The Philosophy of

'VISISTADVAITA
A: expounded by Sri Vedanta Deéika in the
Nyéya-siddhéfijana

Nyéya-Vedénta Vidvfin, Vidyératna,

Vedfintavfiridhi, Deéikadaréanaratna
Dr. M. E. Rangachar

Published by
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Bangalore - 560 050
2000
The Philoaophy of Vifiiggidvaita—
(As expounded by 31-1 Vedanta Deéika in the Nyaya-siddhanjana)
Written by Dr. M. E. Rangachar
Published by Sri Nithyananda Printers, Bangalore-50.
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 PREFACE

Keeping an eye, not just on the next world, but on

attaining ultimate spiritual perfection, even while not
neglecting the life here and now, has been the unique
characteristic of the six systems of Indian philosophy. Of
these six systems it is the Vedanta of Badarayana-Vyasa,
based mainly on the Upanisads and the Bhagauadgi’td, that
has gained greater currency, popularity and respectability,
thanks to the special treatment meted out to it by the three
great Acaryas (éarikara, Ramanuja and Madhva) and their
eminent successors.
Somehow, an impression has been formed in the
imagination of our intellectuals that Vedanta means the
Advaita Vedanta of Sankara. This is rather unfair since it
ignores or is unaware of the extensive and intensive
contribution of the other two, equally important, systems
viz, Visistadvaita and Dvaita Vedfintas.
Like the disciples of Sankara (A. D. 788-820), the disciples
ofRéménuja (A. D. 1017-1137) and of Madhva (A. D. 1197-1276)
also have contributed considerably to the development of
these two systems of Vedanta, not only in the primary fields
of expounding their tenets, but also in the dialectical field
of defending them against the onslaughts of rival schools.
One of the most outstanding scholars and teachers of
Vis’istadvaita, considered as next only to Rimanuja, was
Vedanta Deéika (AZ D. 1268-1370), also known as Nigamanta
Desika and Venkatanatha. He enriched the world of
Viéistédvaita Vedanta and the cult of Srivaisnavism for over
three quarters of a century with his writings which number
more than a hundred. These works are characterised by
versatility, beauty of style and thought, and a deep spiritual
insight. He was a poet, a philosopher, a thinker, a polemist
 iv

and a mystic. all rolled into one. His writings include original
works in Tamil and Sanskrit, as also commentaries on older
works.
One of the greatest of his services was his saving the
work Smtaprakdéika (a commentary on the Sri'bhdsya of
Ramanuja) from the chaos that followed in the wake of the
invasion of Srlrangam town by the Mohammedans. It is for
this reason that his name as ‘Vedantaeirya’ is gratefully
remembered by all the srivaisnavas, without sectarian bias,
in beginning the study of the Sribhc‘zsya.
The exposition of an astika system of philosophy like
the Vedanta requires two things:
1. proving that its basic tenets are based on the primary
authority, viz., the Vedas (including the Upanisads and the
Bhagavadgitd); 2. logically defending it from the attacks of
rival schools.
Treatises of this type are called ‘prakarana-granthas’.
The Nyc‘zya-parisuddhi and the Nydya-siddhdfijana of
Vedanta Deéika are two works of this type. They are
complementary to each other. If the former deals with the
pramanas (valid means of knowledge) the latter deals with
the prameyas (what is to be known, the ultimate truths like
God, soul and nature).
The Nyayadaréana (Nyaya- philosophy) of Gautama is
an excellent work on Indian logic. Its knowledge is of
fundamental importance to all systems of Indian philosophy.
Vedanta Desika’s view is that this work—the Nydyasatras—
gives not only the details of the pramanas but also of the
prameyas, which are very near to the ones given in the
Viéistfidvaita philosophy. Boldly differing from the traditional
commentators of the Nyayasatras, he has given his own
interpretation, bringing that system much nearer to
Visistadvaita Vedanta.
 V

Till now, the philosophy of the Nydya-siddhdfijana, has

not been studied and expounded in detail. This doctoral
thesis of Dr. M. E. Rangachar has done exactly that. With
the depth of scholarship of the Sanskrit language, the
traditional tarkasastra or logic and the good grip of the
tenets of Visistédvaita philosophy based both on the Sanskrit
and the Tamil works at his finger-tips, he has acquitted
himself admirably in this task of interpreting and expounding
this recondite work.
We earnestly hope that this work will be well-received
with the esteem that it deserves, by all the scholars interested
in Indian philosophy.

13th March 2000 Swami Harshananda

Ramakrishna Math
Bangalore
 vii

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 EXCERP'I‘S FROM THE SANSKRIT INTRODUCTION

Vfitsyayana, the great commentator of Nyaya-Dars'ana

founded by sage Gautama, in the beginning said that the
entire substances of the universe can be included in the
four categories i.e. pramanam (the valid source of knowledge),
prameyam (objects of knowledge), pramata (the agent),
pramiti (valid knowledge). In the absence of any one of them
knowledge becomes impossible. Pramfita is one who acts
being instigated by desire or abandoning the desire. An
object that is known is prameyam. The knowledge of an
object is pramiti. The means of knowing is pramanam. He
told that these things are very useful in the day-to-day
transactions. The great sages and Acaryas who wrote Sfitras,
Bhasyas and Varticas, wrote them on the basis of these four
concepts.
Among these four, the praména and prameya are very
important concepts. Nyaya and Vaisesika took birth to give
us the correct knowledge about them. Without pramana,
there cannot be prameya and vice-versa. Therefore, if one
is interpreted, the other too needs interpretation.
In this regard the philosophy of Nyaya founded by
Gautama deals mainly with pramanas whereas Vaisesika
school founded by Kanada deals with prameyas. Apart from
these two schools of philosophy, other schools like Sankhya,
Yoga, Mimirhsa and Vedanta also were born. They are
orthodox systems. All these systems discuss pramanas and
prameyas. The system of Carvaka, Buddha and Jaina are
heterodox systems. All these systems discuss pramanas and
prameyas.
Number of the means of knowledge and their definition
and their purpose, like that, the number of
prameyas, their
 xiii

This is an excellent work pregnant with magnanimous,

bold, deep and sagacious ideas. Here the celebrated author
has appropriated his title sarvatantra swatantratva and has
exhibited his great logical acumen, extraordinary wisdom,
resorting to vedic passages and his mastery of all great
works of his ancestors. We can say it confidently that this
work is filled with scholarly, deep ideas stated in limited
words which are pregnant with yuktis and pramanas. Here
the position of the opponent schools are discussed in detail.
Finally the decision is arrived at the prameyas of the
Viéistadvaita. Nowhere in philosophical literature do we come
across this type of discussion. Hence this work occupies a
unique place among the works of philosophy.
The readers also come to realize at every step, his
discretionary capacity over the old works of great acéryas
of the systems. Thus we understand the greatness of Acérya
Des’ika. In the Nydya-sidddfijana there are six chapters.
Each chapter contains very rare subject matter (please refer
to the original or the contents of the present work).
Thus this work is a wonderful creation. I am very glad
to know that Dr. Melkote Embar Rangachar has studied
this work in depth. He has expounded this work in English
in a very easy and clear style. He has discussed all aspects
of the work in detail. Upto this date, this kind of work is
not produced by anybody else.
Each topic of the original work is discussed with proper
division under appropriate captions. Every topic discussed
by him is very good. He has not transgressed the limits of
the original work. This work is not a translation but it is
an independent treatise. In my discretion, Dr. Rangachar
has written this work after deep study of Nydya-siddhdfijana
and hence the work is easy to understand. In my view, this
work is worth possession.
 XIV

Melkote Embar Rangachar is an expert in the philoso-

phies of both the East and the West. Having written this
great work, he has become the recipient of acclamation of
all great people. Let him write many other great works like
this for the benefit of scholars and thus live a long life.
Thus I pray God érlman Narayaria.
Thus
Mahfimahopfidhyfiya
N. S. Mminuiatfitflciryah
Former Vice-Chancellor,
Date 10-03-2000 Rietrly'a Sarhskrta-Vidyfipltha
Bangalore Tirupati
 ACKNOWLEDGENIENT

I had the rare opportunity of studying the Indian

Philosophical texts in the original Sanskrit, at the feet of
my father, Acarya Sri Embar Narasimhawryar of Melkote,
who was a famous scholar in Veda, Vedanta, nyfiya and
other branches of Indian Philosophy. He was the Asthana
Vidvan of Mysore Palace and was duly honoured by His
Holiness Abobila Jeer, Parakila Mutt and Srngeri Sarada
Pitham. During the pravacanas on Indian Philosophical
problems and the study of Srivaisnava religious texts, he
introduced me to Vedanta Desika among other Acaryas of
Viéistadvaita. Inspired and enchanted by the great contri-
butions of Deéika to Indian Philosophy in general and the
Vis‘istadvaita in particular, I turned to the study of the
philosophical works of Desika under the direction and
guidance of my revered father. After the completion of MA.
in Philosophy I took up ‘Nydya-siddhéfijana’ of Vedanta-
Deéika for my special study.

My grateful thanks are due to—

Prof. Sri M. Yamunacharya of Mysore [Iniversity for
kindly suggesting the title of the treatises.
Prof. N. A. Nikkam. Former Vice Chancellor, Mysore
University and Prof. B. N. K. Shams of Bombay
University for valuable suggestions.
Dr. S. G. Mudgal of Rupurel College, Bombay for being
the guide for this thesis.
Srimat Swami Harshanandaji Maharaj, President
Ramakrishna Math, Bangalore, for his continued
patronage, affectionate blessings and for foreword.
 xvi

Mahamahopfidhyiya Ubhaya Vedanta Vidwan Sri N. S.

Ramanuja Tatanhnrya Swamin, Ex Vice-Chancellor of
Tirupati Rash-{fl Smkrta Vidyé Pltha for his brilliant
introduction. Every lover of Sanskrit and valuable
Viéistfidvaita Ely'g0 through this introduction.
Sri A. S. Van“ Boo for his write-up on the author
Sri B. N. Nam-635 Nithyananda Printers for neat
printing ;’ l'l 'l
.3 JIJ'
Sri K. Batavia,
encouragement
Mopist
31.,
for timely help, and

M/s. Vee Yess Charities, for their liberal financial

assistance.
Dr. M. E. Rangachar
 CONTENTS

m
Preface iii
vi
Excerpts from the Sanskrit Introduction xi
Acknowledgment xv

Chapter I
Introduction Part-1 1

Introduction Part-2 14

Chapter 11

Author's Introduction to the Text 31

Prameyss of Nyaya-sidddhsnjana 38
Jada Dravyss 38
Dravys. Adrnvya defined 39
Position of Buddhists 4O

Buddhist position examined 42

Six fold division of Dravya 44
Difl'erent views on division 44
Prstyuk and Parék Drsvyas defined 45
Pralq'ti and its definition 46
Transformation of Prakrti 4B
Mahat 48
Ahahknrs Tsttvn _
49
View of BhojarAia and it! examination 50
Indriyas 51
Views of different thinkers and this examination 51
Plikrh-Aprfikrta Division 52

Jiinnendriys and Karmendriys division 53

Menu 54

mm Srotra 57
 xviii

Prakrta Tvag‘indriyn 57
Prakrtn Cakgurindn‘yl u 53
Cakaurindriya in
PM ’ '
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Nature of bdrm-.g‘rgamt
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Tanmatras
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Sparéa—tanmatra and Vlyu defined 70

mm
View of Naiyaikn 70
banfmb 71
Naiyflyih
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Nature arm her: .- -_.

72

Mr;
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”7 72
View of
73
74
74
75
75
77
77
77
78
'
Divisions of Tdal min.
to Naiyayika 79
Divisions of Tejaa according to Viéiqgadv'ait'a
The Nature of Tqias 885‘

Rasatanmntra
 xix
Jala: Definition and its Nature 80
Types of Jala 80
Gandhatanmntra 81
Prthvi: Definition and its Nature 81
Indriya and Vieaye of Prthvl 8]
Dravyatva of Darkness discussed 81
Contradiction of Tattvaratnakara solved 83
Ccontradiction between Taittiriya and Chandoya
regarding the process of Creation 84
Contradiction solved 34
Categories of Saivdgama discussed 84
Kalamtva awarding to Saivagama and its examination 86
Niyati of Saivngama 86
Kala according to Viéistadvaita 87

Eternality of Kala and its presence in Nityavibhnti 87

Transformation of Kala 83
VikAra of portless objects explained 83
Pailclkarana 92
Dik or Direction 94
Definition of same (Body) 96
Definition of Sarina offered by Nyaya-vaiéesikas and
its examination 97
The purpose of defining Sol-Ira in Veddnta 99
Definition of Quin according to Viiistadvaitin 101
The Divisions of éarlra 105
Satin-Satin Bhava oxplsimd 103
Conclusion of Jada-pafinbeda 111

Chapter III
lea 114
General Introduction 114
Definition of Atman according to Viiistadvaita 114
Chapter V
Nityavibhflti discussed 213

Chapter VI
Buddhi 223
Definition of Buddhi 223
Self-luminosity of Buddhi 224
View of the Naiyfiyikas 225
View of Mimfimsakas 225
Examination of Naiyayika view 226
Examination of Mimirhsaka view 228
Contraction and expansion of Dharma-bhuta-jfiana of Jiva 233
The problem of Dhnrfivahika-jfiéna 234
Stage of Pratyaksatva 236
Several objections answered 238
Different modes of Dharma-bhfita-jfiana 249
Iccha (Desire) Prayatna (Effort) etc,of is’vara are also the
different forms of his Dharma-bhfita-ji‘ifina 251
Adrsts is the Priti (Love) or
Apriti (Anger or Aversion) of Iévara 252
Fixed conditions like Rati, Hfisa, etc.,
of Rhetoricians are also the modes of Jfiéna 254

Chapter VII 2.,

Adravya 256
Definition and Division 256
Sabda 260
The Position of Vedantin 263

Existence of Vargas upto Pralnya 264

Examination of Sphota—vada 266
Sabda is Dravya 269
Adravyatva of Sabda established 271
Sparéa 272
 Ruin 274
Rm 275
Gandha 275
Sadiyoga 273
s'akti 231
Inclusion of remaining
Dravatva
”ties in the accepted one 287
288
Sneha 233
Vfisanfl 239
Vega 292
Sthitasthfipakatva 293
Sankhyi ,‘ 294
Pan'mana 296
Prthaktva 297
Vibhaga 293
Paratva—Aparatva 298
Remaining
mm d' Vaiéesikas examined 298

Chapter VIII
Conclusion 305
Bibliography 3 16
 Dedicate to
My revered Father and Acdrya
Melkote Sri Embar Narasimhacharya Swamy
and belOved Mother
Smt. Shellammal
 The Philosophy of
VIS’ISTADVAITA
As expounded by Sri Vedanta Deéika in the
Nydya-siddhafljana
 Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION
Part I
THE ROLE OF AEvARs AND THE IMPORTANT
PRECEDING AcARYAs 0F DESIKA AND THEIR
WORKS IN THE GROWTH OF VISISTADVAITA

It becomes clear by the study of great works of

Viéistfidvaita, that this system is based upon éruti, smrti,
Divyaprabandhams of Alvérs and the experience and sayings
of great aeiryas. Sri REmanuja did not invent this school
but he only expounded this system, which was already in
practice. It becomes evident from the study of l_i’gr.)eaia,l that
the love of God is the means of God-realisation. Love unites
the lover and the_loved. After the Sarhhitfis, the Upanisads
gloriously enjoined that the loving meditation upon the
Brahman, is the summumbonum of life. The Itihfisas and
Fur-dries expound gloriously this philosophy of hhakti. The
torchbearers of that bhakti-cult were great saints of
Tamilnsd who were known as the Alvars. The 4000 Tamil
verses of these Elvira compendiously, known as the
"Divyaprabandhas".
Myers in their prabandhams have dived deep into the
divine bliss of God-love, and their works furnish several
phases of loving meditation of all'anspicious qualities of the
Parametman of a very impassionete nature. We can see the
Viéistadvaitic God-experience in the great sayings of Alvfirs.

1- Ronda. x-133.e.
Beveda. X VIII-92.32.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istfidvaita 3

Vis'istédvaita-siddhfinta. The tradition says that these Alvars

belong to 3000 B. C. But the historians are not prepared to
accept this date and they say that one among Alvarez namely,
Tirumangai Alvir belonged to 7th century A. D. From this
it becomes clear that, in the opinion of the historians the
dates of Alvars begin from 3rd century A D. and last up to
7th century A. D.
ACHARYAS

After the period of Alvars, acaryas began to propagate

this philosophy of love of God, by giving a beautiful shape
to the system. These acaryas experiencing the divine bliss,
expressed those experiences in their several works and
propagated them among their disciples and whatever is
known about them and their works is only through the
references by Deéika in his works. This is one of the greatest
contributions of Desika to the system.
In the galaxy of acéryas, Nathamuni occupies the first
place. In the beginning of S'ribhdsya, Ramanuja quotes1 the
name of the great sage Bodhayana as belonging to the system
of Visistédvaita and opines, that there were many commen—
tators on Brahmasatra of Badarayana, even before him. In
Veddrtha-sarigraha Rz'imanuja2 declares that this system of
Visistédvaita is a very ancient one and was propagated by
great sages like Bodhayana, Tanka, Dramida, Guhadeva,
Kapardi, Bharuci, and so on. Ramfinuja quotes from Tanka
l. bhagavad bodhdyana krtam brahmasmravrittim pfimdct‘zrydh
saficiksipub, tanmatanusdre'na smrfiksarani vydkydsyante.
Sribhdsya: p. 2).
2. Refer Vedarlha-sarigraha. p. 117
blwgavadbodhayana-tarika-dmmida-guhadeva-kapardi-bharuci
pmbhrn' avig'lta fiista parigrhlta veda-uedfinta uydkhydna
suuyaktartha trutim'kara. daréitqyam panlhizhll
Yatirqja saptati of Vedanta Deéika, (Sloka 57)
 The Philosophy of Vis'istndvaita 5

profusely from Nydyatattua. In this work, Nathamuni

criticises the traditional expositions of Nyaya-vaiéesika
teachers. It is clear from the references of Vedanta Desika
to the Nyayatattva that it was the most comprehensive
treatises on the philosophy of Viéistadvaita. That it is now
extinct is a great pity indeed.

FUNDARixAKsACARYA
Vedanta Desika in his Soto-dasani (vada 7) quotes two
stanzas of Pundarfltaksacfirya, without mentioning the name
of the work. He was the teacher of Yamunficarya. These
quotations prove the logical and dialectical character of the
work of Pundarl'kéksficarya.

RAMAMISRA I

Desika in his Niksepa-raksfi quotes some portions from

the works of Ramamisra. He was the disciple of
Pundarlkaksacarya and the teacher of Yamunacarya. He was
the upholder of yatharthakhyfiti theory. He is different from
Ramamis’ra II who is other wise known as Somfisiyéndan
(12th century AD).

vAMUNAcARYA and RAMANUJA

Almost all works of Yfimunficfirya and Sri Ramanuja

are available now. The credit for preserving the works of
Yamunacarya and Ramanujicarya goes to Vedanta Deéika.
But Purusa-nirnaya of Yamunficfirya, mentioned by Vedanta
Des’ika has become extinct at present.

RAMAMIsRA 11

Ramamiéra II is known as Somis'iyfindfin. Deéika refers

to his works frequently. He was the exponent of the works
of Raménuja. His exposition of Sribhasya is almost ex-
tinct, except for the portions ,quoted by Vedanta Desika.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 7

5. Varadardja-stava.
6. Sri—staua.
These devotional lyrics are traditionally known as
Paiicastava, which are quoted by Vedanta Des‘ika.

pARASARA BHATTA

According to Vedanta Des’ika Par-asara Bhatta was the

son of Srivatsanka Misra. Deéika refers to him as Bhattfiraka
or Abhiyukta. It seems that the works of Srivatsanka
influenced Vedanta Desika to a very great extent. Desika
refers to Paras’ara Bhatta and his works more than 24 times
in Nydyapariéu'ddhi. In Nyayasiddhdfijana also Desika refers
to him and his works more than twenty times. No where
Deéika differs from the view point of Paraéara Bhatta. Desika
opines that Parasara Bhatta was the best among the
post-Rfimanuja ViSistfidvaitic logicians.
His works are:
1. Srirafigardja-stava (I and II part).
2. Srigurmratnakoéa.
3. Asyasloki.
4. Srirangandtha-stotra.
5.
Bhagauadguzza-darpana. (A commentary on the
Vignusahasrandma stotra).
An important treatise on the logic of Visistédvaita
namely Tattvaratnékara of Parasara Bhatta, which is
frequently quoted in Nydya-pariéuddhi and Nyc’zya-
siddhfifijana is unfortuname extinct. Tattvaratndkara is
known to us only from its quotations in Vedanta
Desika’s
Nydya-pariéuddhi and Nydyaasiddhdfijana.
Another important work of Parasara Bhatta mentioned
by Deéika in Nydya-siddhdfijana is the Adhyiiltma-khagzda—
8 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

dvaya viuarana. This work is also extinct now. Deéika quotes

from this work in his Paficaratra-raksd.
VARADA VISNU MISRA

Des'ika refers to Varada Visnu Misra in his Nydya-

pariéuddhi and Nyaya-siddfzfijana. Deéika characterises him
as ‘ekadesin’. He was a great Vis’istadvaitic logician. He tried
to synthesise the nyaya with the Rémanuja darsana. It
seems that he was the follower of Udayana, Bhasarvajfia
and Vasudeva. That is why Deéika states that his views
are against the writings of Rfimfinuja. His foremost work,
extensively used by Vedanta Desika was Mano-yethc’ztmya-
nirzzaya. It was an authoritative work on Vis’istadvaitic logic.
NARAYANA MUNI-

Deéika quotes Niriyanamuni in his Paficardtra-raksd

and Stotraratnabhdsya. He was the disciple of Sflranga
Narfiyanmérye, who was presumably the direct disciple of
RamEnuja. Des'ika has not mentioned the name of his works.
But the quotations suggest that it must have been the
treatise on the doctrine of prapatti and paficakfila kriya. He
seems to have written a commentary on the Stotraratna of
Yamuna and the works of Vatgiwahgeévara.
His works are:
1. Astaéloki-vydkhyd.
2. Aradhand-sahgraha-karikd.
3. Bhagauadgitfirtha-sarigraha-uibhdga.
4. th‘waprakciéikfi (A commentary on Brahmasfitras).
VISNUCITTA (A. D. 11061200)
'I‘raditionaly Visnucitta is known as Engal Alvén, who
was the successor of Kurukesvara or Timkkurehaippiran
Pillfin. Vedanta Deéika quotes on many occasions from
Visnucitta’s works.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 9

His works from which Deéika quotes are:

1. Prameya-sar'zgraha.
2.Sarigatimala.
Another work of Visnucitta is known as Vispucittiya is
a commentary on the Visnupurdna. It seems that Vedanta
Des’ika was much obliged to these works (especially Prameya-
sarigraha and Sarigatimdld), in the composition of Nydya-
paris’uddhi and Nyaya-siddhfifijana.

VARADA NARAYANABHATI‘ARAKA (12th century A D.)

Varada Narayana Bhattfiraka was another eminent

Visistadvaita writer known only through Vedanta Des’ika’s
works. Varada Nfirfiyana Bhattjraka followed the views of
the Mdna-ydthdtmya-nirnaya and his works are:
1. Prajfic‘z-paritrdzza. This work is known as through its
quotations in Vedanta Des’ika’s works. It was a treatise on
Vis’istadvaita logic.
2. Nyaya-sudaréana. It is also known as Veddnta-nyc'zya-
sudaréana and it was an exposition on Sribhasya.

VARADACARYA (A. D. 1165-1275)

Varadacarya is known as Nadadfir Ammal. He is also

called as Vatsya Varada. He was the greatest of the exponents
of Ramanuja Dars’ana. Atreya Ramanuja was his devoted
student. Vedanta Deéika in his childhood is said to
have received the blessings of Varadficfirya which Deéika
remembers1 in many of his works.

1. uenkateéo varadagurukmélarhbitoddhizmabhfimdl
Tattuamuktd-kalfipa. 1-2.
érimadbhydm syfidasfivityanupadhi varaddcfirya rdmcinujdbhyfim
Adhikaruzm—sardvafi, 2 and refer Sankalpa—saryodaya, (Act. 2—15).
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 11

5. An exposition of the Ramfinuja-gadya.

(This is known as Gadyatraya-vivarana).

NARAYANARYA (13th Century A. D.)

Vedanta Des’ika refers to the works of Narayanarya

and on that basis we can say that the following works are
written by him.
1. Nitimdld: (This work of Naréyanérya is published.)
Vedanta Deéika calls the views of NItimald as “ekades'i-
matam”.
2. An exposition of the Mfmdmsd-satra. Vedanta Des’ika
has criticised this exposition in Nyaya-siddhdfijana and labels
it as ‘praudhi-prakisana'. (Mere show of one’s skill).
ATREYA RAMANUJA (1221-1295 A. D.)

Atreya Ramanuja or Vadihaihsambudacarya was

Vedanta Des’ika's great teacher. It was he who initiated
Vedanta Deéika to the secrets of Visistfidvaita and Srivaisna-
vism. He was the fourth in direct decendence from Ramanuja.
Desika calls him Vedantodayana. He was also known as
Pranatartihara. He was the resident of Kafici and Vedanta
Desika was his sister’s son. Tradition says that he was the
author of three works. But so far only his Nydya-kulis’a is
published and other two works are extinct.
From the reference of Vedanta Deéika in his Tdtparya
candrikd to a s’loka, it is presumed that Atreya Ramanuja
was the author of the commentary on Sribhcisya.
Dr. S. N. Das Gupta mentions Moksa-siddhi of Atreya
Ramanuja in his Indian Philosophy.
MEGHANADARI SURI

Meghanadari Sari was an early contemporary of Vedanta

Deéika. Deéika mentions him as ‘asmadiyah’ (our own
man).
 The Philosophy of Viéistfldvaita 13

Other Gitébhfisyakaras referred to by Desika are:

1. Pisfica.
2. Rantideva.
3. Yajfia Svfimin.
4. Abhinavagupta.
TATPARYA TULIKAKARA

Deéika refers to Tatparya Tfilikfikfira in his Tattuafika

and accepts his interpretations as authoritative.
VAMANA

Desika refers to Vfimana as the commentator of the

Dramida-bhdsya.
VARADARAJA PANDITA

Varadarfija Pandita is referred to by Vedanta Desika

in his Saccaritra-raksd. He also refers to his work called
the Sanmdrga-dipika. He was the pre-Vedfinta Des’ika
exponent of Srlvaisnavism. Further Desika mentions the
names of Bhojarfija (his work is Prayogapaddhati-ratm‘wali),
Srflqsna Muni (and some of his élokas), Baladevfiuirya
Vasudeva Swamy, Grdhra Saromuni, Vangi Vangeévara,
Pratépa Bhfipa (his work Acamana-nirnaya), Bharatamuni,
Bhavasvfimin, Namyanficérya (his work Tattvanimaya).
Varadarajacérya (who is different from Varadarfija Pandita),
Sédgunya Viveka, Parakfila Sfiri and so on. Nothing else is
known about them.
From the above details one can know the vast literature
of Viéistadvaita philosophy and its ficfiryas, known from the
works of Vedanta Desika.

*-
14

INTRODUCTION
Part II
LIFE, wonxs AND CONTRIBUTION OF
VEDANTA DESflIA

Acarya Vedanta Des'ika was born in Tfipul, a suburb

of Kaficipuram in 1268 AD. He was the son of Anantasfln'
Somayfiji. His mother was Totaramma, the sister of Atreya
Ramanuja. Tirumangai was the wife of Des’ika. Desika is
regarded as an incarnation of the ‘ghanta’ (bell) of the Lord
Venkates‘vara at 'I‘irumalai. Deéika himself hints this idea
in the introductory stanza of Sarikalpa-saryodayal.
He lived a life of 102 years leaving behind him
innumerable intellectual products which inspire the thoughts
of learned people. He composed several devotional songs
which can appeal to the hearts of the learned as well as
the common people.

m
U!“ H
Aoarya Deéika's. t1; ' .the spiritual teacher
mo
_
7

was recognised by the '

'_Nadadur Animal. This
episode took place whu hemfimyears old His maternal
uncle Kadambi Appguir
(the birth name of VMMQ) .W the boy Venkatanatha
to the temple of Lord
Varadaraja where thefemMer of the time, Nadadur
Animal was imparting-
It is said that Ammfll was
mon Sribhc'zsya of Ramanuja.
wonder-struck at the spiritual
luster of the boy and enquired about him. While being
astonished at the recognition of immeasurable power in the

1. uitrdsini uibudhauairauarfithininfim
padmasanena paricaravidhait prayulmil
utprekayate budha janaimpapattibhllmna
shame haressamqjaniua yadatmanetill Act 1-14.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 15

young boy to become a great seal-ya of the school, Ammal

even forgot the context of the discourses that was going on.
Immediately the young boy stood up with folded hands and
stated with modesty the summary of the discourse which
was being imparted by aefirya Ammal at the time of his
entrance to the hall of discourse. The joy of the acfirya knew
no bounds at this. He hugged the boy and gracefully patted
him and heartily blessed him in the following manner:
pratisthdpitaveddntah pratiksiptabahirmatahl
bhzlydstraiuidyamdnyastuam. bharikalyazwbhajanam II

Guruparampara p. 119.
You establish the philosophy of Viéistfidvaita on firm
grounds, refuting other systems and thus become honoured
by all scholars. Let all auspicious things come to you.
Thus having blessed the boy, the scarya asked his
disciple Atreya Ramanuja to instruct the boy in all the lores
of sciences. Accordingly, the maternal uncle trained the boy
in all sciences that were known at the time. It is recorded
that by his twentieth year, he had mastered all the s’astras,
and had given the exposition of Ramanuja’s Sribhésya several
times. Des'ika himself has stated this fact in his Sarikalpa-
szZryodaya:
uiméatyabde vis’rutanéndvidhauidyabl
triméaduaram érauitaédrlrakabhdsyah II Act I. St. 15.
By his erudition and marvellous intellect, he won the
title of ‘Sarvatantra-svatantra’. Because of his mastery over
the Vedantasastra, it is stated that the Lord Ranganatha
Himself, was pleased to confer the title, i.e., “Vedanta Des’ika"
on him.
Desika was a great poet. His poetic talent was supreme,
beyond any comparison. Many scholars are of the opinion
that the poetry of Deéika excels even that of Kalidasa, the
renowned poet of our country. Deéika’s poetry is full of
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 17

Vedanta Desika’s greatest service to Viéistadvaita

philosophy is his powerful defence of the system against
rival schools, with the help of his powerful logic, which was
not against the Upam'sadic philosophy. Deéika wrote many
scholarly works. To mention some of them Tattuamukta-
kalc‘zpa with his own commentary, i.e., Sarvc'zrtha-siddhi,
Tattvaflka, Adhikarana-sdrdvali, Sata-dzisani, Tatparya-can-
drikc‘z, Mimamsa-pddukd, Sesvaramimfimsd, Nyfiya-pan's’ud-
dhi and Nydya-siddhdfijana etc. He has written fourteen
Sanskrit works on Vedanta expounding, defending and
establishing Ramanuja’s doctrines. He was a great commen-
tator. He has commented upon Raininuja’s Gadyam,
Bhdsyam and Stotraratna of Yamuna and Esopanisad. He
has produced 32 works in Mani-pravéla’ (a blend of Tamil
and Sanskrit) for the easy understanding of his followers.
They all explain in a simple manner the importance of the
s’aranagati-tattva. In this direction, his magnum opus is
Rahasydtrayasdram.
In addition to this, he has composed 28 stotras in
Sanskrit which are full of devotional aroma. Unfortunately,
some of his works are lost. Some 120 works in Tamil,
Sanskrit, Prakrt and in Mani-pravala prose are available.
Vedanta Desika was an outstanding poet, philosopher,
dialectician, dramatist and a great devotee of the order of
Alvars. His writings cover all fields of knowledge and they
are prodigious and prolific, both in content and in style. He
possessed amazing knowledge in art, science, religion,
philosophy and even in handicrafts.
Deéika, in spite of all such divine qualities showered
on him, was free from egoism and attachment. He was free
from pride and prejudice. He was free from the pursuit of
power, name and wealth. For him a clod of earth and a
nugget of gold were equal in value. Friends and foes were
alike to him. He spurned worldly wealth. He had supreme
18 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

scorn for worldly fame and power, though he was living on

‘ufichavrtti’ (begging). The reply to Vidyaranya who was his
classmate and the Prime Minister of Vijayanagar, is a classic
masterpiece]. This incident justified his ‘jnanavairagya-
bhfisanam’ title. Srl Des'ika lived a life of an ascetic even
though he did not actually become a sannyasin. Thus Des’ika
dedicated his entire life for the sake of Hinduism or
Vaidikadharma in general and Viéistadvaita philosophy in
particular.
Incidentally, we have to know the devotion of Deéika
towards Ramanuja. For Desika, Ramanuja was only next to
God. After Ramanuja, the Vis’istadvaita philosophy received
a vigorous attack from several schools. They too were basing
their interpretations on the Vedas, Brahmasatras and the
Gita. Though Riminuja had interpreted the Vedas and
Upanisads in their entirety, yet it appears as if his
interpretation did not give so much importance to the
varnasrama-dharma and karma. This wounded the prestige
of the scholars of his time who were strictly following the
supremacy of caste. They did. mglike the approach of
Ramanuja. But they could HISEW the arguments of

w
Ramanuja. aefirya Dea'ika, with;§i}$vonderful, profound and
accurate knowledge in the philosophical texts and
rules of interpretation.
08an the Sribhc'zsya on firm
grounds. Deéika, built an evaluating steel fortress around
the system of Elwinltia to safeguard it against the attack
of anyone at any time. That is why for his signal service
rendered to the system of Rimanuja, acarya Desika is
worshipped by Srivaisnavas, at the beginning of their study
of Sribhasya, as a mark of their gratefulness and respect
for the great scarya. At the time of Desika, éri Ramanuja's

1. nasti pitrc‘rrjitam kificit 7111 may& kificiddrjitaml

asti me hastiéaildgre vastu paitdmaham dhanamll
Vairfigya-paficakam
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 19

teachings had begun to wane and were losing their grip on

the minds of the people. Among the followers of Ramanuja
himself, the disintegration had crept in. At that critical
juncture, Vedanta Deéika appeared on the scene, and wrote
proper commentaries in a remarkable manner and thereby
maintained the unity among the followers of Ramfinuja. He
declared1 that there was no difference of opinion among the
followers of Ramanuja though the interpretations might vary
regarding the minor and insignificant topics.
Vedanta Deéika never for a moment forgot the teachings
of great acérya Ramanuja. He declares that all his conclusions
are based on the teachings of Ramfinuja and other scaryas.
He offers prayer to éri Ramanuja and other great acaryas in
every important work, both in the beginning and at the end.2
Des'ika has written an extensive gloss, viz., Tattuafika
on Ramanuja’s Sribhdsya. To Ramanuja’s commentary on
the Bhagavadgi'tc‘z, Deéika has written elaborate notes, viz.,
Tdtparya-candrika. In writing this commentary, Des'ika
enters into the hearts of the Lord and Rimfinuja who is
considered to be the Lord’s avatara. These writings of Des'ika
have a great impact on the reader because of their versatality,
profundity of thought, beautiful diction and inspiring spiritual
fervour. To Vedanta Des’ika, Rfimfinuja was the veritable
incarnation of the Lord himself. In his Yatirdjasaptati, Desika
presents Ramanuja to us as the avatara of Lord Krsna3.
1. Sribhfisyakfiramdayaéisya sampradfiyarigalil onrilum artha-
virodhamille. Vfikyayojanabhedame ullad. Deéakdlavasthfi visesari-
galéle varum anusphana vaifiamyan': édstrdnumatam.
Sampmddyapan'éuddhi, p. 6; Tuppul Venkatfiérya edition.
2. jayati yatiraiasalztih jayati muleundasya padulcfi yugalil
tadubhayadhandsm'vedim avandhyayanto jayanti bhuvi santahll
Pddukasahasra 1008
3.
éamitoclaya sankarddi garuah svabaldduddhflayédava-prakd§al_1|
avamPltavdn érutera parthc’m nanu ramdvarqjassa esa bhflyah ll
Yatirfijasaptati 13.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 21

footing, Desika also wrote versatile works on the statements

of Ramanuja. For this purpose, he used Nyaya and Mimamsa
schools as his weapons. He interpreted those two systems
in the light of Visistadvaita without any contradiction with
the statements of Ramanuja. In addition to this, Desika
systematically expounded the religious philosophy of
Ramanuja by writing Niksepa-raksd and commenting on
catusloki of Yamuna.
It is said that the knowledge of Nyaya is very essential
for the understanding of the technique of every sastra.
“kanadam paninlyam ca sarvaéastropakarakam".
It is with the help of this wonderful science the great
scholars of different philosophies have put their systems on
firm foundation. The sage Gautama founded this school. But
almost all other systems of Vedanta have refuted the
philosophy of Gautama. Now Deéika’s problem was whether
to admit the tenets of this science or reject them as other
systems had done. Deéika in his Nyfiya-pariéuddhi elaborately
discusses this problem and comes to the conclusion1 that
this system should be admitted to the fold of Visistadvaita,
leaving aside the statements which are against the principles
of Vedanta. So Desika purified the nyaya aphorisms of
Gautama, by writing a bhfisya on it according to Viéistfidvaita.
2. Desika had realised the importance of M’imamsa
school in interpreting the tenets of Vedanta. Generally
Mimamsfi school is divided into two groups, viz.,
pfirvamlmamsa and utteramlmamsa. Between them, the
exponents of purvamlmfirhsi reject utteramlmamsfi, because

1. yiwadiha yuktiyuktan'z tdvadupflvyate nahi tatdkasthah parikopya-

parikila buddhibhih tadavagahibhirupaflvyatel atah sirhha-
uanaguptinyayena nydyanugrhl'tarh vedam, vcddnugrhl'tarh
nydn'i
ca anusardmabl na punch nyayamdtraml
Nyaya-pariéuddhi p. 86.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istjadvaita 23

4.Further, some schools of Vedanta do not regard the

Pdficardtra as a pramana. Desika established its pramanya
in Pdficardtra-raksfi and on the basis of this agama expounded
the religious philosophy of Vis’istadvaita.
‘Sri’, the
5. Desika proves in many of his works that
of the world.
consort of Lord Narayana is also the lsvari
The word ‘Tévara’ denotes both ‘Srl' and Narayana’. He
also
He says that they
proves that ‘Sri’ is ‘Vibhu’ (all-pervasive).
the basis of scriptural
are one tattva, only with two forms, on
evidence: ‘ekatattvamiuoditau’ (Pdr'icardtra). Des'ika
estab-
of the statements of
lishes all these views on the basis
Ramanuja and other ficéryas.
6. For Desika, all languages were equal. One can pray
to God in any language that one likes. For this purpose. be
composed a stotra, viz., Acyutas'ataka, in prakrt language
and thus has contributed to world thought that there should
be no prejudice regarding languages.
7. Desika declares1 that saranagati marga can be
followed by all jivas irrespective of caste, creed or colour.
8. Des’ika contended that the songs of Alvfirs are equal
to the Vedas in merit and called them as Tamil Veda and
thus he was responsible for the conventional title often used
by scholars, namely ‘ubhayavedanta-acarya'.
9. Deéika in all his stotras has drawn pointed attention
to area form of worship. Though he is a philosopher of very
high order, he enjoys the temple festivals which are the
sources of mass appeal. In one of such festivals, he sings
in rapture “satyam éape vdrazzaéailanatha vaikunthaudse’pi
na me’bhilasah I” (Varadaraja-paficdéat, stanza 49). “Oh,
Lord, your Vaikuntha itself is less attractive to
me when I
enjoy the beauty of your area-manifestations".
1. nisfiddnam new“
Daydéataha stanza 66 and see (Adaikkalapattu,
4th stanza).
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 25
said1 that the remaining portions are already explained in
other works of Desika.
The text ends in the middle of the explanation of
sfimanya (generality) which is included in the structure of
the object. The inclusion of other categories of different
systems, especially Nyaya-vaisesika, is explained in other
works of Des’ika. The main purpose of this thesis is to
explain and examine in a summarised form, the concepts of
Visistadvaita as they are expounded by Deéika. But more
details which are found unnecessary to my thesis are avoided.

HOW THIS WORK TENDS TO THE

GENERAL ADVANCEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE
Nyaya and Vaisesika are considered to be the
samanatantra or allied systems. Because both of them agree
in several philosophical respects they are understood to be
as parts of one whole. Generally it is also said that these
two systems are uncompromisingly opposed to the Vedanta
system. However, thinkers of Visistfidvaita from the very
early period have tried to make these systems important
accessory systems to Vedanta and have also tried to prove
that Nyaya is not opposed to Vedanta. For this purpose
some of the views of the Nyaya system which are opposed
to the scriptures, are reinterpreted. According to these
thinkers, the followers of Nyflya have misinterpreted the
tenets of that school. Further these thinkers opine that such
principles as cannot be shown to agree with the scriptures
and reason should be omitted. Des’ika writes that
“there is
nothing wrong in accepting some principles which can be
1. na kvdpyatah paramadréyata koéasesah
tacchesaparanakrtih parihfisahetubl
jfidtavyamnyadapi taimirandyi sarhyah
gmnthfintaresviti na kincidihasti cintyamll
Nyaya-siddhar‘iiana-fikfi. p.378.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 27

The five fundamental elements like prthvi, jala. etc.,

are eternal while they are in atomic form. These philosophers
hold the view that atoms are the causes of this universe
and thus favour the view of arambhavada. For them the
avayavi (the created object) is different from avayava (the
parts).
In this system the Paramatman is only an instrumental
cause of creation and dissolution and His existence is known
by inference. The Srutis only establish what is known through
inference. The Vedas according to them are pauruseyas
(composed) and their author is God himself.
Further this system accepts the plurality of jivatman,
the theory of karma, the theory of rebirth and dharma and
adharma. According to this system moksa means complete
freedom from duhkha and it is the sumum bonum of human
life. Further jivatman is not conscious by nature and it is
only when he gets into contact with the manas, he gets
consciousness. He experiences iccha, sukha, duhkha and
dvesa when he is embodied. The real knowledge of the
padarthas dispels the erroneous knowledge and enables the
atman to attain liberation or freedom from pain.
There is a vast difference between the two systems
Vis’istadvaita Vedanta and the philosophy of Nyéya-vais’esflta.
According to Visistédvaita, atman is jfiana gunaka, jfiana-
svan‘ipa and anu. This system refutes the paramanu
karanavada and prefers satkaryavada, on the basis of Sruti.
Adrsta and samavaya of Nyaya-vaisesika school are not
admitted in this system. This system argues, that the
vibhutva of jivatman as admitted by Nyaya-vaiSesika goes
against the Srutis and hence concludes that jiva is arm.
The grace of the Lord is the real cause of liberation in
this system. Viéistadvaita further points out that moksa is
not merely the destruction of duhkha as held by Nyaya-
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 29

by Vedfinta Desika in his Nydya-pariéuddhi and Nyc‘zya-

siddhdfijana, one can easily infer the incompleteness of those
works in bringing about the synthesis of Nyfiya and Vedanta.
The Nyc‘tyatattva of Nithamuni is aphoristic and difficult
to decipher correctly. The works like Atmasiddhi of
Yamunacérya do not discuss the nature of all padz'irthas in
detail and cannot effectively meet the new arguments and
challenges by the opposite schools. No doubt the celebrated
writings of Ramfinuja are competent to give the befitting
answer to such new arguments, but they are merely directed
to discussion of the topics which are relevant to Vedanta
alone.
The Mdnaydthdtmya-nirpaya, Prajfid-paritrazta and
Nyc’zya-sudaréana of Varadanfirfiyana Bhattaraka also deal
with the synthesis of Nyaya and Vedanta. But these works
contain some ideas which go against the writings of Ramanuja
and the author of these works seems to be under the influence
of some other systems. This point is clear from the references
to these theories and their criticism by Vedanta Des’ika in
his Nyc‘zya-siddhdfijana.
In the same way the works of Srivisnucittarya and
Sriramamisra have also not succeeded in bringing about the
synthesis. But works like Tattvaratndkara and Adhyatma-
khaudaduaya-vivarana etc., of Bhatta Paraéarapada, really
have made some progress in this direction. But as Vedanta
Des’ika himself points out in Nydya-siddhdfijana, these works
are not completed by the author himself. Tattvasdra of
V_aradaguru and Nyfiya—kuliéa of Vfidhihamsfimbhuvfiha
(Atreya Rimanuja) also do not completely satisfy the
contemplated aspiration of the synthesis, because they are
also concised in their meaning. In this
way after Nathamuni
and before Vedanta Desika, there were several works of
Viéistadvaita thinkers, to rationalise their Vedanta with the
help of Nyaya. But they had not yielded the required result.
30 The Philosophy of Vis’istfidvaita

Here in this work I have endeavoured to show how

Nydya-siddhdrliana of Vedanta Deéika has achieved success
in bringing about the synthesis of Nyéya and Vedanta. I
have also tried to show, how this synthesis of these two
systems is in conformity with the Sruti, smrti, sfitragranthas,
the writings of Rémfinuja and sampradéya.
I have shown how Deéika has rationalised the prameyas
of Viéistfidvaita in Nyaya-siddhdn‘jana and how this work
of Des’ika differs in its theme from his other works which
also deal with the synthesis of Nyéya and Vedanta.

->x<-
 31

Chapter II
AUTHOR’S INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT

In the beginning the author himself, introducing the

text, explains the theme and purpose of this work. It is
evident from the introductory stanzas of this work, that the
Nydya-parisuddhi was written by Deéika himself before the
present work was written. Nyaya-pariéuddhi is a successful
attempt of Vedanta Desika at synchronisation of ancient
Nyfiya-philosophy with Vis’istfidvaita. Des’ika had realised
like his predecessors, the role of nyaya in the study of
Vedanta. But some of the tenets such as, 'the all-pervasive
nature of the individual-self’, ‘the idea that God is the
instrumental cause of the universe’ etc, of Nyfiya-philosophy
were against the tenets of Vedanta. Therefore, Desika decided
to reorient the Nyaya-philosophy by reinterpreting the
Nydya-satras and thus harmonized Nyaya and Vedanta.
Vedanta Desika, after purifying the nyaya aphorisms
in the furnace of Visistédvaita gives a wonderful collyrium
which dispels our ignorance of subject, object and their
relation. He says: “labdhartho uaraddryapddarasikdd
rdmanujdcdryatahl" (Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 1), that he got
this wonderful collyriym from his acarya, acarya Ramanuja.
This ‘ar'ijana’ is called Nyc‘zya-siddhdfijana, prepared with
the help of nyaya.
Here one may ask in what way is this work helpful in
realizing the ultimate reality which is already revealed by
his predecessors. Deéika answers that the 'tattva’ that is
Brahman is upapluta1 (eclipsed) by different systems through

1. upaplutasya tattvasya sudhyartho'yamupakramahl

Nyaya-siddhdfijana, p. 2
 32 The Philosophy of Vis'istfidvaita

their misrepresentation. Here Brahman is presented in its

real nature.
Deéika further says that the present work explains in
detail the objects of valid knowledge which are already stated
summarily in Nydya-pariéuddhil. So he says: “Here I shall
explain the prameyas already introduced towards the end
of Nydya-pariéuddhi", in detail.
Now let us see how he has introduced the theme of
Nyfiya-siddhdr'ijana in the end of Nydya-parisuddhi. There
at first he defines what prameya is the object of valid
knowledge. He writes2 the object of valid knowledge is called
prameya. The nature of the object that is known should not
be superimposed. This is the general definition of a prameya.
But in Vedanta the prameya must be niééreyasa-antaranga,
that is, it should be helpful to the final liberation of the
soul. Erroneous understanding of prameya is the root cause
of cycle of birth and death. The true‘knowledge of prameya,
will lead to moksa (liberation).

caWy
In this context he explains mlfihflosophical views
regarding the divisions of proves that
the division by dravya
Aksapada with the same
andeW’is correct.
subjects prameya 5'

to twelve-fold division. He ml .K-

‘,‘1.
.
I

dtma-éari'ra-indriyu nah-pravrttidosa-
‘
'

pretyabhdva-phala , data prameyamiti I

. zfarna-nydya-slztra, 1-1-9.

1. yannydyapariéuddhyante sarigrahezuz pradaréitaml

punastaduistarezzatru prameyamabhidadhnwhell
Nyaya-siddhafljana, p. 2.

