SOVIET

SOBMfiitlfiES
Dvsign. Dvvvlopmvnt and Tactics

)an Brvvmvr

JANE'S INFORMATION GROUP

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 SOVIET
SUBMARINES
Dvsign. Dvvvlopmvnt and Tactics
To Ann
Contents

Introduction 7
Imperial beginnings 9
The First World War and Revolution 28

The interwar years 42

Submarine operations in the Second World War 58

Postwar reconstruction 1945-1960 78

Transition to nuclear power 1960-1970 98

The Soviet submarine fleet in the I 970s 122

The 'Quiet' revolution and the future 138

Appendix l: Soviet submarine accidents 167

Appendix li: Soviet transfers of submarines abroad 1945-1988 172

Appendix Ill: Basing infrastructure 1 74

Introduction

The Soviet Union has owned the world's largest "uhmarine fleet i n peacetime since the late
1 930s_ Since then, its numbers have never dipped below 200. The Soviet Navy, through its
T::.arist predecessor, can also lay claim to being among the first of the vvorld's navies to
explore the p oten tiali ties of the 'submarine torpedo-boat.' Russia's early submarine
inventors, notably S K Dzhevet sk y and 1 G Bubnov, rank vvith Western pioneers such as tht'
Americans John P Holland and Simon S L:�kc, and the Frenchman Gustave Zede. Notable
Rw.sian submarine inventions a n d experiments at the turn of the century included
Dzhevetsky's famom torpedo 'drop colbr', the periscope (about 20 years before its gen era l
introduction elsewhere), a chemical <lir purification s ystem sectional hull construction for
.

rapid disassembly and reassembly, and an e<lrly form of clo sed cycle ' propuHon
' -

A few years ago, Am erican Secretary of State for Defense James R Schlesinger
paraphrased Winston Churchill's characterisation of Stalinist USSR to portray the Soviet
Navy as ·a force . . . that is to some degret' a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.'
The core of the Soviet naval 'enigma' is the submarine fled. Its potential wartime strategy.
role� and missions, and capabilities have been a riddle for t he West since the day the Soviet
state wa� created in 1 9 1 7. Indeed, even before, Tsarist secrec y com monl y preven ted
Western observers from knovving the exact size of the I mperi al submarine flotillas, vvhich
boats were still on the active Admiralty list. and which no!.
Looking back over the past 75 years or so of Russian submarine bui ld i ng , a few traditions
stand out. One, the I m perial Ru�sian and Soviet submarine fleets have hZ�bituZ�lly operated
m ore d i fferent classes and types than haw other navies. Today, in the l980s. there &e as
many different operating classes as thert' arc letters in t he alphabe t. One can onl:y
guess v..rhat the effect might he on repair and maintenance. A seco nd and related
phenomenon has been the t ende ncy to operate. side by side, wry new and very old
sub ma ri ne s. During the first World War. the Leop ard ' cia�-; was the tech no logical equal t o
'

the best submarines produced b y the United States and Creat Britain. A t the s<�rne time. the
Imperial submarine brigades' went to St'a with submarines that wt'ft' already obsolete when
'

first delivered during the Russo-Japanese war. The pattern was repeated in tht· 'Crc<lt
Pa tri otic War'. The Stufi11ct::, or 'S' class. was as good a seaboat as the German Typt' VII fin
fad, t he Stulinet=. was a German desi g n) . Fighting alongside the Stnliuetz was the 'Dekabri�t·
group, the Soviet Union\ fir�t post-First World War design and emb od y i ng the state Df thc
art of that p er iod. Forty-five years bter, the Soviet fled combines the high technology
'Typhoons' and 1\ku/ns with the anachronistic 'Whiskeys' built in the early J 950s.
A third historical tendency has been the bu i ld i ng of sptt"inlised or 'mission -specific'
submarines. Already before and d u ring the First VV'orld War. the Rus�ians Jesigned and built

7
a range of submarine capabilities - from two-man harbour defence craft, to plans for
submarine 'cruisers' with a range of 18 500 nautical miles. The Imperial Navy was also the
first, of course, to deploy a submarine (Krab) for the specific purpose of minelaying. Between
the wars, too, a 'family' of submarines, each designed with specific capabilities and for
specific purposes, was built. The diminutive lV!alodki with two torpedoes was charged with
ncar-shore defence; next, the medium-size Shchuka group was planned for forward
offensive operations in the contiguous seas. The top-of-the-line. ocean patrol boats were the
'K' class cruisers. They were armed with two 100 mm guns, and were initially intended to
carry a folding-wing spotter aircraft as well.
The functional balance of the Soviet submarine fleet is particularly striking today.
Whereas the United States has tended to build single classes of multi-purpose attack boats,
the Soviet Union has laid down multiple classes to apparently suit different missions and
weapon systems. Thus, the Soviet Navy has built different types depending on whether the
main armament is cruise missiles or torpedoes. Within the missile carrying category it has
constructed different classes to fit short versus long-range missiles. At the same time, the
design of both (diesel-powered) coastal and (nuclear-powered) ocean-going submarines has
continued.
This book hopes to contribute to a better understanding of why the Soviet Union has built
the kind and numbers of submarines it has, and what their military purposes may be. I t is in
the nature of the subject that relatively little is known with absolute certainty, especially
after the Second World War. Most of the problem has to do with the Soviet refusal to
expand Mr Gorbachov's celebrated glasnost to even the relatively 'old' history of Soviet
submarine design and operations. As an example, the Soviets have yet to provide a detailed
accounting of their submarine losses in the Second World War.
Declassified intelligence reports of the 1950s and early 1 960s provide a partial remedy,
but it is important to remember that these were estimates; especially the reports of the early
1950s later frequently turned out to be inaccurate. From the late 1 960s onward, reliable
information becomes very difficult to come by. Part of the problem in this case is that a large
number of intelligence estimates that are legally qualified for declassification remain closed
because of cuts in funding for the declassification teams. It is for this reason that the modern
history of the Soviet submarine fleet becomes largely a matter of inference and speculation.
This book does not skirt speculation; some of it will be found quite different to prevailing
judgements and opinions. If the result is controversy and debate, the book will have served
an even more important purpose than a mere outline of history.
1 Imperial beginnings

The birth of the Russian submarine Fled is invariably linked with Wilhelm Valentin Bauer.
An artillery officer of Bavarian origin, Bauer had made a name for himsdf with submarine
experiments in 1 850, when according to his own account of events. the mere presence of his
first 'submarine', Rmndttmclu'r ('Diving Inomdiary'l, was instrumental in lifting tht.' Danish

Model of Wilhelm Bauer's Bmndtaucllt'r on display in the Deuts(he� Mu:.eum, Munich

!Deutsche:. Museum)

n<wal blockade of Kicl. The next year, he and his crew l'arned the reputation of being the first
to survive a submarine disaster. During a diving experiment in February, HrmrdtatJcha
collapsed and sank along with her crew of three, including Bauer himself, beneath 1 5 m (45
ftl of water. The inventor\ presence or mind saved the occupants' lives; after a wait of six
and one� half hour:-., the pressure of the water that had flooded imide had become equal to
that outside, allowing Bauer to open the hatch for the three men to float safely to the surface.
When the war between Denmark and Prussia had come to an end. Bauer set out to market his
invention to the various courts of Europe. The Austro�Hungarian emperor "vas interested. as
was King Ludvvig I of Bavaria. but neither monarch was prepared to back his fascination with
Bauer's scale model with the funding necessary to construct a full�sizc submarine vesseL
Better luck was had in England. At the invitation of Prince Albert, construction of Bauer's
next submarine went underway at the M i llwall Yard in London in 1 8 53. A dispute over the
financial terms of the contract. possibly exacerbated by the Bavarian's merr:urial
temperament, soon led to d ifficulties, however, and Bauer left England to next appear i n
Russia.
England and Russia had meanwhile gone to vvar i n the Crimea, and the Russians were
casting about for means to strengthen their coastal defences in the Black Sea against the
opponent's much superior fleet. In May 1 8 55, Bauer was commissioned to build the Diuhle

9
Marin ('Sea Devil') at the Leuchtenberg Yard in St Petersburg. The dolphin-shaped vessel
was completed on 1 November of the same year and turned over to the Russian Admiralty
for trials in Kronshtadt harbour.
Built around an iron-framed hull with a thickness of about 13 mm (half an inch), Diable
Marin was designed to withstand submersion to 46 m (ISO ft). Propulsion was by means of a
stern propeller driven by two treadmill-like wheels each about 2 m (nearly seven feet) in
diameter. One hundred and thirty-three trials had been completed without mishap since
May 1856 when, on 2 October of that year near-disaster struck. On her 134th trial and
while slowly submerging to prepare a mine-laying experiment, Oiable Marin's propeller
became entangled in seaweed. Water entered the craft through the conning tower, but the
Russian Navy crew managed to escape. The boat was subsequently refloated, but she later
sank again, this time for good, off Ochda in the Baltic Sea. Bauer attempted to interest the
Admiralty in his next designs, including a 24-gun submarine corvette, but by the spring of
1 8 5 8 the uncertain relationship between the two parties had become such that Bauer
thought it best to leave Russia.

The main charactcri�tics of the Diable Marin were as follows:

Displacement unknown
Length about "16.0 m (52.5 ft)
Beam about 3.4 m (I 1 . 2 ft)
Draught about 3.3 m (ll.O ft)
Propulsion human muscle power with auxiliary sail for surface navigation
Speed 1 99 m (330 ft) in 17 minutes while in submerged condition {limited by crew
endurance)
Armament explosive charges
Diving depth about 15 m (49.5 ft)
Diving speed 30 minutes for each metre
Complement one helmsman plus 1 2 crew

The first indigenous Russian submarine design was an all-metal boat built by Ivan
Fedorovich Aleksandrovsky, a St Petersburg photographer by profession but with
considerable training in mathematics, physics and mechanics. Constructed between 1863
and 1 866, the design displaced 3 5 5 tons, had a length and width of 33.2 and 4 m ( 109 and
1 3 ft) respectively, and a draft of almost 3.65 m ( 12 ft). Motive power appears to have been
furnished by some sort of hydraulic mechanism that connected compressed air to two
propellers operating in tandem. The vessel reportedly became lost in 1 8 7 7 when the hull
collapsed at too great a depth.
It was also in 1 8 7 7 that one of the best known Russian submarine designers, S K
Dzhevetsky, launched the first of what became a successive series of miniature submarines.
Dzhevetsky's first design was a 4 m (13 ft)-long craft similar in appearance to the early
submarines built by the American John P Holland. It was propelled by a single screw that
received motive power from foot pedals, much like a bicycle. The hull was made of steel and
was topped by a stubby conning tower that gave the sole occupant an occasional glimpse of
the horizon. Since human muscle power obviously limited the craft's radius of action, steel
eyebolts were located near the bow and stern for raising and lowering the tiny vessel from a
'mother ship'.
Dzhevetsky's design had two particularly interesting features; one was a small pump that,
operated by the propulsion gear, exchanged the foul air inside the boat for fresh air from the
outside. The other was the submarine's 'weapon system' � a set of externally-carried
explosives that, through manipulation with a kind of leather glove on each side of the
conning tower, was to be placed against the hull of a target vesseL Rubber suction cups were
to ensure that the explosives would remain attached to the victim's hull.

10
Stepan Karlovich Dzhevchky (1843-1938). (Central Naval Museum, LeningraJl

I I
 Dzhevetsky's idea of carrying the submarine's armament outside the hull eventually
evolved into the famous 'Dzhevetsky gear' or 'drop collars' - an externally-mounted
torpedo-carrying, aiming and release mechanism that was widely adopted in
the Russian submarine fleet and elsewhere, notably on board pre-First World War French
submarines. The advantage of the drop collar was its cheapness compared with the cost of
internal torpedo tubes, and the ability of the submarine to carry a larger torpedo load-out
than was possible with internal stowage only. Even boats with 'standard' internal tubes were
frequently retrofitted with additional Dzhevetsky 'apparatus'. The system had its drawbacks
however ; aiming of the torpedo was difficult, and the release mechanism had a tendency to
function at the wrong time and lose the expensive torpedos. Also, the collar and the weapon
itself were vulnerable to damage on the surface, while the constant exposure to the natural
elements lowered reliability.
Dzhevetsky's second design, a four-man operated boat, was completed on commission to
the Russian government in 1879. Apart from larger displacement, several other innovations
marked this 6 m (20-ft) craft. Fitted to the forward end of the conning tower was, some 25
years ahead of its general introduction, a primitive persicope constructed of a system of
prisms and a magnifying glass, that allowed the helmsman to view the surface of the water
while submerged. Armament consisted of two torpedoes attached to the exterior of the
boat. The weapons could be released from the inside of the submarine whence they would
float upward for attachment against the keel of the ship under attack. The torpedo's flotation
and attachment mechanism was ingenious; placed on either side of the weapon were rubber
girdles or cushions that would fill with compressed air from inside the submarine just prior to
attack. Although there are no records to show how effective this system turned out to be in
fact, Russia's Ministry for Coastal Defence was sufficiently impressed with the boat to order
50 similar vessels. Instead of two propellers, one fore and one aft, this series carried only one
that. located aft, was capable of moving the craft in every direction ; presumably some sort of
reversible propeller was involved. Also introduced was what has been described as a system
of 'travelling weights' that could be moved the length of the boat to ensure stability and
course keeping.
The full complement of 50 'mini-submarines' was eventually completed; 34 were
reportedly sent to the Black Sea for the defence ofSevastopol, while the balance of 16 stayed
behind to protect the harbour of Kronshtadt. Still, the tiny vessels evidently never served in
their intended role. Responsibility for Russia's coastal defence was transferred, in 1 886, from
the Navy to the Army and with it went control over the 'submarine forces'. The craft served
out their careers as floating bridge pontoons and as light buoys.
Another result of this change of jurisdiction had more serious implications: official
Russian interest in the submarine languished for nearly 20 years, until the outbreak of the
Russo-Japanese war. Although Dzhevetsky could find little material support at home for his
designs, abroad he was recognised as one of the world's foremost submarine designers. His
plan, in 1896, for a 1 90-ton submarine was awarded with a prize of 5000 francs from the
French Naval Ministry, and even though the design itself was not produced, the Dzhevetsky
torpedo drop collar became a standard feature throughout the French submarine fleet.
Two other Russian submarine enterprises near the turn of the 19th century merit mention.
The first involved the design, in 1896, of a one-man craft by the engineer Pukalov.
Described in contemporary accounts as a 5.8 m ( 1 9 ft)-\ong craft that, powered by electric
batteries, was reputedly capable of a top speed of ten knots, the Pukalov boat sounds
remarkably similar to Dzhevetsky's harbour defence submarines. Building of the Pukalov
design reportedly started at Kronshtadt, but it is uncertain if she was actually completed and,
if so, what became of her.
The second, more ambitious project, enlisted the dubious submarine design talents of the
Swedish inventor Thorsten Nordenfelt. Nordenfelt, who had already made his fame and

12
fortune with the invention of a reliable machine gun, had teamed up, in the early 1 8 80s, with
the English submarine pioneer George William Garrett. Although Garrett's own ideas about
how t o design and huild a submarine were sound enough, the more ambitious but also less
practical plans of his better-known and monied partner held sway. A faulty understanding
b y t\;ordenfelt of the principles of submariner operations caused a succession of his boats to
suffer from severe longitudal instabili t y . The 1\:ordenfelt submarines, wrote one
commentator, not many years after the Swede and his English partner had left the submarine
business, "arc principal!y useful as examples of what to avoid'.
Before this conclusion had become the general consensus, however, Nordenfelt enjoyed
considerable success in exploiting Europe's rivalries. The l\lordmfclt f was bought by the
Creek Navy in 1 886, and the Turks, not to be outdone. promptly ordered two of
Nordenfelt"s next and brgcr design. None of the vesseb had any operational value, but on
paper at least, Turkey became the strongest submarine povvcr in the Black Sea. Russia
responded as might be expected, and bought the Nordrnji,lf IV a 245 -ton submarine
propelled by steam. Steam was a common mode of submarine propulsion at the time,
particularly on the French submZJrines, for movement on the surface and for recharging the
electric batteries (then knov.m as 'accumulators') for suOmergeJ navigation. NurJenfelt's
steamplant went one step further however, Jnd was intended to furnish motive power on as
well a� bclovv the surface. The idea was for the live steam from the submarine's boiler to give
up its heaL via a heat exchanger, to a reservoir filled with water. The superheated water thus
stored would ostensibly be sufficient to give the submarine a submerged range of 2 0 nautical
miles at five knots on latent heat alone. There were obvious problems with the system, not
the least one being that, once the reserve of !alent steam had been used up, further
submerged operations had for all intents and purposes become impossible. The submarine
\-vould have to first return to port and fire up her boilers for several days to build up enough
steam pre<;sure for the next undcrvvatcr sortie.
The representatives of the Tsar's navy apparently vvcrc not overly concerned with this
drJwback. for they v.,rent ahead and signed a contract without bothering to first sec the craft
perform underwater. The I\itJrdmfi'lf IV departed England in November 1 888 to �et sail for
Kronshiad t. After a short call in Amslerdam, she rounded the Danish coastline and promptly
ran aground off Jutland. The Russians had seen enough: although i t was not long before the
submarine was refloated, the Imperial Navy refused to accept her.
Russia's first submarine built in the 20th century was a small craft, named Peter Kochk"u
Designed by an engineer by the name of Kuteinikov and Navy lieutenant E V Kolbasicv, the
20-ton, 6 m (20-ftl vessel was launched at Kronshtadt in 1 90 2 to become the first Russian
submarine assembled from prefabricated hull sections. �inc sections V\'ere joined together by
bolts, and could be disassembled and reassembled at \viii. The three centre components
contained the machinery for surface operations, and the three fore and three aft sections held
the batteries while at the same time serving as bzdlast tanks. Two externally-carried
torpedoes comprised Peter Koclrkn's armament.
The small boat was plagued b y serious stability problems. According t o a contemporary
account, written before the vcsst'l's final trials, the craft, when inclined to 90 degrees ( !)
'rights itself immediately'. The erratic performance of the torpedo drop collars further
contributed to Peter Kochbis failure as an effective weapon. Nc\·crtheless, 'Lrfffe Pcfcr's'
sectional construction can take credit for inaugurating a solution to the Russian Navy's long­
standing problem of hmv to strengthen i t s distant fleets in the Far East and in the Black Sea
Sectional construction became a standard feature of Russia's smaller submarines for decades
to come
The R u sso-Japanese Wa r

The huge geographic distance that separated Russia's interests in the Far East from the centre
of its naval strength in the Baltic Sea contributed heavily to the Imperial Navy's disastrous
defeat at the hands of the Japanese in I 904-05. War between the two countries broke out on
6 February 1904. Two days later, a Japanese destroyer attack with torpedoes on Port Arthur
put two Russian battleships and one cruiser out of action_ Af�f'f sever�! month<> of mining
and countermining, and with the Japanese infantry slowly infesting Port Arthur from the
landside, the opposing fleets met in the Yellow Sea on 10 August 1904. After a running
firefight in which the Russian squadron commander, Vice-Admiral Vitgeft, was killed by a
shell splinter, the bulk of the Russian force hastened back to Vladivostok where it remained
under the watchful eyes of the Japanese fleet.
Meanwhile drawn-out preparations had been completed on the other side of the Eurasian
continent to dispatch Vice-Admiral Rozhdestvensky's 'Second Pacific Squadron' from the
Baltic Sea. After an eventful journey of some 2 1 000 nautical miles that took over seven
months, the Baltic reinforcements of nine battleships and a mixture of cruisers, armoured
coastal defence ships and destroyers met Japanese Admiral Tago's numerically inferior but
materially better prepared fleet in the Korean Straits, off Tsushima Island. Japan gained a
decisive victory; the Russians lost eight battleships in addition to 22 smaller combatants,
compared with Japanese casualties that amounted to two badly damaged cruisers and three
sunken torpedo-boats. When the smoke had cleared, the Imperial Russian Fleet had been
relegated from third to sixth place among the world's naval powers.
When the war erupted, neither side possessed any effective submarines. Japan had yet to
acquire its first submarine of any kind, and the only Russian craft worthy of being called
'submarine' was the 1 13-ton Delfin (Dolphin) that had only recently completed her trials.
Delfin was the brainchild of Ivan Grigorievich Bubnov, an engineer and one of the most
famous names in the history of Russian submarine design (and elsewhere). Built at the Baltic
Shipyard in St Petersburg, her characteristics were as follows:

Displacement 1 13 / "135 tons

Length 19.2 m (63 ft)
Beam 3.6 m (I2 ft)
Draught 3.3 m (l I ft)
Time to dive 20 min
Surface speed 9 knots
Submerged speed 4.5 knots
Complement 20
Armament 2 Dzhevetsky torpedo drop collars

Delfin was immediately pressed into service as a training vessel for the crews that were to
man the new submarines that were hurriedly ordered at home and abroad. Unfortunately,
the instructors were hardly more familiar than their students with submarine operations. On
the morning of 20 June 1904, with the craft being overloaded with ten to 20 additional
trainees, a passing paddlewheel steamer caused a large wave to wash over the shallow craft
into the open conning tower. One of the crew panicked and managed to become lodged
under the hatch cover. Delfin rapidly filled with water; a short in the electrical circuitry
caused an explosion of the built-up hydrogen gas and petrol fumes, and the boat foundered.
Only six of the crew survived this second submarine disaster of the 20th century. Raised and
refitted, Delfin later served in the Pacific Ocean and in the White Sea, where she ended her
career in 19 I 9.
As the first shots were exchanged, both the Japanese and Russians hastened to build up
their respective submarine arms. The Japanese Navy enlisted the services of the Electric Boat

14
Company in the USA that had absorbed the Holland Torpedo Boat Company, and ordered
five 103-ton submarine<;. All five arrived d i sassembled in Yokohama, but none became ready
in time to see action agains� the Russians. Russian submarine acquisition plans were more

ambitiow.. One stopgap measure vvas the ordering of a vvoodt'n submarine de<;igncd by a
Lieutenant Botkin, and the alteration of the Dzhevetsky-designed Kcfn (Siberian salmon) of
1886. A mme substanti<Jl step was taken in February 1 904 vvith an mder for four Bubnov­
designed boats of 1 40 tons at the Baltic Yard. A certain Count Sheremetyev footed the bill of
400 000 rubl('s for a fifth ves�el on the condition that she be named after one of his ancestors,
a contemporary of Czar Peter the Great. A sixth unit was added to the commission later.
All six boab of v.'hat came to be knm·\'fl as the Kns11ikn (Swallow) class were bunched
between July and Augu<>t 1 904. Their name� were Fcldmurslur! Cm( Shcrcmd_t!n'. N7stlfku,
Sk(lf, l\lalinr. lv!akref and Ohm. Only the lead ves::.el. Ktbtlfka, vvenl through trials. the others
being shipped. disassembled, to Vladivostok via rail. Upon their arrival i n the Far East, i t was
soon discovered that none was ready for operational duty. Due t o delays in the shipment of
the German-manufactured petrol engines that the original design had called for, the craft had
been refitted with small dynamos. Used for surface as \vel! as ::.ubmerged navigation, speed
Vlras reduced to four and one-half knots. Thr main problem though was poor stability.
Moving �he conning tower well fonvard of the hull took care of the difficulty of proper
trimming. but this. in turn. d i splaced the centre of buoy.:mcy. An engi neer named 1\: A
Smirnov solved this d i fficu lty through the rather unique idea of imtalling a false conning
tower vvell aft. This rectified the buoyancy problem, but created a nevv problem : the hulls
had been designed to withstand lht· pre::.sure of water at 90 m (300 fti, hut the additional
conning towers had m.1dc the boats top-heavy. Making matters worse was the otherwise
inventive idea of the commanding officer of Fcldnum;fwf Cmf Slremnefyn_, t o u::.e the false
\ovvers for carrying fresh water_ A::. il turned ouL the various alterations to the Knsutk-u clas-;
reduced diving depth by more than 50 per cent to only 3t> m ( 1 20 ftl.
While work progressed at the Baltic Yard, additional Russian orders were placed abroad
In the United State�. contracts were let with both the Lake Torpedo-Boat Company and the
Electric Boat Company for the comtrudion of four and five submarines each. Included in the
package deals were Simon Lake's Pro/ector and John P Holland's experimental Fulfo11. In the
case of tlw Like contract. morem·cr, Simon Lake himself and a party of American engineers
iN ere engaged to supervise crew tr<:�ining for Pro/ector and the construction of the Lake boats
in St Petersburg.
The account of the shipment of the I 30-ton Prolrctor reads like a cloak -and -dagger story.
Doubtful that the U S government would give permi::.::.ion to export the submarine to a
belligerent nation, and worried that Japanese spie::. might sabotage the craft, Lake arranged
for his submarine to secretly meet with the chartered steamship Forfww. Under the cover
story of a tri.:d run. Protector set out from Bridgeport, Connecticut on a Saturday, when
gowrnment office::. were closed. Once out of sight from land. the two ships met and the
submarine was lifted onto the deck of the steamer with the help of a large wrecking barge.
The trip across the ocean V\' as uneventful until Forhm11 and her deckload entered Russian
\'vaters. The suspicious captain of a Russian gunboat did not believe that the tarpaulin­
covered f>rotcctor wa::. destined for Russia and forced the steamer to pull into the nearest
Russian port. from which she even\u.Jlly arrived in Kronshtadt. Five days after her arrival at
the Baltic fleet's main naval base. Lake himself arrived to oversee crt'W training. just in time
to hear the news of the De/fin disaster.
The Russiam were evidently satisfied enough vvith the performance of Profccfor (which
they renamed Osyotr) to increase their order with Lake vv·ith another five boats similar to
Prolccftlr. At least four units in this second batch vvere deliwred in !905, but none could be
made ready in time to see serv1cc in Russo-l apane::.e War. The four boats involved vv-ere
named Bytrlwk. Kcjnl. Pu!lrb and r/olm. After the war, in June 1 906. one more Lake -built

15
The Profcdor before her departure to Russia (US Navy)

submarine entered Russian naval service. This was the former Lake X that had been built to
participate in US government-sponsored submarine trials but had been completed too late
to enter. Lake X was commissioned into the Imperial Russian Navy as Sig.
The Russians were much less happy with the delivered performance of the first four Lake
submarines ordered. Lake had promised, and the contract had stipulated that the vessels
would have enough endurance to negotiate passage from Kronshtadt to Port Said, Egypt
(and hence to the Far East via the Suez Canal) without refueling. The advertised
characteristics of the submarines (which came to be named Alligator, Drakon, Kaiman and
Krokodih were impressive enough. Displacement was 4 10 tons on the surface and 482 tons
submerged. The designed surface speed was 15 knots, and cruising radius was to be as high
as 3500 nautical miles. These were very ambitious statistics, considering that the typical
'modern' submarine at the time was only half this size, considerably slower, and not
expected to range beyond 500 nautical miles. The armament of the Alligator class did
justice to her size: four inches ( 10 1 mm) of armour surrounded the exposed portion of the
hull which carried two 4 7 mm guns in addition to four internal torpedo tubes. No doubt. if
the boats had lived up to expectations and had been finished in time, they could have
presented a formidable threat to Japan's commanding naval position in 1905. Since anti­
submarine measures against a submerged submarine had yet to be invented. it is difficult to
see how the Japanese Navy would have ensured the blockade of the Lake submarines along
with the surface elements of Russia's Far Eastern squadron. Once at sea, the boats' combat
radius would have been more than enough to imperil Japan's line of communications to its
besieging army at Port Arthur; even Japan's own coastal seagoing traffic would have been at
risk. The Japanese Navy might also have found that the submarine's armament and small
profile when awash added up to a respectable opposition for smaller warships. Finally, Lake's
long-time interest in the submarine as a minelayer and mine-clearing vessel was reflected in
the incorporation of diving airlocks whence the Russians might have covertly tried to
neutralise the Japanese minefields while planting their own.
As things turned out. however, the Alligator class as first completed became, in the words
of one commentator, 'perhaps the most unhappy episode in Russian submarine development

16
for this period'. The submarines proved to be, according to the same observer. complete
failures i n every respect. Tests and trials were conducted i n 1 909- 1 9 1 0 and revealed,
according to one Russian eyewitness, that the submarines 'were unable to submerge and
invariably stood on end, first by the bow, then by the stern'. Lake insisted that his customer
accept the boats in spite of their fla\vs. When the Russians threatened to cancel the contract,
he warned that they would be turned over to the Swedish Navy. which just might solve the
submergence problem. The two sides ;vent back to the negotiating ta\lle, and the Ru�sians
decided to keep the four Lake boats after all. They <>pent the next two years trying to iron out
the various difficulties.
The Imperial Navy's efforts to make the Al11gator class seaworthy gives the lie to the
popular notion that the Russians arc not mechanically inclined. Lake\ team of American
engineers had been baffled by the boats' imtability problems, but after thc Russian Navy had
taken over, its technical personnel determined. before too long. that excessive weight was
the root cause. The submarines had to somehow be lightened by about 1 2 tons but it was not
evident how and where. The Russian Admiralty, perhaps even more so than their colleagues
abroad, was not known for pragmatism. but this time, it took the unusual step of giving
the commanding offict'rS of the Af!t:.;afm· class mrte /;/mtchc to spend up to one million rublt>s
to get their craft operational. however they sav\' fit. This they did by virtue of the rather
drastic decision of removing four of the submarine's engine cylinders and next by
eliminating the useless 4 7 mm conning tower gun. A further modification was the
installation of a ballast -compensation system that used engine-driven pumps to offset the
lo<>s of petrol during operations with an equal amount of water. Final!y, torpedo armament
was strengthened with the addition of two drop collars.
The Alfisator class became operational in the spring of 1 9 1 1 ; the weight reduction and
addition of a ballast system had increased the speed of submersion to five minutes, and
underwater handling was also improved substantially. An added gain was that the
underwater design �peed had been bettered from six to seven and one-half knots. It is tn1c
that when war came three years later, the four large Lake submarines prO\ ed to have only
limited effectiveness. Nevertheless. the ability of the Russian submarine service to take the
initiative and overcome the same problems that had confounded a much more experienced
and ostensibly more technically skilled team of designers and engineers is testimony to a
Russian ingenuity that Westerners arc vvont to ignore.
Mention has already been made of Russiil's second American order for submarines with
the Electric Boat Company. Sorn (ex-Fu ftmt) wa<> shipped overseas. in disassembled form, for
reassembly at the Nevsky yard. The other five in the group were built from the keel up at
Nevsky. and \-Vt're christened Stcr!!IWi (the lead boat). Hyelusn. Pcskar. 5/H-Iwka and LostlS.
ShclnJko, together wit - h Som. were originally· sent by rail to Vladivostok ( w here they were
still reported to be in early 1 9 1 4), but eventually finished their careers in the Baltic. StcrlytJd,
H);clusn and Pc�knr were directly assigned to the Baltic Fleet where. in 1 9 1 8. they were
captured by the Germans at Reval {Tallinn). The fifth unit in the group, L(1sos. was joined by
one additional ! Iolland-type submarine. the SudtJk, that had been built from the keel up at
Nevsky in 1 90 7 : together they became the nurleu<> of the Black Sea submarine flotilla.
Besides the wartime orders for American submarines, a further three boats were
contracted for. in April I 904, with the Cermania-Werft at Kiel. · 1 he stage for this particular
transaction had been set earlier when. aware nf Russia's naval predicament. this Krupp­
owncd subsidiary had invited a Russian technical committee to inspect its experimental, all­
electric Fore!. The Russian tearn were impressed vvith the 16-ton boat's diving capabilities,
and placed an order for three submarines vvith a displacement of 205 tons each. Cerman
Emperor Wilhelm 11 gaH' the tiny Fore/ to his imperial Russian cousin as part of the bargain.
The craft was shipped to St Petersburg via rail in June 1 904 and, after trials in the Baltic Sea,
\Vas sent to Vladivostok. There she proved to be all but useless. Twice �he foundered - once

17
during the Russo-Japanese War itself, and again in 1 9 10 while under tow by the destroyer
Plofvn.
Like the American orders, the three Germania-built Karp class submarines Knrp, Knrnbala
and Knras arrived much too late. The first boat was to have been delivered in August 1905,
but it was not until two years afterward that Russian crews sailed all three into Libau for
subsequent railroad transport to Sevastopol. The Russians accused the Germans of
deliberately delaying delivery so as to gain experience for their own Navy's First U-boats.
The Germans on the other hand claimed that Russian changes to the original design were
largely to blame. Both arguments have some validity; certainly, the similarity between the
Karp class submarines and the German U-1 supports the Russian suspicion. One lesson the
Germans undoubtedly learned from their Russian commission: instead of using the highly
explosion -prone petrol engines that powered the Karp boats, the U-1 was given the much
safer Koerting heavy oil (paraffin) plant.

The Karp after her commissioning into the I m perial Russian Navy (Krupp Archives).

None of the three Karp class submarines had a particularly illustrious career. Kamlmla sank
during manoeuvres in the Black Sea on 12 June 1909, when she crossed the path of the
battleship Rostislav and was cut in half. Twenty out of a crew of 24 were lost, including the
commander of the Black Sea submarine flotilla. Karp and Knras were already obsolete when
the First World War broke out. and were scuttled off Sevastopol in 1 9 19.
In April 1 904, the Royal Navy's First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Fisher, received news of the
eighth (unsuccessful) Japanese attempt with torpedo boats to flush out Russia's Far Eastern
Squadron at its Port Arthur roadstead. Indignantly, he wrote to a confidant : 'Why! Had he
(Admiral Togo) possessed submarines it would have been one attack and one attack only 1 It
would have been all over with the whole Russian Fleet. caught like rats in a trap!' And. Fisher
thundered, if only the Russians had had submarines, 'Togo outside would never have dared
to let his transports full of troops pursue the even tenor of their way to Cemulpo and
elsewhere!'
As events turned out. Russia's submarine build-up in the Pacific was too little and too late.
A total of perhaps I 4 boats of different types managed to arrive in Vladivostok before the
armistice was declared in October 1905, but only nine reportedly were ready for sea duty.
Those that did venture out were used for the one purpose that most naval authorities at the
time believed was the submarine's sole legitimate role: as a coastal reconnaissance auxiliary
on behalf of the 'real' navy of battleships and battlecruiscrs - not as an offensive weapon. It is
nevertheless interesting to note that considerable speculation existed on both sides during

18
the war that submarines would make their pre�ence felt. Thus, one early report on the
sinking of the Japanese baHle�hip Yuslrinw in May 1904 claimed that a submarine, not a
mine. had been the culprit. But, noted the British journal Engitwcr dryly, 'had a su bmarine
done i t Russia vvould have lf:'t the world knovv· the fact'.
Even had Russia's submarine flotilla in the Far East been employed more aggre�sively, il is
extremely doubtful that the balance of power could have been changed to a telling degree.
especially after Rozhdestvcnsky\ defeat at Tsushima. Unit for unit. the odd <JS�emblage of
'submarine-boats', many of thf:'m manned with only partially-trained crews and marginally
st>a-worthy, would have been hard pressed t o inflict significant losses on the well-trained
and materially well -prepared Japanese battlef!cct. Few kno'vl.rledgeablc naval observers at the
time, including even the staunchest advocates of th�· submarine, believed that a single or
even a few torpedoes would suffice t o sink a well -armoured surface warship. Moreover, the
disappointing performance of the torpedo early in the Russo -Japanese War, compared with
the devastating effectiveness of the mine, had led some commentators to queslion the
usefulnes-; of the submarine as a torpedo-firing vv·eapon. Confounding the low reliability of
the early Whitehead torpedo was the Ru:-,sian custom of carrying the �'\· capon exposed, -;lung
inside its submarine hull-mounted drop collar. it i� not d ifficult to imagine how the constant
exposure to salt water and air must have rJpidly degraded the reliJbility of both weapon and
launch mechanism.
These can only be speculations; certain however i s that the Russo-Japanese conflict had
Firmly committed the Imperial Ru�sian Navy to the submarine. Indeed, the case can be made
that i t was precisely Russia's defmt in that \V<lf that helped set the stage for the creation of
what became the numerically strongest submarine fleet in the world.

Org a n isat ion a n d equ i pment before the Fi rst World

War
From the point of view of the ·r saris! autocracy. the military defeat at the hands of the
Japanese was not the only, possibly not even the most important loss. The decimation of the
fleet undermined national and military morale and was seen by the middle class as another
sign of a bankrupt political system. Unrest and :-,trikes spread and became organised to the
point that Russia's economy came to a vidual standstill. On 30 October 1 905, Tsar 1'\ikolai
II \.-\'aS compelled to sign into force the October Manifesto granting Russia its first
constitutional parliament, the Duma. Although the Dum<� never evoked into a Western­
style parliament with effective control over the JCtions of government or T:-,ar, ih existence
nevertheless represented a limitation on autocrJtic power. rhe Duma becJme the centre nf
Russia· s political life; its debates filled the ncw.;;papers, and it� leader�hip leurned to use their
limited powers to goud effect, particu!Jrly \vhen it cJmc l o appro\·ing the budget and
questioning the Tsar's ministers.
One result of Russia's '>hort-lived 'democratisation' was the popularisation of tht.• debate
over the futun' of the post -Tsushima na\'Y· The First rcJction was to rebuild the fleet to its
pre-war glory, centred about battleships and battlecrui�er'>. Thus, the navy's Firs! proposal
called for the construction, by 1 9 1 5, of a total of 1 1 8 warship:-,. including I 2 baltle�hips anJ
1 5 cruiser�, but only ten submarines. The newly -elected Dum<J refused to fund this
progrJmme, however, and demanded instead that the navy scale down its plans pending a
thorough reorganisation of the fleet's admini stration as a whole. and a clearer definition of
Russia':-, military and naval need�.
Complicating the navy's choices was that traditional notions of battleship design had
suddenly been outmoded with the appearance. in 1906. of the Royal Navy's n.'volutionary
Drmdnouglrf. Not only had DreadHoHgiJ! made all of her predecessors obsolete, she also was
much more expensive. The recovering Russian economy could hardly afford construction of

19
enough of the big ships, and it was doubtful in any case whether Russian yards had the
necessary skills.
The Duma's budgetary reluctance to sanction a large ship building programme was
fuelled, in part, by the debate within the Navy itself between the 'Old School' and 'Young
School' of naval strategy. The former represented 'traditional' navy thought that
emphasised offensive operations with capital ships. The strategy and material condition of
the fled should, according to the Old School adherent�, Le consistent with the 'proper'
purpose of naval power : to gain command of the sea in Russia's maritime approaches via a
decisive battle with the opponent's high seas fleet. The Old SchooL in short, wanted to
recreate a fleet in the image of the one that had gone down in the Far East, only larger.
Submarines, according to this doctrinal philosophy, were for reconnaissance and counter­
blockading purposes, but were rejected as a cheap alternative to the deciding gunpower of a
high seas battlefleet.
Arranged in opposition were the Young School, whose image of the objective of war at
sea was based largely on the doctrine popularised by French Admiral Aube in the 1880s. The
latter had stressed the importance of coastal hit-and-run tactics and guerre de course against
enemy commerce, rather than the search for a decisive clash between organised battlefleets.
Instead of a concentrated force of large gunships, the Young School wanted to employ the
offensive-defensive tactics of 'mosquito flotillas' of destroyers, torpedo boats and
submarines to defend Russia against invasion and blockade.
The effective outcome of the dispute was a compromise fleet that failed to satisfy the
material requirements of either strategy. Delay after delay set back the reconstruction of
Russia's fleet ; when war came, in 1 9 1 4, Russia lacked both the flotilla forces needed for an
effective coastal defence, and a battlefleet powerful enough to seek a decision on the high
sea.
Meanwhile, the nearly 1 0 - year interregnum between the Russo-Japanese War and the
First World War was marked by a virtual explosion in submarine construction worldwide.
By late 1 913, France, the leading submarine navy, had increased its number of submarines
from about 60 in I 905 to 90, Great Britain from 40 to 85, the United States from 15 to 44,
and Russia's underwater fleet had grown to 48 boats. Newcomers to join the ranks of the
submarine navies during this period included Italy with 20 units in 1 9 I 3, Germany with a
fleet of 30 in the same year, and Japan and Austro-Hungary with 1 5 each.
Qualitatively, too, the submarine had progressed rapidly. The typical submarine of 1905
displaced about 1 50 tons; its successor eight years later displaced some 800 tons. Surface
speed improved from a maximum of less than ten knots to twice as much ; underwater speeds
also doubled. Cruising endurance went up from perhaps 500 nautical miles in 1905 to 1 500
nautical miles or more in 1 9 13-19 T 4. Speed of diving from an awash condition was cut from
at least 20 minutes to five minutes or less. Possibly less dramatic at their inception, but at
least as important in the long run. was the creation hy the principal submarine powers of
specialised submarine support vessels, the introduction of wireless radio aboard submarines,
the deck-mounting of medium-calibre guns and, most important. the first experiments at
anti-submarine warfare with aircraft.
One major implication of technical advances such as these was that submarines were
rapidly assuming the capability of long-range offensive operations on the high seas.
Improvements in speed and endurance meant that the submarine would be able to
accompany the battlcfleet, that is to say, at least until the impending 'decisive' clash. Joint
operations between submarines and the battlefleet became a regular feature of the
manoeuvres held annually by the major naval powers. Some submarine enthusiasts went so
far as to predict that their favourite weapon might soon replace the 'destroyer torpedo boat'
as the battlefleet's armed scout.
Russia's submarine fleet during the interwar years fairly kept pace with tactical and

20
technical improvements elsewhere. A subm<�rine training school vvas established at Libau
(Liepaja) i n the autumn of 1 906. All student officers were giwn a thorough instruction not
only i n the principles and handling of a submarine, but \'v' err also expected to br intimately
familiar with all aspects of engineering operatiom. Each candidate officer \Y.ls t a ught skills
that else\'\' here vvere normally assigned to enlisted personneL such as the opcr<Jtions of the
vertical and horizontal rudders, watch standing in the engine room or at the electrical
controls. etc The reported Soviet Navy custom today for officers to carry out duties that arc
normally entrusted to noncommissioned personnel in V\'estern na\·ies has been cited as
evidence of inadequate enlisted training. Perhaps; it might also reflcd a tradition that has
been carried over from procedures that were first inaugurated more than 70 )·'Cars ago.
Casualty drills. too, were a standard aspect of Russian submarine training before the First
World War. Granted that it i s difficult to draw e1 scientifically valid conclusion about
comparative safety records (for example, number of submarine casualties per number of
submarine days at sea), i t is noteworthy nonetheless that the Russian Navy experienced only
four subm<1rinc sinkings prior to the First \!Vorld War. compJrcd with eight in the Royal
N a v y and I 1 in the French fleet.
The last Ru�sian submarine to suffer this fate before the Fir�t World Vv'ar WdS the 14 7 - t on
!v1inoga. A contemporary account of the mishap in 1 9 1 3 follows. It is interesting in part. for
the graphic description of the perilous life aboard the e<1rly submarines, but more so for its
picture of an efficient rescue and salvage operation :

fhe Bubnov-designed l\1mugo as she appeared in !909_ 1\oll' the rows of torpedo drop collar�
(Central Naval Museum, Leningrad}

· .'vfirloStL under the command of U Car�oycv, was manoC'uvre1ng off Libau, when �he was SC'en
to take a �udden plunge . The appeJrance of the emergency buoy first gave the alarm at 3 i n the
.1fternoon, but it wa� not unt!l 9 at night that the salvage \'L".,�els reached the spot. The \o\·eathcr
conditions remained happily bvourable, and divers havi ng f1xed the heavy li ft ing chains. the
..\1iiWSII vva'> �uccessfu lly brought to the �urf.:lCe by mi dnight
\A./hen the a fter hatch was opened. 3 men staggered out. b<.1rel:,-' able to cra\1\rl. Fifteen of the
cre\.V and the captain were got out unconscious from the after p.1rt of the vessel. There remained
only the coxswJin, who was i n the conning-tower amidships. It WJS necessary to raise the

21
 submarine well out of the water to get at the conning-tower, and this took another 3 hours
work, but the coxswain, when released after 12 hours confinement, was in the best condition of
any of the crew. Thus the whole command of 20 men was saved and the submarine recovered
after lying 9 hours at the bottom of the sea helpless.
The cause of the accident has been ascertained to have been a defective ventilator. Before
exercising, these ventilators, which are indispensable to proper actions of the accumulators
which provide the motive energy of submarines, are screwed home from the inside. A
ventilator in the forward part of the vessel was either defective or had not been properly
screwed home, and water leaked in through this forward ventilator until the delicate trim of the
submarine was affected and she plunged head foremost to the bottom. Water continued to enter
until the air within the vessel was so far compressed as to resist the entrance of any more at a
pressure of 7 fathoms (42 feet) depth.
On this air the crew of 20 survived, the captain and IS men in the body of the submarine
suffering from the fumes of chlorine gas given off by the accumulators. The 3 men who crawled
out unaided by the after hatch and the coxswain, . . . were apparently out of reach of the chlorine
gas fumes . . All have now recovered from the effects of their terrible experience.'

Steps toward better administrative and operational control over Russia's submarine forces
progressed hand in hand with improved training and support. In 1 907 supervision of all
submarine matters was placed under the Department of the Chief Inspector of Torpedo
Affairs with a subsection strictly concerned with submarines. Three years later the first
submarine 'type command' was set up in the Baltic Fleet with the organisation of a Brigade of
Submarines. The Brigade was made up of two Divisions, each with a nominal strength of five
submarines. The 1st Division was supported by the tender Khabarovsk, and the 2nd by the
tender Yevropa. Also, construction was taken in hand for the rescue ship Volkhov, an SOO-ton
vessel equipped with pumps, cranes, and hospital facilities for the injured.
Joint manoeuvres between Baltic Fleet submarines and battlefleet units became a routine
annual event, starting in the autumn of 1 909. Unfortunately, the persistent perception of the
submarine as a weapon suitable primarily for coastal defence inhibited the development of
realistic offensive tactics. Instead, pre- 1 9 1 4 war plans, instructions and exercises ordinarii y
called for the submarines to take up pre-assigned patrol positions and lie there in wait for the
advancing 'enemy' fleet. A successful submarine attack could take place only when the
'enemy' ships followed the rules of manoeuvres and passed through the pre-positioned
submarine barrier; little attention was given to the offensive closing of enemy vessels. A
related consequence of this artificiality was an exaggerated expectation of the submarine's
defensive potential and a failure to develop adequate anti-submarine warfare equipments
and tactics.
The years before the First World War produced a plethora of ambitious fleet and
submarine building programmes. A five-year construction programme developed by the
newly-established Naval General Staff in 1907 proposed that the defence of the Baltic
approaches be entrusted to 40 submarines and 90 torpedo boats, among others. Another 26
submarines were believed required for the defence of the Black Sea coast in addition to
offensive operations against the Turkish Straits. Alternative programmes, some produced by
the Navy Department and others from the hands of the Chief of the Naval General Staff,
circulated at the same time, including one for the building of as many as 120 submarines. No
firm action was taken, however; instead different factions within the Navy, the Council of
State Defence, and the Duma spent their time in fruitless debate. The unavoidable outcome
was that the Fleet was unprepared to do much more than help defend the Army's coastal
flanks.
The most interesting submarine laid down during the interwar years was the world's first
underwater vessel specifically designed for minelaying purposes. The vessel was the
brainchild of Mikhail Petrovich Nalyetov, a railroad engineer. Nalyetov was in Port Arthur
during the war with Japan, and had witnessed the destructive power of mines. While in Port

22
Arthur, he had begun construction of a submarine, but the unfinished boat was blown up to
prevent its capture by thr Japanest'.

The KruJ,, popularly known as the "box of surpri:.es', about to undergo repairs at a Black Sea
yard sometime during the First \1\'orld \1\'ar (US Naval Historical Center. courtesy of Boris V
Orasphill

In 1 906, the Admiralty apprmTd hi'i plan for a _'i J 2-ton minclaying "'ubmarine
Comtruclion of the Kmh began at the \likolayev Yard in 1 908 but d i d not finish until 1 9 J ·"
·
To her ere\.\' the boat became known as the 'box of surpri:.es·. During her wartime career. she
\vas plagued by a series of mechanical mishaps; as far as can be determined, she cJrried out
only four mine-laying missions in the BlJck Sea.
Another innovative design was Dzhevitsky"s Jlocht(Ji.!.ll \Postal). Built in 1 90 7- 1 908 by
popular subscription, thic. I 34-ton vessel was powered by a "unified' engine. an t'arly form of
closed-cycle propulsion. A petrol engine was used both on the surface and for undcnvatn
running. Compressf'd air for engine usc replaced conventional ::.torage batteries for
underwater navigation which had the unfortunate by-product of a long - and very
noticeable - trail of exhaust gas bubbles on the surface. Jloddol'�' wa:. c.tricken from the naval
list i n 1 9 1 .'> .
A number o f conventional submarines w a s complf'ted bdore t h e yvar. The Bubno\·­
designed ..'v1inogu and A�·1dn vverc laid dovvn at the Baltic Yard i n 1 90 7 . and accepted hy the
Navy in 1 909 and 1 9 ! I respectively. The twin -screw i\ku!u was Ru�sia's first diesel­
propelled c.ubmarine, and stood out for her ram bow, a characteristic of the later Bubnov
designs. Her ovartime career in the Baltic Sea showed many deficiencies. The absence of
mufflers made her ext remt'ly noisy, and thf' Navy's insistence on space for reserve l orpedoe:.
had been accommodated at the expense of storagt' for reserve lubricating oil. Also
completed in 1 909, after four years of construction and alteration, were tht' 1 40-tori CXuu
and M11krcl. Both joined Aku/11 and i'vfinus;u to form the I st Division of the Baltic Fleet
Brigade of Submarines.
Until 1 9 12, the submarine flot illa in the Black Sea had depended on the shipment of
disassembled boats via rail. One mJjor drawback of this practice vva:. the tendency of the
connecting flanges and nuts and bolts that held the d i fferent sections togf'tlwr to rust
quickl y. The corrosion on the K.. 1rp cla:.s. for example. vvas so sc\·ere that the boats" design
depth of _W m ( 1 00 ft) had to be cut back to J. mZlximum of J S m \60 ft J . A solution came in
1 9 1 2, when the Black Sea acquired its own n•ntre for submamw nmc.lrudion with the

23
The Dzhevetskiy-dcsigned Pochfovy. This was Russia's first attempt at a 'dosed-cycle' submarine
propulsion system (Central Naval Museum, Leningrad).

24
The Aku!u and her designer, I G Bubno\·, at the Baltic Yard. St. Petersburg (US Naval Historical
Center. courtesy of Bori::. V Drasphil)

'
'

Aku/a. Since she does not fly the Imperial Navy ensign. and her drop collars are empty, she
appears to be on pre-commissioning trials The submarine in the background is probably a Lake­
designed Protector-type (US Naval lnstitutt')

25
completion, at the Nikolayev Yard, of three 630-ton Holland designs: Kashalot, Kif and
Nan,al. They were succeeded immediately by the Mor.JJ (Walrus) class, also of three boats:
Mor::.h, Tyu!en and Nerpa. The latter were built according to a Bubnov design, but because of
their near-identical size, armament, and speed characteristics. they have frequently been
grouped together with the Kashalot class.
The Russian Navy's most capable group of submarines in the First World War, the Leopard
class, was ordered under t-he na va l programme of 1 9 ·1 2. The recently -founded Nebel­
Lessner Yard at Reval (Tallinn) received an order for 1 2 of these Bubnov-designed
submarines, and a second order for an equal number went to the Baltic Yard. The latter
facility shared its commission equally with Nikolayev.
The original design features of the Leopard class compared favourably with the best
submarines then produced in the United States, France and Italy. Displacement was 650 tons
on the surface and 784 tons submerged. Speeds were 1 8 knots on the surface and 9.5 knots
below, while a long cruising radius classed the boats as long-range ocean patrol types.
Armament was impressive also, and included four internal torpedo tubes, eight external drop
collars, and one or two 6-pounder guns. Up to one half of the Leopard class submarines were
laid down too late to be completed according to the original design specifications, however.
The first 12 boats received their planned German-built 2640 hp engines for surface running,
but the next ten were given 500 hp power plants taken from the Kopje class of Amur river
gunboats. As a consequence, surface speed dropped to nine knots. The final two boats in the
group of 24, received 840 hp engines. Both (Fore! and Ynrsh) were also retrofitted with
external minelaying mechanisms in place of their original torpedo drop collars. The Leopard
class altogether included these boats:

Group I Group II Group III

Bars (N&L) Leopard IN&L) Fore/ IB)

Crpard (N&LI Panfern IN&L) Yorsh (B)
Llgor IN&LI Tigr IN&L)
Ynz (B) Tur (N&L)
Yedinorog (N&LI Yaguar (N&Li
Kuguar (N&L) Vo!k (B)
Vyepr IBI Lyebed (NI
Lvitsa (N&L) Ryss (N&L)
Zmeya (B) Pelikan (N)
Bureveslnik (N) Ufk·a IN)
Cagarn (N)
Orlan (N)

B = Baltic Yard, St Petersburg; N&L = Nobel & Lessner Yard, Reval; N = Nikolayev Yard

An overall assessment of the state of Russia's submarine forces on the eve of the First World
War can fairly be summarised as one ot promise but with limited operational and material
capabilities. Tactical training was adequate in terms of the prevailing notions of the main
purpose and missions of submarines, ie scouting and defensive barrier operations aimed at
harassing and slowing down an approaching enemy fleet. Officers and enlisted personnel as
a whole appear to have been as qualified as most of their foreign counterparts in the materiel
handling of submarines, but barring some notable exceptions, failed to adapt their
operational routines to the aggressive tactics that the war soon showed were necessary for
the submarine to fully make its presence felt.
When war broke out, the submarine support organisation was still being developed ; once
at war, a key limitation on the effectiveness of the Russian submarine fleet was low

26
operational readiness as the result of a dearth of repair and maintenance facilities.
Complicating the ability of the Russian yards to keep enough submarines at sea wa:-, the lack
of standardisation. Germany entered hostilities with 45 U -boats at sea or under construction
belonging to lhree basic das�es, most of them built after 1 9 lCI. Russia started with about the
same number of boats, but they belonged to at !t'ast nine different - and older - classe:-, i n
addition to several one-off types. This mi xture was t h e pay-off, i n part, o f the need during
the war with Japan to pres:-, into service mi!J submarine, no matter what kind. It also reflected
the inability of the Russian Navy to decide what type of submarine with what characteristics
was best suited to its naval needs. This dilemma was symptomatic, in turn. of the Navy's
failure to agree on its principal roles and missions, and a force structure to match - whether
the fleet should be organised around light forces for coastal defence. or be ba.'>ed on capital
ship<> designed for offensive action on the high seas. Various submarine projeds t ypified this
quandary. For example, in the same year - 1 909 - that tht' army engineer corps ordered
three useless -� 3-ton Holland-type miniature submarines for the defence of Kronshtadt
harbour, design went underwuy for a 1 700-ton submarine minelayer and a 4500-ton
armoured cruiser submarine. The latter was to have a combat radius of I 8,500 nautical miles.
a maximum surface speed of 7.5 knot<; and a submerged speed of I 4 knots. The design\
weapon system was to consist of no fewer than 36 torpedo tubes and five 5-in ( 1 2 7 mmi
guns! An even more ambitious project was the proposaL in 1 9 1 I , b y the engineer Shuravlev
for a 5000-ton minelaying submarine with a capabi lity for 1 5 0 mines. None of these
monstrous vessels ever progressed beyond the drawing board, hut almost equally far­
fetched design plans continued to d istract from Russia's real naval needs right through the
war itself

P r i n c i pa l sources

Much of the preceding chronology of Russian submarine developmenb before the First World War is
based on contemporary English-language reporb in the professional naval journals. including the US
1\:aval lnstitute's Proreediuss and the Army and ,1\,Jai'.lt joHnri/1. Specific key sources comulted include I he
following:
jane. Fred T . . Ed. June's fixhtius Sl1ips. London. various years of publication.
--. Tlrr lrnpnial Russian Nm'y. 2d edition ( 1 904). (reprint). London : Conway Maritime Press. 1983.
fateyev, M . Private correspondence. Leningrad. ! 984.
Kassel!. Bernard M., Lt Cdr. US Navy. Rm�ia's Submarine Lkvelopmenh 18.50- 1 9 ! 8 . founra/ 1'/ tire
American Sorid!t o} Naval En;.;I/Jeers, 1 950.
Krupp Archives Essen, \A/est Germany
Lake, Simon. J he :::irdmlllrine in Vv'nr mal renee. Philadelphia. PA and l ondon: J. B. Lipp!!Kolt Co, I 9 1 8.
()[\if l�e<'ICW, Vol ! 0 . No 12, Decemhl'r 1 955. 'A f listory ol Ru;;sian and Sovwt SubmarinC' Design.'
Roehr. Albert. Willn'l111 Bauer: Em Lrtindnsilwksili. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag GmbH. ! 9 7 5 .

27
2 The First World War and
Revolution

A detailed account of Russia's naval and submarine exploits during the First World War falls
outside the scope of this volume. Instead, this chapter is limited to a broad outline of the
Russian Navy's experience in the conflict while highlighting the main events involving the
actions of its submarines. This chapter closes with a synopsis of the impact of the Bolshevik
Revolution and subsequent Allied intervention and Civil War on the death of the Imperial
Russian Navy and the birth of its successor, the Soviet Navy.
The description of naval action in the First World War is restricted to Russia's two main
theatres of fleet operations: the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. No Russian naval combatants in
the Far East participated in hostilities; most of the Vladivostok-based submarines were
transferred to the West during the course of the war. Fighting at sea did take place in Russia's
Arctic regions especially as Allied shipments of war material increasingly attracted the
attention of the German U-boats. Little is known, however, about the role that the two to
three submarines stationed in the region had played.
Principal references consulted for this chapter include the declassified correspondence of
US government officials stationed in wartime Russia, and The Fleet in the First World War, Vol
!: Opera/ions of the Russian Flee/, edited by Rear-Admiral Professor N . B. Pavlovich.

