OXFORD THEOLOGY AND RELIGION MONOGRAPHS

Editorial Committee
D. ACHARYA M. N. A. BOCKMUEHL
M. J. EDWARDS P. S. FIDDES
S. R. I. FOOT D. N. J. MACCULLOCH
H. NAJMAN G. WARD
OXFORD THEOLOGY AND RELIGION MONOGRAPHS

George Errington and Roman Catholic Identity

in Nineteenth-Century England
Serenhedd James (2016)
Theology and the University in Nineteenth-Century Germany
Zachary Purvis (2016)
Angels in Early Medieval England
Richard Sowerby (2016)
Maria Maddalena de’ Pazzi
The Making of a Counter-Reformation Saint
Clare Copeland (2016)
Freedom and Necessity in Modern Trinitarian Theology
Brandon Gallaher (2016)
Intercessory Prayer and the Monastic Ideal in the Time
of the Carolingian Reforms
Renie S. Choy (2016)
Ottoman Puritanism and its Discontents
Aḥmad al-Rūmī al-Āqḥiṣārī and the Qāḍīzādelis
Mustapha Sheikh (2016)
A. J. Appasamy and his Reading of Rāmānuja
A Comparative Study in Divine Embodiment
Brian Philip Dunn (2016)
Kierkegaard’s Theology of Encounter
An Edifying and Polemical Life
David Lappano (2017)
Qur’an of the Oppressed
Liberation Theology and Gender Justice in Islam
Shadaab Rahemtulla (2017)
Ezra and the Second Wilderness
Philip Y. Yoo (2017)
Maternal Grief in the Hebrew Bible
Ekaterina E. Kozlova (2017)
The Human Condition
in Hilary of Poitiers
The Will and Original Sin between
Origen and Augustine

ISAB EL LA IMAGE

1
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For my parents
 Acknowledgements

It is a professional duty, but also a joy, to say firstly and most importantly that
this study would not have been possible without the generous doctoral funding
of the Arts and Humanities Research Council; I am immensely grateful to
them, and to the Faculty for facilitating the award.
Excerpts from Migne’s Patrologia Latina cited here have been sourced from
ProQuest’s Patrologia Latina database, with many thanks. (Occasionally other
variants have been used in line with recent textual studies). All rights reserved.
http://www.proquest.com.
My doctorate encountered many hiccoughs along the way and I should like
to thank all the administrative staff I encountered for their calm efficiency,
particularly at the Oxford Theology Faculty and the Humanities Division.
Likewise academic staff at the Faculty, including those on the Theological
Monographs Committee, have always been supportive.
Four people in particular have contributed to the content of this book. My
doctoral examiners Carol Harrison and Markus Vinzent and my anonymous
referee Lewis Ayres all provided acute and perceptive critique and a painstak-
ing approach to detail, while providing sympathetic encouragement that was
hugely appreciated. Lastly, it would be impossible to express properly my debt
to my supervisor Mark Edwards. His academic contribution has been im-
mense, but his support and kindness have been even more valuable.
Finally, I should like to thank my family; my husband for putting up with
me; and Clemmie, who always has a keen nose for the most important in any
endeavour.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/5/2017, SPi

Contents

1. Introduction 1
Hilary of Poitiers: Life and Afterlife 1
Hilary’s Context: Between Origen and Augustine 4
Modern Scholarship on Hilary’s Theological Anthropology 8
Methodology: Comparing Hilary’s Commentaries 10
Research Questions 12
2. Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 15
Introduction 15
Jerome on Hilary’s Psalm Commentaries 15
Textual Witnesses to Origen on Psalm 118 17
Case Study: Ps. 118.17–24 (Strophe ‘Gimel’) 23
Analysis: Hilary’s Translation Technique 30
Adaptation of Theology 34
Conclusion 38
3. Body and Soul 40
Introduction 40
Literature Review 40
Body and Soul in the Psalms Commentaries 44
Body and Soul in the Commentary on Matthew 51
Hilary’s Influences 56
Discussion 65
4. The Human as Imago Dei 67
Introduction 67
Current Scholarship 67
Imago as Expression of our Creation and Progression 68
Hilary Adopting Origen? Imago Theology in the Psalms Commentaries 71
Hilary Rejecting Origen? The Lost Image 76
Conclusion 80
5. The Fall 82
Introduction 82
The Fall Narrative 82
First Cause of the Fall 90
Some Effects of the Fall 92
Conclusion 98
6. Constraint (1): Voluntas 99
Introduction 99
Hilary’s Articulations of the Will 100
Voluntas before Augustine 114
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 18/5/2017, SPi

x Contents
Discussion 122
Conclusion 124
7. Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 126
Introduction 126
Passions and Emotions 126
Hilary and Stoic Ideas of Mental Processes 131
Cogitationes 134
A Difference from Stoic Thought: Apatheia 139
Discussion 142
8. Original Sin 144
Introduction 144
The Sinful State: Creation or Fall? 145
The ‘Sins of our Origin’ 148
Transmission by Birth 151
Baptism 155
Conclusion 157
9. Hilary between Origen and Augustine 159
Introduction 159
Hilary’s Anthropology 159
Hilary’s Usage of Origen 161
Augustine’s Usage of Hilary 168
Closing remarks 181

Appendix 1: The ‘Anthropological Household’

(Hilary, InMt 10.23–4) 183
Appendix 2: Third Strophe of Ps. 118 (Gimel: v17–24)
Comparison of Palestinian Catena, Hilary, and Ambrose 186
Select Bibliography 229
General Index 239
 1

Introduction

This introductory chapter presents Hilary and the historical context of his work.
In particular, the foundation is laid for the focus of this thesis—Hilary’s anthro-
pology, especially his understanding of the human person, the Fall and sin.
Hilary’s context will also be discussed. This book seeks not only to identify
Hilary’s anthropological thought but also to place it in the current of theo-
logical development of the fourth century. In particular, this study will be
useful in a wider context in two ways. Firstly, it will demonstrate one angle
in reception of Origen in the mid-fourth century, before the criticisms of
Epiphanius and the debates in the Egyptian monastic communities. Secondly,
it will contribute to our understanding of the tradition from which Augustine
feels he receives his doctrine of original sin.

H I L A R Y O F P O I T I E R S : L I F E AN D AFTE RLI FE

Hilary’s early life is obscure. It is sometimes suggested that he was born in the
300s or 310s, maybe in the Poitiers region of France, and that he was educated
at the university of Bordeaux made famous in the poems of Ausonius.1
However, these facts are purely conjectural: the assumption of his birth year
is based on the fact that he must have been in his forties or fifties by the time of
his involvement in the Trinitarian controversy, and the assumption of his
university education is based on his literary confidence and fluency. The sixth-
century biography by Venantius Fortunatus mentions a wife and daughter, but
they are not known from any works of his day (the editor of the Latin text
rightly considered Hilary’s letter to his daughter Abra as medieval forgery).2
Hilary springs into history in the mid 350s. He appears to have been
involved in some debates also involving the ‘court bishops’ Ursacius and

1
On birth date: for example DESCOURTIEUX 2008:12–13. On possible education at
Bordeaux: SAFFREY 1969:248–51.
2
FEDER 1916:lxxxi–lxxxiii.
2 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Valens, and was finally exiled in 357 by Constantius. The exact reason for the
exile remains a mystery since it is never explicit. Gwatkin raised the suspicion
of immorality, Feder suggested political disloyalty, and Barnes suggests that
Hilary was exiled for failing to subscribe to a condemnation of Athanasius.3
The inclination of the present writer is that Hilary was exiled for personal
reasons and thereafter may not have been considered to hold full episcopal
status. In describing an official (doctrinal) hearing held at the emperor’s
command towards the end of his life, Hilary states: First they slandered me
personally, and said that I had previously been condemned by Saturninus and
should not be heard as a bishop. This is not the time to tell what answer I gave;
but those who then heard me decided that the matter at hand should rather be
about the Faith, as the king wanted.4 The words ‘should rather be about the
faith’ (de fide potius) could suggest that his original condemnation was not for
reasons of faith; this is further supported by the fact that Athanasius never lists
him among the Western bishops exiled as confessors.5 Nevertheless, if Hilary’s
exile was not ‘for the faith’, he re-invented himself successfully: tradition, at
least, exalted Hilary as a Nicene confessor.
While in Asia Minor, Hilary attended the Council of Constantinople 360
and entered discussion with local bishops, becoming well versed in the
arguments of the Trinitarian controversy in those years. Out of this Trinitar-
ian engagement emerge the works for which he is most famous and which are
most often studied in the current day, particularly On the Trinity for its
theology, and the various collections of creeds, letters, and documents for
the historical background of the controversy (On the Synods; Against Ursacius
and Valens; Against Constantius).
Hilary probably returned home from exile around 360 or 361. It may have
been Constantius that permitted him to return home as being too much of a
troublemaker to keep in the East, as Sulpicius Severus suggests.6 Alternatively
he may have been permitted to return home as part of Julian’s general amnesty
of Christian bishops, as Jerome suggests.7

3
BARNES 1992:137. References to Gwatkin, Feder, and others at BARNES 1992:129.
4
HILARY c.Aux. 7: Primumque . . . de persona [mea] calumniatus est, damnatum quondam
me a Saturnino, audiri ut episcopum non oportere. Non est nunc temporis, quid ad haec
responsum sit, enarrare: sed qui tum audiebant, de fide potius, ut regi placuerat, agitandum
esse decernunt.
5
E.g. Hilary is absent from the lists of exiled Western bishops at ATHANASIUS Historia
Arianorum 33, Apologia de Fuga 4. Compare RUFINUS Historia Ecclesiastica 1.20.
6
SULPICIUS SEVERUS Vita Martini, 6.7: nec multo post, cum sancto Hilario comperisset
regis paenitentia potestatem indultam fuisse redeundi, [Martinus] Romae ei temptauit
occurrere profectusque ad urbem est. Also SULPICIUS SEVERUS Chronica 2.45.4: postremo
quasi discordiae seminarium et perturbator Orientis redire ad Gallias iubetur, absque exsilii
indulgentia.
7
JEROME adv. Luciferianos, 10: Omnes episcopi, qui de propriis sedibus fuerant exterminati,
per indulgentiam noui principis ad ecclesias redeunt. Tunc triumphatorem suum Athanasium
 Introduction 3
On his return, however, Hilary continued to stir trouble. He continued to
collate documents relevant to the controversies of the day,8 travelled with
Eusebius of Vercelli to gain support in north Italy,9 and raised charges against
Auxentius, the bishop of Milan.10 He is thought to have died in 367 or 368.11
As a result particularly of his unwavering efforts on behalf of Nicene
orthodoxy, Hilary came to be seen as an authority in his own day and in the
decades immediately following his death. He was considered one of the
greatest doctrinal authorities of the early church, in common with Cyprian,
Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine.12 Augustine calls him ‘eminent teacher of
the churches’ (insignis ecclesiarum doctor);13 Jerome calls him ‘our Hilary’
(Hilarius noster)14 and upbraids Rufinus when the latter seems to impugn
Hilary’s orthodoxy.15 He even attributes Hilary’s mistakes to an assistant
(Heliodore) so as not to malign Hilary himself: I dare not criticize such a
man, so very articulate in the debates of his own day; he is spoken of throughout
the Roman world for his worthy Christian affirmation, his life of hard work,
and his splendid eloquence.16 Both Jerome and Augustine use Hilary as an
authority for their own work: Jerome continually uses him as a yardstick of
excellence in how to translate (see further pp. 15–17) and Augustine cites
Hilary in support of his own position on original sin (pp. 168–73).
Hilary’s influence continued into the medieval period, helped along by the
biography composed by Venantius Fortunatus and also by Hilary’s patronage
of the popular saint Martin of Tours as mentioned by Sulpicius Severus.
Isidore of Seville tells us he was the first Western hymn writer,17 and Hilary’s
hymns were explicitly among those mentioned by the Fourth Council of
Toledo (AD 633).18
His popularity into the high medieval period is demonstrated by the
number of churches dedicated to him, particularly in France.19 Further, his

Aegyptus excepit; tunc Hilarium de praelio reuertentem, Galliarum Ecclesia complexa est; tunc
ad reditum Eusebii lugubres uestes Italia mutauit.
8
For example Coll. Ant. Par. A I gives a letter from a Paris synod in 360/1, showing that he
continued his collecting after returning from exile.
9
RUFINUS Hist. Eccl. 1.30–1.
10 11
HILARY c.Aux. 7–9. GOEMANS (1969), esp. 109.
12
CASSIODORUS Institutiones 18–22. In Psalterium Praefatio 15: [Cites Augustine, and
then continues . . . ] dixerunt hoc apud nos et alii doctissimi Patres, id est Hieronymus, Ambro-
sius, Hilarius . . .
13
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.28.
14
JEROME Comm. in Michaeam Prophetam, Prologue.
15
JEROME Apologia adv. libros Rufini 2.19.
16
JEROME Ep. 34.3: tantum uirum et suis temporibus disertissimum reprehendere non
audeo, qui et confessionis suae merito et uitae industria et eloquentiae claritate, ubicumque
Romanum nomen est, praedicatur.
17
ISIDORE OF SEVILLE de Ecclesiasticis Officiis 1.4.2: Hilarius autem, Gallus episcopus
Pictauiensis, eloquentia conspicuus, hymnorum carmine floruit primus.
18 19
Canons of the Fourth Council of Toledo, 13. GAZEAU (1969).
4 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Trinitarian work was influential on medieval writers such as Richard of
St Victor and Aquinas (despite Hilary’s apparent articulation of the Holy
Spirit as merely an adjunct to Father and Son).20
The seventeenth-century edition of Hilary’s works under the supervision of
the Benedictine monk Pierre Coustant became a paradigm for modern editing
technique.21 In modern times, Hilary has become less well known, recogniz-
able by some merely for giving his name to the second trimester of Oxford’s
academic year. However, more recently his works have enjoyed a renaissance
among scholars, partly for the information they can give us about fourth-
century political involvement in religious debates and for his strongly personal
contribution to Trinitarian theology.
However, Hilary’s non-Trinitarian works—those which focus on biblical
commentary—are not so well studied in the modern day. This is a shame,
because they were clearly well studied in his own day, as the comments of
Jerome and Augustine show. In particular, many of his comments seem to
presage Augustine’s defence of original sin, especially in the matter of the fallen
will and the very existence of something called original sin as differentiated from
particular or individual sin. This is addressed in the current study.

HILARY’ S CONTEXT: BETWEEN ORIGEN

AND AUGUSTINE

The brief biography given above demonstrates that almost all of Hilary’s
known activity was conducted during the ebbs and flows of the Trinitarian
controversy, and particularly during the brief flourishing of Basil of Ancyra
and others supporting formulae alternative to Nicaea such as homoios kat’
ousian. Inadvertently, the Trinitarian controversy may have thereby formed a
conduit for Origenistic ideas to be transmitted to the West.
Hilary’s involvement in debates about the Trinity feed through to his
anthropology. For example he sees positive aspects to the human body, and
while this was already true to his Latin tradition (Chapter 3), his insistence
may have been partly a reaction against the theology of Marcellus of Ancyra.
Hilary’s view of the emotions and apatheia may be influenced by his need to
defend Christ’s suffering in Gethsemane and on the cross against his oppon-
ents; Mercer22 suggests that Hilary’s depiction of Christ’s passion within Stoic
categories23 allows us to see that Christ, not the average human, is ‘normative’

20
DYER (2011); further works on medieval usage of Hilary’s writings are referenced at
2011:335, fn.5.
21
Critique of Coustant’s work in DOIGNON 2007a:59–61.
22 23
MERCER 2014. trin. 10.23–4, InMt 31.1–10.
 Introduction 5
when it comes to defining humanity. Hilary’s polemic against the homoians
here argues that part of Christ’s uniqueness is due to his different origin
(origo), which also has another implication. Hilary’s understanding of the
stain of sin and the transmittal of this stain through birth appears to be related
to his defence of Christ’s perfection through his different origin—he has no
sins arising from his origin, or in other words original sin.
The context of Hilary’s exile in the East may also explain his encounter with
the work of Origen. Modern scholars often follow Doignon in holding that
Hilary did not know Origen before his exile,24 and indeed it seems that Origen
was not really known in Western writers.25 However, Hilary would have come
across a number of conflicting attitudes towards the third-century scholar.
From the beginning of the fourth century there appear to have been debates
about Origen’s thought; Dechow26 lists some of these, including those
prompted by Methodius, the opponents of Pamphilus, and Eustathius. Indeed
Simonetti27 suggests that the very emergence of the Trinitarian controversy
sprang from debates about Origen’s ideas. Ayres28 rightly points out this is a
simplistic understanding of the complex factors contributing to the debates;
however, it is true that Origen was seen by contemporaries as contributing to
the issues at stake. For example Eustathius associated Arian views with
Origenism, which he strongly opposed,29 while Eusebius of Caesarea was
more sympathetic to Origen.30 Similarly but a little later, Marcellus of Ancyra
argued against the subordinationism of Asterius which he felt was Origenistic,
although possibly a misunderstanding of Origen’s actual thought.31
By the time that Hilary came to be involved in the late 350s, a number of
Origenian concepts were being used to inform the debates. Objections to the
word homoousios, first used of the Father–Son relationship by Origen,32 seem
to have re-appeared in the 350s,33 spawning a whole number of variants
(homoios kat’ousian, homoiousios, etc.) or preferences for different basic
concepts in which to articulate the debate (e.g. of God’s energeiai or epinoiai—
again both approaches found in Origen).34 More clearly, the influence of
Origen is seen in the argument against Eunomius, who claimed that Father

24 25
DOIGNON 1971:171–2. WEEDMAN 2007:144.
26 27 28
DECHOW 1987b:406. SIMONETTI 1975:15–22. AYRES 2004:20–1.
29
EUSTATHIUS De Engastrimytho contra Origenem 22.5; for analysis see CARTWRIGHT
2015:13.
30
See for example EUSEBIUS OF CAESAREA Historia Ecclesiastica 6.1–39, and his contri-
bution to the defence of Origen by Pamphilus.
31
MARCELLUS OF ANCYRA Fr.17–23; see also the comments of the editor VINZENT
1997:xxxviii–xxxix.
32
See discussion in EDWARDS 1998b.
33
As evidenced by the lack of this word in the early works of Athanasius, compared with the
vast amount of material on it from him and others from the 350s onwards.
34
For energeiai see e.g. ORIGEN princ. 1.2.12. For epinoiai see e.g. ORIGEN Comm. Ioh.
10.37.246.
6 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
and Son were unlike. In response to this, Basil of Ancyra argued that the words
‘Father’ and ‘Son’ were not mere labels, but indicated the essence of these two
Persons; this was different from terms such as Creator and Creature, which
did not indicate essence.35 This argument is essentially from Origen, although
Basil has adapted it for his purpose.36 But Hilary’s engagement in the debates
is clear, since he too in his de Trinitate uses this idea of the connection between
the ‘names’ and the ‘birth’. A line may thus be traced from Origen to Hilary.
Origen was thus a character to be wary of and a theologian whose ideas
could be used in the terms of the debate, however anonymously. Even those
who most berated Origen were still influenced by Origen’s ideas. For example,
Cartwright has shown that despite his polemic against Origen, Eustathius was
influenced by his ideas of inherited sinfulness or of the Son as the image of the
Father.37 This ambivalent approach seems to be common of all at this period
(to differing degrees), and is also true of Hilary.
Others have pointed to Origenian elements in Hilary’s theology, particu-
larly in his Psalms commentaries, since Jerome mentioned that Hilary relied
on Origen’s commentaries. In Chapter 2, it will be shown that Hilary’s
dependence on Origen is far greater than previously assumed by modern
scholars, demonstrating that Jerome was right to suggest Hilary was a good
ad sensum translator. There are two consequences of this. Firstly, a change in
methodology is needed compared to previous scholarship. Rather than just
examining the Origenian elements that Hilary has included in his Psalms
commentaries, it is now possible to make deductions by analysing which
passages Hilary has omitted. Secondly, it is now possible to compare Hilary’s
translations with his other works and assess which doctrines within his source
text he saw as acceptable even if they are not native to him. For example
Chapter 7 will suggest that Hilary is happy to adopt Origen’s articulation of
human psychology and the mental process behind human action.
But at the same time, Hilary omits theology that he is unhappy with; for
example he omits any suggestion that the Son and Spirit are the Father’s
hands,38 and also omits what he sees as an inappropriate account of the Fall
(pp. 84–8). Although Hilary is not considered so important as a theologian of
human anthropology or as a critic of Origen, he occasionally shows more
discernment than either Ambrose or Jerome: he never reproduces the sugges-
tion that humans have ‘lost’ the image of God, which Ambrose does (pp. 76–80),
and he never hints that the Fall involved souls plunging into bodies, which

35
Basil’s theological statements and the creedal document signed at Ancyra 358 are found
among the documents collated by EPIPHANIUS panarion 73.2–26. See discussion in
STEENSON 1983:176–7 and FAIRBAIRN 2013.
36
WEEDMAN 2007:145–7, 150–6. Compare also AYRES 2004:150–3.
37 38
CARTWRIGHT 2015:239–43. pp. 49–50.
 Introduction 7
again both Ambrose and Jerome accept as does possibly Augustine.39 Clark40
shows how the accusations against Origen change over time in the fourth
century; the evidence from Hilary provides continuity between the Apology of
Pamphilus and Eusebius and the first accusations of Epiphanius. But at the
same time, Hilary is happy to use Origen’s exegesis (as others did) even if he
does not anywhere say that he has done so.
Hilary is thus one scholar who introduced Origen to the West, and it is
necessary to investigate his Western roots as well (while being aware that,
apart from Origen, theology did not necessarily form distinct ‘Eastern’ and
‘Western’ branches). With regard to his Latin heritage there is evidence for
the influence of Irenaeus (admittedly of Eastern origin), for example as he
speaks of humans needing to grow through their lifetimes and aspire to
likeness to Christ.41 More markedly, he expresses the effects of the Fall using
the language of vitium in common with Tertullian (for example he uses
Tertullian’s vitium originis, and expands with other phrases such as vitium
voluntatis);42 indeed, Hilary himself tells us he knows Tertullian’s work.43 It
may be his Latin background that encourages Hilary to reject some of what
he may read in Origen, for example in having a positive understanding of the
body.44
Turning now to Augustine, Hilary provides evidence of how the doctrine
of original sin develops before the detailed analysis carried out by Augustine
in the light of the Pelagian controversy. When accused of inventing a
doctrine that does not belong in Christian tradition, Augustine bites back
with a list of ten revered church fathers who have discussed original sin. One
of these is Hilary. Yet Augustine’s citations of the church fathers in question
are often fairly loose and unconvincing, and scholars such as Beatrice
continue to feel that Augustine is unique in his articulation of original sin.
The current study of Hilary will show that the Gallic bishop holds to a form
of the fallen will (Ch. 6), and to the very phrase ‘sins of our origin’ (peccata
originis) as distinguished from individual sin (Ch. 8). These are both elem-
ents of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin, and may even suggest that the
latter may not have been so disingenuous when he claimed that he had
always held a belief in some type of fallen will and corporate sinfulness from
birth. Hilary’s ideas of original sin seem to arise in the context of the
Trinitarian controversy, in as much as he explains Christ’s sinlessness as
arising from the fact that his ‘origin’ (birth, ancestry) is different from the
rest of us sinners.

39
For Ambrose see pp. 85–6; for Augustine see p. 175. On Jerome see Comm. ad Eph. 1 and 3
(Clark 1992:124–5).
40 41
CLARK 1992:85–158 (chapter 3). InMt 10.4.
42 43 44
p. 95. InMt 5.1. pp. 73–4.
8 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Modern scholars still refer to the theory of Norman Williams,45 that
original sin is an African doctrine. It is true that the only fathers Hilary refers
to are Cyprian and Tertullian,46 both African writers. But Hilary’s usage shows
that the doctrine of original sin is known by readers in fourth-century Gaul,
and thus cannot be called an African doctrine (p. 181). (Indeed this argument
could be further supported by the fact that Augustine had some strong
supporters in Gaul, such as Prosper of Aquitaine).47
Lastly, Hilary provides a bridge between Origen and Augustine. A range of
modern scholars suggest that Augustine uses Origenian ideas,48 yet there
is no consensus on what exactly Augustine was reading or what the medium
was through which he received Origenian ideas. Hilary is a scrupulous
filter of his material, but the fact remains that some of his articulations
have their source in Origen’s work. And it will be seen (Chapter 10) that
Augustine’s citations of Hilary often come from texts in which Hilary is
translating Origen. Thus this thesis will show that Hilary is one route
whereby Augustine is receiving Origen’s ideas.

MOD ER N SCH O L A R SH IP ON HIL A R Y’ S

THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Each chapter of this thesis addresses a different issue in Hilary scholarship, so

the relevant modern literature is discussed in each chapter where it is most
relevant. However, some preliminary remarks are possible. The following
comments apply to scholarship on Hilary’s non-Trinitarian work; this should
be considered a different field from scholarship on Hilary’s Trinitarian works.
Firstly, it is possible to identify some influential modern scholars. The
indisputable titan of the field of Hilary studies is the French scholar Jean
Doignon (d. 1997), who published more than a hundred articles and books on
Hilary and related topics over his lifetime. Each chapter of this thesis refers to
at least one work by Doignon, sometimes several—and yet these Doignon
works are different in each chapter. Although Doignon’s expertise was broad,
he focused in particular on exegetical and anthropological analysis of Hilary,
making him particularly useful here. He also edited some of Hilary’s texts for
series such as the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum.
Another influential scholar is Luis Ladaria, a Spanish Jesuit who also wrote
a number of important books and articles on Hilary’s theology. Ladaria was
also vice-rector of the Gregorianum; under his supervision or influence, a

45 46
N. WILLIAMS (1927). See further p. 164. HILARY InMt 5.1.
47
SMITH 1990:39–55 discusses the fifth-century controversy in Gaul.
48
pp. 179–81.
 Introduction 9
number of other Hilary studies have emerged from the Vatican stable.49 On
the whole these have the format of concentrating on a particular concept in
Hilary (for example ‘spirit’, ‘communio’), making them useful reference works.
(In a career move relevant to the current topic on original sin, Ladaria later
became secretary-general of the International Theological Commission which
oversaw the Vatican’s re-articulation of the concept of limbo for unbaptized
children.)
A third important source of Hilary scholarship comes from the research
group composing the Sources Chrétiennes volumes, and in particular the
editors Brisson, Descourtieux, Doignon, Milhau, Pelland, and Rocher. These
without fail provide excellent introductions to the texts, with ample annota-
tion and bibliography, accompanied by stylistic readable translations—and
not just for Hilary.
This has now identified some of the most useful scholarship. It is also worth
identifying some trends in Hilary studies.
Mersch’s 1936 analysis of patristic ideas of a ‘universal body’ included
Hilary among the Eastern (Greek) writers. Wild’s 1950 study of divinization
in Hilary also asked the question of Hilary’s influences; Wild identified
divinization as essentially an Eastern theology, although he admitted Hilary
manifested it in a different manner from his Greek contemporaries. Similarly,
some scholars have identified platonic influences on Hilary’s work (see pp. 40–3).
In all these cases, the idea is that Hilary’s theology was influenced by Greek
theology and philosophy during his three-year exile in Asia Minor. This is
supported by the known influence of Origen on his work (Ch. 2). More
recently, however, the emphasis has been on recovering Hilary’s roots in
both Western theology and in the Western philosophical tradition. Thus
Burns in particular emphasizes Stoic and traditional ‘Latin’ ideas present in
Hilary’s thought, and Scully likewise seeks to compare Hilary with the thought
of Roman writers such as Cicero.
Another change through time in Hilary scholarship has been in assessments
of the impact of his thought. Older scholars have felt Hilary made no original
contribution to fourth-century thought, and this is why he may have been
studied less than his patristic contemporaries; for example Tennant feels that
Hilary has nothing new to say on original sin and merely hands on trad-
ition.50 More recently scholars such as Dupont-Fauville, Scully, and Burns
have proclaimed Hilary’s novelty and creativity in a variety of completely

49
See DUPONT-FAUVILLE in the bibliography. Other unpublished theses are not included
in the bibliography here but are available through the Pontifical Gregorian University website,
including those by P.M. FUNES-DIAS Fuerza, Potestad y Reino de Cristo en San Hilario de
Poitiers (2008); G.B. COLAUTTI Las figuras eclesiológicas en San Hilario de Poitiers (2005);
T.J. BUFFER ‘Salus’ in St. Hilary of Poitiers (2002); D. CORRY Ministerium Rationis Reddendae:
An approximation to Hilary of Poitiers’ Understanding of Theology (2002).
50
TENNANT 1903:337–8.
10 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
different areas.51 This thesis will emphasize Hilary’s independent command
of his material, while at the same time seeing him as part of a continuous
tradition linking Origen and Augustine, two of early Christianity’s giants.

METHODOLOGY: COMPARING HILARY’ S

COMMENTARIES

Hilary is best known for his Trinitarian work; however, he also wrote a sizeable
body of exegetical works or commentaries, including the de mysteriis (a
typological work presenting various Old Testament characters as forerunners
of the Christian story) and a commentary on Job, now lost but known from
Jerome. For this thesis the entirety of Hilary’s surviving corpus is considered.
However, the main methodology of this study has been to compare two
commentaries in particular: his commentaries on Matthew and on Psalm
118, hereafter referred to as InMt and TrPs118. (Other commentaries are
referred to as TrPs 1 for that on Psalm 1, etc.)
The commentary on Matthew is unanimously held by scholars to be Hilary’s
earliest work, dating from before he was sent to exile in 356/7.52 The early dating
follows predominantly from the fact that Hilary here seems to evince a Christ-
ology that pre-dates any involvement in the Trinitarian controversy. (There are
some grounds for suggesting a later date; however, the scholarly consensus will
be followed in this thesis.) Some of the work is lost; it had a preface referred to
by Cassian but now unknown,53 and likewise the end may have been lost or
replaced since it omits the ending of the Gospel (the Great Commission, Mt.
28.16–20) and a number of manuscripts end with a few paragraphs from what is
in fact Jerome’s Matthew commentary. (Particularly strange is that there is only
a passing reference to the risen Christ.) Hilary’s approach to the text is to see an
allegorical meaning behind many of the Gospel stories; in particular, the motif
of a disparity between the ‘faithless’ Jews and the faithful if ignorant Gentiles
runs through the whole work. These concepts of fidelitas and infidelitas will
become relevant for our study (see pp. 91–2).
Hilary’s commentary on Psalm 118, conversely, is thought to be a late work,
dating from after his return from exile. The logic for this is that he refers back
to his own earlier work de Trinitate54 and is clearly concerned about doctrinal

51
DUPONT-FAUVILLE 2008:16, 277f. (Hilary is novel on understandings of communio);
SCULLY 2015:270–2 (Hilary is novel on universal assumption); BURNS 2012:1–2 (Hilary is
novel on progress in Christian life).
52 53
WILD 1950:24; DOIGNON 2007a:19–20. JOHN CASSIAN de incarnatione 7.24.
54
HILARY TrPs [67].15. See further the editorial admonitio at PL 10:222D, and DOIGNON
1997:vii.
 Introduction 11
orthodoxy; also the work clearly relies on Origen55 and Hilary is assumed not
to have known Origen before his exile.56 An underlying hermeneutical theme
for the Ps.118 commentary is that of the growth of wisdom, starting from
elementary principles and eventually leading to Christ; the current life is
merely a shadow of things to come, and we must progress from ignorance
to knowledge of God.57 As a result of this focus, the Psalms commentaries
have more direct theological anthropology than most of Hilary’s other texts,
and many modern analyses of Hilary’s anthropology rely on the Psalms
commentaries; sometimes this leads to misguided conclusions when differ-
ences across his corpus are not considered.
Why compare these two works in particular?
Firstly, they are roughly the same length (between 45,000 and 50,000
words), which means that statistical comparison can be made (for example
the incidence of certain words as on pp. 112–13).
Secondly, they are the same genre (biblical commentary), and share a
common format. First a lemma is cited, and then a paragraph of explanation
follows. Both works have a common hermeneutical approach in as much as
scriptural phrases are often taken as allegorical and indicative of a ‘higher’
truth. However, the audience for these works is not known; for example Burns
suggests that he writes the Psalms commentary for the wider lay community,
whereas Doignon feels that the Matthew commentary may have been written
for a monastic context.58 Essentially these are both conjecture.
Thirdly, these two commentaries are thought to be Hilary’s earliest work,
and one of his latest works. As mentioned, the Matthew commentary sup-
posedly dates from before his exile, when he was not yet involved in the
Trinitarian controversy; the Psalms commentaries date from his later period
when he has encountered ‘Eastern’ ideas and given considerable thought to
Trinitarian implications of his doctrine. A comparison of the two may thus
indicate any change through time in Hilary’s theology, not least since his exile
in Asia Minor comes between them. Theoretically then we would expect the
Matthew commentary to represent a more ‘Western’ theology, whereas the
Psalms commentary may signal a theology affected by his stay in the East.
Fourthly, despite the similarity in genre they have different sources.
Chapter 2 will show that this commentary is a fairly reliable translation of

55
JEROME Apologia 1.2: [Hilarius confessor . . . ] qui quadraginta ferme millia uersuum
Origenis in Job et in Psalmos transtulit. (See p. 16.)
56
DOIGNON 1971:171–2.
57
E.g. TrPs118, Proem.1. This approach to the psalms is found in other church fathers; for
example ATHANASIUS Ep. ad Marcellinum 14: ἡ δέ γε βίβλος τῶν ψαλμῶν ἔχει καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα
πῶς τῆς διαγωγὴς τῶν ψυχῶν . . . and on the authors of the Palestinian Catena see HARL
1972a:127–8.
58
BURNS 2012:56; DOIGNON 2007a:20–1. Compare also DESCOURTIEUX 2008:19–22,
DOIGNON 1997:x–xv.
12 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Origen (except where Hilary disagrees with the theology). It is therefore more
useful for us to study this commentary than that on any other psalm, since for
Ps. 118 more can be known about Origen’s original commentary: firstly from
the meticulous edition of the Palestinian Catena done by Harl and Dorival,
and secondly from the parallel adaptation or translation done by Ambrose.
These two sources mean that we can know more about Origen’s original than
for other Psalms commentaries, and this means we can deduce more about
how Hilary is playing with his source. This then allows comparison with the
Matthew commentary, which may well have Origenian influence but is still
universally held to be an independently written text.
This direct comparison of two texts will serve to enhance a notable finding
of this work, namely Hilary’s ability to adapt his language to different circum-
stances. This book will highlight sundry occasions where tensions appear
across his works, and where his statements do not seem consistent with each
other. In fact these can usually be resolved by pointing to differing emphases
or motivations of the texts in question, but methodologically speaking it
should not be considered necessary to resolve apparent inconsistencies:
these will be highlighted and, if necessary, allowed to stand.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

From the above discussion, a number of issues have emerged that will be the
focus of the following study. At the most basic level, the research here
examines Hilary’s anthropology. This contributes to a number of questions
in Hilary studies. Is his basic theology more ‘Western’ or ‘Eastern’, more ‘Stoic’
or ‘Platonic’—if indeed such categories can be applied? Does Hilary’s theology
change through time, and if so how? And is Hilary novel or innovative in any
way, or is he merely reproducing his theological tradition whatever that
may be?
Moving outwards, it is possible to use analysis of Hilary’s anthropology to
answer wider questions. Firstly, he informs us as to how Origen was received
in the mid-fourth century. Secondly, this thesis contributes to understandings
of the development of original sin, and what Augustine saw as the tradition
that he was following. Thirdly, Hilary will be shown to be a link between
Origen’s thought and Augustine’s, even though these two giants of patristic
thought are often seen as differing considerably on the will and original sin.
Unfortunately it is always necessary to limit the boundaries of one’s
research. In particular, this study has focused on the theological anthropology
of the pre- and post-lapsarian human: his body and soul, his will, his sinfulness.
It has not been possible to consider the related issue of salvation and the work
 Introduction 13
of Christ from an anthropological perspective, which would be another book
in itself.
For example, it has not been possible to examine Hilary’s doctrine of grace
in detail. One aspect of Augustine’s original sin that may be innovative is his
doctrine of grace. Hilary certainly believes that God gives us grace to follow
him, and we would be incapable without him. But at the same time, Hilary
says the initium fidei is ours: we must make the first wavering effort and God
will then help us along the way. This is contrary to Augustine’s position, which
suggests that even the initium is God’s; this logically leads to the doctrine of
predestination, considered unpopular by those who otherwise followed him in
the fifth century.
Another downside of setting aside salvation is that it would have been
attractive to examine Hilary’s understanding of the General Resurrection.
Hilary often refers to the physical body acquiring the nature of spirit, even
in works that pre-date his contact with Origen. In view of the criticisms before
and after him (Methodius, the opponents of Pamphilus-Eusebius, and later
Epiphanius), it would be fascinating to see how Hilary deals with this. This is
all the more true since the conclusions of Chapter 2 imply that Hilary’s
commentary on Psalm 1 used that of Origen. Yet the long passage from
Origen’s Psalm 1 preserved by Epiphanius59 is absent from Hilary’s version
of the commentary. Is this because there were two different commentaries
by Origen (as suggested by Nautin60)? Or did Hilary omit this section—
suggesting he rejects Origen’s views? Or has Methodius copied out another
text of Origen, and mislabelled it? These questions would bear greater analysis.
So the whole question of salvation (including General Resurrection, grace,
human glorification and progress) would merit a tome in itself. At any rate, the
following chapters hopefully provide a relatively complete analysis of Hilary’s
anthropology in terms of human creation and the effect of the Fall.
Chapters 3 to 4 look at the concept of humanity as it was created to be.
Chapter 3 examines the most elementary human components, namely body
and soul, in the light of their creation. Hilary’s influences will be examined and
it will be shown that he does show some philosophical influence, whether
Platonic or Stoic, although these labels are a little anachronistic. It will also be
seen that there is some change between the Matthew and Psalm 118 com-
mentaries. Chapter 4 then examines the notion of the imago dei, and shows
that Hilary may be more consistent than previously thought with Western (or
non-Alexandrian) ideas of how humans are in God’s image.
Chapters 5 to 8 will turn to consider the Fall and its effects. Chapter 5
presents Hilary’s different understandings of the Fall. Two key consequences—
the fall of the will and the constraint of the turbulent human emotions—are

59 60
EPIPHANIUS Panarion 64.12–16. NAUTIN 1977:261–79.
14 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
discussed in the subsequent two chapters (Chapter 6 and 7); the latter will
demonstrate the influence of Stoic psychology in Hilary’s Psalms commen-
taries particularly, mediated through Origen. Lastly in Chapter 8 Hilary’s
doctrine and language of original sin will be presented, and it will be seen
that this plays a major role in his Trinitarian thought.
Chapter 9 will then draw all this together and put Hilary in his place
between Origen and Augustine.
Before all that, however, it will be necessary to examine Origen’s influence
in more detail. Chapter 2 will examine Hilary’s commentary on Psalm 118 and
demonstrate that this is an ad sensum translation of Origen’s commentary on
the same psalm. Hilary’s usage (or non-usage) of Origen will inform the
comparative work carried out in the subsequent chapters.
 2

Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118

I N T R O D U C TI O N

This chapter presents one of the two key texts for comparison in this book:
Hilary’s commentary on Psalm 118 (hereafter TrPs118). In order to determine
the extent of Hilary’s dependence on Origen, his text is compared with
Ambrose’s analogous work on Ps. 118 (hereafter referred to as ExpPs118).
It has always been known that Hilary’s psalms commentaries, dating from
the 360s, were ‘influenced’1 by Origen. The Patrologia Graeca text of Origen’s
introduction to the psalms is footnoted with a stream of references to the
parallels in Hilary;2 the translator for NPNF demonstrated that Hilary always
had Origen before him even if he qualifies that Hilary ‘grew more and more
free in his treatment of Origen’s exegesis’.3 More recently Whealey 4 even goes
so far to use Hilary to reconstruct Origen’s prologue. She cannot provide any
methodological justification for this other than a hunch (but a correct one,
in my view).
The key finding of this chapter is that Hilary’s text is not merely ‘influenced’
by Origen as suggested by these scholars but in fact is a fairly straight
interpolation of Origen’s commentary.

J E R O M E O N H I L A R Y’S PSALM COMMENTARIES

Origen is thought to have commented most or all of the psalter, and Jerome
tells us that Hilary translated at least a very large proportion of Origen’s work:

1
WATSON 1898:9.
2
This is true of the majority of footnotes to PG12, 1053–8 and 1073–84; for example fn.32:
fateberis omnia fere ex Origene nostro mutatum esse Hilarium; fn.54: haec ad uerbum fere
repetit Hilarius.
3 4
WATSON 1898:49. WHEALEY 1996:106.
16 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
If Rufinus was presenting a warrant for his work and wished to give prece-
dents, then he had as an obvious example the confessor Hilary, who translated
almost forty thousand verses of Origen on Job and on the Psalms.
(JEROME Apologia 1.2)5
Of these ‘forty thousand verses’, Hilary’s commentary on Job is lost but
commentaries on the fifty-six psalms survive, as well as commentaries on
the titles of Psalms 9 and 91. (It should be noted that the psalms mentioned by
Jerome do not quite tally with Hilary’s surviving corpus; see p. 33.) Jerome
mentions the ‘forty thousand verses’ again in his commentary on Micah;6
obviously the size of Hilary’s undertaking impressed the later scholar. Job and
the whole psalter are together comprised of only around 3,500 verses reckoned
by modern scriptural divisions; it is more likely that Jerome was referring to
Virgilian hexameters, as suggested for example by Watson.7 At any rate, at
nearly 217,000 words of commentary, Hilary’s translation is formidable.
For Jerome, good translation involves translating ad sensum rather than ad
litteram. In his letter to Pammachius on how good translation should be
carried out, he holds up Hilary as a model of translation.
For now, it is enough to name the confessor Hilary, who translated (uertit) several
Job homilies and Psalms treatises from Greek into Latin. He did not stick to a
listless literal translation, nor tie himself down to a contrived boorish rendition;
rather, he has carried off the meaning (transposuit sensus) into his own language
as a victor does his captives. (JEROME Ep. 57.6)8
Jerome’s point is that translation should be restyled into the target language,
and conveying the meaning of the original but in good elegant Latin. This
freedom of style tallies exactly with what we shall find of Hilary’s translation of
Origen below. Elsewhere he refers to Hilary’s psalms commentaries ‘in which
he copied Origen, and added some of his own material’,9 and describes Hilary’s
translation of Origen as ad sensum.10
Lastly, Jerome does in one letter suggest that Hilary’s grasp of Greek was not
perfect and that he was assisted by a presbyter called Heliodore in translating
Origen.11 However, he seems to mention Heliodore only to excuse Hilary of
bad exegesis. Jerome states that he does not dare criticize Hilary in any way, so

5
Si auctoritatem suo operi praestruebat, uolens quos sequeretur ostendere, habuit in
promptu Hilarium confessorem, qui quadraginta ferme millia uersuum Origenis in Job et in
Psalmos transtulit.
6 7
JEROME Comm. in Michaeum, 2. WATSON 1898:47, fn.104.
8
Sufficit in praesenti nominasse Hilarium confessorem, qui homilias in Iob et in psalmos
tractatus plurimos in Latinum uertit e Graeco nec adsedit litterae dormitatanti et putida
rusticorum interpretatione se torsit, sed quasi captiuos sensus in suam linguam uictoris iure
transposuit.
9
JEROME de viris inlustribus, 100: in quo opere imitatus Origenem, nonnulla de suo
addidit.
10 11
JEROME Comm. in Michaeum, 2. JEROME Ep. 34.3, 5.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 17
the exegetical errors must belong to Heliodore (p. 3). Thus, this evidence
should be taken with a pinch of salt: he is only trying to save Hilary from a
given interpretation, and elsewhere he describes the translation as definitely
Hilary’s rather than Heliodore’s.
So then, Jerome’s description of Hilary’s work may echo Jerome’s own
concerns to defend the various accusations against him. Yet the overall picture
is clear. Jerome is relatively consistent in suggesting Hilary did ‘translate’
Origen but that the translation was relatively free and Hilary added independ-
ent critique of his original. The next step, then, is to examine the texts
themselves to establish for ourselves exactly what Hilary’s translation
technique was.

TEX TUAL WITNESSES TO ORIGEN ON PSALM 1 18

In order to assess Hilary’s own theology it is useful to have an idea of what

Origen’s text consisted of, so that, if applicable, conclusions may be drawn
from Hilary’s modifications to that text. Unfortunately, a direct comparison
between Hilary’s treatise on Psalm 118 and Origen’s commentary is not
possible since the latter does not exist in its original complete form. However,
a number of sources enable a degree of reconstruction; these will be presented
in this section.
Jerome states that Origen wrote three different types of works on Scripture,
namely (i) short technical comments (σχόλια), (ii) homilies (homilia), and (iii)
commentaries (τόμοι or volumina).12 When he writes to Paula listing Origen’s
works, Jerome mentions that all three genres exist for the psalms: excerpta on
the first fifteen psalms, forty-five libri on forty psalms, and a hundred and
twenty homilies on sixty-three of the psalms.13 Elsewhere he mentions an
Enchiridion and suggests that Origen’s works on the psalms are an ‘extremely
large work’ (opus latissimus) which Jerome himself can only briefly con-
dense.14 It is not clear whether Origen covered the whole psalter,15 but the
numbers indicate some psalms had more than one homily or commentary
associated with them.

12
JEROME Praef. in XV homilias Ezech. Origenis: . . . et illud breuiter admonens, ut scias
Origenis opuscula in omnem Scripturam esse triplicia. Primum eius opus Excerpta sunt, quae
graece σχόλια nuncupantur, in quibus ea, quae sibi uidebantur obscura atque habere aliquid
difficultatis, summatim breuiterque perstrinxit. Secundum homeliticum genus, de quo et praesens
interpretatio est. Tertium quod ipse inscripsit τόμους nos uolumina possumus nuncupare, in quo
opere tota ingenii sui uela spirantibus uentis dedit et recedens a terra in medium pelagus aufugit.
13
JEROME Ep. 33 (dated c.385 by RONDEAU 1982:45). Presumably libri are here equivalent
to uolumina (τόμοι).
14 15
JEROME Commentarioli, Prol. See discussion in RONDEAU 1982:51–2.
18 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
With respect to Psalm 118 in particular, Hilary’s text is probably based on
Origen’s third category, the commentary (volumen, liber), particularly because
it corresponds to the other witnesses either direct or indirect to Origen’s
commentary.16 Although this was unfortunately not preserved, it had a wide
influence on later authors. In Greek, fragments are found in the Palestinian
Catena and other similar catenae; citations are also found in Pamphilus,
Eusebius of Caesarea, Methodius, the Philocalia, and Epiphanius.17 Harl’s
edition (1972) of the Palestinian Catena on Psalm 118 provides the best direct
evidence for Origen’s commentary not least because of her meticulous work
dividing up the fragments among the respective attested authors (possible, for
example, due to cross-checking of exegetical points with the glosses in the
Vindobonensis manuscript, pp. 21–2).
In the Latin world, Origen’s psalms commentaries or homilies were trans-
lated by Hilary, Eusebius of Vercelli, Ambrose, Jerome, and Rufinus. Hilary’s
is the earliest such commentary preserved for us, and Ambrose also writes
a long commentary on Psalm 118. As we shall see, both of these Latin
commentaries go back to Origen. No other fourth century Latin author
appears to have broached a commentary on this long psalm until Augustine’s
Enarrationes.
The various modern-day sources for Origen’s text will now be examined in
more detail.
Fragments of psalms commentaries in Patrologia Graeca. The section on
Origen’s exegetical works in Migne’s Patrologia Graeca (PG), reproduced
from a 1733 edition of Origen’s works by the two de la Rue brothers, gives a
series of fragments of psalms commentaries extracted from various catenae.18
A slightly wider inspection of manuscripts contributes to the editions found in
Pitra’s Analecta Sacra.19
However, even the de la Rue were circumspect about the authorship of the
fragments, since it is difficult to determine from the catenae which church

16
RONDEAU 1982:56.
17
List of fragments found in HARNACK (1893–1904) Gesch. d. Altchr. Lit.2, vol.1, pp. 356–7.
Note also the statement of JEROME Ep. 112.20: Superfluum est te uoluisse disserere, quod illos
latere non potuit: maxime in explanatio psalmorum, quod apud Graecos interpretati sunt multis
uoluminibus primus Origenes, secundus Eusebius Caesariensis, tertius Theodorus Heracleotes,
quartus Asterius Scythopolitanus, quintus Apollinaris Laodicenus, sextus Didymus Alexandri-
nus. Feruntur et diuersorum in paucos Psalmos opuscula. Sed nunc de integro Psalmorum
corpore dicimus. Apud Latinos autem Hilarius Pictauensis et Eusebius, Vercellensis episcopus,
Origenem et Eusebium transtulerunt, quorum priorem et noster Ambrosius in quibusdam
secutus est.
18
ORIGEN Selecta in Psalmos (PG12, 1053–686). The fragments on Ps.118 are at 1585–628.
Other psalm fragments are also found at PG17, 106–50 but these do not concern our psalm.
19
PITRA 1884:395–483; 1883:1–522. Of these, the fragments on Ps. 118 are to be found at
1883:246–316.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 19
father any given fragment belongs to.20 Hans Urs von Balthasar’s analysis
(1939) suggested these were in fact for the most part Evagrian sentences, based
on internal evidence of harmony in style, terminology, and theology with
known works by Evagrius. This was confirmed by an analysis of a Vatican
manuscript by Rondeau (1960), starting from the fragment on Ps. 143.1 in
which the author refers to ‘my book on the Monk’.21 This is taken to refer to
the Praktikos of Evagrius.22
The analysis below will demonstrate independently that many such frag-
ments are not from Origen’s psalm commentary. If the relevant fragments
from Patrologia Graeca are compared with the table in Appendix 2 giving the
Palestinian Catena, Hilary and Ambrose, then it becomes clear that there is
minimal correspondence between these latter texts and the Patrologia Graeca
fragments. While this in itself does not prove Evagrian authorship, it certainly
does provide independent proof that these are not from the same text as that
used by Hilary or Ambrose.
Hence these fragments from Patrologia Graeca have been disregarded in
what follows, as not providing a witness to the text of Origen used by Hilary.

Palestinian Catena on Psalm 118. The Palestinian Catena on Psalm 118 is

preserved in two medieval manuscripts and their families.23 It is thought to
date from around the sixth century, from the school of Procopius at Gaza
(hence its attribution as the ‘Palestinian’ Catena).24 This attribution arises
since Procopius was among the earliest to compile commentaries in the form
of catenae of church fathers, and this psalm catena has similarities to known
catenae of Procopius such as that on Genesis25 (e.g. similar linking words
between fragments; subsequent fathers only added if giving a commentary
different from that of the ‘base’ fragment). The dating is supported by the fact
the catenist has incorporated fathers who may later have been considered too
unorthodox for inclusion, as a result of the Origenistic controversy of the
sixth century. The geographical provenance and choice of authors could mean
that this catena may in turn be based on an earlier edition coming from the
library at Caesarea26 and possibly from Eusebius himself or others such as

20
DE LA RUE 1733:512.
21
Gloss on Ps. 143.1, Vat.gr.754 fol.343v (referring to λόγοι τῶν νυκτερινῶν φασμάτων): . . . οἱ
μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μέρους γίνονται τῆς ψυχῆς . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ θυμικοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων
ἀκριβέστερον ἐν τῷ μοναχῷ περιειλήφαμεν . . . This is given by de la Rue (1733:840) as
ἐν τῷ αʹ. εἰλήφαμεν (reproducing the manuscript abbreviation).
22
Cf. the comment of Socrates (Hist.Eccl. 4.23) regarding the work of Evagrius known by two
names, viz. Μοναχός or Περὶ πρακτικῆς. For discussion on this, and on the textual evidence, see
RONDEAU 1960:312–18.
23 24
HARL 1972a:21–8. Citations in HARL 1972a:19, 90.
25 26
HARL 1972a:39. Cf. HARL 1972a:36.
20 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Pamphilus or Acacius.27 Unlike later catenae, this one appears to be an
original compilation where the catenist has the full commentaries of source
authors in front of him.28
Although catenae on other psalms are based primarily on the commentaries
of Eusebius of Caesarea, Didymus, and Theodoret, this one on Psalm 118
mainly follows Origen’s with additions from Eusebius or Didymus and from
Apollinaris and occasionally supplemented by Athanasius, Theodoret, and
Hesychius;29 more than half the fragments are Origen’s.30 Unfortunately the
state of the manuscripts does not always allow clear demarcation of which
comment belongs to which church father; Harl establishes the demarcation
by examining language and ideas and by recourse to ‘daughter’ catenae
(i.e. catenae which use excerpts from the Palestinian Catena, possibly with
re-ordering and paraphrasing).
The catena preserves a fragment of Origen for most verses, typically of
between a hundred and a hundred and fifty words in length. Harl feels this is
only a small part of Origen’s original because of comments attached to the
catena composed by Nicetas of Heraclea (eleventh century), who explained his
method. He states that he omitted some parts of Origen not because of his
unorthodoxy, but because he was too verbose: most of it has been rejected, since
it was far more laboured than necessary.31 Exactly how much has been omitted
is unclear but may be deduced by comparison. For Origen’s commentary on
the Song of Songs, the Sources Chrétiennes editors found that the catenist has
done résumés of Origen’s text, since it is much briefer than the text suggested
by a Rufinus translation.32 So again in the present case, comparison with
Ambrose and Origen will suggest that the catenist may have omitted a
considerable proportion of Origen’s text. In the current case, it can be noted
that nearly two-fifths of Hilary’s word count has a match in Ambrose but not
in the catena, although this of course is an extremely crude indication of how
much of Origen the catenist has omitted (see p. 33).
It would also be helpful to know how the catenist chose what he wished
to preserve of Origen. Harl suggests he was more inclined to preserve spiritual
or ethical material, as well as comments on specific words (e.g. the comment
on the Greek word ἐνύσταξεν v28 is preserved by Hilary in Latin: there are
many similar examples).33 On the other hand, Harl feels the catenist omits
technical details; for example, the glosses in the Vindobonensis preserve names

27
This is the view of HARL 1972a:90, who also cites CADIOU’s view that the longer versions
of Origen are in fact expansions by Eusebius.
28 29 30
RONDEAU 1982:57. HARL 1972a:29, 88, 90. HARL 1972a:32.
31
ὡς τοῦ δέοντος περιεργότερον τὰ πολλὰ ἀπεδοκιμάσειν. Citation and discussion in HARL
1972a:36–8, 86.
32
BRÉSARD, CROUZEL, & BORRET 1991:16.
33
For other examples see TrPs118, 4.6, 4.12, 5.1, 5.7, 5.10, 12.3, 12.14, 15.4, 15.13, 18.5.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 21
associated with given exegetical interpretations (Musonius, Xenocrates) which
do not appear in the catena. Of course, Harl’s suggestion presumes that the
exegeses of the glosses were also originally in the commentary.34
More work on the various catenae on the psalms is being carried out in
Berlin for an edition in the Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller (GCS)
series; ongoing findings may be identified in the articles of Bandt and Risch.35
Glosses on Psalm 118. There are various collections of shorter comments
on Psalm 118, but it is uncertain what work of Origen’s these come from.
There are two possibilities. They may be the different genre known as σχόλια,
and thus a different work of Origen’s, or they may be excerpts of the longer
commentaries (τόμοι), which thus makes them a good witness to the com-
mentaries as used by Hilary.
Jerome says his Commentarioli are based on Origen’s Enchiridion. The
implication of Jerome’s remarks in his prologue is that he is providing a potted
version of a longer work, which could in turn imply that these are extracts
from Origen’s commentaries.36 This is also supported by his use of the Latin
word excerpta.37 On the other hand, while excerpta could imply extracts, it
may also be a technical term to translate σχόλια (or σημειώσεις) rather than
necessarily ἐκλογαί: for example, Jerome’s Excerpta on Isaiah are based on
σημειώσεις.38 The difficulty in ascertaining whether the Excerpta are σχόλια or
excerpts of τόμοι is compounded by the possibility that Jerome could mean
different things in different cases. A fuller discussion of the problem is
provided by Rondeau, and more recently by Risch.39
The issue bears on another collection of shorter comments or marginalia
which is more important for current purposes. The glosses on sections of the
psalter found in an eleventh-century manuscript Vindobonensis theologicus
graecus 8 40 have elements not found in the Palestinian Catena.41 Harl, the
editor of the Palestinian catena, takes these glosses as extracts from Origen’s
longer commentaries (assuming the etymological understanding of excerpta
again). If something in these glosses is not found in the catena, Harl deduces
that the catenist has consciously omitted that material (for example, to edit
theology). For example, at v127 Ambrose refers to a certain Xenocrates and
this is also found in the glosses (but not in Hilary or the catena). It seems that

34
HARL 1972a:62.
35
BANDT (2014), RISCH (2014), (2016).
36
JEROME Excerpta de Psalterio (Commentarioli), Prol.
37
JEROME Praef. in XV homilias Ezech. Origenis.
38 39
RONDEAU 1982:49. RONDEAU 1982:46–51; RISCH (2014).
40
Edited by CADIOU (1936). Cadiou, however, relies on the fragments from Patrologia
Graeca, which throws doubt on his work. RONDEAU 1982:56; 61–2 discusses other inaccuracies
in Cadiou’s work.
41
HARL 1972a:59–63. See also RONDEAU 1982:61–2.
22 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
here the gloss may well preserve something present in the source text but lost
by the catenist; otherwise Ambrose’s use of the name at this specific point is
difficult to explain. On the other hand Risch suggests that the Vindobonensis
glosses are not excerpts from the commentary; he interprets the glosses as
preparatory sketches for the larger commentaries, analogous to shorter works
of Eusebius which may have been expanded to a full commentary. For
example, Risch points out that Ambrose’s comments on Xenocrates are in
the Vindobonensis marginalia but not in the catena and this is evidence of a
different text.42 The degree to which Harl or Risch is correct depends on how
much editing work the catenist is seen as having done.
Ambrose’s Commentary on Psalm 118. Unlike the various fourth-century
Greek texts which make use of Origen’s commentary on Psalm 118, that of
Ambrose is preserved in its entirety. It thus presents a good source for
comparison with Hilary.
Ambrose’s is the earliest entire commentary on Psalm 118 alone (rather
than one which fits into a commentary on the whole psalter). It is dated to the
year 389–90 on the basis of details such as scriptural references for particular
Sundays and mentions of the martyrs Gervase, Protase, and Sebastian (whose
relics were only discovered shortly before this).43 The commentary is thus
fifteen to twenty years later than Hilary’s.
Pizzolato, the modern editor of Ambrose’s Commentary, suggests that it
may have originally been intended for a monastic context, where the psalms
were regularly recited, either as part of the office or for liturgical use; it may
have begun as an oral commentary which was later transcribed.44 This is based
on internal information such as doxologies45 and allusions to listeners (rather
than readers), to liturgical readings, and to indications regarding time and
place;46 certainly each of the twenty-two of the Hebrew strophae is entitled
‘sermo (primus, secundus . . . )’ in Ambrose but ‘littera (aleph, bet . . . )’ in
Hilary. The possibility of an oral source is supported by analogy with other
known works of Ambrose which were preached or dictated; for example
Paulinus the Deacon tells us that Ambrose dictated the Explanatio on Ps. 43
as he lay dying.47

42
RISCH (2016).
43
PIZZOLATO 1987:12–15; see also RONDEAU 1982:153–4.
44
PIZZOLATO 1987:9–11; 20–1.
45
Although it may be true that Ambrose originally preached his strophae, this should not
be deduced on the evidence of doxologies alone, since they also appear in similar places in
Hilary (for example, both authors have a doxology at the end of the seventh strophe: HILARY
TrPs118, 7.7 and AMBROSE ExpPs118, 7.37). The doxology here is thus not a spontaneous
acknowledgement of God’s glory in an Ambrosian sermon, but mere reproduction of a
source text.
46 47
RONDEAU 1982:151. PAULINUS MEDIOLANIENSIS Vita Ambrosii 42.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 23

An important question arises as to whether Ambrose used Hilary, or

whether he was relying directly on Origen. This issue of Ambrose’s independ-
ence will be studied at pp. 28–30; pre-empting that analysis, our conclusion
will confirm the scholarly consensus that Ambrose is indeed independent of
Hilary and can therefore serve usefully as an autonomous witness to Origen.

CASE S TUDY: P S. 118.17 – 24 (S TROPHE ‘ GIMEL’)

The above discussion of the various witnesses to Origen’s commentary has

demonstrated that the Palestinian Catena and Ambrose between them present
evidence of Origen on Ps. 118. The present section will now compare these
two witnesses with Hilary for a specific section of the text, namely the third
strophe, ‘gimel’, which covers Ps. 118.17–24.

Layout

The three commentaries for ‘gimel’, the third strophe of Ps. 118, are presented in
Appendix 2 in three columns which give respectively Origen from the Palestin-
ian Catena; Hilary; and Ambrose. The texts are laid out so that passages which
correspond in the respective authors are placed next to each other. As an
example, consider v17a/row6. The layout demonstrates that the opening of
the block corresponds in all three authors (namely, the caution of not appearing
presumptuous) as does the next statement (that the verse states not ‘reward me’
but ‘reward your servant’); then come a couple of sentences in Ambrose for
which there is no correspondence in the catena or Hilary (on the nature of being
God’s servant); then comes a final sentence which corresponds in Hilary and
Ambrose but is not found in the catena (that one is a servant of God, not of sin).
No material has been omitted; thus the Greek of v24a follows directly on the
Greek of v23/row6 in the catena, with no intervening material in the Greek.
The division into rows has been purely for ease of reference, and row
numbers are provided merely for convenience in the present discussion;
they may be based on a certain ‘block’ of text marked out by theme or
traditional denumeration, but may be somewhat arbitrary where the three
authors do not correspond exactly. The term ‘block’ is used here merely to
mean a unit of text which treats one particular illustration or exegetical point.
An exegetical block may be spread over several rows (e.g. at v21a, rows3–6 all
concern the illustration of pride using the publican and the Pharisee).
Where there is a closer correspondence between authors (other than the
lemma), text may be underlined; for example, v18a/row2 shows that Ambrose,
like the catena, refers to the need for our eyes to be unveiled as ‘sickness’
(aegritudo cf. gravari, compare κάκωσις/βλάβη in the catena). Hilary only
24 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
mentions a ‘cloud of darkness’ (nubes obscuritatis), a concept which indeed
also occurs in Ambrose (nebulam quandam).

Division and ordering of material

Once the texts have been arranged in this way, comparison between the
authors may be undertaken.
A first point regards the way the text has been divided up. The catena most
usually comments by units of a verse or a half-verse. Most commonly, it
discusses the first half of a verse and then leads on to the second half within
the commentary. For example, in v22, an initial discussion on scorn (v22a)
leads directly within a sentence to v22b ‘for I have sought your testimonies’: I
escape the ‘scorn’ with which a wicked man is scorned by God; and I say, ‘Take
away from me shame and scorn, for I have sought your testimonies.’48 (See
v22a/row6 through to v22b/row1.)
Hilary and Ambrose both use exactly the same divisions as those found in
the catena, although the two half-verses may be more clearly differentiated
than in the catena. More significantly perhaps, where the catena does not
appear to have commented by verse or half-verse, neither of the two Latin
successors do either. For example, in the catena v23 and 24 are commented
together, with no clear distinction between the verses (e.g. the text of v24a
itself is not repeated in the Greek; v24b is not even mentioned again); this
threading of verses is reproduced in both Ambrose and Hilary. So then, the
catenist and our two Latin authors seem in this at least to preserve the method
of his source in the way they divide up the psalm for commentary.
The next point of note is that within each such unit, the order of themes or
exegesis is reproduced; there is rarely any deviation from that order. For
example, the exegesis of v17a Repay your servant proceeds as follows. Firstly,
the verse is quoted and it is noted that no-one can really ask for God’s
recompense since we are all sinners (catena, Hilary: row2). Next, Ps. 102.10
is quoted (all authors: row3) and self-awareness with respect to one’s works is
commended (all authors: row4). Ambrose alone applies these words to Christ
(row5). All question the arrogant presumption of what is said, and all then
make the point that the verse is spoken in the spirit of servanthood (all
authors: row6). Ambrose alone then adds further commentary at considerable
length which interweaves with verses from Song of Songs (row7). So thus
the order of thematic or exegetical blocks is almost always the same across
the authors.

48
φεύγω δ’ἐκείνη τὴν ἐξουδένωσιν καθ’ ἥν ἐξουδένωται ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ πονηρευόμενος, καὶ
λέγω· περίελε ἀπ’ ἐμοῦ ὄνειδος καὶ ἐξουδένωσιν, ὅτι τὰ μαρτύριά σου ἐξεζήτησα . . .
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 25
This correspondence across authors is strongly evident when the material is
laid out in this way and it is striking that Ambrose and Hilary have kept to the
order of their source in a manner which is absolutely consistent across
exegetical blocks, so that material is rarely rearranged. However, within blocks
the order may be changed. For example, in v18b/row3 the difference between
the Levitical and spiritual law is being illustrated. The earthly Temple, the
Sabbath rest, and the Jubilee year all get a mention, but these occur in a
different order in the two Latin authors.
The adherence to order across but not within blocks shows that both
Ambrose and Hilary are dealing psychologically with these units of a ‘block’
or exegetical unit and are working systematically through their underlying
source text according to these units or blocks. (This may be contrasted with
modern translation which may deal with the unit of a sentence.) Blocks may
be adjusted within themselves whether linguistically or theologically, or may
even be omitted. It should be noted that this notion of ‘blocks’ is of course
merely theoretical, and is not adhered to strictly; the concept is provided here
merely to illustrate the methodology of the two Latin authors.
The concept of exegetical blocks allows further deduction as to the method
of the two Latin authors when it comes to extemporizing or innovating.
A quick glance at the authors when placed side by side is enough to see
that the catena is relatively sparse on Origen’s text; Hilary has more; and
Ambrose has considerably more again (to the extent that large portions of
his work have no match in either of the other two authors).
It is not clear, however, which is truer to the source: it could be that Hilary
has abbreviated his source, or that Ambrose has expanded on it. Indeed,
there is evidence that both may occur. Occasionally Hilary explicitly sum-
marizes material: at v24a/row2 he refers the reader to what he has already
written (hence his words we already dealt with this above) whereas Ambrose
repeats the exegesis; another example of Hilary summarizing occurs at v21b/
row2.49 Hilary also misses out passages, e.g. at v18a/row3–4. Conversely,
Ambrose is clearly expanding where he interweaves exegesis of the psalm
with that of the Song of Songs;50 this is further demonstrated by the fact that
such Ambrosian expansion is frequently found at the end of the commentary
on a given lemma, showing that Ambrose has gone through his source text
and, once each lemma was completed, then felt free to innovate with his own
material.51 Typically, Hilary is more likely to abbreviate and Ambrose to

49
At v21b/row2 he summarizes a previous argument (de uno et de plurimis mandatis in
superiore uersu competentia diximus), whereas Origen and Ambrose repeat the significance of
whether the plural or singular is used of God’s commandment(s).
50 51
E.g. v17a/row7. E.g. v17a/row7, v17b/row12.
26 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
expand, but this is not a fixed rule and the reverse may also occur (e.g. it is
probably Hilary who is innovating in the expansion at v22a/row5).

