerns, metrics, assertions,
and elements abound that make it difficult to effectively
assess what it means to win a war.

While the victory discipline is contested, often context

dependent, and diffuse in terms of the specific issues
an analyst focuses on, a number of themes consistently
emerge in considering the question of who won a war.
While this article will not present a unified picture of
what it means to win, let alone a singular definition, by
outlining these common themes, it will offer an entree
into the victory discipline for practitioners to consider in
their daily efforts. In doing so, this article will highlight a
considerable problem in the theory and practice of strategy
for which, at present, there is no answer. It proposes that
victory, the very core of strategy, remains essentially
contested, and the West’s record of strategic victory in the
post-World War II era is meager precisely because of it.2 British Army Soldiers from 1st Battalion The Princess of Wales's Royal
Regiment (1 PWRR), known as the Tigers, train new Mortar teams on
a two-week exercise at the Sennelager Ranges in Germany. A mortor
CREATING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
round is visable in flight. Photo: Dominic King, Crown Copyright
The first and most important theme is the difficulty
in translating the intention, statements, and goals of
policymakers into strategic aims. Dominic Tierney TURNING POLITICAL OBJECTIVES INTO
makes it clear that these aims should be as ‘clear and CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
concrete as possible [because] vague goals like ‘victory’ The second theme, following directly from the above,
and ‘democracy’ get people killed.’ However, what this is the need to translate these aims into campaign
means more precisely remains ethereal. Tierney suggests objectives. Sweeping policy statements might have no
that objectives should be ‘political, meaning they refer relationship to execution; they could be canned blather.

1  Harlap, Shmuel, What Is Victory? (Tel Aviv, Israel: INSS, May 1, 2019), 1, available at <www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Guest-
Column-01052019.pdf>. I use the term, ‘reportedly’, because the quote is referenced to a Haaretz article that cannot be independently found.
The author did not respond to my request for clarification.
2  Kapusta, Philip, ‘The Gray Zone,’ Special Warfare (October-December 2015), 18–25, available at <www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/
SW2804/October%202015%20Special%20Warfare.pdf>.
3  Tierney, Dominic, The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2015),
112–113.
4  Rose, Gideon, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), xi.
5  Liddell Hart, B.H., Strategy, 2nd Revised Edition (New York: Meridian, 1991), 338.
6  Schadlow, Nadia, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2017), 1.

BAR ARTICLES | 49
Pictured is an Army Warrior AFV with an Apache Attack Helicopter in the background at the 2019 Army Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD)
that took place on Salisbury Plain October 2019. Photo: Jack Eckersley, DE&S, Crown Copyright

In turn, this leaves campaigns without strong guidance, THE LEVELS OF VICTORY
meaning the use of weapons can be confused with Linked to this is the fourth theme, the levels of victory.
military effectiveness. In the West, this confusion is most William Martel suggests that the first organizing principle
often related to the use of high-technology, stand-off of understanding victory is that it happens across a
weapons that presume universal strategic effect with the continuum: at the tactical, political-military, and grand
release of every weapons load, even though there is no strategic levels. In turn, each of these levels have their
basis for this assertion. own definition of victory.8 The levels of victory, related to
the Perspective theme below, are why various actors are
THE CHARACTER OF WAR able to declare victory in the same war. An actor might
Robert Randle made the superb point that: ‘… the character have achieved (some of) their objectives at one level,
of a war determines the character of its settlement…;’7 that while the other achieved them at another level.9
the understanding of what victory means is dependent
on how the war is fought as much as why it was fought NON-BINARY DISTINCTIONS
in the first place. The character of war is the third theme, The non-binary distinction of victory is the fifth theme.
and helps to explain the first two. Only by correctly linking Instead of Levels, other analysts suggest victory happens
the character of war, effective execution, with suitable and on sliding scales. Colin S. Gray defines it according to
necessary goals in an iterative manner can an appropriate ‘decisiveness,’10 while J. Boone Bartholomees contends it
notion of victory emerge. The confusion of these aspects is occurs across a scale of success: ‘Defeat/Lose/Not Win/
a key problem within the discipline. Tie/Not Lose/Win/Victory.’11 However, the analytical

7  Randle, Robert F., The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemaking and the Structure of Peace Settlements (New York: The Free Press, 1973), viii.
8  Martel, William C., Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 94–98.
9  Tuck, Christopher, ‘Measuring Victory: Assessing the Outcomes of Konfrontasi, 1963–66,’ Journal of Military History 82, no. 3, 873–898.
10  Gray, Colin S., Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 2002), 9.
11  Bartholomees, J. Boone, ‘Theory of Victory,’ Parameters (Summer 2008), 27.

50 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Image of 45 Commando Royal Marines, firing a 50 calibre Heavy Machine Gun in Estonia on Exercise Baltic Protector
2019, as part of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) in Tapa. Photo: Captain Martin Harvey, RM, Crown Copyright

value of these ideas to date are unconvincing, even COST

though they raise the important point that victory is not The seventh theme revolves around the question of
necessarily a purely binary distinction. cost. Many victory definitions build cost directly into
them because excess cost can make the very notion
CHANGING GOALS of achieving a victory hollow, regardless of the limited
The sixth theme is the fact that goals change over time. or expansiveness of the goals. Moreover, as Virgina
Every political actor can and will begin combat with a Page Fortna states, the more costly a war, the greater
modicum of identified objectives, whether long-standing the domestic pressures not to concede on issues ‘for
or ad-hoc. However, because of the inherent chance that which so many may have died.’14 This in turn increases
combat involves, those goals must necessarily change the demand for greater sacrifice to justify the existing
over time. They can become more expansive as tactical sacrifices. Robert Martel makes it clear that there can be
victories increase or collapse down as failures amass. multiple ratios utilized to assert a positive cost-benefit
Added to this, Aaron Rapport noted that domestic calculation, but ‘it is not at all clear which of these…are
institutions and personalities will have their own goals most critical.’15
and will treat them as ‘ends in and of themselves,’12
thereby changing strategic goals. These problems can TIME
make it ‘seem like a new war’ has emerged, instead Should a war finally end, the question of time defines our
of simply recognizing that ‘war is a fluid, complicated eighth theme. For many, victory occurs the moment an
thing….’13 objective is achieved and combat is terminated.

12  Rapport, Aaron, Waging War, Planning Peace: U.S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 29–30.
13  Anderson, Michael, ‘On the Meaning of Victory,’ AUSA, July 26, 2018, available at <www.ausa.org/articles/meaning-victory>.
14  Fortna, Virgina Page, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 79.
15  Mandel, Robert, The Meaning of Military Victory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 7–9.

BAR ARTICLES | 51
However, because termination does not equal the
conclusion to a war, the holding of objectives for a time
period is required. Some suggest the maintenance of
that objective for one year will suffice, but one must be
wary of short-term definitions as a large percentage of
peace agreements collapse within five years.16 Indeed,
even smashing military victories can begin to look less
decisive over a longer term, predominantly because of the
inability to translate tactical victory into strategic victory.
As Cathal Nolan writes in his masterful, The Allure of
Battle, ‘Winning the day of battle is not enough. You
have to win the campaign, then the year, then the decade.
Victory must usher in political permanence.’ 17

PERSPECTIVE
The ninth theme revolves around the perspective problem
of victory. Just because an opponent has achieved all of
its objectives does not mean the other side cannot spin
its efforts as achieving victory as well. Dominic Johnson
and Dominic Tierney’s work shows that a population’s
view on victory is more shaped by pre-conceived notions
of the goals they desire than the facts on the ground,
unless one side is defeated in totality.18 This is why
stabbed-in-the-back conspiracy theories are so prevalent
in societies suffering from a comprehensive strategic
failure - a society cannot believe it eyes, so it assumes a
hidden force at work.19 This Dreamland state can and will
be used to justify their past actions, build a new internal
narrative, and regain power over time, setting the course
for a revanchist response, unless the victor is prepared to
address it from the start.20

SUSTAINABILITY
The final theme of the sustainability of the victory has
three separate parts to it. The first continues from the
above-mentioned revanchism, in that ‘the line between
justice and revenge can be a very fine one.’ Engaging
in ‘justice’ can create the seeds for future aggression The 2019 Army Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD) highlighted
through excessive revenge.21 Second, linked to the innovation and technology with a simulated attack on Copehill Down
Cost theme, victory can exhaust the ‘winner’ so much village by Challenger 2 tanks, Warrior AFVs, Engineers and attack
helicopters and then a hostage rescue by dismounted infantry and
that they do not have the power to enforce the victory military working dogs. Photo: Jack Eckersley, DE&S, Crown Copyright
conditions, and attempting to do so only weakens them
further. Third, the inability or refusal to formalize the end

16  Charles T. Call, Charles T., ‘Ending Wars, Building States,’ 1-24, in Charles T. Call, with Vanessa Wyeth, eds., Building States to Build Peace
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 2008), 1.
17  Nolan, Cathal J., The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (New York: Oxford University Pres, 2017), 4.
18  Johnson, Dominic D.P., and Tierney, Dominic, Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2006).
19  Kimball, Jeffrey P., ‘The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War,’ Armed Forces and Society 14, no. 3 (Spring 1988), 450; 452.
20  Schivelbusch, Wolfgang, The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery. Trans. by Jefferson Chase (New York: Picador,
2001), 14–15.
21  Cochrane, Feargal, Ending Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 155.

52 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

to a conflict, even if it is decisive, can ‘create the strains It is ‘the only thing that gives any meaning to war.’23
on which future conflicts are based.’22 Together, they put And yet, the fact that there is no unifying notion, concept,
significant, even contradictory, pressure on the victor to or theory to bring this mosaic together should give any
navigate in the post-conflict phase. analyst or practioner pause. In turn, it should therefore be
no wonder that the West has struggled to achieve even
CONCLUSION the semblance of a strategic victory in such a long time
The 10 themes listed here offer a quick initial when strategy’s theoretical center is so disordered.
introduction to the issues of victory. But the relative
complexity of the topic, its large, expansive sub-topics, The author previously conducted lessons learned
and their networked character offer a sense of the research at the U.S. National Defense University, and is
problems at hand. Victory is the very purpose of war. the author of three books on the Wars of 9/11.

22  Luck, Edward C., and Albert, Stuart, ‘Introduction,’ in 3–8, in Stuart Albert and Edward C. Luck, eds., On the Endings of Wars (Port
Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1980), 4–5.
23  Codevilla, Angelo and Seabury, Paul, War: Ends and Means, 2nd Edition (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 70.

BAR ARTICLES | 53
Ignoring the Calls for
Korean Unification
Major Mike Churchman argues that security in Korea is best served
by the status quo and that Unification could prove to be dangerous for
the region.

The Monument to Three Charters of National Reunification south of Pyongyang, North Korea. It was built at the southern approach to Thongil
Street in August 2001. Photo: Bjørn Christian Tørrissen, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License, Wikimedia

54 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

S ince the partition of the Korean peninsula at the end
of World War Two and the Korean War of the 1950s
into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in
forces] in the South, is greatly in US strategic interest.
The interests of the US and China, for different reasons,
remain vested in the maintenance of the status quo,
the north and the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south, rather than conflict’.4 Stating such a purpose for its
both entities have officially championed the goal of the military forces would be needlessly provocative as
reunification of Korea (albeit under their own systems). ‘the demands of smooth-running diplomacy make it
Even China, who many assume is hostile to any event impossible to say such a thing publicly’. Instead ‘it
that could lead to US troops encroaching on its border, is much easier to point to ‘rogue states’ such as
has previously placed on the record its support to the North Korea’.5
concept of reunification - in 1997 its foreign minister
stated that ‘China supports the reunification of the Beyond countering the threat of conflict on the Korean
Korean Peninsula’ through a ‘practical approach towards peninsula and hedging against the growth of China, the
the issue of the Korean Peninsula’.1 current status quo incorporates US forces in Korea and
provides logistical support from Japan. This presence
Beyond these ‘Sunday speeches’ however, the reality effectively extends the US’s ‘nuclear umbrella’ of
is that Korean reunification would benefit neither the deterrence over both countries, such that neither country
DPRK or the ROK, their respective backers China and the feels compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent
United States (US) nor the wider region (most notably or air and maritime power projection capabilities,
Japan). Whilst the successful absorption of the DPRK ‘capabilities for those two nations that might appear
by the ROK (backed by the US) might remove the threat provocative if either had developed them on their own.’6
of nuclear attack against Japan or the US’s western Furthermore, it enables Japan to maintain its post-World
seaboard (to say nothing of the devastation which would War Two pacifist constitution and a military which
be caused if a military conflict became the method by is only permitted to defend itself.7 Without the status
which unification was pursued), it is the status quo quo and the US 'umbrella', the historic distrust with
which offers the greatest stability to the security of the which China and both Koreas have with Japan - formed
Korean peninsula and the wider Asia-Pacific region. on the backdrop of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895,
the exploitation of Korea as a colony in the early 20th
KOREAN UNIFICATION - THE US PERSPECTIVE century, Japan's invasion of China in 1937 and the use of
US troops are purportedly based in the ROK to mitigate Korean ‘comfort women’ during the Second World War8 -
the threat posed by Kim Jong-un’s regime to US regional would be exposed.
allies including ROK, Japan and Taiwan.2 These forces
are intended to deter and ultimately defend against a What seems clear is that post-Korean unification
repeat DPRK military conquest of the ROK, as well scenario in which the US removes its forces from
as against ‘North Korea’s [short- and medium-range] both Korea and Japan, Japan would be required to
missiles, which threaten Japan and must be assumed to increase investment in its own defensive military
have nuclear capability’.3 capabilities. Such a technologically advanced country,
suddenly developing its own military capabilities, risks
Beyond these immediate threats, however, as noted by unleashing an arms race within east Asia, not least
one current practitioner on Korean affairs, ‘the current because of the tensions inherent in its own colonial
geopolitical situation with North Korea providing a legacy vis-à-vis China and Korea, as those countries
buffer to China allowing the ongoing presence of [US grapple with a new security dilemma.

1  Plate, Tom, ‘In Korea, a Growing Consensus That Unification Is Inevitable,’ The International Herald Tribute, (13 September 1997), p 1
2  ‘U.S., South Korean Alliance Top Topic at Pentagon,’ U.S. Department of Defense, (Last Updated 1 April 2019), https://www.defense.gov/
explore/story/Article/1802202/us-south-korean-alliance-top-topic-at-pentagon/
3  Hilpert, Hans Günther and Pohlkamp, Elli, ‘Japan: On the Sidelines,’ in Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s
Interests, eds.; Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier, (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 12, December 2019), p 36.
4  Anonymous, email interview with author, 18 June 2019.
5  Lloyd Parry, Richard, ‘Unified Korea could destabilise US role in Asia,’ The Independent, (19 June 2000), p 14
6  Haselden, Carl E., Jr, ‘The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia,’ Parameters, (Winter 2002-03), p 121
7  Hilpert and Pohlkamp, ‘Japan: On the Sidelines,’ 39.
8 

BAR ARTICLES | 55
U.S. Army Soldiers aboard an M1126 Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment prepare to fire
its .50-caliber heavy machine gun during live-fire exercises at Rodriguez Range Complex, South Korea, as part of exercise Reception, Staging,
Onward movement, and Integration / Foal Eagle 2007 March 22, 2007. The purpose of the exercise is to demonstrate resolve to support the
Republic of Korea (ROK) against external aggression while improving ROK/U.S. combat readiness and joint / combined interoperability. The focus
of the exercise is on strategic, operational and tactical aspects of general military operations in the Korean theater of operations. U.S. Navy photo
by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Daniel N. Woods), Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic License, U.S. Army

Can the status quo even be maintained however? (e.g. to compel US troops to withdraw from South Korea …
The DPRK’s development and testing of a long- or, in the longer term, even force through the reunification
range inter-continental ballistic missile, which can of Korea under North Korean auspices)’.10
allegedly threaten the US’s western seaboard has led,
understandably, to US fears on how to contain such a The temptation now facing the US is whether a policy of
threat to its own territory. The US has so far rejected rapprochement, as Trump’s recent olive branch towards
‘a strategy of military deterrence and containment, as Kim Jong-un represents, might be able to achieve
practised [sic] towards the Soviet Union, Russia and ‘denuclearisation’ and remove this threat of nuclear
China’9 for their North Korean policy, due to concern that annihilation against the US. Despite the optimism of
investment, that the DPRK could ‘blackmail the USA and these recent summits however, they have to date glossed
its regional allies under the protection of its own bomb over the DPRK’s fundamentally different understanding

9  Overhaus, Marco, ‘USA: Between the Extremes,’ in Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests, eds.; Hanns
Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 12, December 2019), p 23
10  Ibid., p 24

56 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

of the term ‘denuclearisation’ - ‘namely a process that
also calls into question America’s extended nuclear
deterrence in the region.’11 Were Kim Jong-un able to
trade its nuclear status for the withdrawal of US forces,
it is possible that it would unleash both the potential for
DPRK blackmail against the ROK, in addition to greater
military competition between the ROK, China and Japan.

Whilst it might be unwise for the US to publicly adopt

this as its foreign policy, the time has come to tacitly
accept the North Korean nuclear threat to Japan and the
US and maintain the status quo through a strategy of
deterrence - the only terms Kim would agree to would
only serve to destabilise Korea and the region.