O perations of the B a l t i c Fleet, 1 91 4 -1 91 5

The mobilisation and deployment of the Baltic Fleet began on 25 July 1 9 1 4 in accordance
with the 1 9 1 2 'Plan of operation of the naval forces of the Baltic Sea'. The essence of this plan
was defensive, positional warfare aimed at frustrating an expected German sea-based assault
into the Gulf of Finland against St Petersburg. Central to this strategy was a combination of
minefields and heavy-calibre coastal artillery with coverage of the line between Reval
(Tallinn) and the Porkala-Udd peninsula jutting out from the Finnish south coast.
Supplementing this so-called 'central position' was a flanking minefield along the line of
Cape Takhona-Bengtokear, parallel to the Finnish shore. The fleet's active forces, from
battleships to gunboats, were concentrated behind the mine artillery barrage. whence they
were tasked to engage any German shipping attempting to break through. The fleet's
subdivision of submarines based on Reval was the only naval force deployed ahead of the
barrier. Its assigned mission was to lie in wait and harass the movements of the approaching
enemy preparatory to its contact with the central position.
Beyond this strictly defensive and highly static scheme of operations, the 1 9 1 2 plan left
room, if the situation permitted, for offensive mining operations off Germany's Baltic ports
and harbours, and along the principal sea routes leading to them. The long-term and most
ambitious goal was for the Baltic Fleet to blockade the eastern end of the Kiel Canal with
mines and supporting vessels after the British Navy had defeated the German High Seas
Fleet.
Initial Russian naval operations in the Baltic Sea followed the prescribed course. The Gulf
of Finland was closed with mines, and patrols by cruisers and lesser combatants kept a wary
look-out for the anticipated German break-through attempt. When it became evident in the
Autumn of 1 9 14 that this was not the German intention, the area of Russian naval
operations expanded to include offensive minelaying off the coast of East Prussia. Protecting

28
the minelaying forces were usually three submarines. Taking ad vantage of the relative
passivity of the German Navy, the Russians also decided to extend the Baltic Fleet's main
defensive perimeter westward to the Moon Sound that bars the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.
Easing the fleet's ability to meet its expanded responsibilities was the arrival of a numbcr
of reinf�rcements. Added during the first year of the war were four new battleships. a few
destroyers and the three Lrol'ard class submarines Bors, Vyqn- and Gepard. Another important
boost for the Baltic Fleet camf:' in late October with the dispatch. via the Danish Straits, of the
Royal Navy\ submarines, E.1 and E.9. The submarines, later joined by others. were placed
under the commander of the Baltic Fleet. but were detailf:'d to conduct independent
operations against the capital ships of the German High Seas Fleet. One British writer's
description of the operations of [. J and E.LJ in the spring of 1 9 1 5 as 'an orgy of destruction
on German shipping' may be slighted for a bit of chauvinistic colouring. It is true
nevertheless that, in terms of enemy ship sinkings. the British Baltic submurinc flotilla proved
to be considerably more successful than its Ru�sian counterpart. The German submarine
mmmanders were instructed by Prince Heinrich of Prussia : '] consider the destmction of a
R11<>sian submarine will be a great succe�s but I regard the destruction of a British submarine
as being at least as valuable as that of a Russian armoured cruiser'.
The balance at sea had remained virtually unchanged until action re;,umed in May 1 9 1 5
when the annual five-month long icc-pack began t o break up. The German Army meanwhile
had slowly gained ground up the coast of Courland. so that by the end of April, the Baltic
Fleet's main submarine base at Libau (Liepaja) was threatened from land as well as sea. The
city fell on 8 May, thereby affording the German fleet a forward position for intensified
operations against the Gulfs of Riga and Finland. At the end of june, German ground forces,
supported by naval units. launched an offensive against Vindau (Ventspils), north of Libau,
and the principal Baltic Fleet naval base west of Riga itself.
The seaborne portion of the assault was a failure. After a brief surface battle on 28 june,
the German strike force. consisting of one older battleship, two cruisers and six
minesweeper�. was forced to cut short its bombardment of Vindau and return to Libau. The
German Army was more successfu l ; Vindau was captured by the German troops on I 8 july,
thus endangering the security of the Gulf of Riga directly.
The expected German attack into the Gulf of Riga proper came on the morning of 8
August. A large German force of seven pre-dreadnought battleships, six cruisers and 24
destoyers and torpedo boats entered the lrbe Strait. led by a flotilla of minesweepers. The
mine-clearing flotilla succeeded in sweeping a channel through the first two fields. but the
heavy Gcrm<Jn ships were unable to bring the inferior Ru<>sian forces to battle. When the
Germans lost a minesweeper on a third line of mines, the break-through attempt ;vas
aborted. The Russians promptly re-mined the cleared passage.
On 1 4 August, a second German attempt to break into the Gulf of Riga began. Again. the
accompanying minesweepers cleared a path for the heavy forces and, this time. the Russian
covering forces were compelled to retreat north to prevent being cut off. The way cleared,
the Germans entered the Gulf the next d a y to probe the coastline. After some desultory
artillery exchanges ;vith minor Russian forces and after losing two dcstro_:.rcrs on mines, the
German force vvithdrew a few days later. No further attempt to seize the Gulf of Riga and
Riga itself by seZJ would be made until 19 1 7, after the German Army had occupied the
surrounding coastline. The Baltic Fleet, for its part. used the suspension of the German naval
offensive to switch its forces to more active operations against the enemy sea lines of
communications
Since the start of the war, German shipping i n the western part of the Baltic Sea had been
able to function virtually unimpeded thanks, i n part. to the overriding Russian concern with
the security of the Culf of Finland. A second, and related. reason was that Russian prewar
plans simply had not considered aggressive operations against Germany's maritime

29
communications. This omission was corrected, when, starting in September 1 9 15, the larger
submarines, together with the British boats, began a systematic, if somewhat low-key
campaign against the German iron ore traffic with Sweden. On 28 September Akula sailed
for Libau, £.8 for the Gulf of Danzig, and £.19 for the Dagerort-Falsterbo area. The patrols
lasted from ten to 12 days. Akula returned empty-handed, but £.8 and £.19 shared in the
sinkings of seven transports. By December, the Anglo-Russian submarine force had taken a
toll of 1 4 German merchant ships. two cruisers and one lorpedo boat. The enemy was also
forced to beach two steamers, and three vessels were taken as war prizes. Although the
numbers themselves were small in relation to Germany's total Baltic traffic, the portent of
larger losses to come forced the Germans to transfer additional escorts from the North Sea.
More important perhaps from the Russian point of view, the loss of and damage to some of
their large warships prompted the Germans to withdraw the older battleships and armoured
cruisers from Baltic operations.
At this point it is useful to consider the operational condition of the Brigade of Submarines
of the Baltic Fleet, changes to its order of battle since August 1 9 1 4, the pattern of
operational submarine tactics, and the overall performance of the Baltic Fleet submarines so
far.
The Baltic Fleet commenced wartime operations with an active inventory of 1 I, perhaps
12 submarines. They included the 1st Division with Akula, Minoga, Makrel, and Okun, the
2nd Division with Alligator, Drakon, Kaiman, and Krokodil, and a training division composed
of three Holland -designed Sterlyad class boats : Sferlyad, Bye/uga, and Peskar. The ex-Simon
Lake X, renamed Sig, may also have begun her wartime career with this command before
being transferred to the Far East.
Altogether six Baltic Fleet submarines were lost during the war due to hostilities (see
Table 1 at the end of this chapter). The first loss involved the somewhat mysterious
disappearance of Akula in November 1 9 1 5 . Some accounts reported that she had been sunk
in the course of a gun duel with the German warship Kaiserin in the Bay of Danzig.
According to these same reports, Akufn had been engaged in an artillery bombardment of
the city of Danzig. The official Soviet version of events is that she sank from causes
unknown, but presumably from mines. The submarine's assigned mission at the time was to
lay mines in the vicinity of Pappensee even though damage sustained in an earlier encounter
had limited her operational condition to surface navigation only. Her disappearance
prompted the suspension of further submarine minelaying operations.
Added to the fleet during 1 9 1 5 were Bars, Vyepr, Volk, and Gepard so that, by the end of
the year, the naval command could muster eight large and r 3 small submarines. ln addition,
the British contribution had been raised to five. Further reinforcements were pending as the
Russians had embarked on a crash building programme. Plans were completed in 1 9 1 5 to
build as many as 1 1 4 submarines by 1920. One order for the construction of a Holland ­
designed group of boats, known as the 'G - l' class, went to the Nebel-Lessner Yard.
Charaderistics were lhe following :

Displacement 960/1200 tons

length 76.2 m (250 ft)
Beam 7.3 m (24 ft)
Draught 33 m ( l l ft )
Speed 16/9 knots
Propulsion 2200./700 hp
Endurance unknown (fuel capacity 60 tons)
Armament 8 internal and 4 external 533 mm (21-in) TT; 2 X 100 mm and I x 57
m m A A gun
Complement approx 5 0

30
In addition. specifications called for instullation of four 550-hp diesel engine� for surface
cruising and for driving the generators while submerged. Diving speed was to be less than
one minute from i1 complete surfaced condition. and minimum undenvater endurance vvas to
be 100 nautical miles at five knots.
In addition to the Hol!and types, the Baltic "1/V'orks in PetrogrLJd (formerly St Petersburg.
renamed in Autumn 1 9 1 4) was contracted to build a series of Bubnov-designcd submarines.
known as the 'B- 1 ' class, that were virtually identical to the G - 1 design. Neither group was
completed. however. and no reliable Figures arc available on the numbers involved in either
the B - 1 or the C- 1 order. One source cites a minimum of ten G- 15. v..r hile a report issued by
the US Navy's Office of Intelligence (QNI), in January T 919, mentions that enough material
remained at Revel (Tal!inn) for the construction of I 5 submarines
The principal role of the Baltic Fleet submarine� during the first year of the war vvas
twofol d : reconnaissance and early warning of enemy surface forces approaching the central
mine-arti\lery barrier in the Gulf of Finland. and the �creening of mine-laying vessels against
enemy surface attack. The older and �maller submarines, if not tied up for frequent repairs.
normally patrolled the flanks of the mine barrage, while the larger units would usually take
up patrol stations ahead of the field. As had already been noted, offensive submMine
operations against Cermany's �ea routes did not become a serious preoccupation until the
Autumn of 1 9 1.5, and it vvas only then that submarine commanders were authorised to
destroy enemy shipping without examining cargo first. and detain neutral vessels if found to
carry contraband. Even so. the campaign wa� never pressed with the kind of single-minded
determination that marked the German or. for that matter. British efforts. Not enough
submarines were assigned, and fear of complications with Sweden usually deterred the
Rus�ians from interfering with Cerman shipping making pa�sage inside that country's
territorial waters.
During 1 9 1 5 , one attempt wa� made to employ Baltic Fleet submarines to lay mines.
Three boab, Aku!a. Vycpr and Btns, were fitted with hull-mounted mine racb for manu.Jl
delivery of the vveapons into the water. There is no record if any of the trio attained any
degree of success; as noted previously. Aku!a may have been lost on this particular mission.
In any case. no further attempts were apparently made during the vvar to usc submarines for
this purpose in the Baltic.
Except on rare occasions, submarines operated independently, usually inside strictly
circum�cribed patrol quadrants. V'v'hile avvaiting the approach of a hostile ship, the submarine
would be in an awash condition so as to pre-;ent the smallest pos�ible profile while still
maintaining a dear view through 360 degrees of the horizon. lf the detected vessel was a
vvarship, the submarine would submerge and attack with torpedoes fired in �ah·oes of two to
four. Gunfire wa� preferred against merchant vessels, but if a submerged attack was made.
usually not more than a single torpedo was expended. The record of Russian submarine
torpedo attacks vvas disappointing : out of J total of 50 torpedoes fired by submarines in
1 9 1 5 not a single one found its target. Most of the I 5 German freighters sunk by Baltic Fleet
submarines during the year was the v-...·ork of gunfire Jnd demolition charges placed by
boarding parties. Blamed besides 'the complexity of the situation' can be a combination of
materiaL training and tactical inadcquecics.
A broader reason for the limited i mpact of the campaign against enemy shipping was the
submarines' low operational tempo. due, in good part, to th(' ncar-constant need for repair of
the many obsolete boats. For example, when the first Briti::.h submarine� arrived in the Baltic,
they reportedly found every one of the Russian submarines immobilised by engine trouble.
The structures developed leah. and the absorption of V\iater destroyed the vessels'
buoyancy. The petrol engines were not only a constant source of mechanical difficulties, but
since their operation relied on the boats" !imited oxygen supply, the crews \Verc endangered
by �uffocation. The overall result of these and similar setbacks was that the large Baltic Fleet

3!
submarines went on patrol for an average of a mere five or six days per month; the smaller
boats spent even less time at sea. The German U -boats, by contrast, were able to deploy for
up to four weeks at a time.

Operations of the B a l t i c Fleet, 1 91 6-1 91 7

No major naval actions took place in the Baltic theatre in 1 9 1 6 until the end of the year while
German military attention was concentrated on the Western Front, at Verdun, and on the
two new theatres of hostilities that were created with the entry of Italy and Bulgaria into the
war. Germany's first - and only - naval offensive in the Baltic during 1916 began in
November; the outcome for the German side was a disaster. On the tenth day of November,
the German naval command sent its lOth Mine Flotilla into the Gulf of Finland with the
objective of destroying any Russian ship encountered and shelling the coastal ports. Eleven
destroyers, protected by the light cruiser Strassburg, entered the Gulf; two destroyers
promptly struck mines and were lost. A third destoyer picked up the crews and turned home.
The others continued on their course and, after some ineffectual shelling of coastal targets,
prepared to return to base. Five more combatants sunk in a minefield before the decimated
flotilla arrived back in port.
Baltic Fleet activities during the year were limited also, and were mainly preoccupied with
strengthening the defensive positions in the Gulfs of Riga, Bothnia and Finland. By the close
of 1916, 25,000 Russian mines had been laid in these waters since the beginning of the war.
Ten, perhaps I I new submarines joined the Baltic Fleet during the year : Volk, Lvitsa,
Pantera, Ryss and Tij�r, plus five or six 360-ton Holland types that were part of an order of 18
placed with the Electric Boat Company in the USA early in the war. Generally known as the
'H' class, the submarines received the Russian designation 'AG' for 'Amerikanski Galland'.
AG- 1 1 through AG-15 (plus possibly AG-16) arrived in their operational area via a
circuitous route. Hull sections, machinery and other equipment were manufactured in the
United States by the Bethlehem Steel Corporation with the Electric Boat Company acting as
subcontractor. Because of America's neutrality laws, the subassemblies were sent by rail
(along with an American workforce) to Montreal in Canada for final assembly at the
Canadian Vickers yard. The latter was a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant British
munitions concern, Vickers Ltd. The latter also held a 25 -year patent on the Holland designs
and was a part owner in the Electric Boat Company. After the submarines were completed at
Canadian Vickers, they were again disassembled for railroad transport across the North
American continent. Next, they were sent by ship to Vladivostok, whence they would again
be placed on railroad cars to arrive at their destination for reassembly.
A second batch of six 'AGs' was sent to the Black Sea Fleet in a similar fashion, but only
two had been reassembled before the Bolshevik Revolution. This event also prompted lhe
US Government to embargo the balance of the order. They were purchased by the US Navy
as H-4 through H-9.
As noted, there is some uncertainty whether the first 'AG' shipment counted five or six,
and if the latter is the case, what became of AG-16. A submarine with hull number AG-16
was commissioned into the Finnish N a v y in 1 9 1 8. B u t i t is n o t clear whether she was the
'missing' sixth unit in the group, or, in fact, a renumbering of the original AC-13.
The arrival of the new submarines occasioned minor changes in the administrative control
of the Baltic Fleet submarine brigade. Btlrs, Vyepr, Gepard, Yedinorox and Zemlya were
included into the Tst Division, Lvitsa, Panfera and Ya,\'uarinto the 2nd Division, and the older
submarines henceforth reported to the new 5th and 6th Divisions. Submarines still under
construction would be assigned to the 3rd and 4th Divisions.
Even as the submarines of the Baltic Fleet continued to produce negligible results against

32
enemy shipping, future building plans insisted on the grandiose in place of the practical.
Cons�ruction began in la�e 1 9 1 6 of lvvo 2200-ton 'cruiser submarines', one al RevaL the
other at Petrograd. The planned characteristics of the two craft � neither of which was ever
finished � were the following :

Displacement 2200iJOOO tom

Length 100 m (328 ft)
Beam 9.4 m ( 3 1 ft)
Draught 3.9 m ( 1 3 ft)
Speed 20/ lO knots
Propulsion 4000! 1600 hp
Armament 1 J internal and 6 external TT (size unknov·ml: 4 X I 00 mm guns and 2
x 5 7 mm AA guns

Submersion from an awash condition was to be accomplished in 1 5-20 seconds, and in one
minute from a fully surfaced condition. Triple bottoms and watertight compartmcntation
were designed to limit the intake of water in case of a mine explosion. With a fuel capacity of
300 tons, cruising radius was estimated at I 2,000 nautical miles. How and under what
scenario these two vessels were expected to see action remains a mystery.
The fleet meanwhile went about its tasb with the materiel on hand. Since there were no
firm indications, in the early part of 19 I 6, that the enemy planned major operatiom against
the Gulfs of Finland and Riga, the scope of submarine activities against the German sea
routes could be expanded. The operational plan for the 1 9 I 6 campaign instructed the Baltic
Fleet, 'to attempt to destroy any weaker unit of the enemy fleet and a!! hi s merchant ships'.
After preliminary reconnoiterings with the objective of pinpointing the principal areas of
concentration of enemy vessels, the First patrol aimed at the systematic interdiction of the
enemy's commerce was launched on 25 May. Hars and Gepord were deployed in the region
of the Swedish coast and Gotland Island, and the British [. 1, E.S and [. 18 were sent off Libau
to attack enemy troop shipping. The mission as a whole was a failure. Not a single German
ship was sunk although F.. 18 managed to blow the bow off a destroyer before she herself
vanished the day after.
The next major submarine mis�ion teamed f.9, f . 1 9. Vyepr and Vo!k with a cruiser­
destroyer detachment for the purpose of intercepting a German iron ore convoy heading
south from Stockholm. Again, the results were nil. The submarines were tasked to protect
the flanks of the :-.urface force .1gainst the possible appearance of enemy reinforcements, but
when the convoy was sighted the Russian destroyers charged ahead to engage their
opponents while permitting the intended quarry to escape into Swedish territorial waters.
On balance, the best that can be said for the Russian campaign against Germany's sea lines of
communications is that it forced the opponent to take additional protective measures ; it
contributed all but nothing to Germany's supply problems.
The winter of 1916� 1 9 1 7 was a particularly severe onc. lce covered not only the Gulfs of
Finland and Riga, but also extended along the eastern Baltic shore, well into the southern
portion of this body of vvater. As a result, naval operations in the area did not commence
until late May. By that time, the centre of attention had shifted to Russia's internal situation.
Widespread disorders broke out in Pctrograd in February 1 9 1 7 ; rioting strikers were
joined by Army units sent in to quell the unrest. On I I March, the Tsar ordered the Duma
dissolved, but the representatives defied the command, and remained in informal session to
elect a 'Provisional Committee' with the task of restoring order. On the same date another
informal body of authority came into existence: the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and
Soldiers' Deputies. Two days later, Tsar Nikolai ll abdicated in favour of his brother Grand
Duke Mikhail. Mikhail refused to take over the reigns of power, and constitutional authority
devolved to a Provisional government led by Aleksander F. Kercnsky.

33
 The Provisional government assured the Allies that Russia would stay true to its
commitments and not sign a separate peace with the Central Powers. Changes were
instituted in the military High Command, and Kerensky toured the troops in the field trying
to instill a renewed faith in the righteousness of their cause. On 8 November and after
another failed Russian offensive, Lenin and his Bolshevik Party seized power.
Little remains to be said about the course of Russian naval activities in the Baltic Sea. The
1 9 1 7 campaign opened in June with the laying of additional minefields, but the outcome of
events was being determined on land. On 1 September the German Army took Riga; by 6
October, Russian units were forced to evacuate the Gulf of Riga and surrender Moon
(Mulm) Island that controlled passage into and out of the Gulf. On 28 November the
Germans agreed to the Bolshevik proposal to negotiate an armistice, and on 15 December
1 9 1 7 a ceasefire agreement came into force.
The final wartime Russian submarine acquisition was the 250-ton Italian-built Sviatoi
Georg. Ordered in 1 9 1 5 and constructed by the Fiat-owned concern of Ansaldo-San Giorgio
in La Spezia, she arrived in Arklangelsk in September 1 9 1 7. The submarine remained in the
White Sea through the period of Allied intervention and later became the Soviet Komrmmisf.

Operations of the B l ack Sea Fleet, 1 91 4-1 91 5

War came to the Black Sea Fleet on 29 October 1 914. A Turkish torpedo boat raid surprised
the harbour of Odessa, while the German battlecruiser Goeben, nominally recommissioned
into the Turkish Navy, shelled Sevastopol to damage or sink a number of Russian warships
caught unawares of the outbreak of hostilities. Turkish naval forces next laid a minefield off
Sevastopol and bombarded the town of Feodoisya.
Russian preparations for a naval campaign in the Black Sea proceeded from the primary
objective of guaranteeing the security of the coastline by seizing and maintaining control of
the Black Sea against the most likely opponent, Turkey, and its possible allies. The planned
operational and material means to implement this purpose resembled those employed in the
Baltic theatre. It had been decided that control of the Black Sea could best be gained by
denying the Turkish Navy access through the Bosporus. The plan therefore was to block the
northern exit of the Strait through the creation of a strong mine barrier backed by surface
forces and submarines. If the enemy were to force his way through nevertheless, the Black
Sea Fleet was to fall back and prevent him from penetrating into the northwestern part of the
Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
The main problem with this strategy - aside from its overly defensive orientation - was
that it underestimated the enemy's ability to clear the Bosporus minefields while
overestimating the effectiveness of occasional mine plantings. As it turned out moreover,
the second half of the blockading strategy would only be partially implemented.
Maintaining a standing cruiser patrol near the centre of the enemy's military strength and
away from Russia's main naval bases was found too risky a venture; the exit from the
Bosporus would be guarded by submarines only instead.
The initial Russian response to the Turko-German surprise attack was to bar the entrances
to the Black Sea's main ports with extensive minefields. This completed, four destroyers with
the support of a potent force of battleships and cruisers set out on 4 November to mine the
western end of the Bosporus. The next day, the same group of ships shelled Zonguldak on
the Turkish coast, sinking three transports in the process. One Soviet historian has reported
that 100 000 uniforms were destroyed along with one of the vessels.
The focus of military operations in the Black Sea theatre in late 1 91 4 and 1 9 1 5 was the
Caucasian Front. Since the Turkish side relied heavily on seaborne supplies and
reinforcements the interdiction of the same became a Russian objective of the greatest

34
importance. On 15 November virtually the entire Black Sea surface fleet, including five
battleships, four cruisers and 1 3 destroyers. bombarded the main Turkish supply port of
Trabzon on the Anatolian coast. Similar raids, although on a smaller scale, conshtuted the
main business of the fleet through the first half of 1 9 1 5 . In fact, the first fevv months of the
war fairly welt set the pattern for the next three years of naval hostilities: defensive and
offensive mining, interspersed by occasional clashes on the surface and the bombarding of
coastal supply points.
Both sides received reinforcements by the middle of 1 9 1 5. The Germans dispatched a
number of small U -boah, and on the Russian side, the Black Sea Fleet was strengthened with
two battleships in addition to nine submarines. Delivered from the Far East were the two
Kasntka class boats Skat and Nalinr, and two Sterlyad class submarines, Shdntku and Som. All
four of this first generation of small boats proved to be all but useless for the - relatively ­
long-range deployments that the Black Sea command had in mind for them. Once an effort
was made to tow them to the sea area off Zonguldak on the Turkish coast, but when this
turned into a failure Slrchu.ka and Smn were loaded back onto flatcars and sent on to the Baltic
Fleet. The others were henceforth kepi ncar the Crimean coast.
Newly-commissioned in T 9 1 5 were the 630-ton Kif, Nnruu!, Tyt-dcn and Morzft, and lhe
mine-layer Krub. The Soviet naval historian. N B Pavlovich has reported that ten Leopard
class submarines entered the Black Sea Fleet a� well during 19 1 5 . However, he makes no
mention of any of the hull name� involved ; in fact, no l.eopt1rrf class submarine'S arc cited b y
name a t all i n his account of naval hostilities i n the Black Sea. A further complication to
Pavlovich's claim is that all other sources report the completion of only six l.eo;mrrf class
submarines at Nikolayev and that those six only saw service in the Black Sea.
The augmentation of the Black Sea submarine flotilla permitted the extension of offensive
mining and anti-shipping operations into the Turkish Straits. No attempt to blockade the
Bosporus with mines had been undertaken during the first few months of 1 9 1 5 while the
Russians awaited a more favourable balance of power in the area. The principal deterrent to
more aggre�sive action in this regard was the presence of the German Coeben.
Submarine patrols near the Bosporus started in early March. The initial patrol schedule
usually alternated Ncrpa and "[ yu/1'11, but it was common later on for the two submarines to
operate simultaneously, one to eastward, one to westward of the Bosporus.
The submarines were ordered to 'sink anything going in or coming out', but success did
not come until the end of June; T�mlen sank a three-masted Turkish bark with gunfire, and
Morzh destroyed a small steamer.
One reason for these mediocre returns was the prevailing method of patrol. The Black Sea
Fleet submarines, in common with their counterparts with Baltic Fleet, usually operated in
static, pre-assigned patrol positions or in extremely confined patrol :.ones. Thi� meant that
the probability of encountering an enemy vessel depended almo<;t entirely on the movement
of the opponent. Some writers have faulted the scarcity of enemy shipping. but that
argument can equally well strengthen the case £7Stlinst the positional method of patrol. After
alL it would only take for the first enemy vessel to chance an encounter with a submarine for
it to raise the alarm and have all other shipping rerouted. Also. the bet that the Russian naval
command was able to muster only two submarines to patrol the one body of V..'ater that
prewar planning had agreed vvas critical to the control of the Black Sea as a whole is a fair
indication of the fleet's operational condition.
One example of the poor mechanical state of the Black Sea submarine flotilla came in July
1 9 1 5 on the occasion of the maiden voyage of the new battleship lmpcmtritsn M(lryi11 from
the Nikolayev Yard to Sevastopol. Fearing a German attack. every available submarine in
the Black Sea was tasked to blockade the Bosporus for the duration of the big ship's passage.
The flotilla included four submarines: l\icrptl. Tyulnr, Mor::.lr and Kml1. Kmh was assigned the
key role of mining the neck of the Bosporus; l'Jerptl was to take up a position east of the Strait,

35
and Tyulen was to keep station westward of the Bosporus. Morzh's duty was twofold : first,
she had to take Krall in tow because her engines were malfunctioning and after Kmb had
planted her mines, Morzh was to position herself directly astride the Bosporus. The mission
itself was a success. Kmf, Jaid 58 to 64 mines. Imperatritsa Mariya was able to complete her
voyage, unscathed and, as a bonus, one of Krab's mines damaged the German cruiser Bresfau
seriously enough to require several months of repairs.
The enemy had meanwhile expanded its submarine operations also. Additional U-boats
entered the Black Sea throughout the year, and matters became particularly grave for
the Russians in October 1 915, when Bulgaria's entry into the war gave the Germans direct
access to the Black Sea. Fearing the escalated threat of submarine attack, the Russians became
increasingly reluctant to operate their heavy surface units away from their home ports. As a
corollary, smaller combatants, particularly destroyers, that could otherwise have been
employed for offensive operations, now had to be progressively committed to the
protection of merchant shipping.

Operations of the B l a ck Sea Fleet, 1 91 6-1 91 7

The transport of troops, amphibious landings and fire support on behalf of the Russian
Army's offensive against Turkish Anatolia were the principal responsibilities of the Black Sea
Fleet in 1 9 16. It was in addition forced to assume responsibility for the defence of Romania's
coast after this country had joined the ranks of the Allied powers. Russian battleships,
screened by the old submarines Karp and Karas, were sent to protect the harbour of
Konstanza. Within two months however, the Russo-Romanian front collapsed, forcing Black
Sea Fleet units to hurriedly evacuate the port city on 22 October.
The bulk of submarine activities during I 9 16 took place off the Turkish coast as part of the
Russian naval blockade of the so-called Ugol'nyi region. ln daytime, the boats - usually two
- would patrol their assigned areas on the surface but dive for a submerged approach as soon
as an enemy vessel was sighted. At night, the submarines remained on the surface to
recharge their batteries.
One operational innovation at this time was the use of radio for two-way communcation
between submarines and patrolling surface craft on the location of enemy shipping. A
different form of co-operation was used to improve the accurate positioning of minefields.
Having watched the comings and goings of enemy seagoing traffic, the observing
submarine would Aoat buoys along the most frequented routes, and position herself nearby
at night to show screened lights to aid the work of the minelayers.
In the second half of 1 9 16, an average of seven submarines was ready for sea duty. Hull
names were : Nerpa, Tyulen, Morzh, Kit, Krab, K.ashalot and Narval. Patrols lasted from five to
12 days as the seven submarines altogether logged 54 'long-range' cruises off the Turkish
coast. The overall results were minor; the bulk of enemy shipping destroyed or captured
were small sailing transports (although it must be added in fairness that the majority of
Turkish coastal shipping happened to be of this type). At the same time, the most critical
entry point for the enemy's supplies and reinforcements into the Black Sea, the Bosporus,
continued to be guarded with inadequate forces, and was mined only intermittently.
An effort was begun in July and August 1 91 6 to remedy this situation. Krab and a Aotilla
of torpedo boats, aided by buoys laid by Nerpa, planted 820 mines in the approaches to the
Bosporus. In an ironic reversal of roles, the battleship Imperatrifsa Mariya went along to
escort the small craft. The minelaying campaign continued through December, but although
the fields were a considerable nuisance to enemy shipping, the Strait was never blocked in its
entirety. Coastal shipping continued to ply its waters, and the Russian minelaying
expeditions could not outpace the opponent's clearing activities. Making matters worse for

36
the Russians was an easterly storm in late September which freed many of the mines to
become a danger to Russia's own shipping.
The Black Sea Fleet's operational directives for 1 9.1 7 remained unchanged. As before, the
Na\·y's task was to maintain control of the sea. blockade the Bosporus to the extent possible.
attack enemy shipping and support the land forces on the CJucasian and Romanian fronb.
New additions to the fleet included the submarines Bureuestuik-. Cagum and Ulka. Russia's
numerical lead o\·er the opposition was widened as the result. but materi.1l scarcities and
spreading unrest among personnel seriou<>ly degraded effective strength. From 2 8
December 1 9 1 6 to 2 7 October 1 9 1 7, the Black Sea submarine fleet carried out altogether 2 9
offensive patrols. and managed to sink 9 1 enemy vc�sels.

Death of the Imperial R ussian S u bmarine F l eet

Between November 1 9 I 7 and 1 920 the Imperial Russian Navy, including it::. submarine
flotillas ceased to exist. literally and figuratively. The first fevv years of the Bolshevik regime
were a period of utter military and political chaos. To begin with, the Trcuty of Brcst-Litovsk
had carved part of Russia into a number ot nominally independent but factually German­
controlled republics. A feeble attempt by the Soviets' rag-tag military force:, to overthro1--v
the Ukranian Republic was quickly dismissed under the weight of a renevved German
offensive with the result that. by mid-April I 9 I 8, German troops had become firmly
established deep inside Russi<�. On J April the commander of the British submarine flotilla at
Helsingfors. Finland was given the order to scuttle his seven craft to prevent their capture by
the Germans. A notice in The 1intes of London reported that the Russians followed suit and
blew up 'their four US submarines' along vvith several hundred mines and torpedo warheads.
The units in question presumably were ;\ G- "! !, A C - 12, J\ G - ! 3 plus one unknown submarine.
Scuttled one month earlier at Reval had been Yedinorog, but at least six other submarines
(A!Iij.;afor, Dmkmt, Krokodi!, Knin11111, Shdwhtl and B!!efusll) were seized by· the Germans.
The initial fate of the Black Sea submarine flotilla after the cessation of hostilities is less
dear. When German forces stood poised to occupy Sevastopol in April 1 9 1 8, reports
received by ONI warned that the 'six modern Russian submarines" (ie the Lt"op11rd class boats)
would be transferred by the Germans to Constantinople. A later intelligence report
confirmed that the entire Black Sea submarine fleet of up to 1 6 boats had pas�ed into German
control. It also conveyed the news that part of the German-claimed war booty at Nikolayev
included two nearly-completed submarines plu<> 'the parts for six more. in packing cases'.
The latter undoubtedly vvere hull numbers /\C-2 l through -20 shipped the year before by
the Electric Boat Company. Yet. there is no evidence that any of the Black Sea Fled
submarines (or those with the Baltic Fleet for that matter) ever sailed under the German fbg.
The ink on the paper of the Russo-German peace treaty had hardy dried vvhen Russia's
former al!ies began landing troops at different strategic points around the Russian periphery.
The reasons for the Allied intervention were m<Jnifold and varied from one partner to th{:'
other. The ostensible purpose was to keep large quantities of Western -supplied vvar material
from falling into German hands and to prevent a German partition of tht' rormer Russian
empire. This second motivation became readily translated into active support ror vvhichever
anti -Bolshevik faction appeared prepared to keep Russia in the war. An Allied favourite in
this regard was the White Russian Army led by the former commander of the Black Sea Fleet,
Admiral Kolchak. French and Creek forces were disembarked from British warships at
Odessa. Japanese and US troops landed at Vladivostok, and additional American units
arrived at Arkhangelo.k. After a period of considerable military �uccess, the uncoordinated
anti -Bolshevik forces disintegrated under the blows of the neovly-organised Red Army. The
Civil War formally came to an end in 1 9 2 1 .

37
 It is impossible to completely reconstruct the fate of the Russian Fleet during the years of
Allied intervention and Civil War. Available Soviet and Western accounts of this episode are
overwhelmingly preoccupied with events on land. The following brief account of the
Russian underwater forces in the years immediately after the First World War does not
overcome this limitation. Derived mainly from contemporary intelligence documents, i t
nevertheless fills part o f the vacuum of information that links the histories o f the Imperial
Russian and modern Soviet submarine fleets.
A report received by ON!, on 3 1 March 1 9 18, shortly before the German seizure of
Hango, Finland, listed the following Baltic submarine order of battle :

Helsingfors (Helsinki) 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions of submarines and the British
submarine flotilla.
Hango three submarines plus a support vessel.
Reval (Tallinn) two large and four small submarines.

None of the vessels was identified by name, but it is certain that included were Alligator,
Drakor1, Kaiman and Krokodil at Reval, and AG-1 1, AG-12, AG-13 at Hango. The smaller
submarines at Reval probably were SliChuka and Byeluga. Also, based on information in later
intelligence reports, it can reasonably be ascertained that the 1st and 2nd Divisions included
Vyepr, Volk and Yaguar, and Tigr, Panfera and Ryss, respectively.
A more comprehensive report on the status of the Baltic Fleet became available in early
January, 1 9 1 9. Commenting that, 'No submarine is believed to be seaworthy', ONI listed 25
hull names by class:

Yedinorog class Zmeva. Yaz and fore/

Vo!k class Volk and Vvepr
Tixr class Kusuar, Leopard, Pantera, Ryss, Tixr, Tur and Ya,�?uar
'Lake' class Krokodi/, Alligator, Drakon, Kaiman and Minogu
'Holland' class Sferlvad. Bveluga, Shchr1ka and Pt·skar
'Bubnov' clas� Kasafka, Feldmarshal Craf Sheremefyeu, Ol;wr and Makrel

ONI also estimated that one minelaying submarine remained under construction at
Petrograd, and that enough material was probably ready at Reval (Tallinn) for another 1 5
submarines. As has already been remarked, the reference t o the 1 5 unfinished boats may be
connected with the Bubnov-designed 'B- I' group ordered during the war. Also involved
may have been a number of otherwise unspecified 235 -ton minelaying submarines. One
ONI study of a much later date has speculated that the early generations of Soviet-built
submarines may have been derived from these two groups.
Numerically, the Baltic Fleet submarine flotilla was still a potent force. In actuality, few, if
any, vessels were capable of even the most ordinary peacetime exercises, let alone wartime
duty. Those that were seaworthy at all were tied up for lack of fueL crews and a virtually
non-existent command structure. The fleet's large warships had their weapons removed for
usc in the Civil War, and many of the smaller vessels, including the submarines Knsafka,
Makrel, Okun, Feldmarshal Graf Sheremetyeu (renamed Ugor after the loss of the Leopard class
submarine of the same name off Tallinn in February 1 9 1 8), went inland to the Volga river via
the canal system. A report received by ONI from Finland, in April 1 9 19, had this to say
about the condition of the Baltic Flee t :

'It may b e considered that the active fleet is practically non-mobile . . . The morale of the navy i s
o n par with its equipment and efficiency. Discipline has been done away with and a s a fighting
unit, the navy may be considered as having ceased to exi st. '

Another message in the same month estimated that sufficient fuel was left for only four
submarines, while a growing number of submarines was listed as 'under repair' a �

38
euphemism for dis-repair, inadequate spare parts, fueL and trained officers and crew.
Evaluated as 'put aside for an indefinite period' of repairs were, in March 1 9 1 9, nine Leo!'nrd
class submarines, practically the entire modern Baltic submarine flotilla. Submarine training
had cea�cd and exercise� had become a thing of the past.
The events that led to the disintegration of the submarine command i n the Black Sea were
d i fferent. but the results was much the same. After the Germans had departed. the majority
of naval forces fell under the control of General Wrangel's White Army. The 'White'
submarine flotilla, watched over by British and French warships. remained tied up in their
Bl ack Sea ports until the Bolshevik seizure of the Crimea in 1920. Three submarines,
Buwuesfnik. 1\mlni and Utka, escaped in November in company with the evacuating Anglo­
French fleet, and were interned in Bizerto in French Tunisia. Most of those left behind were
scuttled off Sevastopol ; some were salvaged later on, and recommissioned into the Soviet
Navy. The I mperial Black Sea Fleet, along with its counterpart to the north had ceased to
exist.

Pri n c i p a l sources

A vast body of likrature exists on the navaL including submarine aspect of the First World War. The
bulk by far is wnccrned with events in the main, Atlantic and North Sea theatres, with scant attention
paid to the 'backwaters' of the Baltic and Black Sea�. There are a fevv German official and unofficial
accounts. but they offer little insight into the progre�s of the naval war through Russian eyes. The
critical source in this regard b Volume I of Professor N B Pavlovich's The J'let'f in fl1e Fir:,/ Vv'orld \!1/ar.
The original Russian-language edition was published in 1964. An English translation, sold by a n
obscure publishing house in N e w Delhi, india, became available i n ! 9 7 9 . H along with t h e 'Attach{·
Records' hrld at the National Archives in Washington, DC have prov1ded the principal source material
for this chapter

Table I : F ate of the I mperial Rmsian Submarine Fled

Submarine Fate

AC II Scuttled off Hango. 1 9 1 8

AC 12 As above
AC 13 As above
AC 14 War loss, July 1 9 1 7, off Libau Cause unknown, presumably
mines
AC-75 Scuttled off Hango, 1 9 1 8
AC-16 Later i n Finnish Navy
AC-21 Scuttled off Scva<;!opoL 1 9 1 9. Raised and repaired in 1928,
and renamed !vfda!lisf:'A-5
AC�22 Interned in Bizerta. 1920
AC�23 Completrd in I 920 a� Trotsh, later Shakhlyor, A-4
AG-24 Completed in 1 9 2 0-2 ! as l.wruchlwr�ki, later KommwriS/, A
AC-25 Completed about !922 as KnmnlljC1'. later !'vlurhist, ;1 - 2
AC�26 Completed about 1 9 2 2 a ::, Polilmhofnik, later A-3
Aku/u (Shark) War los�. Bay of Danzig, November I 9 1 5
A/lisator Captured b y the Germans a t Reval (Tallinn). 1 9 1 8
Burs (Snow leopard) War loss, Baltic Sea, Ma y 1 9 1 7
Burc1.'esfnilc (Storm petrel) Interned in Bizerta 1920
Bye!uga (White sturgeon! Captured by the Germans at Reval (Tallinn ) , 1 9 1 8
BytLholc· (Steer) Fate unknown; probably destroyed or '>Crapped at Vladivostok
in connection w1th Allied intervention 1 9 1 9- 2 1
Dmkon (Dragon) Captured b y the Germans a t Reval {Tallinn) 1 9 1 8

39
Table 1 - C ontinued

Submarine Fate

Feldmarshal Cmf Shaemetyev Fate unknown; reported at Reval (Tallinn) in January 1 9 I 9

Tore! (Trout) Sunk b y British destroyers in Gulf of Finland 1 9 1 9
Gagaru (Loon) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 1 9
Cepard War loss, Baltic Sea October 1 9 1 7
Kaiman (Cayman) Captured by the Germans at Reval (Tallinn), 1 9 I 8
Karas {Crucian carp) Stricken during First World War
Karp (Carp) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 1 9
Kasafka (Swallow) Fate unknown; reported on Volga river 1 9 1 9
N<shalot (Sperm whale) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 1 9
Kefa/ (Grey mullet) Fate unknown; probably destroyed or scrapped a t Vladivostok
in connection with Allied intervention 1 9 1 9-2 I
Kit ! Whn/e) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 I 9
Krokodil Captured by the German� at Reval (Tallinn) 1 9 1 8
Kra/J Scuttled off Sevastopol I 9 I 9
Kuguar (Cougar) Renamed BednyakiB-1
l.ye/Jed (Swan) Scuttled off Sevastopol I 9 I 9
Leopnrd Renamed Krasnoarmeyetzi B-4
l.osos (Salmon) Scuttled off Sevastopol I 9 I 9
Lvitsa (Lioness) War loss, Baltic Sea June 1 9 1 7
Mokrel (Mackerel) Fate unknown; last report in March 1 9 1 9 as part of the
Astrakhan-Caspian River Flotilla
Minoga (Lamprey) As above
Morzh {Walrus) War loss May 1 9 1 7
Nulim (Burbot) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 1 9
Ncrpa (Seal) Renamed Polifruk
Obm (Perch) Fate unknown; last reported in March I 9I9 as part of the
Astrakhan-Caspian River Flotilla
Pm1tera Renamed Kommissar,lB-2
Pe!ikur1 Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 1 9
Paftus (Halibut) Fate unknown; probably destroyed or scrapped a t Vladivostok
in connection with Allied intervention 1 9 1 9-2 1
Plotva (Roach) As above
Peskar (Gudgeon) Captured by the Germans at Reval (Tallinn), 1 9 1 8
Ryss (Lynx) Renamed Bolsher,iki B - 7
ShciJUka (Pike) Captured by the Germans at Reval (Tallinn) 1 9 1 8
Sknt (Skate) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 I 9
Som (Catfish) War loss; rammed and sunk by a steamship in the Baltic Sea,
May 1 9 16
S!erlyad (Sterlet) Captured by the Germans at Reval (Tallinn) 1 9 1 8
SrJdnk (Pike) Scuttled off Sevastopol 1 9 1 9
S1,intoi Georg Renamed Kommumst
Tyulen (Seal) Interned in Bizerta I920
Tigr (Tiger) Renamed KommunuriB-6
Tur (Aurochs) Renamed Tovurishchi B-3
Ugor (Conger eel) Fate unknown; reported in March 1 9 1 9 as 'under repair' in
Baltic area
Utkn (Duck) Interned in Bizerta 1920
Volk (Wolf) Renamed Bafraki B-1
Vyepr (Wild boar) Fate unknown
Yaguar Renamed Kmsrwflotyefz,iB 10
Yaz (Ide) Fate unknown

40
Table 1 -
Continued

Submarine Fate
� ------ ----- -�

Ynl111oros (Unicorn fish) Scuttled at Revzd (Tallinn) \ 9 1 8

Yor�h (Ruff) Renamed Raboch!!iB-•J
Zmeya (Snake) Renamed ProlcfiJryi B- I I

4I
3 The interwar years

The growth of the Soviet submarine forces during the 20-year period that separated the final
months of the Civil War from the German invasion in 1 94 T can conveniently be divided into
three main phases. The first phase of reconstruction and rehahilitafion began in 192 1 with the
decision of the Tenth Party Congress to rebuild the Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy
(RKKF), and lasted until the completion of the First Five-Year plan in 1932. During this time,
the heart of the Navy's submarine strength were the remnants of the Imperial Fleet,
supplemented by a few newly-constructed craft designed during the war years.
The second phase was one of modernisation and expansion, and coincided with the Second
Five Year Plan which ran from 1 January 1933 until I April 1937. At the end of this period,
the Soviet economy had gathered enough strength to generate a naval budget large enough
to underwrite construction of the most numerous submarine fleet in the world.
The third phase came to an end with the opening shots of the Second World War, and can
perhaps best be labelled as the 'Big Navy' era in Soviet pre-war naval doctrine and
construction. Doctrinal changes that had already germinated in the final years of the second
phase came to full flower as the flotilla strategy of active coastal defence gave way to a much
greater traditional emphasis on a fleet suitable for forward and offensive operations on the
high seas. Procurement decisions reflected this tilt as the keels were laid for battleships,
battlecruisers and cruisers, and plans came afoot to build the first aircraft carriers. On the
submarine side, the construction of small and medium-size boats for coastal defence shifted
to progressively larger and ocean-going vessels, culminating in the 'K' class cruiser­
submarine of nearly 1500 tons.

Phase 1: Reconstruction a n d reha b i l itat ion

Little w a s left, i n 1 9 2 1 , o f t h e navy that had fought the First World War. Dockyards and port
facilities were a shambles; ships that had not been scuttled by the White forces or the
evacuating Allies were in desperate need of overhaul and repairs; fuel, ammunition and spare
parts were lacking, and political agitation interfered with the efforts of crews to man and run
their ships. On top of all this, the fleet had lost its forward bases in the Baltic Sea with the
creation of the independent states of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Gone as a result
were Libau, Vindau, Riga, Reval and Helsingfors (Helsinki).
With the defeat of Turkey, no potential enemy of consequence faced the Soviet Union in
the Black Sea. Quite the opposite was the case to the north. Poland remained implacably
hostile after its short and initially successful invasion of the Ukraine in 1 920; Finland was
staunchly anti-Bolshevik, and although the German Navy had been decimated under the
Treaty of Versailles, its post-war concentration in the Baltic Sea made it the most efficient
naval force in the area.
The main threat from the sea however, was believed to lie with Great Britain. With
memories still fresh of the Royal Navy's intervention, sharpened by a surprise British
torpedo-boat raid against Kronshtadt harbour in June 1919, no Soviet politician or naval
leader could close his eyes to the possibility of a renewed British attempt to overthrow the
fledgling regime by military force. Given this assessment of the threat, it is no surprise that
the Tenth Party Congress of 192 I readily adopted the recommendation to place priority on
'repair, outfit and provide regularly with fuel the most important units of the Baltic Fleet'.
New construction was out of the question for the time being pending the restoration of the

42
country's shipbuilding infrastructure and. more important, the availability of funding. It was
decided instead to salvage. rehabilitate and, \-\'hen affordable, modernise the remaining ships
of the Tsarist fleet.
The nufleria! strength of the Baltic submarine forces at this time stood at 20. In reality,
only nine of these, all members of the Leop11rd clas�. could be considered effective. All nine
were renamed to properly symbolise Russia's new revolutionary spirit. Now known as the
'Bolshevik' class, they included:

Tsarist name Soviet name

Vofk Bnlmk (Farm l<�bourer)
fltmfem Kommis."1r
T"' 7 OI'Ilrishc/1
I eopard Kmsll!'tlrllll'!!cl= (Red Army trooper)
l.mey11 Prolelury
Tixr Konlfi/UIItlr
Rys:-, Bolshn,i/..
Yors/1 Ralmcli!l (V'-iorker)
Yuguur Krns1wf7olyel::. (Red Navy sailor)
Kuguur Bednynk (Poor peasa nt )

All would be later be re-numbered B. 1 through 8.9, plus 8.25 (ex-Kugwn). Submarines still
under construction at the former Imperial yards in Leningrad (formerly Petrograd/St
Petersburg) were never completed. Among them were four minelayimg boats, known only
as Z. l through "1.4.
The condition of the Black Sea submarines was even worse. After the Allied withdrawaL
the Bolsheviks were left with a single submarine. Nerpn, renamed Pulitruk. By "I 923, Politru.k­
was joined by four of the American-built 'AG' group of submarines shipped during the war
but left unassembled. Completed were Trofski (ex-AC.23), Lunachorski (ex-AG.24),
Kmnenyep (cx-AG.25) and Politm!Jofllik (ex-AG.2ti). The group as a whole later became
known as the Metal/isf class following the renaming of the raised and repaired AG.21 in
1928. More name changes would come with the shifting political fortunes of the Bolshevik
'old guard' under Stalin's rule.
The Soviet leadership was well aware that. come war, their meagre and ill-equipped fleet
could do little but perhaps fight a holding action. The naval strategy that evolved in the
1 920s was designed to precisely do that - to interfere with and delay an enemy seaborne
attack long enough for the Red Army to be mobilised and be rushed to the threatened
landing area. The strategy's material ingredients were coastal fortifications, old battleships
used as floating batteries, destroyers and small attack craft, and of course. the submarines.
Operationally and administratively, defensive plans were elaborated in accordance with the
Leninist concept of the unity of military command. This meant that all naval forces were to
co-ordinate their operations with the force� on land in line with a single plan of action.
Conversely, coastal army units were to orchestrate their plans with those of fleet. The
practical implication of this unified command principle was that the navy became effectively
subordinated to the decisions of the army leadership.
Using the navy as a 'fortress fleet' to defend the immediate approaches to the Soviet
Union's strategically most sensitive coastlines was probably the only strategy that the
Soviet economy could realistically afford. The choice did not come without opposition and
debate. however. Criticism of a passive coastal defence came from the Tsarist 'Old School'
whose adherents, in many instances, still officered the Red Fleet. Others could be found in
influential teaching positions at the Voroshilov Naval War College and the Frunze Naval
Academy in Leningrad. Old School advocates conceded the unexpected accomplishments of
the submarine in the past war;but remonstrated that the underwater craft had proved neither

43
decisive nor able to replace capital ships as the tools for seizing and maintaining command of
the sea. Moreover, they pointed ouL the 'inevitable' development of countermeasures
would surely deny the submarine of much of its sting in the next war.
These arguments were very much in the mainstream of naval thought elsewhere. In Great
Britain and United States too, the weight of post-war professional naval opinion
acknowledged that the ability of the submarine to circumvent a blockade and avoid a
'decis ive battle' had cha nged the tradihonal significance of command of the sea. BuL ndvctl
officers pointed out, the submarine had not changed the need to protect one's OU'II shipping;
this, they insisted, only a surface fleet could do. Leningrad Professor Gervais faithfully
echoed this view in 1 922. Submarines, he said, 'are an effective weapon of sea warfare which
constitute a grave threat to the maritime communications of any enemy with the outside
world'. However, he reminded his audience, 'to cut the maritime communications of an
enemy . . . is only half of the wartime task. Yet another task remains, one that is not less if not
more importan t : to secure one's own communications with the outside world. In what
manner can this task be accomplished by submarine�?'
The difference between the 'capitalist' navies and the Soviet fleet of the 1920s was that
the former could afford to build navies in the image of the command of the sea model. Aside
from the debatable military value for the Soviet Union of a strategy and force structure that
might be appropriate for an insular nation, such as Great Britain or Japan, the Old School's
insistence that the new Soviet Navy be a capital fleet to contest and command the seas
simply did not mirror fiscal realities. Speaking before a gathering of naval officers in 1 925,
Navy Commissar V. Zof said as much:

'You speak of aircraft carriers and of the construction of new types of ships . . . at the same time
ignoring the economic situabon of our country and corresponding conditions of our technical
means, completely ignoring the fact that perhaps tomorrow or today we will be called on to
fight. And with what shall we fight? We will fight with those ships and personnel that we have
a lready.'

The Young School strategy, modified to take greater account of the submarine, and 'dressed
up' in proper Bolshevik revolutionary terminology, provided the doctrinal underpinning for
Soviet naval building programmes in the 1920s and early 1930s. By the mid - 1 920s essential
repairs to the shipbuilding and repair industry had been completed, the worst fuel shortages
overcome, and regular exercises had again become possible. To the surprise of some
Western observers, a Baltic flotilla managed to steam as far as west of Kiel in the Summer of
1925. The economy had improved enough to permit a modest budget increase for new
construction.
In November 1 926, the construction of 12 (some reports claim 1 5) new submarines was
approved. Six of the ve�sels became the Series I DekalJrisf or 'D' class, built in equal numbers,
from 1927 to 1 9 3 1 , at Leningrad's Ordzhonikidze Yard (the former Baltic Yard) and the
Marti Yard in Nikolayev. The Baltic Fleet boats were commissioned as Dekabrisf,
Narodovolefz and Kmsnogvurdeyefz. The second batch of Black Sea Fleet hulls were named
Revolutsioner, Spartakovefz and Ynkobinefz. Although reported to have been good seaboats,
the Dekabrisf class never became effective war-fighting submarines. Design and combat
capabilities were already ten years behind the state of the art elsewhere, and poor
workmanship and material shortcomings caused a continuing need for repairs and
modifications. Krasllo>;vardeyetz sank during an exercise in the Baltic Sea in June I 935, but
was raised and repaired.
The obsolescence of the Dekabrist class submarines may be accounted for, in part, by
unconfirmed reports that they were, in fact, the unfinished Bubnov-designed B - 1 series of
the First World War. Other knowledgeable sources, however, have credited the Italian firm
of Cantieri della Adriatico with inspiring the Dekabrisf design. Adding to the confusion

44
The first Somel submarine design, the Dcl.-t�lwisf da:-.s (Central Naval Museum, Lemngradl.

about the background to this group of submarines is the report in June's Fig/Jtillg Ships of the
I SUO� that a fourth unit. presumably built at the Ordzhonikidze Yard and reputedly named
Rc::.IJo::.hnik (Godless), sank i n September 1 92 7 while on trials in the Baltic Sea. To add to the
puzzle. the Soviets shortly gave the same name to the British L.SS which had sunk off
Kronshtadt in June 1 9 1 9, b u t was raised by the Soviets in 1 928, and recommissioned into
the Baltic Fleet in 1 93 ! .

�\umber built b (7?)

VVhen built l 9 2 7 · 1 9J I
Where built Ordzhonikidt.e Yard (leningrad), Marti Yard (Nikolaycv)
Dlsplacemt'nt 920.:" ! 3 l 8 ton�
length 86 m ( 2 8 2 ftl
Beam 6.5 m ( 2 1 . 2 5 fti
Draught 3.9 m \ 1 2. 7 5 fti
Propulsion 2600 bhp.-' 1 260 shp
Speed I S i S knob
Endurance 8000 nm dt 9 knot..; I 05 nm at 5 knoh
Armament 8 X 53J mm ( 2 ! in) TT (6 bov..', 2 stern), I x l l)2 rnm gun, I x 45 mm AA gun,
2 machine gum. I 4 lorpedoc�
D1ving limit 90L) m 1300 ft'i
Complement .S J
--------- ----

Within a few months of the launchings of the Dekn/,nsf da :-.s the keels were laid for a second
series of six boats approvcd under the 1 926 Naval Programme. Again. the order for this
Serie� II was split equally between Ordzhonikidzc, the lead yard, and the Marti facility. The
lead boat was launched at Ordzhonikidze in February 1 93 I. and commissioned in the
Autumn of 1 933 as Leninel::.. Subsequent hulls were named lvlllrksisl, Bolslu'11ik, Can"lmldiet::.
Clu1rfist, and Knr/Jonmi. l'v1nrksist and HtJ/s/icr,ik were later re-named Stnhnetz and Frun::.opef:.
respectively, b u t the group as a vvhole ultimately sailed undn numerical designations I.. I
through L.6.

45
Leninefz class submarine (Central Naval Museum, Leningrad).

Built mainly for minelaying duties, the Leninefz submarines were fitted with two stern­
located mine shafts whence they were capable of depositing a mine complement of 14 to 20,
depending on the type of mine used. Bearing a strong resemblance to the ex-British L55, the
class has been criticised for poor design and construction methods, inadequate ventilation,
and a low battery capacity.
The Series II was followed by the Series XI and XIII built under the Second Five-Year Plan.
Series XI consisted of six submarines, and Series XIII counted seven, all built, in prefabricated
form, at the Ordzhonikidze Yard for shipment and reassembly at the Dalzavod Yard in
Vladivostok.
The Series XIII and modified Series XIII-bis were the most capable units in the overall 2 4 -
unit 'L' class. They carried eight instead o f six torpedo tubes, and installed engine power was
nearly doubled from 2200 to 4 1 00 bhp. Rated horsepower for submerged cruising was
increased as well, from 1050 to 1450 shp. The result was an improvement in surface
endurance from a normal 7400 to at least 10,000 nautical miles. The characteristics of the
Series II Leninefz class submarines are listed in Table 3.

Table 3: Series II Leninefz ('L') class submarines

Number built 6
When built 1929-1933
Where built Ordzhonikidze Yard (Leningrad), Marti Yard (Nikolayev)
Displacement 1040/ 1335 tons
Length 81.0 m (265.7 ft)
Beam 6. 9 m (22.6 ft)
Draught 4. "1 8 m ( 13 . 7 ft)
Propulsion 2200 bhp/1050 shp
Speed 13.8/8.5 knots
Endurance 7400 nm at 7.5 knots/ 154 nm at 2.5 knots
Armament 6 x 533 mm ( 2 1 -in) bow TT, I x 102 mm gun, l x 45 mm gun, 1 2 torpedoes,
14-20 mines laid via twin stern mine shafts
Diving limit 75 m (246 ft)
Complement 50

Noft• : Series XI ( 1 934-1938) included six boats, Series XIII ( 1 935-1938) seven, and Series XIII-bis
( 1 938-1943) five.

46
Phase I I : Modernisation a n d expansion

The 1 3 Srries X I a n d XIII Leuimt: class boats completed under t h e Second Five-Year Plan
underwent final assembly at the Oalzavod YJrd in Vladivostok for deployment in the Far
EasL There, they joined the newly established ( 1932) Pacific Fleet to offspt the ominous
groVI'th of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Shortly, additional subnwrines began to arrive,
prompting a flurry of reports and rumours abroad of a va::.t Soviet 'mystery fleet'. The dire
warnings that came especially from the German and Japanese press would find an echo, 20
years later. in American and British new::.papcrs and journals.
The British )cnmwf of thr Royn/ Unded Service:; lnstifufc set the tone. in I 935, when i t cited a
Japanese report of a Soviet plan to deploy 50 'very modern submarines' in Vladivostok. The
German l'vl11rine Rwrdsclltl!l followed up a few months later when it alleged that the Soviets
had at least 30 and probably more submarines available in the Far East. The Japarwse, who
had their own reasons for keeping the Soviet 't hreat' in the neV'iS, confirmed, in April 1 936,
that 35 400- to 800-ton submarines 'of the latest design and equipment' had been stationed
in Vladivostok. Next. the Clricnso Tribune reported another Japanese claim that the number
of submarines could be as high as 80. The newspaper went on to �ay that none were reported
on the 'regular naval lists' and that 'no prying eyes are permitted to fathom their design'. The
British Sunday Tm1e� 'explained' the rea�on for the rumoured Soviet build-up:

' . . Russia i� determined to build a barrier of submarine::. all the way north and �outh along thv
Ru::.sian coast . . this chai n of submarine craft vvould never a!lmv the Japanese fleet within
striking distance of any important area. ·

As rumours of imminent war in the Pacific e�calatcd, so d i d foreign estimates of the Soviet
'mystery fleet'. In early 1 938, the count rose to 'over 1 00' with 'more arriving each week by
way of the Trans-Siberian RailwJ.y to be assembled.' The Italian Revisftl M11riffim(l took
note of the Japanese assertion that most of an estimated Soviet submarine strength of 200
was based at Vladivostok, but, the magazine cautioncJ, most other expert ::.oun.:es thought
that the entire Soviet underwater fleet counted only 75 ves�els. A French publication was
even more skeptical, and accused the Japanese and Germans of deliberately inflating the
'mystery' threat. The actual number of effective submarines in the Soviet Navy. maintained
the Revue de� Doo: 1\1ondcs. in late I 9,� 8 was only 50, including obsolete types. 'Rus::.ia\
naval strength'. the magazine editorialised, 'has been grossly exaggerated by both Japan and
Germany so that these powers could further increase their naval armamenb with the support
of public opinion'.
The Soviets' C1Wl1 public pronouncements complicated the mystcry. lnstead of publishing
'hard' numbers, Soviet commentators typically boasted of their navy's growth in term� of
percent11ges, without bothering to spell out whether the alleged increases v-.'ere tons of
displacement or numbers of ships. Even this difficulty could have been overcome, were i t not
for the fact that the Soviets also failed to provide any 'baseline' numbers. For example.
Assistant Defence Commissar Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky told the Congress of Sovieb
in January ·1 935, that the Navy's submarine fmrntlge had grown by 435 per cent since I 9 3 1 .
The next year, the commander-in-chief o f t h e Soviet Fleet, Nikolai Orlov, announced that
the mmrhn of submarines had been increased b y 7 1 5 per cent since 1 933. In neither case, d i d
t h e Soviets offer a basis for comparison b y reporting t h e tonnage a n d numbers extant in
1 93 1 or 1 933.
Today. with the benefit of hindsight, the size and composition of the Paci fic 'mystery fleet'
has been fairly well determined. The numl:wrs involved were neither as high as claimed b y
japanese propagandists, n o r certainly a s miniscule a s reported by t h e French. The most
detailed estimate has been dew loped b y the Swiss naval historian )Urg Meister, who h<:�s
reported a numerical growth between 1932 and 1940 as follmv s :

47
Year end Total number of submarines Number of submarines
in the Soviet Navy in the Pacific Fleet

1932 20 0
1933 38 8
1934 82 39
!935 !06 45
!936 143 57
1937 I5 I 67
1938 !68 69
!939 !81 74
1940 205 87

Source : JUrg Meister, Soviet Warships of the Second World War. London : Macdonald and Jane's 1977,
pp 1 68-69.

No question, these are impressive numbers; from 1 934 until 1940, an average of 43 per cent
of the entire Soviet submarine fleet was stationed in the Pacific. Moreover, at the end of the
second year of the build-up, 1934, Soviet submarine strength in Vladivostok already
exceeded that of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The lead would continue to widen until the
Second World War. Not obvious from the tabulation is the fact that the Vladivostok-based
fleet was mainly composed of medium- and short-range submarines, designed for near-shore
defence - not to attack Japan's sea routes. The bulk of the 'mystery fleet' were the medium­
size (600 tons) Shchuka or 'Shch' boats and the 160 to 200-ton Malodki or 'M' coastal
midgets. The Shchuka and Malodki would be the Soviet Union's most ubiquitous
submarines of the Second World War.

The Shchuka a n d Malodki cl asses

Constructioh of the Shchuka class was first approved and initiated during the course of the
First Five-Year Plan under the designation Series III. After that, the design evolved through
six major modifications to become the most prolific Soviet submarine of the Second World
War. Some of the later Shchuka series were still being completed and commissioned into the
Navy after 1 945.
As had been the case with the Lminetz group. successive Shchuk(l series underwent
gradual improvements. The original Series IIJ boats were powered by two 8-cylinder diesels
with a combined horsepower of 13 70; the final Series X-bis came equipped with two diesels
with a combined rating of 1600 bhp. Also, a progressive increase in size allowed for more
fuel to be carried and an increase in armament from ten to 12 torpedoes. More powerful
engines and larger fuel tanks translated into higher speed and greater endurance. The Series
III submarines were designed for a maximum speed of 13 knots and a combat radius of 3250
nautical miles at eight knots. At-sea endurance was 20 days. By comparison, the Series X -his
were nominally capable of a top speed of 1 5 knots, a combat radius of 5000 nautical miles,
and a patrol endurance of 40 days. In short, the Shchuka evolved from a coastal patrol boat
suitable for 'in-and-out' patrols, to a reasonably capable, medium-endurance ocean-going
boat. It seems, in fact, that at least some of the Shchuka series may have been intended as
ocean-going fleet types: the second group, the Series V, was first reported as Lineya Lodki
types, meaning 'boats of the line'. The lead submarine in this series was commissioned with
the abbreviated name Lin (Shch.305), prompting some Western sources to distinguish
between the Sfn-lmka and Lin classes for years afterwards.

48
 More than 80, possibly as many as 1 00 Shchuk-a class submarines were built between
1930 and I 948, involving at one time or another, at lea�t six different yards. Sectional hulls
de�tined for the Pacific Fleet were shipped by the Marti and Ordzhonikidze Yards for final
assembly at the Dalzavod Yard. Initially at least, the Pacific Fleet submarines were numbered
from 100 upwards. Black Sea Fleet units were built at the 6 1 -Kommunar and Marti Yards in
N ikolayev, and were numbered from 200 upwards. The Zhdanov. Marti and Ordzhonikidze
Yards in Leningrad built the Baltic Fled hulls with numbers in the 300 series. Interestingly,
the Shclwka submarines were the first Soviet-built boats to inherit the names of prominent
Imperial Russian submarines. Besides Shclt�1ku, there were, among others, Losos, Karp, Kam.<>
and Delfin.

Table 4 : Series Ill Shchuka ('Shch') das:. submarines

Number built 4
When built 1930-1934
Where built Ordzhonikidze Yard (Leningrad)
Displaceme nt 5 7 7 / 704 tons
Leng th 57 m ( 1 8 7 ft)
Beam 6.4 m ( 2 1 . 1 ft)
Draught 3.78 m ( 1 2 . 4 ft)
Propulsion I J 70 bhp/800 shp
Speed l J / 8 knots
Endurance 3250 nm at 8 knots:" ! 10 nm at 1.75 knots
Armament 6 x 533 mm (2 l -in) TT 1 x 45 mm AA gun, 10 torpedoes
Diving limit 76 m (250 ft)
Complement 35

The second group of submarines that was largely responsible for the Vladivostok 'mystery
fleet' was the Malodki dass.Mn!odki is the abbreviation for l'v1nliye /odki meaning 'small
boats'. The description was appropriate, for the first Series VI of this sectionally-built group
of ves::.els displaced a mere 160 tons on the surface, and was crewed by only three officers
and 13 enlisted personnel. Armament consisted of two bow torpedo tubes that had to be
loaded externally before the submarine left port.
The Malodki wa� the first submarine built at a Soviet inland yard. The Ural Machine
Works (Krasnaya Sormova) in Svcrdlovsk began construction of the first four submarines in

Series Xll-bis Mulodb (for Muliyl' lodki or 'small') submarine (Central Naval Museum, Leni ngrad) .

49
1 932, but the order was quickly increased to 30 under a supplemental five-year plan for the
Pacific Fleet. When the boats were first assembled (depending on the series, they consisted of
six or seven prefabricated sections), trials were held in the Caspian Sea. Next, they would be
placed on specially designed railroad cars for shipment to Vladivostok.
The Malodki's small size and simplicity of construction meant that large numbers could be
built quickly without interrupting ongoing work at the traditional yards. The drawbacks of a
submarine this sma!l quickly became ohvious, however. Besides limited armament,
economical endurance was restricted to 1600 nautical miles, and submerged running was
limited to 55 nautical miles. These and other shortcomings were partially alleviated with
successively larger Malodki series. The final Series XV was completely redesigned around a
hull with a normal displacement of 400 tons. The number of torpedo tubes was doubled, and
endurance at economical speed was improved to 4000 nautical miles. Other earlier
deficiencies were overcome with the entry of the experienced shipyards in the building
programme. The principal characteristics of the Series VI Malodki class are detailed in Table
5.

