4COO

'Britain's Crisis of Confidence': How Whitehall Planned Britain's Retreat from the extra-

EuropeanWorld, 1959-1968.

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirementsfor the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Stirling.

ROSS CHRISTIE

November 2004.

ýS
061
 i

Contents.

Abstract. iv

Declaration. vA

Acknowledgements. vii

List of Abbreviations. ix

List of Tables. xiii

Introduction. 1

Chapter I: The Whitehall Policy-Making Apparatus, 1959-1968. 36

Ministers and Officials. 38

The'Overseas' Departments. 42

The Creation of a Unified Ministry of Defence. 53

The Treasury and the 'Overseas' Departments. 58

The Cabinet and its Committees. 66

Summary. 70

Chapter II: The Macmillan Government's, 'Future Policy Study, 1960- 71

1970'.

The International Economic Environmentand Britain's World Role. 76

Resources and Overseas Expenditure. 85

The Three Circles. 95

Britain's Extra-EuropeanRole. 103

The Reaction of Ministers and Officials. 111

Summary. 117
 11

Chapter III: British Policy Towards Africa, 1959-1968.119

'Africa: The Next Ten Years': A Policy Agenda for the 1960s? 121

Britain and the Continuing Problem of Apartheid. 139

An Economic Price Not Worth Paying: A Colombo-StylePlan for Africa. 143

The Ramificationsof South Africa's Departure from the Commonwealth. 147

British Policy Towards Sub-SaharanAfrica: The View of the 'Overseas' 151

Departments.

Assessing the 'Balance of Advantage' between South Africa and 155

CommonwealthAfrica.

A Post-IndependencePax Britannica in East Africa? 165

'A Position of Secondary ImportanceAmong our Interests in the World'. The 169

Labour Government'sWithdrawal from Africa: 1964-1968.

Summary. 190

Chapter IV: British Policy in the Middle East, 1959-1968.192

Britain's Main Interests and Obligations in the Middle East. 194

The Decision to Act UnilaterallyAgainst Iraq, 1961.198

A Questioning of the Kuwait Commitment? 201

South Arabia and Aden: A Seemingly Intractable Problem. 205

The Treasury's Losing Battle to end Britain's Middle East Role. 217

Michael Cary's Review of Britain's Role East of Suez, 1963.221

The Foreign Office's Case for Retaining Britain's Position in the Middle East. 226

The Policy of the Labour Government on Assuming Office: 1964-1965.229

The Defence Reviews -A Decisive Change in Policy: 1964-1967.241

Britain's Final Withdrawal from South Arabia, 1967-68.252

The Final Decision to Withdraw from the Middle East, 1967-68.255

 iii

Summary. 261

Chapter V: British Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1959-1968. 264

Britain's Principal Geo-Political Interests in South-East Asia. 266

The Malaysian Scheme: An InauspiciousBeginning? 271

The Problemsof 'Overstretch'. 276

The Conservative'sQuestioning of the SEATO Commitment. 280

A Decision Deferred:The Problem of IndonesianConfrontation. 282

The Foreign Office Planning Staff Review, 1964. 293_

American Influence on the Policy of the Labour Government, 1964-1966. 298

A Revision of Britain's South-East Asian Role: The Defence Reviews, 1965- 307

1967.

'Never Glad Confident Morning Again': The Impact of Devaluation. 326

Summary. 334

Conclusion. 337

Dramatis Personae. 349

Appendix (I): Future Policy Ad Hoc Committee Structure. 365

Appendix (II): Principal Holders of Office, 1959-1968.366

Appendix (Ill): Ministry of Defence: After 1964 Reorganisation. 369

Bibliography. 370
 iv

Abstract.

This thesis attempts to give an account of how Whitehall planned Britain's withdrawal

from extra-Europeancommitmentsin the years 1959-1968,demonstratingthat foreign

policy developmentwas essentially a cross-departmentalprocess, involving a

synthesis of views articulated by the Treasury, Board of Trade, Ministry of Defence,

Colonial Office, CommonwealthRelations Office, as well as the Foreign Office. More

specifically,the thesis is concerned with the direct effects of the interplay of different

departmental policies on British retrenchmentfrom Africa, the Middle East, and the Far

East. Most accounts of how ministers and officials approachedthe subject of

withdrawal from international commitmentslack any substantive analysis of

documentary evidence, a fact attributable to the 'thirty-year rule'. Many academic

works also contain a reference to 'delusions of grandeur' as the main explanation as to

why Whitehall guided a tentative course in extracting Britain from its remaining

overseas obligations. By examiningWhitehall's attempts to review future policy,

usually on an inter-departmentalbasis, this thesis questions the commonly held

assumption that an outdated imperial sentiment permeated the political establishment

until economic reality, namely the devaluation of sterling in November 1967, forced

Britain to confront the fragility of its position. Developing and expanding upon previous

scholarship, this thesis makes a contribution to historical knowledge by providing the

first sustained and unified study of how the highest echelons of Whitehall framed

Britain's long-term strategic aims in the late 1950s and 1960s.

This thesis is a contribution to administrative, diplomatic and military history, and

provokes a number of questions. To what extent, for example, did economic

considerations inform the decisions of leading policy-makers? Did a misjudgmentover

the strength of British 'power' lead to the pursuit of inappropriate foreign policy
 V

objectives? How was foreign policy affected by defence policy? What influence did

the Treasury exert over high foreign policy? Did the influence of civil servants vary

according to policy issues and the personalitiesinvolved? In what ways did the views

of the departments responsiblefor economic matters differ from those in charge of

defence policy on the priority attached to military expenditure? To what extent did the

Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence disagree on matters regarding Britain's

overseas commitmentsand possessions? In answering such questions, this thesis

casts new light on how Whitehall, between 1959 and 1968, reduced the scope of

Britain's internationalcommitments, redirectingthe central thrust of British foreign

policy away from extra-Europeancommitmentstowards Europe.

 vi

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by myself, and that the work

which it embodies has been done by myself and has not been included in any other

thesis.

Signed:

November 2004.
 vi'

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the Student Awards Agency for Scotland (SAAS), the Arts and

HumanatiesResearch Board (AHRB), and the Faculty of Arts, Universityof Stirling, for

funding this doctoral thesis. The basic researchwork for this thesis in London,

Cambridge and Oxford could not have been undertaken had it not been for the

generous decision of the SAAS and AHRB to provide financial assistance for three

years.

For access to archival or written sources, I am grateful to custodians and staff of the

Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; Churchill College, Cambridge;the Library of

Congress,Washington, DC; the National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh;the Public

Record Office, London; Stirling University Library; the Trustees of Harold Macmillan's

papers; and the Executers of Lord Duncan-Sandys'sEstate for permission to access

documents and other material.

I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Professor George Peden, for his tireless

support, advice and encouragement. For reading and commenting upon early drafts of

this thesis, I must also express gratitude to Dr Robert McKean and Dr Richard Whiting.

I would like to thank the staff and research students of the Departmentof History at

Stirling who have given me both encouragementand support over the past three

years. Special thanks must be afforded to Dr Tim Lovering, Dr Mark Nixon, and Mr

David Kaufman, all of who listened to my ideas and offered kind advice.
 vi"

Finally, special thanks should be extended to my family, whose moral and practical

support was of great comfort throughout. In the absence of my parents'

encouragement,I am sure that this thesis would not have been finished.
 ix

List of Abbreviations

TEXT

AMDA Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement

A(O)C Africa (Official) Committee (Cabinet)

ANZAM Australia, New Zealand and Malaya

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and the United States

ATUC Aden Trade Union Congress

BP British Petroleum

CAF CentralAfricanFederation(NorthernRhodesia,Southern

Rhodesia,Nyasaland)

CENTO CentralTreaty Organisation(UK,Turkey,Pakistan,Iran)

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CO ColonialOffice
COS Chief of Staff

CPC ColonialPolicyCommittee(Cabinet)
CPM Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting

CRO Commonwealth Relations Office

DC Defence Committee (Cabinet)

D(O)C Defence (Official) Committee (Cabinet)

DEA Department of Economic Affairs

DOPC Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (Cabinet)

DOP(O)C Defenceand OverseasPolicy(Official)Committee(Cabinet)

DTC Departmentof TechnicalCo-operation

EEC EuropeanEconomicCommunity
FAMA Foundation of Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the
 X

Sahara

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FLOSY Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (Aden)

FO Foreign Office

FOPS Foreign Office Planning Staff

FPC Future Policy Committee

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNP Gross National Product

HMG Her Majesty's Government (UK)

IBRD InternationalBankfor Reconstructionand Development

ISC InternalSecurityCouncil(Singapore)

IMF InternationalMonetaryFund

LTSG Long-TermStudyGroup

MCP MalawiCongressParty

MoD Ministryof Defence

MP Member of Parliament

NATO NorthAtlanticTreaty Organisation

NIBMAR No Independence Before Majority African Rule (Southern

Rhodesia)

NLF National Liberation Front (Aden)

NHS National Health Service

OAU Organisation of African Unity

000C OfficialOverseasCo-ordinatingCommittee

OLOS Organisationfor Liberationof the OccupiedSouth (Aden)

OMD Ministryfor OverseasDevelopment

OPC OverseasPolicyCommittee(DOPCafter July 1963)

 xi

OP(O)C Overseas Policy (Official) Committee

(DOP(O)C after July 1963)

PAP People's Action Party (Singapore)

PM Prime Minister

PKI Indonesian Communist Party

PRO Public Record Office

PSP People's Socialist Party (Aden)

PUS PermanentUnder-Secretary

RAF Royal Air Force

SAF South Arabian Federation

SAFG SouthArabianFederalGovernment

SEATO South-EastAsia Treaty Organisation

TANU Tanganyika African National Union

UAR UnitedArab Republic

UDI UnilateralDeclarationof Independence

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

US UnitedStates

USSR United Soviet Socialist Republics

REFERENCES

BDEE British Documents on the End of Empire

CAB Cabinet Office papers

CLRK Clarkepapers(ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)

Cmd.,Cmnd. Commandpaper
CO Colonial Office papers
 Xll

DO Commonwealth (Relations) Office papers

DSND Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge)

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office papers

FO Foreign Office papers

FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States

GNWR Gordon Walker papers (Churchill College, Cambridge)

HC Deb. House of Commons Debates

HMD Harold Macmillan's Diary (Bodleian Library, University of

Oxford)

HMSO Her Majesty's Stationary Office

NAA National Archives of Australia

PP ParliamentaryPapers

PREM PrimeMinister'sOffice

SELO SelwynLloydpapers(ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)

T Treasurypapers
 X111

List of Tables.

TABLE: 2.1: EstimatedSteel and Electricity Production/FutureGrowth of 78

World Population, 1957-1970.

TABLE: 2.2: Predicted Population Growth Per Annum Between 1960 and 80

1970.

TABLE 2.3: Claims on Gross Domestic Product, 1958. 88

TABLE 2.4: Defence as a Percentageof GNP, 1949-1958. 90

TABLE 3.1: UK Economic Relationswith Africa, 1959-1962. 158

TABLE: 4.1: Defence Expenditure, 1964-65. 242

TABLE 5.1: The Ethnic Make-Up of Malaya and Singapore, 1959. 269
 xiv

it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of
....
defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil

or military establishmentsin time of peace, and endeavor to accommodate her

future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 1776.
 Introduction.

On 5 December 1962, in an address to the West Point Military Academy, Dean

Acheson, US Secretary of State under President Truman, controversially remarked:

'Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role'.' Acheson's

undiplomatic statement was poorly received by many within the highest echelons of

the British political establishment, being described by The Times as a 'swingeing

2
attack'. Harold Macmillan, British Prime Minister between 1957 and 1963, thought

that Acheson's speech was ill-conceived, and by pronouncing that Britain's world role

'was played out' had repeated an error that had 'been made by quite a lot of people in

the course of the last four hundred years, including Philip of Spain, Louis XIV,

Napoleon, the Kaiser and Hitler'.3 With the post-war ascendancy of the United States

and Soviet Union, Macmillan realised the self-evident truth that Britain's position in

international affairs had declined, but believed that through 'interdependence' the UK

could play an influential global role, disproportionate to its actual economic and military

strength. In the early 1960s, two fundamental positions on Britain's international role

existed: the first view, which for short-hand purposes can be termed the 'Achesonian'

perspective, suggested that Britain's global role was peripheral and coming to an end;

the second viewpoint, held by many leading political figures in the UK, was premised

on the conviction that Britain could still act as a major influence in world affairs,

retaining its centuries-long position as a power with trans-oceanic interests.

Academic works, relating to Britain's foreign policy during the period under review,

have tended to lack rigorous analysis of governmental documents, being based, to

varying degrees, on secondary works, memoirs, diaries, and collections of private

' The Times, 6 December 1962. 12. A full text the

p. of speech can be found in The Times, 8 December 1962. p. 8.
2 The Times, 6 December 1962. 12.
p.
3 Harold Macmillan quoted in The Times, 11 Dec. 1962. 11. For further information, see Harold Macmillan's Diary
p.
(hereafter HMD), Department of Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, d. 47, entries for 7 and 9
December 1963.
4 For Macmillan's published
views on Britain's role in world affairs see H. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-61,
(London: Macmillan, 1972) and H. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-63,(London: Macmillan, 1973).
 2

papers. The 'thirty-year rule', which prevents the release of government documents

for that period, has until recently prevented historians from adequately answering a

number of basic in
questions relation to Britain's changing world role. For example,

did leading policy-makers come to accept the 'Achesonian' interpretation of Britain's

international position? To what extent did perceptions within Whitehall change in

regard to the role to be played by Britain in global affairs?

This introductory chapter is divided into six central areas of inquiry. The first

advances a conceptual analysis of the term 'world role', as applied to Britain, and

examines the key issues of 'power', 'policy', and 'diplomacy'. The second area

examines the historiographical debate on the foreign policies of the Macmillan, Home

and Wilson governments, asking whether or not Conservative and Labour

governments held divergent views on what constituted Britain's world role. Thirdly,

consideration is given to the general failure of historians to address the issue of

foreign policy formulation, at the highest levels of Whitehall, in the late 1950s and

1960s; this is highly important, as an exploration of policy development will ultimately

enhance our understanding of the main factors influencing the scope and breadth of

Britain's 'world role'. The fourth section will present a broad-based analysis of the

deficiencies and limitations of the hitherto published works that seek to explain how

and why Britain's geo-political standing changed between 1959 and 1968: Fifthly, a

review of the primary sources used in the process of researching this thesis will be

undertaken. Finally, an examination of the problems associated with studying the

roles of political elites is attempted.

WorldRole: The ConflictbetweenPerceptionand Reality.

Nationalroles, it is arguedby Hans Morgenthau,fall into three main categories,

accordingto whetheror not a state is intent primarilyon keepingpower,increasing

 3

power, or demonstrating power, leading respectively to the adoption of policies of

status quo, imperialism, or prestige.5 If Morgenthau's thesis is applied to British

foreign policy between 1959 and 1968, Britain's role was arguably (at one time or

another) underpinned by all three categories, thus demonstrating the inherent difficulty

in defining what is meant by'role'. Morgenthau's model, therefore, provides a helpful,

but ultimately limited, 'frame of reference' for analysing how Britain's global role

changed during this period. 'Role', for the purpose of this examination, is defined as

'an image of how a state, a government, or an individual thinks it should be acting'

.6
Put simply, Britain's perceived 'role' in international affairs can be understood in terms

of 'expected function'.7 Paul Kennedy's The Realities Behind British Diplomacy argues

that Whitehall's view of Britain's appropriate role, during the late 1950s and 1960s,

was not realistically aligned with the capacity and resources of the UK economy - and,

it might be added, failed to correlate with the views of other nations, notably the United

States and Soviet Union.8 Kennedy's argument is both compelling and coherently

argued; however, he does not adequately address how leading policy-makers dealt

with the twin problems of relative decline and international overstretch. Were senior

civil servants and ministers aware that overseas obligations were incompatible and

inconsistent with Britain's economic capacity? If so, were their divisions within

Whitehall (for example, between the Foreign Office and the Treasury) on how to

address this issue? Were all policy-makers unrealistic about Britain's global position?

Kennedy, along with many other historians, also fails to define what he means by

'Britain' or 'the British'. A. J. P. Taylor once remarked: We [historians] write 'the

British' when we mean [a] few members of the Foreign Office' 9 Taylor was correct
...

5 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power

and Peace, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 85.
e B. Russet
and H. Starr, World Politics and the Menu For Choice, (5th ed). (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co, 1996),
237. Added emphasis.
For similar arguments see D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power In the Twentieth
Century, (London: Longman, 1991), R. Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900-1970,
(London: Fontana, 1991) and F. S. Northedge, Descent from Power British Foreign Policy, 1945-73,(London, Allen
and Unwin, 1974).
e P. Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy:
Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865-1980,(London:
Fontana), p. 375.
A. J. P. Taylor quoted in P. Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Pimlico, 2001), 380.
p.
 4

in asserting that historians usually use phrases like 'the British' or 'Britain' when

referring to the views of a small policy-making elite at the apex of Whitehall, but

wrong in ascribing especial importance to the Foreign Office. Taylor's maxim

therefore requires further refinement and re-definition for the purpose of this thesis:

foreign policy development, in the late 1950s and 1960s, was essentially a cross-

departmental process, involving a synthesis of views articulated by the Treasury,

Board of Trade, Ministry of Defence, Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office,

as well as the Foreign Office. This has led David Reynolds, in his influential study of

British policy and world power in the twentieth century, to propose 'that there was

if
rarely, ever, a unified concept that we can call "British foreign policy"'.10 Various

individuals and departments within government held differing perspectives and

viewpoints as to Britain's appropriate world role, and no historian has to date

adequately explained how these differences were played out and reconciled within

Whitehall.

Reynolds rightly indicates that the definition of 'power' is difficult to pin down, arising

from the fact that it can be defined in two distinct ways." Traditionally, 'power' has

been defined in terms of the sum total of a state's economic and military capacity;

hence, 'power' is a concept that can (to some extent) be measured using certain

tangible criteria, such as population size, military strength, and Gross Domestic

Product (GDP). Throughout the period under examination, policy-makers gave

detailed consideration as to how power, influence and policy were interrelated. In May

1962, for example, Foreign Office civil servants produced a paper, 'The Relationship

between Power and Influence', which suggested that Britain's ability to exert

international influence was limited by economic strength: 'the more the nation

the more it can devote to the instruments of policy'.12

produces... ' , it was argued, '. ..

10Reynolds, op. cit., 54.

p.
11ibid, p. 4
12iThe Relationship between Power
and Influence', 31 May 1962, FO371/166997.
 5

However, a nation that attempts to retain (or develop) a defence capability that does

not correlate with its economic capacity may suffer from 'overstretch', potentially

sowing the seeds of future decline. Kennedy contends that'if too large a proportion of

a state's resources is diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military

purposes, then that is likely to lead to a weakening of national power over the longer
13
term'. With reference to British foreign policy during the late 1950s and 1960s, this

thesis tests Kennedy's proposition. Secondly, 'power' can be viewed in terms of the

ability of one state to influence the policy of another state. Put simply, it can be said

that 'power' has been successfully exerted, if State X can influence State Y to do

something Y would not do in the absence of pressure from X. 'Power, in this sense, is

not necessarily dependent on tangible factors, like military and economic strength, and

can be exercised through 'intangibles' such as reputation, leadership, and diplomatic

skill. Such 'intangible' sources of power depend on the willingness of other states to

recognise these as being of legitimate value. By emphasising Britain's record as a

'good' colonial power, many within Whitehall believed that the UK could bolster its

international standing. On 3 May 1961, for example, Duncan Sandys, Secretary of

State for Commonwealth Relations, attempted to convince Kwame Nkrumah,

President of Ghana (which had achieved independence in 1957), to 'speak well in

public' of Britain's 'colonial record', emphasising that 'our behaviour had been vastly

different from that of, for instance, the Portuguese or Belgians'.14 Others were more

circumspect as to the efficacy of such an approach, with one Foreign Office official

remarking: 'we are not reasonable if we continue to feel surprised and puzzled

because our good colonial record and moral superiority only earn us marginal

toleration'. 15 Were Whitehall policy-makers realistic about Britain's ability to exert

influence in world affairs? Did a misjudgement over the strength of British 'power' lead

13P. Kennedy, The Rise

and Fall of the Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000,
London: Fontana, 1989), p. 549.
4 'Note of Topics the Secretary State Discussed
of with President Nkrumah', 3 May 1961, Sandys papers (Churchill
College, Cambridge) DSND 8/18.
15'The Relationshipbetween Power
and Influence': minute by F. A. Warner, 13 April 1962, FO 371/166997.
 6

to the pursuit of inappropriate foreign policy objectives? Did policy-makers try to retain

a residual world role by exercising 'power' through diplomatic skill and leadership?

Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr argue that 'foreign policy is the output of the state

into the global system'.16 The ambit of foreign policy is therefore extremely wide-

ranging and requires refining for this study. William Wallace's The Foreign Policy

Process in Britain contends that foreign policy can be divided into three fundamental

layers - high policy, sectoral policy, and low "

policy. This thesis examines matters

relating to Britain's 'high' foreign policy aims. Wallace describes high policy issues as

'those, which are seen by policy-makers as affecting Britain's fundamental standing in

the world'.18 Theoretically, high policy objectives should be determined by the Prime

Minister, senior members of the cabinet, the Cabinet Secretary and the permanent

secretaries of the major departments. Historians have yet to test the extent to which

this model applied to British policy-making during the late 1950s and 1960s.

Consideration will also be given to the influence of special advisers, such as Philip de

Zulueta (Macmillan's foreign affairs adviser) and Thomas Balogh (Economic Advisor to

the Cabinet, under Harold Wilson), on thinking within Whitehall.

At this stage, it is perhaps instructive to make a distinction between 'foreign policy

and 'diplomacy'. 'Foreign policy' can be defined as the international objectives that a

state endeavours to achieve, while 'diplomacy' is a method through which these aims

are accomplished. Lord Gore-Booth, former Permanent Under-Secretary to the

Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Head of the Diplomatic Service, summarised

this point well:

Foreign policy is what you do; diplomacy is how you do it. Of course the
two get mixed up especially when a diplomat is advising on policy or a
member of the Government normally engaged in policy discussions takes

1eRussett and Starr,

op. cit., p. 163.
17See W. Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process In Britain, (London: Allen
and Unwin and The Royal Institute of
InternationalAffairs, 1977), p. 8.
8 lbid, p. 11.
 7

over a diplomatic operation which seems to merit top level or summit

discussion. But generally speaking the task of government is to decide
and the task of a diplomat at any level is to try and make the decision
19
work.

Thus, 'foreign policy' and `diplomacy' are distinct, albeit complementary, concepts.

This thesis concentrates on the subject of 'foreign policy', as defined above, focussing

on how global strategy was conceived and developed within Whitehall. This is not to

suggest that the role of diplomats in foreign policy formulation was negligible, but

merely to recognise that it was, generally speaking, of secondary importance.

Nevertheless, where appropriate, this thesis examines, in detail, the influence of

diplomats on the policy process: for example, the role of Lord Selkirk, Britain's chief

diplomat in the Far East, in developing policy towards South-East Asia is considered in

Chapter V. On the whole, however, this is a study of the policy-making apparatus, as

it existed within Whitehall, focusing on the development of policy between

departments, particularly the Foreign Office and the Treasury, and the operation of the

cabinet committee system.

Britain'sMajor ForeignPolicy Objectivesin the Age of Macmillanand Wilson.

The commonly held view of Britain's international role, from the Suez crisis in 1956 to

the devaluation of sterling in 1967, was cogently summarised by lain Macleod,

Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs under Macmillan, in an article for the Spectator,

a magazine he edited, in April 1965:

Alone among America's allies Britain is a member of all the three

collective security alliances: NATO, SEATO and CENTO. Beyond these,
we fulfil widespread defence obligations inside and outside the
Commonwealth. By ourselves in Malaya, and alongside America's

19P. Gore-Booth, With Great Truth

& Respect, (London: Constable, 1974), p. 15.
 preponderant forces in Korea, we have fought Communist aggression
and beaten it back... Meanwhile, in the entire sea area East of Suez

across the India Ocean, the Royal Navy plays the leading role in
safeguarding the free 20
world's commerce and security.

Macleod, along with many other leading politicians of his day, failed to question -

coram populo, at least - why Britain needed to occupy such a leading role in global

affairs. Was Britain not a medium-sized power with a comparatively poorly performing

economy in the mid-1960s? There is considerable agreement among historians that

Britain's perceived role was disconnected with economic and geo-political reality for

much of this period. Bernard Porter's Britain, Europe and the World, 1850-1986:

Delusions of Grandeur contends that the divergence between perception and reality

led to a skewing of priorities, serving to infuse a degree of confusion into the strategic

direction of foreign policy.21 This viewpoint is shared by many leading academics and

outside observers: for example, George Ball, the former US Under-Secretary of State,

wrote that 'the contrast between her [Britain's] accepted position and the power she

could command injected ambiguity into British 22

policy'. F. S. Northedge's book,

Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-73, follows a similar line of

argument, contending that an outdated belief in a British 'world role' permeated

Whitehall, until economic reality forced policy-makers to confront the fragility of

Britain's international position during the late 1960s. 3 Northedge's contention is

appealing on an intuitive level; a lack of empirical evidence, however, ultimately

undermines its academic value. This thesis seeks to identify the extent to which

'delusions of grandeur' pervaded the British political establishment. Were policy-

makers more realistic about Britain's actual international position in camera? Were

civil servants and ministers constrained in addressing this problem by public opinion,

20lain Macleod quoted In J. Frankel, British

Foreign Policy, 1945-1973,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 164.
21B. Porter, Britain, Europe
and the World, 1850-1986,Delusions of Grandeur, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 152.
22G. Ball, The Discipline Power: Essentials
of of a Modem World Structure, (London: Bodley Head, 1968), p. 72.
23Northedge, Descent from Power,
pp. 298-299.
international pressure, or treaty obligations? These fundamental questions can only

be answered by an exhaustive examination of recently released government

documents.

Between 1959 and 1968, perceptions of Britain's appropriate 'world role' did not

remain static or unchanged. Reynolds's general survey, Britannia Overruled, confirms

that Britain's world role experienced a dramatic transformation during this period.

Combining chronological narrative with careful consideration of the main theories of

international behaviour, Reynolds provides an important introduction to the evolution of

British foreign policy during the late 1950s and 1960s. Reynolds highlights several

developments which impacted on Britain's international position: Britain's world role

was affected by continuing post-war economic decline, relative to other Western

industrial countries (and, for that matter, Japan); a reduction in the international value

of the pound and the consequent abrogation of the sterling area; the loss of key

strategic bases, notably Aden and Singapore - on which UK power in the Middle East

and Far East (generally referred to as 'East of Suez') was hinged; a decline in the

relative military capability of the Army, Royal Navy, and the Royal Air Force; and

increased dependence on the United States for nuclear technology.24 A combination

of these factors profoundly affected how Whitehall viewed Britain's 'world role',

compelling policy-makers to undertake a fundamental reappraisal of the approach

taken to international relations. Unfortunately, Reynolds' inability to support his

argument with archival evidence (at least for the period after 1959) leaves an

important gap in the available literature. Similarly, David Sanders's Losing an Empire,

Finding a Role does not demonstrate how perceptions within Whitehall changed as

Britain's international position declined.25 Hitherto, academic historians have only

attempted to explain how and why Britain's position changed vis-ä-vis other nations;

24Reynolds, Britannia Overruled,

pp. 208-219
25D. Sanders, Losing
an Empire, Finding a Role: An Introduction to British Foreign Policy since 1945,(London:
Macmillan, 1990).
 10

how policy-makers addressed the problem of Britain's changing international position

remains a neglected theme. This thesis, in addition to analysing the external factors

that inhibited Britain's ability to play a global role, seeks to explain how officials and

ministers reacted to prevalent pressures, investigating why particular policy directions

were pursued.

Macmillan's foreign policy has been the subject of a number of published books,

each varying in scope and perspective. Historians and writers agree that Macmillan

believed Britain should occupy a global role26 This role was multi-faceted, involving

exerting influence over American policy, maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent,

retaining sterling's status as an international reserve currency, ensuring orderly

decolonisation in Africa and Asia, establishing closer relations with the EEC, and

maintaining the Indian Ocean as a British sphere of influence. The most

comprehensive account of Macmillan's foreign policy can be found in a collection of

essays, Harold Macmillan and Britain's World Role, edited by Richard Aldous and

Sabine Lee. This book offers a critical reappraisal of British foreign policy between

1957 and 1963, addressing how Macmillan attempted to answer the key question:

'Why should the UK stay in the big game?'. Furthermore, it takes the key areas of

overseas policy - Anglo-American relations, the Middle East, defence,

Empire/Commonwealth, and Europe - and traces Macmillan's attempt to establish a

new direction in the aftermath of Suez. The book makes impressive use of available

primary sources and provides a useful insight into Macmillan's foreign policy agenda,

but lacks coherence (a common problem with collected essays) and neglects the

importance of Whitehall in the development of overseas policy.27

Anthony Sampson's biography, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity, argues that

Macmillansaw Britainas a global power,destinedto play a leadingrole in international

26See R. Aldous and S. Lee (eds.), Harold

Macmillan and Britain's World Role, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), A.
Home, Harold Macmillan, vol. It of the Official Biography. (London: Macmillan,
1989). R. Lamb, The Macmillan Years,
1957-1963:The Emerging Truth, (London: John Murray, 1995).
27Aldous and Lee,
op.cit.
 11

affairs, as evidenced by his first broadcast statement as Prime Minister: 'Every now

and again since the war I have heard people say, "Isn't Britain only a second - or a

third - class power now? Isn't Britain on her way out?" What nonsense. This is a

great country and do not let us be ashamed to say so' 28 Similarly, Richard Aldous

and Sabine Lee's essay, 'Staying in the Game', argues that Macmillan - like many

leading political figures of his period - was a'victim' of his own life experience, claiming

that his perception of Britain's international status was informed by past British

triumphs, a mindset which led him to exaggerate the country's actual power, influence

and importance.29 This line of argument supports David Marquand's contention that

the opinions of leading public servants were often informed by a culture forged during

the period of Empire 30

Yet, a cursory examination of Macmillan's memoirs suggests that he was prone to

bouts of pessimism in relation to Britain's future role. In a memorandum (worth

quoting at length), entitled 'The Grand Design', Macmillan recorded:

Britain - with all her experience - has neither the economic nor the military
power to take the leading role. We are harassed with countless problems
- the narrow knife-edge on which our economy is balanced; the difficult
task of changing an Empire into a Commonwealth; the uncertainty about
our relations [with] the new economic, and perhaps political, state which is
being created by the six countries off continental Western Europe; and
the uncertainty of American policies towards us - treated now as just
another country. 31

Macmillan's scepticism about the value derived from Britain's world role was deep-

rooted and long-held: for example, in December 1956, Cynthia Gladwyn, wife to the

British Ambassador in Paris, Jebb Gladwyn, records Macmillan (then Chancellor of the

Exchequer), as being doubtful over Britain's ability to sustain its international

28The Times, 18 January 1957, 4.

29Aldous and Lee, p.
op. cit, p.152.
3° D. Marquand, The New Reckoning:
State, Markets and Citizens, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997), p. 193.
31H. Macmillan Pointing the Way,
p. 324. Added emphasis.
 12

commitments: 'Over port and brandy Harold held forth. The great thing for a country

was to be rich as we were in the nineteenth century, he mused; and why should we

not give up spending millions on atom bombs, why should we not give up Singapore,

and just sit back and be rich?932Leslie Stone argues that Macmillan saw the UK
...
as a secondary power, but claims that he attempted to reassure the public of Britain's

status as a world power for 33

political reasons If true, this would suggest that

Macmillan was not merely a product of his social class and age, as is alleged by

Aldous and Lee. Stone claims that Macmillan's 'public face' led to a 'self-deception',

which inhibited his ability to take a lead in developing policies commensurate with

Britain's declining economic position34 Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State under

Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, effectively dismissed all these arguments,

when he wrote: 'Macmillan was the first British Prime Minister to confront explicitly the

powerful reality that his country was no longer 35

a world power'. Therefore,

Macmillan's views on Britain's world role are open to interpretation and in need of

further examination. Did Macmillan believe that Britain was a world power? Did he

explicitly confront the reality of decline? Did Macmillan attempt to manage Britain's

transition in a way that was politically acceptable?

The 1964-1970 Labour governments' foreign policy, Ben Pimlott contends, set off

along familiar 'Bevinite' lines, in the sense that Wilson was unprepared to see a

diminution in Britain's global commitments 36 In November 1964, in his first major

foreign policy speech as Prime Minister, Wilson asserted: 'We are a world power, and

a world influence, 37
or we are nothing'. Chris Wrigley argues that the Wilson

government saw Britain's last attempt to maintain a global role, or at least the

pretension to retain the symbols that endowed the country with the belief that it fulfilled

32M. Jebb (ed.), The Diaries of Cynthia Gladwyn, (London:

Constable, 1995), p. 195.
33See L. Stone, 'Britain and the World' In D. Mackie
and C. Cook (eds.), The Decade of Disillusion: British Politics In
the Sixties, (London: Macmillan, 1972).
34ibid, p. 124.
35H. Kissinger quoted in Aldous
and Lee, op. cit., p.152.
36B. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, (London: Harper
Collins, 1992), pp. 382-403.
37The Times, 17 November 1964, 6.
p.
 13

a world leadership 38
role Wrigley's work makes a useful contribution to the debate on

post-war British foreign policy, but lacks much in the way of depth and analysis.

Regrettably, Wrigley's account, like many others on the subject, neglects the role of

Whitehall in policy development, concentrating almost excessively on the influence of

senior Labour politicians. Any examination of Labour's foreign policy that

fails to consider the role of Whitehall is severely limited. This issue is given even

greater significance by Labour's often-fraught relationship with the senior civil service

during the 1960s. Leading Labour figures, most notably Thomas Balogh and Richard

Grossman, believed that Whitehall outmanoeuvred the Wilson government on a

number of key policy issues. Furthermore, as the Wilson government lacked much in

terms of administrative experience (following thirteen years of Conservative rule), this

thesis examines the extent to which Whitehall was able to influence the direction of

British foreign policy.39

Wilson believed Britain's world role to be founded on two factors. Firstly,

maintaining Britain's position East of Suez was seen as essential to international

influence. In December 1964, Wilson told the House of Commons: 'whatever we may

do in the field of cost effectiveness we cannot afford to relinquish our world role -
...

our role for shorthand purposes is sometimes called our East Suez role' 40
of

Secondly, Wilson was determined to maintain the sterling-dollar parity, at £1: $2.80,

considering this fundamental to Britain's global standing, helping to secure the East of

Suez position. Pimlott indicates that the importance attached to this commitment was

exemplified by Wilson's decision to defend the parity of sterling for three years, even

though this effectively eliminated any possibility of Labour achieving its key domestic

38SeeC.Wrigley'Now youseeit, nowyoudon't:HaroldWilsonandLabour's InR.Coopey,

Policy1964-70',
Foreign
S. Fielding
andN.Tiratsoo(eds.), TheWilsonGovernments,
1964-1970,
(London:
Pinter,1993).
39 Labour had been out of government for thirteen years. Only three
members of the Cabinet - Harold Wilson, Patrick
Gordon Walker, and Jim Griffths - had held that rank before.
40HC Deb. (Fifth Series), 16 December 1964,
cols. 425-426.
 14

4'
policy objectives. On entering office in 1964, Labour was confronted with a balance-

of-payments deficit of £800 million, along with severe speculation against sterling,

forcing the adoption of one of three unpalatable options: the devaluation of the pound;

the imposition of quotas on imports; and/or a surcharge on a number of imports. 2

Wilson, along with the Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, George Brown, and the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan, decided to defend the value of the

pound, thus enabling the government to retain the confidence of the international

money markets, whilst simultaneously undermining Labour's objective of increased

3
growth. The Labour government followed this 'strong' pound policy until November

1967, when Callaghan, on the resolute advice of Sir Alec Cairncross, Head of the

Treasury's Economic Service, devalued the pound from $2.80 to $2.40.4 But to what

extent was retaining dollar-sterling parity seen within Whitehall as synonymous with

Britain's status as a world power? The general consensus amongst historians has

been that devaluation was a policy to be avoided at all costs. Tim Bale's article,

Dynamics of a Non-Decision: The `Failure'to Devalue the Pound, refutes this

argument, contending that the Wilson government was prepared to accept devaluation

as a pre-condition of entry into the European Economic Community (EEC). This is

confirmed, to some extent, by Crossman's diary entry on 15 February 1967, which

claimed that Callaghan said: 'of course we would accept a 10-15 per cent devaluation

as a condition of entry [to the EEC]. Yes, that's all clear in Whitehall, that's what we

41Pimlott, op. cit,

pp 350-351. A number of caveats should supplement this argument. It should be noted that
Wilson's decision not to devalue sterling was also conditioned by a number of domestic party political considerations;
first, Wilson was aware of his precarious parliamentarysituation (Labour had a majority of three until the 1966 General
Election); secondly, Wilson did not want Labour to be stigmatised as the 'party of devaluation', following devaluation In
1949. Additionally, the Labour government did not see devaluation as a long-term solution to Britain's economic
problems, believing that such a decision would cause disruption to the world financial system.
Z Cabinet
minutes, 26 November 1964, CAB 128/39.
a3For accounts the
of economic and foreign policies of the Wilson Government see, W. Beckerman (ed.), The Labour
Governments Economic Record, 1964-70,(London: Duckworth, 1972); F. Blackaby (ed.), British Economic Policy,
1960-1974,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); A. Caimcross, Managing the Economy In the 1960's;A
Treasury mew, (Basingstoke: St Antony's/Macmillanseries, 1996); A. Caimcross, The Wilson Years:A Treasury Diary,
1964-69,(London: The Historians' Press, 1997); R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tintsoo, The Wilson Governments,
1964-70,(London: Pinter, 1995); W. Davis, Three Years' Hard Labour The Road to Devaluation,(London: Deutsch,
1968); C. Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour In Power, 1964-70,(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989).; H. Wilson, The
Labour Government, 1964-70:A Personal Memoir, (London: Weidenfeld Nicholson, 1971).
asK. O. Morgan, Callaghan:A Life, and
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 234-290; A. Caimcross, The Wilson
Years, (1997) 243-255.
 15

face as a precondition of entry' 45 The inadequacies of the present literature leave a

number of questions unresolved with regard to how Whitehall saw devaluation

affecting Britain's wider international influence. Was the Wilson government reluctant

to devalue because such an action would involve a scaling down of British

commitments in the Middle and the Far East? Was devaluation seen as likely to

damage Anglo-American relations? How realistic was the quadripartite objective of

retaining the international value of sterling, maintaining Britain's position East of Suez,

ensuring close relations with the United States, and achieving membership of the

EEC?

Historians generally agree that devaluation was the critical moment in Britain's

decision to retreat from East of Suez. John Darwin, for example, has argued that it

took devaluation, allied to the appointment of Roy Jenkins as Chancellor of the

Exchequer, to `extract the final avowal that the last vestiges of the imperial role were at

46
an end'. Jeffrey Pickering has suggested that it took the 'blow of devaluation' to

steer Britain away from its East of Suez commitments47 Sean Greenwood describes

devaluation as an 'incontrovertible turning point', removing the 'fig leaf which had

obscured the threadbare British pretensions to globalism'48 A notable exception to

this school of thought is provided by Joseph Frankel, who contends that devaluation

was 'only the occasion, not the cause, of the decision to withdraw [from East of

Suez]'49 In this respect it is important to note that Britain had, following numerous

sterling crises and balance-of-payments difficulties, began to reduce the scale and

scope of international commitments prior to devaluation. Robert Holland's book, The

Pursuit of Greatness, argues that gradual withdrawal, in combination with the Wilson

government's application for EEC membership in February 1967 (which also preceded

45J Callaghan
quoted (15 Feb 1967) in R. H. S. Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister Lord President of the Council
and Leader of the House of Commons, 1966-68,vol. II, (London: Hamilton Cape and Jonathon Cape, 1976), p. 240.
46J. Darwin, 'British DecolonisationSince 1945:
A Pattern or a Puzzle?', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, vol. 12, No. 2, (1984), p. 348.
47J. Pickering, 'Politics
and "Black Tuesday": Shifting Power In the Cabinet and the Decision to Withdraw from East of
Suez, November 1967 - January 1968', Twentieth Century British History, 13, No. 2, (June 2002), 148.
48S. Greenwood, Britain vol. p.
and the Cold War, 1945-91,(London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 174.
49J. Frankel, British Foreign Policy,
p. 165.
 16

devaluation), had convinced Whitehall of the frailty of Britain's 'great power

50
pretensions. On the other hand, a number of academics, notably Robert. J. Lieber,

maintain that Wilson's decision to apply for membership of the EEC was based on the

hope that this would act as a panacea for economic under-performance; EEC

membership, according to this line of argument, did not represent a rejection of

Britain's world role or an acceptance of the inevitability of regionalisation.51

What Factors Influenced British Perceptions of World Role'?

During the late 1950s and 1960s, as in most periods, international developments and

internal political changes were instrumental in determining Britain's 'world role'. As

argued by Anne Deighton: 'foreign policy actions are a result of pressures from the

international environment as well as forces at work within the nation state'.52 This

inevitably leads to a degree of controversy over whether 'external' or 'internal' factors

are more important in determining particular foreign policy objectives. Britain's world

role, during the period under study, was inescapably influenced by two key 'external'

factors - the emergence of the EEC and the Cold War. J. W. Young's Britain and the

World in the Twentieth Century argues that the increasing weakness of Britain in

relation to the EEC compelled British policy-makers to adjust their definition of 'role',

by pursuing policies aimed at integrating Britain into a regional, supranational

53
organisation. More important to the thinking of British policy-makers was the Cold

War; indeed, a central theme of this thesis will be that historians have tended to

underestimate this overarching factor in determining British withdrawal from extra-

European commitments. This thesis explores how the Cold War influenced the

50Holland, The Pursuit Greatness,

of pp.
51Frankel, op.
cit, pp. 165-166; R. J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: Parties, Elections and Pressure
Groups, (London: UCP, 1970).
52 A. Deighton, 'British Foreign Policy-Making:
The Macmillan Years' In W. Kaiser and G. Staerck, British Foreign
Policy, 1955-64: Contracting Options, (Macmillan: London, 2000), p. 7.
53J. W. Young, Britain
and the World in the Twentieth Century, (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 193.
 17

thinking of senior officials, considering what role Whitehall envisaged Britain fulfilling in

the all-encompassing East-West conflict.

Analysing the impact of international factors in isolation inevitably leads to an

incomplete understanding of foreign policy development. It is too simplistic, as stated

by Anne Deighton, to view foreign policy decisions 'as a clear and clean reaction to

external factors'.M In the years 1959-1968, Britain's public administration and political

leadership, like the universe of Descartes, were in a state of constant flux. No

historian has thus far comprehensively examined the extent to which ministerial

changes, alterations within the civil service hierarchy and modifications in the inter-

departmental committee structures, altered the central thrust of British foreign policy.

The civil service has often been criticised by politicians, academics and intellectuals

for lacking foresight and being ponderous in reacting to events. Lord Hailsham,

Conservative Lord Chancellor on two occasions (1970-1974 and 1979-1987), was a

strong critic of the role of Whitehall in Britain's post-war decline:

The Civil Service is like the Brigade of Guards, the Bank of England,
...
the judiciary, and many other typically British institutions. But it is very
close to the seat of power, and because of the eclipse of Britain, its
influence must be closely studied, for, despite its many virtues, its
operations must bear some responsibility for what has been happening in
55
the past thirty-years.

This thesis tests to what extent Gore-Booth's assertion that, 'the object of policy had to

be to ensure that a great nation could stop half-way down and establish itself as a

second level power with real tasks to perform and obligations to fulfil', was readily

accepted within the upper echelons of Whitehall. 56

u Deighton,
op. cit, p. 8.
55Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma
of Democracy, (London: Collins, 1978), p. 156.
6eGore Booth
quoted In Hennessy, op. cit., (2001), p. 401.
 18

Both Conservative and Labour governments undertook a number of organisational

changes in respect of the administrative operation of Whitehall: most prominently, a

unified Ministry of Defence was created; the Ministry for Overseas Development was

established; and the Colonial Office was incorporated into the Commonwealth

Relations Office (CRO), which subsequently merged with the Foreign Office.57

Historians have not considered the full effects of this administrative reorganisation on

the dynamics underpinning the formulation of foreign and defence policy. For

example, did the merger of the Colonial Office - following the inordinate time Wilson

took in 'killing it off', in the words of Sir Saville Gardner, Permanent Under-Secretary to

the CRO at the time of amalgamation - with the CRO in 1966, and the CRO's final

subsumption within the Foreign Office in 1968, alter the balance of prevalent views on

Britain's international role within Whitehall. 58 The fact that the two most powerful

departments, representing colonial and Commonwealth interests, lost their separate

seats in cabinet, arguably illustrates a changing attitude within government as to the

importance attached to Britain's perceived historic role arising from the legacy of

Empire.

The thesis also assesses how the differing views of ministers helped alter

perceptions of Britain's appropriate world role. Between 1959 and 1968 there were

three Prime Ministers, five Chancellors of the Exchequer, six Presidents of the Board

of Trade, six Foreign Secretaries, four Secretaries of State for Defence, seven

Secretaries of State for Colonial Affairs and five Secretaries of State for

Commonwealth Relations.59 To assume that Whitehall functionaries drove policy

would be to underestimate the important role played by senior politicians. However, a

number of historians have questioned the ability of cabinet ministers to change the

57For further information

see Chapter I.
58J. Gamer, The Commonwealth
Office, 1925-68,(London: Heinemann, 1978), p. 411.
59For Information
on main Holders of Office see Appendix III and Dramatis Personae. Also see D. Butler and G.
Butler, Twentieth Century British Political Facts, 1900-2000,(London: Macmillan, 2000). Two further
points: firstly,
Edward Heath, President of the Board of Trade between October 1963
and October 1964, also held the title, 'Secretary
of State for Industry, Trade, Regional Development'; secondly, the ministerial head of the Ministry of Defence did not
have the title 'Secretary of State' until 1964
- prior to this, he had the title, 'Minister of State for Defence'.
 19

direction of major policy objectives: Zara Steiner, for example, has expressed

reservations about the capacity of politicians to influence foreign policy, remarking that

'only a dynamic and determined Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary can strike out in

new directions'.6° This is a contentious statement, as it underestimates the role of

senior politicians in the process of policy formulation, whilst ascribing the capacity to

alter policy objectives as the exclusive domain of Downing Street and the Foreign

Office. This thesis contends that foreign policy development was a cross-

departmental process: for example, by limiting defence expenditure to £2,000 million

(at 1964 prices) between 1964 and 1970, Callaghan, when Chancellor of the

Exchequer, was able to limit the parameters in which his ministerial colleagues

operated. This thesis aims to evaluate the balance of influence exerted by politicians

and civil servants over the direction of British policy towards extra-European
81
commitments This inexorably leads to further questions on which governments

were more susceptible to the influence of officialdom, and which departments were

more successful in influencing policy. Did Whitehall exert more influence on

Conservative or Labour policies? What influence did the Treasury have over high

foreign policy objectives? Was the Foreign Office more successful than the Treasury

in making its case within Whitehall?

In regard to Britain's withdrawal from extra-European commitments, this thesis

concentrates on Africa, the Middle East and Far East. It is not a study of

decolonisation per se - rather it deals with how Whitehall framed long-term policy

objectives in these three areas. As it would be impossible to examine how Whitehall

planned retreat from all Britain's remaining international obligations in the late 1950s

and 1960s, this thesis concentrates on those issues ministers and officials considered

of fundamental importance to Britain's standing in the world. Historians of

80Z. Steiner, 'Decision-Making In

American and British Foreign Policy: An Open and Shut Case', International History
Review, no. 13. vol. 1, (1987), p. 16.
61This has been
an area of great debate amongst historians and political scientists. See D. C. Watt, Personalities and
Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in
the Twentieth Century, (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1975).
 20

decolonisation too often focus on a particular territory or region, frequently leaving the

impression that policy was formulated in a vacuum, neglecting the importance of

international factors such as the Cold War, pressures emerging from the weakness of

sterling, or problems arising from the relative decline of the British economy.

Consideration is given to those matters which occupied the highest echelons of

government, such as the impact of decolonisation in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda

on Britain's world-wide politico-military effort, as opposed to the actual mechanics of

establishing viable constitutional frameworks in East Africa. The thesis is concerned

with how Whitehall accommodated Britain's transition from global power pretensions

to an outlook that was more regional in basis; it is not the intention of this study to

provide a case-by-case analysis of how officials organised disengagement from every

one of Britain's remaining colonies. Whitehall ascribed especial value to Britain's geo-

strategic role in the Middle East and Far East. In these two regions, Britain retained

an extensive military presence, designed to secure two overarching policy objectives:

first, preventing each area from coming under Communist influence; and, secondly,

ensuring regional stability. In the Middle East, Whitehall was also determined to

safeguard the oil trade; strengthen sterling through oil operations; and counter

Egyptian subversion in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Britain's regional role in

the Far East included acting as a counter-weight to the Sino-Soviet 'threat', whether in

subversive or overt form; supporting the 'forward' defence of Australia and New

Zealand; maintaining conditions conducive to the expansion of British commerce and

trade; and, finally, preserving close relations with the United States, so as to exert the

greatest possible influence over American policies in the area. British military power in

the Middle East was dependent on Britain's control of base facilities in Aden and the

Persian Gulf, whilst possession of the large-scale military complex in Singapore

performed a similar function in the Far East. The thesis addresses how Whitehall

agreed upon on retrenchment from South Arabia, Persian Gulf and South-East Asia,
 21

examining how ministerial and official perceptions of the economic, geo-political and

strategic importance of commitments in these two regions changed.

This work does not encompass British withdrawal from the Caribbean, given its

peripheral impact upon Britain's world role. Throughout the period under examination,

policy-makers considered the Caribbean an area of secondary importance, ranking

well below South-East Asia, the Middle East and Africa in terms of economic, strategic

and geo-political value. For example, on 22 November 1961, in a minute to Reginald

Maudling, Secretary of State for the Colonies, discussing British interests in the

Caribbean (a term that included British Honduras and British Guiana), Lord Perth

argued:

Strategically, as I see it they [Britain's interests in the Caribbean] are nil.

Of course we don't want to see them in unfriendly hands, but the U.S.A.
and Canada must ensure this does not come about...

Economically,to the Government the whole area is a constant and

considerable drain whether by disguised subsidy or direct help...

Strategically and probably economically we can afford to be tough and

only sentimentally have we reasons not to be. 2

The thesis concentrates on retreat from the extra-European world only to the extent

that it impacted on perceptions of Britain's world role.

The Major Shortcomings of the Current Literature on British Foreign Policy during the

late 1950s and 1960s.

The majorityof works on Britain'spost-warinternationaldeclinehavetendedto

concentrateon key eventsunderthe Attlee, Churchilland Edengovernments,such as

62Perth to Maudling, 22 November

1961, CO 1031/3278.
 22

the loss of India, the onset of superpower hegemony, and the Suez fiasco.63 The

plethora of academic works on the late 1940s and 1950s is largely attributable to

historians having had access to archival material relating to this period for over a

decade; conversely, the 'thirty-year rule' has resulted in a relative dearth of

documented analysis for the post-Eden years. Published works on Britain's global role

and foreign policy, during the late 1950s and 1960s, have in the main suffered from

two deficiencies. Firstly, texts that have sought to analyse the complexities and

vagaries of British foreign policy lack substantive documentary evidence. The

laudable attempt of Joseph Frankel's British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973to explain

Britain's international decline (between 1959 and 1968) is significantly weakened by

64
his inability to draw on substantial primary source material. Similarly, C. J. Bartlett's

British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century fails in its expressed objective of

explaining the policy formulation process, largely because he neglects the role of key

Whitehall civil servants. Bartlett was wholly dependent on parliamentary papers,

memoirs and diaries in his examination of the motivation and rationale lying behind

foreign policy objectives; such an approach, although justifiable in the absence of

official documents, is ultimately limited. John Barber's Who Makes British Foreign

Policy and William Wallace's The Foreign Policy Process in Britain suffer from similar

deficiencies. It should be noted, however, that Barber and Wallace are political

scientists and that this lack of historical analysis is not uncommon to the discipline of

political science as a whole. Failure to pay due cognisance to the various positions

adopted and advocated by senior officials in the Treasury, Board of Trade, Foreign

63For examples, see C. Barnett, The Verdict Peace: Britain Between her Yesterday
of and the Future, (London:
Macmillan, 2001); S. Croft, The End of Superpower. British Foreign Office Conceptionsof a Changing World, 1945-51,
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); A. Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War, (London: Macmillan, 1990); R.
Ovendale, The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-1951,(Leicester: Leicester University Press,
1984); M. Dockrill and J. W. Young (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56,(London: Macmillan, 1989); J. Kent, British
Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993); J. Saville, The Politics
of Continuity: British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1956-64,(London: Verso, 1993).
84This can also be
said of a number of works on British foreign policy. Although a distinction should be made between
(a) those who have not used documentary sources because they were not available and (b) those historians who have
made a deliberate decision to undertake a broad survey which rely heavily on secondary works. For examples of (a)
see M. Leifer (ed.), Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971); Northedge,
Decent from Power. For examples of (b) see Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness ; Kennedy, The Realities Behind
Diplomacy, Sanders, Losing an Empire.
 23

Office, Ministry of Defence, Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office,

would suggest that any analysis of foreign policy formulation is incomplete.

Nevertheless, given the paucity of available documents, it would be unreasonable to

be overly critical of these academics, whose works are often insightful and helpful in

contributing to our understanding of the period.

Secondly, the majority of published works have tended to concentrate on specific

areas of foreign policy East

(defence65, of Suez66,
nuclear Anglo-American
policy67,

European
relations68, decolonisation70).
Integration69, Consequently, many academics

have disregarded the interdependent nature of policy formulation and the wider

in it
strategic context which was set. This is not to criticise works that specialise in a

particular aspect of British foreign policy, but to

merely acknowledge that a failure to

appreciate the inter-relationship between different areas of policy highlights a

deficiency in the available literature. While some texts are based predominately on a

reworking of the available secondary literature, and others on the workings of one

department or area of policy, this thesis engages with both secondary and primary

sources, providing a re-evaluation of the reasons underpinning Britain's decision to

withdraw from extra-European commitments.

65C. J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy, 1945-70,(London: Macmillan, 1972). J.
Baylis (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World, (London: Croom Helm, 1977), E. Broadbent, The Military and
the Government:From Macmillan to Heseltine, (London: Macmillan, 1988), Carver, Tightrope Walking, F. A. Johnson,
Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974,(London: Gerald Duckworth, 1980), R. Ovendale,
British Defence Policy Since 1945, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994).
66Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez J. Paget, Last Post: Aden, 1964-67,(London: Faber, 1969), J. Pickering,
Britain's Withdrawalfrom East of Suez The Politics of Retrenchment,(London: Macmillan,1998), K. Piergostini, Britain,
Aden and South Arabia. Abandoning Empire, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).
67S. J. Ball, The Bomber and British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy and Britain's World Role, 1945-1960,(Oxford:
Westview, 1995), M. S. Navias, Nuclear Weapons and British Strategic Planning, 155-1958, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991)., R. H. Paterson, Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: From the V-Bomberto Beyond Trident, (London: Frank
Cass, 1997), A. J. Pearce, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970,
(London:The Historians' Press, 1972). E. Spiers, 'The Nuclear Deterrent: Problems and Possibilities', In D. Dilks (ed.),
Retreat from Power: Studies in Britain's Foreign Policy of the Twentieth Century, vol. Ii, (London: Macmillan, 1981).
68C. J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship:A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945, (London:
Longman, 1992). W. R. Louis and H. Bull, The Special Relationship:Anglo-American Relations Since 1945,(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), D. C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America In Britain's Place, 1900-1975,(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
69B. Briavati and H. Jones (eds.), From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945,(Leicester.
Leicester University Press, 1993), M. Camps, Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963,(London: Oxford
University Press, 1964), D. Gowland and A. Turner (eds.), Britain and European integration, 1945-1998:A
DocumentaryHistory, (London: Routledge, 2000), Young, This Blessed Plot, J. W. Young, Britain and European Unity,
1945-1992,(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993).
70J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire In the Post-War World, (London: Macmillan, 1988).
P. Gifford and W. R. Louis (ed.), Decolonisation and African Independence: The Transfers of Power, 1960-1980,(New
Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1988), R. F. Holland, European Decolonisation, 1918-1981,(Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1985).
 24

In the process of writing this thesis, two major works on how Whitehall planned

Britain's retreat from the extra-European world have emerged - Saki Dockrill's,

Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World, and

Frank Heinlein's, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963.

Scrutinising the Official Mind" This thesis adopts a different approach from both

these texts. Although Dockrill's work addresses British foreign policy from 1945 to

1968, it concentrates on how the Wilson government reached its decision to withdraw

from East of Suez, largely neglecting the policy objectives of the previous

Conservative governments. While Dockrill makes a useful contribution to the debate

on how Whitehall organised global retreat, its methodological approach means that

the subject requires further examination and scrutiny. Utilising Whitehall's pan-

strategic reviews of policy (in addition to long-term policy papers, prepared for the

cabinet and its subsidiary committees), this thesis demonstrates that the choice

between a regional and a world role was under active consideration in government

circles from 1959-1960, when Macmillan established the Future Policy Study

(analysed in Chapter II) to examine Britain's ability to retain a global presence in the

1960s. Discussing his role in the Future Policy Study to an Institute of Contemporary

British History (ICBH72)Witness Seminar, Lord Carver (who was Director of Army

Plans in the Far East) suggested that Whitehall had great difficulty in defining what

British interests UK forces were defending in the Far East, and that, if 'confrontation'

between Malaysia and Indonesia had not occurred, there would have been 'a very

great reduction' of UK forces prior to the election of the Labour government, leading

him to the conclusion: 'So looking at what made people withdraw from the Far East, I

think you needto get back to the eventsbeforethe Labourgovernmentcame in'.73

71S. Dockrill, Britain's Retreat from East Suer The Choice Between Europe
of and the World?, (London: Palgrave,
2003); F. Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963:Scrutinising the Official Mind, (London:
Frank Cass, 2002).
72Now Centre for Contemporary British History (CCBH).
73Lord Carver quoted In The Decision to Withdraw from East Suez Institute ContemporaryBritish History
of of
seminar, 16 November 1990, (London: ICBH, 2003), p. 24.
 25

This thesis adopts such an approach, examining how Whitehall addressed the issue of

global retrenchment prior to Labour's assumption of power, as this provides a more

useful chronological framework when addressing British withdrawal from extra-

European commitments. Sir Frank Cooper, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Ministry

of Defence in the 1960s (and later a Chairman of the ICBH), also believed that

Whitehall had resigned itself to the possibility of withdrawal in the late 1950s: 'I think

the period [when policy-makers began to contemplate the possibility of withdrawing

from East of Suez] had in fact started before the arrival of the Labour government,

because we had been in real trouble from 1958 onwards'.74 Similarly, Lord

Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Defence during the 1960s,

argues that'the stage was set long before the Labour government took over in

1964'.75 Moreover, Dockrill's decision to focus on the period 1964-68 means that she

neglects other facets of Britain's world role, notably the importance of Africa in official

thinking. Africa served Britain's economic, strategic and geo-political interests in

several ways: for example, in addition to having strong trading links with the UK, many

African countries held their currency reserves in London; Britain's position East of

Suez was in itself buttressed by the possession of overflying and staging rights in East

Africa, both prior to and after the granting of independence to Kenya, Uganda and

Tanganyika; officials also considered it vital to retain cordial relations with former

African territories in the post-colonial period, since this served to strengthen Britain's

position in the Commonwealth and United Nations, both of which acted as important

forums for exercising British influence. Heinlein by stopping in 1963 fails to give due

consideration to the neglected theme of British policy in the post-decolonisation period

and withdrawal from other strategically important areas, such as Aden and Singapore.

74Sir Frank Cooper, ibid.

75Lord Zuckerman, Ibid 25.
p.
 26

PrimarySources.

This thesis is only made possible by the Wilson government's decision to revise the

Public Records Act of 1958, reducing the period for the release of Departmental

records from fifty to thirty-years. On 5 August 1965, Wilson informed the cabinet:

the principle implicit in the concept of a closed period as regards the

availabilityof Departmental records had been the subject of criticism by
modern historians on the ground that the period of 50 years was
unnecessarily long and that the rule was inimical both to the public
interest and to the requirements of genuine scholars.

On the understanding that the existing safeguards against premature disclosure in

appropriate cases would be retained, Wilson believed that 'a reduction of the closed

period to 30 years should not undermine the essential principles of public

administration'.76

The National Archives (Public Record Office) provides the student of contemporary

British history with a wealth of material, highlighting the need to set parameters with

regard to what is achievable. The voluminous nature of documents generated by

Whitehall necessitates a highly disciplined and focussed approach. Fortunately from

the point of view of this research, both Conservative and Labour governments

undertook a number of large-scale reviews of future foreign policy. These documents

represent key reference points in this thesis, as they were comprehensive in scope,

involved inter-departmental debate on Britain's role in the world, and as such provide a

unique insight into the foreign policy-making process. Cabinet Office (CAB) files

provided the starting point for this research. In 1954, The Report of the Committee on

Departmental Records (or Grigg Committee Report), the first serious review of the

public records system in Britain since the Public Records Act (1877), stated that CAB

76Cabinet minutes, 5 August 1965,

CAB 128/39
 27

files 'comprise the most valuable single collection of modern material for historical

purposes that can be obtained from "

official sources'. The Cabinet Office was

responsible for the co-ordination of major areas of governmental policy, including pan-

strategic foreign policy development: for example, the Macmillan government's 'Future

Policy Study, 1960-70', examined in Chapter II, was drawn up by a small group of

Cabinet Office officials, who attempted to reconcile inter-departmental differences on

how British policy might be adapted to enable the UK to continue to play a significant

78
role world affairs. This thesis has made use of several Cabinet Office sources, the
in

most important of which relate to the workings of the cabinet, the Defence Committee

(ministerial and official), Colonial Policy Committee, Africa (Official) Committee,

Overseas Policy Committee (ministerial and official), and Defence and Overseas

Policy Committee (ministerial and official).