CHINA - NOTHING TO GAIN

All said, just because the US’s interests lie in maintaining
the status quo in order to ensure troops remain in both
the ROK and Japan, it does not follow that China’s
interests in contrast would be served by breaking the
status quo. As former head of the US delegation to the
six-party talks Ambassador Hill summarised:

The real issue would come back to how China is going

to regard US troops. I’ve said to Chinese diplomats:
‘What if the only way to keep US troops in Japan is to
keep US troops in Korea?’ Because the Chinese, when
they’re honest with themselves, they don’t want Japan Demilitarized Zone of Korea Reunification memorial at the inner side of
on its own. It’s a highly technological society and for all North Korean DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) entrance gate stating: ‘Let us
pass on the united country to the next generation!’ Photo: Nicor, Creative
the idea that China is ten feet tall … China worries about
Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license, Wikimedia
Japan still. I would not just assume that China would
see it as good if US troops were removed from Japan.12
The prevailing opinion is that China’s foreign policy
Any assessment, however, on the geopolitical preferences preferences are best served by pursuing the three
of China is fraught with difficulty, not only because fundamental goals of ‘no war, no chaos and no
of the relative secrecy which characterises the foreign nuclear weapons’14 which in addition to promoting
policy of a single party authoritarian state, but also, as is denuclearisation and preventing war on the Korean
frequently ignored by western commentators, the variety peninsula, maintains the status quo by preventing North
of opinions and debates held within China. In the words Korea from collapsing.15 The presence of the DPRK as
of Ambassador Hill: a buffer state between China and the US-allied ROK
assuages Chinese fears of how, following unification,
People like to generalise about what China does but the US might rebalance its forces in East Asia and how
they’ve got over a billion people there and they have a a unified Korea may deploy a ballistic missile defence
lot of different opinions.13 system on its border. In this instance ‘China would be
left with fewer offensive options and only Russia as
a potential defense [sic] partner’16. For all that Beijing

11  Ibid.
12  Ambassador Chris Hill, telephone interview with author, 27 Jun 2019.
13  Ibid.
14  Boc, Anny and Wacker, Gudrun, ‘China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation,’ in Facets of the North Korea Conflict: Actors, Problems and
Europe’s Interests, eds. Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research Paper 12, December 2019), p 28
15  Boc and Wacker, ‘China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation,’ 27.
16  Spangler, Michael, ‘Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks,’ Parameters, (46(2), Summer 2016), p 39.

BAR ARTICLES | 57
disapproves of the DPRK’s nuclear status and aggressive The peninsula issue must be resolved peacefully.
foreign policy, it appears to prioritise ‘Sino-American The military solution has no way out. China will
superpower rivalry … and the seventy-year-old status quo not allow war or chaos on the Korean peninsula’
on the Korean peninsula.’17 …. He also reiterated that China firmly opposed the
deployment of a US-developed missile shield in South
This view can be seen from the Chinese Foreign Korea, saying it severely damaged strategic security in
Minister’s comments in 2007: the region.18

North Korea’s ballistic missiles on parade during North Korea Victory Day in 2013.
Photo: Stefan Krasowski, Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license, Wikimedia

17  Hilpert, Hans Günther and Suh, Elisabeth, ‘South Korea: Caught in the Middle or Mediating from the Middle?,’ in Facets of the North Korea
Conflict: Actors, Problems and Europe’s Interests, eds. Hanns Günther Hilpert and Oliver Meier (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Research
Paper 12, December 2019), pp 18-19.
18  Zhen, Liu, ‘China says it won’t allow war or chaos on Korean peninsula after backing latest UN Sanctions,’ South China Morning Post,
(Published 12 September 2017), https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2110757/china-gives-full-backing-latest-un-
north-korea.

58 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Perhaps there are concessions which the US and ROK As Spangler highlights:
might offer China, which could relieve these post-
unification fears, not least ‘any US presence on Korea China seems best able to influence and shape the
following reunification, especially if US forces are emerging government of the four North Korean provinces
stationed above the 38th parallel.’19 Such concessions along its border, notably the Tumen River Valley, as well
could include renouncing the role of its Terminal High as two mid-located provinces and Pyongyang.22
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system on the
peninsula or trading a US military role above the 38th In doing so it could effectively re-establish a quasi-
parallel in return for an assurance that Chinese forces security buffer zone, drawing on the influence China
will not cross the Yalu River.20 currently has over a number of North Korean officials, to
‘help set up a pro-Chinese governmental system in the
Making such concessions to China, however, would region’23 - hardly a desirable outcome for the US or ROK.
likely lead to China using a unification settlement to
expand its influence in the Korean peninsula, not just Korean unification for China thus is a choice between
limit the proximity of US forces in its sphere of influence. how it limits a ‘US strategy of containment’24 on China
Any post-unification settlement would need to be mindful (including the sustained presence of US troops in Korea)
of China’s aspirations - ‘they’ve already fought one war as it continues its economic rise, and how it hedges
on the Peninsula to ensure their interests are met and against the impact a more confident and assertive unified
would be willing to invest considerable resources to Korea might have on a complex China-Korea-Japan
protect that position.’21 security dynamic.

Christmas Festival at Cheonggyecheon. The flag of unification can be clearly seen.

Photo: Christian Bolz, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License, Wikimedia

19  Haselden Jr, ‘The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia,’ p 125
20  Spangler, ‘Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks,’ p 41.
21  Research Officer, FCO, email interview with author, 7 June 2019.
22  Spangler, ‘Preparing for North Korea’s Collapse: Key Stabilization Tasks,’ p 40.
23  Ibid., p 40.
24  Haselden Jr, ‘The Effects of Korean Unification on the US Military Presence in Northeast Asia,’ p 124

BAR ARTICLES | 59
Ultimately, China’s overriding preference for stability and
the status quo is evident in the defensive treaty between
China and the DPRK, signed in 1961 and formally
remaining in force until 2021, which promises ‘mutual
assurances of military assistance in the event of an
armed attack on one or the other’.25 Not only does China
probably not want unification, it could go so far as to
fight to prevent it.

NOT WORTH THE RISK

Despite the obvious revulsion which the continued
existence of the DPRK brings, with its appalling human
rights record and aggressive nuclear posturing, the
dream of a unified Korea, in which nearly two million
Korean troops cease their confrontation across the
DMZ26, ‘beat their swords into ploughshares’ and swell
their country’s labour force, masks the huge destabilising
impact this event would have on north-east Asian
security. The sudden removal of the North Korean buffer
zone between the Chinese border and US troops and
anti-access area denial missile screens in the ROK,
would lead to a significant dislocation of the Sino-
American security relationship.

Leaving aside an aggressive American policy in which US

and Chinese troops confront one another across the Yalu
river, a unification settlement would possibly result in the
US agreeing to maintain its forces below the 38th parallel,
giving China the space to increase its influence over the
north of the peninsula and effectively re-establish a de-
facto partition of the country. Alternatively, the demise of
the Kim regime as a result of unification, would remove
the only overt justification for the continued presence
of US troops in Korea and Japan. Such a significant
departure of the US from the region would thrust the
twin technological superpowers of Korea and Japan into
the rapid development of their own military capabilities
(including anti-access area denial and expeditionary
forces). Whilst Korea and Japan might be able to overcome
their centuries-old enmity on a foundation of trust built
on democratic values, competition with China would be
almost assured. The resultant arms race would serve only
to strengthen China further. Sadly, Korean unification just
isn’t worth the risk.

Major Mike Churchman is currently studying a Masters

in Applied Security Strategy at Exeter University under
the External Placement (Academic) scheme. This
article is an excerpt from his wider dissertation ‘Korean
Unification: War, Collapse or Mutual Agreement?’

25  Boc and Wacker, ‘China: Between Key Role and Marginalisation,’ 27.
26  Eberstadt, Nicholas, ‘Hastening Korean Reunification,’ Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1997), Volume 76, No. 2, p 86

60 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

This is a memorial to fighter pilots of all nationalities who lost their lives in the Korean War 1951-53. Photo: Grah

BAR ARTICLES | 61
Making the Army better
with 360 Degree Reporting
In this article, Captain Robin Winstanley asks how the
Army might change if the subordinates’ observations of their
commanders’ performances were taken into account for their
commanders’ appraisals.

1st Brigade Head Quarters during Exercise Iron Strike 2 conducts a quick brief before moving on to rock drills for the next stage of their exercise.
Photo: Corporal Donald Todd (RLC) / MoD Crown Cropyright

62 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

‘ What are they like to work with?’ is a question frequently
asked by soldiers and officers alike when they get a new
commander. It is far from unusual that the opinion of a
to the team that they seek to build. Such a reporting
method is one of the most effective ways of identifying
ineffective leaders within an organisation since they
leader by his superiors can conflict with the assessment are most readily apparent to their subordinates. This
of those they command. How would the military change is important because, for instance, leaders interested
if subordinates’ observations of a superior’s performance only in their own advancement have a negative impact
lent weight to the content of both their mid-year1 and end on retention, driving away their subordinates and
of year appraisal?2 For an institution where leaders can undermining unit cohesion.3
have a greater impact than arguably any other profession,
the military must strive to ensure the right people occupy Many forms of 360-degree reporting exist and have
those positions of responsibility. been tested with mixed results, with the US military
commissioning a study by the Rand Corporation.4
Many who serve in the military can likely identify people An example of this method of appraisal would be the
in positions of authority that have no place being there. US Army’s 360-degree assessment tool referred to as
By adopting 360-degree reporting where subordinates’ the Multisource Assessment and Feedback (MSAF).5
input is included in the appraisal process, the quality of While no system is flawless, the potential benefits can
those who are promoted could improve and as a result outweigh the cost. There are roles in the military, such
the organisation might become more effective. Service as staff positions, where people have no subordinates.
personnel can, and should, have greater confidence As a result, this system cannot be employed universally
that the appraisal process is a better reflection on and is only appropriate for those in appointments where
the performance of everyone within the organisation. they command. This can potentially have a significant
This is more likely when the assessment considers impact on the results of a grading board where someone
the experiences of all those in the chain of command. without subordinates is competing with a commander
No report should be shaped solely by the input of who is viewed as exceptional by those they lead.
subordinates alone but it can, and perhaps could, make However, throughout their career officers and soldiers
an important contribution to the final assessment, are required to lead as a fundamental part of their role. A
helping to benefit the individual and the wider Army. comprehensive assessment of their performance in these
positions must be understood if the military is to ensure
By including subordinate input into the appraisal they gain the very best out of their personnel.
process, reports could serve as a much more holistic
assessment of a leader’s performance. Such a process One of the most straight forward and easy to implement
could be used not only with the objective of identifying approaches would be for reporting officers to talk with
poor performing leaders, but also identifying those subordinates of those they are reporting on as a normal
who perform well in their roles. Also, subordinate input procedure similar to the U.S Marine Corps ‘Requesting
could provide the Army with a greater understanding of Mast’.6 They can informally solicit perspectives from a
how well its leaders embrace Mission Command. It will variety of individuals, in order to gain a broad picture as
provide the individuals themselves with the opportunity to what they are like day-to-day. For instance, an example
to learn more about how they are perceived as a leader could be, a Major discussing the performance of a new
and where they can make the biggest improvements. officer with his Sergeants. The Sergeants’ observations
It could potentially shift the focus of those seeking and analysis can help mould how the report is formed
advancement, placing less of an emphasis on pleasing providing valuable insight gained from observing how
their reporting officer and instead lending greater weight the subject interacts with the soldiers and carries out

1  Chief of Defence People, JSP 757 Tri Service Reporting Instructions, MoD, Part 3, Para 2, Pg 3-1
2  Chief of Defence People, JSP 757 Tri Service Reporting Instructions, MoD, Part 4, Para 2, Pg 4-1
3  Reed, George E., and Bullis, Craig R., The Impact of Destructive Leadership on Senior Military Officers and Civilian Employees, Armed Forces
and Society 2009, SAGE, Pg 8
4  Hardison, Chaitra M., Zaydman, Mikhail, Oluwatola, Tobi, Saavedra, Anna Rosefsky, Bush, Thomas, Peterson, Heather, Straus, Susan G., 360
Degree Assessment, Rand Corporation, Preface, Pg iii
5  US Department of the Army, Army Training and Leader Development, Army Regulation 350-1
6  Chaitra M. Hardison, Mikhail Zaydman, Tobi Oluwatola, Anna Rosefsky Saavedra, Thomas Bush, Heather Peterson, Susan G Straus, 360
Degree Assessment, Rand Corporation, Chp 4, Pg 23

BAR ARTICLES | 63
Commanders from B Company, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment alongside 3rd Company, 81st Quick Response Force Battalion gather for
quick battle orders before assaulting a position. British paratroopers put their skills to the test alongside their Jordanian counterparts during
joint training on the desert plains of Jordan in Exercise OLIVE GROVE. Photo: Corporal Jamie Hart, Crown Copyright

their duties. A second method of soliciting input for a appraisal reporting method. The immediate one and two
report would be for the subject to have members of his down subordinates of the Troop Commander, in this case
team write reports anonymously that would then be sent the Troop Sergeants and Corporals, would submit their
to his reporting chain. This would allow for a transparent assessment of the performance of the officer at the mid-
process, understandable by all within the organisation. year appraisal phase. The contents of their assessment
would only be made available to the Squadron
Using the example of a Troop Commander we can test Commander and Commanding Officer in order to prevent
the suitability and effectiveness of adopting a 360-degree potential negative reporting by their own reporting

64 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 include how effective they perceive their senior officers to
be as leaders; do they embrace Mission Command, how
effective are they in developing their subordinates and
where they can improve?

The effectiveness of the changes in reporting that have

been implemented can then be assessed at the end of
year appraisal. Reporting officers should make reference
in an individual’s report, to areas of improvement
identified by their subordinates. This is especially so for
performance shortcomings of which individual's may not
have been aware.

A clear benefit of this reporting method is allowing for

the reporting officer to distil the information they have
received into a useful narrative that can be inserted
into the report rather than a subordinate providing it
directly. Reporting officers would not be required to
use all the information that is provided by subordinates
verbatim, but would reference what is appropriate. In
order for this process to be beneficial reporting officers
must actively seek value from the information that they
have been given and employ it in the appraisal process
in an effective way. The reporting officer will still own
the report that they produce but others within the
organisation can have greater confidence that the author
is fully informed about the reportee.

The input of a subordinate will have the most impact

during the mid-year appraisal process where areas
of concern can be identified. Areas for improvement
identified more readily by subordinates may go unnoticed
by a superior. Subordinates also have an incentive to
articulate areas of improvement to improve their own day-
to-day working environment and contribute to creating the
best team possible, ready for the demands of deployment.
Such a process could provide a clearer insight into how
effective the individuals being report on are at developing
their subordinates or commanding their teams.

For example, should a commander need to improve the

way he or she delivers orders or managing subordinates,
officer. However, these reporting officers can use what those they are responsible for are in the best position to
has been identified to support the development of the tell them. For an organisation that invests so much time
subject. A designated template similar to that used by and resources in developing its leaders, there are many
the UK Armed Forces appraisal process could be sent that are not as effective as they could be.8
out electronically.7 The responses would be submitted
in the form of a narrative and the participants would be The use of the 360-degree appraisal method can also
asked to focus on a variety of elements. These would be used to protect against the Observer Effect - where

7  Chief of Defence People, JSP 757 Tri Service Reporting Instructions, MoD, Part 4, Para 2, Pg 4-1
8  See Reed and Bullis, The Impact of Destructive Leadership on Senior Military Officers and Civilian Employees, Armed Forces and Society
2009, SAGE, Pg 15

BAR ARTICLES | 65
a subject behaves in a particular way when they know Leaders subconsciously gravitate towards people whom
they are being observed, for instance an Officer behaving they perceive as similar to themselves as discussed by
differently when the Commanding Officer is present. Laurison and Friedman in their book The Glass Ceiling.9
The most obvious example is how individuals behave When Officers or Sergeants look for traits in their
when they have an opportunity to interact with their subordinates that they themselves possess, they may
reporting officers, particularly if they seldom have overlook other leaders with a different style of leadership.
an opportunity to work with them directly. This is The approaches may be more effective than that of their
demonstrated when the main effort for the unit shifts commanders but because it is different it may not be
from preparing for operations to preparing for the visit of identified. Subordinates may be better able to comment
the senior officer. The focus of senior officers within the on the effectiveness of a leadership method or, at the
Regiment is aimed at ensuring the visitor receives the very least, provide a different perspective. By allowing for
best impression possible, which inevitably means greater scope of different styles of leadership the diversity
that the picture presented does not reflect reality. within the Army will inevitably increase. This opens up
By focusing their resources and attention on pleasing the prospect of greater debate within the organisation
their commander in order to advance their own interests and improvement to the intellectual rigor the Army
and careers, the organisation as a whole suffers. applies to its own reflective process. The current

Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, together with their attached supporting units, hone both their fighting and their fieldcraft
skills on the baked Kenyan savannah as part of the six-week long Exercise Askari Storm. Photo: Dek Traylor, Crown Copyright

9  Laurison, Daniel, and Friedman, Sam, The Class Ceiling: Why It Pays to Be Privileged, Policy Press

66 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

appraisal process encourages uniformity of opinion Commanders should be judged on the team that they
with subordinates agreeing with their commanders in build and the content of their character, as much as the
order to ingratiate themselves with them. This inevitably quality of their staff work. By encouraging this method
cascades throughout the organisation. If the input into of reporting leaders are also demonstrating the moral
an appraisal was not limited solely by the view of the courage to hold themselves accountable to those they
reporting officer, greater confidence to express opinions lead. We expect that the lawful orders we give should be
or assessments that differ from the collective orthodoxy followed, despite the fact that they could potentially lead
may follow. to a soldier’s death. If we are asking subordinates to trust
us to make the right decision with their lives, should
Human nature and ambition inevitably impact how we not have faith in them to provide us with a fair and
people behave. In a hierarchical organisation such effective reflection on our performance? By allowing for
as the Army, inevitably the focus of attention is on such input we could further strengthen the bonds that
the feelings and opinions of the boss, but this can bind commanders and those that they lead.
negatively impact the rest of the unit and increase
stress.10 Anyone who has witnessed absurd decisions Such a method of reporting will not be effective in
made with the intention of keeping superiors happy, isolation and has several shortcomings that must be
to the detriment of many others in the unit, would considered when deciding whether to adopt this policy.
understand this. If this behaviour was recognised for It is critical to understand that this would not replace
what it is, could change for the better follow? the current methodology of appraisals but supplement

Headquarters 20th Armoured Infantry Brigade exercise on a snowy Sennelager Training Area, Germany, as part of a test for the UK's Vanguard
Armoured Infantry Brigade (VAIB) during Exercise SPECULAR. Photo: Dominic King, Crown Copyright

10  Britt, Thomas W., Davison, James, Bleise, Paul, Castro, Carl Andrew, How leaders can influence the impact that stressors have on soldiers,
Military Medicine, Vol 169, Pg 541-544

BAR ARTICLES | 67
them. The reporting officers should continue to assess positive effect on the military cannot be ignored. As a
and articulate how an individual has performed. The learning organisation we are constantly evolving and
contribution from a subordinate could shape how changing the way in which we approach our work. In an
that assessment is ascertained. Arguments against era of ever-dwindling resources and greater demands,
employing this method of reporting raise concerns a change in the way we assess the suitability of
that some commanders may approach the reporting commanders for advancement could have a huge impact,
period as a popularity contest, sacrificing the mission and serve as an important force multiplier.
in order to please their troops or to keep them happy.
At the same time effective leaders who are difficult Those who are able to articulate intent and embrace
personalities may be unduly penalised. This is why it Mission Command can have an outsized influence on
is critical that the reporting officers continue to take the battlefield. Commanders who enjoy the confidence
a holistic approach to the reports that they produce. of those that they lead can drive them to do incredibly
Finally, another critical concern is that reporting difficult things under the most trying of circumstances.
officers are not under any obligation to accept the input By allowing those we lead to provide their insights into
provided by subordinates. By having a transparent how we develop, we can all become better leaders and in
process where subordinates’ input is included in the so doing create a more effective Army for the future. No
report, a subject who receives a report where this input system is without faults, but such a reform could allow
has not been clearly articulated could have grounds the Army to address critical deficiencies in command
for appeal. that far too often allow poor leadership to thrive.