Table 5 : Series VI Malodki ('M') class submarines

Number built 30
When built 1932-1935
Where built Ural Machine Works (Sverdlovsk), Marti Yard (Nikolayev)
Displacement 160/202 tons
Length 37.8 m (124 ft)
Beam 3. 1 m ( 10.2 ft)
Draught 2.58 m (8.5 ft)
Propulsion 685 bhp/240 ,hp
Speed 13.25./7.5 knots
Endurance 1600 nm at 8. 25 knots/55 nm at 2.5 knots
Armament 2 x 533 m {2 1 -in) bow TT, 1 x 45 mm AA gun. 2 torpedoes
Diving limit 50 m (165 Hi
Complement 16

The Pravda c l ass

The building of small- and medium-size submarines designed and armed for operations in
near-shore waters against a penetrating enemy fleet conformed with the doctrinal tenets of
the Young School. Yet, even as the 'small fleet' strategy seemed to be firmly entrenched in
Party and Navy doctrine, and the arguments for a high seas fleet apparently had lost all
favour, design and construction decisions in the early 1930s signalled an important change
of direction.
Stalin's special and curious passion for heavy cruisers, or as Professor John Erickson has
phrased it, his 'big ship megalomania', has commonly been cited as the driving force behind
the Soviet Union's 'big fleet' programme of the 1 930s. This is partly true. All accounts of
Stalin's involvement in the Soviet Union's armament programme of the 1930s and 1940s
cite the dictator's very personal concern and indeed surprising knowledge of the technical
characteristics of different weapon systems.
Why Stalin chose to shift gears and provide 'his' navy with a mix of capital ships that the
majority of high-ranking officers- including Old School supporters - viewed as unbalanced
and inappropriate for Russia's needs, remains an open question. The end of the battleship
'holiday' and the resumption of vigorous naval rearmament among the major powers has

50
frequently been cited. Yet, the end of the naval ratio system did not come until 1936,
whereas work on the Soviet Navy's first cruisers was begun in 1 935. The construction of
battleships wa� ordered in 1 93 7 and the first keels were laid the next year. Given a lead time
of at least five years between the definition of operational and design requirements, and the
first bending of metal, it stands to reason that Soviet battleship plans were drawn up in the
early 1930s.
Viewed from the perspective of the Soviet 'threat analyst' of the early 1 930s, Stalin's
decision to build a fleet capable of sustained combat operations on the high seas may have
made considerable sense, in fact. Capabilities and apparent intentions suggested that the
Soviet Union's most acute seaward danger came from Japan. In ! 93 1 . Japanese troops
entered Manchuria; their objective in the eyes of Soviet military planners appeared no less
than to gain a springboard against Northern China and the Soviet Far East. Japan's ability to
mount and sustain a campaign on the Asian continent hinged on domination of the adjacent
sea areas by the Imperial battle fleet. While the Pacific Fleet's Shchukas and Malodkis might
make the transportation of Japanese troops and supplies costly, they would have achieved
few results against the true 'shield' of the Japanese supply line - the battleflcet! In order to
wrest command of the sea from Japan, the Soviet Union would have to build a fleet to fight
the Imperial Japanese Navy on its terms, i.e. with another battlef!eet. Stalin's 'big fleet' was
probably never intended for concentration in the constricted water� of the Baltic and Black
Seas - had the programme been completed, its fruits would have found a 'home' in the
Pacific.
Stalin's ambitions for a capital fleet were not limited to large surface combatants. Plans
were developed, in the early I 930s, for a 'cruiser-submarine'. a heavily-armed, large­
displacement submarine vessel capable of operations more than 10,000 nautical miles away
from its home base. Granted that the Soviet design was not quite as grandiose as some of the
'monster' submarine building plans then popular in Western movies, (the French Navy. for
example, launched its 2880-ton Surcuuf in 1 929), it was impressive enough to raise some
doubt about the doctrinal conviction, as opposed to expedient pragmatism that underpinned
the avowed acceptance of the Young School strategy. One development in the early 1 930s,
for example, was the so-called Troject KE-9' submarine which, in the second half of the
decade would become the 'K' class cruiser-submarine of 1480 tons. Preceding these large
vessels, however. came the Prm.'da group of three submarines that. by appearance at least,
were clearly designed for long-range offensive cruises on the high seas.
As it turned out, the three Series IV Pravda, or 'P', class boats Pruvdu (Truth). Zuezda {Star)
and Iskra (Spark) were complete failures. Despite their large size (955 tons on the surface and
167 1 tons submerged), they carried only six torpedo tubes in addition to two 1 00 mm guns
and one 45 mm anti-aircraft gun. Endurance was a mere 20 days (compared with 30 to 40
days for the much smaller Sh11chuka series), and diving from a surfaced condition to periscope
depth took a long 90 sec onds. An additional problem was shallow draught of barely over ten
feet, which meant that the least amount of swell exposed the propellers and seriously
degraded mobility and speed. Despite repeated alterations, the Prrwdn class submarines
never became capable fighting boats. and were used mainly as tramports during the Second
World War.

Table 6: Series IV Pmvdil ('P') class submarin e�

Number built 3
When built 193 "!-"/936
Where built Ordzhonikidze Yard (leningrad)
Displacement 955 / 16 7 1
Length 8 7 . 1 m ( 268 ft)

51
Beam 8.0 m (26.25 ft)
Draught 3 . 1 m (10.2 ft)
Propulsion 2700 bhp ./ 1 1 00 shp
Speed 1 5 .-..- 7 knots
Endurance 5750 nm at 10 knob.: 105 nm at 4 knots
Armament 6 x 533 m m (21 in) bow TT, 2 x 100 m m guns, ! x 4.'i m m AA guns, 1 2
torpedoes
Diving limit 60 m ( 200 ft)
Complemen t 54

One noteworthy aspect about the Pravda group was the powerplant: two 6-cylinder diesel
engines, manufactured by M.A.N. of Germany, powered the boats on the surface. M.A.N.
diesels would similarly propel the next series of Soviet submarines as well. German-supplied
main machinery was merely the tip of the iceberg in a 'German connection' that would
heavily influence Soviet submarine design and construction through the next two decades.

The G e rm an connection

On ·16 April 1922, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo. ln addition
to extensive trade agreements, the pad gave the Soviet Union its first de jure international
recognition, and cancelled all war claims between the two countries. Furthermore, since the
Soviets were not a party to the Treaty of Versailles, they were not obligated to respect its
provisions. including those that prohibited German rearmament.
Reports of secret joint Soviet-German endeavours in the naval field began circulating in
the Western press shortly afterwards. One French commentator, reflecting his country's
particular sensitivity to the slightest hint at German rearmament, warned of the 'imminent'
prospect of Germany 'constructing many submarines in the Russian dockyards'. He claimed
that more than 200 German-manufactured diesel engines had been shipped to Kronshtadt,
'all of which are certainly not reserved for Russian submarine use'.
The report was not entirely baseless. It is known for a fact that at least three different
classes of Soviet submarines received M.A.N. diesel engines. They were the Pravda, Leninet::.
and Stolinetz classes. It is probable moreover that the Soviet-made Kolomna T -D 8-cylinder,
4-cyde diesel plant that powered the later Stalinetz and large 'K' class submarines were
copies of the German equipment.
The full extent of Soviet-German naval co-operation - technical and operational - during
the 1 930s is still not fully known. There is no doubt that it was quite extensive. A report
prepared by ONI after the Second World War, and based on captured German documents,
concluded that, 'in some ways the Soviet-German naval co-operation in the years prior to
I 941 was as great or greater than that afforded the Royal Navy by the Russians from 194 I
until the end of the war'.

The Stalinetz class

One important form of Russo-German co-operation in the naval sphere took shape in
1933-34 with the design and construction of the Soviet Navy's next generation of long­
range patrol submarines, the Series IX Stalinetz, or 'S', class. Unhappy with the Pravdas, the
Soviets turned to the Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (Lv.S.) in The Hague, The

52
Netherlands. The l.v.S. was a German front organisation. -;et up and owned jointly by the
Krupp-owned Germania Yard. the Deutsche Schiff und Maschincnbau AG. and the German
Navy. Staffed by German engineers. the organisation \Vas tasked to develop Germany's next
generation U - boats. Short of capitaL the l . v.S. readily .sold its blueprints t o foreign navies,
including Japan, Spain, Finland, Turkey, The !'..: d herlands. mu:l the Soviet Union.

'S"-type submanne. The "S' is commonly thought to sldnd !or SiHiincf::. Modern Soviet sources
use the transliteration sredrw_llll for "medium ' !Central Na\·al Museum. Leningrad!.

The design t h a t interested the Soviets was the 862 -ton Type A I . forerunner of the
German Navy's most successful submarine of the Second Vv'orld War, the Type V I I . The
Soviet Navy agreed to purchase a larger and more powerful version of the Type A I, and
construction of the first three hulls of what became the SillliHet=. class began. supervised by a
German technical team. at the Ordzhonikidze Yard in December 1 93 4 .
The lead boat w a s launched less t h a n eight months after keel-laying. Originally planned
to carry the name 1\Jolim (Burbot). she received the numerical designation :\1. 1 instead. On 20
October 1 937, N. I and the two follow-on boats were redesignated 5. 1 through S.J. Many
more were to follow.
The Sf(l/inet::. class submarines turned out to be very successful. They displayed a good
economical range of nearly 10 000 naulical miles a t an average �peed of 10.4 knots, were
capable of diving twice as fast as the Prm.'du class, and had operational characteristics that
were simple and easily understood.
A� is the ca�e w i t h most series-built Soviet submarines of the 1 930s, the final number
completed remains in doubt. The original plan reportedly called for the construction of 49
unib, but the vvar interrupted the building schedule. An added problem is the Soviet habit of
periodically renumbering their submarines. frequently, but not always, to mark transfers
between different fleet areas. In any case. different estimates have cited the completion of 42
to 53 StolmeL:. class submarines by I 9..J.8. Building yards included Ordzhonikidze,
Sudomekh and Zhdanov in Leningrad, Marti in Nikolayev, Dalzavod in Vladivostok (Jor
final fitting out of boats built in Leningrad) and the Krasnaya Sormova Yard in Gorki. Hulls
completed a t this last inland yard were towed on pontoons t o Leningrad, Molotovsk and
Nikolayev for final fitting out.

Table 7 : Series IX Stnlilll'l: ('S") clas� �uhmarines

Number buill 42-SJ

When built 1934- 1 948
Where built Ord7hinkikdze, Sudomekh, Zhdanov Yards (Leningrad), Marti Yard (�ikolayl'\").
Dalzavod (Vladivostok). Yard 402 (Molotovskl
Displacement 840/ 1 0 70 tons
Length 78 m (2 55.8 ftl

53
Beam 6.4 m ( 2 1 ft)
D raught 4.4 m I 14.5 ft)
Propulsion 4000 bhp / 1 100 'Ph
Speed 19.5/9 knots
Endurance 9800 nm at 10.4 knots/ 1 4 8 nm at 3 knots
Armament 6 x 533 mm { 2 1 -in) TT(4 bow, 2 stern), I x IOOmm gun, I x 45 mm AA gun,
1 2 torpedoes
Diving Limit 80 m (263 ft)
Complement 45
Note : Present name of Molotovsk is Severodvinsk

Phase I l l : The ' B i g Navy'

The full flowering of Stalin's 'big navy' programme came with the Third Five-Year Plan that
started on 1 April 1937. Young School adherents within the navy still opposed to the
dictator's schemes were purged in the course of the next several months along with the
greater part of the higher officer corps in the other services. Stalin now had a free hand to
place 'fundamental emphasis . on constructing a surface fleet for the Baltic, Black and
Barents Seas'. But the price would be a high one, and one to be paid in the coming war years.
With most of the experienced and capable naval leadership eliminated, and with the
survivors fearful to object, strategy would be made and force structure decisions taken
without the benefit of considered professional advice.
Robert W Herrick's Soviet Naval Strategy cites a number of reasons for the 'big fleet' shift
in Soviet naval doctrine and material preparations. Aside from Stalin's personal
predilections, they can be summarised as follows: (I) Stalin's desire for greater international
prestige, (2) an inflated estimate of the Soviet Union's industrial and modem ship building
capacity, and (3) the perception of an increasingly threatening international environment
spurred on by the military preparations of Japan, Germany and Italy.
Once Stalin had decided that, in the words of Pravda, 'Only the biggest High Seas Fleet
will meet Soviet demands', work began accordingly in a grandiose fashion. Four battleships
of 59,000 tons each (more than 30 per cent heavier than the US Navy's USS New jersey!)
were laid down between 1938 and 1 940. Also, construction was begun on two
battlecruisers with displacements of 35 240 tons, in addition to seven Chapayev and Kirov
class cruisers. None of these big ships, with the exception of two Kirov class cruisers built in
Vladivostok, were completed before or during the Second World War. The partially­
finished battleships and battlecruisers were either cannibalised by the Soviets or destroyed
the German occupation forces. Five Chapayev class cruisers were completed after the Second
World War.
Complementing the capital surface combatants were to have been several aircraft carriers.
Construction of at least one large carrier was slated for the end of the Third Five-Year Plan,
but the project was cancelled when (although not necessarily because) the United States
refused to sell the Soviets its latest aircraft carrier blueprints.

The ' K' c l ass

The final pre-war class of Soviet submarines, the Series XIV 'K' class, faithfully reflected the
Navy's 'big fleet' ambition. The letter 'K' has been reported as standing for Kreiserny, ie
'cruiser' type. The size of the submarine did justice to the latter designation. Surface

54
displacement was 1498 tons (comparable to the largest German and US fleet submarines
of the Second World War), and submerged displacement amounted to 2095 tons. Fuel
capacity was 255 tons, sufficient for an endurance of 15,000 nautical miles at nine knots.
Rated horsepower was 4200, which leads one to suspect Soviet claims of a sustained
maximum speed of 20 knots for 2900 nautical miles.

"K" class 'cruiser" submarine. (Central Nav.1l Museum, Len ingrJd)

During the 1920s and 1 930s, all of the principal submarine navies were experimenting
with submarine-based aircraft for reconnaissance purposes. The 'K' class was the Soviet
Union's only known attempt to mate the stealth and firepower of the 'cruiser submarine'
with the speed and range of the aircraft.
Sometime between 1 93 1 and 1 934, the young aircraft designer Ivan V Chetverikov
received Navy approval to design a submarine-carried variant to the OSGA- 10 l amphibian
aircraft. The latter had been buill and flight-tested t o become the 'eyes' o f the freighter
Chelyuskin which was about to (unsuccessfully) navigate the newly-opened Northern Sea
Route. The OSGA- 10 ! derivative was given the designation SPL lfor Sa rnolyot podvodnoy
lodki) to identify it as a submarine-borne aircraft. Some Soviet sources refer to the aircraft as
the Gidro- l, but that designation came into effect only after the plane had failed acceptance
tests and became available for exhibition abroad.
Flight tests took place between late 1934 and early 1 9.i 5 . With an empty weight of only
about 544 kg ( 1 200 \b), the aircraft, with its wings folded. was intended for storage in a space
measuring 7.5 x 2. 1 x 2.3 m (24.6 x 7 x 7.6 ft). Soviet sources report that dismantling
the SPL to hangar configuration took 3-4 minutes; preparation for flight by three crew
members could reportedly be accomplished in 5 minute::.. The aircraft established a number
of flight records for its class, but it proved too light and too small for safe take-off-; in the
open sea. Since the solution - a larger and heavier aircraft - could not be accommodated by

55
the intended carrier. interest waned, and none of the 'K' class boats ever went to sea with its
organic 'eyes'.
The armament of the 'K' class included ten torpedo tubes (including two external ones),
two 45 mm anti-aircraft guns, and, as the war was to show, a most formidable battery of two
100 mm anti-ship guns. The weapons load-out itself included 24 torpedoes and 20 mines.
The latter were stowed amidships on the lower deck and were dropped into the water via
two vertical chutes located below the control tower.
Table 8 details the principal features of the 'K' class. The data reflect the uncertainty about
the actual number built.

Table 8 : Series XIV 'K' class submarines

Number built 12-17

When built 1936-1947 (?)
Where built Marti Yard, Ordzhonikidze Yard (Leningrad)
Displacement 1480 /2 095 tons
Length 97.1 m ( 3 1 9 ft)
Beam 7.4 m (24.3 ft)
D raught 4.5 m (1 4.8 ft)
Propulsion 4200 bhp/2400 shp
Speed 20/10 knots
Endurance 15,000 nm at 9 knots.: 160 nm at 2.9 knots
Armament 10 x 533 mm ( 2 1 in) TT (6 bow, 2 stem, 2 external stern), 2 x 100 mm guns, 2
x 45 mm AA guns, 24 torpedoes, 20 mines in internal chutes
Diving limit 80 m (263 ft)
Complement 60

The Second and Third Year Plans had produced the greatest defensive navy in the world, but
also, as contemporary commentators were quick to point out, the 'strangest' navy in the
world; measured by traditional standards, the Soviet fleet on the eve of war was completely
unbalanced.
The decade before the German invasion had been used to built the world's largest
submarine fleet by far, larger in fact than the two next strongest underwater fleets - Italy and
the United States - combined. It was a force that had been built largely in the active defence
image of the Young School activities of the 1920s. The word 'largely' is important, for the
price paid for the 'big navy' tilt was a failure to 'flesh out' the Navy's coastal defence core
with a balanced force of supporting ships and weapons, mainly minelaying and -sweeping
vessels and an adequate stockpile of mines themselves.
Soviet naval doctrine shared with its Army counterpart an almost religious emphasis on
the offensive. Defensive operations meant inactivity, and inactivity signified defeatism.
Soviet Navy regulations in force in I 94 1 befitted the kind of high seas fleet that was Stalin's
aspiration - not the coastal flotillas that were on hand in fact. The Navy's first objective, they
stated, was to conduct 'offensive operations on the high seas, in the air, and off an
opponent's coast and bases . ' The Soviet Union's standard unified plan of action still called
for the Navy to support the Army's flanks, but the invocation was much less emphatic than
only a few years before. According to Achkasov and Pavlovich's chronology of Soviet Naval
Operations in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945, 'it was envisaged that the tasks assigned to
each of the fleets in a particular maritime theatre could be fulfilled as a result of conducting

56
them both as independent and as Joint operafions with sround f(nces· (emphasis added). In
pradice, however, these same two authors point out, 'top priority was assigned to the
traditional ro \e of destroying enemy forces at sea'. By comparison. 'undue attention was paid
to the development of naval warfare at the expense of preparations for joint operations with
th e ar m y · ln defence of the Navy's 'unbalanced' preoccupation with an independent and
.

offensive campaign, it should be repeated that it no more than mirrored Soviet military
doctrine as a whole. Soviet military science in the late 1930s \Vas predicated on t he premise
that, a fter a brief defensive struggle, its forces would assume an uninterrupted offens1ve. The
Navy's doctrinal orientation no more than echoed this optimistic prognosis.
Would the Soviet Acet have made a better showing had it had the time to build the
battleships. battlecruisers and aircraft carriers that Stalin had in mind? Probably not. The
solution to the Soviet naval dilemma had (and has today) less to do with the kind of fleet on
hand than the 'permanently operating factor' of unfriendly geography. It is questionable
whether ony navy, faced with the all but land-locked geography of the Baltic and Black Seas,
could have turned in a much better performance than the Soviets'. As the Red Army reeled
under the onslaught of the German Panzer divisions. the Soviet Navy and its submarine
component were quickly forced to re-order priorities a nd assume the role of 'faithful
assistant of the ground forces'.

Principal sources

Key referenc£'S for the foregoing description of inter-war developm('nts include conkmporary
Western and Soviet periodicals . With regard to the latter. the pre-Second World era is the most recent
period in Soviet military history that has been opened. by the Sovieh. to a relative abundance of 'hard'
and primary data. Another important source, albeit one written in retrospect. turned out to be the Ot''.lf
Review. This document especiall y offers insights into two aspects of Soviet inter-war submarine
development s : one, the characteristics and capabihties of the different submarine classes that. at war's
end, were still at the core of the 'threat'. and tv.' o. the extent of Cennan prc-vvar submarine technology
transfer.

57
4 Submarine operations in the
Second World War

This account of the operations of Soviet submarines in the Second World War (the 'Great
Fatherland War' in Soviet history books) follows the same general format used in Chapter 2's
narrative of the First World War. Each of the three principal theatres of naval hostilities
involving the Soviet submarine fleet is reviewed separately in this order: Baltic Sea, Black
Sea, and Arctic Sea. The Pacific Fleet did not become an ac�ive participant to the war until the
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1 945. No Pacific Fleet submarines saw
action in the eight days before the Japanese surrender.
As in Chapter 2, the descriptive material in this chapter summarises the main course of
naval events in each theatrf' and highlights the key actions involving Soviet submarines. An
important difference from the account of the First World War is the greater difficulty of
evaluating the Soviet naval performance in the Second World War. Soviet source material to
this day suffers from incomplete data, unreliable information, and, in some cases, plain
misrepresentation of fact. Soviet reports of alleged successes at sea can be quite detailed, but
when it comes to setbacks, causes and circumstances are mentioned only sporadically. For
this reason, the wartime career of many submarines remains in doubt, and heavy reliance
must be placed on German wartime records and their principal interpreters, ]Urgen Rohwer,
]Urg Meister, and Friedrich Ruge. This writer personally experienced the Soviet Union's
continued refusal - more than 40 years after events - to furnish comprehensive, 'hard'
information on the negative side of its Navy's wartime performance. Repeated requests for a
summary of submarine losses went unanswered.
It is common for belligerents to inflate their own claims of success while minimising
defeats and the claims of the opponent. It is also common that, as the war and the passions it
generated recede further and further into history, claims and disclaimers on both sides tend
to become more moderate, frequently to the point of convergence. The prerequisite is that
the former belligerents and their historical recorders have free and open access to their
countries' wartime files and, most important, that they are permitted to 'exchange notes'.
The Soviet historian of the Second World War at sea is at a disadvantage on both counts.
For one, his access to the Soviet equivalent of, say, the British Admiralty files, remains
extremely limited; the source material for Soviet historical publications is overwhelmingly
based on 'finished' evaluations of what happened - not data-in-the-raw. In the second place
(and in part because the Soviets attach much greater contemporary relevance to the 'lessons'
of the Great Fatherland War than does the West), the Soviet military historian's
opportunities to meet with his Western colleague are severely circumscribed by an inflated
'security' consciousness.
Despite these handicaps, there has been a modicum of convergence between Western
(mainly German) and Soviet accounts of events nevertheless. For example, in stark contrast
with the Stalinist 'chronologies' of the war years, modern Soviet military writers are quite
prepared to admit that the first year of retreat had less to do with a clever and deliberate
strategy of 'active defence' (and 'overwhelming' enemy superiority) than with their own
country's mistakes at all levels of military planning - strategical, tactical, and intelligence.
Soviet 'revisionist' history stems from eminently practical reasons - Soviet military art,
especially under modern (meaning nuclear) conditions, could hardly expect to advance if
writers no more than parrot its intrinsic infallibility. One result has been that, compared with

58
Soviet writings during the I 950s, contemporary claims of victories and defeats at sea much
more closely match those of the Germans. By the same token, the Western literature has
tended to perpetuate certain negative images of Soviet naval performance that, in some
cases at least, may have little basis in fact. For example. German sources have commented on
how 'inexperienced' Soviet submarine commanders would frequently come to the surface
prematurely in order to inspect a presumed successful 'kil!'. ln many instances, these sources
report, the submarine would find itself face to face with a 'victim' still very much alive. It is
true enough that Soviet submarines were in the habit of prematurely broaching the surface of
the water, not uncommonly because the second-in-command, the po/itruk wished 'to see for
himself'. and finish off the enemy with gunfire instead of expensive torpedoes. 1t is also
apparently true, however, that material problems, not necessarily lack of skilL were
sometimes the culprit. The design of the SJ1chlJko class was reportedly flawed in that it took
some time for the torpedo tubes to fill with counter-balancing water once the torpedo was
fired. With the boat out of balance. the lighter bow would tend to force the submarine to the
surface.

S u bmarine Order of Batt l e , 21 J u ne 1 941

The Soviet order of battle for submarines on 21 June 1 9 4 1 was as follows : Baltic ('Red
Banner') Fled under Vice Admiral V F Tributs - 65 submarines; Black Sea Fleet under Vice
Admiral F S Oktyabrsky - 47 submarines; Northern Fleet under Rear Admiral A G
Golovko - 15 submarines; and Pacific Fleet under Vice Admiral l S Yumashev - 9 1
submarines. Geographical distribution b y submarine type has been calculated by Ji..i rg
Meister as shown in Table 9.

An unidentified Soviet submarine (5-class?) on a Baltic Sea patrol on the C've of the Second
World War (US Naval Institute, courtesy TASS News Bureau'! .

59
 Meister's estimate adds up to a total available inventory of 2 1 3 submarines, five more
than Soviet historians have reported. The discrepancy may be due to Meister's inclusion of a
few obsolete Tsarist vessels. Another possible reason may be the use of slightly different
criteria for availability. At the outbreak of hostilities, according to Meister, nine Soviet
submarines were running acceptance trials, while another 49 were conducting builder's trials
or fitting out. Pinpointing the moment when a newly-built combatant is to be considered
fully operational is a very inexact art (witness the much more contemporary dis pute between
the Soviets and Americans over precisely whm a ballistic missile submarine is to be counted
against the SALT ceilings). In any event, John Erickson's The Road to Sta!ingrad has reported
that as soon as the Soviet Fleet went to 'Readiness State No 1 ' just before midnight 21 June
1941, a number of warships on trials were immediately accepted into the fleet and placed
under operational commands.

Table 9: Soviet Submarine Fleet by Fleet area. 2 I June I 94 I

Submarine Baltic Black Sea Northern Pacific

class Fleet Fleet Fleet Fleet

Deknbrist I 3
Leninetz 3 J I,l
Pravda 3
'K' 4 2
Stalinetz II 4
Shchuka 20 15 6 34
Ma!odki 21 14 6 37
Metallisf 5
Bezbozhnik
Leopard 1
ex-Estonian 2
ex-Latvian 2

Totals 69 44 15 85

Operations of the Baltic Fleet

It is said that no two wars are fought alike. Strictly speaking, this is true, yet the initial
opposing plans and pattern of hostilities in and around the Baltic Sea displayed some marked
similarities with events in August 1 9 1 4 . On the strategic level, the Soviets again expected
the Germans to combine their overland attack with a strong naval offensive into the Gulf of
Finland. The Soviet Navy responded as its Imperial predecessor had done 27 years before.
Disregarding its own fighting instrudions to conduct a n offensive battle at sea, the Baltic
Fleet proceeded to implement a static defensive strategy by closing off the Gulf of Finland
with minefields supported by coastal artillery batteries.
On the German side, naval priorities again faced westward, and did not envisage an
aggressive naval campaign into the Gulf of Finland with Leningrad as its aim. Like their
opponent's, German naval strategy in the Baltic Sea was mainly defensive and aimed at
protecting the sea lines of communications to Sweden, Finland and along the army's coastal
flank. Tadically, the Germans sought to contain the Baltic Fleet inside the Gulf of Finland b y
means o f extensive minefields and land-based air power.
On the map at least, the Soviet Union's gee-strategic situation in I 94 1 was not unlike that
of 1914. In 1939, the Baltic states that had become independent from Imperial Russia after
the First World War were forced to accept Soviet naval, land and air bases on their territory.

60
These 'mutual assistance' pads. and the subsequent complete Soviet occupation in summer
1940 of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia had given the Soviet Navy control over Baltic Port and
the islands ofHiiumaa (Dagoe) and Saaremaa (Oecell in the Jrben Straight, as well as Tallinn,
Riga, Liepilja and Ventspi!s (formerly Libau and Vindau).
Finland had refused to give in to Soviet demand for a military pre�ence but, after the
ferociom 'Winter War' of 1939-1 940, was compelled to grant Moscow a 30-year lease to
the naval base at Hango at the westernmost end of the Gulf of Finland.
The strategic advantage that had come with the possession of the�e advance position�
was more apparent than real. how-ever. The Hango naval base was surrounded on the
landward side by hostile Finnish territory' so that supply and reinforcement were dependent
on Soviet control of the Gulf of Finland. Instead of being fronted by a secure rear area as had
been the case when Finland was a Russian province, Hanko (formerly Hango) would this
time bear the brunt of a Finnish Army that had cast its lot with the Germans.
The security of the base" on the southern Baltic coast was not much better and had
become worse with Germany's advance into the western portion of Poland in 1 939. Soviet
military planners expected - correctly - that the main threat would come from land, and had
hf'gun to develop a series of defensive positions. The pace of construction had been slow
however, due in part to the Red Army's doctrinal expectation that defensive operations
would quickly shift to the offensive on the enemy's territory. Exacerbating the resulting
shortage of supplies and weaponry to fight a drawn-out siege were the uncertain command
arrangements between the Army and Navy. Responsibility for the defence of naval bases
had been entrusted to the ground forces \.vhich were to co-operate with naval artillery and
naval infantry forces. Seemingly a sensible arrangement. this practical application of the
'unity of command' principle had only sporadically been translated into effective joint
operational planning. Achkasov and Pavlovich tactfully put it as follows: 'unanimity in the
organisation of forces operating jointly in the defence of a base was not achieved prior to the
beginning of the war'. When the defending Army units were repeatedly forced back or cut
off from the base they were supposed to protect, responsibility for base defence would
repeatedly and suddenly fall into the lap of the unprepared Navy, forcing the latter to strip
its ships of crews for duty on the frontline.
The Baltic Fleet went to 'Readiness State No. 2' on 1 9 June. meaning that ships wen·
fuelled and crews put on alert. Other precautionary measures had been taken earlier in the
wake of repeated German reconnaissance overflights and reports of German submarine
movements off the fleet's forward bases. In mid-May, Vice Admiral Tributs. the Baltic Fleet
commander, had decided to disper�e some of his units. including submarines. from LiepJ:ja to
Daugavgriva (Ust-Dvinsk). Other ships were moved from Tall inn to Kronshtadt. Yet,
despite an overwhelming number of strategic and tactical indicators of an impending attack.
tactical surprise was complete. The result was that none of the B<:�ltic Fleet's submarines was
at sea when the German assault came on the break of day of 22 june.
German naval operations had preceded the main assault on land by a fevv days \.v ith the
laying of mine fields in the Gulf of Finland. Additional barrages were shortly planted
between Tallinn and Suursaari (Hogland) Island, off Liep.'lja. Ventspils, in the lrben Strait and
elsewhere in the Gulf. Luftwaffe aircraft began to systematically attack the naval base at
Liepilja, and magnetic mines were dropped in the fairway of Kronshtadt.
When it dawned upon Stalin that more than a 'provocation' was involved, the Soviets'
first reaction was to emplace large defensive minefields across the Gulf of Finland. Three
destroyers and one cruiser covered the operation on the night from 22 to 23 June; one
destroyer sank on an enemy mine, while the two others suffered damage. On 26 June. the
unexpectedly rapid advance of the German Army prompted Admiral Kuzentsov's order for
the fleet's withdrawal. The panic-stricken local political commander in LiepJja ordered the
destruction of all vessels, including five submarines. that could not be moved immediately.

61
The five underwater craft included the ex-Latvian Ranis and Spldola that, through materially
ready to go to sea, were evidently beyond the skills of their newly-installed Soviet crews.
The situation deteriorated rapidly. On 7 August German troops arrived on the coast of
Kunda Bay in the Gulf of Finland, and, three weeks later, they stood on the outskirts of
Tallinn. The order for naval units in Tallinn to evacuate had come the day before, and for the
next several days, hundreds of large and small warships and transport vessels braved attacks
from the air by day and the danger of the minefieiJs at night to reach Kronshtadt. According
to Soviet sources, 1 6 combatants of different types in addition to 8 7 per cent of the transport
force were lost to mines and air attacks. German-source statistics are in approximate
agreement.
The fate of the Baltic Fleet's outlying bases was the same elsewhere. The islands of
Saaremaa and Muhu in the Irben Strait were lost on 2 1 October, and Hanko, about to be cut
off from seaborne reinforcement and resupply with the oncoming ice, was evacuated in late
November. At the close of I 941, both the northern and southern shores of the Gulf of
Finland were in German-Finnish hands. Leningrad was under siege, and Stalin issued orders
to begin preparation to scuttle all warships in Leningrad should the city fall. Meanwhile, the
German-Finnish forces tightened the noose by seizing the islets of Suursari, Tyttersaari and
Lavansaari deep inside the Gulf.
Few Soviet submarine operations of significance were carried out during the first six
months of the war. Achkasov and Pavlovich merely report that, 'in connection with the
withdrawal of the main forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to eastern bases, the already
adverse conditions for submarine operations against the enemy sea lanes continued to
deteriorate'.
Before the war, the main task envisaged for the submarines had been the destruction of
enemy shipping in the Baltic Sea. As already mentioned, not a single Baltic Fleet submarine
was evidently on sea duty at the moment of the German attack. Three units of the 1st
Submarine Brigade at Liep.3ja managed to take up stations between Liep.3ja and Klaipeda
(Memel) sometime on 22 June. For reasons that are not obvious, the balance of the 1 5-strong
brigade was evacuated to Ventspils and elsewhere. On the second day of hostilities, six
submarines of the 2nd Brigade at Tallinn went to sea to assume defensive positions. By 2 7
June, a grand total of 2 0 boats operated i n various locations along the Baltic coast for
purposes of reconnaissance, minelaying and defensive 'holding'. All were recalled at the end
of the month without having sunk a single enemy vessel. At the end of August, the Baltic
Fleet had been forced to give up everyone of its advanced bases, so that all but two
submarines had fallen back inside the confined waters of the Gulf of Finland.
The avowed aim of the Baltic submarine fleet to interdict the German-Finnish lines of
communications became more and more difficult with each German advance up the Baltic
coast and the growing threat of minefields deep inside the Gulf of Finland. By October­
November, enemy mine barrages extended as far east as Hogland Island. An even g rea ter
danger than the minefields or the constant threat of air attack, however, was the spectre of
losing Leningrad to the encircling German army. In an effort to put pressure on the German
supply lines, the Baltic Fleet sortied 21 submarines in the second half of September. The
results were meagre. The Soviet account lists five transport vessels, two tankers and one
enemy submarine, while the German version of the episode credits Soviet achievements
with only one steamer and one submarine.
Achkasov and Pavlovich's account of events concedes that, 'the enemy's extraordinary
ability to employ positional anti-submarine warfare defences resulted in great losses'. They
offer no detailed numbers, but German sources have it that 27 Soviet submarines (39 per
cent of the_ starting line-up) were sunk or destroyed in port before the close of 1 94 1 . Soviet
and German accounts dispute the amount of German shipping lost in exchange, but the most
telling measure of the rather insignificant impact of the Soviet submarine weapon is that

62
German merchantmen in the Baltic Sea were permitted to sail without naval escorts. The
Soviet submarine sink-loss ratio would improve somewhat in 1 942, but the operational
future of the Baltic Fleet's submarines was about to take a decided turn for the worse. Short\ y,
the German-Finnish forces would emplace the most successful anti-submarine barrier ever
constructf:'d in the history of naval warfare.

The Bal t i c S u bmari ne Fleet contained

Although the annual freeze-over of the Gulf of Finland had brought all shipping to a
standstill, hostilities in this strategic body of water continued through the winter of
1 94 1 - 1 942. German-Finnish forces occupied virtually the entire Gulf shoreline, but had yet
to secure control of the Gulf itself. A key obstruction was the continued Soviet possession of
several small islands deep inside the Gulf. Not only did the latter permit the Baltic Fleet to
maintain a tenuous supply line to the encircled Soviet Army on the Oranienbaum beachhead
opposite Kronshtadt, but also local artillery positions and forward-based torpedo boats
continued to harass German-Fmnish shipping. Both were sufficient rl'a:::. ons for the German­
Finnish forces to attempt to dislodge the Soviet garrisons, but an f:'ven more important
consideration motivated German and Finnish military planners. Naml'ly, the idea had arisen
to hermetically seal off the entire Gulf of Finland as far cast as possible by means of a net
barrier complemented by mine barrages. The Gulf islands were the linchpin to this strategy,
prompting the Finns, later supported by German troops, to launch a series of furious infantry
attacks across the icc.
Two of the islands, Suuarsaari and Suur-Tytersaari, were taken at the end of March, but
the others, including Lavansaari, Peninsaari and Serikari. remained in Soviet hands. Despite
partial success, the German-Finnish forces went ahead with establishing what has probably
been the densest minefield in history. Some 13 000 mines of different types were planted
across the eastern portion of the Gulf of Finland through the autumn of 1 942. According to
Soviet calculations, the interval between mines varied from about 1 8- 1 3 7 m (60 to 450 ft),
and the probability of a submarine encountering a mine from 30 to 60 per cent.
The opponent's failure to seize all of the Gulf islands, particularly Lavansaari at the centre
of the mine barrier, had left the Soviets with a critical point d'appui in support of the
continuing effort by the submarines of the Baltic Fleet to break out into the open sea
Lavansaari-based aircraft and artillery positions were able to provide much-needed
assistance to minesweepers while, at the same time, presenting a constant threat to enemy
anti-submarine warfare forces and mine-laying vessels.
The first Soviet submarine break-out attempt into the Baltic Sea came in June, and
involved from seven to nine vessels. Unlike later practice, this first penetration called for the
submarines to force thf:' minefields independently, ie in groups of two and without the
benefit of 'combat stability' provided by minesweepers and armed escorts. The first wave
was relatively fortunate; apparently only one submarine (M.95) was lost on a mine. Clear of
the barrier, the submarines operated in the western portion of the Gulf of Finland and in the
Baltic Sea itself as far west as Swedish coastal waters. Soviet sources claim that this sortie
produced the sinkings of 1 4 transports and damage to one. They offer no commentary that
three of the destroyed vessels probably belonged to neutral Sweden. Reportedly, 4 7
torpedoes were f:'Xpcnded in the course of 50 separate attacks.
The second wave of tf:'n submarines began to deploy on 1 1 August. after the return on the
same day, of the last submarine in the first echelon. The break-out was supported this time
by energetic efforts, both in the air and on the surface, to suppress enemy anti-submarine
warfare forces. The Soviets claim that the second-echelon submarines sustained 'relatively
insignificant losses' on their patrols, and credit the 'tactical skill' of their commanders and

63
ineffectiveness of the opponent's anti-submarine measures. Again, there is a second opinion.
Retired West German Vice Admiral Friedrich Ruge maintains that two submarines were lost
on mines and that a third received serious enough damage to return to base. Also conflicting
are alleged exchange ratios. Soviet literature credits the submarines in the second wave with
the sinkings of 1 4 vessels, whereas Ruge limits the number to five. The latter also asserts that
all five sinkings, in addition to two ships damaged, were caused by torpedoes. Achkasov and
Pavlovich's version of events agrees that all sinkings were the result of torpedo attack, and
adds that 46 torpedoes were expended in the process. If the Soviet claim is the correct one,
then the consumption of 46 torpedoes to sink 1 4 ships is quite comparable to the relative
effectiveness of German and Allied torpedo attacks during the Second World War.
The third and last wave of submarines to break out before the onset of the winter of
1942-1943 departed in groups of five, four, and seven between 1 5 September and 4
November. Before the last one returned in, the middle of November, about 15 transports
plus several small combatants were destroyed in the course of 68 individual attacks.
Whichever figures are used, Soviet or German, the results of the Soviet Baltic submarine
campaign in 1 942 can hardly be called outstanding. The Soviets claim that the total of 3 5
submarines that participated i n the three break-outs accounted for the destruction o f 40
merchant vessels, several small warships, and possibly a number of freighters that ran onto
submarine-laid mines. The German story, by contrast, holds to the destruction of only 26
ships with a gross tonnage of 52 500 and the damage of eight more (34 000 gross tonnage).
The Soviet version of events acknowledges that success came 'at high cost', but fails to
provide specific numbers. Ruge and Rohwer have estimated Soviet submarine losses in the
Baltic Sea in 1942 at ten, plus at least seven damaged. Rohwer moreover points out how
overall German and German-controlled shipping in the Baltic Sea for the yeai (excluding
independent sailings) added up to I 738 vessels with a gross tonnage exceeding five million.
It goes without saying that if these numbers are even anywhere close to correct, the Soviet
submarine campaign had made little immediate impact, and that what little effect it did have
came at a high price in submarines and experienced crews.
In fairness to the Soviet side, it must be emphasised that the Baltic Fleet submarines were
forced to operate under the most difficult conditions. First of all, the annual icepack in the
Gulf of Finland restricted submarine and other naval activities to about seven months out of
the year. The forced five-month hiatus not only limited the opportunity to seek out the
enemy, but it also gave the German-Finnish forces a long breathing spell to repair and
strengthen their mine and other defences. One wonders also what the effect of long periods
of inactivity may have had on crew proficiency.
A second handicap peculiar to naval operations in the Baltic theatre was the dominating
influence of the area's constrictive maritime geography. Its impact on the productiveness of
the Soviet submarine campaign worked in more than one way. Sea distances being relatively
short, the length of time that a ship was exposed to the threat of submarine attack was
comparatively brief. Quite often, German merchantmen and supply vessels travelled within
sight of the coast, and therefore had the opportunity to quickly seek shelter in shallow and
friendly (or neutral Swedish) waters. Moreover, the same ship that, when damaged in the
middle of the Atlantic Ocean, might have to be abandoned, might well be kept afloat in the
Baltic long enough to be brought into port for repairs, and sail another day. Another
implication of the Baltic's confined geography was the constant threat of land-based air
attack. This meant that German or Finnish ship or convoy under attack could often quickly
call for assistance.
There was little the Baltic Fleet submarines could have done about these basic
disadvantages. Many years later, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G
Gorshkov'·s The Sea Power of the State took the German U -boat campaign to task for its failure
to combine operations with adequate air support. It is doubtful that the Admiral implied

64
criticism of his own service in this regard ; it is true nevertheless that even though the Baltic
Fleet on the eve of the war boasted a 600-plus aviation support unit, few aircraft, including
the otherwise capable torpedo-bomber version of the Ilyushin DB-3f; 01-4) long-range
bomber, were a match for the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters. In any case. th� bulk of
Navy's attack aircraft was quickly diverted to the battle on land.
StilL modern Soviet commentators have not been loath to admit that material and tactical
�hortcomings contributed to the fleet's disappointing results. Submarine commanders
repeated some of the same mistakes made by the Imperial Fleet 25 years before. Again,
patrolling submarines relied mainly on the pas�ive, so-called 'positional method' to vvait for
an enemy �hip to happen within torpedo-launching range. Achkasov and Pavlovich blame
an 'insufficiently critical approach to the re�ults of operations by Russian submarines in
1 9 14-1 9 1 7 . which clearly demonstrated the inadvisability of this method'. Holding
operations in narrowly-defined patrol zones, the same authors rightly conclude, sharply
reduced the probability of detecting enemy �hips vvhile increasing the chances of hostile
counter -detection.
The low probability of sinking a vcs�el \Vith a �ingle-torpcdo salvo was another le��on the
Soviets had to relearn. Firing distances were typically between 1830-2290 m {2000-2500
yds). This was well within the advertised range of contemporary torpedoes. but it did not
account for such tactical factors as relative speeds. firing angle. and the size of the targ�'t. By
the end of 1942, the Soviet submarine fleet had learned the same les�on that became
common practice for submariners elsewhere: the nece�sity to attack with multiple torpedoe�
fired in spread salvoes or at rapid intervals.
Western sources have, with little exception. ratt>d the material and human quality of the
Soviet submarine force in the Second World War much below the standards of the German
and Anglo-American navies. The purported stoicism and perseverance of Soviet submarine
crews. and their ability to improvise under the worst of circumstances, have been praised
highly, but the balance of opinion has been well summed up by ]Urg Meister :

Soviet submarines were technically Inferior; command1ng officers anJ crews vvere with very
few exceptions inadequately trained. stra tegicall y badly employed and tadicall;i unsblled.'

A� has already been pointed out, Soviet sources them�elves have not hesitated to complain
about tactical mistakes, at least early in the 'A'<lf. Material shortcomings too have been
criticised, although the technical quality of the submarines themselves has not been put into
question. For example. the 'S' and 'K' classes have been lauded as 'most modern submarines'
and 'not qualitatively inferior to those of foreign fleet<. Soviet authors �imilarly claim that
their country's models I 933 and 1938 torpedoes were on a p11r with the majority of foreign
torpedoes, and they disclaim having experienced the problems with proper depth -keeping
and premature detonation that plagued German and American torpedoe� early in the \.-Var
A lew Sovid submarines at the st<�rt of the war were equ i pped with an acnushc detection
system. known as Drakon - 1 29. By all accounts, the equipment proved of little value in the
detection of enemy ve�sels or the safe navigation of enemy mindields. Attempts to use the
Drakon device for submarine-to-submarine communications appear to have been
unsuccessful.
All Soviet submarines were equipped with short-wave radio sets. but there are conflicting
reports about the extent of their use. Several non-Soviet accounts claim that Soviet
submariners used their radios quite freely with the result that their opponents usually knew
how many were at sea. A report by ONI in 1 948, on the other hand, concluded that Soviet
doctrine during the war prohibited submarines on patrol outside home waters from ever
using their radios except in an extreme emergency. The report"s opinion that. there 'is no
reason to believe that there has been a change in such high standards of communication
security·, implies that Soviet submariners generally abided by this rule.

65
 A major material shortfall in the Soviet submarine force of the Second World War as
reported by the Soviets themselves were insufficient numbers of modern support forces,
especially minesweepers and reconnaissance aircraft. Regarding the first category, the entire
modern Soviet minesweeping fleet on the eve of the war stood at 39 (the Tml class built
between 1935 and 1940). A corollary effect of the lowly place of mine warfare forces in
Stalin's 'Big Navy' plans was that planners had failed to stay abreast of evolving mine
technologies. As a result, the German use of influence mines was completely unanticipated
and found the Soviets without countermeasures.
As has already been noted, the puper strength of the Baltic Fleet's air arm was considerable.
However, between a majority of obsolete planes, the lack of a night-flying and all-weather
capability, and the competing demands of the war on land, its effective strength was minimal.
Throughout 1 94 L the Baltic Fleet could call on only 242 aerial reconnaissance sorties for all
of its operations.
Combat activities in the Baltic Sea during 1943 and the first nine months of 1 944 were
marked by the effective neutralisation of the Soviet submarine force. The renewed German­
Finnish anti-submarine campaign began with the laying of over TO 000 mines and explosive
floats in both the western and eastern ends of the Gulf of Finland. Meanwhile, the earlier
Finnish idea to close the Gulf once and for all was put into effect, between March and May.
with the installation of the 'Walross' double submarine net between Porkala on the Finnish
coast and Nargoen west of Tallinn. Measuring about 48 km (30 miles) across and some 55 m
( 180 ft) in depth, this new obstruction accomplished what tens of thousands of mines had
not: not a single Soviet submarine managed to penetrate the barrier until after the
capitulation of Finland in September 1 944. Several attempts were made between May and
September, but in each case the daring submarine was either forced to turn back or destroyed
by mines and enemy patrols. A Soviet account appropriately concluded : 'Further attempts
to force the Gulf of Finland made no sense in the face of such a tight anti-submarine barrier'.
And, it added, 'it would be necessary to eliminate the anti-submarine barrier with force or to
create a by-pass route . . . by seizing the south and north coasts of the Gulf of Finland'.
The opportunity to by-pass the 'Walross' barrier came with Finland's acceptance of a
cease-fire on 4 September 1944. Soviet forces occupied the island of Surrsari, bringing to an
end German control of the minefields, and on 23 September the last German forces were
evacuated from Tallinn spelling the end of the 'Walross' net. After an absence of 22 months,
Baltic Fleet submarines reappeared in the Baltic Sea in October, too late to interfere with the
massive German withdrawal from Tallinn. Curiously, none of the 18 submarines that
patrolled in the Baltic until the end of the year made an attempt to attack the 'pocket
battleship' LUt:.ow or the heavy cruiser Prinz Euger1.
The Soviet version of the last three months of "1944 reports 23 submarine sorties against
enemy sea routes and 1 1 reconnaissance missions. Also claimed are the sinkings of 1 3
transports for an expenditure of 1 3 2 torpedoe� - an abominably low hit rate, especially
considering that three of the victims were sunk by gunfire. The Soviets admit that their
accomplishments 'could have been significantly greater', and attribute this poor performance
to a variety of factors, including the deterioration of crew efficiency after a nearly two-year
break in operations, and inexperience with night torpedo attacks. Also blamed are the
'deleterious consequences' of the minelaying operations conducted by the Royal Air Force.
Commented Achkasov and Pavlovich: The brilliant successes of the Soviet armed forces
made it possible to draw a fairly reliable conclusion as to the real purpose behind these
British mine plants'.
According to official Soviet statistics, the Baltic Fleet on 1 January 1 945 was 24
submarines strong. Yet, between that date and the German surrender on 8 May, the same
source reports that only 27 submarine patrols were staged. It is not clear if this patrol rate
reflects the work of a few submarines or a fairly even division of labour. One indication that

66
the former may have been the case is that a detailed chronology of this period identifies only
six Baltic Fleet submarines. Soviet historians also fail to mention the participation during the
final months of the war of the (brgely Estonian-crewed) ex-Estonian Lembit. In any case, the
productivity of this flotilla remained as low as it had been before - this in spite of the fact that
the Soviets had complete mastery of the air and an abundance of lightly protected German
sea traffic engaged in carrying off <Jn estimated 2.2 million refugees.
The submarines did claim their victims, including ::.everal liners with thousands of refugees
aboard. German and Soviet sources arc in agreement that altogether 13 transports were sunk
by submarines through the beginning of May. Again, the hit rate was a lmv one: 1 52
torpedoes vverc launched in 52 attacks.
The Soviets credit the Baltic Fleet submarines with the destruction, throughout the vvar, of
74 enemy merchant vessels \..vith a gross tonnage of I 13 180. German figures are much
lower. The Soviets have not announced how many of their submarines \..vcre lost in the
process, confirming merely 'the difficulty of using (submarines) in a theatre such as the
Baltic'. One non-Soviet estimate had established the number of Baltic fleet submarines
destroyed or scuttled at 45 - hardly a favourable trade-off.

Operat ions of the B l a c k Sea Fleet

When the Black Sea Fleet received Admiral Kuznetsov's signal on the midnight of 21 June to
go to 'Readiness State No J ", the majority of its warship� was concentrated at Sevastopnl.
having recently completed a series of manoeuvres. Within a few hours of the order, German
aircraft. guided by the lights of Scvastopol's lighthouses, began to drop magnetic mines.
As in the north, the German High Command had given little thought to ways and means
of seizing control of the Black Sea as part of its overall strategy against southern Russia. The
adverse naval balance gave the German:-. little incentive. of course. to seriously contemplate
the prospect of a major naval offensive. Besides 4 7 submarine<;, the Black Sea Fleet had at its
disposal 22 \argc combatants. numerous torpedo boats, and a naval air <Jrm \..vith 626 aircraft
The German effort at sea had to rely principally on tht" small and mostly obsolete navJl
forces of allied Romania.
As was the (ase in the Baltic Sea, so nJval events in the Black Sea vvere determined almost
exclusively by the ebb and flow of combe�t on le�nd. They were two very important
differences nevertheless. In the first place. the Axis never quite succeeded in extending their
control over the southern USSR shoreline to the sJrne degree Js they \.-Verc able to in the
Baltic theatre. Even though their forces eventually occupied about t\-vo-thirds of the Soviet
Union's Black Sea coast, including its principal ports and harbours. the Black Sea Fleet was
alvvays left with enough manoeuvring room to pose a constant threat to the GerrnJn
positions on land and at sea. Secondly, the distant geography of the Bbck Sea made it
difficult for the Germans to replace ::.hipping losses. This meant that even moderate losses
could have an immediate and serious impact on the supply situation on land.
The initial German advance, supported by the Romanians, portended the c.LJmc disaster
that had befallen the Soviets and their fled in the Baltic area. Nikolayev with its huge
shipyards fell on 1 7 August. The Soviets managed to cvJcuatc some of the partially­
completed warships. but many had to be scuttled or fell under German control. Among the
latter were the battleship SoPiet:;/.:tl_llii Uk-ruinu ( 75 per cent complete). hvo Chnpa�!l'<' class
cruisers, and a battlecrui::.cr (20 per cent complete). Odes::.e� v.ras lost after a dravvn-out siege
in the middle of October, and Rosten: on the Sea of Azov \.-Vas captured by the Germans on
22 November. A So\·ict counter-push dislodged the Germans from thi::. second city within a
week, however, and it would not be until the middle of the next y·ear that Rostov \.-vould fall
into German control again.

67
S-dass submarines (5.36 and 5.37) captured by the Germans at the Nikolaev Yard in August
I 94 I (US Naval Historical Center).

The siege and eventual capture of Odessa was the first instance to show the attacker's
weakness at sea. Surrounded from all sides on land, the order to evacuate the city was given
on 30 September. For the next 16 days, convoys and individual sailings managed to
transport 86 000 Soviet troops with much of their equipment, for their next stand, at
Sevastopol. Enemy interference was minimal, and limited to sporadic aerial mining of
Sevastopol harbour.
Both sides recognised that possession of Sevastopol was critical to the other's sea lines of
communications. Continued Soviet control of the Black Sea Fleet's main base meant that the
German supply line from Romania to the Crimean Peninsula would be constantly at risk
from the air and at sea. German control of the waters around the Crimea, or at least the denial
of such control to the Soviets, would be even more important as the Germans prepared their
main advance into the Caucasus and to the eastern shore of the Black Sea.
Sevastopol's defenders had turned the city into a gigantic fortress. When the enemy
launched its first attack on 30 October 1 9 4 1, the garrison mustered 52 000 men, 1 70 guns,
and about 150 aircraft. Supported by the big guns of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, and
resupplied and reinforced by sea, the city held out for ISO days. Making matters worse for
the investing Germans, who could ill-afford a lengthy siege, were repeated Soviet flanking
attacks from the sea.
The final offensive against Sevastopol began on 7 June 1942, and required nine infantry
divisions supported by over 2000 batteries of guns and the entire strength of the VIII
German Air Corps. As each of the city's main fortifications was systematically battered to
rubble, and constant air- and long-range artillery bombardment forced the Soviet Navy to
pull out its large warships, Black Sea Fleet submarines and motor torpedo boats bore the
brunt of resupply and evacuation of the wounded. Sevastopol fell on 5 July, and with it went
into capture nearly 100 000 defenders whose evacuation had been forbidden by Stalin. Two

68
months later, the Germans reached the limit of their adv::mce along the Black Sea with the
crossing of the Kerch Strait and the capture of the Black Sea Fleel's last main port,
Novorossiysk. Henceforth, the over-extended German v.rar effort in southern USSR
essentially concentrated on safeguarding Army Croup A's supply line to the northern �lopes
of the Caucasus.
The condition of the Germans deteriorated inexorably after the surrender of Von Paulus'
6th Army at Stalingrad on 2 February 1 943. Within a few months. th�' Soviets had pushed
their opponents across the Donets river and, after another major offensive in july. the
Crimea itself was being threatened. On ro September the Soviets staged a large-sc:de
amphibious assault against Novornssiysk. hvo days after Hitler had permitted his forces
there and on the Kuban River brigehead to evacuate. The German retreat back to the Crimea
was completed in good order; losses in lives and equipment v.'ere smalL although the Soviets
have claimed differently.
The Black Sea Fleet suffered a major setback in its attempt to cut off the withdrawing
enemy. Two destroyers and one destroyer leader \-\'ere caught by German dive bombers at
early daylight on 6 October. All three (40 per cent of the remaining destroyer force of the
Black Sea Fleet) were sunk under repeated attacb. Shocked, Stalin gave iHHTler...lidte Ul r...lt.: ,s
that the surface fleet would henceforth limit its operations to direct support of the ground
forces and only insofar it would have the protection of airpower. The withdrawal of the tleet
from offensive seagoing operations was probably instrumental in the succe�sful German
blockade and ultimate destruction of the Soviet beachhead at Eltigen. south of Kerch.
As 1943 drew to a close, continued German control of the Crimea became increasingly
irrelevant to Germany's overall strategic condition in the south of the USSR. By Novrmber,
the main German defensive line had fallen back across the Dnieper river. south to Odessa,
with the result that the Crimea had become cut off from the rest of the front. Minor units of
the Black Sea Fleet had already begun to use some of the small harbours and roadsteads ovest
of the peninsula, thereby endangering the last escape route for the occupying Germans.
Fortunately for the Germans, the Soviets made no concerted effort to cut Sevastopol's
supply line westward, but focused their attention instead on Odessa. Still no large �urface
combatants were employed: submarines and torpedo boats were active, but the principal
means of attack were the bombers of the Soviet Air force and the naval air arm.
Niko!ayev was retaken by the Soviets on 28 March I 944, and Odes<;a vvas evacuated by
the Germans in the first half of April. Again, the Germans were able to complete their
seagoing retreat to Romanian ports v.'it hout substantial interference from the Black Sea Fleet.
Nearly 25 000 soldiers and refugees, along with 54 000 tons of materiel were moved during
a ten-day period without suffering - according to Cerman reports - a single loss. One
Soviet claim that over 30 assorted vessels were sunk has been rejected by Ruge as 'pure
invention'.
The last important chapter in the Black Sea campaign lasted from 8 April until 1 3 May,
and entailed the Soviet offensive to recapture Sevastopol. The attack was carried out on land
and from the air, while an average of eight submarines joined with torpedo boats in an
attempt to cut German communications across the sea. Again, the presence of the Black Sea
Fleet's large warships would have been helpful. for despite constant harassment. especially
from the air, the Germans succeeded for two months in bringing in essentiCJl supplies and
removing their wounded. The Soviets inflicted the heaviest losses during the final days of
the siege, after Hitler had finally given permission to evacuate Sevastopol, and German
shipping of all types attempted to remove the garrison. Between 5 and I 2 May, eight
transport vessels and about twice as many auxiliaries \vere sunk. mostly due to air attack.

69
S u bmarine actions

The main responsibilities o f the submarines of the Black Sea Fleet o n the outbreak o f war
were twofold : one, interrupt the enemy's sea routes along the Romanian and Bulgarian
coasts. and two, protect the Soviet Union's own sea lines of communications, particularly the
tanker lanes along the shores of the Caucasus. The commitment of part of the Black Sea
Fleet's two brigades of submarines to this second task away from the centre of fighting
probably reflected Soviet uncertainty about Turkey's attitude.
Between sporadic mine laying and torpedo attacks, little was accomplished at first against
enemy shipping. This was partly due to the low density of traffic, but also because of a
shrinking patrol rate. During the first three months of warfare. about 1 3 submarines
accumulated some 1 13 patrol days, so that an average of little over one submarine was at sea
on any given day. From mid-October 194 1 until the beginning of July of 1942, only nine
submarines spent a total of 85 days on patrol, for an average daily presence of less than one­
third of a submarine. These low numbers arc all the more surprising in light of the Black Sea
Fleet's starting line-up of 44 submarines. Two reasons can be advanced for this apparently
low rate of availability. The first is that, although numerically considerable, the Black Sea
Fleet submarine flotilla operated a number of boats that were clearly obsolete and that. as
reported in the previous chapter, demanded constant repair and maintenance. Included
among those were three Dekabrisf class. three Leninetz class and five Meta!lisf class
submarines. The second possible explanation is that the enforced evacuation of the fleet from
its main bases compelled the submarines to spend more and more time in transit to and from
their new and improvised harbours further eastward, thus leaving less time on station. This
new circumstance practically excluded the small M(/lodki class submarines from offensive
operations. and placed a much heavier strain of the medium-entrance 'Shch' type boats as
well. Paradoxically. the effective reduction of the Black Sea Fleet's operating strength had
one beneficial result : in order to still cover the areas of interest. the submarines were forced
to switch from positional patrol tactics to cruising operations over wider areas.
Submarine operations in 1 942 were keyed to the developing situation on the Crimean
Peninsula and in southern Russia. As the Germans pushed toward the Caucasus and prepared
their siege of SevastopoL their dependence on seaborne supplies grew. Italian and Romanian
tankers had begun to pass through the Turkish Straits, causing the Soviets to regularly
deploy two or three submarines at the entrance to the Bosporus. Evidently, neutral Turkish
shipping was brought under attack as often as the enemy's.
With the tightening German investment of Sevastopol in the spring of 1 942, Soviet
reinforcement and re�upply by sea became increasingly difficult. At first, the Soviets turned
to the use of fast warships to transport troops and materieL but this solution could only be
temporary in the face of the enemy's superiority in the air. Starting in the early May,
submarines of all types were thrown into the battle to replenish the garrison and evacuate
the wounded. Additional cargo space was created by the removal of reserve torpedoes,
ammunition and other essentials. According to Soviet authors, 3700 tons of supplies and
about 1 200 personnel were moved in this fashion during May and June. The Germans report
that four submarines (Shch. 208, 212. 2 14 and 5.32) were lost during the operation.
After the fall of SevastopoL the submarines returned to their favourite patrol areas off the
Bosporus and the coastal convoy routes along Romania and Bulgaria. No Soviet statistics are
given for 1942, probably a reliable indication of the insignificant results that were achieved.
German sources admit the loss of l l vessels, including six Turkish, in exchange for the
sinkings of ten submarines.
Soviet historians divide the Great Patriotic War into two periods; the first is the period of
'active defence' that ended with the German defeat at Stalingrad in December I942, and the
second includes the great offensive campaigns that culminated in the fall of Berlin in May

70
"1 945. Vv'ith the decline of Germany's military fortune::. during this second period, the
security of the Black Sea coastal lines of communications became increasingly important.
Especially critical to the Germans was the Kerch Str.1it that connects the Crimea vvith the
eastern shore of the Black Sea. Cut off on land, Cerman troops on tht' Kuban bridgehead had
become vitally dependent on supplies by ship across the Strait. Small vvondcr Soviet
submarines concentrated their efforts on blocking this passage.
Unfortunately, the Soviets have bled to give a thorough account of the results of vvhat
became, in Achkasov and Pavlovich's own vvnrds, 'one of the most important (lash) for the
Black Sea Fleet'. Three or more submarines commonly patrolled the southern entrance to the
Kerch Strait. but Achkasov and Pavlovich concede that despite the 'growing effectiveness'
of Black Sea Fleet submarine operation:, generally, the blockade itself vvas ineffective. ·1 he
final Soviet balance sheet could show the sinkings of perhaps thn'e steamers. a fevv tugboats
and lighters, and a handful of smJil pe!trol craft.
It is not dear at all why the Soviets were un<Jble to achieve mort' substantial results. At one
point, the alleged German habit of sending convoys in small groups is blamed. yet
elsewhere. Achkasov and Pavlovich report convoys with as many as 300 vessels. In any
case, studies of the convoying system in the Atlantic theatre have consistently shmvn that
the effectivenes'i of the U-boats \vas directly related to the number of individual targets.
vvhether sailing in single convoys or independently, and not the si7e of the convoy.
Soviet success on the opposite shore of the Black Sea WJS not much better. Po<;sibly seven,
including three neutral Turkish. vessels were sunk off the Bosporu::. and the Romanian COC!c.t.
The best available estimate for total Black Sea fleet submarine lmses in I 943 is ::.even.
The Soviet failure to report their wartime submarine losses is part of the reason for the
uncertain strength of the Black Sea Fleet subm<H inc fleet in 1943- I 944. Rugc has reported
that an average of 30 boats was available through !SLL\ six of which wen' routinely on
station. Meister has listed the official Soviet figures at th{' beginning of I 943 and 1 944 of 22
and 29 submarines, respectively. Seven !vlolodki class boats were reportedly transferred in
the second half of 1943, the implication being, of course. that the Soviets suffered no
submarine losses at all in the Black Sea during 1943. Confusing matters further is a Soviet
statement that 1 8 to ] 9 of their -;ubmarines in the Black Sea were serviceable in the first half
of 1 943, and that another two or three became available later in the year. Bac.ed on a starting
inventory of 22, this implies a serviceability rate during the first six months of 1943 of 90 per
cent or better ! This is an unusually high figure for tUI!I navy; in the So\'ict case. it i� simply
extraordinary! lndet'd, the Soviets themselves have provided figures that c.:�st this claim in
serious doubt, to say the least. According to Achbsov and 1\n·lovich, 'limited repair
facilities' caused the submarines of the Black Sea Fleet to begin operations in 1944 Vl·'ith a
serviceable strength of 40 per cent. This number reportedly dropped to 32.2 per cent b':/
March. lt is highly implausible that operational readiness could have fallen by 50 per cent or
more in one year's time. The same authors also report that 13 subm.:�rines \Aiere on dutyJt the
end of April, \vhich is close enough to 40 per cent of 29 to seemingly ::.ubstantiatc the Soviet
implied claim of zero submarine lmses during \ 943. Yet, it docs not. For, starting in the early
spring of ] 944, the Black Sea Fle(:'t had begun to receive large reinforcements from the other
theatre::.. Four tvf11lodk-J class submarine:, \VtTC shipped overland from the Arctic Fleet. ten
came from the Pacific, and one more was delivered after tri<:�ls in the Caspian Sea. Thec.e
additions more than made up for the seven sinking::. in 1 943 claimed by the Germans. and
could furthermore readily account for the ability of the Black Sea Fleet to deploy 1 3
submarines i n spite of a serviceability rate of 40 per cent or less.
The l944 offensive by the Black Sea Fleet against the retreating Germans relied mainly on
aircraft. A Soviet history of this campaign year offers little explanation for the relative
inactivity of the submarines other than citing the aforementioned low availability rate.
Those submarines that did go to sea were most active in the course of the German

71
evacuation of the Crimea. Seven to eight cruised almost continuously between Sevastopol
and Romanian ports, and were reportedly responsible for destroying 13 vessels.
The campaign in the Black Sea ended on the Soviet side of the ledger with 2 I 7 Axis
vessels with a gross registered tonnage of 3 I 7 522 sunk. Thirty-three of the enemy's losses
in shipping that the Soviets have claimed was the work of submarines, ie approximately 72
ships with a total displacement of some 105 000 gross registered tons. Again, the Soviets
have not announced their submarine losses. Meister has calculated that they amounted to
28.