The records of the Prime Minister's Private Office (PREM) have provided a useful

insight into how various premiers initiated government policy and how they handled the

business of cabinet. The utility of PREM files mainly lies in 10 Downing Street's

position of locus in quo in British politics. PREM 11 files have offered a useful

perspective on foreign policy development under Harold Macmillan and Sir Alec

Douglas Home, highlighting the extent to which both Prime Ministers were dependent

on their cabinet colleagues, the Cabinet Secretary, and special advisers. PREM 13

files cover the period of Harold Wilson's governments, and, since the Prime Minister's

Office adopted a more overt political role during this period, are especially illuminating.

The usefulness of PREM files is largely dependent on the personal style of the Prime

Minister in question; as a consequence, PREM files provide a less comprehensive

record of government activity, for any given period of time, than those of the Cabinet

Office.

n Report of the Committee Departmental

on Records, Cmd 9163, (London: HMSO, 1954), para. 147.
78'Study of Future Policy', Record
of a Meeting held at Chequers, 7 June 1959, CAB 134/1929.
 28

Official documents (like all primary sources) are imperfect and suffer from a range of

limitations. Memoranda put before the Cabinet and its committees, and the recorded

minutes of decisions taken, are usually sanitised and refined documents, containing

highly selective and limited information. This practice owes much to Sir Norman

Brook, Secretary of the Cabinet under four Prime Ministers (Attlee, Churchill, Eden

and Macmillan), who wrote a short handbook for committee secretaries on minute

'A
writing, which suggested: good Minute of a Meeting will be: (a) brief; (b) self-

contained; (c) in the main, impersonal; and (d) to the full extent that the discussion

allows, decisive A minute should be selective It is a proper function of a

... ...
Secretary to clarify, as well as record, the results of a meeting'.79 Sir Burke Trend,

Secretary of the Cabinet between 1962 and 1974, wrote of Brook: 'He wrote well and

easily, but without great colour or emphasis. His prose was lean and muscular;

eschewing rhetoric and emotion; and designed to reduce the most heated and

confused exchanges to a record of orderly, logical, objective discussion'.80 Similarly,

as important policy documents and memoranda underwent a process of rigorous

drafting and re-drafting, and tended to reconcile differing inter-departmental

differences and perspectives, they can lack the relatively uninhibited quality of

departmental working papers. Accordingly, special consideration has been given to

the work of the two 'lead' departments in the formulation of foreign policy - the Foreign

Office and Treasury. In addition, this thesis has made use of The Conservative

Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964: British Documents on the End of

Empire, edited by Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis.81 The material presented in

this volume illustrates the wide range of social, economic and political problems that

's Brook quoted in K. Theakston, Leadership in Whitehall, (London:

Macmillan in association with the ESRC Whitehall
Programme, 1999), p. 116.
80Entry on Brook by Trend in E. T. Williams
and C. S. Nicholls (eds.), The Dictionary of National Biography, 1961-70,
JOxford:Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 141.
' R. Hyam and Wm. R. Louis, The Conservative Government
and the End of Empire, 1957-1964:High Policy, Political
and Constitutional Change. (Part I), (London: Published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies In the University of
London by HMSO, 2000).
 29

confronted policy-makers; by outlining the complexities of the foreign policy

formulation process, this volume has been an invaluable resource.

John Tosh argues that for `the historian of twentieth century politics, letters and

diaries are of particular significance, despite the limitless volume 82

of official records'

Private papers have been of immeasurable value to this thesis, mainly because a

large quantity of what is actually said in Cabinet (and, for that matter, cabinet

committees) goes unrecorded. This thesis has made use of the private collections of

Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, Patrick Gordon Walker, Selwyn Lloyd, Michael

Stewart and Sir Richard 'Otto' Clarke. The edited diaries of relevance to this thesis

have been those of Sir Alec Cairncross, Richard Crossman, Tony Benn, and Barbara

Castle.83

Historians tend to view parliamentary sources as the poor relation of 'official'

documents. Given the importance of Parliament to the political process, it is perhaps

surprising that many historians have tended to either eschew the written material

emanating from it or only make use of such documentation when papers covered by

the 'thirty-year rule' are unavailable. As it does today, Hansard provided an 'edited

verbatim report of proceedings' (oxymoronic though this term is) in which MPs' words

were reported in accordance with 'terms of reference' set out by'Erskine May'.

Nevertheless, parliamentary sources suffer from a number of inherent deficiencies.

The relevance of parliamentary sources to historical research, John Tosh rightly

is
asserts, undermined by 'the very fact 84
of publication'. In the main, parliamentary

sources only contain what the government of the day considers appropriate for

publication, usually omitting anything that might cause political embarrassment or

endanger the national interest. For example, the Labour government's,

82J. Tosh, The Pursuit of History,(London: Longman:

2000), p. 49.
83T. Benn, Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67,(London:
Arrow Books, 1987); B. Castle, The Castle Diaries, 1964-
70, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1984); R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Minister of Housing,
1964-66,vol. I, (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1976); R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister,
Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons,
vol. II, (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon
Cape, 1976); R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Secretary State for Social Services, vol. III, (London:
of
Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1977).
84Tosh, op. cit., p. 43.
 30

Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy, issued on 18 July 1967, contained no

reference of the decision to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by the mid-1970s, even

though the cabinet had agreed upon such a policy on 12 July 1967.85 Hence,

historians who aspire, in Leopold.von Ranke's words, 'to show how things actually

were', must use parliamentary records in conjunction with 'secret' documents, such as

memoranda, minutes, and letters. 86

Newspapers are another underused and undervalued historical source. Peter

Hennessy has argued: 'Historians suffer from an occupational disease. It's called
...
archivitis', by which he meant, historians all too often concentrate on official

documents to the exclusion of the press.87 Newspapers are important to historians for

two principal reasons: firstly, for their reporting of contemporary events; secondly, for

their role as participants in the political process. The reaction of the British political

establishment to Dean Acheson's West Point speech provides a useful illustration of

the value of the press as a primary source: firstly, The Times printed a verbatim copy

of the speech on 8 December 1962; secondly, The Times printed Macmillan's

response, in the form of an open letter, on 11 December 1962; thirdly, the letters page

of The Times carried correspondence relating to Acheson's speech for several days,

allowing the historian to ascertain the views of other leading party political figures,

such as Lord Attlee and Roy Jenkins.

A. J. P. Taylor described memoirs as 'a form of oral history set down to mislead

historians'88 Whilst this viewpoint certainly contains more than a modicum of truth, it

would be misguided to underestimate the utility of memoirs as a source of historical

information. John Barnes has convincingly argued that memoirs often 'provide the first

structuring of a period of history, identifying the major problems, at least through the

e5SupplementaryStatement Defence
on Policy, Cmnd 3357, (London: HMSO, 1967); Cabinet minutes, 6 July 1967,
CAB 128/42.
86Leopold von Ranke,
quoted In Tosh, op. cit., p. 43.
87P. Hennessy, 'The Press
and Broadcasting', in A. Seldon, ContemporaryHistory: Practice and Method, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1988), p. 17.
88A. J. P. Taylor quoted in G. Jones, 'The
value of recent biographies, autobiographiesand diaries', Parliamentary
Affairs, 34, (1981), P. 335.
 31

eyes of a leading participant, and [offer] some evidence on intention, which can be
89
assessed against performance'. The memoirs of leading politicians have been

indispensable to this thesis, primarily because of their tendency to lean on private and

official papers. Harold Macmillan's memoirs, for example, are heavily dependent on

the use of diaries, letters, official memoranda, as well as verbatim copies of speeches

and communiques. The memoirs of Harold Wilson, Sir Alec Douglas Home, Denis

Healey, James Callaghan, R. A. Butler and Reginald Maudling are also illuminating

with regard to party political matters and the operation of government. Donald Watt's

Personalities and Policies argues that the utility of memoirs depends on whether the

individual prefers 'frankness to discretion'.90 On the whole, however, memoirs are less

valuable than most primary sources: for example, the author may use the memoir as a

vehicle to justify a highly criticised government policy. If unchallenged, such ex post

facto rationalisation can lead to the perpetuation of myths and their evolution into

received wisdom.

Largely as a result of the reluctance of publishers to commission accounts by

relatively unknown Whitehall figures, senior civil servants have been less inclined to

write memoirs. Moreover, Whitehall's attitude towards the publication of memoirs has

been lukewarm, if not antediluvian only three permanent secretaries to the Foreign
-
Office have had their memoirs published, whilst no secretary to the cabinet and no

permanent secretary to the treasury has written a published autobiography. Civil

servants, ill-disposed to writing an autobiography, have, on occasion, found it more

convenient to write an account of their department in the manner of Lord Garner,

whose work contains a critical analysis of the main objectives and motives of British

foreign policy, attempting to assess the successes (as

well as the failures) of the
CRO. The book also examines how senior civil servants
within the CRO worked with
ministers, as well as each other, describing how the department reacted to key issues

89J. Barnes,'Books Journals',

80Watt, Personalities and Policies, inSeldon,
and op.
Cit.,
p. 33.
p. 224.
 32

such as British entry into the EEC.91 In a similar vein, Sir Leo Pliatsky has produced

studies on how the machinery to control public expenditure changed, while `Otto'

Clarke wrote about the need to reform the machinery of government.92

This thesis has also made use of sources originating from American and Australian

archives; although, it is important to emphasise that this is not a study of how US and

Australian policy-makers saw Britain's changing position in world affairs. These

documents have been used sparingly, only insofar as they complement the aims of the

thesis and substantiate its central arguments. The Foreign Relations of the United

States (FRUS) series presents the official documentary historical record of major US

foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. FRUS volumes contain

documents from Presidential libraries, the Departments of State and Defense, the

National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International

Development, as well as the private papers of individuals involved in formulating US

foreign policy. In general, the editors of FRUS choose documentation that illuminates

policy formulation and major aspects of its execution. In researching Britain's

withdrawal from South-East Asia, use has been made of digital records accessible

from the National Archives of Australia.

Assessing the Role of Political Elites.

Sir Geoffrey Elton maintained that the historian should shed all prejudices and

preconceptions when approaching documentation, claiming that ideological theory

'threatens his work, by subjecting him to predetermined explanatory schemes ',

...
thus ' forcing him to tailor his evidence so that it fits the so-called paradigm
...
93
imposedfrom outside'. In his polemicalwork, Return to Essentials:Some

91J. Gamer, The CommonwealthOffice,

1925-68,(London: Heinemann, 1978).
92R. B. Clarke, New Trends in Government,
(London: HMSO, 1971); L. Pliatzky, Getting and Spending: Public
Employmentand Inflation, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1982).
aEKpenditure,
G. Elton, Return to essentials. Some Reflections
on the Present State of Historical Study, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), p. 27.
 33

Reflections on the Present State of Historical Study, Elton argued that documents

should be read within the context of the time in which they were produced, and not

judged by the standards of the present. Dominick La Carpa argues against this

viewpoint, claiming that historians, all too often, carry the bias and prejudices of such

documentation into their work, as all documents are invariably written from an

individual viewpoint, with a specific audience and/or purpose in mind. Historians

should, Lawrence Stone maintains, approach documents with a critical eye, for they

were written by fallible people who made errors, asserted inaccuracies, and had their

own ideological viewpoint: 'they [historical sources] should therefore be scrutinised

with care, taking into account authorial intent, the nature of the document, and the

in 95
context which was written'. Ellen Somekawa and Elizabeth Smith argue that
it

documents are more than simple manifestations of their creators' intentions;

accordingly, the social institutions, involved in their production, play an important part

in shaping what was said and how it was said96 This viewpoint is of relevance to the

study of political history generally, and of Whitehall particularly. Consequently, this

thesis considers how official documents and private papers reflect the social,

economic, educational and political backgrounds of politicians and civil servants. In a

similar vain, Richard J. Evans recommends that the historian attain extensive

knowledge of the institution they are studying, and 'bear this context in mind while they

detach the document from it'. 'Otherwise ', Evans concludes, '... they [historians]
.. .
run the risk of violating the boundaries of its possible meaning in the service of their

own particular interpretation'.97

Sir John Seeley, Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge in the late

nineteenth century, argued that'History is past politics, and politics is present

94D. La Carpa, History

and Criticism, (New York: Ithaca, 1987), p. 17.
95L Stone, 'History and Post-Modemism',
Past and Present, 131, (1991), pp. 189-190.
96E. Somekawa and E. A. Smith, Theorising
the Writing of History, or, 'I can't think why it should be so dull, for a
eat deal of it must be invention'', Journal of Social History, vol. 22. (1988).
Evans, In Defence of History, (London: Granta, 1997), 92.
p.
 34

history'.98 This emphasis on the role of political elites is no longer de rigueur in

historical study. The central problem with Seeley's emphasis on political elites, Evans

contends, is that leading political figures were taken to be 'morally and politically

autonomous individuals, whose decisions reflected in the first place the peculiarities of

their own personalities rather than wider forces of any kind'.99 The advent of social

and economic history has, according to Evans, resulted in the demise of the

intellectual credibility of examining historical events from such a perspective. This

debate profoundly affects this thesis on how views at the apex of Whitehall affected

changes in perceptions of Britain's world role. How should an historian, concerned

with elite political figures, address his subject in the light of recent developments in

social and economic history? Whilst this thesis concentrates on how elite figures

within the higher echelons of government saw Britain's changing international role, it

also attempts to take account of the key contextual considerations arising from the

changing economic, social and political environment of the period.

The researcher's approach to evidence is of vital importance to an historical work,

and should be clarified, so that the reader can grasp his central objectives. This thesis

has taken a largely empirical approach, and attempted to analyse documents

objectively and fairly; although, the extent to which this is possible is open to

conjecture, given the advent of post-modernist thought. The basis of this research

questions, to some extent, the post-modern notion that 'the facts of history are

nothing, interpretation is everything', accepting E. H. Carr's definition of historical

objectivity:

When we call a historian objective, we mean two things. First of all, we

mean he has the capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own
situation in society and in history Secondly, we mean that he has the
...
capacity to project his vision into the future in such a way as to give him a

98Sir John Seeley quoted in Evans, ibid.,

p. 161.
99ibid.
 35

more profound insight into the past than can be attained by those
historians whose outlook is entirely bounded by their own situation.100

History, as Leopold von Ranke argued, is different from writing chronicles as it

attempts to illustrate how diverse historical facts are interrelated. Accordingly, this

thesis has attempted to elucidate how differing views within Whitehall conspired to

affect a change in the central thrust of British foreign policy during the late 1950s and

1960s.

100E. H. Carr, What is History?, (Harmondsworth:

Penguin, 1987), p. 30.
 36

Chapter 1:The Whitehall Foreign Policy-Making Apparatus, 1959-1968.

Anthony Sampson, writing without the benefit of access to `official' documents in 1971,

predicted that the influence exerted by senior Whitehall figures, during the late 1950s

and 1960s, would 'come to light in the history books, as the pre-war role of civil

servants like Horace Wilson and Warren Fisher later came out'.' With the recent

declassification of government papers under the 1967 Public Records Act, this thesis

endeavours to assess the impact of Whitehall on shifting perceptions of Britain's world

role. More precisely, this chapter seeks to clarify how Britain's foreign policy-making

apparatus operated between 1959 and 1968; explaining how the machinery of

government evolved; and assessing the extent to which such developments were a

response to Britain's changed status in international affairs. Between 1959 and 1968,

at one time or another, the following departments were involved in formulating policies

designed to facilitate Britain's withdrawal from the extra-European world: the Foreign

Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office, the Ministry of

Overseas Development, the Ministry of Defence, the Board of Trade, and the Treasury.

The relative importance of each of these departments changed as the 1960s

progressed; indeed, some departments were subsumed within others, with others

being ultimately abolished.

The period under examination was marked by a rationalisation of Whitehall's foreign

policy-making machinery, as officials and ministers were forced (but, in some cases,

actively sought) to create an infrastructure more reflective of Britain's changed position

in global affairs. These changes, generally referred to within Whitehall as 'machinery

of government reform', involved two fundamental points: firstly, the allocation (and re-

allocation) of responsibilities both within and between departments; and, secondly,

changes in the structure of departments and the cabinet committee system. The

1A. Sampson, The New Anatomy

of Britain, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1971), p. 260.
 37

Plowden Committee on Representational Services Overseas, appointed by the

Macmillan government in 1962, set in train the process that led to the establishment of

a single department with responsibly for Britain's external relations - the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office. Importantly, Conservative ministers accepted Plowden's

recommendation that the Foreign, Commonwealth and Trade Commission Services

amalgamate into a single Diplomatic Service by January 1965. The Colonial Office

merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office to create the Commonwealth Office

in August 1966, and this department subsequently amalgamated with the Foreign

Office on 17 October 1968. In the area of defence administration, Macmillan

established the position of Chief of the Defence Staff in 1959, largely to limit the

counter-productive inter-service disputes that frequently occurred between the Navy,

Army and Air Force. The Ministry of Defence underwent further organisational change

in 1964, when responsibility for the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Admiralty came

under the authority of a single Secretary of State for Defence. Many of the most

important decisions on foreign and defence matters were taken at the level of cabinet

committee, an essential forum for co-ordinating and determining policy decisions

between departments. In the early 1960s, however, Whitehall's cabinet committee

system was only at an embryonic stage of development in regard to foreign policy

formulation. In July 1962 the ministerial Colonial Policy Committee (CPC) was

replaced by the Overseas Policy Committee (OPC), which sought to take a broader

view of international events. At the same time, the Africa (Official) Committee (A(O)C),

which had been established in May 1957 to address the Foreign Office's complaint of

administrative incoherence in regard to decolonisation, widened its international remit,

when it became the Overseas Policy (Official) Committee (OP(O)C), assuming

responsibility for'shadowing' its ministerial counterpart. There was thus no central

cabinet committee responsible for international affairs until mid-1962. Born of need to

2 See Report of the Committee on RepresentationalServices

Overseas appointed by the Prime Minister under the
Chairmanshipof Lord Plowden, Cmnd 2276, (London: HMSO, 1963-63).
 38

adopt a more coherent approach to international problems, the establishment of the

Overseas Policy Committees represented a significant modification in Whitehall's

foreign policy-making machinery. Conversely, the Cabinet Defence Committee (DC),

the body responsible for the collective discharge of ministerial decisions in the field of

defence, had existed since 1940, and was `shadowed' by a parallel committee of

permanent secretaries and Chiefs of Staff3 In October 1963, the Overseas Policy

Committees and Defence Committees merged to form a single Defence and Overseas

Policy Committee (DOPC), with a corresponding official committee, both of which

remain in existence to the present day.

Ministersand Officials.

Assessing the role of the senior civil service in policy formulation and decision-making

is a complex and difficult task. From a constitutional perspective, ministers are the

democratically elected and accountable representatives responsible for the setting and

discharge of government policy, whilst the function of the senior civil servant is to

facilitate, administer and advise. Of course, as one would expect, the influence of

Whitehall was far greater than suggested by these formal constitutional roles,

accountabilities and relationships. In the 1960s, the Secretary of the Cabinet was

positioned (as he is today) at the apex of the civil service machine, exercising

considerable influence over the development and implementation of foreign and

defence policy. There were two cabinet secretaries during the period encompassed by

this thesis - Sir Norman Brook and Sir Burke Trend. Brook and Trend, both of whom

had extensive access to the Prime Minister, were responsible for co-ordinating policy

between Whitehall departments with a direct interest in major foreign policy matters.

Brook worked as Cabinet Secretary from 1947 until 1962, and also served as Joint

Prior to the establishmentof the Cabinet Defence Committee In 1940,

collective decisions on defence policy were
taken by the Committee of Imperial Defence, which was established In 1904.
 39

Permanent Secretary of the Treasury and Head of the Home Civil Service from 1956 to

1962. This placed Brook at the centre of administrative governance in Britain,

providing vital continuity and stability in a rapidly changing political and economic

environment. Anthony Sampson's description of him as 'the central cog in the British

government machine' was both perceptive and apposite, accurately reflecting his

pivotal role in guaranteeing the effective operation of Whitehall. Commenting on

Brook's career, Trend, who based much of his approach on his predecessor's style,

wrote: 'His natural disposition was that of the co-ordinator, seeking to transcend

departmental boundaries and to elicit from the conflict of disparate purposes the

measure of agreement which would most nearly accord with the basic policy of the

government of the day and would be most likely to promote the interests of the country

5
as a whole'. After Brook's retirement in 1963, the posts of Secretary of the Cabinet

and Head of the Home Civil Service were separated, with Trend taking the former, and

Sir Laurence Helsby assuming the latter; it was hoped that this division in

responsibilities would lessen the considerable workload of the cabinet secretary.

Trend was widely respected for his ability, diligence, and (unlike Brook)

approachability. The influence of both cabinet secretaries largely derived from their

key role in prioritising specific issues and setting the cabinet agenda. Both Brook and

Trend were key in supervising the work of the cabinet committees and their sub-

committees, setting their terms of reference and constituting their membership.

Largely because of its importance, Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee

meetings, like those of the Africa (Official) Committee, Overseas Policy (Official)

Committee and Defence (Official) Committee, were chaired by the cabinet secretary,

who selected a small group of permanent secretaries to discuss major areas of foreign

policy.

Not long after leaving political office, Richard Crossman, a member of the Labour

`A. Sampson, The Anatomy Britain, (Hodder & Stoughton: London,

of 1962), p. 244.
s Entry on Brook by Trend in The Dictionary National
of Biography, 1961-70,E. T. Williams and C. S. Nicholls (eds.),
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1981, p. 141.
 40

cabinet between 1964 and 1970, as well as a prominent critic of Whitehall and its

alleged machinations, derisively remarked: 'The permanent secretaries must form the

most closely knit and powerful association in Great Britain'.6 Crossman's comment on

the influence wielded by the senior civil service was undoubtedly valid; however, it is

difficult, as this thesis will demonstrate, to substantiate the notion that Whitehall's

permanent secretaries formed a `closely knit' association, given the considerable inter-

departmental divisions that existed on a range of major policy issues. It is a common

mistake to view Whitehall as a monolithic organisation, seeking to pursue its own

agenda, even when this conflicted with the policy aspirations of the democratically

elected government. Tony Benn, for example, has argued that `the civil service sees

itself as being above the party battle, with a political position of its own to defend

against all-comers, including incoming governments armed with their philosophy and

7
programmes'. In 1967, when giving evidence to the Fulton Committee, which was

appointed to initiate research into the structure, recruitment and management of the

civil service, Crossman depicted Whitehall's permanent secretaries as a 'coherent and

organised oligarchy. 8 The senior civil service is thus often inaccurately presented as a

united organisation, intent on pursuing its own policy agenda, immune from the

strategic objectives and policies of government. In practice, the reverse was often the

case during the late 1950s and 1960s: Whitehall was an extremely fragmented entity,

with each department fighting for its own departmental budget, intent on pursuing its

own agenda. Sir William Armstrong, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury for much of

the 1960s, neatly encapsulated this point: 'The first thing to be noted about the central

government of this country. . .', he argued, '... is that it is a federation of departments'.9

6R.H.S.Crossman quoted InSampson, New Anatomy, p.260.

T. Benn, Arguments for Democracy, (London: Cape, 1981), 50. p.
K. Theakston, The 1964-70Labour Governmentsand Whitehall Reform, (Leeds: School of Politics and International
Relations, University of Leeds, 2004), p. 5. For Fulton Report see The Report of the Committeeon the Civil Service,
Cmnd. 3638, (London: HMSO, 1967).
9W. Armstrong quoted in P. Hennessy, Whitehall,(London:
Pimlico, 2001), p. 380.
 41

An eloquent critique of Whitehall is contained in the essay, 'The Apotheosis of the

Dilettante', written by the Fabian economist Thomas Balogh, who would later come to

prominence as a special adviser in the Wilson government. Developing Max Weber's

theory of 'permanent residents of the house of power', Balogh directly associated

Britain's national decline with the amateurish approach of the 'public school', Oxbridge

educated civil servant. Commenting on British foreign policy, Balogh posed the

rhetorical question: 'How much of British influence and power could have been saved

in the Middle-East, in Africa and Asia by a little more tact, a little more imagination and

(admittedly a lot more) expert knowledge'.1° Balogh does not enlighten us to 'how

much' power and influence might have been 'saved', but singles out Brook for

particular criticism, castigating him for giving preference to civil servants with no

professional training, favouring the 'smooth, extrovert conformist with good connexions

and no knowledge of modern problems'. 'So far as Britain is concerned... ', Balogh

concludes, '. .. there can be no doubt that the consequential deadening effect which

eliminates originality has resulted in a relative decline in Britain's strength and

influence'." More recently, Correlli Barnett's The Verdict of Peace: Britain Between

her History and the Future, the fourth volume in his extended examination of Britain's

twentieth century decline, directly tied the weakening of the UK's position in

international affairs, albeit in the period leading up to the Suez crisis in 1956, on

Whitehall's preference for selecting individuals with a classically trained, public school

background.12 This thesis questions the extent to which this argument can be applied

to the 1960s, a period that saw a radical overhaul in the demographic make-up of

Whitehall: of the thirty permanent secretaries in 1970, only eleven had attended public

school, with the remainder being educated at various grammar or grant-maintained

13
schools. Moreover, there was, directly below the level of permanent (under)

10See T. Balogh, 'Apotheosis the Dilettante', in H. Thomas (ed.), The Establishment,(London: Anthony Blond, 1959),
of
1' 101.
ibid., pp.109-110.
12C. Barnett, The Verdict Peace: Britain Between her
of History and the Future, (London: Macmillan, 2001).
13Sampson, New Anatomy, 262.
p.
 42

secretary, a growing body of officials educated in the state sector. By the 1960s, the

archetypal Whitehall civil servant was not the allegedly backward looking 'public school

boy', blinded by outdated notions of imperial greatness; he (and it was almost

invariably a'he') was, on the contrary, the grammar school educated meritocrat. In any

case, one should not assume that social origin determines an individual's political

views: for example, Michael Cary, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and a former

Etonian, became one of the earliest advocates of the need to wind-up Britain's East of

Suez role. The fact that Cary served under Brook, whose alma mater was

Wolverhampton Grammar School, also illustrates that humble origins did not disbar

advancement in Whitehall.

The 'Overseas'Departments.

In the early 1960s, Britain's foreign policy-making apparatus had the unique feature,

uncommon to any other country, of having three separate departments responsible for

handling major international issues. The division of responsibility between the Foreign

Office, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) and Colonial Office largely grew out of

Britain's role as a colonial power and position of primus inter pares in the

Commonwealth. The Foreign Office was the most important of the 'overseas'

departments in the late 1950s and early 1960s, reflecting its primacy in policy

development and administration. At its most basic, the Foreign Office promoted

Britain's interests across the world and was responsible for the conduct of British

diplomatic business with other governments and international organisations. The

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as ministerial head of the department, was

accountable to Parliament for the work of the Foreign Office. The Permanent Under-

Secretary to the Foreign Office advised the Foreign Secretary and his ministerial team

on all aspects of foreign policy and was responsible for the 'day-to-day' management of

the department. Plans for the creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
 43

emerged in 1962, as eluded to above, when the Committee on Representational

Services Overseas, chaired by Lord Plowden, reviewed the purpose, structure and

operation of Britain's overseas services. Plowden's report concluded that the division

of responsibility for representational functions between foreign and Commonwealth

countries, and in the Commonwealth between commercial and other activities, was

impractical and unadvisable in the long-term. Separate Foreign and Commonwealth

Relations Offices were to be retained in Whitehall, but both departments were to draw

their staff from a single Diplomatic Service. From January 1967, the Foreign and

Commonwealth Offices operated a common file registry system, under the oversight of

the Diplomatic Service Administration Office. Additionally, there were a number of joint

Foreign Office/Commonwealth (Relations) Office departments where staff from both

Offices provided common services to each other. The amalgamation of the Foreign

Office and Commonwealth Office was in large part a reaction to the changing

international environment: the character of the Commonwealth fundamentally altered in

the 1960s, as countries became less willing to follow Britain's lead in international

affairs, with some even openly hostile to the policies of the British government. The

division of responsibilities between the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office was

simply not conducive to coherent policy-making. During Indonesian 'confrontation', for

example, the Foreign Office was responsible for Britain's relations with Indonesia, while

the Commonwealth Office conducted Britain's relations with Malaysia; during the

1960s, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between what was a matter for the

Foreign Office, on the one hand, and the CRO, on the other.

However, prior to the amalgamation of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office,

there was a merger of the CRO and the Colonial Office, the two departments primarily

responsible for the process of decolonisation. As Britain's colonies gained

independence and became self-governing members of the Commonwealth,

responsibility was transferred from the Colonial Office to the CRO, although the

reverse was true in 1961, when, precipitated by South Africa's departure from the
 44

Commonwealth, responsibility for Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, was

transferred from the CRO to the Colonial Office. Relations between the CRO and

Colonial Office were not always harmonious, becoming especially strained over the

functioning of the Central Africa Federation (CAF), for which they had joint

responsibility. In order to resolve inter-departmental differences, Macmillan considered

handing complete responsibility for the CAF over to the CRO, even though such a

policy would have been poorly received by informed African opinion, which would have

viewed such a decision as nothing less than an unjustified concession to the European

settlers. Brook persuaded Macmillan of the demerits of such a course, suggesting the

alternative of creating a Central Africa Office, placed under the stewardship of the

suitably weighty figure of R. A. Butler, the Secretary of State for Home Affairs. Such

administrative difficulties led to continual speculation as to the long-term viability of

retaining the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office as separate entities.

In 1960, for example, the Conservative Policy Centre produced a report recommending

the merger of the Colonial Office and the CRO, arguing that the division of

responsibilities was ineffectual and anachronistic.14 A merger was hampered by

institutional hostility within the CRO towards the Colonial Office. Senior officials in the

CRO tended to feel that they were operating in an enterprising, progressive ministry,

regarding the Colonial Office as a department in decline, with a propensity towards

outdated imperial sentiments. In June 1960, the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for

Commonwealth Affairs, argued that the Colonial Office should be wound up, eventually

becoming a department dedicated to the distribution of technical assistance:

I suggest the conversion of the Colonial Office into a Ministry for

... ...
Overseas Administration and Technical Assistance It would then
...
become, so to speak, a supply ministry, while the Foreign Office and
Commonwealth Relations Office would remain the political offices

14Winds of Change The Challenge

- of the Commonwealth,(London: Conservative Political Centre, February 1960).
 45

dealing with the political and diplomatic relations of the United Kingdom
in their respective spheres.15

Colonial Office civil servants favoured a merger of the two departments, but this was

met with obstinate resistance from the CRO. Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under-

Secretary to the CRO between 1962 and 1968, later reflected that 'the advantages of a

marriage were less apparent to the CRO, embarrassed rather than attracted by the

dowry'.16 The administrative responsibilities of the CRO extended beyond

decolonisation, with the department acting as a powerful advocate for Commonwealth

interests during the formulation of foreign policy.

The Colonial Office exhibited a somewhat pronounced inbuilt tendency towards

maintaining the status quo, which may have in part derived from its civil servants'

feeling that they were operating on 'spent time'. In 1962, Sir Hilton Poynton,

Permanent Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office, rejected Brook's suggestion of

establishing a Planning Section within his department, similar to that already operating

within the Foreign Office." This reaction differed markedly from the CRO, which had

established a Planning Unit on its own initiative, 'some three years ago on a modest

experimental basis'.18 Similarly, the Colonial Office discarded the idea of creating a

Minister of State for Aid in the Colonial Office; rejected the proposal of establishing a

Commissioner General for Africa; and ignored the suggestion of Malcolm MacDonald,

High Commissioner of India, that Britain should create an aid co-ordinator for South-

East Asia. The Select Committee on Estimates, which examined the relationship

between the Colonial Office and CRO in 1960, noted that the witnesses from the

former were in favour of merger whilst the latter were lukewarm. The committee

considered the arguments 'for' and 'against' amalgamation, and eventually found in

favour of merger. The arguments supporting unification were undoubtedly compelling:

15Home to Macmillan, 10 June 1960, PREM 11/3378.

1eJ. Gamer, The CommonwealthOffice: 1925-68,(London:
Heinemann, 1978), p. 408.
" Poynton to Brook, 26 September 1962, FO 371/166997.
1eGarner to Brook, 20 September 1962, FO 371/166997.
 46

there would be greater net economy in administration; the functions of the departments

were closely linked; the existence of a separate 'Colonial Office' was becoming

anathema in an increasingly non-imperial world; and, most importantly, many of the

economic and technical problems associated with the transition from dependence to

independence could be better handled by a single department.19 However, Sandys

and Macleod (respectively Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and

Secretary of State for the Colonies) both insisted that 'early merger is out of the

question - because the combined work would be too much for a single Ministeri20

Macmillan concurred with this view, believing 'it would be premature to contemplate

such a merger at this present time'.21 In spite of Macmillan's initial hesitancy towards

merger, the last four years of Conservative government witnessed ever-increasing co-

operation between the Colonial Office and CRO: for example, officials from both

departments co-operated in the work of the Department of Technical Co-operation and

the Central Africa Office, and were brought even closer together when Duncan Sandys

acted as Secretary of State for both Offices between July 1962 and October 1964.

Ministers from the Colonial Office and the CRO began to work in both departments in

October 1963, with their responsibilities being divided on a functional basis. Finally, it

was agreed in February 1964 that the two departments would merge in July 1965.

On 10 October 1964, Sir Lawrence Helsby urged the incoming Labour Prime

Minister, Harold Wilson, to accept the previous Conservative government's decision to

amalgamate the CRO and Colonial Office, suggesting that the latter was 'coming to the

point of ceasing to be a viable department'' A few months later, Wilson discussed the

future of the Colonial Office with Helsby, Arthur Bottomley (Secretary of State for

CommonwealthRelations)and Arthur Greenwood(Secretaryof Statefor the

Colonies). At this meeting,Wilson expressedhis preferencefor retainingtwo separate

19Fourth Report from Select Committee Estimates,

on 1959-60, PP. 260, xxxvii, 280.
20Brook to Macmillan,25 October 1960, PREM
11/3378.
21Macmillanto Brook, 25 October 1960, PREM
11/3378.
'Future of Colonial Office': note by Helsby, 10 October 1964, PREM 13/2693.
 47

secretaries of state, although it was agreed that the Colonial Office should in due

course be wound up as a separate department, with officials working towards that end

during the course of 1965.3 On 10 August 1965, Greenwood, going against the

wishes of his senior officials, proposed replacing the Colonial Office with a new

'Department of Territories Overseas', designed to deal with colonies which chose some

form of continuing association with Britain as their 'final' 24

status. However, Sir Hilton

Poynton, Greenwood's Permanent Under-Secretary, was determined that the Colonial

Office should not be reduced to what he described, earlier in 1963, as a 'rocks and

islands' Department'25 Helsby and Poynton conspired to undermine Greenwood's

plans: on 6 October, Helsby wrote a curt note to Wilson, informing him that this

`alternative approach' had been examined by the Cabinet Office and Colonial Office, in

the process of which it was agreed that the previously established plan for merger was

the right course to pursue - adding: 'The Colonial Secretary accepts this conclusion'.

Desperate to secure Wilson's agreement to an amalgamation of the CRO and Colonial

Office, Helsby argued: 'From the point of view from the machinery of Government, the

sooner the change can be made the better. It is getting increasingly difficult to

maintain the Colonial Office as a separate department ... It may be worth considering

whether the merger could not take place even while (or if) there is a separate Secretary

of State for the Colonies'. 6 On 12 October 1965, Helsby made another attempt to

push Wilson into accepting merger, suggesting that Poynton was 'not in very good

shape' (in the event, he went on to live until 1998), it being neither in his interest or that

of the Colonial Office that he should remain Permanent Under-Secretary much beyond

the end of 1965; accordingly, Helsby was 'reluctant' to propose the appointment of

someone to replace Poynton if the Colonial Office was on the point of being

23'Note of Meeting', 18 December 1964, PREM 13/2693.

24Greenwoodto Wilson, 10 August 1965, PREM 13/2693.
25Poynton to C. Jeffries (Joint Deputy Under-Secretary State the Colonial Office, 1947-1956),25 June 1963, CO
of at
967/433. R. Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, British Documentsand the End of Empire: The ConservativeGovernmentand
the End of Empire, 1957-1964 (hereafter BDEE) (Part I), (London: Publishedfor the Institute of CommonwealthStudies
in the University of London by The Stationery Office, 2000), p. 337.
26Helsby to Wilson, 6 October 1965, PREM 13/2693.
 48

27
abolished. In reply, D. S. Mitchell, Wilson's Principal Private Secretary,told Helsby

that the 'PM was not proposing to move for some considerabletime on the Colonial

Office', believing that events in Aden (examined in Chapter IV) had shown the need to

retain two 28
separate ministers This issue was allowed to drift until March 1966, when

Lord Longford, Greenwood's replacementat the Colonial Office, informedWilson that a

'satisfactory plan' had now been worked out between officials of the Diplomatic

Administration Office, CRO and Colonial Office for the implementationof a decision to

undertake merger; however, Longford and Wilson agreed that amalgamationshould

not be announced until after the forthcoming General 29

Election. Thus ended the

strange death of the Colonial Office.

In early 1961, Macmillan prepared a memorandum for the cabinet, arguing that there

would be a need for Britain to mobilise its strategic resources more effectively. Given

the limitation of resources, Macmillan suggested that Britain would increasingly rely on

the provision of experts and training facilities to preserve its influence in the developing

world, particularly amongst newly independent Commonwealth nations. It was this

general concern that provided the rationale for the creation of the Department of

Technical Co-operation (DTC), which functioned under the leadership of a junior

minister without cabinet rank, who assumed responsibility for the technical assistance

work previously performed by the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office

and the Colonial Office. (The DTC was also responsible for work formally done by the

Ministry of Labour on the technical activities of the United Nations. ) The new

department was to co-ordinate the arrangements for providing technical assistance to

Commonwealth countries, the remaining colonies, and, where appropriate, to other

developing nations. Macmillan favoured providing technical assistance to the

Commonwealth, and was attracted to the notion of establishing a Commonwealth

Advisory and Technical Service, an idea first floated by the Select Committee on

27Helsby to D. J. Mitchell (Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister), 12 October 1965, PREM 13/2693.
28Mitchell to Helsby, 13 October 1965, PREM 1312693.
29'Mergerof the CRO and ColonialOffice': minute by Lord Longford,1 March 1966, PREM 13/2693.
 49

Estimates in 1959-60. The driving force behind establishing a Departmentof Technical

Co-operation was Brook, who first proposed the scheme to Philipde Zulueta, Principal

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, in August 1960. Brook argued that there was

'much to be said for the establishment of a Department of Oversea[s]Technical

Services', given that the Foreign Office and CRO were ill-equippedto provide such

services, and that the Colonial Office had become an anachronism,with many newly

independent territories being 'reluctant to accept services which still carry the Colonial

label'. Moreover, Brook hoped that creating a department dedicated to the provision of

technical services would prove 'a useful first step towards a merger of the

Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office'30 Policy-makerswere

anxious to ensure that the establishment of a new department, dedicated to the

provision of aid and technical assistance, should not to be interpreted as an attempt to

continue colonial rule by other means. Macmillan addressed this problem at the 1961

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, by consulting with the leaders of those

nations directly involved. Nonetheless, many of the Colonial Office's characteristics

permeated the DTC, as a result of a decision to appoint officials from the Colonial

Service to the new department. To some extent this was inevitable, since Brook

believed that the new department should 'make the best use of the talent and expertise

which is being 31
thrown up by the shrinkage of the Colonial Service' On 21 March

1961, Macmillan told the House of Commons of his intention to create a separate

department with responsibility for aid provision and technical assistance. 2 The DTC

received a lukewarm reception from the other 'overseas' departments, but no serious

problems arose throughout its existence, since it acted in a manner more akin to an

agency than a department, being ultimately subordinate to the political departments in

matters of policy. In large part, the institutional weakness of the DTC can be attributed

to Poynton, who advised his Secretary of State, lain Macleod, against his own

30Brook to de Zulueta, 15 August 1960,

PREM 11/3378.
" Brook to Macmillan, 25 October
1960, PREM 11/3378.
32See Technical Co-operation:A
Progress Report by the New Department,Cmnd 1698, (London: HMSO, 1962).
 50

preference of making the Lord President of the Council (a position of cabinet rank) the

minister with responsibility for the new department. Poynton also played a decisive

role in convincing Macleod that the senior official at the department should carry the

title Director-General - equivalent to that of a Deputy Under-Secretary - rather than

Permanent Under-Secretary.

In late 1963, senior officials began to consider the future of the DTC. Sir Andrew

Cohen, Director-General of the DTC, was in favour of creating a more powerful Ministry

of Overseas Development, subject to the resolution of administrative difficulties, arising

from the division of responsibilities between departments. The arguments in favour of

establishing a single overseas aid department were substantive, given the increasing

importance of aid as an instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, as the majority of

developmental capital projects required technical assistance, it made administrative

sense for proposals concerning capital development to be considered together by a

single department. On the other hand, Sir Ronald Harris, who supervised the division

within the Treasury responsible for overseas expenditure, believed that aid was

undervalued at a senior political level: 'The truth of the matter is that at present aid is

not regarded politically as a matter of the highest priority: if it were, the Treasury would

be under much more constant and forceful pressure to increase the allocation of aid

funds to all overseas departments'. He believed that, for as long as the government

refused to make aid 'a matter of the highest priority', there would be 'considerable

advantages', from the perspective of holding down overseas expenditure, in retaining

the DTC, since the Treasury was under no concerted political pressure to raise the

level of overseas assistance33 On 11 May 1964, Robert Carr, Minister for Technical

Co-operation, wrote to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, now Prime Minister, seeking clarity on

this issue. Carr felt that the administration of aid was 'too diffuse to obtain a sufficiently

quick and comprehensive control of policy and execution or to make a proper impact

33R. Harris quoted in D. J. Morgan, The Official

History of Colonial Development: Changes in British Aid Policy, 1951-
1960,vol. IV, (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 15.
 51

presentationally34 Home's favourable response to this request - he was prepared to

hold further discussions on this issue - gave Carr the opportunity to suggest the

creation of a single ministry for administering aid, although this department would

remain subject to the direction of the Foreign Office and the CRO. As a result, Carr's

proposal differed from Labour's manifesto commitment to establish a free-standing

ministry. The difference in approach between the Labour and Conservative parties on

this matter was succinctly summarised by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,

R. A. Butler, who maintained that ministers preferred the notion of a 'Ministry for Aid

Management', as opposed to a Ministry for Overseas Development.35

Following electoral victory in October 1964, Labour replaced the Department of

Technical Co-operation with an independent Ministry of Overseas Development

(OMD). Unlike its predecessor, the OMD had its own budget and a minister with a seat

in the cabinet. Equally important, Barbara Castle, one of the most recognisable figures

in the Labour government, was made the first Secretary of State for Overseas

Development. Moreover, Sir Andrew Cohen, who became Permanent Under-

Secretary to the OMD, was generally regarded as one of the most dynamic and able

figures within Whitehall. This combination in leadership, it was widely held, enabled

the new department to `punch above its weight'. In her memoirs, Castle admitted to

not getting on particularly well with her permanent secretary, claiming that she became

increasingly exasperated by Cohen going into her `ministerial room and almost literally

wringing his hands over one of my latest choices of policy or people' Rather unfairly,

Castle criticised the Conservative government's aid programme as being unplanned,

uncoordinated, and for being more concerned with the interests of the donor than with

the recipient. Castle claimed that she 'was delighted to be in a position to end all of

this and establish a revolutionary new principle: that the purpose of aid was to promote

the development of the backward countries of the world and that all other

34ibid, p. 17
35 ibid.

35B. Castle, Fighting All the Way, (London:

Pan Books, 1993), p. 343.
 52

considerations must be subordinated to this' 37 In common with most of her Labour

colleague, Castle had little experience of Whitehall; an innocence that she felt

restricted her capacity to influence the direction of policy, as she later alluded to in her

memoirs:

I had not realised how completely the civil service was in control. It was
not that I had had a sheltered political life. I had spent nearly twenty
years at the heart of political infighting, but nothing had prepared me for
the inter-departmental intrigues, which lay ahead, or the civil servants
determination to keep control of them. 38

The creationof the Ministryfor OverseasDevelopmentwas not welcomedby the

CommonwealthRelationsOffice,which disagreedwith its morewide-rangingapproach

in distributingaid to developingcountries. Garnerbelievedthat the new department

led to an unnecessaryduplicationof effort, later admittingthat there was 'some mutual

jealousy[betweenthe CRO and OMD]and constantargumentaboutjurisdiction'.39

More importantly,seriousdifferenceexistedbetweenthe two departmentson how aid

shouldbe distributed. The CRO naturallyfavouredpreferentialtreatmentfor new

membersof the Commonwealth,arguingthat aid shouldbe directedto those countries

with whose historywas inextricablyintertwinedwith Britain,while the OMD preferred

an approachwhich distributedaid objectively,basedon an assessmentof need.

Aware of Labour'splanned'machineryof governmentreforms',a numberof Treasury

officials,doubtlesswith an eye on the potentialeconomicimplicationsof increasedaid

on the balanceof payments,arguedit would be preferableto assimilatean aid

departmentwithin an amalgamated'Departmentof ExternalAffairs',as opposedto

establishingan autonomousministry.40 Additionally,the CRO resentedthe fact that

manyof the OMD'sstaff came from the ColonialOffice,believingthat they were

37ibid, p. 345.
38ibid, pp. 340-344. Interestingly,the
chapter, from which this quote Is taken, is entitled, 'Revelations of Government'.
39Gamer, The CommonwealthOffice, 372.
p.
40See Morgan, The Official History Colonial
of Development,vol. IV, (1980).
 53

'imbued with colonial ideas' and prone to taking an overly paternalistic approach to

newly independent countries 41 Given that the OMD's raison d'etre was essentially

altruistic, this viewpoint was to some extent justified. Sir Andrew Cohen, it is worth

noting, had spent most of his career in the Colonial Office, earning the sobriquet, 'King

of Africa'.

Whilst the 'overseas' departments had much in common, in terms of shared policy

objectives, it would be wrong - as this thesis will demonstrate - to overemphasise the

level of convergence and coherence achieved. There was, for example, a clear

difference of opinion between the 'overseas' departments on the importance of Britain's

role East of Suez. Not wishing to see any diminution in the British contribution to

stability in South-East Asia, CRO officials attached particular weight to Britain's

relations with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. The Foreign Office, on

the other hand, tended to emphasise the primacy of Anglo-American relations in regard

to British policy in the Far East, and, on the whole, was more concerned with Britain's

position in the Persian Gulf.

The Creationof a UnifiedMinistryof Defence.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD), prior to the Macmillan reforms in the late 1950s and

early 1960s, essentially functioned as a co-ordinating department, balancing the

tensions arising from the competing interests of the Admiralty, the War Office, the Air

Ministry, and Ministry of Aviation. By the mid-1950s, however, it became increasingly

clear that this was an unsatisfactory arrangement, wasteful in terms of duplication of

effort, and incompatible with the aim of producing coherent strategy. Macmillan, who

briefly served as Minister of Defence in the mid-1950s, was aware of the strong vested

interests that existed in favour of retaining the extant administrative arrangements, and,

41Gamer, op. cit, p. 372.

 54

on becoming Prime Minister, immediately set about addressing this problem by

appointing Duncan Sandys as his first Minister of Defence. Aware of the need for

fundamental change, Sandys implemented a number of important organisational

reforms in his 1957 Defence White Paper, in spite of strident opposition from the three

Services: Sandys reduced the size of the Royal Navy, downgraded the role of Fighter

Command to protecting nuclear bases, and began the process of phasing out national

2
service. In July 1958, the Conservative government published another White Paper,

Central Organisation of Defence, which strengthened the powers of the Minister of

Defence, whilst correspondingly weakening the position of the Service ministers;

importantly, the White Paper stipulated that it was to become standard practice for

Service ministers' proposals on defence policy to be submitted to the Minister of

Defence for approval. The White Paper introduced two further important centralising

reforms: firstly, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee became Chief of the

Defence Staff, though the Chiefs of Staff Committee remained the body responsible for

submitting military advice to the government; and, secondly, co-ordination was to be

further improved by the establishment of a ministerial Defence Board. 3 The practices

established by the 1957 and 1959 reforms were not as significant as the major

modernising changes that were later implemented in 1963-64, but they did establish a

platform from which further restructuring could take place.

Recognising the need to smooth relations with the Service ministries and Chiefs of

Staff, in the aftermath of the 1959 White Paper, Macmillan replaced Sandys with the

less forceful figure of Harold Watkinson. * On 13 July 1959, Lord Mountbatten became

Chief of the Defence Staff, when he took on the responsibilities of Sir William Dickson.

Mountbatten, perhaps influenced by his experience as an inter-Service Supreme

Commander in South-East Asia during the Second World War, was convinced (almost

42Defence: Outline of Future Policy. Cmnd 124, (London:

HMSO, 1956-7), xxiii. 489. See also S. J. Ball, 'Harold
Macmillan and the Politics of Defence', Twentieth Century British History, 6 (1995), 78-100, and S. J. Ball,
'Macmillan and British Defence Policy' In R. Aldous pp.
and S. Lee (eds.), Harold Macmillan and Britain's World Role,
Ll 996), pp. 67-97.
Central Organisationfor Defence: Cmnd 476, (London: HMSO,
1958).
 55

to the point of obsession) of the need to centralise control in the MoD, using his

considerable influence within Whitehall to achieve this end. Like Macmillan,

Mountbatten believed that Britain's defence machinery was wasteful and inefficient,

claiming: 'I have come to the firm conclusion that nothing short of the abolition of the

separate Service Departments and the creation of a single Ministry of Defence will get

to the root of the problem'"4

Macmillan re-visited the issue of organisational reform in 1962, believing that the

Service Chiefs of Staff would be receptive to further change. It soon became apparent,

however, that the Service departments were hostile towards any further re-

organisation. Partly in to
response such opposition, Macmillan replaced Watkinson

with the more substantial figure of Peter Thorneycroft, who carried the authority of

being a former Chancellor of the Exchequer.45 Thorneycroft faithfully implemented the

'Macmillan-Mountbatten' agenda of organisational reform, but was later criticised by

Mountbatten, rather unjustly, for being overly cautious in his approach. The Chiefs of

Staff and Service ministries' vehement opposition to reform was not just based on

reasons of simple departmental self-interest: the independence of the Service

ministries had a long history, and many of those opposed to modernisation genuinely

believed that it was in Britain's defence interests to retain the in situ arrangements.

The intensity and extent of opposition differed between the three services. Sir Thomas

Pike, Chief of the Air Staff, was the most dogmatic opponent of re-organisation,

standing resolutely against any reduction in the autonomy of the Air Ministry and Air

Council. Sir Caspar Johns, the First Sea Lord, perhaps recognising the fundamental

requirement of reform, was less obstinate in his opposition, but could by no means be

described as a facilitating influence in the process of organisational restructuring. Sir

Richard Hull, Chief of the Army, feared that the newly organised Ministry of Defence

" Mountbattenquoted In P. Ziegler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography, (London: Fontana/Collins,1985), p. 601.
45In January 1958, Chancellor of the Exchequer Peter Thorneycroft had
resigned from Harold Macmillan's government
over the direction of economic policy. The Economic secretary to the Treasury, Nigel Birch and the Financial Secretary
to the Treasury, Enoch Powell resigned at the same time.
 56

would develop into a 'German-style OKW', in that the figures at the apex of the defence

infrastructure would lose contact with those at ground level; however, Hull was given to

understand that he would replace Mountbatten as Chief of the Defence Staff, a factor

that may well have lessened his obduracy towards re-organisation. Despite his

undoubted commitment to modernisation, Macmillan achieved only limited progress on

reform by late December 1962, recording in his diaries that the Service ministries and

Chiefs of Staff were determined to make a 'strong reactionary fight' 46

Largely as a result of the hostility of the Service departments to fundamental change,

Macmillan appointed General Lord Ismay and Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Jacob to

conduct a review of Britain's defence machinery. Despite having being retired for five

years, Ismay was an experienced Whitehall operator, whilst Jacob was widely

respected for his prominent role in drafting the 1946 Defence White Paper. The Jacob-

Ismay report took only six weeks to draft and set out three possible options for the

future of the MoD: firstly, the government could retain the existing arrangements, albeit

with a number of limited changes - this was not considered a viable option; secondly,

Jacob and Ismay suggested creating a unified department, amalgamating the

Admiralty, the War Office and Air Ministry under a single Secretary of State; finally, as

a 'third-way' option, the Service departments could be subsumed within a unified

structure, whilst retaining many of their existing functions. Macmillan thought that a

fully unified structure was a necessary precursor to balancing defence priorities and

ending internecine arguments between the Service departments over their budget

allocations, but opted in favour of the 'third-way' option on pragmatic grounds, believing

that this would provide a basis for further reform. In late February 1963, Mountbatten

confirmed to Macmillan that he thought the decision represented an 'interim solution'.47

Treasury officials, who had long been undermined in their determination to hold down

defence expenditure by the existence of three separate Service departments,

"H. Macmillan quoted in A. Home, Macmillan,

1957-1986,vol. ii, (1989), p. 501.
"Ziegler, op. cit, p. 601.
 57

welcomed this decision. On 10 July 1963, Sir Richard 'Otto' Clarke, Second Secretary

to the Treasury, expressed his approval of this decision, in a letter to D. J. Mitchell:

On our side, we welcome the White Paper. We have been increasingly

dissatisfied with the way in which the basic questions of the allocation of
resources between the Services and their functions have been handled
under the existing set-up. The present system is bedevilled by the
conception of "fair shares" between the Services, and the Ministry [of
Defence] has not been strong enough to act as the active manager of the
defence budget.48

A Defence White Paper, proposing the establishment of a unified Ministry of Defence,

in which complete authority and responsibility for the Armed Forces would be vested in

a single secretary of state, was published in July 196349 These proposals were given

statutory authority under the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1964.50The new

legislation created a unified defence structure, legitimising the supremacy of the

Secretary of State for Defence. The three Services retained a separate identity as

departments with their own Chiefs of Staff, but they were to be ultimately subordinate

to the Secretary of State. Moreover, the authority of the Permanent Under-Secretary to

the Ministry of Defence was extended to cover the civil servants operating in the

Service ministries. This represented a seminal development in the organisation of

Britain's defence infrastructure, creating a central focus for the development of policy

and allocation of resources on a more rational and considered basis. On 1 April 1964,

the three Service ministries came to an end as separate entities, and moved into a

single building in Whitehall. This re-location had a beneficial psychological impact in

developing effective working relationships, as is recounted by Sir Euan Broadbent,

former Second Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence: 'it had

the practical effect that many staff, both military and civilian, were rubbing shoulders

9 Clarke to Mitchell, 10 July 1963, Clarke

papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/312/4.
Central Organisationfor Defence Cmnd 2097 (London: HMSO, 1963).
50Defence (Transfer ofFunctionsr Bill 2., Bills
Public, (London: HMSO, 1963-1964).
 58

informally as well as formally with colleagues in related areas of work whom they had

hitherto rarely, if ever, met'.5'

The Treasuryand the 'Overseas'Departments.

Anthony Sampson's The New Anatomy of Britain described the Treasury's relationship

with other Whitehall departments thus: 'Of all the civil service departments, the

Treasury has always been the most abused, mocked and disliked: for it is its job to say

No'.52 This represents an apposite, although not entirely accurate, description of the

Treasury's relationship with the 'overseas' and defence departments in the late 1950s

and 1960s. Lord Helsby, Head of the Civil Service between 1963 and 1968, rightly

argued that the Treasury was not overly concerned with its unpopularity, claiming that it

could 'never be popular among departments in every way, and indeed it would

probably denote a serious failure on the Treasury's part if it ever did become popular' 53

The Treasury's internal cohesiveness and central discipline as a department differed

markedly from its 'overseas' counterparts, all of which possessed an almost innate

propensity towards intra-departmental in-fighting. The Plowden Committee on the

Control of Public Expenditure (which was set up in 1959, but reported in 1961) argued

that the Treasury's main functions were twofold. Firstly, in addition to its traditional

responsibility as the custodian of the Exchequer, the Treasury was responsible for the

management of the national economy as a whole; therefore, the Treasury was

equipped with the ability to formulate the central aims of economic policy and to act as

the co-coordinator of the policies of individual departments towards the achievement of

these over-arching objectives. To this end, Plowden recommended that the Treasury

be able to fulfil two further tasks: to relate each department's activities and

5' E. Broadbent, The Military

and Government: From Macmillan to Heseltine, (London: Macmillan In associationwith
Royal United Services Institute, 1988), 24.
52Sampson, New Anatomy, p.
p. 275.
53Helsby quoted In ibid.
 59

requirements to the general thrust of national economic policy, to the prospective

availability of resources, and to the total of claims upon them; and to provide advice to

departments on all aspects of economic and financial policy, and to help them fulfil

their departmental responsibilities efficiently and economically. Secondly, the Treasury

was responsible for the management of the civil service, reflecting the centrality of its

position within Whitehall Treasury officials, therefore, tended to take a broad

overview of events when contributing to the development of foreign policy, giving

consideration to how the domestic and external economic environment impacted upon

Britain's ability to play a world role. Whilst Treasury civil servants emphasised the

pivotal importance of the British economy in determining Britain's capacity to play a

global role, officials operating within the 'overseas' departments were generally less

pre-occupied with the issues of macroeconomics and resource allocation. The

Treasury was often resentful of the reluctance of the 'overseas' departments and

defence establishment to confront what it considered economic 'realities': for example,

when commenting on the question of British financial and economic interests East of

Suez in relation to the cost of defending them, 'Otto' Clarke noted: 'I am sure that

neither the military nor the F.O. people understand that these "interests" are quite

negligible in size in relation to the cost of defending them' 55 It was the responsibility

of the Treasury to make the 'overseas' departments aware of economic realities,

although this was often met with implacable opposition. However, it would be

misguided to assume that the Treasury's position as 'holder of the purse-strings' meant

that it was always successful in holding down overseas expenditure.

Along with the Prime Minister (who also possessed the title, First Lord of the

Treasury), the Chancellor of the Exchequer had responsibility for total government

expenditure. The Treasury's position as a central department, with a key co-ordinating

role within Whitehall, invariably made the Chancellor of the Exchequer the second

"4 Control of Public Expenditure,

Cmnd 1432, (London: HMSO, 1960-61).
Clarke to Armstrong, 19 November
1963, Clarke papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/2/5.
 60

most powerful individual in government. The ability of the Treasury to control overseas

and defence expenditure depended on three fundamental factors: the authority of the

Chancellor of the Exchequer within the cabinet; the degree of support the Prime

Minister was prepared to give the Treasury on a particular issue; and the willingness of

other departments to comply with the Treasury's requirements in relation to financial

control. Importantly, when a spending minister appealed to the cabinet against

Treasury policy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had to obtain the assent of his senior

colleagues on decisions of expenditure; thus, the authority of the Treasury was

dependent on the willingness of cabinet ministers to comply with the views of the

Chancellor. If an issue went to the cabinet and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was

defeated, Treasury officials would have to implement policy it disagreed with, for all

decisions reached by the cabinet were binding on the government. G. C. Peden

argues, with some justification, that the cabinet was an important forum for achieving

Treasury control of expenditure, as well as conducive to the efficient operation of

government, since ministers were forced to contemplate the arguments both 'for' and

'against' new expenditure56 The Treasury used the cabinet and its subsidiary

committees to highlight the fact that increased expenditure would require a

corresponding increase in the level of taxation, an important factor in forcing ministers

to set priorities. By bringing the Prime Minister's attention to inter-departmental

disagreements on expenditure, the cabinet secretary could also play an important role

in this respect: for example, in late 1961, when ministers were deciding whether to

maintain Britain's commitment to Kuwait, Brook advised Macmillan: 'If this is so, we

shall not be able to make any substantial reduction in our military expenditure in this

theatre. I hope therefore that, if Ministers decide to accept this commitment, they will

do so with their eyes open to the consequences'57 The Chancellor, moreover, could

usually expect the support of the Prime Minister in cabinet. 'Every Prime Minister... '
,

a6G.C.Peden, TheTreasury andBritishPublicPolicy,

1906-1959,
(Oxford:
Oxford Press,
2000),
Brook to Macmillan, 13 September 1961, PREM 11/3430. University p.523.
 61

Castle later ruefully remarked, '... in the end backs his Chancellor, whose word in

Cabinet is law'.58 However, most disputes between the Treasury and other

departments were not settled at cabinet level, as such a state of affairs would quickly

lead to administrative gridlock. Treasury officials would therefore often reach

agreement with the 'overseas' and defence departments at cabinet committee level or

on a bilateral basis. In this respect, the establishment of the Defence and Overseas

Policy Committee, in October 1963, greatly improved co-ordination between the

Treasury and other Whitehall departments.

During the 1960s, the Treasury emerged as a predominant influence in the

development of British foreign policy. This was a direct result of the progressively

inter-connected nature of foreign and economic policy formulation: for example, the

Treasury was the 'lead' department in Britain's efforts to defend the pound and the two

applications to join the EEC in 1963 and 1967. On the other hand, in the late 1950s

and early 1960s, the position of the Treasury vis-b-vis the 'overseas' and defence

departments was arguably weakened by a succession of ineffectual, and often

transient, Chancellors of the Exchequer. Derrick Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor of the

Exchequer from January 1959 until July 1960, was not a particularly strong figure

within the Conservative party, which undoubtedly undermined the Treasury's position

in relation to the Foreign Office. Peden rightly argues that 'he [Heathcoat Amory] was

far from being a born leader and he found it difficult to persuade his Cabinet colleagues

to do things they did not like'.59 Selwyn Lloyd, Heathcoat Amory's replacement, only

had two years at the Treasury, an insufficiently long period to make any real impact on

foreign policy, especially given his poor working relationship with Macmillan, who

damned him with faint praise in his memoirs, by suggesting that he suffered 'from the

effects of carrying too heavy a burden over too many years' -a strange accusation,

given that Lloyd and Macmillan had both held ministerial office since 1951 and been in

58Castle,
Fighting
the Way,
p.342.
59Peden, op. 432.
cit., p.
 62

the cabinet together for a similar length of time 60 Moreover, Lloyd's personal diaries

give the impression of a man more comfortable at the Foreign Office, where he did not

have to deal with such mundane matters as incomes policy and balancing the budget.