Source Text (Vorlage)

Is it possible to say how far Hilary or Ambrose deviates from their source? The
evidence of Nicetas (p. 20) suggested that the catenist has not preserved much
of Origen’s text; this is confirmed by the fact that frequently where the catena
preserves nothing, Hilary and Ambrose still correspond. This close match
between the Latin authors demonstrates that they must have used a similar
source text which we can postulate was Origen’s commentary or a recension
thereof: correspondence between Hilary and Ambrose may be either exeget-
ical52 or linguistic (to the point of being almost verbatim)53 and they use the
same citations to prove a point.54 Assuming that Hilary and Ambrose are
independent (pp. 28–30), they must therefore be using a common source text,
hereafter to be called the Vorlage55 to distinguish it from both the text found in
the catena and from Origen’s original text (which may have been later edited,
e.g. by Eusebius of Caesarea).
Yet while Hilary and Ambrose frequently correspond, it is the nature of the
correspondence that is striking. Certainly there is occasional close correspond-
ence between the two, with similarity of language or an identical exegetical
point.56 However, the correspondence is more often somewhat ‘lighter’, with
the authors sharing a similar position in the ordering of exegesis or sharing a
certain key point but differing in detail.
For example, while they are still working in exegetical blocks, they often
differ in the detail of the exegesis itself. Moreover, sometimes this slight
difference in exegesis seems to be triggered by something as simple as a
single word or phrase. For example, in v17b/row7 the different exegesis in
the two Latin authors regarding the touching of a corpse could go back to a
confusion of one word, taken as ‘Nazarene’ or Christ by Hilary, ‘Nazarite’ by
Ambrose. Here the trigger word does not come from the lemma, but is
mentioned in the course of the exegesis; Ambrose and Hilary then respond
to it differently.

52
E.g. v24a.
53
E.g. v21a/row3 (on the righteous Pharisee). More on the correspondences in these sections
is discussed below with respect to the issue of independence, p. 29.
54
E.g. v17a/row3.
55
This word denotes an underlying source text for a translation; for example the underlying
Hebrew text used by Septuagint translators, which is not preserved but occasionally differs from
the Masoretic text, is conventionally called the Vorlage.
56
See references in preceding paragraph.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 27
This confirms the idea that Ambrose is working independently of Hilary; his
exegesis is subtly different just too often. This confirms the notion of some
Vorlage, albeit one that is possibly unclear to either Hilary or Ambrose or both.
It could be that our Latin authors are using a corrupted text, or a manuscript
somehow difficult to read. However, it is more likely—given the evidence that
we have from Jerome—that both authors are independently dealing with a
Vorlage in Greek and that differences arise from translation. This is supported
by very slight differences where correspondence is otherwise fairly exact. For
example, biblical citations are very slightly different, even when citing the
lemma. Also, some phrases are so close that discrepancies are best explained
as arising merely from translation: in v23/row5, which appears to be relatively
literal translation due to the close correspondence between phrases, Hilary’s
Zacharias inter templum et altare occiditur occurs in Ambrose as Zachariam,
qui occisus est inter templum et altare with only minor differences in tense
(occiditur, occisus est) and word order.
A more convincing example of translation difference between Ambrose and
Hilary occurs in the same row (v23/row5). The two Latin authors are men-
tioning the fate of Jeremiah at the hands of the ‘princes’ of this world. For
Hilary, Jeremiah was shut up in a prison (carcere clauditur); for Ambrose, he
was thrown into a lake (mitteretur in lacum). The reference is clearly to Jer.
38:4–13 [LXX 45:4–13], where Jeremiah is thrown into a pit or cistern. The
LXX uses λάκκος (a pond, cistern, or pit reservoir), and it would be fair to
assume Origen does the same. Ambrose translates with the exact cognate word
lacus, a word not only similar in form but with much the same semantic
sphere as the Greek. (Jerome’s Vulgate also translated the word as lacus.)
However this is ambiguous in both Greek and Latin, since it could denote
something full of water, while the scriptural passage specifically states there
was no water, only mud.57 Whether or not Hilary knew the reference better
than Ambrose, he is certainly keen to interpret the story more clearly for his
readers, and hence states that Jeremiah was shut up in prison.
But if both authors are translating, the differences based on trigger words
remain to be explained. It seems that one of our translators (or possibly both)
is handling his text in a slightly lackadaisical manner. Either someone is
struggling with their Greek, or they are not concerned to provide a particularly
accurate translation (due to time or other motivations). This more careless
translator picks out trigger words without fully reading the text, and works out
his own exegesis correspondingly (thus for example ναζιραῖος/ναζωραῖος as
Nazarene/Nazarite). It has already been suggested58 that Ambrose on Ps. 118

57
Jer 45:6 (LXX): καὶ ἔρριψαν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν λάκκον Μελχιου υἱοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως, ὅς ἦν ἐν τῇ
αὐλῇ τῆς φυλακῆς, καὶ ἐχάλασαν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν λάκκον καὶ ἐν τῷ λάκκῳ οὐκ ἦν ὕδωρ ἀλλ’ ἤ
βόρβορος, καὶ ἦν ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ.
58
See p. 22.
28 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
was a sermon taken down by a stenographer, as indeed happened for other
works of Ambrose. Thus it may be that Ambrose was preaching with Origen’s
text in front of him. He keeps his finger on the text, glances down to read it
briefly, and then preaches on what he thinks it was about. He can then
extemporize after following the commentary for each lemma.
An example of this lack of attention to detail occurs at the end of v24a/row2.
The catena gives ὁ δίκαιος οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἤ λαλεῖ ἐν τοῖς δικαιώμασι τοῦ Κυρίου,
‘the righteous man does nothing other than speak according to the Lord’s
judgements’ (a reading confirmed by the context). However, a preacher
casting a cursory glance at the sentence could take the word ἤ as ‘or’, and
this indeed is what we find in Ambrose’s clumsy translation.
If Ambrose was indeed preaching extempore with Origen’s text in front of
him, this would explain why his text differs from Hilary’s: for example he sees
the word ναζωραῖος and uses it in exegesis, but he is constrained by the
situation and does not have time to go through the Greek precisely (or with
a dictionary). This suggestion could also explain why Ambrose’s text is so
much longer than Hilary’s (125,000 words as opposed to 45,000).

Ambrose’s Independence

The above methodology assumes that Ambrose is independent of Hilary in his

usage of Origen, so before proceeding it is worth summarizing the evidence for
Ambrose’s independence.
Firstly, there are some details from Origen’s commentary which are present
in Ambrose but not Hilary. For example, Ambrose mentions Xenocrates as the
source of a story about topaz at Ps. 118.127: Hilary does not mention this so
Ambrose may have got it directly from Origen. Such examples might prove
Ambrose’s independence; however, given the extent of Ambrose’s innovating
there is a chance (albeit small) that these could be fortuitous. Further, this
particular reference to Xenocrates has already been shown to belong possibly
to the scholia rather than the commentary.59 Nevertheless, when added to the
following points these contribute to the theory of independence.
Secondly, scriptural citations are usually subtly different. Arguably they
could be harmonizing to known ‘standard’ translations at hand but a more
reasonable explanation is that both are independent translation from Greek.60
In v17a/row3, Origen cites Ps. 102.10. Hilary and Ambrose give renditions
which are only very slightly different:

59
RISCH (2016).
60
Indeed Jerome’s Ep. 34.6 criticizes Hilary’s translations of scripture.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 29

(HILARY:) Non secundum peccata (AMBROSE:) Non secundum peccata

nostra fecit nobis, neque secundum nostra reddas nobis neque secundum
iniustitias nostras reddidit nobis. iniquitates nostras restituas nobis.

Indeed when they cite the various verses of the strophe, there are almost
always differences in just a word or so (this is the case for all the verses in this
strophe, except v21). These seem to indicate independent translation.
Thirdly, the passages with particularly close correspondence in text are
best explained as demonstrating independent translation of a Greek original.
For example, consider the following example (from v21a/row3, appealing to
Luke 18.11f):
Quanto evangelicus ille pharisaeus Quantum laborauit Pharisaeus ille . . .
labore se in uitae uiam statuit . . .
. . . ne in alienam rem rapax esset, ne . . . ne raperet aliena, ne iniustus esset,
in quemquam iniuriosus existeret, ne ne adultaret! Quantum laborauit, ne
adulteriis dissolueretur? pecaret, sicut peccauit publicanus!
Laborauit bis in sabbato ieiunans, Quantum laborauit, ut bis in sabbato
suumque corpus per abstinentiam ieiunaret!
cibi ingenti patientiae uirtute confecit.
Quanto deinde labore auaritiae vin- Quantum laborauit, ut decimam
cendae, decimas substantiae suae in daret omnium quae adquireret!
usum egentium intulit?

The sentence-by-sentence correspondence is indicated by the close equiva-

lence of words (rapax-iniuriosus-adulteriis compared to raperet-iniustus-adul-
taret) and ideas (fasting on the sabbath, giving tithes) as well as the repetition
of key notions (ille Pharisaeus; and most particularly here, labor/laborare). It
appears as if Ambrose and Hilary are both independently translating from a
Greek original.
Three arguments have so far been given for Ambrosian independence,
but the analysis of the previous section now suggests two more. Firstly, as
Appendix 2 shows, there are sections which appear in the catena and Ambrose
and not in Hilary: hence Ambrose must have been using a text other than
Hilary. Secondly, there are the passages with ‘lighter’ correspondence where
differences in exegesis appear to be prompted by an individual trigger word or
trigger phrase. As has been shown, these seem best explained as arising from
each author separately seeking to develop a source text in another language.
Modern scholarly literature is divided on this issue. Most older scholars felt
Ambrose stands independently of Hilary (see works by Gariglio, Gastaldi,
Goffinet, Pizzolato, Auf der Mar; conversely Ceccato believed Ambrose indeed
30 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
used Hilary). More recently Risch’s painstaking analysis of the texts and
Vindobonensis scholia has led him to suggest the converse, namely that
Ambrose was using both Hilary and Origen in composing his commentary.61
The present scholar feels that this does not explain the different responses to
the ‘triggers’ in the two Latin authors. For the reasons presented, then, it is
here taken that Ambrose translates Origen independently, and is thus a
separate witness to Origen.

ANALYSIS: HILARY’S TRANSLATION TECHNIQUE

Hilary’s Setting

Goffinet’s analysis of how Hilary uses Origen suggests that, while literal
translation does occur, on the whole Hilary prefers to translate ad sensum.62
He suggests that this is because Hilary was motivated by his episcopal con-
cerns: for Goffinet, where Origen’s expositions are too complicated for the
faithful, Hilary illustrates with concrete examples; where Origen is about
contemplation, Hilary prefers an active or pastoral approach.63
We know nothing of Hilary’s intended audience but, unlike Ambrose’s, this
is almost certainly a written text: he uses words such as ‘above’ and ‘below’
(superior, inferior) when referring to work already covered or yet to come.64
Hilary regularly comes across the problems of translation: I have often
mentioned that the correct interpretation is not obvious from the Latin trans-
lation.65 In speaking of his own work he uses verbs such as transferre (most
commonly), interpretare, explicare, and their cognates. He also picks up on
individual words and what their exact connotations are.66
Your speech has been thoroughly burned [=tried and tested]; and your servant
loved it (v140). The translation does not make the connotations of this word clear.
Our word ‘burned’ is πεπυρωμένον in Greek. But πεπυρωμένον means whatever is
purified as if burned in a fire . . . (HILARY TrPs118, 18.5)67
Thus Hilary himself sees his work as making a Greek text accessible to his
audience.

61 62 63
RISCH (2016). GOFFINET 1965:140, 164. GOFFINET 1965:140–1.
64
HILARY TrPs118, 2.10, 3.17, 4.6, 6.1, 13.5, 19.6, 22.6.
65
HILARY TrPs118, 12.14: frequenter admonuimus, non posse satisfactionem intelligentiae
ex latinitatis translatione praestari.
66
E.g. HILARY TrPs118, 4.6, 4.12, 5.1, 5.10, 12.3, 12.14, 15.13, 18.5.
67
Ignitum eloquium tuum ualde: et seruus tuus dilexit illud (v140). Non explicat proprietatem
uerbi huius latina translatio. Quod enim nobiscum ‘ignitum’, id graece πεπυρωμένον scribitur.
Πεπυρωμένον autem id significat, quod tamquam conflatum igne purgatum sit . . .
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 31
Ambrose also frequently cites Greek words when it is necessary to explain a
particular exegetical point.68

Hilary’s Translation Method

So far in this chapter Hilary’s work has been called a ‘translation’. But what
exactly does this entail? It is possible to be more detailed about Hilary’s
approach.
Goffinet gives examples of this translation technique, such as translating a
substantive with an adjective, using two phrases to express one in Origen, and
so on.69 However, Goffinet’s analysis is necessarily only done exactly in those
places where a text is found in both Hilary and Origen: that is, where some
correspondence is already found. By its very nature, however, Goffinet’s
analysis cannot include those parts of Origen’s commentary omitted by
the catenist—which is, on the evidence of Nicetas and our comparison of
Ambrose and Hilary, a notable proportion of it (see p. 20, p. 33 for a very
crude estimate). (Nor, incidentally, can he comment on those fragments of
Origen where there is no obvious correspondence in Hilary, or vice versa).
Lastly, Goffinet uses the Origen fragments by Patrologia Graeca, Pitra and
Cadiou—in other words, those which are mixed in with fragments from
Evagrius or other unknown authors. Hence, the analysis of Hilary’s technique
carried out in this chapter benefits from the improved edition of the catena
published by Harl as well as the comparison with Ambrose.
At one extreme, the strophe ‘gimel’ here considered can show evidence of
fairly close correspondence to the source. Consider the following example
from v22a/row2 (based on Dan. 12.2):

Τὰ ἁμαρτήματα ὀνειδισμοῦ εἰσιν ἄξια· Peccata opprobrio sunt digna: et

διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει οἱ ἁμαρτωλοὶ idcirco peccatores exurgent in
ἀναστήσονται εἰς ὀνειδισμὸν αἰώνιον. opprobrium aeternum.

This is an example of more ‘literal’ translation comparing the two authors;

apart from the omitted phrase ‘at the Resurrection’, Hilary is certainly con-
veying his text closely. Moving away slightly from this verbatim approach,
Hilary may embroider on individual sentences: in the excerpt regarding the
Pharisee, for example (see p. 29), one may note per abstinentiam cibi and in
usum egentium to embellish the descriptions of fasting and tithing. These
examples show relatively close adherence to the source text.

68
E.g. AMBROSE ExpPs118, 2.32, 4.13, 4.15, 5.21, 6.30, 9.9 . . .
69
GOFFINET 1965:140f.
32 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
More usually, however, Hilary glosses his source or reworks an exegetical
idea into his own words. For example, consider the commentary on v18b, with
the lemma (Unveil my eyes), that I may see the wonders of your law. At v18b/
row2, Origen cites Heb 10.1, and this is reproduced in Hilary but the sentence
is only a loose reproduction of the original. At v18b/row4, however, Origen
cites 2Cor3.18, and Hilary does not recognize it. He gives another relevant
citation from Romans 7, and paraphrases Origen’s citation but with some
glossing to provide elucidation: τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμενος is glossed
as caduco atque infirmo corpore absolutus, and similarly τὰ θαυμάσια τοῦ θεοῦ
ἐκ τοῦ νόμου αὐτοῦ is glossed as haec quae per corporalem obseruantiam legis
magna et mirabilia in coelis praefigurantur. Hilary’s version therefore adds
considerably to his original, both in clarifying the exegesis and in adding his
own theological shine: it is worth recalling that this is exactly what a ‘good’
classical translation should be doing, since an overly literal one would have
been considered κακοζηλία (= bad imitation, affectation).70 While Hilary does
play with his source, Ambrose by comparison provides new examples and
discourses at considerably greater length (nearly 900 words for this section,
compared with around 180 from Hilary).

Extent of Innovation

In establishing how much of Hilary’s work is translation, it is necessary to

establish how much is his own independent work.
On the surface this is methodologically difficult to ascertain. If Hilary’s text
contains elements that are not in Ambrose or the catena, these could be
independent innovation but they could merely witness to parts of the Vorlage
that have not been preserved elsewhere. Further, where Ambrose and Hilary
differ we cannot say which of the two is closer to Origen, or indeed if both of
them are innovating away from their source. And even if the Latin authors
agree against the catena, it may be that the Latins are closer to Origen since the
catenist too may move away from Origen for theological or practical reasons.
So even where correspondences exist between the Hilary and the other texts,
this only allows weak conclusions to be drawn. And in all this, differences may
be textual or linguistic as much as theological.
What can be said, however, is still of prime importance. Firstly, both
Hilary’s and Ambrose’s commentaries are essentially a good readable repre-
sentation of Origen’s text. Hilary certainly does expand, especially where he
wishes to clarify a point. He also paraphrases the Greek considerably, and

70
JEROME Ep. 57.5: quam uos ueritatem interpretationis, hanc eruditi κακοζηλίαν
nuncupant.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 33
makes theological alterations (see pp. 36–8). But his principal aim is to make
Origen’s commentary available to a new audience. This is indicated by the
ordering of material being consistent from one exegetical block to the next.
Both Hilary and Ambrose take each block as it comes, and then explain it as
seems most appropriate without necessarily going into a ‘literal’ translation.
The ordering of exegetical blocks only diverges very rarely. Hilary’s para-
phrasing means that individual ideas or scriptural references may not occur in
quite the same order as in the original; but the order of blocks is the same; it is
just within the block that the material may be rearranged.
The second point of prime importance confirms this, but is more statistical.
Comparing the word count in each row and column in Appendix 2 can provide
a very crude indication of methodology. It transpires that for this strophe, more
than 90 per cent of Hilary’s word count corresponds to material in either the
catenist or Ambrose (however tenuously). By comparison, only two-fifths of
Ambrose’s word count matches one of the other two authors. In other words,
Ambrose has been considerably freer and has interpolated considerably more
material than the older bishop: Hilary, on the other hand, has adhered to a far
greater degree to his source. The implication of this is that Hilary is a much
more faithful translator than Ambrose, in sense or intention at least, even if not
word for word. All in all, it is statistically much more likely that any exegesis
found in Hilary’s commentary was also present in Origen.

Corollary: Hilary’s Commentary on Other Psalms

This chapter has dealt with Origen’s commentary on Ps. 118. Nevertheless,
Jerome states that many of Hilary’s other psalms commentaries were transla-
tions from Origen, so it will be assumed hereafter that they are all translations
of the same nature as the Ps. 118 commentary.
Jerome only mentions some of Hilary’s psalms commentaries as transla-
tions of Origen (1–2, 51–62, 118 to the end). However, the textual tradition
includes as Hilary’s the commentaries on Psalms 13–14, 63–9 without much
doubt; commentaries on the titles of Psalms 9 and 91 appear in fewer
manuscripts; commentaries on Psalms 15, 31, and 41 are more doubtful
still.71 In the remaining chapters of this book, those not mentioned by Jerome
as translations will be referred to in square brackets, as follows: TrPs [67].3.
This is merely to denote whether or not they are mentioned by Jerome as
translations, without any prejudice as to their authorship.

71
The CCSL series of Hilary’s commentaries omits those on Psalms 15, 31, 41 as spurious,
since they do not belong in the earliest or most authoritative manuscripts.
34 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

ADAPTATION OF THEOLOGY

For the purposes of this study, it will be important to distinguish Hilary’s own
innovations from material that he derives from his source. This section aims to
assess key areas where Hilary may differ from his source.

Hermeneutics

As one example of how Hilary has dealt with Origen’s theology, one may first
consider a relatively uncontroversial topic—Origen’s hermeneutical approach.
In his Commentary on the Song of Songs, Origen famously presents various
hermeneutic ways of interpreting texts (ethics, physics, enoptics, and occasion-
ally logic), which Rufinus translates as moral, natural, and inspective.72 Some-
thing similar can also be found here in the fragments from the Palestinian
Catena. The fragment on v147 contrasts τὸ ῥητόν, the literal, with ἀναγωγή, the
moral or educative application for the individual reader. Commenting v141,
Origen mentions the historical meaning (κατὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν) but also a collect-
ive sense which symbolizes the people of Israel or the church.73 Origen also
mentions the technique of taking the words of the psalmist (described
as ‘the Prophet’ or David) as applying to Christ, or to the ideal believer.74
This gives at least four possible hermeneutic levels: literal, moral, collective,
prosopographic.75
With respect to the interpretation of this specific psalm, Origen’s fragments
suggest he takes it as a wisdom psalm presenting the Two Ways, of which one
is the path to perfection. The fact that this particular psalm is taken to teach
the progression to virtue is indicated by a number of factors. These include the
emphasis on the law, borne out by the discussion of the eight different kinds of
law;76 and the division into twenty-two strophae designated by the letters of
the Hebrew alphabet, which Origen presents as στοιχεῖα (basic elements,
rudimentary principles) that allow a progression.77 As we have seen, Hilary
also divides the commentary into these twenty-two letters, and this is also
found in Ambrose, showing that this hermeneutic was reiterated through
the division of the psalm; the Palestinian Catena, however, is not divided in
this way.
As already mentioned the Prophet (i.e. psalmist) is taken to be an idealized
believer, described for example as ἐκκλησιαστικός.78 It is assumed that he is

72
ORIGEN Commentary on Song of Songs, Prol. 3.
73
Pal.Cat., Origen, on v9, v98, 99, 100; v126–7.
74
Cf. ORIGEN on Ps. 1; also Pal.Cat., Origen, on v139.
75 76
Cf. HARL 1972a:97–8. Pal.Cat., Origen, on v2.
77 78
Pal.Cat., Origen, Proem. Pal.Cat., Origen, on v99.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 35
David, but there is little reference to the historical circumstances of the king of
Israel; any allusions to enemies are taken as spiritual. For example, a signifi-
cant concept is that of ταπείνωσις, but this ‘humiliation’ is viewed as an
interior condition which results from the psalmist’s sin (humility) rather
than as a reference to any historical event in David’s life. The fact that the
psalmist is an idealized believer means that he also prefigures or is an antitype
of Christ, as evidenced by words such as προσωποποιεῖν. Through the words of
the psalmist, a number of conceptions of Christ arise: for example that he
fulfils the law, that he is a light to lighten our path, and that the Christian
should take up the cross and follow him.79
The notion of Christ being the fulfilment of the law brings us in full circle,
for as indicated already the psalm teaches the law: thus the various hermen-
eutic levels may not be explicitly similar, but ultimately they coincide.
Ambrose’s approach to Psalm 118 is, unsurprisingly, similar. His commen-
tary is divided into twenty-two units based on the letters of the Hebrew
alphabet, and these are presented as rudiments which are steps for learning
the law.80 Ambrose, however, attributes a meaning to each of the Hebrew
letters (aleph = interpretatio doctrinae, gimel = retributio, etc.) which he uses
in his exegesis. This is not present in Hilary, and not preserved in the
fragments of Origen. Nevertheless, it would be characteristic of Origen to
have had such analysis, not least because of his awareness of Jewish rabbinical
scholarship which used similar exegetical techniques.81 Ambrose’s commen-
tary also presents an emphasis on the law and on a progression towards God
which again would be derived from Origen’s reading of the psalm.
Pizzolato finds that Ambrose differs from Origen in various respects,
however. Rather than Origen’s Neoplatonic spirituality directed at the indi-
vidual believer, with a focus on θεωρία and intellectual education, Pizzolato
suggests that Ambrose emphasizes the economy of salvation history, with
salvation through the church as God’s people82 and emphasis on the sacra-
ments. Rondeau, on the other hand, thinks that Ambrose preserves the
Neoplatonic emphasis in his mysticism, partly as a result of him interweaving
this commentary with his own comments on the Song of Songs.83
Hilary, like Ambrose, preserves a number of the hermeneutical features of
his Vorlage. Both Latins keep Origen’s prosopography, although Ambrose
appears to be more explicit on the identification of the psalmist as David
(v17a/row3) and, extrapolating, of the psalmist as Christ (him who was born
from a virgin: v17a/row5). This is not Hilary’s understanding of the psalmist in
this verse.

79 80
E.g. Pal.Cat., Origen, on v105, v120. AMBROSE ExpPs118, Prol.
81 82
DE LANGE 1976:103–21. PIZZOLATO 1987:19, 21.
83
RONDEAU 1982:152.
36 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Where Ambrose and Hilary share a given feature this might be strong
evidence of what was in the Vorlage, even against the evidence of the catena.
Both authors pepper their entire work with references to their hermeneutic
principle of the Mosaic law as umbra futurorum (Col 2.17): Psalm 118 teaches
on the (Mosaic) law, but that law itself points to the spiritual law spoken of by
Paul. This principle is repeated constantly in the two Latin authors84 but is
almost entirely absent from the catena.85 This is surprising since it would be
characteristic of Origen’s hermeneutical approach,86 so it seems possible that
it is the catenist here who has ‘innovated’ by removing the references. Maybe
he thought them obvious, or conversely maybe a suspicion of Origen’s exe-
getical approach in the sixth century prompted the catenist to write the
references to law as umbra futurorum out of his text.

Other Changes to Origen’s Theology

So, given these variations in hermeneutics, how far has Hilary altered other
elements in Origen’s theology?
As already discussed, Harl highlighted theological ‘anomalies’ which were
found in the glosses of the Vindobonensis manuscript,87 and which she sug-
gested were omitted by the catenist for theological reasons. Similarly, some
traces of Origen’s theology are taken over by Hilary but not so obvious in
Ambrose. In v19b/row5, Hilary mentions the orders of angels (scit per diuersi-
tatem ministeriorum diuersas esse praeceptorum obseruantias, angelorum,
archangelorum, thronorum, dominationum, potestatum, et principatuum).
The catena is here more concise (mentioning only οἱ ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεις and
πᾶν λογικόν); this could be abbreviation or theological smoothing. Ambrose,
unusually, omits comment on this half-verse entirely; interestingly, however,
he uses the passage on God’s commands as light and illumination at a later
point (catena and Hilary at v19b/row3–4; Ambrose at v21b/row3). This is the
only place in this strophe (‘gimel’) where an entire section appears to have
moved from its proper position.
As another example of theological change, the Latin authors appear to have
smoothed over Origen’s position on the apparent possibility of perfection at

84
The following are examples: HILARY TrPs118, 1.5, 1.6, 1.11, 3.4, 3.6, 3.7, 4.5, 6.7, 6.8, 6.12,
9.5, 17.12, 18.8, 19.2, 22.1. AMBROSE ExpPs118, 3.19, 3.25, 3.27, 5.10, 5.11, 6.29, 18.27 (the idea
is also subverted in 18.37).
85
See σκία and μέλλων in ‘Index of Greek Words’, Harl 1972b:836, 844. One example occurs
at Pal.Cat., Origen, on v18 (cf. also Didymus, on v43).
86
E.g. the umbra futurorum is mentioned in ORIGEN Hom. Lev. 7.4. Origen’s general
strategy is to interpret the Mosaic law allegorically rather than literally; see the homilies on
Leviticus, also c.Celsum 2.2.
87
HARL 1972a:63–6. See also pp. 21–2.
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 37
v20/rows3–6 (on the psalm verse My soul desires to long for your judgements).
Hilary’s exegesis here talks of the last judgement (v20/row4); this is a longer
passage for him, so it is uncertain whether this is Hilary’s personal develop-
ment of Origen’s mention of repayment/retribution, or whether this was
present in his source (cf. v20/row5 ἐὰν ἐπιθυμήσω τὰ κρίματα, ἵνα κολασθῶ
ἐπιθυμῶ). Also, both Hilary and Ambrose feel that the ability to follow God’s
judgements in omni tempore is part of what we request of God (v20/row6); the
Greek, however, appears to interpret the phrase as demonstrating that only a
man with a pure conscience should utter these words (v20/row5). These points
add up to the same thing: Origen’s text suggests only a ‘perfect man’ (τελείος,
v20/row5) can make such a prayer, whereas Hilary’s text makes it clear that
no-one is entirely perfect.
Statistical analysis above found that over 90 per cent of Hilary’s word count
relates somehow to Origen (p. 33). Since this is the case, then any evidence of
divergence from Origen’s text suggests that there may be a motivating factor.
Admittedly this is effectively an argument ex silentio. Yet the absence of any
element from Hilary that was present in Origen suggests that Hilary may be
consciously and deliberately rejecting an unacceptable doctrine, since he is
otherwise happy to borrow Origen’s exegesis. This book will find some
significant instances of these theological ‘omissions’ in ways that are indicative
of Hilary’s thoughts. In particular, Chapter 3 will mention that Hilary omits
any suggestion that the Son and Spirit can be called God’s hands; Chapter 4
will find that Hilary consistently rejects Origen’s idea of humans losing the
‘image of God’ at the Fall; and Chapter 5 will find that Hilary categorically
rejects any suggestion of a supracelestial Fall, as hinted by the following
passage.
My soul clung to the ground: give me life according to your word (v25). Some could
interpret this as being about intense prayer, as if the Prophet ‘clung to the ground’
in the sense of being prostrate on the earth confessing some sin. But I have
carefully examined the force of the words and deduced what was necessary,
so as to comprehend something loftier underlying this statement.
(HILARY TrPs118, 4.1)88
The catena interprets this verse as referring to the body as punishment for pre-
mundane sin.89 Hilary disagrees, but is disingenuous about the original text.

88
Adhaesit pauimento anima mea: uiuifica me secundum uerbum tuum (v25). Potest istud et
de assiduitate orationis intelligi, tamquam ex peccatorum confessione in terram Propheta pros-
tratus adhaeserit pauimento. Sed ut altius aliquid sub his dictis intelligamus, perspecta diligentius
uerborum uirtute, necessarium ducimus.
89
Pal.Cat., Origen, on v25: Ἐκολλήθη τῷ ἐδάφει ἡ ψυχή μου·ζῆσον με κατὰ τὸν λόγον σου.
ἐξομολογεῖται ὁ προφήτης περὶ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς καταλειπούσης μὲν τὸ κολλᾶσθαι τῷ Κυρίῳ
πρότερον, ὅτε ἐν τῇ κακίᾳ ἐτύγχανεν, κολληθείσης δὲ δι’ αὐτὴν τῷ ἐδάφει καὶ καθελούσης ἑαυτῆς τὸ
φυσικὸν ὕψος καὶ ἔπαρμα. πᾶσα γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσα ψυχὴ κεκόλληται τῷ ἐδάφει . . .
38 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

His comment ‘some could interpret this as being about intense prayer’ is
certainly true but he omits to mention that the oratio referred to was probably
Origen’s noetic contemplation before the ‘fall of souls’. So Hilary rejects this
element, although he still interprets the verse as treating the relationship
between body and soul. This rejection of the Fall into bodies is shown in
more detail at pp. 84–8.
In some cases, however, this study will identify areas where a doctrine can
realistically be assumed to be present in Origen (by using the fragments and
Ambrose’s commentary), but has been completely omitted by Hilary. So then,
Hilary is not translating without discernment: he is producing a text which is
usually a straight elucidation of Origen’s text, but which has been corrected
theologically for his audience.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the background and text of Hilary’s commentary
on Psalm 118. Although there exists no complete text of Origen’s commentary
on this psalm, a three-way comparison including Ambrose and fragments in
the Palestinian catena has here been fruitful in demonstrating a number of
points.
Firstly, Ambrose and Hilary have been demonstrated to be independent
translations of a source text (Vorlage) which also feeds into the Palestinian
Catena. The independence of Ambrose and Hilary is proved by Ambrose’s
usage of Origenian references not used by Hilary; by their slightly different
scriptural citations; and by the passages with close correspondence, where
small differences suggest separate translation technique. To these examples
more or less discussed in the literature, a fourth argument for independence
has here been added, namely the passages with ‘light’ correspondence where
differences in exegesis appear to be prompted by a trigger word taken differ-
ently by the different translators.
Secondly, Hilary has been demonstrated to be a relatively reliable rendering
of Origen’s psalm commentary. This was already suggested by Jerome’s many
references to Hilary’s work as a translation, but one that was relatively free
(nonnulla de suo addidit): Hilary is held up as a model of translation tech-
nique. This is further confirmed by comparison with Ambrose, which shows
that Hilary was far closer to his original than he is often given credit for, most
often showing exegetical or linguistic affinities with Origen; and where there
are differences, these indicate Hilary questioning Origen’s theology. In terms
of translation technique, both authors stick relatively closely to Origen’s
ordering of material and exegetical units. However, Ambrose is considerably
 Hilary’s Commentary on Psalm 118 39
more likely to develop his own exegesis and to use his source as a springboard
for his own reflections.
All this has been shown by examining the texts in parallel columns, but to
some degree it is still impossible to tell for any given sentence whether it is
merely an expression of Origen’s text or whether it is Hilary himself innovat-
ing. Nevertheless, it is possible to make at least one categorical statement. The
introduction at p. 15 indicated that many modern scholars credit Hilary with
being ‘influenced’ by Origen, pointing in particular to the psalms commen-
taries. Yet this language of ‘influence’ is surely inappropriate when used of a
translation; it is hardly surprising to find ideas of Origen in a text which is
ultimately an edited translation of Origen.
In this book, Hilary’s anthropology will be deduced not only from what he
says about the human person, but just as much from what he does not say—
that is, from what he omits or rephrases compared to his original. For this
reason this book will analyse Hilary’s anthropology in this psalm commentary,
but will always compare it with the parallels in the Palestinian Catena and
Ambrose. The analysis of his theology will be informed not only by what
Hilary has chosen to keep but also what he has chosen to omit.
 3

Body and Soul

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss Hilary’s doctrine of the elements of the human
person, namely his dichotomous anthropology which sees humans as com-
posed of body and soul.
Some scholars see the dichotomous model in Hilary as influenced by
Platonism (however remotely) while others prefer to see Hilary as closer to a
Stoic model. Yet even those who may deny close Platonic influence still are
happy to identify Platonic ideas in Hilary’s thought such as the soul being
separable from the body, or a simplistic identification of the body as inherently
bad and the soul as inherently good. The presence of these ‘Platonic’ elements
in Hilary will be questioned in the current chapter. Still, the debate as to
whether Hilary is ‘Platonic’ or ‘Stoic’ is somewhat inappropriate since philo-
sophical thought was more properly eclectic by the fourth century; the labels
are only used here in continuity with modern scholarly analysis of Hilary’s
thought.
It will also be argued here that it is inappropriate to generalize Hilary’s
anthropology across his works. There is a slight but visible difference between
his Matthew and Psalms commentaries with respect to his anthropology. This
is because the latter relies on Origen, and Hilary’s influence there should be
seen most properly as Origenistic rather than belonging to any (pagan)
philosophical school; however, Hilary is still critical in his use of Origen. Yet
even in the Psalms commentaries the body–soul dichotomy is not so markedly
contrasting as is sometimes suggested, with the soul in particular just as
responsible as the body when it comes to sin (if not more so).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Almost every modern scholar sees Hilary as having a dichotomous anthro-

pology of body and soul.
 Body and Soul 41
This is indeed ubiquitous across Hilary’s corpus since he repeatedly juxta-
poses or contrasts the body and soul. Fierro cites the ‘double creation’ of
mankind as the basis of Hilary’s dichotomy: ‘Hilary also follows this interpret-
ation [of a double creation] which, in a way, governs all his anthropology.’1
Others including Descourtieux2 and Ladaria3 also see the ‘double creation’ as
the basis of Hilary’s anthropology.
One exception to this is Orazzo, who concentrates not on a two-fold but a
three-fold model for Hilary’s anthropology. Orazzo points to passages with
this tripartite approach: ‘For the Apostle posited a fleshly human, a soul-ish
one (animalis), and a spiritual one’4 (following Paul at say 1Thess. 5:23, cf.
1Cor. 2.14–15). This three-fold scheme is also used by Doignon to structure
his chapter on Hilary’s anthropology.5 However, these words of Hilary’s are in
fact distinguishing between types of person, not components of the person (for
example he points out even Gentiles can be animalis). Also, while he does talk
of the relationship between say spirit and flesh,6 he never elsewhere states that
humans are made of body, soul, and spirit. So then, Hilary should not be
seen as having this three-fold anthropology of body–soul–spirit. The relevance
of Hilary’s reference to humans as ‘body, soul, will’ will be discussed in
Chapter 6.
Returning to the dichotomous model, an obvious possible source for this is
Platonism. Doignon defines Hilary’s anthropology as ‘platonico-stoic’.7 In-
deed it is features like his anthropology that can lead an author like M. Clark to
call Hilary ‘a convert from Neoplatonism’.8 Although Doignon takes many of
his examples from Latin non-Platonic writers (Cicero, Seneca, also Tertul-
lian),9 he implicitly identifies ‘Platonic’ characteristics in Hilary. Two in
particular will be pursued in this chapter: firstly, the concept that the soul is
‘separable’ and aims to soar free of the body which holds it captive; and
secondly, the model that the body is the source of all sin and evil, while the
soul is absolutely good and divine.

1
FIERRO 1964:8: Hilario de Poitiers se atiene también a esa interpretación [de una doble
creación] que, en cierto modo, rige toda su antropología.
2
DESCOURTIEUX 2008:58.
3
LADARIA 1977a:49f. e.g. p. 51: El esquema fundamental de la antropología de Hilario es
dualista. Ladaria says this despite writing on the Holy Spirit, which he identifies as a bond rather
than a separate anthropological element.
4
TrPs [14].7–8, discussed by ORAZZO 1986:143–8: Apostolus enim et carnalem hominem
posuit, et animalem et spiritalem.
5
DOIGNON 2005:119 and note the structure of the subsequent chapter (2005:119–44).
However, RONDEAU 1962:200–1 rightly points out this passage in Hilary is a hapax and he
does not refer to the three-fold anthropology elsewhere.
6
InMt 27.4: Nam ut Spiritus carni [sponsus], ita Spiritui caro sponsa est.
7
DOIGNON 2005:119.
8
M.T. CLARK 1981:10, fn.33. In turn she probably gets this from the Oxford Dictionary of the
Christian Church 1957:638.
9
DOIGNON 1971:121 and fn.11.
42 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
On the other hand Fierro, while seeing Hilary as manifesting a dichotomous
anthropology, rejects the link with Platonism.10 Likewise Burns rejects the
simplistic ‘body bad, soul good’ model, pointing to the neutrality of the body
as well as vitiation of the soul in Hilary’s corpus. Burns takes this a step further
because he supports a more ‘Stoic’ understanding of Hilary’s theology.11
Nevertheless Colish feels that there is nothing of Stoicism in Hilary, whose
use of any Stoic themes is ‘unreflective’.12
Unfortunately this labelling of concepts as either ‘Platonic’ or ‘Stoic’ is
inappropriate for Hilary’s period, and the debate as to the mode of thought
which best describes Hilary tells us more about modern methodology than
ancient categories of thought. The distinction between the two is inappro-
priate since by the fourth century philosophical thought was far more
eclectic. Stoicism did not exist as a separate school; Neoplatonism was
vigorous, but had absorbed many of the ideas which modern scholars
might now call Stoic (for example, Plotinus’ description of the sage is entirely
convergent with Stoic thought,13 although he disagrees with ‘classical’
Stoicism on issues such as the source of knowledge or virtue). As an example
relevant to the current discussion, a ‘separable’ body and soul is normally
deemed ‘Platonic’, yet Seneca refers to the body as prison of the soul14 and
describes how the soul longs to escape,15 despite usually being called a Stoic
(or eclectic). This entire book analyses Hilary’s anthropology using language
such as ‘Platonic’ or ‘Stoic’ since this is part of the debate for Hilary scholars,
but it should be emphasized that these should not be seen as anything more
than stereotyped descriptive labels; they simply do not reflect the contem-
porary philosophical situation of Hilary’s day. Further, the notion that a
dichotomous anthropology must be ‘Platonic’ at all is to miss the point that
there is evidence for this dualism in the scriptural texts Hilary is using. For
example, in Romans 7:21–3 Paul suggests that there is a struggle between his
body and his mind. It is thus possible to read body–soul dualism as entirely
natural within the Christian tradition, and not derived from external thought
systems.
Possibly the best and most convincing analysis of Hilary’s anthropology
is the concise but perceptive article by Rondeau. She acknowledges the

10
FIERRO 1964:337: ‘The reason for the [theological distance between Hilary and Ambrose]
was probably Platonism, which barely leaves traces in Hilary, but on the other hand deeply
permeates Ambrose’s thought.’
11
BURNS 2012:203. Compare also p. 49: the Stoics ‘influence not only [Hilary’s] treatment of
virtue but also shape some of his language about . . . the relation of body and soul . . . ’.
12 13
COLISH 1990:123–5. PLOTINUS Ennead 1.4.
14
SENECA Ep. 65.16, 65.25f.
15
SENECA Ep. 78.10, 79.11–12. He also refers to the soul’s separation from the body as new
birth (Ep. 102.27–8).
 Body and Soul 43
dualistic shine of some of Hilary’s statements, with dualistic thematic pairs
such as light–darkness, ascent–fall, captivity–liberation.16 But she sees this as
a misguided way of reading Hilary who seeks not to separate but to integrate
body and soul into the same nature.17 For her Hilary is not a dualist in his
understanding of man’s ultimate destiny: although initially Hilary interprets
these themes ‘. . . in a dualist manner, at the end of the day he uses them to
express a concept of human destiny which is not dualist at all’.18 Although
the current chapter may differ with her on some details (for example she still
intrinsically sees Hilary’s post-lapsarian, pre-salvation body as the source of
sin), in essence her position—integrating body and soul—is the closest to
that adopted here.
Something very little discussed by any of these scholars is the significance
of differences across Hilary’s works. Doignon does mention that the sharp
‘separability’ of body and soul as found for example in TrPs 129 is likely to
follow Origenian thought, as evidenced for example in the latter’s first
Homily on Genesis.19 (Doignon holds that Hilary did not know Origen
before his exile,20 so this implies he identifies a development across time in
Hilary’s anthropology.) Fierro also highlights the Origenistic influences on
Hilary’s late work. Yet despite these acknowledgements of different influ-
ences across Hilary’s works, there is no systematic attempt to identify
specific changes in Hilary’s anthropology. Modern scholars predominantly
use the Psalms commentaries to deduce Hilary’s anthropology; for example
the majority of citations in Doignon’s article on Hilary’s anthropology
come from the Psalms commentaries.21 In a way this is fair: Hilary dis-
courses more on anthropology in his Psalms commentaries than anywhere
else; there is simply less anthropological material in his other works. Indeed
for some scholars, differences between the commentary on Matthew and
those on the Psalms are to be either harmonized or explained away, as can
be seen from the passage where Hilary appears to suggest the soul is
corporeal (InMt 5.8); the various scholars propose a variety of solutions
to this (pp. 53–6).
This suggests it is worthwhile to carry out an analysis of Hilary’s anthro-
pology which concentrates particularly on differences across his works. This is
what will be assessed in the current chapter.

16 17
RONDEAU 1962:198. RONDEAU 1962:208–10.
18
RONDEAU 1962:198: ‘ . . . au départ ces thèmes dans un sens dualiste, [il] leur fait exprimer
au terme une conception de la destinée de l’homme qui ne l’est pas du tout.’
19
DOIGNON 2005:134–5, fn.83 & 84, citing ORIGEN-RUFINUS, Hom. Gen. 1.13.
20
DOIGNON 1971:171–2.
21
DOIGNON (1989), passim. The same may be said of his analysis in 2005:119–44 (Ch. 4, on
Hilary’s anthropology).
44 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

BODY AND S OUL I N THE PSALMS COMMENTARIES

Body and Soul in Hilary’s Commentary on Ps. 118.73

One of Hilary’s most explicit anthropological discussions comes in TrPs118,

10.1–9 where he comments on Ps. 118.73: Your hands made me and formed
me; give me understanding, so that I may learn your commands. Following
Origen, Hilary takes this as referring to the creation of mankind as found in
the initial chapters of Genesis, and thus presents a clear and usefully lengthy
exposition of his anthropology. The passage helps us understand Hilary’s
thought on factors ranging from the nature of the Fall to man as God’s
image. Here, the basic elements of body and soul will be considered.
Hilary’s analysis of the passage cited begins with an assertion that mankind
is supreme among all earthly works. After making some initial points (for
example that mankind plays a part beyond other creatures in knowing and
venerating his creator),22 he explains why mankind is superior: because we
were made by God’s hands, not just by one hand (as the sky) nor by his word
(as the rest of creation).23
Hilary goes on to describe the two stages of creation. The inner nature, or
soul, is created in the image of God, endowed with Reason, and thus incor-
poreal. This means that, to some degree, it attains to the divine: The thing
which was then made ‘according to God’s image and likeness’ necessarily had
something divine and incorporeal established within it.24 (Chapter 4 discusses
further this issue of humans being in God’s image.)
The second stage of man’s creation, by contrast, is strikingly different
(quanto differt!).25 In this second stage, Hilary’s commentary on Ps. 118.73
turns to Genesis 2, where the outer nature is not created ex nihilo but rather
God takes dust of the earth and moulds it. The significance of this is marked
for Hilary by the use of different verbs in the lemma and in Genesis: At first it
was not ‘he took’, but ‘he made’ [the first man]; but secondly it was not ‘he
made’ as at first, but ‘he took’ and then ‘he formed’ or ‘fashioned’.26 The outer
nature thus is made from earth and assumes the nature of the thing from
which it is made.27 As a result of earth’s nature, man’s outer nature is
corporeal and in itself inanimate (since for him what is corporeal by its very
nature cannot be self-moving); he commonly uses words such as materia or
materies to refer to it.28

22 23
TrPs118, 10.1. TrPs118, 10.3–5, citing Genesis 1 and Isaiah 45 (LXX).
24
TrPs118, 10.7: Diuinum in eo et incorporale condendum, quod secundum imaginem Dei et
similitudinem tum fiebat.
25 26
TrPs118, 10.7: What a difference! TrPs118, 10.7.
27
See further for example TrPs118, 8.18–19.
28
TrPs118, 10.7; see also 3.3, 11.5, 18.2.
 Body and Soul 45
(Hilary does not make great use of the concept of ex nihilo creation with
regard to humankind. He does determinedly refute any heretical suggestion
that Christ was created ex nihilo,29 and also uses the idea that all creation only
continues to exist because God continually grants its existence.30 But on the
whole he does not develop this notion anthropologically, as for example
Augustine does in implying that our sin comes from our nothingness).
Taking these two together, Hilary makes it explicit that mankind therefore
has a double nature:
For man was certainly established with a two-fold origin, since he holds within
him an inner and an outer nature that are at variance with each other, and since
he was made out of two genres into one, a soul-ish being partaking of Reason.
Scripture said firstly, Let us make man in our image and likeness [Gen 1.26], and
then secondly, And God took dust of the earth, and formed man [Gen 2.7].
(TrPs118, 10.6)31
Thus Hilary sees mankind as constituted by two natures, an internal and an
external, and creation is in two stages, with Genesis 1 recounting the creation
of the internal nature and Genesis 2 giving the external nature. Man’s double
nature is confirmed for Hilary by a number of pointers in the text: the two
stages of creation represented by the two chapters in Genesis; the confirmation
of this in God using two hands for the creation; and the different verbs used,
showing that the manner of creation was different in the two stages, with the
inner nature being ex nihilo and the second assuming the nature of its base
matter, earth. Hilary closes this section much as he has begun it, with an
assertion that this exegesis proves man has a double nature, but now as proven
by Paul.
Blessed Paul knows that he has a two-fold nature (duplex natura) within himself,
since he delights in the Law according to his inner man, but sees another law in
his members which leads him captive in the law of sin. (TrPs118, 10.8)32
In other words, Hilary takes Paul’s references to inner and outer natures or
flesh and spirit as referring to body and soul. As for Paul’s other angle—that
man is trichotomous, composed of body, soul, and spirit—Hilary suggests that
this refers not to the static composition of man, but rather to the act(s) of his
creation in three stages: a duplex natura formed by a triplex perfectio.33

29 30
trin. 2.4, 3.3–4, 6.13–18; InMt 31.3. TrPs 148.5.
31
Homo uero, cum internam et externam in se naturam dissonantem aliam ab alia contineat,
et ex duobus generibus in unum sit animal rationis particeps constitutus, duplici est institutus
exordio. Primum enim dictum est: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram;
dehinc secundo, Et accepit Deus puluerem de terra, et finxit hominem.
32
Scit in se duplicem beatus Paulus esse naturam, cum secundum interiorem hominem
delectatur in lege, et cum aliam in memsuis uidet legem quae se captiuum ducat in lege peccati.
33
TrPs118, 10.8.
46 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

Body and Soul Elsewhere in Hilary’s Psalms Commentaries

The view of humanity presented in the commentary on Ps. 118.73 is found

more or less consistently throughout the Psalms commentaries. For example,
in TrPs 129 Hilary again mentions the creation of man with ‘two natures’: He
should remember that humans are composed of two natures, namely that of
the soul and that of the body.34 In particular, Hilary’s account of the inner
man expresses the soul’s superiority in terms which could appear (Neo)
Platonic:
. . . the inner man was made rational, active, always in motion, quick, incoporeal,
weightless, eternal. As far as it can, it mimics the character of its main nature.
Now it rushes past, now flies around; quicker than a word it is now beyond the
ocean, now flies in the skies, now is in the depth, now travels everywhere from the
East to the West . . . (TrPs 129.6)35
Yet Hilary is at pains throughout the Psalms commentaries to indicate the
effect that the body has on the soul. He uses two images in particular to
illustrate this: that of dirtiness or stain, and that of weakness or infirmity.
The notion of dirtiness follows from the fact that the body has been created
from the earth and thus inherits its nature. Hilary expresses this with words
such as labes and sordens; and also with (im)mundus and its cognates, which
are used both for the biblical notion of (un)cleanness in the Levitical sense and
also for the notion of purity in heart.36 Indeed, every instance of labes/sordens
and their cognates in this commentary refers to the effect of the body. The
body’s earthliness also gives rise to other images. The body’s physicality is
recalled by the notion of weight or heaviness;37 the notion of humiliatio is
given the twin meaning of abasement and bringing to the ground (cf. humus
‘ground’).38
An even more common image is that of sickness or physical weakness,
especially since both physical sickness and spiritual infirmity end in death:
[in this life] we associate with carrion.39 This is expressed with words such as
caducus, fragilitas, morbus, or contagio, but overwhelmingly with the word
infirmitas. Hilary’s default way of referring to the human condition is in

34
HILARY TrPs 129.4: . . . meminisse debet hominum institutionem naturis duabus conti-
neri, animae scilicet et corporis.
35
. . . homo interior . . . effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens, citus, incorporeus, subtilis,
aeternus. Quantum in se est, speciem naturae principalis imitatur, dum transcurrit, dum
circumuolat, et dicto citius nunc ultra oceanum est, nunc in coelos euolat, nunc in abyssis est,
nunc orientem occidentemque perlustrat . . .
36
E.g. Lev. 10.10, Ps. 50.12.
37
E.g. grauitas TrPs118, 14.1. See also pp. 57–60.
38
The double meaning of humiliatio is behind the exegesis of Ps. 118.67, given at TrPs118, 9.4
(compare AMBROSE ExpPs118, 9.13–14). This text is discussed further on pp. 85–6.
39
TrPs118, 3.4 (v17b/row 6 in Appendix 2).
 Body and Soul 47
terms of weakness (infirmitas; thirty-nine instances);40 this most frequently
occurs in phrases such as human weakness or the weakness of our nature.41
So infirmitas denotes the condition of the body and soul combined together,
the complete human, natura humana as a synthesized being. At TrPs [13].3
Hilary likens the sickly human condition to a city disastrously affected by the
plague and in need of a doctor. So then, Hilary usually uses infirmitas nostra
to explain some fault or sin, or the failure of man as a whole to attain to
God’s glory.

Influence of Origen: Analysis of Ps. 118.73

The above presents Hilary’s views on body and soul as deduced from a reading
of his Psalms commentaries; however, as Chapter 2 shows these are transla-
tions of Origen’s commentaries. The question therefore arises as to how far
Hilary is merely repeating his source text—the Vorlage—and how far he is
interpreting or adapting the theology of his source.
The text preserved by the Palestinian catenist on v73a is relatively short,
presenting only two interpretative points. The first point is that the ‘hands of
God’ which created man are Christ and the Holy Spirit (as we shall see,
Ambrose uses this but Hilary omits it). This notion is not found in extant
works of Origen, but against Celsus he does state that he has already shown at
great length in a Genesis commentary that God’s hands in creation are not to
be taken anthropomorphically;42 alas, this particular Genesis commentary has
not survived to the modern day. (If indeed Origen does suggest that Son and
Spirit are God’s hands, this is an interesting finding in its own right since this
trope has previously been seen as characteristic mainly of Irenaeus). The
second point made in the catena fragment suggests that the use of the different
verbs ἐποίησαν and ἔπλασαν in the lemma refers to the creations of body and
soul respectively; this point is characteristic of Origen elsewhere.43
However, the text is not entirely preserved because at this point the catenist
(or an earlier copyist) makes an uncharacteristic interjection. He rejects
Origen’s interpretation, suggesting that these two verbs do not refer to differ-
ent stages in man’s creation, but are used pleonastically to refer to the same

40
There are two instances of infirmitas in TrPs118 which are of bodily sickness, rather than
weakness of human nature: 7.1, 9.8.
41
The following is a typical example: TrPs118, 6.6: per naturae infirmitatem sine peccato esse
non possit.
42
ORIGEN c.Celsum 4.37: προηγουμένως γὰρ ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν ἐξηγητικοῖς ταῦθ’ ἡμῖν
κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐξήτασται. The words προηγουμένως and ἐξήτασται both indicate that the
explanation about God’s hands may have been at some length.
43
See discussion and references in HARL 1972b:648.
48 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
single act of creation,44 and he cites other verses to show that the verb
πλάσσειν is used of the soul as well as of the body. It appears that the catenist
is firmly rejecting the suggestion of a two-stage creation entailing a pre-
existent soul.45
The catena fragment is only eighty-two words long, and is not even marked
with Origen’s name.46 However, this is certainly only a small fragment of
Origen’s commentary on v73a: both Hilary and Ambrose have an atypically
extensive exegesis of this half-verse of about 1,100 words in length. For the
following analysis, Hilary and Ambrose were placed in parallel columns. They
turn out to correspond far less than for the strophe presented in Appendix 2.
This seems to be because at least one of the authors is struggling not to
reproduce potentially controversial material; this is typical for Hilary
in doctrinally controversial passages (compare the passages on the Fall,
pp. 84–8) and is further confirmed by the fact that the catenist explicitly
questions Origen’s interpretation here. Nevertheless, the two Latin authors
are close enough for it to be certain that they are both reproducing a Vorlage
considerably longer than that preserved by the catenist. Clearly this verse was
of some interest to Origen. A comparison of Hilary and Ambrose provides
some indications as to what may have been in Origen’s text.
Both Hilary and Ambrose start off with a discourse on the fact that man
is the most perfect of all God’s creations.47 For Ambrose, man is pretiossi-
mum (opus Dei); Hilary calls him utilius and speciosius compared with
other creatures. Yet it is man’s internal feature—his soul—which makes
him so special. Ambrose asserts the soul is superior, but Hilary explains
why: man alone is rationale, intelligens, diiudicans, sentiens. However,
Ambrose and Hilary diverge a little on what the soul’s purpose is. Both
agree that it is to be used ad cognoscendum; but for Hilary the soul should
be for recognizing its maker, whereas for Ambrose the soul should recog-
nize itself, a dictum which Ambrose attributes not to the Delphic oracle48
but the Jewish Law.49

44
ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω ἐκ παραλλήλου τὸ αὐτὸ σήμαινεσθαι. The catenist also mentions and rejects
another early interpretation, namely that ἐποίησαν refers to our ‘first creation’ and ἔπλασαν refers
to our rebirth at baptism.
45
The catena on this one verse is dealt with at length in HARL 1972b:645–52.
46
It may be presumed that the fragment is Origen’s for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the
fragment is placed in first position after the lemma, which is normally the case for Origen
fragments in Ps. 118. Secondly, the two interpretations found are also found in Ambrose and/or
Hilary. Thirdly, the catenist’s interpolation mentions Origen by name.
47
HILARY TrPs118, 10.1; AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.6–7.
48
PLATO Charmides 164d–165a, Protagoras 343a–b.
49
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.10: Attende tibi, ut Lex dicit (referring to Dt. 4.9). This whole
paragraph is devoted to this concept of self-knowledge: Nosce te ipsum, homo . . . Cognosce te,
anima . . . This theme is also found elsewhere in Ambrose, e.g. Exameron 4.9.42.
 Body and Soul 49
Another theme found in both Hilary and Ambrose is the different verbs
used to describe man’s creation.50 It has already been mentioned that the
catenist rejects the interpretation that this refers to two separate stages, but it
forms a key part of the analysis for both Latin bishops. Hilary and Ambrose
both point to the relevance of the two different verbs in representing the two
elements of man; both mention other textual variants (the words in aliquibus
codicibus . . . occurring in both authors);51 and both explicitly compare Gen
1.26–7 with Gen 2.7 to point out that the Genesis narrative(s) also contain
different verbs for the creation of the two elements of man. Further, both
authors use this sequence of verbs (first factum, then figuratum/paratum/
plasmatum) to indicate the distinct origins of body and soul. This double
creation of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ man goes back to Philo’s interpretation of
the two chapters of Genesis as describing a ‘heavenly’ man and an ‘earthly’
one; it is also characteristic of Origen.52 This identification of the two chapters
of Genesis with the inner and outer man is found also in both Hilary and
Ambrose,53 and the Pauline old and new man (Col. 3.9–11) are also brought
to bear.54
However, Hilary does not adopt the exegesis of his source uncritically; he
makes changes to his Vorlage if he sees it as theologically questionable. Hilary
‘corrects’ the commentary in two main ways: firstly in his discussion of the
soul as God’s image, which will be treated in Chapter 4, and secondly with
regard to Trinitarian theology. As already mentioned, the Palestinian Catena
and Ambrose’s translation both suggest that the ‘hands of God’ which created
man may be understood as Christ and the Holy Spirit; Hilary, on the other
hand, seems more cautious. When he gets to the parallel point in his discus-
sion of v73a, he starts a sentence suggesting that God (that is, the Father) may
have been accompanied by others when creating man: Since God is understood
either to be speaking to some other when he says ‘let us make man’ . . . 55 but he
does not mention the possibility that God’s ‘hands’ might be Son and Spirit.
(Origen may also have been refuting the idea that God could be praying to
another being, apart from the Son and Spirit).56 Further, the concept of Son
and/or Spirit as the Father’s hands occurs elsewhere in Ambrose and the

50
HILARY TrPs118, 10.3, 7–8; AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.12, 15.
51
Hilary suggests the alternative variant is finxerunt (10.3), whereas Ambrose translates
plasmauerunt (10.12).
52
See for example ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13; c.Celsum 4.37, 7.31; princ. 2.3.2–3.
53
HILARY TrPs118, 10.8; AMBROSE bon. mort. 7.26.
54
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.17 (the Colossians version) is exactly parallel with HILARY
TrPs118, 10.8 (this time the Romans version). It is not clear which of the two Pauline references
was original to Origen.
55
TrPs118, 10.8: . . . quia uel locutus ad alterum Deus intelligitur cum dicit ‘faciamus
hominem’.
56
Elsewhere Origen mentions the heretical opinion that God may have been praying to
another: orat. 24.5, c.Celsum 6.51, both attacking Tatian.
50 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
catena, but again is absent from Hilary.57 Given his particular context in the
full throes of Trinitarian debates, he may have been anxious about any
heterodox statements about the Trinity, and thus deliberately omitted this
notion of the Son and Spirit being the Father’s creative hands, mere subor-
dinate agents of the Father.
On the other hand, Hilary retains the suggestion that other creatures were
made by God’s word, while man’s special dignity required him to be created
by God’s own hands.58 We may assume this was in Origen, because the
catena suggests that, unlike for the other creatures, God himself formed man,
δι’ ἑαυτοῦ ἔπλασε (i.e. the other creatures were created by God’s Word,
whereas man was created by the hands of the Father himself). Ambrose,
however, corrects in the opposite way to Hilary: he maintains the reference
to the Son and Spirit as God’s hands, but omits the point that man was
made by God’s hands and everything else by God’s Word. Perhaps Ambrose
was simply not aware of any problem with a doctrine of the Spirit as God’s
hand. But it would explain why he omits the distinction that man was
made by God’s hands and everything else by God’s Word, which is poten-
tially nonsensical if one of God’s hands (the Son) is itself identical with
God’s Word.
There are considerable shared elements between the commentaries of
Ambrose and Hilary. Since Ambrose is independent of Hilary (as shown for
example by Ambrose citing Job 10.8, which is found in the catena but not in
Hilary),59 any shared elements may very well come from Origen. At the same
time, however, Hilary reinforces his ownership of his text: the Trinitarian
correction here shows that Hilary is anxious to correct any heterodoxy he
perceives in his source. A more important change in this passage (as far as the
current analysis of Hilary’s anthropology is concerned) is his change to
Origen’s presumed assertions about man being ad imaginem dei. This will
be examined in Chapter 4.
For now, however, we move to compare the picture of Hilary’s anthropol-
ogy gained so far with that in another of his key texts, the Commentary on
Matthew.

57
Compare PALESTINIAN CATENA on v73 with AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.17 (absent from
Hilary TrPs118, 10.1–9). Compare also the catena on v173 with Ambrose ExpPs118, 22.22
(absent from Hilary TrPs118, 22.4); the notion also occurs at AMBROSE ExpPs118, 14.31, 19.37.
58
HILARY TrPs118, 10.3–5 (compare AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.9 and 10.12–13).
59
To be fair, this is not entirely conclusive if taken on its own. Job 10.8a is a fairly obvious
verse to cite since the first few words are identical to the lemma Ps. 118.73a; Origen and Ambrose
might therefore have inserted it independently. However, they refer to it in a similar place and as
discussed in Chapter 2 there is enough other evidence for Hilary and Ambrose translating
independently. Moreover, Job 10.8a is cited elsewhere by Origen when discussing the creation
of mankind, e.g. c.Celsum 4.37.
 Body and Soul 51

B O D Y A N D S O U L IN TH E COMMENTARY
O N M A T T H EW

What we have seen so far suggests a basic dichotomous anthropology, and the
situation initially appears no different in his commentary on the Gospel of
Matthew. He refers to a dichotomous model in this work extremely frequently,
not merely juxtaposing body-and-soul but also other elements such as body-
and-mind or flesh-and-spirit rather than body-and-soul.60
Yet while Hilary’s early anthropology is as dichotomous as in his later work,
there may be some small differences across the works. For example, InMt
twice refers to mankind consisting of body-soul-will.61 Another question
arises as to whether Hilary believes the soul is incorporeal, given that one
passage in InMt may suggest otherwise (pp. 53–6). First however, human
creation in InMt and TrPs118 will be compared.

Creation in In Matthaeum(?)

An important question arises as to whether Hilary’s dichotomous understand-

ing of human creation in the Psalms commentary is matched in the Matthew
commentary. The following excerpt, regarding Christ’s teaching on humility,
throws up a couple of phrases which are interesting in this regard.
He states that the Kingdom of Heaven is in the possession of those who live by
humble principles—that is, those who remember that they are human, and are
self-aware that they are made up of filthy, extremely flimsy elements (principia)
and are begotten (procreari) into this perfect bodily form; and who remember
that in this body they grow in the capacity of thought, reflection, discrimination,
and action, while God provides the growth . . . (InMt 4.2)62
For Fierro, this is a passing reference to man’s creation which is equivalent
to the commentary on Ps. 118.73 discussed on pp. 44–5, and particularly
TrPs118, 10.7 He took dust, and the earthly material was fashioned into a
human.63 Even the order of terms corresponds, and he presents them in
tabular form.64

60
HILARY InMt 4.19, 5.4, 5.6, 5.8, 6.3, 8.7, 9.4, 10.17–20, 10.23–4, 11.5, 14.9, 15.5, 16.11,
17.10–11, 17.13, 18.1, 23.2, 27.4, 28.1, 29.2 . . .
61
HILARY InMt 10.23–4, 23.2. See Chapter 6.
62
Igitur humilia spirantes, id est, esse se homines recordantes, in coelestis regni possessione
constituti, conscii sibi ex sordentibus ac tenuissimis se principiis coalitos in hanc formam
perfecti corporis procreari, et in hunc sentiendi, contuendi, iudicandi, agendi sensum, Deo
profectum ministrante, procedere . . .
63
Nam sumitur puluis, et terrena materies formatur in hominem.
64
FIERRO 1964:48.
52 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

. . . terrena materies . . . . . . ex sordentibus ac tenuissimis principiis . . .

. . . formatur . . . . . . coalitos . . .
. . . in hominem . . . in hanc formam perfecti corporis
(TrPs118, 10.7) (InMt 4.2)

While the first column has ‘a very concrete flavour’ and the second is ‘more
philosophical and more abstract’,65 Fierro feels that essentially they are the
same narrative: ‘We have moved from the direct exegesis of a folk story on
Adam’s creation to a systematized theology which attempts to explain the
earthly condition of humankind.’66 Fierro appears to suggest a movement
from ‘folk story’ in TrPs118 to a ‘systematized theology’ in InMt (note also his
placing of columns, with TrPs on the left). Yet this direction of systemization
would be contrary to the chronology, which is generally accepted as placing
InMt many years before the Psalms commentaries (see pp. 10–11).
However, it may be that Fierro has misunderstood the thrust of this passage.
Rather than talking about the general creation of humanity, it is probably
discussing each individual act of creation, or in other words human procre-
ation and growth.
This is supported by the vocabulary. We should be humble when we
remember that our body is derived from elements (principiis) described as
‘filthy and extremely flimsy’ (sordentibus ac tenuissimis). This could indeed
describe earth or dust as in the Genesis narrative, but it probably refers to
human semen, because it is similar to Hilary’s narrative elsewhere of what is
involved in human begetting as opposed to divine begetting (‘those shameful,
soulless elements’, elementa illa inanima ac turpia).67 A similar argument
regarding how life comes out of such insignificant elements is found in
Methodius.68 The notion of human procreation is also supported by the
word coalitos, a word which describes the process of growth (it is used of
the gestation process by Aulus Gellius,69 of bodily formation by Apuleius,70
and of the growth of plants by Columella71). Lastly the word procreari also
points in this direction.

65
de sabor muy concreto . . . más filosófic[o] y abstract[o].
66
FIERRO 1964:49: Hemos pasado de la exégesis directa de un relato popular sobre la
creación de Adán a una teología sistematizada que quiere explicar la condición terrestre del
hombre.
67 68
HILARY trin. 7.28. METHODIUS res. 14.
69
GELLIUS att.noct.12.1.11: Cur igitur iste . . . non id quoque nihil interesse putat, cuius in
corpore cuiusque ex sanguine concretus homo et coalitus sit? (i.e. man is formed in his mother’s
womb from her blood).
70
APULEIUS apologia 38 (of the generation of fish).
71
COLUMELLA res rustica 2.6, 5.11 et passim.
 Body and Soul 53
The fact that this excerpt is about procreation and individual growth is
further confirmed by the context. Hilary talks of each human learning through
their body to think, reflect, discern, and act. After this the passage goes on to
emphasize that we come into the world with nothing, but all have the same
primordia and are given provision for our life; we should therefore imitate
God’s goodness by our dealings with each other. The word primordium can
also be used to indicate part of the process of physical generation, rather than
the genesis of the cosmos.72
All this explains why the human form is here called perfectus: it does not
imply anything about human morality. Rather Hilary is making a point about
the perfection of the physical human form despite the ‘sullying, insubstantial’
elements it is made from—and this is further evidence of God’s goodness.
In sum, then, this passage should not be taken as pertaining to the Genesis
creation narrative, and does not bear a comparison with the creation passage
in Hilary’s Psalms commentaries.

Corporeal Soul in In Matthaeum(?)

