OSPREY Pearl Harbor 1941 The Day of Infamy. OSPREY Campaign PUBLISHING Pearl Harbor The Day of Infamy Zo Carl Smith « Illustrated by Jim Laurier and Adam Hook Ml vid AikenOEE EEO eee Fist publishes n Great Btn 2001 by Osprey Pushing Ems Court, ‘Chapt Way, Bote, Onto OX2 9LP Unites Kingdom. Eat ntoSoepreypusising com (© 2001 Osprey Publiating is Alig reserve Apan tom any la dealing fr tha purpose of pra stu recsarch, iil or review, 38 parmtes une the Copy. Designs and Patents Act. 1888, v0 part of hs publiation maybe reproduces stored in & ‘eta sytem, or ansmted in any frm or by any means, electron, fete cherica mechanial, optical, photocopying, coring or there, without tne por wren permission ofthe copyright owner. Ents should bo _aurasod othe Pubiaher ISON 104176:290x tor Noll Bogdnovi Desig: The Black Spot Incex by Aan Putor Maps by Map Std, Romsey UK 30 brea vows by ian Pane USS arzone model and Zero aed Val Japanase arora by Hugh Johnson Kate Japanase area by Chris Taye Png of UN plot Sada Karachi by Mika Chae LUN tight equipment and ceting ifonrtion by Gary Nia USS Nace model by Paul Kino COrgrated by Magnet Harlequin, Uxtrggs, UK Pntelin China tough Woks Prt Lt For acetalog of a books pubienes by Osrey Mary aed Aviation please ‘The Marating Managar, Osprey Dract USA, lo Motoroacks international PO Box 1 ‘enol, wi 020-0003, USA mat infoSosoreyrecian com The Markotng Manager, Opry Diet UK, PO Box 140, Wetegberough, Nothans, ANB ZA, Uritd Kingdom, Emit infoCosprayaractcouk or oapeeyslishing.com Key to abbreviations of military ranks Lt = Lieutenant ees KEY TO MILITARY SYMBOLS Artist’s note Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the color plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. All reproduction copyright whatsoever is retained by the publisher, All enquiries should be addressed to: ‘Adam Hook Scorpio Gallery, PO Box 475, Hailsham, East Sussex, BN27 2SL, UK vim Laurier Aviation Art, PO Box 1118, Keene, New Hampshire 03431, USA ‘The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter Author’s note Special thanks are due to the following people: David Aiken; Ray Willis at RW Books, Manassas, for use of his unpublished photos: Lou Zocchi, Gamescience, for ‘being a great resource and for answering those tring and. ‘seemingly endless questions about research details and aircraft data; Ed Finney and Jack Green at Naval Historical Photographic Reference Services for his input on photos and source assistance; Bob Cressman at NHCPRS for help on the disposition of the US Pacific Fleet; Bill Rice for photo reproduction and enlargement; and Roger Thomas ‘and Bill Gallop for research assistance. Finally, Una, for her Patience while | sat cramped with a thousand references, sandbagged around me, Al photos are US Navy or US National Archives unless otherwise stated, Editor’s note ‘Special thanks go to Ed Chappell of the Peart Harbor ‘Survivors’ Association; Jim Laurier for his hard work and, intuition; Sid Kennedy, for his expert input on the Kaneohe attack, and Gordon Jones, another survivor present at the base on 7 December 1941. Special thanks also to Mr John Finn, for his patient help in reconstructing the Kaneohe battlescene, Finally, a big thank you to David Alken, for his Patience, expertise and endless generosity — aloha! FRONT COVER A Japanese Zero fighter provides cover for tho attack on Hickam Fleld air base. (Jim Laurier)CONTENTS INTRODUCTION Poltical background OPPOSING COMMANDERS US Commanders + Japanese Commanders CHRONOLOGY THE JAPANESE PLAN pening moves « Th 2waii Operation Preparations # “Climb Mount Niketa THE FIRST WAVE THE SECOND WAVE AFTERMATH Japanese damage assessments + The real damage PEARL HARBOR TODAY How to get there + The Visitor Center «Information FURTHER READING APPENDICES fe Attack Formation 59 Organization ymy Command Hawaiian Army Air Force * US Pacific Flet INDEX 10 19 24 35 56 75 85 88 90 94Bored servicemen in Hawaii were always vocal about living Conditions or carping about food land barracks life. A Soldier's Prayer was circulated at Hawaiian military installations just prior to the attack. After December 7, boredom was forgotten. LEFT Peart was a natural harbor that had been used for over 4100 years. An early visitor was the battleship USS Texas, shown there with sun awnings in ‘over the foredeck. In 1940, the Pacific Fleet transferred from California, worrying Japanese military strategists, who saw it as a threat to Japanese Security. Toxas was serving {in the Atlantle at the time of the Japanese attack. INTRODUCTION forward, Lt. Mitsuo Matsuzaki dropped his Kate AI301 beneath them into more blue sky, the horizon broken by the low verdant land mass he was approaching, His observer, Cmdr Mitsuo Fuchida, the mission commander, was watchful. Hawaii looked green and oddly peacefull. He scanned the horizon, It looked too good to be true; other than his fliers, no planes were visible. Fuchida remembered, years later how peaceful it had appeared. It was 0730 hrs Hawaii time; the date, December 7, 1941. Fuchida’s destination was the home of the US Pacific Fleet - Pearl Harbor. The fleet and three aircraft carriers berthed there were the key targets. A statement notifying the US that war had been declared had been scheduled for delivery to Washington an hour earlier. This air strike would be the first act of war between Imperial Japan and the United States. All the planning, endless exercises, and practice runs would deter