Following his first week as Chancellor, Lloyd noted (with some exacerbation) in his

diary: 'At the end of first real week of work at the Treasury [it] is apparent how
...
different all this is from the F.O.' 61 Macmillan's last Chancellor (and Douglas Home's

first and only), Reginald Maudling, was a far more formidable figure than his two

immediate predecessors, who had the additional advantage of direct experience of the

Treasury, having served as both Paymaster-General (1952-55) and Economic

Secretary to the Treasury (1957-59); Sir Robert Hall, Director of the Treasury's

Economic Section, even described him as 'a reasonably good economist'62

Nevertheless, Maudling's appointment could not reverse the fact that the Treasury's

position had been weakened against other Whitehall departments by a lack of

continuity at the highest level.

The Treasury's position was strengthened by the election of the Wilson government

in late 1964, when James Callaghan, one of the government's 'big three' (the others

being George Brown and Harold Wilson), became Chancellor of the Exchequer. As

Chancellor, Callaghan fought for the Treasury's view in cabinet, using his considerable

political influence to direct British foreign policy, particularly in relation to the reduction

of defence expenditure. Callaghan was an authoritative figure within the Labour

cabinet and the trade union movement, but inexperienced with regard to the workings

of Whitehall, which made him particularly susceptible to Treasury influence. Referring

to an informal meeting in Downing Street in late December 1964, Sir Alec Cairncross,

Hall's replacement as Head of the Economic Section of the Treasury, noted in his

60Macmillan, End of the Day, 91. (Interestingly, In

p. the Index to his memoirs, under Lloyd, Selwyn (who, as Speaker
of the House of Commons, still occupied a prominent position In British public life In 1973 the year of publication),
Macmillan inserted - lack of Initiative, 89,91,94). -
8' Personal Diary Entry, (undated, but
probably late September 1960), Selwyn Lloyd papers (Churchill College,
Cambridge) SELO 4/23.
62A. Caimcross (ed.), The Robert Hall Diaries,
1954-1961,(London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), p. 11.
 63

diary: 'He [Callaghan] talked very Otto about the need to fix a ceiling now to defence

expenditure and how his proposals would mean that the growth in public expenditure

for the first time would be brought under control'.63 Callaghan's 'very Otto' posture was

a reference to the almost osmotic influence of 'Otto' Clarke, who was leading the drive

to bring public expenditure under control. Furthermore, Labour brought its own

'special' advisers into government, most notably Thomas Balogh and Nicholas Kaldor,

both of whom were initially hostile towards Whitehall and its alleged machinations, but

in general agreement with the Treasury's desire to reduce Britain's 'burdensome'

overseas commitments.

Labour's creation of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) only had a marginal

affect on the Chancellor of the Exchequer's authority in the field of foreign affairs. The

DEA, which was responsible for mobilising resources to increase productivity and

exports, was established in order to meet Labour's ambitious (but ultimately

unachievable) manifesto commitment of a 25 per cent growth in national output

between 1964 and 1970,64The new ministry's ability to achieve this objective was

severely undermined by Wilson's policy of retaining sterling's parity with the dollar, a

commitment requiring restrictive economic measures in order to defend the value of

the pound. As a proponent of economic expansion based on greater investment in the

domestic economy, the DEA was a powerful ally of the Treasury in demanding greater

levels of retrenchment in defence and overseas expenditure. On 13 November 1965,

for example, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Economic

Affairs put a joint-memorandum before a meeting of ministers and officials at

Chequers, arguing that Britain's economic difficulties would persist unless there was a

reduction in the proportion of Britain's GNP devoted to overseas defence65 On the

other hand, as noted in Wilson's own account of the Labour government, the DEA's

63A. Caimcross, The Wilson Years:A Treasury Diary, 1964-1966,(London:

The Historians' Press, 1997), p. 26.
" See Labour's 1964 manifesto, 'The New Britain',
in I. Dale (ed.), Labour Party general election manifestos 1900-1997,
(London: Routledge in association with Politico's, 2000).
Cabinet (Defence Policy) minutes, 13 November 1965, CAB 130/213.
 64

assumption of responsibility for the main areas of overseas economic policy led to

some friction with the Treasury, which retained its responsibilities in the field of

overseas finance ss

Along with the position of Secretary of the Cabinet, the (Joint) Permanent Secretary

to the Treasury held a slightly higher rank than that of other permanent secretaries

employed in the Home Civil Service, reflecting the Treasury's status of 'first among

equals' within Whitehall. Lord Bridges, who served as Permanent Secretary to the

Treasury between 1945 and 1956, compared the relationship of the Permanent

Secretary to the Treasury with other permanent secretaries to that 'of a brother -

perhaps a year or so older - the person to whom it was most natural to turn in any

difficulty and to whom one could speak most easily and with complete candour's'

Bridges' portrait of inter-departmental harmony will be scrutinised in this thesis, as it

tends to gloss-over the often-fractious interactions that punctuated relations between

the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and other permanent secretaries. Bridges'

fraternal analogy contains some validity, but from the standpoint of the 'overseas' and

defence departments, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury could often appear as

an elder brother prone to bullying and haranguing, intent on undermining the legitimate

ambitions of its younger siblings. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Permanent Under-

Secretary to the Foreign Office would have seen his relationship with the Permanent

Secretary to the Treasury as akin to Bridges' description, even during the late 1960s,

when Britain's international power entered a period of rapid decline.

Writingon the Treasury,Henry Roseveareobserved:'It is naturalto wonderhow far

the permanent Treasury was really responsible for the strikingly consistent orthodoxy

of successiveChancellors,
regardless 68
of party'. This thesistests to what extentboth
Conservativeand LabourChancellorswere susceptibleto the influenceof their senior

Treasuryofficials. Between1957and 1963,on three separateoccasions,the post of

66H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-1970,

(London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p. 5.
87E. Bridges, The Treasury, (London: Allen
" H. Roseveare, The Treasury The & Unwin, 1966), p. 179.
Evolution of an Institution, (London: Allen Lane, 1969), p. 198.
 65

Permanent Secretary to the Treasury was held on a joint basis: first, by Sir Roger

Makins and Sir Norman Brook, between 1957 and 1960; secondly, by Sir Frank Lee

and Sir Norman Brook, between 1960 and 1962; and, thirdly, by Sir William Armstrong

and Sir Lawrence Heisby, for a brief period in 1962. Makins, who had spent the

majority of his career in the Foreign Office, lacked the authority, if not desire, to press

the Treasury's case in Whitehall. Largely because of his proactive and assiduous

approach to the job, Lee's time at the Treasury was more productive than Makins's: for

example, Lee, who had previously served as Permanent Secretary to both the Board of

Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, established the European

Economic Association (Official) Committee, which set in train Britain's first application

for membership of the EEC. Sir William Armstrong was the sole Permanent Secretary

to the Treasury between 1962 and 1974, and it is perhaps no coincidence that it was

with his appointment (at the relatively young age of forty-seven) that the Treasury

became more effective in marking its imprint on British foreign policy. It would be

misleading, however, to credit the Treasury's increasing assertiveness exclusively to

the influence of Armstrong: firstly, Armstrong was assisted by a number of other able

Treasury figures, notably'Otto' Clarke and Sir Alec Cairncross; secondly, the incoming

Labour government shared the Treasury's objective of reducing the level of defence

expenditure as a percentage of GDP; and, thirdly, the position of the 'overseas'

departments gradually weakened during the mid-1960s, a development generally

reflecting Britain's changed position in the world.

The Treasury's acrimonious relationship with the 'overseas' departments resulted

from differing conceptions of Britain's appropriate world role. The CRO was particularly

critical of the Treasury, believing it to be 'cynical and unemotional' in respect to the

value of the Commonwealth. There were serious differences between the Treasury

and CRO over the size of the defence budget, particularly Britain's Far Eastern

defence expenditure. Garner felt that the Treasury's

repeated demands for
retrenchment in defence expenditure placed the CRO in a position of 'acute
 66

69
embarrassment' In spite of this, Garner claimed that there was continuous

collaboration with the Treasury over the problems facing the British economy and the

need to strengthen sterling, although such co-operation was rather limited in reality, as

will be demonstrated in chapter V.

As is often the case with 'new' departments, the OMD found it particularly difficult to

establish itself within Whitehall. Castle's description of a meeting she had with the

Public Expenditure Committee in July 1965 provides a useful example of the relative

weakness of a department like the OMD when opposed by the Treasury: 'One of the

bleakest days in my political life My careful preparation of an opening submission

...
[for the Public Expenditure Committee] went for nothing: Jim [Callaghan] didn't want to

hear it'.70 Like the other 'overseas' departments, the OMD was further weakened by

the relatively poor performance of the British economy in the mid-1960s, given that the

Treasury often looked to the OMD budget when attempting to make greater economies

in expenditure. The OMD's strained relationship with the Treasury resulted from the

differing functions of the two departments: the Treasury was responsible for controlling

public expenditure, whilst the OMD was driven by a largely altruistic mandate.

Personal antipathy between Callaghan and Castle damaged relations between the two

departments further: the latter later criticised the Chancellor for being short-sighted and

overly parsimonious, claiming that Callaghan's 'only bottom line was an accountant's

one'."

The Cabinetand its Committees.

The cabinet had essentially two functions in the late 1950s and 1960s: firstly, the

6' Gamer, The CommonwealthOffice, p. 371.

70B. Castle, The Castle Diaries, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1984). Also see Cabinet minutes, 5 August 1965,
CAB 128/39.
" ibid.
 67

cabinet addressed issues of national importance requiring the collective commitment of

the government to a particular policy course; secondly, the cabinet addressed

questions on which there were irreconcilable differences between departments. The

ministerial committees supporting the cabinet had two further functions. First, they

relieved the full cabinet of unnecessary administrative pressures by delegating

responsibility to a lower level. If the ministerial committee failed to resolve an

outstanding inter-departmental problem, it would - in theory - at least define the points

of disagreement between departments and clarify the main issues for consideration at

cabinet level. Secondly, the ministerial committees were bound by the principle of

collective responsibility, thus ensuring that important issues not considered by the

cabinet would carry the authority of the government and bind all ministers.

Created in 1962, the OPC was chaired by the Prime Minister and was composed of

senior governmental figures - the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary

of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, the

Minister for Defence, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and usually one other senior

member of the government. The importance of the OPC was signified by the fact that

the Prime Minister chaired the meeting once a week, unlike the Colonial Policy

Committee, which met on an ad hoc basis, and had been chaired, at various times, by

the Lord President of the Council, Lord Salisbury, and the Lord Chancellor, Lord

Kilmuir. The creation of the committee strengthened the position of the Treasury;

unlike the CPC, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had a permanent seat on the OPC.

As part of the re-organisation arising from the White Paper, The Central Organisation

for Defence, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) was formed on 1

October 1963, by direction of the Prime Minister, its terms of reference being 'to keep

under review the Government's defence and oversea policies'.72

72Defence and Overseas Policy Committee's

'Terms of Reference' can be found in CAB 148/15
 68

The Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee (DOP(O)C) like its
-
predecessor committees - was an important forum for resolving differences between

departments, prior to discussion at ministerial level. The terms of reference for the

Official Committee were 'to consider questions of defence and oversea policy. 73The

Secretary to the Cabinet chaired the DOP(O)C, with membership including the

Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office, the (Joint) Permanent Secretary to

the Treasury, the Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, the Permanent Under-

Secretary to the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Permanent Under-Secretary to

the Colonial Office, the Permanent (Under-)Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, the

Chief of the Defence Staff, and the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence.

The incoming Labour government had little knowledge of this vital cog of the

governmental machine. Crossman, who had written extensively on constitutional

matters, and Balogh, who criticised Whitehall in print before becoming the Economic

Adviser to the Cabinet, were not even aware of the existence of such official

committees. Crossman was particularly critical of the cabinet committee system,

arguing that it was 'the key to the control by the Civil Service over the politicians'. The

criticism of Whitehall expounded by Crossman was common to other political figures

(particularly those from the Labour party), and is worth quoting further:

The Minister is not merely subject to control by his Department seeking

to make him work according to their departmental policies, there is also a
wider network of Whitehall control exerted through these official
committees. In the Cabinet Committees the Ministers may sit down
together, each with his departmental brief, and discuss policy. But then
they leave it to the official committee both to prepare briefs and to carry
out the policies when they have laid them down. 4

73Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee's

'Terms of Reference' can be found in CAB 148116.
" R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries
of a Cabinet MinisternMinister of Housing, 1964-1966,vol. I, (London: Hamish
Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1975), p. 616.
 69

Crossman's portrayal of the committee system contains a modicum of truth, but is

ultimately too simplistic. Inter-departmental disagreements expressed in the official

committees generally mirrored those at ministerial level: thus, the position adopted by

the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury at the Defence and Overseas (Official)

Committee was normally the same as that taken by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in

the ministerial committee. This resulted from the fact that ministers rarely produced

their own papers for cabinet committee discussion, which ought not to be taken as a

criticism of the ability of ministers, as it merely reflected the realities inherent in being a

cabinet minister in the late 1950s and 1960s - unlike in the age of Gladstone, ministers

simply lacked the time to draft policy papers by themselves, although a few, such as

Julian Amery, did have the wherewithal to do so. Senior Whitehall figures, for the most

part, took their constitutional position seriously, believing that the primary task of the

senior civil service was to advise on policy, with responsibility for decision-making

resting with politicians. It would be wrong to attribute the Machiavellian traits of

coercion and manipulation to senior civil servants, although this did not preclude

officials from steering politicians in a particular policy direction. Given the constraints

of the `thirty-year rule', the work of the cabinet committees remains a neglected

subject, a fact made more noticeable by the reluctance of former ministers to elaborate

on their proceedings in their memoirs. Such a state of affairs is not entirely surprising:

Whitehall, during the period encompassed by this thesis, exhibited a deep-seated

hostility towards the publication of material relating to the workings of government. For

example, on learning of Patrick Gordon Walker's plans to publish a book on how the

cabinet operated, Harold Wilson applied pressure on him to omit all references to the

cabinet committees.75 Acting on the advice of his civil servants, Wilson told Gordon

Walker, in the bluntest possible terms:

75P. Gordon Walker, The Cabinet (London:

Jonathon Cape, 1970).
 70

I am sorry to learn that you apparently intend to leave the passages on

Cabinet Committees substantially unchanged. It may on occasion be
appropriate for a Government to disclose the existence of a particular
Cabinet Committee but it does not follow that there is no objection to
fuller disclosures by a former Minister on the basis of knowledge of the
composition and function of Committees acquired while in Office.7e

As a result of such hostility, it is only now that the workings of the cabinet committees

can be fully comprehended; in doing so, this thesis aims to further understanding of

how Whitehall operated, in relation to foreign policy formulation, during the late 1950s

and 1960s.

Summary.

By laying out how the structure of Whitehall's policy-making apparatus evolved and

changed between 1959 and 1968, this chapter provides a frame of reference for the

following four chapters, which examine how officials formulated Britain's geo-strategic

objectives, in regard to Africa, the Middle East, and Far East. This chapter

demonstrates that 'machinery of government reform' was under constant consideration

within Whitehall, a necessity arising from the rapidly changing nature of British power

and influence. The main contention of this thesis is that these administrative changes

allowed foreign policy to be formulated on a rational and thoughtful basis, with a view

to the long-term implications of Britain's declining international position. This is an

underappreciated phenomenon, given the prevalent stereotypical view of Whitehall as

short-sighted, reactive, conservative, over-concerned with tradition and incapable of

strategic forward planning.

76Wilson to Gordon Walker, 8 August 1969,

Gordon Walker papers (Churchill College, Cambridge), GNWR 2/3.
 71

Chapter II: The Macmillan Government's, 'Future Policy Study 1960-1970'.

Winston Churchill, as Conservative Leader of the Opposition in the late 1940s,

promoted the concept of `three great circles among the free nations and democracies',

which referred to the Commonwealth, Western Europe, and the English-speaking

world. Churchill argued: 'These three majestic circles are co-existent and if they are

linked together there is no force or combination which could overthrow them or even

challenge them. Now if you think of the three inter-related circles, you will see that we

are the only country which has a great part in every one of them'. ' This analysis of

Britain's world role provided a frame of reference through which civil servants and

politicians formulated British foreign policy in the 1950s. In June 1958, for example, a

top-level inter-departmental report, entitled 'The Position of the United Kingdom in

World Affairs', concluded that Britain could still fulfil a global role, through its position as

leader of the Commonwealth, its links with Western Europe, and its relationship with

the United States.2 There was a general consensus that it would be wrong to severely

restrict British involvement in each of its various spheres of influence, though a number

of Treasury officials had begun to question the wisdom and sustainability of such an

approach to international affairs. A. W. France, an official in the Treasury's Overseas

Finance Section, remarked that he was not sure 'whether we [Britain] shall be

sufficiently skilful as a juggler to keep the three circles in the air much longer'.3 The

Treasury, unlike the spending departments concerned with external affairs, namely the

Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office, questioned the viability of

maintaining Britain's extant global commitments over the long-term. Harold Macmillan,

as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1956, graphically reflected this viewpoint, when he

' For Churchill's 'three circles'

speech see W. Churchill, Europe Unite! Speeches, 1947 & 1948,(London: Cassell 1950),
417-418.
app.
'The Position of the United Kingdom in World Affairs', June 1958, CAB
130/139.
A. W. France to D. Rickett, 10 July. 1959, T 234/277. For further information
on the Treasury's view of Britain's world
role in the 1950s see G. C. Peden, The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906-1959,(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), pp. 442-452.
 72

argued: 'it is defence expenditure which has broken our backs'. This statement

referred to the pressure put on Britain's balance-of-payments by extensive overseas

defence commitments, although Macmillan also sought greater economies in home

defence4

By 1959, Macmillan had been Prime Minister for two years, and Britain's economic

difficulties had barely relented, as fears of continuing and future balance-of-payments

instability persisted. Brook had been chiefly responsible for drafting 'The Position of

the United Kingdom in World Affairs', but felt that it had not led to any 'radical re-

assessment of our external policy as a whole - partly, perhaps, because it was not as

good a document as it might have been'. On 20 February 1959, Brook asked

Macmillan whether he would be prepared, some time in the spring, to invite a small

group of senior civil servants and the Chiefs of Staff for a weekend at Chequers to

discuss the basis of Britain's world role between 1960 and 1970 - and, after'launching

them off' on this project, leave them to grapple with it alone, so as to enable the

to
participants settle upon the general shape of a report5 The final document, 'Future

Policy Study, 1960-1970', was intended to clarify how Britain's place in the world would

change over the next ten years .6 Sir Patrick Dean, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at

the Foreign Office, was to chair the Working Group meetings and report to the Future

Policy Study Steering Committee, under the chairmanship of Brook.' The minutes and

papers of both the working and steering groups, as well as the final report itself,

provide a valuable insight into how Britain's long-term foreign policy objectives were

formulated. These papers also illustrate the influence of Whitehall on the policy-

Macmillanto Eden, 23 March 1956, PREM 11/1326.

a Brook to Macmillan, 20 February 1959, PREM 11/2945. Ronald Hyam argues that the'Future Policy Study, 1960-
1970"appears to have been initiated by Macmillan in June 1959'. The documentary evidence suggests that Brook
initiated the policy review on 20 February 1959. See R. Hyam, Winds of Change: the Empire and Commonwealth' in
W. Kaiser and G. Staerck (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64:Contracting Options, (London: Macmillan in
association with the Institute of Contemporary British History, 2000), p. 194.
6'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February 1960, CAB 134/1929. An
extract from this document can be found in R.
Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, British Documents and the End of Empire: The Conservative Governmentand the End of
Empire, 1957-1964 (hereafter BDEE) (Part I), (London: Published for the Institute of CommonwealthStudies in the
University of London by The Stationery Office, 2000), pp. 87-108.
For structure of Future Policy ad hoc Committee see Appendix I.
 73

making process and highlight how differing departmental viewpoints on major areas of

policy were reconciled.

On 6 June 1959, The Times reported: To-morrow Mr Macmillan is giving a

luncheon at Chequers for Marshall of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson, who is

retiring from his position as Chief of the Defence Staff in July to be succeeded by

Admiral of the Fleet Lord Mountbatten. Other senior chiefs and senior officials have

been invited' Sir William Dickson duly retired: however, the primary purpose of the
.8
meeting at Chequers was not as reported in The Times - officials and the Chiefs of

Staff met to discuss a suitable framework and modus operandi for a comprehensive

study of Britain's world role. Taking up Brook's suggestion, Macmillan presented

officials with a lengthy list of questions, which were to act as a guide for discussion. It

was not the purpose of the Chequers meeting to answer all the questions posed, as

Brook noted to Macmillan: 'This looks pretty formidable. If it were an examination

paper, none of the boys in this class could be expected to attempt all the questions'.

The purpose of the meeting, according to Brook, was to have a 'preliminary run over

the ground', to get agreement on the kind of questions to be studied, and to lay out a

programme of work to be undertaken by 9

officials. Macmillan, in setting out the

purpose and parameters for the study, stated that he thought it would be useful if, after

the next General Election, the ministers of a new administration could have for their

consideration an 'up-to-date and comprehensive' forecast of the main economic,

diplomatic and military developments in world affairs over the next decade. The senior

officials were asked to consider 'how our [Britain's] policies might be adapted to enable

the United Kingdom to continue to play a significant part in world affairs'. Macmillan

also instructed his officials to address how the UK should pay for its world role,

informing those present that Britain's aims should be kept in line with national

resources and that, particularly in defence matters where decisions often took many

° The Times,6 June 1959, 6.

p.
° Brook to Macmillan, 25 May 1959, PREM
11/2945.
 74

years to make, broad strategic lines of policy should be established as far ahead as

possible in order to make the best use of available resources. Officials were also

invited to address a number of other important issues relating to the United Kingdom's

extra-European role, namely Britain's position in the Middle East, South-East Asia and

Africa.10 The approach required the working committee to have an iterative

relationship with those steering the study to ensure that the work of the committees

was set within the context of the general strategic policy framework.

Sir Patrick Dean, chairman of the Working Group responsible for producing the

papers for consideration by the Steering Committee, met with senior officials from the

departments involved on 24 June 1959, where he discussed the allocation of work

necessary to support the study. The final report, Dean suggested, would fall into three

main sections. Section A (The International Setting) would consider what international

developments were foreseeable over the next ten years, forecasting the likely resulting

situation in 1970. Section B (The Resources of the United Kingdom) would attempt to

estimate how Britain's economic capacity would change over the next ten years,

gauging - in broad terms only - how much the UK could realistically commit towards

defence expenditure and other ways of preserving Britain's position and interests in the

world. It was recognised that other prospective claims on Treasury expenditure, such

as increased spending on health and education, would put pressure on the scope and

magnitude of overseas policies, and that this would have to be taken into account

during the study. Given the anticipated need for increased investment in social

services and industry, Working Group officials were asked to consider what proportion

of Britain's resources could be allocated (over the period 1960-70) to defence

expenditure, assistance to under-developed nations, and 'prestige' projects. These

questions inexorably led to further questions as to how much Britain should be

10'Studyof Future Policy', Record

of a meeting held at Chequers, 7 June 1959, CAB 134/1929. Another facet of
Britain's world role considered by the committees
was future nuclear deterrent capability. This is not considered in this
chapter, as it is of not central Importanceto this thesis, which focuses how Whitehall planned Britain's withdrawal
from extra-Europeancommitments. on
 75

prepared to pay for its world role over the next decade: an unchanged allocation of

money, an unchanged proportion of GNP, or an increased proportion of GNP? In the

light of the conclusions reached in the first two sections, Section C (The Main

Objectives of the United Kingdom's Overseas and Strategic Policy) was to tackle

questions of policy; however, Dean suggested that it would be helpful if members of

the Working Group could keep questions relating to overseas and strategic policy in

mind from the outset. Dean indicated that the first two sections should be finished by

the middle of September, although a semi-completed form of Section A and Section B

would be produced by the end of July. Detailed work on Section C was to commence

in September 1959, when Section A and Section B had been completed. Dean

emphasised the need for the study to be a 'co-operative exercise', with discussion

limited to a small circle of senior officials, who should sublimate their respective

departmental perspectives:

While members of the Working Group of course represented their

Departments, they had been nominated as individuals to take part in the
Study which, by its nature, would in many cases go beyond the range of
Departmental policy. It was accordingly hoped that they would be able to
think ahead and that the papers contributed to the work of the Working
Group, while generally acceptable to Departments, would not be too

closely bound to current doctrine on present problems."

Inter-Departmental co-operation was therefore considered vital to the success of the

exercise, though this objective went largely unachieved. On the 30 July 1959,

J. S. Orme, one of the committee's two secretaries12,informed Brook that studies

prepared by the departments for the consideration of the Working Group tended 'very

much to reflect Departmental thinking'. 13 After the completion of the Future Policy

Study, Brook considered undertaking further such studies, but Sir Richard 'Otto'

" Future Policy Working Group

minutes, 24 June 1959, CAB 134/1930.
'2 Officials from the Cabinet Office
with responsibility for co-ordinating work between the Working Group and Steering
Committee.
13J. S. Orme to Brook, 30 July 1959, CAB 21/3841.
 76

Clarke, one of the Treasury's representatives on Dean's Working Party, warned that it

would be necessary to learn lessons from the recently completed exercise: 'This kind

of Committee ', Clarke argued, `... is only useful when it is working in the rather
...
rarefied atmosphere where political, diplomatic, military and economic considerations

are inextricably linked together and you have to make a kind of synthesis of them. It

should not be used to do jobs which are within normal Departmental responsibility. It

breaks down at once (and we saw this from time to time in there operations) as soon

it
as gets into in
areas, which there are definite Departmental 14
positions'. Although

Clarke felt the Future Policy Study a 'successful exercise', he, along with his senior

Treasury colleagues, believed that the final document merely reconciled differing

departmental views, failing in its stated objective of setting out a definitive foreign policy

agenda.15

The International Economic Environment and Britain's World Role.

In July 1959, Treasury officials, in consultation with the Foreign Office, Commonwealth

Relations Office and Colonial Office, produced a paper on the relative economic

strengths of both established and emergent powers, and how these would probably

change by 1970. The paper argued that it was important to recognise that two quite

different conceptions of 'economic strength' existed. First, the traditional notion of

economic strength related to the sum total of a nation's economic resources

(technology, industry, agriculture, communications systems and manpower); the

capability of a nation in war, it was argued, largely depended on the size of a state's

GNP, population and industrial capacity. The other concept of 'economic strength', the

paper contended, related to the total resources a nation was prepared to allocate to its

defence effort (including related expenditure, such as foreign aid) during peacetime.

"Clarke to Brook, 26 February 1960, Clarke

papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3//1/1.
's Clarke to Lee, 4 February 1960, Clarke papers (Churchill College,
Cambridge) CLRK 1/31/1/1.
 77

This was to a significant extent reliant upon a nation's resources, but also partly on the

degree to which a government was prepared to deploy these resources on defence

and overseas aid at the expense of social expenditure. The Working Group paper

pointed out that the Soviet Union's strength was greater than its aggregate resources,

primarily because its political system - undemocratic and closed - enabled its

leadership to allocate a disproportionately high percentage of Russia's natural and

manpower resources to military ends. Policy-makers generally agreed that this

extensive reservoir of `disposable power' put the Soviet Union in a more advantageous

position than its actual economic strength suggested, recognising that this could

potentially have serious implications for the final outcome of the Cold War - and, by

implication, Britain's place in world affairs. The West, on the other hand, could

capitalise on its superior economic position if it was prepared to devote a larger

proportion of its resources to defence. Increased defence and overseas spending in

Western countries entailed a simple quid pro quo, whereby citizens would accept a fall

in living standards in exchange for devoting a larger proportion of resources to policies

designed to contain Communism. It was argued that, if the American people were

prepared to accept a reversion to the standard-of-living prevalent at the

commencement of the Eisenhower Administration (1952), the United States could

probably increase its defence effort and economic aid budget by 50 per cent. Thus, if

Britain wanted to effectively preserve its position in South-East Asia and the Persian

Gulf, it would be necessary to consider asking the electorate to approve the politically

unpalatable option of accepting a decline in living standards - which, by the late 1950s,

had begun to fall behind that of other Western countries."

The paper made an attempt to enumerate some of the demographic and economic

factors that were likely to affect Britain's military and diplomatic efforts during the

1960s; these findings would make a significant contribution to Section A of the final

16'EconomicStrength', 20 July 1959, CAB 134/1934.

 78

paper. Firstly, consideration was given to projected population growth of the leading

powers and the two simplest indicators of economic strength - steel production and

electricity generation. This was considered important because of the direct correlation

between national economic capacity and the potential size of a nation's international

power and influence. Accordingly, the world was divided into three main groups -

Western nations, the Soviet bloc, and uncommitted or under-developed countries.

TABLE: 2.1. Estimated Steel and Electricity Production/Future Growth of World Population, 1957-1970.

Production 1957 Population (millions)

Steel Electricity 1957 1970 Inc.
(mill. m. tons) (billion kwh) (est.) 1957-70
Western Countries.
U.K. 22 106 52 54 +2
U.S.A. 102 716 171 204 +33
Canada 5 90 16.5 21 + 4.5
Australia & NZ 3 24 12 15 +3
E.E.C. 60 222 164 179 +15
Other non-Soviet Europe 8 122 101 114 +13
= 200 =1280 = 517 = 587 = +70
Communist Countries.
U.S.S.R. 51 205 203 250 +45
European Satellites 16 85 96 109 +13
China 5 20 640 800 +160
Uncommitted or Under-developeds.
Japan 13 81 91 109 +18
Latin America 3 50 192 265 +73
India 2 15 392 504 +112
Other non-Soviet Asia - 15 432 554 +122
Africa 2 30 225 278 +53

Source: Study of Future Policy for 1960-1970 Working Group. 'Economic Strength', Note by Joint

Secretaries. CAB 134/1934.

These key economic and demographic indicators highlighted that Britain was, in an

economic sense at least, a medium-sized power. The Treasury maintained that it was

necessary for the UK to pursue a foreign policy that reflected this economic reality:

'Only two countries - the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. now have enough "disposable power"
-
to provide a complete and self-sustaining defence and international power apparatus'.

It was argued that the EEC had the potential to move into this
category, providing the
'Six' could effectively pool their resources and
create the necessary supporting
 79

infrastructure for coherent policy-making. Highlighting Britain's relative weakness in

the bi-polar international system of the Cold War, the paper bluntly asserted: `No other

country or group in sight is even near the required strength. The U.K. is clearly not so:

the old dominions could not add enough to make a viable and self-sustaining unit, even

if they were willing'. " The Treasury, which was the driving force behind the paper on

economic strength, had consistently stressed this point throughout the 1950s.

G. C. Peden's The Treasury and British Public Policy highlights how Treasury officials

were of the view that successive post-war governments had tried to do too much in all

aspects of foreign policy, and how this served to place pressure on the balance of

payments and undermined international in 18

confidence sterling. The Treasury

essentially had two main objectives: first, to secure a regular balance-of-payments

surplus, so as to build-up the size of London's sterling and dollar reserves; and,

secondly, to raise the proportion of GNP apportioned to areas such as transport and

education, believing that this would provide the platform for future economic expansion.

Increased domestic investment, Treasury civil servants agreed, was reliant on a

corresponding reduction in the scale of overseas expenditure. In this respect, Treasury

officials were fully aware of Andrew Shonfield's argument that Britain would have to

reduce public expenditure on overseas defence if increased levels of domestic

investment were to be achieved. 19 Writing in 1974, William Wallace argued that there

was 'little debate and argument in the government about the whole structure of British

economic policies and about the implications of political decisions (especially foreign

policy) on economic policy'.20 Similarly, Stephen Blank suggests that the Treasury was

more concerned with political considerations than economic factors when developing

policies designed to preserve Britain's global role: 'Treasury thought was dominated by

a variety of "political myths" about Britain's role in the world... which, in fact, operated

ibid.
1ePeden, Treasury and British Public Policy, 445.
p.
19A. Shonfield, British Economic Policy
since the War, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958), pp 94153.
20W. Wallace, 'Britain's Foreign Economic Policy', International
Affairs, vol. 50, No. 4, (April 1974), p. 251.
 80

against Britain's economic interests. The Treasury's approach, far from being ruled by

narrow economic considerations, too often evaded such economic realities as Britain's

to
capacity pay the costs of its international '
role'? The documentary evidence does

not confirm this assertion - rather, Treasury officials were unable to press their case on

the need to reduce overseas expenditure within Whitehall, which weakened investment

in the domestic economy (designed to increase exports and secure a regular balance-

of-payments surplus), thus undermining the aim of increasing London's sterling and

dollar reserves -a prerequisite for avoiding speculation and retaining the position of

sterling as an international reserve currency.

It was predicted that the global population would increase by around 25 per cent in

13 years: from 2,800 million in 1957 to 3,500 million in 1970. Furthermore, it was

estimated that the world would experience an annual population growth rate of 1.7 per

cent, contrasting markedly with the much slower rate of 0.3 per cent per year forecast

for the UK.

TABLE: 2.2. Predicted Population Growth Per Annum Between 1960 and 1970.

% per annum
U.K. 0.3
E.E.C. 0.7
Other Europe 1.0
U.S.A. 1.4
Japan. 1.4
U.S.S. R. 1.5
Africa 1.6
China 1.7
Other non-Soviet Asia 1.9
India 2.1
Latin America 2.5

Source: Study of Future Policy for 1960-1970 Working Group. 'Economic Strength'. CAB 134/1934.

21S.Blank, 'Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic

Economy and the Problem of Pluralistic
Stagnation', in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), Between Power and Plenty, (Madison: University Wisconsin Press, 1978),
of
p. 104.
 81

This demographic projection would have a profound impact on Britain's international

standing. In June 1959, 'Otto' Clarke stressed this point in a background note to his

Permanent Secretary, Sir Roger Makins, in advance of the meeting at Chequers:

I think the conclusion will inevitably be that [the] U.K's power will
...
continue to fall (quite fast) vis-ä-vis [the] U.S.A., the Soviet Union,
probably Western Europe and indeed the world at large. This simply
reflects the fact their populations are growing much faster than ours; and
that a 50-million country cannot match the width of industrial, scientific
and military effort carried out by the 200-million countries.22

The final officials' report highlighted the constraints of population growth on future

British foreign policy, arguing that inexorable global demographic changes would

weaken Britain's position relative to the Soviet Union, Western Europe and the United

States.

The extremely complex and difficult task of forecasting economic growth was

assigned to the Treasury as part of the Future Policy Study. Clarke was pleased with

the final outcome of the Treasury's economic forecasts, noting to Sir Thomas

Padmore, a fellow Second Secretary to the Treasury: 'I don't think we have ever had

before such a systematic appraisal of rates of economic growth (in relation to

Government policy)'.23 In the period from 1948 to 1956, Britain's GNP grew by 31/2per

cent per annum, of which around one per cent was attributable to a growth in the

working population and 21/2per cent to an increase in output of goods and services per

head of the population. Over the period 1960-1970, it was estimated that the growth of

the working population would decline, and that Britain could expect an annual growth

rate of 23/aper cent for the period 1960-65. Britain's economic growth was expected to

lag behind that of the United States and the EEC: over the forthcoming decade, it was

estimated that the US economy would grow by 4.2 per cent per annum, the EEC by 3.5

22Clarke to Makins, 4 June 1959, T 325/65.

23Clarke to Padmore, 26 February 1960, Clarke
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3//1/1.
 82

per cent, and the UK by 3.1 per cent. 4 Comparisons between the predicted level of

growth in Britain and the USSR were considered invidious, as growth was seen as

representing the success of an economy in satisfying the wants of its population -

which was not the central objective of Soviet economic policy. Industrial production

was viewed as a more valid guide to the relative military and geo-political strength of

the USSR. The Soviet Union's Seven-Year Plan (1958-65), which was approved in

January 1959, estimated an 80 per cent increase in industrial production and a 60 per

cent rise in energy consumption. The Treasury anticipated that the Soviet Plan would

be largely fulfilled, postulating that the industrial ratio between the United States and

Soviet Russia would decline from 2'/z: 1 in 1957 to perhaps 11/2:1 in 1970; moreover,

improvements in Russia's industrial and scientific infrastructure would enlarge the

USSR's capacity to devote increased resources to defence and overseas purposes.25

Greater Soviet involvement in the international sphere, particularly in the East of Suez

region, would have serious implications for Britain, whose industrial output was likely to

grow at a slower rate. The Treasury clearly saw political power as being inextricably

wedded to economic strength: therefore, Britain as a relatively small country, in terms

of economic capacity and population size, would continue to lose influence

internationally. This straightforward equation neglected the less tangible influences of

diplomatic skill and international standing, factors emphasised by the Foreign Office,

Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office.

The 'Economic Strength' paper highlighted the important contribution of overseas

24In the event, growth

rates of gross domestic product and gross domestic product per head of population, 1960-1970
(percentages),were as follows:
Gross domestic product (%).

U.K. U.S. W. Germany. France.

1960-70 2.5 3.8 4.1 5.6

Gross domestic product per head of population (%).

U.K. U.S. W. Germany. France.

1960-70 2.2 1.6 6.5 3.5

Source: J. Eatwell, WhateverHappened to Britain?, (London:

25'The Soviet Seven-Year Plan', Duckworth, 1982), p. 12.
memorandum by the Treasury, 28 February 1959, T 234/768.
 83

development aid to Britain's future international influence, projecting that none of the

under-developed nations (with the possible exception of India) would develop a

significant industrial base by 1970: 'The struggle in Asia and Africa in the 1960s is to

get towards a "threshold" of development, from which expansion can move steadily

forward'. The Treasury endorsed Professor Tinbergen's estimate that Western

countries would have to invest $7.5 billion annually in non-industrialised nations (in

excess of these states' savings) in order to obtain a2 per cent per annum increase in

income per caput, provided recipients invested aid wisely.26 (The policy paper, it

should be noted, was produced before kleptocracy and political corruption became

widespread practices in under-developed and developing countries.) The paper

argued that 'this order of magnitude does not seem prima facie unreasonable as a

measure of what might be needed to make a significant impact'. Britain's interest in

the successful economic performance of under-developed countries was considered

vital, given that many such states -'a band of countries running from Freetown to

Singapore' - held their reserves in sterling and had their currency pegged to the pound:

A weakening of sterling - and even more a depreciation of sterling could

-
have deleterious results for these countries. This area will be suffering
considerable political and social instability in any case. to add to this
..
the depreciation of their currency reserves would be calamitous indeed.
To sustain the financial stability of the area is one of the U.K.'s over-
riding responsibilities in the 1960S.27

As more countries in the sterling area acquired independence, Britain would become

less able to control the extent to which these politically autonomous states drew on the

gold and dollar reserves held in London. Concerned about this possibility, Treasury

officials maintained that it would be necessary to strengthen Britain's reserves, so as to

26ProfessorJan Tinbergen
was Professor of Development Programming at the Netherlands School of Economics-
27'Economic Strength', 20 July
1959, CAB 134/1934.
 84

prevent a drain on them by sterling and non-sterling countries.28 When the Bank of

England's reserves came under pressure, the government reacted by defending the

pound's value through deflation, which curbed growth and retarded imports. The

consequent rise in interest rates, which helped attract short-term capital back to

London and limit speculation against sterling, served to undermine industrial

investment. Strengthening the reserves held in London, Treasury civil servants

argued, necessitated a reining back of certain international commitments - specifically

those that were economically unproductive, such as those located in the Far East. In

the early 1970s, Susan Strange argued that the British government had incurred high

levels of defence expenditure to protect overseas investments and members of the

sterling area, criticising policy-makers for having been unwilling to reduce international

obligations and failing to give adequate attention to the problems of the domestic

29
economy. This approach was questioned by the Treasury, which was a consistent

opponent of increased expenditure on overseas defence, believing that the best means

of defending the sterling area lay in reducing the scale of international commitments.

As will be demonstrated in Chapter V, American pressure undermined Britain's ability

to reduce its commitments in South-East Asia, a policy that weakened the UK balance

of payments, resulting in spells of acute speculation against the pound - ending in the

devaluation of sterling in November 1967. Paradoxically, Washington's coercion ran

counter to American financial interests: if speculation against the pound was sufficient

to force a UK devaluation, as American policy-makers later recognised, speculators

would focus their attention on the world's remaining reserve currency, the US dollar.

The Foreign Office, CRO and Colonial Office disagreed with the Treasury's stance on

the need to revise commitments, generally viewing Treasury officials as overly cautious

and parsimonious. Officials from the 'overseas' departments were invariably hostile to

28See Future Policy Working Group

29Susan Strange minutes, 1 and 7 October 1959, CAB 134/1934.
was right to argue that policy-makers failed to manage the changing role of sterling from a 'Top' or
'Master' currency to a neutral one, but wrong to
argue that Whitehall was more concerned with the preservationof
sterling as an international reserve currency than the to future S. Strange, Sterling and
British Policy, (London: Oxford University Press need secure economic growth.
(for) the Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, 1971), p. 300.
 85

Treasury involvement in foreign policy development, many doubtless subscribing to

Lord Beloff's view that Treasury civil servants were 'a bunch of bank clerks who think

they are mandarins'30

Resources and Overseas Expenditure.

On 31 July 1959, Treasury officials circulated an interim report setting out the

economic limitations on Britain's future external policy. The Treasury favoured a

general reduction in the level of overseas expenditure, but had to concede that the

ultimate decision for such a policy would lie with the politicians of the day. Increased

overseas expenditure was dependent on the will of the public to accept a decline in

living standards, a reduction in the level of consumption, less investment in social

services, and, if necessary, an increase in the rate of taxation. The Treasury took a

long-term perspective on the issue of Britain's overseas expenditure, contending that

the issue was not what the public were 'prepared to provide now, but a judgement of

what the public will be prepared to go on supporting until 1970'. Policies over a long

period, it was suggested, would have to be kept within the 'community's comfortable
31
capacity'. In early October 1959, this point was reinforced at a meeting of the Future

Policy Working Group, when it was argued: 'Although an abnormally high level of

defence expenditure might be tolerated for a short period in special circumstances (as

for example on the outbreak of the Korean War), in the long term the level was

governed by the extent to which the public would tolerate a diversion of resources from
2
other purposes'. If the resources required to support Britain's overseas policies

seemed likely to conflict with what the public was prepared to accept, Treasury officials

30Lord Beloff quoted in P. Hennessy, Whitehall,

(London: Pimlico, 2001), p. 392.
31'United Kingdom Resourcesfor Defence,
1960-1970', 20 July 1959, CAB 134/1935.
Future Policy Working Group minutes, 1
and 7 October 1959, CAB 134/1934. Perhaps significantly, Richard Clarke
chaired both these meetings.
 86

believed that there would be considerable difficulties in sustaining such a policy over

the next ten years33

The Treasury argued that this problem was exacerbated by the inflexible nature of

Britain's defence and overseas expenditure,which was seen as difficult to `cut down at

a time of economic need'. The unit costs of equipment and weapons, for example,

tended to increase as technological capability advanced, and new developments in

weaponry committed the government to increasing expenditure over an elongated

time-frame. The Treasury also believed that the cost of personnel was increasing at an

unsustainable rate, noting that increases in the wages of civil industry resulted in a

corresponding rise in soldiers' pay. When military pay grew at the same rate as

industrial pay, the result was an increase in the proportion of GNP devoted to defence

expenditure, as Clarke later explained to Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Advisor

to the Ministry of Defence:

If GNP goes up at 4%p. a, in real terms, and defence expenditure ditto,

then there will be a substantial increase in the proportion of defence
expenditure to GNP (always appearing in money terms). This is because
the price of defence is always rising faster than that of prices generally:
the soldier's pay increases pari passu with the industrial worker's, but his
"productivity" (as defined for calculating GNP) does not increase at all - if
there is no inflation, the price of boots is falling all the time as productivity
increases in the boot industry, but the price of soldier's pay remains
constant. Therefore a given quantity of defence absorbs an ever-
increasing proportion of GNP.34

The cost of stationing troops overseas was a particular bone of contention for the

Treasury, which argued that the `overseas component of defence expenditure is even

more inflexible - when we are committed to keep troops overseas, the foreign

" See'Defence and EconomicAid: The Resources Balance Sheet',

Memorandum by the Treasury, 23 December 1959,
CAB 134/1935.
34Clarke to Zuckerman,22 April 1964, Clarke
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3//311.This principle was
known within the Treasury as 'Clarke's Law'.
 87

exchange cost is there willy-nilly'. The denial of this important pool of skilled and

unskilled (and, moreover, youthful) labour further inhibited Britain's capacity to produce

the exports necessary to secure a regular balance-of-payments surplus. In October

1959, at a meeting of the Future Policy Working Group, officials agreed that 'the

employment in the forces of large numbers of young people, many of them with special

technical abilities, tended to reduce the national income which otherwise might be

attained' 35 Similarly, 'political' expenditure, like colonial grant programmes, had to be

continued at a steady and sustained rate in order to succeed, and could not be turned

'on and off' in accordance with the vagaries of economic circumstances. In

consequence, Treasury officials questioned the economic rationale underpinning

Britain's world-wide commitments, at least on the scale maintained throughout the

1950s:

If there is some "built-in" tendency for defence and related expenditure to

rise, and very little practical possibility of reducing it at a time of
economic stress (internal or external), it is indeed asking for trouble to
have a policy that is even at the beginning threatening to burst out of the

economic seams?

The Treasury paper argued that overseas expenditure had to be seen within the

context of overall government spending, providing statistics, on the division of Britain's

GNP (at market prices) in 1958, to substantiate its point.

35Future Policy Working Group minutes, 1 and 7 October 1959,

CAB 134/1934.
36'UnitedKingdom Resourcesfor Defence, 1960-1970', 20 July
1959, CAB 134/1935.Added emphasis.
 88

TABLE 2.3. Claims on Gross Domestic Product, 1958.

Per cent.
(1) Consumptionby individuals. 66
(2) Education,health, administrationand other public internal current 9
expenditureon goods and services, other than defence.
(3)Replacements of capital equipment and increase in stocks 8'/z
the economy going" = 831/2
_"keeping

(4) Defence and Governmentoverseas current expenditure 71h

(5) Increases in capital equipment 7
(6) Overseas investment (balance-of-paymentscurrent surplus) 2
=100

Source: Study of Future Policy for 1960-1970Working Group. 'United Kingdom Resources for Defence,

1960-1970', Note by Joint Secretaries. CAB 134/1934.

These figures demonstrated that around five-sixths of Britain's national production was

devoted to 'keeping the economy going'. Importantly, sixty-six per cent of GNP was

taken up by the consumption of individuals; accordingly, increased investment in

Britain's overseas role would require a reduction in consumption. This would be

politically difficult, given that increased access to consumer goods was electorally

in
rewarding, what has been coined 'The Age of Affluence' 37 The Treasury was also of

the opinion that cuts in spending on education, social services and healthcare would be

unpopular, stressing that'there is continuous pressure to increase expenditure [on

education, social services and healthcare], rather than the reverse'. Treasury officials

did not see realistic scope for cutbacks in these fields of social provision, making clear

that such a policy would require strong political leadership over a sustained period:

As a matter of practical politics, it cannot be assumed that this proportion

over a period of time could be reduced. Of course it could be reduced if
under strong and continuing Government leadership, the public were
willing to accept and go on accepting for an indefinite period more taxes
and less social services in order to contribute more to security and the
under-developeds38

37V. Bogdanor and R. Skidelsky (eds.), The

Age of Affluence, 1951-1964, (London: Macmillan, 1970).
38'United Kingdom Resourcesfor Defence, 1960-1970',
20 July 1959, CAB 134/1935.
 89

The Treasury indicated that Britain was now a consumer society with an ever-

expanding welfare state, which impeded its ability to play a substantive international

role. If a large defence and economic aid budget were to be sustained, government

expenditure would have to be matched by taxation: if a political party were committed

to a reduction in the overall level of taxation (as the Conservatives were) or greater

social investment (as Labour were), increased overseas expenditure would become

unsustainable.

While accepting the necessity of 'keeping sterling strong', Foreign Office civil

servants generally emphasised the importance of retaining international commitments,

particularly in the Persian Gulf and Far East -a policy that put pressure on Britain's

limited resources and actually damaged sterling by negatively distorting the balance of

payments. By way of contrast, Treasury officials were concerned about the impact of

overseas defence expenditure on the UK economy, sterling, and the sterling area. The

Treasury contended that a major sterling crisis would destroy any British pretension to

act as a world power broker. The repeated sterling crises of the 1950s, it was argued,

had devalued Britain's reputation, whilst a 'return to such troubles in the 1960s might

well destroy our [Britain's] influence 39

altogether'. As sterling provided the currency

reserves for British (and many formerly British) colonies, its weakness might create

financial instability in these countries, potentially igniting wider political unrest. The

view that the sterling area acted as an important link between Britain and the

Commonwealth - as had been argued by the Radcliffe Committee in July 1959 - was

reaffirmed in the Future Policy Study. 40 Yet, academics have disagreed on whether

the sterling area was actually of benefit to Britain. Andrew Shonfield, in 1958, argued

that British leadership of the sterling area had a negative impact on economic growth,

39ibid.
10Report of the Committee
on the Working of the Monetary System, Cmnd 827, (London: HMSO, 1959); 'Future Policy
Study, 1960-70', 24 February 1960, CAB 134/1929. On 15 April 1958, Derrick Heathcoat Amory, the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, told the House of Commons: 'sterling
and the sterling area are indispensable to the smooth functioning of a
large part of the world's trade, as well as to the See HC Deb., 15 April 1958,
unity and strength of the Commonwealth'.
cols. 51-52.
 90

by weakening the level of investment in Britain. 1 Catherine Schenk, on the other

hand, has recently claimed that the sterling area had no significant effect on British

growth, as the ratio of overseas investment to domestic capital formation was relatively

small. 2

An examination of national defence expenditure, as a proportion of GNP, illustrated

the scale of Britain's expenditure vis-ä-vis its main allies.

TABLE 2.4. Defence as a Percentage of GNP, 1949-1958.

Highest Year Average: 1949-58 1958 (prov. )

U.K. 11.2 (1953) 8.9 7.9

U.S.A. 14.9 (1952) 10.9 11.5

Canada 9.0 (1953) 6.6 6.5

France 11.0 (1953) 8.6 8.2

W. Germany 5.1 (1953) 4.7 ('53-'58) 4.2
Netherlands 6.7 (1954) 5.9 5.7
Belgium 5.1 (1952) 3.8 3.9
Italy 5.6 (1952) 4.8 4.4
Norway 5.8 (1953) 4.2 4.1
Denmark 3.7 (1953) 3.0 3.3

Australia 3.3 (1956-7)

New Zealand 2.5 (1956-7)

Source: Study of Future Policy for 1960-1970Working Group. 'United Kingdom

Resources for Defence, 1960-1970', Note by Joint Secretaries. CAB 134/1934.

Unlike the majority of its Western allies, Britain consistently expended more than eight

per cent of GNP on defence during the post-war period. France had spent a similar

proportion, but it is important to note that the franc (unlike sterling) was not subject to

the pressures arising from being an international reserve currency; indeed, the franc

had been devalued in 1958.

Treasury civil servants divided Britain's overseas and security spending into three

main categories: defence, economic aid and diplomatic expenditure. In 1959, the

'aggregate' cost of these categories to the Exchequer was

around £1,750 million,

41Shonfield, British Economic Policy, (1958),

ch. 5.
42C. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation
to Convertibility in the 1950s,(London: Routledge, 1994).
 91

representing 81/2per cent of GNP at factor cost. The Treasury rightly emphasised that

this was a disproportionatelyhigh percentage when compared to the 'old' dominions

and other high-income European nations. On 29 December 1959, Dean's Working

Group considered a Treasury memorandum, 'Defence and Economic Aid: The

Resources Balance Sheet', which underlined this point. This paper was processed at

the highest levels of the Treasury: after meetings with Sir Roger Makins it had been

submitted to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Derrick Heathcoat Amory, for approval.

The principal point made by the memorandum was that the UK could afford, if it

'wished', a defence and overseas programme which absorbed 8 ý/zper cent of GNP,

but that this could not be afforded without economic damage (i.e. a sterling crisis which

would frustrate the objectives of the programme itself), unless the government was

prepared to moderate other competing claims on public expenditure. The Working

Group thought that Britain ought to devote this proportion of GNP to overseas defence

and aid, whilst recognising that the adoption of such a policy would entail a 'halt' in the

process of reducing the share of GNP devoted to the public sector and thus of lowering

the rate of taxation. 3 Clarke was unhappy at the Working Party's response to the

Treasury memorandum, noting to Makins that members of the committee had had 'a

good go at our paper'44 Described by David Hubback as someone who'was usually

certain he was right', Clarke was a dominating figure within the Treasury, regarding the

intellectual merits of his argument as irrefragable45 The consensus that Britain should

devote 8'/i per cent of GNP to defence and overseas claims, Clarke argued, was only'

valid ... if the consequential action is taken - limiting other claims upon the economy'.

As the proportion of GNP allocated to the public sector was likely to remain stable 'at

best' over the next five years, Clarke felt that there was a 'great danger' in Whitehall

becoming 'committed to the defence and overseas

programmes, without the

43'Defence and Economic Aid: The Resources Balance

Sheet': Memorandumby the Treasury, 23 December 1959,
CAB 134/1930;Future Policy Working Group 29 December
minutes,
" Clarke to Makins, 30 December 1959, CAB 21/3843. 1959, CAB 13411930.
45D. Hubback, 'Sir Richard Clarke, 1910-1975': A
most Unusual Civil Servant', Public Policy and Administration,vol. 3,
(1988), p 20.
 92

corresponding action being taken - and this will lead straight into balance-of-payments

trouble'. Conversely, Foreign Office officials believed that Britain's NATO allies and the

'old' dominions could be convinced to devote 8'h per cent of their GNP to defence and

related expenditure, arguing that this would reduce problems in regard to the balance

of payments. Clarke was sceptical about such a possibility, contending that, if Britain's

allies did not make an adequate contribution, 'we are much more vulnerable, and there

is no sign of [the] Benelux [countries] or Germany or Australia or New Zealand or the

Scandinavians doing anything like as much as they should'. 6

Officials in the 'overseas' departments thought that the Treasury was unduly

pessimistic as to the possibility of allocating 8'h per cent of GNP to defending Britain's

overseas and security interests. As late as 28 January 1960, P. E. Ramsbotham,

Head of the Foreign Office's Planning Department (described by Tim Bligh,

Macmillan's Principal Private Secretary, as 'the long-range crystal gazer in the Foreign

Officei47),suggested to Dean that 'we [the Foreign Office] may have let the Treasury

get off too lightly in the general conclusion that ... we shall be doing rather well if we

keep spending 81/2%of our GNP on defence, aid, etc'. Taking up a point made to him

by Christopher Eastwood, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office,

Ramsbotham suggested that'we [the Foreign Office] should back up the Colonial

Office when they are championing the collective interests of the Overseas

departments', thus highlighting the tendency of the 'overseas' departments to work in

concert against the Treasury. Ramsbotham was less circumspect about the public's

willingness to accept a reduction in consumption, implying that the Treasury's case

was argumentumad captandumvu/gus:

The fact is that, if the public can be taxed in some way or another so that
they have less money for television sets, then we shall have more money
for aid and other overseas expenditure... it is
all a question of how

46Clarke to Makins, 30 December 1959, CAB 21/3843.

47T. J. Bligh to H. Macmillan, 1 June 1959, CAB
134/1930.
 93

seriously the public takes the threat of the new competitive world. If they
can endure 50% per cent of the GNP being devoted to defence in war-
time then surely it is not prima facie absurd that they should be asked to
raise their contributionfrom 81/2%to 9% in 1960 or later, if this is shown
to be manifestly necessary to avoid having to cut commitments which
cannot yet be safely abandoned or to take up new ones (e.g. aid)
because of new challenges 48

Largely reflecting the Treasury's viewpoint, Section B of the final Future Policy Study

report stipulated that Britain's overseas policies depended upon three factors: first,

world economic conditions; secondly, the adaptability and growth of the UK economy;

and, finally, the willingness of the British people to devote a substantial proportion of

their incomes towards such ends. Although the UK economy would remain the most

vulnerable of all the major international economies in the 1960s, it was thought that

sterling would retain its status as an international reserve currency. However, a note of

warning was issued: if, as in early 1960, London's gold reserves remained less than

one-third of the sterling liabilities to other countries, Britain's world-wide defence effort

would come under threat, as this was 'precarious backing for an international currency

that by its nature must take the strain of political and financial pressures throughout the

world'. This led the Future Policy Study to the following important conclusion:

It follows that the United Kingdom's first economic responsibility, and the
necessary condition for maintaining our place in the world, is to keep
sterling strong. This means keeping commitments within resources. If
the future claims on the economy are allowed to accumulate so that the
prospective increases in resources are already mortgaged in advance,
there will be no margin available to meet unforeseen needs or to cope
with the adverse changes in circumstances - which are bound to happen
some time in a ten-year period. 49

48Eastwoodto Ramsbotham,27 January 1960, FO371/152131;

Ramsbothamto Dean, 28 January 1960, FO
371/152131.
49'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February. 1960, CAB
134/1929. Added emphasis.
 94

Britain's interests, as well as those of the West in general, were dependent on the

government striking an appropriate balance between doing too little and doing too

much. Doing too little would have a deleterious impact on Britain's external power,

whereas attempting to do too much would result in a series of sterling crises that would

reduce British influence. This part of the report, compiled almost entirely by the

Treasury, warned that Britain would have to constantly monitor the external financial

position and the balance-of-payments,which were likely to forbid any ambitious

expansion of overseas spending and to limit internal spending too 50

The Future Policy Study made five main points on the relationship between Britain's

resources and international commitments. Firstly, it was possible for a country with

Britain's standard-of-living and productivity to devote, 'if it wished', 81/2per cent of its

GNP to support overseas policy objectives; although, as previously highlighted and

reaffirmed in subsequent chapters, Treasury officials did not favour this approach. This

aim would be made easier if productivity grew at a faster rate than expected or if

Britain's allies increased their overseas and defence budgets to a similar level.

Secondly, overseas expenditure was in direct competition with other competing

demands for resources: lower rates of taxation, expectations of higher living standards,

demands for greater social expenditure, increased consumption and more leisure time,

would also absorb valuable resources in the 1960s. The public sector's share of GNP

was unlikely to decline, which meant that, if the government wanted to increase

overseas expenditure, modifications in the level investment in the domestic economy

and/or the rate of taxation would become necessary. Thirdly, keeping the public

sector's share of expenditure stable would mark a major shift in the general thrust of

government policy. Between 1953 and 1958 the public sector shrank from 29'/2 per

cent of GNP to 26Y2per cent, and overall overseas expenditure fell from 1134per cent

to 81/ per cent. This proportionate decrease in overseas spending had made room for

50ibid.
 95

expansion in other areas of the public sector, notably spending on roads and

education. It was argued that these two areas of investment, along with tax cuts, had

made a major contributionto the improved performance of the British economy in the

late 1950s. Fourthly, if the defence and aid programmes were carried out without

moderation in public and private spending, 'the impact would fall on the balance of

payments and on sterling... ' which would overload the economy'. .. with large and

inflexible commitments'. Finally, a depreciation in the value of sterling would force

drastic cutbacks in Britain's defence and aid programmes. If this were to occur, the

stability of Asia and Africa - where many of the currencies were backed by sterling -

would be severely undermined. 51

The Three Circles.

Officials viewed Britain's contribution to the freedom and stability of the world as

pivotal, it being thought inappropriate for the UK to restrict itself to a role limited to the

European continent: 'we [Britain] are much too important a part of the free world to be

able to retreat into a passive role like Sweden or Switzerland'.52 Regionalisation (that

is to say, confinement to a European regional role) was not an issue under serious

consideration by the Future Policy Study committees, although sympathy for this idea

was rapidly gaining ground in both the Treasury and Board of Trade. On 17 March

1960, not long after the completion of the Future Policy Study, Whitehall established

the inter-departmental Economic Steering (Europe) Committee, chaired by Sir Frank

Lee, Makins's replacement as Permanent Secretary to the Treasury.53

Representing opinion within the Foreign Office, Section C of the Future Policy Study

argued that Britain's ability to play a global role was bolstered by a range of `intangible'

assets: namely, Britain's leadership of the Commonwealth, a 'special' relationship with

51Ibid.
52ibid.
53For minutes and memorandum of Economic Steering
(Economic) Committee see CAB 134/1852to CAB 134/1854.
 96

the United States, and an association with the EEC. It was also suggested that

Britain's influence was enhanced by the legacy of its imperial past, the maturity of its

political experience outside Europe, a national propensity to rise to an emergency, and

a reliability in the defence of freedom and justice. A lengthy Foreign Office

memorandum, 'Britain's Obligations Overseas', written in 1958, stressed this exact

point: 'our influence and prestige have not declined to the same extent as our material

power. This influence and prestige are assets which cannot be assessed in money'.