2. pramdvisayah prameyamiti uyutpatyd fimpitfikfirauyavacchedfirtha-

tayé anampitanzpan'i saruan'l prameyaml
Nyfiya-pariéuddhi p. 183.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 33

Here atma is of two types. They are lévara and Aniévara.

lsvara is God who is the creator of this universe. The
Aniéwara is the individual soul who is not concerned with
the creation and destruction of the world. That which co-exists
with consciousness and is also inseparable from fitman is
called s’arira (body). Sarira is of two types. They are, body
which is born of karma and the body which is not born of
karma. We and other like beings possess the body of the
first type and god possesses the body of the second type.
Our sense organs are born out of sattvikahankéra. They
are eleven in number. Five jfifinendriyas, five karmendriyas
and one manas. The objects that are grasped by them are
arthas. Even their qualities are known by sense organs.
The substance by which the objects are revealed, is
called buddhi. Manas is the extraordinary cause of recollection
and other feelings. The action of mind, speech and body
which brings merits or demerits to atman is called pravrtti.
The causes of these pravrttis are called doses (errors). They
are raga (desire), dvesa (hatred), and moha (illusion), Phala
(result) is the thing attainable from pravrtti (effort).
Pretyabhéva (transmigration) is leaving the previous
body and entering into the fresh one. This action of jiva
(individual soul) is called pretyabhéva.
The object of pravrtti is phala (result). It is this result
of pravrtti that is the purpose of the doer or purusa.
Unpleasant feeling is duhkha. For the soul, who is desirous
of liberation, even the pleasure and its causes are considered
to be obstacles.
Apavarga (liberation) is the absence of pain. Both sukha
and its sadhana also are obstacles to apavarga. They should
be avoided like honey which is mixed with
poison. That
state is the fivirbhava (manifestation) of one’s own nature
or svabhava. It also includes the rapture of divine communion
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 35

The same thing can be said of time also. Time is used

with reference to objects. Therefore it is unnecessary to
attribute a separate existence to time.
Therefore it may be said that Brahman is the only sum
and substance of this universe. It is also possible to divide
the categories into three groups as cit (individual soul), acit
(inert matter) and Iévara (God).
Some think that there are four categories. Some others
hold that there are five categories. AccOrding to them, they
are, prapya, prapta, prapt‘yupfiya, nivartya and phala. With
the inclusion of sambandha some say that there are six
categories.
The entire world of categories may also be divided into
two groups. One is hita (good) and another is ahita (bad or
evil). In the matter of worldly good or evil, the Ayurveda
and Nitiéastras are authoritative sources. Our body should
be properly kept to practise the yoga. In protecting the body,
one should not transgress the rules of Vedas and smrtis. To
know the good and evil of the other world, the authoritative
texts are Vedas. The smrtis (law books). itihdsas (tradition)
and paranas (history and legendary stories) are valid only
when they are not contradictory to Vedas. The injunctions
of the Vedas lay down what is good to each and everyone
and actions forbidden by the Vedas are not good. In this
context Desika discusses an interesting topic.
It is pointed out by some that the Vedas sometimes
prescribe abhicara (witch craft) through which, one can kill
his enemies. If Vedas are valid source of knowledge and lay
down what is good, then these acts also should be good. But
they are sinful because they involve violence. So they are
not conducive to happiness. As a result, in that case the
injunctions of Vedas should become invalid.
Deéika refutes this argument. He points out that, the
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 37

We are all wandering in the beginningless river of

samsara by our own karma. This seed of samsara, namely,
karma can be destroyed through the knowledge of heya (fit
deeds. In
to be abandoned) deeds and upadeya (acceptable)
the lotus feet
addition to this, one should be lustful to em'oy
of the Lord. Desika uses the phrase—mukunda-caranara—
0f life is the summum-
vinda lampatasya’. To live this type
death. All our actions
bonum of the journey from birth to
with full devotion.
should be dedicated at the feet of the Lord
Lord
This type of life is termed in moksa-édstras as yoga.
says in the Gila that to observe karmayoga is the easy way
for your salvation—‘matkarma-paramo bhava'. Kama-yoga
is easier because this can yield the results even though the
person commits mistakes, while observing this yogal. While
observing karmayoga, one should not think that karma alone
can yield result independently. To get our karmas rewarded,
one should take refuge at the feet of God. That is why the
Upanisads declare—
sd kasphd .51“:
para gatihl
The Lord will compassionately over-look the defective
portions of our actions, if we fascinate Him through taking
refuge at His feet. Ramanuja says:
tasya ca vaéfkaranam taccharandgatireval
The befitting result of this type of life is liberation.
In the above explained way the knowledge of the
Nyaya-vais’esika categories may become an indirect means
for liberation. But the knowledge of the prameya of
Vis’istadvaita will become a direct means for liberation. That
is why Deéika explained thecategories of Nyaya-vaisesika
and Viéistédvaita.

1. nehabhikramnaéo’sti pratyaudyo na vidyatel

svalpanmpyasya dharmasya trdyate mahato bhaydtll Gite 2-40.
38 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

Nydyaédstra is a science of pramanés. To show the goal

of these pramanas, here the prameyas are discussed.
Vatsyayana defined the word prameya “yo’rthalz tattvatah
pramiyate tat prameyam I” (1-1-1). That object which is known
through valid knowledge is prameya. Gautama enumerated
them as twelve, naming them étma, sarira, indriya, artha,
buddhi, manah, pravrtti, dvesa, pretyabhava, phala, duhkha,
apavarga (Gautama. 1-1-9). The pramanas should be used
to know the reality of these above-mentioned prameyas.
In Nyaya-parisuddhi, Desika dealt elaborately with the
pramanas. In the end, he also gave a summary of the final
aim of the knowledge of these prameyas. The
the realisatinn n? Annunul “.44-.. 1:,4. .. an-.-
final aim IS _

complete surrender at the feet of- the Lord. In Nydya-

siddhdiijana, he examines the prameyas (the object of the
valid knowledge) which he hinted in the prameyadhyaya of
Nyaya-pari§uddhi in detail.

JADA DRAWAs
=3“

Now what is this "

maria
1-

system? The .
i "is qualified by inert
matter and senmntx - via the only prameya
that is to be -

which are also real. .

,5 l
g

The great aéryas- of ’; ' .

thorough knowledge of five

aspirants of liberation to get a
factors before taking up any sadhana or means of liberation.
They are: (1) The nature of Brahman who is to be attained.
(2) The nature of jivatman who has to attain Brahman. (3)
the means of attaining Brahman. (4) The result of attaining
Brahman. (5) The obstructions in attaining Brahman. These
 The Philosophy of Vis’istfidvaita 39

five factors are called arthapaficaka and the knowledge of

these factors is called ‘artha-paficaka-jfiana’l.
To know the Paramatman who is the indweller of both
cit and acit, the knowledge of the nature of cetana and
acetana is essential. Even from the point of view of
sarira-s’ar‘iribhava relation, (body and soul relation) the
knowledge of jada and ajada is essential. Both cetana and
acetana form the body of the Lord. Therefore the Brahman
with both jada and ajada, forms the prameya of this system.
Deéika in his Nyt‘zya-pariéuddhi, which may be considered
as the first part of Nyc‘zya-siddhdfijana says ‘bladuisayena
bhramena san‘zsdrdmaha yadvisayena tattuajr'idnena apauar-
jyemahi tadiha nah prakaréezta meyam prameyaml (Nyaya-
paris‘uddhi, p. 183). “the knowledge of that which leads to
liberation and the ignorance of which brings bondage, is
called ‘prameya’.” Therefore the Paramétman with cit and
acit becomes the prameya of this "system.2
Des‘ika declares and brings out all the above said ideas
in the very first sentence of Nyaya-siddhafijana. “as’esa-
cidacitprakdram brahmaikamevatattvaml tatra prakara-
prakarinoh mitho atyantdbhedepi-vis’istaikyadi-vivaksayai-
katua-vyapades’ahl” “Brahman which includes the entire
universe is one and it is the prameya, and that object of
valid knowledge (prameya) is divided into two main categories
as dravya (substance) and adravya."
DRAVYA, ADRAVYA—DEFINED

upaddnam drauyaml atathdbhfltamadrauyaml

Nydya-siddhfiiiiana, p. 2.

1. prépyasya brahmapo rapam prdptusca pratyagdtmanahl

prfiptyupdyam phalan‘i caiua tatlu'z prfipti m'rodhi call
Rahasyatrayasdra. 4.

2. Refer also tameuam uidudn (Taittirl'ya A'ranyaka, 3-12).

40 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

The material cause is dravya. Things other than this

are called adravya.
Upadana, the material cause is that which has avastha
(states). Des’ika says that this type of division is based on
the experience. The experience says, that neither the quality
nor the qualified can be denied. In addition to this one can
experience the difference between them in day-to-day life.
POSITION OF BUDDHISTS'
1. Buddhists (Saugata) deny the difference between the
quality and the qualified and say that the qualities like
spars’a (touch), rl'lpa (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell),
are real and one may inot'wacoept the substratum for these
qualities. We cannot soup]: any other dharma in them.
Therefore the dharme (attributes) is real but not the dharmin
(substratum).
We can put the same idea in a converse form. Here
dharmi is real and dharma is not real. Dharmas like sparéa,
rflpa, rasa, etc., are erroneous conceptions. Therefore, the
division namely dravya and adravya is incorrect.
2. Buddhists say that the entire universe is momentary
and therefore: 11mm 9.!) the basis of transitoriness and
momentariIIeB-B. pf -7... .fihe
division namely dravya and
adravya is nnEnable. lugh they accept the so called
dravya, some of the Buddhists say that it is not permanent.
It is momentary. This position may be established on the
basis of inferential evidence also. Accordingly,
yat sat tat ksanikaml
yatha meghamandalam (or) ghatahl
Whichever is sat is not permanent. It is momentary,
as it is in the case of clouds. Clouds remain for some
moments and after sometime they disappear. Therefore clouds
are sat. In the same way all visible things are of the nature
of sat. Therefore they too are momentary.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 41

3. In the third place Buddhists argue that even on.the

of things
basis of pratyabhijfia-pratyaksa. the permanency
cannot be established.
Pratyabhijfia is a form of perception. Sometimes we
recognise things as ‘so’yam,’ “that is this". In philosophy
this
type of perception is named as pratyabhijfia (recognition).
the
The Siddhantin uses this perception to establish
in this
permanency of objects. According to siddhfintin,
which
experience, the word ‘saha’ (he) mentions the thing
has the relation to the past time. The word ‘ayam’ (this)
explains the thing which has the relation to the present
time. The common case that is used in both these words is
of
prathama-vibhakti. (nominative case). Prathama-vibhalfti
both these words indicates the identity of the thing mentioned
by these two words. Therefore the siddhfintin says that
things are permanent. But Buddhists argue that the above
mentioned experiences of pratyabhijfifi might have proved
the permanency of objects, in case it was a valid knowledge.
But this perception is based on illusory knowledge. Because
recognition depends upon samskara (disposition). The knowl-
edge which depends upon samskfira is an illusory knowledge.
This fact is evident in the famous example of illusory
knowledge viz., shell and silver. In that place the knowledge
‘idarh rajatam’ is produced in a shell by rajata-samskfira
which is producedby rajatanubhava (the experience of rajata).
In the same way the above explained pratyabhijfifi must be
an illusory knowledge. Therefore everything is momentary
and nothing is permanent.
The buddhists establish the momentariness of objects
through proving illusoriness of pratyabhijfifi-pratyaksa in a
different way. They say pratyabhijfia-pratyaksa cannot
prove
the identity. It may be illustrated with the
help of an
example. The seed which is stored in a
granary cannot
sprout. If it is sown in the field, it sprouts. Here it is
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 43

not experienced in them. So this inference is invalidl.

Further the siddhantin refutes the buddhist position
that pratyabhijiifi is an illusory knowledge. The permanency
of things can be established on the basis of pratyabhijfia.
No doubt pratyabhiji'ia, as Buddhists explain, is produced
by samskaraz. Though it is accepted as valid one, it is not
correct to say that all knowledge caused by samskara is
illusory. Memory which is produced by samskara is accepted
as valid experience.
Therefore one cannot argue that all knowledge caused
by sarhskara is illusory. In the case of shell and silver
illusion, the knowledge ‘idarh rajatam' will be sublated by
the subsequent knowledge ‘nedarh rajatam'. Therefore it is
an illusory knowledge. Since thevalidity of the above stated
pratyabhijfia-pratyaksa cannot be denied, the permanency
of object (dravya) is established.
Desika also examines the position of Buddhists that
the pratyabhiifia-pratyaksa cannot prove the identity of
objects. Further he answers that the seed in the granary
was not asamartha to sprout. It could not sprout in the
granary because it lacked many accessory causes like soil,
water, air etc. But it had the svarupayogyaté (potentiality)
to sprout. Therefore samarthya cannot be denied to the seed
that is in the granary. Hence to admit identity proved by
pratyabhijiié-pratyaksa does not lead to any contradiction.

1. bhéuaéabdena visuapahsikane paksahetu drstantabhedd-siddhih,

ghagavyatirikta-pahslkdrepi ghatosya Insanikatudpratipatter
drspantatvayogahl Nyaya-siddhafljana, p. 12.
2. tallaksanan‘i tu indriya sahakrta sarhskdra janya jiifinam
[Ahmwli'
According to the followers of Sri Anandatlrtha memory is produced
by menus and not by samknra.
(Refer Pmmana-paddhati' of Jayatirtha. MS.. p. 9).
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 46

this.
the schooll. The idea behind the tripartite division is
and
Three dravyas are cit (sentient), acit (non-sentient)
is
lévara (God). In every place the visesya (qualified)
important/The viéesana (quality) is given the secondary
cit, acit
importance. Above mentioned three dravyas viz.,
and lsvara are the viéesyas. The remaining three are
mentioned it includes
viéesanas. Whenever the viéesya is
the viéesana also.
the
Therefore the six-fold division is not improper. On
whole there are two jada dravyas and four ajada dravyas
or two pratyak dravyas and four parak dravyas.
The dravyas which cannot reveal for themselves and
shine with the help of some other thing, are called jada
dravyas. ‘parata eva bhdeamanam jadam’ (Nydya-
siddhdfijana, p. 16). It is the definition of a jade dravya.
Dravyas other than the above mentioned dravyas are named
ajadas—‘tadanyat ajadam'. (Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 16).
PRATYAK AND PARAK DRAWAS DEFINED
The dravya which can grasp the self and shines
independently is called pratyak dravya. ‘svasmai bht’zsa-
mdnam pratyak.’ (Nyaya-siddhdr‘ijana, p. 16). Jive and lévara
can grasp themselves. Therefore both of them are pratyak
dravyas.
Dravya which shines for others alone, in other words,
which is always known as “this” not ‘I’ is called parék
dravya. Prakrti, kfila, nityavibhfiti, dharmabhfita-jfiéna are
dravyas which shine for the purpose of jlva and lévara.
Therefore they are para}: dravyas.

1. dik kdla bhoga bhfitlr auiuakqitua gunfidi ripatuat dehatmeédbhi-

dartham tmdha tatvam viuincate kecm
Nyaya-siddhafljana, p. 16.
Refer also Rangeramuja's commentary.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 47

The invisible ‘mahat and ahankara’ etc., are known by

Vedas1 (verbal testimony). Prakrti is pervading in all
directions except in the upward direction. Nityavibhi‘iti is in
upward direction. It is full of suddha sattva. The Vedas say
‘ddityauarnan't tamasah parastat’, beyond the prakrti there
is s’uddha sattva.
The third definition of prakrti states ‘mahada-
dyavastharhatvam'. Prakrti, which is triguna, is the material
cause of the thing containing mahatva and ahankara. In
some places, maya is explained as the material cause. In
some other place, avidya is said to be so. Then how to solve
this contradiction? To solve this, Des’ika says the names like
‘maya', ‘prakrti’, ‘avidya’ refer to triguna according to the
works performed by them. Trig-ans is called ‘miya’, while it
becomes the instrument for the creation of the universez.
Because it transforms it is prekrtih, ‘uikt‘zram prakarotiti’.3
Because it obstructs knowledge it is called avidya, ‘uidyé-
uirodhadibhirauidyddisacyate’.
Prakrti is always transforming. When prakrti is in a
state of equipoise—‘trayo gunanarh samyavasthfil’—the like
produces the like. When the samyavasthfi is disturbed, the
gunas mix with one another. Where there is improportionate
mixture of sattva (that quality of prakrti which is observable
in steady condition of balanced motion and calm conscious
life), rajas (that quality of prakrti which represents its highly
active condition full of enlivening and aggressive energy)
and tamas (that quality of prakrti which makes matter dull
and immobile and inert) portion, the transformation of prakrti
is improportionate.
Prakrti has no holes. It is 'niéchidra’.
1. ajfim ekdm lohita éukla krszuiml Svetdévahrropanisad, 4-5.
Nyaya-siddham'ana, p. 16.
'2. tacca uicitra-srstyunmukhatvdt mayd.
3. Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 16.
48 The Philosophy of Viéistjadvaita

TRANSFORMATION OF PRAKRTI
This prakrti transforms into twenty-four fundamental
principles. They are: mfila-prakrti, mahat, ahankfira, six
jfifinendriyas including manas, five karmendriyas, five
tanmatras and five bhntas.
mflla-prakrti -
mahat -
shankara - U1U103P-‘I-‘H

jfifinendriyas -
karmendreiyas -
tanmatras -
bhfitas - 5

Among these twenty-four tattvas, mfila-prakrtI IS the

matrix of all the material things found in the universe.
Mala-prakrti is ‘samatraigunya mfila-prakrtih l’ (Nydya-
siddhdfijana, p. 30). In it, trigunas are mixed in a I
'

proportionate way.
This mfila-prakrti is of four typos, according to the
slight changes in its av‘,_.
aksara, vibhaktivibhakta" ‘.
V '
'_.' )5 they are: ‘,avyakta I

'

avibhakta tamas) ‘ -, ,

siddhdfijana, p. 30). fl ,

133323? '
Mfila—prakrti can 1.
the granny. M3113“ i8 . , The avibhakta tamas can

breaking its parts on account of soakingm the water. Avyakta

can be compared to the seed which is swollen through the
contact of the air, soil and water.
MAHAT

Mahat is the dravya, which is the very next avasthé

 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 49

to avyaktavastha. It is also predecessant avastha to

ahankérfivastha. Mahat is so called because it is the biggest of
all the twenty-two principles beginning from ahankaratattva.
The Sankhya philosophers say 'adhyauasdyo buddhib
dharmojfidnam Uirdga aiéuaryam l’, (Sdflkhyakdrika 23) that
mahat-tattva is a manovrtti called adhyavasaya. But it is
not correct, because adhyavaséya is a state of knowledge.
Mahat is not a conscious one. Therefore, the ‘adhyavasaya’
which is the characteristic feature of a conscious thing cannot
become a dharma of an inert element, namely mahat.
Mahat tattva has three divisions. They are ‘sattvika,
rajasa and tamasa’. The portion of mahat in which sattva-
guna is dominant is called sattvika. Where rajog‘una is
dominant, it is called rajasa. Where tamoguna is dominant,
it is called tamasa.
AHANKARA TATI'VA

The previous avastha of indriyatvivastha is called

ahankfaravastha. Here once again the Sankhya philosophers
say that ahankara is abhimsna—‘abhimanohafikarab tasmad
duividhah prauartate sargahl’ (Sankyakdrikd, 25).
This view of sankya can be refuted on the ground that
the dharma of a ‘cetana’ cannot become a definition of an
‘acetana’.
In Veddntaéastra, ahankara is the cause of erroneous
knowledge, namely mistaking the body which is ‘anaham’
for ‘atman’ or ‘aham’, “sa ca andtmani dehe ahambhava-
karana-hetutuamdtrat aharikara-s’abda uficyabl (Nydya-
siddhdfijana, p. 33).
As in the case of mahat, shankara also has three
divisions: sfittvika-ahankara, rajasa-ahankfira, and tamasa-
shankara. From the sattvika-ahankara, eleven indriyas are
produced, and from the tamasa-ahankara the sabda-tanmatra
 The Philosophy of Viéistédvaita 51
INDRIYAS

Indriyas are defined1 as those which are different from

prime, apfina, vyana, udana etc. Indriyas are helpful in the
activities of recollection. It works residing in the particular
organs like ears, eyes, nose, tongue and skin of the body.
It is the general definition of indriyas.
VIEWS OF DIFFERENT THINKERS AND THEIR EXAMINATION

Varadavishnumisra defines2 indriyas difl‘erently. He says

indriyas which are dravyas are supported by the vital parts
of the body and thus help the fitman. This definition of
Varadavisnumiéra refers only to the prfikrtendriya, not to
aprakrtendriya.
But Sankhya thinkers define indriyas as
“sattvikahankeropadfinaka’, that is, that which is caused by
séttvikfihankfira is called indriya. This definition of Sinkhya
thinkers commits the fallacy of avyfipti (partial inapplicabil-
ity), because the aprakrtendriya is not produced by sattvika-
ahar'ikfira.
According to Vais’esikas3 indriyas (except érotrendriya)
are not the substratum of udbhuta-visesaguna (perceptible
special properties) like colour smell etc. The s’rotrendriya is
nothing but akaéa. Akas'a is the substratum of éabda. Hence,
s'rotrendriya is exempted. In their system udbhfita-
1. prdnddyanyatvesati hrtkarna—caksuradi-Sarim pradeéa-uisesauac-
chinna-vyépératayé tattatkdrya-visesa saktamindriyaml
Nyfiya-siddhfir'ijana, p. 34.

2. as’ariran’i prdriadharyameva yaddravyarh pumsopakarakmii

tadindn'yaml Nyaya—siddiwm‘ana, p. 34.

3. udbhilta-uiéesa-gundndsrayatve sati jfifina kdmna-manassamyoga-

srayatvam indriyatvaml Nyfiya-siddhanta-mafijari, p. 197.
Refer Sitilzanthiya for the same Vakyavrtti (M.S.)
tacca pratyaksa pron-band mitywcyatel Tarka-haumudi p. 3.
Pmmdnédipadfirtha-prahasika. p. 11.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 53
tanmfitra (the subtle element of sound). The material cause
of prfikrtendriya is sattvika-ahankara.

JNANENDRIYA AND KARMENDRIYA DIVISION

(Sense Organs and Motor Organs)
Once again the indriyas‘ are divided into two groups.
They are—jfianendriya and karmendriya. Between these
two that which helps the expansion of knowledge is
called jfianendriya, ‘fjfidnaprasarana éaktamindriyam
jiiénendriyam I” (Nydya-siddhdfljana, p. 35.)
It is of six types: manas, érota (ear), tvak (touch), caksus
(vision), rasana (tongue) and ghrina (nose). This type of
division is admitted by great acoryas like Bhatta Parasara
in Tattuaratnfikaral. In that work he says that jfianendriyas
are six in number. It is an internal sense. But this division
is not admitted in Nyfiya-vaiéesika school. This school groups
them into internal (antaram) and external (bahya), sense
organs. The first one namely internal sense is manas and
the second namely external is nose, eyes etc. Thus says
Gautama: ‘ghrt‘ma. rasand, caksu, tvak, srotrfini indriydni’
(Gautama Satra, 1-1-12).
Sfinkhya philosophers include manas among karmen-
driyas, because it is the cause of all activities. Sankhyas
say2 that buddhindriyas (inanendriyas) are caksu, srotra,
ghréna, rasanfi, tvak and vék. Pfida. pini, péyu, upasthfi
are karmendriyas. Manas is considered to be both jfianendriya
and karmendriya. But manas cannot be a karmendriya;
because the definition of kan‘nendriya does not apply to
1. uktaécaiuam vibhdgab tattuaramfikare bhatta partisan: pddaibl
tacca sodhd ityupakromya dntamm mono]; ityantenal
Nyflya-siddhafijana, p. 36.
2. buddhlndriydni caksus-érotra-ghrdna-rasanfi-tvagddlni; vdk-pdda-
pdni—pdyapasthan': kamtendriydnydhub; ubhaydtmakamatra
manali ' Sankhya-saptati. 26.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 55

the manas. Gautamal says that the successive nature of our

knowledge is the indicator of the existence of manas. He
gives preference to the psychological analysis. According to
Annambhatta2. manas is the substance which is active and
is without touch. His definition does not describe the
psychological aspect of the manas. The existence of manas
is known by inference. That is why both Gautama and
Kanada use the word ‘lir'igam’ in their aphorisms. As there
are countless souls there are innumerable manas. They are
difi‘erent from self to self. Unlike the self manas is atomic
in size. Manas is also eternal;
The Mimamss school accepts manas as different from
atman and as the substratum of the conjunction which is
the ‘asamavayikarana’ of jfiana.
The followers of mz‘iyz‘iva‘icla.3 say that manas is the
substratum of pleasure and pain. 'It is an anthahkarana
containing sankalpavrtti and vikalpavrtti.
According to Srimadfinanda Til-the" manae is produced
by buddhitattva. It is of the form of tattva and indriya. The
indriya type of manas is grouped into nitya and anitya.
Desika explains manas, according to Rémfinuja and
divides it into prakrta and aprfikrta. Prékrta manas is
included in the group of prakrta indriya. Deéika defining
the manas, takes into account the day to-day experience and
psychological aspect of it also. To that extent Desika has
followed Nyaya-vais'esika system. In addition to this he adds
that there is prakrta and aprakrta division regarding manas.

1. yugapat jfiananutpattir manasolingaml

Refer Vfitsyayanabhfisya 1-1-16, Gautama-sane. 1-1-16.
2. sparse rahitatvasati kriydvattvaml Tarka-sangraha, 13.

3. Refer Nydyakos’a, p. 644.

3. Refer Hindfi-daréanasfira, p. 278.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvnita 5'7

‘antahkaranarh trividham’ (there are three internal organs)

is invalid.
PRAKBTA s'ROTRA

Among five sense objects (sabdfidipaficaka) the sense

which can know the sound is called prfikrtasrotrarn. For
human beings, this érotra in in the orifice of the ear, (kanga-
s’aékuli). But for snakes, it is in their eye-balls.
The sound is grasped by érotra. Sound is a dharma
(property) of element namely akaéal. Sruti is the effect of
vaikarika ahankfira. Sound, which is in ikfiéa, that has the
conjunction with srotra is grasped by érotrendriya. The
problem, whether the sound is dravya or adrevya. will be
discussed in adravya chapter. Whether the érotra goes to
the place where the sound is and grasps it, or the sound
itself comes to the s’rotra, will be discussed in the same
adravya chapter.
PRAKRTA TVAGINDRIYA

Prakrta tvag'indriya (the sense of touch) does not produce

the sabda-saksatkara (the perception of sound) but it produces
the saksatkara (perception) of the touch, as well as its
substratum.
This sense is pervading the entire body. The feeling of
touch is different according to difl'erent parts of the body.
We do not experience the touch (spars'a) in our nails, teeth
and hair (respectively) nakha, danta, and keéa, because the
prfinavyapti is little in them compared to other parts of the
body.

1. The above idea is summarised in this kérika.

éabdasya-bhlitadharmatudt firutervaikarikatvatalzl
san'tyuktanilayo yogyah sa tayd sampmtiyatel
Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 38.
 The Philosophy of Vie'istaidvaita 59

In visual perception light is an accessory cause. Light

itself cannot make objects or their reflections to enter into
our visual organ. The qualifying knowledge namely dharma-
bhfitajfiana itself comes out through the sense organs and
gets the contact with the external objects and reveals them
to the perceiver.
In this process the light helps the perceiver only to the
extent of removing the obstruction namely darkness (andha-
him). But light itself does not reveal the objects. Ramanuja
endorses this position on many occasions. Commenting on
the Bhagavadgi'td ‘jyotisamapita jyotihi’ (13-17), Ramanuja
says1 lamp. sun and precious stone etc., are known by us
through our caksus. Light only removes the obstacle viz.,
darkness.
The eye-power may be increased by applying collyrium
to the eyes. That is why the deposits hidden in the ground
are found out by such application.
PRAKRTA RASANENDRIYA AND GHRANENDRIYA

Prakrtarasanendriya (the sense of taste) and the

prakrtaghranendriya (the sense of smell) grasp respectively
taste and smell.
The result of the entire discussion about indriyas (senses)
is this. Among these senses the manas, touch and eyes grasp
both dravya and adravya. The érotra, rasana and ghrana
grasp only adravyas like s’abda, rasa, gandha; or it may also
be said that all the six indriyas grasp both dravya and
adravya. Each sense grasps its objects with the time in
which it exists. Time is an adravya. Visnucittarya, a great

1. deepddityadindpi dtmaprabhfirflpamjr’uinameva prakfiéayatil

Bhagavadgitfi Bhdsya of Réménuja. 13-17.
na. tad bhdsayate saryahl
Bhagauadgita Bhdsya of Ramanuja, 15-6.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 61

Payu is an indriya which helps in throwing out the

male (waste). For some particular type of birds like mandhala
it is in the mouth. This is stated in 'karana—pada
astamadhikarana'l. The sense which is the cause of a special
type of happiness, is called upasthfi. The adhisthfina
(substratum) of this indriya is the genital organ.
APRAKRTA KARMENDRIYA

Aprakrta karmendriya is eternal. Even for nityas,

muktas and lévara, karmendriya is necessary. They are
complementary to the beauty of their bodies. The existence
of aprakrta karmendriya for muktas, nityas and Rivers is
stated in Nityavibhati-paricchedaz—‘Muktss posses five sense
organs. These indiryas act according to the needs and desires
of nitya and mukta. Even the substratums of these indriyas
are like that of karmendriyas’. So there is no contradiction
in accepting karmendriya for the nityas, muktas and lsvara.
Apparently, this view contradicts with the view of
Chandogya Upanisad3 which says the individual self, until
it is in the state of embodiment, it cannot escape the
experience of pleasure and pain. But one who is devoid of
body and is liberated, the main instrument of these
experiences will become destroyed and having risen from
this body shines in his original form. According to this
statement there are no karmendriya for mukta, nitya and
is’vara. But the students of the Upanisad should understand
1. yathd mandhdlddinfim dsyena vinmfitra visargabl
Quoted in Nydya-siddhfir'ijana, p. 43.

2. iyan'i ca paficopanisat pratipddyd paficabhfitendriya mayf nitya

mukteéuardzuim icchanurflpa-sarlrendn‘ya visaya-prdparapena
auatisthatel Nyaya-aiddhdfijana, p. 240.
3. na ha uai saéarirasya satab priyapriyayob apahatirastil asarirurii
viz uasantan'i m: sprsatabl asmiccharlrfit samutthfiya parar'i
jyotirapasarhpadya svena rupenabhinispadyaIeI Chandogya 8-12-1.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 63

NATURE OF INDRIYA
Indriyas are very subtle. But they are not atomic in
their nature. RAmAnuja’s attribution of atomic nature of
indriya, is only to mention, their subtlety. It is clear in his
commentary on the aphorism ‘ahavaéca' (Brahmasatra, 2-4-6).
While the jivatman departs from the body, the indriyas also
accompany him, but this departure is not perceived by the
people who are sitting by the side of the dying man. So
they are subtle. In this sense, they are stated to be atomic
in nature.
All indriyas assist the jlvatman. In giving their
assistance they are all equal. That is why Vedas1 say ‘that
these indriyas are equal and they are innumerable!’ Here
‘samfih' means equal. The word ‘ananta’ does not mean the
all pervasive nature of the indriya. It means only that the
activities (manovrtti) are innumerable. That is why they are
possessing limited and wonderful or variegated dimension.
This vikara (change) of indriya is evident in ants and
elephants. While the indriya in the body of an ant departs
to the body of an elephant, it becomes bigger and vice-versa.
Indriyas are not defective by their nature. If their
substratum is defective, then they are known as defective.
That is why if a blind man enters the other’s body or a
dead-body, by the power of ‘parakaya praveéa vidyfi’ (secret
of entering into other’s body), he need not remain
a blind
man. On the other hand, he will be having the wide
eyes,
which can perceive its objects. Due to
‘adrsta’ (invisible
cause) the power of indriya is obstructed in the state like
susupti (sound sleep) and mfircha (state of unconsciousness).
In some other cases, due to the good adrsta,
Gandharvas
and Yogis know the objects which are
very subtle and beyond
the perception of an ordinary
man.
1. etc sarva eva sanu'ib sarua evfinantdhl BrhadAraqiyaka, 3-5-13.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istfidvaita 65

VIEW OF RAMANUJA

At the first sight Ramfinuja also seems to have accepted

the view of Yadavaprakfisa. Deéika at first supports this
view, giving evidences ‘from Veddntasara and Bhasya of
Rflmanuja. He quotes from Vedant‘adi'pa1 also a very clear
evidence which supports the View of Yadavaprakasa. In
Veddntadipa Raminuja says that the senses like érotra,
caksu etc., move with the atman when he goes from one
body to another. But the senses namely speech, hand etc.,
are produced and destroyed with the birth and death of the
body respectively. Therefore Rfinfinuja's position regarding
indriyas, is same as that of Yidavaprakiéa.

VIEW OF DESIKA
Vedanta Des’ika carefully examines these two positions,
and arrives at correct conclusion. For this purpose, once
again, he quotes the statements of REmE'nuja. Discussing
the sfitra ‘pn‘znagatesca’ (Brahmasfitra, 3-1-3) Ramfinuja
quotes Sruti which are against the views of Yadavaprakasa.
The .S‘ruti2 says, that when the fitman moves from this body,
the vital parts of the body (prfina) also accompany him. At
the same time other indriyas also follow the prfina, which
is accompanying the fitman. Rimanuja never goes against
the Vedas. This view is firmly established in the Bhasya on
‘saptagatyadhikarana’ (Brahmaszztra, 2-4-4+5)

1. dipetu vyaktameuoktarh tatru émtrddini ji'uena saha sarirfintaraga-

manepi gacchantil vdgghastddini kannendriyani tu sthite sarire
tenaiua saha utpattivinasa-yogl'ni upakamkani ityadil athab
yddavapmkésavat harmendriydztfim pmtiéarlramutpattivinaéau
bhfisyakdrdbhimataul Nyaya-siddhdfilhna, p. 46.
2. tamutkrdmantam pranonutkrdmatil
prdnamanutkrémantan'l sarue pram anutkrumantill
Brhadnmnyaka, 6-4-2.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 67

state, which is the end of ksiratvfivastha and the beginning

of dadhitvavastha. This avastha is called madhyamavastha.
In the same way, from tamasahankaravastha five
bhfitatvavasthas are produced. Here the intermediary avastha
is produced, and that avasthfl is known as tanmatravasthal.
These tanmatras are the material cause of five elements.
But it is not as Sankhyas put it that the properties like
sound etc., are the causes of ‘paficabhfitas. The substance
which is related to tanmatra is also called tanmatra. It is
the material 'cause of all the five elements ('bhfitas).
Sankhya thinkers say that the bhfitas are produced by
qualities like sound etc. They say that all tanmatras are
produced by tamasahankara. Among them sabda-tanmatras
produces akas’a without the help of other tanmitras. But
other tanmatras like spars’a, gandha produce vayu. prthvi,
etc., with the help of previous tanmfitrasz.
This view of Sankhya goes against the Sruti “akséad
vayuhl vayorag'nihl agnerapahl adbhyah prthivll”. “This
passage explains that akasa produces vayu, vayu produces
agni, agni produces apah or jala, jala produces prthvl.
Therefore the explanation of Sankhya goes against the Vedas.
The substance which possesses utkatfivastha (promi-
nently visible stage) and which is also the substratum of
‘sabdaguna’ is called bhfita. As in the case of indriyas, there
are divisions like, prakrta-tanmfitra and aprakrta-tanmatra,
prakrta-bhfita and aprakrta-bhfita.
There are five tanmatras. They are: éabda-tanmatra,

1. dadhirapena parinamamdnasya payaso madhyamduasthduat

bhzitarfipena parinamamdnasya drauyasya tatah pfirvarh kacit
auastha tanmdtral taduiéisgamapi drauyan'i tanmdtramityucyatel
tadeua ca bhfitaupdddnamiti na éabdddigunamdtrdt
bhatasrsgihl
Nydya-siddha‘r‘ijana, p. 49.
2. paiicabhyah paficabhatdnil Sankhyahdrihfi, 22.
 The Philosophy of Viéistédvaita 69

perceptibility of ékfiéa. Our eyes can know substances, which

are with colour. But akésa, being a colourless substance it
cannot be known by our eyes. Therefore, the doctrine of
perceptibility of akisa is invalid.
Des’ika rebuts this argument giving the example
0f kfila
(time), which is colourless but Perceived by Vifual orgfms'
Every sense knows its object with
kfila. This is explalTIEd
in the chapter of indriyas. Accordingly kala must be perceived
by our eyes also. Because the colourless ‘kfila’ is perceived
by our eyes, we have to modify the definitions of caksusa-
pratyaksa, which is caused by the colour of the object.
Accordingly colour is the cause of caksusapratyaksa except
in kala- pratyaksa (perception of time). This position should
be accepted regarding kale-caksusa. The same thing can be
said of akaéa also. Excepting the visual perceptions of the
akasa and the Rails, in other places. the colour is the cause
of visual perception. Therefore akESa can become an object
of visual perception though it is colourless.
The perceptibility of fikfis’a may be proved by the
paficikarana method also. According to paficflcarana method,
even akas'a is having colour. The method of paficikarana
would be discussed subsequently. Therefore skisa can become
an object of the visual perception. Prameyasarigraha1 explains
the same in clear terms. It says that kfila is the vastudharma
(the property of an object). It is grasped in every experience.
That is why it is not a separate entity. Both skies and dik
are having colour by trivrtkarana method.
Though there is no colour 1n the akasa and m the kfila,
they are perceived by our eyes, because they are always in
conjunction with the colourful objects.

1. halasya vastudharmatayd saruaprati'tyantarbhauat na prthag—

rl'ipatvaml gaganasya dis‘am ca trivrtkaranena rupauattvaml
Nyfiya-siddhdiijana, p. 52.
 The Philosophy of Visistndvaita 71

holding alofi of grass etc., and its shaking of branches etc.

Therefore viyu is known by the help of inferencel.
The heart of Naiyéyika is. that in vfiyupratyaksa, the
sparéa alone is known, but the substratum is not perceived.
The substratum is known through inference. This position
of imperceptibility of vfiyu is, the view held by old school
of Naiyéyikas (Pracina Naiyayikas). But according to
Navya-Naiyéyikas vfiyu is known by perceptionz.
NAIYAYIKA VIEW EXAMINED

The siddhantin raises the objection against this argu-

ment and says if véyu is inferred by the sense of touch,
then the knowledge of agni (fire), jala (water), and prthvi
(earth) must become inferential. Because even in their
perception one can perceive only their qualities, namely
touch. Their substratum should become the object of inference.
But this goes against experience. There is an experience
that ‘the pot is known by the sense of touch’. In the same
way, the perception of the vayu should be accepted on the
basis of the experience namely “I perceive the véyu by the
sense of touch". Perception of one’s own experience is more
powerful than any other means of knowledge. Therefore vayu
is known by tactual perception.

MOVEMENT OF VAYU
The movement of vayu is horizontal. It is due to Events
sankalpa (the fiat of the Lord). That flat is in the form of
‘Let there be horizontal movement in vfiyu, while there is
no striking to it by either earthen object or by other different
1. udyurhi spars'a-éabda-dhrti-kampuirunumlyate detIya-sparéena,
uilaksapa-éabdena, trnddindrh sakhddl'ném kampanena ca
vayomnumdndtl Nyfiyamuktflvali, p. 145.
2. navyfistu vc‘ryuh pratyahsah itydr‘rgicakruhl
Tarkaprakasab. Refer Nyayakoéa" p. 738.
72 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

vfiyus'. This position is accepted even by Kanfidsl. When

there are such strikings, the upward motion and downward
motions are formed in the vayu.
Véyu is of different types. If its movement is obstructed
either by the earthen substance or by the substance of water,
then it becomes standstill. known as stambhibhava (motion-
less stage) which is seen in bellows and rubber balls.
NATURE OF VAYU
Vsyu is odourless and possesses the touch which is
neither hot nor cold (anusna-élta—sparsa). Sometimes we
experience véyu possessing sparse, like sits (cold) or usna
(hot) and smell like saurabha (good smell). But these are
all due to its contact with, wean-sunlight, flowers etc.
VIEW OF AYURVEDA THINKERS AND ITS WINATION
According to the thinkers of Ayurvedsa, vsyu possesses
the sita- spars’a. The cold touch of the vimis notits special
character. It is the quality of the NEW!
In the body, the cold , increases the
vayu therein. Therefore, " statement, the
vayu is increased or deem '
”wt of water, that
is in the body. Therefore: ““tthe category of
-

the substance like jalaa.

This position of 7
is rebutted by
._-.
_;

accepting ‘anusns-éita In addition to the

will
_

' £1
foregone argument if with an experience
also. That experience says that ‘vayu is not cold’, when there

1. sammriréhanarh nfinfitualifigaml
vt'zyu Vax'sesikasutra, 2-1-14
Refer “evam éabda dhrtikampa api udyu lirigfim' jr'ieyfinil"
Vaiéesika-upaskara 2-1-9-10.
2. dehastha dhdtu uifiesaha m bhisqja ahuhl Nyéyakosa p. 733.
3. urddhih samdnaib sarvesdn': viparitair viparyayalzl
Nydya-aiddhfifijhna, p. 60.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 73

is no contact between jala and vayu. When there is contact

between jala and vayu, the experience will be as, ‘vayu, is
cool’. If the vayu belongs to the category of jala, then, it
should not have been the case. It should have got the touch
of cold for all time. Therefore the above said statement,
“Vrddhih samanaih sarvesam" etc., is not an universal
statement. An increase or decrease of a substance is not
due to sajatiya (belonging to the same category) substance
or vijatiya (belonging to different category) substance.
Therefore, vayu is different substance from jala and possesses
the anusna-sita-sparsa.
Vayu helps all beings, having four forms. The vayu
which helps the sense of touch, being identical with it, is
called indriyapyayaka (complementary to tvagindriya).
VAYU GETS DIFFERENT NAMES ACCORDING TO ITS ACTION

The second form of vayu is prana. It helps all embodied

beings. It is the prime supporter of the body.
The pranavfiyu, though it is one, gets different names
in accordance with the activities it performsl. Thus says
Bfidarayana
pafichaun‘tirmanovadvyapadiéyateI Brahman-a 2-4-11.
According to this sfitra, the prana, the spins, the vyana,
the udana and the samfina are different activities of prfina
itself. Though the word “prfina” covers all these activities.
it is also specially used in vrttiviéesa2 (special state).

1. In Nyayavaiéssika school also prana is one, but its activities are

different. “prdpastveka eua hrdddi nanasthanauasdt, mukha
nirgamfidi kriyfiuabdt ca nanflsafijflfirh labhatel"
Nyayasiddhanta-muktauali. p. 247.
2. According to Srl Anahdathlrths press is Parabrahmsn.
iti veddntinahl
“parabrahma. (Visnuh) prdnaéabdauacyam
Nyfiyahoéa, p. 533.
Refer Madhva-bhasya on Brahmasfltros, 1-1-23, ‘28.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 75

to exist in vayuloka. This type of body in vayuloka, is

admitted by Nya‘aya-vais’esika1 also.
The fourth vayu is different from the pranavayu,
ipyayaka-vayu and the vayu in. the form of a material cause
of the body. This is known as visayavayu. The
hurricane,
the air coming out of fan, etc., are example of this vayu.
TEJAS—AGNI
From the vayu, rfipa-tannifitra and therefrom the agni
is produced. Taittiri'ya says “uayoragnth” (Anandavalli,
1).
The 21in was produced from the vayu.HHere the word ‘agni’
implies tejas—light.
MATERIAL CAUSE OF AGNI DISCUSSED
Now the question is, whether the vayu is the material
cause or the instrumental cause to agn'i‘. In the statement
‘vayoragnih’, the paficami vibhakti implies the instrumental
cause but not the material cause. This type of interpretation
is accepted (to imply the instrumental causality) in the
sentence like ‘kulaladghatah'. Therefore, one has to accept
the vayu, as an instrumental cause but not the material
cause.
Another objection to admit vayu as a material cause
is, that it is against the perceptual evidence. In our experience
it is seen that the substance belonging to prthvi like a piece
of wood, grass,- and dried leaf turning into fire. But vayu
turning into fire is not seen. Vayu may assist the agni,
while the above mentioned articles are consumed by it.
Therefore, vayu is the instrumental cause of the agni.
To solve the above problem, present statement ‘vayo-
ragnih’ should be viewed in the light of previous sentences.
There it is cited that ‘15th is the material cause of akas’a
and akaéa is the material cause of vayu.
l. s'ariram vdyulokel Tarkasarigraha p. 17.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 77
INDRIYAS BELONGING T0 TEJAS

The substance which possesses the hot touch and the

colour of brilliance is called light. Light is the puraka
(complementing) and apyfiyaka (causing fullness) to indriyas
like the vak (speech) and the caksus (eye). This is evident
in the s’rutilz ‘That this vak is made up of light. The sun
is in the form of caksus. He is present here with his rays’.

TEJAS IS NEEDED FOR PERCEPTION

Light is necessary for the perception of things. For

those who apply collyrium to the eyes, too much light is not
necessary. Even for owl, light is not needed for the perception
of objects. Light is necessary in the perception of everything,
except in the perception of darkness. Because the darkness
is known in the absence of the light. The light which helps
indriya to work efficiently. is called indriya-fipyfiyaka-tejas.

TYPES OF TEJAS

The next form of the tejas (light) is vaiévanara (the

fire of digestion in the stomach). Vaiévfinara digests the food
and drinks with the help of prana, apina, etc.
The third type of tejas is the material cause of the
taijasa (full of light) type of body. This type of body is in
the world of Agni and Surya. In producing these bodies the
light gets mixed with other four bhfitas (elements).
The fourth type of tejas is different from all the three
groups mentioned above. It is called visaya-tejas. This type
of tejas helps the beings in the form of moon-light, sunshine,
lightening and earthly fire.

1. tejamayi uanl fidityab caksusi bhfitvd aksizli pn‘wisatal

raémibhireso'smin pratisthitahl Brhaddrapyaka, 7-5-1.
78 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

KSANIKATVA OF LAUKIKA AGNI

Among these four types of tejas, the laukika-agni, which

is of the form of flames, is transitory because the laukika-agiii
is destroyed when its fisraya is destroyed. Therefore this
type of agni is ksanika (transitory). The experience of the
same flame in the lamp even afier a lapse of long time is
due to erroneous pratyabhijfifi. (recognition) which identifies
the object, present before, with the object which is already
perceived, on the basis of similarity in both.
This ksanikatva (transitoriness) is different from the
ksanikatva of Buddhism. Here the siddhantin opines that
the ksanikatva means ‘fiéutara vinééitvam’ (lasting only three
or four minutes).
In a lamp, the oil, and the wick are the material of
the flame. Each one of them produces different flames. But
one has to accept, that they all are destroyed after a while.
If it is not so, then one should have perceived many different
flames. But the difference among the produced flames is
evident. This fact is admitted by Nathamuni. He says1 in
Tattua-ratnakara: ‘The movement of flames in a lamp is
perceived like the movement in water’.‘Though there are
different flames. they are known as one. It is due to erroneous
identity. The difl'erenoe among the flames is visible for a
careful observer.
Some philosophers like Sankara who are influenced by
Buddhist ksanikavada argue that the flames are destroyed
without a cause. This position is not correct. because this
leads us once again to the refuted ksanikavada of Buddhism.
In this world nothing is destroyed without a cause. Adrsta
and Isvara are the causes of everything. In fact, the
destruction is not a negative aspect of a thing. It is bhava-rfipa
1. nipunaniriksane ca jalavenikfivatjualasaficfiramm drSyatel
Quoted in Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 63.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 79

(positive). The substance which is of bhava-n'lpa cannot be

produced without a cause. In Viéistadvaita niéa is nothing
but the subsequent avasthfi occupying the antecedent
avastha. Since it is bhava-rfipa, it must have a cause.

DIVISIONS OF TEJAS ACCORDING TO NAIYAYIKA

Some philosophers1 group the visaya type of tejas (light)

into four different categories, namely, bhauma—belonging to
the earth (fire); divya—light of the sun; audarya—digestive
fire and dkaraja—products of mine, pearls, gold, silver etc.

DIVISION OF TEJAS ACCORDING TO VISIs'I‘ADVAITA

Tejas may be divided into two groups in another way.

They are prabha (radiance) and prabhavat (that which
possesses the prabha). Here the prabha is defined as2 the
substance which expands and contracts with the presence
and absence of the obstruction respectively. The expansion
of the prabha depends upon the presence or the absence of
an obstruction. If there is an obstruction, the expansion of
prabhfi is limited. Otherwise, it is unlimited. It also depends
on its speed.
Prabha comes into being while its aéraya is born, and
becomes extinct while the aaraya is extinguished.
The tejas which possessed this prabha is called
prabhfivat. ‘tadviéispam tejah prabhc‘wat’ (Nydya-
siddhc'zfijana, p. 65). Pearls, sun, lamps, etc, are the examples
of it.

1. Nyfiya-vais'esikas say “visayaScaturvidhahl bhauma, divya,

audarya-dkaraja bheddt Tarkasarigraha, p. 16.
2. fwara[Ia—sadasadbh&uddin&-sarikocauikdsah yathfi vegaéaktya-
dhisthfina-deéfidhikadeéaprasdri tejouiéesah prabhal
Nyéya-siddhdr'u'ana, P. 64.
 The Philosophy of Vis‘istadvaita 81

GANDHA TMTM
From the jala, gandha-tanmatra is born and from there
the prtth comes out. Its definition1 is—“The substance which
possesses smell as its special property and possesses taste
and touch."
PRTIIVI: DEFINITION AND ITS NATURE
In the prthvi, at first, there was saurabha (good smell),
madhurya (sweetness) and krsnarfipa (black colour). The
touch of anusnaéita (neither hot nor cold) continues to be
there. SIta-sparéa or usnasparéa is attributed to prthvi, while
it gets contact with jala or tejas. The existence of the black
colour in the prtth is stated in the Veda also: ‘flyatkrszzam
tadannasya” (Chandogya, 6-5-4). But different colours are
experienced in the earth because of palm2 (change under
heat).
INDRIYA AND VISAYA OF PRTHVI

Prthvi’ is apyayaka of mana-indriya and ghranendriya.

The material cause of the bodies of the human beings. the
animals and immovables is the prthvl.
The visaya prtth is of the type of mud, stones plants
and tamas (darkness).

DRAWA'I‘VA 0F DARKNESS DISCUSSED

It is a disputed fact, to accept darkness as a dravya
in many schools of philosophy. According to siddhanta,
darkness is a dravya and is included in the visaya group
of prtth. But it cannot be. Because darkness means the

1. visigtagandhauattuaml rasavattue sati uiéifia-sparéauattvam ityfidi

tallaksanaml Nydya-siddhéijana, P. 67.
2. annamayan’: Iu' saumya manahl dpydyante ca te nityaml
(Chandogya, 6-5-4).
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 83
The great Mimarnsaka like Kumarila and the great logicians
like Udayana have written much on the tamas and have
held the different View on tamas. According to Kumfirila
Bhatta, Sankhyas and Kandalfltara, tamas is a separate
dravya. According to them it possesses colour. Kumfirila
explains, although light is needed in the visual perception,
in the perception of tamas, its assistance is not necessary.
Because the nature of tamas is such. According to Vaiéesikas1
tamas is not a separate dravya. It is only the negation of
light. According to Prabhakara, non-perception of colour is
tamas. Ramamisra II (refer introductory chapter), seems to
have held the view, that tamas is not dravya. According to
him tamas is the non—perception of colour. The colour of
objects are not known while eyes are closed and that itself
is tamas. Desika opines that this view is against the Bhasya,
Sruti and smrti.