the success of this attack. Some military minds thought it would cripple the US fleet; others hoped it might scare the Americans into appeasement; but most felt it would pull Japan into a war with the United States. If war was to be the outcome, some had said, then let it begin here, because Japan's best hope for winning a conflict with the Western giant was to strike first and cripple the US Navy. Japanese forces could then act with a free hand in the following months and further expand their conquests. For Cmdr Fuchida much of this was immaterial for he was a career officer with a mission: bomb Pearl Harbor B low, thick fluffy clouds blanketed the blue sky. Shoving the stick Political background The Hawaiian Islands lie in the middle of the Pacific, westsouth-west of the United States, the first real landfall west of the mainland, positioned at 150°-170° longitude (just east of the International Date Line) and between 18° and 29° north of the equator. Kauai, Niihau, Oahu, Molokai, Maui, Kahoolawe, Lanai, and Hawaii form the major islands in the chain, originally called the Sandwich Islands. The northernmost edge is at roughly the same latitude as Los Angeles, giving the Hawaiian Islands a uniform, mild annual temperature of 75° Fahrenheit and a tropical climate, with cooling ocean breezes, rainforests, and dramatic stretches of beach at the foot of majestic mountains and volcanoes. These islands, betwe an and the United States, are a perfect military base, first for naval attack and then for air power. Hawaii had been discovered by Europeans in the mid-1700s. First ruled by a monarchy, in 1900 it became a US territory, but it was not made a state until 1959. The land is fertile and the beaches, when properly cultivated, yield immense crops of American, Japanese andMe eel ea told Nv¥a90 ee Oe ac) feof ae FONVIHS p<] SaRIGHT Peart Harbor was the first stopping point in Pacific waters. scause air power attack was theoretical, Peart's fortifications relied heavily on coastal guns in heavy positions to defend against naval bombardment. Despite the war in Europe, in 1941 the US Army was not roady to fight a *modern” war. Although In 1936-iesue field gear, these soldiers on maneuvers would look at home in French trenches 1 quarter of a contury earti Note the cloth puttees, campaign hats and gas masks reminiscent of World War 1. a PP nae international tourists. By the 1930s, the population of Hawaii was mostly American and Asian, with its indigenous peoples waning. Japan noted the islands as a potential threat to expansion. Since before the RussoJapanese War, Japan had been full-steam-ahead modernizing, manufacturing and upgrading its military. With these changes came increased demand for natural resources (steel, oil, gas, raw materials and minerals) and their eyes turned east to China, Indochina, and the islands of the Pacific, Although Russia had tradi \ese expansion and Asian influence, the American and European presence in Asia became increasingly important. The Japanese felt European powers were limiting growth of their empire: as Japan expanded, European resistance coalesced which in turn supported Japanese fears of intervention and limitati Th an, and the the majority of the US Pacific Fleet made Pearl Harbor its home. Real or imagined, the US fle h special interest. onally been viewed as the major threat to Japa a US Congress placed restrictions on business with posed a threat, and Japan viewed Hawa The situation worsened as Japan felt strangled and besieged. When war erupted in Europe, and the United States did not intervene as France and Britain became embroiled in conflict with Germany and Italy, Japan noticed. America, it seemed, wanted neutrality: perhaps they would overlook expansions in Asia. Europeans might have to fight w Europe would be their primary theater and the Pa back seat. The US Pacific Fleet was a deterrent. Jap: spheres of influence grew, stretching thinner, threatening to burst. Japan and the United States moved on a collision course: the former needed to grow, the latter wanted to maintain the status quo. Relations son two fronts, but obviously fic would occupy a worsened, and nationalistic distrust blossomed. On December 7, 1941, at 0750 hrs, the situation exploded. Within hours, the United States was no longer neutralOPPOSING COMMANDERS Admiral Husband E. Kimmel Admiral Husband (Hubby) E, Kimmel (1882-1968) was the naval nder at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Born in Henderson, Kentucky, the najor, he graduated from the Naval Academy in 1904. In February, 1941, he was promoted over 32 other of in Chief Pacific (CinCPAC), becoming the navy's senior admiral. Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in Washington, had every Kimmel's abilities. As CinCPAC, Kimmel! moved to Pearl Harbor, home of the Pacific Fleet. Gen. Marshall advised Gen. Short that Kimmel was reasonable and responded well to “plain speaking.” Kimmel was unhappy with the defense arrangements in Hawaii and at Pearl Harbor. Responsibility for them was split: the army was responsible for land and air defense; the navy for the Navy Yard itself. The navy was responsible for reconnaissance but the army controlled the radar stations and both air and shore defenses in case of invasion, Kimmel let his strong feelings about th tangled web of responsibilities be known. The US military was understrength air power and Army Air Corps aircraft, and still thinking of the last war Weapons, ammunition, and manpower were available, but the overriding mentality was that supplies were to be preserved rather than consumed. Kimmel complained to Washington about inequities. Without supplies and material, service personnel could not do an adequate job. On top of this, the army and navy competed for allocations, and each had its own “turf” to protect. There was no open rivalry, | but clearly the army did not wish to step on the nayy's toes and vic so Kimmel and Short co- operated; but within that interservice co-operation there was competition and a general lack of sharing any overlapping information. Kimmel was friendly with Short, but each man ran his own show Kimmel US policy of building up the Atlantic Flee expense of the Pacific Fleet. son of an arn ers to Commander nd complacent, behind in naval versa, resented the at the ‘Admiral Kimmel (center) and two members of his staff, his operations officer, Cpt. Delaney (left, and his assistant chiet of ‘staff, Cpt. Smith (eight). Although aggressive and vigilant, Kimmel ‘shared responsibility for Peart Harbor with Gen. Short. Both were surprised by the audacious Japanese thrust at an island almost everyone thought too well defended to be a target.American artillery units on Oahu regularly deployed for field maneuvers and war games. Although a strong fortress, many {elt the real threat to Oahu was naval bombardment invasion, rather than Schofield Barracks was the main US Army barracks at Peart Harbor. Security was not in full force until after the Japanese attack. Note the guardhouses to either side of a swing gato ring the legend “Closed.” The US Navy was a deterrent, but transferring ships and men from the Pacific to the Atlantic affected more than his command ~ it affected the security of the United States. Still, he was a career officer, and having stated his objections, he followed orders. Following the events at Pearl Harbor, eight ¢ investigations of the attack were carried out. Kimmel retired in March, 1942, but went to, work as a consultant for a government contractor on secret naval projects. The outraged American public, however, reasoned that someone had to be at fault, and Kimmel and Short were, at the least, censured for failing to coordinate and cooperate better in the defense of Hawaii. They had been in command when the Japanese struck, and in the minds of many members of the American public, they were responsible. There is a two-year statute of limitations on courts martial, and both Kimmel and Short requested one to clear their names, offering to waive the two-year limitation. A court martial before th of the question, partly because of the difficulty of bringing all witnesses together, and partly because of the desire to keep secret the fact that the US had broken the MAGIC code. Kimmel rightly felt he had been made a scapegoat, and in the end the Pearl Harbor investigations revealed that if Kimmel was guilty of anything, it was only of an error of judgment, for which many others in higher positions could similarly be censured. To many, however, Kimmel was guilty until proven innocent. At first he looked forward to the prospect of a court martial because, he declared, information had been withheld from him which would prove a mitigating circumstance. As time progressed, however, he became bitter and felt betrayed, and when Forrestal finally offered him a court martial in August, 1945, he declined, preferring to wait until the Congressional investigation was completed. The final report stated that he was guilty of an error of judgment but not of dereliction of duty. The sour Washington and Hawaii, Kimmel felt vindicated, but he was unhappy that end of the war was out ‘of blame was to be found inthis had taken several years. He died on May 14, 1968, in Groton Connecticut. Major-General Walter C. Short Major-General Walter C, Short (1880-1949) was the army commander at Pearl Harbor, Born on March 30, 1880, in Fillmore, Illinois, a doctor's son, he graduated from the University of Hlinois and accepted a commission in 1901. A training officer in France in World War One, he later went to Fort Benning as assistant comma to brigadier general in 1936. He was given command of Ist Infantry Division and, at the outbreak of World War Two, that of Ist Corps. On February 8, 1941, he was promoted to lieutenantgeneral and given command of the Hawaiian Department Short was quiet, dignified and an able organizer. His m drilled but, under his command, unit commanders carefully watched the use of expendable ammunition and materiel. Short followed his orders to the letter, but failed to read between the lines, He was surprised when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Ten days after the attack, he was recalled to Washington and replaced by Gen. Emmons. An investigation found Short derelict in properly directing his staff. The general was quiet, believing that a court martial after hostilities were over, and when a full disclosure could be made, would vindicate him, He reverted to his permanent rank of majorgeneral and retired at the end of February, 1942. He accepted the position of traffic mana the Dallas Ford plant, which made cars and war goods. Although he maintained a low public profile and did not speak with outsiders, he wanted vindication. During the final investigation Short declared that he had not been given adequate warning from Washington and had been suffering from a lack of