One passage in Hilary could be taken to suggest that the soul is corporeal.
Hilary is discussing the nature of the resurrection body, and his argument
develops in the following excerpt:
Everything is bodily, inasmuch as it has substance and is created. The elements of
everything, whether in heaven or earth, visible or invisible, are [physically]
fashioned. Even the genre of souls (whether occupying [our] bodies or exiled
from [our] bodies) still by nature appropriates a bodily substance; for everything
created is necessarily *in* something. (InMt 5.8)73
In the fifth century Claudianus Mamertus criticizes Hilary for this statement
that nothing created is incorporeal (even the genre of souls appropriates a
bodily substance).74
Modern scholars agree that Hilary did not see the soul as corporeal in a
materialistic sense, but otherwise differ as to how to interpret this passage.
Coustant, the eighteenth-century Benedictine editor, suggests a number of

72
COLUMELLA res rustica 6.37.7 (of horse colouring): Quod accidere non aliter reor, quam
ut auitus color primordiis seminum mixtus reddatur nepotibus.
73
Nihil est quod non in substantia sua et creatione corporeum sit: et omnium, siue in coelo
siue in terra, siue uisibilium siue inuisibilium, elementa formata sunt. Nam et animarum species,
siue obtinentium corpora, siue corporibus exsulantium, corpoream tamen naturae suae sub-
stantiam sortiuntur; quia omne quod creatum est, in aliquo sit necesse est.
74
CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS de statu animae 2.9.3.
54 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
possibilities;75 he leaves the reader to choose between them: ‘The whole issue
regards not the substance of the soul, but its manner of subsisting. Let anyone
interpret it as he wishes, as long as he does not believe that Hilary meant by
these words that the soul is in itself corporeal.’76
Fierro suggests that, in the philosophical language of Hilary’s day, ‘corpor-
ality’ can just mean ‘reality’ (i.e. indicating the soul truly exists); his ultimate
solution is that when Hilary calls the soul ‘corporeal’, he merely means it is
created.77 Doignon’s brief comments on this excerpt78 refer to the influence of
Tertullian and the Stoics on Hilary regarding the corporality of the soul; he
again insists that Hilary should not be understood in a materialistic sense here,
but does not suggest an alternative. Most scholars suggest that the soul is called
corporea in the sense that it has an association with a physical body;79 all
insist that Hilary cannot really mean the soul is corporeal in a materialistic
sense, since this would be inconsistent with Hilary’s statements at TrPs 129.6
(see p. 46).
Which of these approaches seems most correct? To answer this, it is
necessary to consider the context of the passage.
Hilary is explaining why we should not worry about food or clothing after
the general resurrection. Unfortunately, the thread of Hilary’s argument is not
entirely clear (as other scholars agree):80 how does corporality explain the
question? It would possibly be more likely for Hilary to have explained this
passage by stating that the soul was incorporeal and had no need for such
things as food and clothing. In all, Hilary’s reasoning here is initially unclear.
Hilary’s entire commentary here is based on the understanding that
‘tomorrow’ in Mt. 7.30–4 refers to the Last Times; so he interprets the Sermon
on the Mount eschatologically (InMt 5.7–15, interpreting Mt. 6.25–7.5). For
example, the well-dressed lilies of the field represent the angels and humans
at the general resurrection. The hay of the fields burned in the furnace
represents the fire of judgement reserved for non-believers. ‘Do not judge
lest ye be judged’ refers specifically to the Last Judgement. Hilary often
elsewhere shows an interest in the transformation of our bodies at the

75
COUSTANT Patrologia Latina 9 col. 945–6, fn.(e). See PL 9 col. 946–8, fn.(f) and
Coustant’s analysis of TrPs118, 19.8 (anima corporalis) at PL 9:629 C–D, fn.(a); and his
comments in his Praefatio Generalis at PL 9:120D–121A.
76
COUSTANT Patrologia Latina 9 col. 946–8, fn.(f): tota quaestio non de animae substantia,
sed de subsistendi modo uersetur. Sed haec interpretetur quisque ut uolet, modo non credat
Hilarium iis dictis animam in se ipsa corpoream uoluisse.
77
FIERRO 1964:23–7.
78
DOIGNON 2007a:159, fn.9. See also 1971:313 and fn.3 where Doignon states that Hilary
relies on Tertullian’s theory of the soul’s corporality, and 1971:383: fn.1 rejecting a materialistic
understanding of corporality.
79
As well as the authors cited, see also WILD 1950:127–8; BURNS 1981:119–22.
80
FIERRO 1964:228f.; COUSTANT Patrologia Latina 9: 945–6, fn.(e).
 Body and Soul 55
resurrection81 and this is also true in this part of the commentary; for example
InMt 5.11 is more specific about how we become more like the angels.
In talking about the resurrection body, Hilary uses the language of 1Cor. 15.
For example, the language of being ‘clothed’ occurs at 1Cor. 15.53, 54 and
indeed Hilary has already used it earlier in commentating the Sermon on the
Mount (we too will be made splendid by his glorious body, and will be
clothed).82 The link between clothing and the resurrection transformation is
continued in InMt 5.11 (on the lilies of the field) so the link may be assumed in
our excerpt too. So Hilary is not talking about a ‘bodily’ soul but about the
‘embodied’ soul in the context of the resurrection body.
Thus Hilary is referring not to a disembodied soul, but to nature of bodies
that contain souls (and specifically, to the post-resurrection body as de-
scribed by Paul in 1Cor. 15). In short, Hilary is not saying that a soul is
intrinsically physical or corporeal; rather, his argument regards the nature of
the resurrection body.
The language of 1Cor. 15 refers to the ‘body’ both before and after the
resurrection. Although the second body is very different from the first, they are
nevertheless both explicitly described as bodies. This explains why Hilary is
discussing corporality here: he is trying to express (albeit somewhat impre-
cisely) the difference between the pre- and post-resurrection bodies: one is
material and one is spiritual, but both are bodies (cf. 1Cor. 15.35–57). Admit-
tedly his language is unclear, because he talks of souls in the abstract sense
(‘exiled from bodies’), but asserts they are still embodied (‘everything is
bodily’). But essentially when Hilary states ‘the genre of souls . . . still appro-
priate a bodily substance’, he is reasserting the Pauline teaching that the
resurrection body is truly ‘real’, even if not material.
This is confirmed by the argument of the passage. In answering the question
about future food and drink, then, Hilary’s answer is provided by the sen-
tences that immediately follow the excerpt cited at the beginning of this
section.
God demonstrates how absurd this pointless question is. Body and soul are to be
placed in an eternal substance, so he does not allow our future hope in the
resurrection to be sidetracked by concern for food and clothing. Otherwise we
insult the one who restores far more precious things (that is, the body and soul)
on the basis that he has failed to do less important things. (InMt 5.8)83

81
HILARY InMt 4.3, 4.7, 10.4, 33.9. Found also in Hilary’s other works, for example trin.
11.49 (see pp. 71–3), TrPs118, 3.3.
82
InMt 4.3: nos quoque gloria clarificati eius corporis uestiemur.
83
Atque ideo ineptiam inutilissimae quaestionis Deus arguens, non patitur, anima et corpore
in aeternitatis substantia collocandis, spem nostram futuri in resurrectione cibi et uestitus
sollicitudine demorari: ne tanto pretiosa reddenti, corpus scilicet atque animam, contumelia in
non efficiendis leuioribus inferatur.
56 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
If God can achieve the restoration of body and soul, then food and clothing are
a minor issue (levior) by comparison.
So Hilary is struggling to articulate the difference between a material and a
spiritual body, before and after the resurrection, which is what he is trying to
articulate in the phrase (animarum species) sive obtinentium corpora, sive
corporibus exsulantium. This is further confirmed by his reference shortly
beforehand to our future substantia aeternitatis, a phrase which he uses
elsewhere when talking of the resurrection body.84 When our flesh has been
transformed, then whatever the nature of the resurrection body may be, it still
has what Hilary can refer to as ‘substance’: so this is what he is trying to
emphasize in referring to its physicality.
Hilary’s statement ‘everything is bodily . . . even the genre of souls appro-
priates a bodily substance’ is therefore insisting that the resurrection soul is
truly in a body. However, this is not a Platonic reference to a soul which can
potentially be elsewhere. Here, by the nature of things the soul is integrated
with the body and cannot be separated. That is the very point of Hilary’s
statement. The question is not whether Hilary believes the soul is corporeal in
abstracto, but whether the soul can separate from the body at all; one should
not press the point as to whether he thinks the soul is ‘corporeal’ when it is not
embodied. Other scholars assume a separable soul, where one could indeed
question its physicality; but that is not in evidence here, and so the abstract
soul’s corporality is not at issue.
Further, none of the scholars mentioned considers the possibility of a
difference in Hilary’s thought across his works; the assumption is made that
Hilary must be consistent. However, it is suggested here that the different
vocabulary points to different influences playing in Hilary’s different works.

HILARY’ S IN FL UE NCE S

With the evidence presented above, is it accurate to see a ‘Platonic’ angle in

Hilary’s dichotomous anthropology, as implied by some of the analyses
mentioned on pp. 40–3? Although Hilary scholars shy away from crediting
him with Platonism proper, many still make generalizations about Hilary’s
work that imply strong affinities with Platonic thought. Or is Burns the more
accurate, in seeing Hilary as influenced only by Stoic thought?
As already mentioned, the very question is to some degree invalid. By the
fourth century, Stoicism did not really exist as a separate school, and Platon-
ism had absorbed much of Stoic thought. The doctrines covered by the labels

84
InMt 5.8, 5.15; TrPs 52.16, 134.22, 148.3, 148.5. Hilary also uses expressions such as natura
aeternitatis (InMt 16.5, TrPs 148.5).
 Body and Soul 57
‘Platonic’ and ‘Stoic’ overlap considerably by this period, so they are used here
with a degree of circumspection and as characteristic of a classical school
rather than reflecting thought contemporary to Hilary.

Separability?

One example of a philosophical idea seen in Hilary is the issue of the

‘separable’ soul. The two components, body and soul, are seen as inherently
alien to each other and they may potentially (and ideally) be disjoined from
each other. For the soul, the body is an alien thing (rem non suam)85 or a
foreign land (regione non tua).86 The soul dwells in the body as a foreigner
(peregrinus) and Hilary advises that one should make an effort to leave the
body: The Apostle knows the status of this dwelling, and says that he must travel
away from the body and abide with Christ.87
In TrPs118, 8.5 Hilary suggests the need to ‘leave the world’ which he
expresses as (among other things) rebuffing the effects of the body while still
in this mortal life, and not waiting until after death: What profit is there in only
leaving this world when the body is dead and rotted and the soul has left it?88
Hilary is suggesting his reader should strive for the soul to avoid the effects
of the body while still in this life. At another point, Hilary interprets the
psalmist as regretting the association of soul and body:89 The soul, which has a
different origin, is believed to be stuck to bodily earth, maintaining an immense
struggle so that while it abides in the body it may tear itself from fellowship with
it . . . 90 His implication is that, by dint of an ‘immense struggle’, the soul can
somehow struggle free from the effects of the body to which it is ‘stuck’.
Elsewhere he even goes so far as to suggest that the body is the soul’s prison:
Our souls with their invisible form are held within our bodies—a dark, shadowy
dwelling; and our kindly heavenly nature is imprisoned in this poisonous
abode.91
One way in which Hilary expresses the different realms of body and soul is
by illustrating the soul as a bird, soaring far from the earth which represents
the body. This relates to (Neo)Platonism inasmuch as it illustrates a concept of

85 86
TrPs118, 3.8. TrPs118, 14.18.
87
TrPs118, 3.8: nouit incolatus huius Apostolus ordinem, dicens peregrinandum a corpore et
cum Christo manendum esse.
88
TrPs118, 8.5: Quid enim merces est, emortuis corporibus et exeunte anima dissolutis
saeculum reliquisse?
89
TrPs118, 4.1–2 commenting on Ps. 118.25.
90
TrPs118, 4.1: anima quae alterius originis est terrae corporis adhaesisse creditur, maximum
ipsa certamen suscipiens ut se, manens in eo, ab eius societate diuellat.
91
TrPs 119.14: In hoc enim obscuro tenebrosoque corporum habitaculo, inuisibilis illa
animarum nostrarum conformatio continetur: habetque hunc contagiosi incolatus sui carcerem,
coelestis naturae captiua generositas.
58 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
the heavy body weighing down the light, ethereal soul. In commenting on Ps.
118.110 (Sinners have laid a trap for me, and I have not strayed from your
commands), Hilary talks about the devil and his angels laying snares for us. He
compares this to the snares laid for birds, which by nature are heavenly but
which, through traps, may be constrained to earth.
You are well-versed in the subject-matter of heavenly things; what business do
you have with earthly works and deeds? You have been made a bird! Why do you
not stay in the element that suits your nature? . . . Why do you complain about a
harmful trap that is in a zone you do not belong to? . . . It is the nature of birds to
rest when they are not flying; but you have become a dove and rest while flying.
That is, [you rest] when bearing yourself away, by a faithful soul’s flight, from
earthly traps towards your heavenly nest and knowledge. (TrPs118, 14.18)92
The homo eruditus is compared to a bird, and while the snares are not here
explicitly associated with the body or the flesh they are certainly associated
with the earth, which represents the body. Again, the implication is that it is
somehow possible in this life to escape the effects of the body, and Hilary’s
words to the homo eruditus suggest that the learned man can achieve exactly
such a freedom of soul from body—as may be deduced by Hilary’s use of the
present tense (volando requiescis = you rest while flying).
All such references could be taken to imply a Platonic kind of separability in
Hilary’s works. So is the above evidence of Platonic influence? Four points
may be made.
Firstly, body–soul dualism is not uniquely Platonic. As Doignon himself
points out, Cicero also has a dichotomous anthropology and mentions the
‘separable’ soul in flight towards its divine source.93 Annas94 points out that
late Roman Stoics in particular give an almost Platonic contrast between body
and soul (Seneca’s view of the body as prison of the soul has already been
mentioned, p. 42). Also, as discussed (p. 41) there is no evidence whatsoever of
the Platonic tripartite soul in Hilary—something Stoics categorically
rejected.95
Still, classical Stoic thought is normally characterized as seeing a closer bond
between body and soul, which (pace Seneca) are usually seen as more inte-
grated. Annas points out how this relates to the Stoic interest in contemporary
medical developments, where the soul is seen in a more biological way as
relating to the body’s life force.96 This brings us to the second point: that as

92
In coelestem scientiam homo eruditus es: quid tibi cum terrenis operibus et gestis est? Auis
effectus es: cur non in naturae tuae elemento moraris? [ . . . ] Quid quereris iniuriam laquei in
regione non tua? [ . . . ] Natura auium est, ut non cum uolent requiescant: tu autem, iam factus
columba, uolando requiescis, id est, in coelestem te sedem et cognitionem a laqueis terrenis
uolatu fidelis animae efferendo.
93
DOIGNON 2005:136 cites CICERO lael. 4.14, nat.deor. 1.20.54, disp. tusc. 1.27.66, 5.25.70.
94 95 96
ANNAS 1992:55. ANNAS 1992:115–20. ANNAS 1992:20–5.
 Body and Soul 59
well as ‘Platonic’ metaphors, Hilary uses language which is more proper to
traditional ‘Stoic’ thought. For example, in commenting on Ps. 118.151, Hilary
presents the ubiquity of God as similar to the ubiquity of the soul throughout
the body: There is nothing which is empty of God; he is everywhere, like the soul
in the body.97 For Hilary, the soul is not split when limbs are amputated.
Another longer passage in Hilary’s de Trinitate presents the same kind of idea
(the context is the suffering of Christ).
It is the nature of bodies that when they associate with a soul, and are roused by
the sentient soul into having some kind of sensation, then they are not dumb and
lifeless . . . Since the soul somehow pervades and permeates bodies, the latter feel
pleasure or pain according to the circumstances . . . (trin. 10.14)98
Various words throughout this part of de Trinitate emphasize the intermin-
gling of body and soul: consortium, transcursus, transfusa, admixtio. It should
be emphasized that these are consistent with Platonic influences. Still, the very
notion of the soul used in a ‘medical’ way to explain the body’s perception of
pain or pleasure belongs to other schools, such as Aristotelian or Stoic. The
close bond between body and soul is also expressed by other phrases such as
animae corporalis, corporis nostri anima, corporis mens.
Thirdly, all the above examples come from the Psalms commentaries; and in
many cases Hilary’s comments can explicitly be traced back to Origen. For
example, the use of the devil’s snares entrapping our heavenly spiritual nature
also occurs in Ambrose’s interpretation of Ps. 118.110, and thus is likely to go
back to Origen.99 But Origen’s influence is not only ‘Platonic’: for example
Hilary’s passage commenting on Ps. 118.151 (Nothing is empty of God . . . ) is
similar to a passage in Ambrose illustrating the same lemma.100 This again
suggests that it was present in Origen, but this time it is if anything a more
‘Stoic’ idea that Hilary has received from the Alexandrian. It is thus more proper
to point directly to the influence of Origen, rather than to Plato or the Stoics.
Fourthly, and most significantly, there is a question as to how far Hilary
really sees the soul as separable. In her article on Hilary’s anthropology,
Rondeau identifies passages suggesting the ‘flight or fall’ tension between
body and soul, but suggests that it is wrong to read them in a dualist way.101
For example, she shows the passage depicting two sparrows as body and soul
in InMt actually points to the unity of body and soul (this passage will be

97
HILARY TrPs118, 19.8: Nihil a Deo uacat . . . Ubique est, modo animae corporalis.
98
ea enim natura corporum est, ut ex consortio animae in sensum quemdam animae
sentientis animata, non sit hebes inanimisque materies. [ . . . ] ex quodam enim obtinentis se
penetrantisque animae transcursu, secundum ea in quibus erit, aut oblectatur, aut laeditur.
99
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 14.39: auis es, o homo . . . [ . . . ] Quid enim te in terram deiicis, qui
iam coelum petebas? [ . . . ] Ante quasi praedam suam diabolus suo iure capiebat [ . . . ] Auertat a
nobis Deus hos laqueos, quos super peccatores pluit.
100 101
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 19.41. RONDEAU 1962:204–10.
60 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
discussed further on pp. 63–4). She explains other passages this way, showing
that Hilary’s soteriology is not so much about soul escaping body as about the
latter transforming into the former’s nature: ‘Man inclines towards unity. In
the same way, Christ brings about the synthesis of our inner and outer
man.’102 Rondeau is correct regarding Hilary’s soteriology and the associated
anthropology. However, she fails to identify differences between Hilary’s texts
on this matter; this will be resolved on pp. 63–5.
In fact, it can even be counterproductive for scholars to assume a Platonic-
style separability in reading Hilary. On pp. 53–6, this assumption of separ-
ability led to the passage being interpreted as referring to a ‘corporeal soul’,
when in fact it was referring to the embodied soul. Indeed, in that passage
Hilary is assuming that a living soul cannot exist without a body (i.e. his
reference to the soul implies a living being in entirety). This is a Stoic
approach, not a Platonic one.
Thus, on the issue of separability it is not possible to place Hilary squarely in
the box of Platonic thought. As might be expected for this period, he draws on
ideas from a number of schools and many of his ideas are compatible with
classical Stoicism. Nevertheless, the labels are arguably unhelpful; it would be
better merely to describe Hilary’s soteriology as being about transformation of
the body, rather than escaping it.

Soul Corrupted by Body?

Another ‘Platonic’ idea which scholars identify in Hilary’s thought is a simple

good–bad dualism. He indeed frequently hints that the body is somehow bad
or causes sin, whereas the soul represents the spiritual element which is
inherently ‘good’ and seeks after God. This position is emphasized in
Doignon103 and Fierro.104 For example, Doignon likes to point to some
Stoic influence in Hilary, but his articulation of Hilary’s anthropology is fairly
‘Platonic’ in how he expresses the body (‘Man, being carnal, is engrossed by
the concerns of the body and ignores God’s appeals . . . ’)105 and the soul (‘The
presence of an incorporeal substance endowed with Reason marks the first
stage in God’s project to make man in his own image’).106

102
RONDEAU 1962:209: l’homme . . . tend vers l’unité. De même, en nous, le Christ opère la
fusion de l’homme intérieur et de l’homme exterieur.
103
See for example DOIGNON 1989; 2005:118–43.
104
FIERRO 1964:13–69.
105
DOIGNON 2005:120: L’homme charnel est . . . occupé par les soucis du corps, négligeant . . .
les requêtes . . . de Dieu.
106
DOIGNON 2005:128: La présence d’une substance raisonnable et incorporelle . . . marque
la première étape du projet de Dieu faisant l’homme à son image.
 Body and Soul 61
It is indeed true that Hilary says these, but again a subtler analysis is
worthwhile. Before proceeding, however, it is worth reiterating that, even if
dualism does characterize Hilary’s thought, this is still not necessarily a result
purely of Platonic influences. As already mentioned, dualistic language does
appear in Scripture alongside the tripartite model, for example with the sharp
opposition between flesh and mind/spirit at Rom. 7.23 or Rom. 8. 5, 12.
It has already been mentioned (p. 44) how Hilary uses concepts such as
weakness (infirmitas, morbiditas) and stain (sordes, labes) to describe the body
in his Psalms commentaries. The earthly stain results in our corruption, which
in turn means that, without help, death is inevitable.107 Hilary may even use
the language of coercion: bodily nature, . . . through the spurs of the vices, forces
us to be imperfect.108 Conversely, the soul can transform the body in a positive
way.109 For Fierro, it is only the body that needs change if we are to attain
salvation. Fierro’s book Sobre la Gloria en San Hilario suggests that for Hilary,
salvation essentially entails glorification of the body, and this is the most
important part of Hilary’s eschatology.110 For him, salvation entails glorifica-
tion of the body only, not the soul: ‘Glorification is a matter for the body alone,
in which the soul can only benefit indirectly’ (my emphasis).111 Fierro even
goes so far as to suggest Hilary is different from Origen in this regard: he finds
that Origen has body and mind alike conforming to Christ’s glory, whereas for
Hilary it is the body alone.112 Fierro does not talk of any need for the soul to be
saved, apart from where its association with the body is concerned.
Rondeau also sees the body as primarily associated with sin and hindering
our progress, although she admits sins of the soul: ‘Although sins of body and
soul are mentioned, and even of soul alone, there is far more often an
association of sin with the body . . . Even if it says specifically once or twice
that it is not the body which sins but the flawed will,113 he repeatedly uses the
shorthand phrase of the “body’s sins”.’114
On the other hand, Rondeau (like other scholars) does see that there are
plenty of counterexamples to this simplistic body-bad–soul-good model. For
example, although Hilary often calls our body ‘corpus peccati’115 he also uses

107
p. 93.
108
TrPs118, 3.6: [Taceo de] naturis corporum, quae nos . . . per incentiua uitiorum imperfec-
tos esse compellunt.
109 110
TrPs118, 3.3: nisi glorificato in naturam spiritus corpora . . . FIERRO 1964:253.
111
FIERRO 1964:254: La clarificación es asunto exclusivo del cuerpo, en el cual sólo indir-
ectamente puede beneficiarse el alma.
112 113
FIERRO 1964:336. Rondeau refers to InMt 4.21, 11.23–4, TrPs 120.7.
114
RONDEAU 1962:202: S’il est parfois question des péchés de l’âme et du corps, et même de
l’âme seule, la liaison est beaucoup plus fréquente entre corps et péché [ . . . ] Même s’il est
expressément dit une ou deux fois que ce n’est pas le corps qui pèche, mais la volonté vicieuse, le
raccourci d’expression est constant qui parle des péchés du corps.
115
For example, TrPs 62.1, 135.6, 142.2. He frequently uses caro peccati especially by
reference to Rom. 8.3 (God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh).
62 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
more neutral language. For example, in de mysteriis Hilary suggests Adam’s
body was merely lifeless matter stirred by a living soul.116 Indeed Hilary
specifically says that the body is not ultimately responsible for sin. He urges
us not to misunderstand the words of Jesus that ‘if the eye causes you to sin,
tear it out’:117 of course, it is pointless removing the foot—which lacks any sense
of desire—since the foot is not responsible for the punishment.118 Thus he does
not see the bodily member (here the foot) as having caused the sin. Hilary
finishes the passage by reminding us that there is no point in mutilating the
body without reforming the interior: amputating bodily members might be
useful if the heart could also be excised!119 Indeed Hilary often may speak of the
body very positively: not only is it perfectum,120 but it is an intrinsic part of us
that will also participate in the resurrection.121 Hilary admits it seems odd to
wish for the body’s resurrection, but reassures us that it is right to do so: it is
difficult, but certainly true, that we should hope for the body’s eternity just as
much as the soul’s.122
Complementing this, there is plenty of evidence that Hilary actually sees the
soul as being the instigator of much of human sin. For example, he strings
together faults of the soul with those of a body and the world: He is a blessed
man, when he represses the vices of the flesh, and subdues the soul’s wantonness,
and conquers his hunger for avarice, and shuns the glory of earthly honours.123
Although this may merely be rhetoric, the soul is elsewhere referred to as
potentially anima infidelis,124 and the superbia animae insolentis125 is cen-
sured. Most explicitly, the animae perversitas is related to the cor deflexum as
something that can result in straying from the law of God.126 These phrases
seem to indicate that error may be an inherent flaw of the soul itself, regardless
of what arises from association with the body. In explaining Mt. 6.22 (Your eye
is a lamp for your body) he states that the ‘eye’ here refers to the ‘heart’s light’.
It is that which resolves whether the body remains dark, or attains to light.
But if [the heart’s light] is dark with sins and has a flawed will, then bodily nature
will be subject to the mind’s defects. (InMt, 5.4)127

116 117
myst. 1.5. Mt. 5.29.
118
InMt 4.21: certe pes sensu concupiscentiae carens damno inutilis est, in quem poenae
causa non incidet.
119
Ibid. esset autem abscisio membrorum utilis, si et cordis esse posset exsectio.
120
InMt 4.2.
121
InMt 16.5: sicut aeternitas naturae nostrae corpus accepit; ita cognoscendum est, naturam
corporis nostri aeternitatis assumere posse uirtutem.
122
TrPs 62.3: arduum autem, sed maxime uerum est, aeternitatem ita corporis ut animae
sperare.
123
TrPs118, 1.2: hic beatus est, dum uitia carnis coercet, dum animi petulantiam edomat,
dum auaritiae famem uincit, dum terrenorum honorum gloriam euitat.
124 125 126
TrPs118, 3.14. TrPs118, 3.17. TrPs118, 1.14.
127
Si autem [lumen cordis] obscurum peccatis, et uoluntate erit nequam, uitiis mentis natura
corporis subiacebit.
 Body and Soul 63
Thus the terrestrial flesh may encumber us but its effects are compounded by
the will and the vices of the mind. Here again the body is just one of many
factors that can bring the Christian down, and the iniquities of the mind seem
to be more significant than those of the body since they can overcome the
effects of the latter.

Differences across Hilary’s Works

So far here the question of Hilary’s anthropology has been discussed without
particularly highlighting differences between his texts. However, a direct
comparison is instructive.
The basic position is more or less the same across all Hilary’s works.
Everywhere, the basic body-and-soul dichotomous model is not only present
but emphasized. The body is earthly and terrestrial, and may be described
throughout as polluting and corrupting, sick or weak;128 the soul’s role is
to stay aloof from it and, when the time comes, contribute to the body’s
glorification.
At a more detailed level, however, there are hints of a difference in em-
phasis. For example, consider the reference to the ‘corporeal’ (embodied) soul
at InMt 5.8. The discussion there suggested a more integrated or infused
understanding of the body–soul union, very different to the separable soul
of TrPs 129.6 which is specifically referred to as incorporeus. Fierro and
Coustant both assume consistency across Hilary’s work and attempt to har-
monize these two works. However, it may be that this difference in vocabulary
should be allowed to stand.
The two texts also differ on separability. For example, we have seen that the
metaphor of the soul as a bird in flight seems to imply separability in the
Psalms commentaries. Initially the Matthew commentary might appear to
have the same metaphor: Hilary describes spiritual persons as birds fed on
heavenly bread so that they can fly;129 even wicked spirits can be represented
by birds,130 since they are a metaphor for anything spiritual. He also refers to
the body’s sins as weighing one down (bodily sins weigh us down far more
when they are complemented by souls’ desires).131 But as Rondeau points out,
none of this implies a separation of soul and body. The most notable bird

128
Examples from the Psalms commentaries are given on pp. 46–7. Also found in the
Matthew commentary, e.g. InMt 5.4.
129
InMt 22.4: Saginata uero [hostia] sunt homines spiritales, tamquam coelesti pane ad
euolandum aues pastae, caeteros accepti cibi ubertate expleturae.
130
InMt 5.9: sub nomine uolucrum exemplo nos immundorum spirituum adhortatur. Also
7.10: uolucres autem coeli saepe numero immundos spiritus cognominari didicimus.
131
InMt 5.4: longeque magis peccata corporum ingrauescere, si etiam cupiditatibus adiuuen-
tur animorum.
64 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
analogy occurs when Hilary interprets Mt. 10.29 (are not two sparrows sold for
an ass?) as referring to the ‘two sparrows’ of body and soul, sold to sin for the
sake of minor peccadilloes:
But if they should fly, they would be one: in other words, the body’s nature would
change into that of the soul. The earthy material’s heaviness would be effaced and
transformed into the free-moving substance of the soul, and the body would
become spiritual instead. Conversely, when souls have been sold for the price of
sins, the weightless soul becomes weighed down into a bodily nature; it develops
earthy matter due to the filth of its defects, and becomes one of those which are
consigned to the earth. (InMt 10.19)132
Here the soul’s natural predisposition to fly is prevented by the weighing-
down of the earthly body, heavy in its sins. Yet as Rondeau shows, even the
reference to the ‘sparrows’ of body and soul, which fail to fly due to the body’s
weight, urges the need for body and soul to be integrated together;133 it
categorically does not talk of the soul being separated from the body.
Other differences occur. For example, many scholars point to the ‘double
creation’ as contributing to Hilary’s dichotomous model (pp. 44–5). However,
this belongs to the Psalms commentaries, and we know it is based on Origen;
there is absolutely no reference whatsoever to the ‘double creation’ in InMt.
Likewise the Psalms commentaries speak of the captivity or enslavement of the
mind to the body;134 but this does not occur in InMt. Rondeau also notes this:
‘The motif of the body as prison of the soul trying to escape seems to be absent
from In Matthaeum. When this motif appears in the In Psalmos it is often
ambiguous.’135 Although her intention here is to demonstrate that Hilary is
not so dualist as first might appear, she also picks up on a difference between
the two texts.
It should be emphasized that any difference between the two texts is more of
degree than kind, and there is no evidence for a categorical shift in Hilary’s
thought. For example, the Matthew commentary also speaks of the body’s
need for spiritualization before salvation can occur,136 or of its corruptive
effect on the soul.137 Conversely, the Psalms commentaries speak of the soul as

132
Quemadmodum autem si euolarent, unum essent, id est corpus in naturam animae
transisset, et grauitas illa terrenae materiae in profectum et substantiam animae aboleretur,
fieretque corpus potius spiritale: ita peccatorum pretio uenditis, in naturam corporum animae
subtilitas ingrauescit, et terrenam contrahit ex uitiorum sorde materiem, fitque unum ex illis
quod tradatur in terram.
133 134
InMt 10.19. For example, TrPs 125.4.
135
RONDEAU 1962:206: Le thème . . . du corps comme prison de l’âme qui aspire à s’en
évader semble absent de l’In Matthaeum. (Rondeau footnotes InMt 24.11 as a possible exception
to this). Son apparition dans l’In Psalmos est souvent ambiguë.
136
InMt 10.18–19.
137
InMt 5.12 Et haec . . . merces est, ut in nouam coelestemque substantiam ex hac corrupti-
bilis corporis materie transferantur.
 Body and Soul 65
culpable as much as the body, as we have seen. Across all of Hilary’s work,
both the corrupting effects of the body and the redeeming effects of the faithful
soul are found. Words such as labes, sordens, (im)mundus, and pollutus occur
in InMt with almost exactly the same frequency as in TrPs118.
But in other areas, differences in vocabulary are empirically discernible:
the word infirmitas is only half as common in the Matthew commentary138
(and nearly a third of instances occur in Hilary’s last three chapters in the
context of Christ’s passion) while the TrPs is much more likely to speak in
terms of foedus, (ad)misceo, adhaerere, and cognates when referring to the
body–soul relationship. Thus, cumulative evidence suggests a slight difference
in emphasis with regard to theology or at least vocabulary, and there is a
case for suggesting that InMt demonstrates a more integrated anthropology,
although even TrPs may be muting the separability of body and soul, as
Rondeau suggests.

DISCU SSION

So in conclusion, what are Hilary’s most obvious cultural influences apart

from Scripture?
Starting with his Matthew commentary, there certainly is evidence for the
dichotomous body–soul model where the body does indeed weigh down the
spiritual soul. However, this need not be due to Platonic influence alone, and
nor should it be taken simplistically. For example, at two points he refers to
humans as being composed of body-soul-will (see further Chapter 6). More-
over, as Rondeau points out, he appears to have a more integrated view of the
body and soul: Christian life is not about separating the body and soul, but
about transforming the body’s nature into the soul’s so that both may soar
together. For Hilary, the body is as much to be saved as the soul is.
Moving now to the Psalms commentary, Hilary’s vocabulary seems to
express slightly more separability of body and soul and occasionally the
analogy that the soul must escape the body. However, it has already been
shown that Hilary is using Origen’s commentary. Hence the influence on
Hilary here should be seen as Origenian rather than strictly Platonic. At the
same time Hilary is avoiding any extreme position, and still always emphasizes
the body will also be saved.
Later in this book, ideas more in keeping with traditional Stoic influences
will be demonstrated, in particular Hilary’s concept of the weakened will and
human psychology. However it should be reiterated that ‘Platonic’ and ‘Stoic’

138
This refers only to infirmitas used in an anthropological sense. References to Jesus healing
the sick (infirmi, etc.) are common but are not counted here.
66 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

are labels characterizing doctrines of earlier periods; by the fourth century, it is

not surprising to find that Hilary’s articulations should be more eclectic and
draw elements from all schools of thought.
Yet much of the evidence for Hilary’s anthropology—found in the Psalms
commentaries—shows the influence not of any particular (pagan) philosoph-
ical school but of Origen; and this is exactly as would be expected in a
translated work. Nevertheless, comparison with Hilary’s Matthew commen-
tary (and other works) allows us to assess Hilary’s anthropology in another
context. Although Hilary still sees the body as a potentially negative influence,
the same can be said of the soul; and there is no evidence of a separable soul,
unlike in the Psalms commentaries. Yet even in the Psalms commentaries, as
Rondeau suggests, Hilary’s statements are relatively muted when it comes to
separability. It may be that Hilary is indeed ‘softening’ Origen’s theology.
However, most differences between the works are merely in emphasis rather
than in theology. Even if he can call the soul ‘corporea’ in one work and
‘incorporea’ in another, these evince different contexts and debates rather than
properly a shift in theology.
 4

The Human as Imago Dei

I N T R O D U C TI O N

The previous chapter highlighted how some scholars question whether

Hilary’s thought is more properly Stoic or Platonic. This chapter will illustrate
a similar debate about Hilary’s thought, this time more theological than
philosophical: is his articulation of imago doctrine essentially Origenian?
Hilary uses the concepts imago and similitudo in a variety of different ways,
of which three in particular may be noted. Firstly, the exegetical: ‘image’ is
used to express analogies, types or presaging (for example, current realities are
an ‘image’ of things to come). Secondly, the Christological: one articulation of
the Son is as image of the Father. Thirdly, there is the anthropological. These
three usages overlap, but here we concentrate on the issue of humanity as
being ad imaginem dei. Other uses will only be discussed inasmuch as they
affect the anthropological.
This chapter will show that Hilary only evinces any Origenian influence in
the Psalms commentaries; his other works show no evidence of supposed
‘Alexandrian’ imago theology at all. Not only do his imago doctrines have
more in common with Latin authors but Hilary even appears to write Origen’s
doctrine of the ‘lost image’ out of his text. This is an example of Hilary editing
out theologies he disagrees with (see also for example his avoidance of the
concept that Son and Spirit are God’s hands (pp. 49–50), and his rejection of
the Fall into bodies (pp. 84–8)).
The phrase ‘imago theology’ will be taken to include the issue of likeness to
God, similitudo dei.

CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP

Some scholars see Hilary’s imago anthropology as essentially Origenian.

Pelland and Cantalamessa take Hilary as differing from other early theolo-
gians outside the Alexandrian tradition (which for Cantalamessa essentially
68 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
means Clement, Origen, and those influenced by Origen such as Athansius
and the Cappadocians).1 For example, Irenaeus and Tertullian include the
body in the concepts of ‘image and likeness’, giving a much more positive
view of physical aspects of humanity (these two theologians will be used in
this chapter as benchmarks of non-‘Alexandrian’ imago theology). Against
this, Pelland sees Hilary and Origen as making only the soul part of the imago,
thus suggesting a more negative view of the body. Cantalamessa (1980) has a
similar analysis, placing Hilary squarely in his so-called ‘Alexandrian’ trad-
ition. Cantalamessa examines imago theology throughout the patristic period
and identifies two separate streams of thought. He finds one in Western and
Antiochene authors (Irenaeus, Tertullian, Theodore), where the body and
soul together form the human in God’s image, and Christ is seen as ‘visible’
image of God; the other stream is the ‘Alexandrian’ tradition, where it is the
human nous alone which is in God’s image, and the Logos alone is the
invisible image of the invisible God. Interestingly, Cantalamessa sees Hilary
as merging these two streams, while essentially representing the culmination
of the ‘Alexandrian’ tradition: ‘The apex of the Alexandrian tradition, and the
most sophisticated attempt at synthesis with the other tradition, occur not an
Alexandrian author but a Latin one: Hilary of Poitiers.’2
In order to examine the extent to which this might be true, it is worth
comparing Hilary’s articulation of imago theology across his commentaries.

IMAGO AS EXPRESSION OF OUR

CREATION AND P ROGRESSION

The anthropological uses of imago theology are found in Hilary’s commen-

taries and particularly his commentaries on the Psalms. In the commentaries
he uses imago to describe (a) human creation in relation to God, and (b) the
dichotomy between the imago terreni and imago caelesti.
These two anthropological uses of imago are mutually consistent, in as
much as they denote stages of human development and human progress as
a result of Christ’s saving work; they are found predominantly in Hilary’s
Psalms commentaries. Before examining these, however, a passage from his
Matthew commentary will illustrate some key aspects of Hilary’s imago
anthropology across his works. This passage demonstrates that these two

1
PELLAND 1983a:430–4; CANTALAMESSA 1980:358.
2
CANTALAMESSA 1980:358.
 The Human as Imago Dei 69
uses are in harmony with each other as an expression of human development
from creation to the eschaton.
In his Matthew commentary, Hilary almost always uses the words imago
and similitudo to describe a hermeneutical approach, or for illustrations.3
However, one passage uses these terms in their anthropological sense. The
time of our own (potential) transformation is the moment Christ sends out the
twelve apostles to the villages of Judaea (Mt. 10.5–8).
Then all of the Lord’s powerful strength was transferred to the apostles. Those
who were formed in Adam in God’s image and likeness now become the perfect
image and likeness of Christ, with exactly the same powers as their Lord; and
those who previously had been earthly now became heavenly. (InMt 10.4)4
The first key point in this passage, typical throughout Hilary’s corpus, is that
we are created ‘in God’s image and likeness’ (cf. Gen. 1.26–7). For Hilary this
is fundamental to our creation. In the long passage on human creation
discussed in the previous chapter,5 commenting on the lemma Ps. 118.73, he
uses the word imago sixteen times, proposing it as a key part of understanding
humanity and its creation. Humans should remember that they are made in
God’s image and likeness.6 For Hilary, the fact that we are in God’s image
means that we understand that our purpose is to worship God; this is what
makes us different from the animals.7
This excerpt also raises Hilary’s second important use of imago anthropol-
ogy, namely the Pauline dichotomy8 between old and new man, Adam and
Christ. The apostles progress from Adam to Christ, from being ‘earthly’ to
being ‘heavenly’. This Pauline dichotomy is found throughout Hilary’s com-
mentaries;9 it is relevant here because one articulation found is that between
the ‘image of the Earthly Man’ and ‘image of the Heavenly Man’, predomin-
antly in the Psalms commentaries.10
These two usages (our creation in God’s image, and the change from imago
terreni to imago caelesti) are related: they are part of a natural stage of human
evolution in Christ. The apostles change from ‘in Adam, in God’s image’ to ‘a
perfect image of Christ’; surprisingly, this is associated with acquiring powers
to perform miracles, not only for the apostles but by implication for all

3
InMt 24.1: [lex] quae imaginem in se futurae ueritatis expresserat.
4
Tota deinde in apostolos potestas uirtutis dominicae transfertur: et qui in Adam in imaginem
et similitudinem Dei erant figurati, nunc perfectam Christi imaginem et similitudinem sortiuntur,
nihil a Domini sui uirtutibus differentes; et qui terrestres antea erant, caelestes modo fiunt.
5 6 7
TrPs118, 10.1–8. See pp. 44–50. TrPs118, 10.2. TrPs118, 10.2.
8
Rom. 8.29, 1Cor. 15.49. Compare also Christological passages such as Phil. 2.6–7, Col. 1.15.
9
Hilary expresses dichotomies such as first/second Adam, old/new man, earthly/heavenly
Adam in passages such as the following: InMt 10.4; trin. 11.22; TrPs 2.41, 52.16, [68].4, [68].23,
122.3, 129.6, 132.7, 143.21; TrPs118, 12.4, 15.3, 20.10.
10
TrPs 56.8, 129.6, 134.21; TrPs118, 12.4, 12.5.
70 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Christian people (‘all the saints’).11 This is also connected with the likeness, as
is described a few sentences later:
And so that they might wholly (ex toto) achieve ‘God’s likeness’ as prophesied in
Genesis [Gen. 1.26], they are instructed to give freely what they have freely
received . . . (InMt 10.4)12
Gen. 1.26–7 is taken as a prophecy, indicating that our creation is so far
incomplete but realizable. In Gen. 1.26 God states ‘let us make mankind in our
image and likeness’ but in Gen. 1.27 he then creates mankind ‘in the image of
God’; so Hilary sees the likeness as something that God is promising to develop.
Further, the phrase ex toto (‘entirely’, ‘in all respects’) seems to indicate that this
likeness is, for all that, not totally absent: humans do currently have some
degree of likeness, even if it is not an entire likeness to God, which can only be
attained through Christ.
The concept of progress occurs also in the Psalms commentaries. We are
urged to put on the imago caelestis and this expresses our growth in knowledge
and virtue as we progress towards God; there are several references to our
eventual transformation from our moribund mortal state to the glorious one
with a spiritualized body.13 In all, there is an anthropological change here;
Christ’s commission of the apostles is a further step in the development of
mankind, continuous with human creation. The act of creating us is always
continuing and will be completed at the eschaton.
Scholars who feel Hilary has an Origenian approach to imago theology
could point to the fact that the concept of progress in the image is found in
Origen.14 However, all of Hilary’s imago theology as presented so far is
squarely consistent with thinkers outside Alexandria, such as found for ex-
ample in Irenaeus and Tertullian. In particular, Hilary’s idea that we gradually
develop in our image-likeness through history is in the same ballpark as
Irenaeus’ doctrine that likeness is unrealized at the moment of creation but
established at the incarnation.15 Likewise, Tertullian expresses us as gaining
likeness through our baptism at the moment when we join the Church,16 and

11
InMt 10.4; excerpted below, p. 72.
12
Et ut ex toto, secundum Genesis prophetiam, Dei similitudinem consequantur, dare gratis
quod gratis acceperunt iubentur . . .
13
TrPs 54.7: festinat . . . in spiritalem redire naturam. Compare also TrPs 1.13, 128.9.
14
ORIGEN princ. 3.6.1.
15
For example, IRENAEUS adv. haer. 5.16.2. It should be noted that Cantalamessa’s reading
is that Irenaeus, like Athanasius, expresses the likeness as lost at the Fall (CANTALAMESSA
1980:182 on Irenaeus, 1980:351 on Athanasius). However, the scholarly consensus is that
Irenaeus’s Adam lost neither the image nor the likeness; see for example FANTINO 1986:142;
HAMMAN 1987:309.
16
TERTULLIAN de baptismo 5.7, regarding baptism: ita restituitur homo deo ad similitudi-
nem eius qui retro ad imaginem dei fuerat (imago in effigie, similitudo in aeternitate censetur),
recipit enim illum dei spiritum quem tunc de adflatu eius acceperat sed post amiserat per
delictum.
 The Human as Imago Dei 71
speaks of our current Christian life as having either the imago terreni or the
imago caelestis.17 Hilary is consistent with this position, in that likeness is only
potential at the moment of human creation, but Christians achieve likeness
and a transformed image at the moment of the church’s birth or their own
baptism.18

HILARY ADOPTING ORIGEN? IMAGO THEOLOGY

I N T H E P S A L M S CO M M E NTARI E S

The position discussed on pp. 69–71 above is found across Hilary’s commen-
taries; however, there are some articulations of imago theology which are
found only in his Psalms commentaries and not elsewhere. This is probably
because of his use of Origen for his Psalms commentaries.

‘Ad Imaginem Dei’, or Just ‘Imago Dei’?

Hilary explicitly states that there is a difference between ‘ad imaginem’ and
‘imago’: Mankind is not the image of God, because the image of God is the ‘first-
born of every creature’ [i.e. Christ]. Rather, mankind is *in* the image of God—
that is, with the features of God’s image and likeness.19 Scholars such as Pelland
and Rondeau assume that this is an ubiquitous feature of Hilary’s imago
thought, and discuss examples from elsewhere in his corpus on the presump-
tion that Hilary is consistent on this issue.
In order to show that Hilary cannot be read as presenting this theology in
the rest of his corpus, it is necessary to discuss other passages put forward by
Pelland and Rondeau. For example, both these scholars refer to a passage in de
Trinitate describing our eschatological end. When our physical bodies become
spiritual, we shall be ‘created again’ and be made the perfect image of God.
Further, we shall be re-fashioned into the Creator’s image, as the Apostle says:
Having put off the old man and his deeds, and put on the new one—the one who is
renewed in knowledge of God, according to the image of his maker [Col. 3.9–10].
Thus man reaches his completion as God’s image. Once he has come to match
God’s glorious body, he reaches the point of being the Creator’s image (in
imaginem Creatoris excedit), in line with the model established for the first

17
TERTULLIAN adv. Marc. 5.10.
18
Given the discussion to follow, it is fair to note that the concept of progress in the image is
also found in Origen (princ. 3.6.1).
19
TrPs118, 10.7: Non Dei imago [homo]; quia imago Dei est primogenitus omnis creaturae:
sed ad imaginem Dei, id est, secundum imaginis et similitudinis speciem.
72 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
man. When he has put off sin and the ‘old man’ and is become a ‘new man’ who
knows God, then the act of his creation is brought to completion; he acknow-
ledges his God and thereby becomes his image . . . He shall remain his Creator’s
image for evermore. (trin. 11.49, abridged)20
Rondeau21 and Pelland22 both suggest this passage distinguishes our current
situation ad/secundum/in imaginem from the future when we will be a true
imago. Yet their interpretation is not explicit in the passage, which uses the
two types of expression indiscriminately. The phrases ad/secundum/in imagi-
nem dei are indeed used along with imago dei, but the differences are gram-
matically determined: Hilary is certainly not articulating a theological
difference between in imaginem dei and imago dei here. To the contrary,
Hilary’s main point is the dichotomy already discussed: we move from old
to new man, from image of Adam to image of Christ. Rondeau and Pelland are
correct that Hilary distinguishes the phrases ad imaginem dei and imago dei in
Psalms commentaries, but they are misguided in reading this into his Trini-
tarian work; Hilary is not making such a distinction in this passage.
Another example is found in Hilary’s Matthew commentary, already cited
in English on p. 69: in Adam the apostles were formed ‘in God’s image and
likeness’, but now they attain Christ’s perfect image and likeness.23
. . . qui in imaginem et similitudinem Dei erant figurati, nunc perfectam Christi
imaginem et similitudinem sortiuntur . . . (InMt 10.4)
In these lines there is indeed a change from in imaginem to imago. However,
Hilary changes the subject of the possession: from ad imaginem dei to imago
Christi. The emphasis of the passage is not primarily about a change from ad
imaginem to imago (although that is present), but rather from Adam to Christ.
This is reinforced by the sentence that immediately follows.
May they preach that the kingdom of heaven is near!—in other words, [may they
preach that the saints] now have attained God’s image and likeness, and share it
with their Model (in consortium veritatis), so that all the saints—those called
‘heavenly’—might co-reign with the Lord. (InMt 10.4)24

20
Caeterum nos . . . ad Creatoris imaginem reformabimur, secundum Apostoli dictum: Exuti
ueterem hominem cum actibus suis, et induti nouum eum, qui innouatur in agnitionem Dei
secundum imaginem eius qui creauit eum. Consummatur itaque homo imago Dei. Namque
conformis effectus gloriae corporis Dei, in imaginem Creatoris excedit, secundum dispositam
primi hominis figurationem. Et post peccatum ueteremque hominem in agnitionem Dei nouus
homo factus, obtinet perfectionem, agnoscens Deum suum, et per id imago eius, . . . et per
aeternitatem Creatoris sui imago mansurus.
21
RONDEAU 1962:209–10. Rondeau also sees this passage as describing the moment where
the human body and soul come together as imago.
22
PELLAND 1983a:425–30. See also PELLAND 1983b:96–7.
23
InMt 10.4.
24
Praedicent regnum coelorum propinquare, imaginem scilicet et similitudinem Dei nunc in
consortium ueritatis assumi; ut sancti omnes, qui coeli nuncupati sunt, Domino conregnent.
 The Human as Imago Dei 73
Modern translators take in consortium veritatis in a variety of ways (Doignon: ‘la
réalité d’une communauté’,25 D. H. Williams: ‘the fellowship of truth’26). How-
ever Hilary himself elsewhere uses veritas to denote the model of an image: ‘when
a model (veritas) has been copied, that does not detract from the model.’27 So the
phrase in consortium veritatis has here been translated as referring to the image’s
model, namely Christ. Veritas is also used this way by other church fathers such
as Tertullian.28 From the context, it seems appropriate to translate veritas the
same way here. Theologically, then, Hilary is suggesting that the disciples are
now Christ’s image, and they share with their model the attribute of being God’s
image. As far as imago theology is concerned, Hilary is not making any signifi-
cant distinction between ad imaginem dei and imago dei. His key point is, rather,
whose image one is. Again his emphasis is the dichotomy between Adam’s image
and Christ’s image, between earthly and heavenly—especially as this excerpt
follows straight on from that cited earlier (see p. 69): Those who before were
‘earthly’ now are become ‘heavenly’.
So then, even if these two passages do use the phrases ad imaginem versus
imago, this appears to be for grammatical reasons rather than doctrinal ones.
Hilary is not emphasizing a theological distinction between the two phrases.
This difference is not of major importance to Hilary, and is only made explicit
when he is translating a text by Origen.

Imago Dei as Nous, or as the Whole Human Person?

A similar point holds regarding what exactly it is that the imago dei in humans
consists of. Hilary explicitly states that it is the soul or rational element which
is in God’s image: The fact that he was made ‘according to God’s image’ refers
to the soul’s high status.29 This citation comes from Hilary’s narrative of
a dual creation where the soul was created first (Genesis. 1.26–7) and the
body thereafter (Genesis 2.7): humans should know the difference between
their inner and outer nature.30 As shown on p. 46, Hilary describes the soul by

25
DOIGNON 2007a:221: Qu’ils annoncent que le Royaume de Dieu est proche, entendez que
l’on a maintenant avec soi l’image et la ressemblance de Dieu pour qu’elles soient la réalité d’une
communauté qui fasse régner avec le Seigneur tous les saints désignés par le mot cieux.
26
WILLIAMS 2012:112 They preach the coming of the Kingdom of heaven; they have now
acquired the image and likeness of God in the fellowship of truth—as all the saints, who are
called of heaven, may reign with the Lord.
27
InMt 7.1: Nihil enim ueritati detrahit imitationem ueritas consecuta.
28
TERTULLIAN apologeticum 47: numquam enim corpus umbra aut ueritatem imago
praecedit. Also de corona 9; de anima 18.
29
TrPs118, 10.8: quod ergo fit secundum imaginem Dei, ad animi pertinet dignitatem. Also
for example 10.7: Est ergo in hac rationali et incorporali animae nostrae substantia primum,
quod ad imaginem Dei factum sit.
30
TrPs118, 10.6.
74 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
stating that the ‘inner man’ is rational, peripatetic, swift, unbodily, light,
eternal,31 whereas the body was created ‘long after’ the part which is in
God’s image.32 Similar expressions are found throughout the Psalms com-
mentaries,33 as both Rondeau and Pelland34 point out.
But even within his Psalms commentaries, Hilary’s expression may be
ambiguous: Christ takes up the body of a human, who was created according
to God’s image and likeness.35 This implies that being (in) God’s image
includes the body. And in the rest of his corpus, Hilary never states or even
implies that God’s image is the soul alone. Rather, he speaks of homo being in
God’s image and likeness without distinguishing body and soul: the human
body must certainly participate in salvation. For example, in the excerpt cited
on p. 69 Hilary makes no distinction between body and soul:36 each apostle is
now Christ’s image in his entirety, and indeed deals specifically with the effects
of sin in the human body: Whatever evils Satan’s goad brought onto Adam’s
body, the disciples in turn restored because they shared in the Lord’s power.37
This is because Christ’s saving identification with us is specifically in his
assumption of the body. In the eschatological excerpt from de Trinitate
(pp. 71–2) it is true that we become God’s image only when the body has
become glorious, or spiritualized. The body must lose its fleshliness, the
grosser aspects of its nature; but the fact remains that it is our entire human
person that become God’s image, not just soul but body also.
This is compatible with the finding of Chapter 3, namely that Hilary, in his
non-Origenian works, sees humans as a holistic unit, without the ‘Platonic’
separability of body and soul. This indeed would be truer to mainstream
contemporary Latin thought of the time. It is only in the Psalms commentaries
that he states that the inner man alone is part of God’s image; again, only when
he is translating Origen.

Hilary following Origen’s Thought?

The two aspects of imago theology just mentioned are characteristic of Origen.
In the first Homily on Genesis, the Alexandrian presents a detailed analysis of

31
TrPs 129.6: ergo ad imaginem Dei homo interior effectus est rationabilis, mobilis, mouens,
citus, incorporeus, subtilis, aeternus.
32
TrPs 129.5.
33
E.g. TrPs 119.12: in substantia animae ad Dei imaginem figuratus.
34
RONDEAU 1962:202, PELLAND 1983a:430–4.
35
TrPs118, 16.14: . . . [ut] hominis corpus, qui secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei est
factus, assumeret.
36
The same is true of the excerpt on p. 70.
37
InMt 10.4: quidquid malorum Adae corpori satanae instinctus intulerat, hoc rursum ipsi
[discipuli] de communione dominicae potestatis emundent.
 The Human as Imago Dei 75
the various aspect of the verse that God made man ‘according to God’s
image’.38 This includes the distinction between ad imaginem and imago.
‘God’s image’ explicitly refers to Christ (who is this ‘image of God’ . . . except
our Saviour?); humans are in the Saviour’s likeness, ad imaginem dei but not
imago dei.39 Similarly, the idea that the imago in humans is specifically the
‘inner man’ (whether soul, mind, spirit) is characteristic of Origen’s anti-
gnostic thought. Origen holds that the imago dei categorically excludes our
bodies,40 and only entails the inner man.41 The two stages of creation for
the inner and outer man are also found in Origen42 as in Hilary. The ‘inner
man’ denotes that within us which is ‘invisible, incorporeal, incorrupted,
immortal’43—a sequence of negatives that is similar to Hilary’s expression.
Hilary expresses these positions only in the Psalms commentaries, whereas
elsewhere in his corpus these views are absent or undefined. It therefore seems
likely that he presents such views only because he finds them in Origen, and
is reproducing them in his loose translation of the Greek commentary in
front of him.
So is Hilary’s thought Origenistic? Two points may be made. Firstly, Pelland
and Cantalamessa both take these two ‘Origenistic’ positions as typical for
Hilary, but they fail to notice the variation across Hilary’s corpus. Secondly,
both of these two positions can occasionally be found in the ‘non-
Alexandrians’ Irenaeus and Tertullian anyway. For example, Tertullian also
states that we are created in Christ’s image.44 Further, Tertullian can also be
inconsistent on whether the image means mind/spirit or also includes the
body45—just as Hilary is.
So then, Hilary’s explicit articulation of imago theology does seem to
borrow elements from Origen, and it would be true to say that he is influenced
by the Alexandrian in terms of his phrasing and indeed the frequency with
which he uses imago language in his Psalms commentaries. Nevertheless,

38
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.12–15 is on human creation.
39
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13: quae est ergo alia imago dei, ad cuius imaginis similitudinem
factus est homo, nisi Saluator noster . . . ?
40
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13: hunc sane hominem quem dicit ad imaginem dei factum, non
intelligimus corporalem.
41
ORIGEN Entr. Her. 23, c.Celsum 6.63 (soul); Hom. Gen. 13.3 (logos in the soul); princ.
1.1.7, ad Mart. 47 (nous). CROUZEL 1956:156–60 gives citations of Origen’s different expres-
sions as to what the ‘inner man’ might entail (soul, logos in the soul, nous, etc.).
42
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13; Hom. Jer. 1.10 . . .
43
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13: is autem, qui ad imaginem dei factus est, interior homo noster
est, inuisibilis et incorporalis et incorruptus atque immortalis. In his enim talibus dei imago
rectius intelligitur.
44
TERTULLIAN res. 6.
45
Tertullian repeatedly articulates the image as including the body (e.g. de spectaculis 18, 23;
adversus Valentinianos 24) but also gives statements which imply that the ‘image’ is in attributes
such as self-determination and free will (adversus Marcionem 2.5, 2.6).
76 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Hilary’s statements are still fully in accord with non-Origenian articulations of
imago theology as evinced by Tertullian or Irenaeus.
Indeed if anything, Hilary may be modifying or even rejecting parts of
Origen’s imago theology, as will now be shown.

HILARY REJECTING ORIG EN ? T HE LO ST I MAG E

Two examples have been presented where Hilary expresses Origenian imago
theology, but only in his Psalms commentaries: these were the distinction
between ad imaginem dei and imago dei, and the concept that only the inner
man is in God’s image. However, there is also tentative evidence that Hilary
may be consciously and explicitly rejecting one element of Origen’s imago
theology, namely the notion that the image was lost at the Fall. Hilary does
refer in his works to the difference between the imago terreni and the imago
caelestis, as Ambrose does; but he never suggests that the latter was lost
universally at the Fall.
Origen’s first Homily on Genesis states that at some point man lost the
capacity of being God’s image, and has become the devil’s image.46 Or again,
the Saviour sees humans ‘laying aside God’s image and taking up the image of
the Evil One’47 and is moved with compassion to save what he has created,
petitioning the Father that his disciples might have their original likeness
restored in them. The position that our image was somehow lost at the Fall
is also found elsewhere in Origen.48 The loss of the Creator’s image may be
described as having the devil’s image as here, but Origen elsewhere says the
image within us is that of beasts. For example, he speaks of us being snakes or
horses: If our ‘outer man’ is human and our ‘inner man’ is snake, we are not
human humans, but merely humans.49 This sentence goes on to point out that
if our ‘inner man’ preserves the Creator’s image, then we are human both
within and without. Thus animal imagery is located in the imago which, when
sinful, is not an imago dei.50 (Cox51 gives Origen’s statements a positive shine
by suggesting that we realize God’s creation in us when we are depicted as
beasts. However, this seems misguided; Origen is saying that we are beasts
because we have lost the inner spirituality that makes us human).

46
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13: si enim ad imaginem Dei factus homo contra naturam intuens
imaginem diaboli per peccatum similis eius effectus est . . .
47
ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 1.13: [Saluator] uidens [hominem] deposita sua imagine maligni
imaginem induxisse . . .
48
ORIGEN Comm. Rom. 1.17, c.Celsum 6.63, Hom. Luc. 39.
49
ORIGEN Hom. Ezech. 3.8: Quando iste homo qui est exterior homo fuerit, eo qui est
interior homine serpent, non est in nobis homo homo, sed tantum homo.
50 51
See further CROUZEL 1956:197–206. COX 1984.
 The Human as Imago Dei 77
However, Origen gives different articulations elsewhere. At princ. 3.6.1 he
states that we do have the image but not the likeness, which we gain through
progression towards God. In his book on Origen’s imago theology, Crouzel is
circumspect about whether Origen really did believe that the imago was lost at
the Fall.52 Although some passages (such as those just quoted) might suggest
this, Crouzel points out that elsewhere Origen emphasizes that we can recover
the image through a godly life53 and indeed our image is never fully removed
but merely lies dormant: it is impossible for a nature created in God’s image
to erase all its properties and take on those pertaining to the images of any old
reasonless beings.54 Hence Crouzel feels that Origen’s image is certainly
obscured but not lost. (In fact this citation is taken out of context; Celsus
has argued that humans are merely programmed to look after themselves like
ants, and Origen is insisting that humans do have reason.) Whatever the finer
nuance across Origen’s oeuvre, even Crouzel admits passages do exist in
Origen where the image is expressed as lost or obliterated. Further, even if
they have misunderstood Origen’s nuance, Epiphanius and Jerome do charge
him with heterodoxy on this exact point.55 In all then it is perfectly possible for
Hilary and Ambrose to have found some text of Origen that they interpreted
as suggesting the image was lost, whether or not Origen himself actually
intended this.
Unlike Origen, Hilary never uses the language of loss in conjunction with
the words imago or similitudo, although plenty of other things are ‘lost’ at the
Fall (immortality, the fruits of Paradise, our right to be called human rather
than animal).56 Rather, he enjoins us to remember we are made in God’s
image and likeness57—implying that we currently are, to some extent at least.
Similarly, the passage from de Trinitate discussed on pp. 71–2 presents our
eschatological acquiring of the image; but his soteriology is never expressed as
humans re-acquiring something lost, even if it may be changed or improved.58
In that passage, our change is effected in language of renewing, replacing, new
creation, or reaching a goal; it is not expressed in terms of regaining
something lost.

52
CROUZEL 1956:206–11 discusses whether sin causes us to lose God’s image in us
for Origen.
53
ORIGEN Commentarii in evangelium Joannis 20.13.
54
ORIGEN c.Celsum 4.83, cited by Crouzel 1956:208: (Χριστιανοί . . . ὁρῶντες ὅτι) ἀμήχανόν
ἐστι τὴν κατʼ εἰκόνα θεοῦ δεδημιουργημένην φύσιν πάντῃ ἀπαλεῖψαι τοὺς χαρακτῆρας αὐτῆς καὶ
ἄλλους ἀναλαβεῖν οὐκ οἶδα κατʼ εἰκόνας τίνων γεγενημένους ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις.
Crouzel also (inter alia) cites ORIGEN Hom. Gen. 13.3–4 as an example of a passage where
the image is obscured but not lost.
55
EPIPHANIUS Panarion 64.4.9; JEROME Ep. 51.7.2; c. Joannem Hierosolytanum 7.
56
Immortality: TrPs 1.13. Fruits of Paradise: TrPs [66].7. The name ‘human’: TrPs118, 10.2.
57
TrPs118, 10.2. Also for example TrPs 61.4.
58
See also TrPs 129.6, where we put on knowledge of God, good morals, and so on so that we
might become ‘according to the Creator’s image’.
78 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Now, it could just be that Hilary does believe in the loss of either imago or
similitudo, but by chance or accident happens never to mention it. However,
there is a possibility that Hilary is intentionally writing this theology out of
his text.
The evidence for this is one part of the commentary on the lemma Ps.
118.73 ‘Your hands made and formed me; give me understanding, so that
I may learn your commandments’, the creation verse discussed already on
pp. 44–50. Both Ambrose and Hilary spend far longer explaining this one
verse than they usually do for other verses. They interpret the verse in light of
human creation, and from the Palestinian Catena we know that Origen did
too. Some parts of the discussion match in Hilary and Ambrose. (Underlining
denotes a match across the columns.)

Hilary: TrPs118, 10.259 Ambrose: ExpPs118, 10.1160

For when he neglected the knowledge of the . . . Let [the soul] not lose its natural privilege,
things mentioned above and sank into vices, so that it loses the label ‘homo’ (ne hominis
he lost this label (nomen amittit); in other nomen amittat).
words, he was judged unfit to call himself
‘homo’.
The one who was made ‘in God’s image and Scripture calls ‘homo’ the one who is in ‘in
likeness’ is, in reproaches occurring in the God’s image and likeness’;
Prophets and Gospels,
. . . given the label snake, or brood of vipers, . . . but it habitually calls a sinner not ‘homo’
or horse, or mule, or fox. but either snake, or horse whinnying after
women, or weasel, or ass.
Do not be like the horse or mule which have no
understanding. Restrain their jaws with bit and
bridle, so that they do not come near you
[Ps. 31.9]. And: Tell that fox . . . [Lk. 13.32]
is spoken of Herod. John calls a crowd of
humans brood of vipers [Lk. 3.7].
This label ‘human’ is no longer apt once he You are God’s great work, human, and what
has fallen from innocence. God has given you is great. Be careful that you
do not lose that great gift God gave you, that
you are ‘in God’s image’.

59
HILARY TrPs118, 10.2: Hoc enim nomen, ubi rerum superius commemoratarum cogni-
tione neglecta in uitia deciderit, amittit; indignus scilicet iam iudicatus homo nuncupari. //Et qui
secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei factus sit, secundum exprobrationes propheticas et
euangelicas, //aut serpens, aut progenies uiperarum, aut equus, aut mulus, aut uulpes ei nomen
est. //Et proprietas ei nominis sui, ubi de innocentia exciderit, aufertur.
60
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.11: . . . non amittat [uiuacis animae uigor] suae praerogatiuam nat-
urae, ne hominis nomen amittat. //Scriptura enim eum hominem dicit, qui est ad imaginem et
similitudinem Dei; // . . . peccantem autem, non hominem, sed aut serpentem, aut equum adhin-
nientem feminis, aut uulpeculam, aut iumentum uocare consueuit. //Nolite fieri sicut equus aut
mulus quibus non est intellectus. In camo et freno maxillas eorum constringe, qui ad te non appro-
pinquant (Ps. 31.9). Et: Dicite huic uulpi (Luc. 13.32), de Herode ait. Generatio uiperarum uocatur a
 The Human as Imago Dei 79
As is clearer in the Latin, the texts discuss the loss of the label ‘human’. Both
Latin bishops illustrate this by showing that Scripture knows man was made
‘in God’s image and likeness’ and yet in his sinful capacity he is called serpent,
brood of vipers, horse, mule/ass, fox. Initially, the main difference between the
passages is that Ambrose includes some verses proving that Scripture calls
humans by different animal names; it is characteristic for him to add catenae
of scriptural verses to prove a point.
But then there is a bigger change, and the last sentence presented here
shows the two Latin authors diverging more significantly: Ambrose immedi-
ately makes the link between the lost name of ‘man’ and the lost image; Hilary
does not. Indeed, Ambrose then goes on to emphasize the loss of imago (170
words); Hilary does not.61 Later in his discussion of v73 Ambrose again refers
to the lost imago;62 yet again, there is no match in Hilary.
This could be mere chance, since much of Ambrose’s text has no match in
Hilary. However, this particular passage hints at Origen. Both Latin bishops
mention ‘losing the name human’ (amittere nomen hominis) which suggests
this was in the text of Origen that they are translating from. The two texts
are entirely consistent with what we know of Origen’s theology, which iden-
tifies sin with the loss (or obfuscation) of the image and our identification
with beasts.
So it seems that of the two Latin bishops, Ambrose would be reflecting
Origen more accurately in identifying the lost name ‘human’ with the lost
image. This is all the more likely since Ambrose goes on to do so explicitly,
immediately after the passage excerpted above. If it is true that this discussion
of the lost image was in Origen’s commentary, then Hilary would have known
this since he too was using Origen’s commentary. And yet it seems he chose to
omit the suggestion that humans lost the imago dei at the Fall in his own
translation.
On its own this is merely an argument ex silentio. However, given that
Hilary almost always reproduces something of Origen (p. 20, p. 33), it may
be doctrinally significant when he omits something—as also for example
when he edits Origen’s comments on the Fall (pp. 84–8). Further, only a few
years later Epiphanius was propounding that the loss of the imago was a
heretical doctrine (the Panarion dates from around 374; Hilary’s translation
is thought to come from the early to mid 360s).63 Hilary may have seen

Joanne plebs hominum (Luc. 3.7). //Magnum ergo opus Dei es, homo, magnum est quod dedit tibi
Deus; uide ne quod Deus tribuit, amittas magnum illud munus, quod es ad imaginem Dei . . .
61
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.11: exuti coelestis imaginis ornamento, etiam nomen hominis
amittimus, qui gratiam hominis non tenemus.
62
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 10.16: Propterea imago ad eum qui est ad imaginem, uenit: et
quaerit imago eum, qui est ad similitudinem sui; ut iterum signet, ut iterum confirmet; quia
amiseras quod accepisti.
63
MILHAU 1988a:17–18.
80 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Origen’s lost image as relating to our physical form and the ‘tunics of skins’,
as Epiphanius did.64 This is supported by the fact that Ambrose also relates
the lost image to the tunics of skins in another passage in this very com-
mentary, in language highly reminiscent of Origen and thus again possibly
reliant on Origen’s commentary.65 So there is every reason to think that
Hilary may have found such allusions in the Greek commentary. And yet he
chose not to repeat them in his own.
This is an argument from verisimilitude, not a proof. But it is certainly
without question that the loss of the image at the Fall is a doctrine entirely
absent from Hilary’s works. His position is, yet again, entirely consistent with
Irenaeus and Tertullian.