N o rthern Fleet opera t i o ns

The Northern Fleet was preparing to celebrate the eighth anniversary of its establishment.
when its commander-in-chid, Rear Admiral G G Golovko, received the order on 19 June
I 9 4 1 to prepare his submarines for sea. The brigade consisted of three divisions and an order
of battle as follows :

1 s t Division: K 1, K.2, and 0.3

2nd Division: 5hrh.401, 402, 403, 404, 421, and 422
3rd Division: six Ma!odki types

In addition, the Northern Fleet had available five modern and three older destroyers, three
torpedo boats and 20 torpedo craft, 12 mine warfare vessels, and a variety of auxiliaries,
including a few icebreakers. Its naval air arm counted 1 1 6 aircraft.
Although small compared with the other fleet areas, the Northern Fleet had one very
important advantag e : an open exit to the Arctic Sea afforded it wide manoeuvring room and
ensured an - albeit tenuous - line of communications with the rest of the world, including its
Anglo-American allies. Two routes connected the Fleet with the open ocean. The first and
most important one led around Norway's North Cape to the Atlantic Ocean. Next, the
Northern Sea Route skirted the Siberian landmass and the permanent icepack of the North
Pole to provide passage to the Pacific Ocean. Both routes were risky, however. The
westward passage rounded German-occupied Norway. whereas the Arctic passage could be
safely negotiated only about two months out of the year.
A third route used by the Northern Fleet to receive reinforcements was the Stalin Canal.
Built in the I 930s, it connected the White Sea with Leningrad via a series of lakes and
interconnecting canals. The canals were large enough to accommodate ships up to 3000
tons.
The German-Finnish offensive in the northernmost tip of Europe was aimed at forestalling
a possible Soviet threat against German-occupied Norway. Key enemy objectives were the
Northern Fleet's principal naval bases and airfields, and the severance of the Murmansk
railway. As elsewhere in their Russian offensive, the Germans failed to exploit the full
advantages of seapower. Instead of assaulting the bases at Murmansk and Polyarny directly
from the sea, they placed their hopes on a conventional attack across land. The advance went
according to plan for a few weeks, but by the close of 1 94 I , the frontline ground to a halt on
the Litsa river, about halfway between Petsamo and Murmansk. Here, the two sides would
face one another until the German retreat in I 944. Throughout, Murmansk and Polyarny
remained fully operational. Both sides' efforts at sea settled down to breaking the other's line
of communications. For the Germans, the principal naval target were the Allied convoys to
Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. The Soviets concentrated their submarine efforts on the
enemy's coastal supply trade.

72
Open i n g moves

While operations on land slowed down to �tatic vvarfare, both sides proceeded to reinforce
their respective naval contingents. In early July 1 9 4 1 , the Germans :,ent a fcvv U -boats cdong
vvith the 6th Destroyer Flotilla to bPgin opcratiuns off the Kola coast. The next month. the
Soviets used the Stalin Canal to tran�fcr three 'K' type:, ( K. 2 1 , 22, 23). ln September
additional units arrived via the same route. including the St{/liwf::. class boats vvith hull
numbers 5. 1 0 1 and 102, plus at least one further 'K' type \ K.3). Complementing the
underwater order of battle at the end of August were h·vo partially finished Lmincl::. typt>c­
and, reminiscent of the period 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 7, two British submarines
Nine of thC' 1 5 submarines in the Arctic Fleet were at sea on 22 june. Two had been
ordered to take up defensive po<;i tions off the Kola Fjord. three guarded Rybachy (Fi�her)
Peninsula \vith its artillery defences overlooking Motovsky Bay, and four were deployed
between the Varanger Fjord and the Norwegian port city of Hammerfest. ShciJ-4t12 has been
reported as the first Arctic Fleet submarine to attack German shipping. According to the
Soviet account, a vessel was sunk at anchor at Honningsvag, at the entrance to the
Por�angen Fjord. The Ccrman version of events acknowledges that an attack vvas made. but
insists that Sl�t-11-402\ torpedoes exploded harmlessly on the rocb near the ship.
After the first feVI' patrols. tht.' Arctic Flet>t reorganised its submarine patrol schedule to
better accommodate the different ranges cm d endurance of each class of boats. The smaller
,\-Ju!odki types would henceforth cruise among the skerries in the Varanger and Tana Fjords;
the medium-si?e S!Jrlw/.:n class boats were assigned to the area west of the Tana Fjord as far
as North Cape, Jnd the large 'K' types deployed JS far west a<; Vest Fjord between the
Lofoten and the Norwegian mainland. Besides attacking shipping. the vessels, particularly
the 'K' class, were frequently detailed to lay mine barrages.
Sovid hisl.oricms have modified (meaning reduced) claimed enemy shipping kw:;es in the
Arctic during 1 94 1 on scverJl occasions. Achkaso\· and Pavlovich do not cite specific
numbers of vessels or tonnages sunk. Instead. they mere! y confirm that 40 enemy transports
plus several small warships fell prey to submarines during the 'first period of the war·.
Elsewhere in their book, they compare the opponent\ overall wartime submarine-inflicted
lo�scs of I 84 47 5 gross regi.'>!ereJ tons with hi� alleged loss or 1 2 0 000 lons during I 943
Jnd 1944 Jlonc. Based on these numbers, the \iodhern Flec·t's submarines would have
reduced the amount of German shipping space during 1 94 I and 1 942 by less than 65 000
gro'>s registered tons
l'he amount of submarine-inflicted destruction in the Arctic region during 1 94 1 WJS
evidently less than ::,atisfadory. Achkasov and Pavlovich have commented on 'negligible
results' and the 'poor sucres� of submarine operations in the early months of the war'. MJny
nf their rca'>nns are identical to the ones gi\·en for the problems of the Baltic and Black St'a
f!eds: inadequate support from reconnaissance Jircraft, the false economy of trying to inflict
a 'kill' with a single torpedo. and the ovnly-static positional p<:�trol method.
The most versatile submarine type i n the Northern Fleet was the 'K' class. The boat's I DO
mm gun b<1ltery usually outcla::,sed the opponent's escorts, and there have been sevtTJl
occasions in which J 'K' out-duelled a surface opponent. Its principal weapon against
Cerman convoy traffic. however, vvas a large load-out of mines. A standard tactic wa<., to
strew mines in the path of the advancing enemy ships.
Important defensive operations wen' carried out on behalf of the Allied convoys. One
tactic was the use of a so-called 'suspended screen'. whereby· four or five submarines '"' ould
in terpose themselves betvvecn the enemy-held Norwegian coastline and the convoy route.
Once the convoy had passed through the danger area. the submarines Vl'ould switch hack to
offensive operations against German coastal traffic. The Soviets claim to have sunk 45
transports \Vith o total gross �egistered tonnage of 45 000 during 1942. The opposite ::,idt'

73
has admitted to about one-half of these numbers. German records also disclaim the Soviet
report that a torpedo attack by K.21, on 5 July 1 942, damaged the battleship Tirpifz, forcing
the latter to cancel a planned attack against Allied convoy PQ- ·1 7.
German and Soviet records are in agreement that the Northern Fleet lost nine submarines
during the course of 1942. Newly-commissioned into the fleet during the same year were
L.20 and 22, and two or three Ma!odki types. A further five Mnfodkis (i'v1.105 through 108)
rna y have arrived in late 1 942, but probably did not become fully operational until the ::.pring
of the next year.
Substantial reinforcements arrived in 1 943. They included eight 5fn!iHcf:. types, two
A1nlodkis, and L.lS. The latter, in company with 5-5 1 and 5-54 through 56, arrived after an
eventful journey across two oceans that began in September the year before. Sailing in
groups of two and four, the original complement of six boats set out from their Pacific Fleet
bases into the direction of the Panama Canal. After a stop-over in Dutch Harbor, Alaska. L -
1 5 and L. 1 6 were nearing their next port of call, San Francisco, when L . 1 6 was struck by one
or more torpedoes and sank. Although the evidence is still not foolproof. most non-Soviet
sources are agreed that the responsible party was probably the Japanese 1-25. Soviet sources
have speculated that the culprit may have been an American submarine.

Operat i o n s i n 1 943-44

Submarine action in the Arctic waters during 1943 and 1944 followed the pattern set in
1942. Six submarines were typically on station off the Norwegian fjords, waiting to
intercept the small German supply convoys and independent sailings. Co-operation with
aircraft for reconnaissance purposes increased as the naval air arm began to receive more
aircraft. The daily patrol routine was very much affected by the changing seasons. During
the Arctic summer, perpetual daylight forced the submarines to interrupt their standing
patrols and move further out to sea to reacharge the batteries. Unfortunately, the submerged
trip back to station exhausted much of the newly-stored energy.
As time went by, the submarines of the Arctic Fleet became more proficient, but so did the
opponent's countermeasures. Additional minefields were planted in the Kola Bay and Kara
Sea, and as the Germans tightened their escort screens, Soviet submarines were forced to
open up the range for torpedo attack. Responding to the heightened effectiveness of
German anti-submarine measures, the Arctic Fleet resorted increasing\ y to the usc of aircraft
to both attack enemy shipping directly and to strike against the bases of the opponent's
escorting forces. At the end of 1 943. submarines still accounted for most of the enemy
shipping tonnage sunk, aircraft being in second place, but one year later the positions had
reversed when aircraft reportedly destroyed about three times as many vessels as did the
submarines.
The Northern Fleet entered its final year of active hostilities with an official inventory of
23 submarines. During 1944, it was strengthened with the arrival of three ex-British 'U' type
boats, redesignated by the Soviets as the 'V' class. The three vessels ( V-2 through V-4) were
part of what been originally a four-unit transfer arrangement pending Soviet receipt of its
share of the surrendered Italian fleet. V- 1 was lost at sea while en route to her new Northern
bases; V-2 through V-4 were returned to the British in 1949.
At least "I 1 Northern Fleet submarines were at sea in January 1944 to participate in a co­
ordinated air-surface-submarine offensive against enemy shipping in the area off North
Cape. One freighter of some 5000 tons was reportedly sunk. A second combined operation
was staged in the second half of February, again with negligible results. It was on this
occasion that 5. 56 became the first Soviet submarine to make a submerged attack on the basis
of acoustic information only.

74
 Submarines v..rerc teamed up with aircraft or torpedo boats on several more occasions, but
results were disappointing. The bulk of enemy losses was attributable to the increasingly'
potent Air Force and !\a val Air Arm. Some Soviet writers ha\'C' blamed insufficient numbers
of submarines. But if this is so, the question is begged why more submarimes were not
transferred away from the Pacific Flee!. Throughout the vvar, the �izc of the Pacific submarine
force matched (and sometimes exceeded} the combined forces in the three-war-fighting
theatres. Certainly, the likelihood of a Japanest.· attack after the defeat at M1dway in )utw
1 94 2 was practically zero.
Drawing up a final balance sheet on the performance of the Soviet submarine fleet during
the Second World War is a risky undertaking at best. As reported in the opening pages of
this chapter, the main problem i� the SoVJt:>t refusal to fully disclose their war records. It is not
obvious what gain can be had by treating the 'after-action' reports on events more than 40
years ago as state secrets. Indeed, it may have precisely the opposite effect, and help
perpetuate the generally low e�teem that is held in the West of Soviet wartime performance.
Soviet historians record that their submarine fleet sank a grand total of -+02 437 grms
registered tonnage. German records confirm one-half or less than this number. Reportedly,
altogether 1 0 9 Soviet submarines vvere lost due to enemy action or scuttling. Based on the
Soviet-supplied estimate of enemy sinkings, this translates into an exchange rate of one
submarine lost for every 3 700 enemy tom destroyed.
Soviet sources arc even less precise about the 1JJ111d1er of vessels that made up the 402 -l3 7
tons reputedly sank. The displacement of the average German coastal vessel \"\I" as about 2500
tons. If this criterion is used, it turns out that the sinkings of about 1 60 vessels vvould ha\'C
been achieved at the cost of more than 1 00 submarines.
Meister has calculated that a total of 272 Soviet submarines ::.avv service at one time or
another during the war years. This suggests that tvvo out of every five operating boats were
destroyed. By comparison, the Germans lost tvv·o of every three submarines placed into
service, and the United States two of every l l . Tabk 10 compares the performance of the
German and American submarine fleeb with the (inferred) accomplishments of the Soviets.

Table 10: Soviet submarine performance in the Second World War compared •vith the United
States and Germany

Merchant ships Merchant ships

Country period Number of submarines sunk by sunk per
in servi ce submarines submarine lost

luitiaf 1"1>tnl Lu�f ,l1}m11hcr ��HIIIIISC }\'!mdwr T('llllii_�e

.---··- ·

Germany 1 939-6.'42 57 •w 78 1602 7 860 000 20 . .5 IOO 800

Germany 7:'42-1945 331 1080 '70:- 1 226 6 827 000 1.7 9700
Germany 1939-1945 57 I 162 785 2808 1 4 687 00l) .'1 .6 I S 700
USA 1 94 2 - 1 9 4 5 111 288 _'i 2 1 1 78 4 860 000 23.0 93 500
USSR 194 1- 1 9 4 5 218 272 109 160 402 4 3 7 1.5 J692
---·· -----

Source for German and US data is Cemge R Limhcy, 'Tactical Anti-Submarine Warbre:
The Past and Future". Adelphi Paper i\:o 1 2 2 , spring 1972.

The most obvious contrast that shows up in Table 10 is the relatively poor record of the
Soviets in terms of merchant tonnage sunk versus submarines lost. The German statistics
become comparable for the period after July 1 942, ie after the U -boats had lost the Battle of
the Atlantic.
One difficulty with compcirisons such as the one above is that much depends on one"s

75
measures of effectiveness. For example, the Soviets turn in a somewhat better performance if
they are measured based on the percentage of enemy 'throughput' destroyed. Throughput
in this case means the amount of convoyed tonnage that arrives at its destination unscathed.
In the case of the Western Allies, the overall loss in convoyed throughput for the duration of
the war was 0. 7 per cent. No comparable overall figures are available for the volume of Axis
shipping tonnage that travelled in convoy. But a few isolated figures may be suggestive of
Soviet performance based on the throughput criterion. For example, German war records
report that 1 300 000 tons of escorted shipping moved in the Black Sea during 1943. The
same records also show the loss of 28 000 tons; the Soviet claim is 35 000 tons. This implies
that Soviet submarines were responsible for eliminating 2.2 to 2.5 per cent of the enemy's
throughput. A similar calculation for the Northern theatre in the same year is much more
sensitive to a wide variation in losses claimed and admitted. The submarine-inAicted loss rate
to German convoy traffic based on German records was 0.4 per cent; the Soviet claim results
in a loss of 2.4 per cent. Yet, even the lower number is comparable with the performance of
the U -boats.
Perhaps the truest measure for judging the Soviet submarine Aeet is a qualitative one. Two
considerations merit attention : first, the unusudlly difficult circumstances in which it had to
carry out its duties, and secondly, 'mission asymmetry'. With regard to the first, one need
only compare the Soviet and Anglo-American histories of the Second World War in order to
quickly realise that the Soviets fought a land war. and the Western Allies an ocmnic war. The
heroic moments in the British and American chronologies turn on events at sea: Dunkirk,
Pearl Harbor, Midway, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Normandy invasion. For the Soviets,
the war was decided at Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad. and Kursk. By the same token, the
fortunes and misfortunes of the Soviet Navy and its submarines were shaped by success or
failure on land. For the Anglo-Americans, the sea was the medium for choosing the point of
attack on land; the Soviet Union's constricted maritime geography ensured that the
relationship was quite the reverse. The Soviet fleet in the Second World War was more than
an assistant of the Army - it was a dependent!
As to the matter of mission asymmetry, it is important to remember that the German and
American submarine fleets enjoyed the 'luxury' of being able to concentrate their efforts
almost exclusively against their opponents' sea lines of communications. The Soviet
submarines had to divide their responsibilities among a variety of offensive and defensive
tasks: disrupt enemy seagoing traffic, protect friendly and Allied convoys, provide
amphibious transportation for troops, guard ports and harbours, etc The Soviets, in other
words, had fewer opportunities to raise the scoreboard. It may be argued that the Soviets
used their submarines for the wrong purposes; giving up the submarine's offensive
capability in order to evacuate a few troops is certainly a questionable choice between cost
and effectiveness. Yet. because of past mistakes, primarily Stalin's fancy with an 'offensive'
battlefleet in place of a balanced combination of an oj_fensive submarine force. supported by a
modern and defensive fleet of gun-, mine warfare- and anti-submarine-heavy craft and vessels
had served to preclude such a choice.
In conclusion, it is simply impossible to arrive at an objective assessment of the
productivity of the Soviet submarine fleet in their Great Patriotic War. It is true enough that
it had little or no effect on the outcome of the conflict. All the same, western naval planners
should tread carefully when they attempt to draw lessons from events and circumstances
more than four decades ago when they evaluate the potential wartime capability of the
modern-day Soviet fleet.

76
P r i n c i p a l sources

The principz!l non-Snvid source on the naval dimension of the Great Patriotic War are thP post-action
report� of German naval unit:. av;Jilahle in microfilm at the US l\aval Archives in Washington, DC
Excellent secondary non-Soviet �ource� ;Jfl' ]Lirg Meister'� Sot'id VVm·shiv� ot tl1c Sc'''nd V\'or/d VVm·. J
Roh>ver and C I !UmmC'Ichcn's two-volume ClmHJologtl <l( llu· VVm· ul Seu, and friedrich Rugc's Tl1c
S.1uid., 11.- Nm>al OppilllCI!/-5 1 0 4 I - / 9 ..f '> _ Th(' best current semi-affinal Soviet account is Sol'JCt {\/am/
Opcmlw11� 111 ilrt· Crcnl Pntru>flc VV11r J G 4 J - I cJ45 by \' I Ach k asov zmd 1\ 13 Pavlovich
5 Postwar reconstruction
194 5-1960

Western fears a n d Soviet rea l it ies

Winston Churchill called the Allied victory over the German submarine fleet in the Second
World War a 'close-run thing'. Only a few months after the U-boats had raised the black flag
of surrender, suspicion waxed among Western naval planners that the next battle against the
submarine would be even more trying. The US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Chester
W Nimitz, wrote in a secret report in January 1946 that it was 'evident that our present anti­
submarine forces will be unable to cope with the submarine of the future with the same
degree of effectiveness as attained in the past war'. Developing new countermeasures, he
declared a few months later, was as important as finding ways for the fleet to survive the
newest weapon of war, the atomic bomb.
Nimitz did not cite the Soviet Union by name, but it was obvious that this was the only
potential opponent he had in mind. After the Second World War, the Soviet submarine fleet
was the only conceivable threat to what was otherwise an overwhelming Anglo-American
command of the world's oceans. The numerical strength of the Soviet underwater navy was
the immediate concern; more ominous for the future, however, was the prospect of the
Soviets taking advantage of German wartime submarine developments. Much of this
technology was considerably more advanced than that produced by the Allies and had in
many cases outpaced prevailing anti-submarine warfare capabilities and tactics.
The Soviet Union, along with its principal wartime allies, the United States and Great
Britain. had become the recipient of a wide range of German technological know-how in
submarine design, propulsion plants, and weapon systems. Complete ex-German Navy
submarines were allocated to the Soviet Union in 1946 under the auspices of a tripartite (US­
British-Soviet) naval commission established after the Potsdam Conference in the summer of
the year before. In addition, the Soviets embarked upon their version of 'Operation
Paperclip', and removed thousands of German technicians and scientists, along with tons of
technical documentation and hardware in various stages of completion, from their
occupation zone. It is not known precisely how many German submarine design and
construction personnel ended up in the Soviet Union; a commonly-mentioned figure is
4000.
Next to acquiring an unknown number of partially assembled submarines, the Soviets
dismantled for shipment home entire construction and assembly facilities. Among the latter
were the Schichau and Danzig yards in Danzig and several smaller plants in the area of
Stettin. Most of the equipment taken at Schichau found a new home at the Nikolayev Yard
on the Black Sea.
The German submarine development in Soviet hands that most worried US and Britain
naval authorities was the Type XXI submarine. A total of 1 I 8 of these 1 8 19-ton (submerged
displacement) vessels were built between June 1944 and April 1945, but only two had
departed on operational patrols before the war ended. This short-lived operational career
was fortunate for the Allies, for the teams of US and British scientists and operating
personnel that inspected the craft after the war quickly discovered that. had it been deployed
in quantity, victory in the Battle of the Atlantic would most certainly have been delayed. The
Type XXI revolutionised submarine warfare as much as the first nuclear-powered submarine,
the USS Nautilus (SSN 5 7 1 ) would ten years later. Designed to navigate and fight primarily
in a submerged condition, she was streamlined, incorporated a snorkel system, and

78
The most advanced submarine at the close of the Second VVorld VVar V..'as the Cerman Type XXL
Derided (after extensive con1versionl is one of two Type XXb received by thl' US Navy. The
Soviet Union's share ;..vas four (US )\}oJvyJ.

po"sesscd a battery capacity that c1llovved a sustained underwater speed of ! 2 to I o knots

The Type X X I \ predecessors could keep up J. submerged speed of Four tP fivt• knoh !o1
onl:y --1-5 minute� T'.\'Cl .:\3 kdowatt · creeping' motors \VlTC installed for silent running at
"�weds up to six knots.
It ;..vas thi.., combination of capJ.bilihes that compelled the leadership of the US NJ.vy in the
late 1 940s to lake a dim view of the outcome of i1 future anti-submarine campaign. Had the
Type XXI be�·n introduced earlier in the \Var, concluded one report in 1 946, 'our barrier
patrols, search plans, escort of convoy plans, and hunter-killer tactics (would haw been)
rendered ineffective'.
US intelligence experts had no doubts tktt the Sovietc. vven' both l·apab\c of and intent
upon rapidly absorbing and exploiting the Type XXI for their mvn purposes. It WJ.s
estimated, moreover, that once the Soviet Union had mastered the submarine's sophisticated
design features, it v.rmtld promptly embark upon a massive programme of series
construction. Only four months after V -1 Day, the OfAce of Naval Intelligence (ON!)
vvarned : 'In vievv of the performance of German submarines, the strides made by German
indu<>try in their mass production, and the availability of German talent, a radical change in
Rus�ian submarine design philoc.ophy may he reasonably expected in the next few years'.
The Potsdam tripartite naval commission had presented the Sovid Union with four
complete Type XXI submarines ( Ll-2529, U-303S, U-J tl:/-7, and U-35 15). Additionally, an
unknovvn number of partially completed hulk plus some section,1l subassemblies, Wt>re
recovered by the Soviets at the Schichau Yard in DanLig. ONI estimated in the summer of
1 948 that the Soviet submarine Aeet included four operational Type XX!s, vvhile an equal
number was beliewd being completed. This combined total of eight was close to ONJ's
projection two years earlier, bul the intelligence organisation's evaluation of the scale of lhc
Soviet Union's Type XXI construction effort wa:. a far cry from its prediction, in 1 946, that
no fewer than 300 units V•iould be completed by ! 950. Yet. ewn a� ON! reV('alt-d its
moderated estimate of the Soviet Type XXI threat, Navy Secretary John L Sullivan told a
Navy League audience that Soviet production of the Type XXI was running at 20 to 30 units

79
 per year, and would increase to 200 before the close of 195 1 . This force, the Secretary
warned, would join 350 'conventional' boats for a combined submarine fleet 'vastly superior
to any operated by the German Navy during World War II'. The New York Times military
correspondent, Hanson W Balwin, reported Sullivan's prediction in March 1948, but
commented that it seemed 'excessive'.
Predictions of Soviet progress in large-scale production of the Type XXI turned out to be
far in excess of extant technological and manufacturing capabilities. Ultimately, only the four
units received under the tripartite agreement served with the fleet. Even so, it is questionable
whether they ever joined the operational brigades. It is quite likely that they were used for
basically the same experimental purposes as the American two-unit allotment. The US
experience with the Type XXI became the basis for the US Navy's Tong class of submarines.
The Soviets most likely used their tests and trials to refine the designs of the 'Whiskey' and
'Zulu' classes.
�_The ·dif.fio..dty of reliable intelligence was part of the reason why estimates of Soviet
·subniarine (aht:l oth,er military) capabilities during the first decade after the Second World
'
War W e�e conimonl)r biased by what was thought the Soviets might do rather than could do.
Space-b�sed
. sUrveillance systems to keep track of shipyard construction did not come into
·
.
.
e ; ·ist @c � · ·until the early 1 960s. With the 'Iron Curtain' hermetically closed to foreigners,
Western intel.)igence analysts in the late ·r940s and early 1 950s were heavily dependent on
. titbits -Of information brought in by repatriated Germans. Their reports were frequently
.LmF�Ifa_b).e. afld contradictory. Few were skilled or. for that matter. objective observers. Their
.

partiCipation in military or semi-military projects had usually been very specialised. so that
they rarely could elaborate on the status of a programme as a whole. One result was that
reports of Soviet experimentation or even of an expressed interest in a given technology area,
tended to be interpreted as indicative of an established military programme and intention.
I ntentions aside. the Soviet shipyard industry in the late 1940s was simply not in the
position to support a novel design and construction programme such as the Type XXI on the
scale predicted. Sullivan's forecast of an annual production of 200 units was admittedly far
below Germany's actual output of about 350 U-boats a year in 1943 and 1944. But the
German feat included all types of submarines, with most being much smaller, less capital and
labour-intensive. and less sophisticated than the Type XXI. Furthermore, Germany had been
building U -boats at peak capacity under wartime conditions, and at the expense of other
armament programmes. Most important, German submarine production had reached the
peak of the 'learning curve'; it had mastered, through wartime experience and a superior
military-technological base, the technological and production intricacies of managing a
high-volume, yet high-quality submarine building programme. During the war, Germany
commissioned over 1 1 00 new ocean-going submarines; the Soviet Union less than 60.
At the end of the war, the great naval building yards at Leningrad and Nikolayev were a
shambles. Rudolf Lusar wrote in the January 1954 issue of the US Naval Institute's
Proceediuss that the yards were back in complete working order before the end of 1 94 5 . ln
reality. they did not recover until about five years later.
Estimates of the number of submarines built during the immediate post-war years vary
considerably. Siegfried Breyer's Die Seeriisfuns der Sowjefunion which was published in I 964,
reported that about 50 were completed at the end of 1 950. One set of ONI data, based on
post-war completion dates. suggests that the number was much closer to 90.
Meister has calculated that the Soviet submarine inventory at the end of the Second
World War numbered 1 73. Table 1 I shows ONJ's estimate of the Soviet submarine order of
battle in early I950. When allowance is made for the 18 German and ltalian 'war prizes', it
turns out that Soviet yards would have delivered a near-five year grand total of 95
submarines. This converts to an annual production of almost 22 submarines.

80
Table 1 1 : Soviet submarine Order of Battle. 1 February 1 9 50

Num ber 'Ocean Patrol' '] ypt>s

4 ex-German Type XXI

2 ex -German Type IXC
5 ex-German Type VIIC
3 'K types
8 'B' (Lenir1el-:: Series 111?)
10 'K' class
34 Sfalhwf:. class
16 Leninel-z Series II class
8 Lenind:. Series I clas� (0)
2 Pruud11 class (Q)

'Medium Range' Types

62 Shchuka class
2 ex-Italian type�
16 5/rchuka class (0)

'Coastal' Types

2 ex -German Type XXII!

104 l'vfnlodh:i class
6 Malodki class {0)
3 ex -German Type II (0)
1 ex- Estonian Lemhi

Nofe: {OJ = obsolescent and considered available only for training and hmited operations

Source: ON!. Submarine Tahul11fwn, February 1 , !950. De-classified.

More important than numbers per se is the obvious fact that Soviet submarine forces on the
eve of the Korean War were little different in numbers or quality than those on the eve of the
Second World War. Every one of the boats that left the building ways between 1 9 4 5 and
1950 were pre-war designs. With the exception of some of the ex-German types, none were
fitted with the one piece of equipment that the Germans had found to be essential to survive
Allied anti-submarine warfare capabilities: the Sclmorchrl (snorkel).
Having said this. it is only fair to add that (a) there is no certainty what Stalin's plans for a
war against the West were in fad. and (b) Admiral Kuznctsov's own declared goal. in 1 948,
of a 1 200-::.trong submarine fleet gave reasonable grounds for the V\lest's worst fears.

The Soviet ' a n t i - S L O C t h reat'

It took until the late 1 960s for most students of Soviet naval affJirs to conclude that the
Soviet submarine fleet of the early I 950s was neither capable of nor probably intent upon a
tonnage war U-boat style. The view was different during the formative years of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Even though the Western Alliance increasingly depended on
the USA's 'Great Deterrent', planners feared that an initial and short atomic exchange would
evolve into a drawn-out conventional conflict on the pattern of the last world war. Again, a
submarine-strong enemy would seek to stop the arrival of American reinforcements and
resupplies. The U K Sfub:me11f of Def('IICC of 1 9 5 4 called it 'broken-backed' warfare.
Not untypical of contemporary perceptions of the Soviet submarine danger was a

81
strategic intelligence estimate, issued by ONI in I 950. It proposed that a Soviet onslaught
against the Western sea routes would encompass virtually every available submarine,
including the diminutive l\/1{/lodki and even those that ONI's own assessments had declared
'obsolescent'.
The Soviet campaign, said ON I, would take its course in two phases : phase one would
have the submarines mine US and Allied ports and harbours. This accomplished, the
opponent would switch to phase two and follow in the footsteps of Hitler's U-boats.
The study predicted that different classes of submarines would probably be deployed to
match their range and endurance characteristics. Thus, the six ex -German Types IX and XXI
would team up with the 'K' and Stalir1dz units to patrol west of Central America and south of
the Equator. The ex-German Type VIIs were expected to join the Leninefz. and Pravda boats
to obstruct traffic between Norfolk, Virginia and the Cape Verde Islands. The Shchu.ka class
would attack shipping north of a line extending between Cape Farewell, Greenland and
Gibraltar. Finally, all submarines classified 'coastal', including the lvfo!odkis, would range as
far south as the British Isles and Northern France.
It is precisely this kind of scenario that has given the term 'worst case' analysis a
derogatory connotation. Its premises and conclusions were excessively dominated by
'mechanistic' calculations of the most basic of enemy material capabilities - range and
endurance. The ONI analysts calculated that "I 70 submarines were capable of operations on
the high seas, but that only ( ! ) SO per cent would be readily available for such duty. The
agency took its clue apparently from the German experience in its estimate that normally
one-third of the available force would be on station.
The result of these different 'baseline' and inferred numbers would have been a 'steady
state' forward presence of about 45 submarines. This number is close to the size of the U ­
boat fleet on Atlantic patrol between late J 942 and the middle o f 1943. But, Germany's daily
operational availability at the time was only 25-26 per cent - not SOl Moreover, the
Germans never committed more than 40 per cent of their operational submarine fleet to the
Atlantic Ocean. The Soviets, on the other hand, were presumed to dedicate their entire
underwater fleet to an oceanic anti-shipping campaign�
Fresh memories of the Second World War combined with an exaggerated fear of Western
vulnerabilities and Soviet military designs to fuel this offensive image of the Soviet
underwater threat. Conclusions today have the benefit of hindsight. In fairness to those
actually responsible for the defence of the West at the time, one should be mindful that the
day-to-day spectre of a four million-strong Red Army, ready to lend a helping hand to
Western Europe's 'proletariat', hardly left room for a different judgment.
The reality of the Soviet naval position in the early 1 950s was that few submarines
possessed the range and endurance to fight a wide-ranging tonnage war. By illustration, the
one-way distance from Murmansk to an imaginary patrol line connecting the American east
coast and the Cape Verdes is about 4000 nautical miles. The maximum economical
endurance of the Series Xlll Lcninetz that ONI postulated would operate there was 10 000
nautical miles; her cruising speed on the surface was in the neighbourhood of seven knots.
This means that a Northern Fleet Leni11etz type would have had to spend nearly 50 days in
transit and consume some 80 per cent of its nominal patrol endurance. Without even
considering the Soviet lack of experience with commerce destruction outside coastal waters,
it should be patently obvious that their submarine fleet of 1950 was far short of the threat
capability it was credited with.
In terms of capabilities and most likely wartime roles and missions, the Soviet Navy of
1950, including its submersible component, had changed little in ten years. Indeed, a strong
argument could be made that the victory over Germany served to strengthen the Soviet
Union's landward orientation and, as a corollary, the Navy's subsidiary role. This is not to
say that the military high command did not appreciate the fact that the next likely opponent

82
would be a maritime coalition that would pose a far greater seaward threat than the Axis.
However, from the Soviet perspective, the key to victory in a potential war with the United
States remained the clash of arms on land. Accordingly. the principal perceived danger of the
Anglo-American navies was their ability to influence the 'correlation of forces' on land by
means of large-scale amphibious assaults. To prevent this from happening, the Navy was
charged with active defence of the coast, at the same time that the Army would complete its
offensive drive to the Atlantic.
The Navy's operational-strategic concept was the same, by and large, that had dominated
plans in the 1 920s and 1 930s. Potential enemy landing areas would bt' safeguarded using the
idea of a layered 'zone defence'. The outermost zone would be defended by dispersed
flotillas of submarines. Admiral Kuznctsov announced, in 1 948, that his Navy had set a goal
of 1200 submarines. The next defensive belt would consist of mineficlds, while the third and
final seaward 'backstop' would be the task of major and minor surface forces. With regard to
the latter, work resumed on the incomp\etcd Chapaycu class cruisers, and plans were put in
motion to build 24 Suerdlol' class cruisers and two 40,000-ton Stlllillsmd class battlecruisers.
Neither the battlecruisers. nor the full complement of 51'erdloPs or the armada of 1200
submarines were ever realised. The death of Stalin, in 1 953, also sounded the deathknell of
the dictator's vision of a traditional 'big navy'. His successor, Nikib Khrushchev, had little
interest in naval matters, and what little he did have lay an entirely different direction.
Khrushchev takes credit for pushing the Soviet Navy, 'kicking and screaming', into the
'revolution in military affairs'. Yet. Khrushchev was no more than the instrument in a
systemic change in threats, weapons and technologies. The transition of the submarine fleet
of the Second World War to the nuclear-powered and rocket-carrying force of the 1 960s
and beyond was f1.10iutinmrr!l, however. Bridging the generation of the Shclwkns and Sta!inet:
of the ! 9.�0s, and the 'November's, 'Echo's. and 'i{otel's of the 1 960s. wt>re the Soviet
Union's first post war generation nf conventional submarines : the 'VVhiskcy', 'Zulu', and
'Quebec' groups.

'Wh i skey'. ' Z u l u ' . a n d 'Quebec'

The lead unit of the class that become knmvn by the NATO designation 'Whiskey' was
completed in 1 9 5 1 at the Krasnaya Sormova Yard in Corki. Production of altogether 236
vessels terminated in 1 9 5 7 after the participation of three more yards - the Baltic Yard in
Leningrad, the Marti Yard in Nikolayev, and the Amur Yard in Komsomolsk. About 50
'Whiskeys' were still reported operational in 1 986.
When the submarine was First obsen·ed. the initial inclination among Western analysts
was to suspect a Typt.' XX! lineage. Tht' balance of opinion today is that. although the boat
probably incorporated some of the features of the Cerman submarine, Soviet design
characteristics predominated. The Soviets themselves have claimed that the design of the
'Whiskey' dates from 1 944, and vvas based on the Sf1l!inctz class.
A comparison of the external characteristics of the 'Whiskey' and Type XXI makes a
common origin doubtful. The Type XXI was highly streamlined, whereas the appearance of
the Soviet vessel is quite conventional, exhibiting, particularly in the early variants. many
protuberances inimical to good underwater speed. The 'Whiskey' has a fairly high freeboard
appropriate for good seakeeping on the surface; the Type XXI' s main deck was only four feet
above the waterline. The layouts of the torpedo tubes are 'luite dissimilar as well: the
German submarine carried all six tubes in the bow, whereas the 'Whiskey" has four tubes
forward and two aft. Another important difference is that the first serie� of 'Whiskeys' were
not equipped with snorkels. The First snorkel-fitted 'Whiskey' was not photographed until
1 95 5 .

83
 The conjecture that the Soviet Union was building a submarine fleet to fight an Atlantic
tonnage war, added to the supposition that the 'Whiskey' marked the successful Soviet
adoption of the Type XXI design, contributed to an overestimate of the new submarine's
capabilities. First ( 1 952-1956) evaluations credited the vessel with a patrol range of 16 500
nautical miles. This was later downgraded to 10 000, and ultimately to 8500 nautical miles.
Based on these new figures, ONI concluded, in 1960, that fewer submarines than previously
estimated were expected to threaten the Allied SLOCs in the Western Atlantic. But, it

Series V 'Whiskey' class submarine (US Navy).

hastened to add, this did not mean that the threat of a tonnage war had become less - the
battle would be concentrated in the Eastern Atlantic instead.
As had the Soviet Union's pre-war submarines, the 'Whiskeys' went through repeated
series modifications. The series I displayed a stepped extension forward of the sail which was
topped by a twin 25 mm anti -aircraft gun. The II variant had a second extension that housed
an open 5 7 mm or 76 mm gun. Intended to engage surface targets, the gun supports the
assessment that the design of the 'Whiskey' did not fully embrace the underwater fighting
philosophy of the Type XXI. The 'Whiskey Ill' kept the same fin shape but without the gun
armament. The 25 mm gun reappeared on the next evolution in the class, the 'Whiskey IV',
which also received a direction finder attached to a new diesel exhaust stack. The stack was,
in fact, the first positive evidence that the Soviets had succeeded in the installation of a
permanent snorkel system. The final Series V had the extension forward of the fin eliminated
along with the flak battery.
Modifications and improvements continued after production halted in I 95 7. The addition
of sonar equipment was discovered in 1 95 7 58. The Tamir hydrophone array Wds installed
inside a bulbous expansion of the bow. Slightly abaft of the bow, just off the centreline on
the weatherdcck, came a small dome containing an attack sonar, known under the NATO
reporting name as Top Hat. The three odour bright metal plates that are arranged on either
side and forward of the sail are believed to act as a passive warning device against
approaching torpedoes. Also observed for the first time in 1 95 7 was the addition of radar
intercept and direction finding device, designated Stop Light.
The 'Whiskey' was a successful design. Evidence includes the numbers built, its service
longevity, and its adaptability to changing mission requirements and. as a result. important
physical modifications. The series were still in full production, when significant numbers
were recalled for various conversions intended to improve the navy's ability to defend
against the stand-off threat of US carrier-borne nuclear air attack. One programme included

84
'\Vhiskey Canvas Bag' wi th 'Boat Sai l ' air search radar deployed rUS 1\avyl.

the conversion of five boats to early warning picket duty. Modificatiom included the
.:tddition of the 'Boat Sail' air search radar and 'Snoop Plate" surface search radar. The
converted boats were dubbed 'Whiskt>y Canva::. Bag' for the tarpaulim that First hid their
radar antennas from preying eyes.
A second - and in the long run more important - convt>rsion was spotted by Western
intelligence in "1957. The presence of cylindrical objects on the decks of several "Whiskey'
types became compelling evidence that long-rumored Soviet attempts to combine the
submarine with the missile had borne fruit. The background and characteristics of the Soviet
Navy's first-generation missile-launching submarines are discussed in the concluding
portion of this chapter. Table I 2 lists the characteristics of the fifth and final variant in the
'Whiskey' scnes.
Table 1 2 : ' Whi ske y' c lass :.uhma rincs

�umber built 2J6

\Vhcn bui lt 195 1 - 1 95 7
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Gorki, Ba lt ic Yard, Leningrad. Marti Yard, Nikolay('v,
Amur Yard, Komsomolsk.
Displacement 1 0 5 5 / I J 5 5 tons
Length 75.9 m (249 ft)
Beam 6.4 m I 2 I ftJ
D rau ght 4.J m r l ..J..2 ft)
Propulsion 4000/2 700 hp
Speed !8.5 i l J . 5 knots
Endurance 6500 nm at 5 knots (<;norkel) JOO nm at 2. .'1 kn ot s
Armament o x 5_n mm ( 2 1 inl TT (4 how, 2 sterni 1 2 torpedoes or 24 mine:.
Diving limit 200 m (656 ftl
Complement 50-60
----

85
One year after the completion of the first 'Whiskey' class boat, the lead unit of a second class
of post-war submarines left the ways at the Sudomekh Yard. The advanced hull form of the
2500-ton (submerged displacement) of what came to be known as the 'Z' or 'Zulu' class was
clearly derived from the German Type XXI. The boat was much more streamlined than
earlier submarines and it was marked by the numerous floodholes that had been a prominent
feature of the Type XXI. In contrast with the German vesseL however, the early 'Zulu'
v ariant s s t i l l <.:arne equipped with medium calibre surface gunnery.
The 'Zulu's propulsion system has been a source of controversy over the years. Some
sources have reported that the original design called for a Walter closed -cycle drive, but that
technical problems (similar perhaps to those allegedly experienced with the 'Quebec' class)
forced the Soviets to settle on a conventional diesel-electric powerplant. The declassified
pages of the ON! Review offer no hint on this issue. The 'Zulu's' installed horsepower and
attendant endurance has also been a question mark. A few publications continue to claim a
propulsive power on the surface of 10,000 hp, and initial intelligence assessments credited
the submarine with an endurance of 26 000 nautical miles at an average speed of ten knots.
Actual performance figures are considerably less ambitious. Intelligence estimates since the
early 1 960 have rated the 'Zulu's powerplant at 6000 hp, and have calculated a cruising
range of 9500 nautical miles at an average surface speed of eight knots.
Series production of the 'Zulu' came to an end in 1 9 5 7 with the completion of the 26th
unit. Eighteen were delivered by the Sudomekh Yard, while Severodvinsk was responsible
for the balance. This second yard also built six variants - the 'Zulu V' - that carried the
Soviet Navy's First ballistic missiles. Two units, renamed Lim and Vega, were converted for
oceanographic research.

'Zulu IV' class submarine (US Navy)

86
Table 1 3 : Serie� IV 'Zulu' cla�s submarines

Number buil t 2o
Wht>n built ! 9.5 2 - 1 9 .5 �
'A1here built Sudonwkh Yard. Len ingrad , Yard ·-ll12 , Scvewdvmsk
Dispbcement 2 ! 00:' 2 .5 l1Ll tons
Length 90 m l295 ft)
Beam 7.9 m l2t' ft)
Draugh t 6 m ( 1 9 . 7 ft'i
Propulsion 600L1:'5300 hp
Speed 18.5 1 6 knoh
Endurance YSOO nm at 8 knots.' 250 nm at .� .2 knots
Arm,1ment Ill X 5J3 mm ( 2 1 in) TT (6 bmv. 4 stern). 2 2 torpedoes or ..J...J. mines
Diving limit 230 m 1 � s o ft)
Comp lement

The third interim group of post -\Var submarines was designa ted the 'Quebec' class.
Although much smaller than the 'Whiskeys' and 'Zulus". the initial inclination in the West
was to credit it with per�orman ce G!pabilities disproportionate to it ..., size. The 'Quebecs"
were briefly thought to be the crowning achievement of a ten -year Soviet effort to perfec t
the Walter clo::.ed-c yde propulsion system. Named after its German inventor, tht· system
used a hydrogen-peroxide solution to power the propelling turbines. Its principal advantage
was that a submarine <;O driven would be independent of an external zm supply (as i s the
modern nuclear-powered submarind. VVartime experiments had abo shown the plant
capable of delivering a 'burst speed' up t o 24 knots. Although variou<:; design problems had
kept the German experiments from progres::.ing to the operational stage, the principle had
shown enough promise for Cermany"s ershvhilc enemies. cspec i .1 lly Creat Britain and t h e
Soviet Union, t o tempor.1rily
: pursue i t s realisation v,.- ith a c onsiderable inve�tment i n talt·nt
and money
The W::dter plant 'v\-'aS one closed-cy c le system that intrigued submarine designers of thl'
1 940s. Another system - also a German development - vva'-' the so-called Krcislmt({rnt.'aning
'closed cyde') dit·sel. The Krris!llltf d i d not produce the concentrated energy output of the
W<Jlter, but it had the advantage of not depending on scarce h;.rdrogen-peroxide. The engine
operated in the usual fashion on the surface; \vhen submt•rgcd . it rc!ea'-'ed only part of the
exhaust while the rest. cooled and purified, vvas re-introduced along with pure oxygen.
Intelligenc e reports in the 1 950s suggested that Soviet clnscd-cy·c\c work favoured the
Krcislllid d iesel over the \A../alter system. Re<1sons, according t o t h ese reports. vvere relative
si mpli c ity, cost, and case of installation. One experimental submarim' may have been
powered by the en gine in 1 95 5 .
Evidently, the Soviet attempt t o mate the 'Quebec' with a Krcis/m rf"povverplanl met with
failure. Repeated eng i neering and human casualties earned the submarine the nickname
'Cigarette Lighter'. The group of 30 was fitted \Vith il conventional triple diesel plant .
Some sources still cite the early estimate nf a cruising range of 700l1 nautical miles; the
adual nu mber i s mu ch more modest. in 1 958, ON! reduced the end urance of the 'Quebec' t o
-l500 nautical miles; n e x t to 3800 nautica1 mi les, and finally. i n ! 960, tn 2 7 5 0 nautical miles
If this final calculation i <; correct, the 'Quebec" cannot be treated other than as a very short­
range 'interceptor' submarine, intended for little or no more than the coastal defence function
of the ,-V/1t!odkis of the 1 930s.

87
Table 1 4 : 'Quebec' class submarines

Number built JO
When built 1 954- 1 9 5 7
Where built Sudomekh Yard, Leningrad
Displacement 420/ 5 1 0 tons
Length 56.4 m (185 H)
Beam 5.5 m ( I B ft)
Draught 4. 1 m ( 1 3 . 5 ft)
Propulsion 1650./1900 hp
Speed 16.-'8 knots
Endurance 2750 nm at 10 knots/ 144 nm at 4 knots
Armament 4 x 533 mm ( 2 1 -in) bow TT, 8 torpedoes or 12 mines
Diving limit 1 3 7 m (450 ft)
Complement 40

Counte ri ng the American C a rrier Fleet: Early m i ssi le

developments

On I October 1955, the US Navy accepted the USS Forrestal (CV 59), the first of repeated
generations of 'super carriers'. The Forresfa!'s deckload of A3D Skywarrior jet bombers
represented the US Navy's contribution to America's declaratory strategy of 'massive
retaliation' against Soviet aggression at 'times and places of its choosing'.
The nuclear-capable aircraft carrier changed the Soviet Union's naval defensive priorities;
the importance of defeating an amphibious assault force gave way to the even greater
importance of 'neutralising' the carrier threat and limitation of atomic damage to the
homeland.
A principal Soviet counter-weapon to this day is the submarine-launched anti-ship
missile. But it is not true that this weapon was developed as the discrete response to a specific
(anti-carrier) requirement - the promise of the anti-ship missile happened to (partially) fill the
need for some way to stymie the new American 'offensive'. The fact of the matter is that the
Soviets began work on a ship- and submarine-carried missile capability almost ten years
before the commissioning of the Torrestal. The initial intent and result was an anti-land crui se
missile, but throughout the development process, an important side effort was focused on
ways and means of using missiles against ships.

E a rl y s u b m a r i n e m issi l e deve lopments

The fact that the 'Whiskey', 'Zulu', and 'Quebec' programmes all terminated in the same
year, 1 9 5 7, prompted intense speculation among Western intelligence specialists whether
the Soviet Union was about to launch its first nuclear-powered submarine, possibly armed
with missiles. ONI took stock of the slow-down in Soviet naval construction generally. and
concluded, in 1 958, that the Soviet Navy would probably 'soon adapt missiles and nuclear
propulsion to all classes of warships and return to full-scale construction geared to the
nuclear age'. Herbert Scoville, the assistant director for scientific intelligence for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) seconded this appraisal. In secret testimony before the Armed
Services Committee of the US Senate, he opined that the curtailment in Soviet production of
conventional submarines probably foreshadowed the introduction of new missile-carrying
nuclear types.
Reports of Soviet experimentation with missiles launched from the decks of submarines

88
had hltered through the 'Iron Curtain' since about 1 948. It has been established that early
Soviet tests did approximately coincide, in fact. 'ovith similar efforts carried out in the United
States. On 1 2 February 1 94 7, the converted Gnto class submarine USS CrJsk (55 34 8) became
the first Western submarine to successfully launch a missile, the LTV N - 2 Loon. The Loon
was a copy of the German wartime FZC 76 (Fi IO,i ). better known as the V 1 'buzz bomb'.
The Americans had produced their version of the FZC 76 since 1 94 4 ; the Soviets had to
wait until the surrender of Germany. It is not certain whether Moscow acquired any intact
samples (although it seem-; plausible in light of the tens of thousands producedi. but there is
no doubt that it secured the necessary technical documentation along with the German
personnel to set up production lines. By I 950. ON! reported, 'several hundreds' of V I s had
been assembled at Khimki, 1 2 miles northwest of Mmccmr
In a detailed 1 950 assessment of future Soviet submarine capabilities, especially with
reference to the potential exploitation of German \Varhme developments, ONI predicted an
early adaptation of the V I . ONTs reasoning was based on three grounds: first, a series of
alleged eye-witness and hear-say accounts by German repatriJtcs of test-firings; secondly,
the knowledge that the Soviets had acquired the technic,1l know-how to m<lnufadurc the
missile; and thirdly, the logical inference thal combining t h�· V l 'v\' ith a submarine was not
only 'good engineering practice', but abo made strategic sense for a power that was short of
a long-range bomber force.
News of Soviet test firings of V 1 -like missiles from submarine deck installations similar to
the one on the Cw·J first arrived in the <;ummer of 1948. firing ranges vvcrc reportedly
located in the Northern Fleet area, off Arkhangelsk. and in the Black Se.1, off the Kerch
Peninsula. These reports. plus other evidence. caused ON! to conclude, in 1950, that, 'it is
logical to assume that at least several of the large Soviet undersea fleet are equipped for test­
firing V I s from submarines and for training personnel'. Even more ominous, the same report
warned that, 'if the Soviets so desired. several V ls could be launched against our coasbl
cities this year'.
The ONI document did not spell out the probable Vl''eight of such a hypothetical Jttack.
but a 'worst case' estimate can be derived from the organisation's own assc�sment of the
theoretical missile-carrying capability· of the Soviet submarine fleet.
Based on the submarines' si7e, ONJ postulated that lhc large 'Ks' mighl carry five
weapons. the Lcninef: and Slllliud: boats plus a few ex-German types two each, and the
Shclwkas one a piece 'without any serious effects on stability and performance'. The
collective 'load-out' of the Soviet �ubmarine fleet in ! 950 would have added up to slightly
over 200 V I s. The number is imprcs<>ive only on the �urfacc. In the first plaet', it is predicated
on a 100 per cent availability of every submarine that was lllllfcrinll,!! qualified to carry the
weapon. Secondly. the assumption that the entire fleet could readily be converted to
carrying missiles and missile launch installations 'without any serious effects on stability and
performance' is a highly tenuous one at be�t (later reports of seakeeping problems with the
missile-converted 'Whiskeys' argue to the contrary). And thirdly, it takes .:t leap of
imagination to expect that some 1 50 pre-snorkel submarines vvould manage to arrive within
firing range of the continental United States without being detected and brought under
attack.
The Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb in 1 9.:1.9. ON! thought that a nuclear­
tipped VI V\'ould not be 'remotely po<>sible' until 1 95 I - an optimi:.tic prognosis, given the
si:;e and weight of the first generations of US and Soviet nuclear weapons. The implication is
that the hypothetical Soviet V 1 barrage would have involved conventional high explosive�
not much different to the 850 kg I 18 70 !b) warheads used by the Cermans. Although the
Soviethed V 1 could have had a somewhat better accuracy th<1n the 7_4 circular error
probable (CEP) of the 'buzz bomb', it v.'ould have lost some precision due to inaccuracies in
submarine navigation.

89
 The most realistic criterion for estimating the level of destruction that might have been
inflicted by a Soviet salvo of 200 V 1 s is the German experience in the Second World War:
according to Peter G Cooksley's Flying Bombs - The Story of Hiller's V- Weapons in World
War ll, almost 7000 V ls flew to within sight of the British coast in 1944 and 1945. Those
that survived the air defences killed 5500 people, injured another ! 8 000. and destroyed
some 23 000 homes. It is true that the cities and industrial centres along America's eastern
seaboard would have been without the massed air defences that whittled down the number
of incoming V l s in 1944-45, and that the effect on civilian morale might have been far out
of proportion to the damage actually inflicted. Nevertheless. an attack on the scale described
by ONI could hardly have been more than a symbolic gesture, and a very expensive one at
that.
More worrisome than the scenario described above was the possibility that the Soviet
Union would successfully combine the submarine with Germany's other 'revenge weapon',
the V2, technically known as the A4. German scientists and technicians under the
supervision of a Soviet Special Commission first resumed work on the A4 at the wartime
underground plant at Nordhauscn in Harz. In late 1946, the most prominent German
specialists were moved to the Soviet Union to help establish an indigenous experimental
facility and production line. The best-known developmental research and development
(R&D) establishment thus established was NII-88 (for Nauch�1i Js!edovafelski lnsfifuf-88),
headed by one of the premier Soviet missile designers, Sergei P Korolev. Between October
and November 1 947, the NII-88 was involved in the launching of some V2s at a new testing
range at Kapustin Yar, about 120 km (75 miles) east of Stalingrad. Between 1 948 and 1949,
Korolcv's design bureau prepared the designs of what was to become the Soviet Union's first
generation of long-range ballistic missiles and space boosters. Until NATO's introduction
of its own coding scheme, the projects were commonly known by the Soviet prefix 'R' (for
Raketo). For example the SS-1 'Scunner' was known during the 1950s as the R - 1 .
Early Western estimates o f a future Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile threat
focused on the so-called 'amphibious V2'. Also known as the Lafferenfz Projekt, this involved
a German plan late in the war for a submarine to tow up to three encapsulated Vls to within
striking range of the American east coast. The statically buoyant capsules or barges would
be submerged as long as the submarine maintained cruising speed, but would float to the
surface when the towing vessel lay dead in the water. By flooding the trim tanks, the barges
would be up-ended into vertical launch positions for fueling and check-out. The entire
launch preparation was to have taken 30 minutes or less. The project did not progress further
than towing tests with the barges in the Baltic Sea. After the war, the Soviets evidently
obtained at least one version of the barge system along with a partially completed firing
tube. During the early 1950s, the American press published a number of dramatic reports
(including one by the former chief of the German V -weapons programme, Walter
Dornberger), hinting that the Soviets had perfected a nuclear-tipped version of the
'amphibious V2'. There may have been some rudimentary experiments, but there is no
evidence that the Soviets ever launched a missile in this fashion, Jet alone deployed an
operationally efficacious weapon.

Soviet para l le l is m

Most Western intelligence predictions i n the early and mid- 1950s held that Soviet
submarine missile progress would follow the same technological path that had been set by
the United States. Like the United States. the Soviet Union was expected to build an initial
strategic delivery capability around a 'conventional' V 1. The next generation of missiles was
expected to resemble the US Navy's own submarine-launched Regulus II. The latter's design

90
began in 1952. Like the Regulus ll, the Soviet Navy's second-generation 'winged missiles'
had projected characteristics that included supersonic speed. folding wings, a nuclear
warhead, and a range of 450 nautical miles (this would have been about 120 nautical miles
less than the Regulus ll at Mach 2). Hs guidance �ystem vmuld haw been a carbon copy of
the Regulus ll's subsonic predecessor, the Regulus L namely line-of-sight radio control that
required the deployment of a relay of buoys or co-operating submarines between the
launching vessel and the target area.
ON! also expected, as early as 1 950, that in parallel with anticipated US developments,
the Soviets would make a sharp transition from advanced cruise missiles to a first-generation
of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This judgment appears to h;;:ve been based less on
direct evidence of Soviet strategic and technological plans than on the premise that such an
evolution was 'natural'.
Predications of Soviet fnllllo!ogiml paral!clism were matched by the expectation that the
Soviet Union intended to employ its submarine-carried missiles against more or less the
.
same strategic, ie land targets as was planned for the US fleet. None of the declassified
issues of the ON! Review of the 1 950s hint at any suspicion that the Soviets might take
m i ssi les lo sea for rmti-s/up purposes. It is true enough that the more d i fficu l t task o�
mastering the technology for guiding a missile to a point target at sea had a lower military
priority for the Soviets than the creation of a strategic capability. Yet, a significant Soviet
anti-ship missile programme was in existence throughout the 1 950s. possibly even earlier.
One declassified CIA document. dated 1954, contained the unevaluated account by a
German repatriate that a missile 'resembling a torpedo' was fired from a submarine agaimt
the hulk of a gunboat in 194 7 ! By the mid- 1 9 5 0s, the Soviets were heavily engaged in the 5-
2 coastal defence missile (known in the West as SSC-2b 'Samlet'), and by the late 1 950s.
Aight tests of the P - 1 5 (SS-N - 2 'Styx') probably begun.

The 'W hi skey' a n d ' Z u l u ' m issi l e convers i o n s

In 1956, reports o f unusually-configured 'Whiskey' class submarines arrived i n the West.

Tht' next year. American naval intelligence acknowledged the 'possible exi::.tence of
{unidentified) Soviet submarines with external or deck-fitted missile launching system:,'. The

'Whiskey Tvvin-Cylinder" submarine underw a y (US Navy).

91
number and cylindrical shape of the launchers led to the designations 'Whiskey Single­
Cylinder' and 'Whiskey Twin-Cylinder'. The bulky and awkward-looking 'add-ons' most
likely caused stability problems (one Single or Twin-Cylinder may have sunk as result in the
Northern Fleet area). The problem was solved by taking the next six 'Whiskeys', cutting
their hulls in half and inserting a new centre section about 8 m long. First spotted in
1 960, the resulting 'Whiskey Long Bins' contained two pairs of missile launchers each. None
of the 'Whiskey' missile conversion have been reported operational since the early 1980s.
The missile system that has commonly been associated with the 'Whiskey' conversions is
the SS-N-3 'Shaddock'. This system has been deployed in three different version s : the 'a'
submarine-carried anti-ship variant, the 'b' surface ship-carried anti-ship variant, and the 'c'
submarine-carried anti-laud version. The SS-N-3a and SS-N-3c reportedly had the Soviet
designations P-6 and P-7. Their earliest reported initial operational capability (IOC) has
been traced to the early 1960s.
The time lag of about five years between the introduct;on of the 'Cylinder' conversions
and the SS-N-3 raises a guestion about the boats' initial armament. There are two possibilities:
one, the submarines spent several years with empty missile tubes, or two, they carried an
'interim' missile system. There is scant evidence to support both hypotheses. As to the first
one, ON! reported on several occasions, during the late 1 950s, that none of the 'Whiskey'
missile boats seemed to have achieved operational status. It also appears that they rarely, if
ever ventured outside coastal waters.

'Whiskey Long Bin' cruise missile submarine. Note Top Hat' attack sonar on top of the bow of
the submarine (US Navy).

The guestionable early operational career of the submarines can also be marshalled,
however, in support of the second hypothesis, namely that the introduction of the SS-N-3
was preceded by a different missile that shortly proved to be a failure. Collaboration for this
theory has come from a one-time participant in the Northern Fleet's missile R&D programme.
In a report, entitled The lnfroductimi of Missile Systems Into the Soviet Navy (1945-1 962), this
emigrC (who writes under the pen name Mikhail Turetsky) claims that three submarines 'of
an obsolete design' were armed with P-5 missiles. The P-5s were stowed inside one or two
containers that had been welded onto the decks.