resources. The investigation revealed that both Washington and Hawaiian commanders had been at fault. Short requested a court martial but never received one. He died on September 3, 1949 in Dallas, dant and was promoted Admiral Harold R. Stark Harold (Betty) R. Stark was born on November 12, 1880, in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, and graduated from Annapolis in 1903, He was befriended by Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and was awarded the DSM in World War One. In 1939, Stark became Chief of Naval Oper —-— ations (CNO) and overcame strong isolationist sentiment to start construction of modern naval vessels and bases, He beefed up the Pacific Fleet at Pearl, and aided by information from the MAGIC code, knew that Japanese-American relations were drastically declining and approaching a state of war, He gave commanders warnings, but because of the belief that Pearl Harbor was too strong, he felt the Japanese would attack elsewhere. When Nomura’s message was translated by MAGIC on, December 7, 1941, he started to send a message to Pearl Harbor, but Marshall assured him that army communications could get it there just as fast. It In the 19308, the “special tractor” light tank was typical of US materiol. It was modeled after the Renault tank and bore too many angled surfaces that would trap shelifire rather than deflect i. Note the heavy plates instead of treads, which were adopted later.Although outmoded and shown Inefficient by modern aircraft derived from the racing plan‘ of the 19306, in 1941 both the army and the navy still used some biplanes as part of their regular line aircraft. Tho unit crest of an artillery unit stationed on Oahu in 1941. ‘Although the motto was "Take ‘Arms," in general, the army relied upon anti-saboteur and reactive measures more than proactive awareness. arrived after the air raid had begun. Stark was relieved as CNO on March 7, 1942, but Marshall was not removed On October 1, 1943, Stark took over command of the 12th Fleet to prepare US Naval Forces for the Normandy invasion; he was liaison with the Admiralty and Churchill. He testified in the Pearl Harbor hearings and retired on April 1, 1946. He died on August 20, 1972, at his home in Washington, DC. General George C. Marshall A Kentuckian whose lineage could be traced back to the American Revolution, George C. Marshall was born on December 31, 1880, in Allentown, Promoted to lieutenant-colonel, he went to France with the AEF, becoming head of operations and training for the Ist Army. He refurbished the army’s officer training regiment, implemented Roosevelt's 2CC” program through the military in the southern states, and was promoted to chief of war plans and finally deputy to the army's chief of staff. FDR appointed Marshall as chief of staff on September 1, 1939, and gave him his fourth star. Marshall supported the concept of an independent army air corps, and some feel he neglected other branches, building up this new branch at their expense. He was chief of staff when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, but unlike many others, no stigma for the debacle was attached to him. Marshall fully supported the “defeat Germany first” concept, and many blame the length of the Pacific War on his cautious approach to planning and implementation of war plans. Afier the war, he became Secretary of State, and he is primarily remembered as the author of the Marshall Plan that reinvigorated Europe. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and died on October 16, 1959. Cordell Hull Lanky and tall, born in a log cabin in Tennessee on October 2, 1871, by his twentieth birthday Cordell Hull had become a circuit judge, through his hard work and diligence. In 1933, he became Secretary of State under FDR. He and Roosevelt became close friends, and although Roosevelt acted as his own secretary of state on most occasions, Hull was a good subordinate and had great 13influence in matters of foreign policy. Hull met with Nomura on December 7, 1941: although he probably did believe that the Japanese ambassador had been unaware of the 14-part message until too late, Hull read Nomura the riot act, soundly denouncing the Japanese attack after he had received word of it via chain of command. Hull tendered his resignation November 21, 1944. He was awarded obel Peace Prize in 1945 and died in I ent Franklin Delano Roosevelt Roosevelt, known simply as FDR, is the only American president to have served four consecutive terms, from 1983 until his death in 1945. A distant cousin of Teddy Roosevelt, he graduated from Harvard without, distinction, In 1910, he was appointed Secretary of the Navy. In August, 1921, while on holiday at Campobello, he was struck with polio, which left him crippled from the waist down, though he later regained parti use of his legs. Prosident Franklin Delano In 1928, Roosevelt was clected governor of New York: four years later Roosevelt had already agreed he was elected to his first four-year term as president. He established the pails Oat Be SS weed, ie of economic legislation, designed to help the ‘abide by a "defeat Germany first Policy H the US entered the wer Suggling American economy, and in so doing made himself the ‘The atfsck on Paarl Harbor champion of the little man, would test American resolve, Although America remained neutral when war broke out in Europe, Roosevelt noted, in a fireside chat on September 1, 1939, that he could not