In order to test the prospects and impact of such a

change in policy a limited trial could be run that focusses
on a particular unit, target group or rank bracket as a
control group. In order to assess its effectiveness, the
change methodology should be assessed over the course
of five years to determine its impact. Members of the
organisation who have participated in the study should
be asked to record how it has affected their approach
to their work and how they lead. Subordinates’ views
should be used for the assessment if they have seen
an improvement in their leaders and what impact they
think it has had on how managers approach their work.
Commanders within an organisation should examine
both qualitative and quantitative measures to assess
how this practice may have impacted the organisation,
examining, for instance, retention or performance such
as being deployed on BATUS. For the Army as a whole,
an understanding of how this has impacted the career
development pathway of those who have participated will
also help determine if there are significant changes in
who progresses or how reports are written.

Despite enormous investment in developing

commanders, managers and leaders within the military,
poor performers are still evident in the Army. Civilian
organisations, such as the civil service or private
business also suffer from such individuals; however
they do not allocate the same effort to developing their
leaders nor are they invested with responsibility for
the lives of the people that they lead. At the same time,
many organisations practice some form of 360-degree
reporting. The potential for a relatively inexpensive
change of practice that could have a disproportionately

68 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Pictured are British Army Snipers and their spotters conducting live firing on Salisbury Plain during the prestigious Sniper Commanders
Course held at the Specialist Weapon School in Warminster. Photo: Stuart A Hill AMS, Crown Copyright

BAR ARTICLES | 69
Psychometric Diversity,
Creativity and the
Open Plan Office
Major James Ashton AGC (ETS) argues that mixing the right blend
of people in the right environment leads to success, suggesting that
the Army is perhaps not getting this quite right.

British Royal Engineers of the UK Bridge Training Team, deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, discuss the construction of an Acrow
Poseidon bridge over the Tigris River with an Iraqi Security Force (ISF) member in Mosul, Iraq. Photo: Pfc Anthony Zendejas, Released

70 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

I t is commonly considered that a diverse range of
employees helps promote the competitiveness of an
organisation, with different views and experiences
rarely produce innovative results. This is due to inhibitors
in social interaction, creating bland, design-by-working-
group solutions, agreed through consensus rather than
helping to avoid groupthink. The outcome of groupthink, revolution or inspiration. Whilst talking through a logic
if not necessarily failure, is a low probability of a problem can assist solutions, there is also the danger
successful outcome.1 of ‘paralysis though analysis’ which can snuff out the
flickering candle of insight.4
Creative, diverse thought is a contributor to success and
it can come from anyone irrespective of background, age, But the answer is not necessarily to force people to
gender or any other factor. Some people are naturally work alone; indeed many people would be terrified of
inclined to think occasionally outside the box, whilst others the prospect, and such an approach would prevent
prefer to remain firmly inside it. It is the author’s belief collaboration and cross-pollination. The answer is to use
that the key type of diversity required for organisational to greater effect that which we already have, which may,
creativity is psychometric diversity: how people think, in turn, require some interior design modifications.
approach problems and interact with the world.
The open-plan office has, in recent years, become the
Two questions therefore need to be addressed: firstly, common design for military headquarters. Unfortunately,
does the Army successfully recruit and retain a this design has the potential to be the antithesis to the
psychometrically diverse group of people, amongst whom germination of inventiveness. This is true whether one
some might be termed as nature’s ‘heretical creatives’?2 is an introvert or an extrovert; whether one draws energy
And secondly, what does the Army do with its people in from crowded spaces or a quiet, closed environment. What
order to facilitate diverse and creative thought within the is essential for the open plan office to work as intended
work environment? is for it to have ‘enough people with different perspectives
running into one another in unpredictable ways’.5
To address the first question it is helpful to turn to
Susan Cain, author of Quiet: The Power of Introverts The headquarters of today are open but segregated by
in a World That Can't Stop Talking. Cain suggests that capbadge, and if research by the author is taken into
many of society’s most creative people (and incidentally account likely to be filled with people with a similar
transformational leaders) are introverts, citing Mahatma personality type. This is the worst of all worlds, as there
Ghandi and Martin Luther King. She places the number is neither the space for individual quiet reflection, nor
of introverts in society to be between 33-50 per cent, the random interactions of diverse thinkers beyond the
yet suggests that such people feel under pressure to confining desk partitions. As a work environment it has
‘be someone else’ in the workplace. She claims that for the potential to lead to a lack of creative output whilst
many introverts it is necessary to behave like extroverts also providing some of the antecedent conditions for
otherwise their skills and insights won’t be recognised.3 groupthink.6
She contends that many working environments do
not support introverts’ innate talents for creativity. Indeed, a walk around many headquarters in today’s
The importance of this will be seen later. Army might see even Brigadiers sitting at a bench desk,
given limited seclusion from the team. To some this
Malcolm Gladwell’s research supports this. In Blink he will be a preferred method of working, and indeed in
argues that group brainstorming and discussion sessions many circumstances will produce the output required.

1  Janis, I., 1982, Groupthink, P, 244

2  ‘Heretical creative’ is taken to mean a person who is inclined to form logical conclusions that are born from an innovative adaptation of
methodology and doctrine.
3  This is supported by research by Karl Moore of McGill University in Montreal, who states that introverts who make it to the top learn how to
behave like extroverts at least some of the time.
4  Gladwell, M., 2007, Pp. 121-122
5  Lehrer, J., The New Yorker, Accessed 29 Jan 2019 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/groupthink
6  Janis, I., 1982, Groupthink, P.244. Antecedent conditions include: decision makers constituting a cohesive group; structural faults of the
organisation such as group insulation, little impartial leadership and few methodical procedures; homogeneity of social background and
ideology; a provocative situational context with high stress and low hope; difficult decision making processes which lower self-efficacy.

BAR ARTICLES | 71
The British Army Land Forces Headquarters (HQ Land) officially opened a new complex at Marlborough Lines in Andover, Hampshire,
UK in July 2010. Photo: Peter Davies, Crown Copyright

Yet, in the case of those who are required to see and over twenty-two percent being measured as ESTJ alone.7
assess the bigger picture, the inability to close the door Forty-five per cent of junior officers comprise of (ESTJ),
and ponder the strategic situation in peace and quiet (ESFJ) or (ENFJ), out of a possible sixteen categories.8
must have an impact whether the individual prefers the
working environment of the floorplate or not. And for
every brigadier who prefers the quiet of an office, there ISTJ ISFJ INFJ INTJ
must be many more staff officers who equally work 5 (4.5%) 1 (0.9%) 3 (2.7%) 3 (2.7%)
better in smaller, less intrusive environments. With the
Army requiring its people to be ‘the strategic edge’ has ISTP ISFP INFP INTP
it inadvertently created working environments which are 1 (0.9%) 1 (0.9%) 6 (5.4%)
not only non-inclusive (on the psychometric level), but
ESTP ESFP ENFP ENTP
which also actively inhibit our collective planning and
7 (6.3%) 9 (8.1%) 5 (4.5%) 11
processing? With this question in mind, we must look at
(9.9%)
the people who are likely to work in headquarters.
ESTJ ESFJ ENFJ ENTJ
In terms of recruitment it appears the Army does not 25 16 12 6 (5.4%)
seek diversity in the area where it most matters: how (22.5%) (14.4%) (10.8%)
the brain prefers to sift and process information. As has
been alluded-to above, diversity in how one processes Table 1: Breakdown of MBTI results of 111 Lieutenants of mixed
the world around them is critical to creativity in group capbadge with 18 per cent showing as introvert, 82 per cent extrovert,
and 48 per cent comprising just three categories. Note the fact that
scenarios. Yet Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI)
there are more ESTJs than the entire introvert category.
data collected by the author of one hundred and eleven Crown Copyright
lieutenants, between 2017 and 2019, showed a strong
convergence of personality types within the junior
officer ranks, strongly siding towards the extrovert and
action-orientated individuals. Eighty-two per cent of
those surveyed fell within the extrovert category, with

7  ESTJ: Extraversion, Sensing, Thinking, Judging. ESFJ: Extraversion, Sensing, Feeling, Judging ENFJ: Extraversion, Intuition, Feeling, Judging.
8  Evidence was gained through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test. The abridged version of the test was used. One individual who had
previously completed the longer version reported that his outcome was the same.

72 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Based on this snapshot, the officer cohort, therefore, is thinking: splitting problems into logical components
in danger of being dominated by one type of character and steps. The chief alternative to this is the so-called
grouping: ESTJ (extraversion, sensing, thinking, Commander’s intuition, which is viewed with a curious
judgment). This sort of person is described as: mix of veneration and suspicion, depending on who the
Commander is, and in what context it takes place.’9
Practical, realistic, matter of fact. Decisive, quickly
moving to implement decisions. Organises projects The Army’s identified tendency towards reductionist
to get things done, focusing on getting results in the thinking, coupled with the veneration of the Commander
most efficient way possible. Have a clear set of logical and a strong convergence of personality types could
standards, systematically follow them and want others be seen as a particular risk to achieving clear-minded
to also. Forceful in implementing their plans. decision-making, innovation and creativity. The necessity
for decision-making, innovation and creativity has
The description sounds just like a strong military leader long been established within military doctrine, and is
should be. Yet, according to the Myers-Briggs Type encompassed in JDP-04 (Understanding). Yet how many
Indicator (MBTI) literature, such people may end up military personnel feel comfortable to pitch a bold,
becoming domineering and rushing into action without innovative idea in a formal setting? Is the risk to personal
due consideration. This sort of person might be highly reputation too great, and if so, what does that say about
effective, but must be balanced by those who take a the culture of the Armed Forces?
different approach, perhaps one that is more conceptual.
Without an equal spread of personality types, there will The Army needs ESTJs at all ranks, and the effects-based
not be a dissenting voice to be heard amongst a sea organisation that the Army is works well for it. However,
of implementers. if the principle of diversity and inclusivity is to be
followed, then the Army should consider ways to make
Further to this, Professor Karen Carr’s 2011 investigation the working environment better for those with different
into decision-making within the Army environment psychometric profiles. Individual working spaces should
states: ‘The MOD has a cultural bias towards reductionist be available, whilst in officer and soldier reporting,

United Kingdom Army soldiers make their way to the range during the Australian Army Skill at Arms Meeting 2019 held in Puckapunyal, Victoria.
Photo: Corporal Jessica de Rouw, Australian Department of Defence

9  Carr, Karen & Sparks, Emma, (2011), Thinking Skills for Strategic Capability.

BAR ARTICLES | 73
quietness should not be equated with shyness or different for the military. Let us take the example of
weakness, but perhaps might signal a strategic, reflective General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander
and creative thinker. of Allied Forces Europe, who fits into the quiet, reflective
category of personality. Beginning the Second World War
Jim Collins, in his book Good to Great suggests that that as a Lieutenant Colonel, he quickly rose to the top due
the CEOs who remain at the top of their companies for to his ability to manage other Generals and Air Marshals
the longest are quiet and self-effecting.10 It should be no with huge personalities and conflicting egos. He smoothed

The British Army begins its campaign on inclusivity and diversity to coincide with National Inclusion Week and demonstrate just how inclusive
it is acknowledging the diverse backgrounds of its personnel and embraces those little things we all have in common, from a love of karaoke to
worrying what others think about us. Photo: Corporal Jonathan Lee van Zyl / MoD Crown Copyright

10  Collins, J., 2011, Good to Great, Pp 12-13

74 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

over relationships and acted as the diplomat, letting his was despite his wish not to run for office and his instinct
staff have their moments of glory in front of the press to shun the limelight. So, while it was essential to have
whilst he took the back seat. extroverts such as Patton, Montgomery and Coningham
driving the men forwards on the battlefield, it was just as
Further evidence to this is the ‘draught Eisenhower’ essential to have a calm, reflective character to be able
movement, which sought to push him to run for President to order them to work together and maintain the inter-
following the complete victory over the Axis powers. This service and international alliance, maintaining an eye on
the bigger, strategic picture.

However, it cannot be said that the present day Army

(and possibly militaries in general) truly recruit and
promote a diverse set of psychometric profiles. Citing the
case of Eisenhower, it might be more through exceptional
circumstance that an introvert finds him or herself
in a leadership position, demonstrating their unique
managerial and leadership qualities in traditionally
effects-orientated work environments.

What is certain is that further study is needed into

levels of diversity at the psychometric level. As has been
highlighted from the author’s small study, only 18 per cent
of lieutenants fall into the introvert category. This skewed
ratio might be preferable for those filling roles as platoon
or troop commanders, but what of positions which come
with seniority? Research should be conducted into the
percentage of those at lieutenant colonel and above who
fall into the introvert/extrovert category in order to gauge
the retention of introverts and theorists against extrovert
implementers. Do such people get to the top, and if not,
why not and what happens to them?

If the Army truly wishes to promote divergent thinking

and inclusivity, then it must begin at the psychometric
level. The pay-off will be found in the conceptual
revolutions that are critical to being able to outthink a
numerically and technologically superior enemy.

REFERENCES

• Carr, Karen & Sparks, Emma, 2011, Thinking Skills for

Strategic Capability, Cranfield University: MOD
• Collins, James C. 2011, Good to great: why some
companies make the leap ... and others don't, New York,
NY: Harper Business
• Gladwell, Malcolm, 2005, Blink: the power of thinking
without thinking, New York: Little, Brown and Co.
• Janis, Irving L., 1982, Victims of groupthink; a
psychological study of foreign-policy decisions and
fiascos, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.
• Lehrer, Jonah, Groupthink, The New Yorker,
June 19, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2012/01/30/groupthink.

BAR ARTICLES | 75
Empowerment and
Mission Command -
Uneasy Bedfellows?
Lieutenant Colonel Simon Graham, analyses the Army’s continuing
commitment to greater empowerment and the role of mission
command in the process.

The 2019 Army Combat Power Demonstration (ACPD) took place on Salisbury Plain from 28 – 30 Oct 2019. It was set in and around Copehill
Down Village - the Army’s primary urban combat training facility - and showcased a variety of the Army’s most modern capabilities.
Photo: Jack Eckersley, Crown Copyright

76 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

E mpowerment is very much on the agenda in the Army
presently. For several years the Army Headquarters
has been actively seeking ways to empower the Army and
work lives, we rely on a web of superiors, subordinates
and others on whom we depend to get the job done.
Consequently, getting the desired results is not merely
the Field Army is running the Empowerment Programme, a result of how we behave; it also depends on what
which is driving productivity, continuous improvement others do and how they respond. In seeking to influence
and delegation in order that we can remove waste and others, those who can build their power are said to be
focus on the things that matter. Additional emphasis on more likely to achieve their ends than those with less
empowerment is being driven by the Chief of Defence Staff power.5 The literature supporting this argument compels
and the MoD Permanent Secretary, who wrote to all staff in us to engage in the consolidation of power through
the MoD to announce 2019 as the ‘year of empowerment’. various means, but principally by actively and skilfully
controlling valuable resources.6 There are also said
References to empowerment are all around us, but to be multiple ‘bases of power’ including personality,
there is little in the doctrine to help us understand how positional (your rank), expert (you know best how to get
to ‘do empowerment’.1 There is also evidence that the something done), and the power to reward or punish
experience of empowerment differs between ranks. others.7 Whether we consider power as a relational
A study that looked at 5 years-worth of Armed Forces quality or as comprising various bases, we are urged to
Continuous Attitude Survey Data found evidence that recognise that weak people and weak individuals achieve
soldiers feel substantially less empowered than officers. little in the world.8 Power, then, is something to be
Though officers and soldiers feel well trained and skilfully consolidated so that we can achieve our aims.
have confidence in their teams, they differed in their
impressions of how much freedom they were allowed The literature on empowerment takes a somewhat
in how they do their work, the extent to which they different view of power. At its most basic, empowerment
were rewarded for good work and how much intrinsic means ‘to give power to’. Leading management thinkers
motivation they derived from their work.2 argue that for leaders to have far-reaching influence,
they must make their followers feel powerful and able to
This author researched empowerment from the accomplish things on their own.9
perspective of business, academia and military affairs3 and
was also part of a Field Army/McKinsey team during the Thus, organisational power can grow, in part, by being
early stages of the Field Army Empowerment Programme. shared. Therefore, unlike leaders with little power,
This article seeks to summarise this work to assist in a leaders who have effectively built their power are more
more informed debate on empowerment, beginning with likely to see their subordinates’ talents as resources
an introduction to the concept of power in organisational rather than threats and therefore encourage more
life, which is essential to understanding empowerment. autonomy.10 One might take from this that the power
literature11 offers guidance to the individual on how
POWER to progress in a brutal world, while the empowerment
The term ‘power’ refers to ‘the capacity to obtain the literature12 compels us to share power for organisational
result you want’.4 To accomplish even simple tasks in our over personal benefit. The reality, though, is likely to be