92
 The P-.5, Turetsky reports. had been developed by the design bureau headed by V N
Chelomci (also the designer of the P-6:'7) for usc against shore targets 350 nautical miles
away. The unguided weapon carried about 900 kg (2000 lbl of high explosives. and was
supposed to fly <�t an altitude of 45 m ( 1 50 ffl. The entire system. according to Turetsky,
proved to be a failure. Flight behaviour was erratic, and targeting accuracies were far below
the requirement. Finally, the 'quick fix' of externally-mounted cylinders proved to be a
serious danger for the parent submarine's manoeuvrability. The system failed its acceptance
test after one submarine disappeared at sea.
The solution to the Whiskey.:'P-5 debacle was twofold : first, the P-5 was improved to
become the P-6/7 (SS-N-3a:'c); secondly, instead of retrofitting the cxi�ting fleet of
submarines with cumbersome external launchers. a specialised 'missile shooter' was
designed and built from the keel up. In fact, /roo different versions resulted : the diesel­
powered "]ulictt' class, and the nuclear-propelled 'Echo \'.
The Soviet Union of the late 1 950s vva� in a hurry to offset the West's bomber-based
strategic nuclear preponderance. Khrushchev repeatedly bragged that his country's lead in
"atomic missiles' had reduced the B-47s and B-52s of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to
obsolescence. lnside the Soviet m1htary establishment. the Navy was in a raLe with the Army
to develop and deploy a working strategic ballistic missile capability. The early outcome
appears to have been a setback comparable to the P-5 problem.
Close on the heels of the report of the 'Whiskey' missile conversions came news of an
'unusually configured' ·zulu' class submarine. First observation reports arrived in the West in
1956. Three more unib, -;orne of which appeared to be returning from patrols in the
northeast Atlantic Ocean, were li�ted in 1 959. By February 1 959, ON\ had ruled out the
possibility that the 'Zulu" modifications were connected with new radar or sonar equipment.

'Zulu v· class ballistic missile submari ne (US f\!avyJ

It deduced that if the boats' two vertical tubes were. in fact, missile launchers, a 'ballistic
missile type' was most likely. Positive confirmation of the 'Zulu's ballistic missile capability
came in a dramatic way. After a drawn-out pursuit by USS Crcwuiicr (SS 5 25) in the northern
Atlantic Ocean off Iceland, a missile-converted 'Zulu' was forced to the surface in May I 959.
The cameras aboard a co-operating ASW aircraft left no doubt that. housed inside the fin of
the 'Zulu V', were two ballistic missile cannisters.
The discovery of the 'Zulu V' approximately coincided with reliable �ightings of a seconJ
group of probable ballhtic missile types. First observations of what became known as the
'Golf' clas� were made in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas in mid- 1 958. TV>'O additional
units were reported under construction in 1 959. Table 1 5 lists the characteristics of the 'Golf
group as first built.

93
'Zulu V' with SLBM tubes exposed. (US Navy).

The 'Golf I' was the Soviet Navy's first ballistic missile submarine built from the keel up. It is
possible that this class first went to sea with an SLBM with the Soviet designation R- I 1 FM (US
Nav y).

94
Table I 5 : 'Golf class �ubmarint?s
--�� -- --- ---

Number built 23
When buill 1 95 7- 1 96 1
Where built Yard 402, Severodvinsk, Amur Yard, Komsomolsk
OispiJcement 23.50/2850 tons
] _cngth 98 . 5 m (323 ftl
Beam 8.5 m (28 ftl
Draught 6.4 m (2 r ft)
Propulsion o000/5300 hp
Speed 1 7 .:" 1 4 knots
Endurance 9000 nm at 8 knoto;/250 nm at J knots (e�·t )
Armament J X SS-N-4 Sark SLBM ; lll X 533 mm ( 2 1 -in) TT (D hoi!>-, 4 stern I, 26 torpedoes
or 44 mine�
Diving depth 2JO m ( 7 5 0 ft)
C(Jmplcmcnt 85

Preliminary estimates of t he missile weapon housed inside !:he 'Zulu Vs' and 'Golfs' identifif'd
a 'modified R - I O', believed to be a second-generation V2 adapted for air ejection from the
submarine launch tube. General characteristics were tabulated as follows:

Length 1 2.8 m (42 ftl

Diameter 1 . 6 m (5.4 ft)
Tailfin diameter 2.9 m (9.5 ft) retractable to 2 m (6.8 ft)
Range J 5 0 nm
Thrust 3 1 .890 kg (70 ..'100 lb1 st
Accuracy 1-2 n m
Spenfic impulse 240 sec
.
Combustion pressure 2 1 . 1 kgicm l (300 lb ... sq inl
Propellant storage hypergolic liquid
Guidance inertial
Launch weight U,608 kg (30,000 ]b)
Warhead 907 kg (2000 lb) nuclear
--- --- � --� ----

The Soviet Navy's first submergcd-launchable SLBM, the SS-1\-5, went to sea on board the 'Golf
II' shown here (US "1"\ilvyl

95
As is suggested in Table 1 5 , the missile commonly associated with the 'Zulu Vs' and 'Golfs'
is the SS-N-4 'Sark'. But, just as it is questionable that the 'Whiskeys' first went to sea with
the SS-N-3, so it is doubtful that the 'Sark' was the Soviet Navy's first-deployed ballistic
missile. Curiously perhaps, ONJ's estimate of the characteristics of the 'modified R- IO'
closely match those generally associated with the SS-N-4. The original 'Zulu V' and 'Golf
missiles most likely were modified versions of the R - 1 0 (itself a derivative of the V 2), but the
weight of (albeit circumstantial) evidence proposes that the submarines' initial load-out was
a 'navalised' version of the Army's SS-Tb 'Scud A' (with the Soviet designation R - 1 1).
The Navy's adaptation of the R - 1 I went into limited production with the designation R­
l l FM. The letter 'F' probably stood for forsirovanny, meaning 'boosted'; the 'M' was most
likely the prefix for morskayr1 or 'naval', or possibly for 'modified'). According to Turctsky,
the R - 1 -IFM was based on a proven Army design, adapted for stowage aboard diesel
submarines of the 'Project 6 1 1 design'. Turetsky continues that the '6 1 1 ' submarines were
'reconstructed' at the Severodvinsk Yard to carry two missiles each. His description leaves
little doubt about that the ' 6 I I' submarines belonged to the 'Zulu' class.

The 'Golf III' (lengthened by 1 0 m) became a test-bed for the intercontinental-range SS-N-S,
deployed since the early 1970s, on the 'Delta' class SSBN (US Navy)

The R - 1 IFM evidently shared the same fate as its P-5 aerodynamic contemporary.
Although the missile was accepted by the Navy in 1959, it never became fully operational
due to guidance problems and frequent leakages of the liquid fuel. It may have been partly
because of the R - 1 1FM's low mechanical reliability that - according to Turetsky's story - it
never went to sea with other than a conventional high explosive warhead. Another
interesting sidelight is that the projectile was launched (on the surface) not by way of an air­
or gas ejection system, but after it had been raised to the top of the submarine's conning

96
One of four 'Golf dass submarines converted Lo command and control purposes (U.S. Navyl

tov..' Cr with the help of a mechanically or hydraulically-operated platform. Circumstantial

evidence that the Soviets were experiencing difficulties in getting the 'Zulu Vs' and 'Golfs'
operational is that, during 1 960-1961, both types ceased operations in outside waters, and
virtually no test firings took place at sea. The Soviets used the hiatus to perfect the 'rea\' SS­
N -4, otherwise known as the R- 1 3.

P r i n c i pa l sources

An invaluable source for this chapter was the 0,\'1 l<epiew. Tht' declassified 1 94 5- 1 962 issues are
available for at the Operational Archives at the Naval Yard in Washington. DC. Also available are
scattered topical documents, including .some fascinating estimates of Soviet submarine production
capabilities. Another important source dealing with early Soviet submarine mi%ile activities proved to
be a collection of "information documents' prepared b y the Central lntel!igencc Agency during the
early 1 950s. Fina!ly, mention must be made of Turctsky's T!w lnfroJwdw11 <'} !\:1i.so.·iic S!l"fCiii.,. Info t!w
Soviet ,r>.,Javy ( 1 94S-1962). This 1 4 7 -page document was pubh�hed in 1983 under the spon:.orship of
Delphic Associates of Fall Church, VA Delphic Associates has produced a serie.;; of papers on the
Soviet technology base based on the accounts of Soviet emigres. A comparison of Turdsky's
description of Soviet naval missile developmenh with other sources affirmed its reliability.

97
6 Transition to nuclear power,
1960- 1 9 70

' Foxtrot' a n d ' Romeo'

The general expectation among naval intelligence analysts in the mid- to late 1950s was that
the Soviet Union's introduction of submarine-based ballistic missiles would coincide with
the appearance of its first nuclear-propelled submarines. The consensus appears to have been
moreover that the Soviets would imitate the United States and make a complete transition
from diesel to atomic propulsion. Repeatedly, slow-downs or the termination in the
production of current conventional types were seen as portents of the long-awaited arrival
of the first Soviet nuclear-driven boat. In 1957, production of the 'Zulu' class came to a halt,
prompting ONI to speculate that the next series of subm.:uines might be built with adv.:: mced
propulsion and weapon systems. Nuclear submarines, ONJ commented, are a 'natural
weapon for a navy whose primary offensive arm is the submarine branch, and whose

The 'workhorse' of the Soviet submarine Aeet since the late 1950s, the 'Foxtrot' is routinely
spotted, by Western navies, at both southern and northern latitudes. The top photograph was
taken off the coast of Spain in 1972. (US Navy).

98
principal offensive objectives arc the interdiction of the \·ita] enemy transoceanic line� of
communications and the destruction of vital overseas enemy shore installations· .
The intelligence community was correct on at !cast one count: in 1 95 7 the Soviel:s laid the
ked for their first nuclear-powered submarine. But before this became kn(nvn in the West,
calculations that the Soviet move would be an 'either-or' choice v;,.· ere upset by the
appearance of an entirely new type of conventional boat, the 'Foxtrot' class.
First sighted by Western intelligence <;ources in January 1 95 8 while under construction at
the Sudomekh Yard in Leningrad. the 'Foxtrot's' conventional propulsion system and torpedo
armament caught Western naval circles off guard and, for a short while at least. ca::.t doubt on
the a�sumed Soviet aspiration to build a nuclear-powered missile fleet on the pattern of the
American Polaris force. One ON! report proposed that a large fled of traditional torpedo­
firing submarines for attacking the West's sea lines of communications, ll(lt a missile
capability, might remain the Soviet Navy's highest building priority after a ll.
To this day, the 'Foxtrot' ha� been lhe 'workhorse' of the Soviet undervvatcr Fleet. Sixty­
two units were completed Sudomekh between 1 95 8 and 1 9 7 1 for the Soviet Navy ih.elf.
Another I 5 units have been built since for transfer to foreign fleets. Operationally, the
'Foxtrot' is the direct successor to the open-ocean patrol mission of the 'Zulu'. Technically.
however, it represented a marked improvement over the 'Zulu' design. especially in the area
of acoustic sensors. Indeed. the discovery that the 'Foxtrot' came equipped with a sonar
array (dubbed 'Herkulcs') contributed to the short-lived speculation that the submarine might
be the Soviet Union's first dedicated ASW 'hunter-killer', or SSK. This hypothese� has been
by and large rejected with the discovery that it lacks effective silencing measures.
The 'Foxtrot' turned out to be, in fact. a traditional ocean patrol type. intended to operate
on a patrol line or barrier astride the expected line of advance of enemy surface forces. Its
range, endurance and armament vvcre adequate for the requirements of an oceanic tonnage
IA'ar, but the weight of the evidence nevertheless suggests that coastal defence, albeit a
greater distances. was the 'Foxtrot's' principal intended mi::.sion.
Designed for mass production, pair� of 'Foxtrots' were assembled at the Sudomekh Yard
in four distinct phases : phase one, which averaged four md ; one-half months. involved the
initial construction and partial as�embly of basic hull sections; phase hvo, which took
approximately a similar amount of time. included assembly of the basic hull sections into
larger subassemblies incorporating machinery. pipmg. insulation. and compartment
furnishings; phase three - final asscmbl y - came after movement of the subassemblies into J
large two-door shed, and took another four and one-half months ; and phase four was taken
up by final fitting out quayside, requiring from 1 7 to 30 week<> to complete. Table 1 6
::.ummarises the principal characteristics o f the 'Foxtrot' class.

Table 1 6 : 'Foxtrot' class submarines

l\iumbcr built 62 (Soviet Navy production only)

When built 1 9 5 8- 1 9 7 I (Sov ie t J\avy production only)
Where built Sudomckh Yard. Leningrad. and Sevcrodvlll�k
Di�placement 2 1 00/2500 tom
Length 9 1 . 5 m (300 ftl
Beam 7.9 m (20 ft)
Draught 6. 1 m (20.l ftl
Propulsion 6000/6000 hp
Speed 1 6 ..' 1 6 knots
Endurance J 2.000 nnl at 5 knots:'250 nm al J_2 knob.

Armament 10 x s.n mm ! 2 1 in) IT (6 bow, 4 sternl. 22 torpedoes or 44 mi nes

Diving limit 280 m 1920 ftl
Complement 75

99
'Romeo' class submarine (US Navy).

Before the Soviet Navy's long-awaited nuclear types made their appearance, one more
conventional design made its debut. This was the 'Romeo' class, first sighted in August
1 960, when two units completed passage through the Turkish Straits for assignments with
the Northern Fleet. Because of certain external similarities, the 'Romeo' was for a while
thought to be a hunter-killer conversion of the 'Whiskey' class. The similarities that count
are few. The Romeo's surface displacement is 30 per cent greater than the 'Whiskey's'. The
operating and collapse depths of the 'Whiskey' have been estimated at 200 and 300 m (656
and 948 ft), respectively; those for the 'Romeo' at 280 and 430 m (920 and 1400 ft). The
Romeo is armed with ten torpedo tubes, compared with six for the 'Whiskey'. The newer
submarine was fitted with a much more extensive sonar suite than had been the 'Whiskey',
but its capabilities were still ten years behind those of the American hunter-killers. They
were identical to the devices observed on the 'Foxtrot',and included a Feniks bow-wrapped
passive array, the deck-mounted 'Herkules' sonar dome, and the 'Top Hat' (or 'Fez')
underwater communications system.

Table 1 7 : 'Romeo' class submarines

Number built 20
When built 1958-1961
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Gorki
Displacement 1400,/ J BOO tons
Length 76.2 m (250 fl)
Beam 7 m (2J fl)
Draught 5.5 m ( 1 8.2 ft)
Propulsion 4000/4000 hp

100
Speed 1 5 .5/ ! 2. 5 kn ots
Endurance 16,000 nm at 1 0 knob 300 nm at 2.5 knob
Armame nt 8 x 5 3 3 mm 1 2 1 inl TT l,b bow, 2 stf rnl . 18 torpedoes 01 J6 mines
Diving limit 280 m 1 920 ft)
Complement 55

Production of the 'Romeo' bsted for only three years ( 19 58- I 90 l ) . Indications arc that the
series was first intended to be at least twice as large as the 20 units finally built. The question
has been raised, from hmc to time. why the Soviet Union chose to introduce tv..ro new classec.
of conventional attack submarines !'Foxtrot' and 'Romeo') at the same time that it embarked
upon the production of nuclear boats. The more intriguing part of this question is why there
were t<Utl conventional types that, on most counts at least. were remarbbly similar in
performance. The handiest answer (and admittedly not a very satisfying one) is a Soviet
tradition of repeatedly fielding the products of different design burt>aus that are virtu;:dly
identical in assessed capabilities and mission requirements. Examples outside the field of
submarines are the high-speed, high-altitude interceptor aircraft built by the MiG and Yak
teams, and the Yangel and Chdomei SS- 1 7 and SS--19 intercontinental ba!listic missiles
(ICBMs). A much more recent (and more comparable) example is the recently-deployed
(mid--! 980s) triple-generation of Aku!t�-'Mike-Sicrra' class nuclear submarines. Other than
being built by different c.hipyards and displaying slightly different displacements, these most
recent additions to the Soviet Navy's attack submarine fleet appear to be about equally
capable. One suspects that the Soviet military-industrial complex has its own inter-bureau
competitive momentum.

Fi rst - generat i o n n uclears : The H E N G r o u p

The Soviet Navy's first nuclear-powered submarine, the Lennr:J:!I Konrsmnol, was
commissioned on 8 April 1 958, nearly four years after the United States had commissioned
the USS l\inutilus (SSN 5 7 I l . During the five years following the commissioning of "'-'mdrlus.
the Americans added seven more nuclear submarines; collectively, they represented five
distinct classes, powered by six different nuclear powerplants. By comparison, five years
after the introduction of the Lmins�·It Komsomol, the Soviet Navy operated two dozen
nuclear-driven boats that belonged to a mere three distinct types. All used the same
pressuriscd water plant, dubbed HEN (for 'Hotel-Echo-November'). The HEN reactor \vas
most likely a straight derivative of the plant that powered the nuclear icebreaker Lenin. The
long-time chief of the US Navy's nuclear reactor programme, Admiral Hyman G Rickowr.
visited the Lenir� in the summer of 1 959. He was not very impressed with what he saw, and
later derided the ship's engineering plant as a 'sloppy job'. The ship suffered an apparent
reactor melt-down sometime during the 1 960s.
It has been said that preoccupation w·ith conventional clo<>ed-cycle technology may have
been one reason for the Soviet Union's four yt>ar lag behind the United States in adopting
nuclear propulsion. A comparison of early 'milestones' in the US and Soviet nuclear
programmes says otherwise, that the arrival nf the l_min:=J.:y Komsmnol four years behind
tv'{lu/ilus was quite consistent with the Soviet Union's 'late' nuclear start as a whole.
Moreover, the Soviet Union's rate of nuclear development has been remarkably similar to
that in the United States. The following key dates illustrate the point: the United States
tested its first nuclear weapon in 1 945 ; the Soviets exploded theirs in 1 949. The US Navy
became serious about nuclear propulsion for submarines in late 1 945, and set upon the
preliminary design of ,\iauti!us in 1 94 7; tht> Soviets trace their work on submarine nuclear
propulsion back to 1 94 7, and probably started initial dt>sign of Lc11i11s�y Kmnsmuo! in 1 953.

101
The keel for Nautilus was laid on I 95 2 ; work on Leninsky Komsomol presumably began
between 1955 and 1956. A final point of interest that has been reported by Arnold Kramish
in his Atomic Energy in the Souiet Union, is that the Soviet Union's first materials and shielding
testing reactors went into operation at about the same time as their American counterparts,
in early 1952. Both reactors were important to the US (and one supposes Soviet as well)
development of a submarine reactor.
From the mid-1950s onward, ON! acknowledged 'indirect information' that the Soviets
were capable of building a nuclear submarine, but it evidently failed to verify that such work
was underway at the Severodvinsk Yard. In November 1959, Khrushchev told President
Eisenhower that his country had nuclear submarines twice as fast as those of the United
States. Yet, it would be another three years before ONI would definitely confirm the
existence of a Soviet nuclear submarine.
First photographic observations of probable nuclear-powered Soviet submarines were
made in the Northern Fleet operating area in the spring of 1 9 6 1 . Tell-tale evidence included
the absence of a snorkel exhaust. ONI tentatively identified the two vessels as 'probable
SSN, possibly missile-equipped', but expressed doubts that their apparent size could
accommodate missiles, fire control equipment, torpedoes and sonar, as well as a nuclear
plant.
More sighting reports later in I 96 I forced the conclusion that the Soviet Navy's nuclear
propulsion programme might be much more ambitious in scope than had thus far been
anticipated. The occasion was the discovery of a third probable nuclear submarine in the
Northern Fleet area. After a detailed comparison of the three boats seen so far, it was found

This 'Hotel II' class SSBN was spotted in trouble 600 miles northeast of New Foundland in
February 1 972. She was taken in tow by a Soviet salvage vessel {US Navy).

102
that the Soviets had deployed not one, but at least tVI'O classes of atomic submarines the �

'Hotel' type ballistic missile boat, and the 'November' class attack ::.ubmarine. At least five
'Hotels' and three 'Novembers' (including the Lcni11s/.:y Komsonw!) were believed operational
with the Northern Fleet in late 1 96 1 . Before another year vvent by, the third member in the
HEN group - the 'Echo I' nuclear cruise missile submarine (SSCNl - was spotted in the
Pacific Fleet area.
The HEN group was a ta;-1gible re::.ult of a major review of naval needs that took place in
the Soviet Union in the mid - 1 950s. The 195(1- 1 95 8 slow-down in Soviet naval
construction that had struck w�'stern intelligence agencies was part of an overall
reorientation in the Soviet armed forces from dependence on a Second World War-style
mass army, to acceptanfe of the 'decisiveness' (offensively and defensively) of nuclear
weapons. For the Navy this meant that nucledr strike and defence tl,\:tlinst nuclear strike (ie,
damage limitation) became the primary tasks. The material implication entailed the
cancellation or cut-back in production of conventional building plans (especially major
surface combatants) in favour of 'high-tech' nuclear and missile combatants. Khrushchev
selected Admiral Sergei C Corshkov to preside over the transition to a ne\v mi::.sile-armcd
and atomic-powered fleet .
The Soviet Union's principal seaward threat from the mid- 1 950s t o the early 1 960s was
the American nuclear-capable aircraft carrier. For this reason, the most important mission of
the HEN group would have been to defend the ::.ea approaches, sink the US carrier ta�k
force::., and thus limit nuclear damage to the Soviet homeland. Based on the HEN group's
different weapon capabilities. the likely 'division of labour' would have been the following :
close to home, the torpedo�carrying 'Novembers' would maintain relatively static patrol line
on the outer perimeter of a multi-tiered defensi\·e zone . Back-up defensive tiers would be
built around anti�ship missile-armed land-based aircraft, destroyers and a 'mosquito fleet' of
Osn and Krm/1/r fast attack craft.
The 'Hotel' <:�nd 'Echo' classes were -;trategic submarines, armed with four SS-N -4 'Sarks'
and six SS-N-3c 'Shaddocks', respectively. Western strategic thinking overvvhelmingly
associates strategic missiles with countervalue attacks against population targets, or
'counterforce' strikes against the opponent\ intercontinental missiles. By contra�t, the mC�in
strategic targets for the 'Hotels' and 'Echos' appear to have been dictated by the
considerations of damage limitation. ie coastal targets, including the horne ports and bases of
the American carriers.
The 'Echo' and 'Hotel' classes represented different means toward the same end. The
technical difficulties that were experienced with the P-5 and R- I I FM were probably the
reason why the Soviet Union deployed the apparent redundant capabilitie::. of the SS-N-4
and the SS-N -3c - the one would have �erved as a 'hedge' against failure of the other. As the
SS-N-4 evolved to the SS-N-5 and SS-N-6, the 'Echo's SS-N-3cs were replaced by the anti­
ship targetable SS-N-.3a.
The successful modification of the SS-N-.3 from an anti-land to an anti-ship-capable
weapon may have contributed to the devaluation of the Navy's aspirations to escape the
role of assistant to the Army, and assume instead a main strategic task. Furthermore, the
disappointments of the R- l lFM and r)-5 would have made it difficult for the Navy hierarchy
to explain why the Soviet Union should depend on the vigilance of a sea-based deterrent
and striking force.
In 1 959, the Soviet Union created the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRFL Institutionally
dominated by Army generals, the SRF was (and is) chartered with administrative
re�ponsibility for all land-based missiles with a range of over 1 000 kilometres (about 6 2 5
miles). Doctrinally, the SRF has since occupied the position o f main and decisive branch
among the different branches of the Soviet military establishment. As a corollary, the 'deep
strike' role of the Navy's ballistic missiles was limited to that of an SRF back-up at b('St. From

!03
about 1 960 onward their principal targets during the first phase of a nuclear exchange were
naval and maritime in character. Tables 18 through 20 portray the main characteristics of the
HEN group of submarines.

Table 18: 'Hotel' class submarines

Number built 9
When built !958- 1 962
Where built Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk
Displacement 5000/6000 tons
Length 1 1 5 m (377.3 ft )
Beam 9 m (295 ftl
Draught 7.2 m (23.6 ft)
Propulsion 22,000 hp
Speed 20 / 25 knots
Endurance NA
Armament 3 x SS-N-4 Sark SLBMs; 6 x 533 mm ( 2 1 -in) bow and 4 x 356 mm ( 1 4-in)
stern TT; 20 torpedoes
Diving limit 305 m ( 1000 ft)
Complement 90

�Eight 'Hotels' were converted during 1963-!967 to carry the new. �ubmerged-launched SS-N-5 "Serb' SLBMs,
and were redesignated 'Hotel IJ'. A single "Hotel II' was modified again, probably about I 970, to become the test
platform for the SS-N-8, and became known as the 'Holel llJ '

Table I 9 : 'Echo I' class submarines�

Number built 5
When built 1960-1962
Where built Severodvinsk
Displacement 4500/5500 tons
Length 1 1 4 m (375 ft)
Beam 9. I m (30 ft)
Draught 8.4 m (27.5 ft)
Propulsion 22.000 hp

'Echo I' class SSGN (US Navy)

104
Speed 20/26 knots
Endurance NA
Armament 6 x SS-J\-Jc Shaddock; 6 X 53.1 mm 1 2 l -in) bow and -1- X ."> 56 mm ( 1 4 -in) stern
TT; 22 torpedoes or 3t' mine�
Diving limit 305 m ( 1000 ft)
Complement 90

•All five 'Echo Is' I'.'Cre converted to torpedo attark �ubmarines between !968 and ! 9 7 4

Table 20: 'November' class submarines

Number built 15
When built 1956-1964
Where built Severodvinsk
Displacement 4oOOi5300 ton�
Length I I I m (364 ft)
Beam 9 m ( 2 9_ 5 ft)
Draught 7. 7 m ( 25.3 ft)
Propulsion 22,000 hp
Speed 20:'25-28 knots
Endurance 25,000 nm
Armament 1 0 x 53J mm (2 1 -in) TT (6 bow, 4 stern) ; J2 torpedoes or 64 mines
Diving limit ft)
30 5 m ( 1 000
Complement 35

A 'November ' l11s� submannc off t h e coast o f Spain. The crew w a s tramfcrred t o the Soviet
merchant vessel standing by before the submarine sank on 1 2 ApriL 1 9 7 0 (US :-Javyl

The ' J u l iett' class

Each of the HEN group of submarines had its conventional counterpart: the 'Hotel' was
matched hy the 'Golf. the 'November' by the 'Foxtrot' and 'Romeo', and the 'Echo I' by the
'juliett'. Fourteen diesel-powered cruise missile submarines with the designation 'Julictt' left
the building ways at the Gorki yard between ! 962 and 1969. The first few deliveries at least

lOS
began operations with the land strike version of the SS-N-3. All eventually were rearmed
with the anti-ship SS-N-3a. All but one were still reported with the operational fleet in I 986.

Table 2 1 : 'Juliett class' submarines

Number built 16
When built 1 962-1969
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Gorki
Displacement 2800,:"3500 tons
Length 87 m (285 ft)
Draught 7 m (2J ft)
Beam 1 0 m (33 ft)
Propulsion 6000/6000 hp
Speed 1 5 / I S knots
Endurance 9000 nm at 7 knots/300 nm at 2.8 knots
Armament 4 x SS-N-3c 'Shaddock'� 6 x 533 mm (2 1 -in) bow and 4 x 356 mm
( 1 4-inl stern TT: 18-22 torpedoe� or J6 mines
Diving limit 396 m ( 1300 ft)
Complement 80

•ss-N-Jc later replaced by SS-l\:-3a

'Juliett' class submarine off the coast of Spain (US Navy).

Cou nte r i n g the P o l a ris t h reat

In 1960, the USS Ceorxe Wushi11xfon (SSBN 598) departed on what would become the
standard 60-day underwater patrol cycle of the US Navy's SSBN fleet. Two years later, a
total of nine American SSBNs, each with 16 1200-nautical miles range Polaris A - 1
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), were operational. On 2 2 October I 962, at
the height of the Cuban missile crisis, another 1 8 boats were in various stages of completion.
The Polaris A-2 with a range of 1500 nautical miles had been tested in May 1 962, and the
2,500 nm A-3 was in advanced deployment. The Soviet Union could take credit for
launching and deploying the world's first SLBMs, but the capabilities of the 'Zulu Vs', 'Golfs'
and 'Hotels' were at least one generation behind those of the new USN SSBNs.
Initial Soviet reactions in or:en sources were �uarded, even doubtful of Polaris'

106
operational longevity. Commenting on the recent successful tcsl-firing of a Pnl<�ri� frorn the
test ship Obsenmtio11 Island, one Soviet writer claimed. in ! 959, that the US �avy
nevertheless had second thoughts about the weapon. As evidence of alleged difficulties vvil h
the solid rocket propellant, he cited the decision to arm Sllme Pnlaris subm<�rirws 1.-vilh
torpedoes. the recent approval by the LS Congress to build a second nucleJr a i rcra ft c.1rrier.
and statements by high-level US Navy officers that, despite Polaris, the aircr<1ft carrier
remained the centrepiece of US naval striking power.
The success of the Polaris programme prompted some Soviet 1.-vriters to take a different
tack. In his f<1mous book Vocrmn�m Stm!es;i�tu ( ..-\/li!ifln!l Sfmlcs;u), \!larshal of the Soviet Cnion
V D Sokolovsky played down the SSBN's vaunted vulnerability:

'Much ha'> been said in the foreign press about nuclear �ubmarine� armed with Polaris missiles
The assertion has bt>en made that these are the most invulnerable mean:. for the u�c of missile:.
Actually. these weapon:. arc also vulnerable. Homing missiles launched by subm.mnes and
'>urfacc �hips <Jn' an effect ive ;vcapon against missile-carrying submarines '

Sokolovsky's naval colleagues were much less sanguine about the case of SSBN
countermeasures. Retired Admiral Alafuzov took Sokolovsky and his co-authors to task for
their 'bra:.h'. 'unconvincing' and 'unproven' conclusion that the SSB� was vulnerable t o
homing mi:.siles. Had Sokolovsky eta/, asked Alafuzov, perhaps not considered the fact that
nuclear submarines only operated submerged?
In truth, Sokolovsky's claim on behalf of 'homing missiles' may have been not nearly as
preposterous as his critics made it out to be. Starting in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union
deployed a series of missile-like ASW weapons, including the SS-N- 1 4, - 1 5. and - 16. They
arc carried on board submarines and surface vessels, and considered a potential threat l o
Wec.tern SSBNs. It is quite probable that the SS-N- 1 4 a t least was already i n advanced
development when Sokolovsky first made his claim in 1 962. In support of the hypothesis
that the Marshal may actually have had the SS-N - 1 4 in mind is the fact that, despite
Alafuzov' s criticism, he repeated his claim vertabim in the third ( 1968) edition of Vonmtl!ltl
Strutegiyn.
Western analysts today disagree over the nature of the {initial) Soviet anti -SSBN solution.
Other than doing nothing. the Soviets had basically tvvo options. The option that fit the
Soviet doctrinal prediliction for active defence and damage limitation, and indeed the one
that most analysts believe was taken (or attempted, at least). was the development of a
strategic ASW capability. As evidence is cited the introduction, in the late 1960s, of a variety
of improved ASW combatants, sensors. and weapons. From the mid - J 960s onward Soviet
naval warfare priorities reputedly shifted from anti-carrier to anti-SSBN.
Soviet open-source naval writings of the period support the contention that active anti­
SSBN defence became a main task. Admiral Gorshkov wrote in The Seu Power oFthe Stale that,

'The intensive development of submarines, in particular the appearance of mi:.sile submarines

with atomic power, the _fisht against whicil rJssurncd tire character of a stnte task. raised the question
of a further and sharper rise in the effecti veness of antisubmarine weapons.' {emphasi'> added)

Soviet statements of military policy or doctrine are frequently quite ambiguous on the
distinction between actual capabilities and am/1ifions or intentions. Thus, one cannot tell from
Gorshkov's statement whether defence against the SSBN was a Navy capability or an
aspired capability. More on the practical reality of the anti-SSBN option is said elsewhere in
this book.
Even had the Soviet Union chosen to pursue a policy of stratrgic ASW, its leadership
must have realised that it would be many years before the necessary ships and weapons
would go to sea. One possible interim measure would have been the second option, namely
the creation of a 'countervailing deterrent' of the Soviet Union's own SSBNs.

107
 Again writing in The Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov has implied that this was part of the
thinking that went into the building of the modern Soviet SSBN fleet. Referring to the Polaris
boats. he remonstrated that, 'Naturally, in the face of such a formidable danger we were
compelled to take all necessary steps to defend our country, . . . (and) our country began to
explore the possibilities of arming ships with qualitatively-new missile weapons'.
The 'true' answer to the question of how the Soviet Union intended to confront the SSBN
threat is not known. But it probably involved a mix of both the defence and deterrence
options. One of the problems with dissecting Soviet naval decisions of the mid -1 960s is that
certain types of behaviour that seemed to match one option were probably symptomatic of a
variety of unrelated considerations. The choices that were made by the Soviet Navy during
the mid-1 960s were a composite of strategic, military-technological, and political
considerations. The need to 'do something' about Polaris was one. But so was the still­
expanding threat of carrier-borne aircraft (the 3000-mile range A-5 Vigilante Mach 2 bomber
was formally re-assigned to a reconnaissance role in 1964, but it retained its nuclear delivery
capacity). The debacle at Cuba was another factor, and so was Moscow's search for ways and
means to proselytise the Third World with more than fraternal promises. Contrary to early
opinions, defence against the Polaris fleet was probably one of the least pressing reasons
why the Soviet Navy was ordered to sea.

The Soviet Navy ' G oes to Sea'

Most observers of Soviet naval affairs have traced the Soviet naval build-up and forward
deployment of the 1 960s to one or two event s : one, the realisation, in the wake of the Cuban
missile crisis, of the continued relevance of ocean-going, traditional naval power, and two,
the requirement to offset the threat of the Polaris fleet. Practical first steps included the
geographical expansion of the Navy's traditionally coastal-bound exercise areas, the
systematic use of long-range aviation to monitor US fleet movements in the northern Pacific
and eastern Atlantic Oceans, and. in 1964, the establishment of a permanent eskadm in the
Mediterranean Sea.
The intellectual history of the serious Western study of the Soviet Navy is barely two
decades old. Its dean is Robert W Herrick, a former US Navy intelligence officer attached to
the American embassy in Moscow. Herrick's Soviet J\Iaval Strategy: fifty Years of Theory and
Practice upset official US Navy wisdom with the argument that Soviet naval capabilities and
purposes were essentially defensiue in character.
The Soviet Navy became a subject worthy of study because its behaviour had become
salient. Its salience derived from the fact that, after one-half century of what had been little
more than coastal deployments, it suddenly sent its forces onto the high seas to apparently
contest the West's monopoly.
The Soviet Navy's forward deployment wos a salient event - but only so with regard to
its surface component. In reality, the 'invisible' side of the Soviet Navy, the submarines. had
operated far beyond home waters, including the North American continental shelf, since the
late 1 940s. It is not clear whether their purpose may have been more than reconnaissance,
but the frequency and location of their reported appearances are intriguing enough to
warrant mention.
Reports of possible, probable, and positive contacts with unidentified submarines off the
North American coast showed up first in 1 948. One 'positive' encounter, based on sonar and
visual sightings occurred near the US naval base at Norfolk, Virginia in October 1948.
A different area of interest for Soviet submarines was Eniwetok Island in the south Pacific.
Eniwetok was the site for America's second post-war series of nuclear tests. A report of an
unidentified submarine off the atoll appears in the diary of then-Secretary of Defense

108
forrestal. Bernard J O'Keefe's 1\Iudear 1-Ios/(l:.;es has given an eye-witness account of how the
sightings triggered fears that the Soviets might 'come ashore from a submarine and literally
steal the bomb'.
Reports of Soviet submarine patrols in North and South American waters conl:inued
throughout the 1 950s. Two unidentified submarines were spotted during the sea trials of the
USS Fnrresl11f (CV 59) off Norfolk in 1955. !n 1 958, sightings were registered as far away as
the Marshal and Palau islands in the South Pacific.
The Mediterranean Sea, too, became a theatre for Soviet submarines long before the
establishment of the surface eskadm The centre for Soviet submarine activities during the
1 950s was the Albanian island of Saseno in the Adriatic Sea. Construction of submarine pens
began in the late 1 940s after the Soviet-Yugoslavian split and the Soviet loss of access to the
Yugoslavian naval base at Pola. Contemporary press reports drew a vastly exaggerated
picture of this 'Soviet Gibraltar'. According to the accounts of Albanian exiles, thousands of
slave labourers \-Vorked day and night to build underground berths for up to 90 submarines.
Albania evicted the Soviets in June 1 96 1 ; the Soviet naval presence at Saseno typically
amounted to four 'Whiskey' class submarines, although enough berthing space may have
been built for r 2

Seco n d - generation n uclears: ' V i ctor', 'Ya n kee', a n d

' C h a r l ie'

The n1ix of Soviet concerns with naval security (as opposed to a singlr overriding focus on
the SSBN threat) materialised in the distinct characteristics of the successors to the
'November', 'Hotel', and "Echo ! ' classes : the 'Victor', 'Yankee', and 'Charlie' types.
Sixteen 'Vidor I' class torpedo attack submarines were built in Leningrad between 1 965
and 1974. They are double-hulled ve.'>sels, as are most Soviet submarines (the 'Aifa' group
appears to be an exception). The boat's principal advantages over the 'November' include a
higher maximum speed (30 versus 25 knots) and a reduced self-noise. The 'Victor l's' radiated
noise (ie, the sound produced by the main and auxiliary machinery, pumps, and propeller)
has been favourably compared with the performance of the first-generation American
Skipi(lck class.

"Vidor J' clas� SSN being shadowed by US Na\' Y P-.-, Onon ASVv' aircraft of VP 48 while
trJnsiting through the Malacca Straits in Ap ril 1974. Unlike US:'--J or Royal l\.:avy �ubmarirw�,
Soviet SSNs arc frequently caught transiting on the surface (US i\ avyl

1 09
 The 'Vidor I's possible 'quiet' hunter-killer role has been questioned in light of its
apparent 30 knots speed potential. No question, moving at this speed would neutralise
much, probably alL of the submarine's silent ability. Still, the argument overlooks two
considerations - one operational, the other technical. In the first place, a speed of 30 knots
would be the exception; the 'Victor T's typical patrol speed lies between five and 15 knots,
depending on whether it passively listens for a suspected enemy datum, or searches for a first
contact. For navigation at 'hovering' speed, two small two-bladed propel!crs can hf' used in
place of the central main propeller.
High speeds may be the preferred tactic depending on the type of patrol operation. The
Soviets recognise at least four basic search and track routines. Milan Vega, who is one of the
West's premier analysts of Soviet submarine tactics, has listed them as follow s :
- Forward positioning astride the probable path o f intended movement (PIM) o f enemy
submarines to and from their bases;

- moving barrier patrols across narrow choke points with the aim of intercepting passing
enemy submarines;

- combined surface ship-submarine barrier patrols across broad ocean areas, in which case
the submarine is expected to 'hand-off the initial decision to the surface combatants (or
ASW aircraft) for prosecution;

single but preferably co-ordinated dual submarine patrols in the open ocean at 'key
points' along the enemy's lines of communications.

The 'III' version of the 'Victor' class is conspicuous for the streamlined pod on the tail fin. It is
generally thought to contain a towed sonar array, but a few analysts hold that it might house an
advanced form of auxiliary propulsion (US Navy).

The 'Vidor' class has been built in three distinct series. The 'Vidor II' and III arc 4.6/ 13.7 m ( 1 5
and 45 ft) longer, respectively, than the 'Vidor I'. Besides the standard torpedo armament, all
three versions are believed armed with the SS-N- 15, the a pproxi mat e equivalent of the US
Navy's SUBROC nuclear depth charge-carrying rocket. The lis and IIIs have in addition
been credited with a second ASW stand-off ASW weapon, designated SS-N- 1 6. This has
been evaluated as a torpedo-carrying missile (roughly the submarine equivalent of the SS-N-
14) that, according to some sources, is launched from two specially designed tubes in the
bow of the submarine.
The twenty-second hull in the 'Victor III' group was launched in 1984.
Substantially quieter than the I and IL the.Victor III' is currently ( 1 988) the Soviet Navy's
top of the line operational hunter-killer.

1 10
Table 11 · "Victor' class submarim.·�

"Vidor ]' 'Vidor II' "Vidor IIJ'

!\umber built 16 22 \Spring !Y88)

When built 1965-7..! 1 972-78 r 978-present
Where built United Admiralty Yard. Umtcd Admiralty Yard, United Admiralty Yard.
Len in grad Leningrad Leningrad and Komsom­
olsk
Displacement ..!300:·5 roo tons 4500.'5700 tons 4800/6000 ton�
Length 95 m (J ! 2 ftJ 100 m (J28 ftl roo m 1 3 ..! 8 ftl
Beam 1 0 m ( .B ft) 1 0 m { 3 3 ft) ILl m (.�3 ftl
Draught 7 m (23. 1 ft) 7 m (23. 1 ft) 7 rn (23 . 1 ftl
Propulsion 30,000 hp 30,000 hp .30.000 hp
Speed !6/29 knots 1 6 : 2 9 knots 1 6 :" 2 9 knoh
[nJurance NA NA N.-\
Armament 6 x
5.B mm (2 1 -in) 6 x 5J3 mm ( 2 J -inl o x 5 3 J mm i 2 l · i n 1
bow TT: SS-N - 1 5 ; bow TT: SS-N - 1 5 . bow T T : SS-N - 1 5 .
3 2 torpcdoe� or SS-N- -I b : 3 2 SS-l\-"16. 3 2
64 mines torpedoes o r 64 mines torpcdoe� or 6 4 mine�
Diving limit .396 m \ 1 300 ft) J 96 m ( IJOO ftl 396 m ( I J O O ftl
Comp ll'ment 90 90 90-plus
--- ----

About one year after the keel vva� laid for the first 'Victor I', \'1/ork began on the Soviet
Navy's first truly modern SSBN. the 'Yankee' cbss. The design9tion may have contributed
to the boat's frequent comparison with the e ar l y US N av y SSBNs. Coincidentally, the
'Yankee' carried the same number of ( 1 6 ) SLBMs as its U S counterpart. ·1 he U S choice of 1 6
tubes, b y the •vay, appears t o have been mostly arbitrary
The differences between the 'Yankees' and the Ethan Allen class are more important than
their similarities. To begin with, the Soviet boats displace about 50 per cent more tonnage
than the American ones. Their nuclear propulsion system delivers at lea::.t twice a:, much
horsepower (30 000 versus I 5 000), but contrary to early estimate�. this has not resulted in a
significant speed advantage. Most of the 'Yankee's extra power output is probably consumed
by its large size and a high drag ractor. The latter is the result of the continuing Soviet
practice of lining the outer hulls of their submarines w·ith numerous free-flood holes.
Another disadvantage i� an excessive flow noise which is prone to detection and also masks
the 'Yankee's' own listening ability. l ndeed, the 'Yankee" is characterised by a high self-noise
level generally, and is reportedly one of the easiest Soviet submarines to detect.
Another important difference bctvveen the 'Yankees' and the USN's SSBNs concerns
their respective SLBM armaments. Ont' of the keys to the success of the Polaris programme
was a break-through in solid-propellant technology for large boosters; all American SLBMs
since the Polaris A - I have used solid propellant motors. Until the early 1 980s (and the
deployment of the SS-N-20), Soviet SLBMs \Nere boosted by liquid fuel t•ngines (om•
exception is the experimental SS- N - 1 7 aboard a single 'Yankee ll'). Liquid propellant
systems have certain advantages ; they can be throttled, stopped and restarted more easily
than solid propellant motors. But the benefits are outweighed by certain important
disadvantages. Liquid engines are larger and more complex than solid propellant motors.
Liquid fuel is more volatile and is therefore more dangerous to transport; inspection of tanks
and fuel lines must be done on a regular basis.
Unlike the first generations of Soviet SU�Ms that could be fuelled only shortly before
launch, the 'Yankee's" SS-N-6s went to sea with a storable liquid fuel. Even this had to be

l I I
/

'Yankee I' SSBN nearly dead in the water (US Navy).

'Yankee I' SSBN underway (US Navy).

periodically replaced as a safeguard against tank corrosion and evaporation. The

comparative weight and bulkiness of liquid-fuel missiles help explain why the SS-N-6,
though roughly comparable with the Polaris A - 1 in terms of range, is some 35 per cent
heavier and 50 per cent taller.

1 12
 The first 'Yankee' patrol within SS-N-6 range of the US eastern seaboard occurred in
1968. Three years later, a Pacific station was established. As production reached ten a year,
Western defence and intelligence officials fully expected that the Soviet Union would
emulate the US Navy SSBN patrol pattern, and keep one-half of its burgeoning fleet within
striking range of the North American continent. There is 'little doubt', Defense Secretary
Melvin R Laird told the US Congress in 1972, 'that out-of-area operations by these
submarines will increase over the next several years'.
The prediction has not been fulfilled. Although 33 'Yankees' were built, their number on
out-of-area duty has apparently never exceeded five - three in the 'Yankee Box' off the US
east coast, and two in the Pacific Ocean. Chapter Seven examines the apparent (and inferred)
reasons for this 'anomaly'.
The operational 'Yankee' SSBN fleet in the Spring of 1988 stood at 1 7. This includes the
single 'Yankee' IT that has been modified to carry 1 2 SS-N- 1 7s. Sixteen 'Yankees' had been
taken out of service a� ballistic missile boats since 1978 in compliance with the SALT I limits
on modern SSBNs and SLBMs. They are being modified for torpedo or cruise missile attack
purposes. One 'Yankee' sank near Bermuda in 1986 after an explosion and fire in the missile
compartment. Table 23 compares the 'Yankee' class characteristics.

Table 2 3 : 'Yankee' class <>ubmarines

Number built 34
When built 1 966- 1 9 74
Where built Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk
Displacement 8000/9600 tons
Length 1 3 0 m (426 ft)
Beam 1 2 m (J9.J ft)
Draught 9 m (29.8 ft)
Propulsion JO,OOO hp�
Speed 20:' JO kno ts
Endurance �A
Armament 1 6 X SS -N - 6 'Sawfly'; 6 X 5 3 3 rnrn { 2 ! -inl bmv rr
Diving limit J96 rn ( I J OO ftl
Complement 120

�some sources report that the 'Yankee' i'> powered h y two nuclear reactors with an aggregate
output of 50 000 hp.

The fact that the erstvvhilc high rriority of anti-carrier warfare had not entirely been
overtaken by the anti-SSBN demand became clear with the deployment, in 1968, of the third
member in the trio of second-generation Soviet nuclears : the 'Charlie' class.
The outstanding characteristic of the 'Charlie' is its SS-N-7 'Siren' armament. Launched
from a submerged condition at a maximum range of about 25 nautical miles, and flying at a
cn1ise altitude of some 90 m (300 ft), the missile barely affords a ship two minute's to react
and defend ihelf. The threat posed by the 'Charlic' ./SS-N-7 system had forced a wholesale
revision in standard carrier battlegroup defensive tactics. The fact that a submerged
submarine could henceforth attack a surface warship at stand-off ranges erased the
traditional separation bctVI'een anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare. Ships now
needed to be capable of smndhmeous warfare. The concluding portion of this chapter takes a
closer look at the strengths and liabilities of the 'Charlie' class in an anti-carrier scenario.
The 'Charlie' class has been built in two series. Twelve 'Charlie Is' \Vere completed at the
Gorki yard between 1 967 and 1973, and another six 'Charlie lis' were deliwred by the same

I Ll
Aerial photograph of a 'Charlie I' class SSGN (US Navy).

facility through 1 98 1 . A total of 1 5 or 16 vessels remained operational in 1988 after one

reportedly sank off the Kamchatka Peninsula in June I 983, and a second was transferred to
India, in 1 988, under a 'lease' arrangement.
There arc conflicting reports that some 'Charlie' units have been rearmed with the longer­
range SS-N -9 missile. The SS-N-9 is of about the same vintage as the SS-N -7, and was first
seen on the Nrmuchka class missile corvettes. It has also been identified as the armament of
the one-off 'Papa' SSGN.
Several features of the SS-N-9 argue against a 'Charlie' refit. One is size. The SS-N-9 is
considerably larger in both length and diameter than the SS-N - 7 (9.1 m./30 H versus 7.6
m,/25 ft, and 2 m,/6.7 ft versus 1 . 4 m ,.:' 4 . 7 ft, respectively. Yet, the 'Charlie' shows no visible
modifications. A second anomaly concerns the range of the SS-N -9. Official US Navy
sources report a range of 60 nautical miles; other authorities have claimed as much as 1 5 0
nautical miles. Either range would seem t o be far outside the 'Charlie's' own acoustic fire
control range. If so, the need for third-party targeting assistance would largely negate the
'Charlie's' stealth advantage. Finally, it is not at all clear that the SS-N-9 turned out to be a
success. Circumstantial evidence is that the Nanuchkas sold to the Indian Navy were armed
with the SS-N-2c due to technical reliability problems with the SS-N-9. Table 24 compares
the 'Charlie' I and II classes.

S u b m a r i n e a n t i -carrier c a pa b i l it i es
As is related in the next chapter, the extent to which the Soviet Navy has managed to
implement its anti-SSBN ambition through an efficient set of tactics and hardware is quite

114
doubtful. This is not the case with the avowed priority of d efeat ing the US 1\'avy aircraft
carrier. The Soviets believe that they have developed an anti-carrier warfare (/\CVV) cnnccpt
that, if carried out as practised repeatedly in major fleet exercises, will inflict 'unacceptable
losses' on the opponent. Submarines play a critical part in this concept of opcr,ltions. The
concluding sedion of this chapter is an overvie\v of this p<�rt vvi!: h special emphasis on tlw
estimated contribution of the cruise missile -firing submarine. The information reflects
intelligence assessments ·of Soviet ACW capabilities and tactics current in the late 1 96L1s to
early 1 9 70s.

Table 24: 'Charlie ' class submarines

'Charlil· I' 'Charlie II'

Number built J2 6
When built 1967-1973 1 972- 1 98 1
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Corki Krasnaya Sormova Yard. Gorki
Di�placcmcnt 4000i50DO tom 4500 5500 ton�
Length 95 m (J I I fl) IOJ m (JJ8 ft1
Beam 9.9 m 1 .'! 2 . 7 ft) 9.9 m U2.7 ftl
Draught 8 m (26.4 ft) 8.3 m (27.3 ft)
Prop ulsi on JO,OOO hp JO.OOll hp
Speed J 7 i26 knots 1 7 /26 knoh
Endurance NA !';A
Armament 8 x SS-\1-7; 6 x 5JJ mm ( 2 1 -in) 8 x S S - N - 7 (SS-:--.J-97); SS·N - 1 5 ;
bow TI : 1 8 torpedoes or J6 mines 6 x S.'U mm ( 2 1 -in) bow TT; 1 8
torpedoes or 3 b mint'S
Diving limit 386 m ( IJOO Hi J9C' m ( 1 300 It)
c:omplement '}(1 90
-------

The S S G a n d SS G N a n t i -carrier t h reat

Anti-ship cruise missile submarines in operation with the Soviet fled around 1 9 70 included
the 'Echo II' and 'Charlie' SSGN, and the 'Juliet!:' SSG. The 'Echo ! ' series was in the process of
conversion to torpedo attack boats. The 'Fcho II' carried eight SS-N-3a Shaddocks, the
'Charlie' eight SS-N -7s, and the 'juliet!:' four Shaddocks. An improved version of the SS-N-
3c. the SS-N - 1 2 Sandbox, \vas in advanced development and would later be retrofitted to
the 'Echo IT' and po%ibly the 'Juliett' as well. Table 25 compares the performance
characteristics of the SS-N-3a and SS-N-7. Complementary flight profiles arc shown i n
Figure ! .

Table 2 5 S.S-N-3a and SS-N 7 performance characteristics

Characteristics SS-N-3a 55-N-7

Max range. n m 220 30

M i n range, n m 12 4 5
Probable operational
range, n m 150 25
Cruise speed, Mach ]\.io 12 0.9
Termi nal speed, Mach N o 1.2 0.9

1 15
Cruise altitude 3960 m ( 1 3,000 ft) 90 m (JOO ft)
Terminal profile low-angle dive low-angle dive
Guidance track command with mid­ pre-set auto-pilot with
course updating and ad:ive active terminal homing and
radar terminal homing possible infrared back-up
Propulsion turbojet and rocket­ turbojet and rocket­
assisted take-off assisted take-off
Warhead 500-1000 kg ( 1 100-2200 500 kg ( I 100 !b) HE or
!b) HE or nuclear nuclear

seeker on acquisition
4,570

�--.!..,� ••::':< � �
oc o

_ - - -

3,050

•
�
�
•
E
.;
"" 1,520
"
�
•

t
terminal
run-in

0
150 120 90 60 30 0
range, nm

Figure la: SSN -N -Ja flight profile at I 50 nm from target

90

60

•
30
�
•
0
E
-30
•
"0

�
•

5 10 15 20 25
range, nm

Figure I b : SS-N-7 flight profile

1 16
Table 25 and Figure l offer a good clue to the respedi\·e strengths and limitations of the
.
'Echo 11' /'Juliett' and 'Charlie' vveapon systems. The most important, perhaps single benefit
of the SS-N-3a is its great stand -off distance. VVhcn it vvas first deployed in the early 1 960s.
the outer air defensive perimeter of a carrier battlegroup was typically si tuated at about 1 0 0
nautical miles from t h e 'vital centre'. Accordingly. an 'Echo I I ' or 'Juliet!' would have stood a
reasonable chance of staging an attack undetected. Today. however, an aircraft carrier sends
out its combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft at least twice a� far. Radar early warning aircraft
extend the battlegroup's 'eyes' another 200 nautical miles or so. The longer-range SS-N - 1 2
and SS-N - 1 9 may have been the Soviet respome to this development.

']uliett' cbs<> SSG showing hull 1ndentations that ad as hb"t dctledors for the SS-N- �a IUS
Na\'yJ.

The SS-N-3a is marked b y some distinct limi tations. One is that is relatively bulky and
t herefore presents a radar cross section (RCSi comparable in strength to that of a jet fighter.
A more important drawback is that the missile must be launched on I he surface and requires a
number o� rather cumbersome and time -consuming preparations
After an 'Echo II' or 'JulieH' he�s broached the surf.:�ce of the water. it must elevate pairs of
launch tubes at angle" of 1 5 -20 degrees. At the SZ!mc time. the <;uhmarine must deploy the
'Front Door',i'Front Piece' guidance radar to provide tracking out to a distance of about I 00
nautical miles. Throughout the tracking proces<>. the bunching platform must remain
exposed on the surface. I t Gill be estimated that, bctvvecn launch prepare�! ions .:�nd J 00
nautical miles of tracking. the submarine will c.pend about 3L) minutE'S on the surf.Kc before
the missile reaches the target area.
Thr SS-N -3a is apparently launched in pairs. Because of the limited ability of the 'Front
Dnor,/'Front Piece" rad.:�r to track simu!taneouc. targets. a second salvo cannot be fired until
the SS-N-JJ's own active radar acquires the target about 5 Ll nautical miles J'A'dy. l f the flight
trajectory is about 1 5 0 nautical mile<;, this means that the interval between salvoes i �
e�pproximately 1 5 minutes. I t also means that a single 'Echo ] ] ' o r "Juliett' i s not likely t o
saturate modern shipboard defences.

117
SS-N-3a launcher arrangement on 'Echo II' SSGN (US Navy).

Another important liability inherent in the SS-N-3a system is that targeting an opponent
beyond the radar horizon requires a co-operating platform for target co-ordinate updating
and missile midcourse corrections. Three aircraft have been identified for this role: the Tu-95
'Bear D' turbo-propelled long-range reconnaissance aircraft, and the Ka-25 'Hormone B' and
Ka-2 7 'Helix B' helicopters. The 'Bear D' and 'Hormone B' carry different variants of the 'Big
Bulge' radar which operates in the I /J-band of the spectrum, and both have been associated
with a video datalink signal with the designation A346Z.
Using the 'Bear D' or 'Hormone B' to extend the striking range of the SS-N-3a is an
interesting techriical solution; its operational efficacy is doubtful. The wartime life expectancy
of both slow-flying aircraft within radar detection range of a carrier battlegroup is not very
promising. Moreover, since the platform must be within radar range of both the 'Echo II' or
'Juliett' and the intended victim, the latter has an equal chance of intercepting the tell-tale
A346Z video signal.
Co-ordinating the activity of a submarine and an aircraft is not a very difficult problem
in an exercise setting. It is an altogether different matter to try and ensure their
simultaneous arrival against a target of opportunity in time of war! Fleets carry out firing
exercises after long and careful preparations and under ideal weather conditions. Neither
side will have this luxury when real hostilities break out - the 'Bear D' that comes to the aid
of an 'Echo II' may find the detection range of its 'Big Bulge' radar cut into half or less by a
North Atlantic rain squall.
The 'Echo II' and 'Juliett's' SS-N-3a was a formidable weapon when first introduced in the
early 1 960s, before shipboard missile air defences had barely developed beyond the
prototype stage, and when electronic countermeasures were virtually non-existent.
Launched en masse, it still presents a dangerous saturation problem; in a one-on-one
situation, the SS-N-3a has become outclassed by modern shipboard defences.

1 18
The ' C h a r l i e '/SS - N -7 weapon system

First deploy,ed in the late 1960s, the submerged-launch capability, lovv flight altitude and
short time of flight of the SS-N-7 mTrcamc many of Hw vulnerabilities of the SS-1'.:-.3<� juo.t
described. indeed, Western analysts wen.' wont to cite the SS-N-7 as material evidence that
the Soviet<> had recognised the weaknco.ses of long-range anti-ship mis.;;;i les, that short-range
'low -fliers' were the wave of the future. In reality, the Soviet Navy has continued to deploy a
IWX of over-the-horizon 'high -fliers' and short -range sva skimmers.
H is tempting to see the SS- N - 7 as the deliberate counter-response to the American
reaction to the SS-N -3a. The US Navy countered the threat of long-range missile attack with
the medium- and long-range Standard Missile I ISM- l J. b y expanding the aircraft carrier's
anti-air and anti-submarine defensiw perimeter \Nith the E-2C Hawkeye and S-3A Viking
aircraft, respt>ctively. and by stationing its most capable ASV\o' escort, the DD 963 class, on
the outer flanks of the task force.
rhe characteristics of the 'Charlie' 'SS-:\-7 we<Jpon system thrcaterwd to nullify t hose
steps. Between the missile's short flight time and lmv incoming altitude, the SM's ability to
make a timely intercept was put in doubt. l"he restationing of the DO 963s away from the
'vital centre' had opened gaps i n acoustic coverage, and given a ·quiet · 'Charlie' the chance to
slip through. The carrier vvas still protectt'd by an inner screen of dose-in cruisers and
destroyers, but its main task vvas protection against a torpedo LJttack and uot a missile fired
from 5 nautical miles av,.ray !
l"he most difficult problem for c1 'Charlie' class submarint> working zdone is an Jccuratc fire
control solution. Becaust' the SS-N-7's maximum estimated range roughly coincides vvith
that of the first acoustic cnnvt•rgencc zone \CZJ (at temperate latitude'>, that is). it is possible
for tht> submarint• to get a fairly reliable fix of the target 's r.:mge lof murse. CZ sound
transmission works both \vays. so that the target has an equal chance of counter-detection).
l n practice. hovvever. CZ sound transmission channels arc a highly VZJriable phenomenon
whose existence depends on such factors as seasonal \·ariations, water temperature and
v•iater depth. Moreovt>r. a CZ detection would :.till leave the submarine without bearing
information.
Considering these limibtions. it is likely that in most tactical circumstances. the 'Charlie'
needs visual or electromagnetic confirmation of the target's position, or alternatively the
support of a co-operating platform. The latter could conceivabl y bt· an acoustic triangulation
with the help nf a second submarine.

Anti -carrier doct r i ne a n d tactics

Predictions of hmc tht' Soviet submarine fleet might employ its ACW capabilities depend on
three sources: ( I ) Soviet declaratory· doctrine and military art as portrayed in Soviet
writings, (2) the characteristics of Soviet fleet exercises. and (3) estimated capabilities. A
standard analytical tool for examining the interplay of ,1 11 three is the engagement scenario.
Typical Soviet ACW scenarios of the early 1 9 70s were twofold : the first one 1ovas
predicated on a bolt-from-the-blue attack agaimt the US Sixth Fleet i n the Mediterranean
Sea; the second one postulated an encounter behvcen an advancing carrier task force and
Soviet 'barrier' forces in the area of the Greenland�lceland-United Kingdom (G!UK) Gap. In
both scenarios the brunt of the Soviet attack 1ovmdd be borne by missile-armed submarines
and Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) bombers. Missile-armed surface combatants were usually
assumed to be held i n reserve, while torpedo at tack submarines \vere presumed to enter the
fray mainly to 'mop up" against ships already disabled by the opening missile strikes.
Soviet declaratory doctrine and observed exercises (most notably the 'Okean 70'

119
manoeuvre) suggested a strategy based on mass, surprise, simultaneity of attack, and
repeated follow-up strikes, all aimed at winning, in Gorshkov's words, the 'battle of the first
salvo'.
In the GIUK scenario, the enemy disposition of submarine forces was generally envisaged
as follows: ( I ) one or two submarines (probably a 'Charlie' and,ior 'Victor' class) in trail of the
advancing batt!egroup ; and (2) 'Echo lis' and 'Julidts', intermixed with torpedo attack
submarines deployed in mobile patrol zones as part of a genera! barrier formation astride the
opponent's PIM.
The assault itself was expected to evolve along approximately these lines.

I . Tu-95 'Bear' a nd ,ior Tu - I 6 'Badger' reconnaissance aircraft, opera ti ng in pairs, pro vid e final
targeting data to the barrier-deployed 'Echo lis' and 'Julietts', and the approaching SNA strike
regiments;
2. SNA strike bombers. involving as many as three regiments of about 20 missile aircraft each
plus escorting radar jamming aircraft, make their final run-in on different bearings from the task
force;
3. Stand-off jamming aircraft attempt to distract the defender's CAP aircraft away from the 'real'
attack corridors;
4. As the d efend ing force is preoccupied with the nearing bomber force, the trailing 'Charlie'
fires off an SS-N-7 salvo;
5. As the first wave of each SNA regiment approaches its launch point, the leading aircraft
radios a final fire control solution to the following aircraft;
6. The first waves launch their missiles simultaneously or near-simultaneously with the first
'Echo II' and 'Juliett' salvos;
7. After the missile raid is completed, missile and torpedo attack submarines close to del iver the
co11p de grace against the survivors.

A much simplified depiction of this scenario is shown in Figure 2.