On 13 November 1959, Brook's Steering Committee endorsed the Foreign Office's

view on this subject:

Although the economic strength of this country was expected to decline

over the next decade in relation to the rest of the world, our influence
need not shrink in proportion. By courage and ingenuity we should still
be able to play a world-wide role by taking our part in countering the
growing power of the Sino-Soviet bloc, by fostering our overseas trade,
and by maintaining the strength of sterling and the cohesion of the
Commonwealth Besides the purely physical assets, the importance
...
of the national character and its ability to rise to an emergency should not
be underestimated.65

These 'intangible' assets, it was claimed, gave Britain 'a leading position among the

Powers and a higher place in their counsels than our material assets alone would

strictly warrant'. Britain's 'intangible' assets were seen as being of genuine value,

although it was recognised that this might not always be the case. If Britain was to

retain its position as a nation with global interests and responsibilities, it would be

necessary to devote sufficient resources to the task, even if this was at the expense of

domestic living standards. Highlighting the viewpoint of the 'overseas' departments,

above all the Foreign Office, the officials' final report affirmed:

5 'Britain's Obligations Overseas': Memorandum by

the Foreign Office, 14 April 1958, T 234/768.
Future Policy Steering Committee minutes, 13 November 1959,
CAB 134/1930.
 97

We have the capacity to play a world-wide role only if we are willing as a

nation to devote our actions and resources to this purpose. There are
many desirable ways of using our resources at home, especially the
improvementof our standard of living through better social services and
the increasing of our wealth through productive investment. But we
cannot exert influence in the world unless we devote resources sufficient
to underwrite our external responsibilities.

Nevertheless, Britain would need to increasingly think in terms of the interests of the

free world as a whole, it being judged necessary to work more as a member of

international alliances and groupings - indeed, the Steering Committee concluded: 'it

may be our [Britain's] role in the 1960s to set an example in making international action

of this kind 56
effective'. It is perhaps salutary to reflect that Britain had rejected

membership of the EEC in 1957, an act of 'alliance-building' with the express aim of

creating greater West European prosperity. Remarkably, UK membership of the EEC

was not mentioned as a possible policy option in the 'Future Policy Study, 1960-1970',

which can partly be explained by the commitment of officials to a global role.

Britain's 'special relationship' with the United States was seen as the most important

facet of UK foreign policy57 The containment of the Soviet Union and China would

provide the central underpinning of US geo-political strategy, since concerns over

national security and fears over 'losing the struggle for ideological and political mastery

[in the Cold War]' dominated political thinking in Washington 58 Despite the proximity of

the Suez debacle, Britain's 'special' relationship with the United States was seen as an

existing source of power and influence, which could be further strengthened. Foreign

Office officials believed that the UK would act in 'partnership' with the Americans on

major international issues, albeit as a junior partner. A Foreign Office working paper,

66'FuturePolicy Study, 1960-70', 24 February. 1960, CAB

134/1929.
57The phrase'special
relationship'was first used by Winston Churchill In the House of Commons on 7 November 1945.
On the term 'special relationship', one Foreign Office
official noted: 'this term has changed during the past 20 years and
has been misconstruedto imply that there is some kind
of preferential relationship between this country and the USA.
This is certainly not our view. The "special relationship" Is fact,
a e.g. we speak the same language and have the same
cultural antecedents;a "preferential relationship" Is part of popular
mythology and is frequently put up as a cock-shy to
enable its detractors to knock it down'. See R. M. K. Slater to A. Henderson, May 1965, FO 371/179573.
58Ibid. 5
 98

on likely American policy in the 1960s, argued:

There is no reason why the habit of prior political discussion with us

should not continue world-wide, provided that we go on playing the game
as we are now doing. This does not mean that we will always get the
Americans to do what we want. But it does mean that we shall have a
better chance than anyone else. As our political as well as our
commercial and defence interests cover the seven seas, it is not hubristic
to believe that our experience and insight will continue to be of interest to
those who have the appalling task of trying to make the American
machine work 59

The Foreign Office thus shared the rather condescending assumption, most famously

expressed by Harold Macmillan, that Britain would act as'Greeks in America's Roman

Empire'60 The British Embassy in Washington, in an annual review of the United

States (which considered the ramifications of the election of President Kennedy), made

a similar point, in a despatch to the Foreign Office:

For our part we may have some uncomfortable moments as Mr

Kennedy tries to grow into the mantle of Roosevelt. But we shall have
many opportunities to exert our influence... We shall start as the most
important and, what is more, the most reliable of America's allies...
Consequently we should not be anxious that the new United States
Government will not be disposed to listen to our counsel. Whether they
follow it or not will largely depend on their judgement of its soundness
and practicability in meeting the challenges of a changing world. Their
judgements will be as liable to error as those of previous American
governments, and during the course of 1961 we may well have
to
occasion reflect that to err is human, to forgive divine.81

59'Noteon United States Policies, 1960-1970': Memorandum by Washington Embassy for Future Policy Study Working
Group, 8 July 1959, CAB 134/1934. Added Emphasis.
60Macmillan,when British Minister Resident to Allied Forces Headquarters
in the Middle East during the Second World
War, expressed this view to Richard Crossman, who was later a prominent
critic of Britain's East of Suez role: We, my
dear Crossman, are Greeks In this American Empire. You will find the Greeks
much as the Greeks found the Romans -
great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more Idle, with more unspoilt virtues but also
more corrupt'. See A. Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity, (London: Penguin Press, 1967), p. 61.
61'Annual Review', Washington Embassy to Foreign Office,
1 January 1961, FO 371/156435.
 99

Nevertheless, cordial Anglo-American relations were not seen as 'a law of nature'. The

Future Policy Study identified several points of potential friction between London and

Washington: Sino-British relations were seen as having the potential to create divisions

between Britain and the United States - for example, if the United Nations General

Assembly took a vote on China joining the UN, Britain would probably oppose

America's negative position on such a proposal. Furthermore, Britain's ambiguous

relations with Europe might lead to further Anglo-American disagreement, since

Washington favoured the concept of a'United Europe' - despite the potential for dollar

discrimination - and were anxious that the EEC should form a strong and cohesive

political unit. Unless Britain reached a'permanent understanding' with Western

Europe, Washington might become increasingly indifferent towards British policy.62

The emphasis on 'permanent understanding', and not 'membership', is stark; as this

issue was cited as an area of potential friction over the next decade, it is clear that

Whitehall had not yet attained a settled view on the issue of Europe.

With regards to Western Europe, it was agreed that Britain's main objective should

be to contribute towards the 'unity and strength' of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance.

The main threat to Western European unity, it was suggested, lay in the future of

Germany, which, in turn, depended on the course of French policy. A strong France,

committed to the principles underpinning NATO, was regarded as essential to the

future stability of Western Europe, and it was generally thought that only General de

Gaulle could 'hold France to such a pitch'. It was recognised, however, that de Gaulle

was a strong proponent of French individualism and nationalism; such ideals, if carried

to their logical conclusion, 'would wreck the Atlantic Alliance'. The movement towards

greater West European unity was deemed beneficial to Britain's future interests: this

would offer the best means of preventing German neutralism; limit the possibility of a

rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union; guard against a reversion to

62'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February 1960,

CAB 134/1929.
 100

Franco-German disharmony and a return to German militarism; and, most importantly,

firmly tie Western Europe to the Atlantic Alliance. The Future Policy Study indicated

that Britain would have to adapt itself 'to the idea of living alongside a very powerful

West European group', making it essential to cultivate a more intimate relationship with

the EEC, since 'it would seriously weaken our own [Britain's] standing in the

Commonwealth and in the Atlantic Alliance and the cohesion of the Alliance itself if we

found ourselves excluded from Europe'. As a 'relatively small economic Power', Britain

would become increasingly exposed to the economic and trade policies of the EEC,

making it necessary, at some point over the next ten years, to form 'a satisfactory

association with it' 63 A little under three years later, following Britain's failed

negotiations to join the EEC, Macmillan's own view on this subject had undergone a

dramatic transformation, noting in his diary: "'What is the alternative to the European

Community (?)" If we are honest, we must say there is nothing'. 4

The 'overseas' departments generally viewed the Commonwealth as an asset that

enhanced Britain's international status. Macmillan's own view was not that the Empire

was 'breaking up', but, on the contrary, it was 'growing up' through the

Commonwealth.65 The Future Policy Study's arguments as to the value of the

Commonwealth largely reinforced the conclusion of Whitehall's 'audit of Empire',

conducted at Macmillan's behest in 1957.66 The existence of the Commonwealth, it

was held, would 'demonstrate to coloured and not least to colonial peoples the

possibility and advantage of an independent but close relationship with White Western

Powers'; not, it should be noted, exclusively Britain. The colonial character of the

Commonwealth would be replaced by 'a more wide-spread community of sentiment'

that had the potential to adopt a concerted approach to international issues later
-

`3 ibid.
64Harold Macmillan's Diary (hereafter HMD), Department Western
of Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, University of
Oxford, d. 49, entry for 4 February 1963.
" H. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956-1959,(London: Macmillan,
1971), p. 200.
66For a detailed account of Macmillan's 'audit Empire'
of see T. Hopkins, 'Macmillan's audit of Empire, 1957' In
T. Hopkins, 'Macmillan's audit of Empire, 1957' In P. Clarke
and C. Trebilcock, UnderstandingDecline: Perceptions and
Realities of British Economic Performance,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 238-239.
pp.
 101

events, examined in subsequent chapters, showed this to be somewhat wishful

thinking. Britain would also benefit from continued 'intimate co-operation' with

Australia, New Zealand and Canada, and it was believed that mutual advantage would

ensue from the economic expansion of these countries. Reflecting pressure from the

CRO, the final draft of the Future Policy Study concluded: 'The Commonwealth

association is a very important source of political influence, which buttresses our

standing as a Power with world-wide interests'. At the outset of the study, CRO

officials had taken a forceful position on the value that ought to be attached to the

Commonwealth, as Orme noted to Brook: 'The Commonwealth Relations Office, with

some support from the Colonial Office, has caused increased emphasis to be given to

the Commonwealth. They pressed their point of view rather extremely at the
...
beginning, but now seem to be reasonably content that their interests are not being
...
7
overlooked'. Officials in the Treasury and Board of Trade were less impressed by the

perceived benefits of the Commonwealth, viewing it as an unwieldy and disparate

organisation, a viewpoint that was also reflected in the Future Policy Study: 'politically it

[the Commonwealth] can be sometimes more of an embarrassment than an asset' 68

Moreover, officials in the `overseas' departments saw the Commonwealth as an

important bulwark against the spread of Communism in Africa and Asia, arguing that it

helped 'keep away from Communist clutches a very large part of the world's

population, which might otherwise be vulnerable'.69

The maintenance of Britain's position in Churchill's 'three circles' provided the central

underpinning of British foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It was

predicted that this would remain the case throughout the decade, although it was

recognised that it might not be possible to retain an equally close relationship with all

three groupings. It was generally hoped that Britain would act as a bridge between

87J. S. Orme to Brook, 30 July 1959, CAB 21/3841.

"'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February. 1960, CAB 134/1929.
" Ibid.
 102

Western Europe and the United States, avoiding being placed in a situation where it

would have to choose between the two:

One basic rule of British policy is clear: we must never allow ourselves to
be put in a position where we have to make a final choice between the
United States and Europe. It would not be compatible with our vital
interests to reject either one or the other and the very fact that the choice
was needed would mean the destruction of the Atlantic Alliance. The
continued cohesion of the alliance, though not necessarily in its present
form, is essential. We must therefore work to ensure the continuation of
a wide economic and political community of interests embracing both the
United States and Western Europe. In so far as the United Kingdom can
help to keep Western Europe steady in the alliance we shall enhance our
own standing in American eyes.

If this course could be followed in the decade ahead, Britain would be able to exert

influence over American policy and 'not need slavishly to follow their [the United

States'] line'. By securing greater interdependence in the 1960s, Britain would be able

to act with some degree of independence. If the interests of the Commonwealth

conflicted with those of the Atlantic Alliance (which covered both the United States and

Western Europe), Whitehall agreed that Britain should choose the latter: 'if such a

clash of interests should arise ', it was agreed, '. then we should never forget that
.. . ..
the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance is, in the last resort, the most basic of all our

interests'.70 In April 1961, the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth

Relations, wrote an article for International Affairs, in which he argued: When I hear

people talk ... of our having to choose between the United States or Commonwealth

or Europe, my reply is that that is not the choice The choice is not between one or
...
the other'." This sentiment may have characterised the views of Home and the CRO,

but it did not represent the general consensus within Whitehall.

70ibid.
71The Earl of Home, 'Interdependence:The British
Role', InternationalAffairs, vol. 37, no. 2, (April 1961).
 103

Britain's Extra-European Role.

Policy-makers divided Britain's role outside Europe into four discrete areas: Africa,

south of the Sahara; the Middle East and North Africa; Asia and the Far East; and,

least importantly, Latin America.72 It was generally believed that it was in Britain's

interests to check Sino-Soviet expansionism in all these areas; to keep local

governments and populations 'on our side' or, at least, benevolently neutral; and to

promote general prosperity.

The Future Policy Study's conclusions in regard to Africa were largely informed by an

inter-department report carried out by the Africa (Official) Committee in 1959, which will

be examined in greater detail in Chapter 111.73

In sub-Saharan Africa, it was argued that

British policy should be aimed at fostering stability and freedom in the newly

independent states, helping to establish self-governing societies founded on the 'rule of

law' and respect for individual liberty. The immediate problem in multi-racial African

states was to reduce inter-racial tensions, since only when this was attained could

there be progress towards self-government or full independence. Although a

commitment to creating integrated multi-racial societies might potentially lead to

'difficulties with impatient African nationalists', officials in the 'overseas' departments

(particularly the Colonial Office) attached priority to ensuring a harmonious transition to

self-government. It was accepted, nevertheless, that it might be impossible for Britain

to satisfactorily accomplish its 'historic duty' of creating self-governing countries in

Africa: 'Pressures may well so build up that we shall find it difficult to pursue the more

orderly and less precipitate progress towards independence which we judge to be

desirable in East and Central Africa'. An accelerated approach to decolonisation was

favoured by the Treasury, which had disagreed with the Colonial Office's approach

throughout the 1950s. A. G. Hopkins is right to argue that Britain would have

n Given its relative unimportancein relation to Britain's

world role, projected British policy towards Latin America will not
be considered in this thesis.
73See'Africa: The Next Ten Years' (Foreign Office
print), June 1959, FO 371/173972; 'Study of Future Policy, 1960-
1970': Note by J. S. Orme and P. E. Ramsbotham, 18 June 1959.
 104

undertaken a faster process of decolonisation had Treasury officials been able to

assert greater influence on the direction of policy.''a

In the 1960s, Britain's defence responsibilities in sub-Saharan Africa would be mainly

limited to the fulfilment of its remaining colonial responsibilities, being generally met by

local forces, reinforced by British soldiers stationed in the region. Additionally, UK

troops based in Kenya could be called upon to settle disturbances, when not

committed to their core function of defending British interests in the Persian Gulf and

Arabian Peninsula. Whitehall policy-makers still believed that former British colonies

should be economically nurtured by the metropole, a role attributable to the country's

imperial past: Exchequer loans for independent territories and Commonwealth

Assistance Loans for independent members of the Commonwealth were viewed as

important in this respect. Britain would also commit itself to financing schemes of

technical assistance to Ghana and Nigeria, and to the provision of grants to dependent

territories under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.75 Between 1960 and

1970, such expenditure was expected to be in the region of between £24 and £28

million a year, although it was thought that there would 'be pressure to increase this

figure'.76

Britain's 'direct' interests in the Middle East and North Africa were more substantial

than those located in sub-Saharan Africa. Officials divided the Middle East/North

Africa region into two main areas, lying north and south of the Middle East land barrier.

North of the barrier, Britain had four major commitments in 1960: membership of

Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), a `moral' obligation towards Jordan, and treaty

agreements with both Cyprus and Libya. Cyprus provided the base facilities for the

support of CENTO and for operations in the Levant. The primary purpose of Britain's

presence in Libya was to provide protection against Nasser's United Arab Republic

(UAR). It was forecast that the unearthing of new oil fields in Libya would make it an

74Hopkins, 'Macmillan's audit of Empire, 1957' in Clarke

and Trebilcock (eds.), UnderstandingDecline, p. 257.
73See Colonial Developmentand Welfare Acts, 1929-70:A Brief
Review. Cmnd 4677, (London: HMSO, 1971).
'"'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February. 1960, CAB
134/1929.
 105

even more 'tempting target' for Egyptian expansionism, leading Foreign Office officials

to conclude that'the discovery of oil in Libya will do more harm "

than good'. Besides

Libya, Britain's remaining commitments in the area lying North of the Barrier were

viewed as burdensome, albeit necessary, if the general interests of the West were to

be secured:

With the partial exception of Libya the burden which the United
...
Kingdom carries North of the Barrier is in the general Western interest.
Notwithstanding this, it is unlikely that our allies will accept a greater
share of this burden. The Americans are as fully committed to CENTO
as they are ever likely to be and are already contributing much to Jordan,
though with increasing reluctance.

These commitments were to be met by forces stationed in Cyprus, Libya and Malta,

and by plans to reinforce the area with naval forces, air power and units of the army

strategic reserve. These forces might also participate with the US in support of the

existing regime in Lebanon, or join in operations South of the Barrier, most probably in

Kuwait's defence against Iraq. Conversely, it was argued that it was 'doubtful' whether

Britain would wish to intervene again in Jordan, as it had in 1958. Britain's military

presence in the Middle East was seen as acting as a buffer against Soviet

expansionism -a central policy objective of Britain and the West: 'Indirectly the

presence of the United Kingdom land forces in the area and the knowledge that they

can be quickly reinforced will continue to be an important factor in strengthening the

will of the regional members of CENTO and the Levant countries to stand up to Russia

or other threats'.78

Foreign Office officials emphasised the importance of halting the spread of Arab

nationalism, led by Nasser's UAR, in the Middle East. A Working Group paper,

J. S. Orme to Brook, 30 July 1959, CAB 21/3841.

78'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February. 1960, CAB 134/1929.
 106

prepared by the Foreign Office, speculating on future developments in the Middle East,

argued that Nasser (assuming he retained power) would seek a union with Syria, to

bring Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait into association with the UAR, and to

undermine Britain's position in Southern Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, it

was thought that Egyptian expansion, whether by influence or the acquisition of

territory, would be checked by the evolution of Iraq, either as a rival republican and

Arab nationalist state or as a Soviet satellite. Between 1960 and 1970, it was predicted

that the furthest progress towards a united Arab state, under Egyptian leadership, was

an enlarged UAR consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, associated in some way with

the Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In the absence of a Communist take-over in Iraq (which

was considered unlikely, but not ruled out), it was thought that Qassim (Prime Minister

of Iraq, who deposed the Anglophile Hashemite monarchy on 14 July 1958) might

succeed in forming an anti-Communist military government, possibly with National

Democrat participation, with the tacit support of moderate and radical opinion. The

rivalry between such a government and Nasser's Egypt for leadership of the Arab

world, and particularly for the allegiance of Syria, would represent a major issue in

Arab politics.79

In the southern Middle East, policy-makers were less inclined to equate Britain's

interests with those of its allies, despite the fact that these had general implications for

the West: for example, Britain and Western Europe were both heavily dependent on

the Persian Gulf for oil supplies; thus, if the region came under Communist or pan-Arab

nationalist influence, the general Western interest would suffer. On 4 November 1959,

Dean's Working Group considered a paper on Middle East oil, prepared by the Ministry

of Power, in consultation with the Treasury and Foreign Office. After lengthy

discussion, Dean summarised the conclusions reached by the Working Group: there

would be a growing demand for Middle East oil over the next decade; it was unlikely

79'Main Trends of DevelopmentIn the Middle East':

Memorandum by the Foreign Office for Future Policy Working
Group, 16 July 1959, CAB 134/1934.
 107

that Middle Eastern oil-producing states would overcome their mutual jealousies to co-

ordinate a policy of expropriation against the West; Kuwait was the only country in

which Britain might wish to intervene to protect supplies by force; for this purpose, and

for the general containment of Communism, Britain would have to maintain forces in

the region; unless one or both of these purposes lessened in importance over the next

decade, it seemed unlikely that the level of UK forces could be reduced; but it was

important to do all that was possible to get Britain's allies to share the defence

burden80 The final draft of the Future Policy Study reflected these arguments: 'To the

extent that our [Britain's] position in the Persian Gulf area safeguards the supply of oil

and preserves the political status quo, we are serving a general interest' 8' 'Otto'

Clarke disagreed with this prognosis, believing that it was unlikely that Arab states

would 'cut off' the supply of oil in the absence of a UK military presence82

The Foreign Office believed that demands for political and social reform would gain

momentum in all the Persian Gulf states, indicating that it was conceivable that some

measure of popular participation in government, at least in Kuwait and Bahrain, would

be conceded by 1970. Such a development would not necessarily be conducive to

British interests: 'Substantial concessions to popular demands it was contended,

.. .',
'... might lead rapidly to the destruction of the existing regimes and of the special

British position in the Persian Gulf'. It was recognised that it would be necessary for

Britain to make political concessions to the ruling dynasties. For this reason, Selwyn

Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, advised the cabinet, on 4 January 1960, to

accept Kuwait's demand that Britain reduce its jurisdiction in the country, so as to

preserve the 'Ruler's 3

confidence'. This led to further calls for greater autonomy

amongst Persian Gulf states: on 4 April 1960, Lloyd informed the cabinet that the Ruler

80Future Policy Working Group minutes, 4 November 1959, CAB 134/1930.

81'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February. 1960, CAB 134/1929.
82Clarke to Serpell and Makins, 21 December 1959, CAB 21/3843.
83Cabinet minutes, 4 January 1960, CAB 128/34.
 108

of Abu Dhabi was anxious that UK jurisdiction in his territory be reduced, as was being

done in Kuwait.84

Increasing oil production in Qatar, and the possible discovery of oil in the Trucial

states and Muscat and Oman, would tend to create 'types of outlook and behaviour

familiar in the more advanced Arab countries', although Foreign Office officials

believed that the prospects for orderly progress would depend very much on the

individual rulers. In Kuwait, for example, it was believed that the ruling family would

keep abreast of nationalist and reformist currents. Conversely, it was considered

doubtful that the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States, and Muscat and Oman

would have the will to move with demands for greater political participation. Kuwait

would, in all probability, be fully independent by 1970, possibly retaining a'special

treaty relationship' with Britain. Identifying the problem of Iraqi expansionism, Foreign

Office civil servants believed that Baghdad's policy, in the long run, would 'undoubtedly

to
aim' absorb Kuwait.85 As will be highlighted in Chapter IV, this prediction would

come to pass in 1961, an event which forced Britain to prosecute a large-scale military

operation in defence of Kuwait's independence.

Britain's policy towards the Middle East, Foreign Office officials advised, should be

aimed at terminating extant commitments, whilst avoiding undue damage to the

security of oil supplies and the general political stability of the area. Given Whitehall's

concerns over the predatory predilections of Iraq, Britain's most important military

commitment was to ensure the security of Kuwait -'at very short notice'. To meet this

commitment (in addition to defending other minor Sheikhdoms), naval, land and air

forces were stationed in the Persian Gulf and Aden, in addition to the theatre reserves

based in Kenya. The Treasury questioned whether Britain should continue to carry out

such a burdensome role, asking why Britain's European competitors could not do more

to defend the West's general interest in preserving access to Middle Eastern oil.

"Cabinetminutes,5 April1960,
CAB128/34.
'Main Trends Developmentin the Middle East':
of Memorandum by the Foreign Office for Future Policy Working
Group, 16 July 1959, CAB 134/1934.
 109

The Foreign Office was also concerned that the Shah's regime might not survive in

Iran. The USSR would work for its replacement by a regime that would be, at the very

least, neutralist. Discontent with the Shah, it was predicted, might 'erupt in revolution

at any time', though a successful insurrection would be dependent on the emergence

of a viable leader, or the Shah 'committing some act which appeared to be a surrender

to imperialism'. Prior to any revolutionary faction consolidating its base, it was feared

that the Soviet Union would make an effort to capture it through the indigenous

Communist Party, possibly precipitating a struggle between Communists and

nationalist army officers, similar to that which had taken place in Iraq. Even a non-

Communist revolutionary government (except perhaps an extreme right wing junta)

would play into Soviet hands, since the accompanying upsurge in nationalist fervour

would press for the denunciation of agreements with the West 86 It was against this

background that British policy towards Iran was framed.

The Future Policy Study argued that Britain's policy in Asia and the Far East was

`one in which the responsibilities and commitments of the United Kingdom. ' were
..
'... largely inherited from our imperial past'. A large proportion of Britain's Far East

land forces were tied up in ensuring the internal security of Singapore for the purpose

of using it as a base for all three services. If political developments in Singapore and

Malaya were to curb the full use of the base facilities, it was recognised that Britain's

position in Singapore might become untenable. The prospects of maintaining UK

troops in the area until 1970 would be 'improved', Dean's Working Party agreed, if

Singapore and Malaya were able to 'unite or confederate'87 The final report suggested

that Australia and New Zealand ought to make a greater contribution to the defence of

the area, although it was acknowledged that it would be difficult to convince Canberra

and Wellington to increase expenditure in this field 88 Dean's Working Group feared

that this might have serious ramifications for the Commonwealth, with Australia and

86Ibid.
87Future Policy Working Group
minutes, 23 and 25 September 1959, CAB 134/1934.
88'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February
1960, CAB 134/1929.
 110

New Zealand becoming increasingly dependent on the United States: 'If neither

country were willing to make a larger contribution, we (and they) might have to face the

fact that they would both tend to gravitate towards the United States'.89 The Treasury

was sceptical about the value of retaining Singapore, regarding the cost of Britain's

military deployment as disproportionate to UK economic interests; as a consequence of

pressure from the Treasury, it was recognised that the abandonment of Singapore

might have to be contemplated 'before the end of the decade' 90 When it was decided

to present a version of the Future Policy Study to the Prime Ministers of Australia, New

Zealand and Canada, W. A. W. Clark, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the CRO,

argued that the prospect of abandoning Singapore should be referred to in 'rather

different terms', as to put such a possibility 'so bluntly' might 'alarm and dismay'

Australia and New Zealand.91 Despite having asked officials to sublimate their

departmental views at the outset of the study, Sir Patrick Dean also reflected the

viewpoint of his department on this issue, informing J. S. Orme that it was important

'not to give Australia and New Zealand the impression that we are ready to abandon

Singapore as a base' 92

Britain's role in South-East Asia was seen by the 'overseas' departments as vital to

the wider strategic interests of the West, and this was reflected in the final report: 'The

United Kingdom, by virtue of its imperial history and Commonwealth position, plays a

role here which cannot be discarded within the next ten years. We shall have to

continue to make a significant contribution?. The key question, from the perspective of

the Foreign Office, was whether the independent countries of South-East Asia could

maintain their independence in the face of Communism. Western assistance took two

main forms: first, mutual defence arrangements which directly covered Thailand and

the Philippines (South-East Asia Treaty Organisation - SEATO) and Malaya (Anglo-

89Future Policy Working Group minutes, 17 November 1959, CAB 134/1934.

80iFuturePolicy Study, 1960-70', 24 February 1960, CAB 134/1929.
91W. A. W. Clark to J. S. Orme, 3 May 1960, T 298/59.
92P. Dean to J. S. Orme, 4 May 1960, T298/59.
 III

Malayan Defence Agreement - ANZAM), and indirectly Laos, Cambodia, and South

Vietnam (designated as part of the SEATO area in a Protocol to the Treaty); secondly,

economic and other assistance, aimed at strengthening the economies and

governmental machines of South-East Asian countries. Yet, it was recognised that the

scale of this defence commitment would have to be reduced over the next ten years,

albeit in an incremental and pragmatic fashion, being constrained by Britain's 'interest

in the cohesion and development of the Commonwealth and the need to retain some

influence over United States policy in the area'. 3 Britain's economic aid effort in

South-East Asia was to be primarily devoted to Malaya, a country that was a significant

'dollar-earner' for the sterling area. Grants and loans to Malaya were expected to

average £7 million per annum, generally seen within Whitehall as an investment

yielding a long-term return.

The Reaction of Ministers and Officials.

Macmillan circulated the 'Future Policy Study' to the cabinet on 29 February 1960,

instructing the ministers present that, having this picture before them, they ought to

formulate policies that corresponded with this broad overview.94 On 23 March 1960, a

month after the completion of the Future Policy Study, Macmillan met in the Prime

Minister's Room in the House of Commons with his senior colleagues: Selwyn Lloyd,

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Derrick Heathcoat Amory, Chancellor of the

Exchequer; the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations; Harold

Watkinson, Minister of Defence; along with R. A. Butler, Secretary of State for the

Home Office. Macmillan concurred with the main findings of the Future Policy Study,

agreeing that Britain's relative power would decline vis-ä-vis the United States, the

Soviet Union, and possibly the EEC. However, he

also believed that the exercise of

93'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February

1960, CAB 134/1929.
"Cabinet minutes, 29 February 1960, CAB
129/100.
 112

'intangible' influence could compensate for the inevitable decline in Britain's economic

strength:
Even though the material strength of the United Kingdom would decline
relatively, we should still have other assets which would enable us to
in
play a significant part world affairs. The best periods in our history had
by no means been those, such as the nineteenth century, when we had a
preponderanceof wealth and power, and for the future we must be ready
to consider how we could continue to exercise influence in the world
other than through material means alone.95

Nevertheless, Britain would have to think increasingly in terms of inter-dependent

alliances, being to
ready sublimate specific British interests in favour of the interests of

the West as a whole.

Butler considered the forecast of the international setting unduly pessimistic, arguing

that it 'did not sufficiently bring out the possibilities of development of the

Commonwealth and Colonial system'. Butler's opposition to accelerated

decolonisation was fairly implacable: Why... ' he asked, should we assume that
, ...
we had to follow an inevitable course in granting independence to our colonial

territories and thus create trouble for ourselves in the United Nations? Did the

Nigerians really want independence?'. The predicted economic growth rates of

Germany and France, and of the EEC generally, concerned Butler, who postulated

(possibly as a `Devil's advocate') whether Britain ought to take over the 'leadership' of

Europe: 'Should we not "invade" Europe and take the lead before it was too late, thus

forestalling the possibility of France adopting isolationist policies with the consequent

risk of [the] collapse of West European unity'96 The views expressed by Butler at the

meeting might well have been deliberately disingenuous and provocative, in an attempt

to raise the tempo of debate amongst senior colleagues; as Home Secretary, Butler

95'FuturePolicy Study, 1960-70': Minutes Ministerial Meeting,

of 23 March 1960, CAB 134/1929.
96ibid.
 113

was not obligated to defend the viewpoint of a particular department, giving him a 'free

hand' in the discussion.

The Earl of Home, whilst accepting the general analysis that British power would

decline, felt that the final document failed to give due weight to the Commonwealth

'circle' in supporting Britain's world role: Without the USA we should be defenceless,

without Western Europe we should be poorer, but without the Commonwealth our

in
position the world would rapidly decline'. If the Future Policy Study was carried out

to its logical conclusion, Home contended, Australia and New Zealand would become

'satellites' of the United States and India might be 'cut off' from the West altogether.

Similarly, Harold Watkinson accepted that'the United Kingdom could not stand alone

in the world in the 1960s', although, like Macmillan, did not think that this would

preclude Britain from playing a significant role in international affairs. Even so,

Watkinson was incapable of great original thought, having been appointed to the

Ministry of Defence, at least according to Macmillan's diaries, in part for being a'self -

Macmillan sound judgement 97 Rather

made man', an attribute often equated with

mysteriously, Watkinson suggested that 'the United Kingdom could take the lead

behind the scenes', directing the policies of other countries, namely the United States.

Britain, according to Watkinson, could 'discreetly exert leadership in many fields where

the Free World was in need of leadership', by working through international alliances

and the Commonwealth.98

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, representing the department most in favour of

reducing the level of overseas expenditure, criticised the Future Policy Study for not

adequately questioning the economic viability of Britain's world role. Heathcoat Amory

candidly asserted that 'he could not see how we could continue to carry out present

commitments overseas, even with the help of our friends and allies'. In particular, he

doubted whether it was right to assume that Britain 'must continue indefinitely to carry

97HMD, d 37, entry for 18 October 1959.

98'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', Minutes of Ministerial Meeting, 23 March 1960, CAB 134/1929.
 114

part of the defence burden in Asia and the Far East'. In this respect, Heathcoat Amory

was very much reflecting the views of 'Otto' Clarke, who questioned the long-term

viability of retaining such commitments: 'Our forces are stretched over a hotchpotch of

commitments (mostly of dubious relevance to our own needs and those of the West).

Any of a dozen happenings, none unlikely and none even originating in the Sino-Soviet

bloc, would compel us to withdraw from these commitments'.99 Embracing a subject

other members of the committee had neglected, Heathcoat Amory suggested that it

could 'not lightly be assumed' that Britain could continue to devote 8'/z per cent of GNP

to support overseas polices throughout the following decade, as expanding public

programmes in the social services and investment in industry would make it extremely

difficult to maintain such levels of overseas expenditure. In order to preserve a

reasonable balance-of-payments and the strength of sterling, it would be necessary for

Britain to curtail some of its 'existing overseas commitments, as regards both defence

and aid'. Accurately articulating the views of his senior officials, Heathcoat Amory

asserted: 'At present we were trying to undertake more than we could expect to

achieve, especially if the declared policy of the Government to reduce taxation rates

were to be maintained'. In discussion there was general agreement that securing a

stable balance-of-payments was important; however, it was also agreed that it might be

preferable to maintain the existing burden of taxation rather than reduce the proportion

of national resources allotted to overseas expenditure. In order to secure greater

economies in expenditure, ministers agreed that further efforts should be made to

encourage the United States, Western Europe and the older Commonwealth countries

to bear a greater proportion of Western defence and economic aid spending.`

Sir FrankLee, (Joint)PermanentSecretaryto the Treasury,thoughtthat the major

value of the study lay in setting Britain'scapacitiesand resourceswithin the contextof

the internationalenvironment.This had been a centralobjectiveof the Treasuryfrom

9' Clarke to Serpell and Makins, 21 December 1959, CAB

21/3843.
100'FuturePolicy Study, 1960-70': Minutes ministerial meeting,
of 23 March 1960, CAB 134/1929.
 115

the outset and was recognisedin the final report. On 5 April 1960, in a meeting at the

Treasury, Lee claimed that the 'general background setting out our place in the world

and showing our dependence upon alliances rather upon our own independent military

efforts was well done'. Lee also felt that the importance of a sound economy for

carrying out Britain's world role had been 'given its proper weight'. 'Otto' Clarke shared

this view, adding that he thought Section B -'The Resources of the United Kingdom' -

was particularly important, as 'this was the first serious attempt at a detailed survey of

this kind, covering as it did the prospective development of the U.K. economy'. Sir

Robert Hall, Director of the Treasury's Economic Section, believed that the most

important conclusion, emerging from the study, 'was the necessity of a contraction and

concentration of our efforts, which were spread out much too thin - with the result that

we were failing to make as effective impact as we should'. Senior Treasury officials

were therefore content with the first two sections of the Future Policy Study; the

conclusions in Section C, on the other hand, were seen as incompatible with the rest of

the report, thus reducing its applicability. Clarke argued that it was 'more difficult to

justify our defence policy in the Middle East and Far East (particularly the latter) which

assumed that these were areas where the U.K. had special responsibilities'. 'The role

we were trying to carry out in these areas Clarke argued, ' did not really fit in
.. .', ...
with the criteria in the report governing the desiderata of the U.K.'s policy in the

1960s'.1°1

The size and scope of other countries' defence and aid efforts was highly
significant
in the Treasury's view, as this influenced the level of expenditure Britain
was required
to devote towards its overseas commitments. Consequently, when it
was decided to
present a version of the 'Future Policy Study, 1960-70' to the Canadian, Australian,

and New Zealand governments, a number of senior Treasury officials thought it

essential to take a robust line with the 'old' dominions. Brook felt
such an approach to

101'Future Policy: Minutes of a Meeting held In

Sir Frank Lee's Room, 5 April 1960, T325/65
 116

be lacking in diplomatic tact, believing it better to present these countries with a

'bowdlerised version' of the report (particularly Sections A and B). There was even

disagreement within the Treasury on how to approach this issue. Frederick Vinter, a

senior Treasury official, argued that'the reference to the so-called "old dominions" is

not particularly tactful, and the main question is how much we should leave in order to

be able to get across the message to them'.102Clarke strongly disagreed with this

in
view, and a reply to Vinter, 'I
asserted: cannot really see why we should be "tactful" -

surely the point of giving it to them is to give them the facts'. The implementation of

strategy into tangible action was intrinsic to Clarke's thinking, and he urged Lee to use

his influence within Whitehall to prevent the 'overseas' departments deflecting from the

central economic realities outlined in the study. Clarke, in a note to Lee, contended: 'it

would be to
absurd water this down to meet their [the 'old dominions'] susceptibilities.

Indeed, one of the purposes, I suppose, is to teach them the facts of life.

(Nevertheless, I should not be at all surprised if the Commonwealth Relations Office

to this if I to resist strongly)'.103As Clarke

wanted cut out - so, would press you

predicted, CRO officials strongly opposed such an approach: on 3 May 1960, W. A. W.

Clark, writing on the behalf of Sir Alexander Clutterbuck (Permanent Under-Secretary

to the CRO), argued that to'present the Commonwealth Prime Ministers with such a

critical and unvarnished analysis of the Commonwealth could only leave them with the

impression that we do not rate it very high nor give it much weight in our assessment of

world affairs and developments'.104Taking up Clarke's recommendation, Lee wrote to

Brook on 4 May, suggesting that Britain had 'got into a position vis-a-vis the

Commonwealth of being frightened of ghosts under the bed and of believing that the

Commonwealth prefer illusions to plain and realistic speaking Indeed, surely one of
...
the purposes of letting the Prime Ministers see this document is precisely to rub in the

particular point about the inadequacy of the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand

102R. F. P. Vinter to Clarke, 19 April 1960, T298/59.

103Clarke to Lee, 28 April 1960, T 298/59.
104Clark to Orme, 3 May 1960, T 298/59.
 117

defence contributions'.105Despite Clarke's Gradgrindian concern with presenting

Britain's allies with the `facts', the Treasury was unsuccessful in getting its 'world view'

accepted within the rest of Whitehall. This can be explained by two major factors:

firstly, the Treasury was heavily outnumbered in the Future Policy Study committees by

departments that had a vested interest in maintaining overseas commitments;

secondly, there was no appetite within the Conservative Party or Whitehall (Treasury

and Board of Trade apart) for a radical revision of Britain's global role. On 13 May

1961, Macmillan met with the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Canada

to discuss the Future Policy Study, but was unable to secure a solid commitment from

the 'old' dominions to contribute more to Western defence, a failure attributable to

Whitehall's reluctance to present these countries with the 106

`facts'.

Summary.

The Macmillan government's `Future Policy Study, 1960-1970' represented an

important attempt to assess the best means of maintaining British power and influence

in the world. Although it was hoped that the final review would not be too closely

bound up with departmental thinking on international problems, officials and ministers

generally represented the views of their respective Whitehall departments in committee

discussions, resulting in a final report containing contradictory conclusions; this can be

accredited to Section A (The International Setting) and Section B (The Resources of

the United Kingdom) being largely drafted by the Treasury, and Section C (The Main

Objectives of the United Kingdom's Overseas and Strategic Policy) being produced by

the Foreign Office. It is difficult to substantiate the claim that Whitehall was motivated

by an outdated imperial sentiment when preparing the Future Policy Study - rather a

stalemate had been struck between those who favoured a change in the central thrust

105Lee to Brook, 4 May 1960, T 298/59.

106iNoteof a Meeting between Mr Diefenbaker, Mr Menzies, Mr Nash
and Mr Macmillan held at 10 Downing Street, 13
May 1960, T 298/59.
 118

of British foreign policy away from extra-European commitments (the Treasury and the

Board of Trade) and the departments which believed that the retention of global

responsibilities served Britain's wider interests (the Foreign Office, Commonwealth

Relations Office, and Colonial Office). Senior Treasury civil servants argued that

Britain's overseas obligations were incompatible and inconsistent with the capacity of

the UK economy, but were unable to engineer a reversal in British geo-strategic

objectives, a fact that can be largely attributed to the make-up of Dean's Working Party

and Brook's Steering Committee, which contained representatives from the three

'overseas' departments and the Ministry of Defence, all of which had a vested interest

in maintaining the status quo. The following chapters analyse how these fundamental

differences were played out and reconciled between 1959 and 1968.
 119

Chapter III: British Policy Towards Africa, 1959-1968.

John Darwin argues that historians will be hard pressed to find any coherent rationale

behind the process of British withdrawal from Africa.' As a provisionaljudgement, Darwin

suggests that officials were more influenced by the 'constraints of the local situation on the

African continent than by the new international considerations', but cautions (as all

historians with limited access to archival material should reflect) that the causes of this

decisive shift in policy will remain 'obscure until the archives of the 1960s are opened up'.

On the other hand, Robert Holland has claimed that British withdrawal stemmed from a

fundamental change in national priorities, whereby public expenditure was focused

towards domestic rather than overseas objectives. He concedes, however, that officials

were conscious of the difficulties associated with governing indefinitely, with seminal

events such as the publication of the Devlin Report on Nyasaland (which condemned the

colonial authorities for running a 'police state') hastening the pace of 2

decolonisation.

Conversely, J. D. Hargreaves maintains that British policy towards Africa, during the late

1950s and 1960s, was informed by fears that the Anglo-American relationship 'could be

jeopardised if Britain remained too closely identified with the residues of her colonial

empire in eastern and southern Africa'. With increased pressure on Britain's limited

resources, Hargreaves contends, Africa was one of the few areas 'where many

commitments could be safely contracted'3

Most academic works on Britain's retreat from Africa neglect the role of Whitehall,

preferring to concentrate on a single territorial possession, or the process of

decolonisation as it was administered 'on the ground'. Thus, how leading politicians and

civil servants - the individuals responsible for the formulation and prosecution of 'high'

' J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation:The Retreat

from EmpireIn the Post-War World,(London:Macmillan,1988), p. 278.
2 R. Holland, The Pursuit Greatness:Britain
of and the World Role, 1900-1970,(London:Fontana,1991),p. 198.
3J. D. Hargreaves,DecolonisationIn Africa,
(London:Longman,1988), p. 187.
 120

foreign policy - reacted to the 'winds of change' remains an under-examinedtheme. This

thesis concentrateson the economic, geopolitical, and strategic importanceof Africa in the

thinking of senior officials and ministers, examining the extent to which such

considerationsinformed perceptions of Britain's world role; it is not a study of

decolonisationper se - rather it seeks to examine the changing significanceof Africa in the

thinking of Whitehall. Utilising recently released documents, this chapter questions a

number of the central arguments put forward to explain Britain's decision to relinquish its

leading role in Africa, providing a re-evaluationof Darwin's emphasis on local constraints

over internationalfactors. Historians have hitherto tended to underestimatethe extent to

which British withdrawal from Africa was informed by wider global politico-strategic

considerations. African nationalist opinion not only had an impact on the internal stability

of the colonies and the ability of the colonial authorities to govern, it also had to be

accommodated in order to secure wider British interests: for instance, Britain's position

within the Commonwealthand the United Nations was dependent on securing close

relations with former territories; UK bases and over-flying rights in East Africa were

strategically valued assets, supporting Britain's position in the Middle East and South-East

Asia; many African states held large sterling balances, the withdrawal of which could

cause serious damage to the sterling area, something policy-makers aimed to avert

because of the potential ramifications on Britain's international status (as demonstrated in

Chapter II); Whitehall also had to consider the implicationsof disengagementon the

position of Britain (and, by extension, the West) in the Cold War. Was decolonisation

accelerated so as to prevent (or, at least, limit) damage to Britain's international position,

thus making the whole process not so much an aspect of continuing decline as a rational

attempt to maintain international power and influence? Was an obstinate stance against

decolonisation rejected on the grounds that it might inflict long-term damage on Britain's
 121

position in both the Commonwealthand the UN, as opposed to avoiding a series of

expensive colonial wars?

Policy-makersalso had to balance the impact of Anglo-South African relations on

Britain's standing amongst developing nations. Throughout the period under examination,

British officials were torn between two competing interests in regard to South Africa: first,

Anglo-South African trade was important to Britain's balance of payments, making it

difficult to adopt an overly hostile stance against Pretoria's policies; secondly, since

developing nations (both inside and outside the Commonwealth)generally looked for

unequivocalcondemnationof South Africa, a failure to openly oppose apartheid had the

potential to precipitate the disintegrationof the Commonwealth. This thesis will highlight

the importance of this issue, largely neglected by historians, on Whitehall's thinking

towards Africa during the 1960s.

Finally, historians have tended to ignore how Whitehall adapted to the immediate post-

colonial world. Britain's relations with its former colonies did not come to an end with the

achievement of independence:UK trade with the former colonies continued; British

companies continued to operate in CommonwealthAfrica; Whitehall's interests in securing

stability - in a potentially fractious area - did not end with the termination of British rule.

What were Britain's main objectives in the immediate post-colonial period? Did policy-

makers hope to retain de facto control in the former colonies? How sensitive was
Whitehall to charges of neo-colonialism?

`Africa: The Next Ten Years: A Policy Agenda for the 1960s?

On 12 April 1957, Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar, Permanent Under-Secretaryto the Foreign

Office, asked Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, to give consideration to the

possibility of establishing 'some kind of Africa Committee'. Having had informal

 122

discussionswith Brook on this subject beforehand, Hoyer-Millaradded, in parenthesis:

'Under Cabinet Office chairmanship,of course'. Brook followed up this request some five

days later, informing Macmillan: ' the international importance of Africa is increasing
...
rapidly. Problems are consequentlyarising which transcend the Departmental

responsibilitiesof the FO, CRO and CO for their respective territories. There is a clear

mood for some standing machinery for inter-departmentalco-ordination in matters

affecting Africa as a whole or large it'

areas of ., 5 Consequently, on 9 May 1957, Macmillan

established the Africa (Official) Committee (A(O)C), its terms of reference being: 'To keep

under review political and economic problems concerning Africa (excluding problems

concerning the Suez Canal in

or problems which Egypt and Libya are the only African

states concerned) which raise important questions of policy calling for inter-departmental

discussion'.6

In January 1959, officials on the A(O)C began work on an inter-departmentalreview of

Britain's future policy towards Africa. The genesis for this reappraisal arose from talks

between Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, and John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary

of State, at Brize Norton in October 1958, when Britain and the United States agreed to

undertake a joint review of policy with respect to Africa. Sir Burke Trend, the civil servant

entrusted with the chairmanship of the A(O)C, was tasked with synthesising varying

departmental views on a range of relevant issues. On 14 January 1959, at the first

meeting of his committee, Trend clarified the need to identify Britain's main interests, as

well as the best means of defending these over the next ten years, given Africa's strategic

position as the likely'next object' of Soviet attack. In discussion, officials also agreed that

the committee should, against the need to formulate a comprehensiveAnglo-American

policy towards Africa, to

seek establish inter-departmentalconsensus on issues

` Hoyer-Millarto Brook, 12 April 1957, CAB 21/4580.

5 Brookto Macmillan,17 April 1957, CAB 21/4580.
6'Africa (Official)Committee:Terms of Reference',9 May 1957, CAB 21/4580.
 123

specifically relating to Britain's own interests: for example, it was important to strike an

appropriatebalance between the political advancement of the remaining colonies and the

strategic requirementof maintaining UK defence facilities in Africa. Whilst appreciatingthe

significanceof consultationswith the Americans, the committee agreed on the need to

avoid giving 'the impressionof allowing these to determine' Britain's future policy towards

its colonial territories. Discussionswith the United States, the committee agreed, should

take place in two distinct stages: first, officials would ascertain American views on likely

future developmentsin Africa; and, secondly, after Whitehall had reached agreement on

Britain's own policies, further talks should be held to determine how a coherent Anglo-

American approach could be devised to promote the achievement of agreed strategic

aims. Officials hoped that talks with the United States would increase British influence in

shaping future American policy, believing that such discussions would provide an

'opportunity of influencingtheir [American] thinking ', which ' underlined the

... ...
importance of crystallising our [Britain's] own ideas in advance'.'

The Committee, following these initial considerations,turned its attention to Britain's

main political, strategic and economic interests in Africa. Provisionally,Britain's

fundamental political interests were defined as the maintenance of stability and a'pro-

Western outlook' in former and newly independentAfrican territories. Over a large partof

the continent, however, officials recognisedthat a pro-Western outlook would be too much

to hope for, and it might be necessary to accept some form of neutrality, similar to that

practiced in India. This led attention to be focused on the crucial question of whether

British interests would be best served by the retention or relinquishmentof political control

in dependent territories. The A(O)C agreed that it could not be assumed that ceding

control would necessarily represent the best means of ensuring a pro-Western or

politically neutral Africa: for example, East Africa lacked a 'reasonably educated middle

''Africa (Official)CommitteeMinutes, 14 January

1959, CAB 134/1353.
 124

class', and it was feared that a poorly timed withdrawal would lead to 'administrative

chaos' and a 'dangerous power vacuum', making the area more susceptible to Communist

incursion. It was recognised, nevertheless,that it would be impossibleto retain control of

the dependentterritories indefinitely, and that the general thrust of British policy would

have to be aimed at establishing 'an adequately educated middle class capable of

advancing the territory after independence'. If Britain pursued this objective during the

period prior to withdrawal, there would be a better chance of minimisingthe effects of anti-

Western influence, resulting in a final outcome 'more in accord with our [Britain's] general

political interests than would otherwise be the case'.8

In considering Britain's strategic interests, officials had to assess how crucial UK

defence rights and facilities in Africa were to wider geo-political objectives. C. W. Wright,

Assistant Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, indicated that Britain's strategic interests in

Africa centered on the stationing of the strategic reserve in Kenya and the possession of

over-flying and staging rights in several East African territories. The need to retain the

strategic reserve in Kenya depended wholly, and that of over-flying and staging rights

partly, on the extent to which Britain would be prepared, in the long-term, to safeguard its

oil supplies in the Persian Gulf by military means. Provided control of Aden could be

retained, Wright maintained, Britain would be able to secure its interests in the Persian
Gulf and Arabia without an embedded military presence in East Africa; to do so, however,

would be prohibitively expensive.9 Arguably because of its relative weakness as a

department within Whitehall, the Ministry of Defence was only prepared to offer advice on

the strategic viability of maintaining a military presence in Africa, as opposed to articulating

a considered view as to the desirability of such a policy course, reflecting its subordinate

° ibid.
° ibid.
 125

position to the 'lead' departments- Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and

Treasury - in shaping Britain's foreign policy agenda.

Trend's committeethen turned its attention to Britain's economic interests in Africa.

While alternativesources of supply might be available for some of the raw materials

produced in Africa, A(O)C officials felt that the continent would remain an important market

for Western (particularlyBritish) exports. On the other hand, the withdrawal of European

administratorswas liable to limit the capacity of African countries to absorb the capital

necessary to develop their economic and social infrastructureon a significant scale.

Importantly,Trend's committee accepted that Britain's economic (as well as strategic)

interests might have to be sacrificed in the interests of preserving general political stability.

Officials did not, however,view stability as being necessarily commensuratewith

democratic rule, and, in discussion, it was suggested that'the time might come when the

United Kingdom should support political groupings which fell short of those which we

regard as ideal, in to
order prevent a much worse outcome'.10 Such pragmatism does not

lie easily with Macmillan's claim that British decolonisationwas guided by a sense of

'duty', whereby Britain passed on to its former colonies the 'advantages' it had gained

'through the course of centuries'.11

In June 1959, the A(O)C produced its final report, entitled 'Africa: The Next Ten Years'.

The purpose of the officials' paper was to survey the strategic developmentof Africa over

a ten-year period; not, it should be noted, stipulate detailed recommendationson individual

problems. The report sought to provide a framework within which Britain could determine,

with its allies, the future policy course to be adopted 'towards the rapid march of events in

the African continent'. There was general agreement that the "scramble out of Africa"

presented a unique dilemma: unlike other areas of the world where the imperial powers

10ibid.
" H. Macmillan, Pointing the way, 1959-61,
(London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 116-117.
 126

had transferred sovereignty, as in the case of the Indian sub-continentand the Far East,

where 'the political immaturity' of the countries had been compensatedby an 'indigenous

culture' with 'roots stretching far back into the past', officials saw much of tropical Africa as

not'far removedfrom primitive savagery'. In consequence, it was suggested that the

'outstanding personalities',that is to say prominent African nationalist leaders, were few

and disproportionatelyimportant, and that much depended on 'a handful of key men' -

Kwame Nkrumah, Presidentof Ghana; Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister of

Nigeria; M. Houphouet-Boigny,President of the Ivory Coast.12

The officials' paper divided Africa (excludingthose countries on the Mediterranean

littoral which were generally consideredwithin the context of policy towards the Middle

East1) into two geographicalregions: first, the predominately 'black' (a word consistently

used by policy-makersto denote an area with a small settler population) area north of the

Congo, extending from Senegal in the west to the Somali territories in the east; and,

secondly, the area lying south of the Congo, which incorporated several multi-racial

societies, the most important being Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Forecastingten years

ahead, officials argued that an 'emerging patchwork' of independent and semi-

independent states would be established in the area north of the Congo. The two most

important states in West Africa, from Whitehall's standpoint, were Ghana (formerly known

as the Gold Coast) and Nigeria. The committee predicted that a form of semi-authoritarian

government, enforced by Nkrumah's 'democratic' party, or some other 'dominant

personality', would continue in Ghana. The A(O)C paper concluded that such a system of

government offered the best means of securing internal political security - and, in spite of

probable attempts to improve diplomatic relations with Moscow, the most effective way of

suppressing internal Communist subversion. It was considered unlikely that the

12'Africa: The Next Ten Years', June 1959, FO 371/173972.

13See Chapter IV.
 127

relationshipbetween Ghana and Guinea would develop into a formal federation, although

Whitehall hoped that this 'partnership' would provide the basis for a wider and looser

grouping of West African states. Trend's committee considered itself 'on surer ground' in

forecastingthat Ghana would become a republic during the next five years, whilst

remaining in the Commonwealth.

Officials hoped that Nigeria, a nation on the verge of independencewhen the paper was

completed, would maintain cordial relations with London during the post-colonial period.

Although Nigeria was a federal construct, potentially capable of fragmentation into a

number of regional entities, Whitehall felt that 'regional patriotism', although strongly

rooted, would be replaced by a growing 'sentiment of Nigerian unity'. Moreover, if policy-

makers played their 'cards well', Nigeria would sign a defence agreementwith the UK on

attaining independence,remaininga'fully co-operative' member of the Commonwealthfor

the remainder of the decade, whilst adopting an implacably hostile stance towards both

the UAR and the Soviet Union.14 Establishinga defence agreement with Nigeria was

important from the perspective of Britain's wider geo-political interests, as this would

provide the communicationfacilities necessaryfor reinforcing the defence of South-East

Asia. When the Anglo-Nigeriandefence treaty came to be negotiated,Treasury officials

expressed concern not about the direct cost of the agreement but the benefit gained from

Britain's military role in South-East Asia. Sir Richard Clarke, Second Secretary to the

Treasury, argued: 'I must say that I have considerable doubts, after going through the

"future policy" exercise, whether this complicated system of communicationfacilities to the

Far East (the maintenance of which is the purpose of this agreement [with Nigeria]) will

look as important in 10 (or even 5) years' time as it does now'.15 By the latter half of the

1960s, as Nigerian politicians became less preoccupied with internal matters, officials

14ibid.
15Clarketo Bell, 8 March 1960, Clarke
papers (ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)CLRK 1/3/1/1.
 128

hoped that Lagos would assume a leading role in the affairs of tropical Africa, with the

to
capacity act as an important pro-Western bulwark against Communist 16
expansion.

In the area south of the Congo, the officials' report suggested that the pace of political

developmentwould be particularly rapid in non-Commonwealthcountries, being most

marked in the Belgian "

Congo. Conversely, constitutional change in British East and

Central Africa would vary in accordancewith local circumstances. The paper rejected, at

one extreme, a policy of prompt withdrawal of UK control and, on the other, a die-hard

policy of 'digging-in' and refusing to contemplate any possibility of relinquishingcontrol in

the foreseeable future, coming down in favour of a'middle of the road' policy.18

As Britain's three main territories in East Africa (Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda) were

to a large extent economicallyinterdependent,A(O)C officials concluded that it would be

advisable to promote constitutionaladvancement at a similar pace. On the other hand, as

each state had differing domestic circumstances- Kenya contained a particularly large

settler population; Uganda was dominated by Buganda, but relatively 'advanced'; and

Tanganyika was a UN Trust Territory - it would be difficult, on a practical level, to promote

contemporaneousprogress. In Kenya, policy was aimed at establishing a viable, 'non-

racial' state, in which the interests of all communities were secured, with Britain

maintaining 'full responsibility' until this was achieved at some stage' during the mid-

1970s. In Uganda, the main difficultly lay in reconciling the conflicting ambitions of

'traditionalists', headed by the tribal rulers, and the aspiring nationalist movements; and,

on a regional basis, managing the tensions between Buganda and the rest of the

protectorate. Officials did not envisage Uganda being ready for full internal self-

government by 1965, but tentatively suggested that this would 'probably' be attained by

1970. Despite possessing an 'educationally backward' population, the African nationalist

"Africa: The Next Ten Years', June 1959, FO

371/173972.
"As envisagedin the far-reaching
constitutionalplans announcedby Brusselsin January 1959.
18'Africa:The Next Ten Years', June 1959,
FO 371/173972.
 129

movement in Tanganyikawas consideredto be particularly 'strong and undivided'.

Projectingten years ahead, the A(O)C suggested that the 'main retarding factor' to

progress towards Tanganyikanindependencewould be a lack of personnel 'capable of

governing with any hope of success'. Tanganyika, it was argued, would be 'well on the

way' to responsiblegovernmentby 1965 -'probably' achieving self-governmentby 1970,

whilst remaining heavily dependenton external economic and administrativeassistance.

Even so, as pressure for constitutionalreform fermented, it would be necessary to deploy

'great skill and judgement' in preventingtoo rapid a move towards independence,a

developmentthat could, if too premature,result in 'economic and political chaos. ', which
..
could potentially'. . .throw the door wide open to influences hostile to the West'.19

The plans set out by the A(O)C were quickly thrown into disarray by events in East

Africa. On 27 February 1961, following the victory of the Tanganyika African National

Union (TANU) in the Tanganyikan LegislativeCouncil elections, Macleod informed the

Colonial Policy Committee (CPC) that it would be necessary to grant independenceto

Tanganyika'in the very near future'. Fearful about the potentially destabilising impact of

Tanganyikan independenceon Britain's other colonies, ministers and officials endorsed

the idea of establishing an East African Federation, being further hastened by pressure

from Julius Nyerere (leader of TANU and Chief Minister of Tanganyika), who argued that

the East African territories 'must move towards independenceat one and the same time';

accordingly, Macleod advised that Kenya and Uganda should be brought rapidly to a stage

of constitutional development, roughly correspondingto the stage reached by

Tanganyika.20 Impatient for independence, Nyerere effectively ended Whitehall's hopes of

launching an East African Federation, which might precede the attainment of

independence by the individual constituent territories, by asserting that Tanganyika should

19ibid.
20'Independenceof Tanganyika':CPC
memorandumby Macleod,27 February1961, CAB 134/1560;'Constitutional
DevelopmentIn Uganda':CPC memorandumby Macleod, 12
April 1961, CAB 134/1560.
 130

go ahead separately to independence. The cabinet felt unable to stop Nyerere, since it

would be difficult to deter the United Nations (UN) from prematurely terminating the

Trusteeship Agreement;therefore, it was considered necessary to accept a date for

independencenot later than March 1962, and possibly as early as December 196121

Nevertheless,Whitehall refrained from setting a date for self-governmentin Kenya and

Uganda, as Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for CommonwealthRelations, explained to

President Nkrumah,who desired a resolution in the UN setting target dates for the

independenceof the remainingcolonies: 'in Uganda fixing a date would not help to solve

the problem created by differences between Buganda and the rest; in Kenya we
...
accepted the view that the majority must rule, but we wished to see independence

achieved in circumstancesin which the European and Asian minorities would have

sufficient confidence to stay on in the community, thereby preventing its economic

collapse'. 2 With Tanganyika moving towards independence, however, the CPC was

forced to accept that'it would be impossible to justify to the Kenyan Africans the

maintenanceof United Kingdom rule in Kenya merely on account of the presence of

significant numbers of Europeans'.23 Macmillan feared that there was no possible solution

to the problem of Kenya, noting in his diary: 'If we have to give independenceto Kenya, it

may prove another Congo. If we hold on, it will mean a long and cruel campaign - Mau

Mau and all that'.24 Following a London constitutional conference in 1962, Kenya was

granted self-government,leading to full independencein 1964.

The circumstances in Central Africa were different from those in East Africa, presenting

even greater difficulties from the perspective of Whitehall. The Federationof Rhodesia

and Nyasaland, otherwise known as the Central African Federation (CAF), consisted of

21Cabinetminutes,7 March 1961, CAB 128/33.