1  See Army Leadership Doctrine (2016), p52-53.

2  Graham, S. (2019) Isn’t mission command enough? How the British Army can benefit from empowerment at the Regimental level. University of
Warwick.
3  The author studied an MBA with Warwick Business School. Business research included Harvard Business Review articles. Academic
articles and books were sourced through the Warwick Business School library. Military research included BAR articles and doctrine
publications. ALIS was a useful source of military writings on mission command.
4  Forrester, R., (2002) ‘Empowerment: Rejuvenating a potent idea’, Measuring Business Excellence, 6(2), pp. 12–13.
5  Pfeffer, J., (1992) Managing with Power: Politics and influcne in organisations. Harvard Business School Press.
6  Pfeffer, J., (2010) ‘Power Play’, Harvard Business Review, (August), pp. 84–92.
7  French, J. R. P. and Raven, B. H., (1958) The Bases of Social Power. Edited by D. Cartwright. University of Michigan Press.
8  Badaracco, J. L., (1997) Defining Moments. Boston: Harvard Business School Press
9  Kanter, R. M., (1983) The change masters. New York: Simon & Schuster. McClelland, D. (1975) Power: the inner experience. New York: Irvington.
10  Ibid.
11  Pfeffer, J., (2010) ‘Power Play’, Harvard Business Review, (August), pp. 84–92.
12  McClelland, D., (1975) Power: the inner experience. New York: Irvington

BAR ARTICLES | 77
In South Sudan, vulnerable groups, such as women, are subjected to various forms of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV). In partnership with
the Human Rights Division and with the support from other departments working as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the UK
Engineers have successfully lead empowerment based self-defence workshops. Photo: Captain Bratby, Crown Copyright

more complicated with successful individuals skilfully competition drove a search for new forms of management
combining both methods. that encouraged greater risk-taking, innovation and
employee commitment.14 Empowerment appeared
EMPOWERMENT to provide just such a solution.15 The central tenet of
Though the term empowerment is relatively new, the empowerment is that people respond more creatively when
concept of delegating decision-making authority from given broad responsibilities, encouraged to contribute,
management to employees as a means of improving and helped to derive satisfaction from our work.16
performance is not and can be traced back to the 1970s.13 This approach contrasts markedly with traditional
Empowerment took hold as a management concept in management techniques that have emphasised control,
the late 1980s when the increasing rate of change and hierarchy and rigidity.17 Empowerment is a complicated

13  Kanter, R. M., (1977). Men and women of the corporation. New York, NY: Basic Books.
14  Spreitzer, G. M., (2008) ‘Taking Stock : A Review of More than Twenty Years of Research on Empowerment at Work’, in Barling, J. and
Cooper, C. L. (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Behavior : Volume 1 - Micro Approaches. London: Sage Publications, pp. 54–72
15  Thomas, K. W. and Velthouse, B. A., (2011), ‘Cognitive Elements of Empowerment: An “Interpretive” Model of Intrinsic Task Motivation.’,
Academy of Management Review, 15(4), pp. 666–681.
16  Walton, R., (1985), From control to commitment in the workplace, Harvard Business Review, March-April, pp. 77-84
17  Greasley, K. et al., (2008), ‘Understanding empowerment from an employee perspective’, Team Performance Management: An International
Journal, 14(1/2), pp. 39–55.

78 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 The people The context provided by Intrinsic motivation/ Collective outcomes
managers A mindset

SRUCTURAL ORGANISATIONAL
PERSONAL AND EMPOWERMENT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS
RELATIONSHIP EMPOWERMENT - Performance
- Alignment
CHARACTERISTICS - Meaning outcomes (Productivity,
- Shared information proactivity, creativity,
- Disposition - Competence
- Boundaries innovation).
- Performance - Self determination
- Participation - Attitudinal outcomes
- Seniority - Impact (job satisfaction,
- Training & knowledge
- Trust commitment)
- Org. support

Inputs Process Output

Figure 1 - A model of empowerment18

concept, which history has shown is very difficult to rather control than empower you. Therefore, relationships
implement effectively.19 Empowerment rhetoric and the matter for empowerment.
reality of implementation are often very different.
STRUCTURAL EMPOWERMENT
The model of empowerment in Figure 1 shows all the Structural empowerment consists of the things that
constituent parts of empowerment and will be used to managers do and the context they set. If a commander
explain what empowerment is in practical terms. is considering creating a more empowered environment
within the unit – and has already established a baseline
PEOPLE of authentic and trusting relationships - then structural
Research suggests that those with stronger self-esteem, empowerment is where the commander should focus.
higher rank, more tenure and higher education report Structural empowerment is associated with sharing
stronger feelings of empowerment in their organisations. power by shifting responsibility and decision-making
In large hierarchical organisations, this typically plays authority down through the chain of command - hence
out as those at the top of the organisation feeling more ‘to give power to’. All too often leaders talk about
empowered than those at the bottom. Therefore when empowerment but say and do nothing about the balance
considering where to focus effort in any empowerment of power in the organisation.20 The benefits of shifting
initiative, a good place to start is with junior employees power downward include enabling us to grow our power
to understand how their responsibilities and participation by sharing it with others who work to a common goal
can be improved. Trust is also important. If your and, by sharing decision-making we can create time for
manager does not trust you, he or she would instinctively longer-term thinking and innovation.21

18  Derived from three articles: Conger, J. A. and Kanungo, R. N., (1988), ‘The Empowerment Process: Integrating Theory and Practice.’, Academy
of Management Review, 13(3), pp. 471–482; Thomas, K. W. and Velthouse, B. A. (2011) ‘Cognitive Elements of Empowerment: An
“Interpretive” Model of Intrinsic Task Motivation.’, Academy of Management Review, 15(4), pp. 666–681; and Seibert, S. E., Wang, G. and
Courtright, S. H. (2011) ‘Antecedents and Consequences of Psychological and Team Empowerment in Organizations: A Meta-Analytic
Review’, Journal of Applied Psychology, 96(5), pp. 981–1003.
19  Storr, J., (2011), ‘A command philosophy for the information age: The continuing relevance of mission command’, Defence Studies, 3(3), pp.
119–129.
20  Forrester, R., (2002), ‘Empowerment: Rejuvenating a potent idea’, Measuring Business Excellence, 6(2), pp. 12–13.
21  Kanter, R. M., (1983), The change masters. New York: Simon & Schuster. McClelland, D. (1975) Power: the inner experience. New York: Irvington.

BAR ARTICLES | 79
The most common practices associated with structural • Training and Knowledge: Getting the most from
empowerment are explained below.22 The practices are people and enabling them to make a real difference
designed to enable people to act with greater autonomy in the organisation requires us to help them build
while still aligning them to an organisational purpose knowledge and skills not only to do their jobs better
and giving them the skills and information they need: but also to learn about the wider organisation. One
aspect of the Field Army Empowerment Programme is
• Strategic Alignment: Leaders must continually to strengthen and standardise in-barracks routines and
communicate a clear and compelling unit purpose. An share this understanding widely.
exercise or operation is not a purpose. They are tasks. • Organisational Support: Organisational support
Tasks should have associated activities which are includes the supportiveness of the unit’s climate, our
all linked to an overarching purpose. It is a leader’s perception that the organisation values and cares about
role to help subordinates, whatever their place in us, and the level of trust the unit has in individuals.
the organisation, understand how their activities Implicit in this is that people will be supported if they
contribute to a meaningful purpose. Purpose matters; make well-intentioned mistakes.
make the organisation’s purpose clear to those you
seek to empower. Any one of these practices by itself will have only a
• Information sharing: As far as possible, we must marginal effect on empowerment.23 The real impact
provide our people with complete and accurate comes from the interaction and reinforcement among
information to allow them to make judgements, these practices.24
prioritise and plan. Merely passing on information
is problematic in a world where there is so much Empowerment, then, is not about removing control and
of it. Instead, leaders should be ‘sensegivers’. oversight and just letting people ‘crack on’. Doing so is
Sensegiving requires us to make things that have likely to lead to activity that is unsynchronised against
already happened meaningful to others, i.e. using common objectives. The skill lies in increasing our
our experience to make judgements about what is subordinates’ area of freedom but doing so in a way
going on around us and communicating that to our that engages and supports them in pursuing a common
subordinates in a way that is meaningful to them and objective. Colonels Val Keaveny and Lance Oskey, US
enables them to react. In return, subordinates must Army veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
share their attitudes and continuous improvement illustrate this point in their recommendations on how
ideas with managers. to empower subordinates on operations by the effective
• Clear Boundaries: Boundaries consist of a shared conduct of Mission Command.25 For them, the key is
understanding of unit goals, policies, processes and employing a set of tools and procedures in the form of
lines of authority and responsibility to better enable shared documents and a cycle of coordination meetings
subordinates to take autonomous action. Boundaries to find a balance between micromanagement and an
constitute the control element of empowerment. environment with so little structure that activities are
• Participative Decision-Making: Individuals and frantic, ill-timed and unsynchronised.
teams must have input into decisions ranging from long
term to day-to-day. Doing so will improve the quality The structural view of empowerment is an incomplete
and acceptance of decisions when participation fits the construct as it takes an organisationally-centric look
constraints of the situation. Remember that subordinates and fails to consider whether people feel empowered.
cannot be expected to participate meaningfully in This led to the development of a psychological
decision-making if they have not been provided with all perspective on empowerment.26
the relevant information.

22  Spreitzer, G. M., (2008), ‘Taking Stock : A Review of More than Twenty Years of Research on Empowerment at Work’, in Barling, J. and
Cooper, C. L. (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Behavior : Volume 1 - Micro Approaches. London: Sage Publications, pp. 54–72.
23  Lawler, E. E., (1986), High Involvement Management. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
24  MacDuffie, J. P., (1995), ‘Human resource bundles and manufacturing performance: Organizational logic and flexible production systems in
the world auto industry (1995)’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 48(2), pp. 197–221.
25  Keaveny, V. and Oskey, L., (2015), ‘The Art of Command and the Science of Control - Brigade Mission Command in Garrison and Operations’,
Military Review, March-Apri, pp. 62–67
26  Conger, J. A. and Kanungo, R. N., (1988), ‘The Empowerment Process: Integrating Theory and Practice.’, Academy of Management Review,
13(3), pp. 471–482.

80 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Members of C Company, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment is on Exercise Yellow Assault, which is focussing on their core infantry skills of fire
and manoeuvre. The training refreshes and reinforces their ability to work together to assault objectives, starting from individual movement on a firing
range to attacks as an eight-man section, then bringing sections together to attack as a platoon. Photo: Corporal Jamie Hart, Crown Copyright

EMPOWERMENT AS A MOTIVATIONAL CONSTRUCT Psychological empowerment is also described as

In contrast to structural empowerment, psychological intrinsic task motivation; positive experiences that
empowerment is not concerned with the transition of individuals derive directly from a task. Sometimes we
authority and responsibility but instead with people’s can obtain motivation and satisfaction from the work
perceptions and the enhancement of feelings of itself.30 These situations arise when we have feelings
self-efficacy (meaning a capacity to bring about the of meaning, competence, self-determination and impact
desired result).27 Psychological empowerment is not an (Table 1).31
organisational intervention or a dispositional trait but
rather a mental state achieved when individuals perceive BRINGING STRUCTURAL AND PHYSIOLOGICAL
that they are empowered.28 Where empowerment ELEMENTS TOGETHER
in a structural sense is defined as ‘giving power to’, For a comprehensive perspective of empowerment, it
empowerment in a psychological sense considers power should be considered as having both structural and
as energy, and thus empowerment is ‘to energise’.29 psychological elements. Structural should also be

27  Spreitzer, G. M., (2008), ‘Taking Stock : A Review of More than Twenty Years of Research on Empowerment at Work’, in Barling, J. and
Cooper, C. L. (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Behavior : Volume 1 - Micro Approaches. London: Sage Publications, pp.
54–72.
28  Conger, J. A. and Kanungo, R. N., (1988), ‘The Empowerment Process: Integrating Theory and Practice.’, Academy of Management Review,
13(3), pp. 471–482.
29  Thomas, K. W. and Velthouse, B. A., (2011), ‘Cognitive Elements of Empowerment: An “Interpretive” Model of Intrinsic Task Motivation.’,
Academy of Management Review, 15(4), pp. 666–681.
30  Ibid.
31  Some of these ideas are brilliantly brought to life by Daniel Pink. Search on YouTube for: RSA ANIMATE: Drive, the surprising truth about
what motivates us.

BAR ARTICLES | 81
 Element Description of effective delegation of responsibility and the combined
Meaning The fit between work goals and beliefs
efforts of people at the bottom of the organisation
or values; i.e. the extent to which one continuously improving the systems and processes on
cares about a task which they work. The scale of the incremental benefits
to be gained from bottom-up continuous improvement
Competence The belief individuals hold regarding
their ability to perform their work should not be underestimated.36
activities skilfully
The Field Army Empowerment Programme provides
Self-determination One’s sense of autonomy or control over
units and formations with the levers by which the
how they carry out their work
benefits of continuous improvement can be realised.
Impact The degree to which individuals view It aims to give people the skills required to identify
their behaviour as making a difference waste (time, money, other resources), the authority to
or the extent to which they influence
remove it, and to stop doing the things we don’t need to
outcomes.
do. In so doing we can better focus on the things that
Table 1 - Elements of psychological empowerment32 matter; battlecraft, enhancing our collective warfighting
capability, developing bold and innovative commanders,
regarded as a precursor of psychological empowerment.33 and engaging in constant competition.37
The idea of internal commitment links both structural and
psychological elements of empowerment. To generate Empowerment is also said to benefit individuals by
and sustain an empowered environment, leaders must enhancing well-being and positive attitudes.38 Similarly,
encourage the development of internal commitment. empowered employees have a greater sense of motivation,
Internally committed individuals are committed to a job satisfaction and organisational loyalty and are thus
particular project, person, or task based on their own less likely to want to leave the organisation.39
reasons or motivations. Any management practice that
encourages staff participation, such as participating WHEN EMPOWERMENT EFFORTS FAIL
in defining the tasks and goal-setting, will result Despite the many accounts of the supposed advantages of
in individuals feeling empowered and being more empowerment to the individual, team and organisational
committed to the task and organisation.34 performance, very often the benefits are never realised.40
Empowerment efforts can only generate positive outcomes
PRACTICAL BENEFITS OF EMPOWERMENT if well aligned to the organisation. If not aligned, however,
Empowerment enables organisations to get the most they may breed backlash and resentment.
from their employees by harnessing their talents and
ideas. Organisations with higher levels of empowerment, A common cause of the failure of empowerment efforts
such as Google,35 have demonstrated improvements stems from the difference in assumptions about trust
in various performance areas including innovation, and control. Frequently, there is disagreement amongst
productivity, team performance, flexibility and management as to whether empowerment should be
responsiveness. principally a top-down process of delegated decision-
making within clear boundaries, or whether it should be
The quality and efficiency of firms such as Singapore bottom-up where leaders role model and provide support
Airlines are not simply the result of good strategic to subordinates whom they implicitly trust to innovate,
decision-making by senior managers, but also the result take risks and ultimately drive improved performance.

32  Spreitzer, G. M., (1995), ‘Psychological empowerment in the workplace: dimensions, measurement and validation’, Academy of Management
Journal, 38(5), pp 1442-1465.
33  Maynard, M. T., Gilson, L. L. and Mathieu, J. E., (2012), ‘Empowerment-Fad or Fab? A Multilevel Review of the Past Two Decades of
Research’, Journal of Management, 38(4), pp. 1231–1281.
34  Argyris, C., (1998), Empowerment: The Emperor’s New Clothes, Harvard Business Review, May-June.
35  He, L., (2013), Google's Secrets Of Innovation: Empowering Its Employees, Forbes Online. Accessed 21 Jun 19.
36  Heracleous, L. and Wirtz, J., (2017), Singapore Airlines: Aligning strategy and organization, (January 2015), pp. 1–17.
37  CFA’s Oct 19 VLOG on Army Empowerment: https://akx.sps.ahe.r.mil.uk/sites/akx/army-orders/field-army/cfas-priorities/army-empowerment
38  Hempel, P. S., Zhang, Z.-X. and Han, Y., (2012), Team Empowerment and the Organizational Context, Journal of Management, 38(2), pp.
475–501.
39  Spreitzer, G. M., (2008), Taking Stock : A Review of More than Twenty Years of Research on Empowerment at Work, in Barling, J. and Cooper,
C. L. (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Behavior : Volume 1 - Micro Approaches. London: Sage Publications, pp. 54–72.
40  Quinn, R.E., Spreitzer, G. M., (1997), The Road to Empowerment: Seven Questions Every Leader Should Consider. Organizational Dynamics,
26(2), pp 37-49.

82 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

French and British troops take part in a Combined Arms Live Fire exercise on Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire as part of an agreement to conduct
collective bilateral training. Soldiers from 2 Coy Regiment de Marche du Tchad and 2nd Battalion The Yorkshire Regiment have been working
together during Exercise WESSEX STORM undertaking world class training to maintain force elements at high readiness. Photo Staff Sergeant
Steve Blake RLC, Crown Copyright

Another common mistake made by organisations without providing them with any new levers of power can
looking to empower people is to expect too much from only serve to engender cynicism.
the managers in the middle. Encouraging managers to
‘just let go’ ignores the intense control, achievement
and recognition needs we all have. Consequently, SUMMARY
organisations seeking to shift quickly from a controlling This article has provided a practical guideline for how
management culture to an empowered one could struggle to go about creating a more empowered environment. In
because of middle management change inertia.41 an Army context, empowerment enables the commander
to increase their subordinates’ area of freedom whilst
Efforts can also come to grief if there is an overemphasis aligning them to a compelling purpose, being clear
on the psychological aspects of empowerment at the about what control measures apply and providing
expense of structural aspects. Individuals come into them with information and support. Empowerment
work with a general sense of self-efficacy, feelings of can be particularly useful in barracks for the purpose
competence and motivation, which organisations are of harnessing people’s talents to drive continuous
hard-pressed to affect in any practical way.42 Therefore, improvement, which in turn will deliver greater
efforts to convince individuals of their newfound power productivity, performance and job satisfaction.