/ Echo JT/Juliett
SS-N-3a
250 n m

ss-N-Jb ��
Kynda/ Kresta

150 nm
I c r u isers

Victor
torpedoes

'
Badger
AS-2

110 nm
([ Charlie
SS-N-7
25nm
Badger
AS-5
120 n m

Bl inder/Badger
AS-4/6
180 nm
Figure 2 : Soviet anti -carrier torpedo and missile envelopes
{Darkened centre circle is 10 nm diameter battle-group)

120
P r i n c i pa l sources

The Ol\il Re<'ifU' offered valuable data and commentary' on the hrst-generation Soviet nuclear
submarines, the HEN group. Important open-source documents included the annual posture
statements by thP US SecrdariE''> of Defense and J\Jvy. and the )oint Chds of Staff. Equally v<�luable
were the transcripts of US Congressional heanngs
Important secondary accounts of Soviet naval developnl('nh bl.'canw Jvailable in the latl' \ 960:..
The classic in this regard rcmznns Herrick "s 5ut't'cl ,�>.,Ju ulli SfmleS!I: Frf"t!' Yt•nr' <'/- TIJel'r!l 1111d Pmcl ice. Al�o
mentioned must be S1egfried Breyer\ nw Scerii�l!ms da Smcielrmitlll of I 964 . The description of Soviet
ACW tactics is indebted. in part. to informahon contained in the declassified C \/ Ctlllcepf Stud.l!. This US
Navy document vva.;; prepareJ in tlw early I 9:'0s to examine the fcasibilit)-' of employing the attack
aircraft carrier for anti -submarine vvarfare purposes

121
7 The Soviet submarine fleet in the
19 70s

The evolution of the Soviet submarine fleet in the decade of the 1 970s was highlighted by
two, arguably three events. First came the signature, on 26 May 1 972, of the SALT I treaty,
officially known as the Protocol to and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to
the Limitation of Strategic Arms. Second was the publication by Admiral of the Fleet of the
Soviet Union Sergei G Gorshkov of the series Nrwies in War mui Peace and the book The Sea
Power of fhe State. Both prompted an intense debate in the West over Soviet naval purposes.
The question of Soviet naval purposes, or more precisely a sh1ff in purposes, was the third
major development.

SAlT I a n d the 'Yankee' t h reat

Permanent out-of-area. 'Yankee' patrols off the North American coast were inaugurated
between 1 968 and 1 9 7 1 . ln 1 969, the US Navy issued instructions to its Atlantic Fleet that
all submarine contacts within 1400 nautical miles of the Atlantic seaboard be identified
immediately. Soviet missile submarines found in the area posed, according to the
instructions, a threat of 'pre-emptive attack'.
Contemporary threat assessments maintained that the most likely targets of a pre­
emptive 'Yankee' attack were the bomber bases of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). The
'Yankees', warned a 'Blue Ribbon Defense Panel' in 1 9 70, were intended for a first strike with
no effective warning, and were capable of 'destroying our national command centers and
much of our B-52 bomber force'. Warning time would be five minutes or less if. as was feared
by some defence planners, the Soviets developed the capability to launch their SLBMs on
so-called 'depressed trajectories'.
Four 'Yankee' SSBNs were fitting out or operational in 1 967. Four years later, the US
Defense Department reported that the operational total had risen to 'at least 1 7'. while
another 15 or more were in various stages of assembly or fitting out. The apparent
momentum of Soviet construction efforts caught the West by surprise. By contrast. the
United States did not plan to build new SSBNs until the late 1 9 70s.
In early 1 9 7 1, the annual production rate of the 'Yankee' was estimated at seven to eight
units. The next year, the Defense Department raised its estimate to nine to ten units, and
held out a yearly potential of 12. At an annual building rate of nine to ten, the 'Yankee' fleet
was projected to exceed the 4 1-strong US SSBN force by one in late 1973. Defense
Secretary Laird warned, in 1 972, that the Soviets could have 70 'Yankees' at sea before the
United States completed its own forty-second SSBN.
The 'Yankee' momentum prompted the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) to insist that the SLBM
issue be included the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), then in progress. Admiral
Elmo R Zumwalt, Jr. then the Chief of Naval Operations, explained later in his book On
Watch that the Soviet Union's largest submarine yard could turn out more SSBNs than the
combined US facilities. A freeze on strategic weapons that excluded SSBNs, he argued,
would not only give the Soviets a quantitative edge, but would also allow them to
concentrate their resources on qualitatiue improvements of their SSBNs.

122
 The SALT I Interim Agreement d i d put a cap (of sorts) on the Soviet SSBN momentum.
Ironically. however, the 62 'modern' SSBNs alloVI'ed the Soviet Union wen' precisely the
number that Laird had vvarned vvou\d constitute an unacceptable danger to SAC
The two superpowers agreed that the Soviet Union could build u p to a maximum of 62
modern SSBI\:s vvith no more than 950 modern SLBM launchers. The US ceiling was put ut
41 SSBNs \vith a maximum of 7 1 0 modern launchers. Zumwalt later called the numbers
'appalling'. It is worthwhile reviewing their rationale.
The American opening proposal was for th�' Soviet Union to cumplete the 'Yankees' then
under construction. In this way, the two sides \\'ould hcwe a nu m�'rical parity of 4 I modern
SSBNs each. The Soviets rejected the offer out of hand. Their argument vvas that the 'true'
measure of parity was not numerical equivalance, but (IIJ-::;tuftii/J equivalence. Since it, the
Soviet Union, d i d not have the benefit of forvvard b<.1scs such as Rota in Spain, Holy Loch in
Scotland. and Guam in the Pacific, its SSBNs were forced to spend more time in transit. It
followed. claimed the Soviet negotiators, that their side should have a numerically superior
fled.
The Soviet argument was simple, disingenous and. most important, effedive. Perhaps not
altogether coincidentally, the AmeriLan� had already calculakd t-hat �he numerical
equivalent of the Soviets' 'geographic disadvantage' wa::. a 20-unit advantage in modern
SSBNs. Thrown into the bargain (but excluded from the Soviet 62.-'950 ceiling) were the
Sovi�'t Navy's older ballistic missile submarines, mainly the 'Golfs' and 'Hotels'. and older
SS-N-4s.
The Soviet 'on-station equivalence' claim was d i singenous on two counts. The SALT pad
was signed in the spring of 1 9 72. and already then there were ample indications that the
Soviet SSBN fleet had no intention of copying the American example and keeping one half
of its numbers out -of-area. In January 1 9 72, the operational 'Yankee' inventory numbered
25, yet out -of-area deployments remained at a steady three. In the second place, the Soviets
knew (and the Americans s!Jtwld have known) that the 'Yankee's' 'geographic d isadvantage·
was about to be offset b y virtue of a new, long-range SLBM, shortly known as the SS-N-8.
Zum�A'alt testified to that effect during the US Senate's r.1tificahon hearings on SALT 1 :

. . the Soviets have tested a .'>000 nautical mile mi�o.;ile for their submarine�. This would, of
course, be one of the reasons why the ratio in their favor should be negated, the justification for
it would no l onger exist in the long haul if they an· operation,1l at sea suhmarinc� . The
justification for a superior number on their part . . has been that they laLk forward ba�es, you
need enough additional submarines �o that you can ket'p the same number on station; bu t <lS
they gd the 3000 mile missile their submarines will be on stal ion just about 1 he time they go to
sea

Zumwalt's 3000-nautical miles estimate of the SS-N 8 would later be raised to over 5000.

B u i l d i n g programmes: Tra d i t i o n and i n novat i o n

The 'Yankee' building momentum vvas sustained a t the price of 'gcnerJ.l purpost:
construction. As can be seen from ·1 able 26, the Soviet Navy added only about 25 nuclear­
powered non-strategic submarines to the fled between I 9 7 1 and 1 980. This translates into
an average annual delivery of 2.5 boats. By comparison. the SSB� fled was boosted with the
addition of 24 'Yankees ' and 32 'Deltas' for an average yearly completion rate of 5.6 SSBNs.
The completion of more than twice as many· SSBNs as SSN ..: SSGI\:s invites a couple of
broad observations. One is that although a ten-year annual average of S.b SSBN
completions is much less than the nine to ten annual 'Yankee' building rate on the eve of
SALT. it is quite another matter to claim that the SALT pad had served to hJ.lt the Soviet
SSBN building 'momentum'. One may wonder to what extent the Sovid Union's own

1 23
building calendar rather than SALT I was responsible for the fluctuations in the 1 9 7 1 - 1 980
deliveries.
A second observation is that the comparison of SSBN and non-SSBN deliveries is hardly
suggestive that anti-SSBN had a high priority in Soviet submarine construction. The only
submarine built in the 1970s that could plausibly be considered an SSBN hunter-killer was
the 'Vidor' class. Yet, only about 1 6 were built. The obverse of this observation is that the
Soviets may have placed greater stock in a large SSBN fleet to deter the Western SSBN thrPal"
than they did in a fleet of hunter-killers designed for active defence.
Table 26 compares the Soviet submarine orders of battle in 1 9 7 1 and 1980. Also shown is
a 1 9 7 1 intelligence projection of Soviet submarine strength in 1980. The latter is based on
the Defense lntel!(r,;ma Projections for Plans that is produced annually by the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). It is commonly known as the DIPP.
The DIPP projection is included for the insight it gives into contemporary expectations
about Soviet submarine building plans. The estimate repeated ONI's misjudgment in the
1950s about the speed with which the Soviet fleet would transition to nuclear power. Only
some 25 per cent of the projected general purpose submarine force was expected to be still
diesel-powered; the actual fraction turned out to be about twice as large.

Table 26: Comparison of the Soviet Navy's 1 9 7 1 and 1 980 projected and actual orders of
battle of general purpose submarines

Class Number in 1 9 7 1 Projected Actual number

number in 1980 in 1980

'Echo I' SSGN 2 0 0

'Echo II' SSeN 28 28 29
'Charlie' SSGN 6-7 24-34 15
'Papa' SSeN I 10-15
'}uliett' sse 16 16 16
'Whiskey' SSe 12 0 7
'Echo I' SSN 3 5 5
'November' SSN 14 14 IY
'Victor' SSN 9-10 27-37 26
'Alfo SSN !0-15 2
'Foxhot' SSK 45 40 60
'Zulu' SSK 25 0 10
'Bravo' SSK 5 5-10 4
'Romeo' SSK 14 0 10
'Whiskey' SSK 105 0 45
'Quebec' SSK 8 0 4
Tango' SSK 0 0 10

Totals 294-296 1 79-2 1 4 257

�one 'November' unit sank i n the eastern Atlantic i n 1 9 70. See Appendix I .

Related to this overestimate of the Soviet nuclear building plans was DlA's underestimate
of the operational longevity of the older diesel boats, especially the 'Whiskey' class. The
Soviet Navy has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not abide by the (ideal) Western
practice of retiring Its submarines after 20 years of service.
Table 26 also reveals that the 'Foxtrot' was seen as the Soviet Navy's last conventional
patrol design. Coincidentally.DIA published its estimate at the same time the keel was laid
for a new series of diesel submarines, the Tango' class.

124
The 'Ta ngo' c l ass

Built at the Krasnaya Sormova Yard since 1 9 7 1 , about 18 'Tango' class submarines \vere still
operational in 1 986. With a surfacE" displacement of 3000 tons, they are the world's largest
conventional torpedo a Hack submarines by far. Although the design has been depicted as a
lineal descendant from the 'Foxtrot' class, the ::.imilarities other than identical lengths and
general appearance are non-exi:::.l enl. The 'Tango' hull from is broadly cylindricCJ.! and is
marked by a prominent upward slope forward of the fin. The extra internal volume may
house two additional launching tubes for the SS-N - 1 5 or SS-N - 1 6.

'Tango' class conventional attack submarine (US Navy).

The 'Tango's propulsion system is somewhat of an enigma. When the boat first made its
appearance, there was some speculation that a Walter-type dosed-cycle plant might be
involved. The idea has since been discredited, but some disagreement still exists whether the
conventional diesel-electric plant is connected to two or three propeller ::.hafts. When
navigating on batteries, the 'Tango" is reported to be much quieter than the 'Foxtrot" or
'Romeo', and in fact, more so than most Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. This feature, in
addition to other silencing measures such as the application of anechoic hull coCJting, mCJrk it
as CJ good candidate for quiet line patrols in near-shore waters and choke points. ·1 he vessel is
reputedly capable of maintaining 15 knots for up to six hours on batteries. Table 2 7 is a
compilation of the Tango's main characteristics.

Table 2 7 : 'Tango ' da�s submarine�

Number built 20
When built ! 9 7 1 - 1 984(?)
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Gorki
Displacement 30QQ.:"J 700 tons
Length 91 m (.�00 ftl
Beam 9 m (29.7 ft)
Draught 7 m (23. ! ft)
Propulsion 6000; 6000 hp
Speed 20/ 1 6
Endurance NA
Armament SS-N- ! S :"SS -N - 1 6 : 1 0 x .533 m m (2 1 -in) T T ( 6 bow. 4 stern)
Diving limit 396 m ( !300 ft)
Complemcnt 60-plus

125
' M ystery' s u b m a r i n e N o 1 : The ' Pa pa ' class

Because of cost, navies rarely enjoy the luxury that air forces and armies have of starting
series produdion after a run-offbetwecn competing prototypes. Navies generally must 'live
with' the design and performance characteristics that are decided on paper and in computer
simulations. There are exceptions, however. Sometimes, the promise of .1 new technology
outweighs cost and risk, and a prototype ship or submarine is built. Most of the early
American nuclear submarines were prototypes - the Nautilus itself, the USS Seawo/f (SSN
5 75) with its sodium-cooled reactor plant, the dual-reactor USS Triton (SSRN 586), and the
USS Tul!ihee (SSN 597) whose experimental tear-drop hull shape set the standard for all next
American (and foreign) submarine dcsiens.
The Royal Navy, too, has a record of one-off or 'limited edition' submarines. High
expectations with the Walter closed-cycle plant prompted the Admiralty to fund
construction of two experimental boats (Explorer 49 and Excalihur 41) during the mid- I 950s.
The Soviet Navy has built experimental submarines on several occasions (an example is
the 'Project 95' aluminium alloy derivative of the Malodki class built shortly before the
Second World War). In stark contrast, however, to the experimental progression of the
American nuclear submarine fleet, the Soviets chose to series-produce their first-generation
nuclear boats around the first nuclear reactor that proved functional. As a maHer of fact, the
keels for the first 'November' types were laid before the Lenin testbed had completed trials.
With no recent Soviet precedent of experimental nuclear construction, it was
understandable for the DIPP to predict that the first 'Papa' seen was the lead unit of a follow­
on series to the 'Charlie' type. Moreover, from the Western point of view, the 'Charlie' was a
'successful' counter to the aircraft carrier that made sense to improve upon with a ten in
place of an eight-tube missile load.
Not so plausible was the annual 'Papa' production forecast of a little more than one unit
per year coincident with a near-tripling of the output of 'Charlies' at the same yard, Krasnaya
Sormova. To begin with, the Soviets would have no good reason to continue, let alone boost
production of the 'Charlie' if the supposed 'Papa' successor had proven successful enough to
warrant her own series production. Secondly, even though the Krasnaya Sormova yard had
demonstrated an impressive capacity in the past to produce conventional submarines, it was
another matter to expect it to complete more than four much larger, nuclear submarines per
year.

Starboard view of the 'mystery' 'Papa' class SSGN (US Navy).

126
 Published characteristics of the 'Papa' class vary wildly - from physical size and
pmverplant to Vl'hether or not the hull is built of a titanium alloy. There arc tVI'O possible
reasons Yvhy the Soviet Union stopped building the submarine at one unit. Most anal�/sts
today seem to agree tha!: the 'Papa" may h<�ve been a te�t-bcd for the giant 'Oscar' clas�
SSCN. It is not cle<Jr why·. Other than the fact that both types were armed with submerged­
latmchable variants of surface ship-launched anti-ship missiles {the SS-N-9 for the 'Papa', <1nd
the SS-N - 1 9 for the 'Oscar'), they share no simil<lrities whahoevcr. In any case, the SS-1\ - '-J
and SS-N- 1 9 arc quite different as regards their physical size and performance.
The other explanation for the Tapa' is that it was a mistake. no more and no less. The
'mistake' may have been the attempt to take the SS-N -9. make it submerged-bunchable, and
put it on a submarine. Table 28 lists the ch<Jradcristics of the "Papa' class that arc most
commonly cited.

Table 28 : "Papa' class submarines

Number built
When built 1970
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Corki
Displacement 6000.'7000
Length 109 Ill (357 ft)
Be<Jm I 1 - 1 2 m (36-40 ft)
Draught ':". .5-9.6 Ill (2-t.t\-J 1 . 4 ft.l
Propulsion 40,000-75,000 hp
Speed 2 5 ..' 3 .5 - plm
Endu r.mce NA
Arm<1mcnt 10 x SS-N 9; 4-6 x 533 mm (2 1 -ini bow TT
Di vi ng limit 760 m (2500 fll (as�uming titanium hull!
Complement 90

' M ystery' s u b m a r i n e No 2 : The 'Aifa' cl ass

A second 'mystery' nuclear attack submarine that the DIA erroneously predicted v-...·ould be
produced on a ::.cale identical to the "PJpa' wils the much-headlined 'Alfa'. A singk 'Alfa' was
reported in existence in 1 970- 7 1 (some reports claim that she may have been completed in
1967). Six follovv-nn units were built between the mid- I 970s and 1 984. The extraordinarily
long delay between hull No I and Nos 2 to 7 is only one of the factors that has
mystified Western analysts.
VV'hcn the "Alfa' was first reported in the early 1 9 70s, its estimated characteri::.tics seemed
ordinary enough: a surface displacement of 2 700 tons, a submerged displacement of 3300
tons. and an average <>ubmerged speed of about 30 knots. Jeli\·ercJ by a single-shuft nuclear
reactor rated at 24,000 hp. By the mid- 1 970s, and with no follmv -units in evidence, it had
become generally accepted that the 'Alfa' was an experimenbl platform vvho�e production
would be limited to one. Rumours circulated that it might have been fitted with J.n
experimental reactor design that had suffered d melt-down.
The 'Alfa' returned to the news in the early 1 980s after. contrary to cxpcdatiom. the
Soviets had resumed production and had apparently placed the fir::.t fevv units on operational
fleet status. Reports of unheard-of performance capabilities quickly escalated. An
underwater speed of 45-plus knots was reportedly docked, leading some analysts to
conclude that the 'Alfa' could 'outrun' Western torpedoes. The hull of the 'Alfa' was found to
be constructed of titanium or a titanium alloy {a material that the US Navy had rejected for

127
submarine construction because of cost and difficult fabrication). It was calculated that this
gave the 'Aifa' the ability to withstand pressure at a depth of more than 6 1 0 m (2000 ft)
which, if true, put it outside the operating envelope of most Western-built torpedoes. The
boat's titanium construction also meant that one of the principal means used by NATO ASW
aircraft for submarine localisation - the magnetic anomaly detector or MAD - had been
rendered powerless. The only apparent mitigating factor was that, navigating at 'hot rod'
speed, the 'Alfa' would sound like a freight train and be acoustically 'blind'.

'Mystery' submarine No. 2 : 'Alfa' class SSN (US Navy).

Six 'Alfa ITs' were produced at the Sudomekh Yard between the late 1 970s and early
1980s. The entire group is attached to the Northern Fleet area, but it is not dear to what
extent their duties are operational as opposed to experimental. There have been no reports
that the Soviet Navy's large 'surge' exercises in recent years have included the 'Alfa'.
It appears, on balance, that the 'Alfa' was primarily designed with experimental purposes
in mind, and is operated to develop practical experience with a variety of new-in-principle
submarine technologies, such as titanium construction, a high degree of shipboard
automation, and perhaps new reactor types (some sources report that the propulsion system
is a liquid metal-cooled reactor while others have speculated on a new form of chemical
propulsion). Proven concepts will presumably be incorporated into the next generation of
production submarines. It is coincidental perhaps but notable nevertheless that the 'Aifa' has
been built at the Leningrad Sudomekh Yard. This facility has a long record of innovative
submarine designs. In the 1930s, it experimented with a diesel engine intended to operate in
both surface and submerged conditions. During the same period, it was involved in the
'Project 95' aluminium hull Malodki. After the war, it was Sudomekh that attempted to mate
the 'Quebec' class with closed-cycle propulsion.The initial Western excitement over the
'Alfa's' speed and diving performance has given way to a much more moderate assessment of
the operational threat it presents; Western ASW planners of the late 1980s are much more
concerned with the 'quiet revolution' in Soviet submarine design inaugurated by the Akula
class. Given the technological thrust of the modern US and British nuclear submarine fleets,
ie the priority placed on (relatively) slow and quiet operations, the 'Aifa's dependence on
speed appears an 'anachronism'. I t was not, however, when design requirements would have
been first laid down, presumably sometime in the late 1 950s. The Western submarine design
emphasis on quietness came in the early -1960s, partly the product of advances in passive

128
sonar and, at the operational leveL the emerging interest in 'static' AS\N barrier deployments
as opposed to 'active' hunt-and-kill patrols. VVhen first designed, the 'AI fa' was the Soviet
Union's 'countervailing' response to the high-speed attack submarines planned in the West.
Western submarine design ch.lllgcd direction, t hereby (inach-ertcntly) neutralising what
would have been the 'Aifa's' speed and depth-keeping advantage (an interesting analogy is
the MiC-25 'Foxbat', built to counter the USAf B - 70 bomber. but 'checkmated' b y the
bomber's cancelbtion). Pf'rhaps the most important aspcd ot the 'Alta' i s that it sought to
combine a series of hull and engine technologies - 30 years ago! - far in advance of those
then planned in the West. Table 29 is a compilation of the wide range in open-source
estimates of the 'Aifa's' ch.:nactcristics.

Table 29: 'A[fa' ci<Jss submarines

� -- ---

!\umber built C' (plus 1 ",

When built J 9b7- 1 98 ..J.
Wht>r"f' buill SuJc>mckh Y<�rcl. !.t'ningrad
Dispi<Jcemf'nt 2800. :; 700 tons
Length 80-82 m ( 26 2-- 2 69 It )
Bedm 9.o- 1 0 m ( 3 1 A-J2.8 fti
Draught �-7 0 m (23. I -2..\.9 I l l
Propulsion l ..J..000-45.000 hp
Speed lc- J 8 /4l1-45
Endur<Jnce "'A
A rmdmcnt SS-N - I S 'SS- l\ - 1 6 . o x .",'>3 rnm ( 2 1 - in ) bow TT
Div1ng limit o J 0-9 1 5 m (2000-JOOO ftJ
Complement -1-0-bO

The ' Delta' c l ass S S B N

Production of the 'Yankee' class SSB� c1me I n end in ! 9 7-L \A/o rk at the Se\·crod\·insk and
Komsomolsk yZJrds had shifted meanVI'hile t o her successor (itself basically ,111 enlarged
1/('J Sinn of the 'Yankee'), known shortly as the 'Delta' class. Associated ;vith the nt'\V vessel
vvas a battery of ! 2 SS-�-8s. At this t1mc, V\lcstcrn intelligence had upgradt>d the SS- N-S's
rangt> capability to 4200 nauticui n'i lc",
The first series of flight tests of thf' SS-N -8 \VCI e held in tht· Barents Se,1 around I 970. and
wert> limited to single re-entry vehicles (RVsL A fcvv years afterward, another series of tests
with what appeared to be a MlRVed version nf the SS-N-8 was observed. VVith the benefit
of hindsight, it now seems fairly •:ertain that a new missile, the SS- \: - 1 8 was involved
instead. According to the US Defense L)cpd : t lllcnt',_ :::;,,,,wi .·'vfilift�r!J JJ.mw. both the Mod I
and 2 version s of the SS-!\1 -8 are a rmed vvitb 'iingle \-varheads. The SS-1\ - I $. by conlr<lst, i s
credited w i t h three different single or multiple warhead options. I t i s vvorth mentioning in
this connection that US efforts at moniforin� Soviet missile testing during 1 9 74 V\-'erc
hampered by unusual Soviet .:1ttempts at camouflaging their SLBM progr.1mme. Telemetry
signols were encrypted. Western monitoring equipment was jammed. and even the 'Delta'
construction ways at Severodvinsk Wt'rt' physically shielded from the prying cameras on
surn:illance satellites.
Forty-one Deiter SSBI\s had been built b y the spring of I 9$7. Thi.., rnakcs it the second
most numerous Soviet nuclear submarine programme so fen. The mo'->t recent version. the
'Delta IV'. remains in construction, thu:; holding nut the possibility· that the 'Deltas' may
eventually outnumber the -1-3-unit st rnng 'Vict(lr· class. The characteristics nf the 'Delta' I
through IV series are shown in Table 3 0 . The progre"sivc t'nlargcment of the submarine t o

129
fit newer and bulkier SLBMs (and indeed the 'Delta's own lineal descendancy from the
'Yankee') exemplifies the strong evoh1fionary theme in Soviet weapon design. A different
perspective on the 'Yankee-Delta' 'family' is the widening qualitative gap between
successive platforms and their weapons. The 'Delta IV's' SS-N-23 far outperforms the
'Yankee's' SS-N-6, yet with the exception of a moderate improvement in quietness, the
Delta IV' s hull and machinery (H & M) do not represent a significant advancement over the
'Yankee'. The different 'Delta' SLBM weapons systems are presented in Table 3 1 .

• # .. · =g
'Delta III' SSBN (US Navy) .

Table 30: 'Delta' class submarines

Delta I Delta II Delta III Delta IV

Number bui lt 18 4 14 5 (spri ng I 988)

When built 1972-77 1973-76 1976-84 1986-present
Where built Severodvinsk and Komsomolsk
D isplacement 9000 / 1 1.750 10,500/ 12,750 I O,OOO.i13,250 1 1 ,200i14,500
tons
Length 1 40 m ( 460 ft) 155 m (508 ft) 155 m (508 ft) 160 m (528 ftl
Beam 1 2 m (39 6 ft) 1 2 m 139.6 ft) 1 2 m (39.6 ft) 1 2 m (39.6 ft)
Draught 1 0 m {33 ft) 1 0 m {33 ft) 10.3 m {33 . 7 ft) NA
Propulsion 60.000 hp
Speed 20.:"25 knots
Endurance NA
Armament 1 2 X SS -N -8 1 6 X SS-N -8 1 6 X SS- N - 1 8 1 6 X SS -N-2 3
6 X 533 mm 6 X 533 mm 6 X 533 mm 0 X 533 mm

{ 2 1 -in) bow TT {2 1 -in) bow TT (2 l -in) bow TT (2 l -in) bow TT

D iving limi t 396 m ( 1 300 ft) 396 m ( 1 300 ft) 396 m (BOO ft) 396 m ( 1300 ft)
Complement 120 1 20 120 1 20

Table 3 I : 'Delta' class-carried S LBMs

SS-N-8 SS-N-18 SS-N-23

lv1od I ,\1od 2 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 3 /\dod r

Year of IOC 1973 1977 1 977 1 978 1978 1986

Range, nm 4200 4900 3500 4300 3500 5000
No of RVs I 3(MIRV) 7(MIRV) IO(MIRV)
Yield per RV, KT 1000 800 200-500 450-1000 200-500 100?
E't CEP. m(ft) 1510 910 1400 910 910 < 910

(4950) (3000) (4600) (3000) (3000) ( < 3000)

¥55-N-23 Mod 2 version may complete flight testing in 1988.

130
The SS- NX-1 3 e n i g m a

Western SLBMs have been designed exclusively t o attack land target�. Soviet open-source
literature, on the oth�·r hand, has frequently mentioned the 1111/ i-nm1ul potential of long-range
ballistic mio;-;ilcs, including ::;tdmlllriuc -/Ju�cd strategic mi-;siles. One possible candidate for
such a role that caused considerable excitement during the first half of the I 970s was the
KY-9 (the prefix KY stands for the Kapustin Yar testing facility), lalt'r known as the SS-NX-
13.
At-sea testing o f the SS-NX - 1 3 was carried out from the late I 960s until November 1 9 7 3
aboard a specially reconfigured 'Golf' clas:-. SSB. Then-retired CNO Admiral Elmo R
Zumwalt told a US Congressional subcommittee, in 1 9 75, that after the United States had
signed the SALT I pact. Kissinger was forced into a 'secret agreement' in order to plug a
loophole resulting from 'sloppy negotiating' that would have permitted the installation of
2 10 SS-NX� 1 3s on the 'Golf' class submarines. This number obviously raises questions. since
the 22 'Golfs' operational in 1972-73 dearly would not have been capable of carrying
almost ten SS NX- 1 3s each. By all accounts, the SS-NX - 1 3 had the same external dimensions
as the 'Yankee's' SS-N-6. Furthermore, a US Navy training ducument of 1 973 identified only
the 'Hotel IV' and a modified version of the 'Yankee' (dubbed 'Yankee II') as the SS-NX- l3's
likely launch platforms. According to this same estimate. the 'Yankee 11' \-vould hold ten of
the missiles.
The estimated characteristics of the SS-NX - 1 3 are displayed belcnv. They are based.
in part. on declassified telemetry data. Most sources. including official one�. have described
the weapon as a ballistic anti-ship missile with a terminal guidance system. Some reports
claim that it may have been intended for anti-submarine purposes as well

sensor
lock on

...
re-orientation

�
1 5 - 3 5 sec
2nd stage burn �
' 5-15 sec burn

�'
�� '\
re-orientation

' 5 sec burn

I
vem;e, bum
''
\
' '
'

'
'
apogee '
' RV
•
'

',
150 n m '
,
separat1on
1 1st stage burn '
'

______ ________ __c_________ ' __

____________ ____,__

I
____ ____ ____ ____ ' ,

_' '"
��--�
range : 100-600nm target aim
point

Figure 3 : Estimated flight profile of SS-NX- U

Fired in an anti-ship mode, the SS-NX - 1 3 vvould have been an extremely dangerous
opponent. Its extreme range and flight altitude \vould have put it outside the intercept
envelope of shipboard defensive missiles. On its final approach and even though within the
range envelope o"f the defender, !:he SS-NX- J 3's down-the-stack dive angle (ic at ncar-90
degrees) would have exceeded the manoeuvring capability of most. if not all. ship-to-air
missiles.
Employed as an anti-submarine weapon, the SS-NX - 1 3 would presumably have been
armed with a nuclear depth charge (a warhead yield up to one megaton IMTI ha::. been cited).

131
A large-yield underwater nuclear explosion could kill a submarine in two different ways.
First, overpressure could crush the hull. This method is at the heart of the open ocean
'barrage' scenario. Its practicality is quite limited by the very large number of detonations
needed to cover the entire operating area of the opponent's submarines. The MX Missile
Basil IS Study, produced by the US Office of Technology Assessment in I 98 I , calculated that
1 T 30 nuclear detonations, each with a kill radius of about 3.5 nautical miles, were needed to
destroy four SSBNs. The size of the barrage would multiply tenfold with a false alarm rate of
83 to 88 per cent (which is typical of actual ASW experience).
The second potential kill -mechanism of an underwater nuclear explosion is known as the
Van Dorn effect. It, too, offers little practical promise, at least against the American
operating routine in deep water. The Van Dorn phenomenon involves the propagation of an
explosion-induced deep water wave into the shallower waters on the continental shelf. As
the wave is funnelled onto the continental shelf it assumes extreme proportions; a submarine
caught in its path is likely to be up-ended and, if not destroyed, severely damaged. But, there
arc two drawbacks to this tactic. In the first place, and as already mentioned, the US SSBN
Aeet is normally 'caught' on the continental shelf only during transit to and from port. In the
second place, the wave action needs to be generated in sufficiently deep water, and takes
therefore several hours to arrive. SSBNs near deep water would have time to escape; those
who do not would still have ample time to launch their missiles.
The biggest problem, however. that an SS-NX- 13-like system must overcome is targeting.
The SS-NX-B's active homer permitted some self-correcting guidance (against surface
targets, that is), but finding its victim would ultimately have depended on the reliability and
promptness of third-party target co-ordinates. The state of Soviet 'real-time' ocean
surveillance capabilities in the early 1 9 70s could have caused the ces::.ation of the SS-NX- r 3
programme. At that time, Soviet overhead tracking and trailing of Western naval
movements still depended primarily on the 'Badger' and 'Bear' aircraft. The first ocean
reconnaissance satellites had been put into orbit, but it would be almost another decade
before their intelligence could be down-linked in 'real-time' fashion to ocean-going
platforms. At the time instead, satellites had to store their information and wait until their
orbits brought them within line-of-sight of Moscow headquarters for a 'dump'.
Two other reasons have been advanced for the cessation of the SS-NX- 13 programme, in
late 1973. Michael MccGwire has proposed that the missile embodied an early Soviet
attempt at an 'exotic' breakthrough of the anti-SSBN problem, that the goal of a dual­
capable anti-ship and anti-submarine weapon proved overly ambitious. Others have
suggested that the Soviets had foregone deployment in order not to compromise their
allowable ceiling on 'conventional' land attack SLBMs. The Kissinger 'secret protocol'
suggests that the second is the more likely reason.

The Soviet S S B N operati n g e n i g m a : bast i o n s or break­

out?
The SS-NX B played a minor role in what became a major Western reassessment of Soviet
naval strategic priorities. The outcome of this reassessment has been codified today as the
cornerstone of the West's agreed estimate of the Soviet Navy's wartime plans to deploy and
employ its SSBN fleet, the so-called 'bastion' strategy. The concluding section of this chapter
traces the 'intellectual maturation' of this bastion strategy from what was little more than
one of several hypothetical constructs in the early 1 9 70s to its wholesale adoption by the US
Navy, a decade later, as the underpinning of its Maritime Strategy. Throughout this account,
it is important to remember that the relevant Soviet military literature has never even alluded
to the operational and doctrinal practices that Western analysts claim arc central to the
bastion concept.

132
Bastion o r i g i n s

The intellectual origin of the bastion idea goes back to a series of conferences held a t the
Dalhousie University i n Halifax. i\ova Scotia during the first half nf the 1 9 70s. The
tramcriph. of these meetings, attended by the cm11c de In crn11c of the American Soviet t\avy
analytical community, have been published under the co-editor�hip of Michael MccGvvirc,
the conference chairman. rhc three publi"'hed titles Jrc So u icl Nllt't!l DcuclopHICIIh: Cilpilbilif!;
mtd Co11texf. Souicf Nm,n! Po!iw 0/,infiuc:; 1111d Cons/mint.�, and Stli'l'cf Nilunl lu/htcllt'i':
0(1/IJesfic nnd [orcigu Diuu'nsious.
The backdrop to the first gathering, in 1 9 73. was the recent publication of Admiral
Gnrshkov's i''.ill l'II'S iu VVn r ilnd Pmcc. At issue VI' as the authoritat i\ eness of the sene<>: did they
represent a formaL Politburo-approved �takment of Sm·ict naval policie� and priorities, or
were they an exercise in navalist ad\ ocacy? And i n either case. what exactly \'•/as being
announced or advocated?
The chid protagonists on the question were MccCv.rire and James M McConnelL a senior
analyst with the Center for Navc1l Analyses ((NAl. a semi-official 'think tank' in the suburbs
of Wilshington. DC McConnell tonk the lead tn datming that Nui.'ICS in V\'11r mtd flt•ucc were
an authorativc announcement of current Soviet naval :.trategic priorities as approved by the
country's top political and military leadership. The most important doctrinal innuvation that
could be gleaned from the series, he cbinll'd, wa� the decision. formalised at the 24th
Congress of the Communist Party in 1 9 7 I . to turn the So\·iet SSBNs into a strategic 'fleet in
being'. This meant. he explained. that the SSB\J:., espt'Cially the nevv· 'DcltJ' cia..,:., would be
withheld from the initial :>trategic exchange, so that their t hreat of follow -up strike., could be
used to influence the course of hostilities and the shapt' of final peace negotiations
Uoc!rin11l witholding. McConnell went on. would be matched 1.v ith a nevv policy of
seo:.;mpltiml witholding. Whereas the US Navy SSBt\ witholding option had ahvay's
depended on the security afforded by oceanic di spersion. the Soviet:; had chosen to escond
their SSBt\s 'in local v;,.·atcrs, protected in a wartime environment over J protracted period by
the main ASW and other forces of the Russicm fleet'. The building of the intercnntinentJ. I ­
rang(' SS-:\ - 8 , h e said. vvas the d i rect result o f this decision.
Bradford Dismukes, another CNA analyst. :.econdeJ his collcZJguc's opinion that the
Sm·iets would use their general purpose na\·al fon·es for 'pro-SSB:\' protection. l ie adduced
these reasons t I ) Russia's hi storic:!l preoccupation with defensive n11ssiom, (2) its fcJr of
\tVestern ASVV capabilities. ( 3 ) the heightened importance of a secure deterrent in an era of
'mutual as...,u red destruction'. and ( -t ) So\·il'l recognition that current technic<"! I rea liti l' S held
out little hope for the erstwhile priority of llllfi-558,'\". rhi:. la:.t point has interesting
cnnnobtions i n that i t suggests that the fleet's re-assignment from an anti- to a pru-SSBN
role was partly brought about by the navy's institutional need to justify its existence.
rhe stronge:.t exception to McConnell's 'wit holding' and 'prn-SSBN' theses came from
MccGwirc_ Strategic ASW against thr US SSBN fleet remained the Soviet Navy's foremost
priority. he claimed. The Soviets were committed to anti-SSBN. he explained, for tv.-o
reasons : one, damage limitation and tvvo, to prevent the USA from using their withcld
SSBNs to deter a victorious Soviet army from occupying Western Europe.
Shortly, MccCwire seemed to have second thoughts on the solidity of Moscow's anti­
SSBN commitment. I n 1 9 74, the CNA published a trio of expert interpretations of the
Gorshkov series under the title Admiml Corsltk-ou on 'l\im>ie5 itt �'V11 r mtd Peace ·. Having
reiterated his conviction that destruction of the US Navy's SSBNs was still the Soviet Na\·y\
main purpose. MccGwire went on to acknowledge a 'faint possibility' that Gorshkov might
favour dropping the anti-SSBN task_ But, he quickly added. the reasons would havc less to
do with doctrine than V\' ith opt'rationa\ practicalities, such as disappointing progress with
strategic ASW capabilities, and the need to release more ships for naval peacetime purposes.

UJ
 Also, he speculated, the Soviets might have concluded that the most cost-effective way of
neutralising the US SSBNs was through the countervailing deterrence of their own SSBNs.
Obviously, this last consideration would constitute a doctrinal shift of the greatest
importance.
MccGwire also agreed with McConnell that the Soviet SSBN fleet, with the exception of
the few 'Yankees' normally on patrol off the American coast, would probably be witheld
from the initial strategic shoo�-ou�. Rut he disagreed t ha t such witholding would be
doctrinally-motivated. The key to Soviet witholding, MccGwire maintained, was the
SSBNs' vulnerability to Western ASW. This meant, he concluded, that the 'Yankees' with
their relatively short-range SS-N-6s would probably attempt to break out only after
Western ASW capabilities had been disrupted in the initial hostilities. Due to their much
longer-range SS-N-8s, the 'Deltas' would have no need, of course, to break out.
MccGwire and McConnell's conflicting views on the relative importance of anti- versus
pro-SSBN in Soviet naval strategy coloured their respective evaluations of the SS-NX - 1 3
enigma. MccCwire saw the weapon a s part of a Soviet campaign t o find a n effective counter
to the Western SSBN. McConnell, on the other hand, thought that SS-NX - 1 3-armed
'Yankees' might 'ride shotgun' in support of a break-out by the 'conventional 'Yankees'. I n
other words, whereas MccGwire stressed the SS-NX - 1 3's ASW potential. McConnell's
estimate focused on its role as an mdi-ship weapon against Western surface ASW forces.
The MccGwire-McConnell controversy came to a head following Gorshkov's
publication of The Sea Power of the State in 1 976. MccGwire charged that his opponent's
portrayal of the Gorshkov writings as an authoritative announcement of a 'new doctrine of
conserving forces based on a "fleet-in-being" of SSBN' was based on a 'selective reading of
(Gorshkov's) historical analysis'. A Soviet SSBN witholding decision, he objected, would not
be dictated by doctrinal prescription but instead by operational requirements at the time. The
most likely 'operational requirement', MccGwire proposed, would be to deter the United
States (whose socio-economic system, like the Soviet Union's, would have been devastated
in the initial strategic exchange) from taking over a (relatively) undamaged Western Europe.
Evidently, MccGwire foresaw a post-exchange situation in which the United States and the
Soviet Union both would use their witheld SSBN fleets to deter the other from a 'great
migration' to Europe.
In a 1 976 study sponsored by the Congressional Research Service under the title Soviet
Oceans Development. MccGwire summed up his case against McConnell :
'The evidence in the Gorshkov series will not support the conclusion that Gorshkov is
advancing a doctrinal rationalization for the political decision to withold a substantial portion of
the Soviet SLBM in order to carry out 'deterrence' in war, conduct intra-war bargaining and
influence the peace talks at the end of the war . . . Gorshkov shows no particular interest in the
concept of a 'fleet in being' and its potential influence either on the outcome of war, or on the
subsequent peace negotiations. If he had wanted to present this case, his naval historians could
have produced a clutch of examples to bolsle1 his digument.
The SSBN force, together with the SRF (Strategic Rocket Forces), comprise the main striking
power of the Soviet Union. Because of the system's characteristics it is likely that at least a
proportion of SLBM will not be used in the initial exchange. SSBN are part of the Soviet Union's
general war-fighting capability, and decisions on their use will depend on evolving operational
requirements, the course and nature of the war, and the opportunities to influence its outcome.
It is not clear why the Soviets should consider it necessary at this particular juncture to produce
a convoluted doctrinal rationalization for a process that is inherent in the weapon system. But if
they think it necessary, one would then expect the message to be clearly articulated and readily
discernable by its readership.'

McConnell countered his critic with a series of excerpts from The Sea Power ofthe State which,
he asserted, strengthened his claim of a Soviet SSBN witholding doctrine. True, he said, the

134
potential to wit hold was inherent in the high survivability of the SSBN, but the mpubilif!t to
wit hold was not the same as the 111te11t to withold. The dear me�sage of the Gorshkov series
was. according to McConnelL that a political decision had been made to keep a large portion
of lhe SSBN fleet in reserve for the purpose of intra-war deterrence and to influence the peace
talks at the end of hostilities. Before this decision �A'aS made. McConnell argued, the Soviet
SSBN fleet would probably have participated in the initial and �hort-ldsting exchange; the
need for pro-SSBN protection by the Navy'� general purpose forces had then been minimal.
Nmv however, the SSBNs would have to survive through a possibly protracted period of
ho�tilities; it followed that the provision of 'combat stability' by the na\·y as a whole had
become extremely important. It vvas also in this connection. McConnell concluded, that the
recent rehabilitation in the Soviet naval lexicon of the 'command of the sea' concept should
be appreciated.

The Bast i o n s i n the 1 980s

It seems a bit ironic that it was apparently MccGwire who coined the term SSBN 'bastions'.
Because of its association with active defence, the word v;,.·as preferred over SSBN 'sanctuary'
or 'haven'.
From the late I 970s onward. MccGwire (and most other Western Soviet Navy analysts)
became converted to the McConnell thesis (although by no means to hi� reasoning and
evidence). In a lengthy article, written in the magazine lntenwtimwf Defense RePiew in 1980,
MccGwire announced a 'fundamental shift' in the theoretical basis of Soviet naval policy. No
longer was Soviet military science and war planning based on the fundamental premise of a
short general nuclear war. The new Soviet planning assumption instead was a protracted
conventional war not unlike the Second World War. Coincidentally. he claimed, the Soviets
had also arrived at the conclusion (as had MccGwire himself) that the long-sought break­
through in anti-SSBN ASW lay still far in the future.
These two new factors - a new doctrine and a technological setback - MccGwire
theorised, had prompted the 'basic decision' to rdocm Soviet naval planning on SSBN
protection in 'defended ocean bastions in the Greenland and Barents Sea and in the Sea of
Okhotsk'. New operational requirements, war-fighting plans. and warship design and
construction specifications had cascaded in a logical fashion. Thus, the 'one-shot' Soviet
surface fleet that had been sufficient for the short-war doctrine of the 1 960s was no longer so
today. Preparations for drawn-out conventional hostilities (which would include a 'stout'
defence of the bastioned SSBNs) demanded a new generation of larger warships vvlth the
capability to fight and survive to fight another day. The Kiroi' battlecruisers, the SoPrememw
and Udaloy destroyers. and the large Berezina replenishment ship, claimed MccGwire, were
some of the material results of this new requirement.
MccCwire's 1980 argument has been further elaborated in his new ( 1 987) book Militor_v
0/Jjecfives i11 SoPiet Foreigu Policy. In it, he grants that McConnell's intuition of 1 5 years before
had been right after all - only his 'explanation and evidence were wrong'. Soviet SSBN
witholding did rest on a doctrinal decision, but not the one McConnell had claimed. I n
MccGwire's judgment, the key reason for wit holding and protecting its SSBNs i s the Soviet
Union's requirement for an insurance force against the risk that some sort of American
technological break-through might 'outflank' the land-based Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF).
In his book, MccCwire speculates whether the Soviet bastion strategy is about to fall into
disuse. Based on what he terms 'fragmentary evidence', he suggests that the Soviets may
have decided that building an expensive fleet for the sole purpose of near-home defence of
the SSBNs may not be cost-effective after all. Besides the fact that a lot of naval capability
would be tied up, the Soviet Union may not be confident after all that their 'insurance force'

135
would stand up against a Western ASW campaign. MccGwire thinks that the Soviets may
already have seized upon another option. namely to transfer the SSBNs' witheld insurance
responsibility to a land-mobile missile force of SS-24s and SS-25s. This done, the Navy's
'pro-SSBN' general purpose forces would become available for other wartime tasks.
MccGwire offers no hints as to the wartime assignments of the 'debastioned' SSBN fleet.

The Bast i ons: Pol icy versus evidence and i n ference

The bastion 'model' of Soviet SSBN capabilities and purposes is a coherent explanation of a
number of aspects of Soviet naval activities that have puzzled Western intelligence and other
interested observers ever since the Soviet Navy's forward deployment in the mid- 1 960s. I t
i s also a construct that is beset by factual uncertainties and a good deal o f inferential logic. It
is important to be aware of those factual and inferential uncertainties for at least one very
good reason: the presumption that the Soviet Union has committed its SSBNs, along with
the bulk of naval general purpose forces, to wartime deployment in near-home waters, is
critical to US and allied hopes with the efficacy of the evolving 'Maritime Strategy' (MS).
The most authoritative outline of the MS so far ( 1 987) appeared in a special 'white paper'
by the US Naval Institute in January 1986. Central to the strategy is the concept of an early
'forward offensive' against the Schwerpwnkfe of Soviet naval strength, primarily the Northern
Fleet. A key purpose of the offensive would be to hold at risk and, if necessary, sink the
Soviet SSBN fleet and the supporting 'pro-SSBN' flotillas. This purpose is expected to serve
these goals:
- the destruction of the Soviet Navy, the US Navy's only competitor of consequence on
the world's oceans;
- force the Soviet Union to divert military forces that otherwise face the allies on the
main Central Front;
- prevent the Soviets from dispatching their attack submarine fled against the allied sea
lines of communication; and
- change the correlation of strategic nuclear forces to the allied advantage, thereby
making prolongation of the war increasingly risky for the Soviet Union.
Many critics have taken the MS to task for its aggressive emphasis on strategic ASW
against the Soviet SSBNs, and have argued that this could well turn a war that started out
conventionally into a nuclear holocaust. This is certainly a legitimate consideration, but it
seems that an even more basic question is whether the Soviets will, in fact, hold to an SSBN
bastion strategy in wartime.
The preceding overview of the origins and development of the bastion concept showed
that, whereas most analysts agreed that this was indeed an accurate description of Soviet
SSBN strategy. they arrived at no single agreed explanation of why the Soviets chose this
direction. Thus. McConnell's explanation relies on his interpretation of what he calls the
'language-within-a-language' of Soviet open-source military writings. MccGwire's
explanation has varied over the years; initially, he cited the SSBNs' alleged vulnerability to
Western ASW. while most recently he has alluded to a doctrinal decision made 20 years ago.
Still others, most notably Kenneth McGruther in his The holuiHX Sovief Nauy, have
hypothesised a Soviet Navy institutional rationale. namely the need of the professional
Soviet naval officer to 'find a mission' to justify the building of large surface combatants after
'anti-SSBN' had proved a 'non-starter'. There is a hint here that the bastion proponents have
spent more time marshalling evidence and formulating explanations to support conclusions
already made instead of the other way around. The other side of the same coin is that
evidence that cannot be easily accommodated by the bastion concept has been explained
away, or if cited at all, has been labeled an 'anomaly'. Those anomalies warrant citation :

136
 - the occasional 'Delta' patrols in the southern portion of t h e Atlantic Ocean. A pos sib l y
associated phenomenon is the extensive Soviet hydrographic exploration of the South
Atlantic in recent years. A similar Soviet programme preceded the 'Yankee' patrols off the
US East Coast:
- the very large si7e and nucleilf propulsion of a Soviet SSBN fled that \viii presumably
limit its wartime patrol s to near-home waters. lf this is the Soviet strategy. >vou l d not a
reasonable alternative have been to build many small and di e-;el -powcred submarines?
And if it >vere. why· was this option foregone?
- is there perhaps a relationship be hvcc n the low out-of-area patrol tempo of the Soviet
SSBN fleet and the inefficiency of the Soviet submarine overhaul establishment mentioned
in the JCS P osture Statements of the late 1 970s?
- the fraction of the So viet flet't a<> a \Vhole normally on "forward deployment' closely
matches that of its SSBN portion, ie about I 0- 1 5 per cent. ln ot he r words, the lo\1\' out-of­
area patrol tempo of the Soviet SSBNs is a salient phenomenon only when compared with
that of US SSBN fleet ; it is entirely consistent with the normal operating pattern of t he
Sou Jet fleet :
- open-source evidence indicates that the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces are
maintained at a lower level of readiness than those of the United State s . Also, the open­
source Soviet doctrinal literature suggests that Sovid strategic planners expect to usc a
period of 'cr isis indicators' to ready their forces. Is it perhaps in this context that the Soviet
Navy's periodic 'surge' exercises ought to be explained?
- when Soviet naval writers talk about the importance of a 'balanced fleet' for submarine
combat stabil i t y, do tht'y mean that the SSBNs must receive protection in m sJfJJ bastion
waters, or while 'breaking out' onto the h igh "eas ?
- in ! 985, the US Navy's CNO, Admiral James Watkins. told the US Congress that the
Soviet SSBN fleet had introduced a dual crewing system similar to the US 'blue -gold "
system. How docs this fit a fled, 85 per cent of whose units and crews is normally waiting
in port or manoeuvring in coastal waters?
- a key reason, according to many anal y s h , why the Soviets chose to bastion their SSB!\"s
was the boats' acoustic disadvantage against Western ASW capabilities. What are the
implications, if any, of the recent (and apparently surprising) Soviet progress in submarine
quieting? More on this is said in the concluding chapter.

P r i n c i p a l sources

Other than offkial US Covernment documentation. primarily the annual posture -.tatcments of the
Deparlmenh of Defense and the Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. and the transcnpts of Congres::.ional
hearings, little primary source material on this period in Soviet submannc developments is available.
Exceptions 1ncludc a scattering of declassif1cd documents originally marked 'cunfidcntial". Key
secondary sources thai Wl'rc con::.ulted. especially in connection with the chapter's discussion of the
'bastion strategy'. include the three volumes of e::.say::. on Sovid nav;:�l developments that han' been
published under Hw co-editorship of M ichael MccCvvire. They arc: Soc'!d .1\./uc',d Occ,c/,lplleiJf::;
Cu/IIJ!,ilil!! 1111d C(lllfcxt. S,Jl1id l''>!'auol Polily : 0/Jicdi<'CS mui Co11s!-rdrll/s, ;md Soc,icl f\illi.'<ll ln./hreii(C
Do!llcshc mul Fomsn Drmen�ion,,. Another irnporlanl series of documents is Robert \N Herrick\ multi­
volume study of Sov1d naval mission ossignments, especially Parts I (S(lPiel SSBN l\(1/e:; in 51,·-JicsiL
5/rike) and I I (A Pfi>tmded VV'illwldms Role f;rr Sm•rd SSBl'11's?) Thc�e reports were produced, 1n the late
1 9 70s. under contract to the US 1\:avy

137
8 The 'Quiet' revolution and the
future

The overall size of the Soviet submarine fleet has declined by less than ten per cent over the
past two decades. End strength in 1967 was about 380 units of all types; in 1986 the number
was about 360. What has changed is the conwosition of this force. Two decades ago, the
strategic portion (SSB and SSBN) of the fleet counted some 40 units. At the same time,
altogether 50 boats ( T O SSBNs plus 40 SSN./SSGNs) were equipped with nuclear reactors. In
"1 986, more than 20 per cent of the overall submarine inventory included SSBNs and SSBs;
nearly 60 per cent of the total fleet was nuclear-powered.
Another change over the past 20 years that may not be as obvious is that the 1986 force is
comparatively older than its 1967 forerunner. None of the submarines in the I 967 inventory
had yet reached its normal 20-year life expectancy; the oldest vessels at that time were the
'Whiskeys' and 'Zulus' built in the early 1950s. In 1986, by contrast, nearly one-half of the
reported operational inventory consisted of hulls 25 years or older. What is more, Soviet
submarines built through the early 1970s are generally regarded to be up to ten years behind
their \A/estern chronological contemporaries in technological age. This means that. in an
encounter with a Soviet submarine, there is a 50 percent chance that a modern US (or British)
submarine will have a 30-plus year edge in technological modernity.
At the close of the decade of the 1 9 70s, especially the non-strategic half of the Soviet
submarine fleet was threatened with 'block obsolescence'. One reason was that, beginning in
the mid - 1 960s, Soviet yards had steadily cut back on the high an�ual production quotas that
had marked the 1 950s. As has already been reported in the preceding chapter, the yearly
completion rate of non-strategic types during the 1 9 70s was less than six units; the number
was far from enough to carry out a one-for-one replacement of older types. Different
mission requirements and different performance expectations ·could be one reason for the
construction slow-down. As with all navies, however, cost was probably the most influential
factor. As also shown in the previous chapter, Soviet submarine cons�)J.ldion in the 1970s
was weighted heavily in favour of ballistic missile types; short of an unlimited budget. the
navy may have had to forego one-plus new general purpose boats for each SSBN it ordered.
The navy's ambitious surface programme may have been another competitor for funding.
There is one other possible, albeit quite speculative reason for the general purpose
construction slow-down of the 1 9 70s. As is remarked upon in greater detail elsewhere in this
chapter, there has been considerable commentary in the West of late about the advanced
characteristics of the most recent series of Soviet attack submarines. US Navy sources have
reported that their one-time ten-year lead in submarine quieting has narrowed to three years
or even less. The design of the new 'Akula', 'Sierra' and 'Mike' classes presumably started in
the very early 1 970s. It was also at this time that the Soviets had the services of the
Walker,/ Whitworth 'spy family' and reputedly learned how vulnerable to detection their
submarines were in fact. lt is widely suspected that the superior acoustic characteristics of the
Akula, etc are a direct result, hence the nickname 'Walker' class for the Akula.
Is it possible that the Soviet Union had enough confidence in the Aht!a ef a! design that it
risked a ten-year submarine building 'holiday?' In other words, assuming that the Soviets
had indeed come to appreciate the necessity of building submarines far quieter than had been
practiced so far, and also assuming that, between Walker, ef al, 'technology transfer' from
abroad, and indigenous ingenuity, they had acquired the necessary design knowledge, two

138
courses of action would have been open. One W<lS to continue building and gradually
improving second-generation nuclear boah such as the 'Charlies' and Victors' in large
enough numbers to replace obsolescent types. The drawback would have been a costly
programme that the Sovieh. already knev..' would do little to offset the \!\'estern acoustic and
counter-aC"oustic advantage. The second choice (and the one that C"ould be speculated was
made) was to 'freeze' the production of inferior design::., and risk a ten-year 'windovv of
\'ulnerability' in anticipation of a superior design for the 1 980s.
Naturally, this i s no more than a hypothesis. StilL this kind of development would not be
unique in the history of Soviet weapons acquisition. An important precedent i s Khrushche\: s
attempt. in thE' late 1950s, to 'leap-frog' the US advantage in strategic weapons delivery
capability. Soviet production of long -range bombers was slowed down in anticipation of a
breakthrough in ICBMs. Again, in the early 1 960s, the Soviet Union accepted the
temporary risk of a strategic missile gap. It stopped fielding the cumbersome first-generation
SS-6 ..' 7 ,.,.. 8, and waited for the much more Flexible SS- I I to become available. in the second
half of the I 960s, to create a numerical counter to the US Minuteman ICBM force.

S S B N deve l o pments - th e ' Typhoon' c l ass

In November 1 9 74, Soviet Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhncv hosted US
President Gerald Ford on the occasion of the signing of the Vladivostok Accords'. better
known as SAL Til). Brezhnev informed his guest that if the United Statps went ahead with the
Trident SSBN. his country would counter with the 'Taifun·.
At first. analysts were inclined to interpret the Taifun as a new missile. the literal
counterpart to the Trident I SLBM. By 1 9 78, i t had become clear that involved was either a
new class of SSBNs or a combination of a new SSBN mui a new SLBM type. In one of three
exceptions from the NATO reporting name scheme (the other::. being Ak-uffl and Belu.go). the
platform itself became known as the 'Typhoon' class. The associated SLBM system has been
identified b y the Soviets as the RSM-52; the NATO designation i s SS-N-20.
The lead hull of the 'Typhoon' class was launched in September I980. and became
operational one year later. Production at the Severodvinsk yard has proceeded at about one
a year. so that five units had been launched by January 1 98 7 . US Defense Department
and Navy officials predict that the entire series will number s�;>ven or eight. So far, the Soviet
N a v y has introduced a new generation of SSBNs about every ten years (the 'Hotel' class i n
t h e late 1 950s, t h e 'Yankee,/ Delta' group i n t h e late I960s-to-early 1 9 70s, a n d the
'Typhoon' in the late 1 9 70s). Based on this performance. the next generation of Soviet
SSBNs should make its appearance b y 1 990.
The outstanding difference between the 'Typhoon' and the 'Delta' class is size; the
'Typhoon's length of 1 70 m ( 1 86 yards) has popularly been compared with the size of an
American football field. The official US Navy's estimate of the vessel's submerged
displacement has settled at 25 000 tons, but or other sources have reported 20 to 40 per cent
more. Even at a 'mere' 25 000 tons, the 'Typhoon' almost matches the displacement of the
Kirov class battlecruiser. It also exceeds that of the Ohio class SSBN b y almost one third.
The 'Typhoon' carries 20 SS-N-20s. This i s the Soviet Navy's first series-produced solid­
fuelled SLBM with a 'bus'� that i s estimated to contain eight MIRVs. Each warhead has an
assessed yield of 100 kilotons (KT) that can be targeted with an estimated accuracy of
0.2-0.3 CEP (circular error probable). Range has been estimated at about 5000 nautical
miles.

�AI�o known as post�boost whide. or PBV, "bus" 1s the projectile of a mis�ile with mu ltiple re-entry vehicles,
gu idance systoom. propellant. and a thrust device for changing the balhstic pat h so that the RVs can he t:jt:ded
sequentially against separate targets

139
 Other than these basic statistics, much about the 'Typhoon' is shrouded in speculation.
Size and the possible purposes for the submarine's large internal volume is one question
mark. Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, then the US Navy's Director of Naval Intelligence,
conceded to a US Congressional subcommittee, in 1 98-!, that his analysts had yet to grasp
the reasons for the Typhoon's' dimensions:

'We never dreamed that the thing would be that big. It is a monster . . . it probably can carry
extra people, extra equipment. It's monstrous. It can probably stay out for long periods .
Maybe it will stay out longer.'

Some members of the subcommittee questioned the relationship Shapiro sought to draw
between the 'Typhoon's' size and the ability of the SS-N-20 to target the continental United
States from inside Soviet home ports. Between the many 'deleteds', the chid of US naval

'Typhoon' class SSBN (US Dept. of Defense).

1 40
intelligence acknowledged that the SS-N-20 could be carried on a much smaller submarine.
The large ' l'yphoon' was necessary, he -;aid, to accommodate simultaneously the range and
multiple warhead capability of the 55-N-20, and, at the same time, overcome the excessive
noise level induced by the 'Delta\' notorious 'hump'.
A variety of other reasons has been advanced for the 'Typhoon's' size. Most have focused
on a double-hull construction with a separation between inner and outer hulls of up to 1 . 8 m
(6 ft). The double-hull design of the 'Typhoon' is not a novel feature per se; it has been a
standard Soviet pradive even though Western submarine builders switched to essentially
single-pressure hull construction many years ago. Until the 'Typhoon', the popular
impression was that the Soviet double-hulls \Vere symptomatic of backward manufacturing
standards. Namely, for a single-hull to withstand high underwater pressure it must have a
uniformly circular shape built to extremely close tolerances; the presence of an outer hull
allows for a greater margin of error.
lt is now thought that the double-hulled Soviet SSBN Aeet may reflect an eminently
practical design objective, after all : the space between hulls could cushion the blow
of. say, an exploding torpedo warhead. It would also give the submarine an extra margin of
buoyancy in the event the outer hull became punctured by natural obstacles, say, ice. It
should not be thought. however. that a Soviet double-hulled submarine that has taken a
torpedo hit through the outer hull without damage to the inner hull cannot be vitally
injured. Located between the shells is auxiliary equipment such as pumps. piping and wiring
conduits. So arc sonar hydrophones and the propeller shaft. Direct or shock damage could
result in a 'mission kill'.
In line with Admiral Shapiro's speculation that the 'Typhoon' may have been designed to
carry extra crew and equipment. �orne analysts have proposed the possible pres�nce of a
missile air defence system. Submarine self-defence capabilities against air attack went out of
vogue when the diesel-propelled submersible was replaced by the true, nuclear-powered
underwater craft. But the aircraft - the submarine's most dangerous opponent during the
Second World War - adapted also; surface search radars were replaced by suh-sur_Face search
sonobuoy� and magnetic anomaly detectors {MAD). This development has prompted a
renewed interest in some sort of last -ditch self-defence capability for a submarine that knows
it has been localised by an overhead ASVv' aircraft. In the late 1 960s. the British introduced a
submarine-carried variant of the Blowpipe infra-red homing surface-to-air mi�sile, and called
it SLAM {for Submarine-Launched Airflight Missile). In the United States, too, studies were
carried out on a system variously known as SIAM {for Self-Initiated Anti-Aircraft Missile)
and SUBADS (for Submarine Air Defense System).
Western ASW capabilities rely heavily on long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA),
most notably the ubiquitous P<� Orion. It stands to reason that the Soviet Navy regards the
MPA's wide-area search and localisation./attack capability a potcpt threat. A study, in the
late I 970s, by Robert W Herrick of the Soviet perception of various US ASW capabilities
found that the P-3 has come to be seen as a key anti-submarine threat. especially when
operated in conjunction with the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUSl of ocean bottom
hydrophont> arrays.
Turetsky's earlier-cited account of Soviet Navy missile developments through the early
1 960s make� mention of a conceptual design for a submarine-launched anti-air missilt> with a
range of about six nautical mile�. A technical presentation of the system was evidently
prepared, in 1 96 1 , for Khrushchev.
Throughout the 1 960s and 1 970s, neither open Western sources nor since-declassified
intelligence documents even hinted at the possible existence (current tlf projected) of a
Soviet submarine surface-to-air mis�ile (SAM). In early 1 982. however. several Western
defence journab rt>ported the occasional sightings of a 'Tango' class submarine that appeared
to have been retrofitted with a SAM system. mounted on the fin. Later reports have hinted

141
that the Soviet Union's newest diesel-driven submarine, the 'Kilo' class, may carry a similar
armament.
No official confirmation or denial of a Soviet submarine SAM system had come forth at
the time of this writing. Obviously, this can be no more than second-guessing, but it seems
that this kind of capability would make considerable sense for the Soviets: (a) the
physical /'technical capability clearly exists, (b) the Soviets ought to have plenty of
motivation do snmdhing about the West's airborne ASW threat, and (c) the �iLe of the
'Typhoon' class affords ample opportunity to translate capability and motivation into
practical hardware.