ask all Americans to remain neutral in thought. When Pearl Harbor was bombed, he denounced the action in a specch that decried December 7 asa “day that will ive in infamy.” He piloted the US through the darkest days of World War Two, but it was to0 much for him, and he died on April 12, 1945, at Warm Springs, Georgia. His imprint on American political thought remains visible to this day. New Deal conglomer: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto The seventh son of a schoolteacher, Yamamoto was born April 4, 1884. Isoroku means “56,” which was his father's age when he was born. He lived near Nagaoka, entered naval school at 16, and graduated as seventh in his class. He was an ensign on a cruiser in the Batlle of Tsushima in the RussoJapanese War in 1905, when he lost two fingers on his left hand, He was adopted by the Yamamoto family and took their name. mamoto was promoted to commander and transferred to Tokyo naval headquarters, where he married: however, he was sent to Harvard to study economics, and also learned about petroleum. While World War One raged, he discovered the military use of aviation. He was fond of playing goand shogi, and was a guest at many dinner parties, also learning —* Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto Poker and bridge. Sls ican lecting tropontea ot In 1923, Cpt. Yamamoto was head of the air taining base at ‘aval air power and did not wish —-Kasummigaura and became naval attaché to Washington, At the London a prolonged war with the US.He naval conference, he convinced all that the 5:5:3 ratio was no longer folt Japan could not win, but acceptable, and it was discarded. He returned to Japan as a diplomatic ‘once Japan entered it, he fought hard for his homeland. Vemamoto_HTO and became Vice-Minister of the Navy. ‘was the force behind the Hawail Yamamoto favored air power, and he relegated the steel navy to a Operation, secondary position, opposing the building of the battleships Yamato andIn early 1941, army issue ‘equipment was far behind ‘where it would be a scant five years later. Bolt-action Spring- fields, old gas masks, and “dishpan” helmets would shortly be replaced when war production went into high gear. Musashi as antiquated technology, saying: “These ... will be as useful .. as a samurai sword.” He championed new aircraft carriers, opposed Japan's entry into the Tripartite Pact in 1939, opposed the war hawks, and ‘acknowledged that although he could run wild for six months to a year, after that time he had no confidence whatever in Japan’s ability to win a naval war. In mid-August, 1939, he was promoted to full admiral and became commanderin-chief of the Combined Fleet. He became a Rommeblike figure to the men of his command, inspiring them to greater efforts by his confidence, and improved the combat readiness and seaworthiness of the Japanese Navy by making it practice in good and bad weather, day and night. Yamamoto did not wish to go to war with the US, but once the government had decided, he devoted himself to the task of giving Japan the decisive edge. He decided that Pearl Harbor would be won with air power, not battleships. The plan to attack Pearl Harbor was his. ‘Afier the success at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto suffered a defeat at Midway: this has been likened to Lee’s early success at Chancellorwille followed by his defeat at overconfident. During the battle for Guadalcanal, he decided to visit his men to inspire confidence and improve morale. His plane was shot down on April 18, 1943, by American fighters. His death deprived the Japanese military not only of a courageous and insightful leader, but also of a man who was a tue military professional, a man who fought but wanted peace. Had he lived, the ‘outcome of the war would probably not have changed: however, his stature and efforts might have shortened the struggle. tysburg. Some have speculated that he was Commander Mitsuo Fuchida Born in Nara Pi Mitsuo Fuchida was clever, outspoken, and personally fearless. In 1921 fecture on December 2, 1902, in the Year of the Tigerhe entered the Naval Academy and shortly thereafter befriended Minoru Genda when they discovered a shared love for flying. Their friendship and mutual respect was to last for years, and in many ways it helped shape the concept of air war and the attack on Pearl Harbor. Somewhat pnically, he once characterized his friend Genda as “reckless.” First specializing in horizontal bombing, Fuchida gained such prowess that he was made an instructor, Shortly thereat promoted to licutenantcommander and was accepted into the Naval Staff College. It was there that he espoused naval air power In 1989 he joined the Akagi as flight commander. On sea exercises he met Adm. Yamamoto, who expressed his real interest in naval aviation. Fuchida came to respect Yamamoto and became a devoted supporter of the admiral. After a short stint on Ryuho, he returned to the Akagi with more than 3,000 hours of flight time under his wings. While in China, he leamed the art of torpedo bombing, and was recognized throughout the IJN as a torpedo ace. Fuchida was a hard-headed officer who tenaciously defended an idea until it was proven untenable; then he compromised. He had a sly sense of humor, defended the underdog, and was a kind, ge private life, but he had the spirit of a warrior, Nicknamed “Buddha” by his friends for his good humor, he was an officer who planned things down to the