CONCLUSION

Hilary sees our creation ‘in God’s image and likeness’ as one of the funda-
mental characteristics of humanity. Yet our creation is not completed in the
first week of the world described in Genesis 1; rather, it progresses through
human history. We are created with Adam, but through Christ’s coming and
with godly living we may exchange the imago terreni for the imago caelestis;
this moment is first described at the sending out of the Twelve and he urges us
to do the same and take on Christ’s image. And eschatologically, when our
fleshly carnal bodies are transformed into spiritual bodies, that is when we
fully become God’s perfect image and our creation is completed. Hilary also
regularly expresses our change in Christ as a Pauline dichotomy, and in
particular often refers to the need to exchange the imago terreni for the
imago caelestis.
Scholars such as Pelland, Rondeau, and Cantalamessa are right to give
Hilary an ‘Alexandrian’ shine, particularly because of his statements that the
imago consists of the soul not the body. However, the situation is more
complicated. Supposed ‘Origenian’ positions are indeed found in Hilary’s
Psalms commentaries; but there he is known to be using Origen, and these
positions are either absent or at best insignificant elsewhere in his works.
Hilary’s theology is more consistent with that of Irenaeus and Tertullian,

64
EPIPHANIUS Panarion 64.4.9: τὸ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα δέ φησιν [Origen] ἀπολωλεκέναι τὸν Ἀδάμ.
ἐντεῦθεν φησὶ καὶ τοὺς χιτῶνας τοὺς δερματίνους ἐπισημάνασθαι τὴν γραφήν· ὅτι, φησίν, τὸ
ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς χιτῶνας δερματίνους καὶ ἐνέδυσεν αὐτοὺς τὸ σῶμα, φησίν, ἐστί. καὶ πολλή τίς
ἐστι παρ᾽ αὐτῷ ἡ ᾀδομένη χλεύη.
65
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 11.14: Utrem autem corpus hoc dici, licet ex pluribus locis, tamen
etiam inde intellige, quod Adam et Eua ubi imaginem deposuere coelestis, quam ante portabant,
imaginem terreni hominis induentes, tunicas dicti sunt uestiti esse pelliceas, corporales enim eos
de spiritalibus fecerat culpa commissa [Gen. 3.21].
 The Human as Imago Dei 81
particularly the notion of imago-similitudo development through history
which is particularly characteristic of Irenaeus. To the contrary, the body is
to be glorified in order to participate in the imago. So evidence for Origenian
influence in Hilary’s opus is limited to one of his latest works, the Psalms
commentaries. Even then he appears to reject consciously angles he feels are
unorthodox, namely Origen’s notion that humans may have lost the capacity
of being in God’s image at the Fall.
 5

The Fall

INTRODUCTION

This chapter looks at Hilary’s narratives of the Fall, and also gives an initial
discussion on its effects; the effects will be then expanded upon in the
following chapters.
It will first be shown that Hilary is aware of three articulations of the Fall.
The first is the scriptural narrative, which he wholeheartedly embraces theo-
logically but does not ever discuss at length. The second he rejects, namely the
doctrine of the fall of souls into bodies which Hilary feels he is reading in
Origen. The third is the analogy of the ‘anthropological household’ (my term)
which demonstrates clearly how he sees the Fall as involving the internal
composition of the human person.
This will be followed by an initial examination of the effects of the Fall. In
accordance with his ‘household’ narrative, it becomes clear that Hilary sees a
key effect of the Fall as being an anthropological change that alters the human
person by introducing sin and disobedience into the human make-up. Alter-
natively Hilary may express this human change differently, in terms of the
human person now being buffeted by internal turbulent passions. Both these
elements will be expanded in more detail in subsequent chapters.

THE F ALL NARRATIVE

Hilary rarely discusses the Fall overtly, but its events and effects are alluded
to extremely frequently. His allusions suggest three different Fall narratives:
the scriptural story according to Genesis, which he embraces; the Fall into
bodies, which he feels he finds in Origen and categorically rejects; and finally
the analogy of the ‘anthropological household’ which demonstrates how
Hilary shows the Fall as a change in the human person echoing Tertullian’s
‘second nature’.
 The Fall 83

The Genesis Narrative of the Fall

It is perhaps not surprising that Hilary’s most frequent references to the events
of the Fall are those in accordance with the scriptural narrative of Genesis 2–3
and its Pauline interpretation found in the Epistle to the Romans. Hilary
clearly sees Adam’s sin as somehow affecting all humanity.
These Genesis references almost always come in passing, as Hilary is
explaining some other passage or theological point. For example, he takes the
healing of a paralytic (Mt. 9.2–8) to signify how we are healed of Adam’s sin.
In the paralytic, all peoples are offered up for healing . . . In one man, Adam, sin
was passed on to all peoples . . . The soul’s sins are passed on to this paralytic,
and pardon for the first transgression comes when the paralytic is forgiven.
(InMt 8.5)1
Hilary sharply rejects the interpretation that the paralytic is being healed of his
own personal sin.2 In common with other patristic authors,3 Hilary takes this
passage as illustrating the healing of Adam’s sin. It is not clear, however,
whether the paralytic is culpable for Adam’s actual sin, or merely provides an
analogy. Still, Hilary frequently elsewhere refers to the fact that we all have
gone astray through Adam’s sin.
In the error of one man, Adam, the whole human race went astray. (InMt 18.6)4
Whoever recalls that he has been exiled from that same Sion as a result of the
offence of his first father, Adam . . . (TrPs 136.5)5
Another place where the Fall is used in exegesis is at Christ’s temptation, which
Hilary sees as parallel to Adam’s temptation and thus the Fall.6 Christ’s three
temptations are to turn rocks into bread; to throw himself from the Temple; and
to worship Satan. Hilary matches these to three elements of Adam’s temptation,
namely seduction with food, being led to a ‘place of sin’ (the tree), and ambitio.
He seduced Adam with food; and led him from the glory of Paradise to a place of
sin—that is, to the area of the forbidden tree; and thirdly he corrupted him with
aspiration (ambitio) for the Divine Name, by promising that they would be like
gods. (InMt 3.5)7

1
Jamque in paralytico gentium uniuersitas offertur medenda . . . In Adam uno, peccata uni-
uersis gentibus remittuntur . . . Huic remittuntur animae peccata, et indulgentia primae trans-
gressionis ex uenia est.
2
InMt 8.5: Non enim paralyticum peccasse aliquid accepimus, cum praesertim alio in loco
idem Dominus dixerit, caecitatem a natiuitate non ex peccato aut proprio aut paterno fuisse
contractam (Jn. 9.3).
3
e.g. IRENAEUS adv. haer. 5.17.1–3, CHROMATIUS Tractatus in Matthaeum 44.4.
4
Sed in unius Adae errore omne hominum genus aberrauit.
5
Quisquis ergo in crimine primi parentis Adae exsulem se factum illius Sion recordabitur . . .
6
InMt 3.1–5, commenting on Mt. 4.1–11.
7
Cibo Adam pellexerat et de paradisi gloria in peccati locum, id est in regionem uetitae
arboris, deduxerat, tertio diuini nominis ambitione corruperat diis futurum similem pollicendo.
84 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Thus the devil entices Christ with the same three lures that were presented to
Adam; this symmetry is necessary to trick and conquer the devil.8 This
connection between the temptations of Adam and Christ is found elsewhere.
Ireneaus also suggests that the parallelism between the two temptations is
needed to defeat the devil;9 this is an element of his recapitulation theology,
although Hilary does not call it such. The parallel of deceiving Adam and
Christ by means of food also occurs in Origen.10
Other references to Genesis 3 also refer to the devil’s work. Hilary uses this
to interpret Christ’s injunction that we should be wise as serpents and gentle as
doves (Mt. 10.16). He observes that Genesis calls the serpent ‘wise’;11 we must
be as wise as the serpent was at the Fall, even if that was for the wrong reasons.
The serpent’s ploy is to attack the gentler sex first: his temptation is to seduce
her with hope and then to promise her a share in immortality.12
Hilary often alludes to the Genesis 3 narrative.13 However it is his use of
other Fall stories that is more interesting.

Rejecting the Fall of Souls into Bodies

Hilary suggests that the body and soul were created in two very separate stages
(pp. 44–5), with the soul breathed into the body long after (longe postea) it was
created: When he made humankind ‘in God’s image’, he did not make the body
too. Genesis teaches that it was long after humankind was made ‘in God’s
image’ that he took dust and formed the body.14 However, there is no sugges-
tion that this comprised a fall in any way. If anything, it seems that Hilary is
specifically removing any theology which he perceived in his source text
involving a descent of souls into bodies. This may be seen by comparing
Hilary with Ambrose and the catena for two verses, namely Ps.118.25 and
Ps.118.67.

8
InMt 3.1: Sed ita dignum nequitia eius et scelere erat, ut in eo cuius morte et calamitatibus
gloriabatur homine uinceretur.
9
IRENAEUS adv. haer. 5.21.2.
10
ORIGEN frag. 62 on Mt. 4.3–10; frag. 95–6 on Lk. 4.1f. and 4.4.
11
The Vulgate calls the serpent callidus, but Old Latin versions also used variants such as
prudens and sapiens. Alternatively, Hilary may have been using a standard interpretation of this
passage.
12
InMt 10.13: Primum enim animum sexus mollioris aggressus est, spe deinde illexit,
communionem immortalitatis spopondit.
13
For example, InMt 21.9; TrPs118, 16.9, 19.12; TrPs 1.13, 1.19, 51.12, 52.8, 57.2, 59.4, [66].7,
[68].15, 119.4, 142.11 . . . see also passim throughout this chapter and Chapter 8.
14
TrPs 129.5: Non enim cum ad imaginem Dei hominem fecit, tunc et corpus effecit. Genesis
docet longe postea, quam ad imaginem Dei homo erat factus, puluerem sumptum, formatumque
corpus; dehinc rursum in animam uiuentem per inspirationem Dei factum, naturam hanc
scilicet terrenam atque coelestem quodam inspirationis foedere copulatam.
 The Fall 85
In de Principiis, Origen used Ps. 118.67 Before I was brought low (humi-
liarer) I sinned (deliqui), because I kept your word as evidence for a fall of souls
from a heavenly realm into material physical bodies.15 It seems he used the
same interpretation in his Psalms commentary, because our three texts which
use Origen (the catenist, Hilary, and Ambrose) entirely diverge on this verse in
a way that suggests they were all trying to avoid reproducing something in the
original. Firstly, the catenist entirely omits to quote Origen for this verse—
extremely unusually for him, since for most verses Origen’s commentary
serves as the catena’s base. Secondly, Ambrose’s treatment is revealing:
Another textual tradition has: Before I was brought low *I was in ignorance*
[nescivi, rather than deliqui]. That is why some think that the human soul says
this: “Before I was brought low” (so as to enter the mud that is this body), “I was
in ignorance as to your commands” (since I had not read them).
(AMBROSE ExpPs118, 9.13)16
Ambrose cites the opinion of some who suggest that the soul knew no
commands before entering the body. However, by appealing to the Septuagint
version (I sinned rather than I was in ignorance) Ambrose prefers the inter-
pretation that the soul entered the body as a result of some sin (So let us
assume the words ‘I was brought low’ mean he had been brought low due to
some sin).17 Due to his reference to the Septuagint, we could deduce that
this argument is actually Origen’s, and that the source text is here alluding to a
pre-bodily fall of souls.
So much for the catenist and Ambrose. Hilary’s exegesis of this verse is brief
and suggests that our abasement (humiliatio) is a result of sin, and is a
discipline that is for our own good.18 He refers to the abasement as an
emendatio and disciplina. This tallies with the Ambrose passage, which also
refers to our abasement as emendatio for some fault. Ambrose makes this refer
to Adam’s sin, but Hilary makes it personal sin. In all, it appears that all three
commentaries (Hilary, Ambrose, catena) are deliberately avoiding repeating
what was in the original; but there is enough to give us a hint as to why.
So far this is not conclusive, but there is more compelling evidence for
Hilary’s rejection of a fall to Earth at Ps.118.25 My soul clung to the ground.
Both Hilary and Ambrose take this as referring to the soul clinging to the

15
Such at least is the claim, found in fragments preserved by EPIPHANIUS (Panarion 64.4.7)
and JEROME (c. Ioannem Hierosolymitanem, 7). However, this is absent from the translation of
Rufinus. See also EPIPHANIUS Panarion 64; ep. 51.4.7; JEROME Comm. Eph. ad Eph. 1.4;
CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA In Ioannis Evangelium 1 (PG 73.132–3). (Cyril may be using
Epiphanius here).
16
Alia traditio habet: Priusquam humiliarer ego *nesciui*. Unde putant aliqui, quod anima
hominis hoc dicat: ‘Priusquam humiliarer, ut in hoc lutum corporis introirem, tua quae non
legeram mandata nesciui.’
17
Ideo accipiamus ‘humiliarer’ ita dictum, eo quod peccato uideatur humiliatus.
18
TrPs118, 9.4.
86 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
earthly body (represented by the pavimentum, the ground or floor). Ambrose’s
text is lengthy as usual, but the following excerpt suffices to illustrate his
argument.
Then Adam was cast out of Paradise (that is, out of that sublime heavenly place to
which Paul was taken up, not knowing whether he was in the body or out of it
[2Cor. 12.2])—so when he was cast out of that lofty place and thrown down to
earth, he bewailed the fact saying: My soul clung to the ground, just as elsewhere
he said: My soul has been brought low to the dust, and my belly clung to the earth
[Ps. 43.25]. These are the words of a man who is repenting . . .
(AMBROSE, ExpPs118, 4.2)19
In other words, Adam is cast out of Paradise for some sin. His expulsion results
in his soul now clinging to an earthly body, represented by the ground (as
Ambrose has explained in an earlier paragraph). This suggests that the original
text portrayed a descent of the soul into the body (this impression is confirmed
by Hilary’s version, as we shall see in the next paragraph). This is further
suggested by Ambrose’s reference to 2 Corinthians: Origen used Paul’s ecstatic
vision to justify that before the Fall, Adam may have been outside the body.20
Also, Ambrose shortly afterwards gives further evidence that before the Fall
‘Adam’ was in a heavenly realm: That supremely blessed man who previously
touched the golden ether is now bent over by the worries of this world.21
This excerpt must represent Origen’s source text, because Hilary in one
sense echoes it while at the same time firmly subverting it. Like Ambrose, he
cites Paul on the body (although this time he quotes Php. 3.21) immediately
followed by a citation of Ps. 43.25. However, he precedes these citations with a
determined rejection of an incorrect interpretation of this lemma. Others may
think this verse refers to the psalmist clinging to the ground (i.e. body) out of
repentance, Hilary says, but this reading must be sharply rejected.
Some could also interpret this as being about intense prayer, as if the Prophet
‘clung to the ground’ in the sense of being prostrate on the earth confessing some
sin. But we have examined the force of the words more carefully and we are
deducing what we must, so as to realize that something loftier underlies this
statement. (HILARY TrPs118, 4.1)22

19
Denique eiectus de paradiso, hoc est, ex illo sublimi et coelesti loco (ad quem raptus est
Paulus siue in corpore, siue extra corpus nesciens, [2Cor. 12.2])—ex illo ergo eminenti loco
deiectus in terram, deploret Adam dicens: Adhaesit pauimento anima mea; sicut alibi ait:
Humiliata est in puluere anima mea, et adhaesit in terra uenter meus [Ps. 43.25]. Poenitentiam
gerentis haec uox est . . .
20
For Origen’s use of Paul’s vision to prove that heaven is not bodily, see EPIPHANIUS anc.
54.2–3; Methodius in PHOTIUS Bibliotheca 235.
21
AMBROSE ExpPs118, 4.3: Qui ante beatissimus auram carpebat aetheream [ . . . ], is nunc
sollicitudine mundi huius . . . curuatus [est].
22
Potest istud et de assiduitate orationis intelligi, tamquam ex peccatorum confessione in
terram Propheta prostratus adhaeserit pauimento. Sed ut altius aliquid sub his dictis intelliga-
mus, perspecta diligentius uerborum uirtute, necessarium ducimus (HILARY TrPs118, 4.1).
 The Fall 87
Hilary suggests that the lemma actually refers to the awkward tension between
body and soul. His defensiveness runs throughout the commentary on this
lemma, since he starts with the insistence that there can only be one correct
understanding (there cannot be several interpretations merely because the
words are obscure), and he then tries to argue his case with a number of proofs
(there are many clues which suggest that my interpretation is more likely).23
The catena can be placed in parallel with Ambrose, which provides a further
indication of the underlying text (although even the catena is playing down any
notion of a fall into bodies). For example, there are parallels on both the fall
from the heavenly realm and the prosopological character of the psalmist; these
indicate that Origen saw the lemma as referring to penitence for some sin.

PALESTINIAN CATENA AMBROSE

Origen, ad v2524 ExpPs118, 11.1325

. . . [the soul] cast down the sublimity Thrown out of Paradise, that is, out of that sublime
and loftiness it had by nature. lofty place . . .
[...] [...]
The Holy One says these things . . . So either the Prophet’s spirit (expressing pain) or the
Lord (who took up his weakness) . . .
. . . taking on the persona of the . . . displays the persona of Adam, and takes on his
penitent. emotion.

However, there are differences between the catenist and Ambrose. The cate-
nist does not mention that the ground signifies the body—which was probably
in Origen’s text because it is in both Ambrose and Hilary. Secondly, Ambrose
is not clear on whether Origen’s ‘holy one’ refers to the Prophet or Christ.
Lastly, the catena and Ambrose diverge on whose persona the psalmist is
representing; we cannot know what was in Origen’s commentary. Despite the
defensiveness of the catena and Hilary, the common elements of the three
commentaries can be compared and conclusions drawn. It seems that Origen’s
text mentioned the ‘ground’ as representing the body. This is taken to mean
the soul entering into a body as a result of a sin, and that event being
associated with repentance for some sin or for general sin. However, as a
caveat it should be noted that we do not have enough evidence to determine

23
HILARY TrPs118, 4.1: multiplex intelligentia non potest in se habere dictorum difficulta-
tem . . . et multa sunt, quae nos ut hoc potius probabile existimemus admoneant.
24
καὶ καθελούσης ἑαυτῆς τὸ φυσικὸν ὕψος καὶ ἔπαρμα // [ . . . ] λέγει δὲ ταῦτα ὁ ἅγιος . . . //
[καὶ] προσοποποιῶν τὸν μετανοοῦντα.
25
eiectus de paradiso, hoc est, ex illo sublimi et coelesti loco // [ . . . ] Spiritus ergo propheticus
(qui dolorem expressit) uel Dominus (qui suscepit eius infirmitatem) . . . //personam repraesentat
Adae, et assumit eius affectum.
88 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
precisely what Origen himself said. For example, Origen may not have referred
to Adam or the Genesis Fall explicitly; or he may have suggested this as merely
one speculative interpretation of this verse. Again, it may be that Origen
believed the pre-lapsarian Adam and Eve did have bodies, but less gross
than ours.
Other hints across the Psalm commentaries suggest that Hilary is consistent
in rewriting this theology. For example, Methodius claims that Origen used Ps.
65.11 as evidence that the body is a ‘snare’ or punishment for some sin.26 Now
as it turns out, Hilary does translate Psalm 65. But when he gets to this verse,
he mentions it in one brief sentence and moves straight on.27 This suggests
that he may not like the interpretation he found in his source text, but has not
troubled to come up with an alternative.
We cannot say what Origen himself really thought or was proposing in any
of these places. However, even if Hilary is misreading Origen, nevertheless
from Hilary’s angle it is clear that he sees a doctrine he disagrees with; he
vehemently rejects any suggestion whatsoever of a fall of souls into bodies. His
interpretation also fervently rejects the theology that the soul’s embodiedness
is a consequence of sin, confirming the analysis at pp. 84–8.

The ‘Anthropological Household’ Analogy for the Fall

Possibly the most notable passage discussing the will is found at InMt 10.23–4.
Hilary is discussing Mt 10.34–6: I came not to bring peace, but a sword. I am
come to set a man against his father, and daughter against mother, and
daughter-in-law against mother-in-law, and a man’s enemies will be his own
household. Hilary uses a common hermeneutical rule28 and takes Christ’s
words as teaching on anthropology. So here, the Gospel teaching involves
a household of five individuals whose alliances are determined in three
consecutive stages; Hilary interprets the household as the human person,
composed of a number of elements. The three stages of household alliances
become a narrative of Fall and Redemption applied to the human person. The
household of five represents the human and the components of which he
is made.

26
Methodius quoted in EPIPHANIUS Panarion 64.46.2–3.
27
TrPs [65].22.
28
Consider for example the mention of sparrows at Mt. 10.29, which Hilary interprets as
representing the soul and sin (InMt 10.18). This is also a common hermeneutical rule in other
church fathers, particularly Origen. For example, Origen takes the Creation narrative in Hom.
Gen. 1 as referring allegorically to the human person. Heaven and earth represent the combin-
ation of mind and body (1.2); the fact that earth bears fruit represents our need to bear good
spiritual fruits (1.3, 4); the placing of the sun in the sky represents the way Christ illuminates us
(1.5); etc.
 The Fall 89
(1) In the first stage, there are three in the household. This household is the
pre-lapsarian human, composed of body, soul, and will.
(2) The Fall occurs, and two more enter the anthropological household:
subsequent humans also have sin, which is the father of the body, and
disobedience (infidelitas), which is mother of the soul. These provide
the in-laws required by the biblical verses.
(3) However, this household is divided by the sword, which for Hilary
represents the Word of God. This leads to the third stage, when the five-
fold individual becomes a Christian through baptism and is renewed in
the Spirit. When this occurs, the sword (=Word) divides the household
and sin and disobedience are cut off and subjected to body and soul.
This completes the explanation of why the five are divided two against
three and three against two.
The details of the relationship between members of the household are
confused in Hilary’s narrative and will be discussed further in Chapter 6; the
whole text and a translation are given in Appendix 1. However, the basic
picture is clear. Adam was created with body, soul, and will, but somehow the
Fall caused the entry of sin and disobedience into the human person. In other
words, the human nature somehow changed at the Fall; sin and disobedience
were previously extrinsic but now have become internal components of our
anthropological make-up. In particular, the voluntas is now constrained by
disobedience. On the other hand, baptism can also alter human anthropology.
Hilary is not alone in interpreting the Gospel story of a sword dividing the
household in anthropological terms. In interpreting the parallel story in Luke’s
Gospel,29 Ambrose plays with a number of interpretations, for example that
the ‘five’ in the household could refer to the senses (as found in Origen),30 or

29
Lk 12.52, interpreted in AMBROSE Exp. sec. Lucam 7.134–48.
30
ORIGEN Fragmenta in Lucam (in Catenis), 202: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ πρόσωπα ἕξ
ἐστι, ῥητέον, ὅτι τὸ ἓν πρόσωπον, τὸ τῆς νύμφης, τέμνεται εἰς δύο, εἰς νύμφην καὶ θυγατέρα ἐν τῷ
πρὸς τὴν μητέρα καὶ τὴν πενθερὰν διαμάχεσθαι τὴν αὐτήν· καὶ οὕτως ἀπαντᾷ τρεῖς ἐπὶ δυσὶ καὶ δύο
ἐπὶ τρισὶ διαμάχεσθαι. πρὸς ἀναγωγὴν δέ· ὡς ἐν ἑνὶ οἴκῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ αἱ πέντε αἰσθήσεις, πρὶν μὲν
ἐλθεῖν αὐταῖς τὸν λόγον, ὁμονοοῦσινἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, ἐπιδημήσαντος δ’ αὐτοῦ μερίζονται· δύο μὲν αἱ
φιλοσοφώτεραι, ὅρασις, δι’ ἧς ὁρῶντες κόσμον καὶ τὴν τάξιν αὐτοῦ θαυμάζομεν τὸν κτίστην, καὶ
ἀκοή, δι’ ἧς μαθητευόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἔπειτα τὰς λοιπὰς τρεῖς· γεῦσιν, ὄσφρησιν, ἁφήν, τὰς
ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ οὐ πεφυκυίας πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, αἱ δὲ τρεῖς ἐπὶ τὰς δύο ἀντιπράττουσι μᾶλλον. τὸ
οὖν· ‘διαμερισθήσεται πατὴρ ἐπὶ υἱῷ’ ἀφ’ ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς ἀναγνωστέον, οὐκ ἐχόμενα τῶν πρώτων, ὃ
ῥητῶς μὲν τὸν τῶν πιστῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπίστων δηλοῖ μερισμόν. συμβολικῶς δὲ ‘πατὴρ’ νοῦς μερίζεται
‘ἐπὶ υἱῷ’ μοχθηρῷ λογισμῷ μὴ συγκατατιθέμενος αὐτῷ· ‘καὶ υἱὸς ἐπὶ πατρί’, ὁ τὸν ἀποθανόντα μὴ
θάπτων πατέρα· ‘μήτηρ ἐπὶ θυγατρί’, ψυχὴ τὸν μοχθηρὸν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἀποδεχομένη καρπόν· ‘θυγάτηρ
ἐπὶ μητέρα’, τὴν ὕλην ἡ μηκέτι ἑνουμένη αὐτῇ ψυχή· ‘πενθερὰ ἐπὶ νύμφην’, ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἀνδρὸς τῆς
ὑπ’ αὐτῷ ψυχῆς μήτηρ, λέγω δὴ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα, καταλιπὸν τὸν ἐκ περιτομῆς λαόν· ‘νύμφη ἐπὶ τὴν
πενθεράν’, ὁ διὰ τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν λαὸς χωρισθεὶς τοῦ πνεύματος.
90 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
that the ‘two’ could refer to the body and soul. In other words, he too sees the
‘two against three and three against two’ as depicting human nature which is
corrupted by Adam’s Fall but is restored by Christ.
The flesh and the soul can appear to be separate from profligate Smell, Touch,
and Taste, dividing themselves in one household against the besieging vices . . .
The conflict between them which arose through the First Man’s sin became
nature . . .
But through the cross of our Lord and Saviour, both their mutual estrangement
and the Law of commandments are made void, and they are reconciled into
harmonious fellowship. (AMBROSE Exp. sec. Lucam 7.141)31
Again the details are hazy, but in this interpretation Ambrose proposes the
same three stages for the human person. The perfection of the first man’s
internal composition is damaged by his sin and now discord not only enters
but becomes human nature. As a final stage the Saviour restores the internal
human harmony.

FIRST CAUSE OF THE F ALL

Hilary seems to have one implicit explanation for the ‘first cause’ of the Fall,
namely our createdness: sin was, in one sense, always going to arise due to our
earthy weighted body. However, he gives various kinds of explicit explanations
for the Fall itself: the devil’s lure, and internal human attributes such as pride
(ambitio) or disobedience (infidelitas). Of these, he appears to see the last as
most significant.
(a) The devil’s lure has already been demonstrated above (pp. 83–4) in the
cunning of the serpent that seduced Eve and in the three temptations
which match those of Christ. At the same time, Hilary insists this is no
excuse. Those who sin are like the first serpent: The serpent could have
been blameless, but he blocked his own ears so that they would be deaf.32
The implication is that any sin is due to deliberate deafness. The devil’s
temptation is of course pertinent, but the Fall’s first cause is ultimately
somewhere within us.

31
Possunt etiam uideri caro atque anima ab odore, tactu, gustuque luxuriae separata, in una
domo se aduersus incursantia uitia diuidentes . . . : quorum licet dissensio per praeuaricationem
primi hominis in naturam se uerterit . . . ; tamen per crucem Domini Saluatoris tam inimicitiis,
quam etiam mandatorum lege uacuatis in societatis concordiam congruerunt . . . Cited also by
AUGUSTINE c.sec.Jul.resp. 5.
32
TrPs 57.3: Nam serpens innocens esse potuisset, cui aures per se ut surdae sint obstruuntur.
 The Fall 91
(b) Other passages in Hilary suggest that ambitio was the root problem.
The section on Christ’s temptations already quoted suggests this was
the third temptation matching Adam’s: he corrupted him with aspir-
ation (ambitio) for the Divine Name, promising that they would be like
gods.33 Similarly the serpent seduces Eve by giving hope and promising
a share in immortality; it lied that it could achieve this, but Christian
preachers can claim in truth that we will indeed be like the angels.34
These two accounts share the promise that we will be similes diis or
similes angelis. These both involve some kind of desire to achieve a state
beyond what is normal for humans.35 All this recalls the patristic notion
that pride was the first cause, found for example in both Origen and
Augustine.36
(c) Lastly, Hilary’s description of the Fall in terms of the anthropological
household mentions that our internal change arose because of Adam’s
peccatum and infidelitas. In the context of the Fall, these are best
translated as sin and disobedience (to the command God had given).
For Hilary, infidelitas is a key theme of the Matthew commentary, as
may be noted by its frequency (infidelis or infidelitas occurs around
eighty times) and by its recurrence in the final chapter, emphasizing its
importance as a key hermeneutic for interpreting the whole work. It has
a variety of different significations, so it is hard to find an English
translation that encapsulates both the ‘disobedience’ that caused the
Fall, and the ‘disloyalty’ of the Jews which is contrasted with the
faithfulness or openness of the Gentiles.
These are not unrelated: even the persistent theme of the Jews’ disloyalty
points towards our anthropological make-up. This can be seen in the beauti-
fully neat allegory with which Hilary explains the execution of John the
Baptist.37 John (representing the Law) urges Herod (representing the Jewish
people) not to bind himself to Herodias (representing infidelitas). Herod is
emotionally seduced by Herodias and her daughter Salome (who is voluptas);
thus the two women can ask for John’s head—‘that is, the Law’s glory’. The
whole allegory points to the way that infidelitas conspires to avoid the Law.
Here and elsewhere,38 Hilary links the national level (regarding the Jewish

33
InMt 3.5: diuini nominis ambitione corruperat diis futurum similem pollicendo.
34
InMt 10.13: spe . . . illexit, communionem immortalitatis spopondit. . . . Quod ille mentitus
est, nos praedicemus ex uero, secundum sponsionem Dei angelis similes futuros esse qui
crederent.
35
At Ps. 118.21 increpasti superbos, Hilary and Ambrose both talk of pride as a reason why we
do not keep the divine commandments. Ambrose interprets this in relation to the Fall, but Hilary
does not; it is not clear whether this was in the source text and if so whether Hilary omitted it
accidentally or deliberately (HILARY TrPs118, 3.14; AMBROSE ExpPs118, 3.34).
36
ORIGEN Hom. Ezech. 9.2; AUGUSTINE de natura et gratia, 33 [xxix].
37 38
InMt 14.7. InMt 21.9.
92 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
people) and the individual anthropological level, as we can see from the way
that the vocabulary and concepts match the description of the anthropological
household (for example, infidelitas is represented by a marriage39 and begets
another anthropological property, namely voluptas40).
Hilary does often use (dis)obedentia or (in)obedentia but his preference for
(in)fidelitas might be because of its wider semantic flexibility, so that it can
apply to the range of situations just mentioned. Further, the latter word is
preferred because its opposite—fides or fidelitas—is what effects our salvation.
As Peñamaría points out, the renewal of the body–soul relation is directly
attributable to faith,41 and this faith frees us from sin and justifies us.42 It is the
specific antidote for the infidelitas which is both cause and effect of our Fall.
The Devil is unfaithful (infidelis); Abraham is faithful (fidelis). The former was
deceitful (perfidus) in Man’s transgression; the latter was justified by faith (ex fide).
(InMt 2.3)43
Since infidelitas causes the enslavement of the will, it is faith that will redeem
it, as seen also in the example of Peter’s mother-in-law excerpted on p. 95
(until he believed, he was kept in check because his will was enslaved).

SOME EFFECTS OF THE FALL

The effects of the Fall in Hilary are described in a wide variety of ways, for
example as a curse or as captivity, but also as an event that caused an
anthropological change; indeed, these transpire to be the same thing. In
particular, the disobedient act made disobedience part of our human nature.

Curse, Death, Captivity

Earth’s curse. The curse on the earth is not mentioned in InMt but occurs in
various places throughout the Psalms commentaries. In Scripture this is a
direct explicit consequence of the Fall since God tells Adam, ‘Cursed is the
ground because of you; through painful toil you will eat of it all the days of
your life.’44 Hilary concentrates on the first phrase of this curse.45

39
InMt 14.7: ipsis [gentibus] tamquam uinculo coniugalis amoris annexa est [infidelitas].
(This regards the earlier marriage of Herodias to Herod’s brother, which made the second
marriage unlawful.)
40
InMt 14.7: . . . uoluptas enim tamquam ex infidelitate orta . . .
41
PEÑAMARIA 1974:237, citing InMt 10.24.
42
PEÑAMARIA 1974:241, citing InMt 8.6, 21.15.
43
Diabolus infidelis, Abraham fidelis. Nam ille in hominis transgressione fuit perfidus; hic
uero iustificatus ex fide est.
44 45
Gen. 3.17. See also TrPs 51.12, [66].7.
 The Fall 93
[The Earth] deserved to fall into disgrace both for Adam’s deeds and for Abel’s
blood. (TrPs [14].5)46
These things were applied to the entire human race, since from one man a death
sentence and life’s labour issued to everyone [Rom. 5.18]; as it is written: Cursed is
the earth because of your deeds [Gen. 3.17]. (TrPs 59.4)47
First [God] gave his blessing when all things were created and made; afterwards, to
be sure, they were placed under a curse due to Adam’s sin. (TrPs 132.7)48
Death. The second excerpt here shows another unfortunate consequence of
the curse on the earth: a death sentence . . . issued to everyone. Since the earth in
Hilary represents the human body, the curse on the earth is one on the body;
more specifically it is the curse that leads to death for humans. Adam was
formed for life, but brought in death.49
. . . the law of life was established in the beginning for Adam, and conditional
on an edict; the Giver of that edict changed the law of life into a law of dying.
(TrPs 51.18)50
I shall praise the Lord with my life. His life does not refer to the current one with
bodily weaknesses. That ‘life’ began with Adam, but it was not the one when
Adam came into existence. The Apostle knows that particular ‘life’ is not life but
death, as he says: Wretched man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body of
death [Rom. 7.24]? (TrPs 145.2)51
The Fall also has other universal consequences. Sin took a hold: the first man
became a slave to sin, infected or contaminated by sin.52 We lost the right to be
called human.53 Our condition is described as being in exile in another land
with another law,54 while anxious to come home.55 Thus for Hilary (in the
Psalms commentaries), the Fall results in a curse and the coming of death, for
both humans and the entirety of creation.
Captivity and constraint. As Doignon points out,56 Hilary uses the same
biblical verses to indicate our sin as other early fathers (such as Cyprian,

46
[Terra] et in Adae operibus, et in Abel sanguine meruit offensam.
47
Et haec . . . ad uniuersitatem humani generis aptata sunt, quia ex uno in omnes sententia
mortis et uitae labor exiit, cum dictum est: Maledicta terra in operibus tuis.
48
Primum omnia cum creata et facta sunt benedixit, postea uero ex peccato Adae in
anathemate constiterunt.
49
See also TrPs 137.12.
50
. . . cum decernentis potestas constitutam ab exordio in Adam sub conditione decreti uitae
legem demutauerit lege moriendi.
51
Laudabo Dominum in uita mea. Non enim ea uita, quae nunc est per infirmitates corporis,
sua est. Ab Adam namque ista coepit, non cum Adam inchoata est, quam non uitam, sed
mortem esse, Apostolus nouit dicens: Miser ego homo, quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?
52
TrPs 142.6 (peccati seruus), [66].2 (peccatis coinquinatus).
53
TrPs118, 10.2 (see also pp. 78–9 on the association with losing the imago).
54
TrPs 136.5: quisquis ergo in crimine primi parentis Adae exsulem se factum illius Sion
recordabitur.
55 56
TrPs118, 22.6. DOIGNON 1996b:14–17 et passim.
94 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Lucifer, and Ambrosiaster); Hilary, however, uses them to demonstrate not
just the universality of sin but the constraint that the ‘law of sin’ places over us.
He cites Rom. 7 on several occasions57 and the neccesitas humana or human
constraint that arises from living under sin. Further, Hilary interprets the
Babylonian captivity as a cipher for human constraint.
The Apostle teaches what they are that ‘led off as captives’, when he says: I see
another law in my members, struggling against the law of my mind and leading me
captive in the law of sin which is in my members [Rom. 7.25]. There is a battle
between fleshly and spiritual desire, so those which venture to suppress us as
captives seize the body and take possession of it . . . (TrPs 136.9)58
Hilary is not specific here, but may be referring to spiritual beings who keep us
constrained under the law of sin (those who/which venture to suppress us).
Peñamaría59 points out that Hilary repeatedly uses the captivity of Sion as a
cipher for the soul’s captivity to both the body and sin;60 Hilary explicitly
connects this to Adam’s Fall and uses the Babylonian Exile to stand for the
exile from paradise (an exile as a result of the offence of his first father Adam,
p. 83).61 The captivity of body illustrated by the historical exile was bad indeed,
but the captivity of the soul is far worse.62
Alcain demonstrates how Origen also frequently uses the exile in Babylon
as representing human constraint and captivity.63 Since Hilary interprets Baby-
lon the same way in his Psalms commentaries, it seems clear that Hilary is
deriving this metaphor through Origen again. This metaphor will be discussed
again on pp. 154–5; but for now it is sufficient to highlight that this is not so much
an external captivity as an internal incapacity and constraint, following an
internal change: the human person is now subject to internal passions which
prevent him or her from acting in an entirely rational way. This leads us to what
is arguably the key consequence of the Fall, a change in human anthropological
make-up.

Infidelitas and Anthropological Change

Hilary expresses the consequences of the Fall as effecting a change in human

nature. He is following in the tradition of scholars such as Tertullian, whom

57
For example TrPs118, 1.3, 22.6; TrPs 58.4, 136.9.
58
Quae autem sint quae ‘captiuos ducant’, nos Apostolus docet, dicens: Video aliam legem in
membris meis militantem aduersus legem mentis meae et captiuum me ducentem in lege peccati
quae est in membris meis. Cum igitur inter concupiscentiam carnis et spiritus pugna est, tum ea
quae captiuos nos conantur sibi subdere pertentant occupare corpus . . .
59 60
PEÑAMARIA 1974:238. TrPs [13].6, 52.20, 125.3–9, 136.3–9, 136.13–14.
61 62
TrPs 136.5. TrPs 125.4.
63
ALCAIN 1973:67–78. Alcain cites passages of Origen such as Hom. Ez. 1.3, 12.2; Hom. Jer.
2.1, 2.2, 3.4, 19.14.
 The Fall 95
we know Hilary read.64 As already mentioned Tertullian sees the Fall as
changing our nature or giving a second nature (alia natura) which means
that we are is subject to a certain depravity going back to Adam (vitium
originis).65 Likewise, later authors such as Augustine see the Fall as having
changed human nature, for example when he says the habit of sin has been
turned into nature (in naturam versa) by Adam’s sin.66
This change in nature does not, for Tertullian, affect the fact that man is
ultimately self-determining. This is not true for Hilary; as we will see, Hilary
sees the Fall as affecting the will and human emotions. His description of the
anthropological household, presented on pp. 88–90, is Hilary’s longest and
most detailed treatment of the Fall. From this passage it has been shown that
the Fall was caused by our infidelitas and peccatum; or indeed, our infidelitas
and peccatum were themselves the Fall. However, Hilary takes the extra step of
stating that these were not only the cause of the Fall—or themselves comprised
the Fall: they are also the effects of the Fall. This equation of cause and effect is
also found in Augustine, for whom ‘sin and the penalty for sin are the same’:67
for example, Augustine’s fallen will is the penalty for the will’s disobedience.
So in Hilary, disobedience and sin now become fundamental elements of the
human person.
Hilary’s interpretation that disobedience is a fundamental part of post-
lapsarian humanity occurs elsewhere:
Peter’s mother-in-law represents the depraved disposition of Disobedience (in-
fidelitas); it is affiliated to the free will, which binds itself to us as if by a marriage
contract. When the Lord enters into Peter’s house—that is, into [his] body—the
disobedience is cured, that disobedience which is feverish with the heat of sins and
with the diseased tyranny of the vices. [Hilary promises to discuss this later]. But for
now, Peter’s mother-in-law will be called Disobedience, because until he believed,
he was constrained since his will was enslaved (voluntatis suae servitio). (InMt
7.6)68
Just as in the narrative of the anthropological household, a mother-in-law is
taken to represent disobedience (infidelitas) due to the analogy of the marriage
bond being also an anthropological bond. This disobedience holds the will in
thrall (voluntatis suae servitio detinebatur), as indeed Hilary states again
elsewhere.69

64 65
InMt 5.1. TERTULLIAN an. 41.
66
AUGUSTINE de fide et symbolo 10.23 (written 392–3).
67
AUGUSTINE de natura et gratia 24.22.
68
In socru Petri, uitiosa infidelitatis aestimatur affectio, cui adiacet libertas uoluntatis, quae
nos quadam sibi coniugii societate coniungit. Ergo ingressu Domini, in Petri domu, id est in
corpore, curatur infidelitas peccatorum calore exaestuans, et uitiorum aegra dominatu. [ . . . ]
Nunc autem ideo infidelitas socrus Petri nuncupabitur, quia usque dum credidit, uoluntatis suae
seruitio detinebatur.
69
For example InMt 5.4–6 suggests that sin perverts the will.
96 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
This notion that our anthropology is affected by the Fall is found through-
out Hilary’s work; however, it is not always expressed in terms of infidelitas.
Although that term is thematic in InMt, it is much rarer in the Psalms
commentaries.70 In the latter text, other negative attributes form part of our
anthropological make-up:
All the heart’s sorrow has been healed, and we are now freed from all the
weaknesses that come from human passions. So that the heart does not submit
again to being bound forever, let us please God in the land of the living, and let our
soul return to its rest from which it was driven out through the transgression of its
first father, Adam. (TrPs 146.4)71
This passage suggests that before the Fall our soul was at peace but the Fall
brought in the ‘weakness of the passions’; this is also found elsewhere in
Hilary.72 The need to be ‘freed’ suggests that the passions (including emotions)
constrain us, as indeed has already been suggested. Similarly we are con-
strained by the underlying malitia which again is an intrinsic part of our
fallen state.73
I don’t think anyone could be an exception to this. Malevolence (malitia) affects
everyone, because we all have a will as part of our unstable (demutabilis) nature.
The Lord taught that there was even malevolence in the apostles, even though
they were saints and purified by the word of faith, because they shared the same
origin (origo) as all the rest of us. (TrPs118, 15.6)74
Thus malevolence or ill will became an intrinsic part of the human condition
as a result of the Fall (and this was probably in the source text; the catena is not
preserved at this point but Ambrose refers to malignitas here). We all contain
a degree of malitia, and this is due to the will.
So then, Hilary sees the key effect of a Fall as anthropological change, and
this may be expressed as humans acquiring infidelitas or passions which skew
their will and their action. This situation can only be remedied by a further
change in human nature:

70
For one example see TrPs [67].6: Parate uias Domini . . . Omnis uallis implebitur, et omnis
collis humiliabitur (Lk. 3.3). Parato itinere nostro (id est, uitiorum infidelitatisque nostrae uel
compressis tumoribus, uel eleuata humilitate terrenae labis), . . . in corda nostra descendet.
71
Sanata enim omni cordis contritione, et ne perpetuo rursum subeat alligata, his omnibus
humanarum passionum infirmitatibus liberati, placebimus Deo in regione uiuorum, anima
nostra in requiem suam (ex qua per transgressionem primi parentis sui Adae eiecta est)
reuertente.
72 73
TrPs118, 9.4. Elements of this passage will be discussed again on p. 109.
74
Et nescio quem possit excipere. omnibus enim per naturae demutabilis uoluntatem malitia
adiacet, ipsisque apostolis uerbo licet iam fidei emundatis atque sanctis, non abesse tamen
malitiam per conditionem communis nobis originis docuit Dominus . . .
 The Fall 97
The stain on the human flesh that arises from the habit of wrongdoing mingling
with it cannot be destroyed inwardly, unless our nature is changed.
(TrPs 142.13)75
This change of nature can be achieved by baptism, as shall be shown on
pp. 155–7. However, it will be necessary first to consider the will and passions
in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

Guilt and Punishment

But why did this change in nature occur? If he gives any reason at all, Hilary
states that the change in our nature was a punishment for the first sin. This is
why the language of the curse (on the earth, and on the human body) can
be used.
Truly this ‘earth’ of Adam’s is cursed; it became guilty when seduced by food.
(TrPs [66].7)76
Similarly Hilary states the passions77 and the entry of death78 are specifically
punishments. They do not remit our guilt, though, since it is stated that Christ
dies due to the juridical guilt on flesh: The Prince of the World found no sin in
him, but still exacted the punishment for sin: that is, the legal penalty of death.79
However, punishment and guilt are generally limited to the Psalms com-
mentaries. In the Matthew commentary, by contrast, the narrative of the
anthropological household implies that the entry of sin and disobedience
into the human make-up is a natural and inevitable consequence of the Fall
(which was itself sin and disobedience); there is no mention here of a curse,
punishment, or guilt. This makes original sin more a natural outcome than a
punishment: the crime is sin and disobedience, and thus sin and disobedience
become part of the human person.
The idea of sin as a natural consequence (rather than a punishment) would
be in accordance with expressions of the Fall and its effects in say Irenaeus,
where the Fall is seen as part of our weakness and a situation we need to be
redeemed from rather than a punishment.80 Hilary never asks himself why we
can be held reprehensible for something which is also a punishment (i.e. our

75
Labes carnis humanae per admixtam in se uitiorum consuetudinem aboleri penitus, nisi
cum naturae demutatione, non possit.
76
Verum hic Adae terra, quae per illecebram cibi erat criminosa, maledicitur.
77 78
TrPs118, 9.4. TrPs 62.6.
79
TrPs [68].8: mundi princeps, nihil inueniens, peccati tamen poenam, id est ius mortis, exseruit.
80
For example IRENAEUS adv. haer. 4.39.3 (men have blinded themselves), 3.23.2 (God
cursed the earth, not Adam).
98 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

own intrinsic disobedience). Hence we should probably assume that he sees

our post-lapsarian human nature as (partly at least) a consequence of, rather
than purely a punishment for, the first sin and the Fall.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed Hilary’s articulation of the Fall and some of its
immediate consequences. His simplest use of the Fall refers to elements from
Genesis such as Adam or the first sin, and he can be shown to reject any
suggestion that the Fall consisted of a fall of souls into bodies. Nevertheless, his
most interesting narrative is that of the household whose members are divided
by a sword; Hilary takes this as referring to the human and the internal
elements he or she is composed of. It is odd that his longest treatment is not
scriptural, but treats with the change in human nature effected by Fall. This
angle is remarkable, and suggests that Hilary understands the Fall as funda-
mental for understanding the composition of the human person, due to the
effects it had on us.
In the latter part of the chapter, the effects of the Fall began to be assessed.
As well as concepts such as earth’s curse, death, and constraint, it is clear that
Hilary sees sin and disobedience not only as the Fall itself but also as the
consequences of the Fall. The will (voluntas) is affected and constrained by
passions from proper action. These two constraints—the fallen will and the
turbulence of the passions—are now intrinsic to human nature, and prevent
humans from acting rightly. These will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7.
 6

Constraint (1): Voluntas

I N T R O D U C TI O N

In this chapter, Hilary’s usage of the word voluntas will be surveyed. In

particular, this chapter will ask how Hilary articulates the voluntas as an
anthropological component, and see that he is an early example of the use
of voluntas to express constraint on human action.
Hilary is not generally thought of as presenting a depraved or constrained
view of the will; for example, he speaks of self-determination and uses the idea
of the initium voluntatis to justify how God can still hold us responsible for
our actions. But at the same time, he expresses the Fall in terms of some kind
of slavery of the will, in a way that presages Augustine; he also uses the will to
express both individual character or disposition, and a psychological compo-
nent in general human action. Indeed, Hilary uses the term to express con-
cepts that other church fathers may explain without recourse to voluntas, as
shown by the fact he uses the word considerably more often than Ambrose.
Hilary’s thoughts on voluntas will be compared with early Christian
thinkers and non-Christian philosophers. Earlier Christians such as Irenaeus,
Tertullian, and Origen are known to posit an entirely free will, with human
autonomy explaining the problem of evil in the world. Yet at the same time
they all demonstrate that there are constraints on human action and response
(for example in terms of devils or ignorance). Against this, Stoic-derived
thought at this period uses the will as part of the language expressing
human constraint; in this case, the enslavement of the will expresses our
lack of freedom from emotions and clouding ignorance. Hilary demonstrates
an unconscious combination of these, being an early example of the voluntas
concept being used to express constraints on human action that earlier
Christian literature had expressed in other terms.
Some of Hilary’s uses of voluntas are not worthy of remark in this chapter. As
is to be expected, the word sometimes appears merely as an abstract nominal of
the verb velle: that is, where voluntas (alicuius) is equivalent in a trivial way to id
100 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
quod vult aliquis.1 Other standard idiomatic phrases occur (e.g. ex voluntate
sua to mean ‘voluntarily’).2 In addition, references to God’s will have been
omitted from this discussion. They are frequent particularly in InMt where
phrases such as ‘the Father’s will’ are common (twenty-two occurrences),
usually reflecting divine purpose in Christ, and thus a shorthand phrase for
God’s economy. In TrPs118, on the other hand, God’s will is used not of the
incarnation, but of God’s desire for human response—his desire, that is, but not
necessarily the actuality. The notion of God’s will occurs only six times.
This chapter thus concentrates on the anthropological or psychological
meaning of the will.

H IL A R Y’ S ARTICULATIONS OF THE WILL

The Competent Will: Freedom and Human Action

No Hilary scholar has remarked on the notion of the fallen will in Hilary,
and that is partly because Hilary often appears to present an entirely
competent will.
As discussed on pp. 114–16, early Christians asserted human freedom for a
number of reasons. Firstly, it was used in response to the question of why evil
existed in a world with a good creator; secondly, it explained how we could be
morally responsible for our actions. Hilary continues in this tradition.
These overlap inasmuch as the will is simply part of the vocabulary in
describing the process of human action. The word voluntas in Latin legal usage
denoted ‘intention’; voluntas could be punished legally (as indeed it can
today). Hilary often uses it in a legal sense, connected with God’s law: Using
fear, the Law restrained faithless Israel within the bounds of fear, and controlled
our intention [voluntas] to harm by repaying it with harm.3 The voluntas is key
in ensuring one keeps the law (which need not be Mosaic): it is not hard to
follow God’s law if the will is present 4 and the will should be tireless in seeking
the law;5 it is only by application of the will that we can achieve hope and faith6
or indeed understand God’s judgements.7

1
InMt 14.8: Contrarium uidelicet est, tunc eum uoluisse, nunc nolle: et praesens molestia
anteriori non conuenit uoluntati.
2
TrPs118, 7.8.
3
InMt 4.25: Lex infidelem Israel intra metum metu continebat, et iniuriae uoluntatem
iniuriae uicissitudine coercebat. See also e.g. 4.22 which enjoins uoluntas pacis on a man seeking
to divorce his wife; and 20.7 quamuis ad Israel lata lex fuerat, uoluntas tamen gentium non
excludebatur a lege.
4 5
TrPs118, 12.15: si uoluntas adsit. InMt 5.4.
6 7
Hope: InMt 5.6. Faith: InMt 6.2. TrPs118, 1.12.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 101
Soul and will may both be said to function in human action. The will has a
different focus from the soul, presumably because it includes bodily desires
and appetites. It is probably in this regard that we find Hilary hinting at several
wills (see pp. 104–5); this coheres both with elements of classical thought
(where bodily appetites or ‘spirited’ earthly loves may distract the higher
rational element of the soul) and Christian thought (especially the Pauline
discourse of Romans 7 and recalled in Augustine).
Ideally the intentions of both soul and will should coincide (the Prophet did
not merely examine [God’s testimonies] thoroughly; he examined them from the
soul, uniting his soul’s purpose with the will’s function).8 This coheres with
what he says about their interrelationship in the anthropological household
(pp. 103–9): after baptism, the will is somehow subsumed into (or subordin-
ated to?) the soul and there is no tension between body-soul-will. Yet in our
fallen world, the will and the soul are for now distinct human components.9
When someone is about to face martyrdom, Hilary warns that the soul may
conspire with the will in its weakness10 (again showing that the soul may not
be Platonically perfect).
Sometimes it seems that Hilary sees the will as able to undercut human
nature. In TrPs118 the Prophet makes his choice not as his nature compels, but
as his devotion wills;11 another passage states that the Prophet’s nature holds
him back, but his will inclines his heart towards works of righteousness.12
However the will is elsewhere expressed as comprising part of nature, as in
the anthropological household.13
The martyrdom examples highlights that our will may, of course, follow
either a right or wrong course. Hilary describes the will as capable of being
swayed: it is regularly described as ambigua, incerta, or vaga or any combin-
ation of these terms.14 On the other hand it is something which can be
controlled, and thus something which we may be exhorted to strengthen:
Christ’s patient will is an example to us15 and we should follow Christ in will
even if not in suffering.16 It is not merely our desires that should be trained but
also our attitudes and even our thought processes.

8
TrPs118, 17.1: Neque tantummodo perscrutatur, sed perscrutatur ex anima, ad uoluntatis
officium animae intentione sociata. Also TrPs118, 18.5: ex deuota mentis uoluntate.
9 10
InMt 10.23–4; InMt 23.2. TrPs118, 15.3.
11
TrPs118, 22.4: Elegit autem non naturali necessitate, sed uoluntate pietatis.
12
TrPs118, 14.20: natura . . . eum detinebat, sed uoluntas . . . ad iustificationum opera declinat.
(Also possibly InMt 10.13: introspecta uniuscuiusque et natura et uoluntate. However this may
be hendiadys rather than opposition.)
13
Also for example TrPs118, 15.6: omnibus enim per naturae demutabilis uoluntatem malitia
adiacet.
14 15
InMt 2.2, 5.6, 6.2. InMt 10.15.
16
InMt 16.11: presumably this means we should be willing to suffer on his account even if we
don’t actually have to suffer.
102 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
This in turn means that a human’s will also defines him or her as an
individual, with different characters and dispositions. Although humans are
of the same nature, this does not mean that their natural predisposition or
their degree of spiritual training are the same. Natural character of course can
be changed by the will. Cicero mentions the Megarian philosopher Stilpo
whose predilection for women and liquor was bettered by his will.17 Tertullian
also mentions how the will could change a man’s natural character or dispos-
ition,18 and variations in individuals (i.e. their souls) may be affected inter alia
by their wills.19 Hilary uses phrases such as bona voluntas or mala/prava/
perversa voluntas to denote individuals’ different personalities.20 For example,
we fall from God’s laws if we have a voluntas iniqua,21 and heretics have an
irreligiosa voluntas and choose to misinterpret Scripture.22 Likewise he refers
to a vitium voluntatis, but it refers not to the human race as a whole, but to
specific individuals whose attitudes or desires are misdirected.23 The example
of the Wedding Banquet on p. 110 will highlight that there are two types of
people, distinguished by their will, which is inemendata or otherwise.24 The
Prophet has voluntas et religio; others have a vitium voluntatis;25 the will of
most humans is vaga, incerta, ambigua. Thus Hilary uses voluntas to express
individual character and personality; as we will see on pp. 119–22, this
ultimately derives from Stoic thought.
However, although anybody’s will may either be firm or wavering, the fact
remains that we have moral responsibility because we are ultimately free.
Before each man is laid out the path to whatever he wishes for in his life, and he
is allowed freedom in desiring and acting (appetendi et agendi libertas). Due
to this, each man’s personal choice is visited with either penalty or reward.
(TrPs118, 22.4)26
Hilary is here suggesting that we have complete freedom: we each have
complete licence to live our way of life entirely according to our wishes, and
it is on the basis of this that we are judged and receive either reward or
punishment. This is why we can fairly be attributed with moral responsibility.
In this particular passage, Hilary does not express his point in terms of the
voluntas: our libertas agendi is not a libertas voluntatis. By itself, this passage
could imply we are free to *do* what we wish, but there is no assertion that we

17
CICERO de fato [5] 9–11. The passage also cites, possibly irrelevantly, the hypothesis that
Socrates was taken as naturally dull-witted and addicted to women. Surmounting these may have
been a matter of Socrates’ will, although Alcibiades at least was sceptical.
18 19
TERTULLIAN an. 20–1. TERTULLIAN an. 20.
20 21
TrPs118, 8.17, 13.4, 15.1, 16.9, 17.10; InMt 24.7, 18.9. TrPs118, 15.1.
22 23
TrPs118, 13.4. InMt 18.11, 22.6; TrPs118, 21.4.
24 25
TrPs118, 22.6. InMt 18.11, 22.6; TrPs118, 21.4.
26
Unicuique ad id quod uolet uia est proposita uiuendi, et appetendi atque agendi permissa
libertas. Et ob id uniuscuiusque aut poena aut praemiis afficietur electio.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 103
are able to *wish* what is rational or righteous. (The libertas appetendi here
suggests freedom to strive after a thing: freedom to follow desires rather
freedom in the desire itself).27 This distinction between libertas agendi and
libertas voluntatis is present in other early writers; for example Dobbin
suggests freedom in Chrysippus may be of this sort.28 Put another way, the
freedom expressed here is not the freedom of Epictetus discussed on
pp. 120–1, which essentially means freedom from passions and false judge-
ments. The subject is free to act, and still has self-determination; but as we will
see in Chapter 7, Hilary still sees humans as constrained by their passions and
psychology.
In summary, each of us has moral responsibility due to our freedom in
action; and voluntas is part of the language used to express action. For Hilary,
any one of us may have a bad or good voluntas in any given action, and we
may also have a bad or good voluntas already; but so far Hilary only uses the
same kind of ideas that are seen in any other Christian up to this period,
denoting self-determination and moral responsibility.
Hilary scholars have thus seen Hilary as continuing in the tradition of his
forebears. However, there are elements in Hilary’s thought which appear to
presage Augustine’s ideas of the depraved will; to these we must now turn.

The Depraved Will: The Anthropological Effects of the Fall

Hilary’s longest and most significant passage involving the will is his narrative
of the Fall in terms of an ‘anthropological household’ (my term), already
introduced at pp. 88–90. To recap, the Fall is represented in three stages
affecting a human person and his components, using the Gospel household
where ‘three are divided against two and two against three.’ Firstly the human
is composed of body, soul, and will; in the second stage, sin and disobedience
(peccatum, infidelitas) enter in; and finally at baptism they are removed,
leaving only a unified body and soul. So far so good, but the devil is in the
detail and to some degree it looks as if Hilary has not quite thought his
example through: he does not seem entirely clear as to how the will relates
to the other members of the household. Yet this is of fundamental interest
here. The possible interrelations of anthropological components will be illus-
trated by Figures 2 to 4 (with Figure 1 giving a key to how marriage and
parenthood are indicated in the subsequent figures); the full text is available at
Appendix 1.

27
Appeto, -ere. (I) strive after a thing, grasp after (A) Lit. seize, rush at (B) assault, assail (C)
Trop. desire eagerly, long for (of food) have an appetite for (II) draw nigh, approach (of time and
things) (A) desire, be eager for (B) be eager for money, avaricious. (Liddell & Scott).
28
Brief discussion in DOBBIN 2008:67, with references.
104 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
In the first stage Hilary cites the will as a third component of man, yet at the
same time it may somehow be a faculty of the other two:
[The household in the lemma has five individuals]; but we only find three things in
a human, namely body, soul and will. The soul is given to the body, and likewise
each is granted the ability to use itself as it wishes; that is why a law was imposed
on the will. (InMt 10.23)29
One interesting feature of this discussion is Hilary’s reference to the law
imposed on the will. Hilary refers to this law (lex) again in an inventory of
God’s works in the Old Testament: this time it is the law established for Adam’s
will.30 On a third occasion, in a slightly different phrasing, Adam is described
in paradise as receiving a law but also being allowed his own will. This law is
connected somehow to his freedom: He received a law (lex); he was given over
to his will; he was established as lord over the world, free from all things; he
became a resident in Paradise.31 These uses of ‘lex’ refer to God’s first com-
mand not to touch the apple, and it is noteworthy that Hilary considers this as
a law specifically for the will. In Augustine’s analysis, before the Fall is the only
time that Adam has a fully competent will which can obey any command; the
same thus appears implicitly true for Hilary. In other words, God’s command
is a lex voluntatis inasmuch as it is a command which specifically tests Adam’s
voluntas.
However, the relationship between the will and the other members of the
household is not clear. Doignon32 at least appears to think Hilary’s will is a
faculty of (each of) the other anthropological components; in other words,
there may be more than one will or at least a divided will. He derives this from
an ambiguous statement Hilary makes a few paragraphs later.
Due to the first father’s sin and disobedience, for all following generations Sin
became the father of our Body and Disobedience the mother of the Soul. Due to
our first father’s transgression, we take our birth from these ‘parents’. For each
has its (or: his) own will. (InMt 10.23)33

29
Sed tria tantum in homine reperimus, id est, et corpus et animam et uoluntatem. Nam ut
corpori anima data est, ita et potestas utrique utendi se ut uellet indulta est: atque ob id lex
est proposita uoluntati. Nam uoluntas unicuique sua adiacet.
30
TrPs118, 19.12: Qui enim statutam Adae uoluntatis legem meminit, qui ipsam illam Euae
creationem didicerit, qui maledictionem serpentis audierit, qui clausum uitae lignum Cherubim
flammeo gladio et conuertibili legerit . . .
31
TrPs 134.14: Legem accipit, uoluntati suae permittitur, liber ab omnibus mundi dominus
constituitur, paradisi incola est.
32
DOIGNON 2007a:245.
33
Sed ex peccato atque infidelitate primi parentis, consequentibus generationibus coepit esse
corporis nostri pater peccatum, mater animae infidelitas; ab his enim ortum per transgressionem
primi parentis accepimus; nam uoluntas unicuique sua adiacet.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 105
For the last sentence here, Doignon’s translation suggests that each anthropo-
logical component has its own will: voluntas unicuique sua adiacet = à chacun
d’eux est adjoint une volonté propre (where ‘unicuique = à chacun d’eux’ refers
to the four other anthropological components or members of the household).
This is grammatically valid since unicuique then has the same antecedent as ab
his in the previous clause. Doignon’s interpretation is exactly what Hilary
seems to be implying throughout InMt 10.23–4; compare for example the
excerpt cited on the top of p. 104 (each is granted the ability to use itself as it
wishes), and also with the description of post-baptismal regeneration to be
discussed shortly.34
A viable grammatical alternative is to take unicuique with those born ‘to all
following generations’ (consequentibus generationibus), i.e. that each one of us
has our own will. This is at least more meaningful, since otherwise Doignon’s
translation suggests that there is actually more than one will in any one human
(i.e. soul-body-sin-faithlessness each has a will, which adds up to eight in
the household rather than five). Hilary’s metaphor is starting to fall down:
he seems inconsistent as to whether there is one will or several in post-
lapsarian Adam.
Maybe they all have a share in the same will. Hilary’s next paragraph implies
there is just one will, which marries the combined homo.
So at this point there are five in the one house: Sin, father of Body; Disobedience,
mother of Soul; and Will’s choice (voluntatis arbitrium) which comes in and knits
together (distringit) the whole human as with a marriage contract. Disobedience
is the mother-in-law of this [sc. of the choice of the will; or, ‘of him’, the homo].
(InMt 10.23)35
Hilary appears to suggest that the voluntas is what binds the whole man
together, ‘as if by a marriage contract’.36 The use of distringere37 seems to imply
constraint; whether or not the verb is this or the easily confused destringere,38

34
InMt 10.24 (excerpt beginning ‘Since the body itself dissolves . . . ’ on p. 108).
35
Ergo iam unius domus quinque sunt: pater corporis peccatum, mater animae infidelitas, et
incedens uoluntatis arbitrium, quod totum hominem quodam coniugii sibi iure distringit. Huic
infidelitas socrus est . . .
36
Doignon translates as follows 2007a:245: [c’est du péché et de l’infidélité que nous sommes
issus . . . ] . . . car à chacun d’eux est adjoint un vouloir propre. Ainsi, il y a maintenant cinq
personnes pour une maison: le péché père du corps, l’incroyance mère de l’âme, et la liberté de la
volonté qui, intervenant, s’attache l’homme tout entier en vertu d’une sorte de droit conjugal. Elle a
pour belle-mère l’incroyance . . .
37
Distringo, -nxi, -ctum. (I) (very rarely) draw asunder, stretch out (II) (= distineo) hinder,
occupy, engage. 2. Puzzle, confound (Plautus: with homo as object). PARTICIPLE (A) strict,
severe (B) used of inner mental strife (e.g. in Cicero), hesitating, vacillating (C) (more freq) busy,
occupied, engaged. (Liddell & Scott).
38
Destringo, -inxi, -ictum. (I) strip off (leaves of plants, intestines, draw sword) . . . (II) touch
gently, skim, graze (A) of beasts; cause a slight wound (B) criticize, censure, satirize; hence
destrictus severe, rigid, censorius. (Liddell & Scott).
106 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

m denotes marriage,
“x is married to y’’

sin, body anthropological components

faithlessness, soul, will (feminine gender indicated by italics)

denotes parenthood,
“x is the parent of y’’

Figure 1.

sin faithlessness

m
body soul will

Figure 2.

the basic meaning is clear due to Hilary’s almost identical description a few
chapters earlier when talking of Peter’s mother-in-law ( . . . the free will, which
binds us to itself by a marriage tie).39 So now there is just one will, which acts
as a link that ‘marries’ the human (that is, the one homo comprised of body
and soul).
The last sentence of the excerpt indicates that faithlessness is the mother-in-
law of the will (confirmed in the subsequent paragraph: the free will is split
from its mother-in-law, that is, from Disobedience).40 If infidelitas is mother of
the soul, and mother-in-law of the will, then the soul must be married to the
will, as shown in Figure 2 (a key to the subsequent figures is given in Figure 1).
But if this is the conjugal arrangement, there is no clear connection with the
‘body’ in the household.
But Hilary has said in the above excerpt that the will marries totus homo. In
this case, it can be said that the will is married to body and soul together
(Figure 3). Indeed it may be for Hilary that this is essentially the same as the
preceding scenario, if homo and anima are essentially equivalent. But then
the description of sin and faithlessness as parents of the body and soul does
not quite work. Still, this interpretation has the advantage that sin and

39
InMt 7.6 (see p. 95).
40
InMt 10.24c: libertas uoluntatis a socru sua—id est, ab infidelitate—diuisa.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 107

sin faithlessness

(body & soul)

m
will h o m o

Figure 3.

sin faithlessness

m
body soul
will

Figure 4.

faithlessness are clearly extrinsic to the homo household (that is, they are
extrinsic to the nature of mankind) and it also explains why Hilary cannot
quite work out what to do with the will at the end of his exegesis, since it is
not technically intrinsic to the homo any more than sin and unfaithfulness are.
A third possible way of reading this passage is to take the will as the
marriage itself (Figure 4). This complicates the relation between the voluntas
and her supposed mother-in-law infidelitas (since the latter could surely not
be called mother-in-law of the marriage itself), and also does not really explain
which members are intrinsic to the homo. It is also grammatically less likely
due to the sibi, which implies the will is itself marrying someone. Nevertheless,
it is the neatest system, and it may be that this is closest to what Hilary is trying
to describe, albeit awkwardly. It also explains the stages of salvation history
better: firstly body and soul lived in the household, linked by will; then sin and
faithfulness came in.
However, glossing over the details, the general picture is clear and certain
elements are notable: the description of sin and disobedience as ‘parents’
which are somehow part of yet extrinsic to the anthropological ‘household’;
the role of the will and the way it is affected by the Fall; the way that baptism is
taken as altering human anthropology.
108 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Despite his muddled metaphor, Hilary proceeds to explain the third stage,
where the believer is renewed and regenerated by baptism. At this point the Word
of God enters in as a sword and slices away the sin and disobedience components.
The body itself dissolves into a soul’s nature, so it starts to will identical things to
the soul . . . The free will (libertas voluntatis) separates from its mother-in-law
(that is, from disobedience), and surrenders its jurisdiction to the body and soul.
What was before the free will now becomes a faculty of the soul. (InMt 10.24)41
So at baptism the nature of the body is subsumed into that of the soul, and the
will of the body and soul are entirely synchronized. This is a return to the
notion that there was somehow more than one voluntas or velle in the warring
household. With baptism, however, the oneness of the will is restored.
(Although with Hilary’s confusing narrative, there may have been more than
one will even before the Fall).
However, the will is not merely synchronized. It is cut away from disobedi-
ence, and this allows it to relinquish its jurisdiction and become ‘a faculty/ability
of the soul’ (potestas animae). This is ambiguous. Firstly, if the will was indeed
truly free, why should it need to surrender its jurisdiction? Secondly, it is not clear
if the will entirely dissolves (as suggested by the past tense what was the free will)
or merely becomes subordinate, as suggested by the subsequent sentence:
The flesh’s origin, the soul’s origin, and free action are split into two, namely into
(a) the body and soul of the New Man, which begin to will exactly the same thing,
and (b) the three which were split off; these shall be subject to the other two,
which are more able to govern them due to their ‘newness in the Spirit’ [i.e. now
they are spiritually renewed; Rom. 7.6]. (InMt 10.23)42
Now the ‘three which were split off ’ are subjected to the other two, namely the
body and soul of the New Man: but this appears to classify the will as something
negative like disobedience and sin. Still, the Christian is now categorically
composed of body-soul alone. The nominal will (voluntas) is no longer a part
of the household, although the body and soul still will verbally (velle).
It is better not to push Hilary’s analogy too far: it is internally inconsistent
and not well thought through. Rather than picking one of the solutions
illustrated in Figures 2 to 4, it is preferable to accept that Hilary has not
been clear in working it out. It can, at least, be said that disobedience and
sin are somehow extrinsic to man. The position of the will is more ambiguous.
It is not extrinsic in the way its ‘in-laws’ are, but nor is it the homo

41
Et quia corpus ipsum . . . in naturam animae . . . euadat . . . : idcirco iam unum atque idem
cum anima uelle coepit effici . . . , quibus libertas uoluntatis a socru sua, id est, ab infidelitate
diuisa, ius suum omne concedit: ut quod erat libertas uoluntatis, deinceps animae sit potestas.
42
Origo carnis et origo animae et libertas potestatis in duos diuidentur, animam scilicet et
corpus hominis noui, quae unum atque idem uelle coeperunt: diuisique tres duobus subiacebunt,
in dominatum eorum de Spiritus nouitate potioribus.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 109
itself; it merely binds the homo together. It is not clear whether it describes an
anthropological component which is intrinsically proper to the human person.
Also, at times he speaks of one single will and at other times he suggests that
body and soul independently have wills (which must ideally be synchronized).
What can be said, however, is that he sees humans as composed of body,
soul, and will,43 and that the will is certainly affected by the Fall.