22'Noteof Topics the Secretary State Discussed
of with PresidentNkrumah' (CoveringNote " Linlott to Clutterbuck),3 May
1961, Sandyspapers (ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)DSND 8/18.
23CPC minutes, 6 January 1961, CAB
134/1560
24Macmillan, Pointing the Way,
p. 291.
 131

Southern Rhodesia,a self-governingcolony, with an independentlyminded and expanding

Europeancommunity, and the two British protectoratesof Northern Rhodesiaand

Nyasaland,each of which had large indigenousAfrican populations.25 In Southern

Rhodesia,the politically active 'white' settlers, unlike the Europeansin East Africa, were

anxious for independencefrom British control, despite being 'intensely loyal' to the

Commonwealth. The Europeansin Southern and Northern Rhodesiawished to

amalgamate and achieve 'dominion status', with or without Nyasaland. The Africans in

Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland,on the other hand, looked to Britain to protect their

interests against encroachmentby the European settlers; moreover, there was mounting

pressure for universal adult suffrage in these territories, leading to African political control

and independence. In response to these conflicting ambitions, the compromise idea of the

CAF evolved: it was hoped that a multi-racial partnership, based on 'civilised standards',

would emerge, preventing Southern Rhodesiafrom allying itself too closely to South

Africa, and avoiding 'a direct clash between a white-dominatedAfrica south of the

Zambezi and a black dominated Africa to the north'. In order to counter African fears, the

pledges contained in the preamble to the CAF's constitution and reiterated by

Conservative ministers in parliament, confirmed that British protection of the indigenous

population would be maintained for so long as the African people so wished, whilst

simultaneously agreeing to a 'high qualification' for the franchise, based 'on a necessarily

arbitrary interpretation of "civilised standards"'. Despite achieving a seemingly workable

modus vivendi, the CAF was hampered by mutual suspicion: African opinion feared being

permanently dominated by a European ruling elite, whereas the settlers harboured

concerns of being submerged by an 'uncivilised' African nationalism. 6

u For a detailedaccountof the creation the CentralAfrican

of Federationsee. R. Hyam. 'The GeopoliticalOriginsof the
Central African Federation:Britain, Rhodesiaand South Africa, 1940-1953',HistoricalJournal,
30, (1987), 145-72.
The Next Ten Years', June 1959, FO 371/173972.
 132

During March 1959, a state of emergency was announced in Nyasaland,when latent

discontentmentwith the policies of the federal government erupted into mass riots. Under

emergency powers, the authorities arrested Hastings Banda, leader of the opposition

Malawi Congress Party (MCP), along with some 60 party members. Followingcalls from

the Labour oppositionfor an official inquiry into the circumstancessurroundingthe

emergency, Macmillan established an independentcommission, under the chairmanship

of Sir Patrick Devlin, a senior high-courtjudge, who was dispatched to Nyasalandto

gather evidence. In July 1959, Devlin released his findings, which were severely critical of

the police and army, accusing the governor, Robert Armitage, of presiding over a 'police

state where it is unsafe to make any but the most restrained criticism of Government

policy'. Moreover, Devlin found that the majority of Africans were opposed to the concept

of federation:

The government'sview is that these nationalist aspirationsare the

thoughts of only a small minority of political Africans, mainly of self-seekers
who think their prospects of office will be worse under Federation;and that
the great majority of people are indifferentto the issue. We have found this
not to be so. It was generally acknowledgedthat the oppositionto
Federationwas there, that it was deeply rooted and almost universally
held. 27

On 1 June 1959, just a month or so prior to the release of the Devlin report, the Earl of

Home, Secretary of State for CommonwealthAffairs, advised Macmillan to establish a

commission of inquiry into discontent in the CAR 28 Macmillan appointed Walter Monckton,

believing that he would accurately represent his own views, which were that the

indigenous Africans could not be `dominatedpermanently without any opportunity of

...

27Report of the NyasalandCommission Inquiry,Cmnd 814 (London:HMSO, 1959).

of
28Hometo Macmillan,1 June 1960, PREM 11/2588.
 133

development and ultimate self-government. Nor can the Europeans be abandoned'. 29

With the appointment of Macleod as Colonial Secretary in August 1959, a clear change in

the direction of government policy was in the offing. With the support of Macmillan and

Home, Macleod released Banda on 1 April 1960, just prior to the completion of the

Monckton Commission, allowing him to submit evidence as an independent witness. In

August 1960, Banda visited London, where it was agreed that Nyasaland should have a

new constitution, with a government based on majority rule. This decision had profound

implications for Northern Rhodesia, with its majority black population, leading Macleod to

argue in favour of holding a constitutional conference for Northern Rhodesia In 1961.

Macleod was helped in this respect by the findings of the Monckton Commission (released

in October 1960), which recommended several far-reaching constitutional changes,

including equal representation for blacks in the Federal Assembly and a new constitution

with a black majority for Northern Rhodesia, with individual territories being able - if they

to
so wished - secede from the federation 30 On 30 November 1961, Macmillan agreed to

a constitutional conference for Northern Rhodesia In February 1961. On 10 December

1960, Sandys and Macleod met with the political leaders of the CAF: Sir Edgar Whitehead,

Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia; Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation

of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; Hastings Banda, leader of MCP; Kenneth Kaunda, leader of

the Zambia African National Congress; and Joshua Nkomo, President of the African

National Congress (ANC) in Southern Rhodesia. Starting off the discussion, Sandys

suggested that political opinion on the federation could be divided into two groups: those

who wanted the Federation to continue; and those who wanted it dissolved. Whilst

accepting the legitimacy of the respective arguments, Sandys insisted that Britain could

not be expected to consider the dissolution of the Federation, with all that entailed, unless

29A.Home,Macmillan:
1957-1986,
vol.II, P.211.
30
Report of the Advisory Commissionon the Reviewof the Constitutionof Rhodesiaand Nyasaland,Cmnd 1148, (London:
HMSO, 1960).
 134

he had first satisfied himself that it was impossible to introduce changes, which would

make it generally more acceptable. Banda wanted Nyasalandto leave the Federation

immediately. In imposing the 1953 Federation on Nyasaland, he argued, Britain had acted

contrary to the trust placed in it. Banda believed that some form of association between

the three territories might be possible, but only if they became 'truly representative'and

based on an equitable electoral franchise31 Following a failure to reach agreement at the

constitutional conference on Northern Rhodesia in early 1961, Macmillan,fearing a

possible 'white rebellion', accepted Welensky's demands for the continuation of white

minority rule -a decision opposed by Macleod. In August 1961, Banda's MCP secured

electoral victory in Nyasaland,paving the way for self-governmentin 1963. This left

Conservative ministers to deal with, in the words of Macleod, the 'true problem' of

Northern Rhodesia. 2 Reginald Maudling, Macleod's replacementat the Colonial Office,

feared that the situation in Northern Rhodesiawould 'get out of hand', unless the

constitution could be amended in such a way as to give the indigenous Africans a chance

in
of winning a small majority any forthcoming 33
election After great deliberation, Northern

Rhodesia's new constitution came into force in February 1962, effectively ensuring

majority rule. R. A. Butler, who assumed responsibilityfor Central Africa in March 1962,

was given the task of overseeing the dissolution of the Federation. Believing that Banda's

support was more important than damaging relations with Welensky, Butler finally agreed

to Nyasaland's secession from the Federation,officials considering it impossible to hold

Nyasaland by the use of force34 Nyasaland's departure provided the final death knell to

the ill-fated CAF, which was dissolved on 30 December 1963, quickly followed by

independencefor Nyasaland (which became Malawi) on 6 July 1964 and Northern

"'Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland:Recordof Conversationafter Dinnerat Chequers',10 December1960, DSN
8/18.
32MacLeodto Macmillan,31 May 1960, PREM 11/3240.
33Cabinetminutes,26 February1962, CAB 128/36.
34A(O)C minutes,24 October 1962, CAB 130/189.
 135

Rhodesia (which became Zambia) on 24 October 1964. With the break up of the

federation, Southern Rhodesia also demanded independence,although with no change in

its existing constitution,which effectively prevented majority rule. As the leader of the

'Rhodesian Front government (elected in 1962), Winston Field, was unpreparedto provide

adequate safeguards for the African majority, Macmillan,who feared the establishmentof

'a bloc of White power from the Cape to the Zambezi', refused to accept his demands.

The issue of independencefor Southern Rhodesia remained unresolved until Ian Smith,

Field's successor, announced a unilateral declaration of independencein November 1965.

Whitehall agreed that it was highly unlikely that the racial policies pursued by South

Africa would change in the foreseeable future: in consequence, Pretoria's relations with

other African states and the rest of the developing world would be characterisedby

'increasing bitterness'. The South African government's plans for the resettlementof the

native population, the A(O)C paper argued, would mean that Africans had 'less chance

and less desire to rise against their white masters'; accordingly, the A(O)C concurred that

South Africa would move into 'deeper and deeper' Isolationismover the next ten years.

Nevertheless,the officials' paper predicted that South Africa would remain a member of

the Commonwealthfor the remainder of the decade, though Pretoria's policies of racial

separation might debar her future membershipfrom the United Nations.

Fulfilling an important aspect of its remit, the A(O)C identified a number of common

Western interests in Africa, which can be summarised as the maintenanceof peace and

stability, the promotion of economic prosperity, and the exclusion, so far as possible, of

Soviet Communism. Except in extreme cases, it was considered unlikely that Britain

would 'wish' to deploy troops, solely for purposes of internal security, in any of its former

colonies, after they had achieved self-governmentwithin the Commonwealth. In the wider

context of pan-global strategy, Africa was important to Britain for two principal reasons.

36'Africa:The Next Ten Years', June 1959, FO

371/173972.
 136

Firstly, UK military facilities in East Africa increased Britain's ability to use armed force in

South Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Adopting a stronger position than that taken by

C. W. Wright at the first meeting of the A(O)C, Trend's final paper argued that logistical

considerations required the UK to maintain elements of the strategic reserve in Kenya to

reinforce forces stationed in the Persian Gulf and Aden, adding that it would also be

advantageousto retain the use of the naval facilities in Mombassa. Secondly, Britain

required the ability to reinforce the defence of South-East Asia by the 'eastabout' route

from the UK; this would be impossiblewithout the use of over-flying and staging rights in

Africa, since the only available aircraft, over the next ten years, would have ranges

requiring the use of Kano in Nigeria and either Entebbe in Uganda or Nairobi in Kenya.

However, if it were decided that it was no longer necessary to support Britain's oil interests

by military force, or reinforce the defence of South-East Asia from Africa or the UK,

Africa's importance in relation to global strategy would require re-assessment.

Consequently,over the next ten years, Britain might find it 'expedient' to 'modify' its

strategic role in Africa, either in response to mounting nationalist pressure or as a

consequence of a re-appraisal of the benefits derived from defending the Middle East and

South-East Asia by military means36

The A(O)C agreed that Britain had a vested interest in meeting requests for substantial

economic assistance to newly independentAfrican states, but cautioned that it might be

necessary to limit aid in accordance with the capacity of states to absorb capital. The

Treasury favoured an 'international approach' to aid distribution, involving a variety of

multilateral bodies, namely the International Bank, the International Finance Corporation,

the United Nations Special Fund and the International DevelopmentAssociation. Treasury

officials believed that an 'international approach' would enable greater 'flexibility' In

expenditure. As Frederick Vinter told Clarke: 'It would mean on the one hand [Britain]
36 ibid
 137

would not have to be quite so nervous about additional commitments,and on the other,

one would not have to niggle quite so much about emergenciesas they arose'37

Moreover, multilateralaid was deemed more acceptable by African nations than bilateral

assistance, and viewed as advantageousto the West in the wider context of the Cold War.

Even so, internationalorganisationswould be incapable of addressingthis problem in

isolation, and it would be necessaryto try and convince the United States, West Germany

and other industrialisedcountries to do substantiallymore in the sphere of African

economic development.38

Despite being the product of inter-departmentaldebate, 'Africa: the Next Ten Years' very

much reflected the views of the 'overseas' departments, particularly the Foreign and

Commonwealth Relations Offices. Selwyn Lloyd told Macmillanthat it was a'most

interesting and instructive document', claiming that it was 'quite an achievement'to have a

report in which the views of the 'overseas' departments were 'so closely harmonised' -

Lloyd's comment, it should be noted, did not encompass the Treasury or the Board of

Trade, both of which also had representativeson the committee. Conversely,

Macmillan's Private Secretary with responsibilityfor Foreign Affairs, Philip de Zulueta,

criticised the document for'being permeated by the unimaginativespirit of a colonial

administration in decadence'. 0 If the conclusions of the paper were to be followed through

in practice, de Zulueta claimed, it would result in the adoption of the wrong policies, or, at

best, no policy at all. In a minute to Macmillan, he lamented the fact that the paper had

made no attempt to compare the progress and success of the colonial policies adopted by

other European powers. For example, he asked: Is the Congo system going, in the end,

to give better results than that in Portuguese East Africa? Why had the French managed

to produce a higher type of politician than Britain? De Zulueta believed it important to

" Vinter to Clarke, 19 July 1959,T 234/768

38'Africa:The Next Ten Years', June 1959, FO
371/173972.
39SelwynLloyd to Macmillan,28 June 1959, PREM
11/2587.
40De Zuluetato Macmillan,1 July 1959, PREM
11/2587.
 138

answer these questions, since Africa was 'one of the few parts of the world in which we

[Britain] still have the power to influence events'. In correspondencewith Lloyd, Macmillan

reiterated the arguments of de Zulueta, adding that problems relating to Africa would

become more importantto Britain over the next ten years. Macmillan instructedWhitehall

to consider how far Britain could co-ordinate its policies with those of the other colonial

powers, urging that officials give considerationto the success of the various colonial

approaches in developing an African political system capable of 'standing on its own two

feet and favourably disposed to the West'41 Alan Lennox-Boyd,Secretary of State for the

Colonies, feared that this might give an impression that the colonial powers were 'ganging

up', especially if Ghana and South Africa were excluded from such discussions. He was

also sceptical as to the potential for co-ordinating Britain's policies with those of the other

colonial powers. On 30 July 1959, in a letter to Macmillan, Lennox-Boydargued: 'It may or

may not be possible for us to coordinate our policies with those of other Colonial powers.

We should certainly exchange views freely. But I fear that it is fifty years too late for the

Metropolitanpowers to indulge in an exercise to adjust territorial boundaries'42 On this

issue, the Colonial Office's view prevailed, with talks between the colonial powers confined

to a few sub-ministerial discussions on matters of minor detail.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Derrick Heathcoat Amory, agreed with the general

thrust of Trend's paper, but hoped that officials would, in future discussions with other

countries, emphasise the 'desirability' of a 'genuinely international approach' to the

difficulties facing Africa, particularly with respect to aid and development. The Treasury

believed that African political advancement depended on economic development (and

vice-versa),and this should be achieved by channelling substantial investment into Africa

through international agencies. Heathcoat Amory, reflecting the dominant viewpoint in his

41Macmillanto Selwyn Lloyd, 3 July 1959, PREM 11/2587.

42LennoxBoyd to Macmillan,30 July 1959, PREM
11/2587.
 139

department, maintained that it should be possible 'to promote a sense of partnership

between black Africa and the West, which should be valuable in a political no less than in

an economic sense' 43

Britain and the Continuing Problem of Apartheid.

South Africa's apartheid policies severely compromised Britain's leading position in both

the Commonwealthand the United Nations. In December 1959, in an extensive minute to

Macmillan,the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, argued for

the need to confront a'sharp dilemma' between two conflicting UK interests in this regard.

On the one hand, Britain had a large economic and strategic 'stake' in maintaining close

relations with South Africa. (Moreover, South Africa could, if it wished, make 'life very

unpleasant' for the High CommissionTerritories - Basutoland, Bechuanaland,Swaziland.)

On the other hand, Britain's support of South Africa, in the UN and at Commonwealth

Prime Ministers' Conferences,was often construed by others as condoning apartheid,

leading to a diminution of Britain's reputation amongst many developing countries. 'The

goodwill and confidence of the emerging masses of Asia and Africa... ', Home advised

Macmillan, ' are of vital and increasing importance to us, and there is no doubt that
...
our support of South Africa tends to damage that confidence and raise doubts about the

sincerity of our political thinking, especially on race relations'. In an ever-expanding

Commonwealth,premised on multi-racial co-operation, the promulgation of extreme

policies of racial discrimination by a member state was becoming increasingly

unacceptable. Home argued that, in the battle against Communism for'men's minds in

the uncommittedcountries', South Africa was a 'liability' for the West, and Britain's

continued support for Pretoria would cost the UK'more and more'. Home believed that

43HeathcoatAmory to Macmillan,30 July 1959, PREM 11/2587.

 140

the consequentdamage to British prestige and influence was 'great', being most apparent

at the UN, where Britain was becoming 'increasingly exposed'. Washington had also

expressed disquiet about Britain's support for South Africa, intimating that this was

damaging to the West. This led Home to question how long Britain could add fuel to the

perception of supporting South Africa? On this important matter, Home urged Macmillan

to consider abstaining from resolutions relating to apartheid, recognisingthat whilst this

would not satisfy the main critics of South Africa, it would lessen Britain's exposure to
international condemnationand help ameliorate damage to its moral authority. Although

such a modification in Britain's voting practice would be bitterly resented by Pretoria,

Home believed that'sober argument' would remind South Africa that retaliation - for

example, by closing its market to UK exports - would serve to antagonise its 'only reliable

friend'. Home thought it unlikely that South Africa would leave the Commonwealthover

this issue, but suggested that Britain might be denied the use of naval facilities in

Simonstown,Capetown and Durban, which could assume strategic importance in the

event of a global conflict with the Soviet Union. As Britain's wider international interests

and its relations with the new African states (especially Nigeria) were likely to be of

increasing significance in the future, Home felt that the balance of advantage lay in altering

Britain's voting policy in the UN, leading him to conclude that the Commonwealthwould

'undoubtedly be happier and closer-knit were the ugly duckling out of the nest'.

Concurring with Home's proposition, Selwyn Lloyd informed Macmillan of the Foreign

Office's view on 2 January 1960:

We have, I believe, reached a stage in which, in the United Nations, more

harm is being done to our reputation as a Colonial Power by our attitude on
these South African items, than is done by any troubles that may occur in
the colonies themselves... When we join the few who vote with South

"'Policy Towards South Africa: The United Nations Items', Home Macmillan, December
to 17 1959, DO35/10621.
 141

Africa at the United Nations, we stand amongst the retrograde,and doubt

is thrown on the sincerity of our progressiveattitude.45

Less pre-occupiedthan the Foreign Office with how other nations viewed Britain's

'reputation', Treasury officials concentrated on how a revised British approach in the UN

might impact upon the status of sterling and London's position as one of the world's major

gold markets. On 5 January 1960, R. S. Symons, a senior official in the Treasury, argued

that it'would not be a disaster, from the point of view of South African gold production, if

Pretoria decided to leave the sterling area. Having consulted the Bank of England,

however, Symons also felt that 'presentationallythe departure of such an important

member could have far-reaching consequencesfor the cohesion of the Sterling Area and

the status of sterling'46 In general, Treasury officials did not believe that South Africa

would retaliate, to a changed British position in the UN, by reducing its sterling reserves.

To this extent the Treasury and Commonwealth Relations Office were agreed: Sir

Algernon Rumbold, Deputy Under-Secretaryof State for CommonwealthRelations,

described by his Permanent Under-Secretaryas the 'dominating influence in the Office' on

economic matters, suggested: 'I think that the South Africans tend to keep their politics

and economics, so far as possible, separate'47 Indeed, South Africa's departure from the

sterling area would not necessarily entail the withdrawal of large sterling balances, since

Pretoria held its reserves almost entirely in gold and dollars. On 26 February 1960, J. R.

A. Bottomley, another Deputy Under-Secretaryat the CRO, indicated that he was unsure if

a change in Britain's voting position in the UN would result in South Africa abandoning its

practice of selling the bulk of its gold on the London market: 'Membership of the Sterling

`'Policy Towards South Africa: The UN Items', SelwynLloyd Macmillan, January 1960, FO 3721145291.Added
to 2
emphasis.
'B Minuteby R. S. Symons,5 January 1960, T 236/4874.
"J. Gamer, The Commonwealth Office: 1925-68, (London:
Heinemann, 1978), p. 400. Minute by A. Rumbold, 1 March
1960, DO 35/10621.
 142

Area might well seem to South Africans to have a pro-British political flavour. he
. .',
argued, '... but this would not be true of the choice of gold markets'48

The Bank of Englandwas more concerned than the Treasury with respect to the

potential financial implicationsof South Africa's departure from the sterling area. M. H.

Parsons, a senior figure within the Bank of England, confirmed that South Africa regarded

sterling as their main currency of external settlement and that its Reserve Bank had held

reasonablysubstantial sterling balances over the greater part of the post-war period.

Whilst conceding that there had been periods when South Africa's sterling balances had

dwindled down to insignificantlevels, Parsons suggested that South Africa had tended to

hold certain dollar balances because of its post-war habit of borrowing on the New York

capital market, a practice stemming from its inability to meet its total requirementsfrom

London. There had also been occasions when South Africa had come to the direct

assistance of the Exchange EqualisationAccount by increased sales of gold for sterling. If

South Africa were to leave the sterling area, Parsons cautioned, it would tend to use other

currencies, rather than sterling, when purchasing goods from non-sterlingarea countries -

a developmentwhich had the potential to be costly to Britain in terms of exchange; In any

case, South Africa would probably cease to hold sterling in its reserves, which totalled

around £40 million in 1960. Reflecting the dominant viewpoint within the higher echelons

of the Bank of England, Parsons argued that the departure of South Africa from the

sterling area, involving the defection of the world's leading gold-producer,would be

regarded by the rest of the world as 'a major crack in the Sterling Area system'.49 Lord

Cobbold, Governor of the Bank of England, was anxious that the Chancellor should be

made aware of the 'Bank's strong view' on the serious psychological and political

ramifications of South Africa's removal from the sterling area -a viewpoint undoubtedly

48Minuteby J. R. A. Bottomley,26 February1960, DO

35/10621.
49Minuteby M. H. Parsons,7 January 1960, T
236/4873.
 143

influenced by the impact of Iraq's earlier withdrawal from the sterling area, which, although

not terminally damaging, had produced serious repercussionsfor sterling.50

Sir Frank Lee, (Joint) PermanentSecretary to the Treasury, believed that the Bank was

'much too alarmist' in implying that Home's proposed policy changes would result in South

Africa leaving the Commonwealthand the sterling area, but felt it right to inform the

Chancellor of the Exchequerof these concerns.51 Similarly, Sir Robert Hall, Head of the

Economic Section of the Treasury, believed that it was imperative for South Africa to

continue to sell its gold in order to purchase the imports necessaryto survive - Hall held

that the main issue for considerationshould be the impact on UK investments in South

Africa.52 On 17 February 1960, Heathcoat Amory told Macmillanthat 'the financial and

economic consequences might be very serious' for Britain, if Anglo-SouthAfrican relations

were allowed to deteriorate to the point where Pretoria considered leaving both the

Commonwealthand the sterling area. The Chancellor provided the Prime Minister with a

Treasury paper on this issue, written in consultation with the Bank of England, but

appended a covering note, which stated: 'I am not, of course, arguing against the line of

in
action the United Nations which the Commonwealth Secretary has 53
proposed'. Thus,

the Treasury did not whole-heartedlydefend the Bank of England's position within

Whitehall; it merely acted as a conduit for communicatingthe Bank's fears and

apprehensions.

An Economic Price Not Worth Paying: A Colombo-StylePlan for Africa.

At a time when Britain's relations with the Commonwealthwere overshadowed by the

South African question, Home felt that it would be advantageousto launch a `constructive

60Minute by Lord Cobbold,7 January 1960,T 236/4873.

61Minute by Lee, 18 January 1960,T 236/4873.
62Minuteby Hall, 19 January 1960,T 236/4873.
53HeathcoatAmory to Macmillan,17 February1960, T 236/4873.
 144

and positive action in relation to Africa in a non-political field'. This led him to propose the

establishmentof a CommonwealthPlan' for the giving and receipt of aid to under-

developed countries in Africa; this would be analogous to the Colombo Plan, but restricted

to Commonwealthcountries, both as recipients and 54

donors. All the territories in Africa

would be members, some as beneficiaries, some as contributors,with all independent

Commonwealthcountries outside Africa being invited to take part. Like the Colombo Plan,

recipients would be free to make their own bilateral arrangementsfor technical and other

aid, with a small central Bureau providing administrativesupport and publicity. Home

argued that the scheme had several advantages:firstly, as emergent Commonwealth

countries in Africa were dependent on considerable quantities of aid and technical

assistance, a greater contribution from countries such as Australia, Canada and New

Zealand would reduce the pressure on overseas expenditure; secondly, such an approach

was consistent with the Montreal principle of mutual help between Commonwealth

thirdly,
countries55; newly independent countries often encountered 'psychological and

political difficulties' in obtaining aid solely from the UK, with assistance being more

acceptable 'under a Commonwealthlabel'; and, finally, Home posited that the British

56
public would welcome such a policy.

Nevertheless,the proposed scheme suffered from a number of innate defects: for

example, it would be difficult to get Australia and New Zealand, both pre-occupiedwith the

affairs of South-East Asia, to participate in the provision of an aid programme for Africa;

among the Asian Commonwealthcountries, the majority of which were also economically

deprived, CRO officials predicted that only India would be able to participate in such an

6' The ColomboPlan was created in a cooperativeattemptto strengthenthe economicand social developmentof the
nations of South-EastAsia and the Pacific. Officiallythe Colombo Plan for CooperativeEconomicDevelopmentin Asia and
the Pacific,it came into force in 1951 as the ColomboPlan for CooperativeEconomicDevelopmentin South and Southeast
Asia. It is still In existencetoday.
65In September 1958, Canada held a Commonwealth Trade
and Economic Conference in Montreal, where important
measures of Commonwealth cooperation were agreed, including an agreement in principle to construct a Commonwealth
cable system, and, of greatest significance, a decision to fund a comprehensive system of scholarships for Commonwealth
students.
"'A CommonwealthColombo-typeEconomicPlan for Africa':
minute by Lord Home, 3 May 1960, DO 35/8378.
 145

enterprise;the scheme might also be viewed as a 'piece of window dressing', which could

lead to a devaluationof the Colombo Plan itself. The Treasury, fearful that such a scheme

would put the UK under pressure to subvent another aid programme,quickly endorsed the

perceived difficultieswith the proposals. Indeed, Treasury intransigenceon this issue led

some figures in the CRO to question the wisdom of the entire plan: Sir Henry Linlott,

Deputy Under-Secretaryof State to the CRO, who like Rumbold took an interest in

economic matters, suggested that it might make sense to shelve the scheme, given that

the department already had 'a number of expensive proposals ' which it had ' to
... ..,
get through the Chancellor of the Exchequer' 5.7What is more, South Africa's role in such

a scheme was particularly problematic, given that Nigeria and Ghana would in all

likelihood reject South African aid as a matter of principle. Heathcoat-Amorybelieved that

the membership of South Africa would be an 'embarrassment' and act as a 'disincentive'

to other members. He feared that Britain would be put under pressure to increase the

'very large sums' which it was already contributing to African development, expressing

concern about the potentially detrimental impact of such expenditure on the balance of

payments, suggesting that there was 'no advantage - and obvious disadvantage - in

creating yet another new institution for development'. Reflecting the Treasury's objection

to committing to schemes that had not been fully costed, Heathcoat Amory suggested that

Britain (as well as the supposed beneficiaries)would suffer if, as a result of the new Plan,

other institutions felt that they were now no longer under so strong or immediate an

obligation to provide aid to Africa. If implemented, Heathcoat Amory thought that Home's

scheme would end in catastrophe -'an undignified and discreditable "flop"'.58

Expressing concerns held within the Foreign Office, with respect to setting up a new

organisation to disburse Britain's limited resources, Selwyn Lloyd informed Macmillan that

51Linlottto Clutterbuck,21 April 1960, DO 3518378.

5aHeathcoatAmory to Macmillan,4 May 1960, DO
35/8378.
 146

he was 'not very happy about Lord Home's proposal'. Whilst conceding that Home's plan

might underlinethe value of the Commonwealthto the newly independentcountries in

Africa, Lloyd felt that such a scheme would be liable to bring the organisation into

'disrepute and make it appear as an instrument of "neo-colonialism"'. The Commonwealth

had, in Lloyd's opinion, remained remarkably untainted from such accusations, believing

that the 'intangible nature' of the organisation was essential to its future survival in Africa.

The Foreign Office questionedwhether it was necessary to give up on the aspiration of

shifting the emphasis from bilateral aid provision towards developing 'genuine' multilateral

approaches, involving countries other than those who were members of the

Commonwealth:for example, the possibility for expanding the role of the Foundationof

Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA) -a 'promising organisation' in

Lloyd's view - might be impaired by the establishment of a separate Commonwealth

body.59

The opposition of the Treasury and Foreign Office to Home's proposal led to its

abandonment,although the documentary evidence confirms that the CRO had considered

such an outcome a distinct possibilityfrom the outset. The CRO had largely accepted the

arguments advanced by the two 'lead' departments in foreign policy, as is confirmed in a

note by J. R. A. Bottomley to Home, which established three points: Britain could not

afford increased capital aid; no other Commonwealthcountry could afford to make the

required increase in expenditure; and a scheme that produced no new resources would be

wasteful and could cause resentment.60 Unexpectedly,this issue re-emerged at the 1960

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, when Nkrumah advanced a similar proposal,

which gained the general support of African nations. On 6 May 1960, when cabinet

ministers considered this matter in some detail, Home expressed doubts as to whether the

59Selwyn Uoyd o Macmillan, 5 May 1960, DO 35/8378.

60Bottomley to Home, 21 July 1960, DO 35/8378.
 147

resources requiredfor the scheme, even on a relatively modest scale, could be made

available from within the Commonwealthalone. Similarly, HeathcoatAmory maintained

that it would be impossiblefor Britain to increase economic aid to Africa beyond the £26

million per annum already committed. Within the limit of available resourcesto the

Commonwealth,the cabinet agreed that it was unlikely that a Colombo-stylePlan could be

successfullyadopted and that it would be preferable to encouragethe International Bank

of Reconstructionand Developmentto extend its activities in African countries61

The Ramificationsof South Africa's Departure from the Commonwealth.

During the early 1960s, South Africa's membership of the Commonwealthcame under

increasing criticism from developing nations in Africa and Asia, it being commonly held

that Pretoria's apartheid policies stood for the denial of the very principles of individual

liberty and racial equality on which the organisation was based. Sir Abubakar Tafawa

Balewa, Prime Minister of Nigeria, believed that the Commonwealthwould be

strengthened in the eyes of the world by the expulsion of South Africa. 2 Similarly, Tunku

Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaya, was 'passionately opposed' to the South African

policy of apartheid, although he did not think that it was for Malaya, as a newcomer to the

Commonwealth,to take the lead In expelling a founder-member.63 Despite such hostility,

Conservative ministers supported South Africa's continued membership of the

Commonwealth. On 1 May 1961, Sandys met a deputation of Labour MPs (including

David Marquand and George Thomson), in advance of a Commonwealth Prime Ministers'

Conference, later that month. Whilst accepting that South Africa was a 'liability' and its

'continued presence in the Commonwealth damaged the "Commonwealthimage" in the

°' CabinetMinutes,6 May 1960, CAB 128/34.

62iNoteof Talk Betweenthe Prime Minister Nigeria
of and the CommonwealthSecretary'(Sandysto Macmillan),5 October
1960, Sandyspapers (ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)DSND 8/8.
63Sandysto Macmillan,18 October 1960, Sandys
papers (ChurchillCollege, Cambridge)DSND8/8.
 148

world', Sandys contended that it would be misguided to seek expulsion, since, if the non-

Europeans in South Africa were able to vote on the matter they would support remaining in

the Commonwealth. In any case, Sandys maintained, it was 'fortuitous' that an

opportunity might arise for expelling South Africa from the Commonwealthduring 1961.

This opportunity arose because of South Africa's proposed change of status from a

monarchy to republic - in itself, Sandys argued, this would certainly not justify the ejection

of South Africa. If members of the Commonwealthstarted judging other members on

moral grounds, Sandys insisted, there was no saying where the process might end:

'Several other members would not get a "clean bill of health" for their present standing in

relation to human rights' 64

On 15 March 1961, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth,when it failed to win

re-admissionto the organisation as a republic. Just two days earlier, Macmillan had tried

to rectify the damage caused by Verwoerd's indomitable defence of apartheid at the first

meeting of the CommonwealthPrime Ministers' Conference, when he suggested that

South Africa make the 'gesture' of exchanging High Commissionerswith other

Commonwealthcountries. 5 Verwoerd considered this an unwarranted intrusion on

Macmillan's part, maintainingthat he would not make a friendly approach to countries

(such as Ghana, Nigeria, Malaya and Tanganyika) which actively sought to undermine

South Africa's international standing. South Africa's reputation as the 'ugly duckling in the

nest' was confirmed the next day when Canada and Ceylon adopted an even more robust

stance against South African intransigence. The Prime Minister of Canada,

J. G. Diefenbaker, bluntly asserted: 'There was no doubt that to accept South Africa's

request [for membership of the Commonwealth,as a republic] would be construed as

approval of, or at least acquiescence in, South Africa's racial policy. This could not but

`'Relationship of the Republicof South Africa

with the Commonwealth: Note of a Meetingheld in the Secretaryof State's
Room', 1 March 1961, Sandys papers (ChurchillCollege, Cambridge)DSND 8/18.
85Macmillan to Verwoerd, 13 March 1961, PREM
11/3535.
 149

damage the future of the Commonwealthassociation and assist Communist propaganda

in Africa and elsewhere'. 6 With the notable exception of Britain and South Africa itself,

this viewpoint had a strong resonancewith other Commonwealthcountries. Finding

himself unable to compromiseon the issue of apartheid, Verwoerd announced that South

Africa would immediatelyleave the Commonwealth. Britain's inability to reconcile the

fundamental differencesbetween South Africa and the rest of the organisation illustrated

the frailty of Britain's supposed position of primus inter pares in the Commonwealth,and

representeda major policy failure in the eyes of British officials. In the immediate

aftermath of South Africa's departure, Home wrote a short note to Macmillan, in which the

former attempted to exonerate (with some degree of justification) the latter of any blame:

This is a very sad day for you & all of us but I don't see how with emotion
overcomingreason it was possible to get a different result. Certainly you
must not reproach yourself as you did everythingwhich was humanely
possible to keep South Africa ins7

On 15 March, Macmillan held a meeting in his room in the House of Commons, with the

Home Secretary, R. A. Butler, and the Chief Whip, Martin Redmayne,where they

discussed the potential ramificationsof South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth.

Macmillan informed his colleagues that he believed he could have gained unanimous

support for his paper, which proposed the continued membership of South Africa whilst

also recording the detestation of all other Commonwealthcountries to apartheid, but felt

that this might precipitate the fall from power of Abubakar, a developmentthat would have

very serious repercussionsfor the future of Nigeria. Even if Abubakar 'survived' giving his

tacit support of a document accepting South Africa's continued membership, Macmillan

thought that he would be compelled to put down a formal motion calling for formal

" Minutesof the Sixth Meetingof 1961 Commonwealth

Prime Ministers'Conference,13 March 1961, CAB 133/251.
67Hometo Macmillan,15 March 1961, PREM 11/3535.
 150

expulsionat the next CommonwealthPrime Ministers' Conference. In the subsequent

vote on South Africa's continued membership, Britain (possibly with the support of

Australia and New Zealand) would be isolated in 8

voting against such a motion. Thus,

any attempt on Britain's part to keep South Africa in the Commonwealthwould be ill-fated -

an act of postponingthe inevitable.

In late June and early August 1961, officials and ministers conducted detailed

discussions on South Africa's immediate and future relations with Britain. On 29 June,

cabinet ministers agreed that 'it would be important to avoid giving the impression that

after her withdrawal South Africa was to remain a member of the Commonwealth in all but

name'. 9 Harold Watkinson, Minister for Defence, informed the cabinet that he believed

Britain should continue to supply South Africa with military arms and equipment, subject to

the usual international procedures. In return, the Simonstown Agreements, which

preserved British control of the Cape sea routes, would be maintained. 70 Concerned about

the possible reaction of other Commonwealth countries, Sandys told Macmillan that time

was needed for Britain's relations with South Africa to 'settle down', considering it

necessary to 'avoid giving a handle of this kind to our critics'. 71 On 3 August, the cabinet

considered a memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, on future Anglo-South

African relations, a document prepared in large part by the Africa (Official) Committee.

The A(O)C suggested that Britain should 'avoid continuing to give South Africa the

"Commonwealth treatment" unless it was clearly in our [Britain's] interests to do so'. In

order to safeguard Britain's substantial financial and economic interests in South Africa -

and to keep Pretoria within the sterling area - Kilmuir recommended that policy be aimed

"'SouthAfrica's
Departure
fromtheCommonwealth':
Minutes
of Meeting ButlerandM.Redmayne,
Macmillan,
between 15
March1961,PREM11/3535.
" Added Emphasis.
70Cabinet Minutes,29 June 1961, CAB 128/35/1.
" Sandysto Macmillan,22 June 1961, Sandys
papers (ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)DSND 8/9.
 151

at maintaining 'present trade relations as nearly as possible unchanged'. The cabinet was

in general agreementwith Kilmuir's recommendations.72

British Policy TowardsSub-SaharanAfrica: The View of the 'Overseas' Departments.

The rapid turn of events in Africa forced policy-makers to re-assess the policy course

outlined in 'Africa: The Next Ten Years'. To this end, in August 1961, the Foreign Office,

Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office produced an inter-departmental

paper, entitled 'Policy Towards Africa South of the Sahara'. Whilst this paper cannot be

viewed as constituting the 'official' policy of the three departments, since it was not read

(and, therefore, not approved) by Home and MacLeod, it does provide an instructive

insight into the thinking of the 'overseas' departments, illustrating their adeptness at

forging a common position prior to discussions with the Treasury. The paper argued that

the strategic importance of Africa lay in its 'political fluidity' at a time when the rest of the

world had assumed reasonably firm positions in the East-West struggle. Accordingly, the

principal objectives of Western policy in Africa were twofold: firstly, securing stability and

growing prosperity; and, secondly, encouraging support towards the West, or at least,

'genuine neutrality'. The paper identified pan-Africanism, which possessed a strong

emotional appeal, as a potential counter-force to the problem of instability. 73 Some

months later, Sandys revisited this issue, at his own behest, asking his senior ministers

and officials whether pan-Africanism was hostile to Britain's interests, and whether it was

necessary to oppose it. When Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, Minister of State at the CRO,

confirmed that it was not, Sandys replied that there might be something to be said for an

'ZCabinet Minutes,
3 August1961,CAB128/35/2.
''Policy TowardsAfrica South of the Sahara': ForeignOffice, CRO and ColonialOffice officials' paper, August 1961, DO
168/60.
 152

initiative on these lines.74 Even so, cordial relations between Africa and the West would be

undermined by several interrelatedfactors: namely, indigenous dislike of colonialism and

racial discrimination,African fears of continued economic exploitation by Western

governments,and widespread resentment of foreign bases located in Africa. As a

consequenceof the Europeancolonial powers' record in Africa, the officials' paper

maintainedthat the West was judged by'harsher standards' than the Soviet Union,

although the 'overseas' departmentsconcurred that Africans were 'not blind to the threat

of Communist imperialism': for example, at the All-African Peoples' Conference in 1958,

Nkrumah declared: 'imperialism may come to us yet in a different guise - not necessarily

from Europe'. Conversely, as a result of their'colour and own poverty and under-

industrialisation',officials believed China's policies towards Africa were guided by the fact

that their presence was more acceptable to indigenous peoples than either the West or the

Soviet Union. Whilst there was some evidence to support this belief, officials believed that

China was handicappedby factors such as physical remoteness, inexperience, language

difficulties and a shortage of foreign exchange.75

As African leaders were 'exaggeratedly conscious' of the threat of neo-colonialismand

were on the 'lookout for any political content' in Western aid, officials suggested that there

were considerable limitations associated with the use of multilateral organisations. On the

whole, resources expended by the West on technical assistance (which the UK was

particularly well placed to provide) were deemed more advantageousthan economic aid.

In this field, as in aid generally, Britain would need to encourage other Western countries,

not 'handicapped by colonial histories', to direct their efforts to where it would have the

greatest impact. The fear of Western aid being portrayed as 'neo-colonialist' was a

constant theme in Foreign Office thinking, with one official exclaiming: 'The extension of
''Africa
- General Policy Questions: Recordof a MeetingIn the Secretaryof State's Room', 16 April 1962, Sandyspapers
ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)DSND 8/19.
5'Policy Towards Africa South
of the Sahara': Foreign Office, CRO and Colonial office officials' paper, August 1961, DO
168/60.
 153

aid by a recipient is often taken for granted by the recipient or recognised only as what is

due. Aid is in any case available from several sources often in competitionwith each

other... Thus, the effectivenessof aid may depend more on the skill with which it is

directed than its volume'.76 The officials' paper also suggested that detailed study be

given to the advantagesof 'spot treatment', in which technical aid was applied to those

countries where it would be most effective. Aid, it was argued, was particularlyvaluable

when devoted to the development of national administrationsand social "

infrastructure.

The retention of overflying rights in African countries was seen as essential to the

maintenance of Britain's 'position in the rest of the world'. Even so, Africa south of the

Sahara was not considered an area of 'prime strategic importance', in the same sense as

the Middle East or South-EastAsia. What mattered in Africa, in a geo-political sense, was

preventing the spread of Communism,at a time when Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia

had frozen into fixed attitudes in relation to the Cold War. The loss of Africa to

Communismwould present nothing like so immediate a threat to the West as the loss of

say France and Germany; however, the latter two could only be lost to the West as the

result of a'cataclysm', whereas African countries could drift into the Communist camp in

the absence of violent disturbance. It was for this reason that Africa was significant to the

West and why officials in the 'overseas' departments called 'for an effort from us [Britain

and the West] quite disproportionateto its intrinsic importance'.78

The 'overseas' departments believed that the Commonwealthcould act as a "third force"

in international affairs, softening the stark, and often uncomfortable,choice between East

and West. It was argued that the Commonwealthacted as a bridge between 'neutralists'

and 'imperialists', a connection that'the Communistswould dearly like to see destroyed'.

The officials' paper recommendedthat UK policy should attempt to preserve its existing

7eMaynardto Warner, 13 April 1962, FO371/166997.

"'Policy Towards Africa South the Sahara': ForeignOffice,
of CRO and ColonialOffice officials' paper, August 1961, DO
168/60.
78ibid.

.ý
 154

cultural, educationaland commercialties with Africa. In maintaining such links with the

West, it was essential that Western policy disengaged itself, as far as possible, from

internal African affairs. The Commonwealthand the grouping of former French colonies

were considered essentialto the future stability of Africa as a whole. Speculating on how

future events might develop, the officials' paper asserted: 'Moderate African Powers such

as Nigeria, Tanganyika and Senegal, working closely in association with each other and

with the former metropolitanpower, could act as a stabilising force in the 79

continent'.

The bulk of UK aid to African countries (over £30 million in 1959-60)was allocated on a

bilateral basis to dependent and formerly dependent territories. Interestingly,the officials'

paper accepted the Treasury's central argument on the need to reduce overseas

expenditure, concluding that the underlying weakness of the British economy lessened the

possibility for increasing expenditureon aid: 'In our present balance of payment difficulties

we ourselves cannot hope to make further substantial increases In our aid to Africa, nor to

alter its pattern. We must face the consequencesof this: they might well be serious'.

Multilateral aid to Africa took various forms: capital aid through the World Bank and

International DevelopmentAgency; technical assistance through the UN and several other

specialised agencies; and bodies specifically concerned with Africa such as the Special

CommonwealthAfrican Assistance Plan. It was essential for the standing of the West that

a few countries, namely Nigeria, Senegal and Tanganyika, should prosper and be seen to

prosper:

Though we shall have to be careful not to damage particular countries by

obviously favouring them and creating Governments as vulnerable as was

the Nuri regime in Iraq, we should do what we can to build up certain pro-
Western countries into positions where they can take the lead economically

and politically.

79ibid.
 155

The traditional pattern of aid - from the former colonial powers to their colonies - could not

be broken, at least without adverse political consequences,though officials agreed that

West Germany, Sweden, Switzerlandand Japan should do more in the field of economic

assistance to Africa80

Senior officials in the 'overseas' departmentswere united in the belief that Britain should

be 'energetic' in dissociating itself from the policies of Portugal and South Africa; similarly,

the support of these countries for Britain's policies had become 'more of an

embarrassmentthan an asset'. This did not mean that officials in the 'overseas'

departmentswere in favour of adopting a policy of outright opposition to Britain's

recalcitrant allies, but it did mean that they were prepared to withdraw support on certain

issues. In consequence,it was recommendedthat each issue should be considered on its

own merits, with 'non-involvement'acting as the guiding principle in dealings with the two

countries. Officials also believed that the United States would press for the urgent ending

of colonialism, largely in order to curry favour with emerging African states.81

Assessing the `Balanceof Advantage' between South Africa and CommonwealthAfrica.

Difficulties in diplomatic relations with Pretoria led the Defence and Overseas Policy

(Official) Committee (DOP(O)C) to invite Michael Cary, Chairman of the Official Overseas

Co-ordinating Committee (OOCC), to arrange the preparation of papers on South Africa.

Cary's committee was asked to answer the following question: 'In the developing conflict

between the Government of South Africa on the one hand and Black Africa and the rest of

the world on the other, where does the balance of our interests lie and how can we best

minimise damage to them?' Cary suggested that the ideal solution would involve a

80ibid.
8' ibid.
 156

peaceful transition towards a representativeform of government in South Africa; however,

as such a prospect was remote, he argued that Britain would be under increasing pressure

to declare a position in favour of either South Africa or 'Black' Africa.82

For the purposes of assessingthe relevant arguments, Cary's committee considered

whether it would be advantageousfor Britain to come down firmly on either the side of

South Africa or'Black' Africa. Cary did not attempt to draw up a detailed political balance

sheet, but rather set out a number of general considerations. Under existing tensions,

Cary argued, Britain's policies already diverged from those of the United States and the

'old' Commonwealth(and from many of the former colonial powers). Consequently,

African nationalist opinion increasinglysaw Britain as the main obstacle to the effective

application of pressure on South Africa, leading Cary's committee to the conclusion: 'It is

at least arguable that in the long term our political relations with the independentstates of

Black Africa are more importantthan those with South Africa'. Whilst the Western powers

retained a'substantial margin of advantage' in the competition for influence with the

Communist powers, Cary considered it'illusoy to ignore the opportunitiesopen to the

Soviet Union 'if the West failed to take sufficient account of the views of Black Africa in

determining our policies on South Africa'. The most important potential British asset in

Black Africa ', Cary's OOCC paper asserted, ' is the complex of special
... ...
relationships with African Commonwealthcountries'.83

Between 1958 and 1962, Britain's exports to South Africa were worth approximately

£150 million per annum, although this figure rose sharply to £200 million in 1963.

Moreover, the UK had a favourable balance on invisible trade with South Africa, valued at

around £80 million per annum, including an investment income of some £60 million (a

figure which included shipping, but excluding insurance and oil). Between 1958 and 1962,

82'SouthAfrica': OCCC memorandumfor DOP(O)Cby A. L. M. Cary, 18 March 1963, CAB 148/3.

83 ibid.
 157

Britain's exports to the rest of Africa averaged £315 million per year of which £220 million

went to Commonwealthcountries. In 1963, Britain's exports to Commonwealthcountries

in Africa fell to around £200 million, although a substantial proportion of this figure,

perhaps as much as one-fifth, was financed out of British government aid. As a result of

Britain's importanceto African states as a market (and as a source of private Investment),

Cary argued that sheer self-interestwould debar African governmentsfrom imposing

economic sanctions or boycotting UK goods because of British policy towards South

Africa. The CRO thought it necessaryto explain this to other Commonwealthcountries,

with Sandys and his senior officials agreeing that the 'best defence of the British position

was that trade was the very basis of Britain's existence, that we were a nation of traders,

and that to go in for trade boycotts would have a disastrous impact on Britain's economy

and on the position of sterling'TM Experiencedemonstrated that short of direct

interference,trade was 'fairly insensitive to political emotion', though it was possible that

'mass emotion' would oblige African governments to impose'some form of economic

sanction' against British exports. It was difficult, therefore, to exclude the possibility of

collective sanctions being imposed by some African Commonwealthnations in the 'heat of

the moment'. By the same token, it was unlikely that South Africa would take action

against UK trade or investment, except possibly under circumstancesof 'considerable

provocation'; hence, an embargo on the export of arms would be unlikely to produce

reprisals by way of interference with trade. However, if other countries, such as France,

failed to participate in such an embargo, South African orders (not only for military

equipment) might be diverted to French companies. The imposition of full economic

sanctions, banning trade both ways, might well produce retaliatory action In other fields
-
for example, in the High Commission Territories or by the seizure of British assets. If

°` 'Africa General Policy Questions: Record

- of a Meeting in the Secretaryof State's Room', 16 April 1962, Sandyspapers
(ChurchillCollege,Cambridge)DSND 8/19.
 158

South Africa were to take action against Britain, Cary maintained that it would be likely to

do so more efficiently than the many disparate countries of CommonwealthAfrica.85

TABLE 3:1. UK EconomicRelations with Africa, 1959-1962.

British Exports
£ million

1959 1960 1961 1962 Average

1959-
1962
Nigeria 72 80 77 63
Ghana 42 45 50 37
Sierra Leone 9 10 14 11
East Africa (1) 43 45 45 43
Federation of 49 46 48 41
Rhodesiaand
Nyasaland
Commonwealth 215 226 234 195 218
Other South of 32 33 33 37 34
Sahara (2)
Africa South of the 248 259 267 233 252
Sahara
North Africa (3) 51 66 68 75 65
Total 299 325 335 308 317
South Africa 150 155 151 148 151

(1) Kenya, Uganda,Tanganyika.

(2) All foreign countries South of Sahara, High Commissionterritories and Gambia. Does not include Rwanda,
Burundi or Spanish Guinea.
(3) Morocco,Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania,Egypt, Sudan Ethiopia, Somalia.

Importantly, South Africa produced over £300 million of gold a year, which constituted

approximatelytwo-thirds of the free world's annual gold production. Gold represented a

significant item in relation to South Africa's balance of payments, accounting for

approximately40 per cent of its current earnings in 1963. An interruption in this supply

would put the market price of gold under severe pressure, potentially undermining both the

dollar and the pound. Cary believed that South Africa would only withhold gold from the

international market if Britain and the United States applied exacting economic sanctions.

What is more, in the event of severe economic sanctions being applied, it would be difficult

to prevent South Africa from flying gold to Switzerland (which was not a member of the UN

85'SouthAfrica': OCCC memorandumfor DOP(O)Cby

A. L. M. Cary, 18 March 1963, CAB 148/3
 159

and unlikely to participate in sanctions),where the gold could be remelted, lose its South

African identity, and sold elsewherein the world. The immediate consequencesof a steep

reduction in the normal year's supply of £300 million of new South African gold would be

less damaging to South Africa than to the West as a whole. New production from other

sources, including Russia (E200million) would be insufficient to meet industrial and

hoarding demands at the required levels (up to £400 million). This would almost certainly

put the market price of gold under severe pressure, forcing the United States and Britain to

choose between three policy options. Firstly, it would be possible to allow the market price

of gold to rise indefinitely above the monetary price, although this would generally be

regarded as a first step to raising the monetary price, potentially stimulating heavy

speculation against both the dollar and the pound. Secondly, the West could allow an

immediate and substantial rise in the official monetary price of gold; however, President

Kennedy had repeatedly pledged not to allow this to happen, and it might cast doubt on

the future of the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies - the chief beneficiaries, in such

an event, would be South Africa and the Soviet Union. Finally, it might be possible for

Western governments to organise a collaborative defence of the gold price by pledging

themselves not only to take in more dollars (perhaps much more) but also to sell some of

their gold reserves. The combined gold holdings of the leading Western nations could

swamp even large-scale speculation, but the success of the co-operative defence of the

gold price would depend on political solidarity on the issue of South Africa. Provided all

the main countries acted in concert, the loss of South African gold would be manageable

for a period; conversely, any breach in political solidarity would result in 'a very serious

situation'. In these circumstances, the combined available Anglo-American resources,

including assistance through the IMF, might prove insufficient in supporting the two major

reserve currencies of the Western world.86

° ibid.
 160

Given the inherent difficulties in forecasting whether South Africa or'Black' Africa would

provide the better trading terms or the safer areas for investment (in both the short and

longer term), Cary asserted that strategic and political factors would be decisive in

determiningfuture UK policy. In the absence of British territory overseas, UK world-wide

strategy depended on the provision of facilities by others; whilst the denial of facilities by

one nation could usually be compensatedby recourse to another, this would not always be

the case. Although Britain no longer sought any contribution from Pretoria to Western

defence, Cary argued that the loss of UK facilities in South Africa would reduce flexibility in

the choice of routes for sea and air operations. South African co-operation, at least to the

extent of endowing Britain with overflying rights, was essential to UK military reinforcement

of Basutoland and, unless Portugal offered access through Mozambique,for Swaziland.

Similarly, the loss of UK naval facilities in South Africa would reduce Britain's ability to deal

with any maritime threat that might develop - for example, the onset of hostile Soviet naval

activity in the South Atlantic or the establishmentof a Soviet satellite state in Africa with

significant naval facilities. Therefore, the maintenance of South African co-operation on

the lines of the Simonstown Agreements (docking, refuelling and communications

facilities), in addition to the retention of overflying and staging arrangements,would remain

important to achieving UK military objectives. Against the prevailing strategic context,

however, Cary classified Britain's defence facilities in South Africa as 'important rather

than essential'. 7

The principal strategic air route to the Middle and Far East was dependent on the

goodwill of Libya and the Sudan. As a result of outstanding UK responsibilitiestowards

the High CommissionTerritories and in Central Africa, these facilities were classified as

'essential military requirements', as were the staging and overflying facilities for military

87Ibid.
 161

aircraft in East Africa. Cary emphasisedthe importance of paying due cognisanceto such

strategic assets when consideringpolicy towards South Africa:

If we appear to the Black Africans to lean too far towards preferring

defence relations with South Africa we might well endanger our defence
facilities in Black Africa. On the other hand we cannot tell for how long we

shall in any case be able to retain these facilities, although a lessening of

tension over South Africa would obviously make it easier to do so.

Cary accepted that Britain's attitude to South Africa might turn out to be 'irrelevant' in

regard to the retention of defence facilities in 'Black' Africa, but this conclusion did not lead

him to recommendgreater support for Pretoria, since increased cooperation might 'lose us

[Britain] at once rather than later facilities which are now essential to us and which cannot

in the short term be replaced'. For the UK to come down firmly in support of either South

Africa or'Black Africa' represented,in Cary's opinion, 'extreme courses'. Cary advanced

the view that the'immediate problem' facing policy-makerswas to maintain a compromise

position that would limit pressure from both sides. Britain's objective should be to'buy

time, to keep the temperature down and to avoid so far as possible the damage to our

interests which must follow open support for one side or the other'. As international

pressure on South Africa intensified, however, Britain's position would become

increasingly precarious.88 This sentiment was similar to that of Sir John Maud, British

Ambassador and High Commissionerto South Africa, who in his valedictory despatch,

which was circulated to the cabinet by Home, argued: 'It will become increasingly difficult

to continue treating South Africa as half-ally and half-untouchable;we shall have more

difficult choices to make between our conflicting interests in keeping on terms with the

regime on the one hand and avoiding outrage to black African opinion on the other89

°BIbid.
"'South Africa': Cabinetmemorandumby Home,
19 June 1963, CAB 129/114
 162

The cabinet re-visitedthe issue of UK policy towards South Africa on 11 July 1963, since

it was highly likely that resolutions,calling for South Africa's expulsion from the UN and the

application of full economic sanctions,would shortly be moved in the Security Council.

Home, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed his colleagues that the United

States had 'indicated' its preparednessto vote against these resolutions, thus meaning

that both could be defeated without the use of the veto. However, the countries opposed

to South Africa would then put forward an alternative resolution, proposing a total arms

embargo. The United States was not committed to opposing such an embargo, although

they would be prepared to join the UK in sponsoring a more moderate resolution,

distinguishing between arms for external defence and arms for repressing 'internal

disorder'90 On 31 July 1963, Sir Burke Trend, in a briefing note to Macmillan, reiterated

the importance of maintaininggood relations with the 'new' Commonwealthand the United

States on this issue:

We should not risk allowing ourselves to be isolated, without American

support; and, if the Americans accepted a total arms embargo, we

should do so too, subject to the fulfilment of outstanding contracts. We
should, admittedly, stand to lose substantial export orders; but our
economic interests in the Commonwealth countries of Africa are greater
than our economic interests in South Africa and the balance of
advantage lies in endorsing the view of Commonwealth Africa, if the
Americans incline in that way.

The position with regard to economic sanctions was more complex. Trend argued that

South Africa could survive for'some time' without imports, but suggested that Britain

would 'suff er severely' from any substantial loss of exports, especially 'invisibles' (export

earnings gained through the trading of services, as opposed to goods). Such a

development would have a detrimental impact on the UK balance

of payments, potentially
B0Cabinet
Minutes,
11July1963,CAB128/37.
 163

leading to heavy speculation against the pound. The likelihood of a severe sterling crisis

would be further heightened by South Africa being under no obligation to export gold,

possibly precipitating speculationagainst both the dollar and sterling. On the other hand,

if Britain vetoed a resolution on economic sanctions (or, for that matter, decided to

abstain), it would be exposed to a hostile reaction from other Commonwealthcountries, as

well as the in 91
world community general On 1 August 1963, when the cabinet re-

addressed this issue, Home confirmed that Washington and London would exercise the

veto on any resolutions to expel South Africa from the UN or to enforce economic

sanctions, but suggested that the 'Afro-Asian bloc' would attempt to introduce a new

resolution restraining UN member states from exporting all types of military supplies to

South Africa. Home hoped that, with the support of Norway and the United States, Britain

would be able to secure an amendment, exempting military supplies necessaryfor

defence against external aggression. A resolution on this basis, Home told the cabinet,

would probably enable the UK to maintain its existing policy as regards the supply of arms

to South Africa, provided that it could be stipulated that Britain would remain free to

2
complete existing contacts and continue supply spare parts. On 9 August 1963,
to

Britain (along with France) abstained from a UN resolution stating that all member states

would cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms to South Africa93 Serious concerns

over the potential repercussionsof this stance soon emerged within diplomatic circles. On

25 September, Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to the UN, sent a despatch to Home,

stressing his difficulties in convincing Commonwealth members of Britain's sincerity in

trying to eradicate apartheid; until this was addressed, the UK would become increasingly
94
isolated in the UN, a position prejudicial to the furtherance of wider British interests.

91'Policy Towards South Africa', Briefingnote by Trend for Macmillan,31 July 1963, PREM 11/4487.
92Cabinet Minutes,1 August 1963, CAB 128/37.
9' For resolutionsee www.un.org/documents.
94Dean to Home,25 September1963, PREM 11/4568.
 164

When the Defenceand Overseas Policy Committee (DOPC) met (with Butler in the

chair) to discuss Cary's paper on 27 November 1963, two main issues were raised: firstly,

whether Britain should be preparedto enforce more stringent measures on the export of

arms to South Africa; and, secondly,whether the UK should participate in the study group

proposed by the UN to examine alternative solutions to the problems of racial conflict in

South Africa. Whilst UK commercial activities in South Africa were more substantial than

those of other countries, and should not be carelessly jeopardised, the DOPC agreed that

Britain could not allow itself to become isolated from international opinion, which was

resolutely opposed to the apartheid policies pursued by Verwoerd's government. On the

other hand, it would be equally important to avoid provoking Pretoria into adopting

retaliatory measures, especially in view of the value of UK exports to the balance-of-

payments and South Africa's record of prompt payment. The DOPC agreed that'there

was little point in depriving ourselves of this income if our place as a supplier of arms were

to be taken by another nation, such as France'95 On 18 June 1964, Butler informed the

cabinet that a vote would taken that day in the UN Security Council on a resolution

concerning apartheid in South Africa. This resolution avoided any reference to economic

sanctions, confining itself to proposing the establishment of an expert committee to study

the feasibility and implications of measures which could be taken by the Security Council

under the Charter of the UN. In addition it reaffirmed the Council's exhortation to all

member states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of military equipment to South

Africa. Abstention from voting on this resolution, Butler suggested, would leave Britain

internationally isolated. In discussion there was general agreement that the balance of

advantage lay in favour of participating in the work of the proposed expert committee, if

96DOPCminutes,27 November1963, CAB 148/1.

 165

only to ensure some degree of control into any inquiry into the feasibility of economic

sanctions ss

A Post-IndependencePax Britannicain East Africa?

The importance of East Africa to British policy-makerswas highlighted by their reaction to

the outbreak of civil unrest in the region during January 1964. On 23 January 1964,

Duncan Sandys, now Secretary of State for both Commonwealth Relations and the

Colonies, informed the DOPC that Jomo Kenyatta, Prime Minster of Kenya, was

concerned that the dissatisfactions,which had led native troops in Tanganyika to mutiny,

might spread to Kenya - accordingly, Kenyatta had requested that UK troops be made

available to support the civil authority in the event of disorder. At the same time, news

was received that the 1stBattalion of the Uganda Rifles had mutinied, leading the Ugandan

Prime Minister, Milton Obote, to ask for the immediate despatch of British troops in order

to secure Entebbe airfield. As a result of the strategic benefits Britain derived from stability

and the maintenance of pro-British regimes in East Africa, Conservative ministers agreed

to provide assistance to the states concerned; however, Home, now Prime Minister,

instructed ministers to make every effort to prevent international opinion from

misconstruingthis as an act of neo-imperialism:'It would be necessary to try to anticipate

attempts, at the UN and elsewhere, to misrepresent our actions as an example of neo-

colonialism and an indication that we were seeking to reinstate our influence in territories

to which we had granted independence'. One week later, at a further meeting of the

DOPC, Home indicated that the decision to intervene in East Africa had clearly been

justified by the outcome, but cautioned that it would be impossible to contemplate

maintaining UK security forces indefinitely. It was thus essential to consider how to

N Cabinetminutes, 18 June 1964, CAB 128/38.