CONTRADICTION OF TA’I'I'VARATNAKARA SOLVED

Even a passage in Tattuaratnfikara appears to have
held the view that the tamas is mfilaprakrti. There the
author says: "atra tattvauidab prdhuh sthalasflksmadina
sthital daiui gunamayi' nu'zyd bdhydntaratamo mata". There-
fore tamas cannot be the pdrthiua-dravya. Tattuaratndkara
is the work of Paraéara Bhattaraka who is pre-Vedanta
Deéika Viéistadvaita acarya. (Refer Introduction-Chapter 1).
Regarding tamas, the great thinkers opine that it is in the
form of sthfila (gross) and suksrna (subtle). It is of the form
of both internal and external tamas.
Desika after discussing this stanza, elaborately, con-
cludes that, here andhakflra is not the mfilaprakrti. The
author of Tattvarantdkara refers only prakrta-tamas which
is opposed to the light. This explanation is coherent with

1. udbhdtarfipauadyfiuattejassamsargfi bhfivastamahl
Vaiéeeiha-upaakaru, 5-2-20.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 85

They are: mfiya, purusa, éiva-tattva, sakti-tattva, sadfis’iva-

tattva, Iévara-tattva vidya-tattva, kala-tattva, niyati, kala,
vidya and raga.
Among them, the twenty-four tattvas beginning from
prakrti are already accepted in the Viéistfidvaita system. In
addition to them, the Isvara and lea elements make the
number into twenty-six. If kala is accepted as a separate
principle, then, the number becomes twenty-seven. However,
Des’ika points out that among these twenty-six or twenty-
seven (including kale) tattvas, the remaining Saivagama
tattva can be accommodated
Maya and purusa come under triguna dravya and jiva
respectively.
The five tattvas beginning from s’iva-tattva are timeless.
Therefore, they all come under one tattva but not different
tattvas. This position is accepted by thinkers of the Saiva
school also. Des'ika quotes their own sayings. He says, that
Saiva philosophers themselves have stated1 this in clear
words. Because the five tattvas beginning from siva-tattva
are timeless, they all belong to one tattva. But the division
is made in sastras only according to their activities. Further,
there is only one tattva viz., éiva—tattva. The lévara-tattva
is not éiva-tattva, but on the basis of several scriptures, it
should be admitted that it is Narayana-tattva. He is the
Sarvesvara. He is difl'erent from Siva. He is the soul of both
cit and acit. This position of Upanisadic thinkers will be
explained in detail in Room pariccheda.
Among the remaining five tattvas, raga is not a different
tattva, because, it is one of the states of knowledge.
1. tathd hi tairevoktam, paficfinfimapyesdrh na hi kramo'stlha
kdlamhitatvfitl uyfipémuafiadzsflm uihitfi kluilu kalpaniéfistrell
tattvarh vastuta ekan‘i fivasafljflam citra salm' khacitan'r tatl
Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 77.
86 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

The vidyfi-tattva is considered by Saiva thinkers as the

cause of knowledge. But Deéika says, it is unnecessary to
accept vidya-tattva as a separate tattva because the indriyas
like manas and others are suflicient causes in the production
of knowledge. Therefore it is not a separate tattva.

KALATATTVA ACCORDING TO s'AIvAGAMA AND

ITS EXAMINATION

According to the thinkers of éaivagama school, kalfi is

a separate tattva which wards ofi' the mala (the dirt), namely,
pipe and punya (merits and demerits) of the jiva. It produces
kartr-s’akti in him and so becomes the cause of the effect,
namely, beginning from the mahat to prthvl.
Deéika says that there is suing-“thing, which produces
the mahat, etc., in the above explained way, then it is not
different from the aksaravastlfi, which is the cause of
avyakti-avasthi (the stage of. West). The same tattva

mWa
can be called as kale or by smasher name. But we cannot
attribute the to it. Kartr-s’akti is
produced in the jive by the ”ledge produced by our
senses and our karma whidliljn- the form of merits and
demerits. Therefore. .ksli is not in difl‘erent tattva.

NIYATI 0F SAIvAGAMA
The conventional interpretation of the niyati, according
to the Saiva school is that it controls the world. This meaning
of the word ‘niyati’ can be explained in three ways. If it
means the niyantr-sakti (capacity to control the world) of
the Lord, then, it is not different from his sankalpa, the
will of the almighty.
If it means the power of niyama to produce the results,
it is nothing but karma, which is of the form of papa and
punya and not a different tattva.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 87

If it means that “this cause1 produces this effect and

not others”, type of power which controls the effect, then
this is a power which resides in the cause itself. So then
also niyati cannot become a difl'erent tattva apart from the
accepted tattvas. The Pdiicarc'ztra and Ahirbudhnyasan’thitc‘z
enumerate niyati as an entity. But they only mean that it
is the power of objects and not as separate entity.

KALA ACCORDING TO VIs’IsrADVAITA

The thinkers of s’aivagama say that kala is produced

by maya. To accept kéla as a created element is to accept
its beginning. In Visnupurdna (1-2-26), Parasara says:
“anddirbhagauan kc’zlah nc'mta’sya duq'ia vidyate” that kala
is anadi and it is ‘ananta’ also. It has neither beginning nor
end. This agama goes counter to the accepted position of
éaivagama thinkers. So kfila is not a separate entity in the
sense in which it is explained by them.
ETERNALITY 0F KALA AND ITS PRESENCE IN
NITYA-VIBHUTI-

Kala has neither srsti nor pralaya. But without kala

to think of srsti and pralaya is impossible.
In nitya-vibhfiti or the supreme world of eternal glory,
there is kale. Here it is not independent. It is dependent
on the objects that exist in nitya-vibhfiti. That is why it is
said “na kc‘dastatra vai prabhuh” (Moksadharmaparva,
198-9). Time is not the controller in nitya-vibhfiti. In
nitya-vibhfiti every thing is nitya (eternal). To accept
kfilasambandha to an object is to accept perishability to it.
In that sense kala is not prabhu or the controller in nitya-
vibhfiti. If we don’t accept kala in nitya-vibhfiti, then Smti
‘sadd pas’yanti sfirayah’ (The eternals always perceive the
Lord's abode) becomes falsified.
1. tattaJ.‘ sualuirya karanfidi uiuaksdyaml Nyaya-siddhar‘ijana. p. 79.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 89

The above discussion makes it clear, that vibhudravyas

(the object of all pervasive nature) also transform into
different things. Among vibhudravyas there is no ‘avayava-
parivartana’ type of vikara; but there is 'avasthantara-prapti'
(getting different stage) type of vikara. If this position is
not admitted in vibhu-dravyas, they have to loose their
vibhutva itself.
The very meaning of the word ‘vibhu’ namely
‘sarvamfirta-dravya-sarhyogitva’.conjunction with all limited
things, indicates vikara. Here samyoga indicates vikara. If
there is no samyoga then, how can it become a vibhu-drayva,
which has the samyoga with all ‘mfirta-dravya' (things having
finite measure).
Vibhutva and vikaritva are not oontradictories. There-
fore, both of them reside in kala as well as in Even
without
any contradiction. Vedanta Desika quotes Rfimfmuja, accept-
ing vikfiritva for kala in his Vedfirtha-sarigrahal.
Narayanarya in his Mtimt‘zla2 accepts vikaritva for kala.
Kala is anadi and ananta. Kala is always
transforming into
minutes, days, nights etc.
Like Prabhakara school, Vis'istadvaitin also accepts that
kale is perceptible to our six senses. Whenever
an object is
grasped, kfila is also known with it, as an attribute.
Though
kfila is known by agama, it must be
perceptible, because of
its perception by a common man who does not know agama.
Hills is also vibhu. Because it is known as an attribute of

1. nimesa-kc'lsghd-kdla-muhanddi-pardrdhapalyanta-aparimita-
uyauaccheda-suaraps-samotpattisthiti-uinaéadi-sarvaparinama-
nimittabh1'4ta-kfilakrtapariadmfisprstdnantamhduibhfltih |
Vedarflta-sangraha p. 48.
2. kalo'nfidyanantah ajasraksazla parinfimi muhfirtfihordtrédi-
vibhégavdn parindma-parispanda hetuhl
Nydya-siddhafljana, p. 83.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 91

The Nyéya-vaiéesika school discusses elaborately the

M121 and includes it in the group of substances. The substance
which is the special cause of the day to-day usage, namely
to-day, tomorrow etc., is called kala. According to Annam-
bhatta the substance ‘kala’ is the cause of vyavahara (a kind
of temporal usage): Annambhatta says: “atitddi-uyauahara-
hetuh kdlahl” (Tarkasarigraha, p. 11.)
But to Viswanathal time is the cause of things that
are produced, and is considered to be the substratum of the
universe. Further he explains a perception such as “now
there is the jar” takes into consideration the motion of the
sun and so on. When this happens, one has to accept that
there is same relation between the jar etc., and the motion
of the sun and so forth. Now that relation cannot be
conjunction etc. So time alone is assumed to be the relation
between them. In this way kala is considered to be the
substratum of the universe.
Vis’vanatha gives another proof also. The extraordinary
cause of the motion of priority and posterity is time. Kala
is converted into a moment, a day, a month, or a year etc.,
owing to its limiting adjuncts. Kala is known by inference.
“aparasminnaparam yugapacciram ksipramiti kdlalirigfinil"
(Vaiéesikasatra, 2-2-6.)
Though there are innumerable objects in the universe,
how is it correct to say that there are only
twenty-five
tattvas? Des’ika says that we should not count all the objects
that are in vyasti-srsti and those objects of
vyasti-srsti will
be included in the prthvl-tattva.
Therefore, the-number of
the tattvas will not increase as the number of objects
increases.
These tattvas transform into their next states
only in
l. janydndm janakah ktilo jagatamfiérayomatahl
Bhasd—paricceda, 46.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 93

The process adopted to get the proportion is called

'paficfltarana’ (quintuplication).
The process of paiicikarana can be explained in the
following way. In the beginning the Lord divides all the five
elements into two parts. Further he takes one part out of
them and divides it into four parts. All these four parts are
added into other four halves, excluding their own other half.
For example, we can apply the abbve explained process
to akasa. In fikfiéa there is one half of itself and another
half which is made up of one-eighth of the remaining four
elements, which constitutes one-fourth of the other half. The
result of this process is called skaéa. The remaining bhutas
are formed in the same way. Though, the five bhfitas are
mixed, in each bhfita, the preponderance of a particular
bhfita, is the cause of its name and usage. On account of
the same reason one bhfita is not called by the name of the
other bhfita.
Having completed this paficl'karana process, the
almighty, being an antaryamin (the immanent one) to all
jivas, makes them to experience their past karma. For this
purpose, He makes ijas to enter into the objects of prakrti
and prakrta. He also creates brahmanda (the cosmic egg)
which consists of seven avaranatattvas. In that brahmfinda,
He creates manas, caksus, vak, arotra, nasika and nabhi-
kamala. In one of these seven places the Lord creates the
caturmukha (four-faced) Brahman out of his prasada. Out
of His krodha (anger) He creates Rudra. This explanation
is based on Sruti, which says, that Narayana was only one in
the beginning of creation and there was no Brahma or Is'vara.
From Narayana the four-faced Brahma was born and then
the three eyed Siva who had triéfila in his hand was boml.
1. eko ha vai ndrdyana dsInna brahma neédnahl tatra brahmé
caturmukho jdyatal tryaksah éfllapaziib purusofidyatll
Mahopanisad, 1.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 95

are boml. It looks as though prana is a different tattva.

But sfitrakara says: "na udyukriye prthagupades‘dt I"
(Brahmaszitra, 2—4-8.) “Though the separate creation is stated
to prana, it is nothing but véyu visesa itself’." So the same
method should be followed in the case of dik also.
Once again this position of Deéika contradicts the
statement of Prameya-sarigraha, which says, both Mama and
dik are having colour because they are created by trivrt-
karanaz. Deéika explains this statement by pointing out that
dik is created by a bhuta which is formed by paficikarana.
Anyhow, dik is not a separate entity.
Thus beginning from brahmanda to stamba (a clump
of grass) the world is made up of paficIkarana. Though every
object contains the content of other objects, the predominance
of a particular bhuta becomes the cause of the usage. Here
Desika quotes the authority of Brahma-slum, which gives
the above meaning “vaiéesyéttu tadvadastadvt‘zdabl”
(Brahmasfitra, 2-4-19.)
The way in which paficikaran’a is explained, Des'ika
says ‘saptlkarana’ and ‘asfikarana'3 also are accepted. Deéika
says, that bhasyakara opines that ksetra (body) is formed
out of eight substances. Commenting on Gfta, Ramfinuja
says, the five mahabhfitas (from prthvi to akasa) ahahkéra,
buddhi and avyakta are the causes of this éarlra. which is
called as ksetra“. Therefore, our body is caused by
1. etasmc'zfidyate prazw manussaruendriyéni cal Mundaha, 2-1-3.
2. gaganasya discin‘i ca triurtkaranena rfipavattvaml
Quoted in Nyaya-siddhdiliana. p. 92.

3. asgadravyopdddndni-prakrti-mahad-ahankdra
paficabhfitdtmakfistadrvyopadanani ityarthabl
Rangardmanqia bhasya on Nyaya-siddhafiiana, p. 94.

4. mhfibhfitdnyahankfiro buwhimvyaktameua ceti ksetrfirambhaka

drauydm' I
Girabhaqya, 13-5.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istfidvaita 97

ways. The Nyaya-vais'esika school also defines éarlra in its

own way. All schools of Vedanta critically examine the
definition given by the Nyaya-vaiéesika school and finally
give their own definition. So does Vedanta Deéika also.

DEFINITION OF SARlRA OFFERED BY

NYAYA—VAISESIKAS AND ITS EXAMINATION

The Nyaya-vaiéesika school defines sarira as “cesgten-

driyarthaérayah éarirahl" (Gautama-nyayasatra, 1-1-11.)
From this definition we can deduce three different
definitions. They are:‘ cestaérayatvam, indriyasrayatvam,
bhogaérayatvam
For all these three definitions, they add another dala
(piece) in the body of definitionl. That dale is 'antyavayavitva'
(the final state or whole of the effect). All these definitions
can be applied in the case of our body.
Our body includes limbs like hands, legs, etc., They are
antyavayavas. Our body is also a locus for all types of
movements. This explanation shows the applicability of the
first definition.
As our body is the substratum of the senses, the second
definition, i.e., ‘indriyaérayah’ becomes applicable to sarira.
Body of birds, animals and human beings experience
the pleasure and pain. So it is the bhogasthana. Therefore
the third definition is also applicable.
Deéika refutes all these definitions, showing different
fallacies committed by them.
The first definition, namely, ‘cestaérayatva’ commits the
fallacy of ‘ativyapti’ (being too wide), because cestj means

1. cespfiuadantyfiuayaui vrtti dmuyatua vyapya jatimatvam

antyfivayavi matra vrtti cestduadvrtti jdtimatvan’z mi tat!
Nydya-sidddnta-muhmuafl, p. 123.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 99

Deéika adds another objection to this definition in

addition to the first one. The dead body is called éarira,
though it is not indriyaéraya. According to the second
definition the dead body should not be called sarira.
Deéika next proceeds to examine the third definition,
i. e., ‘bhogayatanatva” of Nyaya school. In the definition the
word ‘ayatana’ is used. What does this word ‘ayatana' mean?
If it means cause, then whichever is the cause of experience
of our bhoga (sukha or duhkha) becomes éarira. According
to this interpretation of the definition, our body is the éarira.
But it commits the fallacy of ‘avyapti' (being too narrow)
because the bodies of muktas (etemals) can experience only
the sukha and not duhkha and yet their body is Sarita. Then
this definition cannot be applied to the sariras of the muktas.
To avoid this fallacy, if it is said that only ‘sukhayatana’
is called sarira, then it excludes the bodies of narakins
(residents of hell) by which it commits avyépti.
If only duhkhayatana is sarira, then it commits once
again the fallacy of ‘avyapti' in muktfi-mukta—éarira and the
éarira of human beings and animals, etc.
In addition to this, the bhoga-samagri (the cause of
bhoga) like buildings and vehicles also should be called
éarira, because they are also causes of our bhoga. So the
third definition is also fallacious. So far, the definitions given
by nyaya and vaiéesika thinkers, are examined. A definition
should be devoid of fallacies like ‘avyapti’, ‘ativyfipti' and
‘asambhava’. It should also include all objects that are desired
to be covered. It should also be in accordance with scriptures.
Then it becomes a sallaksana (perfect definition). Desika
says, that Rimanuja in his Sribhasya gives such a definition
which is untouched by such fallacies.
ms punposs OF DEFINING SARIRA IN VEDANTA
Now the purvapaksin may ask what is the propriety
 101
The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

DEFINITION or SARiRA ACCORDING TO VISISTADVAITIN

Deéika after establishing the necessity for the discussion

of sarira in this context, quotes from the Sribht‘zsya, wherein
Ramanuja defines sarira. Sarlral, is that which is always
controlled, supported and is used to his own satisfaction by
a cetana. The definition of sarl'ra given by Udayanacarya,
the greatest logician of 8th century A. D. in his Nydya-
kusumdfijali (5th stabaka) also resembles this definition:
“prayatnauadadhisieyatvarh sariratvam I"

Ramfinuja commenting on Brahmasatra, raises several

objections against éarira-sariribhfiva in the sfitra: “apitau
tadvatprasarigddasamafijasam” (2-1-8). In the very next sfitra
itself namely, “na tu drsydntabhdvat” (Brahmasatra, 2-2-9)
he criticises the objection of pl'u'vapaksin and establishes,
the sarira-sariribhava relation between the world, which is
cetana-acetanatmaka and the Sarveévara. In that context
Ramanuja gives the above mentioned definition which is
based on Upanisadic teachings. This is based on the statement
of Brhadéranyakopanisad which says, He who dwells in the
earth and is within the earth, whom the earth does not
know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from
within, He is your self, the inner controller, immortalz.
Desika says only'this' definition is in accordance with the
Sruti. He says, this definition alone is universally applicable
and is intended by Ramanujaa.

1. yasya cetanasya yadrfipam sarvdtmand sudrtheniyanturh dhdray-

itum ca sakyarh tacchesataikasuarfipam ca tat tasya sarlraml
Sribhasya, p. 457.
2. yah prthiuydn'i tisihan prthiuyd antaro yam prthivi na veda yasya
prthivi éariran'u Brhadfiranyaka, 5-7-7.

2. sarvapmyagdnugunarh idameva érutisiddharh uyfipakan'u

lakéanamiti bhdsyakfirabhipdyahl Nyaya’siddhafljana, p. 99.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 103

The second definition is, ‘A substance which supported

with its attributes by a cetana is the sarira of that cetana’l.
This second definition of sarlra shows the relation of
adhara-adheya-bhava, that exists between s’arira and s'ariri.
The adhara~adheya-bhava relation exists between two things.
In the example “bhutalam ghatavat”, bhfitalarh is adhara
(container) and ghata is adheya (contained). Here ghata the
pot, depends on bhfitala. It may be illustrated with another
example also, namely “rfipayan ghatah”. In this example,
rfipa is adheya and ghata is adhara, because rupa (colour)
depends on ghata (the pot) for its existence. In the above
two examples, the relation that exists between them is
adhéra-fidheya-bhfiva.
This relation can be seen in our bodies also. The
existence of our body depends on 'the cetana who resides
inside. So our body is adheya and cetana is fidhéra. This
relation exists between them until the body exists.
In the same way, the entire world is the body of Is’vara;
because the cetana-acetana—fitmaka prapafica depends on
Isvara for its existence. So the prapafica is adheya and the ,

Iévara is adhara. The prapafica is aprthaksiddha (inseparable

attribute) of Iévara. Therefore, prapafica is the sarIra of the
Lord.
The third definition of sarlra- is, ‘that substance which
is always a s’esa, with its attributes to cetana is the sarira
of that cetanaz'. According to this definition, the substance

1. yasya cetanasya yadauastharh dmvyam yfiuatsattan‘i dharyam

tadavasthan‘z tasya éarIramiti dviflyan'i laksanaml
Nyflya-siddhfifijana, p. 102.
2. tathd yasya cetanasya yadavastham dmvyarh yavatsattam
a$e§atdnarharh tadauasyam tasya sariram iti trtiyan‘z laksanaml
Nyfiya-siddhdfljana, p. 102.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 105

(instrument) and éesa (existing for the fulfilment of others

purposes) to the cetanal.
He gives another2 definition which is the quintessence
of the previous four definitions, i.e., excepting the ls’vara
and His dharma-bhfita-jfiéna, the remaining entire universe
is called sarira. From this we can deduce that prakrti and
all its transformations, kala, nityavibhfiti and jiva are called
sarira.
THE DIVISIONS OF SARIRA
Thus defined, éarira is of two kinds. They are nitya-
s’arira and anitya-s’arira. Prakrti and its transformations,
kfila, jiva, divyamangala vigraha (éarira) of Paravésudcva
and the bodies of etemals andliberated souls are called
nitya-s’arira. Because they are the subhas’raya of
Paravasudeva.
The Visruipurdruz explains these bodies in details3. The
anitya éar'ira is of two types. One is not formed of karma
and another is made up of karma. The twenty-three tattvas
beginning from mahat to prthvi, excluding Paravfisudeva,
Sankarsana, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, the bodies of twelve
mfirtis like Keéava, Madhava, etc., (they are called
‘vyuhantaramfirtis ’) the innumerable incarnations like Rama
and Krsna, are all impermanent bodies worn by the Lord
1. tn'bhirupalaksitasyaiva cetanfiprthaksiddhasya pravrttinimittatvdt
na kas’cidapai dosalzl Nydya-siddhdrijana, p. 103.
2. iéuara tadifldna vyatirihtarh dravyarh éarlrumiti ufi tagastha.
laksagiaml Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 103.
3. samastdh éaktayaécaitd nma yatra pratisthitfihl
taduiéuarapavairapyam rapanwnyaddharennahat ll
samastaéaktirapdni tat karoti janesvaral
devatiryarig manugydkhydh ceétavanti sualllayéll
§ubhd§rayah sacittasya saruagaaya calazmanalil
Visnupurdna, 6-7-70. 71, 76.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 107

that every word, formed by the combination of prakrti and

pratyaya, such as deva, manusyah, yaksah. raksasah, paksi
etc., are the denotations of jlvatman and finally the
Paramatman.
Ramanuja in his commentary on Gita points out that
the jiva gets the lower bodies because of his karma. This
is clear in the Bhasya on the stoma; “firdhvan‘z gacchanti
sattuasthdh I” (Gitd, 14-18). Those who follow the righteous
path go to the heaven.
The jangama group 'of bodies is of four types. They are
deva, manusya, tiryak and nflraki.
The asura, yaksa, raksasas belong to the different deva
groups. Human beings who live in bhuloka belong to manusya
group. They are bound by the rules of éfistras. Even devas
have to follow these s'astras, because the sastras prescribe
expiatory rites like sacrifice, penance and reception of
Brahmavidya for them also. Animals, birds and serpents
belong to tiryak group of jangamas.
The bodies of naraki is famous in hell, like raurava.
Their bodies are the locus of miseries only.
The jangama type of bodies once again can be divided
into two groups. They are yonija and ayonija. Bodies of deva,
manusya and tiryak belong to these types of bodies. Among
devas the body of the four-faced Brahma and the body of
Madhukaitabha which are born of nfibhikamala and the will
of almighty respectively and even the bodies of sages like
Sanaka, Kardama, Narada, Pulasya, Atri etc., are ayonijas.
Among human beings the bodies of Dhrstadyumna, Draupadi
are ayonijas. Among tiryaks the bodies of Airavata, Ucchai-
éravas etc., are ayonijas. The yon'rja type of bodies among
these three groups are well known. The bodies of narakins
also is ayonija because those bodies are taken by jivas only
to reap the results of their evil-deeds.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 109

are the bodies of ls’vara. Brahman is the saririn or inner-

self of all other entities, whether it is sentient or non-sentient
entity. This idea is the fundamental special concept of
Vis’istfidvaita philosophy and is called “pradhana-pratitantra”
(distinguishing differential) of this system. This concept of
sarira-éariri bhava is not an invention of Ramanuja. This
concept is deduced from the infallible scriptures and the
experiences of great sages and reason. There are two types
of scriptures. One is bheda-éruti, which establishes the
plurality of entities. Another is abheda—s’ruti, which estab-
lishes simple unity. This apparent contradiction is not solved
satisfactorily either by the school of Advaita or Dvaita. But
Raménuja solves this contradiction by making Brahman the
saririn of all beings, and by this concept the school of
Ramanuja binds all plurality into unity.
In sadvidyfi, the Upanisadic passage 'sadeva saumya
idamagra asit ekameua aduitfyam...’ (Chandogya Upanisad
6-2-1) affirms in unmistakable terms that the universe is
rooted in Brahman. Chandogya Upanisad (6-9, 10) expounds
by means of various similies, the inner unity between
Brahman and the jiva. The Antarydmi Brc'zhmazza of the
Brhaddrazzyakopanisad clearly establishes1 the truth of s'arira
and s’ariri relation. These passages of the Upanisad are
called ghataka (reconciliatory) érutis, as they reconcile the
extremes of advaita and dvaita. Thus the truth of éarira-
s’ariribhava is proved by scriptures. Ramanuja explains this
Upanisadic phi1050phy in detail in many placesz.

1. yasyz'zpab sari'ram, 5-7-8: yasyfikdéah sariram, 5—7-16; yasyaprt‘znah

éariram, 5-7-20; yasyaprthiui éariram, 5-7-7; yasya tamah éariram,
5-7-17; yasya dtmd éariram, 5-7-30.
yasyavyuktam sariram Subalopanisad 7.

2. sarvan'i cetanacetanan'i prati brahmaziah fitmatvena sarvan'i

sacetanarr‘i tasya sari-ram bhauatil S'rlbhasya 1-1—13.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 111

of Brahmavidya as sarirakamimamsé. (Enquiry in to the

inner-self 1).
Desika explained the concept of s’arira all-comprehen-
sively and it holds good for any kind of
satireThe substance
which is supported, sustained and used by a cetana for his
satisfaction only, is called sarira. This concept is: based on
this
the scriptural passages and experience. To establish
spiritual relationship Vedanta Desika explained the concept
of s’arlra according to Naiyayika school and examined it.

CONCLUSION OF JADA-PARICCHEDA
Vedanta Desika thus has explained the jada padarthas
in a vital way. The proper understanding of the world also
leads the individual self to liberation. The Upanisad declared
“ydthdtathyato arthc’m vyadadhdt saévatibhyah samabhyalz I"
(Ishaopanisad, 8). One who understands the world as it is
he gets freedom from bondage.
Gautama brings out the essence of Upanisads in the
“Nyéyasatras” when he says “duh/tho janma pravrtti
mithyc'zjfldnfinan‘i uttara uttara apaye tad-anantara-apayfid
apauargahl (Nydya-siddhdfijana, 1—1-2). That apavarga (libe-
ration) follows when erroneous knowledge is destroyed. If
the five causes of sorrow viz., pain (duhkha), birth (janma),
effort (pravrtti), faults (dose) and erroneous knowledge
(ajfiana or mithyfijfifina) are destroyedz.
The right knowledge expels the erroneous knowledge.

1. atha euedan'i parambrahma adhikrtya praurttan't {rostrum

sarirahamityabhiyuktair abhidhiyatel Srlbhasya, p. 246.
2. Dr. Radhakrishnan says: “All the systems have for their ideal
complete mental poise and freedom from the discards and
uncertainties, sorrows and sufferings of life, a repose that ever is
the same, which no doubt disturb and no rebirths break into".
Indian Philosophy II, p. 26.
 The Philosophy of Viéistndvajta 113

The entire prakrti is the body of the Lord, which

esses different qualities, colours, such as lol-u'ta (red)
s, s’ukla (white) sattva and Eng-$1.13 (black) tamas. Therefore,

understanding or the knowledge of the body of the

man (Visnu) is very essential.

*
 Chapter III

JIVA

GENERAL-INTRODUCTION

Vedfinta-Deéika, afier dealing elaborately with prakrti

and kale, in the jade-pariccheda, now begins to deal with
itman which is the pivotal problem of all the philosophical
systems in India. '11:: subject atman, has been widely
discussed in all systems of Indian Philosophy.
In fact, all systems aim at annavalokana. We are told
to seek Paramfitman through atmavalokana. The final goal
of Karmayoga, Jfifinlyoga, Bhaktiyoga is to realize this
reality i.e., atman.
Then, what is this ltmnn? Viéistidvaita psychology of
jive is founded on tin minority of the Upanisads, sfitras
and the Gite and thefll‘flnubhava or experience of the self.
Therefore it should“: the character and nature of the
atrium and in doing-'0, it ebuld demonstrate the peculiar
nature of the atman hinted in this system.
In the philosoply d Viéietldvaita the atman is not
merely one of the prameya, but the sole prameya (object
known by the valid
m d' knowledge). The introductory
stanza of this work state—“prameyamabhidadmahe”. There-
fore, the discussion of ltman in this context is appropriate.

DEFINITION or ATMAN ACCORDING TO VISIsrADVAITA

Accordingly. Deéika at first defines atman leatman).

He says: “alpa‘parimazcatve sati jfidtrtvaml sesame sati
jfiatrtvam, ityddi tallaksapam I” (Nydya-siddhafiiana, p. 113).
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 115

According to the system of Visistadvaita, the 51th is

atomic in size and also the substratum of knowledge by the
relation of aprthaksiddhi. Tévara also possesses knowledge
but he is not atomic in size. In the first definition, if the
first piece or dala is not added, then it commits the fallacy
of overlapping in lsvara. Because He also possesses jfiana
and hence He is also a jfiata. Therefore lévara becomes the
substratum of jfiana. If the first part is added to the body
of the definition then, the fallacy becomes warded off, because
ls’vara does not possesses alpa-parimfina. He is Vibhu. If
the second part, i.e., “ji'iatrtva” is not added in the body of
definition, then it commits the fallacy of overlapping in
trasarenu (triad), because triad also possesses atomic size.
Here in this definition the word ‘jfiatrtva’ means the
possession of knowledge which is intended to be in atman,
by the relation of aprthaksiddhi (inseparability). Otherwise,
it commits the fallacy of 'ativyapti’ in objects, like ghata
(pot) pata (cloth), etc., because whenever an object is known,
the known object becomes the jfiana-as’raya (locus of
knowledge) by the peculiar relation, i.e., visayatva. Visayata
exists in the known object. Therefore, to avoid this fallacy,
jfiatrtva must be attributed to atman by the relation of
aprthaksiddhi.
The second definition states that the substance which
possesses the sesatva-dharma (existing for the fulfilment of
God’s purposes) and jfiatrtva-dharma by aprthaksiddhi is
called atman.
As it is in the case of first definition, here also the
first piece stands for eliminating ‘ativyapti’ in ls’vara, whereas
the second piece of definition stands for the same (eliminating
ativyapti), in ghata (pot) and pata (piece of cloth). In Ghata
and pata etc., there is sesatvadharma. Because they exist
for the purpose of others.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 117

or the aggregate of parts is atman. It cannot be argued,

that there are a number of ‘selves’ to guide the body. The
experience says that our actions are done by our body in
unity, not in diversity. If it is admitted that the aggregate
of several parts is atman, then how to answer the above
objection? Then the unity of purpose becomes impossible,
because of the presence of a number of souls in a single
body. Deéika offers the same objections to dehétmavfidin in
his Tattvamuktd-kaldpa. “pratyekan'z cetanatue bahuriha
kalaho vitarc'zgo na jc'itabl” (2-1). Acarya Yamuna also offers
the same objections: ‘If caitanya is admitted in every atom
of the body, then in a single body, the dehatmavadin has
to accept innumerable souls. “pratyekam paramdpusu cai-
tanydnupalabdheh tadabhyupagame ca eka sarlra eva
anekasahasracetanapatatI" (Siddhitraya, p. 21).
In the same way, it cannot be accepted that any one
of these avayavas of our physical body is the self, because
the loss of anyone of the part of the body should mean the
death. Even after the loss of any part of the body, we possess
the pratyabhijfifi of the type “so’ham” (He I am). This
experience would become impossible if a part of the body is
identified with the soul. In our daily transactions, we
experience, ‘my hand’ ‘my head’, ‘my legs’, ‘my eyes’, etc.
These experiences imply difference between the ‘I’ and the
‘mine’. Desika in his Tattvamuktakaldpa
says “yo me
hastddivarsmetyavayava-niyamdd bhdti bhinnassa ekalz I”
(2-1), that atman experienced in this way is one.

To overcome this objection, the dehatmavadin gives the

second explanation in which he says, that caitanya is not
admitted either in each part of the body or in a single
part
of the body. Consciousness is accepted in the
avayavi, which
is different from the avayavas.

Deéika points out that it is ridiculous to state that

 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 119

Desika states that the above argument is fallacious.

The paka happens not only to avayavi but also to the
component parts. In the same way, consciousness should
also be present in the avayavas,,because consciousness is
found in the avayavi. Thus the previous objection remains
unshakable.
Desika points out to the famous saying of the Carvaka:
“tebhyaécaitanyam kinvadibhyo madas’aktivat", i.e., ‘Caitanya
arises in the body and disappears when the body disinte-
grates’. Carvaka compares consciousness to the intoxicating
quality which arises by the mixing up of the ingredients
such as yeast etc., in the preparation of wine. These
ingredients do not possess the quality of intoxication
separately, is a pralapa (nonlsensical talk).
The Carvakas, in order to establish their theory, that
the aggregate of avayavas produce the consciousness, take
shelter behind this analogy and conclude that the intoxicating
power in wine is produced by the ingredients of the component
parts.
Desika refutes this argument on the ground that the
existence of a quality in the avayavi presupposes its existence
in the component parts. So the defects pointed out in this
view cannot be escaped.
The principles that the quality which is non-existent
in the component parts cannot be found in the avayavi, may
be exemplified as follows.
1. In a multi-coloured cloth different colours of its
material cause, viz., tantu (thread) alone is found. Because
the colour of the cloth and the thread cannot be different.
2. Even in the mango the sweetness or sourness of its
component parts alone is experienced and those tastes are
not produced newly in the mango.
 The Philosophy of Vl‘éistadvaita 121

According the strict followers of Veda, the

to
‘dehétmaikya-jfiéna’ can be expelled only by agama. Deéika
quotes here the authority of ficérya Yfimuna, according to
whom, srotriyas desire to know atman by agama1 (scriptures).

THE ATMAN IS DIFFERENT FROM' THE

EXTERNAL SENSE ORGANS
There is another school of thought that identifies the
self with the external sense organs. Their contention is that
our external sense organs are atman. Everyone experiences
consciousness in the waking state, because then the senses
are active. In deep sleep one cannot experience the
caitanya because then senses are undergoing rest. Therefore
the upalabdhi (perceptibility) and anupalabdhi (non-
perceptibility) of consciousness depends upon the sense
organs. The perceiver must be the knower. He is atman.
Our senses perceive objects. Therefore it is better to identify
atman with our senses.
In addition to this, the experiences like “aharn sakalah”
(I am perfect) and “aharh vikalah” (I am defective) with
reference to good or bad conditions of sense organs, also
prove that our senses are atman. Therefore, our senses alone
are atman.
Des’ika raises the same objections which were raised
by him against the dehétmavfida. The indriyatmavadin
cannot rebut the objection viz., the maintenance of unity in
the body is incompatible. As there are many senses, there
are many atmans and there must . be many opinions, as a
result no action can take place.
In siddhfinta there is no such problem. Because the
experiencer is one and the same. Further in indriyfitmavfida

1. dnumanikimapi atmasiddhim aéruddhadhfindh Srautimeva tam

érotriyah sarigirantel Yamuna's Atmasiddhi.
 123
The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaitfl

unifying factor like mind. So the mind itself is atman.

The manas (mind) is known by Sruti. The same Sruti
says: “manasa hyeva paéyati". That the
mind is the
extraordinary cause of our experiences. Even from the
inference the mind is known as an instrument, not as an
agent.
Allour experiences are produced by either of our senses.
Feeling happy is also an experience. The eyes and ears are
incapable of conveying that experience. As a residue the
mind must be the cause of that experience. Therefore mind
is not an agent, but it is an extraordinary cause.
An extraordinary cause viz., karana is always different
from karts (agent). When the woodcutter cuts the wood by
his axe the axe becomes an instrument to the wood-cutter.
Here the wood-cutter and the instrument viz., axe are
different. In the same way one has to admit the difference
between the manas (karana) and the :1th
(karts). Further,
according to the statement of purana. the mind is produced
by sattvika-ahankfiral. Therefore, it is non—eternal. So it
cannot become the atman.
Now the pranatmavadin argues that the activities of
body, sense, and manas, depend on the five vital parts of
pran'a. Death or birth is decided on the presence of prana.
Therefore mine alone is itman. Des’ika refutes this view
stating that the objections pointed out in dehfitmavada also
apply to prfinatmavadaz.
Non identity of atman with prana is well established
in BrhadfiranyakOpanisad, 4—1-15 in a very interesting way.

1. taijasdnindriydnydhurdevd uailedrika data! ekadaéan'l mamécfitm

devd vaikdrikdsmrtéhl Vispupurfizla, 1-2-46, 47.
2. ndpi prfinah tasyfipi dehokta yuktisdmyatl
Nydya-siddhaiijana, p. 116.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 125

buddhi means knowledge, which is the dharma (adjectival

nature) of atman. It can never be a dharmi (substantive).
We always say ‘I have got knowledge and I have lost
knowledge”. This experience shows the non-eternality of the
buddhi. So how can it become an eternal self? The self is
eternal and is a substratum of consciousness. In addition to
this, the recognitional experience ‘He I am’ must become an
illusion, because there is no continuity of the self. This
pratyabhijfia experience cannot be sublated like other illusory
knowledge. Therefore the recognition ‘He I am’ must be a
valid one. This kind of pratyabhijfia experience cannot be
refuted by Buddhist. Inferential arguments like, “yatsat tat
ksanikam yatha jaladharapatalah" whatever exists in mo-
mentary just as a piece of cloud etc., are already refutedl.
Even though we accept the illusory nature of recognition,
it proves the eternality of the self, because pratyab 'jfia is
produced by reminiscences, impressions (sarhskara) of the
previous experience. Memory and recognition, etc., are
possible only when we accept the siminfidhikaranya of
anubhava and samskara. The locus of samskfira, memory
and recognition must be the same one namely an eternal
one. The Nyfiya maxim says, “anubhavasamskfirasmara-
nanam ekadhikaranyam”, that experience, disposition and
memory arise in the same person. It means a person who
experiences alone remembers. Nobody can remember anything
on the basis of other’s experience. This maxim also establishes
and proVes the etemality of the self. If the self is non-eternal
as it is held by Buddhists, then there is no scope for memory
and recognition.
Further, the Buddhists argue that anubhava, sainskara
and smarana need not necessarily be found in the
same
substratum. The example rkairpase raktatfi yathfi' also
proves
1. Refer Tattvamuktd-kaldpa from 1-25 to 31.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 127

not of the substratum. Though the state of seed is lost in

the seed, when it grows as a tree, the substratum continues
and it is true with the consciousness also. But Buddhists
do not admit the permanency of the substratum. Because
Buddhists are called ‘Niranvayavinasa-vadins'.
Desika states that the philosophy of yogficara does not
stand to reason. The philosophers of that school accept that
consciousness itself is the self 1. It is grasped as though
differentiated into jfiana, jfieya and jfiatfi. In fact this is not
so. Buddhist philosophy admits the series of consciousness
as the self. It does not attribute eternality to it. As a result
of this there should be unconnected consciousness, and
therefore buddhist cannot explain memory and recognition.
Desika, therefore says that the atman is different from the
body, the sense organs, the mind, the vital airs, and
consciousness, though it uses all these as its instruments.
JNANA-SVARUPATVA AND JNANA-GUNAKATVA0F ATMAN

latter school ‘Bauddha-gandhi-vedantin2. The objections

pointed out in Buddhist school themselves will disprove the
arguments of nitya-vijfianatmavédin.
According to the school of Advaita, the selfhood is
attributed to pure consciousness or anubhfiti. These philo-
sophers hold the view1 that anubhfiti, the undifferentiated
1. avibhdgo’pi buddhydtmfi uiparydsitadaréanuihl
grahyagréhaka san'wmi bhedaufiniva dréyatell
Nyaya-sinrUam, p. 118.
2. etena bauddhagandhi uedantinfimapi siddhdntobakrdntahl
Nydya-siddluifljana, p. 119.
3. paramdrthato nirasta samasta-bhedavikalpa-nirvisesa-cinmfitrai-
harasa-hatastha-nitya-samvideva-bhréntydjflfitrjfleya-jfiéna-rfipa-
vivid/la-vicitru-bhedat-vivartateI S'ribhasya. p. 47.
 The Philosophy of Visistsdvaita 129

of airman. It is not found anywhere else. So to say that

jfiatrtva is superimposed in atman is not a valid argument.
Jfiatrtva is real in atman.
Advaitavfidin further argues that the jfifinrtva, though
not found anywhere in reality, may be ascribed to an-
tahkarana by illusion, and the same is superimposed on
atman.
This argument of the advaitin leads him to infinite
regress, because the advaitin does not admit jfiatrtva
anywhere in reality. The illusion of jfiatrtva ascribed to
antahkarana, causes the jfiatrtva-jfiana in the self, which is
erroneous. So the fallacy of infinite regress occurs. If the
infinite regress is not a defect as in the case of 'bijavrksa'
then, the same thing can be applied in the case of avidya
also. There to avoid the fallacy of infinite regress, the advaitin
has attributed the anaditva (beginninglessness) to avidya.
Further, if this fallacy is not a demerit, then it is
useless to hold the View, as the advaita system does, that
the substratum of the superimposition is real. So if infinite
regress is not admitted to be demerit, then it harms the
theory of beginningless illusion and the theory of real
substratum. Finally this argument leads the advaitin to the
fold of sfinyavada.
Now the advaitin tries to explain the above jfiatrtva-
bhranti in different ways. following the thought of the Sankya
school. According to the Sankya theory, kartrtva belongs to
antahkarana and cetanatva belongs to the self. When both
of them unite, jfiatrtva is possible. Owing to the shadow of
cit on antahkarana, caitanya is superimposed there. It is
called _cicchayfipatti. The familiar
analogy given here is the
reflection of the face in the mirror. On
the basis of this
analogy, the advaitin holds the theory of superimposition
of
jiifitrtva in antahkarana.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 131

who says that the ahankara which is inert, cannot illuminate

the 51th just like the coal which cannot illuminate the
sun. Further, he concludes that vyafijya-vyafijnka-bhfival is
untenable because of many contradictions. If the knowledge
is illuminated by antahkarana then atman becomes non—
experiencer like pot. Therefore Deéika says, the £1th alone
is the locus of jfiétrtva and ahamartha. He also gives several
reasons in support of admitting atman as the real meaning
of aham-pratyaya.
1.Atman is the self-luminous pratyak principle.
2. The experiences like ‘I am a jfifitfi’ ( I am the knower)
etc, proves that ‘ahamtva’ and ‘jfiatrtva’ are in the same
locus.
3.The yearning for liberation is possible only if
‘ahamartha’ continues for all time.
4.The scriptures say that the liberated2 souls, the
supreme3 and mumuksus4 are having the experience of
ahamartha.
5. A person in the morning after a deep sleep says
‘sukhamahamasvapsam’ (I had sound sleep). If antahkarana
is the ahamartha, then this experience would have been
impossible.
6. The experience ‘mfim nfijfiasisam’ (I did not know
myself) does not deny the jfiata. It only shows that during

1. vyariktr-uyar‘zgyatuamanyonyamna ca sydt prfitikalyatabl

Uyarigyatve'nanubhatituam dtmani ayddyathé ghatel
Nyaya-siddhfifiiana. p. 121.
2. ahamannamahamannamahamannaml
ahamannfido'hamannddo’hamnnfldahl Taittiriya Upanigad.
3. quntfihamimastisrodeuaté enema jiuendtmandnupravisyal
Chandogya Upanisad, 6-3-2.
tvam ud ahamasmi bhagauo devatd ahamasmi vai
tuamasil
 The Philosophy of ViIistadvaita 133

yo uijfidne tisthanl
Brhadfzranyka, Kdnuapdtha, Antaryami Brdhmana, 6-7.

vijfidnan’z yajnan‘z tanutel karmdzu' tanutepical

Taittiriya Anandaualli. 5.

jfidnasvarapamatyanta nirmalam paramdrthatahl

Visnupurazza, 1-2-6

Knowledge like ‘aham janami' (I know) also establishes

the jfiatrtva in atman. But this experience cannot be an
erroneous one. Because superimposition of certain dharma
in a thing requires the presence of the superimposed dharma
somewhere in reality. To mistake a shell for the silver, one
must have seen the silver somewhere. Otherwise he cannot
have the rajata-bhranti of the form ‘idam rajatam'. In the
same way to superimpose jfiatrtva in some place one should
have experienced the real presence of jfiz'itrtva somewhere.
Except in fitman no where jfifitrtva is experienced. Therefore
jfiatrtva is a natural dh‘arma of atman.
Knowledge or jfiana is the peculiar attribute of the jiva.
This jfiana is called dharma-bhuta-jfiana or attributive
knowledge. It is a self-luminous substance.
Dharma-bhuta-jfiana is conceived to be both dravya and
guna (substance-attribute). Because it possesses contraction
and expansion, it is dravya. It is guna because it is necessarily
dependent on a dravya namely jiva and lsvara.
According to Nyéya-vaisesika, knowledge is known by
another knowledge namely anuvyavasaya. In this system of
Ramanuja, though knowledge is knowable, it is so, by itself
and not by anuvyavasaya because it is self-luminous. But
it is not self-conscious. Though dharma-bhfita-jfiana is
common to both jiva and Evan, in the case of lévara
attributive consciousness is eternal and all-pervasive, (nitya
and vibhu). In the case of the individual selves it is obscured.
 135
The Philosophy of Vis'ititfidvaita

If kartrtva is not admitted to the self, the vidhi nisedha

sastras become futilel. Vedas say “6an vaié‘tall
édsm
“GOd °°ntr°ls the
jandnaml" (Taittiri'ya Arapyaka. 3'11).
world being immanent in it”. Even this kartrtva comes to
the atman from Paramatman. The svayamprakaéatva (self-
luminosity), nityatva (enternality), anekatva (plurality),
anutva (atomic nature), niravayavatva (partlessness) etc., of
jivatman cannot be denied. These characteristics are proved
by the Smti itself.
THE SVAYAMPRAKAS'ATVA OF ATMAN
Des’ika says that the self-luminosity of atman is known
by the Sruti: “atrdyam purusah svayarh jyotirbhauati.” The
self is of the nature of consciousness. The external objects
like jar, pot, etc., are known through consciousness. In étman,
there are two types of consciousness. One is dharmi-bhuta-
jfifina (substantive knowledge) by which the £1th knows
himself. Second is the dharma-bhfita-jfiana (attributive
knowledge) by which everything other than itself is known.
Even nityatva, nanatva of 51th are known by the attributive
consciousness. The svarfipa-jfiana shines independent of
dharma-bhuta-jfifina. The atman shines with qualificationsZ,
i.e., ekatva, pratyaktva and anukfilyatva.
There are several apparent contradictions regarding the
svayamprakfis’atva of fitman. But they may be solved in the
following way. If atman is svayamprakaéa, then why the
:1th who is in the body of others is not known by direct
perception? On the other hand atman in the body of others
is inferred by the ‘cesta’ (action) of the body. But this
objection is not tenable, because ‘svayamprakasatva’ of atman’
means that fitman is so, for himself but not for other fitman.
1. jyotisgomena svaryakamo yqjetal na kalafijam bhakgayetl nanrtam
vadet aharahassandhyamupasital
2. ahamiti pratyaktuaikatva viéistataya tu suaprakdéata sarvaddl
Nyaya-siddhafi‘iana. p. 124.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 137

The jivatman who is the substratum or dharmi knows

the objects—jar, pot, sun, moon etc., through his attributive
knowledge. Therefore, he is called premata. lea is called
like any other
prameya because his svarupa is also known
things. The nature of dharmin, i.e., jiva is also of the form
of jfiana. Hence it is called pramana. Therefore Des’ika says:
mdtr—meya-manarzlpo’yamdtma, (Nyfiya-siddhafijana, p. 125.)
In this context he quotes from Prqu'ifl-paritrfizza of
Varadanarayana Bhattfirakal, who says that atman is
pramata, prameya and pramfina. Therefore pramfitrtva,
prameyatva and pramanatva are in jivatman. The last two
are in dharma-bhuta-jfiana. In objects like ghata there is
only prameyatva.
JivATMAN IS JNANASVARUPA
Here the pfirvapaksin questions the jfianasvan‘ipatva
of atman. He says that the Srutis referred to in support of
the view that jiva is jfianasvarfipa, state that brahman is
jfisnasvarupa. In the scriptural statement “satyan'l
jfianamanantam brahmal” (Taittirfya Upanisad, 2-1).the
word ‘jfiana' means Brahman, not jiva. The statement of
Brhaddranyaka “sa yathd saindhauaghano udake prdstah
udaka meudnuliyeta na hasyodgrahanayaiva sydtl”
(Brhaddrazzyaka, 6-5-13) also means that the jivétman is
the locus of consciousness, but not jfiénasvarfipatva. To make
it clear the Sruti gives the example of the lump of salt
which is thrown into water, and could not be seized again.
But whenever one drinks the same water it tastes salt, even
so, this great being, infinite, is only a mass of consciousness.
No doubt, a statement in Anandaualli of Taittiri'ya,

1. pmmc‘zté ca prameyaéca pramfizzan': ca bhavet pumdnl

pramfi meya ca dhfreva meyd eva ghatfidayabll
Quoted in Nydya-siddhfifijana. p. 125.
 138 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

“uijfidnan'z yajfian'z tanutel’ 'appears to hold the view that

fitman is jfianasvarupa. But it is not the correct interpretation
of the passage. Even as the word ‘finanda' is used to mean
Brahman, the word ‘vijfifina’ means that the jlva is only the
locus of the jfiana which is the preponderate quality in him.
The sfitrakfira is also of the same opinion. “tadgunasdratvfittu
taduyapadeéalz l” (Brahmasfitra, 2-3-29). He says, because of
the preponderance of knowledge jlva is understood to be
jfiana-svarfipa. Therefore fitman is not jfiana-svarfipa.
Des’ika says, though the jfifinasvarfipatva is not proved
by the above quoted scriptural statements it is well
established by the statement “esa hi drstd sprastd érotd
ghrdtd rasayité manta boddha kartd uijr'idtmd purusahl"
(Praénopanisad, 4-9).
In this statement, the word 'boddhfi’ means atman in
general. Next. six words, ‘drasfi, érota etc., state the special
jfiatrtva of-atman. After dsw'ihing the ji‘ifitrtva in its special
and general forms the Smfi once again says that atman is
‘vijfifinatmfi’. To interpret this piece also, to mean
jfiAnaérayatva once again serves no purpose. Therefore, this
word should mean the jfifinfisvarfipatva of atman. In the
light of this passage of uplmisad, we have to interpret the
passage of Taittiriya Upanisad, and Brahmasatra.
The self-luminosity of atman is proved only when
jfianasvarfipatva is admitted to the selfl. To prove svayam-
prakfistva of atman, Sflvisnucitta puts it in the form of
inference. That inference is of the form namely that atman
is self-luminousZ, because it possesses jfianatva. Wherever
there is jfianatva, there is svayam-prakaéatva and this is
evident in dharma-bhtita-jfiana.