Harmonizing Hilary’s Thought: Theodicy

The two preceding sections have shown ambiguity in Hilary’s thought. In

some contexts, Hilary appears to assert our freedom (for example when he
says that our will should be tireless in seeking God’s law,44 his statement
implies this is possible for us). But he also speaks of the will as in thrall to sin
and disobedience. Part of this is due to ambiguity in the word voluntas and the
theological argument it is being used for. Hilary’s usage wavers between will as
intention, will as choice, and will as appetite. However, this leads to problems
for him in terms of theodicy: the very same problem, in fact, that Augustine
will later have to wrestle with.
On one hand, the will is implicated in wrongdoing. When addressing
Christ’s teaching that if our hand causes us to sin we must cut it off,45 Hilary
reminds us that the key point here is not the limb but the will; there is no point
in cutting off the hand if the will’s urge [to sin] still remains.46 Elsewhere Hilary
talks of the fact that people sin according to their will, and of the perversitas
voluntatis which leads some away from God.47 Thus the will is entirely
responsible for sin, and is an expression of our moral responsibility.
And yet our will is weakened by the Fall. As we have seen (p. 96), Hilary
laments that it is impossible not to be wicked since we all naturally have
malitia. As it turns out, this malitia stems from our capricious will: Malevo-
lence affects everyone because we all have a will, as part of our unstable
nature.48
Just as for other early Christian writers, all this has important implications
with regard to moral culpability. So how does he reconcile this weakened will
with God’s justice?
Hilary is aware of this problem, and asserts that we have complete moral
responsibility and cannot use the weaker will as an excuse for our sin. In InMt
21.12–5, he discusses the two sons of Mt 21:28–32 who are asked by their

43 44
Compare also InMt 23.2. TrPs118, 5.4.
45 46
Mt. 5.30. InMt 4.21: relictu uoluntatis instinctu.
47
TrPs118, 10.16, 8.17.
48
TrPs118, 15.6 (commenting v115): omnibus per naturae demutabilis uoluntatem malitia
adiacet.
110 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
father to go to the vineyard; interestingly, his understanding is different from
the traditional one, since he suggests that the younger son (who said he would
go, but did not) is the more commendable of the two. This is because he was
delayed by circumstance: [the younger son’s case] presents an enforced delay
without his will doing any wrong (sine crimine voluntatis).49 The phrase crimen
voluntatis occurs again at InMt 32.1, with regard to the kiss of Judas: it is the
betrayer’s voluntas that indicts him.
Another example occurs when Hilary differentiates the good and the
wicked who are invited indiscriminately to the Wedding Banquet (Mt 22.10).
The invitation should surely have made them good, because it is holy, and is
offered out of the best sentiments of the host; but the invitees differ from each
other in regard to the defect of having unimproved wills (inemendata voluntas).
(InMt 22.6)50
The word vitium recalls general depravity but also the effects of the Fall (i.e. a
psychological/moral understanding of the will).51 But the eschatological sense
of the passage also recalls a legal context, namely the Last Judgement. Thus
one’s lot on the Last Day depends on one’s will—both in the legal sense of
‘intention’, and in the psychological sense of a mental faculty that contributes
to sinful actions. Hilary makes it clear that even a good deed cannot obtain
merit except with the application of the will: If we happen to do something
[good] with a slack will, then because of our indifference we shall obtain no
reward for zeal.52
However, this is apparently not a sufficient answer to the problem of God’s
justice. In TrPs, Hilary repeatedly raises the problem of theodicy and the
question of God’s fairness. The following texts are among those which men-
tion moral responsibility or God’s justice in one way or another: TrPs118
5.11–13, 14.20, 16.9, 18.1–2, 20.5. Some of these are phrased as an objectio
against God followed by Hilary’s responsio.
What is more, Hilary may resolve the problem of God’s justice by reference
to the voluntas, as is demonstrated by the following sample passage.
Certainly the ability to *abide* in the faith is a gift from God, but the *starting
point* of faith originates within us. Our will should do its willing by itself; then
God gives growth to what is started. We are too weak to achieve this [abiding in
faith] alone, but whether we are worthy to achieve it depends on our will making
the first move (ex initio voluntatis).

49
InMt 21.14: in eo enim necessitatis mora, sine crimine uoluntatis, ostenditur.
50
Vocatio quidem bonos efficere debuerat, quia sancta est, et ex optimo affectu inuitantis
profecta est: sed per uitium inemendatae uoluntatis discrimen est uocatorum.
51
E.g. TrPs118, 14.20 uitium originis; cf. TERTULLIAN an. 41.
52
TrPs118, 1.11: si aliquid remissa uoluntate . . . egerimus, . . . deuotionis meritum per negli-
gentiam non consequemur.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 111
The Prophet’s nature and his fleshly origin (origo carnis) hold him back, but his
will and piety incline his heart away from the Original Fault (vitium orginis) in
which he was abiding, and towards the works of righteousness.
(TrPs118, 14.20, commenting v112)53
This first excerpt asserts our culpability in terms of our nature. We are held
back by weakness, by the origo carnis and vitium originis; but all we need is a
good will and piety, and if we make a small inclination of the will God will do
the rest. Ultimately, responsibility lies categorically with us and not with God.
Hilary asserts that faith, however small, must begin in us with the will
making the initial move: this is the initium voluntatis. This very discussion
implies, however, that the voluntas cannot get farther than an initium on its
own. That is why the starting point is in our hands, but God gives the gift of
remaining in the faith. Even the saintly Prophet (i.e. Psalmist) is held back by
his earthly flesh and his vitium originis, although he has a good voluntas. But
when it comes to the crunch, our weakness does not achieve [faith] by itself,
even for the Prophet. The will can incline to God, but is not capable of getting
any further of its own accord. In sum, the problem of God’s justice in face of a
weakened will is solved by the fact that the will always has the ability to make
the first move. This concept also occurs elsewhere in Hilary, expressed in a
number of different ways, which suggests it does not yet have a fixed vocabu-
lary (incipiendi a nobis origo est; ex nobis initium est; initium voluntatis; a
nobis est exordium; initium fidei).54 Even ignorance is no excuse: even that is
culpable if it is willed.55
Although the evidence is slight, it seems that Hilary’s articulation may be
unique to him. At v36, both Origen and Hilary ask56 why humans can be held
morally responsible when all things come from God (Hilary asks if human
ignorance lacks blame; Origen evinces the Christian understanding of the
technical phrase ‘up to us’, eph’ hēmin). They both respond by referring
to the parallelism of such verses: ‘Establish for me the way of your command-
ments’ is the humble prayer that God should play his part, whereas ‘and I shall
ever search them’ is the human part to play. Origen and Hilary both use the
same structure, and both use v33 as an example, suggesting that Hilary has

53
Est quidem in fide manendi a Deo munus, sed incipiendi a nobis origo est. Et uoluntas
nostra hoc proprium ex se habere debet, ut uelit: Deus incipienti incrementum dabit: quia
consummationem per se infirmitas nostra non obtinet, meritum tamen adipiscendae consum-
mationis est ex initio uoluntatis. [ . . . ] Natura quidem et origo carnis suae eum [Prophetam]
detinebat: sed uoluntas et religio cor eius ex eo in quo manebat originis uitio ad iustificationum
opera declinat.
54
TrPs118, 5.12 ex nobis initium est; 14.20 initium uoluntatis; 14.30 a nobis est exordium;
16.10: initium fidei.
55
TrPs118, 20.5: non habet ueniam ignoratio uoluntatis: quia sub scientiae facultate nescire,
repudiatae magis quam non repertae scientiae est reatus.
56
Pal.Cat., Origen, on v36; HILARY TrPs118, 5.11–13; absent from AMBROSE ExpPs118,
5.26.
112 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
again closely followed Origen’s text. Yet there is a subtle difference. Origen’s
response is essentially that complete synergy between God and man is pos-
sible, as demonstrated by the parallelism of the verses he quotes. Hilary on the
other hand suggests that all is in God’s hands but we require the initium fidei
(here expressed as a nobis est exordium, at this point without mentioning the
word voluntas). Hilary also prefaces this argument with the point that even
asking this question has wicked intentions (voluntas impietatis). In all, Origen
seems to be allowing for grace whereas Hilary may be pinpointing an area
which is entirely in our remit.
A couple of points may be made in conclusion. Firstly, Hilary knows that he
is presenting a view of a weakened will; secondly, he is aware that this
challenges the traditional explanation of our moral responsibility and God’s
justice. In both these regards he anticipates Augustine.

Statistics

Padovese suggests that Hilary uses the concept of voluntas more than any
other patristic author until Augustine.57 It is certainly true that Hilary’s overall
usage is higher than one might expect, as can be shown by comparing his
usage with Ambrose’s for the same commentary.
In his commentary on Psalm 118, Ambrose uses voluntas 3.2 times per
10,000 words;58 Hilary uses it 9.8 times per 10,00059 (see Table 6.1). So in an
exactly comparable text—using identical subject matter—Hilary uses it more
than three times as often. Moreover, this commentary includes exegesis of
v108 where free-will offerings (voluntaria) are explained in terms of one’s will
(voluntas);60 if this passage is excluded, in order to find only unprompted uses,
the figures are 2.8 (Ambrose) and 9.6 (Hilary) per 10,000.
The figures are even more remarkable when Hilary’s other commentary is
considered; in InMt he uses voluntas a staggering 16.7 times per 10,000.61
Admittedly many of these instances refer to a key theme of the Father’s will in
Christ (not analysed here), but even without these there are 12.2 occurrences
of (human) voluntas per 10,000 of text: more than four times the incidence in
Ambrose’s psalm commentary.
Not only does Hilary use voluntas far more frequently than other writers
but he uses it to express concepts that others express without voluntas. For
example, he suggests that we should follow Christ’s example of patience; this is

57
PADOVESE 1991:8.
58
Forty-one instances out of 126,506 words. (NB all these figures include editorial titles and
paragraph headings.)
59 60
Forty-five instances out of 46,133 words. Compare Pal.Cat., Origen, on v108.
61
Eight-one instances out of 48,479 words.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 113
Table 6.1 Frequency of the word voluntas: Occurrences per 10,000
Ambrose Hilary

Commentary on Ps. 118 3.2 9.8

same, excluding v108 2.8 9.6
Commentary on Matthew n/a 16.7
same, excluding Father’s will n/a 12.2

an exhortation also found in Tertullian,62 but Tertullian does not express this
in terms of will whereas Hilary does (voluntas patientiae).63 Also, as we have
seen, there is the way that Hilary uses the will to express the results of the Fall
rather than just its causes.

Summary of Voluntas in Hilary

So far, this chapter has identified a variety of overlapping ways in which Hilary
uses voluntas in anthropological contexts.
Firstly, Hilary’s will holds a key role in human action; in this usage it
appears to have complete freedom and thereby solve the problem of evil and
moral responsibility. As a corollary, this means that the will can also express
human character or disposition, since each individual human will can respond
to the same situation in different ways; it can be used to refer to all-round
moral fibre (whether this person is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ overall) or it may refer to
character when related to specific actions (as such it overlaps with ‘intention’).
Secondly, Hilary sees the will as an anthropological component. It was
somehow affected by the Fall; the key passage on this suggests it is now
enslaved to disobedience (infidelitas, its mother-in-law) but other passages
suggest its main offence is that it is unstable or out of tune with the soul. At
any rate, it was somehow weakened or rendered less competent by the Fall.
In the Psalms commentaries, the fact that the will is weakened leads to a
concern as to whether God is fair to punish us for wrongdoing. Hilary’s
solution however is coherent across the work. The will is imperfect, but not
totally helpless, and it is only expected to make the initial step towards God—
however small this may be. It must be accompanied by progress towards God,
and willingness to work with him. This notion of the initium voluntatis is
Hilary’s solution to the problem of culpability and God’s justice.
Theodicy of this sort does not occur in the InMt commentary; it may be
that this is by chance, or it may be that Hilary’s repeated defence of God’s
justice arises in the context of something Origen has said and that Hilary
feels he needs to respond to. At the very least, it is not evident in Ambrose or

62 63
TERTULLIAN de patientia 3. InMt 10.15.
114 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Origen and thus this articulation is possibly novel to Hilary. Another minor
difference between the commentaries is that the Matthew commentary may
call the will vaga, incerta, ambigua. TrPs118, on the other hand, explicitly
aims to demonstrate the notion of progress in virtue; the will is something to
be developed.
Nevertheless, Hilary’s use of voluntas is essentially the same across the
commentaries. All his works treat voluntas in relation to the law, being an
indicator of intention and (by extension) moral responsibility. In a slightly
different vein, Hilary consistently treats of the will as an (or the) origin of
human action, which may be swayed by other factors such as the body or
emotions.
It is now time to turn to consider how Hilary’s usage of voluntas fits into the
thought of his day and the evolution of voluntas before Augustine.

VOLUNTAS BEFORE AUGUSTINE

Christianity before Augustine: A Fully Competent Will(?)

In common with the underlying classical worldview, early Christian thought

held that human self-determination is a key part of what it means to be
human.64 Tertullian does not merely insist that man is endowed with autex-
ousion (using the Greek term despite writing in Latin).65 He even goes so far as
to say that the human gift of being in God’s image is for two reasons: firstly,
that his soul is of God’s substance, and secondly, that he, like God, has
complete libertas arbitrii,66 something which is associated with voluntas.67
This is a high role indeed for the will to play.
An important recurring discussion in the first few Christian centuries is the
question of how there can be evil in a world created by a supposedly good
creator. Attacks from ‘heterodox’ Christians meant that this issue of God’s
goodness and the provenance of evil was important, so assertions of man’s free
and competent self-determination are almost unanimous and unchallenged
throughout Christian literature before Hilary. The solution is always human
self-determination, although the vocabulary for this may differ: Irenaeus
against the Gnostics more typically expresses this in terms of ability to

64
Compare Epictetus, e.g. that man is essentially his προαίρεσις (p. 120).
65
TERTULLIAN an. 21. Also found in other second century authors, e.g. THEOPHILUS
Apologia ad Autolycum 2.27.
66
TERTULLIAN adv. Marc. 2.5.
67
TERTULLIAN adv. Marc. 2.6 . . . exigeret voluntarie . . . , ex libertate scilicet arbitrii.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 115
distinguish good and evil,68 while Tertullian uses the language of free will (self-
determination). Indeed for Tertullian, human autonomy is a very part of our
perfection.69
Dihle suggests that before Augustine there was no concept of the will in the
modern voluntaristic sense of denoting the self or individual responses.70 He
demonstrates that in Greek thought action was seen as properly rational, and
‘bad’ actions only arise when proper deliberation is prevented (for example by
ignorance or bodily distractions). Contrasting with this is the biblical world-
view, which Dihle sees as demanding submission without any rational delib-
eration at all. These two contrasting positions are then harmonized by
Augustine, to whom Dihle (following a number of other scholars, in particular
Cochrane: p. 167)71 attributes the true and full invention of a will implying self
and personality.72 Dihle’s interpretation has been rejected on a number of
grounds;73 one common critique is his view that there are various concepts of
the will in philosophical Greek thought which develop through time.74
It is now more common to see Augustine as part of an ongoing trajectory of
thought on the will, as for example suggested by Kahn 1988 or Frede 2011.
Kahn demonstrates how Aquinas’ voluntas differs from Aristotle’s boulēsis, for
example in decision making and in power over the emotions. Next he traces
four intermediate stages: (a) Chrysippus and subsequent Stoic thought on
determinism; (b) the effect of translation into Latin; (c) proairesis in Epictetus;
and (d) Augustine’s merging with Christianity and Neoplatonism.
So these scholars still suggest that Augustine is the first to adopt into
Christianity the Stoic-based idea of constraint in action or human personality.
However, Hilary chronologically fits between Epictetus and Augustine—and
yet he still seems to suggest that the will is weakened by the Fall, and to see it as
something denoting character.
So far it appears as if complete freedom in action is part of the Christian
explanation of how evil arises in the world. Yet it has been asserted several
times above that Christianity also has a concept of ‘constraint’ on human
action. There is no fixed terminology for this; Hilary can only say humans sin
by necessitas. This is partly because earlier writers have different explanations

68 69
IRENAEUS adv. haer. 4.39.1–4. TERTULLIAN adv. Marc. 2.4.
70
DIHLE 1982:19.
71
Cochrane 1957, Ch.11 includes the will in his discussion on the development of the idea of
human personality.
72
DIHLE 1982:123.
73
Other than that mentioned, criticisms of Dihle include (a) the fact that the incompetence of
the will may be dealt with by earlier philosophers but with different vocabulary (e.g. Gosling
1990, Harrison 2006); (b) the presence of voluntarism in Greek literature (cf. Dihle 1982:25–7,
43–6) or philosophy where even the prime mover is motivated by love (Aristotle met.
12.1072b5–6); (c) the question as to whether labelling the debate as rationalism vs. voluntarism
is constructive in the first place (Chappell 1995:207).
74
See for example FREDE 2011:5–6, KAHN 1988:236–7, HARRISON 2006:5–6.
116 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
for the fact that humans do not actually have complete freedom in our actions.
Tertullian posits that our essential goodness is affected by ‘natural’ depravity75
and that we need to progress;76 Irenaeus mentions weakness and immatur-
ity.77 Two other excuses are the malign influence of demons (e.g. Justin
Martyr)78 and the corrupting influence of the earthly body and in particular
the flesh (e.g. Irenaeus).79 Chapter 7 will demonstrate two further important
constraints on human action that arise through Origen and his assimilation of
Stoic thought, namely the emotions and the interrupting ‘thoughts’ that
probably go back to Stoic (dia)logismoi.
There are two important points to make here. Firstly, the idea of constraint
is already present in Christianity right from the start (and does not arise new
in Augustine). It runs absolutely parallel to Christian discourse on human
autonomy; it is thus false to say that Christians posit a human freedom that is
even more absolute than Aristotle or the Stoics (as asserted by say Horn).80
But these earlier thinkers are not particularly exercised by the apparent
paradox between complete freedom and human constraint because they do
not see human action as irrevocably constrained; that is, our action is limited
or hampered, but we still ultimately have the capacity to avoid sin.
This leads to the second key point: when these earlier Christians mention
constraint, they never express it in terms of the will (apart from the exceptions
noted below). This means that it is easier to keep apart the concepts of ‘human
autonomy’ versus ‘constraint in action’. As soon as autonomy comes to be
expressed as a free will, and constraint comes to be expressed as a restricted
will (as indeed it already is in philosophical discourse), contradictions will
begin to appear in any writer’s expressions of human anthropology.

Christianity before Augustine: The Fall and the Weakened Will

There are countless retellings of the Fall in one respect or another dating from
before Augustine. However, with a few exceptions which will be noted shortly,
not one of these describes the Fall in terms of an enslavement of the will. Some
accounts are essentially historical-style narratives based on the Genesis story,
such as those of Theophilus81 or Lactantius,82 supplemented by midrash-type
embellishments; some entwine Genesis with other sources, such as the Naas-
sene description of the fall of primal man into earthly man.83 But none of these
expresses the will as depraved by the Fall.

75 76
TERTULLIAN an. 41. TERTULLIAN an. 21.
77 78
IRENAEUS adv. haer. 4.38.1–4. JUSTIN MARTYR First Apology 4; 10.
79 80
LACTANTIUS div. inst.2.13. HORN 2014:301.
81 82
THEOPHILUS Apologia ad Autolycum 2.21. LACTANTIUS div. inst. 2.13.
83
Cited by HIPPOLYTUS Refutatio Omnium Haeresium 5.2.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 117
There are a few possible exceptions. I have only been able to identify two
passages which could date before Hilary, but even then the details are ques-
tionable (I do not claim these passages are exhaustive). These exceptions are
important because they show that the language of the will was beginning to be
used to express this issue.
The Constitutions of the Holy Apostles describes the work of Christ as
releasing man’s will.
For when Christ, God’s Son, came, he ratified and fulfilled the Law. He took away
the additional precepts . . . ; and he made human self-determination (to autexou-
sion) free again. He did not condemn humans to a temporal death, but set up new
laws for them appropriate to the new state of affairs.
(APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTIONS, 6.22)84
Christ’s work is described in three ways, the last of which is the liberation of
man’s autexousion. The word palin (again) indicates man’s free will has
previously been free (eleutheron) at some earlier point, but then was enslaved
until Christ redeemed it. The dating of this work is hard to establish: the
original text belongs to the early third century but its compilation and
editing are possibly late fourth,85 which makes it hard to ascertain whether
this section pre-dates Hilary or not. Also, Greek autexousion and Latin
voluntas are not strictly equivalent. At any rate, this passage demonstrates
the emergence of notions of restricted self-determination, but more cannot
be said.
Secondly, there is this text from Origen:
I think there was a reason why he said not ‘they emitted a scent’ but ‘they emitted
*their* scent’. This was to show that every soul has within it the ability to act and
exert free choice (arbitrii libertas), with which it can do everything good. But this
good in our nature was extracted at the Fall and was inclined towards either
disgrace or wantonness. When it is mended by grace and restored by the teaching
of God’s Word, it gives out that ‘scent’ which God certainly granted it when he
originally made it, but which the penalty for sin had ripped out.
(ORIGEN Comm. in Cant. 4.1.20)86

84
Χριστὸς γὰρ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς τὸν νόμον κυρώσας ἐπλήρωσεν, τὰ ἐπείσακτα περιεῖλεν . . . · καὶ
τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων πάλιν ἀφῆκεν ἐλεύθερον, οὐ προσκαίρῳ θανάτῳ δικάζων, ἀλλ’ ἐν
ἑτέρᾳ καταστάσει λογοθετῶν αὐτό.
85
On the dating: METZGER 1985:1–62 (esp.15–16, 57–60).
86
Et non sine causa puto quod non dixerit odorem dederunt, sed odorem suum, ut ostenderet
inesse unicuique animae uim possibilitatis et arbitrii libertatem, qua possit agere omne quod
bonum est. Sed quia hoc naturae bonum praeuaricationis occasione decerptum, uel ad ignomi-
niam uel lasciuiam fuerat inflexum, ubi per gratiam reparatur et per doctrinam Verbi Dei
restituitur, odorem reddit illum sine dubio quem primitus conditor Deus inolouerat, sed peccati
culpa subtraxerat.
118 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
At the Fall, the will’s goodness was extracted. Tennant and Williams both
explain away this text in the same way:87 they suggest that Origen had come
across the practice of infant baptism on moving to Caesarea, and this comes
across in the current excerpt (written c.240, during Origen’s Caesarean
period).88 However, they both feel that this was a temporary aberration in
what is otherwise a fairly consistent picture in Origen. Works (supposedly)
written before this ‘Caesarean phase’ are dogmatically insistent on the freedom
of the will; and after this phase Origen apparently returns to his original view
of man’s freedom.
However, Origen refers to a form of original sin at other points across his
corpus,89 even if not in terms of the will, so discovery of infant baptism need
not have prompted this text. Also, if this excerpt belonged to a short-lived
doctrinal phase, it was a very short one indeed; the very same book of Origen’s
commentary on the Song of Solomon shows other examples where the
culpability and freedom of the will are firmly asserted.90 Despite some asser-
tions to the contrary, Origen maybe was not so optimistic about the human
condition.
Arbitrium and voluntas are very different things, and one can have free
choice without freedom of desire/will/personality/action (as indeed the Stoics
point out); it would be helpful to know whether the original Greek text
referred to proairesis or another term. Nevertheless, this passage again denotes
some kind of capacity which was lost at the Fall so that our ability to do good is
hampered.
A third example dates from after Hilary, but supports the idea of a Fall
associated with the will and also bears many similarities to Hilary’s anthropo-
logical household.
Just now we said that the mind is going to be one in nature, person and rank. Also
there has been a time when, because of its free will, it fell from this former rank
and became a soul. And having sunk down even further, it was called a body. But
in time the body, the soul, and the mind, because of changes of their wills, will
become one entity. Because there will be a time that their wills and their various
movements will have passed, the mind will stand again in its first creation.
(EVAGRIUS Ep. Melania, 6)91

87
TENNANT 1903:299; WILLIAMS 1927:227.
88
For this dating, see Brésard & Crouzel 1991:11–12, based on evidence from EUSEBIUS H.E.
6.32.2.
89
WILLIAMS 1927:223–31, e.g. 230. TENNANT 1903: 296–306, e.g. 302, 303.
90
ORIGEN Comm. in Cant. 4.3.21: . . . quoniamquidem per arbitrii libertatem possibile est
unumquemque ex parte alterius transire uel ad partem Dei si melius, uel si nequius ad daemo-
num portionem . . . Comm. in Cant. 4.3.5: Sed quia non deest diuina prouidentia ne forte per
huiusmodi importunitatem turbaretur libertas abritrii et non esset iusta causa iudicii . . .
91
PARMENTIER 1985:31.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 119
Evagrius describes how the mind falls to become a soul and then to become a
body, because of its free will. But the body-soul-mind shall become one again
when their wills change. This echoes Hilary’s anthropological household
narrative in a number of ways—the future harmonization of body and soul;
the mind recovering its former dominance; and possibly even the plurality of
wills, which shall in the future become one.
None of these passages uses the Latin word voluntas, meaning that Hilary
appears to be the first early church scholar to express the Fall in terms of this
word. Nevertheless, these three excerpts all express the Fall as affecting our
self-determination or ability to act freely; and all date from before Augustine.
Hilary thus appears to be on a trajectory that emphasizes how our capacity for
action is affected by the Fall, and articulates this in terms of our incapacitated
self-determination or will.

Stoicism: The Will and Human Action

So much for Christian theology; but a trend in recent scholarship has been to
see Christian developments as part of the development in the Stoic concept of
the will. The following follows the narrative of scholars such as Bobzien
and Frede.
The (earlier) Stoic theory of action proposed three or four stages,92 with
initial sense-impressions (phantasiai)93 needing an assent of the mind (sun-
katathesis) before the final impulse to action (hormē).94 This assent is based on
a variety of considerations, whether rational, appetitive, or emotive. In trans-
lation, and given different Stoic descriptions of the process, it seems that
voluntas could denote either the final impulse, or the rational part of the
assent, or the overall assent (including emotive considerations). Bobzien
points out that moral responsibility here is ‘not grounded on freedom to do
otherwise, but on the autonomy of the agent’.95 This understanding of human
action also allows for moral development, as seen for example in Lucretius,
hopefully reaching ataraxia.96
As many scholars point out (for example Kahn, Bobzien, Dobbin, and
Frede),97 a shift then came about in the works of the philosopher Epictetus

92
Description for example in FREDE 2011:35–41 passim, cf. 157–8.
93
Cicero translates this as impressio, due to Zeno preferring the word τύπωσις (‘imprint’) to
φαντασία. If entirely rational, the φαντασίαι are equivalent to νοήσεις.
94
For another (implied) description of the process of human action, see PLUTARCH Cicero
40, where he explains that Cicero introduced these terms into Latin (ὁ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν καὶ τὴν
συγκατάθεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν . . . ).
95
BOBZIEN 1998:325.
96
See ANNAS 1992:129–33.
97
KAHN 1988:251–3, BOBZIEN 1998:331–57, FREDE 2011:31–48, DOBBIN 2008:xii.
120 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
and his understanding of proairesis. Bobzien highlights his new concept of
eleutheria, freedom from emotions and other things that hinder right assents.
She points out that the earlier concept of to eph’ hēmin (an action caused by us,
for Chrysippus and earlier Stoics) changes in Epictetus to ta eph’ hēmin, the
class of actions which we have full control over—which essentially comprises
only our assent to fate.98 ‘For Epictetus, a free person is someone who lives as
he wills . . . who is rid of pain, fear and trouble.’99 Thus freedom is knowing
what is ta eph’ hēmin; it is not freedom to act otherwise, the type of freedom
envisaged in later Christian discussions. Bobzien insists that in Epictetus there
is no explicit link between freedom and moral responsibility: adulterers are
morally responsible, but are not free from their desires. (This link is in fact first
found in Christian literature, in Justin Martyr and his pupil Tatian.)100
The wise man’s choice to consent to his fate is for Epictetus bound up in the
concept of proairesis. Dobbin101 surveys the different uses of the word by the
philosopher, for example as a part of human action or in assessments of moral
responsibility. He shows that, although it has individualistic overtones, the
word is not so far from Aristotle’s rationalism. Long, on the other hand,
translates proairesis in Epictetus as volition: ‘[In Epictetus] the crucial idea is
that volition [i.e. proairesis] is what persons are in terms of their mental
faculties, consciousness, character, judgements, goals and desires: volition is
the self, what each of us is, as abstracted from the body.’102 Other scholars
differ on the details,103 but the use of proairesis to indicate individual character
is clear: Man is his proairesis, as Epictetus says many times.104
The further developments of this concept in the Christian realm are taken
up by Frede. While earlier Stoicism was merely concerned about causality
(how humans could have moral responsibility in a world governed by fate),
Christianity uses the will for debates regarding the existence of evil in a good
creation, and the problem of moral responsibility.105 Against Dihle’s sugges-
tion that Augustine merges different classical and biblical worldviews, Frede
suggests a continuous development. Frede sees Augustine as essentially Stoic
in his understanding of the will, but also in his concept of its constraint and
incapacity.106 This matches perfectly onto the Stoic idea of only the wise man
or sage being able to act entirely rationally; as shown, this concept is linked

98 99
BOBZIEN 1998:337. BOBZIEN 1998:341.
100
BOBZIEN 1998:344, FREDE 2011:102.
101
DOBBIN 1991:133–4, cf. 112–5. He suggests that Epictetus adopted the word, even
though it had been hitherto uncommon in Stoic discourse, since it was part of contemporary
critique of Stoicism (that is, he made προαίρεσις his own since detractors claimed it was neglected
in Stoic thought).
102
LONG 2002:28.
103
As well as the scholars cited in this paragraph, see DIHLE 1982:60, FREDE 2011:44–8.
104
EPICTETUS 3.1.40, 4.5.12 cf. 2.10.1. Dobbin (1991:114) links this ARISTOTLE EN
1139b5 (albeit with a slightly different meaning).
105 106
BOBZIEN 1998:412. FREDE 2011:155.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 121
from Epictetus with the notion of freedom. Thus the majority of us are not
‘free’ and this is expressed in terms of an incapacitated will.
All well and good, but how does Hilary fit into this? To determine this, we
need to examine how Frede and others see Origen as fitting into the develop-
ment of this concept. For Frede, Origen represents a synthesis between
Christianity and Stoic thought on action and the will. Frede sees Origen as
essentially Stoic with regard to the free will (‘[Origen’s] terminology almost
invariably [is] found in Epictetus and almost all the major claims [have] their
parallels in him, too’),107 grafted onto a Platonic theological (cosmological)
system.108 (The Stoics as a separate school did not exist at this time, but many
of their ideas had been absorbed into mainstream Platonism). But for Frede,
Origen evinces a crucial difference from the Stoics, namely that Origen’s
humans are totally free.109
The key issue is which kind of freedom this means. Origen is certainly clear
on human freedom and the freedom of the will.110 For example, in Book II of
de Principiis he addresses the question of God’s justice as raised by ‘Gnostics’
such as Marcion and Valentinian, in creating different individuals with different
lots of fortune or misfortune at birth. Origen maintains that God is not unfair,
but distributes fortune to each individual according to their free will and how
far they have adhered to God before being born in this world. It is because
different people have different wills and conditions that they fell in different
degrees.111 He asserts the freedom of the will ubiquitously across his works112
and indeed for him it is a key doctrine that we can be judged because of our
freedom: this defends God’s justice and goodness, and explains human moral
responsibility.
Nevertheless, Origen does show evidence of constraint in action. For exam-
ple he mentions that our demons act through our weakness,113 and that we
cannot overcome spiritual battles without God’s help.114 Chapter 7 will
demonstrate further internal constraint in Origen, such as emotions. (There
is even the fascinating passage quoted on p. 117 which may refer to a lack of
freedom for the proairesis). Thus there is indeed evidence for constraint in
Origen—but it is not expressed in terms of the autexousion. Also, Origen’s
system allows for moral progress just as much as the Stoic system does, and
suggests such progress brings us greater ‘freedom’. (It may also be relevant that
Origen writes to refute determinism and defend God’s justice, unlike the
context of grace and human dependence which are Augustine’s concern.) So

107
FREDE 2011:112 (‘ . . . Some of Origen's explications of scriptural texts become intelligible
only against the background of the kind of theory we have ascribed to Epictetus.’)
108 109
FREDE 2011:120. FREDE 2011:177.
110
ORIGEN princ. 3.1.1–24 is an entire chapter (and a lengthy one at that) investigating
different aspects of human free will. See for example 3.1.6–7.
111 112
ORIGEN princ. 1.4.1. ORIGEN Comm. Mt. 10.11.
113 114
ORIGEN princ. 3.2.2. ORIGEN princ. 3.2.5.
122 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
the main difference between Origen and Frede’s Stoics is that Origen is using
the will to denote freedom in self-determination rather than freedom from
constraint.

DISCUSSION

With this information it is now possible to return to Hilary. How does Hilary
fit into the described development through time in understandings of the will?
This question may be partly answered here, although more will come in
Chapter 7.
The first point to note is that, like Origen and Augustine, Hilary shares
concepts in common with the Stoic narrative of human psychology. In
particular the word voluntas seems to share some of the connotations of
proairesis, such as individual character or disposition and its use in submitting
to God’s will (equivalent to fate for Epictetus). But voluntas may also denote a
psychological component in the process of human action, which occasionally
leads us to ambiguity: it can be unclear whether voluntas means ‘desire’ or
‘intended action’. For example, Hilary tells us we must apply our wills,115 but is
there another will with which to apply it? Hilary is partly aware of these
tensions, as when he discusses how Herod earlier had not wished to kill John
but now is forced to by circumstances: Herod both wishes and does not wish to
execute John.116 Such an ambiguity occurs in other church fathers who may
have lost the Stoic psychology but still use voluntas in more than one way.
Augustine’s dilemma, where he struggles with his will,117 can be seen in this
light. Ambrose also sees a strain between voluntas as preference, as anthropo-
logical faculty, and as intention: It is not enough to wish well, we must also do
well; and it is not enough to do well, unless it should come from the right source,
that is, from a good will.118
Secondly, Hilary implicitly distinguishes between the voluntas which pro-
vides the mind’s assent to a perception or action, and true freedom. On p. 120
it was mentioned how these are distinct in Epictetus: the murderer is not truly
free, but is still morally responsible. This is reflected in both of Hilary’s
commentaries. For the anthropological household, pre-lapsarian man has
voluntas, which is also described as a potestas. After the Fall, the referent is
now mere arbitrium voluntatis, which has Disobedience as its repressive
mother-in-law. Finally mankind is restored by baptism and now has libertas
voluntatis (twice), which is related to potestas animae; the passage culminates

115 116 117

TrPs118, 1.12. InMt 14.8. AUGUSTINE conf. 8.9.21.
118
AMBROSE de officiis 1.143: non enim satis est bene uelle sed etiam bene facere; nec satis
est iterum bene facere nisi id ex bono fonte, hoc est bona uoluntate, proficiscatur.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 123
with an assertion of the libertas potestatis. The implication is that unredeemed
mankind somehow loses true potestas in his actions; he can make decisions
accurately, but is not truly unbiased and may be swayed by (unnamed)
external factors. Libertas only comes when some kind of redemption has
been achieved (here baptism, but elsewhere for Hilary libertas seems to be
eschatological). In TrPs the ideal is expressed as the aim to harmonize the
‘soul’s intention with the will’s office’,119 in other words to harmonize
the spirituality of the soul (yearning for God) with human psychology and
action on earth.
Thirdly, where does Hilary get these ideas from? The type of ultimate
freedom just mentioned appears to be freedom from external factors such as
the pleasures of the world—exactly as in Bobzien’s Epictetus. On the other
hand Hilary’s voluntas has some aspects which belong more properly to
Christian thought than to Stoicism; his freedom is formally associated with
moral responsibility. In Hilary on the other hand the voluntas is explicitly
beholden to its mother-in-law disobedience and is responsible for human
action to the point of being the element responsible for our sin (recall
p. 109). Another difference between Hilary and Stoics like Epictetus is his
concern for theodicy and defending God’s justice and goodness. As men-
tioned, although the Stoics are concerned for the tension between fate and free
human action, it is Christian thought that adopts these concepts for debates
regarding God’s justice or goodness. Another way in which Hilary differs here
is that Stoic thought suggests children are born without ‘freedom’ but hope-
fully develop it through their lifetimes. In the Christian narrative which Hilary
follows, Adam was originally ‘free’ but then fell. For Hilary, this is again
expressed as an event affecting the will.
Frede analyses how both Origen and Augustine are influenced by Stoic
thought (maybe mediated through Platonic schools),120 but with the crucial
difference that Augustine denies our freedom whereas Origen relies on it for
his various arguments.121 For Frede, Augustine is entirely consistent with
philosophical thought on the will at his time (for example, that the will is
needed in cognition—pace Dihle who suggests Augustine invented this)122
and is thus not a new departure.
However, this can be improved on in two ways. Firstly, there is indeed
evidence for constraint in Origen, and expressed in Stoic terms at that, as will
be shown in Chapter 7. Secondly, the evidence from Hilary presented here
shows that the expression of constraint in terms of voluntas is not new to
Augustine. Hilary is also relying on these ‘Stoic’ ideas; and he does not even
seem to think that his articulation is novel, but belongs fully in Christianity.

119 120
TrPs118, 17.1 (see also p. 101). FREDE 2011:120, 155.
121 122
FREDE 2011:170. FREDE 2011:153; 156–9.
124 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Can we be more specific as to the source of Hilary’s ideas? Some of his
articulations seem to be shared with Origen. For example in TrPs Hilary’s
ideas of human action, cogitationes and passions seem to have much in
common with Origen; this will be developed in Chapter 7. And the narrative
of the anthropological household does not immediately seem be borrowed—
neither Ambrose nor Origen mention the will—but the evidence from Evagrius
suggests that the idea of the will(s) corrupted by the Fall is not unique. The
concept of proairesis as indicative of personality is also found in Origen: for
example his fragmentary Matthew commentary makes the point that all
humans have the same nature but different ‘wills’ implying personalities.123
But it has already been shown how the notions that the Fall corrupted our
nature, or that our action is constrained by both external and internal factors,
already existed in Christianity apart from Origen (pp. 114–16); so Hilary is not
unique here. On the other hand, he appears to provide an early example of
human constraint being expressed in terms of the voluntas; and this also seems
to drive him to a greater concern for theodicy as expressed in terms of the will.
In these, Hilary appears to be more novel.

CONCLUSION

There are three things worthy of note with regard to Hilary’s use of voluntas in
the Christian tradition: (a) his articulation of human weakness in terms of a
voluntas which is weakened or depraved at the Fall, rather than in terms of the
body, demons, etc.; (b) his solution to the consequent problem of God’s
justice, namely the initium voluntatis—a concept which will become of great
importance a generation later; (c) his use of Stoic concepts in explaining the
process of human cogitation and action.
Rondeau states that the human composition of body-soul-will found in
InMt 10.23–4 (and InMt 23.2) is gratuitous: ‘He is here giving an analytical
description, not an ontological one.’124 She feels that Hilary categorically has a
dualistic body-soul view of the human person as he himself states elsewhere.
The evidence of the current chapter belies this. For Hilary, voluntas is not the
same as the soul (since it may work both with and against the soul) and can
overcome one’s emotions and human nature. Moreover, it is an essential
component of human psychology, even if its role varies through salvation
history.
Hilary’s two commentaries have differences in emphasis, with voluntas
more likely to indicate personality in InMt and more likely to address

123
ORIGEN Comm. Mt. 10.11.
124
RONDEAU 1962:200–1: il s’agit là d’une description logique, non ontologique.
 Constraint (1): Voluntas 125
concerns for theodicy in TrPs. Nevertheless, there is consistency in his lan-
guage. Whenever he talks about God’s justice or moral responsibility, he
affirms the competence of the will (predominantly in TrPs118, but InMt also
suggests we can apply or improve our wills).125 Yet he also asserts the will’s
weakness.
Hilary is aware of the tensions between these positions. His response is the
recurring concept of the initium voluntatis:126 we are helpless and dependent
on God’s grace, but nevertheless we have just enough strength to make the first
move. The very need for the theological ‘solution’ of the initium voluntatis
demonstrates how hampered the will is in the rest of Hilary’s thought. For
example at TrPs118, 14.20 Hilary asserts the initium voluntatis can lead to
redemption, but this is because he has also made the voluntas the explicit cause
of sin. Hilary is significant in being an early (or even the first) writer who
explicitly and consistently asserts a weakened will, which he connects to the
Fall. If this is the case, then scholars such as Tennant are very wrong to say that
Hilary has nothing new with regard to the theology of original sin:127 to the
contrary, he is the first explicit witness of a key ingredient in Augustine’s mix.
Hilary does not explicitly borrow from Origen on the free will: this seems to
be his own articulation of the idea of constraint. Nevertheless, Origen’s ideas
on the notions of human psychology and the process of action, borrowed from
the Stoics, certainly seem to be in evidence especially in Hilary’s Psalms
commentaries. In order to develop our understanding of human constraint,
therefore, it is now necessary to turn to examine human cogitationes and
passions.

125
InMt 6.4; 10.15.
126
Note that the concept recurs, not the actual phrase (which only occurs in this form once).
127
TENNANT 1903:337–8.
 7

Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 6 showed how Hilary’s view of the will implied that human action is
constrained in some regard, expressed by a restricted voluntas. This chapter
aims to pursue in more detail one particular angle of what this constraint
involves.
The approach here is to look at how Hilary conceives of human psychology,
and in particular certain elements of the process of human action including
thoughts and emotions. Hilary’s use of a few Latin words will be examined,
and their connotations will be analysed in the course of the discussion. In the
wider perspective of this study, examining human psychology informs us
further of Hilary’s view of sin and its causes.
A main finding of this chapter will be that Hilary uses notions of psychology
that arise through Stoicism (even though Stoicism cannot really be said to exist
as a separate school in this period, p. 42). Nevertheless, some Stoic elements
such as apatheia and propatheiai may be said to be absent from his thought. It
will be shown that Hilary does have a concept of unconscious cogitationes, but
these should be seen as arising impressions with propositional content rather
than a first reaction to these. Further, much of Hilary’s use of Stoic concepts
appears to be mediated through Origen; for example, his use of cogitationes in
the involuntary sense appears solely in the Psalms commentaries. Neverthe-
less, although he uses Origen’s articulation, Hilary has his own underlying
sense of human constraint which exists independently of Origen.

PASSION S A ND EMOTIONS

Some Psychological ‘Movements’ in Hilary

A variety of terms is used to denote psychological movements in Hilary; here

some of his vocabulary is briefly presented. It should be noted that the English
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 127
word ‘emotion’ translates a number of Latin words, including states of mind,
sentiments, and dispositions which can be ‘rationally’ as well as ‘emotionally’
determined; so the word ‘emotion’ is used loosely in the following sections.
In common with his contemporaries,1 Hilary uses the word motus
(= movement, motion, emotion) to designate any kind of event that impacts
on the individual. Hereafter these will be designated as ‘motions’ in inverted
commas. This could be an external event; for example, he uses ‘motion’ to
describe the world’s stormy sea, from which the church as a ship protects us.2
But it can also refer to psychological states and this seems primarily to be in
the sense of mental reactions to external triggers. If there is any ambiguity
Hilary will gloss appropriately: for example, he might speak of ‘worldly
motions’ (motūs saeculares)3 in the former case, or ‘motions of the affections’
(motūs affectionis/affectionum) in the latter.4 Indeed the former may also
symbolize the latter, as in the case of the wise man who built his house on
the rock: the raging of the storm teaches us about the internal ‘motions’ of
desires.5 Even wise men get ‘motions’, but they are expected to stand firm and
to transform them. Motus can also designate an uncontrolled impulsive
reaction, for example when speaking of the prickings of our disordered
‘motions’, which need to be tamed and broken.6
Two related words which appear frequently in Hilary are affectus and (less
commonly) affectio. These words are hard to translate. They both denote a
state of mind, mood, or disposition, and affectus in particular occurs most
commonly with a genitive in order to express the given disposition (affectus
placabilitas; pietatis; pacis, etc.).7 However, these are closer to what in English
would be called sentiments rather than emotions proper. This is because
affectus, inasmuch as it denotes a state of mind also has a connotation of
intention or purpose (affectus sollicitudinis; salvandi; doctrinae)8 or even
underlying character (affectus malitiae; misericordiae; infidelitatis).9 In this
last case Hilary may instead use affectio, which has a similar semantic range to
affectus but can also denote a more permanent disposition (for example, he
calls infidelitas both an affectus and affectio within the same exegesis).10 The

1
Compare ORIGEN-RUFINUS princ. 3.2.3.
2
InMt 7.9: Ecclesia enim instar est nauis . . . quae . . . subiecta est omnibus et uentorum flatibus
et motibus maris. For other ‘external event’ uses of motus, see for example TrPs118, 11.1;
InMt 8.1, 10.2, 14.14. Compare also InMt 14.17 affectio commotae mentis.
3
InMt 8.1: metum scilicet motuum saecularium nullum esse oportere . . .
4
TrPs118, 11.1, 12.4, 13.13. Compare also InMt 21.3 (the motus of astonishment: not an
emotion in the English sense, but certainly a mental state).
5
InMt 6.6.
6
InMt 18.10: molliendis ac frangendis turbidorum motuum nostrorum aculeis. See also for
example TrPs118, 12.4.
7
For example, InMt 4.19 (affectus placabilitatis), 5.8 (pietatis), 10.9 (pacis); TrPs118,14.13
(affectus paternus), 15.3 (pietatis), 21.3 (laetitiae), 21.6 (perfectae charitatis et pacis) . . .
8 9 10
InMt 5.13, 19.3, 10.27. InMt 23.1, 24.10, 7.6. InMt 7.6, 7.10.
128 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
word affectio is also more likely to be used together with motus, indicating
something closer to the English word ‘emotion’.
Hilary distinguishes between the motūs by themselves and how one uses
them. For example, when we are enjoined to love our enemies, Christ crushes
the petulantes motūs with an affectus publicae charitatis.11 Alternatively, the
motūs affectionum like love and hatred arise naturally but we should use them
to love good things and hate bad things.12 But conversely, a motus can steal in
and trouble a hitherto calm affectio.13 If this occurs, then it may be expressed
by negative terms such as perturbatio.14
On the surface, then, we are not morally responsible for motūs but we are
for our affectūs and affectiones (but see pp. 138–9). Indeed, this underlies his
teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. Anger against another (in alterum
commotae mentis affectio) is as culpable as homicide;15 and with regard to
looking at a woman lustfully, the ‘enticing affection’ (illecebrosa affectio) is as
blameworthy as adultery itself.16 (Unlike others such as Jerome, Hilary does
not appeal to pre-passions here to explain the process of sin). Later when
Christ talks of the innocence of little children, Hilary’s interpretation is that we
all need a child’s blameless affectiones to enter the kingdom of heaven.17

(In)Stability

Doignon rightly states that emotions make us mutabilis, meaning subject to

change or unstable;18 it would perhaps be truer to say that the phrases ‘we are
subject to motions’ and ‘we are unstable’ are equivalent. Our instability and
corruptible nature are the source of many problems for humanity. Of these,
one particular problem is the motūs affectionum. In the following passage,
Hilary is explaining why no mortal can be good relative to God. His explan-
ation is the many ‘motions’ of life:
Of course, [internal] human ‘motions’ are many and manifold due to our
instability; and the imperfect way of things on earth is something else which
causes instability, when an external trigger disturbs us. That is what the many
affective ‘motions’ drive us to: [Hilary lists effects of public insult, material loss,
anger, fear, love, hatred, joy, pain/sorrow, legal disputes, old age]. We cannot be
good like God since our weak natures are subjected to these ‘motions’, and since
we are unstable (demutabilis) both psychologically and temporally. That is why

11
InMt 4.27: petulantes humanarum mentium motus publicae charitatis frangit affectu. This
verse is also referred to elsewhere in Hilary, for example TrPs 119.16.
12 13
TrPs118, 13.13. TrPs 2.15.
14
TrPs 2.13, [15].10, [41].8, [41].13, 52.11, 53.12, 54.6, 121.10, 125.5, 136.5, 136.12, 136.13.
15 16 17 18
InMt 4.17. InMt 4.20. InMt 18.1. DOIGNON 1989:124–5.
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 129
nobody can be perfectly good, because goodness is destabilized by the triggers of
naturally-occurring disturbances. (HILARY TrPs 52.11)19
We cannot be good because we are subject to natural motūs within and
without, and this is related to our instability. Note that features such as old
age and material loss are included in this list: motus can refer to various
troubles associated with the human condition.
Being unstable and being passible are often linked in the Psalms commen-
taries, often compared with God who is neither.20 Hilary constantly reminds
us that emotions belong to the human condition; God is in no way subject to
them.21 Emotions—or more properly, the wider set of Latin terms used by
Hilary—are connected in his works with the weakness and instability of the
human condition. They are thus by extension connected with sin.
So, are we morally responsible for our emotions?
Effectively, the answer has already been provided in Chapter 6: it is our
voluntas that determines whether we are to be held culpable. In his commen-
tary on Ps. 52, a key work for understanding Hilary’s theology of sin, the Gallic
bishop gives a specific answer to this question. In TrPs 52.12 he presents a
procession of biblical characters whose actions or attitudes have been sinful
before God, but who are among the saints because fundamentally they have
had the right will towards God (ex merito voluntatis). Moses broke faith with
God and was not permitted to enter the promised land, yet he and Elijah are
the two great prophets who walk with Christ at the Transfiguration. Similarly
Peter denied Christ three times, but still was given the keys of the kingdom.
Hilary uses much of the vocabulary already discussed here to analyse Peter.
Peter denies Christ because he is a demutabilis homo and the denial stole upon
him (obrepere) at a moment of alarm. Yet immediately Peter wept, showing
the true direction of his underlying will and disposition (voluntas, affectus). In
the course of this explanation, Hilary uses the word demutatio and its cognates
six times as the key explanatory point. Sometimes, then, we are simply not able
to do what is good. As Hilary clearly puts it, it is one thing to be unwilling, and
another to be unable (aliud est nolle, aliud non posse).22 But God knows this,
and mercifully judges us only for our will and disposition (voluntas, affectus).

19
Humani uero motus ipsa plerumque mutatione diuersi sunt, et terrenae legis imperfecta
natura fit alia, ex alio instinctu se perturbante demutans: et ad id nos diuersarum affectionum
motus impellit . . . [ . . . ] His ergo subditi naturae infirmis motibus, aequales [Deo] esse non
possumus, dum et affectu demutabiles sumus et tempore. Et idcirco perfecta bonitas in nullo
est, quia eam naturalium perturbationum incentiua demutent.
20
trin. 3.3, 3.13; TrPs 2.13, 2.17, 52.11, 52.12, 53.12, 138.2, 138.3, 138.19, 139.2. Cf. TrPs.
52.16, trin. 10.33.
21
TrPs 1.19, 2.13, 59.3. This is not unique to Hilary. For example, Origen also holds that
instability is a natural feature of createdness, while not ascribable to God: ORIGEN princ. 1.5.5
(see also SIMONETTI 1962:379, EDWARDS 1992:28).
22
TrPs 52.12.
130 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
And yet Hilary admits that even the will is affected by our unstable nature.23
(For Hilary the will is not entirely free due to our instability, yet Tertullian
holds we must be mutable for freedom of the will to be maintained).24 As part
of this, the will can be influenced by the affectūs or emotions. This may be a
good thing, since for example love is intimately connected with the will: it
comes from the will25 and is an affectus that is proper to the will.26 This
suggests that other affectūs are not appropriate for the will: for example, Hilary
frequently states that God’s law should be obeyed through love not through
fear,27 and that this will make obedience go beyond the letter of the law.28
Hilary can express affection by reference to the will alone: He accepted the
steadiness of their devoted wills (constantiam devotae sibi voluntatis: i.e. he
accepted their steady devotion to him).29
So our will may be misled by our appetites and desires, but at the same time
one of the aims of the Christian life is to train ourselves to keep them under the
control of the will; we are instructed to control our affectūs so that the voluntas
amantis may precede any action.
On the other hand, to some degree accountability is irrelevant. We are
inadequate in God’s sight not merely because of reprehensible sin but because
our very instability is an offence to God’s transcendence and holiness. The
many motūs of our nature are merely a part of our createdness, and an
indication of our inadequacy.
Who alive can be justified in God’s sight? Everyone has mixed within them anger,
pain, desire, lack of knowledge, forgetfulness, misfortune; everyone is constrained
either by bodily nature or by ‘motion’ of the ever-wavering soul . . .
(HILARY TrPs 142.4)30
Hilary concedes that these things might be outside our control, but they still
separate us from God.
An important question that arises if studying anthropological consequences
of the Fall is whether human instability arises because of our createdness, or
because of the Fall. The answer is that Hilary is never entirely clear on this, and
seems to express himself in different ways at different times. For example, on
the one hand he may state that instability is a natural consequence of being
made out of mud and earth (pp. 44–7). But it has already been shown on
pp. 93–4 that our passions are a constraint that arise because of Adam’s deed:

23 24
TrPs118, 15.6. See also p. 96, 109, 145. TERTULLIAN an. 21.
25 26
TrPs118, 18.4. TrPs118, 16.5.
27 28
TrPs118, 18.5. TrPs118, 14.13–16.
29
InMt 31.1: constantiam deuotae sibi uoluntatis acceperat.
30
Iustificari autem in conspectu Dei quis uiuentium potest? cui ira, cui dolor, cui cupiditas,
cui ignoratio, cui obliuio, cui casus, cui necessitas uel per naturam corporis, uel per motum
animae semper fluctuantis admixta sit . . .
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 131
. . . we are now freed from all the weaknesses that come from human passions. So
that the heart does not submit again to being bound forever, let us please God in
the land of the living, and let our soul return to its rest from which it was driven
out through the transgression of its first father, Adam. (TrPs 146.4)31
It is difficult to separate what is inherent through our createdness and what
comes about through Adam. However, Hilary is not alone in this; for example,
Athanasius also evinces this tension between our created fragility and the
effects of the Fall.32

HILARY AND S TOIC IDEAS OF M ENTAL P ROCESSES

Consideration of Stoic ideas of mental processes informs our understanding of

Hilary when it comes to his theory of action.
The Stoic theory of action was introduced on pp. 119–22. Objects around us
form sense perceptions in our mind (phantasiai) to which we may give or
withhold assent (synkatathesis); this assent leads to some action or reaction
from us, where ‘action’ may merely mean some interior response such as an
emotion. This process includes ratiocination as well as the will.
Hilary shows evidence for this understanding of the process. At one point in
the Psalms commentaries he comments on how we see species in our head; this
is equivalent to the Greek phantasiai, received or recalled sense perceptions (in
this case recalled in the memory).33 Elsewhere, Hilary also demonstrates the
concept of consent: he states that every action comes about following either
reasoned judgement or desire/appetite.34
Earlier philosophers saw reasoned judgement as an important aspect of this
process35 and the same is true for Hilary. Hilary talks about how action needs
to be reasoned first (The Prophet did nothing which he had not turned over in
his thought beforehand).36 Elsewhere he insists that action must be taken after
consideration (de consilii sententia), a phrase he often uses to denote the

31
Sanata enim omni cordis contritione, et ne perpetuo rursum subeat alligata, his omnibus
humanarum passionum infirmitatibus liberati, placebimus Deo in regione uiuorum, anima
nostra in requiem suam (ex qua per transgressionem primi parentis sui Adae eiecta est)
reuertente.
32
ATHANASIUS de incarnatione 4.4 describes the Fall as a return to the corruptible state
that arises from an ex nihilo creation.
33
TrPs 120.2: Humanae mentis natura est, ut si cogitatione aliquid contemplemur, talem se
nobis unaquaeque species exhibeat, qualem eam et cogitando formemus.
34
TrPs 137.2: nemo enim, quod agit, ad id agendum non aut ex fructu oblectationis alicuius
aut iudicio bono in eo opinionis adgreditur, dum aut rectum id putat aut eo gaudet.
35
SENECA Ep.107.3, CICERO disp. tusc. 4.37.
36
TrPs118, 8.10: nihil egit quod non antea cogitatione peruoluerit.
132 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
reasoning process of deciding on action.37 His description of prophetic utter-
ance is interesting in this regard: it must be undertaken with ratiocination as
all things must, but at the same time the Prophet does not necessarily
understand what he is saying. All speech occurs following thought (ex sensu
cogitationis ac motu), and this is true of prophetic speech; but for normal
speech the mind is engaged, while for prophetic speech it is set in motion while
being unaware of the meaning (ignorante sensu).38 So then, ratiocination is
necessary but, for godly discourse, understanding may not be. (There is no
parallel for this paragraph in either Origen or Ambrose).
Voluntas is taken as a movement of the mind (cum voluntas motus mentis
sit . . . )39 Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 6, it can be ambiguous as to
what this means. The will may be taken as emotive, as for example when
Hilary says that people are led astray due to the affectus voluntatis,40 or when
he treats the will as parallel to love.41 But it may be also held equivalent to the
outcome of ratiocination, as indicated when Hilary says that the thought or
will is what is reprehensible even if our actions are faultless.42 This is not
confusion in Hilary’s thought; it merely arises due to different meanings of
voluntas, for example as equivalent to proairesis in the former example and to
bouleusis in the latter.
Another quite different question arising is whether the emotions are ‘seated’
in the body and soul. As seen in Chapter 3, Doignon assumes a degree of
Platonism in his dualist anthropology. We are souls enslaved within an
unstable earthly body and this is what causes our mental and emotional
instability. Doignon thus sees emotions as arising from our body (or at least
from our embodiedness).43 Yet the connection with human instability is also
found in the Stoic system (or, more properly, Cicero’s telling of it), belonging
to the mind: Isn’t everybody put off by the way our inconsistent, unstable mind
is so fickle? 44 And on p. 135 we will see that Sorabji suggests the influence of
Stoic thought when unwelcome dialogismoi enter the mind; this again would
suggest emotions arise within the mind. So for Hilary, do emotions arise in the
body or the soul?
The answer is: in both. We have seen Hilary talk of human deficiencies
(anger, pain, desire, forgetfulness . . . ) as arising either through bodily nature or
through ‘motion’ of the ever-wavering soul.45 In other words, some deficiencies

37 38 39
TrPs118, 8.10, 10.4, 10.7, 16.4. TrPs118, 22.2. trin. 8.12.
40
InMt 17.1.
41
TrPs118, 13.2: Differt enim longe obsequium amoris a timoris officio, nec habet gratiam
uoluntatis necessitatis operatio.
42 43
TrPs 57.2. DOIGNON 1989:123–6.
44
CICERO disp. tusc. 4.76.9 (4.35): haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa
prauitate deterreat?
45
TrPs 142.4 (excerpt quoted more fully on p. 130): uel per naturam corporis, uel per motum
animae semper fluctuantis.
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 133
arise through the body (say pain, desire) and others through the wavering soul
(say anger, forgetfulness). Elsewhere Hilary sees motūs as contributing to the
mental process:
Nature controls us more through the mind’s appetites than through the inner
entrails. So then, perception cannot start through movement (motus) of the
senses; rather, one grasps things by knowing one’s nature, and can even know
in advance what the senses’ movements (motūs) will be. (HILARY TrPs 57.2)46
The language here (for example, knowledge of one’s nature or that appetitus
belongs to the mind) is Stoic. This excerpt suggests one should not follow
along with the initial spurs of sense perception but instead have deeper
understanding of things to keep the motūs under control. The notion of a
dynamic mental process is absolutely Stoic: it starts with a motus, and then the
mind through knowledge applies the will to turn it into an appropriate affectio.
Use of Stoic language for the mental process is also found in TrPs 52.11 cited
on pp. 128–9.
That said, the issue here should not be whether affections arise in the body
or the soul as mutually incompatible units. Rather, the question is whether the
soul and body work against each other or whether they are in harmony. It
would not be true to a Stoic system to divide the body and the soul since these
are seen as a holistic process;47 Annas shows that the Stoics derived this from
medical-scientific research as much as from philosophical thought.48 And in
Hilary too it is more accurate to say that motūs affect humans as a whole rather
than body or soul separately. Hilary does not anywhere say that the body alone
is unstable; it is the full human who is described as unstable, and this includes
the soul.
So, these elements would make Hilary closer to Stoic thought: the language
of mental processes (including possibly different stages of emotions, such as
motūs leading to affectiones), the impact of emotions on the soul-mind, the
integrated effects of body and soul together, and possibly the emphasis on the
will. Also, the emphasis on knowledge and wisdom attained through medita-
tion, prayer, biblical reading, and good works is of course characteristically
Christian, but is closely related to the Stoic notion of development through life
and the long experience it takes to make the Stoic sage.
However, Hilary also differs from the Stoic system, for example in not
having a concept of propatheiai (pp. 135–7) nor of apatheia (pp. 139–42).

46
Nam cum naturae potentis uirtus non tam uiscerum fibras, quam appetitus mentis
introeat; necesse est non per motus sensuum perspiciendi sumat exordium, sed per naturae
scientiam etiam futuros motus sensuum praesciens apprehendat.
47 48
ANNAS 1992:56. ANNAS 1992:20–5.
134 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

C O G I T AT I O N ES

It is interesting to consider Hilary’s use of cogitatio, and in particular the

question as to whether Hilary sees us as morally responsible for them. He
sometimes speaks of them as the element that makes a human action repre-
hensible; at other times they appear to be involuntary. This may be due to
Origen’s influence.
A number of modern scholars take Origen’s (dia)logismoi as equivalent to
Stoic propatheiai. On pp. 135–7 it is shown that these are strictly not equiva-
lent. Rather Origen’s dialogismoi should be taken as equivalent to the noēseis
mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, which properly represent an impression
rather than a first response.

Cogitationes in Hilary

One might think that ‘thought’ (cogitatio) would indicate mental deliberation,
and indeed this usage does occur.49 For example, p.131 gives examples of
‘thought’ referring to ratiocination, mentioned in a positive way. However,
often the word is more ambiguous and if anything indicates something which
infiltrates itself into the mind by stealth (subrepere or obrepere).50 For ex-
ample, we should try to suppress the sneaky thoughts by thinking about God
(When thoughts steal upon the Prophet during the silence of the night, he
crushes them by remembering God)51 and no thought interrupts if the Prophet
is meditating perfectly.52 The words subrepere and obrepere are usually used
for mental lapses such as forgetfulness (particularly), vices, and sins.53 This
indicates that Hilary sees thoughts as outside an individual’s control, as in the
example just quoted: one can fight to subdue them once they have entered the
mind, but it not so clear whether the Christian can prevent them from
entering the mind in the first place.
In the Matthew commentary, the word ‘thought’ occurs only three times,
each time in the context that God (or Christ) knows our secret thoughts and
we are accountable for these.54 However, in TrPs118 alone the word occurs
fourteen times, of which several have this connotation of bad thoughts that
arise naturally from our instability or from the devil and steal in to distract

49
TrPs118, 22.2; TrPs 120.2, 133.2.
50
TrPs. 62.9, 136.8. Compare the similar usage of imagines in TrPs [31].5: imagines inuitis
etiam bonis quam frequenter occurrunt.
51
TrPs 62.9: obrepentes itaque sub secreto noctis cogitationes, Dei recordatione compressit.
52
TrPs118, 13.2: nec in eum incidit, interiectu nouae alicuius cogitationis, obliuio.
53
InMt 11.1, 17.6, 19.3; TrPs118, 2.10, 2.11, 8.15, 14.16, 16.13, 18.9; TrPs 2.13, [31].5, 52.12,
57.3, [63].6, [67].29, 120.15, 136.12.
54
InMt 12.12, 23.1, 27.3.
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 135
us: . . . lest the Prophet should lapse and forget when some new thought gets in
the way.55 (By comparison, the number of occurrences of motus is roughly
equal in InMt and TrPs118). This use of ‘thought’ as something unexpected
that steals in is found in Hilary’s other Psalms commentaries as well.
This may be because, in the Psalms commentaries, Hilary is adopting
(whether consciously or not) an Origenistic use of the word from his Greek
source. Indeed, in one instance it can be shown that cogitatio is the direct
translation of (dia)logismos in Origen.56 The concept of dialogismoi is some-
times used by the Alexandrian in the same specialized way as just described for
Hilary: that is, as unwelcome intruding thoughts rather than considered delib-
erations.57 (This usage is also evidenced by its developments in later Egyptians
such as Antony of Egypt, Didymus, Pseudo-Macarius, and Evagrius).