 166

extricate UK forces at the 97

earliest opportunity. On 28 January 1964, Home told the

cabinet that Britain could not carry 'indefinitely' the responsibilityof maintainingorder in

territories over which it no longer exercised any political control. In discussion there was

general agreement with this view, although it was argued that it would not be in Britain's

interest to leave the countries concerned to the 'mercy' of the subversive movements that

had prompted the recent mutinies. There were some indications that the East African

governmentsthemselveswere beginning to think of organising their security on some kind

of collective or federal basis. Ministers agreed that it would be to Britain's advantage to

'encourage this tendency' and to seek to promote a pattern of regional co-operation98

On 29 January 1964, Trend informed his colleagues on the DOP(O)C that ministers had

asked for advice on the policy implications flowing from recent developmentsin East

Africa. Although there was no evidence of direct Communist influence in Kenya, Uganda

and Tanganyika, Trend revealed that there were some indicationsthat Oscar Kambona,

Tanganyika's Foreign Minister, had played a part in Inspiring the army to mutiny, despite

being deterred from carrying through his initiative by the support given to Nyerere by

Kenyatta (as well as some units of the Tanganyika Rifles)99 The DOP(O)C concluded that

there was no immediate danger of further internal disturbances in Kenya, Uganda and

Tanganyika. In Zanzibar, conversely, the possibility of extreme left wing elements moving

to oust the 'relatively moderate' government of Sheik Abeid Amani Karume was

considered a distinct possibility; accordingly, DOP(O)C officials considered whether British

military support should be given, if requested, to Karume. In view of the possible reaction

of the Soviet Union, officials concluded that it would be essential, in the event of a decision

to intervene in Zanzibar, to have assurance of American support. More importantly,

97DOPC minutes,23 January 1964, CAB 148/1. Also
see Cabinetminutes,23 January 964, CAB 128/38. In discussion
there was generalagreementthat'these developmentsaffordeddisquietingevidenceof the extentto which subversive
elementswere seeking to establisha footing in Commonwealthterritoriesin East Africa'.
Cabinet minutes, 28 January 1964, CAB 128/38.
99On 23 March 1964, Sandysnoted: 'Mr. Kambona
was probablyplaying his own game, but for the momenthe was loyal to
PresidentNyerere'.'Note of a Meeting Held in the Secretaryof State's Room the CommonwealthRelationsOffice', 23
at
March 1964, Sandyspapers (ChurchillCollege, Cambridge)DSND 8/21.
 167

DOP(O)C officials agreed that it would be beneficial to encourage the governmentsof

Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyikato co-operate in a joint defence force. Collaborationof

this kind, the DOP(O)Cagreed, might reactivate the proposals for a political union

(including, if possible, Zanzibar),which had been halted by the reluctanceof the

Tanganyikan governmentto fully participate in 1961. If the Kenyan governmentwere

willing for UK forces to remain in the country after December 1964, when the defence

agreement between the two nations was due to expire, this would have the added

advantage of providing a continued British military presence in the region.1°°

On 4 February 1964, DOP(O)Cofficials, under the chairmanship of Trend, produced a

paper on the policy implicationsof developmentsin East Africa. The conclusions of

Trend's committee were guided by the over-arching UK interest of promoting stable

governments in East Africa. Trend pointed out that, rightly or wrongly, Britain's Western

allies considered it the responsibilityof the UK government to arrest the spread of

Communism in this part of the world. 'To abrogate this responsibility ... ' , Trend asserted,

'... could not fail to diminish our [Britain's] international standing'. Trend's paper

maintained that the best means of promoting stability in the area lay in encouraging the

local governments to develop 'some form of joint security system' as 'a prelude to eventual

political federation'. The DOP(O)C considered the timing as opportune to undertake an

initial step in this direction, since the governments concerned had been 'badly shaken' by

their inability to maintain internal control during the recent disturbances, having 'been

brought face to face with the realties of independence'. With order restored, however,

officials feared that this 'mood' would quickly dissipate, recognising that all East African

governments contained, to varying degrees, either Communist or radical nationalist

groupings. Officials were concerned that radical elements had grasped the 'crucial

importance' of winning over the armed forces as a precursor to assuming power: in

10°DOP(O)C minutes, 29 January 1964, CAB 148/4.

 168

Uganda, for example,a movementwas already conspiring to replace the existing army by

one recruited from 'youth movements'. The significance of this development lay in the fact

that, if the present unstabledemocraticgovernments were unable to function, there would

be a distinct possibility (as had been the case in other parts of Africa) that they would be

succeeded by stratocratic rule. On the other hand, it was arguable that military regimes

might, in certain circumstances,offer better prospects of stability than the governments

presently occupying power. Officials agreed that Britain should attempt to'establish its

influence' over leaders within the armed forces who had the potential to opportunistically

seize power. Given the lack of experiencedand trained personnel, it was questionable

whether the East African armed forces were in a position to do this on their own. If this

plan were to succeed, it would be essential to establish a nucleus of British officers

attached to the various national military contingents. Such an arrangementwould have

the additional advantage of reassuring British settlers that they were not going to 'be left to

the mercy of the Africans'. It would be a 'major error of judgement', Trend's paper

concluded, to 'lose' this to to

opportunity contribute stability in East Africa. 101

Aware of the need to enlist American support on East Africa, Sandys held discussions

with W. Averell Harriman, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, giving him

notice of the fact that he had told the East African mainland governments,without

commitment, that if President Karume was in danger of being overthrown and asked for

help, and they supported his request, Britain should be prepared to consider giving him

assistance.1°2On 8 April 1964, Sandys informed the DOPC that the 'extreme left-wing

faction' in Zanzibar had assumed control of the government, in large part helped by

military and financial assistance from the Soviet Union and East Germany.103

101'The Policy Implicationsof Developmentsin East Africa':

DOP(O)Cminute by Trend, 4 February1964, CAB 148/1.
'02'Record of the CommonwealthSecretary'sMeeting
with Mr. Averell Harrimanat the CommonwealthRelationsOffice', 20
March 1964, Sandyspapers (ChurchillCollege, Cambridge)DSND 8/21.
'"' DOPCminutes,8 April 1964, CAB 148/1. Also
see Cabinet minutes, 9 April 1964, CAB 128/38.
 169

On entering office, leading figures in the Labour government expressed enthusiasmfor

Britain's role in East Africa. During private defence discussions with the Americans on 7

December 1964, for example, Denis Healey, the newly appointed Secretary of State for

Defence, used the example of UK military action in East Africa to illustrate how Britain

could contributeto stability in the extra-Europeanworld: 'Had it not been for the UK's

prompt action in throwing "nugatoryforces" into East Africa earlier this year, the West

might have had another Congo on its hands'.104Similarly, Harold Wilson told Dean Rusk:

'In some parts of the world, such as East Africa there were jobs which only Britain could

do'.105By early 1966, however, Britain's preparednessto undertake independent military

operations in East Africa came into question. The importance of East Africa to the

defence of Britain's interests in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf was lessened by the

decision, reached by DOPC ministers on 24 November 1965, to give up any'obligations

to, or defence facilities in, Aden or the South Arabian Federation', when South Arabia

became independent in 1967 or 1968.106On 23 January 1966, Healey was forced to

concede to the Americans that the Labour government's 'Defence Review' had not taken

'into account African needs which may eventuate'.107

`A Position of Secondary Importance Among our Interests in the World: The Labour

Government's Withdrawal from Africa: 1964-1968.

Despite its ambitious domestic agenda, promising the creation of a'New Britain', involving

large scale investment in industry, science and technology, regional planning, education,

transport, housing, social security provision and the National Health Service, the Wilson

104'DefenseProblems':Memorandumof Conversation,7 December1964, FRUS, WesternEurope,

vol. XII, Document236.
105'Recordof ConversationbetweenWilson
and Rusk at 10 DowningStreet', 14 May 1965, PREM 131214.
106DOPC minutes,24 November1965, CAB 148/18. See ChapterV, 225-226.
107'UK Defense Review PrincipalUK Presentations pp.
- and U.S. Responses',Memorandumof Conversation,27 January
1966, FRUS, WesternEurope,vol. XII, Document255.
 170

government entered office firmly committed to the ideal of a British world role. At the heart

of Labour's agenda was the Commonwealth, an entity to which the party had a strong

sentimental attachment, proudly proclaiming responsibility for its inception. Labour

considered Britain's association with the Commonwealth more important than its relations

with the EEC: 'Though we [an incoming Labour government] shall seek to achieve closer

links with our European neighbours, the Labour Party is convinced that the first

responsibility of a British Government is still to the Commonwealth'. Moreover, Labour's

manifesto promised a'New War on Want': the poverty of developing countries, it was

argued, presented the western industrialised nations with a 'tremendous challenge which

we ignore at our peril'. Labour promised to discuss, with other countries, proposals for

expanding the trade of developing nations and increase the share of national income

devoted to essential aid programmes. Labour's commitment to tackling global poverty

was enshrined in its pledge to create a Ministry of Overseas Development (OMD), a new

department with an almost altruistic agenda for distributing aid and providing technical

assistance. This ambitious programme for overseas development and the Commonwealth

were particularly important in relation to Africa, since the continent was poverty-stricken

and comprised the majority of Britain's former (and soon to be former) colonies. Labour's

manifesto also highlighted the potentially damaging effects of Anglo-South African

relations on Britain's standing within the Commonwealth and the UN, criticising the

Conservative's 'equivocal attitude' to Pretoria's racial policies, and their failure to end the

sale of arms to the apartheid regime. 'oe

On 10 February 1965, DOP(O)C officials established a sub-committee on Africa, under

the chairmanship of Paul Rogers, the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet. In what was the

first attempt at establishing inter-departmentalconsensus on UK policy towards Africa

108For manifestosee'The New Britain', in I. Dale (ed.), Labour Party general

election manifestos 1900-1997,(London:
RoutledgeIn associationwith Politico's,2000). For a detailedaccount of Labour's main foreign policy objectivesIn
oppositionsee P. Catterall,'Foreign and CommonwealthPolicy in Opposition:the Labour Party'. W. Kaiser and G. Staerck
(eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955-64:ContractingOptions,(Macmillan:London,2000).
 171

since 1959, Rogers' sub-committeedrew its membership from the Foreign Office,

CommonwealthRelationsOffice, Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence, Board of Trade and

the Treasury. The sub-committeeproduced papers and recommendationsfor a parallel

ministerial sub-committee,chaired by Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of State at the

Commonwealth RelationsOffice. At the sub-committee'sfirst ministerial discussions,

Hughes argued that the Americanswould press the UK to take 'an increasing lead' in

African affairs on the grounds that Britain's 'special relationship with many of the countries

in Africa made it our prime responsibilityto do so'. Hughes felt this presumption open to

question, since Britain's relationshipwith many Commonwealthcountries was, in some

ways, 'a handicap rather than an advantage' -a viewpoint certainly not expressed in

Labour's 1964 manifesto. On the other hand, it was recognised that Britain was in a better

position to intercede in African affairs than the United States, which had damaged its

credibility, at least in Hughes's opinion, through 'hasty and ill-consideredactions'.109

Although a number of draft sections of a report were completed in the first half of 1965, the

sub-committeetemporarily suspended its work in July because of the deteriorating

situation in Rhodesia. As a number of important members on the sub-committeewere

heavily engaged on urgent issues relating to Rhodesia, it became impossibleto complete

any realistic assessment of developments in Africa over a ten-year period.

With the dissolution of the Central African Federation and the imminent independence of

Zambia and Malawi, Southern Rhodesia's European ruling elite called on Whitehall to

accede to independence. Independence, it was argued, should be on the basis of the

1961 constitution, which envisaged eventual majority rule, but limited participation in

elections by means of a restrictive property franchise, effectively confining power in the

hands of the white minority; accordingly, if independence were granted on the basis of the

1961 constitution, responsibility for African political

advancement would lie with Salisbury,

108
DOPC(ministerial onAfrica)minutes,
sub-committee 18March1965,CAB148/39.
 172

not London. In responseto increasingAfrican demands for equal democratic rights,

moreover, Rhodesia's'moderate' Europeanparty leaders were supplanted by more 'hard-

line' elements in the early 1960s. In April 1964, Winston Field, Rhodesia's Prime Minister,

was replaced by Ian Smith (his deputy), when he failed to move rapidly enough, during

independencenegotiationswith Britain, for the more authoritarian elements in his party.

Representativesof Rhodesia'sindigenousAfrican population (who outnumberedthe

Europeans by a ratio of 20 to 1110)

argued that it would be wrong for Britain to grant full
independenceto a minority, maintainingthat priority should be given to the establishment

of majority rule, as was the case in other East and Central African colonies formerly under

British control. The British government'spreparednessto grant independenceto Southern

Rhodesiawas dependent on the fulfillment of five principles: (i) unimpeded progress to

majority rule; (ii) guarantees against retrogressiveamendment of the 1961 constitution; (iii)

immediate improvementin the political status of Africans; (iv) progress towards ending

discrimination; (v) independenceto be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole."'

On 27 April 1965, Wilson told the cabinet that it was increasingly probable that Southern

Rhodesia would have recourse to a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), despite

apprehensions amongst local industrial and commercial interests as to the consequences

of such an action. At the 1965 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting (CPM), African

leaders pressed Wilson to convene a constitutional conference on Rhodesia; if Smith did

not agree to attend and failed to release imprisoned African nationalist leaders, it was

argued that Wilson should suspend the Rhodesian constitution and impose direct rule, if

necessary by military means. ' 12 In response to this request, Wilson contended that it was

'unrealistic' to suppose that Britain could compel Smith to accept such a proposal and that

110Rhodesia's estimated of 4,350,000

population Africans,
224,000 Europeans(white),
wascomposed of about4,105,000
and21,000 ofotherethnicgroups.See'Southern
Rhodesia':
Paperprepared bytheDepartmentof 1967,
State,23January
FRUS, Africa, vol.XXIV,
"' E. Windrich, Britain
Document553.
and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1978),
pp. 41-42.
'2 The African Prime Ministerswere supported by
all the other leadersat the meeting expect Australiaand New Zealand.
 173

it would be impossibleto contemplatethe use of force. Concerned that such a stance

might precipitate several African states leaving the Commonwealth,Wilson offered an

undertakingthat, if future discussionswith Smith did not lead to a constitutional

conference in a reasonably'short time', Britain would 'promote' such a conference, so as

to ensure Rhodesia's progresstowards independenceon a basis acceptable to majority

opinion. Although there was some risk that this would precipitate UDI, Wilson considered

such an outcome '

'unlikely'. 13 At this time, however, pressure was growing within

Southern Rhodesia,particularlyon the part of the country's influential farming community,

for independence. In response to fears within Whitehall that Rhodesiawas on the brink of

declaring UDI, Cledwyn Hughes was dispatched to Washington to enlist American

support. Hughes told Rusk that Britain was doing everything possible to "'postpone the

evil day" when UDI would come', confirming that there was not the 'slightest chance' that

force would be used to quell any rebellion.' 14 On 23 September, Arthur Bottomley,

Secretary of State for CommonwealthRelations, informed the cabinet that it seemed

increasingly likely that Rhodesiawould follow the 'unconstitutionalcourse' of UDI, but

suggested that much might be gained by making one 'final effort' to dissuade Smith from

doing so. As a consequence,Wilson travelled to Salisbury in late October, whereupon he

urged Smith to lead Rhodesia away from UDI towards more constitutional methods of

behaviour.15 The difference between the two leaders was straightforward:Smith wanted

to control the pace of African political advancement,while Wilson was unprepared to hand

that power over to the South Rhodesian government. Despite Wilson's best efforts, Anglo-

Southern Rhodesian discussions proved inconclusive, largely due to Smith's determination

113Cabinetminutes,24 June 1965, CAB 128/39.

"''Southern Rhodesian UDI and Ramifications': Memorandum
of Conversation, 20 September 1965, FRUS, Arica, vol.
XXIV, Document 467.
16 Cabinetminutes,2 November1965, CAB 128/39.
 174

to prevent the emergence of majorityrule."s On 11 November 1965, Wilson notified the

cabinet that it seemed 'almost certain' that Smith would make an 'illegal declaration of

independence (IDI)'."' In turn, cabinet ministersfocused their attention on measuresto

be taken in the event of UDI. James Callaghan,Chancellor of the Exchequer,expressed

concerns on the effect on sterling of blockingthe Reserve Bank of Rhodesia's sterling

balances in London. If Britain appearedto be restricting sterling balances for political

reasons, Callaghan argued, this could well affect the attitude of other holders of sterling

and diminish confidence in the 18

pound. Wilson took the opposite view, maintaining that it

was right to prevent a 'usurping authority' from accessing funds which belonged not to

them but to Rhodesia. Such an action, Wilson contended, so far from undermining

in
confidence sterling, would reassure other holders of sterling balances, who might be

threatened by revolt or illegal pressurewithin their territories. Even so, Wilson was

to
prepared concede that blocking Rhodesia's sterling reserves should not be among the

'initial measures' taken in the event of UDI.19 On action to be taken at the UN, cabinet

ministers agreed that it would be to

essential oppose pressure to use military force,

especially from the Soviet Union; consequently, it would be argued that the application of

economic sanctions, if firmly enforced, would represent the best means of bringing any

rebellion to an end. Halfway through this cabinet meeting, Wilson was informed that

Smith's government had announced UDI.120The next day, the Wilson government passed

78 Sir Saville Gamer, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Commonwealth Relations Office, wrote of Wilson's efforts In these
discussions: 'No man could have done more to avert the clash than Wilson did in October 1965 In Salisbury. He did not
spare himself, but devoted himself for a week, working hard every day until after midnight, to dreary repetitive discussions
with Smith and his colleagues, yet always patient, tolerant, making his points with skill and clarity and taking care to Inform
himself in detail of all matters that came up'. Gamer, The Commonwealth Office, p. 396.
"' As regards the term IDI, Wilson told the cabinet that this
expression was'preferable to a unilateral declaration of
independence and should henceforth be adopted to describe and act of this kind'. See Cabinet minutes, 11 November
1965, CAB 128/39.
18 This Issuehad been under considerationIn the Treasuryfor
a numberof months beforehand. The diary entry of Sir Alec
Caimcross,Head of the Governments EconomicSection, for 10 October 1965 notes: 'I asked [Sir] William [Armstrong]If
thought had been given to the cost of UDI In Rhodesiaand he said 'Yes, £200 million'. A. Caimcross, The Wilson Years:A
TreasuryDiary, 1964-1966,(London:The Historians' Press, 1997), p. 84.
19 On 3 December1965,the Board of the Reserve Bank Rhodesia
of was dismissedand a new board, chaired by Sir
SydneyCaine, Directorof the London School of Economics,appointedby the British government;as a result of this action,
Rhodesia'sbalancesoutside London became legally worthless.
120Cabinetminutes, 11 November1965, CAB 128/39.
 175

the Southern RhodesianAct, 1965, conferring powers to impose sanctions. On 12

November,the UN Security Council adopted, by a vote of 10 to 0, with France abstaining,

a brief interim resolutioncondemning UDI and calling upon all states not to recognise or

render any assistanceto the illegal regime. On November 20, at the request of the UK,

the UN Security Council adopted, by a vote of 10 to 0, with France abstaining, a

compromise resolutioncalling upon all states not to provide arms and military equipment

to Rhodesia and to do their utmost to break all economic relations, including an embargo

on oil and petroleum products.

In late November 1965,Wilson received a request from the President of Zambia,

Kenneth Kaunda, that UK forces should be stationed in Zambia both in order to safeguard

the hydroelectricpower station at Kariba and to protect the country against attack from the

RhodesianAir Force. If Britain rejected this request, cabinet ministers agreed, Kaunda

be In
might overthrown. such an event, Wilson prophesised, there would then be 'no

obstacle to the outbreak of a racialist war which could lead to the disintegrationof the

Commonwealthand would expose the whole of Central Africa to Communist infiltration

and subversion '. For this reason, preparationswere made to send a squadron of Javelin

fighters, with the necessary radar equipment, into Zambia. It was hoped that this action

would strengthen Zambian morale and reinforce Kaunda's political position. According to

Sir Alec Cairncross (Head of the Government Economic Service), Callaghan, who had

been at'odds' with Wilson on policy towards Rhodesia, believed that the Javelins would

make Smith's regime 'most conscious of their dependence on the UK and that they would

take the risks more seriously'.121As there was some risk that the Rhodesian Air Force

might launch a pre-emptive attack on the Javelin squadron before it was fully operational,

HMS Eagle (which possessed a strike capability) was secretly moved from the Far East to

a position off the East African coast. The cabinet rejected Kaunda's second request of

'Z' Caimcross, The Wilson Years,p. 98.

 176

sending British ground forces into Zambia to protect the power supplies from Kariba.

Nevertheless,Wilson believedthat the dispatch of the Javelin squadron might mark the

in
'first stage' a new and developing 122
commitment. As a result, cabinet ministers

it
considered even more important to implement further economic and financial measures

designed to bring the rebellionto an end as rapidly as possible. Wilson informed his

colleagues that the possibilityof instituting an oil embargo, at least to the extent of

preventing the delivery of crude oil to Beria (in Mozambique),was under urgent

In
consideration. order to be effective, however, this would require collective international

action.123On 16 December,Washington agreed to'help' in an oil embargo of Rhodesia,

to
subject an Order in Council providing protection for US oil companies against any

damage claims. Wilson believed that such an embargo would succeed in removing Smith

from power, with Britain resuming responsibilityfor the government of Rhodesia: 'It will put

back 40 ', Wilson told Johnson, '... but it can't be helped'.124While Wilson did
us years.. .

not give a specific estimate of the time it would take for sanctions to succeed, Oliver

Wright, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, suggested to David Bruce, US

Ambassador to London, that Smith's government would fall in a 'matter of weeks'.125

At the January 1966 CPM in Lagos, Wilson rejected African demands for Britain to

intervene militarily to bring an end to UDI, deflecting attention away from such a course by

establishing a Commonwealth Sanctions Committee, claiming that sanctions would force

Smith's government to fall in 'weeks, not months'.126Wilson considered this a 'victory for

moderation', which 'strengthened the Commonwealth vis-ä-visthe extremists of the

Organisation of African Unity'.127Four months later, Ian Smith initiated discussions with

122Moreover,Healeytold the cabinet that an attack on the Javelinswould constitutean 'act of war' against Britain.
12'Cabinetminutes,29 November1965, CAB 128/39.
124'Memorandum of Conversations:Visit to Washingtonof Prime MinisterWilson, December16-18,1965', Cabinet Room
Meeting,16 December1965, FRUS,Africa, vol. XXIV, Document513.
125'Memorandum of Conversations:Visit to Washingtonof Prime MinisterWilson, December16-18,1965, White House
Lunch for Prime Ministerand SubsequentConversation,17 December1965, FRUS,Africa, vol. XXIV, Document513.
"H. Wilson, The Labour Government,1964-70:A PersonalMemoir,(London:Weidenfeld& Nicolson,1971), p. 196.
'2"'Message From Prime MinisterWilson to PresidentJohnson', 14 January 1966, FRUS,Africa, vol. XXIV, Document528.
 177

Britain to try and bring about a settlement. Informal talks between officials followed, so as

to ascertain whether there was a basis for meaningful discussions. On 10 June 1966,

Wilson told Rusk that 'things were going a good deal better' in regard to Rhodesia. The

effects of the credit squeeze, tobacco boycott, oil embargo and growing unemployment,

Wilson argued, was 'a case of sanctions having real effects in a hundred different ways'.

At the end of the day, Wilson insisted, all of this would force Smith (a 'sophisticated

economist') into'real' negotiations. 128 In late August 1966, Anglo-Southern Rhodesian

'talks about talks' were adjourned because of the decision of the Smith government (now

referred to in cabinet minutes and memorandum as the 'illegal regime') to introduce

legislation that would endow it with permanent powers of preventative detention. On 1

September 1966, at a meeting of the cabinet, ministers considered ways to increase

pressure on Salisbury. The cabinet ruled out the use of force, reaffirming its decision of

7 October 1965.129 Handing responsibility over to the UN was also rejected, as this might

serve to increase Smith's obstinacy to reaching a settlement. A mandatory resolution

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, either in respect of economic sanctions or in respect

of supplies of oil alone, was similarly dismissed, on the grounds that this would 'inevitably'

lead to the imposition of sanctions against South Africa, an event that would have

'disastrous' consequences for the UK economy. The cabinet also considered whether

Britain should declare acceptance of independence in Rhodesia before the institution of

majority rule. Such a statement would undoubtedly strengthen Britain's position at the

forthcoming CPM in September; however, since this course would Irretrievably damage

any prospect of achieving a settlement, ministers considered it 'unacceptable'. In these

circumstances, ministers decided to take the following line with the Commonwealth Prime

Ministers. It would be conceded that sanctions had not proved as effective as was hoped

128
'Rhodesia':
Memorandumof Conversation
at 10Dooming Africa,vol.XXIV,Document
Street,10June1966,FRUS, 538.
129
Cabinet 7 October
minutes, 1966,CAB128/39.
 178

at the previous CPM meeting at Lagos in January 1966 (when it was promised that

Smith's regime would fall in 'weeks, not months'), but that it would be wrong to assume

that they were having no effect: on the contrary they were creating substantial difficulties

for the Rhodesianeconomy. The policy dilemma facing policy-makerswas neatly

encapsulated in cabinet discussion:

To grant independencebefore majority rule would undoubtedlyupset

African opinion, but to declare that our policy was not to grant such
independencemeant destroyingany hope of a settlementof the Rhodesian
problem,would inevitably drive that country into the arms of South Africa
and would therefore in practice be responsiblefor the indefinite
postponementof the very majority rule which the policy sought to
130
secure.

Moreover, Herbert Bowden, Bottomley's replacement as Secretary of State for

CommonwealthAffairs, believed that there was a possibility of Smith leading Rhodesia

'back to legality'.131Wilson had two main objectives throughout the September CPM

discussions on Rhodesia: to hold the Commonwealthtogether and to keep the Rhodesian

question, so far as possible, under British control. After rancorous discussion, extending

over three days, Wilson was forced to concede the principle of no independencebefore

majority African rule (NIBMAR) in Rhodesia. The final communique, however, recorded

the British government's intention to give the illegal regime one last chance to return to

constitutional rule before the end of the year. If this were not accepted, the communique

noted, Britain would jointly sponsor mandatory sanctions in the UN prohibiting the import

by member states of selected Rhodesian products. Wilson clearly hoped to avoid the

implementation of mandatory sanctions and NIBMAR; with this publicly expressed threat

of action, he hoped to force Smith's acquiesce in a settlement, within three months. The
130Cabinetminutes, 1 September1966, CAB 128/41.
131Cabinet minutes,29 September1966, CAB 128/41.
 179

acceptance of African demands on NIBMAR and mandatory sanctions,Wilson explained

to PresidentJohnson, was the' price we had to pay to buy this additional time for a last

showdownwith Smith'.132

In early December 1966, matters between Britain and Rhodesia came to a head, when

Wilson held talks with Smith on HMS Tiger.133Sir Saville Garner, Permanent Under-

Secretary to the CommonwealthOffice, later described the negotiationson HMS Tiger as

a 'gamble but a gamble that did not come off'.'34 Although Wilson hoped that it might be
-
to
possible reach a settlement with Smith, he concurred with Garner's assessment: 'If I

was a betting man. . ', Wilson told President Johnson, '... I should wager against a

settlement. But the odds are not so steep that the gamble is not worth taking: and the

stakes, for all of us, are high'. On the issue of returning Rhodesia to constitutional rule,

Smith refused to agree to an immediate return to the 1961 Constitution or that a broadly-

based government should be formed. Smith also asked that a test of public opinion in

Rhodesia in respect of amendments to the 1961 Constitution be conducted by a Royal

Commission before a return to legality. In reply, Wilson and Bowden Insisted that an

interim government should be formed under the 1961 Constitution. Thereafter a Royal

Commissionwould be formed to test public opinion and report whether or not the revised

Constitution would be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Wilson made it

clear that, if subsequently independencewere illegally declared for a second time, there

would be no question of legal independencebefore majority rule; mandatory sanctions

against Rhodesia would be sought and imposed; and there could be no further guarantee

that Britain would not use force in applying such sanctions. When Smith's cabinet rejected

the 'working document' drawn up on HMS Tiger, on the grounds that it could not accept a

'32Telegram From the Departmentof State to the Embassyin the United Kingdom(messagereceivedby President
Johnsonfrom Wilson, 23 September1966)', 24 September1966, FRUS,Africa, vol. XXIV, Document542.
133On the eve of the talks with Smith, Wilson told President Johnson that this would be the 'final showdown' between the two
leaders. See 'Telegram from Prime Minister Wilson to President Johnson', 29 November 1966, FRUS, Africa, vol. XXIV,
Document 547.
'3` Gamer, The CommonwealthOffice,p. 396.
 180

return to legality (i.e., rule by the Governor for an interim period of about four months) prior

to a test of Rhodesianpublic opinion on the new Constitution,Wilson was left with little

option but to proceed with mandatory sanctions. On 13 December, Bowden informed the

cabinet of his intention to propose the imposition of limited mandatory sanctions against

Rhodesia at the UN Security Council. It was believed that these would have a substantial,

but 'not crippling' effect on the Rhodesian economy, reducing annual GDP by some 25 per

cent compared with the situation prior to UDI. Bowden believed that Pretoria would be

unpreparedto alter its 'normal trade' with Rhodesia; this would inhibit the efficacy of

mandatory sanctions, since Rhodesiawould remain economicallyviable for as long as

South Africa continued to trade with the illegal regime. As it seemed probable that South

Africa would fail to comply with mandatory sanctions, Bowden suggested that there were

three options open to the government:first, to do nothing, which would leave Britain 'open

to violent attack' in the UN and the Commonwealth;secondly, prepare measures leading

to economic 'confrontation' with South Africa, although it was concluded that this would

involve 'unacceptable risks' to the UK economy; or, thirdly, invite consultation in these

matters with Pretoria. On the advice of Bowden, cabinet ministers approved the third

course; however, it was agreed that exchangeswith the South African government should

be conducted 'unobtrusively'. Bowden informed the cabinet that it was 'vital' to Britain's

interests that the imposition of mandatory sanctions should not be allowed to develop into

'economic warfare' with South Africa, as this would involve an annual loss of over £250

million in exports, a large rise in the prices of imports, and £80 million net loss of

investment income and invisible exports. Since Britain's economic interests In other

African countries approximately balanced those in South Africa, British policy was aimed

at bringing economic sanctions to the 'pitch of maximum effectiveness', limited only by the

need to avoid 'confrontation' with South Africa.135Garner, with some degree of

135Cabinetminutes, 13 December1966, CAB 128/41.

 181

justification, described South Africa as'key to the Rhodesian problem'.136On 16

December 1966, the UN Security Council approved the imposition of limited mandatory

economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to strengthen and supplement the

voluntary programme. In the short term, sanctions did not succeed in bringing down the

illegal regime, which fell over a decade later, when Rhodesia achieved independenceas

Zimbabwe in 1980.

On 17 January 1967, at the behest of Sir Burke Trend, officials on the DOP(O)C sub-

committee on Africa resumed its work, again under the chairmanship of Paul Rogers, with

to
a view completing the study by April of the same year. Officials in the Foreign Office

to
were opposed resurrecting the committee, feeling that the exercise would be time-

consuming and of limited value. Martin Le Ouesne, Deputy Under-Secretaryat the

Foreign Office, felt that his departmentwould be unable to contribute to 'a paper of this

degree of complexity and difficulty', complaining that the Foreign Office was already

having problems keeping abreast of its day-to-day responsibilities,and that it would be

difficult to 'vet' an inter-departmentalpaper.137Melvyn Brown, a fellow Deputy Under-

Secretary at the Foreign Office, wanted to make sure that the sub-committee's report

would be based, as far as possible, on a paper produced by the Foreign Office Planning

Staff on Southern Africa.138

The final officials' report, 'Future Policy on Africa', predicted that the next decade would

witness a number of far-reaching changes in British policy In different areas of the world,

resulting from an inexorable 'diminution of our role as a world power'. As a consequence,

officials concentrated on how British political, economic and strategic interests could be

furthered in such an international environment. (Although North African countries

bordering the Mediterraneanand Red Sea had significant impact on the rest of Africa - for

138'SouthemRhodesia':Memorandumof Conversation,1 December1966, FRUS,Africa, vol. XXIV, Document548.

137Le Quesneto Brown, 17 January 1967, FCO 25/043.
'38Brownto Le Quesne,25 January 1967, FCO 231043.
 182

example, through the Organisationof African Unity (OAU) - officials considered these

countries within the context of general policy towards the Middle East.) The African

political scene had undergone a dramatic transformation in the period dividing the two

major inter-departmental
studies: most of Middle Africa had been under colonial rule in

1959, and officials had believed that this would remain the case for most of the following

decade. Whitehall generally agreed that former British territories had achieved

independencetoo quickly, leading officials to the melancholyconclusion: 'the fears of

those who argued at the time in favour of a slower rate for granting independencehave

been largely borne out by the price which a number of Middle African countries have now
139
begun to pay for it in terms of internal stability and economic viability'. Thus, officials

believed that decolonisationhad been pursued at too fast a pace, a view that contradicts

Macmillan's portrayal of events in his memoirs.

As a result of its colonial past, Britain retained 'substantial' economic interests in the

more important Commonwealthstates of Middle Africa, an area with a sizeable expatriate

population, totalling approximately 140,000, including 82,000 dependents. Moreover,

Britain was still held to have 'some degree of special responsibility'for the welfare of

independent Commonwealthnations in Africa. With the passing of time, however, it would

be natural, if not 'justifiable', for Britain's 'sense of special responsibility ... to diminish and

eventually cease'. Any sense of sentimentalityin UK policy towards Africa had largely

evaporated by 1967, with the inter-departmentalreport stating: We also should base our

policies in Africa, as elsewhere, not on the legacy of the past but on our assessment of

British and Western interests'. Accordingly, once Britain's remaining responsibilitieshad

come to an end, Africa would 'recede into a position of secondary importance among our

interests in the world'.140

1 'Future Policy on Africa', 17 October 1967, CAB 148!77.

140ibid.
 183

Whilst Britain's economic interests in Africa were not negligible, they were not as

significant as those located in the Middle East and Europe. Politically, Britain had special

responsibilitiesin Rhodesia,and whilst Whitehall agreed that no immediate termination of

this commitmentwas in sight, the sub-committeeagreed that this problem should be

resolved as soon as possible, so as to prevent further damage to Britain's relations with

the developing nations of the 'Afro-Asian' bloc:

While this problem is among the most intractable that we have to

face, it is not crucial for our essential interests: but it would be
unwise to overlook the fact that it bedevils our relations with non-
white African countries and in international bodies causes us
constant embarrassmentnot only with the Africans but with the
Communists and Asians too.

In both Middle and Southern Africa, Britain's long-term interests were primarily economic.

The ability of Britain to safeguard these interests was affected by the racial conflict

between the white minorities in southern Africa, who were determined to maintain the

status quo, and the 'black' leaders of Middle Africa, who were resolutely opposed to the

continuation of minority rule. The officials' paper accepted the imperative of supporting

majority rule in colonial and former colonial territories: for this reason, Britain had been

willing to break-up the Central African Federation and to accept the 'disadvantages' of

seeking to secure majority rule in Rhodesia. Neverthelessthe problem of British policy

towards South Africa remained: on the one hand, Britain unreservedlydisagreed with the

South African government's policy of apartheid, on the other, Britain's material interests

made it important to 'remain on the best possible terms' with South Africa, a policy that

had a detrimental impact on its relations with Central Africa. Demonstratingthe extent to
 184

which Whitehall had failed to resolve this problem, it was merely agreed that Britain should

'avoid throwing in [its] lot exclusively with either Middle or Southern Africa'.141
...
Britain's economic interests in sub-SaharanAfrica were proportionatelyfar greater than

any other industrialisedpower: the region took 12 per cent of Britain's exports, with 20 per

cent of its imports coming from the UK. About 15 per cent of Britain's long-term private

investment was in Africa (60 per cent of which was located in South Africa). The GNP of

southern Africa was £3,800 million, which was less than that of Middle Africa (£6,000

million), though slightly more than that of CommonwealthMiddle Africa (£3,600 million).

More importantly, economic growth in southern Africa out-stripped central Africa during the

1960s, and it was anticipated that this would remain the case for the foreseeable future.

By 1966, South Africa was Britain's second largest market; significantly, South Africa took

a high proportion of 'sophisticated' exports, which would be difficult to replace through the

development of alternative markets. Between 1960 and 1967, Britain's exports to South

Africa ran at an average annual value of over £300 million, increasing by 50 per cent over

the period; moreover, these exports were paid for in cash or on strictly commercial credit

terms, which was almost unique for an African nation. By way of contrast, overall British

exports to Middle African countries totalled £270 million annually, of which £215-£235

million went to Commonwealth Middle Africa. It was estimated that Britain's trade with

South Africa would increase by 4-6 per cent over the next five years, as opposed to a rise

of 2-3 per cent in Middle Africa. Towards the end of 1966, approximately 15 per cent of

Britain's total long term private investment was in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding

Rhodesia), totalling around £1,300-£1,400 million, of which about £835 million was

invested in South Africa - British investments in South Africa had increased substantially

141 ibid.
 185

since 1962,whereas investmentsin the rest of Africa had witnessed only a marginal

increase.142

On the other hand, Commonwealth African countries held large sterling balances - £423

million, equating to 13.5 per cent of gross overseas sterling area holdings. The officials'

paper argued that there was 'a major United Kingdom interest in avoiding any rapid run-

down of the balances of the African Commonwealth countries', as this might precipitate a

chain reaction of events leading to devaluation. However, South Africa produced 75 per

cent of the free world's gold, and the maintenance of this flow (and the continuation of

London's position as the world's largest free gold market) was another essential British

Interest. Policy-makers advised against forgoing trade with, and investment in, either

Middle or Southern Africa: 'It is... important that we [Britain] should eschew any situation

which may lead us into a situation where we cannot avoid choosing between Middle and

Southern Africa'. '43 In early December 1967, nevertheless, cabinet ministers were forced

into a situation where they had to choose between Commonwealth Africa and South

Africa.

On 8 December 1967, at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee,

ministers considered whether the ban on South African arms shipments should be

rescinded. 144A week later, George Brown, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed

his cabinet colleagues that they faced a 'very difficult' decision arising from an approach

by the South African government for the supply of maritime defence equipment, valued at

£100 million. If Britain were to supply this equipment, Brown conceded, there would be

political difficulties 'not merely in Parliament and liberal circles in this country, but also

among Commonwealth countries and in the United Nations'. Whilst fully sharing this

'general repugnance' for the South African policy of apartheid, Brown believed there were

142This general trend discounted

a sharp increase in Investment in Ghana and Nigeria In 1965.
143'Future Policy on Africa', 17 October 1967, CAB 148/77.
1" DOPC minutes, 8 December 1967, CAB 148/26.
 186

'strong economicand strategic reasons'for meeting this request. Failureto do so would

not only lose Britaina valuable order for defence equipment,but would also put at 'risk' a

large number of export orders in 'our second largest export market in the world'. The total

loss of trade might well amount to not less than £200 million up to 1980. Given the

economic situation following devaluation (on 18 November 1967), Brown maintained that

Britain could not afford to lose these orders. Moreover, a refusal to supply arms might

result in Britain losing its naval facilities at Simonstown; in such an event, France might

replace Britain as South Africa's main source of arms and reach a separate defence

agreement with Pretoria. In discussion, some support was expressed for Brown's

proposal, mainly on the grounds that a refusal would cast 'grave doubts' on the will and

ability of Britain to take, following devaluation, the measures necessary to restore the

economy. If Britain was seen to be deliberately foregoing trade for political reasons, which

on some estimates might amount in total to as much as £300 million, confidence in the

Labour government would be impaired, especially among British exporters on whom a

restoration of the balance of payments was dependent. If this opportunity to improve the

balance of payments was 'sacrificed', it might be necessary to make even more drastic

reductions in public expenditure, including politically unpalatable cuts in the fields of

education and social services. Wilson, summing up the discussion, suggested that the

government's political, economic and moral 'credibility' was at issue: 'To agree to supply

the proposed military equipment to South Africa would be contrary to the principles for

which the Government stood: and if they were to do so in order to carry economic

credibility with British industry, they would risk being pushed into other policies advocated

by the Opposition and thus lose all political credibility'. As the balance of opinion was in

favour of deferring a decision, until the problem of arms to South Africa could be

considered in the broader context of a comprehensive review of all policies at home and

overseas, Wilson proposed to make a holding statement in the House of Commons in the
 187

followingweek.145On 18 December1967, in the light of 'inaccurateand tendentious'

press speculation,Wilson thought it right to give the cabinet a further opportunityto re-

considerthe decision reachedon 15 December. The cabinet concurredthat a holding

statementwould not be sufficient,agreeingthat Britain should reject the South African

requestfor arms.14"
Officials on the DOP(O)Csub-committeeagreed that the policies of other powers

involved in Africa had the potentialto either complementor frustrate British interests. The

majority of countriesin MiddleAfrica aimed to make non-alignmenta central componentof

their foreign policies,althoughsome counties,particularlythe former French colonies,

harbouredCommunistsympathisers.

Africans, like other self-styled non-aligned peoples draw a distinction

between their policy of non-alignment and a policy of neutrality or
disinterest. For them a policy of non-alignment means judging issues as
they arise on their merits without any prior commitment to support the
attitude of one or other of the great power blocs. It can alternatively be
described as a policy of playing one bloc off against the other.

Whitehall was convinced, nonetheless, that flirtation with Soviet Communism had led

some African countries to become disillusioned with Marxist ideology, concluding that it

was clear that most of them had no intention of 'swapping the status of a colony for that of

a satellite'. Most Africans, it was argued, found the devaluation of the individual in favour

of the State (or party nomenclature), inherent in Soviet political doctrine, 'repugnant'. "'

This view had been fermenting in Whitehall for some time: for example, on 28 July 1966,

Trend informed the Americans that the 'Soviets do not appear to place Africa at the top of

"5 Cabinet minutes, 15 December 1967, CAB 128/42.

146Cabinet minutes, 18 December 1967, CAB 128/42. For Wilson's
account see H. Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964-
70: A Personal Memoir, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), 470-476.
"''Future Policy on Africa', 17 October 1967, CAB 148177. pp.
 188

their priority list'. 148The Soviet Union had suffered severe setbacks in Ghana, Guinea,

and the Congo, leading officials to believe that they would fail in their attempt to establish

in
a permanent presence countries such as Somalia and Tanzania. The greatest Soviet

threat lay in adding to general instability, primarily through the 'dumping' of their surplus

armaments on the continent.

In an admissionof failure with regard to decolonisation,it was agreed:

Now that the euphoria of independence has worked off the serious
fundamental weaknesses of all these states are becoming apparent: lack
of national identity, ill-adapted and insecurely based political institutions,
inadequate resources of trained manpower, are enormous if not
insuperable obstacles to the attainment of a politically acceptable level of

economic development.

The political systems of Middle African countries were at once too weak to tackle the

problems they faced and too rigid to allow for constitutional change. As a result, policy-

makers characterised Middle Africa as unready for democracy: 'the common pattern is a

military take-over since, outside the party, the armed forces are the only other source of

organised power. There are no grounds for supposing that we have seen the last military

coup in Middle Africa'. Officials regarded the oft-expressed claim of military regimes, that

they intended to re-establish civilian government when 'order was restored', as essentially

meaningless. The experience of Dahomey (modern-day Benin), where Colonel Soglo had

twice given power to a civilian authority and then subsequently reassumed power, was

cited as an example of how events might unfold in many areas of Middle Africa over the

coming decade. The shortage of trained and politically literate personnel meant that the

only civilian group, to whom the military could return power, was precisely those they had

1eiCircuiar Telegram From the Department of State to Posts In NATO Capitals', 30 July 1966, FRUS, Western Europe, vol.
XII, Document 266.
 189

initially replaced;thus, military regimes would continue to be a permanent feature of the

geo-politicsof Middle Africa. Officials did not welcome this development, believing that

'the realisationof this sombre prospect' had produced an 'atmosphere of disillusion and

introspection' in Middle Africa.'49

As regards the racial tensions between Middle and Southern Africa, officials thought it

right to pursue a general policy of disengagement:'if we could avoid involvement in

African racial conflict and effect a complete political disengagementfrom the problems of

Africa there would be much to be said in favour of doing so'. The paper argued that Africa

was 'a political embarrassmentrather than a source of influence', since it subjected Britain

to political pressure both in the UN and Commonwealth,often working against the balance

of British interests. Whitehall agreed that Britain should avoid involvement in conflicts

involving two non-white groups, whether between separate African states or internal

dissension between tribal or racial groups inside a particular country, as any intervention in

a purely African dispute would risk the charge of neo-colonialism. Any hint of paternalism

in British policy towards Africa had been largely eroded: 'In respect of Commonwealth

Africa we should work towards a relationshipwhich is more appropriate to their status as

fully independent members of the Commonwealthand in which the extent of our

involvement in their affairs is determined primarily by our own essential interests'.

Therefore, Britain would no longer seek to maintain a 'leading role' in Middle and Southern

Africa, making it clear to each side that there were 'definite limits beyond which we [Britain]

are not prepared to go in alienating the other'. The paper concluded:

It is not a heroic position to take, nor even a comfortable one. It is all too

vulnerable to the sort of strictures on our behaviour with which we must

expect the Communist powers to be continually filling the ears of Middle
African governments. We shall no doubt be charged by both sides with

149
ibid
 190

inconsistency and insincerity; and there is always the possibility that we

may reach a point in the end where in a particular crisis any decision we
take will alienate one side or other beyond the limit we have set ourselves
to observe.

The Ministry of Overseas Developmentfelt unable to fully subscribe to the report, believing

that it failed to position aid in its appropriate strategic context, as a key lever for the

developmentand maintenanceof long-term relations with countries in Middle and

Southern Africa.150

Summary.

From the perspective of Whitehall, British disengaged from Africa was largely informed by

geo-politicalconsiderations,namely preventing the spread of Communism and furthering

the position of the West in the Cold War. By granting independenceon the best terms

possible, even to nations considered unready for such a step, officials and ministers hoped

to secure the creation of regimes that would act as constructive members of the

Commonwealthand allies at the United Nations - thereby supportingWestern interests in

the Cold War. By demonstratingthat the highest echelons of Whitehall were primarily

concerned with containing the spread of Communism in Africa, this thesis refutes John

Darwin's contention that the 'constraints of the local situation on the African continent'

were more important than 'international considerations' in determining how Britain

approached the process of decolonisation. Furthermore, it is difficult to substantiate

Harold Macmillan's claim that British decolonisationwas directed by a 'duty to spread to

other nations those advantages which through the course of centuries they had won for

150iODMReservations:Africa Sub-Committee Future Policy Africa', 17 October 1967, CAB 148/77.

on on
 191

themselves', as evidenced by Britain's preparednessto accommodate undemocratic

governments.

Throughout the period under examination, policy-makerswere faced with the constant

difficulty of how to deal with South Africa. Whitehall was torn between two competing

interests: first, Anglo-South African trade was important to Britain's balance of payments,

making it difficult to take an overly hostile stance against Pretoria's policies; secondly,

since developing nations generally looked for unequivocalcondemnationof South Africa, a

failure to openly oppose apartheid had the potential to precipitate the disintegration of the

Commonwealth. Under both Conservativeand Labour governments, Britain attempted to

steer a 'middle course' between these two conflicting objectives. This undermined the

Commonwealthideal in Africa, even after South Africa's departure from the organisation in

1961.

The Labour government's initial hope that Britain could occupy a post-colonial role in

Africa, through the Commonwealthand cultivating better relations with developing nations

by means of a principled stance on South Africa, went largely unachieved, being

undermined by considerations of realpolitik. Britain's relatively poor economic

performance and continuing balance-of-paymentsdifficulties inhibited the fulfillment of

Labour's ambitious programme:cabinet ministers were reluctant to pursue policies that

might undermine Britain's trade with South Africa, a stance that had an adverse impact on

UK relations with the rest of CommonwealthAfrica. Whitehall reacted to Labour's plans by

setting up a sub-committeeon Africa, bringing policy more in line with that of the previous

Conservative government, emphasising the 'secondary importance' of African affairs to

Britain's wider interests. The Ministry for Overseas Developmentwas fairly ineffective in

making its case within Whitehall, finding itself unable to alter the central conclusions of

'Future Policy in Africa', the most important inter-departmentalexamination on Britain's

relations with Africa since 1959.

 192

Chapter IV: British Policy in the Middle East, 1959-1968.

In August 1949, Ernest Bevin, Labour Foreign Secretary under Attlee, told the cabinet

that 'in peace and in war, the Middle East is an area of cardinal importance to the UK,

second only to the UK itself'.' The centrality of the Middle East to Whitehall's

perception of Britain's world role continued into the 1960s, in spite of a loss of prestige

arising from the ignominious Suez debacle in 1956, when President Eisenhower's

threat of withdrawing support for sterling forced Eden (who subsequently resigned as

British Prime Minister) to undertake a complete reversal of policy and strategy.

Utilising recently released documents from British and American archives, this chapter

refutes Anthony Clayton's claim that the Suez crisis represented `the effective end of

the British era' in the Middle East and `brought home to the British government the

reduction of British power and influence'3 Similarly, Ritchie Ovendale's contention that

the 1958 Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon and Jordan `marked the assumption

by the United States of Britain's traditional role in the Middle East', is questioned. It Is

erroneous to suggest that British officials had accepted that such a 'transfer of

responsibility' had taken place, even if Whitehall was in favour of greater US

involvement in the region. Washington and London disagreed on a number of

important issues throughout the period, including the diplomatic recognition of Yemen,

the scale of the threat posed by Nasser, the likelihood of Soviet expansionism, and

general policy towards the emergent nationalist movements in the region. In early

January 1963, Macmillan warned the cabinet that to follow Washington's lead and

recognise Yemen would risk Britain losing its `identity' amongst Arab opinion, which

1 Ernest Bevin quoted In N. Ashton, 'Macmillan and the Middle East' in R. Aldous and S. Lee (eds.), Harold Macmillan
and Britain's World Role, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 38. For the purpose of this thesis the Middle East is
defined as the area covered by Libya In the west and Iran in the east, and Syria in the north and Sudan In the South.
2L Johnman, 'Defending the Pound: The Economics of the Suez Crisis', in A. Gorst, L. Johnman, and W. S. Lucas
(eds.), Postwar Britain, 1945-64: Themes and Perspectives,(London: Pinter in associationwith Institute of
ContemporaryBritish History, 1989), pp. 166-81.
3 A. Clayton, 'Imperial Defence and Strategy, 1900-1968' In J. M. Brown
and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The Oxford
History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 300.
R. Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945-1962,(London: Leicester
University Press, 1996), p. 211.
 193

would 'feel that the independent United Kingdom role in Arabia had been swallowed up

in the PaxAmericana'. 5 For much of the period under examination, it makes sense to

speak of an independent British role in the Middle East: Britain, after all, remained the

only colonial power in the region until 1963; retained close diplomatic relations,

established over previous centuries, with many of the ruling dynasties; and UK forces

were the most prominent in the area, resulting from Britain's possession of a number of

strategically important bases something the US lacked. As one of the two global
-

superpowers, the United States naturally commanded substantial power and influence

in the Middle East, but this was not so overwhelming as to negate Britain to the status

is by John Charmley.6
of pliant satellite state in the post-Suez period, as alleged

The inextricable linkage between international power and economic strength also

meant that Britain's in in

position world affairs was significant part underpinned by

Middle Eastern oil. In 1959, Britain obtained around sixty per cent of its oil

requirements from the region, a dependency that was accentuated throughout the

1960s, due to the lack energy sources.' Additionally, oil from the
of viable alternative

Middle East made a significant contribution to the strength of sterling in two important

ways: firstly, oil was purchased at a preferential foreign exchange cost, which eased

Britain's balance-of-payments difficulties; secondly, Kuwait alleviated pressure on

London's dollar reserves, by selling its oil in sterling. The Kuwaiti government built-up

substantial sterling reserves - totalling £300 million out of £2,631 million banked by

holders in 19618 were reinvested in the UK economy. The

overseas sterling - which
Macmillan government's 'Future Policy Study, 1960-1970', as noted in Chapter II,

emphasised the fundamental importance of a strong currency to Britain's continued

Cabinet minutes, 10 January 1963, CAB 128/112.

6J. Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1940-1957,(London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1995), p. 353.
7 On 20 September 1963, the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, told Macmillan:'despite the
diversificationof sources of oil, Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil would continue to Increase. Because of
this, Her Majesty's Government will be concerned in 1970 even more than today, to secure the uninterruptedflow of oil
Imports at reasonable prices, and there Is no foreseeable alternative to the Middle East as a source of a high proportion
of the supplies needed'. Home to Macmillan, 20 September 1963, PREM 11/4936.
e The British Economy: Key Statistics, 1900-1970,(London: London
and Cambridge Economic Service by Times
Newspapers, 1970), p. 17.
 194

world role - the final report concluding: `the necessary condition for maintaining our

place in the world, is to keep sterling strong' .9 On the other hand, Britain's military

complexes in Cyprus, Libya, Kenya, Aden and the Persian Gulf, designed to defend

UK commitments in the Middle East, involved, as Macmillan recognised, 'enormous

cost, both in foreign exchange and in Government expenditure'.10 Similarly, Britain's

military presence and support for several autocratic regimes tended to aggravate Arab

nationalist opinion, leading to constant accusations of imperialism - an allegation that

devalued British standing amongst many newly independent countries in Africa and

Asia. During the 1960s, Whitehall continually reviewed the economic and political

costs of Britain's military deployment in the region against the benefits acquired from

the acquisition of cheap oil. This chapter addresses how Britain's strategic, military,

economic and political interests in the Middle East changed between 1959 and 1968,

analysing the forces which led Whitehall to pursue a strategy of withdrawal from the

area.

Britain's Main Interests and Obligations in the Middle East.

Policy-makers considered Britain's overriding objectives in the Middle East as

threefold: first, safeguarding the oil trade; secondly, strengthening sterling through oil

operations; and, finally, containing Russian expansionism, countering Soviet and

Egyptian subversion, and preventing the spread of Communism, especially in South

Arabia and the Persian Gulf." Whitehall, with the exception of a few dissenting voices

in the Treasury, viewed Britain's military deployment in the region as a prerequisite to

achieving these aims. In the northern Middle East, Britain had three major military

commitments - membership of the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and treaty

obligations towards Cyprus and Libya. The members of CENTO were Iran, Turkey,

9'Future Policy Study, 1960-70', 24 February 1960, CAB

134/1929.
10Macmillanto Selwyn Lloyd, 12 August 1961, PREM
11/3452.
"'Britain's Obligations Overseas': Memorandum by
the Foreign Office, 14 April 1958, T 2341768.
 195

Pakistan and the UK, while the United States, perhaps mindful of George Washington's

injunction of 'no tangling alliances', adopted associate member status.12 Britain's basic

undertaking with regard to CENTO was 'to co-operate for security and defence'; though

Communist incursion.13
military planning was directed mainly against the threat of

Cyprus supplied the base facilities necessary to support CENTO and operations in the

Levant, while the Anglo-Libyan Treaty (1953) committed Britain to providing military

assistance in the event of attack from Nasser's United Arab Republic (UAR). The

treaty with Libya also provided Britain with staging facilities and overflying rights

necessary for the defence of Kuwait - Britain's 'most important interest' in the Middle

East.14 In addition, Britain was able to access base facilities on an 'informal' basis from

the Sudanese and Ethiopian governments during the early 1960s.

In the southern Middle East, Britain's main interests were centred on Aden, South

Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. These interests were safeguarded through a range

of treaties and agreements with the states in the region: Britain was committed to

assisting the armed forces of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman through a 1958

exchange of letters; responsible for the defence and protection of several South

Arabian sheikdoms, a commitment subsequently extended to encompass the whole of

the British-sponsored South Arabian Federation (SAF), when it was established during

the late 1950s and early 1960s; allied to Kuwait through the Anglo-Kuwaiti Agreement

of 1899, which was replaced by an exchange of letters in June 1961; and had treaties

and other obligations for the defence and protection of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial

States (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah and

12CENTO In the form of the Baghdad Pact originated on 24 February 1955 when Turkey and Iraq signed a pact of
mutual co-operationaimed at ensuring the stability and security of the Middle East against aggression and subversive
penetration. The Pact was open to accession by any other states concerned with the security and peace of the region.
The UK acceded on 5 April 1955, Pakistan on 23 September 1955 and Iran on 3 November 1955. After the July 1958
revolution, Iraq took no further part In the work of the Pact and formally withdrew on 25 March 1959. The headquarters
were transferred to Ankara In October 1958 and the new name, CENTO, was adopted on 25 August 1959. See Pact of
Mutual Co-operationbetween His Majesty the King of Iraq and the President of the Republic of Turkey, Baghdad, Cmd
9859, (London: HMSO, 1955).
13A DOP(O)C paper, submitted to ministers In November 1965,
argued: 'CENTO commits us In practice only against
the Soviet threat; It does not involve us in awkward commitments to Iran against the Arabs, to Pakistan against the
Indians or to Turkey against the Greeks'. 'Defence Review': Cabinet note by Trend, 8 November 1965, CAB 130/213.
" DC minutes, 17 October 1960, CAB 131/21.
 196

Fujairah).15 In the absence of these military commitments, officials believed that local

rulers would seek the best terms possible with their larger neighbours, a development

that would endanger Britain's oil interests, as well as those of other Western powers.

Whitehall generally agreed that the maintenance of the Persian Gulf sheikdoms served

to fill a 'power vacuum' that would otherwise be susceptible to Soviet infiltration.

Britain's political presence in Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States consisted of two

elements: firstly, the conduct of foreign relations, based on exclusive treaties; secondly,

jurisdiction, and a number of other administrative functions, derived partly from custom

and partly from formal agreements. Kuwait had been a British protectorate since 1899,

when the Salisbury government promised support to Mubarak the Great in exchange

for control of Kuwaiti foreign policy. The demand by the Emir of Kuwait for

independence, in early 1961, caused considerable consternation in Whitehall, as

policy-makers were forced to find a way of securing Britain's most important interest in

the Gulf, whilst avoiding undue offence to Kuwaiti sensibilities. On 19 June 1961, as

part of the exchange of letters with the Emir, Kuwait assumed ownership for its own

foreign affairs, but British officials were able to secure an important clause in the

agreement: 'nothing in these conclusions .. .', it was agreed, `... Will affect the

readiness of Her Majesty's Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter
'6
request such assistance'. This statement was less specific than was customary in

instruments constituting a formal defence agreement; however, Sir William Luce, UK

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, was unable to secure the Ruler's agreement to

more precise terms." Politically, Kuwait's independence, especially from Iraq, was

deemed important for the stability of the Gulf and the continuance of good relations

between Britain on the one hand and Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other; both the

latter, it was held, would consider their position weakened by Iraqi annexation of

15'Her Majesty's Government's Defence Commitmentsto Foreign Countries': Memorandumby

the Foreign Office for
the DOP(O)C,22 January 1964, CAB 148/4.
"'Exchange of Notes Regarding Relations Between
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
State of Kuwait', 19 June 1961, PREM 11/3427.
"Cabinet minutes, 13 July 1961, CAB 128/35.
 197

Kuwait. To forestall an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, naval, land and air forces were stationed

in the Persian Gulf, Aden and Kenya. The base facilities in Aden enabled Britain to

intervene directly in Kuwait by supplying 'follow-up' forces to the spearhead units

located in Bahrain. In extreme circumstances, Aden also supplied the capability for the

rapid deployment of British forces elsewhere in the region, by providing the command

and logistical infrastructure necessary to support UK troops stationed in the southern

Gulf.18 The strategic significance of Aden was further enhanced with Kenyan

independence in December 1963, a development that was particularly exasperating for

policy-makers, since Britain had invested £7.5 million on military facilities in Kenya to

mitigate the impact of losing the Suez complex. Even so, officials and ministers had

long been aware about the possibility of such an eventuality. On 23 October 1961,

when Whitehall was attempting to re-cast Britain's defence strategy for the medium

and longer term, Macmillan sent a directive to the Cabinet Defence Committee (DC),

indicating that it should be 'assumed that severe restrictions will be placed on our

freedom to use military facilities in Kenya when it becomes independent not later than

1963; in particular we could no longer count on its use in support of operations in the

Persian Gulf'.19 Britain, along with the United States, depended on CENTO and NATO

to inhibit Soviet ambition in the Persian Gulf, relying also on Iran and Jordan as

bulwarks of pro-Western stability. Economic aid and technical assistance, including

large subsidies to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and technical assistance to Bahrain,

also played an important role in securing Britain's interests and influence in the Persian

Gulf. With the loss of bases in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine in the post-war years

running up to 1959, Whitehall policy-makers recognised that it would be difficult for

Britain to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf in the absence of control of the Aden

base. On 17 October 1960, ministers agreed that retaining military facilities in Aden

18In 1960, Aden was chosen to become Headquarters Middle

of East Command.
19DC directive (originally a letter from Macmillan to Watkinson),
23 November 1961, CAB 131/26.
 198

was of the 'greatest importance... [as] only in this way could we satisfactorily ensure

the protection of our other interests throughout the whole of the Arabian Peninsula'.20

The Decision to Act Unilaterally Against Iraq, 1961.

During the late 1950s, Britain's position in the Middle East was compromised by

deteriorating Anglo-Iraqi relations: in early 1958, for example, the normally Anglophile

Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri es-Said, expressed open discontent at Britain's refusal to

countenance his plan to invite Kuwait to join the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union. On 14

July 1958, underlying tensions were transformed into outright hostility, when Nuri es-

Said and the Hashemite monarchy were removed in a coup d'etat, orchestrated by

Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim, a fervent anti-British Irredentist, who quickly established

close links with the Iraqi Communist Party and adopted a belligerent posture towards

Kuwait. This new threat forced senior ministers to re-consider Britain's military stance

in the Middle East. On 6 May 1959, Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, urged Macmillan to consider establishing in the Persian Gulf a smaller British

version of the US Navy's Mediterranean 6th Fleet, with the capacity to deploy a strike

capability in a 'matter of hours'. For political reasons, Lloyd argued, it was increasingly

difficult to base an adequate number of troops on Arab land to defend UK interests, but

suggested, with a seeming disregard for the cost involved, that 'nobody minds ships

sailing about the sea'.21 On 12 May 1959, in view of the unsettled situation in Iraq,

Macmillan informed the DC that he 'was anxious that all possible preparations to deal

with any threat which might arise to British interests in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf

were being made'.22 Interveningto preventan Iraqi attack on Kuwaitwas morethan a

20DC minutes, 16 and 17 October 1960, CAB 131/23.