1. citsuarfipatd hi svayam prakaéatfil Srlbhfiéya

2. dtmd suayampraltaéah jfidnatudt dharmabhzita jr‘idnavatl

Nydya-siddhdr'iiana. p. 126.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 139

On the analogy of dharma-bhfita-jfiana, it cannot be

argued that the atma-svarfipa-jfiana (the substantive con-
sciousness) can illumine other things besides itself. Jfianatva
is common to both substantive and attributive consciousness.
But the experience says, that the substantive knowledge
illumines itself, where as the attributive knowledge illumines
other things besides itself, just like a light and its luminosity.
Though both the light and its luminosity possess the common
characteristic of tejastva, both of them are different. Light
is dharrni and the prabha (luminosity) is dharma. Accordingly
the function is also different. The light illumines itself,
whereas luminosity illumines itself as well as other objects.
Therefore, there is no paraprakfisatva in the svarfipa-jfianal.
Des’ika says there is concomitance between jfianatva and
visayasrayavaisistya. That means jfiana invariably includes
object and substratum of it. It is evident in dharma-bhfita-
jfiana. But this is not admitted in the case of svarfipa—jfifina.
In advaita, jfifina is said to be visayas’raya-sfinya. In
visistadvaita, atman is not nirvis’esa, because it is qualified2
by real attributes, such as jfifinatva, jfianadravyas’rayatva,
jfianadravyatva, nityatva, anutva, niyamayatva, fidheyatva,
sesatva and paratantratva.
ATMAN IS ETERNAL
The eternality of the self is affirmed in scriptures, as
well as in the Gita. The sloka “avim‘zs’i tu tadviddhi yena
saruamidam tatamll vindsamavyayasydsya na kaécit kartu-
marhati II” (2-17), which explains the eternality of the atman
mentions two things. The whole of the universe and something
1. suasyaiua bhdsako di'pah svdtmano‘nyasya ca prabhfil
evam bhedo’sti samye'pi jfifinayordhannadharminohl
Nyéya-siddhdrfiana. p. 127.

2. visaydsraya-vaiéistya-n.irhandhodharmabhatajfiéneI
dharmijr'ifiniznasyfipi visistatvdt paramatédatinzkahl
Nyaya-siddhafliana, p. 129.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 141

has based his bhasya on the Smti which establishes the

etemality of atmanla If the etemality of the self is not
admitted, it leads to the incompatibility of akrtabhyagama
and krtapranaéa. It means if the atman is not eternal, then
it should enjoy the result of the work which is not performed
by him. In the same way he should not reap the fruit of
the work which is performed by him. Therefore the atman
is immutable.
ATMAN IS ANUSVARI'JPA
On the basis of scriptures, anfinuja accepts that atman
is atomic2 in nature. These scriptures say that the self is
not all pervasive. If it was vibhu, then we should have
experienced the atman in our entire body. We experience
its presence only in our heart. The éfistras speak of ‘utkranti’a
—going to svarga and coming back—of atman. If atman is
vibhu, all these statements become invalid.
Though in some scriptures4 vibhutva appears to be
admitted, they should 'be interpreted to mean that the nature
or capacity of atman is such that it can penetrate into any
object itself or through dharma-bhfita-jfiéna. The same
explanation should be offered to the term ‘vyapl" used by
Yamunacarya in Atmasiddhi ‘nityo vyap‘i’. Ramanuja com-
ments upon this term, in the above explained manner5.
1. na jdyate mriyate ua vipaécitl Katha, 1-2-18
nityo'nityfinfiml ' Kagha, 2-5-13
auindéi ua’yamiztmal
2. eso’nurdtma cetasa veditavyahl
Mundaka, 3-1-9.
aragramatro hyavaro drastah valagras'atabhagasya éatadha
kalpitasya cal bhAgo jlvassa Vijfleyah...| Svetfiéuatara, 5-5. 9.
utleranti gatyd gatlmiml
Srtbhagya, 2-3-20.
nityassarvagatah sthdnustadvqijlvo nabhopi cal
yathfi ksetrajfiaéaktissli uestita
nrpa saruagell Vianupurana.
5. atisaksmatayd
sarvacetanfiutahpraveéa suabhdvahl
Sn’bhasya. 1-1-1.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 143

contradiction to the statements of Varadavisnumisra and

Parfiéara. Varadavisnumiéra appears to have accepted the
contraction1 and expansion in the the nature or svarfipa of
atman. At the time of bondage, dharma-bfita-jfifina also gets
contraction and expansion. But at the time of liberation both
attributive consciousness and substantive consciousness
get all-pervasive nature. Therefore jivasvarfipa is also
changeable.
The work named Mdnaydthiztmya-nirnaya of
Varadavisnumisra, interprets the statement of Atmasiddhi,
namely ‘nityo vyapl’ in the same sense. But Deéika states
that this explanation, contradicts the sutras “pradi'pa-
vadades'ah tathéhi daréayati” (Brahmasdtra, 4-4-15),
“gunadvalokauat” (Brahmasfitra, 2-3-26).
In these sfitras Badarayana admits the atomic nature
of atman. Being atomic in nature, though atman, resides in
a particular part of the body, he pervades the body through
dharma-bhfita—jfiana, just like lamp, which is in a particular
place, reveals objects through its effulgence. Therefore, Deéika
says that those statements are vaibhavapara, (aupacarika)
and not literal (metaphorical).
Further, Deéika resolves the apparent contradictions in
the statements of Ramanuja. Ramanuja in the commentary
on the s’loka “anédimatparan'z brahma na sattannasaducyatel
sarvatah panipadan'z tat sarvato’ksiéiromukham II” (13-12, 13)
in his Gitt‘zbhdsya states: “brahma brhatvagupayogi
sariradarthdntarabhfltarh svataséarirddibhih pariccheda-
rahitan'z ksetrajfiatattuamityarthabl sa cdnantyaya kalpate

1. uaradavisnumiéraistu sarhsaradasfiydm suarfipajfldnayah sari/coca!)

anuparimfipamatmasvarfipaml. mokgadaéfiyafi: tu survagatam,
sarvavyapl, jflfinan ca vistirnataya prakdéate....ksetmjfiakhya
tathdpare itil ityadina jivasydpi safikoca~uikfisayogitvamuktam|
Nyaya-siddhaitiana, p. 133.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 145

and bhasyakara are of the firm conviction, that the atman

is of atomic nature: “atah sada anureva jlvah iti
sutrabhasyakaradinam siddhantah I” (Nyaya-siddhdfijana,
p. 134).

PLURALITY OF ATMAN

In Vis’istédvaita, the plurality of atman is admitted.

Each body possesses a different self, excepting the body of
Saubhari.
This truth is also known by our experience. The
pleasures, pains, memory and recognitions are different from
one man to another.
If there was only one self in all bodies, then every body
should have experienced the pleasure or pain of somebody
else. If one person becomes blind everyone should become
blind. Everyone should die if one person is dead. If one
person is liberated, then all persons should become free from
samsara. All these logical arguments confirm the plurality
of the self. Nyaya philosophers1 as well as Sar'ikya2 thinkers
have realized this truth and accordingly have admitted the
plurality of the self in their respective systems.
Deéika further explains the significance of the various
scriptural statements preaching unity of the self. There are
many passages in the scriptures, stating the oneness of the
self 3. In all these statements ‘prakaraikya’ (unity of the

1. ndruitmdno vyavasthdtah I
Gautama-nyfiyasfitra.
2. jananamaraziakarazidnam pratiniyamfidayugapat-praurttes‘caI
purusabahutoan‘i siddham traiguzzya viparyayaccaiual
Séhkhyahdrikfi, 18.

3. yadanyo’sti parah ko'pi mattah pérthiuasattaml

tadaiso'hamahan‘i cfintya vaktumeuamapisyatel
tasydtmaparadehesu satoryekamayam hi yatl
Quoted in Nyaya-siddhdfljana bhfisya, p. 135.
 The Philosophy of Vis‘istadvaita 147

of liberation, there is equality in the all pervasive nature

of attributive consciousness (dhanna-bhuta-jfiana). Due to
the karma of the atman, the Menace is seen in their jfiana
and ananda during the samsara. Desika says1 all these
selves regain their svarfipa and svabhéva in the state of
liberation.
If the plurality of the self is accepted, in this system,
then what is the fate of the statements which negate the
difference and which declare unity between jiva and
Paramatman, in clear terms?
Desika rebuts the above argument as follows. Those
statements which negate the difi'erence namely ‘neha nt'zndsti
kirh ca na’ only do so regarding the sarlradharma, such as
devatva, manusyatvaz, etc. Therefore the plurality of selves
cannot be denied. If it is denied, then the liberation of the
individual soul cannot be explained satisfactorily. The advaita
system cannot satisfactorily explain the difference between
the state of samséra and liberation, because in their system
the liberation or moksa is the ‘péramarthika-avidyabhava’
(negation of avidya). This amounts to saying that
‘paramarthika-avidyfi-sadbh§va' (presence of the avidyé) is
san'isara. According to the system of advaita, avidya is not
real. Therefore there is also ‘piramsrthika avidyabhavah'
(negation of the avidyé), in the state of bondage, which is
the characteristic of the state of makes, in that system.
Therefore, no difference is found in between these two states.

1. sfimyam ca saruqiiudmin‘l suarfipatah mulztyavasthayam gunato'pi

ceti s'ruti-smrtyadisiddhaml Nyaya-siddhdrijana, p. 135.
nimfijanah paraman'z sdmyamupaitil Mundaka, 3-1-3.
mama sddharmyamagatdhl Bhagauadgltd. 14-2.
2. caturuidho'pi bhedo'yam mithyfijfidnanibandhanahl
deuadibhedepadhvaste nastyevdvarano hi sahl
Nyfiya-siddhafijana-bhdsya. p. 136.
 148 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita
The statements like “s’uko muktalz’, ‘udmadeuo muktab'
etc.,
support the theory of plurality.
The theory of Bhaskara also fails to explain the fact
of bondage and release. Their school admits, both unity and
diversity by means of a real uniting adjunct. They do not
separate jlva-svarfipa from Brahman. Due to the contact of
adjuncts like sarira, antahkarana and indriya, there is the
vyavahara of jive. The difierence between them is not real.
Therefore the contact of adjunct to Brahman is called samsara
and the separation from it is known as liberation.
Desika says, it is ridiculous to admit upadhi to Brahman,
which is heyapratibhata, sarvqjfla and anadi.
It is a fact of experience that the objects like jar, pot,
etc. take with them the Ellie's within them, when they are
moved from one place to the other. They leave the akasa
of the previous place then and there. This is same with
adjuncts and Brahman. Therefore, the contact and release,
which take place, amounts to bondage and liberation to
Brahman in every moment Therefore, to explain bondage
and liberation, even Bblskan has to admit the plurality of
selves.
The system of Yidavaprakisa, which admits
‘svabhavikabhedabheda' bdween three entities of cit acit and
levers, also fails to explain the fact of bondage and liberation.
Deéika attacks these systems in the light of the scriptures
and gives a satisfactory solution. But according to
Visistadvaita, the destruction of karma is a positive factor.
This avidya-naéa results in achieving the rapture in the
divine communion. In this state, the dharma-bhuta-jfiana of
ija becomes vibhu1 (all pervasive).
1. asmakam auidydnivrm'mama bhauentaram bhavisyatyeual tacca
dhluiéesauikasddirapam prl'yamfina-paramapuruse-parigrahfidiéca
l l

Nyfiya-siddhdrliana, p. 137.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 149

All these extraordinary changes (like avidya-naéa,

achieving the rapture in the divine communion, dharma-
bhfita—jfiina becoming vibhu etc.) are not found in the state
of samsara. Therefore according to Vis’istfidvaitin. the
difference between makes and samsara is not incompatible.
Because there is s’arira-éariribhava relation between the
jivatman and Brahman in Viéistadvaita, the statements such
as “brahmauid brahmavia bhavati" (Manda/ea. 3-5-9) were
explained differently in this system.
The advaita thinkers are opposed to this explanation
of the passage. According to them indeclinable ‘eva’ is' used
to emphasize the identity of jivfitman with Brahman.
Therefore, the Visistadvaitic explanation is not satisfactory.
Desika realising the force of this objection to some
extent offers another explanation which is given in Nydya-
sudars’ana1: According to this explanation the indeclinable
‘eva' does not explain the identity. It explains only the
equality. This meaning is admitted by lexicographers2.
Invariably we have to admit this position to explain a
passage of Smfia, in ‘pasuyaga’ where the indeclinable ‘eva'
only means equality. A person who is encircled by challenging
opponents, is suggested to perform pas’uyaga. The Sruti
states that the reward of that sacrifice, is that the performer
of that yaga becomes Visnu, ‘Visnureva’. Here adapts in
Mimfir'nsé interpret the indeclinable ‘eva’ to mean equality.
The same meaning may be adopted here also. Accordingly
jivatman attains equality with Brahman and attaining the

l. nydyasudarsane tu uktam eva sabdab sdmyauécil

sdmye caiua kuacichabdah m nighantfihtehll _

Nydya-sidclhdiiiana. p. 138.
2. sfimyevadvaivameveva I
VaifilyantI-koéa.
3. vaisnauan'i uémanamalabheta spardhanu‘zno Uighur-20a bhatvemén
lokt‘mabhi jayatil Yqjummdasamhita. 2-1-3.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 151

samsarins who are destined to be bound by their past karma

for all time to come. It is due to their excessive sins, which
drive them into lower and lower strata. In this regard, these
scaryas quote from the Gite: “tam/1am dvisatalz krIZrdn
san‘zsdresu narddhamdnl ksipdmyajasramas’ubhdn dsuri—
S‘veua yonisull” (16-19), which says that people who hate
God in themselves and others, would be driven into lower
and lower strata of births. They will be born again and
again in this world. They will not get salvation at any time
due to obstacles, they have themselves created. These
obstacles may be looked upon as the punishment awarded
to them by God for their willful wrong-doing. Naraka is
really birth in evil wombs (asuri yoni).
The statement of Parfis’ara also supports their view
point. He says that these haters of God never get salvation.
All these sayings confirm the eternality of the lllévibhfitil
and continuance of some worst sinners in this world of
bondage.
Des’ika sides these scaryas and points out, on the
scriptural evidences also one has to admit the existence of
nitya-samsari. Desika in his Tattvamuktdkaldpa and
Sarudrtha-siddhi points out that both positions (acceptance
and non-acceptance of nitya-samsari-jiva) are valid. In
Dayds’ataka (stanza 79) he opines, that everyone will be
attaining the lotus feet of the Lord one day or the other.
The careful study of all these aspects, makes one to conclude,
that the contention of Vedanta Des’ika is, the samséra (this
universe which is the lilavibhfiti of the lord) is eternal. But
everyone in it can get liberated one day or other. The
lflavibhati will not become exhausted of jivas because there
are innumerable jivas in this samsara.

1. niséesdtmapavarge virataviharano viévakartd tacit: syétl

Tattuamuhld-kaldpa, 28.
 The Philosophy of Visistfidvaita 153

Desika says “smaryamazzamapi kalebaran’z kadambagoldya-

yati I” (Nyaya-siddhafijana, p. 140). that mere memory of
them will fill the mind with fear and breaks the heart.
There are two types of asamsari jiva. They are nityas
and muktas. The nityas or etemals never had the bondage
of karma. They are enjoying the bliss with the Lord from
the anadikala (times immemorial). The muktas, after the
completion of their karma, cast off their mortal body, and
enjoy the eternal bliss with nityas in nityavibhi'iti, the abode
of the Supreme. Everyday thousands of people are attaining
liberation. though the sarhsflra will not come to an end.
“pratidinam sahasrapurusamokse’pi na samsdrdtyanta
vildpahl” (Nyfiya-siddhdfijana, p. 141).
This position1 is maintained by Ramanuja in Veddrtha-
sarigraha. The number of nityas is more than that of the
mukta and baddha-jivas. Some thinkers do not admit the
existence of nityas. But this view goes against the vedic
passage: “sadd pasyanti sftrayabl” (Rgveda, I-5-22-20;
Subdlopaniéad, 6). These innumerable nityas enjoy the
service of the Lord in different ways.
Though there is some distinction between the eternals-
and liberated souls, on account of their contact and
non-contact with samsara, there is no difference in the
enjoyment of the divine bliss, because the love of Lord for
both of them is the same.

MEANS OF LIBERATION
Now Des‘ika enters into the discussion of the means of
liberation. According to the school of advaita, the mere
knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation—“vikyfirtha-

1. brahmaifidnapaksddapi pdpiyanayam paksah aparimita

l

duhkhasya pdramfirthihatvdt, samsfiriziam ananlatvena

dastaratuacca
l
Veddrtha-sangmha. p. 73.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 155

ayandya uidyatel” (Svehfivatara, 3-8.) that vedana alone is

the means of liberation and others are not.
But if karma becomes means to attain vedana. Then
there is no objection. Thus it will not become an independent
means. Karma1 helps the jlva in acquiring cittasuddhi and
to get control over the senses which ultimately leads to
moksa. Residing in the holy places2 and serving the devotees
also becomes the indirect cause of liberation. Desika, after
elaborately discussing the place of Karmayoga and Jfianayoga
according to Rémfinuja, comes to the final conclusion that
bhaktiyoga alone is the means of liberation. For a person
who is incapable of ascending to bhaktiyoga, the ‘fitmfiva-
lokana’ (realisation of the self) is necessary to get eligibility
to bhaktiyoga. The jfianayoga and karmayoga are the means
to attain atmavalokana. Between these two means, jfifinayoga
is 'antaranga’ (nearer means) to the realisation of his own
self. But it is very difficult to practise jfianayoga for a
beginner. Therefore, Desika advises, that one who is incapable
ofjfianayoga should practise karmayoga, which has the same
result. Though a person is capable of following jfifinayoga,
he too is advised to follow karmayoga. Otherwise, the society
will become chaotic. Karmayoga produces the capacity to
follow jiiz'mayoga in a weak-minded man. After attaining
sufficient strength to follow jfiana one may give up karma.
Capability or incapability to follow jfianayoga is due to the
karma of the self.
Therefore, it is indisputable that bhakti alone is the
means of liberation and the spiritual3 perfection is attained
1. has-dye karmabhilz palwe tatojiidnam pravartatel avidyayci mrtyum
tirtum...l Iéavdsya, II and refer Rahasyatraya-sfira. 9.
Nyfiya-siddhdfijana, p. 144.
paramdtmopésanameua tatkratunydydt tatprfiptyupayahl jiua-
jfifinarh kamdnusthdnam ca tanniuartakatuena paramparaya
updya iti bhauahu Tauparya-candrikd. 7-1.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 157

Des'ika explained. defined and interpreted the great

teachings of Ramanuja. The synthetic spirit of Ramanuja
regarding bhakti is clearly presented by Desika in his works.
Therefore. bhakti has a unique place in Indian philosophy
in general and particularly in Vis'istadvaita.
Bhakti is a continuous love for the supreme. It is love
of God. Love and devotion towards adorables is bhaktil. The
term bhakti comes from the root rbhaj' which means service.
Bhakti is of the nature of love (prema). The Bhagavadgi'td
describes the meaning of Bhakti and its greatness. While
commenting on 510101 “manmanfibhava madbhaktah (9-34),
Rémfinuja explains very clearly the meaning of bhakti. It
is an unceasing and loving meditation upon the supreme
person, who is the ocean of all auspicious qualities and who
is untainted with imperfections. Ramanuja puts this as:
“sarua svamini tailadhdrdvat auicchedena niuistfa mana
bhaua I" (Gitd- bhfzsya, 9- 34).
Bhakti is thus a constant remembrance of bhagavat-
svan‘ipa. This continuous flow of bhagavadanubhava is
likened to the stream of oil poured from one vessel to another.
In scriptures this is called nididhyasana, dhyana, dhruvasmrti
etc.
Narada defines bhakti as intense love of God and says
“so tuasmin parama premarzlpdl amrta svarzipc’z cal yal-
labdhva puman siddho bhavatil amrto bhavatil trpto
bhavatil yatprdpya na kir‘icidvdr‘ichatil na éocatil na duesti
na rumate notsdhibhavatil” (Ndrada-bhaktistitra, 2-3-4-5).
“A man who loves God has no wants
or sorrows”. To the
man who finds delight in Him, who is self-controlled and
even-minded, for him the whole universe is full of bliss.

1. mahaniyasya pritirbhaktihl Nyfiya-siddham'ana, p.49.

Also refer Rahasyatruya-sdru. 9; iséuésya, 11 and Visnupurana
6-6-12.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 159

sad-vidya, aksara-vidya, akaéa-vidya, nyasa-vidya, paryar'ika-

vidya, etc. Bhakti is suggested for those who are strictly
observing the varnis'rama-dharma. Even devas and asuras
are permitted to enter into Bhaktiyoga. Women and widowers
are advised to perform meditation and fasting, which are
accessories to bhakti. They too are eligible for brahmavidya.
But those who have deviated from the naiétikatva, who have
fallen from their duties and vows, are not eligible for it
because they are rejected by éistas, and the scriptures1
ordain their non-eligibility. Even the expiatory acts conducted
by them will not make them eligible for brahmavidya.
Sfitrakara explains these details in the sfitra: “bahistu-
bhayathapi smrterdcdrdccal” (Brahmaslztra, 3-4-43).
Here one may ask though bhakti is limited to the three
varnas, how is it that gopikus (the women folk of Gokula)
who did not belong to these three varnas, were eligible to
moksa? Desika discussing this problem says that the gopikas
had taken their birth due to their prarabdha-karma. In their
previous births, they had already performed the upayanu-
sthana. The birth in which liberation is attained does not
count much. This is the same with Vidura and Dharmavyadha
81502.

Then what is the meaning of the episode of Janas‘ruti3

and Raikva? There Raikva, the spiritual guru, address
Janasruti as ‘ét‘idra’—“djahdremalz s’adral" (Chandogya,
4-2-5.)

1. aradho Misti/cam dharmam yastu pracyavate narahl

prdyaécittan‘z na paéydmi yena éudhyet sa dtmahc‘zll
Agneyapurfizza, 165-23.
2. dhannauyadhadayobyanye pfimébhydsdflugupsitel
varnfiuaratve sampraptah samsiddhin'i sramarfi yathfill
Quoted In Nydya-siddhdriiana,
p. 150. Viszzudharma. 10-2-29.
3. Refer Nydya-siddhdfijana,
p. 151.
160 The Philosophy of Vtéietadvaita

This episode establishes that, one who belongs to last

varna is also eligible for brahmavidyi. But that passage
should be studied with sufficient-care.There Raikva addresses
Janasruti as ‘s’fidra’ because the latter’s repentance for
non-acquisition of spiritual knowledge. Etymologically the
word ‘si’idra’ means one who repents for his ignorance—
“socatlti s'udrah”. Sutrakara also is of the same opinion.
“éugasya tadam'zdaraéravapat"-(Bruhmasfltra, 1—3-33). All
these arguments make it clear that upfisanas are not ordained
in scriptures for one and all. The traivarnikas who strictly
follow the aéramadharmas are alone advised to follow the
path of upasané. The cause of liberation, namely, upasana,
should be performed in higher1 births. The result of it,
namely moksa, may be had-in any birth higher or lower.
But what about the'laet varna. They are advised to
perform the duties of theirsta'tion in life developing devotion
towards God by means ofwhich they attain salvation. Because
they are preoccupied With the duties of the life, Sruti
compassionately equates their devoted work, which is
performed as the service to God, to bhakti itself. In
Mahabharata Vidurfl, Dhnrmavyfldha etc., and in Bhdgauata
Gopikas, Akrfira, Malfikira and such others, attained mukti
by the grace of Lord, though they were born in the last
varna. Therefore to do ona's duty in life, surrendering the
fruit of action to God definitely will bless one with the
circumstances that are favourable for practising Bhaktiyoga,
in course of time. Deéika in Daydsataka (stanza 65) quotes
examples from both Ramdyana and Bhdgavata and says,
that Guha, Sugriva, Hanuman, Sabari, Kucela, Kubja and
Gopikfis attained mukti, though all of them did not practice
Bhaktiyoga. Really, the practice of bhakti is a very difficult
process. In this process one should get complete control over
1. The words like higher or lower also refer to the states like ripeness
or rawness of the individual in the field of Vedanta.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvsita 161

his sense-organs. Bhaktiyoga should be practised as long as

this body continues. Therefore with immeasurable compassion
this difficult path of salvation was not suggested for those,
who are performing their duty of their station in life.
Bhagauadgitd endorses this view, saying: “tepi yanti
pardr'zgatiml (9-32.)
Ladies, businessmen and people who are engaged in
the duties of life also attain salvation, if they perform their
duties as the ‘kainkarya’ of Paramatman.

NYASAVIDYA OR SARANAGATI

Saranagati sastra is as old as Vedas. Vedas declare

that for the upliftment of the individual, love of God is very
essential. Vedas say that to man God is everything. Rgvedic
hymns are pregnant with devotion and self-surrender. God
is described there, as a friend and a near relative of all
men. Vedas1 assert that none other than God is able to
protect the jivatman from the ocean of sarhsfira. Vedas
advocate the very essence of éaranagati or prapatti. Though
these words are not used in Vedas (samhita) one can decipher
the philosophy of prapatti in these portions. There fore these
infallible Vedas suggest, that prapatti is the means of
spiritual salvation.
All Veddntas derive their inspiration from Upanisadic
philosophy. Upanisads teach in unequivocal terms that
prapatti is the means of self realization. [savasya2,

1. agne naya supathc'z réye asmdn....| Rgveda. 1-189-1.

nama uktirh jusasva....|
ayt‘zmi te Rgveda, III-1+2.
jdmirjandndm agne mitro asi priyahl
tuan'i Rgveda, 1-75-4.
2. agne naya supathd rdye asmc‘m viévfini dwa vayunani viduénl
yuyodhyasmajjuhurazzameno bhuyistdn‘z Le name uktin’z vidhemall
Isa, 18.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 163

Saranfigati was not an invention of Ramanuja. S'ruti,

smritis and purdnas and the observation of Saranagati by
great aearyas like Nathamuni and Yamuna, will bear ample
evidence to its antiquity. Raminuja was himself a great
prapanna and initiated thousands of his disciples to the
secrets of s’aranégati and thus'showed the way of salvation
to the majority of human beings who were unable to follow
the difficult disciplines of Bhaktiyoga.
Vedanta Desika following in the foot steps of Ramanuja
explained and established the doctrine of prapatti on firm
grounds. He established the greatness of prapatti, on the
authority of Vedas, purdnas, dgamas. Diuyaprabhandhas and
observation of the ancient acaryas, in his Rahasyatraya-sdm,
which work is a land-mark in the history of Visistadvaita
philosophy. Vedanta Desika wrote a work in sanskrit namely
Niksepa-raksd in defence of prapatti.
After Riamanuja there emerged two sub-schools viz.,
Vadagalai and Tengalai. Both these schools were originated
during the time of Ramanuja himself. Both these schools
were preaching the great teachings of their guru, Rimanuja.
The Tengalai school was established by ficaryas like Pillai
Lokacharya and Varavaramuni, who based their exposition
mostly on Tamil prabandhams whereas Vedanta Desika was
the chief exponent of Vadagalai school. In addition to the
prabandhams of Alvars, Desika based his expositions, on
scriptures, Purdpas, itihasds, (zgamas, and the writings of
ancient acaryas of the school.
Regarding prapatti, the Tengalai acaryas advocate
prapatti is complete dependence on the grace of the Lord.
If jivatman does not obstruct the grace of the Lord, that
itself is prapatti. Unless the Lord gracefully desires to protect
'the individual self, the efforts of the jivatman to get liberation
becomes futile. In the redemption of the individual soul the
‘nirhetukakrpa’ of the Lord alone is the resort.
164 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

But Vadagalai school points out that the submission of

one’s own self at the feet of the Lord is prapatti and only
thus the krpfi of the Lord will be evoked. Unless the child
cries for its mother she may not pay her attention to it. In
the same way the individual self also should pray for the
divine communion and thus he should discharge his part of
duty. It is not mere “paratantrysjfinna’, as the other school
advocates. Sastras enjoin certain rules for jivatman to seek
redemption from the Lord. éastras imperatively say ‘s’ararian'i
uraja’ (Gite, 18-66) and ‘éarariarh gaccha’ (Gite, 18—62). ‘Seek
protection at the feet of the Lord. If the non-obstruction
with the grace of the Lord itself brings mukti, then even
inert matters should get liberated. Because they too do not
obstruct His grace. Therefore prapatti should be performed
at the feet of the Lord by one and all.
Nyasavidya or prapatti is the bed-rock of Viéistadvaita
philosophy. It means surrendering oneself to Lord Narayana
with his divine consort Mahalaksmi. Nydsa-virhs’ati, Nydsa-
daéaka, Nyr'lsa-tilaka, Smpagati-dipikd, Niksepa—raksd,
Abhayapraddna-sdm and Rahasyagranthas in Tamil are
written on the same subject by Vedanta Deéika.
There are two types of prapannas. One is arta. who
cannot bear any separation from the Lord. He possesses
intense love for the Lori. Ahbfljer is drpta, who is patient
and not in a hurry. Emancipation is the aim of both arts
and drpta. Drpta though he is patient and is slow still enjoys
the Archa form of the Lord in this world.
Saranagati does not require other conditions like atma-
daréana or Jfianayoga as in the case of Bhaktiyoga. But it
has five angas which are essential for prapatti. They are :

Anukulya sankalpa (determination to do whatever is

1.
agreeable to the Lord). This anga makes the aspirer to know
that he exists only for the satisfaction of the Lord.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istfidvaita 165
2. Pratikfilya varjana (abandoning such actions which
bring displeasure to Him).
3. Kirpanya (helplessness). It means the asprirant
should feel that he is incapable of observing any means like
karma, jflina, or bhakti. Here the prapanna feels that God
alone is his mentor and can help him to attain salvation.
Mahaviévasa (suprme faith). The living faith in the
4.
grace of God is very essential for prapanna.
5. Goptrtvavaranam (praying for the protection). It is
also a very important anga of prapatti. One can get whatever
one desires, only when one seeks for it. In the same way
moksa can be attained only when one seeks for it from the
Lordl.
If atmaniksepa is included among these, then the angas
are six in number. Atmaniksepa means surrender of the
self. Of these, atmaniksepa is considered as an angi (main
factor), for which the five others are angas (accessories).
That is why prapatti is called sadanga yoga. This yoga
namely prapatti should be performed only once with all
these angas. The action of a prapanna is compared in the
Upanisadsz, to the clever archer who shoots the arrow at
the object in a moment. The pranava is the bow, the atman
is the arrow, Brahman is the target. It must be hit taking
the aim with great care. For this purpose one should have
keen concentration.
The conviction, ‘that the Lord with his consort is the
1. Vedanta Deéika summarises this quoting from Ahirbudnya-
san'zhita: dnukulyasya sarikalpah. prdtiklilyasya varjanaml
mksiéyatiti visudsah goptrtua varunam tathfil almaniksepa
karpanye sadvidha sarazu‘igatihll Rahasyatraya-sdra, Ch.11.
2. pranauo dhanuh éara hydtmc'z brahma tallaksya mucyatel
apramattena ueddhyam sumuat tanmayo bhauetll
MurLgiaha, 2-2-4.
166 The Philosophy of Viéiqtidvaita

redeemer of every cetana’, is Nyasavidyal. Prapatti,

s'aranagati, niksepa are all difi'erent names of nyasavidya.
Though Vis’istadvaita admits Nyfisavidya as a separate means
to liberation, there is no contradiction with the Vedic
statement. ‘nanyah panthd ayanaya vidyate’ (Purusa-sakta),
states that knowledge alone is the cause of liberation. Nyasa
or prapatti is also a kind of knowledge. Nyasa is also a
state of bhaktiz. Bhakti and prapatti are the two ways of
awakening divine compassion. vaa also on his part has to
offer sincere prayer for his redemption. The human endeav-
our, which is adopted for awakening of Divine grace is of
two types. They are bhakfi and prapattia.
Both bhakti and prapatti are inter-related. They are
not contradictory to each other. Sometimes bhakti is included
in prapatti and in some other times prapatti is included in
bhakti. Prapatti is called ‘eidhya-bhakti' and bhakti is called
‘sadhana-bhakti’. The devotees who hold that prapatti is the
sole means of liberation, adopt sadhya-bhakti. Those who
look upon prapatti as an auxiliary means to perfect bhakti,
adopt sadhana-bhakti. Bhakti can destroy the heap of karma
excepting the prirabdha-karma, whereas sadhya-bhakti,
namely prapatti, can destroy even prarabdha-karma4.
Bhakti is to he performed as long as one remains in
this mortal body. But it is not the case with the prapatti.

1. adhyavaséyadiuiéesaviéistfi nydsavidyal
Nyéya-siddhdfijana, p. 152.

2. bhaktiuié‘esatudccal Nyfiya-siddhfifijana, p. 152.

bhaktyo tvananyayd...l ityadibhih. Gite. 11-54.
3. bhaktiprapattibhyam tadvasikaranaml
Nyfisa-viméati 17, Also refer Rahasyatraya-sdru p. 200.
4. updyabhaktib prdrabdhavyatirihtaghandsini sddhyabhaktistu sd
harm-I prdrubdhasydpi bhfiyasil
Satyaki-tantru, quoted in Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 152.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 167

Prapatti is to be performed only once in lifetime. Therefore,

prapatti is ordained to be a separate means of liberation,
though prapatti is considered to be the state of bhakti.
Here this point must be borne in mind. The result of
prapatti and bhakti is the same. Prapatti is a means easily
accessible to one and all. Bhakti is a difficult discipline.
Then what is the use of prescribing a gurfipaya (bhakti)
when there is a laghupaya (prapatti)? Desika answers that
prapatti is also a difficult discipline, because to get such
firm faith, namely, ‘the God alone is my redeemer’ is very
diflicultl. Prapanna (one who has surrendered to God) is
stated to be sevaksamaz. A person who is nearer to the king
will not be punished severely though he commits mistakesa.
If antarar'igaseva of king is thought of as difficult to practice,
then it is the same with prapatti also. Bhakti is called
upaya-bhakti and prapatti is called sadhya-bhakti.
In upaya-bhakti it is necessary to discharge the karmas
like nitya, naimittika and kfimya as auxiliary to bhakti.
Those karmas should not be performed independently.
Abandoning the forbidden acts is the same to both bhakti
and prapatti. But in sadhya-bhakti the kamya type of karmas
should be abandoned in toto. But the performance of nitya
type of karma is obligatory.
Des’ika here clears certain doubts regarding the
behaviour of a prapanna. Some people think that a prapanna
can lead a life of his fancies, because he has surrendered

1. tathoktam prapattipra/zarane updyah sukarasso'yam duskarasca

mam mamal Nydya-siddhafijana, p. 153.
2. na prfigvat buddhipurudghe na cdtyantamanugrahahl
laghurdandah prupannasya rfijaputrdparfidhauatl
Rahasyatraya-snru, 18.

3. ksudmsu skhalitesu sahyate mhatsvapi alpadazldo bhavatil

Nyaya-siddhaiiiana, p. 153
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 169

be destroyed like an ‘isiluitfila’ thrown1 in the fire?

This is answered in this way. The brahmavidya will
destroy all karmas excepting such as prarabdha, bhuktaphala
(result of which are already experienced) and krtaprayascitta
(which are warded ofl’ by expiatory rites). The sins committed
by him inadvertently would not stain him. It is not at all
likely that a prapanna, who is guided by the scriptures will
ofi'end the Lord by committing deliberate sins. Sometimes
due to his prarabdha-karma, and due to the adverse
circumstances he may commit certain sins. It should be
borne in mind, that even such a prapanna will not be
discarded by the Lord who is a krpésagara. By the same
grace of God, he prays for the expiation of that sin also. If
by mistake he does not perform prayaécitta, then the sin
begins to bear its fruits before the prarabdha-karmas are
ended. But these sins, do not become the cause of re-birth.
However, if there is any curse or any sinful deed, which
ought to cause re-birth, then it will inevitably be so. Though
the efiects of prapatti will not be destroyed, prapatti itself
becomes effective only after the anubhava of the fruits of
that sin. But the process of committing such sins and enjoying
their fruits will not continue further. Otherwise, the upasana
or prapatti itself becomes useless. Des’ika points out that all
these ideas are brought out by the sutrakara in “evam
muktiphaldniyamastadavasthavadhrtestadauasthduadhfleh I"
(Brahmaszitra, 3-4-51). He says that sometimes even the
rituals performed by an individual, with the intention of
getting worldly objects will not yield fruits. In the same way
brahmavidya also liberates a person in a different birth if
there is such an obstruction, for mukti, in this birth.
For a prapanna even punya (merit) is considered like
papa (demerit) because punya also is not favourable to
1. tadyatheslkatfilmagnau pmtam pradliyeta evan't hyasya same
pdpmdnab pradayantel Chandogya. 5-24-3.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 171

Thus both punya and pipe are impediments in achieving

moksa-purusartha. However, they do not stain a prapanna.
But the question is, then, what becomes of such papa and
punya? Desika explains on the basis of scriptures that the
friends and foes of the brahmavid or prapanna will receive
his punya and papa respectively, during the time of his
departure from the mortal body. This point is clear from
the Sruti “tat sukrtaduskrte dhunutel tasya priyd jfldtayalz
sukrtamupayantil apriyd duskrtaml” (Kausitaki, 1-4) and
“tasya putrddizyamupayantil suhrdah sddhukrtyfiriz, dvisan-
tab papakrtydm l” (Satydyanaka).
Ramanuja also commenting on the sfitra “ato’nyt'zpi
hyekesdmubhayolzl (Brahmasatra, 4-1-17) says, that friends
and foes of a prapanna get his punya and papa respectivelyl.
Here one may ask how is it that the fruits of an action
done by some one go to somebody else who is not their
agent? Des’ika answers2 that the punya and pipe. are nothing
but the prasada and kopa of the Lord. Therefore, the Lord
directs his kopa and priti towards the foes and friends
respectively of the prapanna. That is why the Sruti said
“tasmédt‘ztmjfiam hyarcayedbhfltikdmah I” (Mundaka, 3-1-10)
that one should be very careful and should not incur the
wrath of a prapanna.
Nyasavidya can destroy prfirabdha-karma also, but it
retains a part of his desires to live up to the end of this
sarira and to undergo the ensuing misery from it. If the
prapanna practices the strict asceticism, prapatti destroys
even that retained part of desire and its result. Such lovers
of God are called artaprapannas, and the others are called
drpta prapannas.
1. vidyaya aslesauinaéas’s‘rutisca taduisaydl
Srlbhésya on Brahmaslltra. 4-1-17.
2. 36 ca éaktirbhagavatkopaprltiuiéesdtmikd|
Nyaya-siddhdrliana, p. 160.
172 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita
Gi‘td
says “yarn yan'z udpi smaran bhc‘wam” (8-6), that
a cetana becomes that object on which he meditates during
the time of his departure. Therefore the scriptures prescribe
antima-smrti to upasakas. But for prapanna, even this is
not necessary because the Lord himself remembers him at
that time:_ “aham smardmi madbhaktam”. (Vardha-carama-
éloka). Therefore Deéika says “asydm ca uidydydmantima
pratyaydpeksapi na vidyatel" (Nydya-siddhafijana, p. 161)
that in this Nyasavidyfi a prapanna need not have the
antima-smarana during the time of his final departure, as
the Lord himself remembers him, at that time.
Every upasaka or vidvfin or prapanna departs from this
body through the vein, namely, ‘brahmanfidi' easily, and
continues his blissful journey towards the abode of the Lord,
through the world of ativahikas, “Arci, Ahas, Sitapaksa,
Udagayana, Asta-marut, Arka. Indu. Vidyut. Varuna, Indra,
Prajapati” and being worshipped by them, finally he would
be taken to Brahma by ‘amfinava’ whose form is made up
of lightening. This way by which the prapanna reaches the
Lord is called ‘arciradigati’.
Deéika gives the evidence of Snail in which the word
sambhfiti means arcirfldigati. Vinfiéa means the destruction
of karma. So the idea is, that the prapanna crosses the
ocean of samsira afie'r freeing himself from the fetters of
karma, enters the abode of the Lord by the arciradigati and
finally enjoys the bliss of servitude of the Lord in
nitya—vibhfiti. Deéik‘a further describes the journey of a
prapanna and says that the knowledge and ananda go on
increasing as he journeys through the arciradigati. He
becomes mukta from the time he is touched by the hands
1. sambhatim ca vindéarh ca yastadvedobhayam sahal
uinfiéena mrtyum tirtua sambhatyd'mrtanmsnutel is‘auasya. 14

temisamabhisambhavanti, etfimitah pretyébhisambhauitésmi

bruhmalokamabhisambhauanti l
Chandogya. 4-15-5.
 The Philosophy of Vis‘istadvaita 173

of amanava. Then he reaches paramapada, the abode of the

Lord and gets eight qualitiesl, such as apahatapapmatva,
satyasar'ikalpatva, etc., which are common both to him and
the paramapurusa also. This is the original state2 of the
jiva. Afterwards, he never comes back to this samsara. The
cessation of samsara, going through the path of arciradi,
having the aprakrta-divyamaflgala-vigraha, salokya, samipya,
sarnpya and sayujya, all are connoted by the word ‘moksa'.
Here salokya means getting into the Lord's abode. Samlpya
is reaching the vicinity of Lord's abode. Sarfipya means
having the eight divine qualities. Because jiva is an eternal
entity, it cannot become identical with Brahman. Therefore
Des’ika says, that the interpretation of some vedéntins, that
sayujya means identity, does not stand to reason. The Sruti
and also the smrti3 should be interpreted to mean complete
equality between the jivatman and the Brahman during the
state of liberation.
Prapanna thus liberated gets freedom from samsara for
ever and enjoys the Lord who is anandasagara, and devoid
of any type of duhkha. 'Therefore Desika says, “sa ca
nirduhkha-niratiéaydnandarzlpa b'hagavadanubhaudtmaka
iti siddhaml" (Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 167) that the attain-
ment of intrinsic glory by jiva consists in realising its
dependence (paratantrya) on God who is nirduhkha, ananda-
svarfipa and svatantra.

1. esa dtmu apahatapépmd utjaro uimrtyuh uis’oko vijighatso apipdsab

satyakc‘zmah satyasarikalpahl Chandogya, 8-1-5.
2. parafijyotirupasampadya suena rapezzdbhinispadyatel
Chandogya, 8-12-2.
sampadyduirbhdua suena s'abdfitl Brahmasatra, 4-4-1.
3. paraman'z sdmyamupaitil Mundaha, 3-2-8.
mama sddharmyamdgatahl Gitd, 14-2.
brahmavid bmhmaiua bhauatil Mundaka, 3-2-9.
174 The Philosophy of Viéistfldvaita

MOKSA SVARUPA IN VIS’ISTADVAITA

The desire for emancipation is implanted in the mind
of human-being. It is this desire which makes man to aspire
and to know the final goal of life. When he realises, that
the fruits of rituals are limited in their scope, naturally his
mind begins to think about the final release, which is nitya
and anandarupa. Such a person, in Vedfintaéastra, is called
mumuksu. Acarya Sankara prescribes1 this desire for moksa
as a pre-requisite to become mukta.
According to advaita thinkers moksa consists in the
annihilation of the 'I' ness. But Ramanuja says that a man
would turn away from moksa if moksa means ‘annihilation’
of ‘I’ ness. He asks for himself, when he himself perishes,
of what value is such a release or moksa for him?
Ramanuja writes in Srl'bhbsya that the annihilation of
the self is not moksa. Moksa is said to consist in the
attainment of the Lordly qualities similar to those of the
supreme person ‘Srlmannfirfiyfina'.Ramanuja further writes,
that the soul in all its states is inperfect. When the jivfitman
reaches the Paramatmsn. he should be far from imperfections.
He should posses all blessed q‘ualitiesz, and be higher than
everything else. Release consists in attaining the servitude
of parama-purusa and enjoying the divine-bliss in the
communion of the Lord. Following the ideas of _sutrakara,
Ramanuja in Sribhasya establishes that mukti is not only
the direct perception of the Lord but also the progressive
attainment of Brahmaloka. The advaita exposition of the
two muktis viz., ‘lcrama-mukti' and ‘jivanmukti’ are not
accepted in Viéistfidvaita.
1. ucyatel nityanitya vastuviuekalt, ihc‘zmutra artha bhoga uirdgah,
somedamddi sfidhana sampat. mumuksutuan't cal
Brahmasfltm-bhfisya of Srl éankara, 1-1-1.
2. Sribhdsya, 4-4-1. p. 839.
Chimdogya, 8-12-1.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 175

Jivfitman. who was bound hither to by his karma,

becomes free from it, and gets equality with Parabrahmanl.
This means that mukti is self-manifesting itself in its own
form. Mukti is fullest blossoming of atman.
Rémfinuja commenting on the Brahmasfltra: ‘c‘ztma
prakarandt’ (4-4-3), says that by the ‘self manifesting itself
in its own form in the state of mukti’, is meant the self as
possessing the gunfistaka avirbhava and freedom from all
evil and sin and so on. These are the essential characteristics
of fitman. This original nature of atman was obscured in
the state of samsara, through ajfiana (nescience). Therefore
at the time of mukti these essential qualities get themselves,
expressed. These gunas only manifest, but not originate. The
great sage S’aunaka2 says that even as the lustre of a gem
is not created by the act of washing, so the gunastakas
manifest in the atman by putting ofi' karma-vasana. When
the well is dug, the digger finds water. The water is not
created by the action of digging. It was existent and became
visible in the well. Thus all divya-g'unas only manifest in
:5th through the krpa of Srimanm‘arfiyana. They are not
produced.
Ramanuja following these authorities comes to the
conclusion,that the essential qualities of atman, which are
obscured and contracted by the karma, get expansion, when

1. atah karmazlé sambaddhaya parum jyotirfipasampadya bandha

nivrttirlipa muktib svenarfipena abhinispattirucyatel
Sn$qua, p. 870.
2. yathfi na kriyate jyotsnd mala praksalanfin mapehl
dosa prahdzuit na jr'u'mam dtmanah kriyate tathall
yathodapana karazuit kriyate no jalémbaraml
sadeva nfyate uyaktirn asatal} sambhavah kutabll
tathfi heya guru: dhuamsdt auabodhadayo gunfibl
prahfisyante na jdyante nitya evdtmanohiteu
Vignudharma. 104-56, 56, 67.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istédvaita 177
KAIVALYA

Des'ika here discusses kaivalya which is also admitted

as moksa by some thinkers. This kaivalya is the result of
one of the brahmavidyas, namely. paficag'ni-vidya. Kaivalya
is that state in which the jivatman enjoys the bliss of mere
self. Compared to bhagavadanubhava, the experience of the
self is very inferior type of enjoyment. It is therefore discarded
by all scaryas. On the basis of the statements of
Yi'imunia'icéu'ya1 some scaryas think that there is a moksa
called ‘kaivalya’ near Vaikuntha or the abode of Visnu.
Further, they again quote from Yamuna which also appears
to establish kaivalya kind of moksa. Ramanuja commenting
on Gila says2, that the seeker enjoys the bliss of self-reali-
zation. Desika quotes from Ramanuja and says that
Ramanuja appears to have admitted the arciradigati for both
the seekers," namely, kaivalyfirthi and moksarthi. Just like
the moksarthi, even the kaivalyarthi never comes back.
Therefore Desika presents this purvapaksa (prime facie) that
kaivalya is conventionally admitted by our ancient acaryas.
After elaborate explanation of the View held by some
scaryas, regarding kaivalya, Desika begins to examine that
view with the same vigour. He begins his refutation with
this statement. The kaivalya type of moksa is not at all
admitted by Ramanuja. This is clear in S’fzri'raka Bhdsya3.
i. aisuaryéksara-ydthdtmya-bhagavaccharanarthinfim |
uedyopddeyabhévdnam asgame bheda ucyatell
Gitdrtha-sarigraha, p. 12.
2. jijfidsuh prakrtiviyuktdtmasvarfipavdpticchuhI GItd-bhdsya, 8-12.
caturuidhé bhajante mdrr'i...| Gitc‘i, 7—16. (refer bhasya).

sarvadvdrdni san‘zyamya ityadervyfikhydne.......... prakrtiviyuktam

matsamfinfikdramapunarfivfltimdtmdnam prdpnotityarthah iti
coktehl Nyéya-siddhdfljana, p. 170.
3. atrocyatel na tévadayam moksah bhfisyahdrdbhimatahl
s'firirahabhiwye vyaktamuktatudtl Nyfiya—siddhfifliana. p. 1'70.
 The Philosophy of Vis‘istfidvnim 18]

is like a 'kaustubhamanil’ (a celebrated gem in the heart

of Visnu). Paramatman receives the individual self, after he
is freed from the bond of karma. This jivétman enacts a
beautiful drama, wherein he plays different roles by taking
difi'erent births as deva, manusya, pas’u and paksi, due to
his own karma. He discriminates the upadeya from, the
anupadeya, with the help of s’éstra, and realises the sufferings
of womb and finally adopts anyone of the brahmavidyfis. By
the enactment of this wonderful drama, the eternal Sriman
(wealthy) Paramatman is immensely pleased, and He graces
the actor, i.e., jivatman with prosperity, which is equal to
his own state and makes him enjoy the bliss of his ever-lovable
servicez.

