G.R. No. 182648. June 17, 2015.

HERMAN MEDINA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Theft; Theft is committed by any person who,

with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of
another without the latterÊs consent.·Theft is committed by any
person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latterÊs consent. As defined and
penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was taking of
personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the
taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the
consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished without
the use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon
things. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing
subject of asportation. Although proof as to motive for the crime is
essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent
to gain is the usual motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of
useful property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.
Same; Denials; Denial is considered with suspicion and always
received with caution because it is inherently weak and unreliable,
easily fabricated and concocted.·As against the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, MedinaÊs mere
denials cannot prevail for being self-serving and uncorroborated.
Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with
caution because it is inherently weak and unreliable, easily
fabricated and concocted. Denial, essentially a negation of a fact,
does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus,
courts · both trial and appellate · have generally viewed the
defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not
with outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the
recognition that denial is

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 * THIRD DIVISION.

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66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. People

inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse

too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of
consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative
and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and
has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; In the absence of any
evidence that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper
motives, the trial courtÊs assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
shall not be interfered with by the Supreme Court (SC).·Medina did
not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the
absence of any evidence that the prosecution witnesses were
motivated by improper motives, the trial courtÊs assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses shall not be interfered with by this
Court.
Criminal Law; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law;
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into consideration
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).·Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which,
taking into consideration the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the RPC. As the value of the auto parts
stolen from Lim is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable is
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by Article 309, which
is the maximum of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Since the penalty prescribed is composed of only two
periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division into three equal
portions the time included in the penalty, forming one period of each
of the three portions.
Same; Same; Same; The minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering
any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime.·The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to
that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any
modifying circumstance atten-

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Medina vs. People

dant to the commission of the crime. In this case, the penalty

next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense is prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, or anywhere
from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day to Six (6)
years. Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6)
months and Twenty-One (21) days of prisión correccional, as
minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of
prisión mayor, as maximum.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Lazaro, Castillo, Dela Cruz & Associates Law Offices
for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

PERALTA,** J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
January 7, 2008 Decision1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 29634,
which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City,
Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner
Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple theft,
defined and penalized under Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

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* * Designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2059 dated

June 17, 2015.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate
Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel
G. Tijam, concurring; Rollo, pp. 264-272.
2 CA Rollo, p. 129.
3 Rollo, pp. 209-215.

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68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Medina vs. People

The Information4 filed against Medina states:

That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime
thereafter, in the City of Santiago, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal, and carry away the following to wit: one (1) unit
alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00, battery
worth Php2,500.00[,] and two (2) sets of tire 2.75 x 15 with mugs
worth Php10,000.00 all valued at Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY
LIM, represented by PURITA LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of
the owner thereof in the total amount of Php22,500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW[.]

The factual antecedents appear as follows:

Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago
City, Isabela. He is the registered owner of a Sangyong
Korando Jeep with Plate No. WPC 207, which was involved
in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On
April 27, 2002, he engaged the services of Medina, who is a
mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista,
Santiago City, Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered
to MedinaÊs shop, it was still in running condition and
serviceable because the underchassis was not affected and
the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts
were still functioning.
A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on
the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita
Lim (Purita), LimÊs sister, instructed Danilo Beltran
(Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from MedinaÊs shop on the
agreement that he would instead repair the vehicle in his
own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the
jeep since its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with
rims worth P5,000.00,

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4 Id., at pp. 56-57.

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Medina vs. People
 P5,000.00, P2,500.00, and P10,000.00, respectively,
could not be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he
took and installed them on LimÊs another vehicle, an Isuzu
pickup, which was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran
went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to
get the jeep, but without the missing parts. He had it towed
and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing the
jeep therein, he reported the incident to Purita. Later, the
jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running
condition.
On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint5 for simple
theft was filed by Purita, representing her brother. The
City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.6
Subsequently, an Information was filed before the court a
quo.
In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No
settlement, stipulation or admission was made by the
parties during the pretrial.8 During the trial proper,
Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution, while Medina and a certain Angelina
Tumamao, a former barangay kagawad of Buenavista,
Santiago City, testified for the defense. Eventually, the case
was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of
evidence by the defense.9
The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the March 31, 2005
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the

accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and considering the
absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months

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5 Id., at p. 60.
6 Id., at pp. 58-59.
7 Records, pp. 98-99.
8 Id., at p. 115.
9 Id., at pp. 160-162.