last detail, had insight into tactical and strategic situations, and was personally brave and respected by his men, Genda once said of him: “He was ... our best flight leader ... with a clear head. The success of the Pearl Harbor attack depended upon the character and ability of its flight leader, and that is why ... Fuchida was selected for the job.” He coordinated all preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor and personally led the first wave, flying as an observer with Lt. Mitsuo Matsuzaki, He wanted to conduct a second attack against Pearl Harbor, but Nagumo decided they had done well enough and tured the task force home, Fuchida met the Emperor face to face and provided details of the assault on Pearl Harbor: later he said it was easier to go into combat than to face him then. Sidelined at Midway by appendicitis, Fuchida was soon back on duty and was active throughout the remainder of the war Afterwards, he converted to Christianity, became a minister, and wrote about the Pearl Harbor attack. He died in 1976. 1, he was Commander Born in 1904, Genda attended the naval training school and shortly afterwards met Mitsuo Fuchida. Genda served in the oldest Japanese fighter squadron, the Yokosuka Air Group, under Lt. Kobayashi. Their aerial acrobatics quickly gained the group the sobriquet “Genda’s Circus.” He was recognized as a superior fighter pilot and air operations officer. Rear Admiral Onishi had Genda write a feasibility study for a proposed Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Commander Genda wrote the study and constructed a strategy with ten main points, most of which were incorporated into the final plan. He developed the First Air Group's torpedo program, and proposed a second attack on Pearl Harbor several days after the first, wanting to annihilate the US fleet. He remained aboard Akagi as Nagumo’s air advisor, and was on deck to welcome a's flight back, In 1941, artillery units on maneuvers (shown here with Unit's torrior mascot) deployed and entrenched using camouflage, in the belief that Some day they might have to fight off naval invaders,in the Sunday morning on December 7, mpor ay attacks, taking Fuchida’s place in 1041, at Ford Island would have the squadron since the latter was recuperating following his operation. looked as peaceful as this shot, taken barely four weoks ear Later he was promoted to captain and posted as senior officer in charge (naar plier of naval aviation on the general staff. When Air Group 343 formed in side of the taland (top of picture) December, 1944, Genda transferred from general staff to become and Battieship Row on the east its. commander. He stressed formation combat, improved air-to-air side (bottom of picture). communications, and advance intelligence of enemy air formations. He Japanese intelligence regularly Jed] the group in the Battle of Okinawa, and commanded Air Group 343 scoured newspapers for word of Ween eae PEE Conegs ons uolnce until the end of the war Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo Chuichi Nagumo was born in 1887. Of fiery temperament, this career naval officer was an expert in torpedo warfare. His military stratagems were often aggressive but uninspired and sometimes ill-advised. Vice-Admiral Nagumo was appointed commander of Kido But Ist Air Fleet, despite his lack of familiarity and expe | aviation, He commanded the Ist Air Fleet at Pearl Harbor from the deck of his flagship, Akagi. Two attack waves were planned, and results | indicated a third strike would not yield any further success. The Americans were now somewhat prepared and would probably have | inflicted disproportionate casualties on the attack force, Subsequent events have shown that attacking harbor facilities probably would have further crippled US ability to strike back. | Afterwards, he led the Ist Air Fleet in the Dutch East Indies, the | Indian Ocean and at Midway, where he lost Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu, | 17 , the ice in naval Eee...four of Japan’s finest carriers, because of poor tactical ability and bad luck. The magnitude of this loss disconcerted him, and he lost his drive and any effectiveness he possessed as a commander, As a subordinate of Adm. Kondo, he helped achieve the Japanese tactical victory (but strategic defeat) at Santa Cruz. At Saipan in 1944, he commanded a backwater fleet of banges, patrol boats and infantry. When the inevitable result of the war became clear, he committed suicide, on July 6, 1944. Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura was the Japanese ambassador to Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor, and was cast unwittingly in the role of villain. Born in 1877, he was orphaned, and later adopted by Masatane Nomura, taking his name. In 1898, he graduated from the Naval Academy with imperial honors for scholarship. He commanded the 8rd Fleet during the 1932 Shanghai Incident, coming through the conflict unscathed, only to lose his left eye to a terrorist bomb just we afterwards Nomura government from September 2: tired from active duty but served as foreign minister in the , 1939, to January 14, 1940. His was a voice of constraint and caution, encouraging diplomatic solutions. In February, 1941, Nomura was sent to the United States as ambassador to Washington. As he opposed Japanese militarists, he was welcomed and tusted when he tried to reconcile US-Japanese differences with Cordell Hull. Both Hirohito