41  Forrester, R., (2002), Empowerment: Rejuvenating a potent idea, Measuring Business Excellence, 6(2), pp. 12–13.
42  Ibid.

BAR ARTICLES | 83
If leaders produce a clear and memorable intent, a
framework of control measures and trust their people,
then quicker decision-making is the likely benefit. If,
however, the leaders seek a broader set of benefits and
wish to do something that improves performance and
morale, the model at Figure 1 should be applied. The
leaders can then start conversations with their teams
about what to do next.

Lieutenant Colonel Simon Graham was a member of

the first cohort of the Army Advanced Development
Programme and is now in unit command.

84 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Exercise TRACTABLE is being undertaken by the British Army to demonstrate its ability to rapidly project forces worldwide. Soldiers based in
Bulford gathered the various armoured vehicles together for their long journey through Europe to Estonia by road, rail and sea to complete a routine
fleet rotation of vehicles deployed as part of Operation Cabrit - the UK’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia as part of NATO. The Army’s
fundamental purpose is to protect the nation and deployments such as this, ensures we are always ready and able to do so.
Photo: Sergeant Donald Todd, RLC, Crown Copyright

BAR ARTICLES | 85
A British View of
International Attachment at
the German Officer School
Lieutenant Conor Patrick, 32 AEC, provides an analysis of the
German Army’s Officer Course 2, at the Officer School in Dresden from
the perspective of a British international attachment. He also looks at
the innovative approach the school has to military education.

Pictured is the Officer School of the German Army at Dresden. Photo: Kolossos, GNU Free Documentation license, Creative Commons
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license, Wikimedia

86 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 EDUCATION

S ince 2017, a small number of junior British Army

officers have attended the German Army’s Officer
Course 2 (Offizierlehrgang 2 or ‘OL2’) at the Officer
are expected to be familiar with the various staff roles
and functions within the battlegroup. This is developed
through lessons taught in the school, two comprehensive
School in Dresden. The author is only the fifth to do so, TEWTs conducted in the countryside near Dresden,
successfully passing off the historic Theaterplatz in the culminating in a weeklong execution phase at an Army
heart of Saxony in June 2019. The aim here is to analyse staff trainer facility, co-located at the officer school.
the course’s innovative approach to military education
and to provide advice for potential attendees. COMPETENCY ORIENTED TRAINING
OL2 was undergoing a step change in delivery due to a
WHAT IS OL2? new concept of training being implemented across the
OL2 is a centralised, twelve-week residential course German Armed Forces, for which the author’s company
which must be completed by all young German Army at Dresden was the pilot year. The concept will be
officers as part of their early career pipeline. The official translated as ‘competency oriented training’, or ‘KOA’
aim of the course is to prepare these officers for the (Kompetenzorientierte Ausbildung), by which it is most
wide range of missions and tasks which they might be commonly referred to. The aim is for all German officer
faced with in the field Army. In practice, it is similar in training to have changed to the KOA model by 2021 with
its content and the stage at which it is encountered in the view to applying it across all Federal Armed Forces
the German career stream to the British Junior Officers’ training by the year 2030.1
Tactical Awareness Course (JOTAC). As with JOTAC,
OL2 is not an assessed course. Where they differ is in KOA’s governing Joint Service Publication outlines the
their duration-OL2 being three times longer-and the key drivers for its introduction. There is a recognition of
depth of the training delivered, which is greater. the consequences of demographic changes in German
society: in short, the population is getting older. As a
COURSE CONTENT - WHAT TO EXPECT result, competition for talented and educated people with
Unlike British initial officer training, the product of the other employers has become fierce and will continue
German system is not a platoon commander trained after to do so. Therefore, training must become attractive to
one year; rather a rounded staff officer, capable of adding the next generation of potential recruits. This will aid
value at the Battlegroup level, developed over a number recruitment and retention. Next, in a world of limitless
of years. In the German Army, this is, to borrow our and easily available knowledge, which is constantly
own phrase, ‘international by design’, with participants developing and changing, it is made clear that the Armed
on OL2 coming from over fifty countries. In terms of Forces must become an organisation which promotes
sheer numbers, NATO allies such as France and the lifelong learning. This is described as a ‘necessity’.2 In
Netherlands contribute the greatest number of young tandem with this, the Federal Armed Forces are formally
officers and their commitment is both important and acknowledging that all training that they deliver is a form
impressive; they will complete the entire German officer of adult education and therefore must allow for balance
training package. As such, the training leans heavily between work and private life. This last element is partly
towards standardised NATO practices and procedures. reflected in the decision to adhere to European Working
Time Directive (EWTD). It is interesting to note that these
OL2’s contribution to the German officer training package same drivers form the context to our own Field Army’s
is to take the knowledge acquired on the OL1 course, new Learning and Development Directive.3
loosely akin to the Intermediate Term at Sandhurst, and
have trainees apply it in a battlegroup headquarters What will not change is the German Armed Forces’
scenario, within an armoured brigade context. All officers guiding principle of being operationally focused

1  Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), C1-221/0-100, Kompetenzorientierte Ausbildung in den Streitkräften, p. 23.

2  Ibid., p. 5.
3  Chief of Staff Field Army, (2019), Field Army Standing Order XX: Field Army Learning and Development (L&D) Directive.

BAR EDUCATION | 87
 and innovative personnel capable of interpreting and
operating in complex situations on the 21st century
battlefield7 but have not yet moved in quite as drastic a
way as the Germans to adapt our training. Both forces
have identified the same drivers for change; perhaps the
Germans perceive them as more pressing.

Until recently, German training has been didactic in

nature, with Directing Staff (DS) holding centralised
lectures and presenting learners with knowledge. KOA
foresees learners taking responsibility for their own
learning, with the intended result that more of that
knowledge is retained. This is done by tasking the
trainees with a given scenario and allowing them time
to inform themselves and others of it. The trainees
must then go through a complete cycle of planning
accordingly, making a decision and carrying it out and
then having their efforts assessed. Allowing for failure is
an integral part of KOA; trainees must experience failure
as that, too, offers valuable lessons.8 Crucially, reflection
is the final element in the KOA cycle.9 The preceding
stages are worthless if reflection upon the whole is not
allowed for, as knowledge will not be retained. In all of
this, the DS adopt an advisory and coaching role and
become involved only to task the learners and then offer
structured feedback to the trainees after the training
intervention.10 This is to prepare the trainees in a realistic
manner for the myriad, often unfamiliar, taskings they
will encounter in their future roles.
The author on arrival at the Officer School of the German Army, Count
Stauffenberg barracks, Dresden, in April 19 – ‘Ironing Board Monday.’ This author believes that KOA does make a determined
Photo: Author, Crown Copyright
attempt to develop individuals who have been taught
how to think, not what to think, which is exactly what our
(Einsatzorientierung).4 The ability to fight remains the current Commander Field Army, wants to achieve in the
overarching aim of training. What is fundamentally new is British Army. 11 This will require a disruptive approach to
the understanding of what training is to achieve. Instead training, rather than more of the same. It will be interesting
of meeting set training objectives, the Germans want to see whether the Germans consider this year’s pilot run
soldiers who can take their knowledge and skills and in Dresden to have been a success. What is clear is that
apply them in all situations, especially those which are regardless of the result, they are willing to take the risk in
unexpected and encountered under duress.5 Trainees who order to address the same drivers of change we, too, have
are trained under the KOA model will be able to grasp, identified. They have also written acceptance of failure
judge and tackle complex problems successfully.6 In a into their policy, stating unequivocally that mistakes are
bold statement, then, KOA replaces training objectives to be perceived as learning opportunities.12 The Germans
(TOs) altogether. TOs are no longer considered useful. recognise that learners develop strategies to tackle new,
In the British Army, we too aim to develop fast thinking unknown situations in future when they can take the risk of

4  Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), p. 5.

5  Ibid., p. 7.
6  Ibid.
7  Chief of Staff Field Army, (2019), p. 1.
8  Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), p. 9.
9  Ibid.
10  Ibid., pp. 20-21.
11  Chief of Staff Field Army, (2019), p. 1.
12  Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), p. 9.

88 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

mistakes being made.13 We are aware of this in the British
Army. Indeed, the topic was addressed at last year’s Land
Warfare Conference, where the Chief of the General Staff
observed that we are already training to the threshold of
failure to promote learning and experimentation.14 Yet we all
accept we are not good at allowing trainees to go beyond
that threshold in our training. Let us learn from the clear
direction the Germans have given their own commanders
in this regard as part of the KOA policy: learning from
failure should be accepted and supported by trainers and
commanders alike.15

DEPTH OF LEARNING, MASTERY OF THE BASICS

Visiting OL2 turned out to be outstanding preparation
for attendance on our own JOTAC, primarily due to the
great depth of learning and the level of detail that was
demanded. Though neither course is assessed, both
require trainees to deliver certain products. Naturally,
the expectation of what can achieved in twelve rather
than four weeks is commensurately greater. A couple of
examples may help to illustrate this.

As stated, two TEWTs take place during OL2 and are

conducted for an armoured Battlegroup offensive action.
The DS expect course participants to follow the structure
for ground briefs in strict fashion and general statements
on terrain and capabilities are disallowed. Every field to
be traversed, every ditch or stream to be crossed, each
treeline which may conceal an enemy, is interrogated
ruthlessly by the German DS. If, for instance, one
proposes to plough their tanks through a fruit plantation,
then one better have sound answers as to how the said
vehicles’ tracks will fare against agricultural wiring. The author at Colditz castle, near Dresden. One of the many significant
Equally, suggesting forward callsigns will dramatically historical sites within a stone’s throw of Dresden and the School.
Photo: Author, Crown Copyright
crash through rivers is not acceptable if there is no plan
for echelon troops to follow through the muddied chaos
the tanks have created - if they get across at all. And real a speaker system playing radio traffic from a fictional
value is placed upon technical subject knowledge and its battle, whilst students individually tracked the battle in
application. German officers under scrutiny impressively real time with their lumicolour pens. Interestingly, in the
reel off data on blue and red forces’ vehicles and the British Army, this method of tracking battles is referred to
effect certain variables have on their capabilities. as a ‘reversionary mode.’ The Germans do not have this
term and this reflects an attitude towards training which
The same can be said the military skill of map marking. genuinely subscribes to mastery of the basics.
A prerequisite of OL2 is a working knowledge of Allied
Procedural Publication 6 (C) NATO Joint Military All this is noteworthy as it speaks not just to the
Symbology. German participants already arrive professional competence demanded of a young German
comfortable with recognising military symbols, drawing officer, but more broadly to the import the Germans place
them and employing them during execution. Many an on their personnel being able to slip seamlessly into a
afternoon was spent in the classroom with maps out and NATO working environment and add value there.

13  Ibid.
14  Carleton Smith, M., General, (2018), CGS Keynote Address 2018, [Online]. 20 Jun 18, Church House, Westminster. [accessed 9 Sep 19].
Available from: https://rusi.org/annual-conference/cgs-keynote-address-2018.
15  Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), p. 23.

BAR EDUCATION | 89
EUROPEAN LAW AND GERMAN TRAINING DESIGN Writing as a professional military educator, and having
The working day begins rather early: normally 0730 had the use of these programmed study periods, it must
and finishes at 1615, with Fridays being half-days. The be commented that they are incredibly useful in allowing
German Army is not exempt from the European Working learners to thoroughly engage with the course material.
Time Directive (EWTD). What that means is that service Students retain access to all the superb facilities of
personnel are not allowed to work more than 41 hours the Officer School during these periods and the time
other than in exceptional circumstances, which must be allocated allows for proper collaboration between
signed off by the commanding officer. Anything over and students as well. The trade-off is a much-lengthened
above that is demanded back in time in-lieu. Invariably, total course duration. For that, the Germans develop
the nature of officer training means that there are times officers who are confident in their professional body of
when this is exceeded, but this is managed at Dresden knowledge and its practical application and who have
through careful timetabling. Programmed reflective worked with allies in an environment that is conducive
periods (Arbeitsphasen) have been integrated heavily by to learning. This makes the British career course design
the course designers in part to ensure tasks assigned to seem condensed and rushed by comparison; indeed, in
students can be completed within the working day; there recent years the British Army has tried to reduce course
is no homework whilst on the course as this would be duration without sacrificing content. This phenomenon is
incompatible with the EWTD. readily observable in the example of Junior Command

The author with colleauges and the Directing Staff for an evening of whimsey. Photo: Author, Crown Copyright

90 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

View from the Garrison Church over the Prießnitztal Dresden, on the left the Military History Museum, on the right the Bundesheeresschule.
Photo: Kolossos, GFDL and Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported License, Wikimedia

and Staff College (Land), delivered at Warminster, which exhibition hall interrogating the role animals have played
has been cut to 6 weeks from 8. The question is, then, in warfare through the centuries.
whether the British system places greater value on
throughput, with additional time freed for more courses Political education is at the forefront at Dresden as well
in the training year, than quality of product. What is and largely revolves around analysis of current affairs
certain is that the Germans have made a conscious and international relations. It is expected that, at unit
decision to strive for the latter and their argumentation level, German officers will be responsible for informing
for doing so is simple: superficial forays [into subjects] and educating their soldiers on Germany’s Defence
have the capacity to mitigate learning success.16 policy and place in the world, generally, and this is
practiced daily during the course. A roster is established
WIDER EDUCATION AT THE OFFICER SCHOOL during the course whereby each student must present
Aside from the ‘golden thread’ conflict scenario to the others on either an event on that day in history, or
mentioned earlier which informs the planning and a pertinent current affairs event. These must be linked
execution staff work carried out during the course, other to lessons the Bundeswehr can draw from them. It was
subject areas colour the syllabus of OL2 and add breadth fascinating to watch colleagues deliver on a range of
to the course. These include military history and military topics such as the German invasion of Crete or China’s
law, both of which German officers must know intimately. Belt and Road Initiative. In the British Army, this so-
The Officer School is fortunate to be located on the same called ‘education piece’ seems to be outsourced at times
grounds as the outstanding German Military Museum to education centres, whereas all German officers take
(Das Militärhistorische Museum), which serves as the ownership of this.
backdrop for many of the lessons and presentations
students attend and deliver. Its collections contain Less prominent is the German chaplaincy’s involvement
thousands of objects from battlefields around the world in lessons on the moral component, which, whilst
and encompass hundreds of years of military history. present, is effectively optional for those who decline
The museum focuses on the cause and consequences interaction with the church, reflecting wider-German
of war and its exhibitions achieve this is in various, society’s increasing secularism. The German Army’s
innovative ways. For example, laying out a model of an disposition to concentrate on the legal aspects of the
entire division, man for man, so one can grasp the sheer use of force over the moral may be an area for focused
scale of the numbers involved; or setting aside an entire research but lies outside the scope of this article. Suffice

16  Kommando Streitkräftebasis, (2018), C1-221/0-100, Kompetenzorientierte Ausbildung in den Streitkräften, p. 23.

BAR EDUCATION | 91
to say, the German chaplaincy plays far less a direct
role in German training than it does at, say, RMAS.
Nonetheless, the facility exists and both Protestant and
Catholic offices are located at the barracks in Dresden.
Stepping slightly away from OL2 for a moment, it must
be mentioned that the Officer School has its own English
language training department. This department, run
by the Federal Languages Office (Bundessprachenamt),
teaches officers the English language as part of their
training pipeline for 3 months. Similar to the rest of the
school, it is run on company lines. What is fascinating,
however, is that the platoons are streamed on ability, and
from the strongest platoon, the German Army selects
its candidates to attend RMAS. This author had the
privilege of delivering a presentation to these officers and
answering their many questions about British training.
The question, in this author’s mind, was why don’t we
have greater involvement here? Dresden already has regular
visits from large groups of American service personnel
stationed in Germany who speak to these students to
improve their English. The fact that the British Army has
a large cohort of professional, trained English teachers
makes this seem such an obvious way to maintain a
footprint in Dresden and reinforce relationships. The
Americans are ahead of us in this respect.

FINAL THOUGHTS
What must be emphasised is that having British officers
in Dresden to complete OL2 fits importantly into the
bigger picture of British and German cooperation. In
October 2018, the Defence secretaries of both the United
Kingdom and Germany signed the Joint Vision Statement
at Augustdorf, north of Sennelager. Joint Vision seeks to
strengthen Defence ties between the UK and Germany,
explicitly referencing the importance of interoperability wish to attend are given the time and encouragement to
between our forces, closer cooperation in training, and do so. This author was fortunate to have a supportive
the desire to increase officer exchanges.17 This year chain-of-command, but not all are so understanding.
will see the dissolution of HQ British Forces Germany. To be sure, it will demand some considerable time away
Continued British presence at Dresden is a tangible from the unit; but the benefits accrued at the strategic
demonstration of British commitment to the Anglo- level for UK Defence are not to be underestimated
German Defence relationship which is more important and this effort must be supported and resourced.
now than ever before. In fact, Field Army direction is clear in this regard:
every opportunity should be taken to enhance Fd Army
It is often said that the greatest impediment to having language capability in support of […] interoperability.18
a more regular British footprint in Germany is the At the tactical level, units will receive better educated,
language ability of our young officers; but this is not an more competent young officers on their return with an
excuse for inaction, nor is it entirely true that we do not accompanying course report written by a German OF4.
have enough linguists within our ranks. One challenge That, too, is unique and useful and should be prized by
is ensuring that those qualified service personnel who sending units.

17  Fleischer, Jörg, (2018), Ministerin zeichnet mit britischem Amtskollegen Joint Vision Statement, [Online]. Federal Ministry of Defence,
[accessed 9 Sep 19]. Available from: https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/ministerin-zeichnet-mit-britischem-amtskollegen-joint-vision-
statement-28180.
18  Chief of Staff Field Army, (2019), p. F-6.