*-

1. mazu'vara iua saureb nityahrdyapiifvall

Izalusamatirauindan kiflkamtuddirfibaml
Rahasyatmya-saru, p. 13.
2. kdnu‘zm prdpya vicitrukarmaracitdm paryciyato bhfimikfim
kenapyadbhuta-natakena kampi ért'mntamanandayanl krtvfi
édstramukhe munch pratimukham garbhavamarsfit
pamm
vidydnirvahazaena labdhavibhavo hrdyesa uidyotatell
Nyaya-siddhaiijana, p. 179.
 Chapter IV
— I

NATURE OF BRAHMAN
Sofar we studied prakrti, kale and jlvatman which are
dependent on the omnipotent God. They all are adheyas (the
supported) and s’esas (one who exists for the purpose of the
Lord). We also studied that the goal of human life is to
attain moksa. Moksa is the communion with the Lord or
lsvara. So all these points make it necessary to understand
the nature and character of that highest principle which is
‘independent’ ‘éesi' and 'fidhfira’ of this universe. It is the
supreme principle. That is why that tattva is called Brahman.
In Visisistadvaita the word Brahman denotes the highest
person Purusottama. He is free from all impurities and
imperfections. He is ‘snanta kalyfina gunaségara' that is,
He is the ocean of innumerable auspicious qualitiesl.
The term ‘Brahman’ is derived from brhat (big or great)
and so means that which possesses the greatness of essential
nature as well as of qualifies, and as such is the Lord of
all. “brhati brahmayati tasmaducyate param brahma iti
niruktc‘zt brhatvam bmhmazzatvam ca grfihyaml (Sribhdsya-
darpana, p. 7).
This Brahman is the goal of all adhyatmaéastra. The
Upanisadic statement “nayamdtmd pravacanena labhyo na
medhayd na bahuna érutenal" (Katha, 1-2-23) that ‘neither
the mind nor speech can describe Brahman’ does not mean
1. brahma sabdena ea wabhauaw him-eta nihhiladoso anavadhihati-
éaya asanhhyeya kalydna-guzaa-gamh puruéottamo abhidhlyatel
Srlbhasya, 1-11. p. 6.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 133
that Brahman is unknowable. That statement means, that
with our limited intellect we cannot completely know all
about the Lord. The human knowledge is not complete. So
the human beings cannot know him completely.
The fundamental authority for Rumanuja’s conception
of Parabrahman is Upanisads. The Parabrahman is described
as Srimannéréyana. He is the-creator, sustainer and destroyer
of the world.
It is already mentioned that an object, to be known
clearly, must be separated from other objects through the
help of definition which is devoid of fallacies like avyapti,
ativyapti and asambhava. Therefore Ved'finta Deéika offers
several definitions on the basis of Sruti, satra and Bhasya.
He defines ls'vara.
1. He is the Lord of all. —- sarues’uaratvam.
2. He is vibhu and cetana. —— vydpakatue sati
cetanatvam.
3. He is sarvasesi. — sarvaéesitvam.
4. He is adorned by — sarvakarma-
all activities (karma). samdrddhyatvam.
5. All results of actions — sarvaphala-
flow from Him. pradatvam.
6. He is the substratum — sarvddhc‘zratvam.
of all.
7. He is the cause — sarvakc'zryot-
of all effects. pc‘zdakatvam.
8. For Him, the entire — squfidna-svetara
universe excepting his jfiana samastadravya-
and Himself is body. sarirakatvam.
9. By nature He possesses — svatassatyasankalpat
the auspicious qualities vadikatvam.
like satyakfimatva and
satyasankalpatva etc.
184 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

Here in the seventh definition, lévara is stated to be

the cause of all effects. He is srstikarta only. Hence it may
be objected by pointing out that this definition appears to
go against the definition given by sfitrakfira, which says
that ls’wara is all, i.e., creator, protector and destroyer.
‘janmddyasya yatah” (Bmhmasdtra, 1-1-2).
Deéika answers this objection, by pointing out that the
sfitrakara is not opposed to other definitions like “lévara is
creator", “ls'vara is protector”, “lévara is destroyer”; but he
is of the opinion that except God, none else can do these
works. With that idea, sutrakara has said that all the three
functions are performed by God.
Another point is that there are certain thinkers who
hold the view that trimurtis, i.e., Brahmé, Visnu and
Mahes'vara are all equal. The creation, protection and
destruction has been attributed to them respectively. Those
thinkers are called "trimfirti-fimya-vadins'. To uphold the
view that all the three functions are performed by only a
single person, the sutrakira has given the definition which
attributes all the three functions to Him. That is why the
sutrakfira describes the nature of lsvara as the agent of
destruction also. “am earficaragrahandt" (Brahmasatra,
1-2-9). This sum-a attributes the function of destruction to
the Brahman. Rimfinuja interpreting the above sfitra on the
same line quotes from Katkopanisad (1-2-25) and substan-
tiates that the Brahman is the agent of destruction: “cara
acarasya krtsnasya attrtuam hi tasyaiva sambhauatil”
(Sri'bhasya, p. 287.) In the Kaghopanisad there is a passage,
which says that the mrtyu is the upasecana (being itself
eatable, that which helps other food to be eaten) of the Lord.
That is with the help of mrtyu the God undertakes the act
of destruction and finally withholds mrtyu also. Therefore
lévara, is also the agent of destruction.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 185

This type of interpretation is also resorted to while

understanding the Srutivfikya “satyan’z jr'ifinamanantam
brahma” (Taittz'riya Anandavalli, 1) where the word ‘ananta’
itself is sufficient to separate Brahman from other things.
Yet there, the other words i.e., ‘satyam’ and ‘ji'ianam’ are
not meaningless. In the Sruti, satyatva means that there is
no vikara or transformation in Brahman. The second word
jfiénatva says that the knowledge of Brahman is always
all-pervasive. Therefore, here all words are equally important.
Coming to the point, to say that lévara is the cause of all
effects is not against the opinion of sfltrakfira.

BRAHMAN IS ONE

Brahman is only one. The Sruti says that

.

“ekameuddvitiyam” (Chandogya, 6-2-1)—Brahman is one and

second to none. “na tatsamaécdbhyadhikasca drsyate I"
(Suetdéuatara, 6-7)—There is nothing which is equal to or
higher than Brahman and “praéésitéram saruesdm” (Manu,
12-122)—he is the protector of all. Brahman is absolutely
unconditioned reality. It is beyond tripartite limitations (deéa,
kills and vastu). It is biggest of all; that is why it is called
Brahman. All the names refer to him alonel. The qualities
attributed by the Sruti can be found nowhere else, except
in Brahman. In the same way the word ‘Brahman’ also does
not denote anybody elsez, because it possesses the quality
‘niratis’ayabrhatva’. That Brahman is Lord Narayana.

1. satyarr'i jflanamanantam brahma Taittiriya Anandaualli. 1-9.

yo veda nihitan‘i guhdydm... Taim‘rlya, 2-1.
tasmddvfi etasmfiddtmanahl Taittin'ya Anandaualli, 1.

2. uede bhfiri-prayogaéca gunayogasca saniginil

'
ms mmneua
'
brahmasabdo muhhyaurtto ma hamumll
p. 401.
. .
Gamdapurfina in Tattvasiddhi
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 187

also say that, though God is birthless, and has nothing to

gain in this universe, still He takes different births to
establish dharma, and root—out adharma. This is His lfla.
Ramanuja says that this prakrfiqnandala is His lfla-vibhfiti.
Because He is devoid of all impurities, He is not born
again and again. He does not become old with the old age
of the body. This Paramatman is free from sin, free from
old age, free from death and grief, from hunger and thirst.
His desires are the real. His will is the real.1
Another Sruti passage specifically mentions that
Narayana alone is the creator, protector and destroyer of
the universe and he is the Lord of goddess Laksmi. The
éruti specifically mentions the name of Laksmi who is the
consort.2 of Sfl Narayana. Therefore Narayana alone is the
object of Vedas.
Desika says that wherever there is reference to different
things as the cause of the universe, it is to be construed to
mean the Lord Narayana Himself. Every word ultimately
means Narayana Himself. In Vis’istadvaitic terminology, this
is called ‘aparyavasanavrtti’. Ramanuja explains this elabo-
rately in Sribhc‘zsya and Vedfirtha-sarigrahaa. Desika declares
that every word connotes Narayana Himself. Every name
through its jiva speaks of the Lord. This relation of the
word and the meaning, is called ‘aparyavasanavrtti’ in

1. apahata-pdpmfi divyo deva eko ndrdyapahl Narfiyazwpanisad.

2. hriéca te laksmisca patnyaul Taittiriya-arariyaka, 3-13.
3. sdksddapyavirodhan’z jaiminihl Sribhrzsya, 1-2-29.
jiuamukhyaprdztalirigdnneti cennopdsdtraividyadfis‘ritatuédiha
tadyogat. Sribhasya, 1-1-32.
uedauidagresara valmilci paraéara dvaipayana uacobhiéca
paras-ya
dtmatvdvagamfitw aarua cetanficetanaprakdram brahmaivabhid-
htyatel Vedfirtha-sarigraha. p. 30.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 189

answer, and establishes that Narayana is the Paramfitman

and the supremel. Therefore, Narayana alone is to be
meditated upon and He alone is the inner controller of the
universe. Brahman, Paramatman, Parabrahman, parama-
purusa, are all the names of Srlmannarfiyana.
BRAHIVIAN IS PURNA EVERYWHERE
Brahman pervades the entire universe from the atom
to the mountain. Everywhere he is pfirna (full) in the bodies
of éiva and Brahma (created Brahman) He is pfirna, through
the jiva thereinl. In the body of Visnu, Brahman is pfirna
without the medium of jiva.
Desika here discusses the problem viz., how is it that
the Brahman who is purna in one object can become pfirna
in other object also? Now this objection may be understood
in four different ways. This objection may be construed in
the first place, to mean that the 'Brahman is not full here
alone’ (in the object before us).
But this argument is favourable to siddhfintin, because
he too does not say that Brahman is pfirna in that place
alone.
Secondly if the objection is to mean that Brahman here
(in the present object) is not an object of our full knowledge,
then the objection is not valid. To know an object (its nature)
one has to possess suitable instruments, without which one

1. kastuan‘i tattvavidasmi uastu

panama”; him tarhi uiszzuh kathaml
tattvedampamtaittifiyakamukhatruyyanta-sandaréanét|
anyastarhi girah kathan‘a guma‘dd—Mrdha rudrul; kathan'il
taddrépya kathamudbhavatyauataratyanyatkatham
niyatéml
Quoted in Nyaya-siddhdfijana, p. 189.
2. 'namo hiraziyagarbhdya haraye sanhardyaca' ityt’zdau
totaéca
hiranyagarbha safikaramfirtyorflva viéeaa dufirfi
bhagava-
ccharirutuaml Nyaya-siddhafijana-glha, p. 190.
190 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita

cannot know it. In the absence of that instrument, if the

nature of the desired object is not known, then the objection
is not valid.
Thirdly, the objection may mean here (in the present
object) it cannot produce effect in its fullness. Paramatman
who resides in this place should have produced all effects
here.
Desika points out that, this objection is also favourable
to the siddhfinfin. According to the Siddhantin all effects
cannot be produced in a limited place. Therefore, the third
interpretation is not correct.
Fourthly and finally, the objection ‘that Brahman is not
pfirna everywhere’, may mean that here the Brahman is not
present with all its qualities. This interpretation is also not
tenable, because in the day-to—day experience, it is observed
that sabda, sparse, rfipa, rasa, etc., pervade their substratum.
They are not in one part of the substratum only. In the
same way, Paramfitman who is of an all-pervasive nature,
exists with all his qualities in everything. So, to admit his
presence along with his qualities in the object present before,
commits no fallacy. Sfitrakfira himself has anticipated all
these objections in the sfitra “kflsnaprasaktimiravayavatua—
Sabdaprakopo vd” (Bmhmasatra, 2-1-26.).
In this sutra Badarayana anticipates the objection,
against the theory that Brahman is the cause of the universe.
If the Brahman is ‘sAvayava’ then it goes against the Sruti
which says that it is niravayava. If it is niravayava, then
the entire Brahman becomes pfirna (full) in one object and
hence the other object should become Brahman-less. Therefore
Brahman is not puma everywhere.
Sfitrakara solves this objection in the succeeding1 sfitras.
1. srmstu sabdamalatudtl atmani caivam uicitraéca hil
Brahmasatra, 2-1-27, 28.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 191
In these sfitras and such others he answers the objection
raised by the previous sfitras. There is ‘avyapti’ (concomitant
variation) between two dharmas viz., ‘savayavatva’ and
‘bahubhavana' (becoming many objects). But this vyapti
cannot be applied to Brahman, because dharmas -like
niravayavatva and bahubhavanatva are attributed to
Paramatman by ‘Sruti’ itself. Hence in applying ‘vyapti’ to
these two dharmas, the Brahman must be exempted and as
a result there is no incompatibility in Brahman becoming
many things.
Moreover, all dharmas which are experienced in life
cannot be applied to Brahman also. For example jadatva
which is experienced in inert matters cannot be found in
atman. In the same way Brahman which posseSses extraor-
dinary powers and which is completely different from the
rest of the world may not be the substratum of the dharmas
which are found in cit and acit. Therefore though Brahman
is niravayava (which does not possess the body as a result of
karma), He is puma everywhere by his extraordinary power.
Further, Smtis such as ‘part‘zsya saktih uiuidhaiva
s’rdyate’ (Svetiiévatara, 6-8) declare his unlimited power.
Therefore though the Paramatman is ‘niravayava’ in the
above explained sense, He is full everywhere by his
extraordinary power. therefore Vedanta Des’ika declares‘btah
yathdgaman‘z saruatra pama eva bhagam'm” (Nydya-
siddhdfijana, p. 193)—the Brahman is ‘pfirna' everywhere.

BRAHMAN IS SAGUNA

Deéika next proceeds to discuss the problem, wnecncr

the Brahman is saguna (possessing attributes) or nirguna
(devoid of attributes). According to the school of
Advaita,
Brahman is nirguna. Deéika examines critically this view
and comes to the conclusion that the nirguna brahmavada
of the advaitin cannot be accepted.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 193

In the present circumstance, two contradictory texts, i.e.,

saguna and nirguna are appearing in a definite order. Another
point is the saguna texts and nirg‘una texts are not at all
contradictory. Therefore, apaccheda principle cannot be
applied here. Under the circumstances, the Mimamsa
principle applicable is the principle of ‘érutilingadhikarana’.
The principle of srutilingadhikarana says that if there is
contradiction between any two. of the following, i.e., éruti,
linga, vakya, prakarana sthfina, samfikhyfi. then the pin-va-
pramana becomes stronger. Accordingly, in the present
context, the saguna text becomes weighty and nirguna text
becomes weaker. Thus both the types of statements become
valid and complementary.
The nirguna texts point out that Brahman is devoid of
all evils and imperfections. In other words, these texts affirm
perfection in Brahman. In addition to this, the saguna texts
affirm that Brahman is the ocean of all perfections. Therefore,
Brahman is an abode of eternal and infinite good qualities
like, satyam, s’ivam, and sundaram. The Taittiriya- Upanisad
declares that the qualities viz., ‘satyam’, ‘jfianam’, ‘anandam’,
‘anantam’, ‘amalam’ etc., are his svarfipa-nirfipaka dharmas.
The Chandogya Upanisad clearly states “ya dtma
apahatapdpmc’z uijaro vimrtyurviéoko vrjighatsopipdsah
satyakdmah satyasarlkalpah l" (8-7-1). That it does not become
old. It is free from sin. Free from death and grief, from
hunger and thirst and its desire and will are the real. It
further says that Brahman is the abode of all auspicious
qualities. The same method is to be followed to solve
satisfactorily the opposition between savikaratva and
nirvikaratva texts as well as sasariratva and asariratva
texts.
Brahman by nature is nirvikfira; but saviltfiratva is
found in its attributes just like atman (the individual self),
who is nirvilu'ara, whereas its body undergoes change such
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 195

By the above enquiry it also becomes clear that the

nature of Brahman is opposed to that of avidya which
possesses the avarana-éakti and viksepa-éakti. Therefore
Brahman is sag-ups.

ADHYASA IN BRAHMAN EXAMINED

Desika rejects the advaitic view point that Brahman as

nirviéesa cinmatram or pure consciousness, and the world
is superimposed on Brahman. According‘to them, maya is
a property which is found only in sentient beings. It is a
cctana-dharma. Maya is a type of ignorance that is
beginningless. Because it is a property, it requires a locus
and must belong to something. Its locus is soul. But maya
is not eternal like Brahman. It is destroyed at the time of
liberation.
Maya has two-fold functions. Through one of them,
maya conceals the real nature of the object and through
another it presents some other object. These are the two
powers1 of maya. The power by which it conceals the object
is called avarana-s'akti and the power by which it shows
some other object is called viksepa s’akti. It conceals the
nature of Brahman and shows up in its place the universe
and number of souls. The function of maya makes Brahman
to appear as the empirical world. So the world is empirical
and Brahman is real and nirviéesa.
This nirvisesavada of advaitin is inconsistent. Here in
this uirviéesavada the purvapaksin has to answer several
questions. In the first place according to him Brahman is
1. It conceals the fact of shell and shows up silver in its place. To
see silver where there is only shell, a necessary condition is the
concealment of the shell. Suppression precedes substitution. These
two aspects of it are respectively termed avarana or veiling and
viksepa or revealing (Outlines of Indian Philosophy p. 353). Also
refer Dr. Radhakrsnan's Indian Philosophy, p. 589.
196 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita

the substratum of super-imposition. If the brahmasvarupa

in its entirety, is the object of it, then there cannot be
super-imposition at all. Because the experience says that
when the shell is shining no body will mistake it for silver.
In the same way when the Brahman is shining there cannot
be any super-imposition.
Secondly, if the Brahman is not at all known, then also
the theory of super-imposition becomes meaningless, because
when the substratum itself is not known, how can there be
any adhyasa (super-imposition)?
Thirdly, if super-imposition is said to be on a part of
Brahman, then the other part remains unaffected. Then the
Brahman becomes ‘améibhedasahita’, and this makes the
system of advaita ‘savis'eea-brahma véda’. In the example,
i.e., shell and silver the nature of Brahman is ‘suktau idam
rajatam’ (knowing shell as silver). There are two aspects in
that jfifina. One is ‘idantva’ which is sadhfiranakéra and the
second is suktitva (shellnesa) which is asadharanakara.
Because of these two viéesas, there is the possibility of rajata
bhrama and its sublation. Unless the visesa of the type of
sadharanakara (general type) and asadharanakara (Special
type) in Brahman, is admitted, the prapafica-bhrma and its
sublation becomes ilil'poasible. If they are admitted, Brahman
becomes savisesa and not nirvisesa. Desika summarizing the
above arguments saysl, that under both circumstances
adhyfisa in Brahman cannot be explained.
Further, the Brahman is self-luminous. If this self-
luminosity of Brahman is covered by avidya, Brahman is
loosing its svarfipa which amounts to svarfipahani. It is also
not correct to argue that the svarfipajfifina of Brahman can

1. adhisthdnasya kartsnyena bhfme'bhdne ca na bhramahl

bhatd bhdtakrtibhidfi sauiéesatuassdhikél
Nyfiya-siddhéfljana, p. 197.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 197

remove the erroneous knowledge; as the brahmasvari'ipa is

self luminous and eternal, there must be nitya-moksa and
not samsara at all. If the svarupajfiana cannot remove the
bhrantijfiana, then it is inevitable to admit, eternal samsara
because no other knowledge can expel this bhrantijfiana.

NIRVISESATVA AND MITHYATVA EXAMINED

Further, the advaitin proves nirvisesatva of Brahman
by the sentence ‘Brahma nirviéesam’ Deéika examines this
position and says1 that if this sentence proves nirvis’esatva
of Brahman, then advaitin is admitting a dharma, i.e.,
nirvis’esatva in it. On the other hand, if that sentence does
not prove the nirviéesatva, then savis’esanatva stands
admitted.
Even the Smti “sattamatram niruiéesam nirihaml”
proves savisesatva in Brahman. It only denies in Brahman
the visesa of the type of svan'ipa and svabhavavikara that
are in inert matters and svabhava vikara that is in the
finite souls. Therefore, nirvis’esatva of Brahman cannot be
established by logic or by verbal testimony. Another point
is that advaitin cannot also prove the mithyatva (unreality)
of the world. In his inferential proposition i.e., “sarvam jagat
mithya" the reason is Brahma-vyatiriktatva. Therefore, there
{in the world) must be the sadhya, i.e., mithyatva. Now if
the proposition which proves mithyatva itself is mithya, then,
satyatva or reality of the world becomes well-established.
If mithyatva is not admitted to the statement “sarvam
agat mithya” the fallacy viz., vyabhioaritva2 occurs. Here
n this inference ‘sarvam jagat' is ‘paksa'—the subject (that

brahmazw nirviéesatvamiti dhanno'sti ud naval

duidhfipi saviéesatvan'z tadyogatadayogajamll
Nyfiya-siddhdrb'ana, p. 199.
Tarka-sarlgraha, p. 57.
sadhydbhauauadvntitvam I
198 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

in which something is inferred). Mithyfitva is ‘sfidhya (the

thing to be inferred). ‘Brahma vyatiriktatva’ is hetu (reason).
There must be invariable concomitance between sadhya and
hetu. If mithyatva is not admitted to that sentence and
Brahma vyatiriktatva is admitted in the jagat, then it
commits the fallacy namely 'Vyabhicfira' (a fallacious hetu,
that is— the presence of the hetu in the paksa without the
presence of sadhya). Further, the advaitin may argue, on
the basis of a difi'erent reasonl, i.e., ‘dréyatvat’, he can prove
the mithyfitva of the world. Wherever there is the hetu
‘dréyatvat’, there is the sidhya ‘mithyatva’. In the shell-silver
example, there isidréyatva. Therefore the sadhya, mithyatva
also is there. Now the same process may be extended to the
world also.
Deéika points out that here in this argument, the
advaitin has to answer whether there is mithyatva in
mithyatva (the probandom) or not. If the former position is
admitted, the satyatva of the world becomes established. If
the latter position is admitted, then the hetu (reason) namely
drsyatvat is not capable of proving the probandom i.e.,
mithyatva. Therefore, in that case also, satyatva of the world
is established—“mithyfitvadipratzjfidnhah svapratijfidm
sprs’enna ua ddye' svasyaiua vidhavarhso dvitiye uyabhi-
came I” (Nyaya-siddhafijana. p. 203).
The advaitin may argue that mithyatva is brahma—
svarfipa and hence it is bhavarfipa (positive one). Hence the
mithyfitva of the world remains unaltered. Des’ika answers,
instead of admitting unknown mithyatva, which is bhava-
rfipa-avidyfi it is lfighava to admit satyatva to the world
and say it is brahmasvarfipa.
Again, the pfirvapaksin may pursue his argument,

1. The inference is of the type “sarvam mithyd dréyatudt yathfi

euktihl”
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 199

stating that the world cannot become brahmasvarfipa,

because the world is jadatmaka and the Brahman is
qjadfitmaka. For this objection, it must be answered that it
is possible, in the way in which mithyatva (which is
jadfitrhaka) becomes brahmasvarfipa (which is ajadatmaka)
in advaital.
Further according to advaita in the experiences like
‘ghatassan' ‘patassan’, the Brahman alone which has the
adjunct, i.e., avidya, is known. The hetu, i.e., drsyatva is
also in the paksa (subject). Therefore Brahman also should
become mithya. According to advaita, the suddhabrahman
(Brahman without adjunct) and upahitabrahman (Brahman
with adjunct) are identical. Therefore, if there is mithyfitva
in upahitabrahman, then there must be mithyatva in
suddhabrahman also. If advaitin admits satyatva in suddha-
brahman, then the upahitabrahman, i.e., prapar‘ica, also must
become satya. Therefore, advaitin cannot prove mithyatva
to the world2.
On the basis of the above arguments the Brahman is
reel of reals and it is savisesa. On the basis of scriptural
statementsa, Desika says that Brahman is knowable.

l. yadi prupaflcamithyétvan‘z sadbrahmaiveti sad bhavetl

praparicasca tathaiueti sa satyo na katham bhavetll
jadatufitsa na taccettat mithyétvan‘z ca na tad bhauetl
tattvenaiva tadanyatvfit na tat satyam ca te bhauetll
Nydya-siddharijana, p. 203.
2. kir'wa prapar'ica-tadbadhaka-pratyayabhydmupahita-anupahitddi-
vesezuz bruhmazw’pi dréyatufidanaikantyam brahma mithydtuan‘:
mi sydtl Nyaya-siddhdfijana, p. 204.
3. athfito bnahma jUfldsdl Bmhnmsatm, 1-1-1.
brahma veda brahmaiva bhavatil Mundaka, 3-2-9.
brahmavidfipnoti pamm Taittirlya-anandavalli, 1-24.
”Mind 06 are druspavyo s’rotavyo mantavyo nididhyasitavyahl
Brhadflmnyeka, 4-4-5.
200 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita

According to some thinkers, on the authority of some Vedic

texts like ‘yato vc'tco niuartante’ (Taittiriya dnandaualli, 9)
and ‘yadudcdnabhyuditam’ and others, Brahman is
unknowable. Desika carefully examines this position and
repudiates it on the basis of scriptures which establish the
knowability of Brahman. Really this is a paradox. This
paradox in the scriptures is solved admirably in Vis’istadvaita.
So it must be understood that the scriptures which say that
Brahman is unknowable, they only mean that Brahman is
impossible to be known in its entirety. We cannot know Him
with our limited capacity..The statements such as “One who
knows the Brahman becomes the Brahman himself ", ‘the
brahmavid gets the communion with the Lord’, ‘the atman
should be perceived. heard and should be thought upon’,
establish the knowability of Paramatman. Therefore Brahman
is knowable and is difl'erent from the world of finite souls.
Here the advaitin may argue that without admitting
identity between Brahman and the world, the Visistadvaitin
cannot establish the Brahman as ‘trividha-pariccheda-rahita’
(beyond the limitation of vastu, kale and desa). The
Siddhantin answers, because the Brahman is eternal and
all-pervasive, there is no trouble in admitting ‘trividha-
pariccheda-rahitatva’.
Vastu-pariccheda is to possess small size. Desa-
pariccheda is to possess limited place. The second is caused
by the first. To possess unlimited size is ‘vastu-pariccheda-
rahitatva’l. The same interpretation is given by Vivaranakara
in Veddrtha-sar‘zgraha.
Varadanarayana Bhattaraka gives different interpreta-
tion in Nydya-sudaréana. According to him, immeasurability

1. uastu-paricchedo uastu-parimfiziam, des'a-paricchedah taddhetukahl

Vivaranskara quoted in Nyoya-siddhafijana, p. 211.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 201

of the guna and vibhfiti is called ‘vastu-pariccheda-rahitya1’.

Narayanarya2 also is of the same opinion. The explanations
of Varadanarayana Bhattaraka and Narayanarya agree with
Ramanuja’s Sribhasya3. Vedanta Desika4 sides with the
second interpretation. Hence Paramatman is unlimited in
His qualities or vibhfitis. Though there are innumerable
objects, they are all limited by place, time and object.

BRAHMAN IS THE ABHINNA-NIMI'I'I‘OPADANA-KARANA

In Chandogya. Upanisad, the teacher Uddalaka, initi-

ates5 his son Svetaketu into this philosophy.
Here the teacher teaches his student that knowing the
cause, one can know the effects, because the same substance
enters into different states and assumes different forms.
Here one may take the example of the clay and its different
states. In this example, clay is the upadanakarana (material
cause) of all types of pots or pitchers of clay. If we know
the clay, we can know all its effects of clay. In the same
way, the Brahman is the material cause of the universe.
Knowledge of this material cause (Brahman) includes the
knowledge of all. Therefore Brahman is the upadana-karana
of the universe. This position of admitting Brahman as the
material cause of the universe will not contradict the

l. uastuparicchedo ndma iyadgunaka iyaduibhfitimdnityevamvidhahl

tadrahitam brahma....| Quoted in Nydya-siddharijana, p. 212.
2. gunairiyattfi rdhitydd vastuna aparicchinnatvafica jr'idyatel
Quoted in Nyfiya-siddhafijana, p. 212.
3. brahma uyatirikta vastvantara abhéuddl Srfbhdsya, p. 429.

4. atra 'iyadgupakah’ ityddi paksa eua prdyah slaghyahl

Nyaya-siddhfifijana, p. 212.
5. yathiz saurnya ekena mrtpindena sarvam mrnmayan't uijfidtarh
syfit vacarambhanarh uikt‘zro némadheyarh mrttihetyeua satyaml
Chandogya Upanigad, 6-1—4.
 The Philosophy of Viéistédvaim 203

existence of ls’vara, the dharmi, cannot be proved by reason.

It is-known only through the scriptures. Sutrakara makes
it clear in the chapter s’éstrayonitvfidhikarana—“édstra-
yonitvdtl” (Brahmasutra, 1-1-3).
Therefore, sastras become dharmi-grahaka-mana, (valid
source of knowledge by which the dharmi is grasped). The
same sastra declares that Brahman is the material as well
as the instrumental cause. Therefore, Brahman is abhinna-
nimittopédana-karana of the world.
Nyaya-vais’esika school maintains the difi'erence between
samavaya, asamavaya and nimitta-karanas. Because, the
experience says, when a pot is produced the two kapalas
(potsherds) are the samavayi-karana and the conjunction of
the two kapfilas are asamavayi-kérana, and the potter is
the nimitta-karana. This clearly shows the mutual difference
among these karanas. When such is the case, how the
scriptures teach the identity between the samavayi-kérana
and the nimitta-karana? Therefore, as in the place of
‘adityoyfipah’ here also the Sruti passages should be
interpreted in the secondary sense of the term (gauna). Here
they quote a Mimamsa principle to substantiate their stand.
In sacrifices, the sacrificial-post namely ‘yfipa’ is likened to
aditya. Though both of them are different, the Sruti says—
‘adityo yfipah' (yfipa is identical with aditya). But adept in
Mimamsa decide that these passages imply only the
‘gaunartha’. Nyfiya-vaiéesika school, therefore argues, it is
not correct to admit abhinna-nimitta-upadanatva of ls’vara
and further such Sruti passages should be taken in the
secondary sense, as in the case of ‘adityo yfipah’.
Rebutting the argument of the Nyaya-vaisesika, the
Vis’istadvaita says, that even Nyaya-vais'esika school, in some
places inevitably has to admit the identity between the
instrumental cause and material cause (abhinna-nimitta-
upédénatva). For example, in Nyfiya-vaiéesika school, ‘dancla’
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 205

instance, efi'ects'such as the jar are caused by an agent. In

the same way earth and the sprout of a tree etc., also are
effects. They too must have some cause. Ordinary people
like us cannot become their agents. Hence the existence of
God is proved as their cause.
In proving the existence of God they take the assistance
of scriptures also. This support of scriptural passages is only
given secondary importance.
In answering this anumana pramana regarding
is’varasiddhi, Vedanta Deéika poses two questions. Does the
Nyaya-vaisesika school infer God, as an agent like the agent
of pot, cloth, house etc, or does it infer God to be different
from the worldly agent?
If the Nyaya-vaiéesika school admits the first position,
then it has to admit that its God is ignorant, weak, bound
by karma, embodied one like the potter and with limited
capacity. But if the Nyfiya-vais’esika school admits that the
God is omniscient, omnipotent1 etc., on the basis of S’ruti2
also, then the school admits that the God creates the earth
and heaven. He is the creator of the universe and the
protector of the universe3.
If the second alternative is admitted, that is, that the
God's agency is different from the potter's in capacity, then
it becomes necessary to answer in which capacity is He
different. If Nyaya school may answer that He is different
from the potter in the possession of body, sense, etc, then
this difference may also be applied in the case of knowledge
and desire. In that case God becomes the possessor of only
prayatna (efl‘ort).
1. saruasya draspa samasya bhohta sarvqifiah sarudnubhauil
Vatsyayana-smra, 1-1-9.
2. dydud bhami janayan deva ekahl Rgveda, 10-31-51.
3. viévasya kartd viévasya bhoktfil Manda/ca, 1-1-1.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 207

only explanatory repetitive texts. Sastras are valid only when

they enlighten us about the unknown. If God is proved by
inference, as Nyéya-vais’esikas say, then, scriptures are
enlightening us only the known object and as a result the
scriptures loose their special characteristics viz., ‘agfiatartha-
jfifipakatva’.
Further Desika says, in case the lsvarfinumana is not
rejected, then at the most, God may be proved as an
instrumental cause. But the agent of the universe must be
proved as both instrumental and material cause. The identity
of both instrumental and material causel, cannot become
proved if God is proved only as an instrumental cause.
Through the scriptures2 alone can one know that God is
both material and instrumental cause. Therefore Vedanta
rejects the lsvaranumana3.
It is the conclusion of Vedanta philosophy that the
existence of the supreme being can be known only by sastras,
which declare that he is an ocean of auspicious qualities
and he is the abhinna-nimittopfidfina-kfirana (both material
and the instrumental cause) of the universe.
SRl IN VIS'ISTADVAITA
The Visistadvaita school includes ‘Laksml", the consort
of Visnu in the term ‘lsvara'. There is no difference between
them in any aspect. Both of them are the locus of svfimitva4.
1. nimittopdddna bhateéuardsiddhehl Nyaya-siddhafljana, p. 224.
2.. kin‘wvid uanan'r be u so urksa Mid yato dyéudprthiul nispataksuhl
Yajurueda Brahmazma, 2-8-7.
saksacchobhaydmnizndd I

Brahmasatru, 1-4-26. (Refer Srlbhasya. 427 to 437.)

Srlbhfisya, 1.143.
saha tu dampatyan': édéuatan'i tata eva tul
srlya.
tayob samyaika-aaktitva-taduattuddigirarh gatib II
Nyaya-uiddhdfliana, p. 228.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 211

All the above enquiry establishes that the Sri is ls’vari

or svamini of this world. Because she is lsvari, the entire
universe becomes Her body, as it is in the case of Nfirfiyana.
Therefore, bhfimi which is included in ijakoti is ‘fims’a’ or
part of Sri. But they are not identical. Just as Viévaksena
is a part of Sankarsana, so bhi'irni is to SH.
Goddess ‘Sri’ takes the body1 which is suitable to the
avatars of the Lord. Therefore Deéika concludes that the
entire world of cit and acit are attributes of both S'rl2 and
Narfiyana.
Some other acaryas of the Viéistédvaita school oppose
these views. But Ramanuja admits3 all these attributes and
vibhfltis like vibhutva, Sesatva, Iéitatva, jagajjanakatva
moksapradatva etc., to goddess Laksmi or Sri.
Desika on the basis of different Srutis, smrtis and the
sayings of great fiofiryas-like Ramanuja and Ramamjéra,
brought to light that Sri, the consort of Nfirfiyana, is also
the lsvari and soul of the entire universe. Both Srl and the
Lord are not difi‘erent tattvas. According to Paficardtragama
or Bhagavacchdstra, which goes to the extent of saying,
“ekatattuamivoditau”—they are single tattvas. Deéika takes
special care to establish this truth. His entire Sristuti vividly
depicts the glories of goddess SH. He addresses the
‘divyadampati' as daivatam—“daivatarh dampatd nab",
(SrI-stuti, 24.)

1. rfighavatue'bhavat site mkmizil hrquianmanil

anyesu cavatareau uisnoresanapdyinil Viwupurflpa 1-53-1445.

2. atah siddhamaéesacidacitprukarum brahma shah srimannfirdyagna

itil Nyaya-siddharijana, p. 234.
3. tflanipagunavilfisddibhirfitmanurfipayaériyd sahaslnaml
bhagauatim ériyam deulml Gadyatmya.
aiévaryamaksaragatim paramampadan‘n ual
Sriguparuhm-koéa. 58.
 Chapter V

NITYAVIBHUTI

Séstras declare that the Lord is the Lord of ubhaya-

hfiti, i.e., mavibhfiti and nityavibhfiti. Nityavibhfiti is said
be the abode of nityas, muktas and iévara. So it is
:essary to study the nature and character of nityavibhfiti.
tyavibhuti is the abode of the supreme being. It is here
it nityas and muktas enjoy their original pure states.
akrti is made up of trigunas viz., satva, rajas and tamas.
.e lflavibhfiti, where in the jivas experience the punya or
paphala is made up of this triguna. But nityavibhuti is
lde up of suddhasatva, that is, unmixed with rajogana
d tamoguna.
Desika defines nityavibhi'itil as a substance which is
ferent from prakrti and is in its essential nature and
ode of sattvaguna, unmixed with rajas and tamas. It is
lf-luminous substance. It -is the place where the jivas
come completely free from the fetters of karma.
Lllavibhfiti is the world of matter, wherein an infinite
unber of finite selves are fated to experience their karma-
,ala. It is composed of sattva, rajas and tamas. Prakrti is
id to expand on all sides except one side, where there is
tyavibhfiti or transcendental region. This transcendental
gion is composed of pure sattva.
higunadrauyauydtirihtatue sati sattuavatvaml
svayampmkfisakawe sati sattvavmaml
tamorulu'tatve anti sattvavatvarnl
niflesauidydniurui Mavijaflydnyatvaml
Nydya-aiddhafljana. p. 236.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 215

Nityavibhuti is jfianatmaka (of the nature of knowledge).

Deéika establishes this fact on logical grounds. The
divyamangala vigraha and the nityavibhuti are made up of
pure knowledge.
Unlike triguna, nityavibhfiti does not cause the contrac-
tion of knowledge. On the other hand, it becomes the cause
of expansion of jfiana, sakti, bala, aiévarya, virya and tejas
of the atman. It also undergoes modifications just like the
world of matter according to the desire of ls’vara, the Lord.
It is called as paramapadal, imperishable region (aksare
parame). The lsvara also is called paramapada, because he
is the object of attainment. The jlvatman also is called
paramapada in its pure state.
Though nityavibhfiti is jfianatmaka, it is without object
and without any locus just like the svarfipajfiana of atman.
Because it shines for the atman alone, it is called
parakdravya. Though our~dharma-bhf1ta-jfiana is self-lumi-
nous, its self-luminosity is known only when the objects are
revealed by it. The self-luminosity of nityavibhfiti is in no
way hampered, though it shines for muktas, nityas and
lsvara during the state of liberation. For baddhas, suddha-
sattva is not self-luminous, due to their past karmaz.
Suddhasattva or nityavibhfiti forms the stuff out of
which the bodies, indriyas and visayas of god, the eternals
and the liberated souls are formed. According to some, in
nitya-vibhfiti also there are twenty-four tattvas which are
not subjected to transformation. Because, in Smtis, eternality

1. katharh traydzu'zm paramaprfipyatvamiti cet, bhagavatsvarfipam

pamnmprdpyatvddevaparamapadaml itarayorapi bhagavatprfipti-
garbhatuddeva paramapadatvam| Vedfirtha-sarigraha, p. 190.
2. dhiyab suayam prukdéatuam muktau svabhfiuikarh yathfil baddhe
kaddcitsamrddhah tathiurdpi niyfimyatel
Rahasyatruya-sfira, p. 89.
216 The Philosophy of Viéis‘tadvaita
of the body of nityas and muktas is established. The Smti
passages which deny the body for etemals should be
interpreted to mean the denial of karmakrtaéarira. Nityas
and muktas are having aprfikrta-indriya which is not made
up of karma. Rfimfinuja has discussed in detail the problem
of possession of body and indriyas by muktas in the sfitra
“abhavam bddariraha hyevam" (Brahmasatra, 4-4-10).
In the sfitra “dvfidaédhovadubhayavidham bédan'zyan’o-
tab” (Brahmasatra 4—4—12) RAmEnuja has proved that
according to sfitrakfira,"there are bodies and indriyas for
muktas also. Deéika quotes the statement of Bhatta Paras’ara
and confirms this position.
On the basis of Smti Bhatta-Parfisara admits that
lsvara, nityas and muktas possess manasl. Bhatta Paras‘ara
himself says that according to sOme acaryas the manas in
nityavibhfiti which is stated by éruti is buddhi. That is
why the usages such as ‘buddhimfin’ and ‘manasvi’ are
'

synonymous.
Further those acfiryas opine that the word manas in
the éruti passage, should be interpreted to mean buddhi
because, there is a perception which says ‘ksubhitam me
manah'—my manas is disturbed, ‘praéastam me manah’—my
manas is peaceful etc. If, therefore, manas is understood to
mean indriya, then it contradicts this perception. Because.
manas being beyond the scope of indriyas cannot be known
by perception. Therefore Bhatta Parasara says, that those
ficfiryas concluded that the manas in nityavibhuti means
only buddhi.
Raminuja states that there are, in nityavibhfiti,
1. yadyapyevam tarhab sudtantryena svfinta samarthana samarthall,
tathapi dgamdnugrahena prubhauati santi cagamdhl mhasaitdn
kfiman paéyan ramate....iti matimtaramuktaml
Quoted in Nyaya-siddhafijana. p. 240.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 217

beautiful ornaments, weapons, retinues buildings and ponds

etc.1. In nityavibhfiti, the changes in trees such as, sprouts,
flower and fruits, are not due to time and karma. They are
due to the sankalpa of Sarveévaraz. Nityas and muktas
assume the body for the kaiiikarya of the Lord. Even the
Lord takes up his divyamangala vigraha to please the nityas
and muktas. This divyamangala vigraha helps nityas and
muktas to make upasana. This is due to his will. Nityas
and muktas possess the body sometimes according to the
will of sarvasaksl and sometimes on their own will which
also acts according to the sankalpa of the lsvara. Sfitrakara
brings out these ideas in the sfitras “tanuabhdve sandhya-
vadupapatteh”, “bhaue jégradvat". (Brahmasatra, 4-4-13, 14).
When the mukta wills to get embodieda, then he possess
the body and enjoys the communion with the Lord. When
he wills to enjoy communion with the Lord without the body,
then he becomes bodyless. It means, that mukta is free to
become ‘saéarlra’ or ‘as’arlra’. In the same way when the
Lord wills body to the mukta, then mukta gets embodied
and enjoys the Lord’s sahacarya.
According to the philosophy of Vis’istadvaitadvaita even
the dreams of jivas are real. During the dream the Lord
creates peculiar bodies for jiva and makes him to enjoy the
pleasure or pain. In the same way mukta also enjoys only
pleasure with the help of the body created by the Lord4.
1. visayaécdtra bhflsandyudhdsana-parivdréyatana udyt‘ma-vfipikfi-
kfldfiparvatddayo'tivicitrdh nitydhl
Quoted in Nydya-siddhafijana, p. 241.
For details see Vaikungha-gadyam of Rfiménuja.
2. storm hi tatrdpi tarusu pallaua-phala-kusuma-ddayallparizuimdhl
nadisu phenatarar'zgddayab kfilakrta-paripémamétrariz hi tesu
nisedhyarh na tu bhagauatsarikalpamfitrakrtamapil
Nydya-aiddhdr'ijana, p. 241.
3. so yadi pitrloka kdmo bhauatil Chandogya, 8-2-1.
4. Refer Kaphopanisad, 2-5-8.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 219
which becomes all-pervasive at the time of moksa. He gives
the example of the lamp which being situated in a particular
place, illumines other objects which are in distant places.
Even in the bodies of baddha cetana the atman being present
in a particular place activates the different parts of the body
through his dharma-bhuta-jfiana. The expansion of the
dharma-bhi'ita-jfiana of baddha cetana is limited to the body
in which he is present, whereas-the dharma-bhfita-jfifina of
muktatman is limitless and is all-pervasive.
According to the statement of Mundaka (3-1-3), the
muktatman enjoys complete equality with the paramapurusa.
Then the question is whether the mukta undertakes the
actions like creation and destruction also? Ramanuja answers
that the agent of these actions is Lord Srimannfirayana
alone. None else. Hence the statement should be interpreted
to mean complete equality of mukta with the paramapurusa,
excepting the work of jaganniyau'uma1 (control of the world)
and sriyah-patitva.
Deéika also discusses2 the incompatibility of accepting
nitya and anitya desires for muktas, nityas and lévara. He
concludes that, because there are actions belonging to the
past, present and future time, there are also nitya anitya
type of desires and their resultant bodies for them (nitya,
mukta and lévara). These desires are there only according
to their will and not out of their binding karmas. Deéika
says that all these explanations about nityavibhfiti, mukta,
nitya and lévara are implied by sfitrakara himself.
To please his devotees and maintain the order of the
world, the Lord assumes five svarfipas, i.e., para, vyfiha,

1. Ssbham. p. 334.
2. tathfi ca 812th tanuabhdve sandhydvadupapattehl
bhiwe jagradvat itil
Nyfiya-szddhdfijana. p. 242. Brahmasmra, 4—4-13. 14
220 The Philosophy of Vis'istidvaita

vibhava, antrayami and area, and all these forms posses all
the six auspicious qualities like jfiana, bala, aiévarya, virya,
s’akti and tejasl. Among them the first svarupa, i.e., para
is in nityavibhfiti. It is the transcendental form of God.
Vyi'iha is said to be in the ocean of milk where he
becomes visible to Gods like Brahma and Indra etc. Vyi'iha
is the operative from of God known as Vasudeva, Sankarsana,
Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vibhava is incarnate from of
the avataras like Rama, Krsna, etc. Antaryami-svari'ipa is
that form through which he controls the entire world. By
this form he resides in the hearts of cetanas and it is
realized by yogins through meditation. The forms which we
see in our temples and houses are arcasvan'ipa. These forms
are assumed by God in accordance with the wishes of his
devotees. Ramanuja in his Sribhdsya (4-1-4) says, that
whenever the devotee warships an image of a deity which
is called pratika, that worship is carried through meditation
up to the supreme being. The Lord makes the image or
area-form his special abode according to the wishes of the
devotee.
Ramanuja affirms this fact following the passage in the
Kathopanisad ‘yamvaiea vmute tena labhyahl tasyaisa
atma vivmute tanflrit svdme” (1-2-23) “He whom the self
chooses, to him He condescends to manifest His divine form.
Only those persons who possess living faith and love in Him,
are chosen by Him. The saints, seers, the Alvars and the
acaryas are looked upon as those who are gifted with the
divine eye (divya chaksu). Those saints and seers, after
beholding the divine form (aprakrta divyamar'igala vigraha)

1. urddhi hrasadyabhaudd ea hi bhavati eada pfirpasddguztyas’élil

Tattvamuktfi-kah‘zpa, 3-69.
sarvesvapi bhagavattvam purnattvam ca prakhyapyatel
Samanha-siddhi, p. 456.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 221

communicate their ecstatic experience of the divine form of

the Lord to other mortals.
Deéika’s works are full of devotional songs. Especially
in his stotras he praises the area form of god and makes
the true devotee to enjoy the bliss of Vaikuntha here on
earth.
Just like the Lord, the divyamarigala vig'raha also
possesses wonderful powers. Rfimanuja explains clearly these
powers in Bhagauadgita-bhasyal. Rfimfinuja commenting on
this stanza says, “Here Krsna tells Arjuna that he succeeds
in getting a vision of His Lordly form; he will not only see
the whole universe but he will also get a direct vision of
God. Further Krsna says that whatever Arjuna may wish
to see, he can see it. After Srllq'sna showed his Visvan‘ipa
form, Arjuna saw in the Viévarfipa the entire universe as
the body of God. Arjuna saw in it whole of the universe
with all its differentiation. He saw in it the evolutions and
manifestation of the universe. He saw in Him the living
cosmos which was a unity in diversity. Therefore Desika
says like the Lord, the divyamangala vigraha also possesses
unimaginable powers. The meditation on any one of these
forms will lead us to liberationz.
Thus scriptures, commentators and scaryas have
described nityavibhfiti which is jfianasvarfipa, composed of
pure sattva and ananda. The pure knowledge itself has taken
the form of nityavibhilti to serve Srimannfirfiyana. This
nityavibhfiti cannot be conceived with.1mpure mind. Because
it is of the form of pure consciousness. It can dispel all
1. tatraikasthan'r jagat krtsnam paéyfidya sacarflcaraml Giza, 11-8.
tatraikatsthan'i jagat Izfisnam pravibhaletamanekadhdl
apaéyaddeuadevasya éarl're pdndauastaddl Giza, 11-13.
2. niééreyasan tu uydpakdnusandhflyindm sarvatra hastfipaceyaml
Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 248.
222 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

types of tamoguna which has followed the atman from times

immemorial. Deéika says that everyone should aspire to
enjoy this nityavibhfiti and he prays her (nityavibhfiti) to
stay voluntarily in his heart.
Rfimfinuja has given the detailed description of nitya-
vibhfiti in his Vaikuzzgha-gadya which fills the reader with
ecstasy. Deéika has consolidated the statements of ancient
scaryas and has shown their coherence with scriptures. Thus
explaining the nature and character of nityavibhuti. Des‘ika
has served a delicious mental food for the erudite as well
as the common people.
 Chapter VI

BUDDI-II

DEFINITION OF BUDDHI

It is through consciousness we know the world of objects

and realize the self and Paramfitman. In another words, we
may call it an instrument. We can understand the objects,
i.e., prameyas clearly only'when the instrument, jfiana, is
crystal clear. This fact necessitates the discussion on buddhi.
So Desika begins to analyse and examine buddhi. He defines
buddhi, as a substance which possesses luminosity and is
karmakaraka. It (jfiana) indicates the visayatfi which is in
the known object and also possesses jfianatva. “sakarma-
kduabiidsavattvaml” (Nyaya-siddhdiijana, p. 249).
Jfiana means understanding. In the experience such as
"ghatamaham janami” (I know the pot), the verb is ‘janami’
(to know). Here there are two parts, namely dhatu and
pratyaya (suffix). The former i.e., dhatu, means under-
standing. In sastras, it is called jfiana, prakasa, avabhasa
and sphurana, etc. This jfiana requires a substratum and
an object. In the verb “janami’ the suffix ‘mip’ indicates the
substratum of the knowledge. The pronoun ‘aham’ which is
in the nominative case indicates that it is that substratum.
That which is known becomes visaya. The word ‘ghatam’
which is in the accusative case, is the visaya. It is called
karmakaraka. It is different from jfiana. The visaya possesses
visayatva. That visayatva is indicated (nirupita) by jfiana.
Therefore the definition sakarmakavabhasatva becomes well
explained.
The second definition that is offered is “sakaratrkfwo-
224 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita
bhasatvam” (Nydya-siddhafijana, p. 429). The locus of
dharma-bhfita-jfiana is atman. Therefore, it possesses the
dharmasrayatva. That asrayatva (kartrtva) is indicated by
jfiana.
In addition to these definitions Nyéyatattua offers1 four
more definitions. The first definition is, that substance which
possesses highest velocity is buddhi. There is nothing which
can go faster than dharma-bhfita-jfiana. That is why during
the state of liberation it gets into contact with the entire
universe instantaneously.
The second definition is that it is very subtle.
The third definition of Nydyatattua says that it is
‘nirbhara’ which means very light. Generally the light
substances will have» highest speed.
The fourth definition says that knowledge requires
nothing else for its cognition. To know objects like pot, jar,
etc., we need a lamp. But the lamp does not require another
lamp for its revelation. It shines for itself. In the same way,
the knowledge also does not mquire another knowledge for
its revelation. In other words. it isiealled ‘svayamprakasatva’
or self-luminosity of knowledge.