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70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. People
 and twenty-one (21) days of prisión correccional as minimum, to
eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prisión mayor as
maximum. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim
the total amount of P22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.10

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina.

While the trial court was not convinced with MedinaÊs
justification that he installed the jeepÊs missing parts to the
pickup also owned by Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is
„so lame and flimsy.‰ The CA agreed with the lower courtÊs
findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more
valuable than the pickup; that unlike the pickup, the
needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that
Medina failed to prove that the pickup was completely
repaired and was placed in good running condition; and
that he failed to prove that the pickup is owned by Lim.
The CA also held that the positive testimony of Beltran
deserves merit in contrast with the self-serving testimony
of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to MedinaÊs
assertion that the missing auto parts were turned over to
Crispin Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim.
For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled that such claim
was unsubstantiated in view of MedinaÊs failure to formally
offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt.
Assuming that the exception in Mato Vda. de Oñate v. CA11
is taken into account, the receipt could not still be
considered because it was not incorporated in the records of
the case.
When his motion for reconsideration was denied,
Medina filed this petition which alleges the following
errors:

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10 Rollo, p. 215.
11 Mato Vda. de Oñate v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116149,
November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 283.

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Medina vs. People

I.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION ONLY
PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THEIR
ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. WORST, IT SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED
ONLY ONE SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS DANILO BELTRAN
THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO
(2) PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE
KORANDO JEEP WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
II.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED NOT
ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE BUT ON THE
WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE RULING
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN PHILIPPINES V. ALVARIO.
III.
THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO
FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN THE
CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF AT
ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ABUNDO V.
SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE UNREBUTTED
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.

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Medina vs. People

IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT „2‰ FOR
THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT „C‰ FOR THE
PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT FORMALLY
OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE
OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THE
GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS
PROVIDED FOR BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA,
SR. V. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.12
 We deny.
Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain, but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latterÊs consent.13 As defined and
penalized, the elements of the crime are: (1) there was
taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to
another; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain; (4) the
taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the
taking was accomplished without the use of violence
against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things.14
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the
thing subject of asportation.15 Although proof as to motive
for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is
circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual

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12 Rollo, pp. 25-27.

13 Revised Penal Code, Art. 308, par. 1.
14 See People v. Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761, April 18, 2012, 670
SCRA 130, 140-141; Beltran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 662 Phil. 296, 310-
311; 646 SCRA 728, 741 (2011); and Laurel v. Abrogar, 596 Phil. 45, 56;
576 SCRA 41, 50 (2009).
15 Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013, 712 SCRA
622, 631-632 and Philippine National Bank v. Tria, G.R. No. 193250,
April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 440, 453.

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Medina vs. People

motive to be presumed from all furtive taking of useful

property appertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the
perpetrator.16 As to the concept of „taking‰ ·

The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of

theft under the penal code is that it be capable of appropriation. It
need not be capable of „asportation,‰ which is defined as „carrying
away.‰ Jurisprudence is settled that to „take‰ under the theft
provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying
away.
To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.
The word „take‰ in the Revised Penal Code includes any act
intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed
through the use of the offendersÊ own hands, as well as any
mechanical device x x x.17

In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation

the taking of the jeepÊs alternator, starter, battery, and two
tires with magwheels, but he put up the defense that they
were installed in the pickup owned by Lim.18 With such
admission, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to
prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken.
Upon perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes, the
Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the
burden. Even bearing in mind the testimony of Tumamao,
he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of
supporting documentary evidence or corroborative
testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the
pickup; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were exactly the
same items that were placed in the pickup; (3) Lim
consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto
parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare
parts from the jeep and their placement to the pickup.
Neither did

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16 Beltran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14 at pp. 313-314; p.

744.
17 Laurel v. Abrogar, supra note 14 at pp. 57-58; pp. 51-52.
18 TSN, July 26, 2004, pp. 15, 22-23, 36-37.