92 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Pictured is the officer's mess of the Army Officer School in Dresden. Photo: MatthiasDD, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Unported License, Wikimedia.

FINDING OUT MORE Aspiring course participants should discuss their wish
British participants for OL2 are trawled for on a regular to attend with their respective chain-of-command at the
basis by the international attachments team of Army earliest opportunity to account for the long lead times
International Branch. Candidates are currently sought between expression of interest and physical arrival at
at the lieutenant to captain rank range with German Dresden. For this author, the whole process took close to
language skills. The recommended pre-arrival level of one year. That should not dissuade anyone from taking
German for OL2 is Standardised Language Profile (SLP) advantage of this challenging, fulfilling and enjoyable
3332. German-speaking personnel who have not already opportunity. Those who do may look forward to three
done so should have their SLP determined at the earliest months in one of Europe’s most beautiful cities, enjoying
opportunity by the Defence Requirements Authority for high quality, professional military education with
Culture and Language (DRACL) at the Defence Academy colleagues from around the world. I am personally at the
of the United Kingdom, Shrivenham. This is especially disposal of anyone who wants further advice on attending
useful as knowledge of military specific language is the German Officer School at Dresden. Please feel free to
tested here. get in touch at [email protected].

BAR EDUCATION | 93
Managing the News During
The Battle for Rome in 1944
Brigadier (Ret’d) Richard Toomey analyses the relationship between
the British Army and the media during the Battle For Rome in 1944.

Landing ships unloading supplies in Anzio harbour, 19-24 February 1944 © IWM (NA 12136)

94 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

 HISTORY

T he British public received the news of the Allied

landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 with
enthusiasm, even though they were weary of dispiriting
protests. General Alexander looked sternly at the
protesters. ‘Were any of you at Dunkirk?’ he asked. ‘I
was and I know that there is never likely to be a Dunkirk
news from Italy. Since the Italian surrender in early here.’ The reporters were told that they could no longer
September 1943, the Allied advance from the ‘boot’ use the transmitter. ‘We could not send any news’ (which
of Italy had been slow, bloody and demoralising. The was not quite true), said Vaughan-Thomas, ‘but hadn’t
landing, behind the Gustav Line - the forbidding German the news become too depressing to send?’ 2
defences anchored on Monte Cassino - seemed to be
the breakthrough that everyone had been waiting for. Three months, three failed attempts to penetrate the
The good news reached the home audience quickly. Gustav Line and many thousands of Allied casualties
The Allies had provided reporters at Anzio with a radio later, on 11 May, Operation DIADEM3 began. Fifth (US)
transmitter to get their reports out without delay. and Eighth (British) armies concentrated in the Cassino
area smashed through the Gustav Line defensive belt.
But by mid-February the military-media relationship in Soon after, the forces in the Anzio beach head broke out
Italy had deteriorated badly. As the landing failed to make and the Allied advance continued, liberating Rome on
the progress that had been hoped for, and defeat seemed 4 June 1944. Reports to the public were accurate and
possible, some reporters became despondent, privately timely, good relations between the military and the media
speculating about a ‘Dunkirk-style’ withdrawal.1 Public had been restored and the public liked what they were
morale about the progress of operations fell to its lowest reading and hearing.
level since the disasters of mid-1942. The Prime Minister
and certain senior Army officers deemed the media How had the Allies in Italy recovered their relationship
reporting to be too negative and its impact damaging. with the media? The answer provides a fascinating
insight into the development of approaches to handling
Matters came to a head when the British commander of the media during military operations.
Allied Armies in Italy, General Sir Harold Alexander, flew
in to visit Anzio on 14 February. He came to ensure that PUBLIC OPINION AND THE WAR
commanders and the defences were ready for a major During the Second World War, public opinion mattered.
German counter-attack that intelligence had told him was After the immediate threat to the UK abated in 1941 the
coming. He also had to deal with the sensitive issue of war had to be maintained to a successful conclusion. The
the replacement of the American corps commander in public would have to accept and endure the privations of
the beach head. Just before he left, he called all the press wartime for years. People gritted their teeth and got on
and radio reporters together. BBC correspondent Wynford with rationing, the blackout, long working hours, limited
Vaughan-Thomas was one of them. He recalled: holidays, significant state direction of individual lives
and many restrictions. In exchange, people expected
He spoke to the assembled group with the firm tone of Churchill and his government to conduct the war
a headmaster disappointed at some misdemeanour’. effectively.4 Yet a series of setbacks and disasters in 1941
When he ‘went on to say that the reports sent from the and 1942, some of Britain’s own making, did not inspire
Beachhead were causing alarm, there were emphatic confidence. Even Churchill’s personal standing came into

1  Wynford Vaughan-Thomas, Anzio (London: Pan Books, 1963), pp. 162-163.

2  Ibid.
3  According to Wikipedia, Operation DIADEM was an operation by the British Eighth Army and US Fifth Army, supported by air power
(Operation Strangle) against the German 10th Army holding the Gustav Line and the subsequent Hitler Line. The plan was to smash through
German defences, relieve the pressure on the Anzio beach head, open up the Liri Valley and liberate Rome. While DIADEM achieved its
objectives much of the German 10th Army were able to withdraw north of the Arno River.
4  MacKay, Robert, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
Another factor that grew in importance during the war was the proposal for the post-war welfare state.

BAR HISTORY | 95
 As part of a programme entitled
'Meet John Londoner', here we see
correspondent Wynford Vaughan
Thomas asking Mrs Galraith, a
member of the public, a question.
They are surrounded by a crowd
of passers-by, including Leslie
Hancock, a soldier of a Canadian
Scottish regiment, all interested
in Mrs Galraith's response. The
interview is taking place in Victoria
Gardens on Victoria Embankment
and behind them, part of the Houses
of Parliament can be seen, covered
in scaffolding. This photograph was
probably taken in September 1941.
IWM (D 4592)

question, and if things had not improved, it could have Of course what mattered most was battlefield success
been even worse for him.5 against the Germans. For that, from El Alamein in
November 1942, through Tunisia and into Sicily in
Churchill hated criticism. He disliked the gloomy content 1943, Alexander and Montgomery, and the entire Eighth
of the Ministry of Information’s national morale reports Army became national heroes. They and Churchill were
in 1942 so much that he wanted to stop them altogether.6 seen to be steadily bringing the war to a successful
The popular, left wing Daily Mirror really irritated conclusion. There was a clear, functioning inter-
him and sailed so close to the wind that it was nearly relationship, sustained by the news between home
banned.7 For the Mirror, the failures of 1941-1942 was morale, the national war effort and operational success.9
all evidence of an incompetent, upper class old guard The impact was international as well. As the war could
running the country and the Army.8 only ultimately be decided on land, it was clear that the

5  In July 1942, the British Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) reported that only 41% were satisfied with the conduct of the war. Paradoxically,
confidence in Churchill, at 78%, was notably high, yet this was the lowest level recorded since he came to power.
6  On 4 April 1942, Churchill wrote to Bracken about the weekly report saying that ‘I doubt very much whether this survey is worth its trouble.
How many people are engaged in it and how much does it cost?’ (Ian McLaine, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of
Information in World War II (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 258.
7  Edelman, Maurice, The Mirror: A Political History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966) has a blow-by-blow account including the Parliamentary
debate.
8  The Army in particular. The standing of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force - seen as more modern and more competent - was much higher,
according to contemporary research by Mass-Observation.
9  By June 1943 BIPO found that 75% were satisfied with the conduct of the war - the highest level since their surveys started in summer 1941 -
and Churchill’s approval rating had risen to 92%.

96 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Army’s operational performance and impact, real and
perceived, was the leading indicator of national power.
With every British and Commonwealth success on the
battlefield, Churchill’s strength in negotiations with the
United States and the Soviet Union increased.

THE BRITISH MEDIA AND THE WAR OVERSEAS

During the war the media was subject to censorship.
The policy was to censor only those facts that could
be of value to the enemy, and in theory never to censor
opinion. Journalists in the field were expected to report
facts and atmosphere; editors and writers at home would
supply opinion. Once a journalist had drafted a report,
it would be taken to the censors for approval. Censors
and journalists received frequently updated direction
on what could not be reported. These so-called ‘stops’
were imposed to maintain operational security, leaving
journalists free to adopt whatever tone they felt captured
the story best. There was plenty of self-censorship.
Journalists knew that a censor’s ‘blue pencil’ crossing
out would mean that they would have to come back for
approval, likely missing their deadlines. Not only that,
but journalists also wanted their country to win the war
and consciously avoided undermining their compatriots, General Alexander follows the progress of the Allied assault on the
even though this might have gone against their Gustav Line from a position on the 8th Army front. © IWM (NA 14719)
peacetime journalistic principles.

REPORTING ON THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN Churchill personally triggered the Anzio landing,
By the time the Anzio landings began, the Allies had conceiving it as a tactical masterstroke that would open
been in Italy for just over six months. The first two the way to Rome and reignite his pet campaign. It would
months had been seen as a great success and culminated unhinge the German defences in the Gustav Line in the
in the Italian surrender. At this stage, Churchill imagined Cassino area, allowing a dramatic Allied breakthrough. So
the liberation of Rome before the end of 1943 possibly in December 1943, latching on to a contingency plan to
tilting Allied strategy to the Mediterranean. But the land a division on the coast south of Rome, he proposed
Germans chose to fight every step of the way, over terrain a two division landing and it was duly put into effect. Just
that favoured them. The media with the Allies reported four weeks later the first wave of troops landed.10
what they saw, which was a slow advance of endless
small battles through mountains, over rivers, and for The Allies provided the media with a dedicated
small towns and villages. Churchill, instigator of the transmitter to send their reports back to the censors in
campaign, was particularly frustrated. Naples. The journalists reported what happened but
events did not conform to the Allied script. Like everyone
At the end of October General Alexander explained the else involved they were hugely optimistic at the start, but
difficulties to the Allied journalists in Italy, and this went when the landing force was encircled by the Germans,
some way to reassuring the public. It is notable how the one of the bloodiest attritional battles of the war in the
newspapers of the day were full of the striking successes west began, and there was a serious prospect of defeat,
of the Soviet Army. The public could not fail to compare some of them became despondent. Alexander knew that
progress in Russia with progress in Italy. Every potential he was in a very dangerous and sensitive situation. He
breakthrough in Italy was latched onto by the media and probably thought that eyewitness reporting of the battle
the public, but as they came to little, eventually Italy would be unhelpful. The Germans did not need to know
fatigue pushed the story off the front pages. what was going on inside the beach head, and he and
the fighting troops did not need a running commentary.

10  D’Este, Carlo, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome (London: Fontana, 1992), Chapter 4, ‘The Decision to Launch Shingle’, pp. 67-85.

BAR HISTORY | 97
HM King George VI, accompanied by Generals Leese and McCreery, being driven past troops after landing at Perugia, 25 July 1944.
Photo: IWM NA 17187, Wikimedia

So he decided to switch off the transmitter; all reports Such words as ‘desperate’ ought not to be used about
from Anzio would have to go out of the beach head in the position in a battle of this kind when they are false.
writing by air. Still less should they be used if they were true. In the
first case they needlessly distress the public; in the
This caused a storm at home. The press claimed that second they encourage the enemy to attack.12
they were being stifled and made a formal complaint.
Certain Members of Parliament were up in arms. This highlights the extent to which Allied media
Churchill made an immediate statement in which he reporting, particularly by the BBC, intended for home
seemed less than fully confident and appeared to slope audiences, was being gleaned for intelligence and
shoulders, saying: all battles are anxious as they approach propaganda purposes by the Germans. The same
the climax, but there is no justification for pessimism, broadcasts also reached Allied soldiers in the field, who
according to the latest reports from the responsible were quick to spot disconnects with either their actual
authorities.11 Several days after the event, after the crisis experience, or the briefings of their own commanders.
in the battle had passed and the transmitter had been
switched back on, Churchill came to Parliament to take OPERATION DIADEM PRESS POLICY
personal responsibility, make an emollient apology, but The Allied attacks at Anzio and in the Cassino area in
also to criticise the reporting. January, February and March 1944 were all failures.

11  Churchill Says, ‘The Battle For Rome Will Be Won’’, Sunday Express, 13 February 1944, p. 1.
12  Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 397, 22 February 1944, cols. 649-651.

98 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Churchill tanks are filmed by an AFPU cameraman during the advance of 56th Division north-east of Argenta, 17 April 1945.
Photo IWM, Wikimedia, Released

Alexander decided to delay any further attacks until May. enemies alike. To pre-empt the sort of media problems
There was a key personality change. In early January that had arisen at Anzio - which the Army attributed to
Alexander received a new chief of staff (‘CGS’) Lieutenant ‘unbalanced reporting’, but for which they were at least
General John Harding. Brooke had sent Harding to add equally responsible - Harding issued a press directive, the
some senior intellectual weight to Allied Armies Italy.13 first of its kind, at least in Italy.15
He arrived too late to influence Anzio or Fifth Army’s
attempts to take Cassino, but he was the architect of Dated 8 May 1944, three days before the operation, and
Operation DIADEM. Over March and April his staff consisting of only two sides of direction, it starts by briefly
concentrated most of the Eighth Army alongside the US explaining why the Commander-in-Chief (Alexander) thought
Fifth Army in the Cassino sector in complete secrecy.14 that a press directive was so important. He wanted reporting
to raise morale and facilitate success’ whereas if reporting was
The strategic context was extremely important. A month not ‘a correct representation’ (in Alexander’s view of course) it
before D-Day, and after months of failure in Italy, DIADEM ‘may easily damage morale’ and the ‘excellent relationship
had to be a success, and be seen as such by Allies and ….. between American and British troops.

13  Danchev, Alex and Todman, Daniel, (eds.), War Diaries 1939-1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001).
See entries for 18 Nov and 30 Dec 43.
14 Carver , Field Marshal Lord, The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Italy 1943-1945 (London: Pan Books, 2002), pp. 170-173.
15  ‘Press Directive’, issued by Lieutenant General Harding, Chief of General Staff A.A.I., 8 May 1944, WO 204/6881, National Archives.
Reference to this being the first such policy is in ‘Guidance to Censors in connection with the Spring Campaign’, 11 May 1944, in the same file.

BAR HISTORY | 99
In several paragraphs of guidance the document the enemy could stabilise again a long distance to
addresses the key information issues that commanders, his rear.
staff and journalists needed to bear in mind. The first • Don’t expect a large number of prisoners to be taken
theme was to measure expectations: as this country is unsuited to quick manoeuvre which
alone results in such capture of men and material.
Without guidance from the start unwise statements • Don’t draw comparisons between success now and
may appear and there may be a tendency to magnify previous failures.
early successes and anticipate events without building • Don’t speculate on the future conduct of the
up in the minds of the public a true picture of the campaign.
problem that confronts the Allied Armies in Italy. • Don’t measure success in terms of some distant
objective.
The directive described just how substantial and deep • Don’t magnify early successes. Play down the news
the defences were, how they had been skilfully melded in the opening stages and as each successive line is
into the terrain, and how they were in reality the defences broken proclaim the success in crescendo.’
of Hitler’s ‘European fortress’. Even after the Allies
penetrated the Gustav Line, there was another one, the The process of censorship still applied as before, and
Hitler Line, to come. Crossing the River Tiber would be censors were given further, more detailed direction based
an enormous challenge. German troops would be ordered on Harding’s themes. Harding’s directive, a clear statement
to fight to the last man. Progress would be slow, unlike in of the higher commander’s intent, went to everyone who
North Africa, and should not be judged in miles. might work with the media, or communicate directly
themselves. The distribution included army commanders,
The second theme was Allied relationships. The issue staff in ‘public relations’ (i.e. media operations) branches,
Alexander and Harding were keen to pre-empt was the censors, and the editors of in-theatre magazines such as
idea that the British Eighth Army had come to do a task Union Jack, Stars and Stripes and Maple Leaf.
that the American Fifth Army could not. Unstated, but
in the background was the fact that the international The resulting newspaper reporting over the following few
and inter-army rivalry had been strong, and many of the weeks was carefully measured. As a consequence the
national contingent commanders (ranging from army British national morale reports recorded a gradual but
group to corps) disliked each other or had low opinions of sustained increase in enthusiasm. What Alexander and
each other’s and their army’s ability. Alexander wanted to Harding could not influence was the extremely high level of
keep that firmly under control and out of the public eye. second front anxiety at home, shared by Government and
people alike, including Churchill. Unfortunately, for all those
Finally it concludes with one paragraph of ‘do’s’ and a in Italy, their theatre had been eclipsed by Normandy.
crisp list of ‘don’ts’:
Yet Harding’s press directive indicated a keen awareness
Do’s of the strategic context, and it showed that the staff who
Portray a clear picture of the successive enemy planned Operation DIADEM had learned lessons from
defence lines. Build up in the minds of the public the campaign and the failures of Anzio in particular.
the strength of each as they are approached upon The directive was judged such a success that another
which guidance will be given. As each one is broken, was issued on 3 June 1944. Allied Armies Italy’s insight
proclaim it as a success as opening the way not - probably Harding’s personally - was to see that to be
to Rome or some more distant objective but to the fully successful, operations had to be accompanied by a
next line of the Fortress which is not many miles compelling narrative. This not only told the media - and
behind. The strength of the Hitler Line could well be through them the audience at home - what was happening,
magnified and in any case shown to be greater than but carefully and conservatively shaped their expectations
that of the Gustav Line. The breaking of this line before operations actually started and maintained that
can then be used by us as great propaganda value approach throughout the subsequent campaign.
[against] the enemy.
FURTHER READING
Don’ts The Italian Campaign and the Battle for Rome
• Don’t compare this summer campaign with • Carver, Field Marshal Lord, The Imperial War Museum
desert warfare which almost always resulted in a Book of the War in Italy 1943-1945 (London: Pan
spectacular advance after a successful battle before Books, 2002)

100 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Troops of the 1st Battalion, Duke of Wellington's Regiment march into Rome, 8 June 1944 © IWM (NA 16116)

• D’Este, Carlo, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for (London: Routledge, 1999)
Rome (London: Fontana, 1992) • Hinton, James, The Mass Observers: A History, 1937-
• Ellis, John, Cassino: The Hollow Victory, The Battle for 1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)
Rome January to June 1944 (London: Aurum • MacKay, Robert, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale in
Press, 1984) Britain during the Second World War (Manchester:
• Fennell, Jonathan, Fighting the People’s War: The British Manchester University Press, 2002)
and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War • McLaine, Ian, Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019) and the Ministry of Information in World War II (London:
• Holden Reid, Brian, ‘The Italian Campaign, 1943-45: A George Allen & Unwin, 1979)
Reappraisal of Allied Generalship’, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 13 (1990), 128-161 War Journalism in the Italian Campaign
• Vaughan-Thomas, Wynford, Anzio (London: Pan • Campbell, Doon, Magic Mistress: A 30-year affair with
Books, 1963) Reuters (London: Tagman Press, 2000)
• Moorehead, Alan, Eclipse (London: Sphere Books, 1968)
Public Morale in Second World War Britain • Talbot, Godfrey, Ten Seconds From Now: A Broadcaster’s
• Calder, Angus, The People’s War: Britain 1939-1945 Story (London: Quality Book Club, 1974)
(London: Pimlico, 1992) • Whicker, Alan, Whicker’s War (London: Harper
• Donnelly, Mark, Britain in the Second World War Collins, 2005)

BAR HISTORY | 101

AMERICA’S MODERN WARS: UNDERSTANDING
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND VIETNAM
Christopher A Lawrence
Review by WO1 John Hetherington

A merica’s Modern Wars summarises the research that

The Dupuy Institute (TDI) has done on irregular
warfare over the last two decades. Its aim is to show
which factors do and do not predict success in such
wars. The findings are stark. Often statistical analyses
find phenomena which are significant but hard-to-detect:
here, the data is clear.