and Yamamoto insisted that at least 30 minutes notice be given the US prior to the outbreak of hostilities at Pearl Harbor. A message was sent to Nomura: he was to give it to Hull at one o'clock Washington time. The message was sent in 14 parts and decoded as it arrived. Because of the security on this message, Nomura did not have a competent typist with sufficient clearance. The person selected was slow and Nomura postponed his appointment until 1400 hrs. However, the US had broken the code, but was confused about the intent of the message because it neither declared war nor offered hope of peace through further negotiations Nomura saw Hull at 142 ered the message. Hull was infuriated and terse during the meeting. Nomura soon found the reason for Hull’s reception: Pearl Harbor had been attacked by Japan. Hull declared to the press immediately afterwards that he had never seen a message so full of “falsehoods and distortions ... on a scale so huge that I never imagined .., any government ... was capable of uttering them.” Nomura was shaken by the revelation that Japan had attacked the US and, shoulders sagging, he left Hull’s office. Nomura and his staff were interned, and remained so until 1942, when he was repatriated. After the war he became president of the Japan Vietor Company and was a member of the House of Councilors, He died in 1964View of Southeast Loch, looking north from the Hickam Fie! where sub pens and PT berths were located (to right). Battleship Row Is out of sight to the left. ‘Mountains, destroyer berths, and Patt City are faintly visible in the background. CHRONOLOGY 1936 December 2 - Yamamoto begins forging the naval air arm into a modern weapon. 1939 February 10 - Japan occupies the Chinese istand of Hainan. ‘August - Adm. \soroku Yamamoto appointed commander in-chief of the imperial ‘Japanese Naw, ‘September 4 ~ Yamamoto writes to V/Adm. Shimata to say that he is uneasy about “Japan's relations with Germany and italy in the face of changes now taking place in Europe. 1940 Spiing - The US fleet transfers to Peart Harbor as its permanent home base: to the Japanese, this is thinly veled threat. Yamamoto uses this to urge expansion of naval air power. Yamamoto begins thinking that it would be better to carry war to the US Navy rather than wait for them to choose the time and place for battle, July ~ Roosevelt has an embargo placed on all aviation fuel, steel and scrap iron to Japan. August - Lieutenant-Colonel Friedman, a cryptographer, breaks the Japanese Purple Code (MAGIC) ‘September 3 - Roosevelt gives Briain 50 old destroyers for the right to establish US naval bases in British temitoris, ‘September 4 - The US warns Japan not to attack French Indochina, ‘September 17 - Qjiro Okuda is appointed acting consul general to Hawai. He isin charge (of reporting on movements of US ships in the harbor, much of which appears in ‘American newspapers. Kohichi Sek’ studies Jane's Fighting Ships and travels around the island studying the base and airfields, but without trespassing on US government property though, ‘September 27 - Japan joins the Tripartite Pact. Yamamoto tells Konoys: “I hope you wall avoid a Japanese-American war.” Novernber 12 - British torpedo bombers attack the italian fet at Taranto, Italy Mediterranean feat, bling half of20 December 10 - Yamamoto wites to Shimada: “The probabilty is great... our operations ‘against the Netherlands’ Indies are almost cartain to develop into a war with America, Britain and Holland toefore those operations are half-over. Consequently we should Not launch ... the southern operation unless we are prepared... and adequately equipped. December 30 - Rear Admiral Bloch sends a memo: “Ary alrraft attacking Pearl Harbor will... be brought by carriers, 1944 January 1 - In Japan, American ambassador Grew writes in his diary: “Japan. is on the warpath ... If... Americans ... could read ... articles by leading Japanese ... they would realize the utter hopelessness of a policy of appeasement, January 6 - President Roosevett deciares the United States the “arsenal of democracy.” January 7 - Yamamoto writes a later to P/Adm. Takjru Oikawa, saying: “A conflet with the United States... is inevitable.” The Japanese Navy should “destroy the US main fleet at the outset of the war.” He continues that the Japanese Navy should strike so as to “decide the fate ofthe war on the vary fist day.” His plan is to find the US Navy “at Pearl Harbor (and) attack it vigorously with our ar force.” He concludes that the US Navy is not at Peart Harbor, they should find thom regardiess of where they are. ‘The Japanese First and Second Carrier Divisions should mount a “surprise attack with all their ar strenath, risking themselves on 2 moonlight night or at dawn,” Ollers were Needed for refueling at sea, destroyers would pick up survivors whose aircraft or ships went down, and submarines would attack vessels fleeing Perl Harbor and attempt to Sink Alled vessels at the entrance and block it. An attack on “the Philippines and Singapore should be made at almost the same time as ... against Hawai.” At the end Of the letter, Yamamoto requests: * sincerely desire to ... personaly command that attack force, January 24 - Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese prime minister, asserts that “frm establishment of a Mutual Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia is... necessary 10 the continued existence ofthis country.” Yamamoto