SELF-LUMINOSITY OF BUDDHI
The consciousness of baddhajlvas is also self-luminous.
It is so only at the time of visayaprakziéa2 and that too for
:3th alone. The consciousness of objects of the past and
the future becomes the object of another consciousness.
Therefore they do not possess self-luminosity. The conscious-
l. atyantavegitdtyantasauksmyafii nirbharutd tathal
suusauakdlabhfivydptirjflane laksmacatusgayaml
Nyfiya-siddhdfljana, p. 249.
2. prakoéarh ca uyauaharanugunam taddpddakatuam prakdéakatvaml
Daréanodyali, p. 209.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 225

ness of others is known through inference. The consciousness

of nitya, mukta and Evan is not so, because they perceive
consciousness that are in kalatraya and in others through
their omniscience. The Naiyayikas and Mimamsakas do not
admit of self-luminosity to consciousness. In the perceptual
experience ‘ghatamaham janami’ nobody doubts the objectiv-
ity of jiiana. The doubt is regarding 'visayaténirfipakajfiana’
(the jfiana which indicates the visayata). Naiyayikas solve
this problem in the following way.

VIEW OF THE NAIYAYIKAS

In the knowledge, ‘ayam ghatah’ (this is pot), the pot
is the visaya of that knowledge. The knowledge is the
indicator (nirfipaka) of the visayata that is in the ghata.
This knowledge is called vyavaséyal. After this stage, we
experience another knowledge of the type ‘ghatamaharh
janami’ or ‘ghatamaham saksatkaromi’ (I perceive that this
is a pot).
In this latter knowledge, the previous knowledge,
namely, ‘this is a pot’, becomes the visaya. It is mfinasa-
pratyaksa-rfipa. This knowledge is called ‘anuvyavasfiya’.
Now on the basis of this explanation, Naiyayikas argue that
knowledge is known by manasa-pratyaksa-jfiana2. Therefore
knowledge is not self-luminous as stated by the Vedfintins.
VIEW OF MiMAMSAJms
The thinkers of Mimamsa school also do not admit the
self-luminosity of knowledge. They offer their own explana-
tion. After the knowledge, “ayam ghatah” (this is pot) “ayarn

1. uyauaséyétmakam pratyaksaml Gautama, 1-1—4.

jfidnavisayibhfitam jfit‘maml Nydyakasa, p. 825.

2. saruatra. pratyaksavisaya jfifiturindriyena vyauasayalll
paécdt mama. anuvyavasayahl Vatsyayana, 1-1-4.
226 The Philosophy of Viéistjdvaita

patah” (this is piece of cloth), some atisaya (excellence) is

produced in the known object, namely, ghata or pata. This
atis’aya is called ‘prakatya’ by Mums thinkers. The objects
like ghata are not 'prakata’ (revealed) until their knowledge
is produced. Therefore the atiéaya which is formed in the
known objects is known as ‘prfikhtya’. It is the efi'ect of the
knowledge. Knowledge is the cause of atisaya or prakatya.
Now Mimamsakas argue that the knowledge is inferred by
prakatya that is in the object... Though it can reveal all
objects it cannot reveal itself, just like the tip of the finger],
which can touch everything, except itself. Therefore, knowl-
edge is not svayamprakiéa or self-luminous.

EXAMINATION OF‘ NAIYAYIKA VIEW

Desika critically examines both the systems and refutes

them one after the other and establishes the self-luminosity
of the knowledge. First he examines the view of the
Naiyayikas. The experience, namely, “ghatamaham janami”
(I know that this ispot), is not disputed by anybody, and the
objectivity of knowledge here, is also not the object of dispute.
But the heart of the problem is, what is that ‘nirupaka’ by
which we know the visayata that is in objectified jfiana.
Visayata is not known through manasapratyaksa. In
the previous example ‘ayam ghatah’ there is visayata in the
object, namely, ghata, and visayata is in the knowledge. The
relation between them is known as visaya-visayibhava. The
visayaté that is in ghata is known only by the knowledge
but not by anything else. Further in the subsequem
experience ‘ghatamaharh janami’ the knowledge itself (ayaii
ghatah) becomes the object. The visayatfi that is in objectifiet
1. arigulyagran‘a yathétmdnarh natmam‘z sprastumarhatil svén'ts'eru
jflt‘mamapyevam ruitmdnam jfidtumarhatil
Quoted in Tattua-éuddhi, p. 57?
 The Philosophy of Vie‘istadvaita 227

knowledge is known by the above said knowledge but not

by anything else. Therefore knowledge is svayamprakaéa,
not known by something else.
If the Naiyayikas do not admit this position, they will
have to deny the sarvajfiatva of lsvara which is admitted
by them also. Sarvajfiatva means perceiving everything1 at
all times. lsvara who is a sarvajfia must also perceive his
jfiana. Otherwise, he cannot be a sarvajfia. Therefore jfiana
is a svayamprakaéa-vastu. It illuminates the objects like the
prabha (radiance of a lamp). Prabha illuminates everything
in addition to itself. It does not require another prabha. In
the same way, the knowledge which illuminates every object,
also illuminates itself. The manasa-pratyaksaévada of
Naiyfiyika is refuted by another objection. The satta
(existence) and the satta-visista-vastu (existent objects), are
perceived by knowledge such as, ‘ghato’sti’, ‘pato’stzi'. In the
same way, we have the experience of the knowledge jfiana-
masti’. Here ‘jfiana’ which is the object, is perceived by that
knowledge. If perceptibility of that knowledge is not admitted
then it becomes ‘asat’ and this leads one to admit all objects
that are known by this knowledge as ‘asat’. Therefore it is
inevitable to admit jfiana as a svayamprakasa-vastu. Des’ika
abridges all these arguments in following slokas.
dhiyah svayamprakds’atve vedmityédyupalambhanaml
manasddyaksabharigddirapi manamiti'syatam ll
suadhiuisesam saruajfio’pyadhyaksayati ud na mil
ddye siddha svatassiddhih anyatrasarvaveditdll
jfidnamastiti vijiiénan'z svdtmdnan'z sfidhayen na udl
saruatra svaprakds’atuan'z sarva siddhirato‘nyathdll
Nyaya-siddhafijana, p. 250.

1. uktdnuktdéesdrthesu samfisa-vistara-vibhfiga-visesataéca
tauvavydpta-sadoditasiddhijfianarhsaruajfiatvaml
Sarvadaréana—aangmha, p. 166.
228 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita

EXAMINATION 0F NHMAMSAKA VIEW

After refuting the system of Naiyiyikas, Deéika

examines the view held by Mimfiiiisaka. The Mimamsakfi
has said that jfiana is not a self-luminous substance. The
first defect in this view is that it violates the rule that hetu
(reason) and sadhya (probandom) must have a common
substratum. We infer the fire by smoke in the paksa, i.e.,
mountain. Therefore, there is ‘sadhyahetvoh samsnadhi-
karanyam’. But this samfinfidhikaranya is not present in
the inference by which the Mimimsaké infers jfia‘ma. Here
prfikatya which is the hetu is in outside substances. But
jfiana which oughtto be inferred is inside the individual.
Therefore, how canwe infer a ling-i (sadhya) by linga (reason)
which is somewhat! else?
Further, Miiiflrhmka has to answer whether the
prakatya is perceptible or imperceptible. If it is perceptible,
then, it should be known by one and all, just like the colour
and weight of every object. But according to him prakatya
is known by the perceiver alone. To over come this difficulty,
if he says that it is imperceptible, then, there can be no
inference at all, because in the famous ‘vanhyanumiti (fire
inference) we cannot infer the existence of the fire without
the perception of hetu, that is dhfima. Accordingly without
the perception of prfikatya, inference of jfiana becomes
impossible. Therefore, to say that jfiana is prfikatyanumeya
is untenable.
Desika further says, that Mimar'nsaka cannot prove
prakatyanumeyavada itself. Every knowledgerequires several
apparatus, such as, sense, object, their relation, light, time,
place and adrsta, etc. These are common to all knowledge.
Mimfirnsakas add prfikatya in this group and say that firms
is inferred by it. However, according to them the apparatus
produce the knowledge and knowledge produces the prakatya.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 229

Now instead of saying knowledge is inferred by prakatya,

if he says the apparatus of knowledge is inferred by prakatya,
it becomes ‘laghava-jfiana-sahakrta (simplicity of reasoning).
The adapts in nyaya say the same. “taddhetorevastu
taddhetutvam madhye kim tena I”
On the whole Mlmamsaka will have to deny knowledge
itself, if he accepts prfikatya—vada. But according to siddhantin
this is not a difficulty. Because, in his system, jfiana is
svayamprakasa. Therefore knowledge cannot be denied. Here
the siddhéntin accepts the difference between the knowledge
and the known, because knowledge is perceptible. But all
apparatus are not so. Among the apparatus the ‘adrsta’ is
not perceptible. If the perceived knowledge is denied, then,
on the same basis, the entire universe may be denied. So
mikatyfinumeyavfida is untenable.
Mimamsaka further may argue that the vyavahara in
our day-to-day experience is not compatible unless one accepts
prakatya, because through this prakatya, one can understand
the nature of the object. So it is beneficial to admit
prakfitya-anumeya-vada. The siddhantin answers that this
vyavahara may be done with the help of jfiana itself. So
prikatyfinumeya-vada cannot stand to reason.
Another objection also can be leveled against the
MImfirhsakfi. According to him, jfiana is an instrumental
cause of prakatya whereas the visaya is the material cause
of it. This can be explained in the jfiana which is in the
present time. But the same cannot be said of the jfiana of
past and future times, because we are not having the visaya
before us which is the samavayikarana' (material cause) of
prakatya. As a result of this there can be no knowledge at
all regarding the objects of past and future times.
The Mimfimsakfi in the beginning had given the example
of ‘angulyagra-drstanta’ viz., ‘ the tip of the finger which can
touch everything except itself’ to substantiate his position.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 231

Bhatta Parfiéarapfida1 gives the following reasons to

prove the svayamprakés’atva of knowledge.
1. Jfiana is a perceptible object.

2. It cannot be perceived by any other means like

indriyas. It is perceived by jfifina alone. Therefore it cannot
be perceived by minasa-pratyaksa.
3. In the knowledge ‘ghatamaham janami’, the object,
knowledge and aham padfirtha ‘I’ness are known. Here the
visayatfi that is in jfiéna is known by jfiana itself.
4. By inference ‘jfifinam svayamprakasatvavat jfifinatvat
yathfi iévarajfianam’. In this inference, the hetu i.e., jfifinatva
is in jfiéna viz., the paksa. Therefore, there must be the
‘sfidhya’, ‘svayamprakfiéatva’ also. Their concomitant vari-
ation is proved in Is'variya-jfiéna.
5. The jfiana-vyavahfira begins from the very next
moment of its birth. If it was through manasa-pratyaksa or
prakatya, there must have been delay in its vyavahfira.
6. We never doubt whether we have consciousness or
not. If knowledge was not svayamprakaéa. then there must
have been that doubt.
7. Afier perceiving a thing, we remember it after
sometime. It is due to dhfiravfihika-jfiana. In dharavahika-
jflnna, the preceding jfifinas generate succeedingjfiana. Thus
it helps in producing memory. In dharavahika-jfiana, the
preceding jfifinas are experienced as they produce the
succeeding jfiana. It is not possible if jfiana is not
Ivayamprakaéa.
8. In the middle of dharavahika-jfiana, there cannot
be anuvyavasfiya type of knowledge (knowledge where
l. dhiyalz pmtyaksabhduatvat paratastadasambhaudtl
pafiéeeydtauato bhanam pramdzldcea tatastatahll
Nyaya-siddhaiiana. p. 243.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 233

This objection is met with in the following way. We

need not admit the identity between the known and the
knowledge, though the siddhfintin accepts the niyama of
sahopalambha. There is an experience “ahamidarh janami”.
Here, ‘idam’ indicates karma and the verb ‘janamj’ indicates
the knowledge. ‘idam’ is visaya of the knowledge and jfiana
indicated by ‘janémi’ is visayi. Thus one can perceive clear
difference between visaya and visayi through perception.
Further, pfirvapaksin admits the identity between them
through inference. But inferential knowledge becomes invalid
when the perceptual knowledge is strong. The adepts in
Nyfiya say1 that when an elephant is known by perception
then there is no need to infer it by its “citkfira’. Therefore,
svayamprakaéa-vida will never lead to Buddhism. 0n the
other hand. it proves2 ‘bhedavfida’. Therefore, knowledge is
svayamprakaéa-vastu or self-luminous substance.
CONTRACTION AND EXPANSION 0F
DHARMA-BHUTA—JNANA OF JlVA

Dharma-bhuta-jfiana of jiva can perceive everything that

is in lilavibhuti and nityavibhuti, but due to karma its power
is obstructed in the stage of sainsara. Another-point is that
the jfifina of the jive has to function through indriyas.
therefore, there is parity3 in the expansion and contraction
of the dharma-bhfita-jfifina of jiva. Though this jfiana is
eternal, it is said to be utpanna and vinasta due to its
1. na hi karini drste citkdrena tamanumimate‘numdtdralzl
Paksata, Raghunathaéiromsni, p. 1.
2. svayam prakdsatue sahopalambhaniyamfidabhedabhayamapi
viruddhapratyaksduaruddha-sddhyatvaviruddhatvd-prayojakatva
-prabhfiibhiranumanadasan&tniséesilam".
Nydya-siddhflfljana, 13-256.
3. tamimmindriyaduara jr‘uinaprasdmmapeksya udayfistamayavya-
padeéah pravartatel Srlbhdaya.
 '
234 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

prasarana (expansion) through our senses. Knowledge pos-

sesses extraordinary speed. Hence it gets immediate contact
with the objects which are in distant places. Because of its
subtlety, knowledge gets contact with objects inspite of the
presence of obstructions.
According to the system of 'Visistidvaita the relation
between jfiéna and its objects issuhyoga. In Nyéya-vais’esika
system, the relation between jfiina and dravyas is not
sarhyoga. Because in their 03th jfiina is a quality. A
quality exists in its substratum by samavaya-sambandha.
But, according siddhantin jfilna is a substance. Ramanuja
commenting upon the siltra, ‘m‘zbhdua upalabdheh’ (2-2-28)
accepts dravyattva of jfiina and samyoga as the relation
between jfifina and its objects. That is why Vedanta Des’ika
enumerated jfiina among dravyas. Hence the relation
between jfiana and its object is samyoga.
Dharma-bhuta-jfiina illuminates itself and the objects
of nature. It is of the nature of substance-attribute1
(dravya-guna). It is compared with prabha. Prabha illumines
objects and hence is a quality. At the same time as the
substratum of colour, it is a substance. Likewise jfiana also
expresses essential attributes of the self. In that aspect it
is attribute. It is substance because it has contraction and
expansion.
THE PROBLEM OF DHARAVAIHKAJNANA
Any consciousness of an object that continues for a long
time, without any interruption in the middle, is called ‘dhara-
vahika-jfiana'. Here the doubt is whether this knowledge is
made up of only one knowledge or jfiana or is it the flow
of many jfiins-vyaktis. In the former instance, we can give
1. sambandhasca samyogalaksaztah jfianamapihi dravyamevol
prubha druvyasya pradipagumbhatasyevajiifinasya api dtmaguzta-
bhatasya dravyatvanwviruddhaml Sribhdaya. p. 540.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istfidvaita 235
the example of dea (lamp) and its prabha (radiance), where
the prabha reaches the object without any interruption. In
the same way ji'iana also reaches visaya or object in a
continuous way like a river. In the latter instance, we can
have the example of dips in which every time wick and oil
produce different new flamesof the same type.
In Prajfla-pratitrapal, Varadanarayana Bhattfiraka ad-
mits the former position. Some other acaryas hold the second
view, that is, dharavahika-jfifina is of santatirfipa. Just like
the wick and oil of the lamp produce different new flames,
dhfiravahika-jfifina carries continuous flow of consciousness.
These acaryas also prove their stand on the statement of
Ramanuja. Criticising the View of jflanatmavadin Rfirnanuja
says: “ksanabhariginydssamuidah dtmatvabhyupagame”
(Sribhdsya, p. 67).
This clearly indicates the produced knowledge must
meet its vinfiéa either in the second moment or in the third
moment. As such, it cannot be ekakara (of the same type).
Therefore, it must be santatirfipa. Scriptures also support
this view. During the time of meditation, only one object is
mediated upon continuously. At that time our knowledge
gets detached from other objects. The knowledge of the same
object continues for a long time. This continuity of knowledge
is called ‘dharfikfira-jfifina’. This itself is called ‘dhyana'.
Therefore it becomes established by the smrtil, that dhyfina
is of santatirupa.

1. dhdrfivéhikadhipanktihi svakfilinddhabhfisikdl
mdhdtirekasadbhfiufit naimpekayddapi pramd ll
stambhastambhastambha iti dhirdhfirduahiké matdl
dhdrdudhikauiifidnamekarh jr'ifinam matan't hi nah“
Quoted in Nyéya-siddhafljana, p. 258.
2. tdrfipapratyaye caikd santatiécdnyanisprhfil
taddhydnam pmthamiééadhimfigaimigpadyate tathall
Quoted in Nyaya-siddhflfljana-dha. p. 259.
236 The Philosophy of Viéistndvaita

Desika also seems to hold the second view. Though the

dharma-bhfita-jfiina is eternal, its momentariness (destruc-
tion in second or third moment) is due to its momentary
contact with the objects. Here he quotes from Bhatta
Parasara: “sankoce’pi karanasamprayogavadhika-sthairyfi-
bhyupagamatl” (Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 259).
Because samyoga is ksanika, dhfirflvfihika—jfiéna must
be of santatirfipa.

STAGE OF PRATYAKSATVA

The contraction and expansion of firms in jiva is due

to his karma. The difl‘erence in the apparatus of jfiana is
the cause of difi'erent stages of jfifina like, pratyaksatva,
anumititva etc. When the consciousness expands through
the senses, then senses are the apparatus. So this knowledge
is called pratyakse.
According to Viéistadvsita philosophy the world is
knowable. This system affirms the knowability of reality and
also says that we can know the world of objects as they
are. In every perceptive knowledge the self perceives the
object. For example in the experience ‘ghatam paéyami’ (I see
a pot), atman with the help of jfiana perceives the object
‘pot'. Here the object ‘pot’ is not mere sensation as some
other systems say. The knowledge presupposes a knowing
atman and the object of thought. The objects in nature are
not our mental creation.
In Advaita the antahkarana reveals both itself and the
objects of the nature. In Viéistadvaita this work is done by
the dharma-bhi'ita-jfiana of the fitman. The knowledge of
objects arises, when dharma-bhfita-jfifina gets contact with
the object. Knowledge starts from the atman and with the
help of manas and indriyas reveals the object. Thus this
system recognises the reality of jfifina, jiieya and jfiatfi. In
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 237

Advaita the world of object is the vrttn' of avidya. But in

this system objects have an existence independent of
consciousness. In this way the theory of knowledge in this
system establishes the reality of the atman, visaya and
jfifina.
Further we must note another point in this context.
Dharma-bhfita-jfiana being self illumined, illumines objects.
It is also called samvit, jfiana, mati, s’emusi and dhi. This
dharma-bhfita-jiifina is not self-realised like the atman. It
is only revelatory. It is like a lamp which can only show
other things but cannot know itself.
In inference, the hetu with vyaptijfiana (concomitant
variation) becomes the instrument. Therefore the jfiana takes
Ila form of anumititva. Verbal testimony is produced by
inhda-jfifina. Then the knowledge takes the form of sabda.
These are only three valid sources of knowledge admitted
in Visistfidvaita and all these pramanas are different states
If consciousness alone. But they take different names such
as pratyaksatva, anums‘inatva etc., because there is difference
in their apparatus. Originally knowledge always will be in
the form of pratyaksatva. Knowledge gets different states
ally when it knows objects other than itself. When étman
itself becomes the object then knowledge will be in the form
patyaksatva alone. Desika in this present work has not
discussed the pramanas in detail because he had discussed
them elaborately in his previous work Nyoya-parisddhi.
The consciousness possesses extreme speed. That is why
it gets the contact with the very distant objects within no
time. Because it is very subtle, it can reach any object
without any disturbance. The relation between jfiana and
other substances is samyoga. Samyoga can take place only
between two substances: “dravyayoreua samyogah" (Tarka-
sarigraha-dipikd).
 238 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

Ramanuja puts it in very clear terms: “sambandhasca

samyogalaksanalz jfianarh ca dravyameva". (Sri'bhc‘zsya,
.2227.) This means that the relation between two substances
is saihyoga and the knowledge is dravya.

SEVERAL OBJECTlONS ANSWERED

Des'ika next starts to

answertwelve objections raised
against consciousness.

Objections
1.What is the proof in the eternality of consciousness?
2. If the etemality of consciousness is admitted, then
we have to accept its presence in deep sleep also. As a result
of this, there must be no difl'erence between the states of
j'agrt (waking state) and susupti (deep sleep).-
3. What is the proof in the theory, that the consciousness
which is inside the body expands towards objects which are
in the outside world?
4. Consciousness is like a quality to 5‘1th. It cannot
be a substance. In that case, the colour, touch, sound, smell
which are qualities, also should be considered as substances.
5. Which is the clear pramana to establish dravyatva
of jfiana?
6. In our day-to-day experience, one can observe that
sound, etc., does not take part from their substratum. If
that is the condition how can the consciousness go out from
its substratum, namely atman?
7. According to siddhantin consciousness sometimes gets
contraction and at some other time it gets expansion.
Contraction or expansion are compatible only regarding the
objects which are with parts. Jfiana is a partless substance.
Therefore it is incorrect to say that jfiana expands or
contracts.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 239

8. It is said that consciousness is related by samyoga-

sambandha, with its objects outside. This is explicable only
in objects which are in present time. The same cannot be
said of the objects which were in past and will be in future
times, because our consciousness cannot get contact with
those objects. But it is evident that we are having their
knowledge. Therefore, the relation between consciousness
and objects cannot be the sarhyoga.
9. The relation between jfiana and its object is only
sarhyoga, according to siddhantin. Just as we know objects
through our consciousness, we also know their qualities and
actions through the same instrument. Therefore, they also
may become the visayas or objects to our consciousness. But
one cannot admit samyoga as a relation in between them.
Then what is the relation between them?
10. Our consciousness gets samyoga with very distant
objects such as the sun and the moon, and we get the
knowledge of those objects. At the time when our conscious-
ness gets contact with the sun or moon. there is also contact
with other things which are between our eyes and moon.
Therefore, those other objects also should be known. But
why are they not known?
11. In the system of Vis’istfidvaita, the consciousness of
jiva becomes all-pervasive during the time of liberation. Now
the question is, at that stage whether the knowledge gets
contact with all objects simultaneously or it gets contact
with them one after the other. The former alternative is
untenable because we cannot admit sarhyoga simultaneously
with objects which are nearer and objects which are afar.
In the second alternative also, it is not possible because
brahmfindas are innumerable. So the entire future time is
insufficient for the dharma-bhuta-jfiana to get contact with
the objects therein.
240 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita
12. The difference between mukta and baddha, lies in
the contraction and expansion of their knowledge. In the
state of liberation, this difference vanishes and they become
equal. The dharma-bhuta-jfiana' of baddha also becomes all-
pervasive in that state. According to siddhfintin baddha can
know the objects through his dharma-bhfita-jfiana only, but
not on any account through the consciousness of others. In
the state of liberation, dharme-hhflta-jfiana becomes all-
pervasive. In the same way, there are innumerable fully
expanded dharma-bhflta-jflinas of innumerable muktas. Each
of them is having contact with another. It cannot be clearly
stated which dharma-bhfita-jfiana belongs to whom. So there
should not be any order in dharma-bhfita-jfiana of ija during
the state of liberation.

ANSWERS

All these twelve objections raised against consciousness

may be answered in the following way.
First objection answered
The etemality of jfiana is known by scriptures. The
great aairya Yfimuna in his Atmasiddhi has proved the
eternality of jfiana on the ground that atman is eternal,
which in turn is based on Sruti, “na vijflaturvijfidterviparilopo
vidyate, na hi drasturdrateruiparilopo vidyate, avinc‘zéitudtl"
(Brhadaranyaka, 6-3-30) which declares that the atman and
its knowledge are eternal. The great sage Saunaka gives
the analogy of gem-1. When a gem is washed, it shines with
natural splendour. Then the splendour is not newly created.
1. yatha m hriyate jyotand malaprahodlananmanehl
doaaprahc'man na jfianam dtmanab kriyate tathfill
yatha heyagunadhvamsddavabodhadayo gum!
prakaéyante na janyante nitya evatmano hi tell
Visnudharma. 104-56, 57.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 241

Only the obstruction is removed. One cannot create it, but

one can make it to manifest. In the same way, the gem,
namely fitman, when cleaned by sash-as, shines with natural
effulgence. Therefore the jiiana of atman is eternal.
Sfitrakara cconcretises the above position in the sfitras
fino’ta eva’ (2-3-19) amd ‘iyavadatmabhauitvdca na dosastad-
daréanfit" (2-3-30.)
In the sutra jno’ta eva’ the sfitrakara says that the
Smti fianatyevayam purusah’ (Brlzaddranyaka, 6-3-30)
declares that atman possesses ji‘iAna and he is also of the
nature of jfiana. There are many attributes in the atman.
Among them the jfiana is important. That is why it is called
svarfipa-nirupaka. This knowledge differentiates atman from
other things.
During the time of deep sleep knowledge is in the state
of contraction. But when the fitman is awake this knowledge
gets expansion. Therefore he perceives objects. Youth, old
age etc., which are unmanifested during childhood, become
manifested in youth and old age respectively. Likewise
knowledge also which is in the state of contraction in susupti,
becomes expanded in the state of waking. But here one may
ask, if the perception and non-perception of objects is due
to expansion and contraction of knowledge, then what purpose
is served by sense organs like caksus and ear etc.? This
question may be answered in this way. The indriyas are
helpful in having the perception of objects. Knowledge should
get contact with external objects. In getting that contact,
the indriyas are helpful. Deéika’s contention in quoting the
sfitrakara is to support his view that pratyaksa and other
knowledge are expansion of dharma-bhfita-jfiina. Therefore
the etemality of consciousness becomes established beyond
doubt.
242 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita
Second objection answered

Prakrti is composed of trigunas, namely, sattva, rajas

and tamas. Atman is captured in prakrti. So, when the
quality of sattva becomes predominant in him, then the
knowledge gets manifestation. This state is called
‘jagrdavastha’. If the quality of_tamas becomes predominant
in atman, the consciousness gets contraction in atman. We
call this state by the name ‘susupti’. In this state,
consciousness is obstructed, but not destroyed. It is there in
atman. Therefore, the presence of consciousness in atman
during the state of Isusupti cannot be denied. It only gets
manifested in the waking state, just as youth which is latent
in childhood becomes manifested in young age. Sfitrakara
brings out this idea in the aphorism “puritstuddiuatvasya
satobhiuyaktiyogat” (Brahmaszztra, 3-3-31).
Therefore, it may be concluded that when the buddhi
or consciousness gets expansion, it is called waking state.
The state in which it is contracted is called sleeping state
or the state of susupti.

Third objection answered

During the time when our hands and feet get the
contact with the external objects, our sense of touch also
gets the contact with those objects. In the same way,
consciousness also comes out of the body with indriyas and
gets contact with such and such objects. Yamuna is of the
same opinion. Says Deéika: “ata indriyena saha caitanyamapi
nissrtya tennrthena sannikrsyate hastizdineva tvagindriyam".
(Nyaya-siddhaiziana, p. 262).
Desika proves this fact on the basis of Sruti also
“tadaksaram fat saviturvarenyafiz prajr'id ca tasmdt prasrtd
pursui- l” (Svetdévataropanisad). The jiifina of cetana expands
at the behest of Paramatman who is seated in our heart.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 243

Bhagavadgitfi tells in clear terms knowledge gets

expansion. “indriydudm hi caratdrh yanmano’nu uidhiyatel
tadasyaharatiprajfiam vdyumavamivambhasil” (2-67)—this
sloka says. the mind or jfifina which work in obedience to
the roving indriyas, carries away wisdom, as a stormy gale
carries away a ship in water. Manusmrti endorses this theory
of expansion of knowledge. Manu says, “indriyandm hi
saruesdn'z yadyekan'z ksaratindriyaml tendsya ksarati prajfid
drteb padadiuodakam. ll" (2,99). Among'indriyas, even if one
indriya becomes un-controllable, then other indiryas also
loose their strength. With the indriya, which has become
uncontrollable, the knowledge also leaks as water leaks from
the vessel of leather which has a hole. Deéika quoting this
sloka says that this smrti also establishes the movement of
knowledge through our sense organs.
Therefore, on the basis of logic, Sruti and smrti, one
should admit that the consciousness which is inside the body
comes out and gets contact with the object outside.

Fourth objection answered

This argument is rejected in the following way. The
radiance of a gem or a lamp is considered to be substance
though it is the quality of its substratum. But on the same
basis we cannot consider qualities like colour, taste, etc., as
substances, because they are not the locus of avastha (states)
without which they cannot be called as dravyas. “auasthd-
s’rayatvan'z dravyatvaml" (Tattvamuktd-kaldpa, p. 12).
But on the other hand, the consciousness which is in
atman, is a substance, as it fulfills the condition of
dravya—laksana. Ramanuja gives the same example, namely,
prabhfi and prabhavat in his bhasyal.
1. pmbhfi. dravyasya dipagunabhmasyeva jfldnasydpi dtmaguna-
bhfitasya drauyatuanmuimddhaml S'ribhizsya, p 540.
244 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

Deéika says that we do not accept gunas like N aiyayikas.

According to us, the guns is that which is the adheya
(dependent) by the relation of ‘aprthak—siddhi'. This definition
of guna may also cover the gunas of Naiyayika. In that way,
rfipa, prabhfi and jfifina become qualities. But because there
is avasthfiérayatva in jfinna and prabhfi, we have to include
them in the group of substances. Therefore, according to
Viéistfidvaita, there is some speciality in gunas. There are
some dravyfitmakagunasl (guns as well as dravya) like jr‘iana
and prabhfi, etc., and kevala (mere gunas) like sattva, rajas
and tamas.
Therefore, jfiina is a dravya like prabhfi.

Fiflh objection answered

The clear prawns to establish dravyatva of jfiana is
inference and that inference is of the following form:
jfianam (subject)
dravyam (probandom)
avasthfivattvfit (reason)
yathfi prabhi. (example)
Varadavisrmmiér-a2 establishes dravyatva of jfifina with
the help of another anumana.
jfianam (subject)
dravyam (probandom)
sarhyoga amfinyatvesati } (reason)
bhavanaksrmtv‘t
atmavat (example)

1. evan'l ca gupecu hatcidviéegabl dmvydtmakagupab kevala-

gunasoetil par-De jflanadayabl uttam sattua-rqjastamahpmbhrtayo
uakayantel Nyaya-siddhaiiiana, p. 263.
2. Nydya-siddlmfliana, p 265.
 The Philosophy of Viéistjdvaita 245
Atrnan is different From both sarhyoga and adrsta and
he is also the cause of samskara. Therefore atman is dravya.
In the same way dharma-bhfita—jfiana also being different
from adrsta and sarhyoga causes the samskara. Therefore
dharma-bhfita—jfifina is also dravya.
According to a Nyaya maxim “hetukopipravisydnc‘lm
daléndrh vyabhicara vdrakatayaiva sdrthakyam I", the parts
(dale) included in the body of reason (hetu) should eliminate
the fallacy of vyabhicara. In the above anumana there are
two parts in the body of reason viz., samyoga-adrsta-anyatva
and samskara-kfiranatva. If the former part is not included
in the body of reason then it commits the fallacy of overlapping
in atma-manassarnyoga. Because atma-manassarhyoga is also
safi‘nskfira-karana and thus it also should be called as dravya.
If the later part is not included in the body of reason, then
the same fallacy will be committed in colour, taste etc.
Because they are also different from samyoga and adrsta.
But there is no samskarakaranatva and hence both parts
are necessary.
Sixth objection answered
The sixth objection can be easily met with by the
example, namely prabha and prabhavat, which is already
explained. The above objection may also be answered in
another way. The Visistédvaitin also does not admit that
the jfiana is completely separate from its substratum. Acarya
Yamuna replying to the same objection, gives the same.
answer. Further Yamuna saysl, if once the jfiana gets apart
from the atman, it cannot reunite with it. Dharma-bhuta-
jfiana of :1th gets contact with the outer world through
1. dtmaprahdpanabhyupagamdt auihdyaivdtmanam itastataécetané
indriyfididvfird nissarati, vicchinndyééca tasydh sandhami-
sambhauab tantra euoktahl
Quoted in Nyaya-siddhafvana, p. 266.
246 The Philosophy of Viiistadvaita

the vyaptijfiana and éabdajfifina. For this purpose it need

not get separated from its substratum The same position
is maintained by Nathamum' also: .

Therefore, jfiana, without departing from its substratum,

can get the contact with the outer world.
Seventh objection answered
Desika answers1 this objection in this way. When the
serpent coils its body, it is contracted and while it stretches
its body, it becomes expanded. The same thing can be said
of jfiana also. Another point is that the above said rule
cannot be applied everywhere. This rule will not apply to
jfiana which is partless and a very subtle substance. On the
other hand if expansion and contraction are not admitted-
to jfiana because. ofnits partlessness, then it becomes ,

impossible to apply the some for prabha also because prabhfi

also is partless like jflna. Because of the extraordinary
subtlety. the knowledge gets-extreme contraction even in the
body of an ant. Therefore one need not entertain the doubt
as how the dharma-bhfita-jfifina of an ant which is very
small can get the contact with the whole universe at the
time of liberation. Ifknowleae hadparts. then the objection
would have become valid. like thezprabhis of innumerable
lamps get contraction in a very limited place because of
their partlessness, jam also can getthe extreme contraction
in the small bodies like ant. mosquito etc. That is why
Nathamuni defined dhnlma-hhfita-jfilna as a dravya which
possesses extreme atyantavegitva, (speed) and atyanta-
suksmati (subtlety).
Eighth objection answered
Nyaya thinkers say the objects of the past and future
1. saptamasya ahikundaladrstantena.nirdsabl
Nyfiya-siddhfir‘ijana, p. 265.
 The Philosophy of Viéisfadvaita 247

are known by visaya-visayi—bhava relation. The same thing

can be said in this case also.
In the objects of past and future, though there is no
vartamanatva at present, in the case of an object of past
time it was there, and in the case of the objects of the
future, it is latent there. Therefore there is no inconsistency
in asserting the relation of sarhyoga between jfiana and its
objects.
Ninth objection answered
Siddhantin answers that we too do not admit samyoga
to be the relation between jfiana and gunas. The relation
between them is ‘samyuktas‘ritatva’. The substance becomes
saniyukta with consciousness. The qualities and generality
of substance are related to consciousness through the relation
of sarhyuktas'ritatva. So there is no difficulty in admitting
samyoga as a relation between substance and consciousness.
Ramamisra gives the same explanation in Sadartha-sangra-
ha—“samyogastadarhesu uisayatvdkdrah anarhesu tatas-
tadanuayisul” (Quoted in Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 267).
The contention of Ramamis'ra is this. According to
Vis’istfidvaita jfiana is dravya. There is no inconsistency in
accepting samyoga in between dravyas. The visayatva that
is produced in the experienced object is of the form of the
object itself. But guna( attributes), kriya (action) and Samanya
(similarity) are related with consciousness through the
relation of samyoga. Even the nyaya-vaiéesika system accepts
samyukta samavaya to related consciousness with the gunas,
kriya and jati which are called dr'avyas’ritas in their system.
In Viéistédvaita the relation of samyogfis'ritattva is substi-
tuted for sarhyuktasamaveta relation of Nyaya-vaisesika
system.
Tenth objection answered
This objection can be warded off with the example of
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 249

(aprthaksiddha-sambandha). Therefore, there can be no

disorderli-ness regarding dharma-bhfita-jfifina of jiva at the
time of liberation.
In the philosophy of Visistadvaita dharma-bhfita-jfiana
gets all-pervasive nature at the time of liberation. Because
of its all-pervasive nature, the dharma—bhuta-jfifina does not
move. But the ija moves. There is no inconsistency in
admitting interrelation between these two inter-related
objects. No doubt jiva moves but dharma-bhfita-jfiaana does
not. The Nyflya-vaiéesikas, the Sankhyas and the
Mimarhsakas accept atman as vibhu. In addition to this
they admit the plurality of souls. Because atman is vibhu
in their respective systems it does not move, but the body
and senses of those atman move in the direction where their
respective itman is present. Yet there is no confiision
regarding which body belongs to which fitman. In the same
way there is no confusion regarding the relation of
dharma-bhfita-jfiana of muktatman also.
Thus Viéistadvaita has answered several objections
raised against the nature and power of dharma-bhl'ita-jfiana.
Deéika has established its special nature and power in
Vis'istadvaita, on the basis of émti, smrti, reason and writings
of great ficfiryas like Yfimuna, Rfimfinuja, Ramamiéra and
others.
DIFFERENT MODES 0F DHARMA-BHUTA-JNANA
In the system of Visistadvaita, sukhatva, duhkhatva,
dvesatva are not different from consciousness.1 There is no
valid evidence to prove the Naiyayika theory that conscious-
ness causes sukha or duhkha. Therefore, consciousness itself
takes the form of sukhatva, duhkhatva, icchfitva, dvesatva

1. buddhireva upadhibhedfit sukhaduhkfmcchdduesaprayatnarflpal

Nyfiya-siddhfijana, p. 270.
25° The Philosophy of Viéistsdvaita

and prayatnatva due to difl'erent adjuncts. Here one may

argue that the sukha is not one of the states of consciousness,
because the absence of duhkha itself is sukha and vice versa.
Therefore sukha and duhkha are not positive, but they are
negative. Jfiana is a positive entity. How can there be an
identity between bhava-padArtha and the abhava-padartha?
This objection may be met with in the following way. Nyaya
maxim says that “abhfivajfifinam prati pratiyogi jfianasya
karanatvam". According to it, the knowledge of correlative
substance is necessary to cognise the negation. If the sukha
is of the nature of duhkha-abhava, then the knowledge of
duhkha is necessary to know sukha and vice-versa. Thus it
commits the fallacy of ‘anyonyiéraya’. Another point is, apart
from sukha and duhkha state, we experience madhyama-
avastha which is neither sukha nor duhkha. If both of them
be
were of the negative nature, then either of them must
present. But we experience madhyama-avastha. So sukha
and duhkha are bhiva-padfirthas (positive entity) and are
nothing but the different states of jiiAna1 itself.
Generally whenever something is experienced, it is
known in the form that ‘I know this’. For example when a
pot is known the formof knowledge is ‘I know the pot’. But
if sukha and dubkha are the modes of the knowledge itself,
then the usages like ‘aham sukhi', ‘aham duhkhi’, ‘aham
icchami’, ‘aham yate’ etc., (Here different roots are used)
become inconsistent and the usage must have been ‘aham
janami’ (I know) in every instance. But this objection may
be met in the following way. The experience of memory is
expressed inthe form ‘ahalii smarfimi’ (I remember), though

1. mithassaerayadhlbddhamadhyavasthopalambhanaihI
na nyfitparasparfibhdvamdtrntfi sukhaduhkhayohll
‘

Nydya-siddhdr‘zjana, p. 257.
tatsiddharh sukhaduhkhfidayo buddhiviéesd itil
Nyfiya-siddhfirliana. p. 275
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 251
the memory is the form of consciousness it is expressed with
the help of different root viz., ‘smr’ (to remember) and the
root fjfia’ (to know) will not be used. For that reason alone
jfiana-svarfipatva cannot be denied to smarana. In the same
way sukha and duhkha also are the modes of consciousness.
In all these experiences (aham sukhi, aham duhkhi etc.)
different roots are used to indicate the different modes of
the ji'iana. Though sukha and duhkha are opposed to each
other, they become the different states of jfifina in different
times like youth. old age etc., which appear in the same
body in different times. Even bhakti also is the different
state of consciousness. That is why Rimanuja in his
celebrated S’rfbhdsya, states ‘semusf bhaktin‘md.’ ‘Let the
God bless me with bhakti which is the different state of
jfiina'.

ICCHA (Desire) PRAYATNA (Effort) ETC., OF lSVARA ARE ALSO

THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF HIS DHARMA-BHUTAJNANA

Just as the dharma~bhfita-jfiana of the individual self

takes different forms, the dharma-bhfita-jfiana of Lord also
takes the form of icchatva sukhatva, prayatnatva, etc. Here
one may argue, how is it compatible to accept vikaritva or
change in dharma-bhfita-jfiina of lévara who is stated to be
eternal by scriptures? This argument is not tenable because
even the attributive knowledge of lévara is subjected to
vikfiritva (change due to adjunct karya-samagri-sainyoga).
But by nature it has no vikara. According to some other
thinkersl, there is also anityajfiana in lévara and it takes
the form of icchfitva, sukhatva, prayatnatva, etc.,

1. Vamdavisnumisra is quoted as—

“ [éuarqififinasydnityasya sarua-visayanityaJfianagrhItagrahitvdt I

asyapi indriyqjatvdt iti cal"

Nyaya-siddhdfiiana, p. 276.
252 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

ADRSTA IS THE PRlTI (LOVE) OR APRlTI

(ANGER OR AVERSION) OF is’vm
The above enquiry makes it clear that the consciousness
or dharma-bhfita-jfiana of lévara takes the form of icchatva,
prayatnatva, etc. In the same way, adrsta which is produced
by papa and punya is also the priti (love) and apriti (aversion)
of the Lord. They (prlti and aprl'ti) are also the states of
jfiana, but not separate entities. But in that case, one may
have a doubt that adrsta which was explained as the form
of love and aversion of Iév'ara, may be in His consciousness.
How can it be in jive? Because, if no jiva is the locus of
adrsta, it becomes impossible to judge who is a sinner and
who is not. Thus it leads to chaos. This doubt is cleared in
this way. Though adg'ste is in lévara by the relation of
‘asrayata', it is in the jive by the relation ‘visayata’. An
individual self who commits pipe and punya which are the
causes of adrsta, would become the object of priti and apriti
of the Lord. Adrstecis known by scriptures alone. The
priti-rflpatva and aprlti-rnpatva of adrsta also is known from
scriptures. Here Deéike‘quotee'fi'om Dremidacarya: “pha-
lasambibhatsayd hay-mom piprisanti” (Quoted in
Nydya-siddht‘zfijana, p. 283*)
It means1 that the Lord 'is pleased by the sacrifice and
gift given to the poor etc. and thus pleased He blesses his
devotees with desired rewards. By this it becomes evident
that the adrsta is the priti of the Lord.
Stitrakara2 also is of the same opinion. In the sfitra
‘phalamata upapatteh' (Brahmasatra 3-2-38.) he says that
the Lord Narayana alone gets pleased even though the
sacrifices and other worships are ofi'ered to different devatas,
1. Also see bhaeya; "vyatirekdnauasthitescanapeksatvdt".
Brahmasatra, 2-2-4.
2. srutattvéccal Bruhmsfltra, 1-1-12.
 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita 253

viz.. Agni, Indra, Vayu etc. In all these places the Lord
Nirayana alone gets satisfied by the ofi'ered sacrifice and
he alone grants the reward of that sacrifice, being the
antaryamin in such and such devatas. This fact becomes
clear from the bhasya of Rfimfinuja also where he quotes
Dramidacérya, to explain the above truth. In Vedas, it is
said that the satisfied devata (deity) like Indra and Agni
will bless the devotee with all prosperity. The Sruti says
“trpta evainamindrali prajaya paéubhib tarpayati”, (Yajus-
san'zhitfz, 2-5-4-3)——Indra being worshiped blesses his devotee
with ‘praja’ and ‘pas’u’. Because adrsta is the prlti or apriti
of Isvara. Desika says, here also the antrayamin, parama-
purusa alone will get satisfied and he alone bestows the
devotee with praja and paéu. The Lord himself says: “aharh
hi sarvayajr‘idndm bhoktd ca prabhureua ca l” (Gite, 9-24).
‘I am the bhokta (enjoyer) and svami (Lord) of all the
sacrifices'. Like priti, aprlti also is the state of consciousness
of the Lord. Apriti is kopa. But it is not a defect in him
because kopa (anger) without reason is a defect. Otherwise,
punishing the culprit also should be considered as a demerit.
Lord becomes angry with those who violate the rules of the
sastral. The Lord calls him ‘ajfiacchedi and drohi’. Such
persons are punished by the Lord. That is why in the
Ramayana, the poet Valml'ki enumerating the auspicious
qualities of Srl Rama states “kdlégni sadréah krodhe” (1-18)—
he was fearsome as kalagni in anger. This anger is not
asthana-kopa. Therefore Iévara-kopa is considered as an
auspicious quality in Him. Therefore the import of the stanza
“sham hi sarvayajfinam...." (Gite, 9-24) is, like priti, aprlti
also is the state of knowledge of the paramapurusa. Des’ika
says further that the Lord punishes the sinners out of
1. srutissmninnamaivcy'fid yastt'zmullarigya uartatel
' fidechedi mama drohi madbhakto'pi na uaisruwah ll
Mahabhamta-asvanwdhiha, 6-31.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 255

Deéika strictly follows Rimanuja. He never tolerates

the slightest difference between his conclusions and the
writings of Ramanuja. Even where there are certain apparent
contradictions, they are solved in a very significant manner.
In addition to this, he also contributes his own conclusions
which are based upon scriptures, writings of great acaryas,
logic and experience. Thus buddhi has received a very
handsome treatment at the hands of Vedanta Deéika. He
compares buddhi to goddess Laksmi. This jfifinalaksmi is
being served by the Sfisfiktis (auspicious statements) of
Ramanuja and bestows the desired objects to devotees. She
has climbed the peak of Vedfinta mountain and there she
is enjoying the unbounded bliss ensued by the company of
the Lord Damodara. Jfifinalaksml, who is bhakti-svarfipini
and nityananda-savrfipini, come to our heart to lead us
towards Vfisudeva.