Cogitationes as Equivalent to Propatheiai?

Sorabji suggests Origen’s (scriptural) dialogismoi are related to the Stoic

propatheiai.58 This latter term refers to the instinctive and immediate emo-
tions that arise before rational consideration; it was Aristotle who originally
introduced the distinction between these and the pathē proper (the latter being
so-called ‘voluntary’ emotions which have interacted with deliberation). Sor-
abji suggests that Origen’s primi motūs59 are related to the interrupting
Christian cogitationes, and thus links Christian dialogismoi/cogitationes with
Stoic propatheiai.60 Sorabji’s approach is critiqued by Guly and, in more
moderate tones, by Layton.
Guly refutes the passages used by Sorabji, and examines others.61 He agrees
that Origen’s primi motūs are equivalent to propatheiai but asserts that they
are voluntary and that the whole point of these Origen texts is to distinguish a
sliding scale of culpability, where thoughts are less culpable and words or
deeds more so. But culpable they still are: Guly feels that in Origen, ‘bad
thoughts are always the results of assents’.62

55
TrPs118, 13.2: nec in (Prophetam) incidit, interiectu nouae alicuius cogitationis, obliuio.
56
TrPs118, 15.6 is a direct translation of Mt. 15.19 as quoted at Pal.Cat. ad v115. This appears
to be a standard translation; compare ORIGEN-RUFINUS princ. 3.2.4.
57
E.g. ORIGEN Exhortatio ad Martyrium 11.4: εἰ . . . μὴ διδοίη μὲν τόπον τῷ διαβόλῳ ἐν ταῖς
καρδίαις ἡμῶν, μολύνειν ἡμᾶς διαλογισμοῖς πονηροῖς θέλοντι ἀρνήσεως ἢ διψυχίας ἤ τινος
πιθανότητος . . .
58
SORABJI 2000:346.
59
ORIGEN-RUFINUS princ. 3.2.2 (see SORABJI 2000:343, 347).
60
SORABJI 2000:346–56.
61
SORABJI 2000:346, fn.16 cites ORIGEN princ. 3.2.4, Comm. Josh. 15.3, Comm. Mt. 21 (Sorabji
means 11.15), Comm. Cant. 3, Comm. Ps. 54.5. Guly adds Comm. Eph. ad v4.26a (see his discussion
on textual variants at 2011:178); Hom. Exod. 4.8 (‘primi motūs’); Comm. Cant.3(4).15.
62
GULY 2011:177.
136 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Guly’s analysis is well nuanced and worth reading; however, he appears
to have missed some essential elements of Origen’s argument. In particular,
the whole point about these motūs being primi in the Origen passages is
surely to make the very point that they are instinctive, not rational or
voluntary. Further, the whole point of princ. 3.2.4 is to demonstrate that
some cogitationes arise within the individual whereas others are impelled
from outside (see pp. 134–5). Thus, pace Guly, bad thoughts are categoric-
ally not always the results of assents and this is exactly what Origen is at
pains to demonstrate.
Layton’s discussion is more subtle than Guly’s. He would agree with the
argument presented here that the very point of Origen using propatheiai
(when he does) is to make the distinction between what is voluntary—that
is, culpable—and what is not.63 The Origen passage presenting primi motūs is
not so much about propatheiai as the distinction between stimulus and mind’s
assent.64 Still, even Layton concurs that Origen may be ‘meaning’ propatheiai
even in passages where he does not use the term.
However, it is not so obvious that Origen’s first movements are equivalent
to propatheiai. One reason is that there is no evidence that Origen himself
thinks this. The primi motūs in Rufinus’s Origen seem to indicate first
*movements* rather than first *emotions*: indeed the phrase primi motūs
repeatedly indicates exactly that in Seneca (sc. the initial response before the
mind’s assent).65 As for Origen’s Greek corpus, dialogismoi are ubiquitous, but
the word propatheiai appears in just one section (or possibly twice at most).66
And even there Origen uses it obliquely, as a technical term that is more
proper to schools of thought other than his own: It means an instinctive
(aproaireton) anger; some call this a propatheia . . . 67 Here he is referring to
impulsive anger as opposed to deliberated anger; the word aproaireton makes
clear that the two types of anger are distinguished by assent.
The other examples of dialogismoi in Origen do not have any clear or
explicit link to propatheiai either. At the end of the day, the difficulty modern
scholars have in trying to equate Stoic propatheiai with Christian dialogismoi
is simply that Origen and the Stoics are describing slightly different psycho-
logical processes of thought and there is no exact equivalence between the
two. Sorabji makes this point that the processes are unlike: the difference is
better understood ‘by thinking of it as a change of focus from Seneca’s first
movement, the shock, to its cause, the appearance’. He notes that Origen’s

63 64
LAYTON 2004:119. LAYTON 2004:192 fn.22.
65
SENECA de ira 2.1–4 passim.
66
ORIGEN Comm. Ps. 4.5, used three times, and possibly also Comm. Eph. ad v4.26a (see
Guly’s discussion on textual variants, 2011:178). The word προπαθόντες also appears in Exhort.
ad Mart. 23.11.
67
δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἀπροαίρετον, ὃ καλοῦσί τινες προπάθειαν γινομένην . . .
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 137
usage is a ‘decisive change’ in the concept since dialogismoi (unlike pro-
patheiai) can arise externally and are properly a cause rather than a first
reaction.68 So it is important to note the differences between Origen and
Stoic theories of psychological responses; the similarity is merely because
propatheiai and dialogismoi are both early stages in the journey to a given
act. (It is only with respect to Origen that we must disentangle his theory of
action from Stoicism proper; conversely, later authors such as Didymus69 or
Jerome70 do explicitly present propatheiai as part of the process leading to sin).
But it may be more appropriate to put aside the propatheiai, and see the
Christian dialogismoi as being analogous to the Stoic noēseis, which come
earlier in the Stoic process of action and perception. All animals start with
impressions of say sensory objects. However, adult humans differ from other
animals and children in that their impressions now require acceptance by
reason (or assent). The key point is that adult human impressions may be
rational or have propositional content and may thus be called thoughts
(noēseis).71 For example, Diogenes Laertius states, ‘some impressions are
rational, and others non-rational . . . Rational impressions are thought-
processes; irrational ones are nameless.’72 In a similar way, Philo uses the
concept of thoughts that are involuntary and come in before assent.73
If we take Origen’s dialogismoi as equivalent to these noēseis, then the
‘thoughts’ in Origen’s system are not a break, transforming the Stoic idea of
propatheiai. To the contrary, these at least are entirely continuous with the
Stoic system. As Sorabji states, the (dia)logismoi are not a reaction, but the
initial impression or cause.
So then, Origen’s dialogismoi and primi motūs should categorically not be
identified with propatheiai, but rather with the initial rational impressions that
contain propositional content.

68
SORABJI 2000:346.
69
DIDYMUS Eccl.T. 294.15–20. See Layton (2000), (2004).
70
JEROME Comm. Ezech. 18.1–2: Deus igitur primos et secundos stimulos cogitationum,
quas Graeci προπαθείας uocant, sine quibus nullus hominum esse potest, nequaquam punit. For
example, Jerome discusses Christ’s teaching that whoever looks at a woman lustfully has already
committed adultery. If our spirit is stimulated by sight of her this is merely innocent pre-passion;
it is only a sin if one consents and makes the thought into an affection: si uero consenserit et de
cogitatione affectum fecerit . . . , de propassione transiuit ad passionem (Comm. Mt. 5.28). The
vocabulary here is highly reminiscent of Stoic teaching. See also Comm. Mt. 5.28, 26.37, Ep. 79.9
to Salvina.
71
FREDE 2011:37; DOBBIN 2008:xii.
72
DIOGENES LAERTIUS 7.51: ἔτι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μέν εἰσι λογικαί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι . . . αἱ μὲν
οὖν λογικαὶ νοήσεις εἰσίν, αἱ δ’ ἄλογοι οὐ τετυχήκασιν ὀνόματος. Cited in LONG & SEDLEY,
passage 39A (text in 1987b:238; translation in 1987a:237).
73
PHILO Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesis 3.56 ad Gen. 17.17.
138 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

Cogitationes and Moral Responsibility in Hilary

Returning to Hilary, this all matters if we wish to establish his understanding

of culpability and will. Hilary’s usage of motus dovetails to some degree with
Origen’s usage: there is a motus and/or cogitatio and this leads to sin. So motus
is being used, among other things, to designate a different, earlier stage of the
mental process.
So, are Hilary’s ‘thoughts’ reprehensible? He appears to have a nuanced
position on this.
Hilary repeatedly asserts that God judges us not for our actions, but for the
thoughts within our hearts.74 It is categorically for our thoughts that we are
held morally responsible. Indeed, when it comes to moral responsibility there
are three concepts that seem intertwined in the Psalms commentaries, cogita-
tio, motus, and voluntas.75 Thoughts must be culpable because they are an
indication of the will, and it is the will which determines culpability. This is
true even if the action is not carried through—the will is still culpable. (This is
contrary to what Guly suggests.) It is the will as indicated by ‘thought’ and
‘motion’ that make us reprehensible, not the action itself.
And yet this discussion of thoughts started (p. 134) with the point that
Hilary often talks of thoughts as involuntary, stealthily creeping in to distract
us, outside our control but needing discipline that can only be gained through
practice. Further, it was demonstrated that this only occurs in the Psalms
commentaries. In the Matthew commentary, there is no inconsistency what-
soever: motūs are never reprehensible (in themselves), and thoughts always
are; it is as simple as that. When he translates Origen, however, Hilary
encounters words which are endowed with different theological concepts.
This means that ‘unwanted intruder’ thoughts now come to be held repre-
hensible as they would be in Origen’s system.
So how can we be held responsible for our thoughts if they are uninvited?
The inconsistency could arise merely because Hilary is copying Origen
thoughtlessly, since this ambiguity holds for Origen too. Guly states that
Origen’s thoughts are voluntary and reprehensible, but Sorabji and Layton
are more circumspect. After all, Origen devotes princ. 3.2.4 to a discussion of
thoughts, and demonstrates that they arise sometimes within ourselves, some-
times from good forces (God/angels), sometimes from bad (devil/demons).
They are only reprehensible if we follow them through. Yet elsewhere in

74
InMt 12.12, 23.1, 27.3; TrPs118, 1.11, 21.8; TrPs 57.2, [65].29, 119.4. Conversely, our soul is
free even if the body is enslaved (TrPs 125.4).
75
TrPs118, 21.8: Deus ipsas cogitationes cordium motusque noscente . . . TrPs 133.2: cuius
cogitatio et uoluntas in recordatione peccaminum [ . . . ] euagetur. See also TrPs [13].13: we all
have motūs, but are reprehensible in how we use them.
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 139
Origen we are judged for them.76 (Layton makes a similar point about the
gradual growth of culpability in stages in Didymus).77
But Hilary is not blindly following Origen; elsewhere he continually
‘improves’ on his original, and he translates nothing he disagrees with. The
problem is simply that cogitatio, like voluntas, can be ambiguous since it has
both a ‘common’ meaning and also a technical meaning in the description of
human thought processes. Moreover, there is an interplay in Hilary (or at
least, in the Psalms commentaries) between what is within our control and
what is not. We may not be able to control individual thoughts or motions, but
we can gradually learn to control them more closely and God will give us the
grace on our journey. It is this effort that brings us closer to God. This is no
inconsistency; we may not be able to control our thoughts or will, but we can
learn to improve on our powers and our responses.

A DIFFERENCE F ROM S TO IC THOUGHT: APATHEIA

The absence of any notion of propatheiai (Latin propassiones) is one example

of how Hilary diverges from ‘typical’ Stoic thought. Another divergence is that
it is nowhere suggested that emotions should be removed entirely—merely
that they separate us from God, and that they should be kept under control
and rightly directed (if anything, this is more an Aristotelian position).78
Before considering Hilary on apatheia, it is worth revisiting Origen’s
position. Many modern scholars feel Origen sees the soul as needing to be
purified so that it is no longer weighed down by the body but can rise or
progress towards the Father. As part of this, one should be freed of the
emotions which trouble us. For example, in a psalms homily translated by
Rufinus Origen speaks of gradually correcting (emendare) ourselves when we
are affected by emotions (commoti). This is achieved by continence, and
continual contemplation.79 The emotions are also mentioned in de Oratione80

76
ORIGEN c.Celsum 4.53: we are judged by words and deeds but also our dialogismoi.
77
LAYTON 2000:121–33.
78
Aristotle’s main focus, on the other hand, is to describe the various human functions in a
teleological framework; thus, emotions are useful and functional since they relate to appetite, but
they are still subordinate to deliberation (e.g. GRAVER 2002:xvii–xix).
79
ORIGEN-RUFINUS Hom. Ps. 36.2.3: nos uero, cum haec mandata suscipiamus et econ-
trario cum commoti fuerimus, non ab iracundia sed a mansuetudine desinimus . . . Verum ex hoc
saltem incipiamus emendare nosmetipsos, et paulatim per continentiam et assiduam meditatio-
nem lenientes iracundiam, ueniamus etiam in hoc ut ultra non irascamur . . .
80
ORIGEN orat. 8.1–2, 10.1 talks about the disposition of the soul, the need to put away
wrath, etc.
140 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
and even in dogmatic works such as de Principiis,81 and seem to be an
important part of Origen’s moral teaching.
As well as these references in Origen’s own works, there is evidence that
mental self-discipline formed a crucial part of Origen’s teaching curriculum.
The best witness to Origen’s practical teaching on emotions is the homage to
Origen by a pupil about to leave the school.82 The pupil describes the three
initial stages of Origen’s curriculum. Firstly, one learns logic, to think philo-
sophically and dialectically. Then one learns the physical sciences, and finally
ethics.83 It is only once these stages have been completed that one may proceed
to philosophy and theology. It is the third stage, ethics, that concerns us here.
The purpose of this stage is to train the pupil to control the soul’s impulses84
and replace these with the divine virtues which keep the soul calm and
tranquil.85 This seems to have been achieved through a combination of
education, asceticism, and meditation or prayer (compare the phrase quoted
in the previous paragraph).
While many modern scholars think that Origen unquestionably pursued
apatheia, it is worth noting that this opinion is not unanimously held. Rahner
suggests that the concept of emotional apatheia is not particularly significant
in Origen,86 although he noted the exception of the Selecta in Psalmos. His
point would have been even stronger if he had known that even the Psalms
fragments he quotes mentioning apatheia are not in fact Origen’s, but belong
to Evagrius.87 Yet authors such as Knuuttila erroneously point to these very
Evagrian fragments as proof of apatheia in Origen.88
If apatheia is present in Origen, it still essentially follows Stoic teaching.
Recall cognition is a result of impressions being formed in the brain and being
assented to as an act of will: so a viciously barking dog may instil in me fear of
pain or death. However, this is to be balanced with the Stoic teaching that all
events are pre-determined by a deity who has the best intentions: so I need not
really be afraid because my encounter with the dog is all in the hands of the
providential deity, and not even pain or death are worth being concerned

81
ORIGEN princ. 3.2.2. Emotions fit into the whole discussion on thoughts and temptations,
3.2.1–7.
82
Hereafter footnotes will refer to this Oratio Panegyrica as by Thaumaturgus (as in the
Sources Chrétiennes edition) while duly acknowledging the difficulties in establishing the author-
ship of this work.
83
THAUMATURGUS Orat. Pan. 7.93–108 (dialectic), 8.109–114 (natural sciences),
9.115–12.149 (moral virtues), 13.150–14.173 (philosophy), 15.173–183 (theology).
84
THAUMATURGUS Orat. Pan. 9.137.
85
THAUMATURGUS Orat. Pan. 9.115: one must learn τὰς θείας ἀρετὰς τὰς περὶ ἦθος, ἐξ ὧν
ἡ ἀτάραχος καὶ εὐσταθὴς τῶν ὁρμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς κατάστασις γίνεται.
86
RAHNER 1932:127, fn.100.
87
Rahner cites PG12.1085B, 1672C. But both of these are from Evagrius; see Rondeau (1960).
88
E.g. KNUUTTILA 2004:121–2, 127. He cites PG12.1600C, another Evagrian fragment
masquerading under the name of Origen (Rondeau 1960). Knuuttila is more convincing when
he points to Comm. Mt. 13.16, 15.16–7, Hom. Jer. fr.25 (GCS 6).
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 141
about in comparison. Thus emotions are ultimately unnecessary and should
be eliminated in order to deliberate effectively and attain proper harmony with
the natural order of things. The logic of all this also fits neatly with Christian-
ity. Hilary may have known the writings of Cicero, whose best-known expos-
ition of philosophical theories on emotions appears in his Tusculan
Disputations. Cicero presents the teachings of Epicureans, Cynics, Peripatet-
ics, and Stoics, and in this work at least shows a marked preference for the
latter: he argues forcefully that emotions (perturbationes) must be compre-
hensively eradicated and there is emphatically no place for them in human life.
The ultimate goal is tranquillitas (Cicero’s translation of the Greek apatheia).
(Of course, this must be seen in the context of the piece: Cicero’s statements on
grief are a defence before his Roman colleagues, in the face of his evident
depression triggered by the death of his daughter Tullia and compounded by
career troubles and Caesar’s dictatorship.)
In all, given the influence of both Origen and Hilary’s own cultural back-
ground, we may not be surprised to find appeals to passionlessness in the Latin
bishop. Yet there are none. Certainly, as already seen, we are bidden to
respond appropriately to motūs and have only godly, loving affectūs. Hilary
never uses the word impassibilitas with reference to humans, although he does
encourage mortal men to aim for tranquillitas, echoing Cicero’s translation of
apatheia.89 Burns suggests that Hilary is transforming apatheia in Origen,
preferring to talk of social peace.90 For Burns, this is one example of how
Hilary is autonomous from Origen, moving away from the Alexandrian’s
asceticism. The aspiration to tranquillitas (with its connotations of calmness
and serenity but not necessarily elimination) is consistent with another opin-
ion of Hilary’s, namely that motūs and affectūs alike are a natural part of the
human condition: it is impossible to eradicate them.
In fact this is the usual usage of motus, which can refer merely to physical
needs such as hunger.91 It is even true within those who try to control their
emotions: while Cicero insists the four negative perturbationes must be eradi-
cated, a wise man may replace them with the three corresponding positive
consistentiae.92 This is all the more true outside the Stoic tradition: pathē are
neither good nor bad, except in their usage.93 It is thus not surprising to find
emotions are accepted in the Christian tradition. Indeed, Jerome heavily
critiques Evagrius for suggesting that apatheia is possible; for Jerome, this
would be blasphemous since only God is without emotions.94

89
TrPs 1.6, [91].9, 127.6, 147.5; TrPs118, 12.4, 19.4.
90
BURNS 2012:76 fn.42, citing TrPs118, 9.1 (ad v65).
91
E.g. used of hunger and the libido in ORIGEN-RUFINUS princ. 3.2.3.
92
Metus, aegritudo, libido, laetitia should be eliminated in favour of cautio, voluntas,
gaudium. CICERO disp. tusc. 4.11–14.
93
ANNAS 1992:103, fn.1.
94
JEROME Comm. Mt. 26.37–9, cited in SORABJI 2000:395–7.
142 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
In summary, the source of Hilary’s views is impossible to determine. Hilary
may have been eliminating apatheia from his Greek text (as Burns suggests),
but it may be that Hilary’s work reflects Origen’s own lack of concern for
apatheia. At any rate, it is not a doctrine that is particularly important to
Hilary: for him, emotions should be controlled, but not necessarily eliminated,
because they cannot be. That is why Hilary prefers to use the neutral term
motus rather than the negative term perturbatio.

DISCUSSION

The foregoing has highlighted some of the range of mental conditions in

Hilary, which include emotions, dispositions, states of mind, and moods as
well as intentions and even sense perception. It has been shown that Hilary
distinguishes between these in terms of how far each is voluntary and,
correspondingly, how far each is reprehensible before God. Emotions arise
naturally due to our unstable nature, and separate us from God.
Hilary may appear inconsistent on one point, namely whether the motūs or
cogitationes are reprehensible and subject to the will or not. This should be
seen not as inconsistency but merely as different applications of the words
concerned.
Nevertheless, these discrepancies only occur in the Psalms commentaries.
In the Matthew commentary, our mental and emotional life is certainly
important, but tranquillitas is never mentioned as a Christian virtue and the
word perturbatio occurs only once. It is the Psalms commentaries which
mention the processes of thought, with sense perceptions, assent, ratiocin-
ation, and response. This difference across texts could be for two reasons.
Firstly, it is a simple fact that the subject matter of the Psalms is more
conducive to reflection on human psychology and tranquillity. Secondly,
this use of motus may derive from Origen who has an interest himself in the
Stoic understanding of human psychology. At any rate, Hilary’s Psalms
commentaries emphasize that we should learn to control the motūs and use
them rightly. We do have moral responsibility to love, and this is something
that is directly under the remit of the will, which can be trained through time
just as a Stoic will can.95
Chapter 6 presented Hilary’s use of the constrained will, and the present
chapter has shown one way in which the will may be constrained (it has also
been shown in Chapter 3 that the physical human body may present a further

95
TrPs118, 13.13 (our emotions should be good so that the voluntas amantis may precede any
action); TrPs118, 16.15.
 Constraint (2): Thoughts and Passions 143
constraint). It appears that Hilary’s understanding of the will is entirely his
own, independent of Origen; still, his articulation of human psychology in the
Psalms commentaries appears to be influenced by Origen.
Various aspects of the theology of sin have now been examined—how
we are affected by the Fall (Chapter 5) and constraints on human action
(Chapters 6 and 7). We may now turn to consider Hilary’s doctrine of original
sin itself.
 8

Original Sin

INTRODUCTION

So far in this book, various aspects of our sinful state have been discussed: the
Fall, an anthropological change within us, and a sinful state characterized as
inherent sin and disobedience. This chapter brings these together to consider
Hilary’s theology of original sin, the state of sinfulness that arises through
our birth.
Hilary undoubtedly had a concept of original sin as is evidenced by his use
of phrases such as ‘sins of our origin’ (peccata originis nostrae) and his general
association of a certain sinful state with our origo.
The Lord taught that there was malevolence even in the apostles, inasmuch as
they shared the same origin (origo) as all the rest of us. (TrP118, 15.6)1
Our bodily weakness and the terms of our origin keep us held back in sins.
(TrPs 134.4)2
Still, modern scholars debate how far Hilary’s view of original sin parallels that
of Augustine. Ladaria feels that Hilary’s understanding of original sin is as yet
undeveloped; Doignon feels that Augustine is being disingenuous in stating
that Hilary has a doctrine of original sin. Peñamaría on the other hand feels
that Hilary is all but Augustinian in articulation, excepting only the issue of the
initium fidei.3
Hilary sees sin as universal, a point which he makes several times,4 particu-
larly when considering psalms verses that state ‘no-one does good, not even
one’.5 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether this arises through createdness or
secondarily as a result of the Fall.

1
non abesse tamen malitiam . . . per conditionem communis nobis originis docuit Dominus.
2
(nos) corporis infirmitas et condicio originis in peccatis detinet.
3
LADARIA 1977b:243; DOIGNON 1981a, b; PEÑAMARÍA 1974.
4
TrPs 52.8–9; TrPs118, 15.10.
5
Ps. 13.1, 3; Ps. 52.2, 4.
 Original Sin 145
At any rate, it seems that Hilary is one of the earliest authors who specif-
ically use the vocabulary of our ‘origin’ (e.g. peccata originis) to describe a state
of accountable guilt rather than mere stain or vitiation of nature. It is debat-
able exactly what he means by this.
There is also some question as to how he thinks original sin was transmit-
ted. This is partly because Hilary’s works are ambiguous as to whether the
body or soul is seat of the sin. Still, the notion that we inherit it by conception
or birth tallies with his doctrine that Christ’s sinlessness arises because of the
virgin birth.

THE S INFUL S TATE: CREATION OR F ALL?

Hilary never clarifies the extent to which our sinfulness arises from our created
state, and the extent to which it comes from the Fall. He unequivocally
believes that we are currently in a state of sinfulness, and expresses this in a
variety of ways (the stain of sin, the universality of sin, the change in human
nature). But the terms used to express this current sinfulness are ambiguous,
making it unclear whether it is a result of our createdness or the Fall.
For example, let us consider the excerpt from TrPs 15.6 quoted on p. 96,
144. We all have the attribute of malevolence as a result of the will that is a part
of our unstable nature: is this due to createdness (as suggested by the words
unstable nature) or the Fall (as suggested by the use of will, which we know
was affected by the Fall)? In the same passage Hilary refers to our origo (the
apostles share the same origin as all the rest of us). Does this refer to our origin
at creation, or our common conception and birth?6
To some degree it does not matter that Hilary does not distinguish between
sinfulness that arises from the Fall and that which arises from createdness.
Createdness and Fall both affect our *current* nature and he does not feel the
need to differentiate them further. The distinction between our state at
creation and our state immediately before and after the Fall is not particularly
important for him. Indeed, Augustine is also ambiguous on this point, for
example in saying that we fell because of our creation ex nihilo—which implies
that our Fall was inevitable.

6
TrPs118, 15.6: Malevolence affects everyone, because we all have a will as part of our
unstable nature. The Lord taught that there was even malevolence in the apostles—even though
they were saints and purified by the word of faith—because they shared the same origin as all the
rest of us. //omnibus enim per naturae demutabilis uoluntatem malitia adiacet, ipsisque apostolis
uerbo licet iam fidei emundatis atque sanctis, non abesse tamen malitiam per conditionem
communis nobis originis docuit Dominus . . .
146 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

Sin Arising through our Creation and Embodiedness

The church fathers are agreed that all humans sin and are marked with the
stain of sin. One way this arises for Hilary is through our createdness.
Peñamaría, who argues that Hilary is almost entirely Augustinian in his
theology of original sin, suggests that in Hilary there is no body–soul tension
before the Fall.7 However Hilary’s narratives of creation are sufficient to refute
this, for example at TrPs118, 10.1f. (discussed on pp. 44–5).
Our very embodiedness means that we are weakened and held back in sin.
This is frequently articulated as resulting from the fact that we are made from
earth or mud, which explains the stain upon us. The connection between our
earthiness and our sins is fairly Neoplatonic and is more or less ubiquitous
across Hilary’s works.
Those who hate Sion will be thrown into confusion, thereby returning to their
land and their origin (ad terrena sua et originalia). (TrPs128.9)8
They lay down on the ground (in terram), and associated with the material which
is the origin of their sins and their bodies . . . (InMt 15.10)9
Further associations of this type, where our earthy origin implicitly explains
our sinfulness, may be found on pp. 46–7.
Still, references to our created condition are not necessarily negative. Our
createdness is a simple fact, not necessarily good or bad. It is just a conse-
quence of this that imperfection naturally arises. For example, one reason why
Hilary may not be particularly critical of emotions is that he sees them as an
unavoidable consequence of the human condition.

Sin Arising through the Fall

Nevertheless, Hilary is ever ambiguous as to whether our current sinful state

arises from the matter of our creation or through the Fall. For example, Hilary
may express our emotions or passions as being part of our weakness, a natural
and inescapable part of our being created from earth.10 And yet on pp. 93–4
the passions were presented as arising specifically as a result of the Fall,11 and
are a punishment for the first sin.12
Still, it is indubitable that Hilary does have a concept of sinfulness that arises
as a direct result of the Fall. Moreover, he expresses this in terms of our origo
(although this may mean our creation). The use of the technical terminology

7
PEÑAMARÍA 1974:236.
8
Confundendi erunt qui Sion oderunt . . . ad terrena sua et originalia reuertentes.
9
. . . in terram recumbunt; . . . . peccatorum et corporum suorum origini inhaerentes.
10 11 12
Compare pp. 46–7. TrPs 146.4. TrPs118, 9.4.
 Original Sin 147
of ‘original sin’ terminology will be discussed on pp. 148–50; for now aspects
of the concept will be demonstrated.
Hilary frequently refers to Paul in a way that presages Augustine’s use, and
in particular sin’s law and Romans 7.23 (I see another law in my members,
warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of
sin which is in my members) are repeatedly mentioned.13
Let us recall that David acknowledged the constraint on humans: For look, I was
conceived in wickedness, and my mother bore me in depravities (Ps. 50.7). He
meant this: who will boast that he has a pure heart before God? Not even a one-
day-old baby can do so, since as the Apostle says, both sin’s origin (origo peccati)
and sin’s law abide within us. (TrPs 58.4)14
He realizes that the law of sin dwells in his flesh, struggling with the law of his
mind; and he laments the fact. (TrPs 61.2)15
In fact Hilary even goes so far as to explain why sin is not technically
inevitable, and yet everyone does sin (except Christ):
There is within human nature no compulsion to sin (necessitas peccati); and
yet the sinful habit takes hold, due to the will’s appetite and the seductive vices.
(TrPs [68].9)16
He makes this point that there is no necessitas peccati again elsewhere (see
pp. 150–1).17
The idea of the ‘stain of sin’ is found in plenty of other Latin writers, and is
not in itself to be equated to the idea of original sin as found in Augustine.
However, this should be taken in parallel with Hilary’s view of the Fall
identified in Chapters 6 to 8. It has been shown that (as well as other side
effects such as a curse on the earth and the entry of death) the Fall caused an
anthropological change as well as bringing sin and disobedience into the
human psyche and weakening the will. Hilary also refers to the ‘ancient sin’
(vetus peccatum) as causing blindness.18

13
For example TrPs 61.2, 62.7, [67].2, [68].7, [68].14, 136.9; TrPs118, 1.3, 22.6 all refer to the
lex peccati.
14
Meminerimus eum . . . de humanae necessitatis confessione dixisse: Ecce enim in iniquita-
tibus conceptus sum et in delictis peperit me mater mea; secundum illud: Quis enim gloriabitur
castum se habere cor coram Deo, nec si unius diei fuerit infans?—manente in nobis etiam
secundum Apostolum et origine et lege peccati.
15
. . . et habitare in carne sua peccati legem obnitentem legi mentis suae senserit et
congemuerit.
16
Quamquam ne in naturis quidem hominum inest necessitas aliqua peccati; sed ex appetitu
uoluntatis et oblectatione uitiorum peccati usus arripitur.
17
TrPs 57.3.
18
InMt 9.9 and compare InMt 8.5 where a certain man’s blindness is stated to be unrelated to
his own or his parents’ sin (based on Jn 9.3); by analogy then the paralytic of Mt. 9.2 is held to
represent the illness of the human race, not his own sin.
148 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
So then, Hilary is certain on our state of sinfulness, and although some of
this is bodily, it is sure that there was also an anthropological change at the
Fall, which means that we cannot help but want to sin. That Hilary’s doctrine
approaches Augustine’s is further confirmed by his ‘origo’ terminology and by
his theology of baptism, as the following sections will show.

T H E ‘SINS OF OUR ORIGIN ’

The Word Origo and Related Vocabulary

Hilary has been shown to be ambiguous on whether sin arises from creation or
the Fall. This is also true of the word origo, which can refer both to our origin
as created beings and to the human stock from which we arise. Nevertheless,
although it is not yet quite used as a technical term (as it is for Augustine), it is
clear that origo defines a certain type of sinful state.
As Ladaria points out,19 Hilary never uses the specific phrase ‘original sin’.
He does, however, use various related phrases: ‘sins of our origin’, ‘the origin
of sin’, ‘the fault of our origin’.20 Already many of the excerpts presented in
this chapter have evinced some use or other of the word origo in describing
this sin. These phrases hint that a technical terminology is arising to describe a
certain doctrine on human sinfulness. (Indeed Ladaria asks whether August-
ine may have got the phrase ‘original sin’ through Hilary, although he does not
feel Hilary has exactly Augustine’s doctrine).21
In de Trinitate, Hilary uses ‘origin’ in discussions of how Christ differs from
us because of our different birth. Origo here means our descendance (the stock
we are derived from), but also the physical act of our individual conceptions
and births (the very origins of our bodies’ components are dishonourable).22 For
Hilary our weakness comes by birth or conception, but Christ does not share
this weakness because of his different origin, namely his eternal begetting in
the Father and subsequent virginal conception.
Christ did have a body, but it was one that was appropriate to his origin.
(trin. 10.25)23
And thus he was born human with a bodily birth, but he had no human faults
(vitia), since his origin was not human. (trin. 10.26)24

19
LADARIA 1977b:243–4.
20
Originis nostri peccata InMt 10.24; sub peccati origine TrPs118, 22.6, 14.20; originis uitium
TrPs 57.3, 58.4.
21
LADARIA 1977b:234–4.
22
TrPs [67].25: ipsae illae corporum atque elementorum nostrorum origines sint pudendae.
23
habuit enim corpus, sed originis suae proprium.
24
atque ita et ex corporis natiuitate homo natus sit, nec sit in hominis uitiis qui non sit in origine.
 Original Sin 149
Yet he was not in a body with faults and weakness like ours, since he did not share
our origin. (trin. 10.35)25
Hilary’s point is clear: it is our different respective origins that mean we have
faults and Christ does not. It is worth noting that this use of ‘origin’ occurs in
other authors of the period, such as Faustinus: Who would believe that he was
made human with the same origin as us, a womb—even if it did occur without a
man’s embrace?26 Used this way it both refers to our conception/birth and also
emphasizes our difference from Christ.
In these Trinitarian examples the word origo is not quite a technical term,
but it is certainly a keyword in a theological argument: our origin indicates our
anthropological state (whether sinfulness or immunity from sin).
The phrase originis vitium occurs in Tertullian,27 where he uses it to refer to
the corruption of human nature that arises in the Genesis narrative. This
causes our ‘second nature’ which is handed down through the soul. (This is
different from Hilary who sometimes states the soul is perfect and added later,
as shown on pp. 151–2). However, this is the only instance of such a phrase
before Hilary.
Like Tertullian, Hilary relates human corruption to our origin; he also
specifically uses the phrase vitium originis, or associates vitium with origo.28
But, importantly, he also uses it to talk of our human condition of sinfulness.
Admittedly he does not quite use it as a technical term as Augustine does, but
it is clear that the state of sinfulness is what is meant (not just vitiation of
nature).
He knows that he was born under sin’s origin (sub peccati origine) and sin’s law.
(TrPs118, 22.6)29
Against Julian, Augustine interprets Hilary’s odd phrase ‘sin’s origin’ as
referring to the Fall, although this is not explicit in Hilary.30
So Hilary provides the first evidence of ‘origin’ language consistently used in
the context of a state of sinfulness, even if it is fluid and not quite yet a fixed
technical term. But it is also important to note that Hilary’s usage assumes that
his readers will understand him in this way: Hilary is merely tapping into
common discourse. Ladaria makes the same observation with regard to
Hilary’s discussion of Christ’s origin in trin. 10. Ladaria notes that Hilary

25
non tamen in uitiosae infirmitatis nostrae esset corpore, qui non esset in origine.
26
FAUSTINUS ad Gallam Placidiam de Trinitate (de Fide), 3: quis crederet quod homo
factus fuerat ex originis nostrae matrice, licet sine uiri complexu?
27
TERTULLIAN an. 41: Malum igitur animae . . . ex originis uitio antecedit, naturale quoda-
modo. See also spect. 2.
28
TrPs 57.3, 58.4; trin. 10.25, 10.26, 10.35. Most of these are excerpted in this chapter.
29
scit se sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege se esse natum.
30
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 1.3(9).
150 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
assumes without question that Adam’s sinfulness is transmitted by birth, and
also takes for granted that his readers (even his detractors) will make the same
assumption.31 It appears to be an unquestioned presumption of the Trinitar-
ian debates of the time that ‘birth implies sinfulness’.
In sum, it is ambiguous what origo refers to in Hilary (creation, birth,
ancestry). Nevertheless, our state of sinfulness is consistently described with
phrases such as ‘sins of our origin’ or others using the term ‘origin’.

Corporate Guilt

It has been shown (pp. 146–7) how the Fall means that we are in a state of
sinfulness, but this is not novel in Hilary; indeed, this position is ubiquitously
held among other church fathers. For example, Cyprian mentions that babies
need baptism because they have ‘contracted the contagion of the ancient
death’;32 Origen states we are all born with the stain of sin;33 and shortly
after Hilary, Ambrose states that even a one-day-old child has sin even though
he never committed a sin.34 Also, the idea of anthropological change at the Fall
is not unique to Hilary; Tertullian states that through it the devil changed
human nature.35
However, Hilary represents a step closer to Augustine inasmuch as he sees
us as sharing not only in a universal ‘stain’ but even in the moral responsibility
for the first sin. For Hilary, we all somehow share in Adam’s sin. This is not
unusual; contemporary authors such as Athanasius and Nyssen also believed
that we somehow share in Adam’s sin.36 But in Hilary we do not merely share
in sinfulness; we are ourselves somehow responsible. We ourselves shared in
the first sin: In the error of one man, Adam, the whole human race went
astray.37
Hilary also explicitly distinguishes origo sinfulness from our individual
sins.38 At TrPs, 57.3 he discusses how Esau was foreknown, rather than
predestined, to be a sinner (this theme is also found in Origen).39 Hilary
wishes to make the point that Esau’s sin was his own individual sin. Therefore
he insists that Esau was not forced to sin (no necessitas peccati), nor did his
birth require it. Further, Esau’s future sin was nothing to do with original sin.

31
LADARIA 1977b:235.
32
CYPRIAN Ep. 58 [64].5: . . . infans qui recens natus nihil peccauit nisi quod secundum
Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae prima natiuitate contraxit . . .
33 34
ORIGEN Hom. Lev. 8.3. AMBROSE de Cain et Abel 3.10.
35 36
TERTULLIAN spect. 2.12. EDWARDS 2002:119, fn.95.
37
InMt 18.6: in unius Adae errore, omne hominum genus aberrauit.
38 39
TrPs 57.3. For example, ORIGEN princ. 3.1.20.
 Original Sin 151
This fault cannot be attributed to Esau’s origin, so God charges him with the
offence of a will that was hardened against obeying on such matters, saying: Their
madness is like a snake’s . . . (TrPs 57.3)40
Esau’s sin is his own, not merely original sin—although he is still constrained
by his hardened will.
Augustine will use ‘original sin’ to refer to a state of culpability or sinfulness
as much as a specific sin. Hilary is thus possibly the first author to use the
language of ‘sins of our origin’ referring to a state of sinfulness and culpability
shared by the individual rather than a mere vitiation of nature; and he assumes
his readers will understand that.

TRANSMISSION BY BIRTH

Transmission of Hereditary Sin

So far it has been shown that Adam’s sin has impinged on us all. This
happened in a number of ways, but a common expression in Hilary is that
of hereditary transmission. In his analogy of the ‘anthropological household’
(InMt 10.23–4; text and translation at Appendix 1), Hilary uses the language
of genetic transmission. Adam has body, soul, and will but only because his
beginning is not handed down (traductus) from elsewhere; we on the other
hand receive our beginning (accepimus ortum) from our ‘parents’ sin and
disobedience. Our habits are inborn (ingeniti); our ‘parents’ are also ingeniti
and ‘handed down from some ancient stock’.41
Hilary’s language elsewhere often implies that he sees ancestry as deter-
minative of character. For example, the Jews have hereditary infidelitas,42 but
the children of Abraham should be like Abraham.43 So it is a matter of simple
genetics, as much as one of theology, if we have inherited some of Adam’s
traits, since Hilary constantly refers to Adam as our first parent.44 This genetic
inheritance includes inheriting sin.
A cautionary point is in order. Original sin for Hilary is certainly hereditary,
and connected with the flesh. But contradictorily, Hilary also presents the
opposite view: that there is no hereditary sin. He presents Job and Jeremiah
cursing the day of their birth, but explains that it is not their soul’s creation
they bewail (since that was perfect) but their growth into bodily form in the
womb, since the body is the cause of all their weaknesses and infirmities.45

40
Ne uitium referri posset ad originem, praeduratae in his ad obediendum uoluntatis crimen
exprobrat, dicens: Furor illis secundum similitudinem serpentis . . .
41 42 43
InMt 10.23–4. InMt 2.1. TrPs 52.19.
44 45
TrPs 65.4, 136.5, 146.4; also implied by trin. 4.21, 10.20. TrPs 119.12.
152 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
This passage appears to reject original sin as intrinsic mental fallenness, since
it attributes all sin to the body. (It takes our human problems as arising from
the flesh, although the flesh is, after all, hereditary in its own capacity.)
Still, the very use of the word ‘origin’ to describe this particular state of
sinfulness implies not just our creation but also our ancestry. Ladaria states
correctly that Hilary’s language about Adam and about our birth (and Christ’s
birth) assumes hereditary sin.46 At trin. 10.20 Hilary refutes a ‘heretical’ view
that Christ inherited both body and soul from Adam in order to redeem
Adam’s sin. Hilary refutes this because he believes human souls are created
directly by God, but he does not disagree with the position that our sin is
hereditary. It turns out that arguments for Christ’s sinlessness in Hilary are
key for understanding human hereditary sin.

The Relevance of Christ’s Birth

It may be that Hilary’s view of transmission is not based primarily on our own
birth (which somehow transmits sinfulness) but rather on Christ’s (which fails
to transmit it), as has already been hinted. Given Hilary’s Trinitarian interest,
it seems that here his Christology has affected his anthropology rather than the
other way round.
Hilary states that we know the Son is truly God based on five things: name,
birth, nature, power, confession;47 but he also says that birth (nativitas)
embraces the other four.48 Birth is thus the peg that Hilary hangs his hat on
for his Nicene articulation of the Trinity. As shown by Smulders, Mattei, and
others,49 Hilary uses the concept of Christ’s begottenness over and over again
in his Trinitarian works, not just the de Trinitate50 but also others such as de
Synodis51 and even the short work against Auxentius of Milan.52 Hilary is
thorough in using the birth concept for the very reason that it was of such
key importance in the Trinitarian controversy of the day, as can be seen
from his fragmentary collection of contemporary documents related to the
controversies.53

46 47
LADARIA 1977b:242–3. trin. 7.9.
48
trin. 7.16. I am grateful to Jarred Mercer for pointing these out.
49
For example, SMULDERS (1944) devotes a chapter (Ch. 5, pp. 140–78) to nativitas as a
foundation for Hilary’s expression of Trinitarian relations; MATTEI (2003) traces changes
across Hilary’s works in his use of nativitas; WEEDMAN (2007) discusses eternal generation
and how far Hilary is relying on other theologians of the time such as Basil of Ancyra.
50 51
For example, trin. 6.18–45, 12.1–34. For example, syn. 17–18, 22, 23, 26 . . .
52
c. Aux. 6.
53
For example, Coll. Ant. Par. A.iv.2–3; B.ii.9; B.ii.10–11. Numbered in WICKHAM 1997 as
1.2.2 (p. 21), 1.8.6 (p. 60), 1.9 (pp. 61–4).
 Original Sin 153
In the tenth book of his de Trinitate, Hilary enters into a long discussion
about Christ’s immunity from suffering and sin, and this argument hinges on
an understanding of Christ’s birth; as Ladaria points out, his position essen-
tially assumes the doctrine of original sin.
Christ’s begetting from the Virgin enables him to participate in humanity
and thereby redeem our fallen condition. However, Hilary is careful to specify
that Christ is ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh’ but not himself sinful.54 For Hilary
this is the key point about being born from a virgin—it allows Christ to be free
from the sinful state. The Word took flesh from the Virgin and then received
the soul (for Hilary, the soul is added in separately by God for every
human child).
So far so good, and this is not particularly novel. For example a similar
position is found in Athanasius;55 Keech demonstrates that Rom. 8.3 is a key
part of Augustine’s teaching on Christ’s uniqueness in the context of the
Pelagian controversy;56 Origen says that Christ was sinless because he was
not born of physical sexuality;57 Nyssen also rests an argument on the fact that
Christ’s birth did not result from sensual pleasure.58
But Hilary leaves a gaping hole. He believes in hereditary sin, but yet
believes that each soul is created anew.59 He explicitly rejects Tertullian’s
traducianism,60 but does not give a satisfactory alternative mechanism where-
by vitiation of the soul is transmitted. As Tennant puts it: ‘Hilary abandons
Tertullian’s theory of the mode of propagation of sin, but he fails to present us
with one in its place . . . He consequently reverts almost to the indefiniteness of
thought which obtained before Tertullian wrote.’61
Tennant62 and N. Williams63 both suggest that Hilary’s theology of original
sin follows Tertullian in most respects, including with the vitium originis.
(Williams follows Tennant closely on Hilary with no original comments).
Since Hilary has rejected traducianism, both these authors read InMt 10.23–4
(the anthropological household narrative) as making the flesh the seat of
original sin. This is surprising: this text is precisely the one which suggests
most strongly a vitiation of the soul and fallenness of the will that is inde-
pendent of the body. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that Hilary indicates
elsewhere that sinfulness is transmitted through the body.
Tennant’s accusation of ‘indefiniteness of thought’ is not entirely true.
Hilary would protest that each soul created anew is perfect until combined
with the flesh (as with Job and Jeremiah on p. 151). Christ alone is sinless
because his different ‘origin’ means that even his body is different.64 Yet it is

54 55
trin. 10.25, using Rom. 8.3. e.g. ATHANASIUS inc. 8.3.
56
Discussion in KEECH 2012, Ch.3 (see for example pp. 104–5).
57 58
ORIGEN Hom. Lev. 8.3. NYSSEN Great Catechism 16.
59 60
trin. 10.20, 10.22. LADARIA 1977b:236.
61 62
TENNANT 1903:337–8 discusses Hilary. TENNANT 1903:337–8.
63 64
N. WILLIAMS 1927:298–9. trin. 10.16, 10.22, 10.35, 10.44.
154 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
certainly also the case that Hilary holds the position that the soul is itself
vitiated by the Fall, our entire anthropological make-up changes, and our soul
needs redemption as much as the body. (Indeed, to explain passibility Hilary
even goes so far as to say that we only experience suffering because the soul is
weak and ‘allows’ us to sense the suffering.)65 Tennant is thus correct that
Hilary does not provide a coherent mechanism by which this is transmitted.
Still, from Hilary’s discussion of Christ’s different origin we may deduce
that there is something about conception or birth that explains our souls’
vitiation—even if it is not entirely clear what.
So then, it seems that the theology of original sin is already present in the
context of the Trinitarian controversy, with its debates about the Son’s begot-
tenness and his distinct ‘origin’. Hilary does feel that the body weakens the
perfect soul, but at the same time he holds the soul as independently vitiated
by the Fall. Even if his theology is not clear, he does demonstrate the concepts
of original sin and assumes the same of his opponents in the Trinitarian
debates.

Anthropological ‘Parents’

Parenthood is not just a matter of the historical figure of Adam. Since the Fall,
not just Adam but sin and disobedience are our parents (or in-laws), as the
narrative of the anthropological household shows. There Hilary states that
baptism frees us from the sins and progenitors of our origin (originis nostrae
peccatis atque auctoribus).66 Ladaria translates auctoribus as referring to our
anthropological parents sin and disobedience,67 from whom baptism frees us.
However, he does note the difficulties with this passage and uses this as a piece
of evidence to support his theory that Hilary has not fully thought through the
issue of how we inherit original sin.68 (The phrase is ambiguous, however;
Doignon translates it differently, taking auctoribus in apposition to peccatis, so
that the original sin itself is our parent).69
A synthesis of the parenthood of the flesh and parenthood of anthropo-
logical attributes is found when Hilary explains why it is right for us to dash
the children of Babylon against the rock.

65
trin. 10.14: affert itaque dolorem per animae infirmis admixtionem, in infirmum sensum
suum corpus animatum.
66 67
InMt 10.24. LADARIA 1977b:241 fn.35.
68
LADARIA 1977b:241 fn.35: todo esto nos hace pensar de nuevo que nos hallamos ante una
doctrina todavía no firmamente definida.
69
DOIGNON 2007a:245: Quand, dans ces conditions, nous sommes renouvelés par le bain
du Baptême grâce au pouvoir du Verbe, nous sommes séparés des péchés de notre origine, nos
instigateurs . . .
 Original Sin 155
The entire discourse comes back to our wretched flesh, confused and disturbed:
if we give credit to the story, it was engendered from parents of confusion (ex
confusionis patribus). This is because all flesh is the offspring of earlier flesh. The
beginnings of the whole human race were scattered from those parents, who
when their languages were confused first built the ‘city of confusion’ [Gen. 11.9]
which is now Babylon. (TrPs 136.13)70
Babylon represents our flesh and its ‘confusion’ (referring to the story of
Babel). Hilary says that all flesh was ultimately begotten ex confusionis patri-
bus. It is not clear what this means (are the parents ‘anthropological’ or real?
Are they confused or themselves Confusion?). However, it seems that this
somehow recalls the Fall and the consequent genetic transmission of the Fall’s
consequences, even though it is portrayed through the story of Babel/Babylon.
In particular this passage seems to be attempting an explanation at our
emotional and psychological state (our wretched flesh, confused and dis-
turbed), which arises at one particular event (here Babel); we may compare
the view that passions arise through the Fall (pp. 93–4).

B A P TI S M

Baptism features highly in Hilary’s works. It brings many benefits such as

bringing us into fellowship with Christ as his brothers.71 But more relevantly
here, Hilary’s language of baptism appears to present all the antidotes to the
problems that original sin brings. For example, original sin brings a stain or
blot upon us; baptism cleanses that.
[The man] who has no filth clinging to him after his baptismal cleansing, but
is spotless and gleaming, and his body is not defiled with anything unclean . . .
(TrPs [14].6)72
As another example, Hilary talks about baptism as the second birth, parallel-
ing the first creation which went so badly. Thus he uses words such as ‘reborn’
or ‘regenerated’.73 This may also be associated with the fact that the first ‘birth’
led to death, but the second leads to life74 as the exact offset to the consequence
of the Fall. It has already been shown that all babies are born sinful (pp. 151–2,

70
Ad infelicem enim illa confusionis et perturbationis nostrae carnem sermo omnis reuerti-
tur, quae secundum historiae fidem ex confusionis patribus genita est: quia omnis caro superioris
carnis est filia. Ex his enim, qui primum confusis linguis confusionis urbem quae Babylonia est
condiderunt, uniuersarum gentium initia dispersa sunt.
71
InMt 24.2.
72
[homo] cui post baptismi lauacrum nullae adhaeserint sordes, sed sit immaculatus et
nitidus, sitque ei non corpus stupris contaminatum . . .
73 74
TrPs 2.29, 2.31, 2.41, 52.21, [65].11. TrPs 2.31.
156 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
regarding Job and Jeremiah), and the key theology of baptism in Hilary is as
something that removes this sin.
However, we have seen that the events of the Fall somehow led to an
anthropological change in Hilary, and this is further confirmed by the fact
that baptism seems to reverse this change.
Let us rejoice . . . that we will be dashed in pieces like a potter’s vessel! That way, in
the present life we may walk ‘in newness of life’ once we have died and been
buried with the Lord in baptism [Rom. 4.4], like a potter’s vessel; . . . and in the
next life, we shall pass through our new birth and be re-modelled, as a new
restoration, into a blessed and God-pleasing form. (TrPs 2.41)75
Here, being shattered like a potter’s vessel (Ps. 2.9) is taken as referring to our
baptism. As a result of that, we will be re-formed or repaired (this ‘new
restoration’, iterata reparatio, may recall the recapitulation theology of Ire-
naeus). This gives us a new form (species). This view is also found elsewhere in
the Psalms commentaries, where baptism is the start of us possessing eternal
bodies.76 Baptism thus has an effect on our physical, corporeal body, even
though these effects may only be seen eschatologically.
Nevertheless, baptism also has an effect on our internal make-up, as Hilary
makes clear in his narrative of the anthropological household. There, sin and
disobedience were both the Fall itself and the consequences of the Fall when
they became part of us. But baptism reverses their effects.
Thus, when we are renewed in baptismal cleansing, we are severed from the
sins and progenitors of our origin; we object to the predilections of our ‘father’
and ‘mother’. Now that we have taken off the ‘old man’ with its sins and
disobedience and are renewed by the Spirit in soul and body, we have to be
vexed at our previous innate habits. (InMt 10.24)77
This passage goes on to state further consequences of baptism. First, the
corporeal nature of the body becomes spiritual like the soul (while at the
same time it ‘continues in its own matter’). Next, the will is sundered from ‘its
mother-in-law, Disobedience’ and surrenders itself to the newly spiritual body
and soul; the passage later states that the will becomes entirely subject to the
spiritual soul. Here, baptism does not merely reverse the effects of the Fall but
represents a forward step for the human condition: our bodies are no longer at

75
Confringi . . . nos tamquam uas figuli . . . gaudeamus: ut et nunc, modo figuli uasis, com-
mortui et consepulti Domino in baptismate in nouitate uitae ambulemus . . . ; et tunc per hunc
nouae natiuitatis profectum, in beatam illam ac Deo placentem iteratae reparationis nostrae
speciem reformemur.
76
TrPs [65].11.
77
Cum ergo innouamur baptismi lauacro . . . ab originis nostrae peccatis atque auctoribus
separamur; . . . a patris et matris affectionibus dissidemus; et ueterem cum peccatis atque infide-
litate sua hominem exuentes, et per Spiritum anima et corpore innouati, necesse est ut ingeniti et
uetusti operis consuetudinem oderimus.
 Original Sin 157
odds with our souls, and our wills are no longer independent but in the soul’s
full control.
As Wild points out,78 Hilary sees baptism as something that can only be
completed eschatologically.79 This is further supported by Hilary’s ubiquitous
theology of our glorification at the general resurrection, when the nature
of body and soul are somehow brought together.80 This is similar to the
anthropological household passage where baptism makes the body spiritual
like the soul.
Before rounding off baptism, it should be remembered that redemption in
Hilary means a number of things and expiation of sin is achieved in a variety
of ways. Hilary may use redemption or expiation language without reference
to baptism. As a specific example, the healing of the paralytic in Matthew is
explicitly a cipher for the removal of original sin; the healing includes forgive-
ness, resurrection, and the entry into paradise, but does not mention
baptism.81
In sum, Hilary uses standard biblical language and metaphors about bap-
tism. His language demonstrates that (among other things) he sees it as (a)
removing the sinfulness associated with birth, through forgiveness;82 and (b)
effecting an anthropological change that works both internally and externally,
and has its cumulation eschatologically. These two points further illustrate his
understanding of original sin.

CO NCLUSION

Ladaria (1977b) feels that Hilary has the seeds of a doctrine of original sin
especially in trin. 10, which discusses Christ’s separate origin. However,
Ladaria suggests that Hilary does not have a coherent theology of original
sin, since for example he does not have a model of how the sinfulness
propagates in the soul. But even Augustine never quite explains this, as
Keech shows.83 Peñamaría represents a stronger position than Ladaria; he
sees Hilary as entirely in accordance with Augustine on original sin, with the
sole exception of the initium fidei.84

78
WILD 1950:93.
79
InMt 2.4: reliquum sit consummari igne iudicii. Compare TrPs118, 3.5.
80
InMt 5.8, 5.11, 10.19, 27.4; TrPs 2.41, 145.2; TrPs118, 20.9, 20.10; trin. 11.35, 11.49 . . .
81 82
InMt 8.7. InMt 21.15: in remissionem peccatorum baptizati . . .
83
KEECH 2012:95, 99, 101–2. Fredriksen argues that, for Julian of Eclanum, this inability to
explain the transmission of sinfulness invalidates Augustine’s whole system (see Keech
2012:100).
84
PEÑAMARÍA 1974:245–6.
158 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Still, Doignon, Ladaria, and Peñamaría would all agree that Hilary has some
articulation of original sin, whatever the details may be. This chapter has
suggested that Hilary may be the first writer to use the language of our ‘origin’
to refer to a certain class of sins (even though he is ambiguous as to whether
the ‘sins of our origin’ refer properly to sins that arise from our createdness as
being made from mud, or the state of sinfulness that comes from the Fall).
Further, this is nearing the status of technical terminology and is understood
as such by his audience.
Moreover, this ‘sin of our origin’ is not mere stain or filth associated with
the human condition as found in other church fathers before Augustine:
Hilary states that all humans participate in the sin itself and its culpability.
It is certainly hereditary (our previous innate habits)85 and it may be
distinguished from our individual sins.86 It is possible, though, that Hilary’s
understanding of hereditary sinfulness does not arise primarily from anthro-
pology but through the Trinitarian debates of the time and particularly the
belief that it was the virgin birth that demonstrated Christ’s sinlessness.
Still, the Fall had a definite effect, in particular in bringing in death and in
changing our anthropological constitution so that sin and disobedience be-
came intrinsically part of us; this can, however, be reversed in baptism, which
obtains ‘cleansing’ and ‘forgiveness of sins’ and sets us on the path towards the
resurrection.

85 86
InMt 10.24 (see also excerpt on p. 156). TrPs 57.3.
 9

Hilary between Origen and Augustine

I N T R O D U C TI O N

The preceding chapters have examined Hilary’s anthropology. This final

chapter seeks to put him in his context, particularly by comparing him with
his forebear Origen and his successor Augustine. It will be suggested that
Hilary is one of the many streams carrying Origenian ideas and exegesis
through to Augustine.
The first part (pp. 159–61) compares Hilary’s works; there appears to be a
difference in articulation across his corpus, which may suggest Origenian
influence on certain specific works (particularly the Psalms commentaries)
but may be down to the fact that Hilary’s works are of different genres, or to
common methods of exegesis across Christian communities.
In the second part (pp. 161–8) Hilary’s usage of Origen will be assessed. This
allows us to deduce what Hilary thinks of Origen: Hilary clearly identifies some of
the Alexandrian’s doctrines as heterodox but on the whole he respects Origen’s
exegetical method which he largely follows. In particular, it is suggested that Hilary
had a theology of original sin and constrained will independently of Origen,
as demonstrated by his independent works (particularly de Trinitate and in
Matthaeum). Nevertheless, the Psalms commentaries show that he is influenced
by the Origenian expression of human psychology and the process of stimulus and
response. This feeds into Hilary’s articulation of sin and will in that work.
The third part (pp. 168–81) examines Augustine’s usage and understanding of
Hilary particularly in the context of his debate with Pelagius. It is suggested
(contra Doignon) that although Augustine’s interpretations of Hilary are some-
times a little off-mark, Augustine is on the whole fair and accurate in attributing to
Hilary a doctrine of original sin, even if it differs from Augustine’s in some details.

HILARY’ S ANTHROPOLOGY

The foregoing chapters have discussed Hilary’s anthropology from a number

of angles. Some scholars have seen Hilary in a somewhat Platonic light,
160 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers

emphasizing his sharp demarcation between body and soul and the ultimate
spiritualization of the body (Chapter 3). This places him in a so-called ‘Greek’
anthropological tradition, which typically sees Christian salvation as a pro-
gress towards deification and denial of body. This is certainly present in
Hilary’s theology, but predominates particularly in his Psalms commentaries.
In fact, Hilary appears to be more nuanced on the integration of body and
soul. This may be due to Stoic influence but it may be that a more positive view
of the body is in fact something that Hilary has inherited as a relatively
common feature of the Christian tradition.
Across his works Hilary demonstrates a number of the features of a doctrine
of original sin, including a constrained will (Chapter 6), corporate account-
ability in the first sin (Chapters 5 and 8), and a notion of transmission by
conception or birth even if this is not quite satisfactorily explained (Chapter 8).
He even has something approximating to the later language of original sin.
All these are characteristically seen as typical of Augustine’s theology; their
presence in Hilary is an indication that Augustine is not quite as novel as some
might suggest (pp. 177–9).
At the same time, many of the conclusions about Hilary have been drawn
from comments he makes in passing or are deduced from his underlying
assumptions. Nowhere does he discourse systematically about anthropological
issues as he does for Trinitarian ones.
There is also some evidence of variation across his work. One of the initial
rationales for this study was the observation that Hilary appeared to have
different expressions of anthropology in his commentaries on Matthew and on
Psalm 118 respectively.
To some degree that observation still holds. For example, the passions are
mentioned in both works, but their relevance to human constraint and action
really appears only in the Psalms commentaries (Chapter 7). Also, any sug-
gestion of a ‘separable’ soul is not really tenable in Hilary’s works apart from
the Psalms commentaries, and even there it may well have been muted
compared to Hilary’s source (Chapter 3). Lastly, although it is not discussed
in this study, imago theology in the anthropological sense is far more common
in Hilary’s Psalms commentaries: imago anthropology is found in only one
paragraph of In Matthaeum but in twelve of TrPs118, a text which is of
comparable length. Imago anthropology is also considerably more detailed
and developed in the latter text (Chapter 4).
At the same time, there is undoubtedly common ground across these two
works; for example, the weaker will and original sin are strong motifs found
not only in these two works to an equal degree but indeed across the whole of
Hilary’s corpus.
What emerges from this comparison, then, is the extent to which Hilary is
both able and willing to use different language in different contexts. This is not
at all to say that he is inconsistent; merely that he is an eclectic author who is
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 161
able to adapt his language to his readership and genre. For example, although
the methodology here has been primarily to compare the two commentaries, it
also occurs that some doctrinal articulations are found in the Matthew and
Psalms commentaries but not in the rest of Hilary’s corpus, such as emotions,
which are barely mentioned in his other works except in a Christological
context.1 Also none of Hilary’s other works mentions imago anthropology at
all in its own right (that is, it is only used to make Christological or Trinitarian
points).2
These differences arise for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is the source
material: in the Psalms commentaries there is a greater presence of Origenistic
articulations, as well as more commonality of thought with Origen, and this is
consistent with the finding that Hilary is using Origen’s text. Secondly, there is
the subject area: Hilary’s commentaries set out to discuss a text primarily, not
a specific doctrine or set of doctrines (although to some degree anthropology
feeds his hermeneutic approach). Thirdly, there is the genre: Hilary’s polemical
work naturally will contain more detailed articulations of doctrine targeted at
specific assertions which Hilary is polemically rejecting, which means we can
say plenty about Christological concerns but we lack any full exposition of
Hilary’s view of fallenness (say). Other differences may arise from Hilary’s
milieu at time of writing (diocese in Gaul, exile in Asia Minor), or other
influences arising. So then, due to their different doctrinal or hermeneutical
emphases, strong conclusions about differences between the works cannot be
drawn and other factors must be considered.

HILA RY ’S USAGE OF ORIGEN

Hilary and Origen’s Orthodoxy

In Chapter 2 it was shown that, in places, over 90 per cent of Hilary’s text is
taken from Origen, although with periphrasis and readjustment of material.3
And yet at other points, Hilary shows considerable reworking of material
while still using occasional exegetical ideas (for example, where he seems to be
avoiding statements about a supramundane Fall).

1
Again, the exception is when emotions are used in Christological analysis: see for example
trin. 10 which treats at length the question of Christ’s suffering.
2
For example, HILARY c.Const. 20–1 emphasizes human ‘likeness’ only to show that the Son
should not be called ‘like’ the Father. Also, the creation of humans ‘in our image and likeness’ is
frequently referred to but only to make the Trinitarian point about the plural number of actors
involved in creation: trin. 4.17–20, 5.7–10, 5.24; myst. 2.13, 2.14; TrPs 138.26 (compare
PELLAND 1983a:446–7).
3
p. 33.
162 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
As a starting-point for assessing what exactly Hilary was likely to reject in
his source text, we may examine the list of heresies put forward by Epiphanius
in his Panarion of 376 AD. For most of these ‘heresies’ it can be shown
that Hilary also modifies or omits the relevant doctrine in the Psalms
commentaries.
(1) Subordinationism within the Trinity. Hilary omits Origen’s references
to the Son and Spirit as God’s hands (evidence for which occurs in
Ambrose and the catena).4
(2) Pre-existence of souls. Hilary accepts (possibly in accord with Origen)
that the body was created long after the soul.5 But he rejects the concept
of a supracelestial realm and a Fall into bodies.6
(3) Humans lost God’s image at the Fall. Hilary appears to write this
theology out of his text consciously.7
(4) Garments of skins. Hilary appears to reject sharply the notion that the
body is a punishment for some pre-bodily sin.8
(5) Spiritual resurrection. Hilary insists that the resurrection must include
the body.9
(6) and (7) Allegorical reading of Scripture. Hilary specifically states that
Scripture may be taken allegorically but that its primary meaning is
historical, and that the historical meaning always stands.10
Of course, it is not necessarily the case that Origen himself held all of these
positions that Epiphanius charges him with. Nevertheless, Hilary often enough
omits observations which he found in Origen’s commentary (as may be seen in
the sections referred to in the list above). Hilary adheres quite closely to
Origen’s commentary when he feels it orthodox, so any deviation from this
pattern is significant. He may even reject Origen’s remarks explicitly.11
Origen was always controversial; objections to Origen’s theology of pun-
ishment and forgiveness arose even in his lifetime. Methodius wrote a treatise
rejecting his resurrection theology.12 The list of accusations recorded by
Pamphilus-Eusebius seems to focus particularly on Christology,13 although
there are certainly a number of anthropological accusations (Origen is accused
of denying the punishment of sinners and the general resurrection;14 of saying

4 5 6
pp. 49–50. TrPs 129.5 (p. 84): longe postea. pp. 84–8.
7 8
pp. 76–80. pp. 86–8.
9
p. 62. Hilary is being unfair on Origen; he is himself not so far from the Alexandrian’s
position that this will only occur when the body ‘takes on the nature of the soul’.
10
Compare pp. 83–4.
11
p. 86 (on a sin being the cause of the fall into a body).
12 13
METHODIUS de resurrectione. PAMPHILUS–EUSEBIUS Ap. Orig. 87.
14
PAMPHILUS–EUSEBIUS Ap. Orig. 127–49 (the resurrection) and 150–8 (the punishment
of sinners).
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 163
the soul existed before the body;15 and of teaching metensomatosis or trans-
migration16). Yet by the time of Epiphanius and Jerome, the accusations
become more predominantly anthropological. Dechow argues that the under-
lying reason for many of Epiphanius’ anthropological accusations is that he
feels Origen is not sufficiently positive about the human body.17 For example,
item (2) above assumes that the body is a negative, or at worst a punishment;
(5) arises because Epiphanius rejects Origen’s (supposed) notion of apatheia.18
To some degree, Hilary’s commentary may demonstrate that Origen is far
more nuanced than the likes of Methodius or Epiphanius give him credit for.
For example, as mentioned, one of Epiphanius’s concerns when he rebuts
Origen’s resurrection theology is to reject apatheia (so Dechow).19 Yet the
analysis on pp. 139–40 found that apatheia may not be quite as important in
Origen’s thought as it is sometimes held to be.
But at the same time, Hilary seems to reject many of Origen’s doctrines.
Given his extensive involvement in the Trinitarian controversy it is not par-
ticularly surprising to find that Hilary would be cautious about Trinitarian
doctrines; yet Hilary is ‘correcting’ much of Origen’s anthropology too. As it
turns out Hilary has the same concern as later writers to emphasize the
positivity of the body;20 but in addition to the charges mentioned in Epiphanius,
it may be that Hilary also modifies Origen on the will and the passions.21 It may
be that Hilary reached his objections to Origen independently, but his rewrites
closely match the accusations made by others (garments of skins, loss of image);
so it is perfectly possible that Hilary already knew of these specific charges
against Origen’s work. Yet he writes around a decade before Epiphanius. He
thus provides early Latin evidence of rejection of these Origenistic doctrines.
At the same time, Hilary’s very use of Origen’s Psalms commentaries (and
Job commentary)22 demonstrates a degree of respect and esteem for the
Alexandrian exegete. Further, since our knowledge of Origen’s commentaries
is only fragmentary we cannot always attribute him with the heresies men-
tioned by other fourth-century writers. For example, even where Hilary vehe-
mently rejects the interpretations of ‘others’, this does not mean Origen
definitely wrote something ‘heterodox’ in his commentary; all we can be sure
of is that Hilary himself found something that he felt was heterodox or had been
warned to guard against.23 So then, Jerome’s frequent references to Hilary

15
PAMPHILUS–EUSEBIUS Ap. Orig. 159–72.
16
PAMPHILUS–EUSEBIUS Ap. Orig. 173–88.
17 18
DECHOW 1987a:114. So DECHOW 1987a:117–20, e.g. 118.
19 20
DECHOW 1987a:117–20, e.g. 118. pp. 60–3.
21
pp. 111–12; although this is not certain and depends what one takes Origen himself as
having believed.
22
JEROME de viris inlustribus 100 (this commentary on Job is lost).
23
For example, see pp. 47–50 (on Ps. 118.73); pp. 84–8 (on passages which may suggest a fall
of souls).
164 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
‘translating’ Origen seem fair enough,24 but his remark about Hilary’s Psalms
commentaries is more revealing: in [this work] he copied Origen, and added
some of his own material.25
It should be insisted that Hilary makes extensive use of Origen’s exegesis. At
the same time, however, he is still fully in command of what he writes (and
indeed seems to show considerably more discernment than Ambrose). The
frequency or expression of certain themes may go back to Origen, but Hilary
has full ownership of his material. This is particularly evident when he deals
with material he feels is heterodox.