The book’s main conclusion is that large force ratios are

needed to have a good chance of winning an irregular
war, just how large depending upon how popular the
irregulars’ cause is. A simple and popular, usually
nationalist, insurgency typically requires a force ratio of
above 10:1 to provide a good chance of winning; defeating
a less popular, regional insurgency typically requires
a ratio of less than 5:1. Causes like ‘Communism’ and
‘Islamism’ were in the middle. Lawrence’s key finding
is the relationship between cause and required force
ratio, a link not made in previous analyses: more popular
insurgent causes not only require more forces to defeat
them, but proportionally more forces. This enabled the
TDI to produce a model which predicts the outcome of an
irregular war to eighty percent accuracy.
Published by Casemate,
March 2015, Hdbk, pp 320, Some respected irregular warfare authors have rejected
£13.37, the importance of force ratios, most notably Richard
ISBN-13: 978-1612002781 Clutterbuck (although he qualified himself on the matter)
and Sir Richard Thompson. Both authors note that this
rejection is only found in British authors. However, the
author’s data seems clear. The idea is controversial
because it implies that there are insurgencies - popular
insurgencies in medium-to-large countries - which simply
cannot be defeated because of the size of forces required
to beat them.

Most of the remainder of the book is spent in describing

in detail the other data TDI examined to see what other
factors correlated with success. Some of these are
surprising: the structure of the irregular forces does not
matter; outside support and sanctuaries are important
but not critical factors; population controls only work
in unusual circumstances (Malaya was a real outlier);

102 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

democratic countries suffering insurgencies were
more successful but only if not supported by foreign
interventions. Strict rules of engagement or severe
brutality on the part of the security forces both correlated
with success (an unhappy medium did not) but higher
rates of civilian casualties overall favoured the insurgent.
There are also brief but informative surveys of both
irregular warfare theory from Clausewitz and Jomini up
to the present and of contemporary statistical analyses.
The book compares TDI’s findings with the writings of
the most important theorists: it finds David Galula’s and
Bernard Fall’s works most robust.

This book takes a macro-level view of the subject which

is quite uncommon, as most books have concentrated
on specific tactics and operational measures. The author
holds the proper scientific view: ‘we aren’t convinced we
are correct, but we will argue that (our view) has at least
as much support as any other suggestion made and more
support than most’. Its data, although imperfect, is the
widest yet produced, although many areas are noted
as worth further study. Reading the book is sometimes
hard work as the data is analysed step-by-step but the
results are summarized clearly. Its conclusions, although
sometimes unpalatable and counter-intuitive, hold great
promise for promoting better analysis of insurgencies
and in designing more effective counter-insurgency
interventions and is recommended on that basis.

BAR BOOKS | 103

HURRICANE THE LAST WITNESSES:
PILOTS TELL THE STORY OF THE AIRCRAFT
THAT WON THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN
Brian Milton
Review by Nick Smith

2 015 marked the 75th anniversary of the Battle of

Britain, one of the most important victories in
the history of these Islands. For many British people
this battle is principally associated with the Vickers
Supermarine Spitfire, an iconic aircraft in its own right.
However, it was the Hawker Hurricane which was
destined to carry the bulk of Britain’s defence during
the Battle, confronting the Luftwaffe as it attempted
to dominate the airspace over southern Britain, in
preparation for Operation Sealion, the Nazi invasion of
Britain. That the Luftwaffe was unsuccessful was in
no small part due to the sacrifice and courage of RAF
aircrew - ‘The Few’, and the outstanding quality of two
aircraft, the Hurricane and the Spitfire.

The author Brian Milton, himself a distinguished pilot,

has attempted to redress the ‘popularity’ balance between
the two aircraft. Over a period of some years Brian
Milton traced and interviewed eighteen of the surviving
former pilots who flew the Hurricane during WWII. In
this excellent book he has brought their personal stories
together, as ‘Last Witnesses’, where Hurricanes fought
in nearly every theatre of war, from the Battle of France,
through the Battle of Britain, the defence of Malta, the
Published by Andre Deutsch, deserts of North Africa, to Sicily, Italy, Normandy, to the
May 2010, Hdbk, pp 272, Arctic and the intense heat and humidity of the Far East.
£18.99,
ISBN 978 0 233 00454 9 Miltons’s book is about the human element, the personal
stories of the men who flew and fought in these aircraft
and they really bring this story to life. They variously
describe the Hurricane as a first rate gun platform, not as
fast or as aesthetically pleasing as the Spitfire but able
to withstand punishment, damage which would have
brought down lesser machines. Of the three main Battle
of Britain fighter aircraft, the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitt
Bf109, the RAF’s Spitfire and the Hurricane, it was the
latter, with its ability to turn inside the others which often
enabled the Hurricane to be the superior dogfighter.

104 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Designed by Sydney Camm the Hurricane was the first
monoplane to enter service with the RAF in December
1937 and the first RAF combat aircraft to exceed 300
mph in level flight. It was something of a compromise
between tradition and the demands of the new era of
air warfare. Around 60% of claimed ‘kills’ during the
Battle of Britain fell to the guns of Hurricane pilots but
it never achieved the legendary status of the Spitfire.
However the Hurricane/Spitfire combination during the
Battle of Britain was ideal, the Spitfires taking on the
faster Luftwaffe fighter escorts allowing the Hurricanes
to attack the German bomber groups. Sydney Camm
later went on to design some of the most iconic aircraft
of the post war years, the Hawker Hunter and P1127, the
progenitor of the Harrier, but he remained ‘miffed’ that
all the credit for winning the Battle of Britain went to Reg
Mitchell for his faster aircraft, the Spitfire.

Some 14,533 Hurricanes, including Sea Hurricanes, were

built and at the end of the war it emerged a most versatile
aircraft, having been also used as a nightfighter, ground
attack, tank buster and convoy protector. Of those built,
about 15 remain airworthy around the world with eight in
the UK, compared to over 50 Spitfires flying worldwide.
Two historically important Hurricanes, one the last
from the Hawker production line and the other the last
in RAF service, are maintained in airworthy condition
by the RAF Battle of Britain Memorial Flight (BBMF) at
Coningsby Lincolnshire.

In the summer of 1940, 2,946 young men took part in

the Battle of Britain, 537 were killed and before the war
ended a further 791 of ‘The Few’ had lost their lives. In
2010 there were fewer than 100 left alive, in February
2019 there were six. This book is a tribute to those ‘Few’
remaining and their colleagues who died during WWII.

BAR BOOKS | 105

FIGHT TO THE FINISH: THE FIRST WORLD
WAR - MONTH BY MONTH
Allan Mallinson
Review by John Peaty

A retired Brigadier, Allan Mallinson is well known as

a military commentator in newspapers and as an
author of military history and military historical fiction
books. From the opening shots in August 1914 to the
signing of the armistice in November 1918, the First
World War lasted 52 months. It was fought on, or in the
waters of, six continents and in all of the seven seas. And
for the first time, the fighting was on land, at sea and in
the air.

It was a war that became industrial - and unrestricted:

poison gas, aerial bombing of cities, and the sinking
by submarines, without warning, of merchant vessels
and passenger ships. Casualties, military and civilian,
probably exceeded 40 million. During its course, four
empires collapsed - the German, Austro-Hungarian,
Russian and Ottoman.

In all its military, political, geographical, economic,

scientific, technological and above all human complexity,
the First World War is almost impossible to comprehend.
Day-by-day narratives - excellent reference books - can
be dizzying for the reader trying to make sense of the
2018 Bantam, £25, Hdbk & Pbk, whole. Freer-flowing accounts, while helping to convey
pp 432, 15 Maps, the broader trends and themes, can lose the sense of
Photos (some in colour), the human dimension of time. The month is a digestible
ISBN-13: 978-0593079140 gauge. We remember months, because months have
names, because they are linked to the seasons, and
because they have their own characters. Looking at the
First World War month by month reveals its complexity
while preserving the sense of time.

Based on the author’s monthly commentaries in The

Times throughout the war’s four centenary years, Fight
to the Finish is a new and useful single-volume portrait
of ‘The War to End War’.

106 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

It is not a comprehensive account of the fighting nor of
all the other factors in the war. It does not examine the
war’s causes or consequences. It aims simply to give
a picture of each month: what was the predominant
action, how and why it came about, and how it looked. It
is a narrative not an analysis and there are no references.
While not Anglocentric, it is told in the main from a
British perspective.

There could have been more maps and they could have
been in colour. There are some oddities. The ‘cruiser
rules’ of naval warfare are explained 3 times. July 1916
is all about the British failures and casualties on the
Somme on the 1st. There is no mention of the British
and French advances in the southern sector. There is no
mention of the reduction in the BEF’s manpower prior
to the great German offensive of March 1918. Allenby’s
destruction of the Ottoman forces at Megiddo gets half
a sentence. The author is ready to criticise Haig and
reluctant to say anything in his favour.

Despite its limitations, the author has produced a clear,

informative and digestible summary of the military
aspects of the war for a British audience.

BAR BOOKS | 107

WHY WE FIGHT
Mike Martin
Review by Major David Hoey, QDG

W ar is an apparently deeply unpleasant business

with few benefits. On a national level the process
can bring even a victorious country to its knees; on
an individual level it involves a great deal of personal
discomfort and risk. So why do we as a race pursue
conflict? Specific examples can be explained by one or
more of Thucydides’ well-known trilogy of fear, honour
and interest. But in Why We Fight, Mike Martin looks
beyond these proximate causes for ‘a war’ to seek the
underlying impulses that draw mankind as a species
towards the activity of war in general.

Martin, a visiting fellow at the War Studies Department

of King’s College, London, and a reservist officer with
the Royal Yeomanry, approaches the question through
the lens of evolutionary biology, the subject of his
undergraduate study at the University of Oxford. His
extensive time in Helmand, setting in motion the Cultural
Advisor programme and studying the province for his
PhD, led him to observe two things that have been the
foundation for the theory he advances in this book.
The first is the in-group/out-group nature of human
interaction, so starkly exposed in a society where
survival is an everyday struggle. The second is the
Published by C Hurst & Co, exhilaration often felt by troops in contact, something he
May 2018, Hdbk, £20, pp 224, unapologetically describes as ‘the ultimate team sport’.
ISBN-13: 978-1849048897
The theory posits status and belonging as the key factors
in, respectively, making war and joining the fight, and
Martin advances his argument in sometimes exquisite
detail, working from first principles in ancient times
and developing them as societies evolved to be more
complex. It is status, first as individuals and second
as groups, that led to greater access to the resources
needed to be evolutionarily successful; i.e. to have most
offspring. Those males who were more aggressive were
able to achieve that status and therefore it became a
human characteristic.

108 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

The more puzzling question is why men (mostly) would
feel a deep yearning to take part in conflicts that might
advance their leader’s status, but have very little material
benefit for them. More importantly, conflicts statistically
reduce their chance of reproducing. Martin believes the
answer lies in the evolutionary benefits of being part
of a group, with the associated easier access to safety,
food and mates. We are hardwired to thrive on collective
experiences and the euphoria familiar to anyone who has
been in a sports crowd or religious service is triggered
by a release of oxytocin, giving evidence of its biological
rather than cultural origin. Thus we seek adversity to
provide the most intense group experiences and to prove
our value as group members. The inverse can also be
seen in the outcasting of those who refuse to fight for a
common cause.

Such a theory is not without its critics but the author

maintains that individual examples do not disprove
it. He begs us to consider the centre of the bell-curve
rather than the outliers. In his lectures he has often
had to deal with accusations of falsely glorifying
conflict, countering that not only is he giving an honest
description of his experiences, but he is also seeking to
explain, not to exalt.

Martin’s third book is his most intellectual to date, often

requiring detailed clarifications to enable the layman to
understand the evidence behind his theory. The layman
will, however, discover these denser parts are worth
persevering with, while the expert will breeze through.
This evolutionary explanation of the psychological urges
towards conflict has the benefit of the author’s first-hand
knowledge, and much that he says will chime with a
soldier’s experience. It should be required reading for not
just biologists, psychologists and historians, but military
leaders and recruiters as well.

BAR BOOKS | 109

MISSION COMMAND: THE WHO, WHAT,
WHERE, WHEN AND WHY: AN ANTHOLOGY, ED.
MISSION COMMAND II: THE WHO, WHAT,
WHERE, WHEN AND WHY: AN ANTHOLOGY, ED.
Donald Vandergriff & Stephen Webber
Review by Martin Samuels, Independent Academic

T he United States Army adopted mission command as

doctrine some forty years ago. Alongside the official
manuals,1 there have been numerous ‘private’ collections of
essays on the topic.2 These two new volumes themselves ask
the question, ‘Why write another group of essays on Mission
Command?’ (I: ix). Their answer is that the United States is at
war and that it must (and can) fight better - but how?

There is no easy answer to this question. What is certain,

however, is that adaptability will be essential. We need leaders
who can solve complex problems […]. We need individuals
that can take the initiative and thrive in uncertainty, we
need resilient organizations that shift on a dime when
circumstances change. We need Mission Command. (II: xiii)
CreateSpace Independent
Publishing, 2017), ISBN- [However,] the Army does not conduct Mission Command
13: 9781546506966, xiv + as a normal way of doing business, […] there are systemic
239pp, £15.55 obstacles to the conduct of Mission Command, and […] the
problem has become so pervasive that the Army’s culture must
adapt in order to improve. This implies that change will be
difficult and take some time. (I: ix-xi)

Together, the two volumes comprise thirty-two essays, by twenty-

five authors, most of whom are serving or retired officers up to
the rank of colonel in the US Armed Forces, some now working
as specialist advisers or academics to the Armed Forces. The
driving force behind both volumes was Donald Vandergriff, who
has written extensively on the subject of Mission Command and
has argued there is an urgent need for the US Army to reform its
personnel system, currently based on a Taylorist expectation of
a mid-twentieth century-style mass civilian army, if it is truly to
adopt its espoused command system.3

1  Currently, Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0: Mission Command (2012).

CreateSpace Independent 2  For example, Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, ed. by Richard D. Hooker
Publishing, 2017), ISBN- (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993).
3  For example, Donald Vandergriff, The Path to Victory: America’s Army and
13: 9781546506966, xiv +
the Revolution in Human Affairs (Novato, CA: Presidio, 2002) and
239pp, £15.55 Donald Vandergriff, Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a
Superior Command Culture (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 2019).

110 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Both books are structured around the US military a logistics environment through to the importance of
reporting format (I: xi): Who and What (definitions), physical fitness as a basis for the cool thinking required
Where and When (history), and Why (practical for applying Mission Command to the development of
application). As is almost inevitably the case with subordinates.7 In addition, there is an interesting essay
anthologies prepared by multiple authors, there is some on Mission Command in a policing context.8
variation in the adopted tone (from the analytical to the
polemical), in the approach (from the reflective to the Despite being primarily targeted at serving officers
practical), and in the intended audience (from academics up to field rank, among whom the two volumes have
through to young officers). In addition, although the become something of a bestseller, there is much to
many authors are united in their conviction that Mission attract the interest of readers outside the US Armed
Command, as a flexible system that grants freedom Forces. The descriptions of the realities of life as an
of initiative to junior commanders to work out for officer in the present-day US Army, with their myriad
themselves the most effective means to achieve the intent examples of stifling control and lack of trust on the part
of their superiors, is essential for the modern US Armed of commanders, are very striking to anyone outside that
Forces, their understanding of the key factors holding environment and provide real insights into the reasons
back its effective adoption, and consequently their behind some of the more significant operational failures
solutions for these, varies considerably. This is both the experienced by that force in recent years. In addition, the
strength and the weakness of the collections. most analytical essays, interestingly all written by the
non-American contributors to the anthologies9 provide
On the whole, the two volumes are primarily directed deep insights into why Mission Command appears not to
towards an audience of young officers, up to the rank of have taken firm root in the US military, and the formidable
major or perhaps lieutenant-colonel. These are officers barriers that stand in the way of it ever doing so.
who may find themselves bewildered by the apparent
disconnect between the US Army’s espoused support For students of the modern US Armed Forces, these
for Mission Command and their experience in practice, two volumes provide an invaluable means by which to
where the personnel system rotates officers on an understand the importance of culture in determining
individual basis, thereby hindering the development of behaviour, and how this can overwhelm even the most
unit cohesion, and employs a system of performance determined efforts to change practice. For readers in the
appraisal that encourages officers to focus on avoiding British Army, while the culture and context within which they
risk and protecting their own careers.4 operate is of course different in many respects from that of
most of the contributors to these two volumes, there is also
The essays are designed to give these puzzled and much that will be familiar, or will translate fairly easily.
dispirited officers a better understanding of the origins
of Mission Command as a philosophy and how this Whether these anthologies will have the desired
conflicts with the principles adopted by the US Army effect, however, must be doubted. A number of the
from the end of the nineteenth century, notably set essays refer to Eitan Shamir’s outstanding study of the
out in two essays by Vandergriff himself.5 They then adoption of Mission Command in Western armies,10
provide a series of examples of the application of including the British Army, which found that successful
Mission Command in key operations, for example Gerry implementation relied upon strong support from
Long’s essays on the Germans in May 1940 and on the commanders at the most senior levels. By targeting
celebrated David Hackworth in Vietnam and Tyler Fox their work at more junior officers, Vandergriff and his
on US airborne forces in Italy in 1943).6 The bulk of the co-authors may simply be reinforcing their sense of
material, amounting to around half the essays in each discontent, rather than securing practical change. But
volume, is devoted to practical issues, ranging from the what can be done to secure the commitment of those at
application of Mission Command in a garrison or in the top of the armed forces?