*-
 Chapter VII

ADRAVYA

DEFINITION AND DIVISION

The entire world of prameya is grouped into two parts,
namely, dravya and adravyal. So far we have seen six
dravyas, according to Vis'istadvaita. In s’astras there is a
maxim—“ekasambaridhijfidnam aparasambandhismarakami'
which says related things remind each other. The study of
dravya now reminds us of adravyas. So the study of adravya
is not out of context.
The category which is devoid of samyoga is called
adravya—“samyogarahitamadravyam". Samyoga is said to
exist only between one dravya and another dravya. The six
substances which were discussed in the previous chapters
may get related by saniyoga relation. Sabda and sparéa
which are adravyas are not related with anything by the
'
relation of samyoga.
Adravyas are ten in number. They are sattva, rajas,
tamas, s’abda, sparse, n'ipa, rasa, gandha, sar‘nyoga and Sakti.
The avasthas which come intermittently in dravyas are
included among the enumerated adravyas. Among these
accepted adravyas the other adravyas, or the gunas of
Naiyayika namely parimfina (weight), sneha (visidity),
dravatva (fluidity), saltskira (tendency) and sankhya
(number) etc., are included “evarhvidhesveva adravyesu
gurutvadravatva....vaisistyadinan'1 yathasambhavamantar-
bhfivahl" (Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 289).
1. dravyddravyaprabheddnmitamubhayauidhamI
Tattvamukta-kaldpa, 1-3.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istfidvaita 257

Among them, sattva is the cause of happiness, and

lightness. It is atlndriya (beyond the perception of senses),
and it is different from sakti (potency). Sattva is of two
types. They are suddha-sattva and asuddha sattva. Sattva
which is not tainted by rajas and tamas is called
s'uddha-sattva, which is in nitya-vibhfiti. Sattva with rajas
and tamas is called ‘asuddha sattva’ or ‘misra-sattva' which
is ‘mula-prakrti1
The adravya which causes covetousness and motion is
called rajas2. It is atindriya and different from sakti.
“lobhapravrtyddiniddnam...” (Nydya-siddhdr‘ijana, p. 289.)
The adravya which causes delusion and carelessness is
tamasa. It is also atindriya and saktibhinna. “pramada-
mohadinidc‘mam” (Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 289.)
According to the philosophy of Visistadvaita, all these
trigunas are pervading the entire objects which are the
transformation of prakrti. In the transformed object they are
anitya and they are nityas in prakrti (trigunadravya). Among
them rajog‘una causes ‘srsti’, tamoguna causes ‘pralaya' and
sattvaguna causes ‘sthiti‘. In all these actions, the will of
the Lord becomes an additional cause.
Even though all the gunas of prakrti are to be found
with every embodied soul, yet they do not stand in the same
proportion in all cases. In the body of a great saint sattvag‘una
will be predominant while tamas will dominate the body of
a sinner. All the three gunas exist in association with the

l. tatra prakdéasukhalc‘zghavddinidfinamatfndriyam éaktyatirikta»

madravyan'n sattuaml Nyaya-siddhfifiiana, p. 289.
2. lobhabpravrttirdrambhah karmandmasamassprhél
rqiasyetfini jfiyante viurddhe bharataraabhall Gite, 14-12.
3. pramddo moha eva cal
apraki1§o'prav_rttiéca
tamasyetani jdyante vivrddhe kurunandanall Gite, 14-13.
258 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

sinner as well as the saint. Therefore all gunas possess the

binding character.
Des’ika with all these above definitions of trigunas makes
it clear that the atman is bound by the three gunas of
prakrti. As already studied in the chapter on jiva, the
individual self, is immaterial, immutable and therefore
immortal. The body as we all know is material. This soul
is bound by three guise of prakrti because of its relation
with the body.
Here it is to be noted that all the gunas have a binding
tendency in the explained way. Even the satvaguna has this
characteristic. In our moral life the individual has to progress
from the tamas to rajas and from there to the sattvika state.
Unlike rajas and tamas, the sattvaguna gives rise to sukha
or happiness and it increases the wisdom. Yet the sattvaguna
which is in prakrti-mandala is not pure and is mixed with
rajoguna and tamoguna and as such instigates the atman
to enjoy more and more ‘sukha’ of this world and the other
world. Enchanted by this ephemeral happiness, the jivfitman
indulges in performing such meritorious deeds which brings
him heavenly happiness. Running after this mirage of
happiness jivatman forgets atmavalokana and the bliss of
servitude of the Lord. Thus sattvaguna binds jivatman and
makes him to stay permanently in samsara-mandala. That
is why the philosophy of Vedanta asks the ‘mumuksu’ to
rise above all the three gunas of prakrti.
7

But Sankaracarya explains the binding character of

sattvaguna in a different way. In the system of Advaita,
everything belongs to maya. Therefore when any one feels
happiness, it is due to maya but not due to sattvaguna.
As sattvaguna causes sukha, rajoguna causes ambition
and avarice, greed and selfish attachment. Rajoguna influ-
ences them to increase. The predominance of rajas makes
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 259

the atman to become aggressive. When we are in the grip

of desire, we cannot live peacefully. Desire is the soul of
rajas. It creates the bondage of karma. That is why Deéika
defines it as the promoter of lobha or greediness.
Tamoguna promotes pramfida (carelessness). It makes
us to mistake what is not true for what is true. It influences
the atman to get indulged in sensual pleasure. No one who
is under the influence of tamoguna can understand the true
nature of things. Tamoguna creates three bonds namely
pramfida, alasya and nidra. Pramada is heedlessness, alasya
is laziness which refers to laziness of both mind and body.
Nidra is sleep—too much sleepiness—which makes the mind
dull and incapable of steady efforts.
Thus according to the definition given by Vedanta
Desika, the sattvaguna binds one with the bond of happiness
and knowledge. Rajoguna gives rise to a life of aggressive
achievement. Tamoguna causes the life of ignorance and
lack of attention to one’s duties and responsibilities.
All these trigunas are pervading the entire prakrti and
its subsequent changes. They stay permanently in prakrti.
In the unmanifested condition of the universe, all these
three gunas remain in sémyfivasthfi or in the state of
equanimity. In the state of creation and preservation, it is
perturbed and becomes uneven. Among them, the rajoguna
and tamoguna cause creation and dissolution respectively
and sattvaguna becomes the cause of preservation. According
to the will of isvara, evenness or unevenness in prakrti
takes place.
Rimanuja in Sribhdsya has established1 adravyatva of
l. yatah sattvddayo dravyadharmfih, no in dravyasuarapaml
sattuddayo hi prthiwédigatfi—laghutuaprakééadi-hetuhhutah,
tatsuabhdvaviéesa eva....gur_u‘1 ityeva ca sattvt‘zdinfim prasiddhihll
Sribhdfiya, p. 509.
260 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

these gunas. RamAnuja examining the position of Sankhya

says that sattva, rajas and tamas are not dravyas. They are
the dharma of dravyas. These are known by the name gunas.
Hence they are adravyas.
Ramanuja clearly states that sattva, rajas and tamas
are gunas of dravyasl. Like colour, these gunas also are not
the material cause for anything. The word ‘ca’ in the sfitra
“racaminupapattesca nanumanam ll praurttescall" (Brah-
masatra 2-2-1, 2.), explains that they are the attributes of
dravya.
According to Varadavisnumisra, sattva, rajas and tamas
belong to dravya group. “drlwyarh sadviméatividham, sat-
tvarajastamdmsi (Quoted in Nyfiya-siddhér‘ijana, p. 291)
But Des’ika disagrees with this view and says2 that the
view held by Varadavisnumis'ra is against bhasya and the
statement of Vedanta-dipaa. Therefore sattva, rajas and
tamas are adravyas.
SABDA

The adravya that is graswd by our érotrcndriya is

called ‘éabda’. For nityas and muktas, there is no necessity
of érotrendriya because they can know everything by their
dharma-bhfita-jfiana. Further there is no necessity of indriyas
for them as they can grasp everything through any indriya.
They can hear without srotra. But it is not the same with
samsaricetana because his dharma-bhfita-jfiana is not fully
expanded.
1. cakdrfitsattvédfndfiz drauyaguzwtuena sauklydderiua updddna-
kamnatudsambhavafit samuccirwtil Vedanta—dim, p. 47.
2. tatsankhyfidhikarana sfltrabhfisyadi-uirodhc'tcca-asarlgatam|
Nyaya-siddhar‘ijana. p. 291.
3. sattvadayo hi karyagataldghauddihetubhatdh karanabht‘ud
pflhivyédigatastatsuabhduauitesahI Vedanta-dim, p. 47.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita 261

According to Nyaya-vaisesika school, sabda is a quality

of allies. “éabdoguzzo bhfitvdkds’asyddhigame lirigam”
(Praéastapdda-bhésyam, p. 7.)
But the school of Vedanta and Sankya hold the view
that sabda is in pancabhfitasl. Therefore it is defined2 as
an adravya which is grasped by srotrendriya and which
exists in all the five bhfitas. There is no difference of opinion
in accepting sabda in akas'a. When the wind blows with
speed, the man who is sitting inside the house says that
this is the sound of vayu. By this perception one can know
that vfiyu is the substratum of sabda. When the fire is
burning then we hear sounds like ‘ccha’. This proves the
existence of sabda in ‘agni’. When the river flows with full-
swing one can experience the sound of flowing water. This
shows that ‘jala’ possesses éabda. The melodious sound
produced in musical instruments, the crying of animals
including man establish the earth as the substratum of
éabda. Therefore the definition given by Desika to ‘s’abda’
as ‘pancabhutavrtti’ is in accordance with experience.
Sabda is of two kinds. One is varnatmaka (vocal sound)
and another is avaranatmaka (non vocal sound). In ‘a'kara
there is ‘a’kfiratva. Every alphabet has got its own dharma.
In addition to this, it has the negation of the dharmas which
exist in other alphabets. These varnas manifest in God and
human beings through their palates. The problem of validity
or. invalidity, permanency or impermanency, vacakatva or
sphotatva is discussed regarding varnfitmaka-sabda.
Varnitmaka—éabda is of fifty-one types. It includes ‘ksa'kara
also. If 'la’kira and ‘la’kfira are held identical, then there
are only fifty varnas. In olden times alphabets were being
1. adyadyasya gunan’z tvesdmaufipnoti perch parahl
yo yo yauatitascaisdrh sa sa tévadgunassmrtabll
2. Sabdo asmadddiérotmgrfihyah paricabhatavrttil
Nyaya-siddhaiijana, p. 291.
262 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

practised on sand. This is called 'Matrkapatha‘. In that

system ‘la’kara and ‘la’kara are held identical. There are
sixteen vowels. The hrsva forms of vowels ‘Q’ and ‘3?! ’ are
included in vamamala in languages like Tamil, Telugu and
Kannada, but in Sanskrit they are excluded from varnamala
because both of them do not carry any specific meaning.
According to Sruti “sahasraksare parame vyoman”
(Quoted in Nyc'zya-siddhdfijana-fikd, p. 292.) it is known that
there are one thousand varnas, in nitya.vibhuti; Desika says
that they may be apralq'tavarnas or the same fifty-one varnas
are twisted in one thousand ways.
In avarnatmaka-s'abda, there are negation of fifty-one
clharmas1 like, ‘a’ tva, ‘d’tva, ‘i'tva, ‘q'tva, etc., it is also called
‘dhvanyatmaka-sabda'. It is manifested in throats of animals,
musical instruments, clouds and blowing wind.
According to the system of Mimamsa, varnatmaka s’abda
is a dravya which is all-pervasive, eternal and one2. Because
it is of the nature of all-fiewasiveness; s’abda, which is inside
the srotrendriya becomes expressed and the Stotrendriya
grasps the same éabda. In their system there is no sabda
which is in a distant place. Therefore,‘érotrendriya need not
go outside for its perception. Even dhvanyatmaka-éabda
which is anitya and avylpaka will be brought inside
érotrendriya by air. This view of Mimsmsaka is not tenable
because, if srotrendriya grasps only the sabda which is
already inside it, then the experiences like ‘I hear the sound
in north', ‘I hear the sound in the east’, ‘This sound is from
a distant place’, become invalid. It is not even correct to
say that the sound is brought inside s’rotrendriya through
1. ahacapatapayadi samastaprukfiflibhauasamuddyavéna-
varndtmakahl Nyfiya-siddhdfijana, p. 293.
2. Mimmss school admits etemality, oneness, and all-pervasive
nature to varnatmaka éabda, to establish eternality to Vedas.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 263

wind. The experience says that adravyas like rfipa and rasa
which are ‘ekendriyagrahya’ (known by only one indriya)
will not go from one place to another. So this must be the
same in the case of sabda also. Therefore, one can neither
admit all-pervasiveness to sabda nor its movement from one
place to another.
The position of Naiyayika is also not satisfactory.
According to them, the sound moves from one place to
another. Here they give the example of “vicitaranga-nyéya”,
wave moving another wave. In a pond or a tank, when a
weighty substance is thrown, it creates a wave and that
wave pushes the water ahead of it, and that another wave,
until the last wave reaches the bank. In the same way, the
sound created by abhighata (striking) reaches the srotrendriya
in the explained way, namely a wave pushing another wave.
But in this process one has to. admit innumerable sound
waves which lead to infinite regress. So this process is also
not satisfactory. Des’ika raises many objections against the
theories explained above through quoting the kdrikas of
Varadanarayana Bhattaraka and on the same basis estab-
lishes the theory of vedantin.
THE POSITION OF VEDANTIN
According to the philosophy of Visistadvaita, to grasp
the sound, the s'rotrendriya itself goes to the place where
the s’abda is. Desika saysl that Varadanarayana Bhattfiraka
also admits the s’rotravyapti when the sound is heard from
a distant place. That is why there are perceptions like ‘I hear
sound in the north’, ‘I hear sound in the south’. In all these
places érotra goes to the place where the sound is. Bhattfiraka
1. tatra darasthaéabdagrahane émtravydprtireua varadandrfiyana-
bhaptarakairukta dare éabdah samlpe ca pracydm oetyddi daréandt
I

gatud srotrendriyam tetra. tatra Sabdagrahaksamaml

Nyfiyasiddhfiiijana, p. 293 and 294.
264 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita

further says, that if the Naiyayika view is correct then the

above mentioned experiences will contradict their position.
Therefore ‘s’rotrendriya’ is ‘prapyakari ’ according to Vedanta
school.
This theory of Vis’istzdvaita resembles the theory of
Sankhya who says that the sound is grasped through the
érotra-vrtti which is expanded upto the place where the
sound is produced. This éro'tra-vrtti is a part of érotrendriya.
The part of this indriya that is inside the body is called
‘s‘rotrendriya’ and the part expanded outside the body is
called ‘srotra-vrtti '.

EXISTENCE 0F VARNAS UPI‘O PRALAYA

Some other thinkers hold the view that the sound is

produced with the birth of 51:56:! and is dissolved when the
akfiéa is dissolved. But this is not tenable because sabda
continues to exist upto prelaya. Though it is admitted that
the éabda of akasa is dissolved, the same cannot be admitted
to the éabda—ras’i of other bhfita's like vayu, tejas, jala and
prthvi and they too are cream and dissolved with the
creator’s dissolution of their respective elements. The
existence .of sabda in paflcabhilta is already explained.
Therefore, varnas remain upto pralaya. The experiences like
“utpanno gakflrah” (‘ga'kira is produced) and “vinas’to
gakarah (‘ga'kara is destroyed), do not mean the destruction
of varna-svarfipa. It only means the destruction of the
activities of the palate and other organs.
Taratva (loudness) and mandatva (slowness) etc., are
not the dharma of varna. They are in the vayu which
manifests sabda. This position is evident in Visnupurdnal.

1. venurandhra-uibhedena bhedab Wadi sariu'fiitabl

abhedavydpiuo udyoh tathaaau pammatmanahll
Vimupunazuz, 2-14-32.
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 265

Flute has seven holes. Every one of them is respectively

named as, nisada, rsabha, gandhara, sadja, madhyama,
dhaivata and paficama. The flute-player when he plays on
this instrument, the air, which comes out of his mouth
enters these different holes and gets the sign of the hole
with which it gets the contact. Therefore taratva (loudness)
and mandatva (slowness) are the dharmas of vayu which
makes sabda to manifestl.
This position of Viéistadvaita, Desika says, is well
established by the Sruti “namaste vayol tvameva pratyaksam
brahmdsil tudmeua pratyaksam brahma uadisydmi I” (Taitti-
rlya. Upanisad) also. Visnucittarya, commenting on this
passage, says that here the vayu is praised as the cause of
manifestation of éabda and so he is the perceivable Brahman.
Deéika admitted that slowness and loudness are not
varnadharmas. They are the dhannas of vayu, which
manifests sabda. But this position of Deéika contradicts the
will of Visnucittirya, who appears to opine2 that, slowness
and loudness are the s’abda-dharmas. But Deéika says, that
the intention of Visnucittarya is not to accept those dharmas
in sabda. What he. means is, that even s’rotrendriya grasps
the saviéesa-vastu but not the nirviéesa-vastu. For that
purpose. Visnucittfirya attributes these dharmas namely
Indness and slowness which are in the vayu, to éabda which
is manifested. If he had admitted those dharmas in éahda,
film he would not have commented on the Smti ‘namaste
mo...’ in a different way, which supports the view that
those dharmas are of ‘vayu’. Therefore it is admitted that

L ........ sadiddindn': tIvratuadibheddnam vyam'akauayudhammtvam

trflyatel Nyaya-siddhafmma, p. 275.

2. irotramapi itarendriya visayauat, sabdatva gatua mrdutva

parusatva mandatva madhyamatvddi ananta viscsatmaha uaatu-
grahakam it“ Quoted in Nyaya-aiddhafijana, p. 296.
266 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita

the dharmas like taratva and mandatva do not belong to

sabda, but they belong to vayu, the cause of manifestation
of sabda.
So far, we discussed three systems, regarding sabda
namely,
system which says that Elissa is the locus of sabda.
1. A
2. A school which holds the view that paficabhfitas are
the locus of sabda.
3. A third view which states that sabda is a substance,
manifested by vayu.
All these system are mutually contradictory. Then
which one is to be followed? Desika says that among these
three views no school of thought is against Vedanta. All
sounds are produced by that material cause, namely Brahman
to whom the avyakta is the body. But the Mlmamsaka view
which says that labda' is an eternal substance and has no
material cause for it cannot be admittedThis is the final
conclusion of Vedantasfistral. Therefore, the above three
views are not contradictory, to the central truth of Vedanta.
EXAMINATION OF .SPHOTA-VADA
The paramatmopadana-karanatva of sabda is opposed by
Vaiyakaranis (grammar-inns). They say, the view of Vedanta
school, regarding the nature and origin of sabda, is incorrect,
because Paramatman is not the material cause of the sabda.
Sabda is not an effect. So it has no cause. Sabda is-identicsl
with sabda-brahman which is called sphota. Sphota2 is
1. avyaktaparinamawisesa-éarfraka-paramétnwpfiddnakéh sarve
fiabddlll na punch pfihagdrauyatayfi gunataya vd bhana-
prabhakaramdtavat nityahl na ca anupdddnakahl
Nyaya-siddhsfijana, p. 296.
2. anadiru'dhanam bruhma éabdatattvarh yadaksaraml
uiuartate'rthabhavena prahriyd jagato yatahll
Nyaya-siddhai‘vana-flkd,p. 296.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 267

eternal, partless, the cause of the entire universe and also

the substratum of vivarta (illusory development) of the world.
The position of Vaiyakaranis may be explained in
another way. Among varnatmaka-éabda, some are talavya
(palatals), some are kanthya (guttural), Some are mfirdhanya
(cerebral), some are dantya (dental), and some others or
osthya (labial). So the varnas are caused by such and such
organs. Therefore, it is sufficient to admit that the organs
themselves such as palate, teeth, lips, etc., are the material
causes of the varnatmaka-éabda. Therefore, to hold the view
that the Paramatman is the material cause of the
varnitmaka-éabda is not correct.
Desika examines this argument stating1 that this view
is against scriptures. Taittiri'ya Upanisad says: “namaste
anyol tvameua pratyaksam brahmasi l”—vayu is the material
cause of manifestation of sabda. Here vayu means the inner
umtroller namely Paramatman.
'

Secondly, if there is a perceptible thing, it must be

perceived. If it is not perceived, then, according to sastra,
it becomes, ‘yogyanupalabdhi’(non-perception of a perceptible
thing). According to vaiyakaranis, there is s’abda-brahman
namely sphota. If it is existent, then it must be known by
fiotrendriya. But so far it is not experienced by any one by
hotrendriya. If a perceptible thing is not perceived, it is but
natural to doubt its very existence itself.
Thirdly, the organs such as, palate, tongue, teeth, which
are stated to be the material cause of sabda may be considered
as instrumental cause for the manifestation of sabda, but
not as an upadana-karana.
The existence of sphota cannot be established on personal
experience, because we have not experienced it. The
1. uarnanam aphotddyupddfinakatvaflca égama adhyaksa
mruddhaml Nyaya-siddhafijana, p. 297.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 269

SABDA Is DRAVYA

It may however be argued on the basis of Sruti “yo

vedadau svaralz prokto vedante ca pratisghitabl tasya
prakrti-lfnasya yah parassa mahes’varalz I" (Taittiri'ya
Upanisad), sabda is non-etemal and is a substance. Because
in this passage, varnas are stated to be the material cause
of another varna.
It also becomes evident that the pranava is established
in the beginning and end of the Vedas. That pranava which
is the material cause of Vedas, becomes one with ‘a’kara
and ‘a'kéra becomes one with its material cause namely
Mahes’vara. Therefore the sabda is non eternal. Another
passage of Smti says1 that Vedas are the body of the
Paramatman. Vedas are sabdarasi-rfipa. If sabda is an
adravya then how can it become the body of Paramatman?
An adravaya cannot become a material cause. So s’abda must
be the dravya or substance.
Ramanuja, commenting on this passage in Vedartha-
sarigraha has established the dravyatva of sabda. Accordingly
pranava—the Omkfira—is the origin and the place 'of
dissolution of Vedas. ‘A’kara is the laya-sthéna (the place
of dissolution) of pranava. Therefore, it becomes established
that there is prakrti-vikrti-bhfiva (the state of cause and
effect) between Veda and pranava and pranava and ‘a'kfira.
Prakrti is the upadanakérana of vikrti. To become an
upfidfinakfirana, it must be a dravya2; “upc‘zddnarh drauyan'l.
avasthdsraya updddnam". (Nyfzya-siddhfiiijana, p. 3.)
Vedas, pranava and ‘a‘kara are sabdas. There is
prakrti-vikrti—bhava between them. Therefore, on the ground

1. yasya veddh sariraml

2. samaudyi-kfimmtvam drauyrmyaiveti vijfieyaml
Bhdsa-pariccheda, 23.
270 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

of Rfiménuja’s statement1 also, it is proved that s’abda is

dravya and non-eternal entity.
Acarya Yamuna2 also has established in Atma-siddhi
that Sabda is dravya and non-eternal.
The contention of Yfimuna is as follows. Sound, smell,
the sun-light and effulgence etc., are the loci of movement
and they occupy more space than their substratum. Among
them sound is very subtle and is of the nature of moving
to distant places. This sound moves from its’ locus to outer
place, until it contains speed. Yamuna further says that
éabda is devoid of sparéa. Des'ika says, in case-the sound
is adravya. then there was no need to deny sparsa in it
because it is evident that adravya is not the locus of adravya.
Therefore sabda is neither adravya nor vyangya (manifested).
The foregoing discussion about éabda makes it clear
that sabda is dravya. But adravyatva of sabda also was
established on rational grounds. Now it becomes doubtful
whether sabda is dravya or adravya. Desika impartially
evaluates these two podtions and saysa, among the followers
of Viéistadvaita itself, according to some acarya sabda is
dravya, according to some other acoryas it is adravya also.
But both these thinkers admit that éabda is sparsa-rahita.

l. vedddyantardpatayd uedabiiabhfitapranavasya ayamarthahl

saroasya vedqjdtasya prakrtib pranavahl pranauasya ca prakrti-
rakdrahI pranauauikdro vedah suaprakrtibhllte pranaue linahl
pranavo‘pi....akare llnalz...nhdmsya yah paralt vocyah sa eua
mahefivarahl
Vedartha—sarigraha. p. 133. See also Sribhasya, 1-3-20.

2. Nyfiya-siddhfiiiiana, p. 299.

3. atrocyatel saylithyamatabhedena drauyam, adravyan‘z ca sabdahl

Nyflya-siddhdr'y'ana, p. 304.
 The Philosophy of Vis‘istadvaita 271

ADRAVYATVA 0F s’ABDA ESTABLISHED

Deéika after giving some arguments in support of the

view that s’abda is a dravya (substance), offers several other
arguments which supports the view that éabda is adravya
and finally gives his own conclusion.
a) The arguments offered by Rama'muja1 to establish
adravyatva of sattva, rajas and tamas may also be used to
prove dravyatva of s’abda.
b) In Atmasiddhi, Yamuna only explains the views of
others. Dravyatva view is not his own.
c) Bhatta Paras'arapada clearly states2 that s'abda is
adravya and it is the quality of akasa.
d) The Smti passage “yo uedadau suarah proktalz” only
states the disappearance of pranavabhimani-devata in ‘a'kara
abhimfini-devatfi. Therefore, this Sruti does not establish
dravyatva to sabda. Ramanuja’s commentary on this passage
in Veddrtha-sarigraha also should be understood in the light
of the above interpretation. Des’ika on the basis of these
sound arguments, logic and experience, comes to the
conclusion3 that the adravyatva view of sabda alone is good
and stands to reason. Further he says that it is wiser to
admit sabda as adravya, because only in that view all
apparent contradictions of sastras are solved. Desika further
discusses the views like—
a) srotrendriya going out to the place where s’abda is
(which is érotrendriya-vrtti-paksa);

1. See Sribhfisya on “racandnupapattesca nanurnanam ll praurttesca ll

2-2-1, 2.
2. gaganaguna-éabdadi-suarflpa-sthitihpravartayatd bhagauataiua...l
Nyaya-siddhmiiana. p. 305.
3. tadevamadravyatua-paksa eva éabdasya éldghyahl
Nyaya-siddhafiiana, p. 308.
 The Philosophy of
Via’istfidvaita

c) coming of subtle
s’abda and
parts of drum Which is the
locus of

SPARSA

Spars’a (touch) is a non-substan

ce known b ,
y Sparsendnya
.
(tactual senses). It is of three
types, namel ,, s’it - ,
(cool touch), usna-spars’a (hot anti’bhayz-::::::
touch) and
(luke-warm). Among the five elements excluding akaéa,
there
is sparse in all the four b'hfitas. In water, there is site-sparse.
In light there is usna-sparéa. In air and earth, there is
anusna-sita-sparéa (neither cold not heat). The experience
such as “usnaprthivf’, “élto vayuh” are due to the contact
of another element which possesses that touch. Sometimes
the contact of another bhuta causes the subjugation of its
own touch. For example, when the lustre of dlpa and ratna
are fallen on the body their touch is not experienced. In the
tactual perception of an object, the touch of the object is an
invariable cause. The special characteristic feature of
tvagindriya is, that it grasps object through the ‘adravya’
namely ‘sparéa’. Though there is sparéa in the lustre of clips
and ratna, it is not experienced due to the obstruction of
the touch of another bhfita. In the case of prabha, either
the parts of vayu or the subtle parts of prthvl may be
considered as the bhfitas which obstruct the tactual perception
of dipa-ratna-prahha.
Some other acaryas of the system opine that the
perceptibility or non-perceptibility of an ‘adravya’ depends
upon the ‘udbhutatva' (perceptibility) of the adravya. Because
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 273

there is no udbhutatva in the touch of dlpa-prabha, it is

not experienced.
In the perception of dravya, sparsa is also one of the
causes. According to Vis’istadvaita, the radiance, namely,
prabhfi of clips and gem are also dravyas. But their touch
is not felt because their touch is subjugated by the contact
of some other element such as vfiyu or the subtle parts of
the earth. Sparéa once again is grouped into two. They are
pékaja (produced by baking) and apakaja (not produced by
baking). Pakaja sparsa is felt in the earth and apakaja
sparéa is felt in earth, water, light and air. The touch of a
cow, brahmin, poison, nectar, cotton, stone are apakaja
sparsas. Among them, the touch of nectar causes rejuvenation.
The touch of poison causes death. The touch of a brahmin
and cow causes purity.
According to different pakas (change under heat),
difl'erent sparsas are produced in earth. Mango fruit when it is
raw possesses hard touch. When it is ripened it becomes soft.
Hardness or softness are not a type of samyoga
(conjunction). In that case, it should have become the object
of visual perception. Because samyoga is known by our eyes.
But hardness or softness is known only by the sense of
touchl. Here the contention is, sparse may be inferred by
rfipa which is its concomitant. After the cognition of colour
sparéa is known by inference. With the help of that inference
softness or hardness are known. Therefore these touches are
not the objects of visual perception. In case it is samyoga,
it should become the object of visual perception. Hence they
are special types of touches. Annambhatta in his Tarka-
sorigraha divides ‘sparsa’ into three groupsz; Hot, cold, and

l. mrdukathimbhaofidayopi sparsavisesd eva sparéanenaiva

l

tadupauabdlwhl Nyaya-siddlmfliana. p. 311.

2. so ca tn‘uidhah, mama anusnaéita bhedatl Tarkasangmha, p. 14.
274 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita

temperate. But some thinkers like Sankaramis’ra recognise

citra-spars‘al. Thinkers of Nyaya-vaiéesika also like the
thinkers of Viéistfidvaita do not admit mrdutva and
kathinatva2 as sarhyoga visesa (a peculiar conjunction).
RUPA
Rfipa or colour is a non-substance known only by our
eyes. There are four colours namely white, red, black and
yellow. There are slight internal differences in each one of
these colours.
According to some, the colour yellow is included in red
colour. The Chandogya Upanisad (6-4-1) says there are only
three colours. According to it only white, red and black are
colours. This Sruti passage does not mention the yellow
colour. Therefore some acaryas of the school opined that the
‘pita rfipa' is not a separate colour and that it must be
included in red colour.
Rfipa is also classified into ‘bhasvara’ (radiant) and
‘abhasvara’ (non-radiant). In light there is bhasvara-rupa
and in water and earth there is abhasvara-rupa. Akaéa and
vayu are devoid of rupa. Perception of different colours in
earth is due to its contact with some other element.
Nyiya-vaiéesika thinkers admit ‘citra-rupa’ (variegated
colour) in their system and say that it is the fifizh colour.
Desika rejects this view. He says ‘tadasat‘. Citra-n'ipa is not
an extra colour. It is the colour of the parts which is made
up of different colours. Therefore, the views of varied smell,
varied touch and varied taste are also rejected.
1. citrasparéastu 'rapa “hallya yuklya svlkaranlya evaI
Vaiéesiha-upaskam. Calcutta ed. p-292.
2. mrdu kafhina bhfivddayopi sparse visesa eval sparéanenaiva
ladupalbdehl Nyaya-siddhafljana. p. 311.
hathiziatuadikarh tu no samyoganistha jdti-viksahl caksur-
grfihyahnpauehl Nyaya-sidde-muhtauali. p. 390.
 The Philosophy of Viéistédvaita 275

In Nyaya-vaisesika system colour is of seven kinds.

They are sukla (white), nila (blue) pita (yellow), rakta (red),
harita (green), kapiéa (tawny) and citra (variegated). All
these several colours are not referred to by either Praéasta-
pads or éddhua. But they are enumerated by Visvanfitha
Paiicanana and Annambhatta. Probably the later writer
might have included these colours. That is why Deéika rejects
seven colours.
Among these colours the ‘citra-rfipa’ is the mixture of
several colours. That is why Desika asks, why this citra-rfipa
is admitted separately? Instead of admitting a new colour
why not call citra-raps simply a mixture of several colours?
Annambhatta replies that colours being ‘vyapya-dharma',
there cannot be several colours in one substratum.

RASA

Rasa or taste is a non-substance grasped by the palate.

It is classified into six groups. They are: madhura (sweet),
amla (soumess), lavana (salt), tikta (bitter), katu (pungent)
and kasaya (astringent).
Among them the katurasa is also called as usnarasa
in sistras. Some thinkers opine that usnarasa (pungent) and
kasayarasa (astringent) belong to the group of tiktarasa
(bitter). Desika says that further details may be had
from Ayurveda. “ayurvedataéca ete uiéadamanusandheydh”
(Nyaya-siddhdr‘ijana, p. 314).

GANDHA
Gandha is a non-substance grasped by the nose. This
is of two types namely surabhi (fragrant) and asurabhi
(non-fragrant). The smell is found only in the earth.
Sometimes smell is felt in air and water. It is due to their
contact with the earth which is just like the iron ball getting
heated due to the contact of the fire. Though all the five
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 277

‘apakaja' guns. This touch is natural to earth.

The madhura-rasa (sweet taste) is the natural apakaja-
rasa in prthvi. In the same way, there is ‘surabhi gandha'
(good smell) in prthvl. Thus, the black colour, anusnfi-s’lta-
spars‘a, madhura-rasa, surabhi gandha are there in prthvi
from the time when the prthvi was produced.
In such a prthvi, all the five qualities i.e., sabda, sparéa,
n'ipa, rasa, gandha will be produced with their substratum.
At some other times. some qualities continue to exist or
they get destroyed according to the existence or destruction
d dharmi. These are all due to the ‘péka’ that takes place
in them.
The explanation of paka is given differently by difi'erent
philosophers. Some are ‘pitharapakavadins’ and some others
are ‘pllupakavadins’. ‘pithfira’ means avayavi. Therefore, they
are called ‘pitharapakavadins’.
The Vaiéesika school1 follows the ‘pilupfikavida'. ‘Pi'lu'
means atoms. According to this school, pika is not produced
in the avayavi but it is produced in atoms.
Deéika says that these two methods are not acceptable
to Vedénta school because this school does not admit either
paramfinu which is accepted by Vaiéesika school or avayavi
which is accepted by Nyaya school.
pike ca pilupitharapdkabhedfit vipratipadyante tatra
nobhayampyasmdkam paramfinvavayauinorabhdvdt|
Nyoya-siddhfifijana, p. 317.

Now it should be known whether paka is produced in

the state when the parts are combined or at the time when
they are separated. Desika says: “tatra yathasambhauamu—
bhayamapi I" Wyaya-siddhfifijana, p. 317)——According to the
circumstance, we admit both.

1. See Vafiesika-uposkara. (7-1-6).

278 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita
One may observe that when the raw pot is placed in
the fire, the pot changes its colour without any destruction
of its parts. This position amounts to admit ‘pitharapaka' of
Naiyayika. Desika explains the intention behind the
pilupakavada which is accepted by Vaisesikas. Without
admitting the change in their parts, it is not possible to
agree the change in avayavi because in their system the
qualities such as rape, rasa, etc., continue to exist as long
as their substratum continue to exist. Another reason why
‘pl'lupakavada’ is admitted by Vaisesikas is that the special
qualities of parts alone can produce special qualities in the
avayavi. Therefore pl'lupfikavada is preferred by Vais’esika
and so they are not contradictory but they are complementary
to the followers of Upanisadic philosophy.
SAMYOGA

san'zyogam prati yutasiddhib prayojikdl

Vaisesika-upaskara 7-2-9.

samyogohyavydpyaurttiranityah sarvadravyavrttiscal
thyavrtti.
samyuktapratyayanimittam....
Pratesta-pddaguna-khazzda. p. 30.

There is an experience ‘imau sa1hyuktau', ‘that these

two are connected’. This perception is produced by ‘tvagin-
driya’ (sense of touch) and ‘caksurindriya’ (sense of vision).
Therefore sarhyoga (conjunction) is the instrumental cause
in its perception. It is also an adravya. Therefore Desika
defines it as: “samyuktapmtyayanimittarh samyogah I”
(Nyaya-siddhafljana,‘pz 319).
According to some thinkers, it is of positive nature. In
their view ‘samyoga' is nothing but the substances themselves
which are connected. Some other thinkers view, that samyoga
is abhava-rfipa. It amounts to the negation of intermediate
space between the connected substances. Des’ika says the
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 279

former view (bhava-rfipatva) is not correct. In that case one

must have the experience ‘imau samyuktau’ before and after
the ‘samyuktatva-avastha' of those objects, because the
svan'ipa of the substancecontinues to exist in both the times.
In the second view, if the abhfivfitmaka (negative nature)
sarhyoga is bhavfitmaka (positive), then it is admissible to
us also, because abhavatmakatva is antarfila-éfmyatva
(negation of intermediate space). It is nothing but the
connection with the nearest place.
According to Vedantin, samyoga is avyapyavrttil. It
means that samyoga exists with its abhfiva in a substratum.
This may be illustrated by the famous example of logicians:
agre vrksalz kapisarhyogi male nal
A monkey is sitting on the top of the tree. In that part
of the tree there is kapisamyoga because the monkey touches
the top. Therefore ‘kapisamyoga’ is said to be agravacchinna.
But in the root of the tree, the same monkey is not present.
Hence there is kapisamyogabhéva. Therefore kapisamyoga-
blfiva is mfilavacchinna. This shows that sarhyoga co-exists
with its negation. This nature2 of sarhyoga is called ‘avyapya-
vrttitva’ or ‘svabhivasaminadhikaranya' (partial extensity).
To accept samyoga and its abhava in the same part of the
object, is contradictory. But to admit it in different ‘améa’
Iparts) as in the case of ‘kapisaxhyoga’, is not contradictory.
But this explanation of avyfipyavrttitva of samyoga is
compatible only regarding the objects which possess parts.
There are partless objects like akas’a, kale etc., which also
1. sudtyanwbhduasamdnddhikamnatvaml
Malanmdhurfinathiyam and Gddddharl.
svapratiyogitva-svasdmanfidhikarunya-etadubhaya’sambandhené
bhavauatvamiti niskarsahl Ntlahamhiyam. 1., p. 13.

2. asya ca svdbhfivasddesyamupalabhyamdnam an'iéabhedaprayukta-

tayd na virodhdvahaml Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 319.
280 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

become the pratiyogin (counter-positive) of samyoga. Regard-

ing those catagories the explanation of avyapyavrttitva of
samyoga becomes difiicult. But Desika says, even in partless
categories such as kala, akaéa, etc, the avyapyavrttitva or
samanadhikaranya can be explained between samyoga ‘a‘nd
samyogabhava through the adjuncts like objects. In the case
of akaéa, samyoga is explained through the drum. In the
case of kala and other partle‘ss categories, there may be
samyoga and its negation through the pot, cloth, etc.
There are two types of samyogas. One is anitya-samyoga
which exists between objects which are limited in size like
pot, objects and its substratum. It also exists in things of
unlimited size like kala and shes. Unlike the system of
Vaisesikas, Visistadvaitins do not admit samyogaja-samyoga.
The second type of s'aihy'bga is. nityasamyoga. It exists
in dravyas like lévara, kalm'akaéa, nityas and muktas.
According to the system of Vais’esika, there is no samyoga
in between two ‘vibhu padflrthas’ (all pervasive substances).
“vibhunostu na samyogab harmdyutasiddhyddirapa-kdrand-
bhz‘wdt" (Vaiéesika-satm, 7-2-9).

Desika says that vibhudvaya samyoga must be admitted

on the basis of valid inference and Sruti. The inference is—
“vibhavah” paksa
“mithah samyuktah” sadhya
“nirantaradravyatvfit” hetu
“ghatadivat” udaharana.
Vibhu padartha possess conjunction with another vibhu
padfirtha. Because they are nirantara-dravyas like gahta.
Another point is that these vibhudravyas must ge‘
conjunction with the Lord and his dharma-bhfita-jfiana whicl
are themselves vibhudravyas. If there was no conjunction a
the Lord with-vibhudravyas like kala (this conjunction is c
 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita 281

the form of anupravesa) they all become inactive and hence

vibhudravya samyoga must be admitted.
This stand of Vedantin leads him towards another
problem. The Lord being a vibhudravya pervades all objects
including the all-pervasive substances like skséa and kala.
A substance which is pervaded by another substance cannot
become a vibhudravye (all-pervasive substance). Therefore
allies and kfila will loose their all-pervasive nature in case
the Lord pervades them.
To overcome this objection Viéistidvaita admits two
types of vyfipti (pervasion) for Paramfitman. They are
antar-vyapti and bahirvyapti. In objects like atom and such
other subtle things there is antarvyapti. Hence this vyapti
of the Lord does not obstruct the vyapti of vibhudravyas.
That is why Des’ika saysl, that according to Upanis'ads,
the kale, akséa and such other ‘vibhudravyas’ cannot act
without the samyoga of the Lord who has entered them
through anupraves’a (entering the object). Therefore on the
evidence of many inferences and upam'sadic passages, one
has to admit the ‘vibhudravya-saxhyoga’.
SAKTI

Effect is produced by cause. Everything cannot become

a cause. To become cause it must possess certain dharma.
An adravya which accomplishes this dharma is called ‘éaktiz.
1. aupanisadascdyamarthalzl tathd ca .érutayabl saruavydpl ca
bhagavdn antarbahiéca tat sarvan'l vyfipya narayanassthitah...l
Nydya-aiddhfiiijana, p. 323.
2. sarvakdmuamim kfirazzatvanirudhakah kaécit adravyaviéesah
taktilll Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 325.
mlmdmsakaviéesah prdbhdkarfistu éaktib padérthfintarameva na
tu karapatuanipa ityfihuhl Dinakari-pmtyaksa-khandalz.
tacca suasuavydpyetara-sahalasampattau handbhduavydpakd-
bhduapratiyogituam. Cintamazu' of Gangeéopadhyaya.
 282 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita

According to Vedintin, this Sakti is nothing but

karanatfi-svarfipa. This s'akti is atindriya (beyond sense-
perception). In the presence of any obstruction like ‘mani’,
'
the fire will not burn.
Here the presence of the obstruction suppresses the
power in the fire whereas the removal of the obstruction
releases the power in the fire. This power of the fire is
called ‘s’akti’. This sakti may also be experienced in magnet.
Sakti cannot be admitted in the s’akti. In that case. it leads
to anavastha (infinite regression). It may be argued further
that if sakti is not accepted in the sakti of fire, how can it
produce heat? Without-éakti, nothing can produce effect. In
case the cause which is devoid of éakti can produce the
effect, then one should get oil from sand and the stone
should sprout into a plant, Therefore it is necessary to admit
s’akti in sakti to avoid all these contradictions.
Desika meets this objection by saying that sakti is not
the real cause-of effects like burning. The real cause of heat
is the fire which is withsakti. Dahana—kfiranatva lies with
ag'ni and not with mere sakti. Sakti is the viéesana or
attribute of karanata which is in the agent. Philosophers
turn it as karanatavacchedaka (a distinguishing character
of karanata). For, siddhantin, éakti and karanata are
synonimous. Therefore it need not be admitted that there
is sakti in s'akti, but the éakti which is admitted by siddhantin
is karanata-svarfipa.
The existence of éakti is also proved by the sage
Paraéara. In Visnupurdnal he says that it is very difi'icult
to understand the sakti of all substances. Though they are
beyond sense perception, their existence is known by
1. éaktayassarvabhaudndmacintya-jfifinagocarahI
yato'to brahmanastfistu sargddyd bhdvaéaktaydbll
bhavanti tapatafiz sresgha pavahasya yathospatdl
Visnupumzaa 1-3-2, 3.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 283

inferential knowledge and the scriptural knowledge. That is

why. such saktis which are helpful in the creation of the
universe are natural to the Parabrahman, like the heat to
the agni.
Ahirbudhnya~sarhhitd proves1 the existence of s'akti.
Ahirbudhnya answering the questions posed by Narada says
that in everything there is Qakti according to the nature of
the object. Though the objects are perceptible, their s’akti is
imperceptible. Though they are inferred on the ground of
the efl'ect produced by them, these éaktis are of the form
,of karanata itself.
In the above explained manner, on the evidence of
inferential knowledge and scriptures, éakti should be
admitted as a separate adravya.
The Saiva school admits éakti as bhinnabhinna (identity
in difference) from Brahman. Further this school explains
that in sastras, it is called satta jfiana and ananda. Though
it is changelcss, it gets transformation through acit (inert
matter). Sakti is proved by scriptures also:
jagaduptpddikd éaktistava prakrtirisyatel
Quoted in Nyéya-siddhfifijana, p. 328.
This sakti is identical with the happiness derived from
the enjoyment of worldly things (visayananda). It is called
‘éaivi' because it belongs to Siva. Being the cicchakti, it is
the material cause of this universe. Without this sakti
everything becomes impotent.
Even Sliva2 cannot move or act without éakti. Saivites
1. éaktayassarvabhfiudnam acintya aprthaksthitdhl
suanipe naiua dréyante dflyante kdryatastu tabl
Ahirbudhnya-aamhitd.
2. siuassduya yukto yadi bhauati sahtab prabhauitum no cedeucuh
devo no khalu kuéalaspanditumapil
Saunderyalaharl by Sankaraérya.
284 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita

further say sakti which in difl'erent causes is one. They

is.
are not many, “ekaiva tu paraéaktirjfidndnandakriydmayi I"
(Nyaya-siddhdfijana, p. 328).
Sakti is unlimited because it is only one. It is of an
all-pervasive nature. The entire universe is enveloped in this
saktil. It is savayava (with parts) through acidviéistakara
(inert matter) and niravayava (partless) through cic-
chaktyfikara (consciousness). It is ‘éakti that is the material
cause of the world and is anadi. This sakti is independent
and is not limited by ‘deéa’, ‘kfila’ and ‘vastu'. That is why
sakti pervades the universe. With all these special qualities
it becomes the object of contemplation.
This view is not admitted by other Vedantins. According
to these thinkers, the tattva which possesses this sakti is
the object of scriptural2 investigations. Sakti is only an
upasaljsna (dependent). On account of the same reason, it
cannot become an upadans-klrana. Sakti is not one. If it
is so, then the same efl‘ect should be produced every where.
To hold sakti as eternal is incompatible because the sakti
which is in impermanent things cannot become eternal.
Anéditva of éakti is also not compatible because éakti is
produced with its substratum which is a cause. To admit
its presence before the production of its substratum is not
possible. Deéika says that éaivite’s sakti is not all-powerful.
In that case, sprinkling from fire and burning from water_
also must become possible because the éakti therein is

1. vyapikd tu paraéktirvydpyn uifivamidam jagatl

Nyaya-siddhdfiiana, p. 328.
2. tahtayassarva bhavanam acintyajfiana goearfihl
yato'to brahmazlaatastu samddyd bhdvaéaktayahll
Viwupumna 1-3-2.
3. Ramanuja commenting on this passage says: ‘ato vicitm ananta
satayuktam bruhmaiva ityaflhah'. Vedarflaa-sarigmha, p. 100.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 235

identical. Because they are not identical on the said ground,

it is not unlimited.
Saivites do not even maintain the position that the
Brahman is the locus of sakti. In that case, the previous
objection may be warded off. But another objection creeps
in. In our usage we say sakti of Brahman and not Brahman
of éakti. If the Brahman is the locus of sakti and that s’akti
is the material cause of the universe, then‘ fiakti gains
importance and Brahman becomes secondary, making the
usage, i.e., ‘Brahman of éakti’ possible.
Lastly, Desika raises-another objection against the view
that the sakti is identical with the material happiness of
five. The objections pointed out against advaitin1 who does
not admit the difi'erence between various modes of conscious-
ness are the same here also. If the sakti is identical
everywhere, then we should experience the power of burning
in water and quenching power in fire. In the above explained
way, the exposition of sakti by saivites is not correct.
Therefore, the followers of scriptures have to admit ‘éakti’
in the way it is explained by the siddhantin.
Among the followers of Ramanuja, according to some
thinkers, sakti is in dravya'only whereas to some other
thinkers, éakti is in both dravya and adravyaz.
Deéika opines that whether éakti is in dravya or in
both dravya and adravya, we need not be much bothered
about this. However, according to all followers of
Vis'istadvaita, s’akti is considered3 as one among ten adravyas.
1. aan‘widaduaitadasami ca samdzii atripi anusandheydnil
Nyaya-siddhafihna, p. 329.
2. sawadrauyesu tatkdryasamdhigamyah tatpratiyogi éaktyakhyah
guru]; aadhamnabl Nyaya-siddhqjana, p. 239.
3. euarh dmvyamdm rfipadisuaplti vruistdvat yatha hathaflcidauul
salm‘matran'a sdmpmddyihamiti uhitaml
Nyaya-siddhqiana. p. 329.
 The Philosophy of Viiistadvaita 237

INCLUSION OF REMAINING CATEGORIES

IN THE ACCEPTED ONE
Thus Vedanta Desika has explained the six dravyas,
the ten adravyas according to the division of categories in
the beginningl. Now in addition to ten adravyas namely
sattva, rajas, tamas, s’abda, rasa, gandha, sparéa, rfipa, s’akti
and sarhyoga which are already explained, Desika also
includes the remaining gunas and other categories accepted
in Nyaya-vaisesika system, either in the admitted adravya
group or in the group of dravya.
First he takes up gurutva. According to Nyfiya-vaiéesika
school the quality which is the non-inherent cause of the
first fall of an object is called gurutvaz. When a fruit falls
down from the tree, the first kriya (action) which made the
fruit to fall is gurutva. The succeeding falls are due to the
impulse (vega). This gurutva is inferred by patana (falling)
and it is atindriya. It is eternal in atoms (eternal things).
It is transitory in dvyanuka (dyads). This quality is
enumerated as a separate quality in their system.
Desika explains that gurutva is not a separate quality.
It may be included in sakti or the svarupa of the object. It
is already admitted that sakti is a cause everywhere and
gurutva is not separate from that.
Further Deéika explains the view held by some thinkers
who say that gurutva is the svarfipa of prthvi and jala. In
the end, Des’ika giving his own conclusion says that there
are two views regarding the acceptance of sakti. If sakti is
not admitted, then gurutva is the svan‘ipa as prthvi or jala.
1. dvedhd jaddjadatayfi pratyaktaditarataydpi ué dravyan‘i sodhfi
trigunaneho jiveévarabhogabhfitimatibhedfitl
Nydya-siddhajana, p. 15.
2. adyapatanasamauayi-kdranam gurutvaml Tarkasarigmha. p. 30.
atindriyan't gurutuarh. .9de Bhasa-pariccheda, 153.
288 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita

If s'akti is admitted, then gurutva is identical with it. If

sakti is admitted as the general cause of all, In that
case
gurutva need not be admitted as a separate quality.
This gurutva abides in the two substances beginning
with earth and is inferred by patana: “tacca salilaprthivi—
gatam patanakalpyam" (Nyfiya-siddhqiana, p. 331).
DRAVATVA

drauatvarh tu nimnonnatileéarahita-san'zyoga«Uis'es‘ahl
Nyaya-siddhqiana, p. 335.

Dravatva is of two kinds, namely~natural and artificial.

Natural liquidity is in water and the second type is in earth
and light. There are some other thinkers Who say that
fluidity seen in the melted gold is not of light. It is due to
the contact of the water that dravatva is there. This contact
also is due to pai'icikarana which has been already explained.
Ramanuja has established this fact in the same way, taking
the example of the mirage. Deéika sides with the second
explanation that fluidity is the quality of water alone. Just
as dravatva is not a separate quality, the mrdutva (softness)
and kathinatva (hardness) are also not separate qualities.
They too are included in sarhyoga. If the conjunction of parts
is thin it is called ‘mrdu’. If it is thick, it is called ‘kathina’,
Deéika quotes from Nyéyatattva of Nathamuni1 in this regard.
According to the system of Nyaya-vaisesika, dravatva is a
separate quality. Praéastapada says: “syandanakarma
karanam". (Praéastapada-bhdsya, p. 33).