Origen and Original Sin

Modern commentators frequently point to the fact that Origen apparently has
two narratives of the Fall: the fall of noes from a supracelestial realm, and the
traditional scriptural story of Adam and Eve.
Writing over a century ago, Tennant suggested that Origen was essentially
the forebear of Augustine on original sin, inasmuch as Origen proposed a
corporate sinfulness and general participation in the Fall (unlike other ‘East-
erners’ who maintain individual responsibility). Yet Origen elsewhere insists
on individual responsibility. Distinguishing the two narratives in Origen is
therefore important in the current context because a fall of noes suggests
individual sin and retribution, whereas the Adam story suggests some kind
of corporate fall. Tennant resolves this problem by suggesting an ‘early’
(Alexandrian) phase characterized by individualism and no mystical unity;
and a ‘late’ (Caesarean) phase characterized by frequent references to the ‘filth
of sin’. He suggests that Origen first ‘discovered’ infant baptism on his arrival
in Caesarea, and thenceforward rationalized the theology of intrinsic sinful-
ness.26 For example, in Hom. Lev. 8.3 Origen speaks of the filth (sordes) which
we contract at or through birth, and which is purged by baptism. Tennant
notes Origen’s use of scripture to support this ‘inborn taint’,27 and his
distinction between ‘filth’ and ‘sin’ when discussing the Virgin Mary and the
Christ child.28 This filth is transmitted hereditarily. In all, Tennant suggests
that Origen is substantially a precursor to Augustine; he does not, however,
point to how Augustine may have encountered Origen’s doctrines.29
Beatrice points out that the idea of stain or sin at birth is widespread at this
period: for Beatrice, Augustine’s novelty is not in suggesting babies are stained,
but that they are actually accountable for sinfulness. Still, there are plenty of

24
pp. 15–17.
25
JEROME de viris inlustribus 100: in quo opere imitatus Origenem, nonnulla de suo addidit.
26 27
TENNANT 1903:296–300. TENNANT 1903:300.
28 29
ORIGEN Hom. Luc. 14. TENANNT 1903:302–3; 343–5.
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 165
passages in Origen that do point to the effect of Adam’s sin being more than
mere stain.
Regarding the two Fall narratives in Origen, Tennant’s theory of ‘early’ and
‘late’ phases is not generally accepted in modern scholarship, predominantly
because of the difficulty of dating many of Origen’s works and the circularity
that this method can entail (dating some works as late because they refer to
‘filth’, but then pointing to these to show that ‘filth of sin’ is a late concept).
More recently scholars reconcile the two narratives in different ways as
belonging to different contexts. For example, Alcain suggests that the ‘Platon-
ic’ fall-of-noes belongs to Origen’s speculative work (particularly de Principiis)
whereas the Adam and Eve story belongs to scriptural commentary.30 (This is
belied if Origen’s Psalms commentary referred to the fall-of-noes as suggested
by Epiphanius). Still, Alcain feels that the two worldviews are not quite
compatible.31 Bammel suggests that these two narratives are for Origen
different facets of the same event,32 not two falls but rather a simultaneous
fall,33 or two compatible explanations of how sin entered the world.34 Harl on
the other hand suggests that the narratives cannot be harmonized so easily.35
She points to Origen’s continual reminder that such things are an inaccessible
mystery36 and suggests that a solution may be to re-evaluate Origen’s own
understanding of such things (for example, she suggests that some accusations
of a pre-existent ‘world’ of souls might actually stem from statements in
Origen referring to God’s prescience).37
Regardless of how scholars seek to deal with Origen’s two narratives, all that
matters here is that Origen certainly made statements that are in accord with
Hilary’s (or Augustine’s) understanding of sin. Adam is a type for all human-
ity,38 and death entered because all sinned;39 yet elsewhere Origen says that
death entered through one sin in the singular (Death was given sovereignty as
the result of an offence).40 Humanity is affected in Adam because of our
seminal identity, hence sin entered through one man41 and similarly ‘in
Adam all die’ (1Cor. 15.22).42 Through his seed Adam transmitted physical
and moral death (…they have within them a likeness of his transgression,

30 31
ALCAIN 1973:171. ALCAIN 1973:172.
32
BAMMEL 1989:81 ‘The idea of a sinful tendency inherited from Adam is not intended by
Origen to replace the concept of a previous fall of the individual soul, but is considered
alongside it.’
33 34
BAMMEL 1989:68. BAMMEL 1989:83.
35 36 37
HARL 1987:244–7. HARL 1987:240–1. HARL 1987:251–2.
38
ORIGEN c.Celsum 4.40 (this concept is also found in Jewish writers such as Philo).
39
ORIGEN Comm. Ioh. 20.39, 20.42:…τῷ πάντας ἡμαρτηκέναι…
40
ORIGEN Comm. Rom. 5.3: per delictum morti regnum datur.
41
ORIGEN Comm. Rom. 5.1, 5.2, 3.3; Comm. Mt. ad Mt. 1.18; Comm. Ioh. 20.21.
42
Various explanations for the statement that ‘in Adam all die’ are found at Origen’s
discussion of Rom. 5.12 (Comm. Rom. 5.1, 5.4, 5.6; also c.Celsum 1.31).
166 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
transmitted not merely through his seed but also by his example).43 On the
related matter of the will, Origen is often held up as an example of complete
human freedom. However, his works indicate plenty of examples of human
constraint. For example, there is the overpowering storm of the emotions;44
the difficulty of controlling one’s own thoughts, especially when the devil can
put ideas into our head;45 and there is the very weakness of will which Origen
sees as a consequence of transgression.46 Thus although Origen does not
articulate the will as fallen, he certainly can point to plenty of examples of
constraint on human action.
All in all, Origen does not articulate original sin in quite the same language
as Augustine. However, Origen makes plenty of statements that are consistent
with an evolution towards Augustine’s thought on the effects of the Fall.

Distinguishing Hilary from Origen

The aim here is to identify as precisely as possible what any Origenian

influence might have been on Hilary’s doctrine (especially on original sin),
as opposed to what Hilary’s independent position may have been. Given the
differences in genre and emphasis across Hilary’s corpus (pp. 159–61), it is
difficult to draw firm conclusions; nevertheless, a few observations may be made.
It has already been seen that Hilary’s commentaries are, doctrinally speak-
ing, his own, even if the exegesis derives in large part from Origen. Neverthe-
less, Origen’s influence is certainly present inasmuch as some metaphors or
scriptural references occur more often than Hilary would use in independent
work. Even if a given metaphor is widespread among patristic authors, the
frequency of that metaphor in Hilary may still be Origenian.
Some of these are particularly relevant to theological anthropology. For
example, the idea of human constraint caused by the will or emotions is found
to a lesser degree in Hilary’s Matthew commentary but is far more common in
the Psalms commentaries. These are characteristic of Origen’s thought; for
example, Origen makes a particular exegetical point of associating Babylon
with the confusion of the emotions. He often mentions that Babylon means
‘confusion’,47 particularly confusion caused by vices: I have often said when

43
ORIGEN Comm. Rom. 5.1:…habere in semetipsis similitudinem praeuaricationis eius, non
solum ex semine sed ex institutione susceptam…
44
ALCAIN 1973:75–7 gives a list of references taken from the allegorical reading of Babylon.
45
ORIGEN princ. 3.2.4. See also pp. 135–7.
46
ORIGEN Comm. in Cant. 4:…ut ostenderet inesse unicuique animae uim possibilitatis et
arbitrii libertatem, qua possit agere omne quod bonum est. Sed quia hoc naturae bonum
praeuaricationis occasione decerptum, uel ad ignominiam uel lasciuiam fuerat inflexum…See
p. 117, second excerpt.
47
ORIGEN Hom. Ezech. 1.3, 12.2; Hom. Jer. 19.14.
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 167
interpreting allegories that ‘Babylon’ is our business on earth which is often
muddled by vices.48 Exile to Babylon means the soul is in confusion, but
may be caused by our own sin.49 All this matches closely with Hilary’s
own understanding of Babylon, and is only found in his other works to a
lesser degree (pp. 154–5).
Similarly, a certain theology of Adam appears to be found particularly in
Hilary’s Psalms commentaries. In particular, the contrast between the old
Adam and new (or earthly/heavenly man, old/new man) is relatively common
in Origen’s works, and appears frequently in Hilary’s Psalms commentaries
(although it appears to a lesser degree in his other works).50 Adam brought
in sin and vice throughout Hilary’s work, but the emphasis that Adam’s
action brought in death is also unique to the Psalms commentaries. Also the
use of Paul to emphasize our sinful state is only found in Hilary’s Psalms
commentaries.
Lastly, Hilary’s understanding of ‘thoughts’ as sometimes intrusive,
unwanted, and potentially leading to sin has been shown to be closely related
to Origen’s understanding. Moreover, it was shown that this understanding is
unique to his Psalms commentaries.51 Hilary appears to use language taken
from Origen’s expressions of human action and psychology.
Cochrane argued that the concept of human personality was essentially
something new in Augustine.52 For Cochrane this included how we come to
know ourselves and the world around us53 and the system of stimulus and
response54 as well as the existence of the will in the way described in this
book.55 Although Hilary is not as detailed or as analytical as Augustine, his
work shows evidence of exactly these processes—and these particular elements
appear to be the ones that he has gained from Origen.
In all then, some of the expressions related to original sin, as well as
some elements of human psychology and action, appear to be attributable to
Origen’s influence.
Yet at the same time Hilary’s theology of original sin is categorically his
own, and this can be deduced from his statements in his de Trinitate and other
(early) Trinitarian works. The concept that Adam’s sin affects us all is not by
itself particularly remarkable,56 but the notion of Adam as representing

48
ORIGEN Hom. Jer. 3.4: Frequenter allegorizantes Babylonem diximus negotia esse terrena
quae semper confusa sunt uitiis.
49
For different aspects of this, see ORIGEN Hom. Ezech. 1.3, 12.2; Hom. Jer. 2.1, 2.2, 3.4,
19.14 (also ALCAIN 1973:67–78).
50
For example, HILARY TrPs 6.4, 122.3, 132.7, 143.21; TrPs118, 20.10. This is not common
in InMt but see 10.4, also old-new allusions at for example 9.4, 10.24.
51 52
p. 134. COCHRANE 1957, Chapter 11.
53 54
COCHRANE 1957:432. COCHRANE 1957:433–4, 446.
55
COCHRANE 1957:402.
56
HILARY trin. 10.21: ut quia et corpus et anima Adae in peccato fuit, carnem quoque Adae
atque animam Dominus ex Virgine acceperit.
168 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
humanity is already present.57 More significant still is the discussion of
Christ’s humanity ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh’ throughout trin. 10, presenting
a doctrine of inherited sinfulness (not just sinful stain) from which Christ
himself is immune specifically by dint of having a different ‘origin’. Lastly the
very vocabulary of ‘sins of origin’ is found not only in the Psalms commen-
taries but even in the Matthew commentary,58 showing that this is a concept
he works with quite independently of Origen.
Hilary also shows independence in what he chooses to use of Origen. While
Hilary does derive a certain amount of material from Origen, he also rejects
certain doctrines related to original sin and which seem to have been present
in Origen’s text. These include the imago being lost at the Fall, the concept of
garments of skins being adopted at the Fall, and the concept of a Fall from a
supracelestial realm. In other words, a doctrine of original sin does not
necessarily have to be associated with a pre-mundane realm of souls; this is
something Hilary categorically rejects. Similarly, Dechow’s analysis of the
pseudo-Macarian homilies demonstrates that fourth-century Origenists
linked the loss of God’s image at the Fall to original sin.59 Again, the loss of
the image is something that Hilary rejects. In other words, it is perfectly
possible to hold a doctrine of original sin while rejecting the notions of a
supracelestial fall or of the loss of the image.
So then, Hilary’s theology of original sin belongs to him independently of
any Origenian influence. At the same time, certain expressions such as the
new-old Adam or the subjection to the law of sin and the emotions seem to be
especially frequent in the Psalms commentaries and thus suggest Origen’s
influence. Although the theology itself may not be Origen’s (Hilary’s articu-
lations are always his own), the frequency of some expressions and the
understanding of human psychology seem to derive from Origen.

AUGUSTINE’ S US AGE OF HI L ARY

Augustine’s Usage of Hilary in Anti-Pelagian works

(i) De natura et gratia (AD 415). One reason why Augustine mentions Hilary in
his dispute with the Pelagians is that they themselves cite Hilary as an
authority for their position. In de natura et gratia, Augustine responds to a
work of Pelagius which defended the perfectibility of human nature.60 Pelagius

57
HILARY trin. 4.21:…quia iam in uno Adam omne humani generis exordium constitisset.
58 59
HILARY InMt 10.24. DECHOW 1988:308–9.
60
AUGUSTINE Retr. 2.42(49): Venit etiam tunc in manus meas quidam Pelagii liber, ubi
hominis naturam contra Dei gratiam qua iustificatur impius, et qua christiani sumus, quanta
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 169
has quoted a number of Catholic authors in support of his position (Lactan-
tius, Hilary, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Xystus—a mis-citation—and Augustine
himself). He appears to give two citations of Hilary.
Pelagius quotes Blessed Hilary’s words: We shall not perceive what is immortal in
God unless we are perfect in spirit and transformed into our immortal state; this is
only allotted to the pure in heart [HILARY InMt 4.7]. I don’t know what Hilary
says here that contradicts my own position! Nor do I know what here supports
Pelagius’ position, except that Hilary claimed a man can be ‘pure in heart’…
Again, Pelagius mentions that Hilary said this: What Scripture did Job read that
made him ‘abstain from all wicked work’? He read that one only worships God with
a mind untainted by defects, and that it is the proper duty of righteousness to pay
homage to God. (AUGUSTINE de natura et gratia 61.72)61
Pelagius’ intention in citing Hilary is to defend the possibility of human
perfection. The use of Job is a commonplace in Pelagian literature, being
one of the suite of Old Testament characters whose righteousness is asserted
in Scripture and who thus testify to perfectibility.62
Pelagius uses Job as an example of a man with no stirrings of sin; Augustine
counters that Job did indeed have an ‘internal evil of concupiscence’, but
conquered it.63 Their understandings of righteousness are thus different: for
Pelagius Job’s righteousness is the absence of concupiscence, whereas for
Augustine it means conquering concupiscence with the help of grace. August-
ine supports his reading of Hilary by immediately producing another citation
from the Gallic bishop: ‘If God were to despise sinners, he would certainly
despise all men, because no man is without sin…’64 This reinforces Augustine’s
point that sinlessness is not found (even if it does not quite go so far as to
prove that sinlessness is impossible).

potuit argumentatione defendit. Librum ergo quo huic respondi, defendens gratiam, non contra
naturam, sed per quam natura liberatur et regitur, De Natura et Gratia nuncupaui.
61
Beatus uero Hilarius, cuius uerba haec posuit, Non enim nisi spiritu perfecti et immortali-
tate mutati, quod solis mundis corde dispositum est, hoc quod in Deo est immortale cernemus
(Hilary InMt 4.7); quid dixerit contra id quod dicimus, uel quid istum adiuuet, nescio, nisi quia
posse esse hominem mundo corde testatus est…Item quod eum dixisse commemorat: Quas
litteras legerat ut abstineret se ab omni re maligna? Quia deum sola mente uitiis non ammixta
ueneratur, deum colere proprium iustitiae officium est.
62
FOLLIET 1969:153–6 presents evidence for Pelagian usage of ‘perfect’ Old Testament
characters, as found within the texts of more ‘orthodox’ writers such as Augustine and Jerome.
63
AUGUSTINE de natura et gratia 62.72: Facere est ergo iustitiam, in uero Dei cultu cum
interno concupiscentiae malo interna conflictatione pugnare: perficere autem, omnino aduersar-
ium non habere.
64
AUGUSTINE de natura et gratia 62.73: Et ipse Hilarius…ait: Si enim Deus peccatores
sperneret, omnes utique sperneret; quia sine peccato nemo est. Sed spernit discedentes a se, quos
apostatas uocant. Apart from the addition of the word ‘Deus’, this is a verbatim citation of Hilary
TrPs118, 15.10.
170 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
(ii) Contra Julianum (AD 421). In Augustine’s works against Julian of Eclanum,
the focus is slightly different. Here Augustine writes at great length to defend
the specific doctrine of original sin, in the sense of an inbuilt predisposition to
sin present from the time of our conception. Again he cites a suite of church
authorities on the subject from both the Latin and Greek worlds,65 whose
number and influence back up Augustine’s own authority. He cites a large
number of texts from Hilary, with over 600 words of citations as well as his
own commentary on Hilary’s text. In 1.9 Augustine gives two Hilary citations
which he paraphrases on several occasions in the work;66 he enters into a long
discussion of Hilary citations at 2.26–9, quoting from Hilary’s Job commen-
tary67 and from the psalms commentaries on Psalm 1,68 Psalm 51,69 and
particularly Psalm 118.70 In all cases Augustine presents verses to show that
Hilary supported his own position on sin. Three examples may be given.
Hear what Hilary, bishop of Gauls, said when he wrote about Christ’s flesh: Thus
he was sent ‘in the likeness of sinful flesh.’ Just because he had flesh did not mean he
also had sin. But all flesh comes from sin—that is, it is transmitted from sin, since
Adam is our forefather; so he was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh. He did not have
sin, but the likeness of sinful flesh.
(AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 1.9)71
This first example is used by Augustine to emphasize that, except for Christ, all
flesh comes from sin (ex peccato omnis caro est), a point he also makes
elsewhere using Hilary as a proof text.72 Augustine denies that created flesh
is bad (since it was created by God);73 but our embodied condition leads to sin.

65
His ten key sources are Irenaeus, Reticius, Olympius, Hilary, Gregory Nazianzen, Ambrose,
Basil, John of Constantinople, Innocent, and Jerome.
66
Hilary’s phrase ex peccato omnis caro est is repeated at AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 1.32, 2.8; c.sec.
Jul.resp. 4.97, 6.33. His phrase that we are born sub peccati origine is found also at c.sec.Jul.resp.
1.52, 1.70.
67 68
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.27. AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.28 = HILARY TrPs 1.1.
69
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.29 = HILARY TrPs 51.23.
70
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.26 = HILARY TrPs118, 3.4: Quia lex (inquit [Hilarius]) umbra erat
futurorum bonorum, idcirco per hanc praefiguratam significantiam docuit nos in hoc terreni et
morticini corporis habitaculo mundos esse non posse, nisi per ablutionem coelestis misericordiae
emundationem consequamur, post demutationem resurrectionis terreni corporis nostri effecta
gloriosiore natura. Or again, AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.26 = HILARY TrPs118, 15.6: Rursus in
eodem sermone: Ipsis (inquit) Apostolis uerbo licet iam fidei emundatis atque sanctificatis non
deesse tamen malitiam, per conditionem communis nobis originis, docuit dicens, Si uos cum sitis
mali, nostis bona data dare filiis uestris. See also the citation at fn.75, Rursus idem ipse in
expositione … (AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 1.9 = HILARY TrPs118, 22.6).
71
Cum de Christi carne ageret, attende quid dixerit: Ergo cum missus est (inquit) in simili-
tudine carnis peccati, non sicut carnem habuit, ita habuit et peccatum. Sed quia ex peccato omnis
caro est, a peccato scilicet Adam parente deducta, in similitudine peccati carnis est missus,
existente in eo non peccato sed peccati carnis similitudine.
72
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.27, citing HILARY on Job: illa ipsa corpora nostra omnium uitiorum
esse materiem… This fragment is discussed on p. 180.
73
AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.28.
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 171
Moreover, since flesh is handed down from Adam, sin is too. Augustine cites
Hilary’s phrase all flesh comes from sin repeatedly as a key Hilarian catch-
phrase74—even though this short phrase never actually occurs in Hilary.
Hilary wrote the same again in his commentary on Psalm 122: The Prophet does
not reckon that he ‘lives’ in this life. Of course not, since he said: ‘Look, I was
conceived in evils’ [Ps. 50.7], and knows that he was born under sin’s origin and
sin’s law [Rom. 7.23–5]. [HILARY TrPs118, 22.6]
Do you understand what you are hearing? Have you thought about what you are
saying? This man was distinguished and in such good esteem among the Catholic
bishops, and was remarkable as a well-known person of note. Listen to him indict
you on the matter of original sin, if you have any shame!
(AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 1.9)75
In this second example Augustine uses Hilary as evidence that we are born in
sinfulness. Julian would have been happy to admit this, but Augustine con-
tinues with Hilary’s assertion that the psalmist (and thus every human) is
‘born under sin’s origin and sin’s law’. What is more, he uses Hilary’s phrase to
imply an existing terminology of original sin (Listen to him on the matter of
original sin!).
In his commentary on Psalm 1, [Hilary] does not hesitate to say that our nature
‘catches’ the sickness of sinning, just as it contracts any other disease. Thus, to
avoid sinning we must, in a way, fight against our nature by observing our faith.
For there are many (he says) who have put aside ungodliness by confessing God,
but yet are not free from sin…An impulse of our nature drives us towards these
vices…That is why “Blessed is the man who does not stand in the path of sinners
[Ps. 1.1],” since nature drives us onto this path, but observing our faith bears us
back off again. [HILARY TrPs 1.4].
Do you really think that this scholar was censuring human nature, which God
created? Of course not!…He says, an impulse of our nature drives us towards these
vices. What is this ‘nature’? Is it spawned by shadows, as the Manichaeans’ myth
proposes? Of course not! It is a Catholic who is speaking here, an eminent church
teacher. It is Hilary who is speaking!
So then, our nature was marred by the first man’s transgression…; but you claim
that we say the devil created it! You lie! (AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.28, abridged)76

74
AUGUSTINE c.Jul.1.9, 1.32, 2.8; c.sec.Jul.resp. 4.97, 6.33.
75
Rursus idem ipse [Hilarius] in expositione centesimi duodeuigesimi psalmi…‘Viuere se
(inquit) in hac uita non reputat; quippe qui dixerat, “Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus sum…” [Ps.
50.7], scit sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege esse se natum.’ [Hilary TrPs118, 22.6]. Sentisne
quid audias? Quaerisne quid dicas? Hunc uirum tanta in episcopis catholicis laude praeclarum,
tanta notitia famaque conspicuum, de peccato originali aude, si quid tibi frontis est, criminari.
76
In expositione autem primi Psalmi idem doctor [Hilarius] non dubitat dicere, naturam
nostram, utique istam quae de morbo morbum trahit, ad peccandum ferri, ac sic ne peccemus,
aduersus eam nos quodam modo fidei religione pugnare. ‘Plures enim sunt (inquit) qui cum per
confessionem Dei ab impietate discreti sint, non tamen a peccato per id liberi sunt…Et ad haec
172 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
In this third example Augustine uses a passage from Hilary’s commentary on
Psalm 1 to support a doctrine of human nature’s vitiation. If we wish to fight
against sin we are to some degree fighting our nature (sic ne peccemus,
adversus eam nos pugnare) and this vitiation of nature occurred at the Fall
(primi hominis praevaricatione vitiata). The Hilary passage he cites points
out that we are not free from sin, and that our nature leads us in the way
of sin (natura in viam hanc eferente) unless right religion corrects this
predisposition.
These three examples have demonstrated three key arguments that Augustine
wishes to support. He uses Hilary to defend his doctrine that sin is some-
how handed down through the flesh (ex peccato omnis caro); that we are
born under a law of sin (sub peccati origine et sub peccati lege natum); and
that our nature is vitiated at the Fall (natura primi hominis praevaricatione
vitiata).
(iii) Contra secundam Juliani responsionem opus imperfectus (AD 430). In the
last year of his life Augustine started another work against Julian, but died
before it was finished. This takes excerpts from Julian and then refutes them
one by one. Occasionally Augustine appeals to the authority of church writers
before him, and Hilary is one of these.
He uses some of the same excerpts that he has quoted in his previous work.
The whole citation including the words born…under sin’s origin (p. 171) is
quoted at c.sec.Jul.resp. 1.52 and referred to again at c.sec.Jul.resp. 1.70. Like-
wise the whole citation where Hilary asserts that all flesh is from sin (p. 171) is
found at 6.33, and the citation is absolutely identical to his use of it nine years
earlier as reproduced above (this citation is also referred to at 4.97). Augustine
also brings in a new citation of Hilary that he did not use in his earlier work:
Hilary says that all sinned in the one man, Adam.77 Unlike his previous work
against Julian, however, Augustine does not provide a commentary on Hilary’s
text, but rather cites him in catenae where he combines Hilary with short
catchphrases from other earlier Christian authors in order to provide author-
ity to his assertions. Hilary is used to defend the doctrine of original sin (1.52)
and in particular that we are born under sin (1.70) and that sinfulness is
subsequent on us having bodies (4.97, 6.33).

quidem nos uitia naturae (inquit) nostrae propellit instinctus…Et idcirco “Beatus est uir qui in uia
peccatorum non stetit”: natura quidem in uiam hanc ferente, sed ex uia hac fidei religione
referente.’ [HILARY TrPs 1.4]. Numquidnam istum putabimus accusatorem fuisse naturae,
quam condidit Deus? Non utique! […] Ad haec, inquit, nos uitia naturae nostrae propellit
instinctus. Quae ista natura est? Numquid gons tenebrarum, quam Manichaeorum fabula
inducit? Absit. Catholicus loquitur, insignis Ecclesiarum doctor loquitur, Hilarius loquitur.
Nostra ergo natura est primi hominis praeuaricatione uitiata…; cui diabolum a nobis constitui
calumniaris auctorem…
77
AUGUSTINE c.sec.Jul.resp. 2.164: omnes in uno Adam peccasse, Hilarius dixit.
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 173
In assessing which Hilarian texts Augustine has chosen to use, it seems that
on the whole he has used the best citations possible if wishing to defend the
doctrine of original sin, when considering Hilary’s corpus as a whole. A few
other good Hilary ‘catchphrases’ are discussed in Chapter 8 but on the whole
Augustine seems to have picked out some of the best citations present in
Hilary’s work. Of course, one cannot be certain whether Augustine compiled
these citations himself or used a florilegium compiled by someone else.

Augustine and Hilary: Similarities and Differences

The analysis carried out throughout this study has suggested that Hilary has a
theological anthropology which is not so far removed from that displayed by
Augustine (with some differences to be discussed shortly).
For example, Hilary refers to a doctrine of hereditary sinfulness, not just a
hereditary stain but the actual sinful state with its culpability (pp. 150–1). Hilary
holds that the Fall caused a vitiation in human nature (pp. 94–7), pace Doignon.
He asserts that our sinfulness is handed down from Adam (pp. 151–2) and that
our redemption is through baptism in the new Adam (pp. 155–7). He relates
our birth in sin to the fact that Christ, alone sinless, was alone the one with a
different kind of birth. He even uses the vocabulary of our origo to express all
this. Even if Hilary expresses himself differently at different points, these are
all assertions found in his extant works; and they are all statements that
Augustine would identify with. So then, there is considerable common ground
between Augustine and Hilary on this doctrine. They even both share an
inability to express how original sin can be passed through embodied birth if
the body is not itself sinful but God’s creation (pp. 151–2).
Augustine is often held to have been innovative regarding the will (so for
example Cochrane, Dihle).78 But even here the seeds of his thought appear in
Hilary. Both authors see the will as an anthropological component which can
be conceived of as separate to or influencing other human components;
Hilary’s description of the libertas voluntatis and its loss presages Augustine.
Augustine’s illustration of the will holding together anthropological compo-
nents79 recalls Hilary’s anthropological household where the will joins the
body and soul together (Cochrane feels the will also joins body and soul in
Augustine, although his examples are debatable).80 Hilary also sees a link

78
COCHRANE 1957 (Chapter 11), DIHLE 1982. Also S.HARRISON 2006:5 ‘It is often
claimed that [Augustine] is the inventor (or discoverer) of the will…’ Nevertheless related
concepts are found in Cicero and Tertullian (references in SORABJI 2002:320–1), and we have
seen Hilary’s use of the phrase libertas voluntatis.
79
AUGUSTINE trin. 10.
80
Cochrane 1957:433–4 interprets Augustine’s discussion of vision (trin. 11.2f.) as voluntas
binding together anima and corpus. Cochrane’s position is questionable; Augustine’s discussion
174 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
between the will and love.81 Lastly, the will as anthropological component is
definitive of the human person: both Hilary and Augustine feel that the will is
what defines us as individuals (what are we, other than wills?)82 and that
different individuals may be expressed as having either good or bad wills.83
Yet at the same time both bishops see the will as a cause of sin, since the Fall
brought about a vitiation of human nature, and that vitiation can be expressed
as (inter alia) a vitiation of the will.84 Moreover, for both bishops the adage
holds that humans have to ‘live with the consequences of their actions’ at the
Fall. For Hilary, the Fall consisted of sin and disobedience, and these are the
two very elements which thus enter the human ‘household’ and cause the will’s
difficulties. He mentions in two separate passages in InMt that the will is
enslaved to disobedience (infidelitas) and cannot act on its own: the depraved
disposition of disobedience, which is affiliated to the free will.85 Like-for-like
punishment can be seen in Augustine where man’s proud self-sufficiency
is punished by God abandoning man to himself, and man is punished for
self-will by being given a disobedient will.86 Another constraint on the will
is that brought about by emotions or perturbations, and both bishops see
these too entering in as a result of the Fall.87
Also, both bishops may express psychological conflict in terms of having
two wills. One way of reading Hilary’s anthropological household (InMt
10.23–4) is that the body and soul each have their own will; elsewhere he
differentiates the soul’s intention and the will’s office.88 These are echoed in
Augustine’s famous quandary in his Confessions89 which he articulates as a
clash of two wills reflecting the Pauline law of the spirit and law of the flesh in
Romans 7.
In all then there are considerable similarities between Hilary and Augustine,
both on original sin and on the will—not least the frequency with which both
use the will as an explanatory concept.
At the same time, of course, there are notable differences between these two
authors. One noticeable one is the issue of the initium fidei: Hilary asserts the
usual position that ultimately humans are responsible for the exordium but
God thereafter contributes his grace. This allows human accountability.

of the process of vision cannot necessarily be taken as concerning anima and corpus in the
anthropological sense.
81
E.g. HILARY TrPs118, 16.15: dilectio uero propriae uoluntatis affectio est.
82
AUGUSTINE civ. dei. 14.6: omnes nihil aliud quam uoluntates sunt.
83
For Hilary, see p. 102. For Augustine, see c.Jul. 45 (37); civ. dei 14.6. Compare also
COCHRANE 1957:507 who discusses how Augustine uses bona voluntas to express not just
emotion or intellect but the whole man (paraphrasing lib. arb. 1.13.27, civ. dei. 9.4, 9.5).
84
AUGUSTINE civ. dei 14.15; c.Jul. 3.(17).33 deprauatam quippe primi transgressoris uo-
luntate naturam.
85 86
HILARY InMt 7.6; compare 10.23–4. AUGUSTINE civ. dei 14.15.
87 88
pp. 93–4 on Hilary. AUGUSTINE civ. dei 14.10. HILARY TrPs118, 17.1.
89
For example, AUGUSTINE confessiones 8.(5).10.
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 175
Augustine’s (mature) position, on the other hand, is that even the first flicker
of faith is impossible without God’s help: this opens him up to criticism on the
issue of accountability. It is specifically the initium fidei which scholars pick up
on when comparing Augustine and Hilary: for example, it is specifically this
which makes Padovese call Hilary slightly semi-Pelagian, even though Hilary
is so similar to Augustine on other points.90
Another possible difference (depending on one’s scholarly position) regards
the origin of the soul. O’Connell and Teske91 suggest that Augustine’s early
position on cosmology and human origins was strongly influenced by Plotinus,
including speculation on the prior life of souls in a supracelestial plane. Along
a similar vein, Keech suggests that the opponents of original sin resisted it
because it was seen as Origenistic (again, with a prior life in a supracelestial
plane). For example, Keech demonstrates this in the case of the anti-origenistic
Liber de Fide:92 ‘[In] Rufinus the Syrian’s Liber […] the doctrine of inherited
Original Sin is criticized as the corollary of Origen’s teaching on the fall of
souls from a premundane state.’93 Even though Augustine rejects the view that
the body is punishment for premundane sin,94 nevertheless he also rejects
creationism since the soul must be responsible for sin before birth.95 All this
can be interpreted as making original sin a doctrine related to Origenism.
Now Hilary also holds to the existence of sinfulness from birth; however, he
categorically rejects the notion of the fall of souls into bodies, even if he does
believe in the souls being created ‘long before’ the body. Hence a doctrine of
original sin does not presume or require an Origenistic cosmology on human
origins. (In fact it is debatable whether Augustine actually believed in a prior
life of souls in this way; Tesselle is one example of a scholar who holds the
opposite view).96
Other differences between the two authors are more a matter of degree. For
example, concupiscentia is a key explanatory variable in Augustine’s under-
standing of original sin. Hilary does consider concupiscentia but for him it is
merely one of a number of elements of the human psyche that cause sin.
Likewise the concept of grace is certainly present in Hilary but not to the same
degree to which it was developed by Augustine. And a key part of the
Augustinian debate—namely whether infants need to be baptized to avoid

90 91
PADOVESE 1991:31. For example, O’CONNELL 1968, TESKE 1991.
92
KEECH 2012:59–62. Keech presents passages from the liber de fide which associate
Origenism with original sin, e.g. liber de fide 32 denies a connection between the Fall and the
subsequent entry of death.
93
KEECH 2012:20.
94
AUGUSTINE de peccatorum meritis et remissione 1.31.22.
95
AUGUSTINE Ep. 166.21.7: huius igitur damnationis in paruulos causam requiro, quia
neque animarum, si nouae fiunt singulis singulae, uideo esse ullum in illa aetate peccatum; nec a
deo damnari aliquam credo, quam uidet nullum habere peccatum.
96
For example, TESELLE 1996.
176 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
damnation—cannot be properly assessed in Hilary since he does not raise the
issue (although hints suggest he may have had the same approach as Cyprian).
Lastly, a more methodological point of difference between Augustine and
Hilary is that of context. Augustine writes on theological anthropology at great
length in a polemical context, in order to defend himself against detractors;
modern scholars can thus analyse very fine nuances in his position. Hilary on
the other hand never discourses explicitly on the will or original sin; his
position has been gleaned from passing comments and his articulation is not
always clear. Therefore, one should be cautious of comparing Augustine and
Hilary on a doctrine which Hilary has never treated directly, while Augustine
has dealt with it explicitly at great length. For example, Augustine’s uses of
concupiscentia and grace may have evolved specifically in response to the
criticisms of Pelagian thinkers.
So much for the differences between Augustine and Hilary. However, this
has compared Hilary with Augustine’s ‘late’ position as expressed in his anti-
Pelagian works. Yet both of these bishops and particularly Augustine show
variation in their expression across their works. In particular Augustine too
shows considerable variation in his expressions of the will, according to
context (for example, greater freedom when arguing against the Manicheans
or the source of evil; far less freedom when arguing against the Pelagians).
Some scholars (usually epitomized as Brown, although Brown’s thesis calls on
earlier scholars such as Pincherle and Burnaby)97 argue that there is an ‘early’
phase in Augustine’s thought in which he shows an entirely free will; August-
ine’s position thus changed through time, supposedly triggered by his reading
of Paul and sharpened by debate with Pelagian opponents. However, recent
authors such as Carol Harrison see more continuity of Augustine’s doctrine
throughout his lifetime, mentioning particularly the will and original sin.98
Simon Harrison’s analysis of Augustine’s de libero arbitrio99 also sees con-
tinuity between the first book (written 388) and the latter two books (written
by 395) and thus a continuity in Augustine’s theology of the will.
The truth may be somewhere between these poles of continuity and dis-
junction. However, such variation is also found in Hilary, as for example
when he appears to suggest both freedom and constraint in the will in differ-
ent points in his works. But this if anything merely reinforces the simi-
larities between the two authors: if Hilary were to be compared with the

97
BROWN 2000:139–50 (Chapter 15 ‘The Lost Future’). For example, p. 149: ‘We met him at
Cassiciacum as a man certain of his future…In the Confessions he is a man who has lost this
certain future.’ Or again, p. 139: ‘In this decade, Augustine moved imperceptibly into a new
world.’ See p.139, fn.1 for references to other scholars.
98
C. HARRISON (2006); relevant here are Chapter 5 ‘The Fall’ (pp. 167–97) and Chapter 7
‘The Will’ (pp. 198–237).
99
S. HARRISON (2006).
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 177
early Augustine, then arguably even more points of convergence would be
identifiable.
Indeed, Hilary may even inform some of Augustine’s developments. As
Wetzel shows, Augustine knows he cannot have a fully coherent concept of the
will until he has dealt with the extent to which sin can be voluntary or not
voluntary, and integrated the affections.100 Yet these tensions are already
present in Hilary’s thought, as he cannot establish whether cogitationes are
reprehensible or not (pp. 138–9) and asserts the validity of emotions in Chris-
tian thought (pp. 139–42). Moreover, Hilary is using language usually de-
scribed as ‘Stoic’ to do so, just as Wetzel finds for Augustine. Hilary thus
contributes to our understanding of ideas that were already present in con-
temporary Christianity; but pace Wetzel (‘this will be a story about Augustine’s
“discovery” of the will’)101 Augustine’s genius was not in inventing these ideas,
but in developing them into a system that was more philosophically coherent
and consistent.

Is Augustine Misusing Hilary?

There is scholarly debate as to how far Augustine is misquoting Hilary and his
other sources merely in order to back up his argument against Julian. Beatrice
insists that Augustine’s theology is unique among orthodox writers,102 and is
different from the sources that he quotes supposedly in his defence. (Beatrice
feels that Augustine derives his theology through the Encratist heresy in North
Africa). For Beatrice, earlier authors speak of universal sin and the stain
of sin, but none before Augustine defends infant sin or general culpability. If
Augustine cites earlier fathers on this doctrine, he is doing so only by taking
them out of their context.
Doignon also thinks that Augustine is misusing Hilary. For example,
regarding Hilary’s phrase he knows that he was born under sin’s origin and
sin’s law, Doignon argues that Hilary meant this merely in a judicial sense
whereas Augustine takes it to defend the vitiated nature.103 As another
example of Augustine’s ‘glissement’, Doignon points to his use of Hilary’s
phrase (the resurrection transformation) when the nature of our earthly body is
made more glorious.104 For Doignon, Hilary is referring to a change in the
human condition, not in human nature, yet Augustine uses this citation
to defend the doctrine of changes in human nature, here becoming more
glorious.105 In conclusion Doignon declares himself sceptical as to how

100 101 102

WETZEL 1992:15. WETZEL 1992:3. e.g. BEATRICE 2013:85.
103 104
DOIGNON 1981b:17. AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.26, citing HILARY TrPs118, 3.4.
105
DOIGNON 1981b:17–18.
178 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
Augustine has used Hilary: ‘Nous ne saurions [avoir] optimisme. Il nous est
apparu en effet que la “réception” d’Hilaire…chez Augustin s’effectuait par
morceaux découpés d’avance et adaptés à l’usage qu’on en voulait faire.
Augustin…les retaille, les retouche, les interprète comme il croit devoir le
faire.’106 However, we cannot blame Augustine too much (adds Doignon
graciously) because he may not have worked with Hilary’s original texts but
with a pre-existing catena.107 (Doignon uses additional evidence to defend this
same position in another article regarding a fragment from Hilary’s Job
commentary, discussed on p. 180).
Folliet (1969) holds almost the converse position to Doignon. He compares
how Pelagius and Augustine use a fragment from Hilary’s Job commentary in
order to assess which has understood Hilary more correctly: What Scripture
did Job read, that made him abstain from all wicked work?108 Pelagius uses the
fragment in order to justify human perfectibility, something that Job was often
taken to demonstrate. Folliet assesses Hilary’s theology and deduces that, for
Hilary, no-one can truly be sinless except by God’s grace. Therefore, August-
ine has more accurately understood Hilary’s sentiment than Pelagius has.
Folliet thus dovetails with the positions of Ladaria and Peñamaría (p. 144),
who both feel that, despite some differences, Hilary and Augustine are on the
same ‘horizonte mental’109 regarding the doctrine of original sin.
So then, is Augustine fair in quoting Hilary as holding the same doctrine as
him—or is he being disingenuous and taking Hilary out of context, as
Doignon suggests? Well, a few of Augustine’s citations are misleading, for
example when he cites Hilary’s TrPs 1 (excerpt on p. 171); Hilary suggests
some individuals are more ‘naturally’ perverse than others, whereas Augustine
takes his text to defend the ubiquitous vitiation of humanity. But on the whole
the analysis of these has shown that Hilary is not too far removed from
Augustine’s positions on the will and on original sin. Although there are of
course differences, Hilary shows that Augustine is not radically innovative but
is merely developing trains of thought that already exist within the patristic
tradition. This is essentially the position taken in different ways by Folliet,
Padovese, and Ladaria (against Doignon).
Augustine scholars such as Beatrice assume that the bishop of Hippo is
disingenuous in those he cites against Pelagius. Yet Ambrose also distin-
guishes hereditary sin from individual sin, even if in a fairly garbled way,
when he suggests that foot-washing is needed to cleanse us from our ‘heredi-
tary sins’.110 Augustine is thus not being disingenuous in attributing some sort

106 107
DOIGNON 1981b:18. DOIGNON 1981b:18–19.
108
For references and fuller citation, see first excerpt of p. 169.
109
LADARIA 1977b:244.
110
AMBROSE de mysteriis 32: Mundus erat Petrus, sed plantam lauare debebat; habebat
enim primi hominis de successione peccatum: quando eum supplantauit serpens, et persuasit
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 179
of original sin to Ambrose (however minimally Ambrose held it). This section
has shown that the same is true for Hilary: Augustine is not being disingenu-
ous in stating that Hilary too holds this doctrine, even if not entirely in the
form held by Augustine. So when Augustine says his doctrine is found in
earlier church fathers, he is not lying: I did not make up original sin; the
catholic faith believed it of old. You’re the ‘novel’ heretic here, for denying it!111

Hilary between Origen and Augustine?

A sizeable body of modern scholars have identified ways in which Augustine

may be considered to be influenced by Origenistic ideas (including O’Connell,
Teske, Heidl, Bammel, and Keech). For example, the view that Augustine’s
theology was affected by supracelestial cosmology has already been men-
tioned; although Teske and O’Connell prefer to see this as Neoplatonic, both
mention the possible relevance of Origen (p. 175). Heidl suggests that August-
ine’s conversion was triggered by reading Origen’s commentary on the Song of
Songs.112 All in all, the idea that Augustine is Origen’s successor is not new;
even in 1903 F.R. Tennant was suggesting that Origen was essentially the
forebear of Augustinian original sin.113 All this needs dissecting because
another commonplace in common appraisals of Origen and Augustine is
that they represent opposite poles on the related matter of the will’s freedom
(so Frede, Sorabji).
It is one thing to note Origenian influence and another to identify specific
trajectories whereby Augustine may have received Origenian ideas. Heidl
suggests that Neoplatonic Christians in Milan may have brought Augustine
in contact with Origenian mysticism and exegesis, so that for example Sim-
plicianus may have given Augustine the books of Origen to read.114 A lesser
(and more likely) version of this is to assume that Augustine’s Origenism was
mediated through Ambrose.115 Keech suggests that Augustine must have
accessed Origen through Rufinus of Aquileia, and therefore argues for an
earlier date for Rufinus’ translation in order to show that Augustine’s work is
influenced at an early date (assuming here that Rufinus of Aquileia is distinct
from Rufinus the Syrian).116 Yet Augustine gradually seems to come to

errorem [Gen. 3.6]. Ideo plantae ius abluitur, ut haereditaria peccata tollantur; nostra enim
propria per baptismum relaxantur.
111
AUGUSTINE de nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.12.25: non ego finxi originale peccatum, quod
catholica fides credit antiquius, sed tu qui hoc negas sine dubio es nouus hereticus!
112 113 114
HEIDL 2003, Ch.1. TENNANT 1903:344. HEIDL 2003, Ch. 3.
115
JEROME Ep. 75.20. For a modern scholar, see for example HEIDL 2003:15–16, suggesting
that Augustine may have heard Ambrose’s de Isaac and de bono mortis which are in turn
influenced by Origen’s Song of Songs.
116
KEECH 2012:130–4.
180 The Human Condition in Hilary of Poitiers
disapprove of Origen; in an early letter (395) he tells Jerome to translate more
of Origen,117 but subsequent references are more negative.118
The current study has shown that Hilary may be one route through which
Augustine accessed Origen’s theology, even if through Hilary’s lens. Doignon
(1981a) examines a fragment which Augustine quotes from Hilary’s Job
commentary, which in turn is a translation from Origen’s Job commentary.
Therefore (says Hilary), we remember and are aware that these our own bodies
are a material subject to all vices, through which [per quam] we are soiled and
filthy so that we maintain nothing in us that is pure, nothing harmless. So then, let
us rejoice that we have an adversary like this! When we fight this enemy, we are
somehow fighting the war against our own selves.
(AUGUSTINE c.Jul. 2.27, citing Hilary on Job)119
Doignon compares this fragment with what is known of Origen’s and Hilary’s
theology elsewhere. He suggests that the phrase corpora nostra omnium
vitiorum materiem reflects a negative understanding of the body for Origen,
but only a neutral understanding for Hilary, who sees the body as being a locus
for sin but not a source of it. He uses evidence such as the textual variant pro
qua (‘on behalf of which’, ‘instead of which’) instead of per quam (‘through
which’), which suggests that the body is neutral and not active in sinfulness.120
Doignon seems a little coy in denying the force of the passage: it certainly
seems to imply a negative view of the body in Hilary, even if we accept the
variant pro qua. But he is correct that Hilary is elsewhere more positive about
the body, and it seems fair to assume that Hilary is using Origen while at the
same time tempering his theology.
Still, whether or not Doignon is right about Hilary’s intention, the fact remains
that this text is used by Augustine and ultimately derives from Origen. And
Doignon’s argument essentially suggests that Augustine’s understanding of the
text is true to Origen’s intention (even if not Hilary’s) in taking the body as negative.
Further, this derivation from Origen appears to hold for other Hilary
quotes. Augustine cites one passage from Hilary’s de Trinitate and one from
in Matthaeum; apart from that, all of his anti-Pelagian citations of Hilary
come from the commentaries on Job or on the Psalms. And yet both of these
are known to be translations from Origen.
Then again, this is not to say that Augustine’s theology of original sin defini-
tively comes from Origen (or Hilary). Augustine himself argues against Julian

117
AUGUSTINE Ep. 28.2 to Jerome.
118
For example, Augustine strongly denounces Origen at de gestis Pelagii 10.
119
‘Memores igitur (inquit [Hilarius]) et conscii, illa ipsa corpora nostra omnium uitiorum
esse materiem, per quam [or: pro qua] polluti et sordidi nihil in nobis mundum, nihil innocens
obtinemus, gaudeamus nobis esse hostem, in cuius concertatione quodam concertationis nostrae
bello dimicemus.’
120
DOIGNON 1981a:211–2.
 Hilary between Origen and Augustine 181
that these were ideas already present in Christianity and that he had received
through Christian teachers. Hilary’s work shows that he may be telling the truth.

CLOSING REMA RKS

The idea that original sin is an African doctrine is found for example in the
collection of lectures on original sin by Norman Williams, and more recently
by Beatrice.121 Hilary shows that this doctrine is not purely African. Williams
himself admits that in Hilary ‘the doctrine leaves Africa’,122 and Hilary is a
notable exception to the rule that original sin is purely an African doctrine.
However, Williams does not go so far as to explain why a supposedly African
doctrine is found in a writer who never set foot in Africa to the best of our
knowledge, although his travels would have allowed him to cover a wide range
of other places in the Empire (from Gaul to Asia Minor, incorporating Rome,
Milan, and Constantinople on the way). Moreover Hilary does not feel the
need to explain or justify his concept of peccata originis; he assumes his
readers will both understand him and agree with him. Hilary is not just an
outlier on original sin, a negligible exception to the rule of an African doctrine.
Hilary does not share all of Augustine’s doctrines, but the key concept of
original sin is undoubtedly present in his work. It is thus simply not accurate
to describe original sin as a purely African doctrine.
F.R. Tennant’s tome on original sin felt that Hilary contributes nothing and
merely hands on tradition.123 The present study of his anthropology shows
Hilary as a thinker in his own right, with a theology of original sin and of the
will that is novel for its time. Moreover, he held this independently of Origen.
However, he also uses and interprets Origen on psychology and this may well
have influenced both his own and Augustine’s articulations of the will.
This analysis has also cast light on two different angles of the development of
theological anthropology towards Augustine. Firstly, the bishop of Hippo is not
himself as novel as is sometimes thought; he indeed belongs in a tradition that
holds to hereditary sinfulness and constrained will, even if no father before him
identified the extent of the theological tensions this caused. Secondly, the
present study has highlighted one of the many routes by which Augustine
would have been influenced by Origen’s theology and exegetical methods. Over
a century ago Tennant saw Origen as Augustine’s forebear on the theology of
original sin.124 This study has shown that Hilary is one of the links between
those two great theologians in the development of that doctrine.

121 122
WILLIAMS (1927); BEATRICE 2013:237. WILLIAMS 1927:298.
123 124
TENNANT 1903:338. TENNANT 1903:344.
 APPENDIX 1

The ‘Anthropological Household’

(Hilary, InMt 10.23–4)

Hilary is discussing Matthew 10.34–5: Do not think that I have come to bring peace to
the earth; I have come to bring not peace, but the sword. //I have come to divide a man
against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against
her mother-in-law; //a man’s enemies shall be the members of his own household.
His interpretation also refers to the parallel at Luke 12.52: From now on there shall
be five at variance in one household, three against two and two against three.
For details of translation and interpretation, see pp. 88–90, 103–9.

10.23 (a) Et singularum quidem rerum et 10.23 (a) First of all I must explain the meaning
uniuersae quaestionis primum natura est of each individual element and what the whole
explicanda, nec minus intelligentiam nostram issue is about. The meaning of the sections
sensus et superior et consequens adiuuabit. before and after it will also help our
understanding.
(b) Gladius telorum omnium telum (b) The sword is the sharpest of weapons; it
acutissimum est, in quo sit ius potestatis, et enables justice, gives sentences their
iudicii seueritas, et animaduersio peccatorum. harshness, and chastises sin. The prophets,
Et huius quidem teli nomine noui euangelii who are authoritative, often label the Good
praedicationem appellatam frequens in News proclamation as this weapon. So with
prophetis auctoritas est. Dei igitur uerbum the ‘sword’ here, we should recall that it is a
nuncupatum meminerimus in gladio, qui name for God’s Word. He was a ‘sword sent to
gladius missus in terram est, id est earth’; in other words, his proclamation was to
praedicationem eius hominum corporibus pierce human bodies. It is this ‘sword’ which
infusam. Hoc igitur quinque habitantes in una divides the five who dwell in one home, dividing
domo diuidit et diuidit tres in duos et duos three against two and two against three.
super tres.
(c) Sed tria tantum in homine reperimus, id (c) But we only find three things in a human,
est, et corpus et animam et uoluntatem. Nam namely body, soul and will. The soul is given to
ut corpori anima data est, ita et potestas the body, and likewise each is granted the
utrique utendi se ut uellet indulta est atque ob ability to use itself as it wishes; that is why a law
id lex est proposita uoluntati. Sed hoc in illis was imposed on the will. All this should only be
deprehenditur, qui primi a Deo figurati sunt, understood to apply to those who first were
in quibus coeptae originis ortus effectus est, formed by God—those who came into being
non traductus aliunde. because their beginning was created rather than
it being handed down from elsewhere.
(d) Sed ex peccato atque infidelitate primi (d) For all subsequent generations, on the
parentis, consequentibus generationibus other hand, due to the first father’s sin and
coepit esse corporis nostri pater peccatum, disobedience, Sin became the father of our
mater animae infidelitas; ab his enim ortum Body and Disobedience the mother of the
per transgressionem primi parentis Soul. Due to our first father’s transgression, we
accepimus. Nam uoluntas unicuique sua take our birth (ortum accepimus) from these
adiacet. ‘parents’. Each has its own will.
184 Appendix 1

(e) Ergo iam unius domus quinque sunt: pater (e) So at this point there are five in the one
corporis peccatum, mater animae infidelitas, house: Sin, father of Body; Disobedience,
et incedens uoluntatis arbitrium, quod totum mother of Soul; and Will’s choice (arbitrium
hominem quodam coniugii sibi iure distringit. voluntatis) which comes in and knits the
whole human together as with a marriage
contract.
(f) Huic infidelitas socrus est, nos ex ea natos (f) Disobedience is its [or, his] mother-in-law.
atque a fide metuque Dei peregrinantes We wander away from trusting and fearing
accipiens, ut inter infidelitatem God; and she welcomes us her children (ex ea
uoluptatemque possessos, et in ignoratione natos) so she can hold us back, gripped
Dei et in omnium uitiorum oblectatione between disobedience and pleasure, not
detineat. knowing God and seduced by all vices.
10.24. (a) Cum ergo innouamur baptismi 10. 24 (a) So when we are renewed by
lauacro per uerbi uirtutem, ab originis nostrae baptismal cleansing through the Word’s
peccatis atque auctoribus separamur recisique power, we are separated from the ‘sins of our
quadam exsectione gladii Dei a patris et matris origin’ and whatever instigates them. Once
adfectionibus dissidemus, et ueterem cum God’s sword has sliced through and cut them
peccatis atque infidelitate sua hominem away, we object to the predispositions of our
exuentes et per Spiritum anima et corpore ‘father’ and ‘mother’. And as we take off
innouati, necesse est ut ingeniti et uetusti the ‘old man’ with his sins and disobedience
operis consuetudinem oderimus. and are renewed by the Spirit in soul and
body, we have to be vexed at our previous
innate habits.
(b) Et quia corpus ipsum per fidem (b) When abased by faith, the body itself
mortificatum, in naturam animae, quae ex dissolves into the nature of soul which comes
afflatu Dei uenit (quamuis id ipsum adhuc in from God’s breath (although it still retains its
materia sua exstet), euadat, quia communio own physical matter), because the Word
ipsis inuicem concilietur ex uerbo, idcirco iam unites these two in mutual relationship.
unum atque idem cum anima uelle coepit Because of this the body thus starts to will
effici, scilicet ut illa est spiritalis, . . . identical things to the soul—that is, things that
are spiritual like her.
(c) . . . quibus libertas uoluntatis a socru sua, id (c) Once the free will (libertas voluntatis) is
est ab infidelitate diuisa, ius suum omne separated from its mother-in-law (that is,
concedit: ut quod erat libertas uoluntatis, from Disobedience), it entirely surrenders its
deinceps animae sit potestas. jurisdiction to the body and soul. So what was
previously the free will now becomes a faculty
of the soul.
(d) Fitque grauis in domo una dissensio et (d) There is serious conflict in that one house,
domestica nouo homini erunt inimica, quia and his own family members will be hostile to
ille per uerbum Dei diuisus ab illis, manere et the ‘new man’. He has been sundered from
interior et exterior, id est et corpus et anima, in them by God’s word, and will rejoice that both
spiritus nouitate gaudebit: ea uero, quae his inner and outer self (that is, his body and
ingenita et a quadam prosapiae antiquitate soul) are in a state of spiritual renewal; but
deducta, consistere in his quibus oblectata they are innate, derived as if from ancient
sunt concupiscunt. stock, and desire to carry on with what
seduced them.
(e) Origo carnis et origo animae et libertas (e) The flesh’s origin, the soul’s origin, and
potestatis in duos diuidentur, animam scilicet free action are split into two; namely into /1/
et corpus hominis noui, quae unum atque the body and soul of the New Man, which
idem uelle coeperunt, diuisique tres duobus begin to will exactly the same thing; and /2/
subiacebunt, in dominatum eorum de Spiritus the three which were split off. These shall be
 Appendix 1 185

nouitate potioribus. Et idcirco illi qui subject to the other two, which are more able
domesticas nominum charitates dilectioni eius to govern them due to their spiritual renewal.
praetulerint futurorum bonorum indigni That is why those who have preferred the
erunt haereditate. claim of affections within this ‘household’ to
love of the Spirit will not deserve to inherit
future goods.
 APPENDIX 2

Third Strophe of Ps. 118 (Gimel: v17–24)

Comparison of Palestinian Catena,
Hilary, and Ambrose

Sections which correspond approximately are placed in the same row or adjacent to
each other. Closer correspondence in wording (except in the case of the lemma) may
be underlined. Further explanation of this table may be found at pp. 23–30.
This table is not to be read through; rather matches across columns and underlined
sections may be compared visually. The sections from Ambrose are included only to
provide a visual indication of how much spontaneous material is found in Ambrose.
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

v17a/row 1 1. The third letter for the Hebrews is ‘gimel’, which in

Latin is translated ‘repayment’. This is demonstrated
right from the first verse:
Repay your servant. 2. Repay your servant, he says.
V17a/row 2 We who are not pure in 1. Whoever does not have the steady conscience of a
heart and do not have a purified heart
conscience able to have
frank converse with God,
. . . cannot say as we pray, . . . cannot pray with the Prophet’s words, Repay your
Repay your servant. servant.
For if he repays, he will For if the repayment is in accordance with our deeds,
punish us according to our then we shall abide in punishment for our sins and
sins. offences.
V17a/row 3 Anyone who, like us, has But it is enough if anyone has this assurance at least Why does David say earlier Do not reward us
received mercy from God for rejoicing in the Lord: He has not done to us according to our sins, nor repay us according to our
therefore says: he has not according to our sins, nor has he repaid us according to iniquities (Ps. 102.10)—and yet here ask for
done to us according to our our wickedness; for as high as the heaven is above the repayment?
transgressions, nor has he earth, he has removed our iniquities from us (Ps.
repaid us according to our 102.10–12). God himself knows how we are made.
sins (Ps. 102.10).
V17a/row 4 Whoever has free converse It is a great thing to recognize God’s mercy to us, and The former seems to be spoken by a sinner, while this
with God, and is convinced to know we are far from the habit of wrongdoing, and verse seems to be spoken by someone with a good
in his own conscience, says: are beginning to deserve God’s mercy. But this conscience, asking for the reward for a good deed.
‘Repay your servant, who Prophet (whose body is a fit dwelling for God) is full
has done nothing that of the Holy Spirit, and does not think or say anything
deserves punishment.’ conventional or worldly; so he has the freedom to
pray, Repay your servant.

(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

V17a/row 5 From this, we can deduce that this psalm is delivered

in the persona of him who was born from a virgin for
the redemption of the whole world, and who
presumes to sit at the Father’s right hand, as he
himself says: Henceforth you will see the Son of Man
sitting at the right hand of the Power (Mt. 26.64).
3. Still, David is not asking for something out of the
ordinary if he asks for reward from his Lord God for
his excellent efforts; it is the privilege of faith and
justice to presume for a reward by the Lord’s
goodwill.
Peter was rebuked because, as he walked on the sea,
he doubted with his human fear more than he trusted
in his authority as an apostle (Mt. 14.31). Also in the
Gospel we are taught to have faith and not doubt
about doing things that are supernatural for humans
(Mt. 17.19; Lk. 17.6).
So in the earlier psalms David is still imperfect, and
rightly flees from and avoids being repaid according
to his sins. But in this later psalm, he stands on the
progress in virtue he has made, and prays to be repaid
according to the struggles of his faith and works. In
fact this is just like Paul, who at one point said: I am
not fit to be called an apostle (1Cor. 15.9), and then
later said: The crown of justice is set aside for me,
which the Lord, the Just Judge, will give me on that
day—and not just to me but also to those who love his
coming (2Tim. 4.8).
The Apostle is sure of this promise, but the Psalmist
prays somewhat more modestly. It is certainly a
matter not of impudent conceit, but of a guiltless
conscience, to ask for reward from the one you serve;
lack of hope causes demotivation, but hope
encourages us to labour.
 4. So then, ask boldly, if you deserve it, so that when
you ask for such things you may labour more
earnestly: and that will make you more worthy of
your request. What athlete goes down to the stadium
if he has no hope of the crown, or takes offence if the
winner should ask for it? Testing creates hope; hope
creates assurance. So this is how a righteous man
prays. The Lord delights in such prayer, so that you
might enjoy the confidence that comes from a pure
conscience.
V17a/row 6 But he adds a caveat, so that 2. But perhaps this is surprisingly bold, to choose the 5. But so that the request might not seem
what he says might not desserts of ‘repayment’ (no modest request!), presumptuous,
appear conceited. forgetting that one is situated in a body, that is, in a
worthless and lowly condition.
He does not say ‘repay me,’ But the Prophet rules out every thought of vanity or . . . he did well to add: your servant. This phrase will
but repay your servant, boasting in this regard. When he said Repay, receive both the gift due to the humble and the
meaning ‘whoever is your confident in his innocence, he added your servant reward for servanthood. For whoever was a slave
servant and serves you’. because of his duty to serve and to admit his state. when called to the Lord is the Lord’s freedman (1Cor.
7.22); how can he not presume on the Lord’s favour,
when he was bought with such precious blood?! It is a
great thing for you to be called my son (Isa. 49.6) is
spoken as if to a servant.
It is appropriate for someone to ask this if he If someone is a servant, and serves the Lord well, and
remembers that he is the servant of God, not of sin does nothing as a servant of sin (Rom. 6.16–20), but
(Rom. 6.16–20); everyone who sins is a ‘servant of sin’ rather who says I am a useless servant; I have only
(Jn. 8.34). done as I should (Lk. 17.10)—that man does well to
say, Repay your servant.
V17a/row 7 6. Servanthood is glorious, since even Christ served
us! Your own servanthood is blessed too—but only if
the Adversary can make no claim on your service.
Christ loves the freedom of a good slave-boy; that is
why in Canticles it says: Your cheeks are as beautiful
as turtle-doves, your neck like necklaces (Cant. 1.10)!
One’s countenance is nobler when one is aware of
(continued )
Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

one’s own purity; and it is sweet to bear Christ’s yoke,

if you think ornaments rather than burdens are on
your neck. So lift your eyes always to the Lord your
God, and seek God so that you may find him.
Straighten your neck: you are wearing necklaces, not
chains! Even dumb animals are happy in necklaces,
and look as if they are adorned rather than bound.
Cheeks like a turtle-dove indicate the marks of
modesty, necklaces on the neck bring assurance of
liberty; for Christ’s yoke is light (Mt. 11.30), so the
neck is not pressed down by it, but lightened.
7. We will make for you portraits of gold with silver
inlay, while the king is resting (Cant. 1.11–12). Those
who followed the Law and prophets had an
indifferent faith in the Lord Jesus’s glory; but when
his inheritance was scattered among the peoples, the
more it underwent trial, the more it was proven: the
Church’s numerous persecutions mean we are known
as ‘righteous’ due to the victories of martyrdom. So
the church is like good gold: when it is burned, it is
not harmed, but rather shines more brightly, until
Christ comes to his kingdom and lays his head on his
Church’s faith.
When he came to the lost sheep of the house of Israel,
he had nowhere to lay his head; but now there is a
fragrance of faith, and thus the Church says: My nard
gave out its scent (Cant. 1.11), and says it boldly,
expecting its reward. 8. What smells sweet is the
ointment of grace, from which a virgin was with child
and the Lord Jesus assumed the sacrament of the
incarnation. My cousin is a cluster of drops, it says, my
brother is to me a bunch of cypress; he rests between
my breasts (Cant. 1.12). When the Lord Jesus took up
a body, he bound himself with bonds of love. He
fettered himself not only to our members and natural
passions, but even to the cross; and thus he rests like a
bunch of cypress in the Church’s faith and honest
grace.
My cousin is cypress nard in the vineyards of Engaddi
(Cant. 1.13). If we ask about the area in which this
perfume grows, ‘Engaddi’ means ‘temptation’ in
Latin. In these vineyards there is a tree which, when
pierced, gives out ointment; this is the tree’s product.
The tree itself does not give out scent or fragrance;
but when it is pierced artificially, then it trickles out
weeping.
In the same way Christ too, crucified on that tree of
testing, wept for his people so as to dissolve our sins,
and poured out an unguent from his bowels of mercy
and said: Father, forgive them, for they do not know
what they are doing (Lk. 23.34). So then he was
pierced on the tree with a spear and blood and water
came out of him, sweeter than any unguent, an
acceptable sacrifice to God, pouring out a scent of
sanctification through the whole world. Just as the
perfume comes from the tree, so his power came out
of his body. That is why he said: I feel the power going
out of me (Lk. 8.46). Hence ‘perfume’ represents that,
by this piercing, the tree’s ointment pours out
through the puncture-hole. When Jesus was pierced,
he poured forth a scent of redemption and the
forgiveness of sins (Lk. 23.11). He accepted
limitations when he was made man, although he was
the Word; he was made a pauper although he was
rich, so that we might be enrichened by his poverty.
(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

He was powerful and presented himself as a

contemptible wretch, so that Herod might scorn and
mock him. He caused earthquakes, yet clung to the
tree. He darkened the sky with shadows and crucified
the world, yet he was crucified. He let drop his head
and the Word went out of him; he was emptied, yet
he filled all things; God came down and man
ascended. The Word was made flesh so that flesh
might attain to the Word’s throne at God’s right
hand; there was a wound and it wept ointment; a
beetle was heard (Hab. 2.11, var.), but God was
recognized.
And Christ also answered: See how fine you are, my
darling, see how fine! (Cant. 1.14). Since the Church
recognized this mystery and preached the Lord Jesus
crucified for the redemption of the whole world, she
deserved to hear: ‘See how fine you are! You call me
‘fine’ but you yourself are fine. Because you have seen
my glorious beauty, you too are delightful and
beautiful.’ But when Christ says ‘you are fine’ or ‘you
are beautiful’, what is this other than his Gospel
words: Be at peace, my daughter; your sins are
forgiven (Mt. 9.22)?
V17b/row 1 The next part follows 3. I shall live, he says, and I shall keep your words. 10. Hence, whoever has received forgiveness of sins
naturally: I shall live, and I from Christ rightly says: Repay your servant; I shall
shall keep your words. live and I shall keep your words.
V17b/row 2 He need not despair about this ‘repayment’, since the
Lord Jesus came to save the world, not to condemn it;
he forgets injury but remembers his grace, just as he
himself says in one of the prophetic books: I am ‘I AM’,
who scrubs out your iniquities, and I shall not
remember them. But remember them yourself, and let
 us discuss the case! Tell me your iniquities, so that you
may be pardoned (Isa. 43.25–6). So then whoever tells
God his sins is pardoned—and whoever is pardoned
does not fear reprisal, but actually asks for it; and
whoever does not fear reprisal will live.
V17b/row 3 The words I shall live put I shall live and I shall keep are not in the present tense: 11. But why has he said I shall live, and not I (now)
the action in the future rather, this teaching refers to the future. live? This life is not a place of reward, since it is a
tense. place of death.
I do not think someone For the Prophet knows when that blessed and true
who is already alive would ‘life’ of the living will be.
say I shall live, so the words
I shall live must refer to true
life.
Currently we abide in the dust of death (Ps. 21.16), The Prophet mourns that he is dragged into the dust
of death (Ps. 21.16);
. . . and we are in a body of death, from which the . . . the Apostle wishes to be freed from this body of
Apostle prays to be freed, saying: Unhappy man that death (Rom. 7.24);
I am, who will free me from this body of death
(Rom. 7.24)?
We are mixed together with physical matter, which is . . . so why would the Prophet be deluding himself
answerable to the law of death and of sin; we dwell in about this life? Everything here is full of death (Jer.
dying weak flesh, so we acquire the stain of 9.21). Death comes in through the window: it comes
corruption by association with it. Unless our body is in through your mouth, unless the Lord puts a guard
glorified into having a spiritual nature, there can be over your mouth; sin is born from too much chatter.
no true life in us.
V17b/row 4 Listen to Paul speaking Let us listen to someone [Paul] who remembered that
about himself and those he dwelt in a mortal body. He said: Our life is hidden
with him: Our life is hidden in Christ with God. But when Christ, our life, appears,
with Christ in God. When then you too will appear with him in glory

(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

Christ, our life, appears, (Col. 3.3–4). So this is the ‘repayment’ that the
then you too shall appear Prophet prays for himself: to live!
with him in glory (Col. 3.3–
4).
V17b/row 5 Elsewhere, he teaches when this life will happen:
I shall please the Lord in the land of the living (Ps. [compare v17b/row 12]
114.9). He knows that this world where we rest is not
‘the land of the living’. He knows that we still have to
be cleansed, according to what the Law prefigures.
V17b/row 6 Currently we associate with carrion; and in the Law, Read the commands of the Law, and you will find
whoever touches a corpse is unclean (Num. 19.11). written there: If a living man touches a dead body, he
is infected (Num. 19.11). But so many of us touch
dead bodies! So many of us handle them!
4. But like other things in the Law, this should That is why the Author of Life tells you: Leave the
certainly not be understood in a literal way, that dead to bury the dead (Mt. 8.22). That is why you are
someone becomes unclean by touching a corpse. told in another place: Get up, you who sleep, and rise
Moses brought Joseph’s bones when he left Egypt, from the dead (Eph. 5.14). How could you be told,
and he was the one who established this law (Exod. ‘Get up from the dead,’ unless you were living among
13.19); and Elisha lay on a corpse to bring him back the dead? Very well, let us grant you are clean from
to life (2Kg. 4.34). deathly works and the filth of sin; but still, how can
you be clean when you live in a body of death and live
among the tombs of the dead? Peter had to preach to
the dead so that they could come out of their tombs
(1Pet. 4.6).
V17b/row 7 The Lord himself [= ‘the Nazarene’?] took dead 12. So we need purifying, for we have touched dead
bodies by the hand and brought them back to life (Mt. bodies (Num. 19.11–12). The Law orders us to be
9.25). If touching a dead body caused uncleanness, purified. Who is so great that he is above the Law? It
then the law could not have been violated by such pronounces unclean even a Nazarite, holy to God, if
 men—not even by the Lord, who himself said I have he touches a dead body. So he shaves his head and
not come to abolish the Law, but to fulfil it (Mt. 5.17). cuts his hair as something unholy, and then prays
again to be heard; he could not pray before, since he
had touched a dead body (Num. 6.9). He has whiled
away reasonless days, because he came near a
reasonless body; so he cuts off what is lifeless and
unnecessary on his head, so that he might be
reconciled to Christ. If a Nazarite is purified, we need
to be purified too.
But the Law is the shadow of future goods. It 13. We have all touched corpses, for who will boast
symbolically prefigured something, and taught us that he has a pure heart? Who will dare say he is clean
that it is impossible to be clean in this dwelling (an from sin? (Prov. 20.9). Perhaps there could be
earthly, dying body) unless we obtain cleansing someone—although it is certainly very rare—who
through the washing of heavenly mercy. This will be was not wanting in his speech; God could speak of
after we are transformed at the resurrection, when the him as he did of holy Job, This man did not sin with
nature of our earthly body is made more glorious his lips (Job 2.10). Still, even he could not always keep
(compare Ambrose in v17b/row 12). the thoughts of his heart clean; the devil attacks a
man’s heart. Let us suppose that someone hedges his
heart around with ready and alert vigilance; yet he is
still living in the midst of sinners, and even he needs
to be purified. When Isaiah said: Woe is me, for I have
unclean lips and live in the midst of a people with
unclean lips, one of the Seraphim immediately came
down and touched his lips with coal, so that his
unclean lips might be cleansed (Isa. 6.5–7).
V17b/row 8 5. If perhaps anyone should think that he achieved 14. There is more than one type of baptism. There is
guiltless purity in the baptism sacrament, fit to be the one through water and the Holy Spirit which the
restored to heavenly life, then he should remember church hands down, and with which catechumens
that John the Baptist said: I baptize you in water of must be baptized. And there is another baptism,
repentance indeed, but the one who comes after me is which the Lord Jesus spoke of: I must be baptized with
greater than me; he shall baptize you with the Holy a baptism which you do not know (Lk. 12.50).
(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

Spirit and fire (Mt. 3.11). He should remember that Certainly he had already been baptized in the Jordan,
the Lord himself was baptized by John (Lk. 3.21) as it mentions earlier (Lk. 3.21); but he meant the
when he was still in a body, but said: I yet have to be baptism of suffering, by which each one of us is
baptized with another baptism (Lk. 12.50). cleansed in his blood.
As far we can understand it there is a stage after the There is also a baptism at the threshold of Paradise
waters of baptism that will cleanse us to perfect which was not there before. After the sinner was cast
purity; he will sanctify us at the coming of the Holy out God placed a fiery sword there (Gen. 3.24), which
Spirit, and boil us in the fire of judgement, and by the had not been there before when there was no sin.
violence of death will purge us from the stain of When sin began, then baptism began too, to purify
corruption and association, and he will wash . . . those who wished to return to Paradise—so that those
who returned would say, We have crossed through fire
and water (Ps. 65.12). Through water down here,
through fire in heaven: through water so that their
sins might be washed, through fire so that they might
be burned away.
. . . with the devoted suffering and faithful blood of a But what is harder is that we endure the fire both
martyr. down here and in heaven.
V17b/row 9 15. Who is it that baptizes in this fire? Not a priest or
bishop, not John who says I baptize you unto
repentance (Mt. 3.11), not an angel or archangel, not
dominions or powers, but the one John spoke of: The
one coming after me is greater than me, and I am not
worthy to carry his sandals; he will baptize you in the
Holy Spirit and fire. He has a winnowing-fork in his
hand and he will cleanse his winnowing-ground and
will gather wheat into his barn, but the chaff he will
burn in an inextinguishable fire (Mt. 3.11–12). The
Lord himself testifies (Mt. 13.49–50) that he did not
say this regarding the baptism done by the church’s
priests. Rather, it is about the future baptism, after the
end of the world when the angels are sent to separate
the good and bad. At that time iniquity will be burned
away in the fiery furnace, so that in God’s kingdom
the righteous may shine like the Sun himself in the
kingdom of his Father. And if anyone is as holy as
Peter was, or John, he will be baptized with this fire.
So a great Baptizer will come—I am calling him what
Gabriel called him when he said, He will be great (Lk.
1.15)—and will see many standing on the threshold
of heaven. He will remove the swirling sword, and
will say to those on his right who do not have serious
sins: ‘Go in if you presume to do so, and do not fear
the fire. I preached to you: Look, I come like fire (Isa.
66.15), and through Ezekiel I said, Look, I shall go to
Jerusalem and blow on you with my fiery anger, so
that you will melt like lead and iron (Ezek. 22.19–21).’
16. May a consuming fire come, which will burn away
from us the lead of iniquity, the iron of sin, and make
us pure gold! May my kidneys and heart burn, so that
I may think good things, and desire those things
which are appropriate to purity!
But someone purified here needs to be purified again
there, so the Lord also cleanses us there, as when he says
Enter into my rest (Ps. 94.11; Heb. 4.3), so that each one
of us may be scalded—but not burned away—by that
fiery sword, and enter into that delightful paradise and
thank their Lord, saying, You led us to refreshment (Ps.
65.12). So whoever passes through fire enters into rest;
he passes from material, worldly things to those which
are unchanging and everlasting.
17. It is one fire by which involuntary sins are burned
away, but lucky whoever Lord Jesus prepares as one
of his servant boys, so that he might cleanse us from
this sojourn here which is mingled with dead bodies.