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Medina vs. People

Medina adduce any justifying19 or exempting20

circumstance to avoid criminal liability.
On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he
entrusted to Medina the jeepÊs repair it was still in running
condition and complete with alternator, starter, battery,
and tires, which went missing by the time the vehicle was
recovered from the auto shop.21 Likewise, the testimony of
Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that
he was not able to get the jeep in the morning of September
4, 2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two
tires with rims could not be found, and that when he asked
Medina as to their whereabouts the latter told him that he
took them, placed the starter in LimÊs pickup while the
alternator was in the repair shop.22 Medina informed him
that the jeepÊs missing parts were actually installed to
LimÊs other vehicle which was also being repaired at the
time.23 However, Beltran did not know or had not seen
other vehicles owned by Lim at MedinaÊs shop.24 In the
afternoon of the same day, he was able to get the jeep but
not its missing parts.25 He concluded that they were lost
because he inspected the jeep.26
Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,27 which was relied upon by
Medina, does not apply. In said case, the element of lack of
ownerÊs consent to the taking of the junk chassis was
absent since the records showed that Abundo made a
request in writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis
among the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was
granted. A memorandum receipt was issued and signed.
Pursuant thereto, the

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19 Revised Penal Code, Art. 11.

20 Id., Art. 12.
21 TSN, April 12, 2004, pp. 9-13.
22 TSN, January 19, 2004, pp. 7-9.
23 TSN, January 26, 2004, p. 8.
24 Id., at pp. 8-9.
25 TSN, January 19, 2004, pp. 9-11.
26 TSN, January 26, 2004, p. 16.
27 G.R. No. 97880, January 15, 1992, 205 SCRA 193.

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Medina vs. People

chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or

unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession
of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his
request, with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the
Government, represented by the public officials who had
legal and physical possession of it. We noted that the crime
of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there
can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the
possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the
observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not
ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the
property is not felonious.28
Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a
purported acknowledgment receipt29 that he and Tumamao
identified during their presentation as witnesses for the
defense. According to his testimony, Mendoza came to his
(MedinaÊs) place and saw the subject auto parts while being
transferred from the jeep to the pickup and that, relative
thereto, Medina even called barangay officials and let them
signed a document to bear witness on the matter.30 The
document, dated July 25, 2002, which was marked as
Exhibit „2,‰ was signed by Mendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to
be LimÊs chief mechanic), Mario Pascual (said to be
MedinaÊs helper), and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao
(said to be barangay kagawads). Ostensibly, they signed
the document while facing each other in front of MedinaÊs
house.31
In Mato Vda. de Oñate v. CA,32 which referred to People
v.

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28 Id., at p. 198, citing Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., p. 192,
citing the cases of United States v. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000, 1007 (1922);
Isaac 51 O.G. 2410.
29 Rollo, p. 252.
30 TSN, July 26, 2004, pp. 22-23.
31 Id., at pp. 23-27.
32 Supra note 11 at p. 287.

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Medina vs. People

Napat-a,33 citing People v. Mate,34 We relaxed the

application of Section 34, Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court
by allowing the admission of evidence not formally offered.
To be admissible, however, two essential conditions must
concur: first, the same must have been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and second, the same must have
been incorporated in the records of the case.36
As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was
not considered by the trial court because it was not
formally offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by
the defense testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt
itself was not incorporated in the case records. For its part,
the CA opined that nowhere from the case records does
MedinaÊs acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon
examination, it appears that the July 25, 2002
acknowledgment receipt was attached as Annex „3‰ of
MedinaÊs AppellantÊs Brief.37 Accordingly, the CA should
have mulled over this piece of document, especially so since
the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the
trial proper that said receipt be marked as Exhibit „C.‰38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the
acknowledgment receipt, the same would still not
exonerate Medina. This is due to his admission that
Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him
remove the alternator,

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33 258-A Phil. 994; 179 SCRA 403 (1989).

34 191 Phil. 72; 103 SCRA 484 (1981).
35 SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.·The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified.
36 See also Barut v. People, G.R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014, 736
SCRA 313; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. United Salvage and
Towage (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 197515, July 2, 2014, 729 SCRA 113; Heirs
of Romana Saves v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, 646 Phil. 536, 544; 632
SCRA 236, 246 (2010); and Ramos v. Dizon, 529 Phil. 674, 688-689; 498
SCRA 17, 31 (2006).
37 CA Rollo, p. 65.
38 TSN, September 1, 2004, p. 20.