Artist's impression of submarine tender re-loading 'Typhoon' with SLBM rounds (US Dept. of
Defense).

Most comparisons of the US-Soviet strategic military balance focus on numbers of missile
launchers. The SALT counting regimen has reinforced this tradition. In the process, there has
been a tendency to gloss over the fact that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is
barred from stockpiling launchers with multiple missile rounds. The Soviet Union has always
placed an extremely strong emphasis on the importance of strategic reserve forces, to be
thrown into the fray when both sides are exhausted in the initial clash. The Soviet Union
conducted SRF exercises that involved the reloading of extra ICBM rounds. Moreover, the
reported Soviet production of ICBMs and SLBMs seems to be far greater than necessary for
a one-for-one replacement of older models. Table 3 2 compares the numbers of Soviet ICBM
and SLBM launchers in 1 9 7 7 and 1 986, respectively. It shows that apparently 988 missiles
(SS-7/-8,/ -9/- 1 1 and SS-N-5/-6) were withdrawn from service. They were replaced by the
SS- I 7/-1 8./- I 9,/-25, in addition to the new SS-N- 1 8/-20/-23. During the same time period,
74 new launchers were added, thus creating a basic one missile-per-launcher production
requirement of 1062 ICBMs and SLBMs. But, according to the 1 98 7 edition of Sovief
Military Power, actual Soviet production between 1 977 and I986 totalled 3000, ie an
'excess' of nearly 2000 weapons.
Part of the apparent discrepancy can be accounted for by preproduction and operational
flight-test programmes. The Soviet missile research and development cycle typically
includes the launchings of some 25 developmental and pre-production prototypes. 'Spare'
missiles are also set aside for training purposes. A most liberal allowance for these various
purposes is IOOO missiles. This still leaves a ten-year 'overproduction' of almost another
1000 weapons. If this calculation is correct, the unescapable conclusion is that at least one-

142
third of the Soviet Union's strategic missile production in recent years has been allocated to a
reserve stock p i le . If so. it is a mislake to assume that all of t he SRF and Navy\ launchers arc
equal beneficiaries of this reserve. Some launchers built in the 1 960s are not equipped for
reloads; besides, it makes little seme to maintain a production line for systems in the process
of retirement. The im pli ca ti on is t ha t Soviet land- mui sea-based strategic missile launchers
built since the mid-1 970s can likely call on at least one. probably two reloads. One obvious
ca n d ida t e i s the 'Tyf-'ltuun' clas�. The e st i m at e d characteri stics of l:he 'Typhoo n' class
submarine are shown in Table 3?• below.

Table 3 2 : So viet ICBM and SLBM launcher deployments in 1 9 :-' :' a nd I 986

Number
Laum.-her type 19 7 7 1986
- ----
SS-C 80 0
SS - 8 9 (1
SS-9 208 0
SS- I 1 850 4 40
SS- U 60 oO
SS - ! 7 50 ! .'1 0
SS- 1 8 100 30&
SS- 1 9 0 360
SS-2.5 (1 I 0Ll
SS -N - .5 76 39
SS-1';-6 5 !0 2 :- 2
SS - N - 8 28o 292
SS-N- I 7 12 12
SS-N - ! 8 64 22..J.
SS-N-20 (l 80
SS-N - 2 J 0 48

Toluis nr1 2 .'> 85

- ----- - --- ---

Sourct•s : William T Lee dnd RKharJ f Stadr. :_--;O,'Jel ;V!JIIfan, Pohtv S"nlll' l·\"iw/d �\i1r !1. Sidnford.
Californi a : Stanford U n iversi ty Pre�s. ! 986, pp 82-85, ;md Department of Defense . So<•icl
l'vllliillr!t Power 1987, oth edi t ion. VVashington . DC US Government Prinbng Ofhce. ! 9 8 7 , f1 23'

Table 3 3 'Typhoon' cbs:. :.uhmMinc�

Numher budt
(late ! 986'' 5

When built 1 9 7 7-prescnt

Where built Severodvinsk
Displacement 20,000 .: 25,[)0[1
Length l 70 m (5_'i 7 ftl
Beam 24 . :" m U 3 1 ftl
Draught I l . S m U8 fll
Propulsion 80,000- 1 2l\0L)L) hp
Speed 24'29
Endurdnce NA
Armament 20 X SS-J\ 2Ll , o X 5.'>.1 mm ( 2 1 -in) p lus 2 x O.'iO m m ( 2 5 .6-inl Tl
Diving hmil NA
Cornpleml'nt !50

143
The ' Delta IV' S S B N

The existence of the 'Typhoon' became public knowledge i n the latter part of 1 980. The
reasonable assumption was that the submarine's size and armament was a logical
progression toward a cost-effective balance of great striking power and small crews,
comparable to the rationale for the 18 000-ton US Navy Ohio class SSBN. The Soviet Union
failed to live up to expectations. In early 1 984, Western intelligence announced the
observation of a fourth major modification of the 'Delta' class SSBN, the 'Delta !V'. In early
I 988 five units had been completed with another one or two under construction. A series of
'pie charts' in the 1 98 7 edition of Soviet Military Power hint that the US Defense
Department's expectation is that construction will stop with the sixth or seventh unit.
Two reasons have been given for what appears to be a competitive building programme
with the 'Typhoon' group. The first is that the 'Delta IV' is the somewhat accidental result of
the 'Delta' programme momentum, that it was built to 'use up' materials still on hand. The
second is that the 'Delta IV' is perhaps part of a deliberate Soviet strategy at building a 'Hi­
La' mix of SSBNs, the 'Delta IV' being the 'poor man's' version of the 'Typhoon'. A similar
speculation has been advanced in connection with the simultaneous Kirov and Slava cruiser
programme.
The problem with the first explanation is that it intimates a much greater lack of co­
ordination between the Soviet Navy and the ministries of defence and shipbuilding than
most analysts have commonly claimed exists. If this were the case, then it becomes difficult
to explain why the Soviet Union armed the 'Delta IV' with the entirely new SS-N-23 whose
development presumably began at the same time that the first 'Deltas' became operational.
The idea of a Hi-Lo SSBN mix is the more plausible one of the two. The Typhoon' must
be an ex tremely expensive platform. It has the advantage of great endurance and firepower,
but individual wartime survivability is likely to be offset by the small numbers the Soviet
Union can afford.
There is a third hypothesis that is impossible to prove, however, until much more i s
known about the physical characteristics and performance o f the 'Typhoon' and 'Delta IV'
weapon systems: it is conceivable that the Typhoon'/SS-N-20 and 'Delta IV'/SS-N-23
combinations have been designed to distinct mission requirements. At this time, the only
known outstanding difference between the SS-N-20 and SS-N-23 is that the first relies on
solid fuel propulsion whereas the second is a return to the Soviet Union's traditional
dependence on a liquid fuel engine. Both missile flight test programmes appear to have been
failure-prone. One unusual aspect of the SS-N -23's flight test series has been the incidence of
short-duration trajectories well inside the weapon's assessed 5,000 nm flight envelope.

The ' Delta' ' a n a l og o u s response' of 1 984

In January I Y84, the Pentagon announced that the Soviet Union had bolstered its routine
'Yankee' patrols off the North American coast with several 'Deltas'. This was reported to be
the first time that this SSBN type had deployed outside 'bastion' waters. The background to
what became known as the 'Deltas' 'analogous response' was the following.
On 1 6 March I 982, Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev warned that NATO plans to
install Pershing lis and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) on European soil would be
met by 'retaliatory steps that would put the other side, including the United States, in an
analogous position'. Brezhnev's successor, Yuri Andropov, reaffirmed that the
'Euromissiles' would invite unspecified measures against the territory of the United States
itself. Many Western analysts thought that the Soviet counter-move would be to forward­
deploy SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Eastern Europe, possibly even
Cuba.

144
 In November 1 983, the BundcsiiiX approved the deployment of Pershing !Is and GLCMs
on West German territory. Andropov promptly announced that 'corresponding Soviet
means will be deployed in ocean areas and seas . . . equal to the threat created for us and our
allies . ' I n January 1 984, hvo 'Delta' class SSBNs were spotted moving south through the
Greenland-Iceland -United Kingdom (CIUK) Gap. An 'Echo !!' type \Vas l1bscrved in the
waters off Bermuda.
The Soviet Union made no attempt to hide the 'Delte�s' dispatch. Defence Minister
Dimitry Ustinov told a press gathering that. ''vVe have increased the number or our
submarines vvith nudt·ur missiles aboard off the coJst of the USA in terms of their
chare�cteristics - yield. accuracy, the ability to reach targets nn the territory of the United
States and the flight time to target".
The official American reaction to the event was to dm-vnple�y it as an ineffective So\·iet
attempt at strategic 'gunboat diplomacy'. President Reagan assured reporters that one or

two more Soviet SSBNs off the US coast vvas nothing new . .:�nd certainly' vvould not keep him
from getting a good night'<> sleep in the White House. US Navy spokesmen claimed that the
Soviet move was actually to the US advantage. Deploying their 'Deltas' out of their normal
more distant operating areas, said Lehman. 'increases our ability to deal vvith tht'm'.
[ames McConnell is probably the only one who has ex<�mined the amlogus response
episode for more than its symbolic signi ficance. His viC1A'S J.rt' contained in a I 985 CNA
report, entitled '!he Sm'Je/ Sm-Ba:-;cd 'AuultJSOliS !<espouse' rllld Its Role in SlJl'id OtJCfrinc for
Thmler NJJclmr �Vrn.
VlcConnell believes that 'Deltas' forward deployment signalled an important Soviet
doclriuu! <ohift. Specifically, the threat of a Euromissilt> strike against targets on Soviet
territory allegedly caused Moscow to 'recouple' its theatre-only and intercontinental nucleCJr
options, and thus place US soil at risk analogous to that pm.ed by the Pershing !ls and
GLCMs against Sm'ief soil. The analogous character of the Soviet response, claims
McC on neiL had two dimensions. one geo-political and the other operational-tactical. On
the first leveL the Soviet counter had to match the Euromissile threat in the sense that it, too.
had to be based away from the horne territory. For the Soviets this meant sea-basing. from
the operational-tactical perspective, the Soviet analogous response force needed to
duplicate the weight of a potential Euromissilc assault i n terms of numbers of weapons.
weapon yields and accuracie::.. This meant, according to McConnelL that a Soviet analogou�
response attack V\-'ould be d i scriminate and aimed at strictly military targets located in the
United States. Such an attack would be carried out b y .1 dedicated SSBN task force, separate
and geographically detached from the main body of bastioned SSBN reserves.
This reasoning raise<; �everal provocative questions. ln the first instance, it is not clear why
the Soviet Union should find i t necc�sary to forward-deploy the 'analogous response'
'Delta�· when, by all account�. the boat� are capable of striking US targds from insidt> home
waters. McConnell proposes that by doing so the Soviets hope to minimise the likelihood of
an all�out US campaign against their 'general \Var SSBN reserves'. But in its new Maritime
Strategy the United States has already declared the intention to attack the SSBN 'bastions'
evf'n i f hostilities are limited to conventional we,lpons.
Then there is the question of pruportionality. [uromissile deployment pl.:ms called for CJ
total of 5 72 Pershing l i s und GLCMs. Both missiles carry a single \varhead ; the 1\'rshing ll's
W-85 has a dial-a- yield capability between fi\·e and 5L) KT. and tht> GLCM's W-84 is rated
at 200 K'l . Tht> asscs�ed accuracy· of the GLCM is .1bout I S m ( 5 0 ftl. compared vv·ith e� CEP
of ahout 3 8 m ( J 2 5 ft) fnr the Pershing !!.
.YicConnell's interpretation dt>mands that the analogous response SSB:\s possess identical
capabilities. At the llwncrim/ lcvel this rneans that in order to match 5 72 Euromissiles, the
Soviets would have to forward-deploy· some 27 'Delta' L II and I l l s with an aggregate load­
out of 340 single SS-N-8 warheads plus 240 triple SS- N - 1 8 warheads (assuming an average

145
of three RVs per SS-N- 18). In other words. nearly one-half of the Soviet SSBN Aeet would
need to be reassigned from bastioned reserve status to out-of-area analogous response
duties.
The problem for the Soviets is even worse at the qualitative level. The yield of the SS-N-8
and SS-N-18 warheads is estimated from 500 to 800 KT. ie at least two-and-half times as
much as the largest Euromissile yield. Next, estimated accuracies lie between 910 m and
1 5 20 m (3000 and 5000 ft), which is at least 24 times worse than that claimed for the
Pershing II. Clearly, even should the Soviet Union wish to match the Euromissilcs round-for­
round and target-for-target, it lacks the capability by virtue of a 'Delta' analogous response
force.

Forward depl oyment of the attack s u b m a r i n e fleet

The 'Deltas' forward deployment made news headlines for less than a week. One year later
Western intelligence experts had their attention focussed on another pattern-breaking
activity of the Soviet submarine fleet. In June and July 1 985, the Soviet Navy held a large­
scale exercise in the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic. Called 'Summerex-85' in the West,
the manoeuvre involved o�er 100 surface ships and about six dozen submarines.
The unusual aspect of the exercise was the arrival off the US cast coast of several nuclear
submarines. The presence of a 'pack' of Soviet submarines was first reported by the Royal
Ga::.etfe, a Bermuda newspaper. It noted that an augmented squadron of 15 US Navy P-3s
was attempting to track from eight to ten boats, some which were described by the
newspaper's sources as SSBNs. The US Navy subsequently confirmed, in Secretary Lehman's
words, that 'for the first time we saw new (Soviet) submarines operating aggressively in our
waters against our vulnerabilities'. (emphasis in the original). As to the identity of the
submarines, the US Navy would only confirm the presence of several 'Victor Ills'.
Soviet out-of-area deployments declined noticeably during 1 986. Taking note of this,
Lehman in his final posture statement credited the Maritime' Strategy for having compelled
the Soviets to pull back. The Soviets evidently did not agree. On 7 April 1 987, the US Navy
confirmed the presence of 'about half a dozen' (later reduced to five) Soviet nuclear attack
submarines in the waters between Connecticut and Virginia. Again, the 'Vidor Ill' was
identified. It is possible that at least one 'Charlie II' was present as well. The force left the
eastern Atlantic in the second week of April.
The appearance of the 'Victor III' class off the US eastern seaboard was not a novel
phenomenon per :;e. Dramatic confirmation of its presence came in October 1983, when a
unit was forced to come to the surface off the coast of South Carolina after its propeller had
become entangled in the towed sonar array cable of the frigate USS McCloy (FF 1 038). What
was new was the co-ordinated arrival of multiple units.
Three possible scenarios could lie behind the 'Victors' forward deployment. First, it has
been proposed by a number of analysts that Soviet war planning has shifted to a
conventional emphasis and that, as a corollary, the Soviet Navy has become serious about
the necessity of an Atlantic anti-shipping campaign. Accordingly, the 'Victors' may be
practising a potential Soviet version of the German Paukenschlag campaign of 1 942.
Between mid-January and the end of April of 1942, German U -boats that never exceeded 1 2
i n number sank at least 198 ships with a total gross tonnage of 1 , 150,675 i n US coastal
waters. This was more than 50 per cent of the Allied tonnage lost in the Atlantic due to all
caused throughout T94 I . The Soviet naval high command may have concluded that - as
was the case in 1942 - the Americans will be relatively unprepared to protect their
trans-Atlantic resupply bridge in home waters.
A second possibility is that the Soviets have decided that the best defence against the

146
announced forward thrust of the Maritime Strategy is to go on the ojfCrw:. Thus, instead of
waiting for the US Navy carrier battlegroups after they have safely crossed three-fourths of
the Atlantic Soviet attack submarines may attrmpt to take their to!l just outside the great U S
N a v y bases such as Norfolk. Virginia.
The third possib le targets for the V i ctor l l l ' exercise scenario arc the US Navy SSBNs. For
the first 20 years of their patrols. the SSBNs operated out of four widely scattered locations :
Holy Loch, Scotland ; Rota in Spain; Apra Harbour, Guam; and Charleston. North
Carolina. By the early 1 990s, there will be only two homcports : Kings Bay, Georgia on the
east coast and Bangor. Washington on the vvcst coast. The reduction in home basing
facilities will be matched by <>ma!ler number ofSSRNs. Although much depends on the future
of strategic arms agreements, the current l y planned 0/rio class force goal made public is 20,
ic 5 0 percent of the size of the original Polaris./Poscidon fleet.
Between a ::.mallET number of targets and only tv..'o "launch corridors', early tracki ng and
tniling of thv US Navy/s SSRNs m<1y become a feasible propo::.ition for the Soviet attack
submarine fleet. Recent Soviet strides in submarine quieting strengthens t he plau::.ibility of
this particular scenario.

The ' Q u i et Revo l ut i o n '

The balance o f VVestern versus Soviet submarine ca pabi litic::. has always been a trade-off
behveen Soviet qwmtit.u and Western qwliit)l. A key reason vvhy the United States made the
decision, now more than JO years ogo, to build an all -nuclear underwater fleet \Vas the
expectation that quality, though bought at great expense. would more than offset the So\·id
Union's 4 . 1 numer , ca l ::.uperiority. The American technological lead has been particul.1rly
strong in the area of submarine quieting cmd acoustic detection capabilities. Compared with
modern US or British nuclear attack boats. early Soviet atomic submarines sounded like a
'ru mb ling train'. In fact, in order to make ASW exercise::. realistic, Western nuclear
submarines, playi ng the role of the 'enemy'. were fitted with noise augmentation devices.
\All! y the Soviet Union's submarines were noisier than their Western-built chronological
counterparts was another question. One answer has btTn that the Soviets deliberately chose
to sacrifice stealth for speed. The problem with this hypothesis has been that Soviet
operat;onal submarine strategy presumab ly looked to slmv-moving defensive patrols within
the framework of a predeployed and relatively static series of defensive barri ers
Soviet technolog ica l backwardness has bcpn the second answer. According to this theory,
the Soviets simply had not managed to develop the engineering and machining techniques
to produce moving parts (cg, turbines and propellers) at the necessary close margins of
tolerance. It is in the context of this hypothesis that the US Senate penalised the
J apanese Toshiba Corporation, in 1 957, for sell ing the Soviet Union equipment allowing i t
to mill quieter submarine propellers.
In 1 982-83. re ports accumulated in the public press that newer types of Soviet
submarines were much quieter than the long-acclaimed US DoD ten-year lead in the area of
acoustics had predicted they would be. VVithin the next couple to three years. different
authorities on the subject claimed that the Soviets had (a) caught up to no more than a four­
year-lag and would match the radiated noise level of American submarines before the year
2000, (b) already built new classes of submarines that were the acoustic equals to their
potential US opponents. and (c) surprised the West with one or two new types that had
acoustical superiority. Thus, Admiral Wesley McDonald. recently retired a:, Supreme Allied
Commander. Atlantic (SACLA!\' f ) . wrote i n the 1 98 7 edition of the US Navy
League's Alrlllmac of Smpowerthat the ' Ty phoon ' was the 'quietest submarine yet to be built
anywhae· (emphasis added).

147
 The American tendency to blame the Soviet advance in acoustical performance on
espionage and technological theft is reminiscent of the stories, in the early 1 950s, that the
Soviet Union had, somehow, stolen the secret of the atomic bomb. No doubt, the Soviets
have taken advantage of the illegal transfer of technology, yet most people fJmiliar with the
field of submarine Jcoustics and counter-acoustics concede that the Soviets would have
caught up regardless.
The fact is that acoustic 'observables' and acoustic means of detection have been close to
reaching a technological plateau. The US Navy has advertised that the self-noise of its
newest planned submarine, the SSN - 2 1 Seawolf class, will be essentially indistinguishable
from the ambient noise created by the ocean; in other words, the SSN- 2 1 will be the quietest
submarine that is physically possible to build. In the field of acoustic detection, progress in
detection per se has been slow for the past 20 years; advancements have come primarily in
computerised acoustic signal processing. It is for this reason that the US NJvy research and
development community, notably the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the Ofhce of Naval Research (ONR) have focused their ASW funding on
non -rlcoustic methods.
The Walker family espionage affair and olher illicit lran�fer of Western technical know­
how have undoubtedly helped the Soviets to better define and speed up their submarine
silencing efforts. But it is also true that it was merely a matter of time before Western ASW
forces would encounter the quiet AkrJ!a or its like in any case. After all, told the Commander­
in-Chief of the US Navy's Atlantic Command, Admiral Lee Baggett, Jr, a US Senate
committee in 1986. all the Soviets had to do was 'check out the book that pointed out . . . to
them . . . that you can do preventive maintenance and you can decrease your source level
significantly'.

Quieting t rends

Little information exists i n the public domain to allow more than the most general
observations about the past and present of Soviet submarine noise characteristics. Most of it
ha� become available in the course of US Navy testimony on behalf of the SSN-21 Seawo/f
programme. Tom Stefanick in his recent book, Stmtexic Antisulmrarine W(/rfare a11d Naval
Stmtexy. has used this data to develop the only non-classified model of comparative US and
Soviet quieting trends. The figure reproduces Stefanick's estimate of the trend in total acoustic
output for a variety of US and Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. The reader is referred to
Stefanick's text for the model's estimating assumptions.

Figure 4 allows these general observations:

- until the introduction of the 'Vidor Ill' class, Soviet submarines lagged 1 0 - ! 5 years
behind US submarines in comparative levels of radiated (broadband) noise;
- the 'Vidor Ill', with a noise level comparable with that of the SSN 637 Sfurxeon class,
reduced the gap to about seven years;
- the new Ahdn and possibly also the 'Sierra' match or nearly match the (broadband)
acoustic performance of the SSN 688 Los Angeles da�s;
- a projection of the current trend suggests that the Akula follow-on class is likely to be as
quiet as the planned US SSN-21 Seawolf class.

148
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I m p l i ca t i o ns for Soviet S u b m a r i n e R oles

The different roles a navy is charged with are perhaps equally a function of the prevailing
estimate of the threat and doctrinal-strategic priorities. as they are of technological
opportunity. In fact, a study of Soviet writings on the relationship between military science
and new weapons suggests the view that, more often than not, technological progress acts
as the 'independent variable', and doctrinal innovation as the 'dependent variable'. This view
is entirely consistent, of course, with the Marxist materialist interpretation of social
developments.
The question whether the recent Soviet progress in submarine silencing has been 'driven'
primarily by military requirements or by technological momentum is probably less important
than how this new capability may be integrated into the Soviet Navy's wartime role
responsibilities.
It may be recalled from the discussion in an earlier chapter that Western intelligence
analysts in the late 1950s were somewhat puzzled over the apparent Soviet failure to
develop an ASW 'hunter-killer' submarine. A reasonable answer is that, until the early
1960s, the Soviet Navy had no requirement. For nearly the first two decades after the
Second World War, the overriding seaward threat to the Soviet homeland was on the
surface of the oceans. namely the Western carrier fleets. A moving carrier battlegroup
produces very high noise levels; even if the Soviet Union had had the technological
wherewithal to build quieter submarines, it had no obvious requirement to make the
necessary investment.
The US and NATO situation was quite the opposite. It has been said that, were it not
for the hundreds of Soviet submarines, the post-war US Navy would have lost its raison
d'efre. The recognition, in the late 1 940s, that the sole significant and long-term Soviet naval
danger was the submarine spurred 'Project Hartwell'. Named after its chairm.:: m , this 1 950
convention of the country's foremost ASW specialists effectively pointed the way for ASW
technology (including SOSUS, passive acoustic detection systems, nuclear underwater
weapons, and continued development of the nuclear submarine) for the next 20 years or so.
In the mid - 1 960s, naval threat priorities for both sides had begun to shift. for the first time
in 20 years, the Soviet Union faced a naval opponent whose primary offensive power rested
with submarines; the Polaris submarine had replaced the aircraft carrier as the US Navy's
principal strategic strike platform, and the US Navy was about to deploy its first series-built
counter (the SSN 667 Sturgeon class) to the Soviet Navy's first-generation SSBNs.
On the American side of the equation. the two decades-long preoccupation with finding
ways to defeat the submarine threat was reoriented to developing a balanced defence against
the burgeoning Soviet surface fleet. The US Navy had to overcome the Soviet lead in anti­
ship missiles; the Soviet Navy had to catch up in ASW capabilities.
It must be remembered that the Soviet surface and subsurface combatants that, according
to most analysts in the early 1 9 70s, were forward-deployed in the mid - 1 960s for 'anti­
SSBN' purposes, were designed during the mid- I 950s, before ASW had become an
important Soviet warfare area. The Soviets went to sea with the material that happened to be
available. They probably did not expect an immediate operational pay-off; it is much more
likely that they used the experience to discover shortfalls and identify technological and
design requirements for the next generation of ASW combatants. By the early 1 9 70s, this
knowledge would probably have been assimilated sufficiently to draw up the designs for the
Aku!a, 'Mike' and 'Sierra' classes.
Defence against the West's SSBNs has been a high Soviet priority since the early 1 960s.
Until recent years, Soviet ambitions in this area have been ahead of actual capabilities. When
Western analysts recognised this discrepancy, the general feeling was that the Soviets would
attempt to skip the 'normal' evolution of ASW capabilities and focus their research on some

150
sort of 'esoteric' break-through. The Sovi<>t Union's basic research organisation probably
pursues many of the same non-traditional ASVv' avenues a� docs the West's. Meanwhile. the
Soviet Navy appears to have gone ahead and put into practice basic submarine building
principles they found \vorked for the \tVe'>t.

The Aku/a, ' Sierra' a n d ' M i ke' c l a sses

The types that embody the 'quiet revolution' of the Soviet submarine fleet are the Akrdn,
'Mike'. and 'Sierra' classes. They· are part of vvhat one former d irector uf US naval
intcl!igencc, Rear Admiral John Butts. called an 'unprecedented number and variety of
(Soviet) nucle<.1r attack submarine'>' Strictly s�waking. Admiral Butts Vl'' as wrong on both
counts. Since the early ! 9,�0s, the Soviet Union had bunched a new 'family' of a half-dozen
or so submarines about every ten ycJ.rs. After the Second VVorld \tV or, from the bte 1 95 Lls
until1 960, eight different c!J.s�es \Verc introduced : 'Hok\" , 'Echo I' and 'Echo l l' .
'Novcmbn', 'Juliett', 'Foxtrot'. 'Romeo', a n d ' Golf'. Between t h e second half nf the 1 960s
until 1 9 7 ! . the Vv'est vv·as prespnted 1--v ith the 'Yankee' and 'Delta'. tht.' 'Vidor'. 'Charlie',
Tapa' and 'Alfa', aml the 'Tango'. Moreover. the newest submarines are evidently being
produced at a much slovvcr rate than wne their predecessors of 2Ll and .3Ll years ago. The
expectation i� that. after a 'shake-ou t'. only a fe;v types will enter into series-production.
Little snlid information has so br become available on the SA:Vt 'Sierra-Ak1d11-Mike'
group of submarine:.. i n part, becau�e production rate� for all three have been - by Soviet
standards - u ncommonly slow. Al l three types ha\·e been identified as possible successors to
the 'Victor Ill'. and all three have been picked as possible launch platfurms for the SS-N-2 1 ,
the Soviet Navy's land-attack version of the U S Tomaha�.-vk cruise missile.

'Sierra' da:,-.. SSN_ Masts ( from r. to 1.'1 search (binocular\ pcri:,cope: hack-to-l1<lck S Hlop' radar

1.-\-'ith EW radar warning aerials mounted bL>low top of -..qlJralc HF rC�dio mast, forward of the
radar ma:,t ; SATCOM aeriaL (Rl\iOAJ·l

151
 The lead 'Sierra' unit was completed at the Krasnaya Sormova Yard in Gorki in 1 984. It is
a double-hulled vessel with an external appearance that is generally reminiscent of the
'Victor III'. The 'Sierra' is larger than the 'Victor III', but there is no agreement on how much
larger. The US Navy's 1 98 5 edition of Understundinx Soviet Nuua! Developments cited a
surface displacement of 5500 tons (the same as the 'Papa' class), but other, more recent
sources have claimed as much as 6500 tons. Official US Navy sources have reported a length
of I 10 m, or about five per cent more than th{: 'Vidor III'. This suggests that the 'Sierra' is
slightly 'beamier' than the 'Victor Ill'. Basic armament appears to be identical the 'Victor
ill's', including eight 533 mm torpedo tubes with the capability to launch the SS-N- 1 5 and
SS-N - 1 6. Like the 'Victor III', the 'Sierra', if put into series-production is expected to carry
the torpedo tube-launched SS- N - 2 1 .

Table 3 4 : 'Sierra' class �ubmarines

Number built 2 (spring 1 9 8 7)

When built 1 983-present
Where built Krasnaya Sormova Yard, Gorki
Displacement 6500 .i8ooo
Length 1 ! 9 m (J60 ft)
Beam 1 0- 1 2.5 m (JJ-4 1 ft)
Draught 9.0 m (29. 5 Hl
Propulsion NA
SpeC'd NA/JJ
ArmamC'nt SS-N - 1 5 .:' 1 6 ; SS-NX-2 1 ; 6 x 533 m m (2 ! -in)
Diving limit 396 m ( 1300 ft)
Complement 90-plu�

The Akula class, too, has been described as a potential successor to the 'Victor Ill'. First
launched at the Komsomolsk Yard in mid-1984, its overall silhouette resembles the 'Victor
lll's' even more than does the 'Sierra's'. A notable feature on all three types is a large
streamlined pod on top of the vertical tail fin. The official judgment is that it probably
contains a towed sonar array. Others have speculated that a new type of auxiliary propulsion
system, based on magnetohydrodynamics (MHD). is involved.
Like the 'Sierra', the A kula has so far been produced at a rate of less than one unit per year;
three units were reported at sea in 1 988. Between similar weapons capabilities and

The Akula class is a candidate launch platform for the SS-NX-21 Tomahawk-like cruise missile
(US Dept of Defense).

1 52
approximately the same �in', the two types could be competitive desi g ns . only one of which
may eventually survive for series-production Table 35 tabulates the limited information so
far available on the Ak1ilu.

Table 3 5 : ' Aku la ' class subm.1rinc�

Number built J (spring 1 0f\f\)

When huilt I Lf8J-present
Where buill Komsomolsk
Displacement 8000 .: I OOOll
Length I I O m (.1oll I l l
Beam approx I 1 . .1 m U 7 H l
Dr;1ught appro x "'.o m 125 ft)
Propul�ion 40,000 hp
Speed NA,:'.H-plu�
Armament SS-N - 1 .5 1 6 : SS-N 2 1 ; 1:'> x S.B mm ( 2 1 -inl
Diving limit 396 m ( r .;oo ft)
Complement 90-p lu s

The 'Mike' class is evident ly· a one-off model and, like the 'P.1pa ' . apparently intended for
testbed purposes. The propulsion system reportedly is based on two liquid metal cooled
nuclear reactors, capable of producing 50 000-60 OOL) shaft horse power and a submerged
speed of more than 3 6 kno t s. Unlike the 'Sierra' and Akuln, it docs not display the prominent
tailfin pod. If the l<1tter does indeed contain a towed array, then ih a bse nce on the 'Mike'
suggests a role other than 'hunt and kill' AS I/\/. Ot her negative evidence is the submurine\
high �peed potential. One possit->ility is thut 'Mike' is a tc�tbed for a dedicated c<Jrrier nf the
SS-N-24 land attack cruise mi�si!c.

Table 3 6 : 'Mike' cla�� �ubmarines

!'-.:umber built
VVhen built 1 983- I Y�..J-
VVhere built Scvcrodvinsk (S udumck h. Leningrad?!
Displacement 780ll,: 97l)O
Length t ](1 rn 1360 ftl
Beam <�pprox I 2 m (40 ftl
Draught approx 9 m \JO ftl
Propulsion .'i0-60.000 hp
Speed N1\ .�6
Arm,llll('!ll SS-� - 1 5 :' 1 6 ; SS-N-24(?1; 6 x .'i �� -� mm ( 2 1 -i n l
Diving limit o t 0-- 0 1 5 m (200l)-.�00ll H l
Complement 90-plu�

The SS- N X- 21 a n d S S - N X - 24

The SAM group. in addition to the 'Victor l l l ' . ha� been pinpointed as the likely IJ.unching
platforms for J. new generJ.tion of Soviet st rJ.tcgic cruise missi !c'i, dc�ignatcd SS-l'.:X-2 I .
The first public hints that the Soviet Union was developing a Tornah<�wk-l ih• lund attack
cruise missilt· came during US Congrc��ional hea ri ngs in the �pring of I -:182. The next yeJ.r.
the US Defense Department\ S(ll'll'f i\·Jilitor_u Pmecr mcd tlw dc�ignation SS -NX-2 1 l o

153
describe a submerged-launched 1600 nautical miles-range missile, intended 'primarily (for)
nuclear strike'. The weapon's external similarity with the US Navy's Tomahawk earned it the
nickname 'Tomahawkski'.
The SS-NX-21 apparently surprised the intelligence community. As the United States
developed its own Tomahawk programme, Defense Department officials repeatedly
declared that the Soviet Union had neither a military requirement nor the technological
wherewithal to follow suit. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's 1976 posture statement
declared that, 'there is no evidence as yet that the Soviets possess the technology to pursue
over the near-term a strategic cruise missile development'. (Author's note: 'near-term'
usually meant within the next five years).
In 1 9 79, Defense Secretary Harold Brown reported that the Soviet Union had 'some new
ones under development', but he apparently had evolutionary improvements of exisfirtg
systems in mind. indeed, the American lead in key cruise missile technologies, notably light­
weight propulsion systems and microcircuitry) seemed so overwhelming that some
commentators felt that the United States could safely slew down its programme so as to
stabilise the arms race.
Since the mid- 1 960s, after the withdrawal of the SS-N-3C from service. the Soviet Navy
has focused its cruise missile efforts on anti-ship weapons. Intelligence projections in the
mid-"J 9 70s foresaw a progressively more capable family of submarine-launched anti-ship
missiles, but could discover no compelling reason why the Soviets might wish to resurrect its
long-range land-attack programme. General George Brown, then the chairman of the JCS,
cited, in "1978, 'asymmetries in geography and population distribution' as the reasons the
Soviets did not seem interested. Since most American population centres were within 500
nautical miles of the 100 fathoms depth curve, Brown explained, the Soviets had no need for
a long-range cruise missile. The situation was different for the United States, he said; only six
of the major Soviet cities with only some 2.2 million people were located at a similar distance
from the sea. The ]CS chairman's suggestion that both US and Soviet submarine-launched
cruise missiles would be targeted against cities is revealing of contemporary perceptions
of Soviet targeting doctrine.
Close upon the heels of the SS-NX-2 1 revelation came the report of a second and much
larger submarine-launched strategic cruise missile, the SS-NX-24. This is believed to be a
supersonic weapon, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead over a distance of at least 2 700
nautical miles. If the sketch of the weapon made public by the US Defense Department is
reasonably accurate, length is in the neighbourhood of 12.5 m (4 I ft) and wingspan about 6
m (20 ft). This would mean that the SS-NX-24 is nearly 40 per cent taller than the SS-N-6
SLBM. The SS-NX-24 has been flight-tested from a modified 'Yankee' type. But since fitting
the much larger SS-NX-24 will require extensive (and expensive !) alterations, the Soviets
might choose the deploy it on the older units of the roomier 'Delta' class instead. Assuming
that the Soviet Union will continue to informally abide by the SALT ceiling on allowable
SSBNs and SLBM launchers, and also assuming that the 'Typhoon' and 'Delta IV' will be
built at one unit per year each, the 'Delta Is' should become available for SS-NX-24
conversion by the mid- 1 990s. Also not to be ruled out as an SS-N-24 carrier is a 'Mike' or
'Oscar' development.
There arc indications that the SS-NX - 2 1 and SS-NX-24 programmes are behind schedule.
.
The 1984 edition of Soviet Military Power predicted that the SS-NX-2 , would probably
become operational in 1984, and that the larger missile could attain its IOC before the end of
1986. The next year's version of the same publication repeated this forecast, but the 1 986
issue limited the projected deployment date of the SS-NX-2 I to 'soon'. The SS-NX-24, the
publication announced, 'could' become operational in 1987. Soviet Military Power's most
recent ( 1988) edition has reset the IOC of the SS-NX-24 to 'the next few years'. SS-NX-21
was flight-tested from an A kula unit in early "I 988.

!54
 There arc hvo possible reasons for the apparent four-to-fivr year's delay in the fruition of
the SS-NX-2 I -24 project � : one, the intelligence community could have over-estimated the
ability of the Soviets to. first successfully complete a novel missile R&D programme and
secondly, integrate a major ne\\' weapons sy<;tem with a suitable launch platform. Support
for this hypothesis comes from the unusually low-key production of the SS-NX- 2 1 's
candidate launch platforms, the SAM group. Also, a Soviet Defence Ministry spokesman
admitted. in a press conference in August 1 986, that his country's moratorium on nuclear
testing had 'damaged' certain unnamed weapons programmes. �o hint was made at the
specific project or projects that had presumably been affected. but the complaint did lcuvc
room for the possibility that polih'ml rather than technical considerations have impeded the
operational introduction of the SS-NX-2 1 and SS-NX-24. Support for this hypothesis, albeit
circumstantial, comes from repeated Soviet \-varnings, in 1084. that the installation of the
Tomahawk on American attack submarines invited an immediate Soviet step in kind. In
October 1 984, shortly after the US �avy had announced that its first Lo� Auge!e� class
submarines had gone to sea with the Tomahawk, the Soviet Defence Ministry announced
that, in order to maintain the 'exi�ting equilibrium' . long- range cruise missiles were being
installed on bombers and submarines.

The ' Osca r' class ' battle submari ne'

Western interpreters o f Soviet naval developments in t h e early 1 9 70s were inclined t o view
the 'Charlie' dass SSGN with the horizon-range SS-N-7 as the 'wave of the future' of Soviet
submarine anti-ship missile capabilities. H appeared that the Soviets had rejected the earlier
reliance on long-range missiles that required targeting and mid -course guidance assistance
from a co-operating platform.
The Soviet Union upset this calculation when it introduced, in I 979, the 'Oscar' type
submarine. Not only \vas the 'Oscar' armed with a new· type of long -range, over-the-

The 'Mike' class is another potential bunch platform for the S.S -NX-2 I (US Dept of Defense).

ISS
horizon (OTH) cruise missile, but it also carried three times as large a load-out (24 versus
eight) as the 'Echo lis' and 'Charlies'. Built around the 24 SS-N-19s was a vessel with a
surface displacement of 1 2 .000 tons; the only larger submarines in existence are the US Ohio
and the Soviet 'Typhoon' SSBNs.
Because of its size and heavy armaments, the 'Oscar's' likely wartime use is sometimes
compared with that of the floating batteries or casemate battleships before the First World
War. According to this theory, it is unlikely that, because of its size (and therefore restricted
mobility) and expense, the Soviets will use the 'Oscar' for 'free-play' operations on the high
seas. The expectation instead is that the huge submarine will be held back a� part of a pre­
positioned anti -carrier barrier.
The basic reported characteristics of the SS-N- 1 9 suggest that this is an evolutionary
development of the SS-N-3 and SS-N - 1 2 . A maximum r2nge of 300 nautical miles has been
quoted, but the likely effective range is closer to 250 nautical miles. The missile's speed of
about Mach 2 . 5 is comparable to the S S - N - 1 2 's, but the testimony by US Navy officials
before the US Congress has suggested a greater cruise altitude and more extreme dive angle.
It is probable that the SS- N - 1 9 can achieve a flight altitude of about 24 000 m (80 000 ft),
which would place i t at the limit ofthe 5M-2's l'ngagement envelope. Guidance is evidently
the function of an active radar seeker, possibly backed up b y an anti -radiation homer.
The 'Oscar's' intended concept of operations is puzzling, especially with regard to
targeting. ft is physically impossible for a submarine to detect, locate and identify a target
2 5 0 or more nautical miles away with sufficient precision to develop a missile fire control
solution. This means that the 'Oscar', like the 'Echo If' and 'Juliett', probably depends on a
data relay platform. For 'real-time' targeting it might take .1d vantage of satellite data,
assuming of course, that the submarine, the satellite, and the intended victim ship all happen
to be within line-of-sight (LOS) communications of one another. If the 'Oscar' is pre­
deployed for an 'ambush' attack, i t could receive regul.1r updates on the target's co-ordinates
via land-based extremely-low frequency (ELF) radio.
The 'Oscar's' submerged-launch capability makes it less vulnerable to detection and attack
than the 'Echo II' and 'Juliett'. But this added measure of security may last only as long iiS the
first SS-N-·19 s.1lvo. Even at 250 nautical miles from the centre of a carrier battlegroup, the
'Oscar' will be within the radar and acoustic coverage of carrier-based aircraft such as the E -
2C Hawkeye a n d S-3A/B Viking. As soon a s t h e first SS-N- 1 9 breaks the surface of the
water, the 'Oscar' is placed at the same risk that is often cited in connection with an SLBM
launch, namely it has given away its position. An SSBN stands a fair chance of launching
without hostile ASW forces being i n the area; this is not so for the 'Oscar'. Considering the
55-N - 1 9's unusual combination of strengths and weaknesses, i t cannot be ruled out that the
missile has a secondary {perhaps even primary) hmd-affack) role.

Table 3 7: 'O scar' class submarines

Number built 4
When built 1 979-present
Where built Sevcrodvinsk
Displacement 12,000/ 15.400 (hulls l and 2)
Length l43 m./470 ft (hulls 1 and 2)
Beam 1 7.6 m (57.8 ft)
Draught I I m U6.3 ft)
Propulsion 60,000 hp
Speed N A :' 30
Endurance NA

!56
Armament 24 x SS- N - ! 9 : SS-� - l. "i ' ! 6 : (' x 5J?• mm ( 2 1 -inl plu� 2 x 500 m m { 25_6-inlTT
Diving limit l'iA
Complement l.3ll
---- --- --

The 'Oscar II'. which was fir�t photographed in 1988. is longer than the ·o�c<Jr !s' The added
space may be due lo a rede�ign of the engineering spares or lo modification ul the SS-N - 1 0's
command cenlre and launch tubt?s . \333 Squadron, Royal Norvvegian Air forrcl

' Oscar I I '

Mn�t Soviet nuc!car-prope!!eJ subm;nines hJve been deployed i n a t kost hvo different
'editions'. eg 'Echo' I and IL 'Charlie' 1 and l l . and ' V idor' l to 111. In each case, the 'mod'
bulb have incorporated larger dispiLJcrments in order to Jccommodate a more voluminous
\Vcapons load-out anJ:· m engineering plant. The 'Oscar' class appears to have lived up to
this paHcrn as welL f.ollowing the completion of the first hvo unib. in 1 98 1 and 1 9 82.
respectively, official US �avy sources reported a submerged d i spbcement of 1 5 400 tons. in
1 985, hull number three vvas launched : fitting out and sea trials vvere prt'Sumably concluded
in late I 986. The l'entagon's annual Snt'Jct ;\-!ililnr,!! Pt)U'LT shortly reported a nc\v 'Oscar '
d i splacement figure - 1 7 600 tons. The report ' s 1 988 edition also made reference, for the

157
first time, to 'Oscar I', thereby clearly indicating the existence of a II version. Other sources
have recorded somewht different displacement estimates, but all point to a significant
growth in size between the lead and follow-on hulls. The conclusion is that 'Oscar I'
probably involves units one and two, whereas successors will be known as 'Osc.:u II'.
The estimated 14 percent increase in 'Oscar II's' displacement must be the result of a
longer hull. Given 'Oscar's' extreme 'beaminess', it is plausible that the added displacement
has permitted no more than a 5-lO percent growth in hull length. This means that 'Oscar lJ'
should be 23.5 to 47.0 feet longer than 'Oscar I'.
The reason for the added space is another matter. One possibility is a redesign of the
engineering spaces; another could involve modification of the boat's SS-N - 19' s command
centre and launch tubes for retro-fitting with the SS-N-24. The SS-N-24 is evidently
considerably larger than the SS-N- 19 ; however, the Soviet submarine fleet has a long
history of speeding up new weapon deployments with the help of drastic 'interim'
conversions.

Ret u rn of the m i dgets

As attention in the West was riveted on the 'Typhoon' and 'Oscar' behemoths, rumours and
reports from places as far apart as Scandinavia and Japan pointed to the existence of a Soviet
submarine capability on quite the opposite end of the scale: the two- or three-man 'midget'
or miniature submarine.
Reports of the existence of Soviet midgets have been closely associated with the repeated
sightings of mystery submarines in the fjords and shoals of the Scandinavian countries.
Between the early 1 960s and the beginning of the 1 9 80s, the navies of Norway, Sweden and
Finland had all had occasion to (unsuccessfully) hunt down unidentified submarine intruders.
Success of a sort came to the Swedish Navy on the evening of 27 October 1 9 8 1 , when a
'Whiskey' type submarine (pennant number 1 3 7) was found lodged inside the shallow waters
of the Gasefiaerden. The unfortunate Soviet captain claimed a navigational error. After 1 0
days of tedious negotiations Swedish tugboats pulled the submarine into open waters, but
not until after Swedish personnel had used radiation scanners to determine that the vessel
almost certainly carried nuclear weapons. The Swedish government later presented Moscow
with a bill for $212 000 for �he cost of the salvage operation.
Less than one year after the 'Whiskey-on -the-rocks', the Swedish armed forces spent from
1 October to I November 1982 in staging the country's largest ASW operation since the
Second World War. The 'Horsfjaerden incident' (so named for the location of the events in
the Stockholm archipelago) involved dozens of ships and helicopters ; mines and depth
charges were used to try and flush out up to six 'alien' submarines. None were caught.
A special comf!lission convened by the Swedish government issued its report on the
operation in 1983. It concluded that the 'co-ordinated operation' of three pairs of
conventional and 'mini' submarine teams had been involved. Based on photographs of
trackmarks on the bottom of the area, two different miniature types were identified. One
appeared to be a caterpillar-tracked vehicle for movement on the seafloor itself. while the
second was evidently a twin-propeller buoyant vessel with a reinforced keel.
The Commission left no doubt about its conviction that the intruders belonged to the
Warsaw Pad. It was much less certain about the Soviet Union's reasons. A variety of
possibilities was considered - from training exercises to 'gunboat diplomacy', and from
intelligence gathering to a survey of possible wartime hiding places for the Baltic Fleet's
'Golf' SSBs. The Commission's 'main impression (was) that this submarine activity
represents the preparatory phases of military operational planning'. As to the particular type
of operational planning at issue, it took special note of the existence of Soviet special
purpose troops, th€- so-called Spetsnaz.

158
Soviet m i dget s u b m a r i ne developments a n d the
Spetsnaz co n nection
The developmental history of Soviet midget submarines and the a<>sociated technologies of
underwater habitats, deep-submergence vehicles, and remotely -operated vehicles (ROVs) is
sketchy. Most submarine fleets before the Second World War. notably Great Britain, Italy
and Japan, carried out experiments with a variety of one- or two-men midgets. Civcn that it
owned the 'A'orld\ most ambitious submarine building programme b y far in the 1 930s, i t
would b e surprising i f the Soviet Navy had been the exception. During the War itself, Great
Britain, Italy and Iapan. in addition to Germany, employed their midgets with varying
degrees of success. There is no record of Soviet wartime activities nf this kind.
At the end of the war, the Soviets became the heirs t o lhf' midget technology of the Axis
power::.. Perhaps the most valuable find came with the occupation of the Schichau-Elbing
shipyard in FE·bruary ! 945. This had been the lead yard for Germany's most successful
Srrhwul (Sea]) midget. The Soviets found I 8 Seehwrd in di fferent stages of assembly. Short! y·
after the war, in 1 948, ONI reported that four had definitely been spotted in Leningrad, but
that there might be as many as seven. In 1 9 5 0, ON! calculated that, between captured and
newly-constructed units, the Soviet Navy probably owned from 50 to 70 midget
submarines. Most were thought to be German designs such as the Seelrwrd, l'vfolclr
(Salamander), and Biher (Beaver). The balance was believed to be made up of ex-Italian and
e x -Japanese types that had been captured in the Black Sea and on Sakhalin, respectively.
Comtruction of the German derivatives - based primarily on the Schichau work - was
evidently carried out by the Nikolayev yard. ONT reported that the Sudomckh yard was
engaged in experimental work with two unidentified e x -German midgets.
The midget submarine as a weapon of vvar disappeared from the news for almost .�0 year::..
Ironically perhaps. during the same time pt'riod, but especially in the I 960s and 1 9 70s, many
of the technical difficulties that had tended to make the midget more dangerous to its crew
than to the enemy were being 'pushed' to resolution as the result of the commercial interest
in the exploitation of ocean resomces.
The international search for ocean minerals and more efficif'nl fishing methods has
spawned a host of survival, communication. propulsion, and automation technologies aimed
at creating a vvorkable human undcnvatcr habitat. The Soviet Union is no exception.
Different ministries have been involved in a variety of manned and unmanned submersible
projects for such purposes as acoustic fishery research fish behaviour studie�. and ocean
bottom profiling. One development by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, reported a 1976
study by the U S Congressional Rc:::.earch Service. was a three-man vehicle, known as A(o;; tts.
An unmanned version has been identified as 7ln(<.;. Argus is apparently a 'bottom crawler' and
may therefore be related to the tracked visitor to the Horsfjaerdcn area. It has been
speculated that both may be derivatives. in turn, of the German wartime Seefeufel (Sea Devil).
The latter was a two-men vehicle U. 7 m (45 ft) long and with a displacement of 3 5 tons.
During experiments in 1 944 i t managed to operate at a depth of 20 m (70 ftl.
!t has been suggested that the Soviet version of the Seetcufc/ may be 50 per cent longer
than the original. If so, it probably cannot hold more than five people. including a two-man
operating crew. This means that a boarded Spctsna::. raiding party with equipment would
have limited capabilities. It seems likely that such :::.carce accommodations V\'ould be reserved
for highly specialised operations such as the precision placement (or deactivation) of
mincfields, communications and acomtic surveillance equipment.
The special purpose nature of the midgd-SpcfStra::: team is also hinted by the limited
availability of Soviet 'mother submarines'. Cited most often for this purpose has been the
'India' class. Built into the deck of this submarine are two \-veils. each of which can hold a
single deep submergence rescue vehicle (DSRV). There is no obvious physical difficulty with
the 'India' being used for Spetsnu::. missions. but the limiting factor i s that only two vessels are

159
in existence. Both are attached to the two Soviet fleet areas where a DSRV capability is most
necessary - the Northern and Pacific fleets. One can imagine that the local submarine force
commanders will be very reluctant to 'loan out' this �carce asset for a risky Spefsna::. mission.
A more conventional option would be for the midget to be towed to its zone of operations
by a standard submarine. This is how the Royal Navy managed to get four 'X-craft' midget
submarines across the Norwegian Sea to attack the German battleship Tirpif:z. in 1943.
'Operation Source' was a success in the sense that the Tirpifz was put out of action for six
months, but the price was a high one: between mechanical casualties, broken tow ropes and
other mishaps none of the six 'X-craft' that originally left Britain returned home. Nine of the
overall crew complement of 24 died, and another six survived as prisoners of war.

'India' class 'mother submarine' for deep submergence rescue purposes. (Above) The unusual
construction on the bow is attached when the vessel operates in icc-infested waters. (Below) The
wells in the casing of the 'India' are occupied by two DSRVs. It is thought that the same space
might be filled by Spetsnaz-controlled midget submarines (US Navy)

Conventional s u b m a ri nes - a l i ve a n d we l l in the Soviet

Union

The demise of the Soviet conventional submarine has been predicted for almost three
decades. On the contrary, the introduction of each new generation of Soviet nuclear boats
has been complemented with a novel diesel-powered design. The arrival of the HEN group

160
in the late 1950s was accompanied b y the 'Foxtrot', that of the 'Charlie' /'Vidor'/'Yankee' by
the 'Tango', and most recently, the SAM group and 'Typhoon'.i'Oscar' have received their
conventional counterpart in the form of the 'Kilo' type.
Supporters of the US Navy's all-nuclear submarine fleet have been inclined to treat the
Soviet Union's parallel nuclear and conventional building programmes as somewhat of an
oddity. In reality, it is the exclusively nuclear US underwater Aeet that is the exception. Five
of the world's navies have so far built and operated nuclear submarines: the United States,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Only the United States has chosen to rely exclusively on nuclear power. In the process,
American submarine designers and building yards have surrendered the country's one-time
lead in conventional submarine technology. At the same time, the United States has become
the only modern maritime builder that is incapable of exporting state-of-the-art diesel
submarines.
Perhaps because the United States has not built a non-nuclear submarine in 30 years, the
popular image is that the diesel boat has not changed much since the Second World War ­
cramped guartcrs, limited range and endurance, and the need to expose a snorkel apparatus
every few hours or so. This is not an accurate picture. A morlern conventional submarine
with a displacement of, �ay, 1500 tons, can be as guiet as the newest US nuclear attack boats;
low battery discharge rates permit it to manoeuvre at operational underwater speeds for
eight hours or more, and new types of closed-cycle engines (eg, the Stirling and Brayton
cycle plants) arc about to offer an effective underwater endurance of up to 70 days.
Conventional submarines make sense for the Soviet Navy from a military-strategic as
well as economic perspective. Western preoccupation with the offensive dimension of
Soviet submarine power- the 'Typhoons', 'Oscars' and Akulas - has tended to overshadow
the fact that, in terms of relative numbers. the Soviet Navy is still mostly a coastal defence
force; the greater portion of the Soviet surface and subsurface naval threat is made up of
'green' and 'brown' water gun-, missile- and torpedo patrol craft, and 'short-legged' diesel
submarines.
A nuclear submarine costs about twice as much as a modern I 500-ton conventional boat.
The extra cost is commonly defended as an advantageous trade-off between quantity and
quality. But that advantage depends on the particular scenario. All other things being egual, a
modern nuclear submarine will have the upper hand in one-on-one encounter with a diesel
submarine in the open ocean. The predicted 1 0 : 1 'kill ratio' that US submariners talked about
in the 1 960s should be understood in this context.
But chances are that the opponent of a Soviet diesel attack submarine will not be an USN
or Royal Navy nuclear boat, but a NATO resupply ship instead. The success of a Soviet
tonnage war will hinge on the number of vessels and cargoes sunk. This is much more of a
function of the number of submarines poised to attack than of the quality of the individual
submarine.
It is too early to say at the time of this writing if the 'Kilo' will be the straightforward
successor to the 'Foxtrot' class, in part because average production at the Komsomolsk yard
has so far been barely more than two per year. Eleven out of a total of 20 built so far (spring
1 988) have been transferred to foreign navies (see Appendix II).
The 'Kilo' is a large submarine by conventional standards. Surface displacement is
estimated at 2500 tons, compared with 3200 tons in submerged condition. I t is a 'beamy'
boat with a length-to-beam ratio of about 7:3, which makes it the stubbiest submarine in the
Soviet fleet other than the 'Bravo' class.
The 'Kilo's general appearance is that of a 'true' submarine, reminiscent of the cigar­
shaped form introduced by the US Navy's AUmcore (AGSS 569) in the early 1 950s and since
adopted in the design of the Dutch Walrus and the UK Type 2400 classes. The resemblance
between the 'Kilo' and the Dutch built-for-export Moray class is especially striking. Unlike

161
the Type 2400 and the Moray, the 'Kilo' retains a series of free-flood holes, indicating that it
has a double-hulled construction.

Table 38: 'Kilo' class submarines

Number built 20 (spring 1988)

When built I 979-present
Where built Komsomolsk
Displacement 2500/3200
Length 73 m (240 ft)
beam 9 m (29.5 ft)
Draught 7 m (23 ft)
Propulsion
Speed 12/16
Endurance 7 0 days
Armament 6 x 533 mm ( 2 1 -in) TT; SAM ?
Diving limit 300 m ( 1000 ft)
Complement about 5 0

'Kilo' class submarine (US Navy).

162
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163
The future

The Soviet submarine fleet of the mid - 1 980s appears to be going through a critical period of
transition. Its newest units, such as the 'Sierra', Akula, 'Mike', 'Kilo', and 'Typhoon', present
Western ASW forces with their greatest qualitative challenge since the Second World War.
At the same time, annual production of submarines has declined to the lowest level in 40
years. As Figure 5 shows, the annual completion rate has gone down from a peak of 80-plus
units in 1955 to about one-half dozen in 1985. It also points out the tendency for each
peak production milestone during the past 35 years to be succeeded by a distinct dip,
followed, in turn, by another production surge. Yet, the general trend has been for each new
production surge to be smaller than its predecessor.
This trend will probably persist, so that production of the current third-generation nuclear
submarines and of the 'Kilo' class should peak in about 1 990 with a maximum total output of
between eight and ten units. Production by type is likely to look like this:

Typhoon'
'Delta IV'
'Oscar'
'Sierra'-Akula 3-4
'Kilo' 2-3

One result of declining production is the spectre of massive block obsolescence. The overall
size of the Soviet submarine fleet has stayed remarkably steady at about 360 units over the
past 20 years. This has been possible largely by delaying the retirement of units that had
reached their nominal 20-30 year life expectancy. But the decision can no longer be
postponed. In 1 985, more than 50 per cent of the Soviet submarine fleet was at least 21 years
old; almost 20 per cent was more than 30 years old. These numbers include the generally
newer SSBNs, which means that the gmeral purpose force is even comparatively older.
Just as the decline in production levels has been a long-term tendency, so the 'aging' of the
Soviet submarine fleet has been a steady and consistent phenomenon. The table below
compares the age distribution of the fleet at ten-year intervals from 1 955 until 1 985. In 1 955
more than one-half of the fleet was less than ten years old, in fact considerably so. Over
50 per cent included the newly-produced 'Whiskeys', 'Zulus' and 'Quebecs'; the balance was
accounted for by post-war built 'K', 'S', and Shch types. The 1965 fleet is still a 'young'
force. Built in the preceding ten years was the numerous 'Foxtrot' class, the final 90-odd units
of the 'Whiskey', and the first-generation nuclear-powered HEN group.

Age Fleet strength by year

1955 1965 1975 1985

10 years 283 (5 7 %) 243 (47 %) 120 (36 %) 65 ( 1 6 %)
1 1-20 years 154 ( 3 1 %) 250 (48 %) 1 3 5 (40 %) 125 (32 %)
2 1 -30 years 58 ( 1 2 %) 24 ( 5 %) 78 (24 %) 1 29 (33 %)
3 1-40 years - ( - ) - ( - ) - ( - I 77 (24 %)

Age distribution of the Soviet submarine fleet, 1955-1985

Note : Data are estimates based on multi-sources

The gradual obsoleteness of a good part of the fleet becomes noticeable in 1 975. During
the preceding decade, the production of general purpose boats took a backseat to the
'Yankee' and 'Delta' SSBN programmes. This is also the period when the Soviet Navy

164
became serious about creating a 'balanced' fleet; competition from the burgeoning surfnce
programme most likely made an additional inroad on funding for submarine construction.
By 1985, less than one-half of the fleet still met the standard 20-year useful life criterion
for a submarine. Vivid evidence of worsening materiel difficulties has been the growing
frequency of various accidents and engineering casualties at sea (see Appendix I). From 1976
until 1985, series-production was limited to fewer than 20 'Vidor' l l /llls, six 'Charlie lis', and
about ten 'Tango' types. At the same time, 14 'Delta Ills' were completed.
Mindful of earlier Soviet ambitions at creating a 'big navy' (notably in the late 1930s and
early 1950s), some analysts have proposed that, this time too, the build-up of large surface
combatants may be a temporary phenomenon that will fade and be overtaken by a new
emphasis on submarines. This is improbable, at least in the forseeable future. Economic
constraints may slow down the building of KiroiJs, Tbilis1s and their successors, but it is
unlikely that the Soviet Navy will return to the submarine-dominated fleet of the 1950s and
1 960s. Aside from such bureaucratic reasons as sunk costs and institutional self-interest,
important military-strategic and economic considerations argue against such a
development. On the economic side, the submarine simply is no longer the 'poor man's'
alternative to a major surface combatant. A modern, fully-equipped nuclear submarine costs
as much (be it in dollars or rubles) as a 6000-8000-ton surface warship. Next. the Soviet
Union's military-strategic situation in the mid - I 980s has outgrown the possibilities of the
submarine alone. The Soviet Union until the mid-1 960s was a rexional superpower. Its
military dilemma was relatively simple: how to minimise the weight of US nuclear retaliation
while the Soviet Army went about destroying the NATO armies on the European continent.
The division of labour between the Soviet Army and Navy was also relatively simple: while
the Army pursued its offensive against the NATO defenders, the Navy would try and hold a
defensive line against the US Navy's strike carriers and trans-Atlantic reinforcements. The
submarine was the most efficient weapon for this kind of strategic defence. Since the Anglo­
American fleets of the mid-! 950s to mid-1960s could call on over 1000 warships, it was
important that numbers be met by numbers.
The Soviet Union in the mid - I 980s is a global superpower. Interests and security
problems are no longer limited to the western appendage of the Eurasian continent. From the
point of view of the Soviet military planner, the most dangerous development in the past 20
years has been the Sino-Soviet 'split' and the possibility of a two-front war. Faced with a
potential enemy to the east, the Soviet Union had to find ways to better its ability to shift
military power from the centre of Russia proper to the Orient. Reinforcement of the
garrisons on the border of China was one step, another was to open up new lines of
communications, including the construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway
and the creation of a stronger naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Soviet Navy roles and missions in a war against China would be a mix of defensive
convoying of Siberian resupplies and reinforcemenb, and offnbwt fleet-against-shore
operations. The latter would include the mining of Chinese coastal waters, amphibious
landings in support of the main axis of advance. and shore bombardment and air strike. Both
the defensive and offensive tasks are beyond the capabilities of submarines alone.
The Soviet surface fleet will be a fact of life for at least the next 30 years. Meanwhile, the
Soviet Navy is faced with hard choices between the quantity and qrwlify of its submarine
service. The new types that have been introduced since the early 1980s suggest that it has
decided upon a considerably smaller submarine fleet with capabilities near or equal to those of its
potential Western opponents. Based on current and foreseeable production rates, it is likely
that the Soviet submarine fleet of the mid- 1990s will number about 200 non-strategic types
that are 20 years old or less. In the early 2 1st century, the number will probably be about 25
per cent smaller.
Military doctrinal innovation and the quality of military hardware co-exist in a mutually-

1 65
reinforcing relationship. Chances are that the Soviet shift from quantity to quality submarine
production is as much a function of a change in military-strategic priorities as it is uice versa.
Specifically, a smaller but higher-quality submarine force is likely to reinforce Soviet
strategic reasons for moving away from the traditional reliance on a defensive zonal or
barrier defence to offensive and mobile forward operations. A passive zonal defence was a
plausible strategy as long as the Soviet Navy owned enough submarines to guard all
possible enemy approaches to the Soviet homeland. Moreover, since the submarines would
be pre-deployed and be lying in waiL there was no need to match the Western submarines in
'acoustic speed'.
Fewer, yet quieter submarines both offer the opportunity and compel the Soviet Navy to
push its defensive perimeter forward. The essence of high-quality forces is manoeuvrability ­
both cost and capability militate against using the quiet and high -speed submarine for a
'Maginot Line' type of defence. Military forces must use their mobility to seek out the
opponent! The arrival of the 'Vidor III' class off the principal exit ports of the US Navy may
be a warning that the Soviet Navy intends to carry out the seaward defence of the Soviet
homeland off American shores.