21Selwyn Lloyd to Macmillan,9 May 1959, PREM 11/2753. On
16 and 17 October, when the DC met at Chequers and
Admiralty House, to discuss military strategy for circumstances
short of total war, this idea was finally shelved, it being
agreed that it was 'doubtful' whether Britain's strategic interests In the Arabian Peninsula'could be met by an alternative
seabome/airbome strategy which, in any case, would be prohibitively expensive'. DC minutes 16 and 17 October 1959,
CAB 131/23.
22DC minutes, 12 May 1959, CAB 131/21.
 199

matter of simply defending Britain's stake in Middle Eastern oil: policy-makers also had

to consider the possible political repercussions of such a military operation - notably,

the potential reaction of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Relations Office

(CRO) was concerned that such an intervention might cause irreparable damage to the

Commonwealth. On 5 June 1959, the Earl of Home, Secretary of State for

Commonwealth Relations, presented a memorandum to the DC, warning that military

action against Iraq, or any other Arab state, could 'mean the break up of the

Commonwealth as we at present know it', advising that the 'new Commonwealth (and

Canada) would be bitterly opposed to such an action, raising the possibility of India and

other countries feeling to

obligated secede from the 23
organisation. To use military

means to forestall an Iraqi attack thus ran the risk of causing acute damage to the

Commonwealth, an organisation many policy-makers considered vital to Britain's

position as a world power. On the other hand, Britain's standing in the Commonwealth

might be seriously impaired by Kuwait's loss to Iraq, by causing severe disruption to

the delicate balance of the sterling area. In mid-1959, Macmillan was so concerned

about the Iraqi threat that he agreed to Selwyn Lloyd's recommendation of attempting

to forge a detente with Nasser. The Foreign Office hoped that this initiative (which

eventually failed due to mutual hostility) would serve to create tensions between

Baghdad and Cairo, thus preventing the creation of a powerful pan-Arab bloc.24

On 25 June 1961, British fears concerning a potential Iraqi attack on Kuwait were

heightened, when Qassim rejected the validity of the Anglo-Kuwaiti exchange of letters

(which had been agreed only six days earlier). Qassim declared Kuwait to be an

'inseparable part of Iraq', on the grounds that Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman

Empire subject to Iraqi suzerainty, indicating his intention to appoint the Emir as

Qaimmaqam (cantonal chief) of Kuwait under Basra province25 This statement

23'Likely CommonwealthReactionsto UK or UKIUS Military Intervention In

the Middle East': DC memorandumby Lord
Home, 5 June 1959, CAB 131/21.
Z' Lloyd to Macmillan,25 May 1959, PREM 11/3266.
25The Times,26 June 1961. p. 10.
 200

exacerbated tensions between Baghdad and London, leading to the mobilisation of

7,000 British troops - the largest UK military deployment in the Middle East between

Suez in 1956 and the 1990-91 Gulf War - to counter a potential Iraqi attack. Since UK

armed forces lacked the capability to expel an occupying Iraqi army, requiring a

minimum of four days' in to

notice which prepare to defend Kuwait, Britain invited the

Emir to submit a formal request for assistance under clause (d) of the Anglo-Kuwaiti

agreement - on two separate occasions: 29 and 30 June 1961. Once the

concentration of Iraqi forces in the Basra area had been completed, British officials

warned the Emir, Iraq might invade Kuwait in a 'matter of hours, possibly under cover

of darkness' 2ß As soon as British troops landed in Kuwait, ministers considered it

'highly likely that Iraq would break off diplomatic relations with the UK and would seize

the assets of the Iraq Petroleum Company, but agreed that this 'risk had to be

7
accepted'. On receipt of the request for assistance from Kuwait on 30 June, DC

ministers took the decision to mobilise British troops on 1 July 196128 This action,

known within government circles as 'Operation Vantage', forced Qassim to abort any

plans for invasion.' On 6 July 1961, Macmillan informed the cabinet that the military

situation in Kuwait was 'satisfactory', with 'no indication of an imminent Iraqi attack'. 30

Nevertheless, Britain's military intervention was subjected to strong international

criticism, especially from Arab countries: for example, in a debate in the United Nations

Security Council, the UAR representative condemned Britain's action, even though

Egypt had allowed a substantial force of British warships - en route to Kuwait - access

through the Suez Canal.3' Despite such condemnation, 'Operation Vantage' ensured

26See DC minutes, 29 and 30 June 1961, CAB 131/26; Cabinet minutes, 29 and 30 June 1961, CAB 128/35. On 27
April 1959, ministers agreed to establish military plans on the means required to evict an occupying Iraqi army from
Kuwait, but it was subsequently decided that such an operation would be militarily unviable. DC minutes, 27 April 1959,
CAB 131/25.
27DC minutes, 29 June 1961, CAB 131/26.
28DC minutes, 30 June 1961, CAB 131/26; Cabinet minutes, 3 July 1961, CAB 128/35.
29For a detailed account of 'Operation Vantage' see M. Alami, Operation Vantage:British Military Interventionin Kuwait
(London: LAAM, 1990); M. Snell-Mendoza,'In Defence of Oil: Britain's Responseto the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait, 1961'.
ContemporaryRecord, vol. 10, No. 3, (1996); N. Ashton, 'A Microcosm of Decline: British Loss of Nerve and Military
Intervention In Jordan and Kuwait, 1958 and 1961', Historical Journal, vol. 40, No. 4, (December, 1997);
N. Ashton, 'Britain and the Kuwaiti Crisis, 1961', Diplomacy and Statecraft,vol. 9, No. 1, (March, 1998).
30Cabinet minutes, 6 July 1961, CAB 128/35.
3' Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement, 1959-1963(New York: United Nations, 1965),
pp.
192-193. Also available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertolrel.
 201

Kuwait's continued membership of the sterling area, whilst securing the continued flow

of oil on favourable terms, with no serious damage caused to Britain's relations with the

wider Commonwealth. Although not actively opposed by the United States, Britain's

intervention to defend Kuwait provides a tangible illustration of the UK assuming a

leading role in Middle Eastern affairs; Macmillan even felt able to decline an offer of

assistance from the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who proposed making a US

naval force off the coast of Madagascar available to support British operations in the

Persian Gulf.32 John Charmley's claim that Britain's post-Suez policy was based on

'total subservience' to the United States therefore requires re-assessment. Britain

retained the ability to act independently in the Middle East after Suez; for this reason,

Charmley's argument that the UK was 'not so much a forty-ninth state as a satellite

state' over-emphasises the weakness of Britain's position vis-ä-vis the United States33

A Questioning of the Kuwait Commitment?

The Future Policy Committee (FPC), as part of its examination of British overseas

military expenditure and commitments, considered the success of 'Operation Vantage'

and the value of Britain's relations with Kuwait The Whitehall post-mortem into the

Kuwaiti intervention was not wholly positive, highlighting serious inter-departmental

differences as to how Britain should defend its commitments in the Middle East. The

British mobilisation, whilst an operational success, demonstrated the need to be able to

deploy forces more quickly in the defence of Kuwait. Harold Watkinson, Minister of

Defence, warned his cabinet colleagues that Britain would now require 36 hours' notice

to put a'substantial force' into Kuwait35 In order to meet the commitment towards

32DC minutes, 3 July 1961, CAB 131/26.

33Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance, 353.
p.
34The Future Policy Committeewas an ad hoc Inter-departmental
committee, which reported to the Defence
Committee.
'Kuwait: Cabinet memorandumby Watkinson, 1 September 1961, CABS 129/106; Cabinet minutes, 5 September
1961, CAB 128/35.
 202

Kuwait, Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials advised that it would be necessary to

deploy troops in a 'more forward position', entailing the construction of new air-

conditioned barracks in Bahrain, at a cost of approximately £600,000. The Treasury,

resolutely committed to reducing the total level of governmental defence spending,

opposed this additional expenditure. Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet,

supported this viewpoint, a somewhat unusual occurrence, given that he rarely (in spite

of also holding the position of Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury) acted as an

advocate for the Treasury's position in matters of foreign policy. On 4 September

1961, Brook told Macmillan that he saw the Kuwaiti intervention as an out-dated policy

of 'extracting oil concessions from an autocratic Ruler in return for military protection

' and that he believed Britain was fighting '. a losing battle in propping up these
... ..
reactionary regimes' Such sentiment was not far removed from the views expressed

by Hashim Jawad, Iraq's Foreign Minister, in an address to the United Nations General

Assembly: 'Under the guise of nominal independence of Kuwait and with the support of

military forces stationed in a number of points in this area, Britain is trying to safeguard

its colossal oil interests, and ensure the continued vast financial investment of the

Shaikh of Kuwait in Britain which have been, and still are, important factors in the

British economy'.37 Furthermore, Brook contended that the Emir of Kuwait's

rapprochement with the Arab League (which Kuwait joined on 31 July 1961) would

make him less reliant on his 'special relationship' with Britain. The Emir, he suggested,

was bound to come under increasing pressure to make a greater proportion of his oil

revenues available for Arab development; in order to achieve this, he would have to

extract a larger contribution from Western oil companies, resulting in a decline (or, at

least, no increase) in his sterling balances. In these circumstances (which Brook felt

highly likely to materialise), the raison d'etre of the MoD plan for new facilities in

Bahrain would become obsolete in a relatively short period of time. Accordingly, Brook

36Brook
to Macmillan,
4 September
1961,
PREM
11/3430.
37The Tlmes,7 October 1961, p. 6. Joseph Gobder, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that such accusations
were a 'misrepresentation'of British policy.
 203

believed that British policy should rely upon political and diplomatic means of influence,

arguing that there were fewer and fewer places where garrisons of foreign troops

represented an acceptable and advisable instrument of foreign 38

policy. On 5

September 1961, similar views were expressed at a meeting of the cabinet, where it

was argued that Britain would have to 'rely increasingly on political methods' to secure

its interests in Kuwait.39 Brook tried to convince Macmillan that greater economies in

expenditure could be achieved if the UK reduced its obligations towards Kuwait,

suggesting that it would be unwise to maintain this commitment for more than a 'few

years'. British policy, Brook lamented, took no account of the rising tide of nationalism

in the Middle East; and, for so long as this was the case, he believed that Britain was

bound, in the end, to find itself on the 'losing side'. Additionally, Britain's ability to

intervene in Kuwait would soon be undermined by Kenyan independence, since it was

doubtful that the UK could find, or even afford, facilities as extensive as those in

Kenya ao

Conversely, Foreign Office officials rejected the suggestion that Britain should

abrogate, or even revise, its commitment to defend Kuwait. The Foreign Office, allied

with the other 'overseas' departments and the Ministry of Defence, worked in concert to

outmaneuver the powerful Whitehall axis of Brook and the Treasury, whose opposition

to building new facilities in Bahrain merely served to postpone a final decision on

Britain's long-term commitment towards Kuwait. On October 1961, Edward Heath,

Lord Privy Seal and Minister of State at the Foreign Office, told the cabinet that there

was no practicable alternative, at any rate for some time ahead, to military measures

as the most practical means of safeguarding Kuwaiti independence. The cabinet

approved Heath's recommendation that new facilities be constructed in Bahrain, on the

grounds that this would `provide a reasonable military insurance against Kuwait being

38Brook to Macmillan,4 September 1961, PREM 11/3430.

39Cabinet minutes, 5 September 1961, CAB 128/35.
40Brook to Macmillan, 13 September 1961, PREM 11/3430.
 204

over-run by Iraq' 41 Brook had tried to prevent such a decision, advising Macmillan

that the Foreign Office would be 'more likely' to take a 'realistic view' of political

developments, if it knew that the cabinet was 'unwilling to authorise the increased

expenditure'.42 Despite its operational success, Britain's intervention in Kuwait was in

effect a Pyrrhic Victory, it

as served to inhibit to
attempts re-evaluate British policy in

the region. The Foreign Office repeatedly cited the Kuwaiti intervention as an example,

par excellence, of Britain's ability to maintain regional stability, which was seen as a

pre-requisite for the continued flow of oil (on reasonable terms) and the containment of

Soviet and pan-Arab influence. The success of 'Operation Vantage' merely served to

reinforce the traditional British policy of defending Middle Eastern oil interests through

military means.

The Treasury's ability to make its case on the need to reduce overseas expenditure

was severely compromised by the membership of the FPC, which consisted of

representatives from the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial

Office, and Ministry of Defence, in addition to the Chief of the Defence Staff, First Sea

Lord, Chief of the Air Staff and Chief of the Imperial General Staff, all of whom had a

vested interest in maintaining high levels of defence and overseas expenditure. On 7

September 1961, when the FPC considered a Treasury paper on the relationship

between overseas military expenditure and the balance of payments, the potent

combination of the 'overseas' departments and military establishment conspired to

oppose the Treasury's case. The Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Mountbatten, in

spite of his limited appreciation of macroeconomic matters, questioned the Treasury's

41Cabinet minutes, 5 October 1961, CAB 128/35; 'Kuwait': Cabinet memorandum by Heath, 2 October 1961, CAB
129/106. Heath's memorandumcontained an annexed report, reviewingfuture UK policy towards Kuwait, by an ad hoc
official committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Office, but containing representativesfrom the Ministry of
Defence, Treasury and Ministry of Power. This report concluded: 'Our economic stake In Kuwait Itself, and the central
importance of Kuwait to our oil operations in this whole area, are such that we should take all reasonablemeasures that
we can to protect Kuwait... a British military presence In the area must be maintained which is sufficient both to deter
Iraq by being demonstrably in a position to prevent Iraqi forces overrunning Kuwait and, failing deterrence, to Intervene
in time to hold Kuwait itself In the face of Iraqi attacks on the scale and timing we believe possible. No lesser military
presence will achieve our objective In Kuwait'.
42Brook to Macmillan,4 September 1961, PREM 11/3430.
 205

argument that balance-of-payments difficulties should be addressed by an examination

of Britain's international commitments:

There was grave objection to seeking to remedy this [the balance-of-

payments position] by means of [an] arbitrary and unjustified reduction in
military expenditure overseas... Instead of seeking economies by
limiting our military ability to meet our international obligations, the right
course should be to pursue more vigorously positive polices designed to
improve the nation's economic efficiency and competitiveness.

Similarly, Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office

(described by Macmillan as 'so skilled and reliabler43),suggested that a reduction in

military efforts overseas would disproportionately affect Britain's international influence,

making it imperative 'to concentrate on positive policies to improve our overseas

44
earnings'. The composition of the FPC thus made it difficult for the Treasury to

secure the economies in overseas expenditure it deemed necessary to ensure

improved economic performance, through increased exports and a balance-of-

payments surplus -a precondition, in the view of Treasury officials, for 'keeping sterling

strong'.

South Arabia and Aden: A Seemingly Intractable Problem.

Britain's position in the Middle East was complicated by the constitutional situation in

the Protectorate of South Arabia (or Aden Protectorate) and the Crown Colony of

Aden. Successive British governments had been content to leave the governance of

the South Arabian hinterland to the ruling Sheiks and Sultans. As a result, Britain

possessed only limited jurisdiction in the East and West Protectorates of South Arabia -

43HMD, Departmentof Western Manuscripts, Bodleian Library, University Oxford,

of d 37, entry for 23 October 1959.
44Future Policy Committee minutes, 7 October 1961, CAB
134/1932.
 206

an area that has been aptly described as 'informal' Empire. 5 Unfortunately, from the

perspective of British policy-makers, the Protectorate rulers were prone to fractious

disagreement; such disputes jeopardised the security of Aden, as they served to

destabilise South Arabia, making the area more susceptible to pan-Arab infiltration.

The Conservative government tried to rectify this situation in 1958, when it encouraged

six sultanates in the Western Protectorate (Beihan, Audhali, Fadhi, Dhala, Upper

Aulaqi and Lower Yafa) to join together in a federation. This objective was achieved in

1959, when the six states formed the Federation of Arab Amirates of the South

(restyled in 1962 'the Federation of South Arabia'), with Britain underwriting the

enterprise by its
retaining role as the protecting power. 6 Macmillan claimed in his

memoirs that the Federation was established to 'improve prosperity' in South Arabia,

though the rulers were largely persuaded by the necessity of being able to collectively

resist annexation by neighboring Yemen. 7 Later in 1959, Lahej was admitted to the

Federation, while Lower Aulaqi, Dathina, Wahidi, Sha'ibi, Haushabi and Upper Aulaqi

joined in subsequent years.

As the Protectorate rulers feared that 'nationalist' elements in Aden might precipitate

the Colony's absorption into Yemen, an event that would undermine their position in

the hinterland, pressure was put on Whitehall to include Aden within the federal

structure. South Arabian fears had been greatly accentuated by Yemeni migration into

Aden; by 1965, the population of Aden contained 50,000 Adenis and 80,000

Yemenis48 As the South Arabian sheikdoms' support was essential to continued

British control of the base facilities in Aden, Whitehall was eventually moved to

appease demands for merger, but only after prolonged inter-departmental debate. The

45See G. Balfour-Paul,'Britain's Informal Empire In the Middle East' In Brown and Louis (eds.), Oxford History of the
British Empire.
46The full text of the 1959 Treaty can be found In Cmnd 2451, (London: HMSO, 1964). Article III of the 1959 Treaty
stated: 'Britain shall take such steps as may at any time in the opinion of Britain be necessary or desirable for the
defence of the Federationand after consultation with the Federation for Its Internal security'.
" H. Macmillan,At the End of the Day, 1961-63,(London: Macmillan, 1973), 264.
p.
'8 'The Security Situation In Aden', CIA Intelligence memorandum, 9 June 1965, FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI,
Document 61. Aden's 250,000 population was divided between 50,000 Aden Arabs, 80,000 Yemenis (mostly
labourers), 40,000 hillmen from the hinterland and 80,000 people of Indian origin.
 207

Foreign Office viewed holding on to Aden and retaining the support of the Federal

rulers as of paramount importance:

It seems clear that the present British system in the Arabian Peninsula
forms a delicate structure of which the parts are mutually supporting.
The removal of any one prop may result in the collapse of the whole
structure. For if Her Majesty's Government seemed to waver in their
determination to hold Aden or reduce their support of any member of the
"Rulers' Club", the whole area would be affected ... we should have
embarked upon a process which would almost certainly end in the
elimination of our influence, and the division of the area between the
local Powers.49

On the other hand, a merger of Aden Colony and the Federation was questioned by

Julian Amery, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, who maintained

that Britain should 'work to separate the Colony from the Protectorate as much as we

can both by administrative measures and more particularly by encouraging the

Federation to develop along traditional South Arabian lines and the Colony along

modern diarchical lines'. Amery, a rara avis who took a specialist interest in

strategically important colonies, argued that Aden was a vital 'fortress colony' of such

geo-political value that British control should be defended at all costs 50

Aden's Legislative Council was prepared to co-operate in a merger with the SAF, but

unwilling to enter serious negotiations with the Protectorate rulers until Aden Colony

had attained a degree of political and constitutional responsibility. Specifically, it was

proposed that well before January 1963, when the Legislative Council's term was due

to come to an end, Aden's constitution be amended in such a way as to allow the

elected representatives responsibility for internal matters, leaving Britain to administer

Aden's external relations and defence; once this constitutional change was

implemented, a negotiated merger with the Federation would take place. lain Macleod,

49iBritain's
Obligations
Overseas':
Memorandum
bytheForeign
Office, T 234/768.
14April1958,
50'Long-term
policy in Aden': minute by Amery, 10 March 1959, CO 1015/1910.
 208

Secretary of State for the Colonies, argued that to thwart this expectation of further

self-government would disappoint 'moderate' opinion in Aden, which would become

'unable to sustain its position against the [Yemeni] nationalists'."' The Federal rulers of

South Arabia, like Whitehall and Aden's Legislative Council, characterised the Yemenis

living in Aden - who were disenfranchised but well represented in the pro-Nasser Aden

Trade Union Congress (ATUC) - as "enemies within", requiring containment. On 12

July 1960, Macleod informed the Colonial Policy Committee (CPC) that the activities of

the ATUC were closely linked with 'hostile elements' in other Arab countries, whose

'aim was to use industrial unrest as a means of undermining the British position in both

the Colony and the Aden Protectorate' 52

In March 1961, Sir Charles Johnston, Governor-General of Aden, proposed that

British policy should be aimed at 'a merger of the Colony and Protectorate into a single

Union', as this offered the best means of enabling Britain to retain free use of Aden's

defence facilities with the greatest practicable measure of consent.53 Three months

later, at a meeting of the CPC, Macleod argued that 'the best chances of preserving

our defence facilities in Aden lay in the proposal for a merger of the Colony and the

Protectorate, since only in this way could the friendship of the Protectorate Rulers,

which was of vital importance, be maintained'.54 At an earlier meeting of the CPC,

Harold Watkinson questioned the wisdom of such a policy, asserting that he 'would

prefer to leave matters in Aden as they now were' 65 On 30 May 1961, this matter

came to a head in cabinet, with Macleod and Amery submitting separate memoranda

on the subject of constitutional development in Aden. Macleod repeated the familiar

arguments in favour of amalgamation, maintaining that, since constitutional change in

Aden was 'inescapable', it was 'imperative' that new franchise arrangements be

s' 'Constitutional DevelopmentIn Aden': CPC memorandum by Macleod, 3 May 1961, CAB 134/1560.
52CPC minutes, 12 July 1960, CAB 134/1559; 'Aden Colony Industrial Unrest': CPC by Macleod, 6 July
- memorandum
1960, CAB 134/1559.
0 Johnston to Macleod, 3 March 1961, CO 1015/2392. Also
see 'Constitutional Developmentin Aden': CPC
memorandumby Macleod, 3 May 1961, CAB 134/1560.
5' CPC minutes, 16 May 1961, CAB 134/1560; 'Consttutional Development In Aden': CPC
memorandumby Macleod,
12 May 1961, CAB 134/1560.
CPC minutes, 5 May 1961, CAB 134/1560.
 209

worked out before the next elections, so as to preserve the position of the 'moderate'

political leaders in the Legislative Council; in parallel with this process, Macleod

suggested, it would be 'expedient' to encourage amalgamation, 'partly because this

was the best way of preserving the friendship of the Rulers and partly because a union

of the British territories in South Arabia would hold out the best hope of retaining our

defence facilities for the longest possible period'. Amery, who had moved from the

Colonial Office to become Secretary of State for Air, adopted an uncompromising

position, contending that merger would lead to earlier demands for independence, in

which case use of Aden's defence facilities would rest on a treaty agreement, rather

than British sovereignty. In view of the likely spread of 'nationalist' influences in Aden,

Amery thought it 'doubtful' whether much reliance could be placed upon a treaty,

particularly as the defence facilities would be needed mainly for operations against

other Arab states. Pulling his support behind Macleod, Watkinson said that, while it

would suit Britain better if the 'present position remained unchanged', some

constitutional development in Aden was 'inevitable', if the support of the moderates

was to be maintained; this made merger 'unavoidable', and if this was not encouraged,

Britain might 'lose the support and friendship' of the Protectorate rulers.56 After further

discussion, ministers rejected Amery's argument, accepting Macleod's contention that

to keep the Federation and Aden separate would be 'disastrous' for Britain's relations

with the Federal Rulers. In May 1962, Johnston neatly summarised Aden's new found

importance: 'The fact is that, after many years as the imperial Cinderella, Aden has

suddenly been promoted to prima ballerina'.57 In July 1962, when the rulers of the

Federation and Aden ministers met at a conference in London to discuss merger plans,

British officials agreed that Aden Colony (excluding Perim and the Kuria Muria islands)

should become part of the SAF not later than 1 March 1963, securing agreement that

56Cabinetminutes,30 May 1961,CAB 128/35.

57Johnston to Maudling, 17 May 1962,
FO 371/162784/B 1051/20.
 210

British sovereignty of Aden Colony (which was to become Aden State) would not be

affected.5s

Britain's difficulties in South Arabia were further accentuated when Colonel Abdullah

al-Sallal seized power from Imam Muhammad al-Badr during the September 1962

Yemeni revolution. Sallal was a close political ally of Nasser, who quickly cemented

his support for the coup by sending two Egyptian divisions, totalling 20,000 troops, into

Yemen, ostensibly to help the "People's struggle in Southern Arabia". (Nasser, it

should be noted, was trying to re-establish his reputation in the Arab world following

Syria's acrimonious departure from the UAR on 28 September 1961.) In Aden,

Abdullah al-Asnag, leader of the PSP-ATUC, welcomed the coup and demanded the

immediate withdrawal of British troops so that the colony could join the new Yemeni

Republic. The tripartite grouping of Nasser, Sallal and Asnag collaborated to

undermine Britain's position in Aden, with the last organising strikes and

demonstrations that were to lead to outbreaks of violence. All the same, Foreign Office

officials tended to exaggerate the closeness of Asnag's ties to Cairo: the American

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed it more apt to describe him as 'a Baathist

rather than a Nasserist'.59

On 23 September 1962, Aden's Legislative Council, after much cajoling from

Johnston, voted in favour of joining the Federation. In bringing about this outcome, of

which a substantial body of Adeni opinion was opposed, Johnston noted that it would

have been wrong for'us [Britain] to be inhibited by distorted versions of our own

democratic belief'. If Aden had refused to merge with the SAF and had evolved

separately towards independence, Johnston believed that the Protectorate rulers would

have been forcibly reoriented towards Yemen 60 Nevertheless, Aden's incorporation

into the Federation (in January 1963) failed to solve Whitehall's problems, as a

58See Report of the South Arabian Conference,Cmnd 2414, (London: HMSO, 1964).
59'Outlookfor Aden and the South Arabian Federation': Special MemorandumPrepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency, FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI, Document 67.
80iAden:Valedictory Reflectionsof Sir Charles Hepburn Johnston K.C.M.G.', 16 July 1963, PREM 11/4936.
 211

dangerous conflict soon developed between the Adenis and the leaders of the

Protectorate. Aden, a possession of the British Crown since 1839, had a reasonably

developed political infrastructure and well-educated population when compared to the

rest of South Arabia, which incorporated a number of semi-feudal sheikdoms. To

complicate matters further, the People's Socialist Party (PSP), which was based on the

ATUC, had begun to emerge as a political force."' The tribal leaders, on the other

hand, feared at worst their overthrow, or at best a reduction in their traditional powers,

resulting from increased political and economic participation by an Adeni population

that included many non-Muslims and non-Arabs. Denis Healey, who was highly critical

of the Conservative government's policy, later remarked that this 'was like expecting

Glasgow City Council to work smoothly with seventeenth century Highland chiefs'62

In November 1962, Macmillan explained to President Kennedy the rationale

underpinning Britain's policy towards South Arabia: 'If we lost the Protectorate we

should be left with Aden. But Aden was not like Gibraltar, which could be defended. If

we lost the Protectorate and were in serious trouble in Aden, still worse if we lost Aden,

we should be deprived of all means of defending our clients in the Gulf' 83 Taking

account of recent events in Yemen, Johnston argued in favour of reducing British

control over the Federation: We shall need to think and act in a very different way to

get the Federation to assume adult responsibilities as quickly as possible and to move

away from the present system of controls and supervision to one of aid and co-

operation'.64 This policy course implied giving an independent SAF responsibility for

protecting the base in Aden. Duncan Sandys considered this approach too radical and

argued in favour of establishing an 'advisory relationship' with Aden (similar to the

other states in the Federation), believing that Britain had to retain sovereignty over the

61Duncan Sandys described the PSP

as an'extreme nationalist and pro-Yemeni movement. See"Aden': DOPC
memorandumby Sandys, 2 December 1963, CAB 148/15.
62D. Healey, Time of my Life, (London: Penguin,
1989), p. 281.
63Macmillan, End of the Day, p. 272. Added
emphasis.
64Johnston to J. C. Morgan, 6 November 1962, CO
1015/2597.
 212

essential base 65
areas As both Johnston and Sandys were looking for the best way of

preserving Britain's Middle Eastern role, it would be misguided to view Johnston as far

seeing and his ministerial superior as not. In his valedictory dispatch, Johnston gave a

trenchant defence of Britain's global role:

Nationally speaking the British have been an extrovert people since the
reign of the first Elizabeth. The habit of looking outwards over the seas
has supplied a stimulus which their rather stolid national character badly
needs, a welcome element of leaven in what General de Gaulle so
disobligingly describes as "la lourde pate" of the British temperament...
Unless somehow or other she can continue to look outwards Britain may
all too easily find herself becoming a very dull place -a sort of poor
man's Sweden... All the more reason, in my submission, for keeping up
our special links with which, like South Arabia, are of traditional British
concern.66

The desire to avoid becoming 'another Sweden', highlighted in Chapter II, permeated

Britain's political establishment, which remained committed to a global, not merely a

regional, role. Philip de Zulueta brought Johnston's valedictory dispatch to the

attention of Macmillan, who described it as 'a brilliant document which deserves to be

67
acted upon' Johnston recommended that South Arabian independence should be

granted by 1969, believing that'the easiest relationship with an Arab country is in the

post-Treaty or last phase of all' Home, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
.
found this difficult to reconcile with another passage in Johnston's dispatch, which

argued: What cannot be provided for in South Arabia is any guarantee of stability in

the mid-term period, that is to say in the years immediately following independence'.

Granting independence to the SAF in 1969, Home suggested, would have to be

decided, not so much on the terms enunciated by Johnston, but on a 'hard-headed

65Sandys to Macmillan, 9 October 1963, PREM 11/4936.

66'Aden:Valedictory Reflections Sir Charles Hepburn
of Johnston K.C.M.G.', 16 July 1963, PREM 11/4936.
67P. de Zulueta to Macmillan, 30 August 1963, PREM
11 August 1963; Macmillanto Home, 2 September 1963, PREM
11/4936.
 213

assessment' as to whether Britain in 1969 would have the same interest in supporting

the independence of Kuwait, and whether in the light of this it was necessary to have

use of the Aden base.68

On 3 February 1964, Sandys told a delegation of Conservative MPs, who had

recently returned from a visit to Aden, that he was 'rather chary' about giving increased

powers to the Federation to control Aden State, whilst accepting that this would no

doubt be the right course to follow eventually.69 After much inter-departmental

discussion, the cabinet rejected Sandys' position (despite support from Home), on the

grounds that Aden's political leaders were opposed to such an 'advisory relationship'.70

During May 1964, Sandys visited Aden, holding separate talks with the Federal rulers,

representatives of the PSP and ATUC, and ministers of the Aden Legislative Council.

Representing the opinion of the Federal rulers, Sultan Ahmed bin Abdullah al-Fadhli

[OBE] said that after independence it would be possible for Britain to retain the base

areas on similar arrangements made to those in Malaysia. At the same time as

becoming independent, however, it would be necessary for the Federation Government

to assume full power over all its subjects, including those in Aden itself7' At the

meeting of representatives of the PSP/ATUC, Mohamed Salem Ali argued that Aden

and the Protectorate constituted part of 'the national Yemen', reiterating his party's

belief in Arab unity. Asked about independence for South Arabia, he said that the PSP

was against the British Government granting any kind of "'counterfeit' independence,

i.e. independence to Governments not based on the whole of the people'.72 At the final

meeting with members of the Aden Legislative Council, Baharoon, Aden's Chief

Minister, said that he would like a 'target date' to be set for the independence of the

Federation; the preliminary view of the Aden Ministers was that this should be in about

6' Home to Macmillan,20 September 1963, PREM

11/4936.
69'Noteof a Meeting Between the Secretary State
of and Three Conservative MPs on Aden', 3 February 1964, Sandys
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8121.
° Cabinet minutes, 24 February 1964, CAB 148/1
"'Note of a Meeting Between the Secretary
of State and Federal Rulers at Government House, Aden', 11 May 1964,
Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8/21.
72'Note of a Meeting Between the Secretary State
of and Representativesof the PSP and ATUC at Government House,
Aden', 12 May 1964, Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge)
DSND 8/21.
 214

two years time. After independence, he thought the relationship between Britain and

the Federation would have to be based on 'mutual interests'; accordingly, there was no

reason why the British Government should not be able to retain the base, provided the

local governments benefited from it. In July 1964, Sandys informed representatives

from the Federation and Aden governments that Britain was prepared to accede to

their request that British sovereignty over Aden should be renounced as soon as

possible (in order that the constitutional status of Aden should be raised to that of the

other states in the Federation), subject to the continued exercise by the British

government of such powers as may be necessary for the defence of South Arabia and

the fulfillment of Britain's world-wide responsibilities.73 Sandys announced this in a

written reply on 31 July 1964, the last working day of Parliament before the General

Election; Anthony Greenwood, Sandys' successor at the Colonial Office, informed the

incoming Labour government that this was done 'so that there was no opportunity to

challenge it'.74

With funds and arms supplied by the UAR from its base in Yemen, nationalists

groups were able to instigate an increasingly active terrorist campaign in Aden. In the

spring of 1964, UAR support in the SAF was given further impetus by the British

retaliatory bombing of Harib, a small Yemeni town - an action deplored by the United

Nations Security Council, and condemned as being incompatible with the principles

and purposes of the United Nations (UN) 7*' During cabinet discussion on the response
.
that should be made in the Security Council, R. A. Butler (now Foreign Secretary)

informed his colleagues that the United States might vote against Britain. If

Washington felt unable to support the UK position in debate, Butler predicted 'serious

repercussions' for Anglo-American relations.76 Following a vote on Harib in the UN

73Report of the South Arabian Conference,Cmnd 2414, (London: HMSO, 1964).

"'Policy in Aden and the Protectorate South Arabia': DOPC
of memorandumby Greenwood, 30 December 1964, CAB
148/17.
75See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement,
1965-65(New York: United Nations, 1968), pp.
127-129. Also available at httpJ/www.un.org/Depts/dpa/repertoiret.
76Cabinet minutes, 9 April 1964, CAB 128/38.
 215

(China, France and the Soviet Union voted for the resolution; Britain and the United

States abstained), Home, Macmillan's successor as Prime Minister, told the cabinet

that the 'incident had shown that we should be liable to encounter increasing difficulty

in maintaining our position in southern Arabia', but urged the need to make a renewed

attempt to enlist Washington's co-operation in the measures that would be required to

maintain possession of the Aden base. Whilst it was important for Britain not to

'imperil' its relations with other Arab states, particularly Kuwait and Libya, by appearing

to indulge in unnecessary aggression against Yemen, Home believed it essential to 'be

resolute in maintaining our position in southern Arabia'." On 5 May 1964, following up

on Home's request that ministers make greater efforts to enlist American support on

Britain's position in Aden, Sandys met with Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Stressing the need for Anglo-American unity on

this issue, Sandys argued that it was disappointing that Britain found 'considerable'

American reluctance to come out 'firmly and clearly in support of their friends' when the

UK needed to take action in defence of its interests in other parts of the world; on such

occasions, Washington seemed to be 'easily deterred' by their wish not to do anything

which would be criticised by Afro-Asian opinion. It had been necessary for Britain to

take 'strictly limited measures' against the Harib Fort, Sandys contended, in order to

deter the Yemen from continuing their long-standing policy of provocation and

incursions into British territory, expressing regret that the United States had intended to

vote against the UK in the Security Council and would have done so but for a personal

appeal by the Prime Minister to the President.78

On 27 April 1964, Butler met with Rusk to discuss issues arising from Nasser's

policies towards the SAF. Butler argued that the UK and US should frame a joint

Anglo-American policy to cope with Nasser, informing Rusk that he doubted whether

American aid to Egypt (or'any act of friendliness') was in the Western interest. Butler

"Cabinet minutes, 16 April 1964, CAB 128/38.

78iNoteof the CommonwealthSecretary's Talks
with Senator Fulbright In the Commonwealth Relations Office', 5 May
1964, Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8/21.
 216

labelled Nasser as unreliable and untrustworthy, pointing out that he had reneged on

his promise to reduce the military strength of the UAR in Yemen, which had risen to

40,000 troops. Butler reaffirmed his commitment to establishing a stable federation

and the continued use of the Aden base facilities, informing the Americans that the

base facilities and the hinterland constituted a 'vital interest to the British government

which must be preserved at all costs'. Butler proposed that Britain and the United

States should recognise the link between Moscow, the UAR, Yemen and Somalia,

going as far as to claim that the Soviet Union was now in a position to undertake a

'pincer movement' on the region.79 In September 1964, Butler submitted a detailed

memorandum on Anglo-American relations to the cabinet, arguing that the United

States ought to bring greater pressure to bear upon Nasser to moderate his campaign

against Britain's position in the Middle East and in particular to curb Yemeni subversion

in South Arabia. Butler suggested that Washington was 'not prepared to be too closely

associated with our [Britain's] activities in the area and in particular our connection with

reactionary Arab regimes'.80 Britain's determination to create a stable and viable

federation in South Arabia, even in the face of American hostility, provides a further

illustration of how Washington and London pursued differing policies in the Middle East

during the early 1960s.

The hesitant and protracted nature of constitutional change in South Arabia, deriving

from the desire of the British government to retain control of the Aden base, resulted in

increased nationalist activity in both Aden and the surrounding Protectorate. To this

end, Sandys argued that Britain should make a greater effort in promoting the

economic development of Aden and the SAF, for 'generosity in this context would

ultimately be more economical than an attempt to hold the country down by military

force'. Peter Thorneycroft, Minister of Defence, was in full agreement with Sandys,

contending that it was 'essential to retain our base at Aden', for it was the 'focal point of

79'CounteringUAR Pressure
against the British Position In Aden': Memorandumof Conversation between Butler and
Rusk: Washington, 27 April 1964, FRUS, Near East Region,
80iAnAnglo-American Balance Sheet': Cabinet vol. XXI, Document 55. Added emphasis.
memorandum by Butler, 2 September 1964, CAB 129/118.
 217

our arrangements for protecting our interests and discharging our commitments in the

Middle East'. Moreover, Aden acted as an important link in the chain of

communications with Singapore, which played a corresponding role in the Far East: 'If

we withdrew from Aden, we should be unable to hold Singapore; and we should leave,

in each area, a vacuum which our enemies would seek to fill'.81

The Treasury's Losing Battle to end Britain's Middle East Role.

Writing on Britain's decision to withdraw from East of Suez, Patrick Gordon Walker

argued: 'The decision was taken by a Labour Cabinet after thirteen years of

Conservative rule, during which time the Government never seems to have examined

the question: a British role East of Suez was taken for granted' 82 In reality, divisions

over the value of Britain's politico-military presence in the Middle East (and Far East)

persisted throughout the period of Conservative government - contrary to Gordon

Walker's assumption, Britain's East of Suez role was subject to extensive examination.

On 9 February 1963, Thorneycroft argued that, on the assumption that expenditure on

the nuclear deterrent had already been largely settled at Nassau, the only scope for

restraining defence spending lay in the reduction of UK forces in Europe or East of

Suez. Thorneycroft maintained that in terms of commitments, forces in all areas,

including the reserves held in the UK, were 'stretched to the limit'; thus, if commitments

remained unchanged, force levels could not be cut. If the size of the forces could not

be reduced, Thorneycroft concluded, defence expenditure could not remain constant -

it would be required to rise in step with the increasing cost of modern weapons and

transportation. If no acceptable reduction in commitments could be found, it would be

impossible to hold defence expenditure at a level of seven per cent of GNP. In

response, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Reginald Maudling, contended that

81Cabinet minutes, 14 May 1964, CAB 128/38.

u P. Gordon Walker, The Cabinet, (London: Jonathon Cape, 1970),
p. 122.
 218

Britain's major commitments 'could not be revised in isolation', intimating that

considerations should be informed by a realistic appreciation of the financial and

economic context in which Britain was operating. The discomfiture of the Treasury was

accentuated by the fact that the level of defence expenditure forecast for 1963-64

represented a 10 per cent increase on the previous year. Maudling believed that the

economy was incapable of meeting such an increase in the defence budget,

suggesting that it should, if possible, be reduced, or, at the very least, held at current

levels. Repeating arguments consistently advanced by his predecessors at the

Treasury, Maudling insisted that it was wrong for Britain to effectively carry the burden

of defending the economic interests of its European competitors in the Middle East. In

examining Britain's commitments and the extent to which it might be possible to reduce

them, Maudling put forward the idea of 'realistically' examining the benefits which other

countries derived from UK defence expenditure, identifying against what enemies, in

what circumstances, and with what allies, British forces would be to

called upon act 83

In light of this meeting, when it was agreed that defence expenditure should be

contained within a limit of seven per cent of GNP, Sir Burke Trend (along with the

permanent secretaries of the departments mainly concerned and the Chiefs of Staff)

produced a paper, entitled 'Future Defence Policy'. As part of this review, Trend

commissioned a study examining the cost of maintaining the British base in Aden in

relation to the value and importance of the interests which it was designed to protect.

The officials' paper defined Britain's interests in the Middle East as threefold: to ensure

the maintenance of oil supplies on reasonable terms by defending the independence of

Persian Gulf oil-producing states, particularly Kuwait; to contain the southward

expansion of the Soviet Union by participation in CENTO and by support for Iran and

Jordan; and, if possible, to keep open the direct sea routes to the Far East. The cost of

the military effort involved to secure these objectives was estimated at £170 million

83DC minutes, 9 February 1963, CAB 131/28.

 219

annually; however, it was projected that this figure would rise, by 1970, to perhaps

£220 million. Trend's committee concluded that'our strategy hinges [in the Middle

East] on Aden' - if ministers wished to seek greater economies in expenditure, they

would have to contemplate leaving Aden and devise an alternative strategy, more

limited in its application and less expensive in cost 84 On 19 June 1963, when

ministers considered Trend's paper, Macmillan confirmed that the main justification for

stationing UK forces in Aden was to protect British oil interests, but accepted that the

'threat of force would be increasingly less effective' for achieving this purpose.

Although confronted with the option of withdrawal by officials, ministers rejected the

idea -a fact largely attributable to irreconcilable differences between the Treasury and

Foreign Office.

Given that departure from Aden was not seen as likely in the immediate future,

Treasury officials argued for a reduction in the number of troops stationed at the base,

submitting that Kenyan independence would lessen the requirement for maintaining the

current level of forces. Foreign Office civil servants claimed that the opposite was true,

indicating that the changed status of Kenya enhanced Aden as a strategic asset. More

generally, Treasury officials thought that the nature of British power had changed within

a global context, viewing bases such as Aden as anachronistic and a vestige of

Britain's imperial past. The Treasury contested the claim that beating a retreat from

Aden would lead to an interruption in the oil trade and a diminution of British interests.

Past experience gave this argument some force: for example, British ships continued

to pass freely through the Suez Canal, despite Britain's loss of its bases in the Canal

Zone. The Treasury believed that, irrespective of whether or not British troops were

stationed in Aden, oil-exporting countries would continue to sell their most valuable

commodity. As early as August 1961, Selwyn Lloyd (when Chancellor of the

Exchequer) had floated this idea with Macmillan, questioning whether Britain's military

84'Future Defence Policy': D(O)C memorandum by Trend

for DC, 14 June1963, CAB 131/28.
 220

deployment in the Middle East was 'in fact effective either for the protection of our
...
oil interests or the sterling balances'85 On 1 March 1963, 'Otto' Clarke complained to

his Permanent Secretary, Sir William Armstrong, that the cost of defending Middle

Eastern oil (£120/125 million rising to £150/160 million a year) was 'disproportionate' to

the profits of the British oil-producing companies (estimated at £100 million a year):

'Much too big a premium. Clarke noted, '. even if the forces protected [UK oil
. .', ..
interests] effectively'. If Britain was really concerned about the supply of oil, Clarke

argued, it would make better sense to build an oil stockpile; actively discourage the

substitution of oil for coal (for example, tax oil, encourage other sources of supply,

subsidise coal-oil conversion, etc); and conduct foreign policy to propitiate oil states,

working closely with the United States to protect joint interests in the Middle East. In

Clarke's view, all these policies were 'immensely cheaper' than £120 million a year. If

oil were nationalised, Clarke believed it 'most unlikely' that Middle Eastern countries

would refuse to sell their sole economic asset: 'They could grind our margins - but we

would not invade even Kuwait to stop that' 86 Whilst recognising that this contention

had some merit, Foreign Office officials argued that British 'prestige' would decline if it

were perceived that the UK had been compelled to withdraw its forces because it could

no longer afford to maintain them.

Representing the Foreign Office case, Home maintained that it was essential to

retain the commitment to CENTO, since Britain 'must co-operate with people of a like

mind for collective security in the face of Sino-Soviet expansion', claiming that, as

ministers had rejected the idea that 'we must "choose between Europe and a world

role"', it was necessary to defend UK global interests by a world-wide military

presence. Accordingly, it was essential to 'hold on to Aden' (as well as Singapore), as

to run down UK forces would 'encourage our enemies, dismay our allies and

precipitate the disorder we are anxious to avoid'. As regards the level of defence

85Lloyd to Macmillan,2 August 1961, PREM 11/3452.

86Clarke to Armstrong, 1 March 1963, Clarke
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/2!4.
 221

expenditure, Home suggested that it was not 'wise to ... be dogmatic on the exact

percentage of the GNP which should be earmarked for it 87 On 10 July 1963, Reginald

Maudling called on his colleagues to accept a reduction in the level of defence

expenditure, asserting that spending of such magnitude (over £2,000 million a year,

which exceeded the figure of £1,850 million for 1965-66 agreed by the cabinet) would

raise serious problems affecting other areas of public expenditure, such as housing

and education. In this respect, Maudling was reflecting the concerns of 'Otto' Clarke,

who told Armstrong: 'The social programmes are going up much faster - education,

roads, pensions, etc; and if a higher rate of defence expenditure is to be permitted, the

whole Budget will run away'.88 Maudling thought it wrong to 'allow the Government to

drift into a position in which defence expenditure was absorbing an increasing

proportion of national resources without having been able to weigh up the

consequences'. If defence expenditure were to be brought down to levels that he

regarded tolerable, some major strategic decision would have to be taken. Maudling

did not accept that 'the Government had already taken a firm decision to maintain our

world-wide strategy unchanged and to accept the economic consequences'89

Michael Cary's Review of Britain's Role East of Suez, 1963.

In mid-1963, Michael Cary, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, conducted an inter-

departmental review of British policy East of Suez. This was in direct response to the

Defence Committee's decision of 9 February to hold the defence budget at a level of

seven per cent of GNP. In the process of Cary's review, ministers reached agreement

"'Future Defence Policy': DC memorandum by Home,

17 June 1963, CAB 131/28.
88Clarke to Armstrong [and D. J. Mitchell], 4 February 1963,
Clarke papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK
1/3/2/4.
89DC minutes, 10 July 1963, CAB 131/28; 'Future Defence
Policy': DC memorandum by Maudling, 5 July 1963, CAB
131/28.
 222

on troop levels in Europe, meaning that any reduction in UK commitments would have

to be looked for East of Suez90 As late as March 1963, senior Whitehall civil servants

had considered the possibility of scaling down Britain's military commitments in Europe

in order to enlarge the UK effort East of Suez. On 4 March 1963, when senior officials

considered a draft version of Cary's 'Strategy East of Suez' paper, it was even

suggested that expanding NATO to include countries such as Japan and India might

solve the problem of British military over-stretch; accordingly, NATO would assume a

world-wide, rather than a merely European, 9t

role Cary's re-assessment of Britain's

East of Suez policy was heavily influenced by the arguments advanced by Maudling

and Thorneycroft, as is demonstrated in the opening paragraph of one of his

preparatory papers: 'Our forces in all areas are already stretched to the limit in terms of

commitments, the cost of equipping and transporting them is rising faster than the GNP

and there is no scope for further savings by measures of economy. (As will be

demonstrated below, this did not stop the Labour government from attempting to

maintain Britain's world role by seeking economies in defence expenditure when it

assumed office in October 1964.) Importantly, Cary's paper set out to answer four

main questions: could it reasonably be assumed that Britain would be able to use the

Aden military base after 1970? If so, could it be presumed that military conditions

would remain such that Britain would be able to use the Aden base to intervene

effectively in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf if needed? If so, could the Aden base

be used without prejudice to Britain's wider politico-strategic interests? Finally, would

Britain be able to continue to regard the Aden base as a 'major contribution' to the joint

Anglo-American effort to secure these wider interests?

80DC minutes, 1 April 1963, CAB 131/28.

e' 'United Kingdom Defence Commitments Overseas':
minute of a meeting considering the paper'Strategy East of
Suez', prepared by A. L M. Cary, 4 March 1963, CAB 21/5902. Those
present included: Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to
the Cabinet; William Armstrong, (Joint) Permanent Secretary to the Treasury; Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under-
Secretary to the Foreign Office, Sir Robert Scott, Permanent Secretary to the Ministry Defence; Sir Saville Gamer,
of
Permanent Under-Secretaryto the Commonwealth Relations Office; Sir Hilton Poynton, Permanent Under-
Secretary to the Colonial Office. and
92'Future Policy in the Middle East and Far East': Memorandum
(draft) by A. L. M. Cary, 2 May 1963, CAB 21/5902.
 223

Cary's paper questioned the long-term viability of British policy in the Middle East,

arguing that Britain would find it difficult to hold on to the Aden base for more than a

few years. Even if Aden were retained, Cary argued, Britain would find it increasingly

to
untenable support the existence of the Gulf sheikdoms against the rising tide of Arab

nationalism -a position adopted by Sir Norman Brook and the Treasury, two years

earlier. Accordingly, the UK could not reasonably expect, in the long term, to preserve,

by force or other means, the advantageous position of British oil producing companies,

as to try and do so would undermine other fundamental interests.93 This viewpoint was

supported by Sir Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, who,

when commenting on a draft version of Cary's paper, told Trend: 'I have never been

able to convince myself that the physical presence of forces confers a benefit, though

the actual use of those forces would bring unacceptable political consequences. Nor

do I believe that the presence of forces has any but the slightest effect upon our

economic and commercial relations or our ability to trade' 94 As regards the utility of

Britain's military deployment in protecting UK interests, Treasury officials were

'sceptical about the need to deny the Soviet Union access to oil' and did not see how

conventional forces could 'stop them if they really wanted it'.95 On the other hand, if

British oil producing companies lost their preferential position, Cary recognised that the

cost to Britain's balance-of-payments, resulting from the subsequent decline in their

profits, might be of the order of £100 million per annum. If Middle Eastern countries

were to combine to extract higher oil prices from both British and West European

consumers, and if UK oil companies were forced to halt their operations in the Middle

East altogether, the additional cost to the UK balance-of-payments might be in the

order of £200 to £300 million per annum96

93'StrategyEast of Suez': Memorandum by Cary, 9 July

1963, CAB 21/5902.
9' Powell to Trend, 1 March 1963, CAB 21/5902. On trip to
a the United States, Powell was unable to attend the
meeting that considered the paper 'Strategy East of Suez', prepared by Cary, on 4 March 1963,
95A. D. Peck (Treasury)to P. A. Wilkinson (Cabinet office),
2 May 1963, CAB 21/5902.
96'StrategyEast of Suez', memorandum by A. L M.
Cary, 9 July 1963, CAB 21/5902.
 224

Cary suggested that Britain would have to consider whether, as in other areas where

the UK had historically secured its interests by the exercise of military power, the time

had come to replace a policy of 'divide and rule' by an approach based on 'unify and

withdraw'. Such a policy shift would involve the pursuit of four main objectives: firstly,

withdrawing Britain's military deployment or, at least, drastically reducing capacity to

intervene in local disputes; secondly, 'honourably' disengaging from commitments in

Kuwait, the Gulf and South Arabia; thirdly, participating in the creation of a strong and

stable anti-Communist Arab bloc; and, finally, encouraging an effective regional

economic development programme, subvented by oil revenues. Pari passu with the

formulation of a revised Middle Eastern policy, Britain would have to identify an

alternative means for meeting its military commitments in Africa, the Indian Ocean and

the Far East. The difficulties and risks involved in the process of transition from the

status quo, Cary felt, made 'an argument for making it [withdrawal] sooner rather than

later97 By 1968-1970, Cary suggested that Britain's military commitments in the

Middle East should be 'nil' apart from a general undertaking, preferably under the

auspices of the UN, to help defend South Arabia from 98

external aggression Cary's

paper was produced for the benefit of senior officials, that is to say the permanent

secretaries of the departments with a direct interest in this area of policy, and was not

considered by ministers. However it would be mistaken to dismiss the Cary paper as

irrelevant, for it served two essential functions: firstly, it demonstrated the fragility of

Britain's position in the Middle East and forced officials, in the highest echelons of

Whitehall, to consider the possibility of withdrawing from Aden -'sooner rather than

later'; and, secondly, it required senior policy-makers to consider an 'alternative'

strategic direction in the region. Even so, Cary felt that officials from the 'overseas'

departments, 'in spite of vigorous argument by the Treasury', had a tendency of

'harking back' to the assumption that the only sensible course was to 'wait and see'

''FuturePolicy
intheMiddle
EastandFarEast',memorandum
(draft) A.L M.Cary,
2 May CAB
1963, 21/5902.
98CarytoTrend, by
8 May1963,
CAB21/5902.
 225

and that this would not necessarily result in adverse financial implications. In a letter to

Trend, Cary bemoaned the rigidity of departmental opinion: 'They [the 'overseas'

departments] have not really accepted the point that our military posture in 1968-70 is

being determined today'."

The Cabinet Defence (Official) Committee (D(O)C) met on 21 May 1963 to discuss

the potential implications of British withdrawal from the Middle East. Officials were

clearly aware that a decrease in defence expenditure, which was the general policy of

the government, implied 'some reduction' in the ability of the UK to meet current

commitments. Ideally such a balance between increased risk and reduced expenditure

would take account of likely developments in the political situation in five or six years'

time, since only towards the end of such a period would the effects of any decision

taken not to proceed with certain aspects of the defence programme become clear.

Nevertheless, Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under-Secretary to the Foreign Office,

believed it impossible to cost-account military expenditure on a 'profit' and 'loss' basis,

contending that defence planning should take account of wider political factors. Caccia

insisted that Britain's primary interest in the Middle East was to secure the main source

of oil on which Britain and Western Europe depended, rather than the oil trade or

British investments per se; he suggested that if the Russians seized these sources, if

they came under local monopolist control, or if the area fell into chaos, the whole fabric

of industrial life in Western Europe would be threatened. Caccia believed that the

value of Aden should be assessed in this context, not against a balance sheet of

narrow national interests and expenditure.10° After similar discussion, Defence

Committee ministers merely agreed that'no hard and fast equation could be drawn

between the cost of maintaining forces at Aden and the value of the interests thus

safeguarded'.101

" Ibid.
100D(O)C minutes, 21 May 1963, CAB 130/190.
101DC minutes, 20 June 1963, CAB 131/28.
 226

The Foreign Office's Case for Retaining Britain's Position in the Middle East.

On 19 July 1963, Sir Roger Stevens, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign

Office, produced a detailed memorandum for Caccia on British strategic and policy

objectives in the Middle East. This document provides a comprehensive overview of

how the Foreign Office saw policy developing over the next five years, and was in

response to the President of the Board of Trade, Frederick Erroll, who suggested that

Britain would benefit from establishing a mutually beneficial and straightforward

commercial relationship with oil producing states, with policy based less on 'past

imperialist traditions'. Stevens felt that such a policy would be difficult to implement in

practice, insisting that military withdrawal would undermine Britain's substantial Persian

Gulf oil interests. In this respect, the topography and political relationships within the

Gulf, specifically its remoteness from Egypt, and the fact that Nasser, Iraq and Saudi

Arabia were on consistently poor terms, assisted Britain. A combination of these

factors provided Britain with a 'breathing space', allowing it to arrive at 'a sort of modus

vivendi'with the major Arab powers: this 'modus vivendi was, to some extent, realised

by Saudi Arabia's voluntarily resumption of normal diplomatic relations with Britain,

despite the disputed territory of Buraimi; Iraq's desire to purchase arms from the UK

government; and Nasser speaking of the British position in the Gulf with an 'air of

detachment'. Stevens concluded:

We must not be under any illusions about the fragility of this state of
affairs but the longer it can be made to last the better. This suggests the
conclusion that we should do nothing to disturb British arrangements in
the Gulf and Aden, even if they appear to conflict with the ideal
commercial relationship. In fact I think I would go further than that and
say that even if the major Arab powers were considerably more vocal
than they are at present we should still hold our ground. If we were to
 227

dismantle our position in the Gulf and Aden, I doubt if we should gain
anything very solid in terms of either goodwill or commerce.102

Finally, Stevens set out a few obiter dicta conclusions about British policy in the

Middle East. With respect to the appropriate degree of British involvement in the

Middle East, Stevens' memorandum suggested that it was necessary to draw a

distinction between the eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Arab Peninsula. In

the first of these areas, Britain's 'only real concern', like that of the United States and

the United Nations, was to avoid the renewal of hostilities between the Arab States and

Israel, or developments which might lead to the deployment of sophisticated weaponry.

On the other hand, Stevens believed that Britain had 'special and unique' interests in

the Arabian Peninsula, leading him to conclude that the UK should 'keep in the area for

as long as we can a military presence for quite clear-cut defined reasons which have

everything to do with trade'. Tellingly, Stevens saw the reasons for maintaining a

military deployment in purely economic terms, arguing that 'politically ... we [Britain]

should be better off without it', although he was worried that the Treasury was

becoming increasingly vocal in its opposition to the financial rationale underpinning

Britain's regional role:

And yet within the last few months the Treasury, the supposed guardians
of our balance of payments and of the contribution which sterling oil
makes to that, have been at pains to argue (in the defence context) that
the present arrangements for obtaining oil from Middle East producers
has little value for HMG.

StevensinformedCacciathat the Treasurywas makingthis argument'by innuendo

ratherthan explicitstatement',but advisedagainstpressingthis issuetoo firmly within

Whitehall,since currentpolicywas based 'on FO ratherthan currentTreasurytheory

102'Review of Middle East Policy, Objectives

and Strategy': Memorandumby Stevens (sent to Caccla), 19 July 1963,
FO 371/170165.Added emphasis.
 228

and it may be better to let sleeping dogs lie'. On the question of British investment and

commercial interests, Clarke told Armstrong: 'I am sure that neither the military nor the

F.O. people understand that these "interests" are quite negligible in size in relation to

the cost of defending them. I do not, myself, think that one can even nearly justify our

Middle East expenditure on the grounds of defence of oil supply or oil interests'.'o3

Interestingly, Stevens did not think that it would be appropriate to defend Kuwait in the

event of losing Aden. If Aden were lost, Stevens recommended that it 'might be better

to fall back on non-military means of insurance'.104

On 10 June 1964, in the light of internal debate on the relationship between oil and

the balance of payments, the Defence and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee

(DOP(O)C) met to consider UK policy in the Middle East and East Africa. In

discussion, it was agreed that Britain's overall balance of payments depended

significantly on the investment (valued at £350 million) of the two main "British" oil

companies in the region: British Petroleum (BP) and Shell. If BP and Shell were

excluded from operating in the Middle East, it was estimated that the additional foreign

exchange cost of oil would probably be no less than £200 million. British trade with the

area (including oil imports) was valued at £665 million in 1963, representing 23 per

cent of total British trade with the developing world. The cost of Britain's military

presence in the area was estimated at £170 million per year, which denoted

approximately 14 per cent of the operational component of UK defence expenditure. In

comparison, expenditure on other non-military means of influence, such as aid

programmes and diplomacy, was small: between 1960 and 1963, such expenditure

only averaged £34 million per year, representing about 12 per cent of total overseas

non-defence expenditure. Summing up the discussion, Trend stated that policy should

be directed towards influencing the oil producing states to distribute their wealth more

equitably, by seeking redistribution of Western aid and converting the Arab perception

103Clarketo Armstrong,19 November 1963, Clarke (Churchill Cambridge)

College, CLRK 1/3/2/4.
""Review of Middle East Policy, Objectives papers
and Strategy: Memorandum by Stevens (sent
to Caccia),
19 July 1963,
FO
O 371/170165.
 229

of Britain to one of `benevolentnon-interventionist`. It was concluded that the long-term

objective of the UK should be `to establish a relationship which is governed primarily by

considerations of mutual economic advantage'."

The Policy of the Labour Government on Assuming Office: 1964-1965.

In late April 1964, perhaps with an eye on the likelihood of a forthcoming General

Election, Trend asked Home for permission to create a sub-committee, under the

DOP(O)C, to consider long-term strategy. The sub-committee would, in Trend's words,

ask 'whether it would be realistic either to contract out some of our existing

commitments or to find alternative means - mainly diplomatic and economic - of trying

to maintain our international position and protect our global interest on the basis of a

reduced military effort'.106As a consequence, in May 1964, the DOP(O)C established

the Long Term Study Group (LTSG), under the chairmanship of Paul Rogers, Deputy

Secretary of the Cabinet. The membership of the LTSG came from the Foreign Office,

Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence, Board of Trade

and the Treasury. Despite being commissioned during the period of Conservative

government, the final LTSG covering report, 'Britain's Interests and Commitments

Overseas', was considered by Labour ministers at Chequers on 21 November 1964

-
the meeting at which it was decided to limit annual defence expenditure to £2,000

million at 1964 prices.107Trend thought it necessary to publish this figure as a target

for planning purposes, rejecting the Foreign Office's concern that this might be

interpreted by other countries, whether friends or enemies, as 'implying that we intend

to pull in our horns - i.e. the risk that, once we are seen to be on the run, we shall have

lost our main negotiating card'. Highlighting inter-departmental differences on this

105DOP(O)C minutes, 10 June 1964, CAB 148/10.