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Medina vs. People

starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and
put the same to the pickup.39 Likewise, while Medina
asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was shown
that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep
to the pickup, the latter was not presented as a hostile
witness to confirm such expedient claim.
As against the positive and categorical testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, MedinaÊs mere denials cannot
prevail for being self-serving and uncorroborated. Denial is
considered with suspicion and always received with caution
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, easily
fabricated and concocted.40

Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an

affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus, courts · both trial and
appellate · have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal
cases with considerable caution, if not with outright rejection. Such
judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is
inherently weak and unreliable by virtue of its being an excuse too
easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of
consideration at all, denial should be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative
and self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and
has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.41

Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill

motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely
testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the

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39 TSN, July 26, 2004, pp. 37-39.

40 People v. Gallemit, G.R. No. 197539, June 2, 2014, 724 SCRA 359,
citing People v. Ocden, G.R. No. 173198, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 124,
145.
41 People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014, 727 SCRA 257.

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78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. People

prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper

motives, the trial courtÊs assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses shall not be interfered with by this Court.42
There being no compelling reason to disregard the same,
the Court yields to the factual findings of the trial court,
which were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the
precept that when the trial courtÊs findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally
conclusive and binding upon Us.43 It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked
material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and
evaluate the factual findings of the court below.44 As held
in Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals:45

It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual

findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and authority
(Macua v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the
Court of Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to it, its findings of facts being conclusive. (Chan v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737)
 In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the
jurisdiction of this Court is confined to reviewing questions of law,
unless the factual findings are totally bereft of support in the
records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious
abuse of discretion. (Canete, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 13)
Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the Supreme Court are not
a matter of right but of sound judi-

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42 People v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 382,
409.
43 See Cruz v. People, 586 Phil. 89, 102; 564 SCRA 99, 113 (2008).
44 Ringor v. People, supra note 15 at p. 633.
45 No. L-48700, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 5.

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cial discretion and are allowed only on questions of law and only
when there are special and important reasons, which we do not find
in this case. (Balde v. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365)46

Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial

court:
Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of
simple theft when the value of the stolen property exceeds
P22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:

Art. 309. Penalties.·Any person guilty of theft shall be

punished by:
1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the
value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed
in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand
pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.47

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which,
taking into consideration the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the RPC.48 As the value of
the auto parts stolen from Lim is in excess of P22,000.00,
the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by Article 309, which is the maximum of
prisión mayor in its minimum

_______________

46 Id., at p. 11.
47 Emphasis ours.
48 Beltran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 14 at p. 320; p. 751.

80

80 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Medina vs. People

and medium periods. Since the penalty prescribed is

composed of only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC
requires the division into three equal portions the time
included in the penalty, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Thus, the minimum, medium, and
maximum periods of the penalty prescribed are:

Minimum – 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months

Medium – 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months
Maximum – 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years

The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be

anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime.49 In this case, the penalty next
lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense is prisión
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, or
anywhere from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1)
day to Six (6) years.
Thus, the trial court did not err when it sentenced
Medina to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3)
years, Six (6) months and Twenty-One (21) days of prisión
correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8)
months and One (1) day of prisión mayor, as maximum.50
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
DENIED. The January 7, 2008 Decision and April 21, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
 29634, which affirmed in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago City,
Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021 convicting Herman
Medina for the crime of simple theft, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

_______________

49 Id.
50 See People v. Gungon, 351 Phil. 116, 142; 287 SCRA 618, 643
(1998).

81

VOL. 759, JUNE 17, 2015 81

Medina vs. People

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin,*** Del Castillo,**** Reyes and Jardeleza,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.·The use of Philippine Long Distance Telephone

CompanyÊs (PLDTÊs) communications facilities without its
consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and
business. (Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People, 713
SCRA 18 [2014])
When a person has possession of a stolen property, he
can be disputably presumed as the author of the theft.
(People vs. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728 [2014])
··o0o··

_______________

* ** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Martin S.

Villarama, Jr., per Raffle dated June 8, 2015.
* *** Designated acting member, in lieu of Associate Justice Pres​-
bitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 2060 dated June 17, 2015.

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