Student Name: Eunice Abbygale Ruiz

Course, Year and Section: BSLM2A

Case Title: Microsoft Corporation, petitioner v. Comic Alley, respondent

G.R. No. 166391 Date: 21 October 2015

Facts:

On November 3, 1997, a private investigator together with his agent from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was able to purchase six (6) CD-ROMs of
different Microsoft software programs from the Comic Alley (private respondent).
Private Respondent- Rolando Manansala is known to be doing business under the
name of Dataman Trading Company and/or Comic Alley located at 3rd Floor,
University Building, Taft Ave., Manila. The petitioner has been allegedly using,
distributing, and selling the computer programs of the Petitioner without its consent
to do such actions.

Petitioner, Microsoft Corporation owns the copyright and trademark rights over all
versions and editions of Microsoft software (computer programs) including, but not
limited to, Microsoft Windows, MS-DOS (disk operating system), Microsoft Office
package (Word, Excel, Access, PowerPoint, and Works), Microsoft Flight
Simulator, Microsoft Fox Pro, and among others, together with their user’s
guide/manuals.

The agent immediately applied to NBI for a search warrant to further investigate
and search the premises of the private respondent. Thus, more illegal copies of
Microsoft programs have been revealed upon their search on November 19, 1997.
The result of the seizure and search was followed by the petitioner filing an
Affidavit-Complaint in the DOJ.

Although, the complaint charged to the private respondent was dismissed for the
violation of Section 29 P.D. 49 on the grounds of lack of evidence in terms of
questioning the respondent was the one who printed, copied, or sold the products
of the petitioner in his store. Hence, it was recommended that the respondent be
charged for violation of Article 189 instead of the precedent article.

However, the petitioners not being satisfied with the results, file for Motion for
Partial Reconsideration to contend that printing or copying the materials itself is
not essential for establishing the crime of copyright infringement under Section 29
of PD No. 49. This petition however was denied by the public respondent as well
as the subsequent petition for Review with the DOJ. The same verdict also
occurred when the CA affirmed the dismissal by the DOJ.

Issue/s:

a. Whether or not the printing or copying of the copyrighted material is

an essential determinant for the crime of copyright infringement?
b. Whether or not the respondent's selling of pirate computer software
constitutes copyright infringement?

Held:

a. Yes, the problem arose regarding the mere act of printing or copying the
materials of the petitioners as a consideration for the crime of copyright
infringement is because of the interpretation of Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 49 regarding the use of the syntax “and”. Since “and” pertains
into indicating terms like “joint with”, “together with”, “added to or linked to”,
or any other words to associate one thing to another. This poses a problem
for interpretation that causes the rejection of the complaint of the petitioners
because the petitioners fail to prove that the respondent is the one printing,
selling, AND copying the material because they claim that the respondent
is the one printing, selling, OR copying the material which depicts that the
acts are independent from each other which contradicts the interpretation
of Section 5 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 49.

Although, this interpretation was contradicted by the book of Noli C. Diaz

entitled Statutory Construction together with the precedent of Automotive
Parts & Equipment Company, Inc. v. Lingad which highlights:

“Nothing is better settled then that courts are not to give words a
meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequence. That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen
decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results. That is a strong argument against its adoption. The
words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: ‘The fact that the
construction placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to
an absurdity is another argument for rejecting it x x x.’

It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to

avoid such a deplorable result. That has long been a judicial
function. A literal reading of a legislative act which could be thus
characterized is to be avoided if the language thereof can be
given a reasonable application consistent with the legislative
purpose. In the apt language of Frankfurter: "A decent respect for
the policy of Congress must save us from imputing to it a self-
defeating, if not disingenuous purpose. Certainly, we must reject a
construction that at best amounts to a manifestation of verbal
ingenuity but hardly satisfies the test of rationality on which law
must be based.” (Emphasis and italics supplied)

This precedent thereof became the basis that the syntax “and”
should not be taken at its literal and ordinary grammatical
acceptation. Hence, interpreted like the disjunctive "or" if the literal
interpretation of the law would change or obscure its legislative
intent. Also, it is concluded that the violations listed under Section
5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 49 – "To print, reprint, publish, copy,
distribute, multiply, sell, and make photographs, photo-engravings,
and pictorial illustrations of the works" might not happen in all of the
classes of works considered for copyright stated under Section 2 of
the same presidential decree.

All in all, since computer programs as works or creation are protected

by copyright – the Court sees it unnecessary to have the other
procedures in Section 5 (a) of Presidential Decree No 49 to be
committed aside from “multiplying”, “selling”, “printing”, “copying”,
and distributing” to occur before interpreting the act of the respondent
as a crime of copyright infringement. The Court emphasized that the
mere sale of the copies of the computer programs can stand alone
 to prove the existence of copyright infringement which does not
require the petitioners to provide evidence of whoever reproduced,
copied, or replicated the same software programs to prove that the
crime of copyright infringement is present on this case.

b. Yes, the mere printing or copying of the materials with an exclusive right
violates Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49 which constitutes a crime
of copyright infringement.

Section 5. Copyright shall consist in the exclusive right;

(A) To print, reprint, publish, copy, distribute, multiply, sell, and make
photographs, photo-engravings, and pictorial illustrations of the
works;

xxx

(C) To exhibit, perform, represent, produce, or reproduce, the work in any

manner or by any method whatever for profit or otherwise; it not
reproduced in copies for sale, to sell any manuscript or any record
whatsoever thereof;

(D) To make any other use or disposition of the work consistent with the
laws of the land. (Emphasis, underscoring, and italics supplied)

In this case, the precedent Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is

consistent regarding consideration of actionable copyright infringement
when actions under Section 5 of P.D.49 was committed without the
copyright owner’s consent. Strengthen by the precedent determining of
“gravamen of copyright infringement” of NBI- Microsoft Corporation v.
Hwang

“is not merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works

but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered
by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under
Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent
renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright
infringement.” (Emphasis, italics, and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the Supreme Court’s verdict was:

“WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on

certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on February 27, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 76402; DIRECTS the
Department of Justice to render the proper resolution to charge
respondent ROLANDO D. MANANSALA and/or MEL MANANSALA,
doing business as DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC
ALLEY in accordance with this decision; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.”

Reference:

Microsoft Corporation v. Comic Alley | The LawPhil Project.

(n.d.). Retrieved July 19, 2021, from
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/oct2015/gr_166391_2015.html.