SNEHA

Sneha (viscidity) is also not a separate quality. The

Vaiéesika system says that it is experienced and so becomes
1. viralasarhyoga-prayuktasparéo mrdul}; niruiralasarhyoga-prayukta-
sparsah haphinahl Quoted in Nyaya-siddhdjana, p. 335.
 The Philosophy of Viéistfldvaita 289
the object of tactual perception. It is only in jala. In ghee
it is experienced temporarily. That is why they say that
“sneha jale sa nityonu" (Bhdsa-pariccheda, p. 157).
But according to Visistadvaita it is not a separate
quality as considered by Vaisesikas. Some thinkers of the
Viéistédvaita accept it to be a quality which is in water and
which helps to collect the parts or dusts. Deéika says that
there is the experience of the type ‘snigdham' (an object
with viscidity). That experience refers only to the colour and
the touch of object. More than this nothing is experienced
there. The experience of viscidity in water is due to its
sofizness. This is same with gold. In the collection of particles
the water itself becomes the cause. When there is no water
the collected parts get separated. This sneha is accepted in
‘cetana' also. In cetana it is of the form of priti (love) upaditsa
(desire to take or collect). The hardness or cruelty is of the
form of duhkha or jihasa or anger. Therefore sneha is not
a separate quality.
etc na gundntara siddhihil Nyaya-siddhdjana, p. 333.

VASANA

The tendency known as ‘bhavana’ (reminiscent

impression) is included under the consciousness ofjivfitmanl.
Desika at first discusses the vasanfi as a separate quality.
According to Nyfiya-vais’esikas, bhavana abides in the soul
and is imperceptible to the senses and so the bhavana is a
separate quality of atman. This bhavana is one of the forms
of sarhskflra. Bhfivanfi is called as vasanfi in Visistadvaita.
‘Vasana’ is inferred by efi'ect namely the smrti (representative
cognition). Smrti is not produced by ‘anubhava’ (presentative
cognition) because it is lost long before. Atman who is
1. damn mate anubhaua samskfirasmninan‘i jfianduasthfiviéesa
rfipatvdt....". Nyfiya-siddhdiljana, p. 339.
290 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

characterised by anubhava cannot be treated as the cause

of smrti. That which is unintelligible cannot become the
cause of something by the way of upalaksana also. Nor is
smrti caused by anubhavadhvamsa (consequent negation of
anubhava). In that case samskara should remain for all
time. Therefore in between the smrti and the anubhava, one
has to admit ‘vasana’ which is produced by anubhava and
which causes smrti.
Further Desika discusses the locus of ‘vasana’ and
concludes that the ‘vfisana’ remains in ‘jfiana-dravya',because,
both presentative and representative cognitions are the
different stages of jfiina-dravya. They are in the same object.
Therefore it is proper to say that “vasana’ also resides in
jfiéna-dravya. Further Deéika concludes that thus described
‘vasami’ is identical with the dharma-bhuta-jfiina of ‘cetana’.
Because, the presentative and representative cognition and
tendency are nothing but the different modes of dharma-
bhuta-jfiana.1. Therefore, in Viéistadvaita, bhavana, which
is one among ‘samskAras' according to Nyaya-vais’esika, is
not a separate quality of atman as they opine.
Here this position of Desika may appear to contradict
the statements of Rfimfmuja: “etadubhaya-kc'uyakérana-
bhfitdnfidi uipari'ta vasaru'zbaddho’pi" (Gadyatraya p. 250) in
which he seems to admit ‘vasana' as a separate quality. But
here also we have to interpret ‘vasana' as the mode of
consciousness. This is clear from the statement of Ramanuja
himselfl, which says that there is no proof for the existence

1. Refer Tattvamukté-kaldpa. 5-103.

itthan‘i safinskdra sadbhfivamuktua tasya buddhinispatuan'n
upapadayatil Samartha-siddhi, p. 772.
2. anfimbdhakarya eua tu| Bruhmasatra, 4-1-16.
na ca pupyfipunyqjanya....§arIrasthitihetuthZta san‘zskdrasadbhdve
pramambhauau Sribhasya. p. 325.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 291

of ‘samskara' apart from the prlti or apriti of the Lord.

RAmanuja commenting on Gitd (17-2) explains how the
wasana’ is born out of anubhava, and this affirms the view
of Deéikal, that there is nothing like samskara apart from
anubhava and ‘vasanfi’ which in turn are the modes of
dharma-bhuta-jfifina.
Desika further says that by the chanting of the
‘garudamantra’ certain sarhskira in the water is produced,
and the touch of that water mitigates the pain of poison
caused by the snake-bite. But this samskara is not different
from the accepted siakti.
Some thinkers opine that ‘vfisana’ should be admitted
as a separate quality and they give the analogy of cotton-seeds
which are dyed by lac. These seeds, even after the removal
of redness by the process of washing, yield flowers and cotton
of red colour by the samskara they had received. These
thinkers say that it is sufficient to prove the existence of
‘vasana' in seeds, otherwise the cotton would not have turned
into red.
Desika says that here one has to use his discriminatory
knowledge. He poses two questions against this problem of
kfirpfisa bija (cotton-seed). Whether the vasana which is
desired to be proved is admitted in sprouts which are the
effects of the seeds, or in the parts of the seeds which
transform into bud, flower, cotton etc.? The former position
is not tenable because there is no co-existence between the
cause and the effect. rVasana' which is the effect is produced
in different substratum namely ankura and the cause exists
in the kfirpisa-bija. Therefore there is no co-existence of
cause and effect.
1. éuddlmsvabhdvasyaiva atmanalz karmamala gummaya prakrti
sarhsargopddhika dharma-bhllta-jfidna parinativiéesa ityarthahl
Tatpanya-candrikd, p. 517.
292 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

The latter position is also not tenable because, whil'e

the red seeds of cotton transform into red flower and red
cotton, the parts of lac also follow the transforming seeds
and causes redness in them. Therefore in no way it
necessitates the acceptance of vasana in them.
According to Mimfimsa school, in performing certain
rites such as sprinkling the paddy, a peculiar type of samskara
is admitted in them. Deéika says that it is nothing but the
mode of the consciousness of the worshipped deity. When
the paddy is sprinkled by water it becomes purified and
becomes agreeable to the deity or that sprinkling may produce
sattva quality in that substance. In the former case, it is
the mode of consciousness. In the latter case it is included
in the accepted adravyal namely sattva.
Vega
According to Vaiéesikas, ‘vega’ (impulse) bhavana
(impression) and sthitasthfipakatva (elasticity), are the three
varities of samskfira (tendency). “samskfirabhedo uego’tha
stitisthfipakabhduane (Bhdsd-pariccheda, p. 158).
Deéika says that even samskara of Vaiéesika is not a
separate quality. Among these subdivisions of vaiéesikas, it
is proved how bhavana also is not a separate quality. Vega
(speed or impulse)2 may be included in the cause which
produces speed. It may be included in the accepted
karmavis'esa3. This karmavis’esa is accepted by both Vaiéesika
and Vedantin.
l. atrocyate yadyapycuaml athdpyayam sarhskfirah tattaddeuatddhi-
matiuiaayatvan'z vd satvddiguzwdbodlwna yaga yogyatvan‘: vd anena
no tatotin'kta guru: visesasiddhibl Nyoya-siddhafijana, p. 346.
2. mar-lama”! tu vegasydtl Bhasd-pariccheda. p. 158.

3. uegaaya kammviéesavyatireke praménabhfiuat....... karmatisaya-

matrezla caritfirthatvat karmfitiéayasya cobhayavadisiddhatvdtl
Nyaya-siddlmfljana, p. 339.
 The Philosophy of Visistldvaita 293

The experience ‘s'lghram gacchati’ (moves fastly) also

does not prove the separateness of the speed. It only refers
to the latent ‘atisaya' (s’akti or potency) of the action. This
atis'aya should be admitted by both Vedantin and Vais’esika.
Here Des’ika quotes from Nyayatattva of Nathamuni.
“sarhyogakélasdmlpyam vegalz” (Nydya-siddhéfijana, p. 340.)
"The time taken by an arrow to reach its target is called
‘vega’.” It is nothing but the above mentioned karmatisayas
namely the s'akti.

Sthitasthc'zpakatva
According to Nyfiya-vaiéesika sthitasthapakatva1 (elas-
ticity) is one of the varieties of samskfira (tendency) which
abides in earth. Some consider it to be present in all the
four substances. This elasticity may be seen in the branches
of the trees which return to their former position when they
are pulled and let go.
Des’ika includes this elasticity in samsthana-vis’esa (form
of the object). “sthitasthc'zpako’pi san'zsthdnauiéesa eua”
(Nydya-siddhfiiijana, p. 341).
The branches of the tree which have been pulled and
let go, return to their former position due to their peculiar
figure itself. To explain this, one need not admit sthita-
sthipakatva as a separate quality. This avayava-sarhsthfina
is nothing but the peculiar conjunction2 of parts.
It may be further argued, if this ‘samskara' is nothing
but the samsthana, then one has to experience the action
(going and returning of the branch) at all times, because
the cause, namely the samsthina of branch is present there.

1. kr'iydviéesmhnakah Izriyduisesqianyah suajanyakriydnizsyah

gunaviéesalll Dinakari-guna-khauda, p. 233.
2. safiIyogamddfiya sthitasthfipakasyapi sambhavdu
Yatlndrumata-dipilu‘z, p. 152.
294 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

This argument of Vaisesika is not tenable because he also

has to answer this problem. Therefore this objection is same
to both and hence cannot become a demerit to one system.
Therefore samskara is not a separate quality as the
Nyaya—vais'esika school argues. This vasana and other
varieties are included in the accepted adravyas.

Sarikhyd
Sankhyé (number) is accounted for by the essential
nature of the substance to which it belongs. This sankhya
becomes the object of the usage namely one, two, three etc.
According to Vaiéesikas, this number exists in dravyas only.
according to some others it exists in all dravyas and gunas.
The Vaiéesika system admits unity1 as eternal in the eternal
substances such as the atoms, while it is transitory in the
substances such as jar, cloth etc. Numbers that collectively
cover many things such as duality are the result of
apeksa-buddhi (the notion of addition). This apeksa-buddhi
is of the form ‘this is one, this is one’, and so on. According
to Nyaya Kandall'kara and Udayana, there are some difference
of opinions regarding the notion of triplicity and multiplicity.
In the system of Vaiéesika the notion of duality is
produced in this 'way. First in objects there will be
‘apeksa-buddhi' which is of ‘samfihalambanan‘ipa’ (collective
cognition), which contain the notions of ekatva and dvitva.
Then there will be the origination of duality; with its help,
the perception of the characteristic traits of duality is
produced. In this perception ekatva is the non-inherent cause
and the apeksa-buddhi is the instrumental cause. This is
nirvikalpaka—the indeterminate perception of duality-hood.
This is followed by the perception of dvitvatva—what
is possessed of duality-hood. At the same time there will be

1. The Vaiéesika system counts numbers as unity, duality etc, and

not one, two... etc.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 295

the destruction of the apeksa-buddhi (the notion of addition).

Then there is the destruction of duality. Then the knowledge
namely ‘these are two’ is produced. In this process although
the knowledge lasts only for two moments, the notion of
addition is assumed to last for three moments.
Desika says that there are no sankhyas like dvitva,
tritva etc. The apeksa-buddhi which is accepted by Vais’esikas
also will suffice to become the cause of the convention of
counting. Further there is no valid proof to accept them.
Ekatva is admitted in atoms in primary sense. In
aggregates it is in the secondary sense. The usage of ekatva
(unity) in such places is due to adjuncts. In the same way
the usage of ekatva in adravyas should be taken in the
secondary sense. Because there cannot be guna in the guna.
“gune gimanangflcarat” (Nyaya maxim). This ekatva is
identical with the object which possesses it. But it is not a
separate quality.
Refuting the nirviéesa-vada, Ramanuja says: “ekatva-
meka sankhyd vacchedah" (S'ri—bhdsya)—'ekatva’ is in ‘eka
sarikhya’.
By this statement, Ramanuja appears to have admitted
the sankhyé as a separate quality. But in that context
Ramanuja opines by that interpretation that nirvisesa-vada
becomes the savis’esa-vada. In advaita if ‘ekatva sankhya’
is admitted in Brahman then advaita becomes the
savisesa-vada.
Further Yamunamuni appears to have admitted sankhya
as a separate quality in Atmasiddhi. But in the Prameyapdda-
saptarm‘zdhikarana, Nathamuni clearly says: “san'zyogdntar-
bhfltd sarikhyd" (Quoted in Nydya-siddhdfijana, p. 351).
‘Sankhya' is included in ‘samyoga.’
Varadavisnumiéra, following the statement of Yamuna-
muni in Atmasiddhi accepts sar'ikhya as a special quality.
296 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita
He admits sankhya even in gunas. Des’ika
says that all this
is only the explanation of others view.
Bhatta Paras’ara refuting the prakatya of Mimfirhsaka
seems to have accepted safikhyfi. But it is doubtful whether
this is his own position or the position of some other school.
However according to the Viéistadvaita sankhya is not a
separate quality.
Parimdna
Parimana (dimension) becomes the object of the
‘parimana pratyaya’ (knowledge of parimana). There are four
types of parimana. They are anu (minute), mahat (medium
or big), dirgha (long) and hrasva (short). All these dimensions
are known by their counter-positives. Because there are
usages like “this is more minute than that'. ‘It is shorter or
longer than that’ etc.
Some thinkers of this school say that there is no
dimension in all-pervasive substances because they are
immeasurables. Thus opines SrIramamisra while he
comments on the word ‘ananta’ in Veddrtha-sarigraha.
Yamunamuni in Agama-prdmanya, explaining the
pfirvapaltsial says, though in akis'a parimana is explained,
yet this view must be re-examined.
Some other thinkers accept parimfina even in all-
pervasive substances because there is a usage that this is
bigger than this. The usage like ‘all-pervasive substances
are immeasurable’ only means that they are not of small
dimension.
Further Deéika explains the view of some other thinkers
who hold that there is no parimana at all. Probably this
must be the view which is acceptable to Deéika. According
1. yadapi uiyati parimazzamiha nidaréitam, tadapi vimaréanlyameval
Quomd in Nyaya-siddhamhm, p. 362.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 297

to them, this parimana is the place itself which is occupied

by the object. But it is not a separate quality. Desika explains
how the usages like ‘this is bigger' or ‘smaller' take place.
When an object occupies _‘more place’ in addition to ‘the place
occupied by the other object’ at the same time, then there
will be usage like this is bigger? (adhika-parimanam). While
an object cannot occupy the entire space occupied by the
other object at the same time, then the usage namely ‘this
is smaller in dimension (nyiina pariminam) takes placel.
Length in the object is its extension in particular
direction than other objects. If it is less straight then it is
called short. An object which is bigger in dimension in
several directions is called mahat. If it is smaller in many
directions it is called ‘anu’. Des’ika says1 that all these
dimensions may co-exist in a single object. For example
stamba (a clump of grass) may be bigger or smaller relatively
than the other one. Therefore parimana is not a separate
quality. Parimana which is of the samsthanari'ipa is of three
varieties. They are ayama (length) vistara (width) and ghana
(hard).
Prthaktua
Like parimana prthaktva also is not a separate quality.
It is nothing but ‘difference’. Wherever there is the usage
like ‘idamasmad bhinnam’ (This is different from that). there
is the usage ‘idamasmad prthak’. Therefore these two words
are synonyms. Further it may be argued that why ‘bheda’
itself should not be included in prthaktva. But bheda is the
self-sameness of the object.
1. ya! sarizyuhtan'z deéan‘: decimal-am ca ya: yugapadalcmmitum
saktan'z tattato‘dhika parinu'zzzaml yat san'zyulztam deéamakhila-
mekadaiva yadfikramitun‘l naéaktam tattata nyuna parimdpamI
Nyaya-siddhafljana. p. 363.
2. yathd stamba viéesaeua stambantarapehsaya athaldnutva dlrgha
hrasuatva uyavahfiralz itil Nyaya-siddham’rma. p. 353.
298 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita

Vibhaga
In the same way vibhaga also is not a separate quality.
This is not ‘sarhyoga-virodhi' as the Vais'esikas think. It is
the negation of samyoga. Sarhyoga is accepted as a separate
adravya and explained in the previous chapter. This position
is accepted in Nyayatattva by Nathamunil.

Paratva—Aparatva
Paratva (remoteness) and aparatva (proximity) are not
separate qualities as it is in the system of Vais’esikas. These
two are the relation of time and direction to an object. It
is laghava (simplicity of reasoning) not to accept them as a
separate quality. It may be argued how the relation with
an imperceptible thing can become perceptible. But in
Vis'istadvaita even time and directions are perceptible? Hence
there is no incompatibility in the perception of their relation.
Further even for Vais'esika it is difficult to explain them,
because Vais'esikas have to explain them in relation to time
and direction. Therefore these qualities may be included in
the accepted adravyas.

REMAINING CATEGORIES 0F VAISESIKAS EXAMINED

Deéika thus explained the way in which the extra
qualities of Vaisesika and other systems are included in
accepted adravyas. He includes the remaining categories of
Vaiéesika in the accepted one. Other categories accepted by
them are karma, samanya, viéesa, samavaya and abhavn.
Kanada difines3 karma (motion) as that which exists in
1. atyanta sandpyam aan'lyogalz, duratvam viyagah itil
Quoted in Nydya-siddhafljana, p. 361.
2. dikkdlayorupi pmtyahsatvaaya samarthitatvdtl
Nyaya-siddhafifima. p. 362.
3. ekadravyamagupam sarhyogavibhfigesvanapeksakaraaamiti kar-
malalzsanaml Vaiéesikasfltru. 1-1-17.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 299

active substance. According to them karma is known by

inference.
In Vedanta. ‘karma’ is not a separate category. It is
included in ‘samyoga’1 which is the cause of ”karma. The
conjunction is admitted by both Vedantin and Vaiéesikas.
Further accordingto Vedantin karma is known by perception2
but not inferred.
But sfitrakara has not rejected the karma in clear terms.
Therefore, according to some arAryas, there are three
categories, i.e., dravya, guna and karma. Sfitrakara has
clearly rejected the categories like ‘sfimfinya’, ‘viéesa’ etc.,
but not the karma. Therefore as a result three categories:3
namely dravya, guna and karma were admitted by these
scaryas. But Deéika concludes4 that this view is held only
by a section of acaryas. In fact there are only two categories
namely dravya and adravya. Further he says5 that karma
is not separate from the accepted gunavarga (samyoga). This
position of Viéistfidvaita is accepted by Bhfisanakfira also.
According to Vaisesikas the category which generates
the knowledge of common feature in different substances is
called generality. Vatsyayana puts this idea in clear terms.

1. ye ca....kannaphalatuendbhyupagata-sarhyoga vibhdgdtirihtarh
nipunanirihsane'pi nopa labhyate iti manyamahel
Nyfiya-pariéuddhi, p. 180.
2. tat pratyaksameua, karatalfidiéu tathopalambhatl na tvanumeyaml
Nydya-siddhlifijana, p. 364.
3. sdmdnyddisu szltrakfirfidibhih nirastesu pariéista dravya-
evan'z
gunakarmarapéstrayah padfirthdh iti kecidécizrydhl
Nyaya-parisuddhi, p. 180.
4. ato drauyam adravyamityeua vibhagahl
Nyaya-siddhdfijana, p. 368.

5. Math tu manydmahe, atireke’pi gunauargannardéyantaramkarma,

Uibhdjakdbhfivatl Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 130.
300 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

yd samdndm‘zm buddhim prasfite

bhinnesvadhikaranesul thsyéyana-bhdsya, 1-1-68.
This Samanya becomes the cause of ‘ekatavyavahara'
(usage of oneness) in many things. The generality which
exists in many substrate is eternal and is inherently related
to them. That is .to say, the individual unit like man may
come and go but the generality is eternal.
Des'ika refutes this position and says that Samanya is
nothing but avayava sarhsthana (the peculiar structure of
an object). This samsthinal, the knowledge of similarity,
can generate the knowledge of common feature in different
substances:
Des’ika after establishing this position by reason, gives
the scriptural evidence also. Sfitrakara in the aphorism:
‘tadananyatvamarambhanasabdddibhyah’ etc. (Brahmasatra,
2-1-15), has refuted the Vais’esika system. In Vedanta, the
material cause gets the different avastha (modes) in the
state of effect. But there is no separate avayavi which is
the substratum of generality of Vaiéesikas. Therefore there
cannot be any jatl (generality) which depends upon avayavi2.
Ramanuja conunen'ting on the aphorism clearly states3 that
samsthflna itself is jati. Avayava samsthana is the extraor-
dinary shape of the object. Therefore samanya cannot be
considered as a separate category.
Unfortunately the work Nydya-siddhdfijana abruptly
1. ........ anuurttapratt'tivyauahdrayoh samsthdnasfidrsyameva niban-
dhanaml Nydya-siddhafijana. p. 372.
2. sdmt‘znyamapi pamktam satmkaraireua nirastaprc‘zyaml tathdhi,
tadananyatvamt'zmmbhazia sabdabibhyah ityddibhih srltraihl
Nydya-pariéuddhi, p. 179.

3. samsthanatirekino'nekesvekdkc‘zra- buddhibodhyasya darsanatl

samsthanam mime suasddhdranam rapamiti yathavastu
sarhsthdnamanusandheyamitil Sribhasya, 2-1-15.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 301

ends while discussing the category namely Samanya. But

whatever is to be stated is already stated in Nyt‘zya-pan'éuddhi
and Tattvamuktd-kaldpa by Deéika himself. Here according
to those works other categories are also included in the
accepted division.
In the system of Vaisesika, ‘viéesa’ is a separate category.
According to them, that difference which belongs to the eter-
nal substances is called ‘viéesa' (ultimate difference). “antyo-
nityadrauyaurttirviéesah parikirtitab" (Bhésd-pariccheda, 10).
Deéika says this category is not admissible to sfitrakara.
This is indicated in the sfitra “mahaddirghavadva hrasva-
parimandaldbhydm” (Brahmasatra. 2-2-10).
Further he argues that in. impermanent substances the
difference is known by their qualities and by their peculiar
shape. The acceptance of ‘visesa' as a special category is not
even necessary to know the difference between the eternal
substances. In Vedanta the 'dik' (direction) is not a separate
substance and hence there is no need of visesa to know its
difference from other substances. There are innumerable
atoms, which are identical with the parts of the earth and
water, etc. To admit vis'esa in each one of them is to commit
infinite regress. The difference in time is known by ksanatva,
lavatva, acetanatva, etc. Difference in atman (between jiva
and Evan) is known by anutva, vibhutva. niyamyatva and
niyantrtva, etc. However according to Visistadvaita, there is
no need to admit vis'esa as a separate categoryl.
Samavaya, according to Vaiéesika is a permanent
connection existing between two things that are always found
inseparable. This relation exists1 between parts and products,
1. Refer Tattuamuktfi-kaldpa. 5-125.
2. avayavduayavinoh gunagunirwh kriydkriyévatob jdtiuyaktyolz
nityadrauyaviéesayosca yassambandhah sa samauayahl
Nyfiya-siddhfinIa—nmklfivali, p. 53.
302 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

quality and qualified, motion and their substratum, generality

and the individual unit, and lastly particularity and eternal
substances.
Desika refutes this samavaya of Vaiéesika. The relation
is common to two things. Between them one is adhara
(support) and another is adheya (supported). This difference
is known by their nature itself. This svabhfiva (nature) of
the related substances must be admitted by Vaisesika and
others who admit samavfiya. Samavaya is the peculiar
svabhava of related parts and hence it is unnecessary to
admit samuvfiya in between theml.
Further one more objection also may be levelled against
samavaya. According to Vaiéesika it is an eternal relation
(nitya-sambandha). Therefore the pratiyogi (counter positive
of the relation) like jar should become eternal. But it goes
against the experience. Therefore samavfiya is not a separate
category.
Further sfitrakirahas rejected samavaya in
Vaisesikadhikarana. The heart of sutrakara’s objection is
this. If Vaisesikas accept samavaya to prove the eternal
relation between the quality and qualified, motion and their
substrata, generality and the individual unit, and lastly
particularity and eternal substances; they are committing
the fallacy of infinite regress. Because in that case one has
to admit samavaya in the samavaya and so on. But in the
case of danda (stick) and purusa (man) samyoga, this type

1. sambandhasyobhaya tulyatuat, tasmdt samavdydrigikdra midim'zpi

sambandhinoavabhdvauiéeaah suikizryahl tatlu’z ca madhye
samauayaklptir nirarthakal Nyaya-siddhafijana. p. 178.
wisesikfidhikarape: 'samavfiyébhyupagamficca sdmyfidanavasthi-
teb' iti sfitrakéraireva samavdyakhya paddrthfintaradflsanena
pardstaml Nyfiya-pariéuddhi, p. 178.
samhandhe sarvatulye... Tattvamukta-kalapa, 5-127.
 The Philosophy of Vis‘istédvaita 303

of infinite regress is not admitted. Because in that place

sarhyoga isv perceptible whereas the samavaya is not
perceptible. Here to prove the fidhflra-fidheyabhava (relation
of container and contained) between inseparables, Vaisesikas
admit samavaya. Instead of accepting a new relation like
samavaya it is better to admit ‘ayutasiddhi’ itself as a
relation to prove adhfira-fidheyabhfiva. Therefore samavaya
is not a separate category.
According to Vaisesikas abhfiva is a separate category.
It is not bhavariipa (positive). That is why that system
defines abhfiva as ‘bhava-bhinnah’. In their system they are
of four kinds namely pragabhfiva (antecedent negation),
pradhvarhsabhava (consequent negation), anyonyabhava
(reciprocal negation) and atyantabhava (absolute negation).
Among these the first two are considered to be transient
negations and the other two are permanent negations.
In Vedanta, abhava (non-existence) is not a separate
category. Abhfiva is a bhfivaviéesal, i.e., avastha-viéesa (state
or mode of a thing). To accept an additional and unnecessary
category is to commit gurutva dosa.
It may be argued, that in case abhava is considered as
bhavarfipa then why not the rfipa and rasa, which are
commonly admitted as bhfivarfipa be considered as
abhavan'ipa? Vedantin answering this objection says that
rfipa and rasa etc., are known by ananyathasiddha (indis-
pensable antecedent) knowledge and hence they cannot be
proved as abhivarfipa. But in the experience like ‘ghata
abhfiva’ the knowledge of 'ghata’ which is the counter-
correlative of the abhava is necessary to know the ‘ghata-
abhava’. That counter-correlative is bhfivarfipa and hence
abhava becomes the dharma-svarfipa of bhfiva-padfirtha.

1. abhfiuasya tu bhdvauiéesaiécdnyathdsiddlwtvena tyagassmucita iti

bin—wall! Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 794.
304 The Philosophy of Vis'istadvaita

Even Nyaya- vaiéesika school admits abhava

as bhavarfipa
in certain experiences. For example in the experience
‘ghata-
abhfiva-abhfivah’, means ‘ghata’ itself, which is bhavarfipa.
Here the second abhava negates the first abhava. The nyaya
maxim ‘dvitlya abhavasya prathama abhava pratiyogi
svarfipatvam’ also means the same thing. Therefore abhava
is not a separate category and it is bhavarfipa.
Visistadvaita system offers different explanations to all
abhfivas accepted in Nyaya-vais’esika system. The continuance
of a prior state is called ‘pragabhéva’ (antecedent negation).
The continuance of an after state is the pradhvams'abhava
(consequent negation), the extraordinary attribute or the
structure of an object itself is anyonyabhava (the reciprocal
negation) and atyantabhiva (absolute negation). When mud
is in the form of ‘pindatvavastha’, it is called pragabhava.
When the pot gets ‘the kapalatva avastha', it is called
pradhvamsabhava. Ghatatva is different from patatva. Here
ghatatva and patatva refer to the structure of the object. It
is known as anyonyabhava. When the pot is present in the
kitchen then it is not present in the hall. It is known as
atyantabhava.
Deéika says1 that sutrakara has rejected even abhava
in the aphorism which refutes samavaya. Therefore non-
existence is not a separate categoryz. So, the foregoing
discussion about the categories of Vaisesika proves that there
are only six dravyas and ten adravyas. In the above explained
way, the other different categories of various systems should
be included either in dravya or in adravya.
'86-

1. abhavatadadhikamzlayob visesana uiéesyabhdvasannidhi-viéesddi

fiabdovdcya sambandhfintaranumanamapi samauaya- dflsazm-
cchfiyayaiua dasitameual Nyaya-parisuddhi. p. 173.
2. Refer Tattvamuktd-kaldpa, 5-102, 132.
 Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

The system of Visistadvaita is a very ancient system.

This system is also called RAmanuja-darsana, because
Ramanuja expounded this system by writing celebrated
commentaries on the Brahmastztra, the Bhagauadgitd and
on the important passages of Upanisads. He was influenced
by the devotional songs of the Alvars.
Generally Advaita is translated as monism and
Viéistadvaita as qualified monism. Viéista means qualified.
Visistadvaita implies the Parabrahman qualified by its
attributes cit (soul) and acit (matter). The soul and matter
have no separate existence apart from the Parabrahman.
They are inseparable parts of it. The Supreme Being is the
soul of all souls and soul of all matters. That is why He is
called Paramatman. The Antarydmi Brdhmapa of the
Brhaddranyakopanisad, and such other vedic passages
establish this inseparable relation between Paramatman and
the universe.
As the word itself suggests, the Visistadvaita system
asserts monism, but it maintains the natural differences
between the nature, soul and God. The matter and soul are
as real as God himself. Both of them stand in an attributive
relation to him.
Here one of the attributes namely nature is referred to
as non-sentient nature (acit). It is devoid of consciousness.
Another attribute referred to is the sentient (cit), which
consists of human beings, animals, plants etc. Both the
conscious and self-conscious things are suggested by the
306 The Philosophy of Vis’istfidvaita
word cit. God manifests in this universe through cit and
acit. When the Brahman is in the un-manifested causal
form, it is called ‘suksma-cid-acid-visista-Brahman’and when
it manifests in the form of visible universe, it is called
‘sthula cid-acid-visista-Brahman’. Both of them are identical.
Philosophical knowledge consists in understanding the
unity of Brahman qualified by the sentient and the non-
sentient. The great sage Badarayana, with the intention of
teaching this Brahman as the only reality, which is qualified
by cit and acit, began his enquiry about this Brahman and
explained that Brahman possesses attributes like cit and
acit. The great exponents of the Vis’istadvaita system opine
that Badarayana here indicates by the term ‘Brahman’,
Srimannarayana who is qualified by cit and acit as the only
reality. This is what is suggested by the term ‘The Philosophy
of Visistadvaita’l.
Ramanuja says that the Brahman of Viéistadvaita is
free from all defects and is the ocean of beneficent attributesl.
That is way Ramanuja addresses Him ‘akhila heya praty-
anika, samasta kalyana gunakara etc.’ He is the natural
abode of jfiana, bala, aisvarya, virya, sakti, tejas, sausflya,
vatsalya, audarya, mfirdava, saundarya, samya and
gambhirya etc. He is the ocean of compassion and easily
accessible to his devotees.
Rimfinuja’s full-fledged God with a name and form and
attributes is more attractive a personality. The upasaka was
thus presented with a more lovable and gracious God.
Rimfinuja with this postulate of the highest God-head,
restated the tattva, hits and purusartha in a more appealing
from. This service of Rimanuja satisfied both the intellectual

1. Refer Yatfndra-mtadipikd, p. 155.

2. Refer Gadyatruya, p. 216 and 264.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 307

quest for God and furnished food for that great human
emotion, Love. At the hands of Ramanuja, the centre was
shifiod in Upanisadic philosophy from the ‘aham' (one’s own
self) to God (Supreme-self). So’ham (I am He) gave place to
‘dAsoham’ (I. am his servant).
All types of good karmas were converted into kaii'ikarya
(service to the Lord). Both punya and pipe were considered
as obstacles to obtain liberation. The true punya is the
kaiiikarya and experience of the Purusottama and his
attributes and papa is to forget him. The wholehearted
surrender to paramapurusa, that is prapatti, is the sure and
easiest means to achieve the grace of the Lord. The grace
of the Lord frees us from all types of sins such as
bhagavadapacara (denigration of God Himself), bhagavata-
apacara (ridiculing of His devotees), asahyapacara (obstruct-
ing the religious duties being carried out by sincere men)
and so on. The devotion of érimannéréyana burns into ashes
all types of sins that have been committed, that are being
committed and that are going to be committed in thought,
word and deed.
Sarira—s’arlri-bhfiva or body-soul relationship is the
corner-stone of Viéistfidvaita philosophy. This relationship is
the pradhina—pratitantra of the Visistiadvaita siddhanta. The
principles which are peculiar to the particular system and
not adopted by other systems are called as pradhana-prati-
tantra.
This principle means that God sustains, commands and
obtains all benefits from both the atman and the nature,
who in turn are sustained and commanded by God and exist
only for him. The paramapurusa, soul and matter are
inter-linked and united. Atman and the nature have no
independent existence apart from the Paramatman.
Rémfinuja elucidated this glorious principle in all his works.
Innumerable corollaries may be derived from this
308 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita

synthesis and every one of them leads to the well-being of

man and the world.
If all the souls are the prakiras or modes of Brahman
then it certainly follows that they must all act in unison.
It also suggests that all men should not quarrel among
themselves. There should be complete unity among men just
as there is no conflict between one part of the body and
another.
The beautiful result of body-soul relationship in
Visistédvaita may be further elucidated with an example.
Taking the family as a unit, the entire family is the soul.
The members of the family are different parts of that family’s
body. Each member works for the welfare of the family.
From family to society is the next step. There society is the
angi. Member of the society is an anga.
If this relationship is kept in mind, there can be no
conflict between one individual and another and one nation
and another. Therefore the synthetic body-soul conception is
capable of universal application.
For the service rendered by that great acarya Ramanuja,
Svarni Vivekananda paid a very high compliment in these
terms. “Ramfinuja....with a most practical philosophy, a great
appeal to the emotions, an entire denial of birthrights before
spiritual attainments, and appeals through the popular
tongue, completely succeeded in bringing the masses back
to the vedic religion.”
It is already explained many times, that the philosophy
of Visistadvaita is a very ancient one. The deep and strong
foundation for this philosophy was laid in the remotest past
by Tankha, Dramida, Guhadeva and Bodhfiyana in the form
of Bhaéyas and Vrttis on the Brahmasatra of Badarayana.
Rimanuja refers to this point in his celebrated commentary
Sfibhdsya on Brahmasatra.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 309

He says1 that great acaryal of the past wrote

commentaries on Brahmasatra in a concised form, which he
would expound following the ideas of those great acaryas.
Nathamuni and Yamunficarya wrote several works and
raised the Visistadvaita siddhfinta on those foundations to
the basement level. Ramanuja completed this glorious edifice
by writing his celebrated Sflbhdsya and such other works.
Vedanta Desika who is only next to Rimanuja in every
aspect in the garland of Visistadvaitic scaryas, enriched and
beautified that edifice by illuminating the entire edifice by
the beauty and the brilliance of his poetry and logical acumen.
Deéika re-told and explained the Visistadvaita siddhanta in
all of his innumerable works. The credit of explaining,
elaborating, reaffirming, consolidating and establishing on
firm grounds the philosophy of Visistadvaita goes to Vedanta
Deéika, one of the greatest successor in the school of
Viéistédvaita. On the evidence of the Vedas, puranas, itihésas,
agamas, the Divyaprabandams of Alvars and the expositions
of the ancient scaryas, Desika established the siddhanta on
solid ground. Had it not been for the much needed exposition
and systematisation by Vedanta Desika, the Visistadvaita
siddhanta would have ever remained hazy and indefinite.
Deéika bases his exposition on the innumerable authorities
and teachings of the ancient masters, and never gives an
arbitrary and imaginary explanation.
Contributions of Vedanta Desika to ‘Indian philosophy
in general and Viéistadvaita in particular are many. He
synthesised Nyaya and Mimamsa with the Vedanta by
re-interpreting the Nydyasatras of Gautama and Mim'dn'isd-
satras of Jaimini. He accommodated many of the theories
of those schools in Vedanta system and repudiated some
1. bhagavadbodhfiyanakrtdm brahmasatra urttim pllrvdcdrydh
sanciksipuh tanmatdnusarena sfitrfiksarfini vyakhyasyantel
Srfbhasya. p. 4.
310 The Philosophy of Vis’istadvaita
others which were against the evidence of scriptures. By his
original arguments he kept the system of Visistadvaita safe
from the attacks of the rival schools. To uphold the validity
of Paflcaratra-égama he wrote Paficardtra-raksd. Deéika on
the basis of Sruti, Visnupurapa, Pancardtra-(zgama and
teachings of ancient scaryas, re-established the traditional
view that ‘Sri’ (goddess Laksml) is equal in every aspect to
Visnu and that they are one tattva.
' I

He gave much importance to the arca form of worship

and admitted the holiness of pilgrimage centers like
Srirangam, Kafici, Pandarapur etc. But he cautions us that
the purity or the impurity of such places depends upon the
people who reside in such places. He states in clear terms
that one should reside in such places where one can get
concentration1 and can have the congenial atmosphere to
enjoy the bliss of communion with Lord Srimannarayana.
The greatness and holiness ascribed to places like Srirangam
and Kafici in puranas are maintained only when sattvika
type of people reside there.
Deéika has expounded the inner meaning and signi-
ficance of the doctrine of prapatti in all aspects and for this
purpose he wrote Niksepa-raksd and his magnum opus, the
Rahasyatraya-sdra. In his Rahasyagranthas, he clearly
states1 that there are no differences of opinion among the
followers of Ramfinuja and thus has strived to synthesise
the sectarian divisions among Srivaisnavisrn.
Desika was responsible to celebrate publicly the holy
union of the Sanskrit and the Tamil Vedas. It is he who
first called the prabandhams of Alvars as ‘Tamil Veda’. He
called them as Dramidopanisad. He established the equal
validity of the Tamil scriptures with that of the Sanskrit
1. yatraikdgrayam bhavati bhagavatpado sevfircanddebl
Rahasyfitmya-sfira. adhikara 19.
2. Refer Sampradfiya-pariéuddhi. p. 6.
 The Philosophy of Visistadvaita 311

scriptures and thus elevated the status of other languages.

He wrote many works in Manipravala and Tamil. It is said
that Lord Ranganatha was so pleased at this achievement
of Desika that he bestowed on Desika the title of “Ubhaya
Vedantacaryal".
In the history of Visistadvaita, the place of Vedanta
Deéika is uniquez. He wrote many independent treatises like
Tattvamuktd-kaldpa, Sarvdrtha-siddhi, Adhikarana-sdrdvali,
Sesuara Mimdn'zsd, Mimdrnsd-pdduka, Nyaya-paris’uddhi,
Nydya-siddhc'znjana and so on.

1. This episode is vouched for by Des'ika’s own work. “vedfintachc'nya

safijr'idmauahita bahuvit sdrathamanuarthayfimi”.
Adhikarana-sdrfivali, 1.
Prof. M. Hiriyanna observes “Then came Venkatanatha, better
known as Vedanta Des'ika (A. D. 1350) whose many sided scholarship
and long labours contributed much to establish the doctrine of
Ramanuja on a firm basis. First, he formulated even better than
his predecessors had done the objections to the advaita, taking
into consideration the defence put up by its exponents since
Ramanuia's time. Not only did he thus render the doctrine stronger
on its critical side; he also undertook the task of internal
systematization and set aside once for all whatever departures
from strict tradition had taken place by his time.
Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 385.
Dr. Satyavarata Singh observed “Vedanta Desika is the real
representative of the Rfimfinuja—dars’ana and the Srivaisnava
sampradaya. This fact has abundantly been made clear by the
great sage Vidyaranya (13th-14th centuries AD.) who quotes
Vedénta Deéika's Tattvamuktd—kalc‘ipa, instead of Ramanuja's
Sribdsya while summarising the points of the philosophy of
Viéistfidvaita (vide the Saruadaréana-sarigraha)".
“That Appayya Diksita (15th-16th century A.D.) took Vedanta
Des'ika’s Yddavdbhyudaya and Pfiduka-sahasra to be the real
poetic presentations of Viéistadvaitic Vaisnavism is an evidence
in itself of Vedanta Deéika‘s eminence in the galaxy of post-
Rfimfinuja Viéistadvaitins." Vedanta Deéika-A Study, p. 149.
312 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita

The present work Nydya-siddhafijana of Vedanta Des'ika

may be called as the II part of Nydya-parisuddhi because
the discussion about prameyas which were introduced in the
last chapter of Nyaya-pariéuddhi is continued in this work.
This work is a Prakarana-grantha. which explains the
prameyas of the school. This work is not only a prakarana
but also an independent and important treatise of
Visistadvaita. The text has a remarkable logical rigour. Every
sentence in it contains abundant meaning like the aphorisms
of great rsis. In fact this work is also one of his great
contributions to the system. The special characteristic feature
of this work is whenever the author explains or interprets
something, he traces them to the scriptures and Brahmasatra
and the teachings of great acaryas of the system. Unfortu-
nately the last portions of adravya pariccheda have been
lost.
Thus Vedanta Deéika with the help of scriptures, logic,
experience, and the statements of great ficaryas, has purified
the Brahman which was upapluta (eclipsed) by the misrep-
resentation by other systems and thus has fulfilled his oath.
“upaplutasya tattvasya é’uddhyartho'yamupakramah” (Nyaya-
siddhdfijana, p. 2). “Here in this work namely Nyaya-
siddhdfijana the Brahman which is misrepresentated by
other schools will be represented in correct way."
Though Vedanta Desika has achieved success in
synthesising Nyfiya and Vedanta, yet some of the un-
bridgeable major differences may be noted in the following
way.
Nyaya-vaiéesika system admits atman as the sub-
1.
stratum of jfiana. But Visistadvaita admits jfiana-svarfipatva
of atman, in addition to jnanadhikaranattva.
The ‘paramanu-karanavada’ of Nyaya-vaiéesikas is
2.
not admitted by Viéistédvaita. The paramanu-karanavada is
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 313
refuted by sfitrakfira himself in the aphorism “mahad-di'rgha-
vadud-hrasva-parimandaldbhyam" (Brahmaszztra, 2-2-10.)
3. Samavfiya which is accepted as a separate category
in Nyaya-vais'esika system is not admitted in Visistadvaita.
4. In Nyaya-vais'esika the movement in atoms is started
on account of the adrsta that is in atman. But the adrsta
is not admitted in Visistadvaita.
5. According to the scriptures the atman is arm and
hence the Visistadvaita disproves the vibhfitva-vada of
Nyaya-vaisesika system.
6. Further, Viéistfidvaita says that the explanation given
by Nyaya-vaiéesika regarding jagat, Is’vara, karma and jiva
also is not satisfactory and against the principles of
Upanisads.
7. Though both Nyaya and Vis’istadvaita admit moksa,
there is much difference in between them regarding the
means of liberation. According to Nyaya-vais’esikas, tattva-
jfifina is the means of liberation. They say: “tattvajr'idna-
nniééreyasa adhigamah" (Nyayaszztra, 1-1-1).
But Visistadvaita prescribes the grace of the Lord as
the redeemer of the individual from ajfiz‘lna. This philosophy
of Visistfidvaita is derived from the Upanisadic philosophy
“yamevaisa ornate tena labhyah” (Mundaka, 3-2-3).
The ls’vara of Nyaya-vaiéesika is only the instrumental
cause of the universe and He is in no way connected with
the redemption of the individual. But in Vis’istadvaita the
grace of the Lord alone is the redeemer.
8. According to Nyaya-vaisesika the liberation of the
individual consists in ‘duhkha-dhvamsa’. The liberated soul
becomes like a slab of stone without experiencing either
sukha or duhkha. This type of moksa is known as
‘upalavadbhava’ in that system. Visistadvaita maintains that
314 The Philosophy of Viéistfidvaita

moksa is not only ‘duhkha dhvalhsa’ but also it is the state

in which the individual soul gets supreme bliss in the
communion of the Lord.
9. In Nyaya-vais’esika system the Lord is only a
nimitta-karana of the world, but in Vis’istadvaita He is
‘abhinna-nimitta—upédana-karsna’ of the world. Though the
philosophy of Nyaya-vaiéesika discusses the cetana and
acetana tattvas in detail, it does not derive its conclusions
from the Vedas; whereas the Visistadvaita maintains that
both these cit and acit tattvas are the visesana of the Lord
and thus both of them are dependent tattvas.
Nyaya-vaisesika system advocates the reality of the
world and plurality of souls. lévara, jiva, karma, transmi-
gration and the validity of Vedas are admitted in that system.
Further, this system advocates that ‘atyantika duhkha nivrtti’
is moksa. None of these great principles are against the
principles of Viéistadvaita. That is why the great thinkers
of Visistadvaita beginning from Nathamuni to Vedanta
Desika endeavoured to synthesise-Nyfiya and Vedanta. Desika
achieved complete success in this attempt by writing great
works like Nydya-pariéuddhi and Nydya-siddhdr’ijana. He
discarded some principles of Nyfiya-vaisesika which were
against Veda and accommodated some principles of that
system which were in agreement with the Vedas. He
reinterpreted some other principles of Nyaya-vaisesika in
the light of Upanisadic philosophy.
In the beginning of Nydya-pariéuddhi Des’ika has said1
that the two systems are interdependents like ‘simha’ (lion)
and ‘vana' (forest) and he has demonstrated this truth in
the above mentioned two works. That is why conventionally
it is said that the study of Vedanta must be accompanied
with the study of Nyaya. Then alone the Vedanta becomes
1. Refer Nydya-parisuddhi, p. 86.
 The Philosophy of Viéistadvaita 315

‘Nyaya Vedanta’. Thus Vedanta Des’ika concretised the

relation between Nyfl‘ya and Vedinta by writing Nydya-
pariéuddhi, Nydya-siddhdfijana and thus he fulfilled the
great ambitions of the scaryas of Vis’istédvaita.
The aim of all the sastras is to bring peace of mind to
mankind which is tortured by worldly pleasures and miseries.
A man who possesses the peace of mind is a philosopher in
the Indian sense of the term. “éamdrtharh saruaédstrc‘zni
uihitdni manisibhilzl so we sarva-s’dstrajfiah yasya s’antam
manassadfz ll" (Mahdbhérata-édntiparva).
The equanimity of the mind can be had only when we
know the real nature of the cit, acit and lévara in the light
of scriptures and logic. Gautama says that the padartha-tattva
jfiz‘ma (knowledge of the categories in their reality) leads
to liberation “tattvajfiéndnniééreyasc‘zdhigamah” (Gautama-
nydyaszztra, 1-1-1).
Des’ika by his wonderful erudition which is obtained
through the unbounded compassion of his ficfiryas has
prepared the afijana (collyrium) viz., Nyaya—siddhdfijana for
the benefit of mankind. IntelligenCe lies in understanding
the nature and character of cit, acit and ls‘vara and enjoy
the ecstasy of the divine communion in this life itself. To
conclude, in the words of Vedanta Des'ika himself in his
Dayd-éataka, “muktfinubhatimiha ddsyati me mukundah".
Dayd-éataka, 100.

k5 Q
x (
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Edition, Madras, 1973.
Tarkasafigrahadi'pika of Annambhatta, Madras, 1975.
Tattvafikd of Vedanta Defika, Sri Veeraraghavacharya
Edition, Madras, 1973.
Veddrthasarigraha of Ramanuja, Adhyatma Prakasha
Karyalaya Edition, Holenarasipur, 1938.
Vain‘zgya Paiicaka of Deéika, Tuppul Venkatacharya
Edition, Bangalore 1909.
Varadardja Paficfiéat of Des'ika, Tuppul Venkatacharya
Edition, Bangalore, 1909.
thsydyana Bhdsya of Pakshilaawamy, Calcutta Edition
1865.

Vignupurdzw of Vyasa, Jnanasuryodaya Publication

Bombay, 1940.
Vaiéesika Sfitra of Kanida, Calcutta, 1861.
Vaiéeaika Daréana of Sadinanda, Calcutta, 1942.
Vedantasara of RamAnuia. P. B. Annangaracharya Editio:
1938.
Vedantadipa of Riminqia, P. B. Annangaracharya Editim
1938.
 The Philosophy of Viéistgadvaita 321

Vaiéapikaupashara of Sankara Miéra, Calcutta, 1861.

Vaijayantikosa of Yidava Prakas’a, Madras.
Vivekacadamani of Sri Sankara, Mysore.
Yatiraja Saptati of Deéika, Tuppul Venkatacharya Edition,
Bangalore, 1909.
Yodavdbhyudaya of Deéika, Sri Veeraraghavacharya
Edition, Madras, 1973.
Yajurvedasan‘ihitd, Chakravarti Iyengar Edition, Mysore.
Yogasatra of Patafijali, Banana.
Yatindra Mata Dipika of Srinivasacharya, Adidevananda
Edition.

B. ENGLISH

Indian Philosophy, Dr. s. Radhakrishnan.‘/

Outlines of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna.
The Philosophy of Vis’istc‘zdvaita, P. N. Srinivasacharyag
Essentials of Indian Philosophy, M. Hiriyanna.
Karmayoga, Jfic‘inayoga and Bhaktiyoga, Swami
Vivekananda.
Vedanta Des’ika—A Study, Dr. Satyavrata Singh. =

Theory of Knowledge, Dr. K. C. Varadacharya.

History of Indian Philosophy, Das Gupta} ‘T/

The Philosophy of Sadhana in Visistadvaita, Dr. N. S.

Anantharangachar.
Desika Sambhc‘wanfi, Venkateswara Sabha Publication..‘-'
Peeps into Mysticism of D. Ramaswamy Iyengar, Madras.
Upanisads—An Anthology of D. S. Shanna, Bharathiya
Vidya Bhavan Publication, Bombay.
322 The Philosophy of Viéigtzidvaita

C. TAMIL

Adaikkalapattu of Deéika. Sriknnta Publication Mysore,

1960.
Ndlc'u'ra Diuya Prabandham of Alvfirs, Vaijayanti
Publication, 1929.
Vedanta Deéika's Srlmadrahasyatrayasara
Abhaya. Pradfinasdra, Virodha. Parihara
Rahasyanauanftam, Paramapadasopc‘ma
P. B. Annangaracharya Edition Kanchi and
T. VeeraraghavacharyaEdition, (Sanskrit translation).

D. KANNADA

Rdmdnuja Daréana, Dr. N. S. Anantharangachar.

Tattuaéuddhi, Devashikhamani Ramanujacharya, Mysore.
Hindu Daréanasdra of Lakgmipuram Sfinivfisacarya,
Mysore.
Vedanta Deéikaru Mattu Avara Granthagalu,
N. Anantharangacharya, Acharya
Kainkaryabhivardhini Sabha Edition, 1940.