4  See, I: 10
5  See I: 49-58 and I: 101-118
6  See Long (I: 69-86), Hackworth (II: 67-86), and Fox (II: 59-66)
7  See MC in a garrison (I: 121-136), logistics (II: 200-218), physical fitness (I: 193-206), development of subordinates (II: 149-161) respectively
8  See MC in a policing context (I: 207-222)
9  See Long on training, (I: 69-86), Tommy Krabberød on Mission Command in the navy (I: 17-48), and James Fish on how Google’s staff
management might be applied to an army (II: 244-250)
10  Shamir, Eitan, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University, 2011).

BAR BOOKS | 111

SCEPTICAL CHRISTIANITY:
EXPLORING CREDIBLE BELIEF
Robert Reiss, Jessica Kingsley
Review by David Benest, Colonel, (Ret’d)

H er Majesty, The Queen, is both Head of the Church

of England and of the Armed Forces. The Church
has a strong influence within all units of the Armed
Forces and as mentioned elsewhere in BAR, has been
a source of great comfort and reassurance in times of
peril and in peace. The Reverend Dr Robert Paul Reiss,
Canon Emeritus of Westminster Abbey, has undoubtedly
followed in this tradition. Yet he is acutely aware of
the ‘doubting Thomases’, of whom I am certainly one.
Having recently joined the ranks of Humanists UK, I
feel decidedly more comfortable than when as a cadet at
RMAS, I was required, on compulsion, to attend weekly
CofE services. Had those been on a voluntary basis, I do
wonder just how many cadets would have felt the need to
attend. Robert Reiss thus asks a very simple and relevant
question, ‘How can Christianity remain a credible faith
in our current era of scepticism? What can be plausibly
believed today?’

Chapters include themes such as: belief in God;

the actual historical record of Jesus of Nazareth;
the Resurrection and Ascension; Faith and Reason;
Salvation; Death and Afterlife; public worship and prayer;
Basic Books, and contemporary issues of a Christian life - Forgiveness,
January 20017, Interfaith engagement, Euthanasia, Homosexuality; and
Hdbk pp 304, finally, an examination of issues of freedom of thought
£20.90, within the Church.
ISBN:
467891`01112 Dr Reiss is himself refreshingly sceptical of much
received wisdom and is especially critical of those
ordained members of the Church who seem not to know,
nor care, whether their own ‘wisdom’ is based upon not
much beyond prejudice. For Army Chaplains, this book
really is ‘up your street’ when talking to our officers and
soldiers, many of whom might be sceptical, not least
in the context of acts of state violence that are legal yet
ethically troublesome to many. On this I would much
have liked to see another chapter, exploring the ethics of
war and counter insurgency.

112 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Dr Reiss writes lucidly and with the book just under
200 pages, his account could easily be devoured in
time for the next padre’s hour. Who knows, perhaps
we are gradually experiencing a ‘Second Reformation’
- the realisation by senior members of the Church of
England that it must either adapt or collapse in the face
of Enlightenment thinking of the Twenty-First century.
Well worth reading in conjunction with Stephen Law’s
HUMANISM - A Very Short Introduction.

BAR BOOKS | 113

CORNERSTONES
Katherine Swinfen Eady
Review by Colonel Toby Bridge

The centenary of the Great War has produced an

array of books on its general history, on the senior
officers involved and on the fighting soldier. Less well
documented are the lives and concerns of the staff
officers - without whom the war could not have been
fought and won. A contemporary Great War joke ran
‘If bread is the staff of life, what is the life of the staff
- Answer: One long loaf’. Cornerstones remedies that
gap and disproves the joke: it is the collected letters,
supplemented by biographical detail, of Colonel Harold
Mynors Farmar (late Lancashire Fusiliers).

The book was written initially as an act of love by

Mynors Farmar's great-granddaughter; it has developed
into a tour de force. Katherine Swinfen Eady - a leading
contemporary artist and married to a former officer - set
out to examine her grandmother's version of her youth.
The grandmother (Mynors Farmar's daughter), the
novelist Mary Wesley, had cultivated the persona of a
neglected child of an absent, distant, unloving father.
‘Absent’, Mynors Farmar may have been - there was
a war on; ‘distant’ and ‘unloving’, his letters disprove.
The majority of the book details - with the authoress's
Published by Helion & Company commentary for context - his service in the Great War.
2019, Pbk,
£18.00, pp 582, Throughout the war, with the exception of the opening
ISBN 978-1-910777-43-5 months when he was a regimental officer in India and
a few months teaching at the US Army Staff College in
France, Mynors Farmar served on the staff - initially as a
Brigade Major at Gallipoli and later mainly at divisional
level (3 Australian Division, under General Monash then
35 Division). In his war he had to wrestle with the issues
of amphibious operations, trench warfare - and then the
air-land battles of the war of movement from August
1918. These were novel challenges which he, along with
his peers, had to overcome, employing his imagination,
experience and training. Undoubtedly Colonel Farmar's
career up until the opening of the Great War was more
varied and interesting than we would now be used to
- perhaps this imbued a certain flexibility of mind and
‘make-do’ attitude?

114 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

Exiting RMC Sandhurst his first posting took him to the
Sudan in time to form square at Omdurman. Then on
to the Boer War for service as Mounted Infantry, before
returning home via police operations on Crete, and
garrison duties in China and Barbados. Within the UK
he served as adjutant of his battalion in southern Ireland
during the halcyon Edwardian period about which one
reads in Somerville & Ross books - hunting with the
Black & Tans. (It is interesting that a recent official Army
publication on the Great War did not even know what the
Black & Tans are!).

Throughout, one is also aware of Colonel Farmar's deep

concern for social issues - he was one of the instigators
of Toc H1; and when he left the Army he went into charity
work (and not as an highly paid executive). This book
fascinates on a number of levels: seeing the attitudes
of a regular Army officer of the time; what it was like
dealing with the issues of war constantly for four years;
and for its insight into the wider Army of the time (and
comparing with today). It is sobering to realise that to
gain entry to staff college, pre-Great War students had
to educate themselves to pass an exam the ‘equivalent
of Honours in Modern Greats at Oxford, together with
proficiency in higher mathematics and two modern
languages plus all military subjects’ - not just get on well
with their Second Reporting Officer !

Also to learn that, in the 1900s (and again in the 1920s

and 1930s), for those who missed selection for Staff
College through ill health or bad luck, the Army organised
courses of instruction at the London School of Economics
where modern business methods were taught as a way
of solving AQ (G4) issues. My one sorrow with this book
is that the authoress has been let down by her editor
- who should have removed the spelling mistakes and
anachronisms (practice/ practise and RMA Sandhurst).

1  According to the Toc H website it is an international charity

and membership movement that emerged from a soldier’s club
in Peperinge, Belgium during the First World War. It was set up
by Reverent Phillip Bayard (Tubby) Clayton. Toc H stands for
Talbot House and got its name from the radio signallers’ in lieu of
its initials TH. https://www.toch-uk.org.uk/history-of-toch/

BAR BOOKS | 115

COMMAND: THE-TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
GENERAL
Professor Anthony King
Review by Colonel Alistair McCluskey

C ommand is the third book of Professor King’s trilogy

analysing military transformation in the 21st century.
Following on from The Transformation of Europe’s
Armed Forces and The Combat Soldier, his latest work
explores the subject of command via the development of
Divisional headquarters over the last century. His central
thesis proposes that in the face of increased operational
complexity, traditional heroic models of command are
now giving way to ‘command collectives’ better able to
cope with the challenges of the modern world.

This book appears to somewhat polarise opinion; readers

seem to either love it or loathe it. There are several
written references to it from informed commentators,
such as Professors Peter Mansoor and Lawrence
Freedman, which comment positively on its insights
into modern command. Conversely, I have heard several
verbal critiques, from both academic and military
personnel, which are less convinced in the validity of its
conclusions. Both positions have merit, although there
may be shortcomings in his core argument, particularly
with the use of history, limited contextualization of the
Cambridge University Press Division within a wider command architecture and a
(31 Jan. 2019), loose definition of key terms.
Ppk, 504 pages, £17.99,
ISBN 978-1108700276 In broad terms, Professor King juxtaposes the execution
of Divisional command by key personalities through the
20th century, against the transformations driven by their
modern counterparts in the recent Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts. He describes the integration of these later
developments into contemporary command structures
and processes of the British and US Armies through
3(UK) Division and the 82nd Airborne Division following
his attachment to both formations.

It is in the contemporary observation of the sociology

and personal interaction within these organizations that
Professor King excels, and where this book is at its best.
Analysing 6(UK) Div/CJTF-6 in 2009-10 and 1 Marine
Division’s ‘March Up’ to Baghdad in 2003, he observed
the efforts to integrate civil, governmental, informational
and military activity to operate successfully at pace.

116 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

He highlights the role of the Commander in ‘defining This in turn highlights the almost total absence of the
the mission’ while collaborating with a wide swathe of military command nodes above and below the Division
subordinate actors to develop the eventual plan. Likewise, in Command. HQ ISAF and V(US) Corps are not referred
processes to communicate intent were developed through to at all which creates an air of independence around
ROC drills and constant liaison, backed up by an both CJTF-6 and 1 Marine Division that is difficult to
understanding that commanders were to act decisively. understand. This may be an accurate reflection of fact,
To help manage this process and focus on the key but it needs to be explored more deeply to explain the
issues, King tracks the development in both formations implications for contemporary Divisional command. In
of an effective system of Deputy Commanders. This the same vein, there is no discussion of how the HQs
harnessed the senior officer experience at hand, provided of 3(UK) and 82nd Airborne Divisions integrate with a
deployed command presence to points the GOC could not deployed 3* HQ in a contemporary deployment. This is a
personally reach and was pivotal to mission management. critical omission for Armies preparing for future conflict
in which C4I resilience is essential.
Professor King also highlights the influence of these
missions on both British and US military command Finally, there is some confusion in the use of the terms,
capabilities in recent years. In Britain, A2020 saw the command, management and leadership. Although
restructuring of the Divisional HQs with the creation Command includes chapters to address this, the
of Future Plans, Future Ops, Current Ops and JAGIC discussion is somewhat limited. Leaning chiefly on the
Cells amongst the changes. Likewise, he describes the work of Drucker and van Creveld, Professor King defines
US evolution of distributed command in 82nd Airborne leadership as primarily related to combat motivation,
using digital communication technology to create a Joint and command to decision making; management is
Operating Center in Fort Bragg to support an ‘in-theatre’ not defined at all. Professor Keith Grint’s work is
Divisional Tactical Command Post. better developed in this area and may provide a better
framework to understand the conduct of all three tasks
Where Command is less compelling is the assertion that for a collective organization facing complex problems.
these developments represent a coherent chronological
response to an increasingly complex operational Overall however, notwithstanding the points made above,
environment. The use of historical examples has Command is a thought-provoking work. Professor King’s
significant shortcomings, characterized by the statement observation of contemporary 2* command is a valuable
of a contemporary British Officer that The First World record of operations in the early 21st century, and for that
War was ‘not a war among the people’. The soldiers reason alone, it is worth the read.
fighting in the Western Desert or Dublin in 1916, or
Palestine in 1917-18 might have had a different view. A
further (acknowledged) problem is caused by Professor
King’s use of a very small ‘control’ group of historical
commanders including Monash, Rommel, Montgomery,
Gavin, Ridgway, Massu, Erskine and Rupert Smith. Given
that most of these were operating within armies made
up of tens or hundreds of Divisions, their removal from
this wider context makes representative comparisons
between historic and contemporary command more
difficult to sustain.

BAR BOOKS | 117

HOW ARMIES GROW IN THE AGE OF
TOTAL WAR 1789-1945
Mathias Strohn
Review by Captain Steve Maguire R IRISH

T here’s an old military proverb that goes something

like ‘never laugh at an old man in a young mans’
profession’. Military skills, experience, and mindsets
take a long time to grow. The cost of not developing or
maintaining military skills is often death and defeat on
the battlefield. Yet, armies are not always needed and
tend to wilt away at times of perceived peace.

How Armies Grow is a historical examination of how

land forces expand rapidly at times of need. The book is
a collection of articles from a range of senior academic
and military writers edited by Dr Matthias Strohn. Each
chapter focuses on a different case study starting with
the French Revolution in 1789 and ending with the
Second World War in 1945. It covers a broad range of
military traditions from which to draw context and to
examine different models for growth. These case studies
cover issues such as recruitment, equipment, training,
casualties, and leadership to detail the challenges that
the nations examined faced. But despite this range, How
Armies Grow stays focussed on its purpose of articulating
the challenges of expansion. It is worth reading as both
Published by Casemate UK a piece of history and because it contains many direct
(30 September 2019, Hdbk, parallels to military problems today.
£32.50, 256 pages,
ISBN-13: 978-1612006017 The core theme of the book is that growing an army is a
task for the whole nation. An army cannot expand on its
own. One of the recurring themes is the need for political
oversight to ensure that wider industrial production,
transport, education, material, etc, are in place. This
requires a political plan and purpose. As such, the writers
make a strong case for politicians to determine a long-
term strategy for expansion when, not if, a large army
is needed. This hits at the heart of the purpose of land
forces. Are they expeditionary or defensive? Small and
professional or large and conscript? The tensions this
creates are examined through the different case studies.

118 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

To give one example, the book highlights the role of the
Territorials in Britain during the interwar period. The
British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshall
Henry Wilson, wanted a reserve force that offered military
utility. For Wilson, the shape of the British Army needed
everyday utility to justify its cost against a declining
budget. However, Winston Churchill was more concerned
about the reserve being a popular and political success.
Such debates about the purpose of the reserve forces will
feel very familiar to modern British readers.

Another key theme is the importance of military

education. How Armies Grow argues that it is critical
to maintain a high level of doctrine, staff training, and
experience if an army is to expand successfully at a time
of need. The interwar period German Army, restricted
by the Treaty of Versailles, is used as a case study of an
Army able to operate ‘one up’ to quickly incorporate new
recruits. Leaders were trained to do it without formal
military academies. Yet, the really successful armies
in the case studies were heavily reliant on defined
education programmes. Be it, the formal establishment
of staff and war colleges or more informal training,
How Armies Grow finds that maintaining a breadth of
experience was a core part of any army expansion.

How Armies Grow is an important contribution to the

literature focussed on a core question for land forces,
namely, how to generate mass. As western policy makers
increasingly look for ways to make defence cheaper, this
book offers historical insights into ways in which land
forces can expand when needed. As such, it should be
read widely by those involved in making strategy and
military policy. The lessons of history cited are valuable
to those who might have to implement them in the future.

BAR BOOKS | 119

THE NAZI HUNTERS: THE ULTRA-SECRET
SAS UNIT AND THE QUEST FOR HITLER’S
WAR CRIMINALS
Damien Lewis
Review by Ian Palmer

T his book has commendable intentions. It concerns

itself with the activities of the SAS involved in Op
LOYTON in the Vosges region of France in August to
October 1944 and their aftermath. Although it purports to
tell the tale of the efforts by members of the SAS to track
down those SS responsible for the murders of 31 SAS
soldiers and 140 French civilians, readers have to wait
until halfway through the book to get to this, the first half
having been taken up with a depiction of the operation
itself. This was an operation that was compromised early
and relied heavily on support of the local population to
keep going. A particular relationship developed with
the village of Moussey, which continues to this day. It
introduces the key players, on all sides, and memorialises
them within its covers.

I was looking forward to reading this book as I had

been an RMO to this unit. It is an easy and quick read.
However, the prose style seemed inappropriate to my
(military) taste and rather spoilt my enjoyment of the
book, which at its core is a tragic tale of total war and its
consequences to civilians and soldiers alike. The style
of writing currently de rigueur, in which the voices of the
Published by Quercus Press, individual players I heard felt a little bit like a dialogue
London, 2015, heard through the craft of a ventriloquist.
Pbk, £10, pp 425,
ISBN 9781784293871 The target audience would appear to be the lay
readership, armchair warriors and the itinerant
populations of airport lounges. The purple prose was
redolent of the war comics of my youth. It felt like the sort
of book that Barbara Cartland would have written had
she chosen to write a war story. Throughout, I could not
escape the thought that it is a book ‘looking for a film’.
Had I read the author’s acknowledgement, I may have
been less disappointed … we are told that ‘… early in the
manuscript stage an extremely gifted schoolboy had “read
and commented with aplomb on this book”’ - I wonder if
he ended up doing a bit more!

120 | The British Army Review 177: Winter / Spring 2020

BAR BOOKS | 121
Contents
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BRITISH ARMY REVIEW
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WINTER /
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