hypothesizes that should war break out “between Japan and the United States, it would not be enough that we take Guam and the Phifppines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to ... dictate the terms of peace in the White House. | wonder four poitcians ... are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices January 27 - In secret talks with Britain, the US decides that if Japan enters the war on the German side, and if the US enters the war, Germany is to be defeated frst then Japan. Ambassador Grew, in Japan, is warned by his Peruvian counterpart that he has heard a Japanese worker in his embassy say thet if war oocurs the “Japanese ‘miltary ... [vil] etter»pt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using ll their military In late October, Ford Isiand (center), the tank farm on the Southeast Loch (center left, ‘opposite Ford Island) and Hickam Field (top left) were business-as-usual bases. War was in Europe or China.‘acilties." In Washington, miltary intaligence is surprised only that Grew puts credence in the source of the report and notin the supposition of the report. In Japan, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka says, “We must control the Western PPacttic,” and that the US should reconsider their prior actions: ifthe US does not, there is “no hope for Japanase-American relations." Aboard Nagato, Yamamoto ciscusses the logical and technical feasibilty of an attack on Peart Harbor. After this, ‘meeting, Onishi asks Maeda (his senior staff officer the following question: if US. capital ships were “moored around Ford Island, could a successful torpedo attack be launched against them?" Maeda says no, the water is too shallow for torpedoes to be effective. However, i the torpedoes were modifi. February 1 - Kimmel replaces Richardson as CinCPAC; Short is promoted to commander of the Hawaiian Department. February 5 - Kimmel receives a letter from Secretary Knox stating: “if war eventuates with Japan ... hostities ... would stat... with a surprise attack an Peart Harbor” The latter tos Kimmel to “increase the joint readiness of the army and navy to withstand a raid.” He says that probable forms of attack are bombing, torpedo attacks, or both. Congressman Faddis of Pennsylvania states: “The Japanese are not going to risk @ fight ... where they must face the American Navy in open battle. Their navy is not strong enough.” February 12 - Nomura presents his credentials, which appoint him Ambassador to Washington, to Cordell Hull, February 15 - Kimmel issues a Pacific Fleet Conference letter saying they are faced with ‘possible surprise attack on ships in Peart Harbor, \Mid-Februery - Onishi sends for Cmdr Minoru Genda and presents Yamamoto's plan, mentioning that Yamamoto has given some thought to making t a one-way mission (katamnechi Kagami) to increase the striking distance to over 500 mites. Genda ‘opposes treating aircraft as disposable: “Ditching ... would be a waste of men and planes.” He thinks Yamamoto should include dive-bombers and high altitude bombers ‘as well as torpedo planes in the attack. “To obtain the best results, all carriers should approach as close to Pearl Harbor as possible.” His last point is: “Our prime target ‘should be US carriers." Onishi asks Genda to prepare a report about feasibility, ‘component forces and manner of execution, and then report back in ten days. Late February Genda gives Onishi a report containing ten main proposals. it must be a surprise attack; US carriers are its main objective; US aircraft on Oahu are an ‘objective; and every avaliable Japanese carrier should take part in the operation. Furthermore, all kinds of attack aircraft should be used, end Japanese fighters should play an active role in the attack; the attack should be in early morning; refualing vessels at sea is necessary for success; and all planning must be ultra-secret. The tenth proposal is for a full-scale invasion, which Onishi disagrees with because they ‘could not maintain supply so far from ther present bases. Yamamoto wants to cripple the US Navy whereas Genda feats they should annihilate it. February 27 - Olaida reports: “The fleet goes to sea for a week and stays in Peart Harbor for one week. Every Wednesday those at sea and those in the harbor change places." ‘March § - The Japanese foreign ministry wires Nomura to say that they fee! fairly certain that the US “is reaaing your code messages. ‘March 10 - Onishi gives Yamamoto a draft of his plan for attack, based on Genda's plan but with some modifications, March 11-12 - Congress passes the Lend Lease Act, which supplies materiel to governments fighting the Axis. ‘March 14 ~ Kita is appointed consul general to Hawai ‘March 20 - Nomura responds to the foreign ministry: “Though | do not know which ones, | have discovered that the United States is reading some of our codes.” Nomura informs them he wil tell them detals in a “safe” way. Stil they did not change the Purple Code. Matsuoka may have been suspicious of Nomura’s warning, feeling it sprang trom insecunty. March 27 ~ Takeo Yoshikawa, an inteligence officer, arrives in Pearl Harbor and realizes that battleships are berthed in pairs and that the in-shore ship is protected from torpedo attacks by the outboard one. ‘March 30 - Roosevelt orders the Coast Guard to seize two German, 28 italan and ‘85 Danish ships in US ports. Api ~ Naval inteligence in Washington alerts district commanders to the fact that “the 24