P r i n c i pa l sources

Principal source materials for this chapter included the transcripts of US Navy budgetary testimony
before the US Congress. An important secondary source was professional naval journals, especially the
US Naval Institute's Proceedings, Jane's Defence Weekly, and Navy International. An indispensable
account of recent Soviet progress in submarine quieting is Tom Stefanick's Strategic Antisubmarine
Warfare and Naval Strategy.

166
Appendix 1 : Soviet submarine accidents
According to former US Navy Secretary John Lehman, Jr. the Soviet submarine fleet suffered
over 200 accidents between 1 975 and 1985 alone. The most recently reported (and most
dramatic) episode unfolded during the first week of October 1 986. On the third day of the
month a fire broke out inside the SS-N-6 missile compartment of a 'Yankee' class SSBN
about 600 nautical miles east of Bermuda. The fire evidently causcd enough heat to cause the
explosion of the liquid fuel tanks of the number 13 missile. The explosion blew a hole

Two recent Sovit't submarine casualties. The photo above �hows the damage sustained by a
'Vidor I' as the result of a collision with a Sovid me-rchantman in the Strait of Cibrallar on

September 2 I, 1984_ The one below shows the damage to a 'Yankee' SSBN after an explosion
and fire in the missile compartment. The photo was taken on August 5, 1986, one day before
the submarine sank in 18,000 feet of water (US Navy/US Dept. of Defense).

167
 through the outer casing of the hull, killing three crewmen and injuring others. The Soviet
news agency TASS reported that the fire was brought under control on Sunday, 5 October.
With the reactor shut down, a Soviet merchantman attempted to take the 'Yankee' in tow.
The effort failed; on 6 October the submarine was either abandoned or scuttled, and sank to
a depth of over 5500 m ( 18,000 ft).
Various reasons have been offered for the apparently high accident proneness of the
Soviet submarine fleet, including (I) sub-standard design, construction, and engineering
methods, ( 2) poor maintenance practices, and (3) insufficiently trained crews. Indications are
that all three have played a role.
Stark evidence of primitive construction methods came to light with the raising of the
forward section of a 'Golf II' SSB by the CIA-operated Glomar Explorer in 1974. Hull
thickness varied widely, and welds were uneven and dangerously pitted. Most surprising
was the use of four-by-two wooden beams for internal structural support.
Another instance of 'make-shift' construction were the 'Whiskey' missile conversions. It is
known that the addition of the 'Single' and Twin-Cylinder' launchers caused serious
stability problems. One boat, presumably a 'Whiskey Twin-Cylinder', reportedly sank as a
result and was never recovered.
Basic design flaws and inadequate quality control and safety provisions in main and
auxiliary equipmentS have been another cause for mishaps. In the 1950s, a series of explosive
accidents with the 'Quebec's' experimental closed-cycle engine earned it the nickname
'Cigarette Lighter'. In more recent years, there have been a number of confirmed and
suspected instances of fires and radiation leakage involving the first-generation HEN nuclear
reactors. The prototype HEN reactor on the icebreaker Leningrad experienced a melt-down
sometime in the I960s. It has also been speculated that the original 'Alfa' may have been
broken up after suffering a catastrophic reactor accident.
Accidents have also been traced to the weapons area. In I 972, radiation leakage inside the
storage area for nuclear-tipped torpedoes reputedly caused a number of fatalities among the
crew of an unidentified nuclear submarine. The extent of the radiation was evidently such
that the boat had to be taken in tow to Severomorsk.
Propellant leakage, sometimes resulting in crew poisonings, was a problem with the first­
generation liquid-fuel SLBMs, such as the SS-N-4. The SS-N-4 used non-storable liquid fuel
which meant that the tank would be filled on board the submarine just before the actual
launch. Turetsky has reported that it was not uncommon for the vibration of the submarine's
machinery to cause leaks in pipes and seals. A leak at the rate of one drop per minute, claimed
Turetsky, was enough to debilitate the crew in adjoining compartments in eight hours.
The comparatively small amount of time that Soviet submarine crews spend away from
port and the resultant loss of practical at-sea experience have been cited as another cause for
a high frequency of materiel casualties. Admiral James Watkins, then the Chief of Naval
Operations, told a US Congressional committee, a few years ago, how 'Soviet crews decry
the fact they don't get enough at-sea training time. They bitch about it in the documents and
we see the results'.
The ability of a submarine crew to operate, maintain and, if necessary, carry out repairs at
sea dep�nds, in part, on how 'user-friendly' the equipment is. No matter how simple, if
machiriery is ill-designed and constructed, even the much more highly-trained Western
.. s'!lbmarine
. personnel would be 'stretched thin' .
· -l(�sigri and construction flaws also have an adverse effect on the ability of shipyard
p.ei-S:onnel to carry out necessary maintenance and overhauls. The quE-stionable performance
of the Soviet Union's submarine overhaul infrastructure was commented upon in a report by
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1973. According to the Urtited States Military Posture for
FY 1979, it took the Soviets an average of 30-36 months to overhaul a nuclear submarine ­
twice as long as the United States.

168
 Part of the reason for this backlog may be an institutional impediment. Soviet industry,
including the shipbuilding component, is outrmt-oriented. Industrial performance (and
rewards for the Soviet captains of industry) is measured by production - not by the
efficiency of maintenance and repair chores that might interfere with pre-set quotas.
The Soviet Navy depends on the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry for major submarine
repairs and overhauls. In theory, this organisation is an equal to the Ministry of Defence
which has ultimate control over naval matters. In practice, however, the first and foremost
pre-occupation of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Indistry is new nmstructio11, be it naval or
civil i an , not 'non-productive' repairs. A 1 970 US Congressional report explained the
reluctance of the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry as follows·

' . . . repair work is a less efficient process {than i s new-construction) in the shipyard In (the US)
system. we plan on an input cost basis. The total input cost is less to repair a nuclear submarine
than to replace it. Jn the Soviet system, the shipbuilding industry is not on a cost basis, and they
maximize output not minimize input. ! suggest that the Soviet Ministry of Shipbuilding does
not want lo be in the ship repair business. especial!y the most difficult of all ship repairs. nuclear
submarine work. In our own system, <;hipbuilding and sh1p repair are very compatible. The
funds to build ships and those to overhaul them are almost non-competitive in our budget
process . . . Ship overhaul funding gets low visibility in the annual budget and is usually less
volatile than the shipbuilding budget. As a result, submarine overhaul is desirable work for even
our private yards . They can rely on a steady backlog of work and do not have to deal with large
changes in the work force to fit the ups and dovms of the shipbuilding budget.'

Table 39 is a partial listing of major Soviet submarine accidents in the past 20 y ear s.
Two things need to be kept in mind. In the first place. there is no 'scientific' evidence per se
that the Soviet submarine fleet has experienced a proportionately larger number of accidents
than has the United States'. For one, the US Navy provides no detailed data on the frequency
and scope of its submarine 'incident::.'. For another, the Soviet Union operates more than
three times as many submarines as the United States. All thi n gs being equaL the Soviet fleet
should sfatisticall.lt expect a higher incidence of accidents. Needed to confirm or disprove this
(statistical) hypothesis is something similar to the safety criterion used in the airline industry,
ie the number of aeroplane accidents per thousands of miles flown.
In the second place, the reader is cautioned that much of the data shown in Table 39 i s
based on second- and third-hand reports by Soviet emigr€s; their credulity as expert
witnesses is doubtful in some cases. For example, much of the evidence of so-called 'nuclear'
accidents is circumstantial.

169
Table 3 9 : Soviet submarine accidents I 966- 1986

Date Class/type Nature Location Casualties,/damage

'Around I 966' unidentified radiation leakage in Polyarny unknown number of crew members hospitalised
submarine reactor area for radiation sickness
Between 1966 and 'November' class SSN internal fire near North Pole unknown number of crew members received burns
1968 (Lminski Komsomo!sk)
I I April 1 968 'Golf 11' class SSB internal explosion 750 nm NW of bow section recovered by Glomar Explorer in
fo!lowed by fire. Hawaii July 1 9 7 4
Sank with a!! hands
in 5 I20 m ( 1 6,800 ft)
of water
1968 unidentified cause unknown; sank Kolsky Zaliv 90-man crew perished after consuming food
submarine with all hands; estuary off supply
believed nuclear salvaged Severomorsk
12 April I970 'November' class SSN propulsion failure NW of Spain boat sank after crew abandoned vessel
and internal fire
April-May I 970 unidentified internal fire near Faeroe scuttled by crew to prevent fire from reaching
nuclear submarine Islands reactor compartment. Accident took place during
'Okean 70' exercise
January 197 I 'Foxtrot' class SSK apparent surface Mediterranean 6 m (20 ft) of bow section missing
co!lision with Soviet Seo
merchant ship
February 1972 'Hotel II' class lost all power after 600 nm NE of several deaths possible; taken in tow
SSBN serious propulsion Newfoundland
malfunction
December 1972 unidentified nuclear radiation leakage in off North submarine towed to Severomorsk; radiation
submarine nuclear-tipped torpedo American coast sickness and deaths reported among crew
storage area
October I976 unidentified nuclear fire in missile launch Atlantic Ocean unknown; returned under own power
submarine, possible compartment
SSI3{-.'
1977 unidentified nuclear internal fire, possibly Indian Ocean unknown number of deaths; submarine towed to
submarine due to outdated reactor Vladivostok
1977 unidentified nuclear radiation leakage Atlantic Ocean 12 officers evacuated to Soviet Union via
:.ubmarine Canada
28 August 1977 'Echo' class SSG� surface collision with Mediterranean hull damaage
USS Vose (FF 1 0471 Sea
I 9 August 1978 'Echo I!' class SSGN engineering casualty 140 nm NVV of casualties unknown; taken _n tow
in nuclear power plant Scotland
2 I August 1980 'Echo' class nuclear internal fire 290 nm [ of at least nine dead, three injured; submarine
:.ubmarine Okina;va taken in tovv by Soviet tug
September 1981 unidentified nuclear 'series of strong and Baltic Sea unknown number of crew members hospitalised
submarine sudden physical shocks ' for radiation exposure; boat to'A'ed to
made boat 'no longer Kaliningrad
navigable'
June 1983 'Charlie I' class unknown off Kamchatka casualties, if any, unknown; reportedly salvaged
SSGN Peninsula
September 1983 unidentified nuclear unknown Northern Pacific unknown
submarine Ocean
J 1 October 1983 'Vidor Ill' class propeller entangled off South Carolina, taken in tow to Cuba by 'Purga ' clas:. Soviet tug
SSN in towed array cable US coast
of USS i'v!rClo.ll (Ff 1038)
2 1 March 1984 'Vidor I' class collision with USS Sea of Japan damage unknown; submarine dead in the water
SSN Kitty Hnwk (CV 63) after collision
20 September 1984 'Golf ll' class fire, possibly due to Sea of Japan casualties. if any, unknown; submarine headed
SSB electrical overload about 50 nm for Vladivostok under own power after 5 2 hr
:-.J\V of Okino-shi;va of fire-fighting efforts
Island
21 September l 984 'Vidor I' class collision with Sovid Strait of damage to forward hull section : emergency
SSN merchant vcs:.el Gibraltar repairs in Hammamd, Tunisia
1 3 january 1986 'Echo 11' class unknown 280 nm NW of damage or casualties unknown: taken in tmv b y
SSGN Okinawa in China Soviet salvage vessel
Seo
3 October 1 986 'Yankee' class internal explosion in cast of Bermuda three reported dead. others injured. Sunk o n
SSBN 1\o B missile tube 6 October 763 n m S E o f New York

�
�
Appendix II : Soviet transfers of
submarines abroad 194 5-1988

The Soviet Union became a major exporter o f submarines abroad in the early 1950s. Until
the early 1970s, it followed the example of the United States and limited overseas 'gifts' and
sales to older cast-offs of its own fleet. The pattern was broken with the re-opening of the
'Foxtrot' production line for export purposes. The decision to build the new 'Kilo' class also
appears to have been partially motivated by the expectation of foreign sales. An even more
important precedent-breaking move was the first international transfer of a nuclear-powered
submarine. In early 1988, India received from the Soviet Union, under a 'lease' agreement, a
'Charlie I' class submarine. It is widely expected that the 'permanent' transfer of one or more
'Vidor' types will follow the �raining of Indian crews.

Table 40: Foreign transfers of Soviet submarines, 1945-1986

Recipient country Submarine type Number Year

Albania 'Whiskey' 2 1960

'Whiskey' 2 1961�
Algeria 'Kilo' I 1988
Bulgaria Series XV 'M' 3 early 1950s
'Whiskey' 2 !958
'Romeo 2 1 9 72-73
'Romeo 1985
Cuba 'Whiskey' 1979
'Foxtrot' 1979
'Foxtrot' 1980
'Foxtrot' 1984
Egypt Series XV 'M' 195 7
'Whiskey' 4 1957
'Whiskey' 3 1958
'Whiskey' I 1962
'Romeo' 5 1966
'Romeo 1969
India 'Foxtrot' 1968
'Foxtrot' I 1969
'Foxtrot' 2 1970
'Foxtrot' 2 1973
'Foxtrot' 1974
'Foxtrot' 1975
'Kilo' 1986
'Kilo' 3 1987-88
"Charlie I' I 1988
Indonesia 'Whiskey' 8 1 960-62'1'¥
'Whiskey' 4 !962
Libya 'Foxtrot' 1976
'Foxtrot' 1977
'Foxtrot' 1978

1 72
 'Fox�rot' 1 98 1
'Foxtro�· 1982
'Foxtrot' 1983
North Korea 'Whiskey' 2 1967
'Whiskey' 2 1 9 7 1-72¥"'�
H
People's Republic of China Series XV 'M ' l 95 3 "
Series VI 'M' 2 1954
Series !Xbis 'S' 2 1954
Shchuka 4 1954-55
Series XV ' M' 2 1955
Poland Series XV 'M' 4 195 4
Series XV ' M' 2 1955
'Whiskey' 1 1 962
'Whiskey' 196 4
'Kilo' 1986
'Kilo' 1 1987-88
Romania 'M' type 4 1957
'Kilo' 1987-88
Syria 'Romeo' 2 1986

"seized at Soviet withdrawal from Sazan Island.

Hin ·1959 2 'Whiskeys' were transferred via Poland.
"""in 1 986, 16 'Romeos' had been delivered by the PRC or built locally since 1973.
H'I'-"The PRC has built its own version of the "Whiskey' and 'Romeo' classes since 1956, and has
exported a number, in turn, to several Third World countries. Most sources claim that Chinese
construction of these two types began after the Soviet Union had delivered several fully
a�sembkd copies of each_ David Muller claims, based on declassified ON! reports that no actual
transfer of Sovicl Navy 'Whiskeys' or 'Romeos' took place. Sec his China As a Maritime Power.
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1 983, p. 29

] 73
Appendix III : Basing infrastructure
Fleet Area Base Infrastructure
Within the Soviet Navy's four principal fleet areas, the submarine contingents are dispersed
among dozens of individual operating bases. Some, especially those harbouring the SSBNs,
are very large and fully equipped to service hull, machinery and weapons. Many others are
little more than out�of-the-way anchorages. Figures 6 to 9 display the known locations of
individual submarine operating bases in the four fleet areas; where known SSB and SSBN
bases are marked as such. As a point of interest, Figure 6 shows the Northern Fleet submarine
bases infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula. It indicates a degree of concentration (hence
potent-ial vulnerability) much greater than a listing of site names alone might suggest.

Out-of-Area Deployments and Base Infrastructure

Since the mid- to late - I960s, routine Soviet out-of-area submarine patrols have been
concentrated in six ocean areas : (1) SSBN, SSGN and SSN patrols in the North Atlantic and
North Pacific off the North American coast ; (2) once-a-year Caribbean cruises by torpedo
and/or cruise missile attack submarines; (3) torpedo attack submarines temporarily attached
to the 'West Africa Patrol' in the South A tlantic Ocean ; (4) a varying mix of diesel and
nuclear-powered boats armed with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles in the Indian Ocean ;
and (5) a similar but larger contingent associated with the 5th eskadra in the eastern and
central portions of the Mediterranean Sea.
Apart from the 'analogous response' episode of 1 984, the maximum number of Soviet
SSBNs on patrol in North Atlantic and Pacific waters outside Soviet 'home waters' has never
exceeded a simultaneous total of five - one-half in the Gulf of Alaska or north of the
Hawaiian Islands, and the other one-half in the 'Yankee Box' off the US east coast. The
'Yankee' out-of-area patrols ceased in 1987, prompting speculation within the Western
intelligence community that this move was (a) part of an overall Soviet Navy 'economising'
programme, and/or (b) connected with a re-shuffling of theatre nuclear targeting
responsibilities in the wake of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement and the
concomitant requirement for the Soviets to compensate for the elimination of the land -based
SS-20.
After a one-year hiatus, the Atlantic 'Yankee' patrol was re-established in mid -1988. I t
seems likely that the patrol's one-year suspension had less t o do with a n economy drive o r a
Soviet reassessment of post-INF needs for theatre nuclear coverage, than with a very
practical decision to 'recall' the 'Yankees' after the disaster of October 1986.
The 'Yankees' have carried out their patrols without the benefit of a 'chain' of intermediate
'way stations', analogous to the overseas infrastructure (eg, Holy Loch, Scotland, and Apra
Harbor, Guam) that has supported the US SSBN fleet. There is (marginal) evidence that the
Soviet Union may have tested the US determination to deny it 'Yankee' 'on-station
equivalence'.

Caribbean Operations and Basing

In July 1 969, shortly after the arrival of the first 'Yankee' of the US east coast, a seven-ship
Soviet flotilla, including two 'Foxtrot' and one 'November' types submarines, accompanied
by a tender, arrived in Caribbean waters. The two diesel submarines called on Havana, but it
is not clear if the 'November' entered a Cuban port. In April 1 970, a second Soviet flotilla
visited Cuba, calling on the port of Cienfuegos on the island's southern coast. The group
included two 'Foxtrots', one 'Echo II', and a tender. Its arrival had been preceded by the

Figure 6 Northern FIC'et submarine basing infrastructure.

1 74
 rJ iYf

tf
�� [i��&* FRANZ J O S E F
L AND ,
\ U S SR) \

SVA L B A R D
(NORWAY)

!he Litsa G uba area

mcludes the bases:
h
Bols aya ��1tsa
Ura
Sayda
Olenya
Rosta
zapadnay
, a Litsa
,Ty hoon Bas
p e

Sea

blenegorsk•

0
2
-<
�

U SS R

"
50

l 75
70"

u s s

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130

North
Pacific
Ocean

1 30° o•

176
highly publicised visit, in November 1969. by Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Andrei
Grechko, and the Deputy Chief of the Soviet Naval Staff. U-2 reconnaissance flights had
meanwhile confirmed the erection, at Cienfuegos, of installations apparently designed to
serve nuclear weapons. Indications were that the two superpowers were about to 're-visit'
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
The impending showdown was resolved in the winter of 1 970-7 1 . On October 6. 1 970,
the Soviet ambassador in Washington, DC Anatoly Dobrynin, presented President Nixon's
national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, with a formal note, reaffirming the
Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding of 1 962 that no Soviet offensive nuclear missiles
would be introduced into Cuba. According to Kissinger's account of events, Dobrynin gave
oral assurances that his country's ballistic missile submarines would never visit Cuba 'in an
operational capacity'.
Despite assurances, there have been at least two occasions when Soviet strategic
submarines have called on Cuban ports. On 29 April 1972, a 'Golf class SSB. accompanied
by a tender, entered Bahia de Nipe. Exactly two years later another 'Golf put in at Havana.
With those two exceptions, the Sovieh. have apparently kept their commitment - literally,
that is. In practice. Cuba has become an important Stiif::.J.nmk-r for Soviet 'strategic' submarine
operations. Cuban access supports Soviet 'pro'- and 'anti-SSBN' missions in at least three
ways. First, beginning in 1 983, the Soviets have used Cuban airbase facilities to routinely
stage long-range ASW reconnaissance flights by Tu-95 'Bear Fs'. Those flights can serve
two purposes : one, general surveillance of US Navy underwater ASW forces tasked to
counter the 'Yankees' and 'own force' anti-SSBN 'Victor I!Is', and two, general surveil!ance
of US SSBN movements in support of 'Vidor III' tracking-and-trailing tasks. The third
'strategic' contribution of the Cuban facilities was demonstrated in October 1 986, when
Cuban-based Soviet ships were dispatched to try and save the explosion-stricken 'Yankee'.
From 1 969 though 1986, Soviet Navy general purpose forces visited the Caribbean
operating area on 2 7 different occasions. Typical deployments have included at least one
'Foxtrot' type (sometimes two) plus, on more than a sporadic occasion, a single 'Echo II'. The
submarines have always been part of a combined surface-subsurface task force, usually
consisting of two surface combatants and an oiler. Shoreside support for the flotillas has been
provided by a steadily expanding Soviet-owned logistics infrastructure at Cienfuegos.
Besides shorebased facilities (including unconfirmed press reports of concrete submarine
'pens'). submarines can also call on the services of a semi-permanently based tender and
other auxiliary craft.

West African Presence

The Soviet Navy has maintained a 'West Africa Patrol' in South Atlantic waters since 1 9 70.
'Steady state' forces are usually limited to surface vessels, including one or two surface war
vessels, an amphibious unit, a mine warfare ships. and several oceanographic research and
other auxiliary vessels. Submarines apparently 'chop in' periodically while in transfer
between the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. While in the area, submarines can call on repair
and maintenance services from Soviet auxiliary repair ship:. based at Luanda, Angola and
Conakry, Guinea.

Indian Ocean Operations and Infrastructure

The Soviet Navy became a 'permanent' aspect of the naval scene in the Indian Ocean in
1968. The eskadra has typically averaged some 20 ships, mostly drawn, on a semi-annual
basis, from the Pacific Fleet. The 'average' submarine component has been two 'Foxtrot' class
submarines, also usually detach�d from the Pacific Fleet. The largest congregation of Soviet

Figure 7 Pacific Fleet submarine basing infrastructure.

177
 I ,

I
F I N LA N D

1 I
I '
,
I
I
I
I
,
I
I
,
I
I
I
,
,
,
,
1 56�
1
__f-
.� ,
_ --

,
,
,
uSSR I
I
,
,
,
,
,
I
,
I
I
,
' I
POLAND '
'

zo· 2 ••

Figure 8 Baltic Fleet submarine basing infrastructure.

submarines in the area was reported in July 1 980 (following the arrival of two US Navy
carrier battlegroups in response to the Iranian 'hostage crisis'). Counted were two 'Foxtrots',
two 'Echo IIs' and two 'Victor' class attack boats. Together, the force accumulated 5 5 4
shipdays. I n 1 983, Soviet submarine shipdays had tailed off to 8 1 .
Soviet submarines operating i n the Indian Ocean have included virtually every type,
excluding so far as known, the SLBM classes. When the Soviet fleet made its first appearance
en masse in the region in the late 1 960s, Western analysts tended to interpret the event as a

counter to US SSBN patrols. The interpretation is highly suspect ; there is no evidence that
the Polaris-Poseidon boats ever patrolled the Indian Ocean (if for no other reason that few
Soviet targets would have been within reach of Indian Ocean Polaris/Poseidon stations).
The much longer-range Trident IC4 of 20 years later can cover Soviet targets from the
Indian Ocean, however, the superlative acoustic quietness of the Ohio class obviates the
need for expanding its patrol area outside the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
The size and composition of the Soviet Indian Ocean eskadra, including the submarine
component, suggest four motivations: ( 1) a routine show-of-the-flag peacetime presence,
(2) a 'baseline' fleet-in-being that can be augmented quickly to become a 'countervailing
deterrent' to American crisis reinforcements in the region, (3) peacetime intelligence
gathering needs, and (4) material deployability of whatever Pacific Fleet units happen to be
on hand.
Soviet Indian Ocean submarine deployments are supported by two, possibly three, out­
of-area 'bases'. The most important facility, since 1 9 8 1 , is the former US military base at
Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. According to the US Congressional testimony by the director of
US naval intelligence in March 1 988, Cam Ranh Bay harbour, on the average, two to three

1 78
 o
2,5" J o· 3 5° 0
4,

U S S R

Burgas Pot 1

8 lack Sea

°
T u rkey' 40

4' 0 "

Figure 9 Black Sea Fled submarine basing infrastructure

torpedo or cruise missile attack submarines. Repair facilities have been available, since 1 984,
by virtue of a submarine tender.
On the opposite side of the Indian Ocean basin, Soviet ::.ubmarinc units can call on
shoreside support at the Ethiopian island of Dchalak at the southern tip of the Red Sea
(facilities include a floating drydock). and the port of Aden. The latter berths an auxiliary
tender, and has become the 'homeport' for at least one 'Foxtrot' class unit.

5ffr [skadru Opcrutio11� wrd B11se llifmstrudure

Since the early 1980s, the overall size of the Soviet Navy presence in the Mediterranean Sea
has fluctuated from 30 to 40 vessels, The Northern (and occasionally Baltic) Fleet has
typically contributed six-to-eight submarines. One or two usually involve anti-ship mi::.sile
types, including the 'Charlie', 'Echo II' and 'Juliett' classes. Torpedo attack types have
included the 'November', 'Victor', and 'Tango'. Transit routes to and from the Northern and
Baltic Fleet areas lie west of Ireland (for the nuclear types) and via the North Sea (for diesel
classes). North Sea tramits are commonly on the surface.
Since the Soviet withdrawal from Egypt between 1 972 and 1976, 5th eskadm submarine
repair and maintenance facilities in the Mediterranean Sea have been restricted to Tivat,
Yugoslavia and Tartus, Syria. The Tivat shipworks have been available on a commercial
basis since 1 9 74, but repairs are limited to no more than two combatants at a time, and they
are not to exceed six months. The Tartus harbour facility houses some auxiliaries, including a
submarine repair ship; however, the small and ill-equipped Syrian port has proven to be a
poor substitute for the spacious facilities at Alexandria and Mcrsa Matruh 1 5 years ago.

! 79
Index

lhdir m!mcmls refer to Ctll 'lums

Achkasov, V I <H1d Pavlovich 1\: B SoVIet Nm,dl i�ed. 1 943-4 66, 6 7 ; submarine attacks on
Operalwns m lhl' Grml PalrioiH \!Var 1941-!945 56, German refugep traffic 6 7 ; victories and lo%eS
6 1 . 62. 64, 65, 6b, 7 1 , 73 6C
Alafu70v, Adm 1 0 7 quality ofsubmarines and cre\\os b 5
Alb.:-rt. Prince Consort 9 submarines' lack o f �upport force� 6 ci
Aleksandrovsky. Ivan Fedorovirh: builds fir�\ Balw·in, Hamon W 8 0
Russian -design!;'d submarine 1 0 Bauer. Wilhelm Valentin 9
Andropov, Yuri V 1 4 4 , ! 4 5 llmltdimJ.-Jwr �ubmarine 9, LJ

Ansaldo-San Giorgio company .'>4 Diablc lv1ar!ll �ubmarine 9-10

Aube. Adm 20 dispute with English submarine builders 9
Bt'thlehcm S!el:'l Company 3 2
Baggett, Adm Lei:'. lr 1 4 8 Black Sea Flee! operations, First World War
Billhc Fleet operations, Fir�t World War progress: surpri�e enemy naval raid� on Odessa and
defensive plan 28. 29-30 SevastopoL 1 9 1 4 3 4 ; Rus�ian failure to block
progress; mobihsation, 1 9 1 4 2 8 : defence of Gldf of Bosporu� J4, 3 6-7 , minclaying 34, 36. 3 7 ;
Finland 28, 29; minclaying off E. Prussia, 1 9 1 4 attacks o n Turkish porh, 1 9 I 4- I S 3 5 : effect of
28-9: increase i n strength, 1 9 1 5 29: J��i�tanu:' Bulgarian l:'ntry into war. 1 9 1 5 Jt-; troop
of RN submarin�es 29, 30. .l.'; los� of Libau ba�e. support. I 9 I 5 36: fate of fleet at end of war 37,
1 9 1 5 29, los� of Vindau base 29: �ucce��ful 39
defenct:> of Gulf of Riga, 1 9 1 5 29: campaign submannes .35-7
again�t Swedish-German iron ore traffi< . 1 9 1 5 Black Sea rlect operations, Second World VVar
30; fear of complications with Sweden 3 J , failure fleet complement. 1 9 4 I 67
of torpedo attacks, J 9 1 5 J l ; submarine progress: waJmess. June \ 9 4 1 6 7 ; Cerman mining
minelaying J I ; succe�� of minco, 1 9 1 6 3 2 ; 67; threat to German laf'd and �ea pm1lion� 6 7 ;
�ubmarine reinforcements, I 9 I 6 3 2 ; failure of porh lost, 194 1 6 7 , 68, t>9: So\Jel ship� scuttled
offensive submarine patrols .B operat ions 67; de fence of Scvastopol 68, 7 0, ship losses,
reduced by �evere winter 1 9 16-1� 33, 194,> 69, recovery o f ports 6'1; recovery of
operations halted b y Rm�ian revolution, 1 9 1 7 Sevastopol ci9
33-4: German successes 3 .1 . cea�cfire, I 9 1 � 35 �ubm,1rine�
report� on statltS of. 1 9 I 8 I 9 38 blockade of Kerch Strait 7 I
submanne� patrolb'ng. 1 94 ! 2 70
mventory, 1 9 1 4 .)0 responsibilities 7(}
losses 30 �trength 7 1
principal role, 1 9 1 4- 1 5 3 I succe��es and losses 72
repair nt>eds of obsoll:'tl:' types 3 I-2 Balkin, Ll 1 5
strength. late 1 9 1 5 30 lln'«lmJ. CE>rman Crmser Jo
Balbc Fleet operation�. SPcond World War Brest-Lttovsk, Trc,lly of. 1 9 1 7 3 7
geographical disadvantages for Russian� b4 Breyn, Siegfril;'d D1c Seerlistrmg der Sowidumo11 8(1
German 'Walros.;' submarine twt 66 Bre7hnev. Leonid I 139. 1 4 4
problem of base �ecurity 61, 62 Bntain
progress: defensive �trategy at start bO; rcadine��. Stcdrmenl ''f Defcncc, 1 9 5 4 8 1
[une 1 94 ! 6 1 ; lo��of advanccd ba�e.;, ]unc I 9 4 J submarines
6 1 -2: dl;'fence o f ��lands in Gulf o f finland. 1942 l:'mployed in Baltic First World YVar 29
63: submarinp break-out mto Baltic 1942 64; .)0, 3 3

meagre succc'is. 1942 64; submarines neutral- Fn-u/ilmr 4 1 I 2 o

181
 Explorer 49 126 Gorshkov, Adm Sergei G 103
operating from Russian ports 73, 74 Nm,ies i11 Peace rmd Wrn ! 3 3
scuttling o( Helsingfors, I 9 I 8 3 7 The Se11 flower of the State 6 4 , 107, 1 0 8 . 1 3 4
Type 2400 class 1 6 1
Brown, Gen George 1 5 4 Hango (Hanko) naval base, Baltic 6 1 , 6 2
Brown. Harold 1 5 4 Heinrich. Prince. o f Prussia 2 9
Bubnov, !van Grigorievich 7 , 1 4 , 2 1 . 23, 25 Herrick, Robert W . 1 4 1
De/{i11 submarine 1 4 Sovirf Nmmf Strafegl! 54, 108
submarine design 1 4 , / 5 , 2 3 Hitler, Adolf 69
Butts, Rear Adm John 1 5 I Hoiland, John P 7. 1 5
Holland Torpedo Boat Company 1 5
Cantieri della Adriatico company 44
Chetverikov, !van Y· plans for submarine-carried fmperntnfStl lvfaryi11, battle�hip .35, 36

aircraft 55-6 Imperial Russia

Chicu,«o Tnlnme 4 7 consequences of defeat m Russo-Japanese War I 9

Duma instituted, 1905 1 9
ChurchilL Winston 7 , 78
Cooksley, Peter G ·. Flying Bombs - The Story of I-Ii/Ids scales down naval estimates 19-20
V- VVeaprms in World \1\iur !! 90 ineffective fleet. 1 9 1 4 20
Crimean War 9 October Manife�to 19
Cuban missile crisis, 1962 106. 108 'Old' and 'Young' schools of naval strategy 20
revolution and collapse, I 9 I 7 33-4, 3 7
See also Russia
Danzig
Imperial Russian submarine fleet
Danzig
AC (Amerikanski Gotland) class
Danzig Yard 78
AG-1 1 32, 37, 3 8
Schichau Yard 78, 79
AG-12 32, 37, 38, 3 9
Dismukes, Bradford 1 3 3
AG-13 32. 37, 38
Dornberger, Walter 90
AC- I4 to - 1 b 32. 3 9
JJrmdmmghf, HMS, 1906 19
AG-21 t o -lb 3 7 . 3 9
Dutch submarine�
Aktdu 8 , 23, 25, 30, 3 I
Moray 161-2
lost during F1rst World War 30. 3 1. 39
Walrus 1 6 1
minelaymg, Fir�t World War 30. 3 1
Dzhevetsky, Stepan Karlovich 7, 1 1. 1 2
A!IJ)iafor class 1 6 - I 7
four-man submarine design, 1 8 7 9 1 2
Alli,«ufor I6, 3 1. 37, 38
Ke/a submarine, 1886 I 5
attempts to modify I 7
miniature submarines, 1870s !0. I 2
Dmkmr I 6. 3 1, 3 7, 38, 3 9
plan for French submarine, I896 1 2
K11imrm 16, 3 1 . 3 7 , 3 8 . 40
floc/rlrn'y submarine 23. 24
Krokodil 16, J 1, 37. 38, 40
unseaworthiness I 7
Eisenhower, Pres Dwight D 102 B r class 3 1 . 38
Electric Boat Company 14-I5, 17, 32. 37 fate of 39-4 1
Engineer 19 Fore! (German gift) I 7-18
Erickson, John: Jlre Road to Stanlingrnd 60 ' G - I ' clas� 30, 31

Fisher. Adm Lord 1 8 K.nrp class

Ford, Pres Gerald 1 3 9 corrosion in 23
Knmlmla 1 8
Carsoyev, L t 2 I Knms 1 8 , 36, 4 0
German submarines 78 Knrp 1 8 , /8, 36, 40
U-1 1 8 /0/,'>alka class
Second World War Teldmarslral Craf Shermrelyev dater U,«or) 1 5 , 38, 40
Laf/erenf-: Proiekf for V -2 carrying 90 /0;safka I 5. 38. 40
midget 1 5 9 Mukrcl 1 5 , 30, 38, 40
operational availability 8 2 Nalim 1 5 , 35. 40
production 80 Ohm 15, 30, 38, 40
Type XXJ 78-9. 79, 80, 83, 84. 86 Skut 15, 35. 40
Germania-Werft, Kiel 17, 1 8 Knshulof class
Gervais. Prof 44 Kaslm/of 26. 36, 40
Goeberr, German battlecruber 34, 35 Kif 26, 35, 36, 40
Golovko. Rear Adm A G 59, 72 Narual 26, 35, 36
Gorki: Krasnaya Sormova Yard 53, 8 3 . 8 5 , roo. 106, Kruh minelaying submarine 22-J. 23. 35, 36. 40
1 1 5 . 1 2 5 , 126, 127, 1 5 2 Lake X (or Sig) 16, 3 0

182
T eopard (or Ti:-;rl class 7, 26, "'15, _; 7 SH,IIlk 17, 4 0
Bar� 26, 29-33 r'u'_,rm, 3LJ 5l'lnloi Ceorg "q_ ' 40
Burel'esfmk 26, 27, .'>9 Fi rst World War
Fore/ 26, 38, 40 budd ing program me, 1 9 1 5 .'>0 - I
Cag,Jra 26, 37. 40 'cruiser 'iu bm ari ne �' p lanned, 1 9 I 6 33
Cermrd 26. 29. J L .n. .B, 40 deliverie'i from US 32
Kuguur 26, 38, 40 �ubmarines scutll<'d, 1 9 I 8 37
Lr',J!'ard 26, 38, ,H) lngenieurskanhJor voor Schcepshouw , The Hague
r <'ihu 26, 32, 40 52-J
Lyrbed 26, 40 /n/trllafiot�nl Defense Rwln<' 1 3 5
Orlrm 26
Pa11/em 26. _'\2 .'18. 40 June's Fishtmx Slufh 45
Pc/rkun 26, 4l\ f,nmwl ,,f tire /\,')lrll U11ifcd Scnm h hrshiiiie 4 7
Rll'' 26, 32. 38, 40
Trsr 26. 32. 38 40 Ke ren sky, Aleksandcr F .B 34
Trrr 26, 38, 40 Khrushchev, Nikila 83. 102. 103, 139
LJg,,r 26, 38, J9, 4Ll Kok:hak Adrn J7
Ulbl 26. 37. J9, 40 Komsomolsk Amur Yard 83 85, 95, I04, 1 1 1 , I I3,
Vn/1.. 26, 32, 33, 38, 40 129, UO, 1 5 2, J 5 _)
V.lfcpr 26, .>0-J ]Hi '''lffl, 38, 10 P 90
Korolev. S<:'rgel
Y.r;;wJr 26, 32, J8. 40 Kramish, Arnold A/OH!IC hrergy 1/I IIw 5<'1'1el L/JII<lll 1 02
Ya:.: 26. 38. 40 Kronshtadt 2 7. 6 L 6 2
Yedmrog 26, J2, 3 7 , 38, 40 Briti�h raid on, ] 9 1 9 4 2
Yur,h 26, 40 early submarine hmld i n g 1 2 . I 3
bneya 26, 32, 38. 40 Kuteimkov and Kolbas i e v. C V · Peter Kuclrha
l'vfill<lSII 21 2J, ,)0, 38, 40 'iubmanne 1 3
lo�s of 2 1 -2 Kuzentsov, Adm 0 L 67, 8 L 83
M,,r�h da'i.,
·\1,or;:_h 26, 35, 36, 40 Laird, Melvin R I 1 J, 123
Nr·rrm 20, 35, 36, 40 Lake . Sm1on 7. 1 5 . 16, 1 7
Tl!Minr 26, 35, J6. 39, 40 Lake Torpedo-Boat Company 1 5
nine!eent h -century Lee, William T and Slaar. R!Chard F Sui'!el lVIilifar!l
begmnings, 1 8 5 0s 9-10 !'o!ictJ Sin<c Vl/i>rld tVnr II 1 4 3
fir�t ind igenous dt>�i gn 10 Lehman, )ohn, ]r 1 4 5 , 1 4 6 , ! 4 7
miniature submarine, 1 8 7 7 10, 1 2 Leningrad
one-man d e si g n, 1986 I 2 besieged, \ 9 4 I 62
Rmsia n d ealings wtth 1'\ordenfeiL 1880s 1 3 Frull7t' Naval Acade my 4J
pre-Fir�t World War Mart1 Yard 4 9. 56
Bngade of Submarines organi�ed 22 Drdzhonikidze (or Saltier Yard 44, 4 5 , 4t\ 49, S I
fiv e-year building programme 22, 23 53, 56. 83, 84. 8 7
growt h o f numbers t o 48, !9JJ 20 ruined oh1pyards. 1 9 4 5 8 0
mJt10euvre� 22 Sudomekh Yard 5 3 , 86. 88, 8 9 , I 2i'>, 129, 1 5 3 , ! 5 9
new yard'i opened 23, 26 United Admiralty Yard I I I
prefabricat<;>d submarine., 1 .\ Voroshdov 1\:aval War Coll<>gc 43
state at stJrt of war 26-7 Zhdanov Yard 4 9, 53
submarine looked on as defensive weJpon 22 Libau (Ltep.3jal
tenders Klruhun•usk and Yn'mpu 22 overrun by Germa ns, F1r�t \A/orld \11/ar 2LJ
t rain ing school establbhed, 1906 2 1 �ubmarine lrami ng school 2 1
PrufectN class I 6 Se1' a/-;,J Lt epiij a naval base
LtepiiJa navJI ba�e. Baltic 6 L 62
B!llrhok 1 5, 39
Kt'{al I S , 40 �ubmarint'S dest ro yed on German advance, 1 9 4 1
l'uirus 15, 40
61 2
1-'lo/<)rl IS, 40 Lindsay, George R: ' [ Jclical Anti-Subtnarir:c V\'arfan··
Prolnlur 15, /b 75
Russo-Japanese V\'ar and. �cc Rus�o-]apanesc War Ludwig L King oi Bavana 9
S/erlyw-1 (Holland-type) clas s 2 7 LuSJl'. Rudolf 80
Bl!elr!g,l 1 7 . 30. 3 7 , 3 8 , J 9
LNIS I 7, 40 NlcConnell. lame� M 1 .� 3-6 Jlih�llll, I 4 5
Pe5kor I 7 , .'>0, "'18, 4 0 McDon ald, Adm W<'slcy I 4 7
Sh.-lruka 1 7, 35, .'>7, 38 4 0 McCruther, Kennet h : The fpu/c'mg So<>ld Nm>v l .'i b
Som (ex-f ldlulll 1 7, .35, 40 MccCwire. Michael 132-6 I''L"im
Sierlyad 17, 30, 40 /'v1rhhrr�l Obieclit'c; Ill S,,pic/ foreign Pohq1 I 35

183
 Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Confent Potsdam Conference, 1945 78
(ed) 1 3 3 tnpartite naval commission 79
Sovief Naval fnf/uenc.e Domestic and Foreign Pravda 5 4
Dimensions (ed) 1 3 3 Pukalov one-man �ubmarine, 1896 1 2
Souief Mwal Poliry : Obieclit>es ami Construillls (ed)
133 Rapallo, Treaty of. 1922 52
MAN company, of Germany: �upplies submarine Red Navy, Workers' and Peasants' 42
diesels to Soviet Union. interwar 52 between World Wars
Marine Rundschau 47 fears of British attack 42
Meister. JUrg 4. 58. 59, 80 naval co-operation with Germany 52
on disposition of Soviet submarines, June 194 I 60 naval doctrine 43-4, 56-7, 83
on Soviet submarines and crews 65 Pacific Fleet, 1 930s 47-8
on strength of Soviet Pacific Fleet interwar 48 plans to modernise Baltic Fleet. I921 42-3
Soviet Wurships of the Sermui World War 48 unbalanced nature 56-7
MikhaiL Grand Duke 33 during Second World War
Molotovsk: Yard 402 53 submarine operations 58-9. See also Baltic. Black
Muller, David China as a Maritime Power 173n Sea and Northern Fleet operations entries
Murmansk 72 submarme order of battle, June 194 1 59-60
submarine performance compared with Germany
Nalyetov, Mikhail Petrovich 22 and US 75-6
New York Tunes 80 Tml class minesweepers 66
Nikolai II, Tsar 33 po�t Second World War
Nikolayev, Black Sea 68 acquires German submarines and equipment.
falls to Germans, 1 9 4 1 6 7 1945 78, 79-80
Marti Yard 44, 4 5 . 46, 49, 5 3 , 83 building plans 83
Nikolayev Yard 23, 26, 35, 68, 78 forward deployment, 1960s 1 08-9
recovered from Germans. 1944 69 Lenin icebreaker 1 0 1
ruined shipyards, 1945 80 Leninxrad icebreaker I68
Nimitz, Adm Chester W 78 'Okean 70' manoeuvre 1 1 9-20
Nordenfelt, Thorsten 1 2 - 1 3 response to US installation of cruise missiles,
faulty submarine design, 1 880s 1 3 1984 1 44-6
Nordenfe/1 I submarine 1 3 'Summerex-8 I ' manoeuvre 1 4 6
Nordmfelt IV submarine 1 3 programme for 'big fled' 5 0 - 1 , 5 4 , 1 6 5
grounds off Jutland 1 3 Reagan, Pres Ronald 1 4 5
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation {NATO) 8 L 90 Reval 3 1. 33, 3 7 . 38
Northern Fleet operations. Second World War Nobci-Lessner Yard 26, 30
routes to open sea 72 See u/so Tallinn
Stalin Canal connection to Leningrad 72, 73 Re1'isfa ,\1arit/ima 4 7
�ubmarines Revill' des De�.<x Mondes 4 7
composition, 1 9 4 1 72 Rickover. Adm Hyman G 1 0 1
composition, 1 9 4 4 74 Rohwer, JUrgcn 58. 64
defence of Allied convoys 73 Royal Guz.effe, Bermuda I 46
increase in proficiency 74 Rozhdestvensky, Vicc-Adm: leads 'Second Pacific
lo�scs, 1942 74 Squadron' to defeat at Tsushima I 4, 1 9
offensive, 1 9 4 4 74 Ruge, Friedrich 58, 64, 69
patrol effectiveness 73, 74 Rumsfeld. Donald 1 5 4
question of tonnage sunk 75 Russia
reinforcements 73, 74 Allied intervention, 1 9 r 8 3 7
responsibilities 72, 73 end of C1vil War, 1 9 2 1 J 7
German troops established in. 1 91 8 37
Odessa Provisional Government. 1 9 1 7 33, 3 4
falls to Germans, 1 94 1 67, 68 revolution of 1 9 1 7 3 7
Germans evat'uate, 1944 69 Russo-Finnish 'Winter War', 1 939-40 6 I
O'Keefe, Bernard J : Nuclmr Hostuxes 109 Russo-Japanese War, 1 904-5
Oktyabrsky, Vice Adm F S 5 9 Japanese investment of Port Arthur 1 4
ONI: Submarme Tabulatiorl S 1 Japanese submarines ordered from US 1 4 - 1 5
Orlov, Adm Nikolai 4 7 lo�s o f Japanese battleship Yashima 1 9
Russian fleet destroyed off Tsushima 1 4 , 1 9
Pavlovich, Rear Adm Prof N B 35 Rus�ian naval defeat, 1904 1 4
The Fleet in the First World War, tiol I Opemtions of Russian submarines 18-19
the R�.<sswn Fleet 28 Delfin 14, 1 5
Petrograd, see St Petersburg Fulton (or Som) 1 5 , 1 7

184
 Kasalku das.� ! 5 Soviet submarines, 1 92 1 -45

orders abroad for \ 5 - 16, 1 7 Baltic �trl'ngth, 1 9 2 1 4J

l'rofeclor !renamed O<_voir) I S , 10 Black Sea strength. 192 1 ..L�

unreliability of torpedoes ! 9 'BolqhPvik' class (B_ I to 8.9, anJ B.251

wooden submannc 1 5 BefnJJ..- (ex - Vn/k) 43

St Petersburg (Petrograd) J J Bedn_vak (ex-KIJgll<lr) 43

Baltic Shipyard 1 4 , 1 5, 26, ,1 I . See ar-o Leningrad r;.,/slreurk- (ex-1\)ISS) 4.>

Ord7honikidn' Y.ud Kmrrn11;:,llr (ex- Tlltr/em) 43

Leuchtenbng Yard 1 0 Ko11mnmur rex- Tigr) 43

Nevsky Yard 1 7 Kmsrrullmreyel� (ex-Leopard) 43, 60

Kms!w_/),,h;cl: (ex- Yaxwn) 4J
Petrograd Soviet JJ
rn,/efllrl/ lex lmt'f!il) 4.1
See tllso Leningrad
SALT I treaty, 1972 1 2.'
Rnl,oclr!t (ex- Yurslr) 42

'Yankee' submanne thn:'at influence on 122-J, 1 2 ..t ToPnrislrclr (ex- Ti!r) 4 3

SALT II 1 3 9 Ot·k-ohn,f cb�s ..J,4 - 5 , 4.�. �o

Be::b1'::hmh 45, 60
Schle�inger. James R 7
De/... o/n-isl 44
Scoville, Herbert 88
disposition, 1 9 4 1 6(1
Scvastopol 67
be�1eged 1 9 4 2 - 2 68, 7(1 Knl.'ll<'!o,'Vilrdcur'i:: 44

recovered by Ru��lans, 1 9 4 4 69 Nnrndni'l111'i: 44

Severodvinsk· Yard 402 86, 87. 95, 99. I04, Jll5, I 1 3 , Rn•,>lrof.<i<'rwr 44
Sparlakln'l'f: •l4
129, ! .10, 1 4.1, 1 5 3
Shapiro, Rear Adm Sumner 1 4 I Yuk,,fn'rrct� 4..J,

Sht;>rcmclyev, Count I .� Drakon- 1 29 acoustic ddcdion system 65

Smirnov, N A I 5 ex -[stonlan 60
Lemhi 67 8 1
Sokolovsky, Mahhal V D: Vt'NHinllli Slralexilfll
!Mihtarv StmleX!II 1 0 7 K class 8, .� L 5 4 -.�. _;_r;, So, o5. 72, 7.\ 8 1 . 1 6 4
aircraft for 5 5 - 6
Soviet submarine m1�silcs
&,position. 194 r 60
deployments, 1 9 7 7 and 1986 1 4,1
mineL1ying 7 3
development 88-90, 96-7
1\!11-88 establishment 90 Lmincl: cia% ( L I to L6l 4 5 --6, -4-0, 47, 52, 70, 73,
{\ 1 . 82, 89
t<'sl finngs, 1 9 4 8 8'-l
Western predictions, I950� 90-1 Buls!tt1'rk (later hmr:n1'el:l 45

SS-N-.'1 'Shaddock' 92, 96, !0.\ 1 ! 5 - I6, 1 1 7, I I !:I, Clrorli:<l 45

1 1 8, 1 1 9, 1 5 4 . 1 56 disposition, 1 94 1 60
Carihaldiet: 4 5
&'l-N-4 'Sark' 96, 97. 103, 12J, 1 6 8
SS-N-5 9S, I O J . 1 4 3 Knrbmltlrr 4 5
Mw-bisl (later Sinlirrri:'J 43
SS-N -6 1 0 3 , 1 1 1 . 1 4 3
SS-N-7 1 1 3, 1 1 4, 1 1 5 - 1 6 , I I 9 , 1 2 0 ! '> � ,\<Jidodkr cla�s 8. -4-9, 49-50 70-4 pas�im, 8 1 . 1'2, 87,

SS-N-8 q�_,_ 1 2 3 . 129, I43, 1 4 5 , 1 4 6 1 26, 1 2 8

SS-N-9 1 1 4. 1 2 7 dispo�ition, J 94 1 60

SS-1\: 1 2 1 56 A1etallr�l class 70

SS-N 14 1 0 7 disposition, ! 9 4 1 60

SS-N- 1.' 107 1 10 K.imrerr_liCl' (ex-AC.25) ..p,

SS-N- 1 6 I07, 1 1 0 Lrmilc!ltlr>l.:r (ex-AC.24) 4J

SS-N 1 7 1 1 1 , 1 1 3, 1 4_) Puli!rlliJo/llik (ex-AC.2fl 4.1

Pnlrlnrk (ex-Nerfhll 43
SS-N 1 8 1 4.'1, 1 4 5 , 1 4t'
SS-1\: 1 9 127, 1 5 6 , 1 �7. 1 5 8
Tn,l.'kr (ex-AC.23l 43

SS-N 20 I l l, 1 4 J number� m Pacihc 'my�tery fleet' 4 7-8

SS.l\: 2 1 1 5 r . l.'i2 Pnn'dtl class 5 1 -2, i\ 1 . 82

SS·N 23 1 -:U dbpo�ition, 194 I 60

SS-N 24 1 5 8 Iskra 5 l
l'rrw,-ln 5 1
SS-NX-13 U I -2, LH
SS-�X - 2 1 1:0.2, 1 5 .1-4, ISS, I. � .� b'r':dn 5 1
nse in number�. 1 9.12-40 48
SS.NX-24 ! 5 4, 1 5 5
/(rnris (ex-Latvian) 60. 62
threat to carriers I 1 5 - 1 8
Slrclwku class 48-9 5 1 , 59. 70 72, 73. 8 1 . 82, 8..'>,
Soviet submarine�
164, I �J
accidents IC>7 - 7 1
Dclh'n 49
building, 1 950-85 103
disposition, 194 I 60
naval Joe trine, post- 1945 I S O - I
Knrw< 40
transfer· abroad, 1945-88 1 72 3
Kmp 49
Sec also following four dated entri6

185
 Losos 49 comparison of orders of battle of general purpose
Shchuka 49 submarines, 1 9 7 1 and 1980 1 24
Spidola (ex-latvian) 60, 62 construction slow-down 1 38-9, -164, 165
Stalinrlz class 7, 52-J. 53, 54, 59, 65, 88, 73, 8 1 , 83. 'Delta' class I 29-30, 130, 15 I, 154, 164, 165
89, 164 development of SAM system 1 4 1-2
disposition, 194 I 60 'Kilo' class 142. 1 6 1 , 162. 162, 164. 1 72. 1 73
usc of Gt;>rman engines 52 long overhaul period for nuclears 1 68-9
Sov1er submarines. 1 915-60 'M' type 1 7 J
acquisition of German Type XX!s, post Second midget submarines 1 59-60
World War 78-9. 79, 80 Argus 1 5 9
goal of 1200, 1948 83 'India' class 'mother submarine' 1 5 9 , 160
'Gulf cla�s 93, 94, 95. 95. 96. 96, 97, 97, 1 06, 123, used by SpeiSII!IZ 1 5 9-60
1 3 1 . 1 5 1 , "158, /68, 1 7 0 Zbug 1 5 9
inventory, 1 9 5 0 80-1 'Mike' class 1 5 1 , 153, 155, I 64
order of battle, 1 9 5 0 8 1 obsolescence, I980s 1 3 78, 164-$
'Quebec' class 87-8. I 2 4 . I28, I64, I68 'Oscar' class 127. 1 55-6, 157, 1 5 7-8. 1 6 1
Western fears about 78-82 passim. 89 'Papa' class 124. 126. 1 26-7. 1 5 1, / 5 2
'Whiskey' class 7, 83-4, 84, 85, 85, 88. 124, I 58, quietness compared with US submarines 1 4 9
164, 172, 173 qUietness o f operation achieved 1 4 7-8, ISO
'Boat Sail' radar 85 possible part played by Walkcr/Whitworth spy
missile conversion. I950s 91-2, 92, 93, I 68 family 1 3 8
'Zulu' class 86, 86-7, 88. 106, 124, 164 reach 60 per cent nuclear-powered 1 3 8
missile conver�ion. I 950s 93, 94, 95, 96 retention of conventional submarines 1 60-2
Soviet submarines, 1 960-70 Series VI 'M' 173
anti-carrier doctrine and tactics 1 1 9-20 Series !Xbis 'S' I 7 3
'Charlie' class 109, I I 3-14, 1 14, H5, 1 1 9, 120, Serie� XV 'M' 172. 1 7 3
124, I26, l S I , 1 5 5 , 156. I 6 1 . 165, 1 7 I , 1 7 2 shift from quantity t o quality, J 980s 1 65-6
t·ountering Polaris threat. 1 960s 106-8 'Sierra' cla�s 148, 1 5 1 . / 5 1 . 152, 164
'Echo' class 103, I04. 104. 1 15. 1 1 7. 1 I8, l /8, 120, Tango' class I24, 125, 125. 1 4 1 , 1 5 1 , 1 6 5
124. 1 5 1 , 156, 1 5 7, 1 7 [ 'Typhoon'dass 7, 1 39-40, 140, 1 4 1 , 142. 1 43, 1 4 4,
'Foxtrot' class 98, 99, 124, 125, 1 5 1. 1 6 1 . 1 70. 1 72. I 4 7. 154. 1 6 r. 164
! 73 Soviet Union
'Hotel'clas� 102, 103. 1 04, 106, 123, / 3 1 , ! 5 1 , 1 70 explode� first nuclear bomb, 1949 89
')uliett' class 1 05-6. 106. I 1 5 . I 1 7 , 1 1 7. 1 1 8. ! 20, Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry I 69
1 24, 1 5 "1. 1 5 6 position in J92 I 42
lemnsk.11 Komsomol. nuclear-powered. 1958 101-2, Tenth Party Congress. 1 9 2 1 42
103, 1 70 Stalin. Josef 61, 68
HEN reactor 10 I 'big ship' megalomania 50, 54
'November' class 103, 105, 105, "124, 1 5 L 170 death, 1953 83
'Romeo' class 100, 1 0 0 - 1 . 124, 1 5 1 . 1 72. 1 73 plans for 'cruiser-submarine' 5 1
tactics, J950s-early 60s 103 Stalingrad 69
transition to nuclear power, 1 960-70 98-9 Stefanick, Tom: Simtegir Anlisu/lmariuc V'v'arjr1re lhui
first-generation nuclears (HEN group) IO-J-5, Naml Strategy I 48. 1 4 9
160-1, 164, 168 Strategic Rocket Forces 103
second-generation nuclears 109-14 Submarines
'Victor' class I09, 109, 1 10. I !0-1 I . I 20. !24. ! 5 1 , belligerent powers' forces. pre First World
152. 153, 1 5 7, 1 6 1 . 165. 767, 1 6 7-8, 1 7 1 . 1 72 War 20
deployed on US eastern �eaboard, 1 980s 146, improvements, early twentieth c 20
147, 166 Sullivan, John l 79, 80
worldwide patrols, 1950s !09 Sunday T1mes 4 7
'Yankee' class 109, 1 7 1 - 1 2, 1 1 2 . 1 1 3 , 129, 1 3 1 . Sverdlovsk: Ural Machine Works 49. 50
134, 144, 1 5 1, !54, 161, 164, 167, 1 7 1 Sommf. French submarine 5 1
building programme·� effect on general purpose Sweden: Gasefjaerden. Soviet submarine's intrusion.
submarines I23-4 1982 1 5 8
threat to US mainland. 122-3 Tallinn 6 1 , 62, 66
Soviet submarines, 1970 onwards TASS 168
Ak!,/a class 7. 128, JJ8. 139, 148, 152. 152. 153, 1 6 1 . Tnnes. The 3 7
164 Tirp1lz 74
'Alfa' class I24. I27-8. 128, 129, 1 5 1, 168 RN midget submarine attack on. /943 160
ba�ing infrastructure I74-9 Togo. Adm 14. 18
'Bravo' class 1 2 4 Torpedoe�: low rel1ability of early Whitehead type 19

186
To�hiba Croup 1 4 7 { )/rrr> class suhmanne I J 9 , 1 44-, 1 4 7
Tribub, Vice l\dm V r 59, c- I Polaris forCl' 99, l Oti, !07, !l18
Tukhachev�ky, Marshal Mikhail 47 'Proiect Hartwell' ASW investigation ! 5 0
Turetsky, Mikhail 93 Seuwolf class submarino 1 4 8
T11c lnlrodw fi,,n ,,f ,'\1io;�rlc 5!�.-�<'•n,; lrrl<> tlw 5,,,,1!'1
USS Semc1'/[ I 20
fV'!W)I 1194S-fCJQ2} 92, 1 4 1 , ! 6 8
St�1rgem1 class �ubmJrines 1 50
Tmrx dJs� suhm<Hmes 80
Ukranian Republic 1 ':1 1 8 J 7 based on German Type XXI 80
United State� o f America
Uuderstmulirrx S,'l'ld Nm•lll Devl'f,,rmrorls, 1 985 ! 5 2
American f\:avy League: Almi!lli!C ,,f s('Iif!lllCCr I 4 7 USS Fum•s/ul 88, 1 0 9
Center for 1\:aval Analyse� tCNA) LB USS Georse \;\lu_,hing/,,rr 106
Admir.d c;,,rslrhru /HI 'lV'rwlf' ill lVm- >111ri Pe>Ii"e USS Crenadrer 9"�
133
USS Kitty 1 /md.. I 7 1
fhe Sumef Sm-Ba�ed 'Anuluxou� 1\espmhc ' ilwl lh
USS Nmdilr;s 78, l O L 102, 1 2 6
R,,Je lf1 5U1'id Ooclrme jor Thmler f\/i<C!e.Ir vv./)
USS /'dcC!c>)l ! 46, 1 7 1
I45
USS Tn/(l)r I 26
CPntral lnb:' lh'�e nce AgenC) ' !CIA) 88
USS THifrbee 1 2 6
Clomer f:q<lorer vessel I 68, I 7 0
uss v,'S�' r 71
Congressional Research Service I 5 9
Ustinov, Dimitry ! 4 5
S,>pief Uaarrs De1'L'iop11WIII I J 4
Oefen�e Advanced Research Projt'Cb Agency
Vicker� Ltd 3 2
(DARPA) 1 4 8 Vindau !Ventspi\s) naval bas<.>, Bailie 29, 0 I
Department o f Defense : SoPiei A·Jihfunt P.Juw. I 29,
Vilg!:'fL Vice-Adm 1 4
I42, 1 4.), 1 4 4. 153, ! 5 4 , ! 5 7
Vladl\•Ostock I4, !7. I8, 37, 47, 5 0
OIA: Defn1,e lnll'lliswce l'rme.-tiorr� fl>r !'/mrs 1 2 4
Dalzavod Yard .t6. 4 7, 53
Office o f Naval Re�earch !ONR) 1 4 8
�ubmarine strength, I 9 ";os 47-8
Office o f Technology l\�se%ment: [\AX lv1Issli1'
\'on Paulus, Ccn 69
Basuw Shtdy 1 3 2
Umlcd Stale� Milrlwy Po>! rae f[>r FYI'i79 l ot'>
VValker:'Whihvorth spy famdy 138, 1 4 8
US Naval lnstitule I 36
Watkin�. Adm James U 7 , l o 8
US Navy
Wilhelm \ L Empnor 1 7
Allmcore submarine I 6 1
Wrangel. Cen
bastion strategy I J 2
White l\rmy 39
in 1 930� 1 3 5 - 6
'White' submarine Aotilla 39
origins 133-5
policy v evidence and inference 136-- �
Yumashn, Vice Adm 5 9
EJI11m Allen class submanne 1 1 1
Cato class submarine 89
Zof. Navy Corllrnissar V 44
USS Cusk 89
Zumwalt. l\dm Elmo R, lr I 22, I 23, I 3 1
Los Arrseles class submarine� I .� 5
Ohsen.mtwn f,Jmrd 1 0 7

187