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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

It is another, different fire which he delegates to the

devil and his angels, regarding which he said, Enter
the eternal fire (Mt. 25.41), in which burned Dives,
the man who asked that moisture be dripped to him
from Lazarus’ finger (Lk. 16.24). But Lazarus indeed,
reclining in the bosom of Abraham, takes hold of
eternal life, which the Prophet promises him when he
says: I shall live and keep your laws. He says ‘I shall
live,’ as if he does not yet live; for here we live in a
shadow.
V17b/row 10 6. That is why the holy Prophet says he will see 18. So this bodily life is a shadow of life, an illusion,
victory while he is still alive: because he will be not truth. Man walks in an illusion, and our place is in
conveyed through the shadow of this life to that the land of the shadow of death (Isa. 9.2; Mt. 4.16).
true land of the living. But if someone does not cast the eyes of his mind on
earthly things but lifts them to spiritual ones, so that
he can say The Spirit before our face is the anointed
Lord Christ, then he will be worthy to say We will live
in his shadow (Lam. 4.20); for Christ is life, so
whoever lives in Christ’s shadow is in the shadow of
life. Rightly the Lord’s holy one says elsewhere,
Protect me in the shadow of your wings (Ps. 16.8).
V17b/row 11 Since ‘I shall live’ refers to According to this example, he said I shall live; and All of us, even the saints, are in a ‘shadow’ while still
future events, as I have said, thus likewise, I shall keep your commandments. But in the body. They do not see perfectly, they do not
similarly I reckon the same for now they are kept—according to the Apostle know perfectly, but they know in part. Paul himself,
holds for ‘I shall keep your Paul—in part, and through a mirror (1Cor. 13.9, 12). that ‘instrument of choice’ (Acts 9.15), says: For we
words’: neither through a For there are many stumbling-blocks in this world, know in part (1Cor. 13.9).
mirror nor in part (1Cor. which prevent us from keeping the commandments
13.9, 12). perfectly. (That’s to say nothing regarding bodily
nature! In this life it forces us to be imperfect either
through weakness or by inciting our vices.)
 But when death is truly conquered, and his sting Christ restored his eyes and enlightened his grace; he
blunted (1Cor. 15.55), and when we hear and see saw him not face to face, but through a mirror (1Cor.
Christ face to face (1Cor. 13.12), then indeed we shall 13.12). And David asked to uncover his eyes so that
also live, and keep God’s commands. the shadow might be removed which prevented his
eyes seeing healthily.
V17b/row 12 Who could doubt that this is the land of the dead,
when the Saint himself says: I shall please the Lord in
[compare v17b/row 5] the land of the living (Ps. 114.9)? For no-one can
please God perfectly in this place; even if it were
possible to be sinless, merely for living in this land of
the dead one would still need purifying, in order to
remove the contagion of that land.
19. We live here in shadow, so we keep God’s words
in shadow. Let me give an example. We were certainly
under the Law’s shadow before when we kept new
moons and sabbaths, which are the shadows of future
things, just as Jews today do. They do not recognize
the true Sabbath, and serve the copy and the shadow.
Even we who now live according to the Gospel still
follow only the shadow of God’s words. Nathanael
was seen under the fig tree (Jn. 1.48); David says that
he hopes in the shadow of the wings of the Lord Jesus
(Ps. 16.8); Zacchaeus went up a sycamore tree to see
Christ (Lk. 19.4). Jesus also spreads his hands out to
us, to overshadow the whole world. How can we not
be in a shadow, when we are protected by the cross’s
veil? The crucified one defends us from the world’s
malice and the fervour of the human body, so how
can we not be in a shadow? Or are we unaware that
God’s Word did not come into the world as the Word
which he was in the beginning with God, but empties
himself and takes the form of a servant (Phil. 3.21)?
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Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

He came in a light cloud (Isa. 19.1) and, since he was

the Power of the Most High, he overshadowed Mary,
[compare v17b/row 7] so that he might transform our vile body to become
like his glorious body. Just as he changed his form
when he was born of a virgin, so even God’s words
seem to us transformed when they are read in the
Gospel; their meaning in Scripture seems to be as if
through a mirror, since complete truth cannot be
understood here. But when that perfect Word comes
again—not descending, nor through a mirror like
things that are transformed—then the meaning of the
Gospel words shall shine out, with their complete and
obvious true meaning.
20. And let it not bother you that it says I shall keep
the words, in the plural. For when someone has
known the one Word, he knows many words. In the
One are many, and in many words is the One. We
need to sort out how one word can be many and
many words can be one. It is not hard to learn, since
the Apostle said, He is the image of the invisible God,
the firstborn of all creatures, in whom are created
everything in the heavens and on earth, whether visible
or invisible, whether thrones or dominions or
principalities or powers; all things are created through
him and in him (Col. 1.15–16). There is one Word
which works in each individual thing, and when it
does so it works all things and in all things. This
Word, the sole one with the Father, diffused himself
into many things, since we all receive of his fullness. So
if you were to see every single one of the things which
were created in him, you will see that one and the
same Word in every single thing; we too participate in
him, as far as we are capable. The human word is in
me, as the Apostle recalls and says: I think that I too
have God’s Spirit (1Cor. 7.10); the heavenly word is in
another, and the word of angels is in many. There are
some who have the word of dominations and powers;
the word of justice, the word of chasteness, the word
of carefulness, the word of piety, the word of strength.
Thus the One Word is many, and many words are the
One. I certainly don’t think this is far-fetched, since
we read that the Spirit of Wisdom can do all things.
21. The word of wisdom is given to one through the
spirit, and to another the word of knowledge through
the same spirit, and to another faith in the same spirit,
and to another the gift of healing in one spirit, and to
another the working of wonders, and to another the
spirit of knowledge, and to another the spirit of wiser
counsel, and to another the spirit of bravery, and to
another the spirit of piety, and in everyone is one and
the same Spirit, dividing between each one as it
wishes (1Cor. 12.8–11). He is spirit of the prophets
and spirit of the apostles, and even the spirit of
craftsmen like Beselehel and Eliab, whom the Lord
filled with the Divine Spirit of wisdom and knowledge
and all skill, so that they could make the vestment and
the tabernacle and the altar by the proficiency which
God gave them (as indeed to other wise men!) to
understand and do everything according to
everything which the Lord commanded (Exod.
35.30–5). They did what they had not learned nor
seen, according to what the Spirit showed them. And
another Spirit was seen by many of the apostles,
another of the prophets, and differently by each one;
but there is not a diverse Spirit, but one, allocating
diverse types of faculties.
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

So there should be no doubt that the Word was given

as apostolic to some, prophetic to others, angelic to
others, administrative to others; and there is one
Word, allocating himself to each according to our
ability or his free generosity.
In this world I see this Word, which is the head of all
things, through a mirror (1Cor. 13.12), so I cannot
keep God’s words here. But when I shall see his glory
unveiled, face to face, then I shall live; and, living life,
I shall keep the divine words.
V18a/row 1 Uncover my eyes, and I shall 7. The logic which holds for the first verse also holds 22. That is why he says in the second verse: Open my
apprehend the wonders of for subsequent ones. For he says: Unveil my eyes, and eyes, and I shall consider the marvels of your law.
your law. I shall consider the marvels of your law.
V18a/row 2 The Prophet perceives that Whoever asks for his eyes to be opened certainly
his eyes are veiled over; for understands that they are sick. A man does not ask
something like injury or for a doctor unless he requires a medicine for his
damage has entered our illness. So he says to the Doctor from Heaven: Open
consciousness . . . my eyes. If the eye is troubled, then all the pain is
easily calmed with a salve; unless of course one’s
vision is dimmed by an opaque swelling, and then a
better remedy is required.
Just as for bodily eyes, there is also for the soul’s eyes
a similar kind of affliction which necessarily gets
He knows that a thick cloud obstructs our mortal worse unless a good doctor removes that ‘veil’, the
bodily eyes. cloudy congealed fluid; it is held to impede or even
damage the mind’s sight so that it cannot see as it
did before.
V18a/row 3 . . . due to the aging of the The illness creeps in with the old yeast, inasmuch as
‘old man’ (Col. 3.9, Eph. we did not remove the Gentile or Jewish cataract
4.22, Rom. 6.6). when we first came into the Church. We did not hear
the good doctor’s instruction when he said: Take off
 the old man with his deeds and put on the new one,
who is renewed in knowledge according to the image of
the one who made him (Col. 3.9–10).
If someone puts on an extra garment, rather than
taking one off, then the illness stealthily grows more
serious, and the eyes are sickened with a permanent
veil. No-one can remove it, not an Angel or Virtues or
Dominions or Powers. The veil stays. It hampers his
reading, it darkens his vision. It is not removed, says
the Apostle (that is, by anyone else), unless it is
cancelled out in Christ (2Cor. 3.14). So when this
person has turned to the Lord, the veil is removed
(2Cor. 3.16).
V18a/row 4 23. So you have a way to remove the veil which hangs
over the eyes of your heart! Turn to the Lord, and the
veil will fall. Paul turned to the blessing of Ananias;
something like scales fell from his eyes and he could
see, even though he had not seen for the previous
three days (Acts 9.17–18).
There is only one who is His soul’s eye was healed at the same time as his
able to cure this, namely bodily eye: the doctor from heaven showed him a
God’s Word; remedy . . .
. . . for God has sent his . . . that doctor of whom it is written: He sent his
Word and healed them, and Word and healed them; he freed them from all their
delivered them from their infirmities (Ps. 106.20).
devastation (Ps. 106.20).
So the Word comes, and This is no earthly doctor, since he cures every
uncovers our eyes, infirmity and restores the people to wholeness. Send
this doctor, Father! May your Word come; may he
open my eyes!
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

V18a/row 5 . . . and takes away the veil, Even the eyes of the apostles were closed, until
for when someone turns to Jesus opened them. Hence, when he explained the
the Lord, the veil is taken Scriptures to the two going to a village called
away (2Cor. 3.16; Exod. Emmaus, and when he blessed them, their eyes were
34.34). opened and they knew him, it says (Lk. 24.31). Unless
Jesus had opened our eyes, no-one would see. Unless
Jesus had removed the veil, the Gospel’s grace would
in no way have shone forth.
Peter and James and John had their eyes closed. On
the mountain they were heavy with sleep, but were
awoken by a splendour of divine majesty and opened
the eyes of their hearts. And because they could not
see fully whilst in the body, clouds overshadowed
them (Mt. 17.5), lest the splendour of heavenly glory
weaken their bodily eyes.
v18b/row 1 24. But then, who is so great that he could open his
eyes and see the sacraments of the law, unless Christ
had shown him?
Not Moses. When the Lord commanded, he threw
down his staff and it became a snake and he ran away
from it; he grabbed the snake’s tail and it became a
staff again (Exod. 4.3–4). And he did not yet know the
mystery by which it was declared that the Lord Jesus
would descend to earth, and that when he died he
would allow himself to be taken down from the cross
and cast into a tomb. From that tomb, according to
the Law’s oracles, he would rise again, and change
back from a snake into God’s glory and royal
fellowship in the holy throne. Let us too, then, grab
the ‘snake’s tail’ of that crucified man (Jn. 3.14), so
that we can recognize his royal might. The woman
 who put oil on his feet also grabbed hold of him
(Lk. 7.38). So Moses grabbed the snake’s tail and his
mouth was opened. He would not have spoken about
the Lord unless the Lord had opened his mouth. 24.
But then, who is so great that he could open his eyes
and see the sacraments of the law, unless Christ had
showed him?
V18b/row 2 The Prophet knows that the He knows that the things which the Law are 25. Here, David asks that his eyes be opened, and
Law holds the shadow of commanded in a bodily way are a shadow and mirror previously he said, Who will show us good things (Ps.
future goods (Heb. 10.1); of future things. He reads the Law, certainly; but he 4.6)? He was brought up under the Law, and he knew
and he sought to know prefers to behold the Law’s marvels. that the Law is a shadow of future goods (Heb. 10.1);
what the ‘good things’ are now he desires to see these goods not through a
that the Law holds the shadow, but with opened eyes.
shadow of.
He knew that those who zealously followed the Law
of Moses were only following a copy and shadow of
heavenly mysteries. He wanted to understand the true
holy worship itself; so to tear the veil from his eyes, he
turned to the Lord and prayed: Open my eyes, and I
shall consider the marvels of your law. He understood
that there is indeed a heavenly warfare which anyone
could have known about from the Law—as long as
the Lord should reveal it to them, that is. For in fact,
who is there who can proceed merely by human
footstep, without divine guidance, from earthly to
heavenly things, from shadow to brightness, from
copy to the essence of truth?
V18b/row 3 He recalls the sabbath is holy: but he wishes to 26. That heavenly altar and the true temple, the
experience the rest of eternal sabbaths. priests and Levites . . . who is able to observe the ones
He uses unleavened bread, of course: but he is in a which act by the Spirit’s grace, rather than those who
hurry to get rid of the yeast of [our] old nature. carry out their duties in the flesh? But that is precisely
the only thing David asks for himself, above all else

(continued )
Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

He sacrifices the paschal lamb: but he desires to stand however so great. He says: I have sought one thing
with that Lamb who was revealed by John (Jn. 1.29). from the Lord, and this I ask: that I may dwell in the
He fulfils the law of the seventh year: but once the Lord’s house all the days of my life and see the Lord’s
seven thousand have been exacted, he asks to be free delight and consider his temple (Ps. 26.4).
of the world. Who could have known how great a gift a rich man
He fulfils the law of the fifty-year Jubilee: but he is in a should offer, as much as he could afford, for his sin to
hurry to obtain the forgiveness and renewal of be absolved? If someone had nothing to offer, a ram
Pentecost. for example, who could have understood that his sin
was not absolved by it anyway? Who could have
He knows that by God’s command, following a realized that there is uncleanness which is not
heavenly model, Moses established the altar and absolved by the Law as the Jews think, but only by the
Aaron dressed in the priestly garb and adornment: spiritual law which Paul knew? Who could see that
but he hastens to be involved in the ministries of the true forgiveness of sins is only reproduced in the Law
High Priest (Christ), the model which those things but is a reality in the Gospel? As the Lord Jesus says,
followed. Your sins are forgiven (Lk. 7.48), not by the blood of
He also prays to be led into the holy land, a land goats but by the sacrifice of his own body!
flowing with milk and honey, as if he were a traveller A man is rich under the law if he confesses Christ’s
throughout this whole world. complete and perfect majesty and somehow offers
this, with hands of faith, at that heavenly altar, and
thereby absolves his sin. This man sees the high priest
and thereby sees the True Priest. This man who hears
who says the following: Destroy this temple, and I
shall raise it again in three days (Jn. 2.19), thereby
perceives the True Temple.
Great is that temple, from which power went out and
cured all people! Marvellous is that altar, on which
the sacrifice of just one lamb removed the sins of the
world! How excellent is that Levite, who came not to
wield his ministry, but so that he could show to all the
ministry of his suffering! God was his portion; down
here he had nothing, and yet he had everything.
27. The Law orders that Hebrews can be slaves for
only six years, and in the seventh year should be freed
(Exod. 21.2). What shall I say about this? How are we
to interpret this ‘free Hebrew’? Who is great enough
to realize this refers to eternal years, and thus see that
True Hebrew—one who does not remain a slave
forever, but passes six ‘years’ as a slave and attains the
gift of freedom in the seventh ‘year’? The patriarch
Isaac seems to have known the mystery of his slavery
and freedom, since he said: You will be slave to your
brother. And one day you will take off and remove his
yoke from your neck (Gen. 27.40). He meant there
would be a time when, although someone might be
put in a position where he is enslaved to his brother,
nevertheless afterwards when the years have been
exacted (totting up every day and every month which
we pass here on earth), then the yoke will be removed
from his neck. This is in the ‘seventh year’, the year of
remission.
We can take Joseph as a type of the True Hebrew: he
bore his yoke of slavery, but not for any crime; no
prison hemmed him in, no Egyptian atoned for him.
We can take Peter, John and James, as types. They
were born and brought up under the Law’s yoke; and
yet they removed the Jewish yoke over their brother
as soon as the Law’s time of rest came, when the
forgiveness of sins shone out to them.
28. And yet down here this is done in a shadow, in
parallel with heavenly things. But how great that rest
which is inferred by the Law, but revealed in the
Gospel by the Lord Jesus when he says: I desire that,
wherever I am, these men will be with me too
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

(Jn. 17.24)! How blessed the man who, as a fruit of

our current dwelling, can earn a share in the rest in
that place!
Then he will understand what it is to open eyes, so
that one might see the marvels of God’s Law.
V18b/row 4 He called to God, not The Jews do all these things of course, in a bodily
praying in a Jewish way, manner: but Paul understands these things in another
but praying out loud like a way, saying: We know that the Law is spiritual (Rom.
prophet, and saying: Unveil 7.14).
my eyes, and I shall
apprehend the wonders of
your Law . . .
. . . so that he might behold The Prophet prays so that he might perceive these the
[as in a mirror] the Lord’s Law’s marvels, which are obscured from veiled eyes;
glory, with unveiled face . . .
. . . being transformed into . . . that is, that he might be released from this
his image (2Cor. 3.18) . . . perishable weak body,
. . . and seeing the wonders . . . and see the things which, through bodily
of God’s Law. observance of the Law, prefigure great and marvelous
things in heaven.
V18b/row 5 29. The Gospel lesson we have just heard reminds us
well. The leper who said, If you want, you can heal me
(Lk. 5.12) was healed, showing that power is realized
through the Lord’s will. The Lord replied in like
manner: I do want. Be healed (Lk. 5.13). Once his will
was moved to compassion, his power was licensed to
act. Jesus says ‘I do want’ to everyone, because he does
not wish sin to exist. Christ’s ‘I do want’ is available to
all; ‘Be healed’ is for the faith of the one who believes
in Christ. And he touched him. He touches those who
 are touched by faith. (On another occasion he said:
Someone touched me; I feel the power going out of me
(Lk. 8.46). By a touch, his spotless body enacted the
forgiveness that comes from God.)
30. But, in order that the leper might be more fully
healed, Jesus opened his eyes and said: Go, show
yourself to the priest (Lk. 5.14). The synagogue had
many priests; but whoever opens their eyes sees not
false priests but the true one. Who is the true Priest, if
not the one who is priest forever? That is why the
Father said to him: You are a priest forever (Ps. 109.4).
Christ opened the leper’s eyes, and he saw, and
understood what kind of gift he had to offer to be
purified. Blessed the man who hears these things—
but how much more blessed the man who sees them;
who can show himself to the True Priest, so that he
has nothing which he is ashamed of showing; and
who can first look at himself with face unveiled!
Unless he should look at himself first, he will not dare
show himself, just like Adam who wanted to hide
because he did not know himself.
But let us examine what comes next.
V19a/row 1 I am a foreigner (paroikos) 8. As he prays, his sentiment is consistent. For he next 31. I am a foreigner (advena) on the earth; do not hide
in the land [on the earth]; says: I am a tenant-farmer (accola) on the earth; do your commands from me.
do not hide your commands not hide your commands from me.
from me.
V19a/row 2 Some may cling to the A tenant-farmer does not cultivate land in his own These are not the words of just anyone, but of the
earth, and love things there right, since it is someone else’s. Nor does a traveller man who has renounced earthly pleasures and put off
and not trust that he will wait for the harvest of the land which he has every sentiment of worldly desire.
depart [in death] and will temporarily worked on. The Apostle is a smallholder
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

be with Christ (Phil. 1.23). and knows the logic of this, saying that he must travel
Let that person not say I am from the body and abide with Christ (2Cor. 5.8).
a foreigner on earth; let him
know that he is a citizen of
the earth!
Through his faith, the Prophet observes certain Whoever can say, But our citizenship (conversatio) is
images of ‘heavenly citizenship’ (conversatio; Phil. in heaven (Phil. 3.20) is a foreigner upon earth. He is
3.20): of course he dwells in the body, but he is a foreigner if his portion is in the Lord; if he is upset to
cultivating something that is not his own, for the eyes live so long on earth, and tired at the long span of this
of his mind are lifted to heaven. life; if he dislikes the long duration of dwelling here—
the saint loathes it and says: Woe to those who dwell on
the earth (Rev. 8.13); if he is unafraid to die and, when
he does, assumes that he will be with Christ. (Phil. 1.23)
V19a/row 3 He knows that riches are stored for him in heaven: Whoever is a citizen among the saints, and belongs to
because where one’s treasure is, there also one’s heart God’s household, and builds up riches for himself in
is (Mt. 6.21). heaven, is truly a ‘pilgrim on earth’.
V19a/row 4 He will not be a tenant of his land . . . As he comes out of Egypt, he certainly does not wish
to return to the ‘intelligible’ Egypt, nor does he fear
the limits of doomed old age and death . . .
. . . with the attitude of the man in the Gospel story . . . nor does he build barns for the harvests he has
who built barns capable of holding an immense gathered, because he is already about to live another
harvest, life.
. . . and roused his soul to luxuries due to the The only wealth he gathers is from the fruitfulness of
abundance at hand. virtues; . . .
The fool was deprived of his soul that very night. (Lk. . . . not even death can take that wealth away from
12.18f.). him.
V19b/row 1 Hence the saintly man’s 9. So the Prophet admits that he is a tenant, and prays
remark: Do not hide your that God’s commands should not be hidden from him.
commandments from me.
For no-one is fit to know God’s commandments
unless he is a stranger to his body.
V19b/row 2 If the Lord’s command God’s command is bright, giving light to the eyes
shines brightly, bringing (Ps. 18.9),
light to the eyes (Ps. 18.9b),
. . . why does the Prophet . . . so it seems absurd that he should have asked
say, Do not hide your God’s commands not to be hidden from him, since by
commands from me? their nature they both are bright and give light.
V19b/row 3 Not that the Lord’s But you will misunderstand if you do not attend
*commands* are bright, but carefully. In the earlier verse the *command* is bright
the Lord’s *command* is and gives light, but here the *commands* are hidden.
bright . . .
V19b/row 4 . . . a law which concerns The *command* is bright, inasmuch as it illumines us
this life; to gaze at the light of the *commands*. The Law’s
greatest commandment enjoins us to love God with
all our soul and strength (Dt. 6.5); through that, we
become worthy of the illumination of understanding.
That is how we shall pass from glory into glory (2Cor.
3.18); thus also in light shall we see light (Ps. 35.10);
thus also we shall one day behold our own appearance
through a mirror (1Cor. 13.2). For by this
commandment in our bodily life, we are illuminated
by the sacrament of baptism and by God’s precept,
and we possess light, and we abide in glory. From this
commandment we will see further commandments;
by this shall we see light from light; by this we shall be
changed from glory into glory.
V19b/row 5 On the other hand the 10. But the Prophet knows that in heaven there are
commandment which is many commandments of God. He knows that there
above mankind, and applies are as many acts of keeping the precepts as there are
to the powers above (every ministers: angels, archangels, thrones, dominions,
(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

rational being lives under powers and principalities (Col. 1.16). There must
commandment) is hidden. certainly be as many offices as there are names, but
they endlessly perform the commandments in
accordance with their changeless natures.
V19b/row 6 So the Prophet prays that And for this reason, he prays that the sacraments of
the sacraments of God’s the heavenly commandments will be revealed to him;
commandments regarding for he knows that he is a traveller in this earthly body.
life here be revealed to him
before their appointed time.
V20/row 1 My soul has desired to long 11. This is the fourth verse of the third strophe: My 32. And he fully deserves to say: My soul has desired
for your judgements in every soul has desired that I should long for your judgements always to long for your judgements in every moment.
moment. in every moment.
V20/row 2 He certainly cannot pray this unless he is free from all
bonds—not only from the bonds of worldly cares, but
even from the bonds of human affection. There are
numerous bonds in this world: the desire to live is a
bond, seductive pleasures are bonds, there are career
bonds, marriage bonds. That is why the good teacher
says to you: Are you free of a wife?—do not seek a wife
(1Cor. 7.27). The man who takes a wife is not sinning,
but he ties himself up; he ties himself with psychological
bonds, since he worries about how to please his wife (he
would be happier if he only wanted to please God!), but
also with physical bonds, since whoever does not have
power over his own body is certainly bound.
It is a commandment of God, which is brought out in
both the Law’s pronouncement and the Apostle’s
preaching (Dt. 6.5; 1Cor. 7.27), that no-one should
put wife, riches, honour, or necessities before God.
Rather, whoever puts these things first is answerable
 to God’s judgement. That is why the Prophet first
asked God not to hide his commandments from him.
For whoever has known and kept the
commandments does not flee from divine
judgements, but longs for them. He deservedly says:
I have desired to long for your judgement in every
moment,—as if the commandments had already been
revealed to him.
V20/row 3 Why, indeed, did he not The Prophet’s discourse is different from that of 33. He did not say, ‘I have desired’ the judgements,
say: ‘my soul has desired others, or of the world. Using familiar language he but I have desired to long for. We have seen ‘living life’
your judgements,’ but brings out a higher meaning, when he says: My soul is more than ‘living’; after all ‘living’ is common to all
rather it has desired to long has desired that I should long for your judgements in who are alive, but ‘living life’ belongs to the saints. In
for, as if it were not in our every moment. Many will feel he would have done the same way, ‘desiring to long’ for God’s judgements
power to desire God’s better to say, ‘my soul desires your judgements in is more than ‘longing’ for his judgements. We desire
judgements? every moment.’ Indeed, perhaps they think that is to long, as if longing were not up to us, but up to
precisely what is meant by these words. God’s grace.
V20/row 4 12. But the Prophet recalls that, for human nature, it When the Lord has seen us taking delight in the desire
is difficult and extremely risky to desire God’s for the longing for his judgements, he makes this clear-
judgements. No-one living is pure in his sight, so how headed sentiment grow; but when we sin we do not
can his judgement be desirable? Since we are to give desire to long for God’s judgements. Nor does a sick
account for every careless word, shall we desire the man long to be burned or cut so that he can receive
day of judgement, when we will have to undergo that healing. Whoever is more ill takes refuge lest he be
tireless fire and those grim punishments for the soul burned or cut or bound or made to abstain from food.
to make amends for sins? A sword pierced the soul of But whoever is hale and hearty is untroubled when he
Blessed Mary, so that the thoughts of many hearts meets a doctor. Hence indeed the Lord says advisedly:
could be revealed (Lk. 2.35). If that holy Virgin of God I have very much longed to eat this Passover with you
was liable to severe judgement, who will dare desire to (Lk. 22.15). He did not only long, but equal to the
be judged by God? Job discharged battle over all longing he desired to forgive sins.
human calamities and achieved victory. When he was
tested he said, The Lord gives and the Lord takes
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

away; blessed be his name for ever (Job 1.21), and

admitted that he was but ash; and when he heard
God’s voice from the cloud he resolved to say nothing
more (Job 40.1). So who would dare to desire God’s
judgements, when such a great prophet could not
withstand his voice from the heavens (Job 42.3, 42.6),
and when the apostles standing with the Lord on the
mountain could not endure it (Mt. 17.6)?
V20/row 5 I demonstrated for Repay 13. The Prophet was aware of the limitations of Hence let us too desire to long for God’s judgements—
your servant (Ps. 118.17a) human nature and self-awareness, when he said, My with a good conscience, which is proven when it is
that not everyone should soul desired that I should long for your judgements in tested,
pray Repay your servant, every moment. He did not ‘long for judgement,’ but
but only those who worship he *desired* that he should long for it. He longed for
God with a pure desire, not for judgement.
conscience.
Similarly not everyone He desires to long for, that is, he desires to abide in
should desire [God’s] such blamelessness that his longing might be free
judgements in every from the fear of judgement. He does not really desire
moment, but only those judgement because he is aware of his human nature,
who commit no sin. If I but he longs to desire it if it came from the
desire your judgements, consciousness of perfect innocence.
then the very moment I sin,
I am desiring to be
punished! A perfect man
can desire God’s judgements
in every moment, so that is
why the Prophet says this.
V20/row 6 He does know indeed that the desire for this longing – and let us desire to long in every moment, so that no
ought to be steadfast and tireless. So he added in every moment may pass which is free of a good desire.
moment, in other words teaching that we should
never take time off when we do not always grasp onto
the desire for this longing.
V21a/row 1 You have censured the 14. Then he says: You have upbraided the proud: 34. There follows the fifth verse: You have upbraided
proud; accursed are those accursed are they who turn from your commands. the proud; accursed are they who turn away from your
who stray from your laws.
commands.
V21a/row 2 Oh, unhappy pride, which scorns to live under When the Lord Jesus redeemed the human race
heavenly precepts, and shrinks from holy commands through his obedience, he transformed justice; but
with the vanity of a faithless soul! Human vices have through disobedience the serpent introduced sin. We
many faults, and sin works in many countless ways; can assume that this came from pride. Pride comes
but nothing provokes God’s wrath so much as pride. from the devil, whom the prophet [Isaiah] describes
You have upbraided not the greedy or lustful (groups as follows: I shall put my throne above the clouds, and
who indeed deserve to be upbraided) but the proud. I will be like the Most High (Isa. 14.14). Since he is
Many despise obeying God with the same pride Most Evil, so that he will not give honour to our Lord
whereby they look down on human things. God, he trains his disciples to be still worse. He exalts
15. But there are other works of faith, even quite himself since he wishes to be held equal and like to
splendid ones, where pious devotion may linger in the Most High; but the Apostle indicates that his
every observation of holy precepts; yet pride steals in, disciple is unworthy to be held equal and like to God.
and obliterates the memory of those things we did It is written:
rightly. When the Man of Evil and Son of Ruin is revealed,
who opposes and exalts himself above everything
which is called ‘God’ (2Thess. 2.3–4). The master has
the presumption that he is like God, but the disciple
has the presumption that he is above God. In the
same way also the Lord said to his disciples, You will
do greater things than these (Jn. 14.12), so that Christ
should grant to do greater things than he himself did
on earth to those whom the serpent was deprived of
rather than lost. For Christ wished the prince of the
world to fail through himself, but to triumph in the
disciples.
V21a/row 3 35. He wished to rescue the human race from such an
offence, so he introduced the story of the Pharisee
and Publican praying in the Temple (Lk. 18.10f.). He
taught that a proud man, even if he has other good
features, causes more offence than a humble man
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

who has no dowry of virtues to prop him up; the devil

yearns to trip up those intending to do good deeds.
How much that Pharisee in the Gospel determined a What an effort that Pharisee made, not to rob the
way of life for himself by effort!—not to rob another’s goods of others, not to be unjust, not to commit
goods, not to act unjustly to anyone, not to act adultery! How he toiled not to sin, as the publican
lasciviously in adultery (Lk. 18.11f.). sinned!
He strained in effort to fast twice on a sabbath, and, What an effort, to fast twice on the sabbath!
applying immense patience, exhausted his wretched
defective body by fasting.
How much effort was it to conquer his greed, and give What an effort, to give a tithe of all which he
away a tithe of his wealth for the use of the needy?! acquired!
What is more splendid than these things? What is Which of us does these things? How many of us have
harder than doing these things? possessions, but repose alone on our fruits, and
gather harvests for ourselves alone!
V21a/row 4 But he fell into the trap of pride, saying: I am not like The devil contrived this, and afflicted him with a
this sinner the publican. And by this fault, the burning sore, so that he lost his head due to being
unhappy man tumbled from great works into sin. puffed up in his physical mind,
He became impudent by boasting his virtues, and fell . . . and for the very thing he thinks will be
behind the publican who received greater praiseworthy, he will be judged more severely. For he
justification. thanked God that he was not a robber, an adulterer,
or an evildoer.
When is the Adversarial How harmfully the Serpent wrestled with him, and
Spirit not wrestling with us? bound him in his heavy coils! He raised the Pharisee
He fights against us not higher in order to cast him down from a loftier place;
only when we are sinning he presented himself as lower, so that he might cast
deliberately, but also when down the elevated Pharisee with a greater fall.
we are doing fine and Terrible is the downfall of arrogance, which brings an
excellent things; he fights to exalted person crashing down; and terrible the
puff us up and make us Serpent’s wrestling, since its coils wind around in a
haughty. myriad of ways!
16. But what shall we say of that other Pharisee, the 36. Paul, too, wished to be puffed up. Which Paul?—
Apostle who is not from men nor through man, but the very one, of course, who is an apostle not from
 through Jesus Christ (Gal. 1.1). The devil wrestled men nor through man, but through Jesus Christ (Gal.
against him with all the skill he could, and he received 1.1). And he almost failed in his task, to the extent
a messenger of Satan to torment him (2Cor. 12.7), so that he asked for a thorn in his flesh which was
that through the tireless vexations of all the emotions, bringing him down to be taken away. But the good
there would be no break giving a chance for pride to Lord, who wished Paul to become stronger through
creep in. his weaknesses, sent him a messenger of Satan, so that
the devil might be conquered by his own arts (2Cor.
12.7–8).
Also, Paul laid down something like a rule for
choosing and appointing a priest. When he had set
down what virtues make a man fit to be bishop, he
forbade that a new convert should be chosen lest he
grow proud. He said: Not a new convert, lest he should
get puffed up and fall under the same judgement as the
devil (1Tim. 3.6); that is, Paul wishes that the
prospective bishop should first be tried with much
war of emotions, and wants him to be motivated by
the many wages of humility and faith, lest he should
grow haughty due to having received the grace of re-
birth so soon.
v21a/row 5 God opposes the proud, God does not despise a broken heart, and the best
but gives grace to the sacrifice is a contrite heart (Ps. 50.29);
humble (Prov. 3.34; Jas 4.6;
1Pet. 5.5).
Therefore however great because whoever exalts himself will be humbled, and
you are, humble yourself, whoever humbles himself will be exalted (Lk. 14.11).
and you will find grace
before the Lord (Sir. 3.18).
V21a/row 6 The Pharisee was not a liar—he spoke the absolute
truth—but everyone who elevates himself causes
offence, even if he speaks the truth (Lk. 18.14). So the
Pharisee went into the temple more acceptable than
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 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

the publican, but came out condemned. Pride is a

great crime indeed, if adultery is preferable to it!
37. So then the Lord, who freely gave to others,
opposed the proud, and launched himself in dispute,
so to speak, against those who exalt themselves, and
claimed the contest as his own; and he had pity on
others, but rebuked the haughty. Nothing is more
serious than when we show contempt for our poor
brothers with a proud eye, and when we repulse with
intolerant distaste people like us, judging them
unworthy of our kindness because they are destitute.
God unquestionably esteems poverty more than
riches.
V21b/row 1 17. And thus accursed are those who stray from your 38. Accursed, it says, are those who stray from your
commands, for the proud are upbraided. Through the commands.
pride of a haughty soul, we both scorn human affairs
and neglect divine ones.
V21b/row 2 But the force of the words set down here should be
attended to carefully. It would have been simple
enough to say: ‘Accursed are those who do not
comply with your commands.’
I have already discussed (I said enough at an earlier verse regarding commands
how it is possible to stray, in the singular and plural).
not only from ‘a
commandment’ in the
singular, but also from
‘commandments’.
Accursed are those who are instructed by this Above he said: Do not hide your commands from me.
teaching of the prophet yet stray from God’s And so, as if he knew the commands revealed to him,
commands: that is, through longings caused by he condemns those who may stray from the divine
present weaknesses they fall away from the hope commands.
presented in the eternal commands.
 We are not permitted to a Whoever strays goes out of the way he was in, and is And rightly he says those who stray, for a command is
stray from even a single diverted from one place to another, and leaves his straight, so no-one may wander from it.
commandment, for the path by some kind of detour.
Lord’s command is straight.
That is why accursed are
those who stray from your
commands.
V21b/row 3 39. But this begs the question why he said this: Do not
hide your commands from me.
[see v19b] [see v19b] For what is hidden is obscure and concealed; yet
above he had said, The Lord’s law is bright, bringing
light to the eyes (Ps. 18.9). If the law is light, how is it
hidden—since no-one puts a lamp under a bowl (Mt.
5.15)?—unless perhaps there is one bright command,
but many commands are hidden. For your
judgements are like the great deep (Ps. 35.7). It is not
‘a judgement’ but ‘judgements’ that are said to be like
the deep.
40. But see the logic of this. Above he says: Do not
drive me away from your commands (Ps. 118.10).
Later he says: Do not hide your commands from me
(Ps. 118.19). Here he says: Accursed are they who
stray from your commands. Accursed indeed are
those who stray from your commands, who should be
showing gratitude—firstly because they were not
driven away, and secondly because they obtained not
to have the divine commands hidden from them.
Someone strays inasmuch as that is what he chooses
to do.

(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

V21b/row 4 So not only someone who The sentence of being accursed applies even to
has failed to keep a someone straying only slightly from God’s
command is accursed, but commands. This is so we may understand what a
also someone who has dangerous matter it is for us to ignore them
strayed however so slightly completely. It is a curse for us to stray from them!
from God’s command.
V22a/row 1 Take away from me rebuke 18. Take disgrace and shame away from me, for I have 41. There follows: Take disgrace and shame away
and contempt, for I have sought your testimonies. from me, for I have sought your testimonies.
sought your testimonies.
V22a/row 2 Sins deserve contempt; Sins deserve shame: and thus sinners shall rise again
hence in the resurrection to eternal shame (Dan. 12.2).
sinners will rise again to
eternal contempt, which
contempt is followed by
eternal disgrace (Dan.
12.2).
V22a/row 3 There are two kinds of If a scorned person is heading for a place of disgrace,
contempt: God has chosen how come it is written: God has chosen the shameful
the contemptible things things of this world (1Cor. 1.28)? But consider, he said
(1Cor. 1.28), shameful things ‘of the world’, not ‘of God’. For what
is shameful in this world is precious to God.
. . . and an evil-doer is Again, humility is belittled in this world, but it is
contemned in his sight approved by God’s judgement. And if the publican
(Ps. 14.4a). humiliated himself, he is exalted. Listen, this is the
man whom God loves and does not count as nothing:
whoever is saintly, lives without blemish, keeps truth,
does not covet what belongs to his neighbour, and
does not conduct himself in a slanderous way to
anyone in God’s sight, but reproves all that belongs to
spite (Ps. 14.2–4). Such a man, even if he be a Gentile,
is approved by God for his humble devotion. But
 proud men like the Pharisee he holds as nothing
because of their arrogance. Indeed ethnicity is
irrelevant, but piety abides forever.
V22a/row 4 I despise the scorn which Beware that you are not a shame to Christ. I dislike it
fools hold towards me; they if someone libels me, and scorns me as if I were a
scorn men who deserve not sinner.
contempt but honour.
Let us learn that all sins deserve shame from the But if Christ holds someone as shameful, how serious
Gospels: the Lord began to reproach Chorozin and that is! Woe to you, Chorozin and Bethsaida (Lk.
Besthsaida, the cities in which many of his miracles 10.13)! They are condemned because they did not do
had been performed and they did not repent penance for their sins.
(Lk. 10.15).
V22a/row 5 I avoid that scorn by which He holds everyone equal in the same crime that they
an evil-doer is scorned in began. He reproaches the human race where it has
God’s sight . . . not repented nor pursued the Gospel way, as is found
in the psalm: What is the point in my blood, while I go
down into corruption? (Ps. 29.10.) He reproaches the
proud and the accursed, that they thought there was
no point in the sacrament of his blood and his
death—when in fact it was for us that he was born
and suffered and died.
19. The Prophet was aware of human weakness. He
knows there are things within us which God’s mercy
should take away from us. He knows that we should
pray to God and confess our sins to the point that,
even if we deserve to be indicted, we may still not
actually be indicted. A sin should be confessed so that
forgiveness too might be obtained. The Prophet also
knows that, after an indictment, the Gentiles are held
in contempt, that is, held as nothing. For it is written:
All Gentiles are as nothing, and everything which
comes from malice is held as nothing (Isa. 40.17).
(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

V22a/row 6 . . . and I say, take from me We should follow the Prophet’s example, and pray Let us behave in such a way that our shame is taken
rebuke and scorn . . . with hope and confidence for disgrace and shame to from us.
be taken away from us. That is why the words take
away from me disgrace and shame . . . ,
V22b/row 1 . . . because I have sought . . . have the following words added to them: For But then again, who is there who is not shameful? The
your testimonies. I have sought your testimonies. one who has sought the Lord’s testimonies.
Do not judge me fit for There are indeed many who wish to cast shame on
scorn and reproach any your servants, but they are the more shameful; for it is
longer, for I have sought glorious to suffer shame for your name.
your judgements,—those
judgements of which it is
said, Blessed are those who
study his judgements
(Ps. 118.2a).
V23a/row 1 Rulers have sat [in counsel] 20. The Prophet is not searching out God’s testimonies 42. This is why he says: Princes have sat and vilified
and libelled me, but your at leisure, nor for self-important recreation. Rather, me.
servant meditated on your he searches them out while many are sitting [in
judgements. (Verse 24:) For counsel] against him, and many are slandering him,
your testimonies are my when he says: Princes have sat and maligned me.
concern, and your
judgements determine my
plans.
V23a/row 2 This text has a deeper He knows that prophetic authority is threatening to These are the words of a martyr who is led to be
meaning. The rulers of this the princes of this world. judged by persecutors, when he is forced to sacrifice
world (1Cor. 2.6) to idols but loyally resists. Meanwhile the judges,
particularly investigate sitting in the court and cramming in their duties,
more righteous people resent that their commands are not being complied
with, and discuss among themselves what
punishment they can deem him fit for.
V23a/row 3 Thus it was written He stood undaunted and said: Princes have sat and
regarding Christ: The kings vilified me. These are certainly the Lord’s words,
of this world have stood and when the elders of the people and the chief priests
the rulers gathered together and the scribes convened, and he was led before the
against the Lord and council of Jews who said: What do we need witnesses
against his anointed (Ps. for any more? We have heard it from his own
2.2). mouth (Mt. 26.65).
When he stood before the governor’s stand, and was
led to the cross, what could he more aptly say than
this: Princes have sat and vilified me (that is, the
princes sat while I stood)? Because they were high
above on the court’s platform, they did not see the
Lord. They sat, elevated high up in their princeliness,
and they did not give a thought to the Prince of
Princes. But this was not enough for them: they
vilified me, he says. I came as their redeemer, I came
to wash the sins of all, that I might regain the lost, and
restore the inheritance of holy Jacob to paradise; and
they vilified me.
V23a/row 4 He knows that the apostles would be hated by them So then, you who copy me—you my disciples—do
all, due to being called Christians. not blush at the injury if you are stood before princes
for my name; since I stood up for your salvation.
43. Then again, Peter was handed over to custody
with the other apostles, and on the next day
appointed, he said steadfastly before the council:
Leaders of the people and elders of Israel, if we are
brought to judgement today because a benefit was
brought to a sick man and he was made whole, let it be
known to you all and to all the people of Israel, that
this man stands before you today whole in the name of
Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom you crucified and
(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

whom God raised from the dead (Acts 4.8,10). In

other words: ‘You are the ones who also passed
sentence on Christ. We consider this supposed crime
to be something glorious, because we are charged
with bringing a man healing instead of his sickness.
This is the inheritance the Saviour of all leaves to his
servants.’ But they consulted amongst themselves
saying: What shall we do with these men (Acts 4.16)?
And they sent them away. Hence Peter boasted, and
each one of the apostles because they were worthy of
being inhabited, who sustained harm for Christ’s
name. Then each one of them shall correctly say:
Princes indeed sat and vilified me.
V23a/row 5 Princes sit [in council] against the prophet [Isaiah] 44. Princes sat [in council] against Isaiah, and
and slander him, when they hear him saying: Hear debated for him to be cut to pieces; but the man who
the word of the Lord, princes of Sodom, and listen to had said Hear, princes of Sodom (Isa. 1.10) was not
God’s law, people of Gomorrah (Isa.1.10). It was afraid.
because of the counsel of such as these that Isaiah is
cut into pieces,
and Jeremiah too is shut up in prison, They sat [in council] against Jeremiah, that he be
thrown into the cistern.
and Daniel is thrown to lions provoked by hunger to
savagery,
Zachariah is killed between temple and altar (Mt. They sat [in council] against Zachariah, who was
23.25, Lk. 11.51), killed between the temple and the altar (Mt. 23.25, Lk.
11.51).
. . . the apostles are slaughtered, and cut to pieces, They sat [in council] against Susanna, and passed
and crucified; so that God’s message might be judgement against a chaste woman. But the Lord
thwarted, and the prophetic teaching might be aroused a boy’s spirit so that the princes’ verdict
obstructed, and the way of eternal life be blocked. might be shown to be awry. The princes pronounced
her guilty of death, but the prophet absolved the same
woman as guiltless of any crime whatsoever.
V23a/row 6 Well might I say that the 45. But there are other sorts of ‘princes’ who vilify us.
rulers of this world gather Of them it is said: Our struggle is not against flesh and
together, meaning those blood, but against principalities and powers, against
who have worldly wisdom; the rulers of this world, and of these shadows, against
they sit [in council] and spiritual forces of wickedness which are in the skies
examine against the (Eph. 6.12).
righteous man, They sit [in council] and investigate who the
. . . so that they might righteous man may be in this world, who is the
contrive against him. Christian who assiduously serves God, zealous to do a
good works and deeds.
But whatever the ‘rulers’
might say—whether They vilify him, saying: ‘Let us lay in wait for him, let
worldly or spiritual us obstruct him, let us prevent him from doing what
ones— . . . he wishes, let us wear him out mentally, let us break
his spirit with frequent and sudden set-backs. And if
God wishes to test this man’s righteousness, let us ask
to carry out the trial!’
V23a/row 7 Nor indeed could they have inflicted the many trials
he endured on such a prophet unless God had
allowed them to, in order to test his soldier so as to
crown him with greater glory. Who roused king Saul
against David if not an evil spirit (as we read), who
was aggrieved that he was shut out every time David
soothed the king’s mind and soul either with the
sound of his harp or with the ‘cords and strings’ of his
good counsels and deeds (1Sam. 16.23)? Who
aroused the wickedness of Doeg the Syrian, that he
should betray a holy man and repay the kindness of
hospitality with a priestly massacre (2Sam. 22.9–18)?
Who incited the passion of Amnon that he should
bring incest into a prophet’s house, and distress his
father’s soul: the former by lustful incest, the latter by
(continued )
 Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

misconduct (2Sam. 13.1-2)? Who prophesied to

others, but could not foresee the evil in his own
house? Who equipped Absalom’s rage with arms so
that he would bar his father from his house, and
pursue him in a parricidal combat (2Sam. 15.14)? But
while the Saint [David] was yet inferior to his son in
force of arms, he extinguished the devil’s burning
darts against him by this one thing: that while his son
sought the death of his father, the latter still, with
devoted affection, commanded his son’s life be saved.
V24a/row1 But a steadfast faith has scorned this congress of 46. So the princes of the people like Ahithophel and
princes and these belittling utterances. the other war leaders sat [in council] (2Sam. 15.31).
The princes of the people did business with Absalom
against the Prophet [David] (2Reg. 15.31). That is
why he says: Indeed princes have sat [in council]
against me, and vilified me,
For there follows: . . . but your servant is occupied . . . but your servant has meditated on your
with your judgements. judgements.
V24a/row2 In other words although they harass him, and Let us assess the armoury of a righteous man, by
although every means of punishment hampers him, which he repulses all onslaughts of adversaries. He
his spirit continues to be occupied with God’s says somewhere else: They surrounded me and
judgements. assaulted me without a cause: they maligned me rather
than loved me: but I prayed (Ps. 108.3–4). He says this
because he was zealous: but he was not zealous to
practise the youthful arts of war and entrap an enemy
by bold ruse, with the aim of overcoming someone
that he could see. Rather, he waged war against those
whom he could *not* see. It was more his devotion to
God than his bodily strength which did the fighting.
He campaigned ‘in God’s judgements’ so that he
might wound the devil with a counterthrust.
 21. But, as I already discussed above (TrPs118, 2.11), The devil, with warlike distractions, tried to divert
being occupied in judgements and contemplating him away from attention to justice and application to
testimonies means the following. With works of the devotion; but he all the more busied himself with
Law one can be occupied in material achievements by godly works and a rhythm of meditations. So the
being occupied in judgements; but by contemplating Lord protected the man who hoped in him, the man
testimonies, we somehow make ourselves ready for he spoke to, and held fast to with all fondness.
contemplation of eternal goods by contemplating
present things.
. . . the righteous man does For the righteous man either speaks with God by
nothing other than speak in praying, or speaks about divine works by praising:
the Lord’s judgements; and he always speaks about God’s works, lest his
mouth should speak about men’s works.
. . . for the righteous man The righteous man speaks about nothing earthly, and
speaks nothing earthly. does no merely mortal work.
V24b The Psalmist shows how this contemplation of 47. So he says: Indeed your testimonies are my
testimonies arises. For he added: Your judgements meditation, and your justifications determine my
determine my plans. plans.
That is, every concern in his life and every inclination You perceive what he teaches, namely that these
of his many different plans all focus on God’s should be a righteous man’s plans: that he should
judgements, in Christ Jesus, to whom be glory and meditate on God’s commands, and apply himself to
honour for ever and ever. Amen. God’s praises and prophecies, and that he should
always demonstrate the Lord’s justice. Whoever does
what God commands, the things he believes please
God, demonstrates God’s justice. We can understand
this from the Gospel reading where the Evangelist
says that the Pharisees scorned God’s counsel as they
were not baptized with John’s baptism (Lk. 7.30).
(continued )
Origen (Palestinian Catena) Hilary Ambrose

This is in one Gospel, but you have it in another: they

did not justify God, because they did not wish to be
baptized. When John said, I should be baptized by
you; yet are you coming to me?, the Lord replied: Just
let it be. For thus we should fulfil all righteousness (Mt.
3.14–15). Whoever does God’s commands
demonstrates God’s justice, because he is being
just: and it is good that men’s counsels should follow
God’s counsel, because God’s counsel is always
unerring, whereas many of our counsels are shown to
have been incorrect with hindsight.
 Select Bibliography

Primary Texts
Primary Texts: Hilary
Collectanea Antiariana Parisina (or, Fragmenta Historica). Ed. A. Feder (1916)
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Primary Texts: Catenae and Fragments of Patristic Psalms Commentaries

Catena, Arabic. Ed. Caubert Iturbe, F. J. (1969, 1970) La Cadena Árabe del Evangelio
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Fragments, Apollinaris of Laodicea and Didymus the Blind. Ed. Mühlenberg,
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Primary Texts: Other

Ambrose of Milan Expositio Psalmi 118 (Commentary on Psalm 118). Trans.
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 General Index

Accountability, see Moral responsibility Change in human nature 70, 82, 88–90, 92,
Adam 69–73, 83–4, 86–8, 91–7, 104, 130–1, 94–7, 103–9, 144, 146–8, 150, 155–7, 173,
150–4, 164–8, 170–2 177–8
Allegory, see Hermeneutic Christ 4–5, 10, 11, 13, 45, 57, 60, 67, 97, 112,
Ambrose 117, 129, 162, 164, 168, 170
Commentary/Exposition on In exegesis 24, 26, 34, 35, 87
Ps.118: 22–8, 32–6 Likeness/image 6, 7, 67–75, 80
Doctrines of Creation and Fall 47–50, Origin/birth 5, 7, 145, 148–9, 152–4,
76–80, 84–8 173
Independence from Hilary 28–30 Suffering 4, 59, 65, 101, 112–13, 161
Anthropological Change, see Change Teaching 51, 88, 109, 128
Anthropological Household 88–92, 95, 97, Temptation 83–4, 90–1
101, 103, 118–19, 122, 124, 151, 153–7, See also Exegesis: Hands of God
173–4, 183–4 Cicero 9, 41, 58, 102, 119, 132, 141
Anthropology Concupiscence 169, 175–6
‘Anthropological Parents’ 88–90, 91–2, Constraint, see Will
95–6, 103–9, 154–5 ‘Correcting’ theology 34–8, 49–50, 63–5,
Dichotomous anthropology (body & 76–80, 84–8, 138–42, 161–4
soul) 40–6, 63–6 Creation 13, 44–53, 76–7, 93, 118, 145–6, 173,
Different articulations in Hilary 10–12, 175
63–5, 71–6, 159–61 ‘Double creation’ (two stages) 41, 44–8, 49,
See also Body; Creation; Soul; Will 64, 73–5
Apatheia 4, 133, 139–42, 163 Ex nihilo 44–5, 131, 145
Augustine 3, 7–8, 12, 18, 45, 91, 95, 145, Image and likeness 68–72
168–81 Procreation 51–3, 148–52
Citing Hilary 168–73, 177–8
Original sin 144–51, 153, 168–79 Disobedience (infidelitas) 10, 82, 89–92,
Reception of Origen 7–8, 12, 179–81 94–8, 103–9, 113, 123, 127, 147, 151, 154,
Similarities to Hilary 173–7 156, 158, 174
Will 99, 101, 103–4, 109, 112, 115, 120–3, See also Anthropology (‘Anthropological
173, 176–7 Parents’)
Autonomy (autexousion) 114–19, 121
‘Eastern’ vs. ‘Western’ thought (or Greek vs.
Baptism 70–1, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107–8, 118, Latin) 10–12, 40–3, 67–8
122–3, 150, 154, 155–7, 164, 173 Eclecticism 42, 56–7
Basil of Ancyra 4, 6, 152 Emotions, see Passions
Body Eph’ hēmin, see Will
Corrupting the soul 40–3, 60–6, Epictetus 103, 114, 115, 119–23
128–33, 145–6, 151–2, 164–6, Epiphanius 6–7, 13, 18, 77, 79, 80, 85,
170–3 162–3, 165
Earth/mud 44–7, 51–3, 55–60, 63–4, 84–8, Evagrius 19, 31, 118–19, 124, 135, 140–1
90, 92–3, 97, 111, 130, 132, 146, 164 Evil, problem of 99–100, 114–16, 120
Integrated with soul 42–3, 53–6, 57–60,
63–4, 73–4, 104–5, 108 Fall 6–7, 37, 82–98, 116–19, 150–2, 168
Prison of soul 41–2, 57–8, 64, 93–4 Causes 91–2
Transformation in glory 54–6, 61–2, Effects 92–8, 103–10, 116–19, 124, 145–8,
69–73, 156–7 154–6, 172–4
Weakness/infirmity 46–7, 63–5 Loss of image 37, 76–80
See also Anthropology Scriptural narrative 83–4
240 General Index
Fall (cont.) Origen 5–7, 17–23, 161–4
Supramundane 6, 37, 38, 84–8, 161–2, Apatheia 139–42
164–6, 175 Body & soul 47–50, 59–60
See also Anthropological Household; Constraint 121
Change; Sin; Will Creation 47–50, 164–8, 175
Freedom, see Will Fall (supracelestial) 84–8, 164–8
Image theology 67–8, 74–80
General Resurrection, see Last Times Original sin 117–18, 150, 153, 164–6,
Glorification, see Body (Transformation in 179–81
glory) Propatheiai 135–7
Will 111–12, 121–4
Hilary Origin (origo) 5, 7, 45, 57, 95–7, 108, 110–11,
Bridge between Augustine and Origen 8, 144–50, 154–5, 156, 158, 168, 171–2,
12, 179–81 173, 175
De Trinitate 6, 10, 59, 71, 74, 77, 148, 152, Christ 152–4
153, 159, 167–8, 180 Original sin 117–18, 144–58, 164–8, 173–7,
Differences across works 10–12, 63–5, 179–81
71–6, 159–61 African doctrine 8, 177, 181–2
In Matthaeum 10–12, 159–61 Differences between Hilary and
Life 1–5 Augustine 144, 177–9
Modifying Origen 32–3, 36–8, 47–50,
71–80, 84–8, 139–42, 161–4, 166–8 Palestinian Catena 12, 19–21
Tractatus super Psalmos 10–12, 15–17, Nicetas 20, 26, 31
23–38, 159–61 Creation 47–50
Use by Augustine 168–79, 177–9 Passions 4, 13, 82, 94–6, 97, 99, 103, 114–16,
Hermeneutics 34–6 120–1, 126–36, 146, 155, 160–1, 163, 166,
Allegory 10–11, 34, 67, 88, 91, 162, 167 168, 177
Doxology 22 Instability 109, 128–131
‘Heavenly’ and ‘Earthly’ man 49, 60, 68–76, Motions/movements 127–8
156, 167–8 See also Apatheia; Will (Constraint)
Human nature, see Anthropology; Change Pelagian Controversy 7, 153, 159, 168–9,
175–6, 178, 180
Image of God 6, 13, 37, 44–5, 60, 67–81, 84, Perfectibility 37, 168–9, 178
114, 168 Platonic thought 9, 12, 13, 35, 67, 74, 101,
Ad imaginem 71–3 115, 121, 123, 146, 165, 179
Including physical body 73–4 Body and soul 40–3, 46, 56–66, 132,
Lost at Fall 37, 76–80, 162–3, 168 159–60
Instability, see Passions Proairesis, see Will
Infidelitas, see Disobedience Propatheiai, see Stoicism
Irenaeus 7, 47, 68, 70, 75–6, 80–1, 97, 99,
114–16, 156 Resurrection, see Last Times

Jerome 2–4, 6–7, 10, 15–17, 18, 21, 27, Scriptural exegesis
33, 38, 77, 128, 137, 141, 163, 180 Babylon 94, 154–5, 166–7
Hands of God 6, 37, 44–5, 47–50,
Last Times 54–6, 61, 69–71, 74, 77, 80, 110, 67, 162
123, 156–7, 177 Peter’s mother-in-law 92, 95, 106
Law 25, 34–6, 45, 48, 91, 93–4, 100, 104, 114, Righteous Pharisee 23, 26,
117, 130, 147, 149, 168, 171, 172, 174, 177 29–30
Wedding Banquet 102, 110
Marcellus of Ancyra 4–5 See also Anthropological Household
Moral responsibility 109–12, 120, 135–6, Seneca 41–2, 58, 136
138–9, 142, 174–5, 177 Sin 145–8
Motions/movements, see Passions Cause 145–6
Corporate sinfulness 7, 150–1, 160, 164
Nature, see Anthropology; Change Hereditary 151–3, 158, 173, 178, 181
 General Index 241
Universal 76, 93–4, 144–5, 150, 164–6, 177 ‘Trigger’ words in translation 28–30, 38
See also ‘Anthropological Parents’; Vorlage 26–8, 32, 35, 36, 38, 47–9
Original Sin See also Correcting theology
Soul Trinitarian Controversy 1–6
Bird metaphor 57–8, 63–4 See also Scriptural exegesis (Hands of God)
Corporeal 43, 53–6, 63
Corrupted by body 60–7, 153–4 Vorlage, see Translation
Distinct from will 101–2
Instigating sin 62–3 Will 13, 62–3, 97, 99–125, 132, 163, 166–7,
Integrated with body 42–3, 56 173–7, 178, 179
Pre-exists body 73–4, 175 As anthropological component 41, 51, 65,
Rational and self-moving 44–50 96, 101, 103–9, 113, 122–3, 145, 156–7
‘Separable’ from body 41–3, 57–60, As personality 101–2, 115, 118, 122–4, 167
63–6, 74 Competent/empowered 100–3
Statistics 20, 33, 112–13 Constraint 13, 93–4, 115–16, 129–30, 147,
Stoicism 4, 9, 12–14, 40–2, 54, 56–60, 65, 99, 160, 174
102, 115–16, 118, 126, 160, 177 Early Christian thought 100, 114–22
Dualism 42, 58–9 Eph’ hēmin 111, 120
Mental processes 119–22, 131–3 Fallen/enslaved 7, 13, 88–9, 92, 95, 103–9,
Propatheiai 135–7 116–19, 151, 153
Will 115, 119–25 Freedom from passions 102–3, 120, 123
See also Apatheia; Thoughts; Will Freedom to act 102–3, 119, 142–3
Initium fidei 13, 99, 111–13, 124–5, 144,
Tertullian 7–8, 41, 54, 68–76, 80, 94–5, 99, 157, 174
102, 113–16, 130, 149–50, 153 Lex voluntatis 104
Thoughts (cogitationes) 116, 124, 126, 132, Proairesis 115, 118, 120–4, 132
134–9, 142, 167, 177 Process of human action 113–14, 122,
Translation technique 31–3, 163–4 131–3, 140
Explanation of Greek terms 20, 30–1 Several wills 104–5, 174
Heliodore 3, 16–17 Statistics 112–13
Jerome 16–17, 32 See also Augustine; Autonomy; Stoicism