Added emphasis.
106Trend to Home, 30 April 1964, PREM 11/4731.
107iBritishinterests and commitments overseas':
report by DOP(O)C for the DOPC, 12 October 1964, CAB 148/7;
Cabinet (Defence Policy) minutes, 21 November 1964, CAB 130/213.
 230

matter, Trend added: 'This risk is discounted by the Economic Departments (another

example of divergence of Departmental views!)'. 108The Foreign Office accepted that

Britain should aim to achieve the £2,000 million target, but opposed specifying the date

by which this figure would be realised. Patrick Gordon Walker, Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs, told Wilson: We must start our journey towards the £2,000 million

target at once, but when we may arrive is known only to God'.109

Senior civil servants agreed that the central problem facing the Labour government

related to the strain of overseas commitments on Britain's limited resources. At a

meeting of the DOP(O)C on 14 October 1964, just one day before the General

Election, officials re-affirmed the broad strategy required to address this problem:

A balance would have to be struck between the pressing need to restore

our own economy and the value to us, as a trading nation, of being able
to continue to exert through our overseas commitments an influence on
world affairs out of proportion to our actual resources.110

The LTSG took a different approach to the Macmillan government's 'Future Policy

Study, 1960-1970', in that none of Britain's commitments were taken 'as given'."' As

'Otto' Clarke noted in May 1964, when the work of the LTSG was getting under way: 'It

is easy (but desperately wrong-headed) to create a logical and self-interested series of

assumptions about the future and act on that basis: you are then logical, but certain to

be in the soup because your assumptions are bound to be wrong. On the other hand,

you can behave like a plain common-sense down-to-earther, and do whatever seems

reasonable at the time. What we really have to do is to find a self-consistent course

that makes as much sense as possible over a wide range of possible futures'. 12 The

LTSG was asked to consider the impact of Aden's loss on Britain's position in the

108Trend to Wilson, 11 June 1965, PREM 13/215.

109Gordon Walker to Wilson, 11 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
10 DOP(O)C minutes, 14 October 1964, CAB 148/4.
"' DOP(O)C minutes, 12 October 1964, CAB 148/4.
112Clarke to Bell, 24 May 1964, Clarke papers (Churchill
College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/3/1.
 231

Middle East. This modus operandi was chosen in the hope that it would 'throw fresh

light' on the relevance of Britain's existing commitments in relation to its `real' interests.

Trend thought that this change in the 'terms of reference' represented an important

innovation in pan-strategic policy analysis, believing that previous approaches had

always resulted in the same conclusions:

namely, that there are no interests which we can afford to cease to

defend and no commitments which we can afford to discharge; from
which it follows we must maintain the pattern of our overseas military
deployment intact; from which it follows that we must continue to
shoulder the rising cost of defence without very little hope of reduction.113

The final LTSG study paper, 'Regional Study on the Middle East', concluded that

Britain's principle interests in the Middle East were the prevention of Communist

hegemony and the maintenance of secure oil supplies.' 14 But how were these major

objectives to inform policy? The LTSG argued that Iran was the 'most exposed' of the

oil producing countries and that Britain should do its utmost to prevent Iran's defection

into the Communist camp. Iran's autocratic system of government meant that Tehran's

Western orientation depended largely, if not entirely, on the attitude of the Shah. The

Foreign Office was concerned that the Shah might be tempted to adopt a neutralist

stance, suggesting that the likelihood of such a policy shift would increase in the

absence of resolute British support of CENTO. During 1964-65, UK forces committed

to CENTO consisted of four squadrons of Cyprus-based Canberra light bombers, each

with a nuclear capability. In addition, Britain provided CENTO with annual military and

economic aid amounting respectively to £600,000 and £1 million in 1964.15 If the

Shah were to adopt a non-aligned position, the LTSG report indicated that 'we [Britain]

should have no confidence that Iran could for long resist Communist penetration and

113
Trend
toWilson,
19 November
1964,
PREM
13/26.
114'Report of the Long Term Study Group Regional Study on the Middle East': Memorandumby the Foreign Office for
-
DOP(O)C, 21 October 1964, CAB 148/10.
115'Military Aid to the Central Treaty Organisation': DOPC
memorandum by M. Stewart, 19 February 1965, CAB 148/20.
 232

eventual domination'. Such a development would carry the danger of further

Communist infiltration into the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf littoral.16

On 31 March 1965, at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee

(DOPC), the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary openly disagreed

on the issue of military aid to Iran. The Committee had to make a decision on the

provision of a fourth radar station to Iran, at a cost of £1.75 million over the three years

1966-69. Michael Stewart, Gordon Walker's replacement at the Foreign Office,

emphasised the paramount importance of good Anglo-Iranian relations, claiming that

this was vital to maintaining Iran's 'moderate oil policy' and UK overflying rights., 17

Britain's reliance on Iranian goodwill had been accentuated by a change of regime in

Sudan on 3 December 1964 - the new Sudanese government, Anglophobic in outlook,

having decided to deny Britain the use of its southern air route through the Sudan and

Libya. The only alternative to the Libya/Sudan route, which had been of considerable

strategic benefit in moving troops and aircraft to Aden and thence to the Far East, was

the route via Turkey and Iran using Cyprus."' Stewart, who was due to attend the

annual meeting of the CENTO Ministerial Council in Tehran during early April 1965,

feared that a refusal to provide a fourth radar station might precipitate a chain of events

leading to the dissolution of CENTO. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, James

Callaghan, believed that there was no military case for the radar station and that Iran

was capable of self-financing the installation. Callaghan told the DOPC that he was

against finding funds for the station because of the need, wherever possible, to avoid

any undue strain on Britain's limited resources. In any case, Callaghan thought it

unlikely that the Shah would take any action likely to jeopardise CENTO. Siding with

the viewpoint of the Foreign Secretary, the committee agreed to the provision of the

116'Report of the Long Term Study Group Regional Study the Middle East: Memorandumby the Foreign Office for
- on
DOP(O)C, 21 October 1964, CAB 148/10.
"' DOPC minutes, 31 March 1965, CAB 148/18.
18'British Interests and Commitments Overseas':
report by the DOP(O)C for the DOPC, 18 November 1964, CAB
130/213.This route was nevertheless imperfect, as it was not suitable for all types of aircraft at all times of the year.
Also see Cabinet minutes, 3 December 1964, CAB 128/39. Patrick Gordon Walker told the cabinet: 'the new
Governmentof the Sudan, by suspending our right to overfly Sudanese territory, had placed us in a position of
considerable difficulty in relation to the reinforcement of our positions in the Middle East and the Far East'.
 233

radar station, on the grounds that this was essential in maintaining the good relations

necessary for the continuanceof British overflying rights.' 19

Even so, it would be mistaken to suggest that the Foreign Office was prepared to

in
acquiesce every demand laid down by the Shah. For example, Foreign Office

officials opposed the Shah's main strategic request, namely that Britain and the United

States should endow CENTO with an effective military structure analogous to NATO,

with a Supreme Commander and similar force commitments. On 5 March 1965,

Stewart made a concerted effort to convince the Shah of the demerits of replicating the

organisational and command features of NATO within CENTO. Stewart conceded that

CENTO was an 'organisation of limited scope', but argued that it had 'considerable

importance as a "keep out sign" for the Russians'.120On 26 May 1965, Stewart

presented a detailed memorandum to the DOPC on UK policy towards CENTO over

the next five years. This paper argued that Britain should continue its membership of

CENTO and maintain support for it at about the present level. The Foreign Office

thought that some reduction in current strength 'might' be possible provided that this

to
remained adequate convince the regional members of the 'genuineness' of Britain's

military backing.12' The dissolution of CENTO would bring few if any compensating

benefits, Stewart argued, since it was unlikely to result in any corresponding

improvement in Anglo-Arab relations. On the other hand, Denis Healey, Secretary of

State for Defence, doubted whether CENTO was necessary for preserving the Shah's

pro-Western orientation. The Ministry of\Defence did not foresee any immediate Soviet

military threat to Iran and questioned CENTO's effectiveness in preventing internal

Communist subversion. Healey argued that Britain should encourage the Shah to form

an alternative regional grouping to CENTO, considering the existing commitment as

unnecessarily expensive in military terms. 122

119DOPC minutes, 31 March 1965, CAB 148/18.

120'Record of Conversationbetween the Foreign Secretary
and the Shah of Iran at the Iranian Embassy', 5 March 1965,
PREM 1311923.
721'United Kingdom Policy Towards CENTO': DOPC
memorandum by M. Stewart, 31 May 1965, CAB 148/21.
122DOPC minutes, 26 May 1965, CAB 148/18.
 234

Despite being committed to the maintenance of CENTO, Foreign Office officials

believed that it was unlikely that Russia would join with Arab countries to undermine

Britain's position in the Middle East. Michael Stewart's paper, 'Middle East Policy',

presented to the cabinet in March 1965, argued that, although the UAR and Syria, and

at times Iraq, were prepared to enter into fairly close relations with Moscow, there was

considerable resistance to Communism in Arab countries. Stewart suggested that

there were two fundamental reasons for Arab antipathy towards Russian influence:

first, Islamic and Arab nationalism tended to be ideologically anti-Communist in nature;

and, secondly, Middle Eastern governments generally wanted to remain non-aligned.

By maintaining close relations with most of the nations in the area, Stewart suggested

that Britain was able to 'hold the balance' and thwart Soviet progress.123Even so,

Stewart recognised that Britain's policy in the Middle East was subject to serious

limitations, informing the cabinet: 'The United Kingdom... no longer had the power, as

in the 19thcentury, to impose solutions'.124

The importance of Middle Eastern oil to the functioning of the British economy was

underlined in the final LTSG report. The Middle East contained 68 per cent of the free

world's proven oil reserves projected to be economically workable on a large scale

between 1964 and 1974. The Ministry of Power predicted that this energy source

would provide the 'bulk' of energy required for future British economic growth. The

existence of Kuwait and Iran as independent oil producers was of particular value to

Britain, as these two countries could provide alternative sources of oil should supplies

elsewhere be curtailed or offered on a less favorable basis. Kuwait's oil formed 20 per

cent of the free world's proven reserves; more importantly, Kuwaiti oil was easily

accessible and inexpensive to produce, while the Kuwait Oil Company was a UK

registered company. Iran, the only major non-Arab source of oil in the Middle East,

contained 11 per cent of the world's proven reserves, although it was recognised that

123The Middle East': Cabinet memorandum by M.

Stewart, 24 March 1965, CAB 129/120.
124Cabinet minutes, 30 March 1965, CAB 128/39.
 235

Iranian production had great scope for future expansion, to the extent that it might

eventually surpass Kuwait. Total exclusion from Middle Eastern oil, though believed

improbable, would have serious, if not catastrophic, repercussions for the British

economy: for example, Ministry of Power officials estimated that the output of the UK

economy would decline between 10 and 15 per cent of GDP by 1970, or somewhere

between £3,000 million and £5,000 million a year, if Britain were denied access to

Middle East oil. As other European countries would be similarly, if not worse, affected,

this would have a devastating impact on the level of international trade. Britain's

contribution to peace and stability in the Persian Gulf, the LTSG concluded, provided a

secure framework within which international oil companies were best able to ensure

the continued flow of oil.125Senior members of Wilson's 'economic team' questioned

this assumption, favouring buying oil at prices more in line with those paid by other

countries. In October 1965, Thomas Balogh, Economic Adviser to the Cabinet,

contended that 'the benefit accruing to the British economy as a result of this military

presence has to be completely reconsidered'.126

The LTSG was instructed to assume that Britain would be denied use of Aden within

the next decade;on this hypothesis,it was to considerto what extentthis altered

situationwould permitthe UK to protectand maintainits interestsand dischargeits

responsibilities; assess how far British interests and commmitments would have to be

modified or contracted; and examine by what alternative means - whether political,

economic or military - Britain could continue to make a contribution to the West's

position in the Middle East. The divergent positions adopted in inter-departmental

discussions highlight how divided Whitehall was on the issue of current and future

BritishpolicytowardsAden and, by implication,the wider MiddleEast. There was

-
generalagreementthat only two sets of circumstancesexistedin which Britainwould

withdrawfrom Aden:first, Britain might be deprivedof use of Aden againstits own

125'Reportof the Long Term Study Group Regional

- Study on the Middle East': Memorandumby the Foreign Office for
DOP(O)C, 21 October 1964, CAB 14ah0.
126Balogh to Wilson, 19 October 1965, PREM 13/460.
 236

wishes; or, secondly, the British government could decide to leave the base for its own

reasons. Foreign Office officials argued that a decision to withdraw voluntarily would

be dependent on a realisation that the defence of Kuwait was no longer viable or could

be provided for by other military means not reliant on the base facilities in Aden.

The Foreign Office firmly rejected the alternative strategy of terminating all external

defence arrangements, an option favoured by both the Treasury and the Board of

Trade. The `economic' departments maintained that commercial imperatives

necessitated oil-producing countries to sell their output to Britain and other Western

nations, but the Foreign Office claimed that the 'fatal difficulty in this thesis' lay in the

fact that there was no inherent stability in the Middle East. The Foreign Office was also

hostile to any notion of the UN assuming Britain's regional role. With a special

reference to Kuwait and the Persian Gulf, it was argued:

In the circumstances, the prospect of United Nations intervention would

be equally ineffective as a deterrent and so could not, as British forces
do, give the Gulf rulers the confidence to protect their own positions
against externally inspired subversion, which is the most immediate
danger to their independence.

If the United States 'could and would' assume Britain's regional responsibilities,

Foreign Office officials saw no reason to suppose that Western interests would suffer;

however, given the absence of United States defence facilities in the area, allied to

Washington's undoubted reluctance in taking on what it perceived as 'a quasi-Imperial

political role', the Foreign Office saw'no foreseeable prospect' of this occurring.12'

Michael Stewart, some five months after the completion of the final LTSG paper,

reaffirmed this viewpoint, in a memorandum submitted to the cabinet: We alone can

play this stabilising role because of the positions we hold along the eastern and

127'British Interests and Commitments Served In

the Area Served by the Aden Base': Memorandumby the Foreign
Office for DOP(O)C, 16 July 1964, CAB 148/8.
 237

southern shore of Arabia; it would not be possible for the United States or any other

Western power to take these over from us'.128This conflicts with Ritchie Ovendale's

claim that the 1958 Anglo-American intervention in Lebanon and Jordan marked the

moment when Britain willingly relinquished its traditional role in the Middle East to the

United States.129Whitehall generally agreed that the Western position would be

strengthened by greater American involvement, but it would be mistaken to assume

that Britain's independent role had been, as Macmillan argued in a different context,

'swallowed up in the Pax Americana'. American interest in creating defence facilities in

the Indian Ocean was welcomed by officials working on the LTSG, who hoped that this

would eventually lead to direct US involvement in the protection of the southern shore

of the Gulf. Retaining Britain's position in the Middle East fitted well with the instincts

of the newly elected Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, who told Dean Rusk that'he had a

prejudice for the maintenance of the British role East of Suez'.' 30 Accordingly, Wilson

was pleased to hear, from the British Embassy in Washington, that'the Americans

have a strong interest in helping us directly or indirectly to avoid a retrenchment of our

defence commitments East of Suez'. Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador to

Washington, highlighted the concerns of US policy-makers on this issue, pointing out

that the Americans did 'not want to find themselves saddled with some sort of police

role in the Gulf'.13'

Britishwithdrawalfrom Aden, LTSGofficialsagreed,might be acceleratedby power

falling into the hands of the nationalist PSP. Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism held a

strongemotionalappealfor many SouthArabians,includingthose in the Federal

Armed Forces, who were well placed to undermine Britain's position. On the other

hand, ForeignOffice officialsnotedthat the Protectoraterulerswere preparedto see

Britainretainfull use of Aden's base facilities,suggestingthat the UK'could retainits

728'The Middle East': Cabinet

memorandum by M. Stewart, 24 March 1965, CAB 129/120.Added emphasis.
'29Ovendale, Transfer of Power, 211.
p.
130'Record of Conversation between Wilson
and Rusk at 10 Downing Street', 14 May 1965, PREM 13/214.
Dean to Gore Booth, 10 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
 238

position in Aden in the face of hostile Arab nationalism'. The. Foreign Office thought it

highly unlikely that Britain would be forced into a precipitate withdrawal from Aden; the

final decision for this would come at some unidentified point in the next ten years, when

it was deemed advantageous to do so. This viewpoint was reflected in final LTSG

paper on the Middle East, which argued: `No doubt with difficulty we could hold on to

the base under these circumstances for some time but we might conclude before 1975

that we would be well advised to withdraw'. 132

What would be the political implications of being compelled to leave Aden? Britain's

forced withdrawal from Aden, Foreign Office officials conceded, would have a

devastating impact on British prestige, given that this would be construed as a 'victory'

for Arab nationalism. Such a development would force Britain out of its remaining

defence installations in the Persian Gulf and mark the end of British power in the

region, although the LSTG concluded that the various Gulf Rulers would react

differently: for example, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman would 'cling all the more

tightly' to the UK; the Ruler of Sharjah would try to end the agreement giving Britain

use of his airfield; while the Ruler of Bahrain would become even more difficult about

any extension of British defence facilities. More importantly, it was predicted that a

forced British withdrawal would strengthen Arab nationalism in Kuwait, compelling the

Emir to denounce the Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement of June 1961. Withdrawal from Aden

was dependent on the political conditions in Kuwait. The LTSG identified three main

circumstances in which UK forces would no longer be required to defend Kuwait.

Firstly, the Kuwaiti government might decide to sever its links with Britain (subject to

three years' notice), though this was generally viewed as unlikely to occur. Secondly,

Britain might decide that defending Kuwaiti independence was no longer sufficiently

important to justify maintaining forces in the area, a policy course supported by the

Treasury and Board of Trade. Thirdly, ministers might conclude that it was possible for

'32'Report
oftheLongTermStudyGroup Regional
Study theMiddle
East':Memorandum for
Office
bytheForeign
DOP(O)C, 21October - on
1964,CAB148/10.Addedemphasis.
 239

Britain to defend its major objectives in the Persian Gulf without Aden; in such an

event, Britain would have to rely on the use of more distant bases, including those

located in the United Kingdom, coupled with some reinforcement of existing units in the

Gulf itself.133

Despite hostility within the Foreign Office to the very idea of retrenchment, LTSG

officials accepted that the repercussions of a voluntary withdrawal 'would be

appreciably less'. If Britain decided to leave Aden on its own terms, Foreign Office

officials believed that establishing alternative facilities in the Persian Gulf and the

Indian Ocean would be preferable to relying on non-military means of Influence. There

had thus been a volte-face in Foreign Office thinking since Stevens' memorandum in

July 1963, when it was claimed that there was no real alternative to Aden. The

'economic' departments were strongly opposed to the idea of re-locating British troops

from Aden to the Persian Gulf. In discussions, Treasury officials forced the Foreign

Office to concede that such an arrangement would only be worthwhile if these facilities

could be provided at 'reasonable cost' and in political circumstances that ensured they

would not themselves become vulnerable. The Foreign Office, on the other hand,

countered the view that the provision of financial and technical assistance could act as

an effective alternative to the UK military presence:

We do not believe that any form of financial and technical aid,

...
however substantial, could ever be an effective substitute for military
support in the circumstances of the Middle East where instability results
not from a lack of funds in most areas (indeed, in some instances, the
contrary) but from acute inter-state political rivalries and the magnitude of
the prizes at stake.134

Howwould withdrawalfrom Aden affect Britishpolicytowardsthe SouthArabian

Federation?As alludedto earlier, Britain'spoliticalprogrammefor the independence

'33Ibid.
134ibid.
 240

of South Arabia, which included the introduction of a limited degree of democratic

governance, had two main purposes: firstly, an independent SAF lessened the efficacy

of Egyptian subversion, enabling the Federal authorities to command wider respect in

the Arab world; secondly, the Federation allowed Britain to divest itself of a heavy

political responsibility, whilst permitting UK forces to retain use of the base facilities. If

Britain were to leave Aden, and subsequently withdrew financial support to South

Arabia, the LTSG paper argued that Saudi Arabia could partially replace the UK role: 'If

it were decided that, in the event of a voluntary withdrawal from Aden, we could not

afford to go on financing the Federation, perhaps the best safeguard if we could

achieve it would be to bring it into closer relations with Saudi Arabia, which is already

showing some interest in its future'.135Not so much "America in Britain's Place", as

"Saudi Arabia in Britain's Place".

The Labour cabinet largely accepted the previous Conservative government's policy

on South Arabia. On 11 December 1964, Anthony Greenwood, Secretary of State for

the Colonies, informed the cabinet that his recent visit to Aden, the purpose of which

had been to create a favourable political climate rather than to discuss the military

base, had prompted a joint declaration by the Adeni and Federal governments,

espousing the aspiration of creating a unitary state on a democratic basis-138Even so,

Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, former High Commissioner to Aden and the Federation of

South Arabia, believed that this went too far, informing Sandys (and Amery) that the

Labour government had 'run into trouble' as a consequence of 'varying the objective of

the previous Administration'. From its assumption of power, Trevaskis argued, Labour

had refused to accept the argument on which the previous government's policy was

based: that the left-wing nationalists in Aden were 'Nasser's stooges' and that Britain's

'friends in the Federation and Aden will only support us if they are confident of our

135'Report of the Long Term Study Group Regional

- Study on the Middle Easy: Memorandumby the Foreign Office for
DOP(O)C. 21 October 1964, CAB 148/10.
136Cabinet minutes, 11 December 1964, CAB 128/39;
'Policy In Aden and the Protectorateof South Arabia': DOPC
memorandum by Greenwood, 30 December 1964, CAB 148/17.
 241

support in return'. Accordingly, Trevaskis posited, Labour had sought to grant

independence to a Federation dominated by left-wing nationalists, who, once the door

had been opened to them, would see greater advantage in co-operating with Nasser

than Britain.137Although Wilson and his cabinet colleagues were committed to keeping

the Aden base and hoped to bring the discontented Adeni population into a stable

democratic association with the federal rulers, increased terrorist activity in Aden

complicated the problem of launching a viable Federation. The efforts of Greenwood

to win over moderate opinion in Aden were essentially futile. Anti-British sentiment in

Aden meant that there was simply no 'critical-mass' of moderates to create a

consensus of support in favour of Britain's position.

The DefenceReviews-A DecisiveChangein Policy: 1964-1967.

In November 1964, Labour set a financial target for defence expenditure of £2,000

million at 1964 prices, to be achieved by 1969/70. Put simply, Labour aimed for the

defence programme in 1969/70 to cost no more in real terms than it did in 1964 -

overall this entailed a reduction of £400 million or 16 per cent on the plans of the

previous Conservative government. Curtailing the equipment programme had made

limited progress towards this objective: on 5 August 1965, Healey was able to report

that he had managed to get more than half way to the £2,000 million target (from

£2,400 million to about £2,180 million) without impairing Britain's ability to meet its

military commitments. These economies were made principally in the aircraft

programme (notably the cancellation of the TSR2, HS-681 and P-1154); the

curtailment of the Polaris Fleet (the cancellation of the fifth vessel); a reduction in the

Research and Development programme; and the reorganisation of the Territorial Army

137Trevaskis to Sandys (originally Amery), 21 July

1965, Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 14/1.
 242

and measures relating to inter-service '38

rationalisation. These changes nonetheless

failed to solve the central problems of military over-stretch and the excessive cost of

defence in terms of foreign exchange. In planning to close the gap of £180 million,

Labour's Defence Review set out to determine which political obligations should be

abrogated, as well as limit the scale of the military tasks imposed by remaining

commitments.
TABLE 4.1. Defence Expenditure, 1964-65.

£ million
Forces Overseas
Europe 199
Med & Near East 61
East of Suez: Aden 75
Singapore 210
Hong Kong 11 296
556

Formations based in UK 507

1,063

Other: R&D Expenditure 280

Unattributable Geographically 657
937
2,000

Source: 'The Future Size of the Defence Budget', Clarke to Armstrong, 3 November 1964, Clarke papers

(Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/3/2.

By plainly stating what would be required to support a continued British military

presence in the Middle East, an inter-departmental DOP(O)C report, produced as part

of the Defence Review process and containing studies on long-term political strategy,

highlighted the fragility of Britain's position. Ministers considered this paper on three

separate occasions: 13,14 and 24 November 1965. If Britain wished to continue to

defend Libya against Egyptian attack, DOP(O)C officials argued, it would be necessary

138Denis Healey, 5 August 1965, Part Papers (Commons),vol. 717, cols. 1882-1887. Before making this
announcementto the House of Commons, Healey actually revealed the government's progress on reducing defence
expenditureto a Ministry of Defence press conference on 4 August 1965. The MoD was able to save £75 million as a
direct result of substituting the Phantom, the C130, the F111A, the Kestrel and the Comet for the P-1154, the HS-681,
the TSR2 and the OR352, and £40 million from the fact that it would be unnecessaryto buy an interim generation of
aircraft; £15 million was saved from cancelling the fifth Polaris submarine; £20 million was saved from the
reorganisationof the Army Reserve. The rest of the savings came from administrativechanges, none of which involved
a major change In policy.
 243

to retain the expensive Dhekelia armaments stockpile in Cyprus.13' On 24 November

1965, when the DOPC considered this issue, ministers agreed that Britain should seek

to persuade the United States to take over the British commitment to Libya. Even the

Foreign Office accepted that the Dhekelia base would become surplus to requirement if

the United States took over Britain's obligations towards Tripoli. If Washington was

unwilling to assume entire responsibility, and insisted on some UK contribution, the

DOPC agreed that the government should offer to retain the forces required to ensure

a point of entry at El Adem. Callaghan was prepared to accept this compromise

because of the relatively small costs involved.'40

The DOP(O)C report emphasised the importance of Iran's pro-Western alignment,

claiming that it was a 'major United Kingdom asset'. If Iran were to fall into the Soviet

orbit, or even if Tehran were to adopt a neutralist posture, this would have considerable

implications for Turkey, pro-Western elements in the Middle East and for the West's

position globally.141On 23 November 1965, Stewart reminded the cabinet that the

Shah 'remained apprehensive' about any extension of UAR influence in the Persian

Gulf, pointing out that Tehran would need to be convinced that a settlement in the Gulf

region would not result in its becoming a base for UAR subversion in Iran.142For this

reason, DOP(O)C officials agreed that the Shah needed constant reassurance of

Western support, if he were to 'remain convinced that his present game is worth the

candle'. It was contended that the Shah was unwilling to rely on the United States

alone - significantly, the Americans were not full members of the CENTO alliance, even

though the Eisenhower Doctrine provided a 'bilateral guarantee' to Middle Eastern

countries under imminent or actual threat from 'international Communism'.143For

these reasons it would be seriously damaging to UK interests to alter present

'39'Defence Review': Cabinet

note by Trend, 8 November 1965, CAB 130/213.
140DOPC minutes, 24 November 1965, CAB 148/18.
141'Defence Review': Cabinet
note by Trend, 8 November 1965, CAB 130/213.
"2 Cabinet minutes, 23 September 1965, CAB
128/39.
14'See 'President Eisenhower.The Eisenhower
Doctrine on the Middle East, A Message to Congress, January 5,
1957', The Department of State Bulletin, vol.
xxxvi, no. 917 (January 21,1957), pp. 83-87.
 244

dispositions, as this might provoke the collapse of CENTO. It was suggested that

withdrawal of Britain's Canberras from Akrotiri would be all too likely to have this effect,

even though their military value was in real terms negligible. As the only Western

forces declared to CENTO, the Shah saw them as a symbol of Western support, and

his commitment would be 'greatly shaken' if they were withdrawn. If CENTO were to

implode, this would not reduce the necessity of ensuring Iran's pro-Western alignment,

and it would be crucial to seek other ways of reassuring the Shah, potentially involving

a greater level of commitment than required under CENTO. Both Britain's policy

towards CENTO and 'tenderness for Iranian susceptibilities' were governed by the

existence of a pro-Western regime in Iran; however, as officials recognised, an

`assassin's bullet' would change this situation 'overnight', and 'the raison d' etre of

these policies would disappear with it'. 144

So long as the UK retained its political responsibilities to other parts of the Arabian

Peninsula, DOP(O)C officials contended, Britain's relations with Saudi Arabia would

remain of 'special importance'. Saudi Arabia was particularly concerned about the

future organisation of the principalities under British protection, both in the Gulf and

South Arabia. As a consequence, officials advised that Britain should take Saudi

Arabia 'as fully as possible into our confidence', and, if necessary, play down any

issues (such as Buraimi) where British and Saudi objectives clashed. The Saudi

regime under King Faisal was seen by officials as 'reasonably enlightened and

reasonably well-disposed to the West', it being thought realistic to consider Saudi

Arabia as Britain's 'eventual heir in the Persian Gulf some time after 1970'.

Irrespective of Nasser's fate, it was forecast that Britain and Egypt's basic objectives

would continue to conflict, thereby making a positive relationship with Cairo an

'improbable' prospect. Nevertheless, in dealing with Egypt, it would be necessary 'to

show restraint', despite the excesses of Egyptian propaganda and of 'their recurrent

'" 'Defence Review': Cabinet note by Trend, 8 November

1965, CAB 130/213
 245

attempts to inflict petty humiliations on their former masters'. It was recognised that

Nasser was better placed to damage British interests than vice-versa: 'All-out political

warfare between Egypt and ourselves would be worse from our point of view than the

present attempt to preserve "normal" relations despite his murderous plotting in

Aden'.145

In planning Britain's political strategy up to 1970, policy-makers concentrated on the

two areas where the UK retained direct political responsibilities - the Persian Gulf and

South Arabia. Britain's effective policy choice, it was argued, lay between (a)

abandoning both in short order; (b) retaining both indefinitely; or (c) retaining both for

long enough to avoid the dangers of (a) without incurring the difficulties of (b). The

case against (b) was perhaps self-evident in an anti-colonial age -'its essence is that in

the face of mounting pressure against us the financial, military and moral cost will

become prohibitive'. The difficulty of (c) lay in getting the extent and timing right,

though the Foreign Office believed that Britain should and could retain its pre-eminent

position in the Gulf until after 1970. Even so, there was no intention amongst policy-

makers to 'mark time for five years or more'. For this reason, it was suggested that

British political strategy should be aimed at preparing the way for change, 'with a view

to making it as painless as possible for all concerned'.146A few months earlier, on 23

September 1965, Stewart indicated Foreign Office thinking on this subject, when he

told the cabinet: We had inherited a position which we could not afford to maintain

indefinitely. We must therefore contemplate a gradual and orderly withdrawal from the

Middle East'.147Officials advised ministers that policy towards the Gulf states should

incorporate five main facets: the 'modernisation' of relations with local authorities in the

area; pressuring the rulers to move rapidly in the direction of administrative and social

reform; reorganisation of the Trucial Coast into two main units, one comprising only

Abu Dhabi (the largest and wealthiest of the Sheikhdoms) and one brining the other six

145
ibid.
146ibid.
147Cabinet minutes, 23 September 1965, CAB
128/39.
 246

states together under the leadership of Dubai; encouragement of some form of

quadripartite association between Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and the Dubai group;

and, finally, the promotion of greater contact between these four, collectively and

separately, and their larger neighbour, Saudi Arabia.148

On 13 November 1965, when the cabinet met at Chequers to discuss the Defence

Review, ministers and officials accepted that Britain's position in Aden was 'precarious'

and that it would be necessary to 'plan on the assumption that it could not be held'. If

Aden were given up, however, it did not follow that Britain must withdraw from the

Persian Gulf: indeed, it might be possible to strengthen Britain's position there, so as to

enable the UK to fulfill its extant commitments. The minutes of this meeting note that

there was an 'unresolved divergence of view between Departments about the need to

maintain a United Kingdom military presence in the Gulf'. Callaghan argued that it

would be 'uneconomic to spend large capital sums on facilities in Bahrain or elsewhere

in the Gulf to take the place of Aden', whilst Stewart emphasised the need to retain a

military presence to act as an anti-Soviet bulwark. Concerned with reducing defence

expenditure to £2,000 million (at 1964 prices), Healey argued that it would be

necessary to withdraw from Aden on its independence in 1967 or 1968; reduce

commitments in the Persian Gulf and to CENTO, in order to 'exclude' any commitment

to intervene in Kuwait and to 'exclude' the need for nuclear strike forces in Cyprus; and

decrease intervention capability below the current level required for operations in Libya

and Kuwait.149

On 24 November 1965, ministers agreed that Britain should give up any'obligations

to, or defence facilities in, Aden or the South Arabian Federation', on the occasion of

South Arabian independence in 1967 or 1968. In order to fulfil the existing

commitmenttowards Kuwait,ministersconsideredwhetherit would be necessaryto

establishdefencefacilitiesin the PersianGulf, which was estimatedto cost £22 million.

148'Defence Review: Cabinet

note by Trend, 8 November 1965, CAB 130/213.
149Cabinet (Defence Policy) minutes, 13 November
1965, CAB 130/213.
 247

The Ministry of Defence argued that it would be impossible to complete such facilities

by 1967 or 1968, since these would require a minimum of five years to build. As an

alternative, Healey suggested that it would be possible to undertake a smaller

programme costing £10 million, which would enable Britain to maintain a visible military

presence and to fulfil its 'non-Kuwait' commitments in the Gulf. If this smaller

programme were implemented, and in the event that it was subsequently decided to

develop the capability necessary to defend Kuwait, it would cost an additional £16

to
million upgrade these facilities. There would therefore be a period following

withdrawal from Aden when the UK would lack the facilities in the Persian Gulf

necessary to fulfil its obligations towards Kuwait. Even with higher expenditure, Healey

argued, it was impossible to guarantee that Britain would be capable of defending

Kuwait in the event that the Iraqi Army was freed from fighting the Kurds. Since Kuwait

had consolidated its status as an independent country, the MoD suspected that the

likelihood of repeating a `1961-style' intervention had rapidly diminished. Conversely,

Stewart thought that it was important to recognise the legitimacy of the Emir's desire

for the continuation of 'a visible United Kingdom presence' in order to deter potential

Iraqi aggression.150

On 19 January 1966, when the cabinet returned to this issue, Stewart argued in

favour of building up British forces in the Persian Gulf to the extent that they would

continue to have a capability to defend Kuwait, suggesting that this commitment should

be retained until the Kuwaiti government itself took the initiative in renouncing the June

1961 exchange of letters. The Treasury disagreed with this assessment, contending

that nationalist pressure against Britain's presence would rapidly gain momentum if UK

forces remained in the Persian Gulf following departure from Aden. Britain might,

Callaghan warned, become embroiled in the maintenance of the internal security in

Bahrain, a development that would make the extrication of British forces more

150DOPC minutes, 24 November 1965, CAB 148/18.

 248

problematic. Healey informed his colleagues that retention of the Kuwait commitment,

after British withdrawal from Aden, would entail increasing the number of men

stationed in the Gulf from 3,700 to more than 11,000, but pointed out that political

considerations precluded the stationing of such large numbers of men in Bahrain,

Sharjah and Masirah. The MoD felt it was better to get out of the Gulf sooner rather

than later, believing it more advantageous to rely on non-military methods of

influence.15' David Bruce, US Ambassador in London, indicated to Rusk that Healey

would 'prefer to use whatever influence he had in prolonging [the] UK presence in

Singapore/Malaysia rather than [in] the Gulf'. He also claimed that Healey's mind was

set on this issue, since he believed that 'it was likely to be harmful rather than helpful to

prolong Brit[ain's] Gulf presence beyond 1970-1971'.152Despite Callaghan and

Healey's objections, the DOPC agreed that a serious breakdown of regional stability

would ensue if the UK undertook a complete withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in

tandem with retreat from Aden. The Foreign Office successfully argued that Britain

should seek to maintain forces in the Persian Gulf, retaining the capacity to carry out

three main tasks on the Arabian Peninsula: the ability to defend the protected territories

(Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States) and Muscat and Oman against outside attack;

assist these states and Kuwait against internal disturbance; and deter outside

aggression against Kuwait. Wilson, when summing up the discussion, added that it

was important to be mindful that the United States would be likely to express concern

at any suggestion of complete British withdrawal from the Middle East on the occasion

of South Arabian independence.153

In late January 1966, Anglo-American discussions'on the UK Defence Review were

held, involvingRuskand McNamara,on the US side, and Stewartand Healey,on the

Britishside. Stewartinformedthe Americans in an eloquentexpositionredolentof

-

15''Defence Review: Forces and Facilities in the Persian

Gulf: Memorandumby the Ministry of Defence for the
DOP(O)C, 14 January 1966, CAB 148/69.
152'Telegram from the Embassy In the United Kingdom
to the Departmentof State', 9 January 1966, FRUS: Western
Europe, vol. XII, Document 287.
153DOPC minutes, 19 January 1966, CAB 148/25.
 249

Treasury orthodoxy - that the UK was over-stretched in trying to maintain its present

overseas commitments. In order to secure Britain's economic well-being and

international standing, he argued that it was essential to correct the serious foreign

exchange drain: 'if British defence commitments create an unbearable strain,

especially in balance of payments terms, the result will be a weakening of the UK

position everywhere'.154

As a consequence of recurrent balance-of-payments difficulties, Britain's economic

prospects deteriorated markedly during the summer of 1966. Confronted with an

unsustainable drain on London's reserves and speculation against the pound in the

first half of July, the Labour government was forced into taking a number of stringent

economic measures. On 12 July, the same day that the pound fell to its lowest level

since November 1964, Callaghan presented a paper to the cabinet, warning that the

economy was suffering from labour shortages, inflationary pressures, rising wages and

too many imports. Primarily because public expenditure was forecast to grow too

rapidly, Callaghan did not foresee any prospect of an improvement in the balance of

payments during 1966 or 1967.155Furthermore, Britain had to pay off the loan it had

acquired from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 1965 and owed

£3,385 million to Swiss banks. Sitting behind his desk in the Treasury, confronted with

such a gloomy economic prognosis, Callaghan became an even more vociferous

advocate of the need to withdraw from East of Suez. Prior to the major attacks on

sterling between 12 and 14 July, Callaghan had argued in favour of drastic economies

in defence expenditure - on 1 July 1966, for example, Callaghan tried to convince

Wilson of the need to abandon the East of Suez role in a private meeting.t5" On 15

's''British
Defence
Review':
Memorandum
ofconversation,
22January FRUS:
1966, Western
Europe, XII,
Document vol.
155
254.
Cabinet minutes, 12 July 1966, CAB 128/41.
'56K. O. Morgan, Callaghan:A Life, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), p. 242. George Brown was also present at
this meeting.
 250

June 1966, when recording the deliberations of a meeting of the Parliamentary Labour

Party, in which Wilson gave his 'usual Bevinite speech' denouncing the 'strange

and
alliance'of pro-Europeans left-wingersopposedto East of Suez, Crossmannoted:

His theme was that though he was prepared to withdraw and reduce the
number of troops East of Suez he would never deny Britain the role of a
world power... While he was talking, Jim [Callaghan] came in and sat
beside me on the other side from Fred Peart. Throughout the speech
he whispered to me how totally he disagreed and told me that he
thought Denis Healey holds much the same view as he does and that
George Brown wasn't enthusiastic. East of Suez is solely the P.M.'s
line - the P.M. with George Wigg's [Paymaster-General] backing.
Undoubtedly, it's all a fantastic illusion. How can anyone build up
Britain now as a great power East of Suez when we can't even maintain
the Sterling Area.157

Jeffrey Pickering's assertion that'Healey, Brown and Callaghan ... had unambiguous

Bevinite roots and, as later events would verify, continued to stand resolutely behind

East Suez is in if outright refutation.158Healey

the of role' urgent need of revision, not

sought the abrogation of Britain's commitment to Kuwait in January 1966 - eighteen

months prior to the devaluation of sterling. Given that Kuwait was the most important

British commitment in the Middle East, a region that represented one of the two 'pillars'

on which the East of Suez role stood (the other being the Far East), it would be wrong

to portray Healey as someone who doggedly pursued Bevinite policies. Throughout

his period at the Treasury, Callaghan argued for an accelerated reduction in military

expenditure and overseas commitments. The documentary evidence presented in this

chapter makes it difficult to sustain Pickering's contention that Callaghan and Healey

157R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Minister of Housing, 1964-66,vol. I, (London: Hamish
Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1975), p. 570. Added emphasis. George Wigg, a member of Wilson's kitchen cabinet',
was an ardent supporter of Britain's East of Suez role. When commenting on a draft version of Christopher Mayhew's
Britain's Role Tomorrow,a highly critical account of the Labour government's foreign policy which had been handed into
Whitehall to make sure that it corresponded with rules and procedures concerning publication, he told Wilson: 'if this
had been written by one of my subordinates during my Army days the writer would by now have been back In his
barracks'. Wigg to Wilson, 14 September 1966, PREM 13/911.
'58J Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suer The Politics Retrenchment,(London: Macmillan, 1998), p.
of
156.
 251

were 'men from the old Labour right who fervently supported the overseas role'. In

fact, Wilson's resolute commitment to an East of Suez role stifled Callaghan and

Healey's attempts to revise commitments, though it should be noted that both the

Chancellor and Defence Secretary, representing the views of their respective

departments, had differing opinions with regard to Britain's appropriate place in the

world.

During the course of 1966-1967, in response to the July economic crisis, Whitehall

conducted a series of defence expenditure reviews, under the Defence Review

Working Group, a subsidiary committee of the DOP(O)C. The final DOP(O)C report,

which acted as the basis of Labour's Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy

(published on 18 July 1967), concluded that Britain should withdraw from the Persian

Gulf by the mid-1970s, meaning that UK forces would no longer be capable of

defending Kuwait.159On 6 July 1967, Healey told his cabinet colleagues that there was

'no further scope' for savings without cutting the capability of UK forces, and that in

order to reduce defence expenditure in 1970-71 by £200 million, rising by 1975-76 to

£300 million, it would be necessary to accept a reduction in commitments and a

fundamental change in the basis of British foreign policy. As part of the measures

needed to achieve these financial targets, Healey informed the cabinet that the MoD

was now planning on the assumption that Britain would have withdrawn from the

Persian Gulf by 1975. In discussion, cabinet ministers considered the advantages and

disadvantages of including in the Defence White Paper a specific date for withdrawal

from the Middle East, reaching 'general agreement that no date should be given'.180

Reflecting opinion on Labour's left wing, Richard Crossman, Lord President of the

Council and Leader of the Commons, did not believe that the Defence White Paper

went far enough, arguing in favour of immediate withdrawal from the Middle East, with

'"'Defence ExpenditureStudies': Report by

the DOP(O)C, 21 June 1967, CAB 148/32; SupplementaryStatement on
Defence Policy, Cmnd 3357, (London: HMSO, 1967).
160Cabinet minutes, 6 July 1967, CAB 128/42.
 252

Britain opting out of CENTO and cancelling all its treaty obligations in the Persian

Gulf.161

Britain's Final Withdrawal from South Arabia, 1967-68.

When the cabinet met on 13 March 1967, ministers agreed that Britain should grant

independence to South Arabia on 1 November 1967, whilst retaining sovereignty in

Aden and control of internal security until then; and to withdraw all forces from the

mainland of South Arabia as quickly as possible after independence, whilst providing

carrier-based support to the new state against external aggression for up to six months

thereafter.162The Federal government rejected these proposals, maintaining that their

ground forces would not be capable of assuming full responsibility for internal security

until 1 April 1968, and that their naval and air forces would not be ready for some

months later. The Federation was willing to accept independence on 1 September

1968, but only if four conditions were met: first, if Britain were to transfer all

responsibility for internal security in Aden on 1 March 1968; secondly, if British forces

remained in Aden until 1 March 1968; thirdly, if the UK provided a'Defence Guarantee'

for up to three years after 1 September 1968; and, finally, if a new constitution were

brought into force well before 1 September 1968. On 11 May 1967, George Brown,

who replaced Stewart at the Foreign Office, recommended that Britain reject the

proposal of a Defence Guarantee' and decline the invitation to provide a continuing

presence until 1 September 1968, but proposed a compromise, whereby independence

would be granted on 1 January 1968, rather than 1 November 1967. The cabinet

came down in favour of Brown's recommendations.163As Crossman noted in his diary,

161'DefenceWithdrawals':
DraftPaperbytheLordPresident CAB137/35.
30July1967,
theCouncil', On6July
1967,Crossman of
expressedsimilar
viewsata meeting
ofthe See
cabinet. Cabinet 6
minutes,July CAB
1967, 128/42.
'62Cabinet 13
minutes, March1967,CAB 148/42.
163Cabinet 11 May
minutes, 1967, CAB 128/42.
 253

Brown was 'genuinely and passionately determined to get out of Aden at all costs', and

the compromise package was 'solely designed as a cover for this 1

operation .164

With support from the Federal Government, Whitehall decided to adopt the

constitutional proposals contained in the Hone-Bell report of February 1966.165

Although the constitution was to provide for countrywide elections on the basis of

universal adult suffrage, it was to be based on 'liberal' nationality legislation, restricting

the vote to genuine 'belongers' of various races. This provision did not extend to the

substantial Yemeni population in Aden, something that was totally unacceptable to

opposition groups, such as the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen

(FLOSY) and the National Liberation Front (NLF). In addition to maintaining an off-

shore British naval force for six months after independence as an assurance against

external aggression, and stationing a unit of V-bombers at Masirah Island for at least

six months, Britain would also increase by £10 million the amount previously committed

to the South Arabian Federal Government (SAFG) military for the first three years of

independence 166

In the words of one US intelligence memorandum, Aden had become 'an armed

camp' by mid-1967, with assassination and terrorist acts commonplace. Despite this

state of increasing anarchy, Whitehall clearly hoped to avoid leaving behind 'another

Congo'.167The vital question, however, was whether it was not already too late to

achieve any kind of order out of the chaos arising from the explosive concoction of

tribal feuds, ethnic prejudices, social backwardness, and the political machinations of

other Arab countries. On 27 October 1967, at a meeting of the DOPC, ministers

agreed on the need to establish arrangements to inform Parliament of the

government's intention to withdraw the last British troops from South Arabia in the

'64R. H. S. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of
Commons, 1966-68,vol. 11,(London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1976), p. 368.
'65In late 1965, South Arabia's Federal Government decided to commission two internationallyknown experts to advise
them on a future constitution: Sir Gawain Bell, who had a distinguished career in the Sudan, the Persian Gulf and
Nigeria, and a well known constitutional lawyer, Sir Ralph Hone.
'66'Future of South Arabia', 24 May 1967, FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI, Document 97.
167'South Arabia': US Intelligence Memorandum,24 July 1967, FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI, Document 65.
 254

second half of November. The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, concluded:

'Although it now seemed that circumstances might compel us to leave South Arabia

without securing the formation of a stable successor government, our position was fully

defensible and would be welcomed by a majority of opinion in this country'.168Three

days later, at a meeting of the cabinet, Brown informed his colleagues that the

disintegration of the Federal Government and the failure of the Protectorate rulers to

maintain their authority (even in their own states) had left FLOSY and the NLF as the

two dominant political forces in South Arabia. There was thus no government to which

Britain could hand over its responsibilities in South Arabia, nor was it clear that there

would be one by the end of the year. With a decline in the threat posed by the UAR,

which had reduced its presence in Yemen, Brown argued that British policy'must be

adjusted to meet the new situation'. In particular, there was 'no advantage' in retaining

UK forces in South Arabia until January 1968 - indeed, it might well be that a political

settlement in South Arabia would be hastened by a rapid withdrawal of UK forces.

Brown also proposed that Britain withdraw its promise to provide maritime and air

support to South Arabia in the period following independence.16' Crossman believed

this to be a fortuitous development: 'It now looks as though we shall get out of Aden

without losing a single British soldier, chaos will rule soon after we've gone, and there'll

be one major commitment cut - thank God'.170On 1 November 1967, Sir Patrick Dean

informed Rusk of the cabinet's decision to withdraw from South Arabia, but reassured

the Americans that these actions 'in no way reflected on HMG's determination to

remain in the Persian Gulf'."' The NLF eventually emerged as the dominant

nationalist movement in Aden, taking over the government of the federation. South

Arabia became independent on 30 November 1967, but was quickly re-named the

People's Republic of South Yemen, being re-named in 1970 as the People's

168DOPC minutes, 27 October 1967, CAB 148/26.

169Cabinet minutes, 30 October 1967, CAB 128142.
10 Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister,
vol. II, p. 541.
""'UK Withdrawal from South Arabia': Memorandum Conversation,
of FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI, Document
107.
 255

Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Soviet Union became an important backer of the

Yemeni government, which oversaw the development of a quasi-Marxist state, with

Russian naval bases being established in the area in 1979 -a development

disadvantageous to the West in the wider context of the Cold War.

The Final Decision to Withdraw from the Middle East, 1967-68.

On 11 July 1967, in the light of the recent Arab-Israeli Six Day War, the cabinet

considered a memorandum by Brown, entitled 'Arab Attitudes and British Economic

Interests in the Middle East'. Brown pointed out that Britain's large interests in the

Arab states 'limited our freedom of action in the area generally'. Highlighting the extent

to which Britain was unable to exert influence in the region, Brown told the cabinet that

there was 'little that we ourselves could now do to influence the way in which events

moved in the Middle East'. In discussion, it was argued that recent events had

illustrated that Britain's military deployment in the Middle East was of 'no value to our

economic interests and that this presence should be withdrawn as quickly as possible'.

As regards the longer term, the cabinet agreed on the need to re-examine Britain's

dependence on Middle East oil, having regard to the limitations this placed on British

foreign policy and to the fact that on three occasions in the last ten years interference

with supplies had put UK industry at risk.172

On 16 November 1967, at a meeting of the cabinet, Callaghan recommended that

sterling be devalued on 18 November, to a new fixed parity of £1:$2.40. (The cabinet

discussed, but rejected, the idea of introducing a floating exchange: Callaghan

believed that the objections to a floating rate were 'overriding', contending that this

would run counter to the 'basic philosophy' of international exchange rates and would

therefore incur the active hostility of the IMF and the international monetary community;

172Cabinet minutes, 11 July 1967, CAB 128/42.

 256

in these circumstances the rate might sink to an unacceptably low level; and even

though the rate might recover, the damage to the system of international trade and

payments in the interim could be 'very grave'.) Callaghan informed his colleagues that

it had not been easy for him to make this recommendation, since in one sense it

marked the end of the economic strategy hitherto pursued by the government.

Although Britain still had considerable reserves of foreign exchange and was not

compelled to devalue by sheer insufficiency of liquid resources, Callaghan believed

that speculation against the pound had reached such proportions that any other course

would have been ineffective. If the policy of holding the pound's parity with the dollar

remained unchanged, Britain would be liable to exhaust the reserves still available and

should then be unable to defend even a reduced parity. Callaghan identified a number

of reasons for devaluation, including the recent Middle East crisis and the closure of

the Suez Canal. In order for devaluation to succeed, it would be necessary for the

government to 'throw their united effort' into the creation of confidence in the new

parity, the aim being to improve the UK balance of payments by £500 million in 1969.

Reductions in defence expenditure had been under discussion between Callaghan and

Healey since the summer, with the purpose of achieving a saving of some £60 million.

Given the adverse economic circumstances, cabinet ministers believed it right to

substitute a more exacting target, particularly since restrictive measures in areas of

social provision, such as abandoning the decision to raise the school leaving age to 16,

would not be politically acceptable to Labour MPs without further economies in defence

expenditure. An additional saving of some £50 million, making a total of some £110

million in all, would bring defence expenditure in 1968-69 not only below the target set

for 1970 but also below probable actual expenditure in 1967-68.13 On 21 November

1967 cabinet ministers considered the measures that would be necessary to make

devaluation a success. Healey said that he was proposing to save a total of some

173Cabinet minutes, 16 November 1967, CAB 128/42.

 257

£110 million of the estimated expenditure for 1968-69. Of this, some £60 million was

accounted for by a wide range of small savings which had already been under

discussion before the decision to devalue. The further £50 million of savings, Healey

warned, would be concentrated upon cuts in Britain's defence capability, some of

which were `quite severe' and would involve a 'substantial reduction' in the UK's

capability for operations outside Europe during the next five years. All these cuts,

totalling £110 million in 1968-69, would bring a direct foreign exchange saving of some

£15 million a year.174

On 4 January 1968, when the cabinet reconsidered the implications of devaluation on

Britain's defence commitments, Brown argued that it would be wrong to suppose that

in
any new major change of policy was now question. 'That decision had been made

as a result of the last Defence Review in July 1967... ' Brown asserted, '. when the
, ..
decision had been taken to withdraw our forces from East of Suez and, although it had

not been announced at the time, from the Persian Gulf'. The issue was now the extent

to which British withdrawal should be accelerated. Unlike in the Far East, Britain had

'direct' interests in the Persian Gulf: forty per cent of UK oil supplies (and over fifty per

cent of Western Europe's) came from the Gulf; and the forty per cent of Gulf oil which

was in British ownership made a significant contribution to Britain's foreign exchange

earnings. Reiterating an argument long advanced by the Treasury, Brown recognised

that UK forces 'could not defend our oil supplies' and that the oil producing states

needed Britain as a customer for their oil. For this reason, however, Brown preferred

to make no announcement of Britain's plans for withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. If it

became known that the UK intended to leave the Persian Gulf, Brown believed that'we

might be faced with the same situation as we had faced in Aden and be forced to leave

sooner than we intended'. When the cabinet discussed Britain's planned withdrawal

from the Persian Gulf, ministers agreed that it would be essential to declare a date for

174Cabinet minutes, 21 November 1967, CAB 128/42.

 258

withdrawal. Unless this was done, it would be impossible to announce or plan the

phasing out of the aircraft carriers (which would yield substantial savings in

expenditure), given that the carriers would be needed to cover withdrawal from the

Gulf. An early announcement was also necessary to remove uncertainty in the area,

and it was argued that Britain could not stay in the Gulf after withdrawal from the Far

East. Indeed, once it was known that the UK was withdrawing from the Far East earlier

than was planned, Britain's position in the Gulf was likely to become 'more and more

difficult'.15 Summing up this part of the discussion, Wilson concluded that the decision

of the cabinet was that British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf (and Far East) should

be completed by the end of the financial year 1970-71.1e

The Treasury, acting from a position of unprecedented post-war strength in the

aftermath of devaluation and not content with reducing the level of British defence

commitments, urged the 'overseas' departments to accept a substantial diminution in

their military aid programmes. On 12 January 1968, John Diamond, Chief Secretary to

the Treasury, argued that the aim of policy should be to bring Britain's current

obligations to an end and to accept no new commitments. Expenditure on military aid

would be £21 million in 1967-68, £23 million in 1968-69 and £19 million in 1969-70. Of

the 1967-68 figure, about £4 million represented military technical assistance, mainly to

Commonwealth countries. The largest item in the remaining £17 million was military

aid to South Arabia (by this time Southern Yemen), amounting to £11 million. The

Treasury disagreed with the proposed increase of military aid in 1968-69; after all, it

had been agreed that military aid to Southern Yemen should continue for six months

up to May 1968, with no commitment incumbent on Britain after that date. Any further

aid, it was argued, should be economic rather than military, and should be found within

the overseas aid budget.'77

175See Chapter V.
176Cabinet minutes, 6 January 1968, CAB 128/43.
177Cabinet minutes, 12 January 1968, CAB 128/43.
 259

Historians have often portrayed the events of late 1967 and early 1968 as being of

pivotal importance in Britain's decision to withdraw from East of Suez. David

Reynolds, for example, suggests that a 'revolution in financial and defence priorities'

took place after devaluation, emphasising the importance of a change in the balance of

the cabinet, resulting from Roy Jenkins' replacing Callaghan at the Treasury.18 This

dominant view owes much to the Grossman diaries, which present the final decision to

withdraw as a painful battle between a Bevinite core, led by Stewart, Callaghan, Brown

and Healey (who Grossman described as the 'four pygmies' responsible for `running

our foreign policy for the last three years'), and an unlikely grouping of the Labour Left
179
and pro-Europeans. It is interesting to note that Crossman's earlier diary entries

frequently contradict this characterisation of Callaghan, Brown and Healey, with

historians often failing to highlight this inconsistency in his recording of events.180In a

similar vein, Pickering argues that 'the new Chancellor, Roy Jenkins, emerged as a

policy entrepreneur... he challenged a foreign policy realm that [had] been considered

immutable by successive British governments'.181This statement certainly over-

emphasises Jenkins' role in events, since the Chancellor merely pushed through

policies long advocated by the Treasury, namely the need to reduce overseas

expenditure and undertake military retrenchment. It is hard to substantiate the view

that either Labour or Conservative governments considered the East of Suez role

'immutable', as is demonstrated by the succession of Whitehall pan-strategic policy

reviews analysed in this thesis. Devaluation merely accelerated what was accepted

within Whitehall as inevitable.

On 16 January 1968, Wilson announced that Britain would withdraw its forces from

the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 - by that date the UK would have no bases outside

18 D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled.,British Policy

and World Power in the Twentieth Century, (London: Longman,
1991), p. 231.
"' Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. II, 635.
p.
780Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister,
vol. I, p. 570.
18'J. Pickering, 'Politics and "Black Tuesday": Shifting Power
in the Cabinet and the Decision to Withdraw from East of
Suez, November 1967 - January 1968', Twentieth Century British History,
vol. 13, No. 2, (2002).
 260

Europe and the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Wilson kept up the conceit that Britain

would be able to act militarily in the Middle East:

On the Gulf, we have indicated to the Governments concerned that our

basic interest in the prosperity and security of the area remains; and, as I
have said, the capability we shall be maintaining here [in the UK] will be
is 182
available for deployment whenever, in out judgement, this right.

The reaction of Washington's foreign policy-making establishment to this decision

underlines the need to revise Ovendale's contention that the United States assumed

Britain's 'traditional role' in the Middle East following the 1958 Anglo-American

intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, disputed the need for Britain to withdraw,

believing that the Western position in the Persian Gulf is almost entirely dependent on

the British presence'.' 83 Walt Rostow, President Johnston's National Security Advisor,

wanted Iran and Saudi Arabia to assume Britain's responsibilities for maintaining

stability in the Persian Gulf: 'Good relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will be

necessary to keep things under control when the British leave. The alternatives are

instability with a strong chance of an increased Soviet presence. We don't want to have

to replace the British, and we don't want the Russians there. So we must count on the

Shah and Faisal'.184An Inter-departmental Regional Group meeting, chaired by

Battle, concluded: 'It is neither politically feasible nor desirable for the US to "replace"

the British presence in the Persian Gulf'. 185On 1 February 1968, therefore, Johnson

informed the Shah: 'The United States interest in the security of the area does not...

'82Parl. Papers (Commons), 16 January 1968, vol. 756, cols. 1580-1582.On 29 March 1968, Stewart requested
permissionfrom the DOPC to open formal negotiations to terminate Britain's commitment to Kuwait and the protective
assurances to Bahrain, Qatar and the seven Trucial States; this would be the political counterpart to the decision that
military withdrawal from the area should be complete by the end of 1971 at the latest. See DOPC minutes, 29 March
1968, CAB 148/35.
183'BritishPlans to Accelerate Withdrawal of Military Presence from Persian Gulf: Your Meeting
with Foreign Secretary
Brown': Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle)
to Secretary of State Rusk, 9 January 1968, FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI, Document 122.
184'Message to the Shah on the Persian Gulf': Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)to
PresidentJohnson, 31 January 1968, FRUS, Near East Region, vol. XXI, Document 128. Added emphasis.
11 'Record of IRG Meeting': 1 February 1968, Near East Region,
vol. XXI, Document 131.
 261

envisage that we would wish either to replace the British military presence or

participate in any new regional security arrangement. The United States looks to the

countries of the to
area ensure the area's security'.186

On 26 July 1968 the DOPC considered a paper by Stewart (who went back to the

Foreign Office following Brown's resignation) on non-military means of influence in

those areas outside Europe, including the Persian Gulf, from which Britain was

withdrawing its forces. Stewart concluded: We must continue to protect and promote

our very substantial economic interests in these areas over the next five years and it

would be in our overall interest slightly to increase our non-military effort in this period'.

Thus, in a reversal of previous policy, the Foreign Office embraced non-military means

of influence as a substitute for military power. By way of contrast, Jenkins expressed

concern with regard to increasing expenditure in the non-military field. 187A desire to

exercise non-military means of influence did little to ameliorate Washington's

discontent at the withdrawal of UK forces from the Persian Gulf. As Sir Patrick Dean

noted in a dispatch to Stewart, the Americans, with their pre-occupation with the

strategic balance of power, found this prospect `difficult to contemplate with

feeling
equanimity', that the UK was 'pushingits load on to the United 188
States'.

Summary.

Between 1959 and 1968, British policy towards the Middle East underwent a dramatic

transformation, as relative economic decline, a weakened military capability and the

rise of hostile Arab nationalism (particularly in South Arabia) conspired to make

Britain's position in the region untenable. The changing balance of power between the

Treasury and the Foreign Office was an important (although, as yet, under-

'86Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy In Iran': 1 February 1968, Near East Region,
vol. XXI,
Document 129.
187DOPC minutes, 26 July 1968, CAB 148/35.
188Dean to Stewart, 31 July 1968, FCO 7/778.
 262

appreciated) factor in facilitating the process of British retrenchment from the Middle

East. In late 1961, Whitehall's attempt to re-consider Britain's obligations towards

Kuwait provided the first opportunity since the Macmillan government's 'Future Policy

Study, 1960-1970' to re-evaluate high policy objectives towards the Middle East on a

structured inter-departmental basis. Despite the best endeavours of the Treasury and

Sir Norman Brook, Foreign Office orthodoxy triumphed. Ex post facto, this can be

viewed as a seminal juncture (a historical turning point where Britain failed to turn), as

it reinforced the Foreign Office view that the overt demonstration of military power,

despite being expensive, was the best means by which to secure British interests. If

the Conservative government had pursued the policy course advocated by Brook,

Britain might have been able to organise an orderly disengagement from South Arabia,

as a changed relationship with Kuwait would have negated the need to retain base

facilities in Aden. Although the Foreign Office's contention that military retrenchment

would lead to a curtailment of vital oil supplies was perhaps unjustified, based as it was

on the belief that Arab nations would not be driven by commercial considerations when

exporting oil to Western industrialised countries, it would be misleading to characterise

this position as being entirely rooted in outmoded imperial sentiment: Foreign Office

officials marshalled economic (albeit challenged by the Treasury) as well as political

arguments in favour of their preferred policy course. Even so, the early 1960s were

characterised by an instinctive gravitational pull on the part of the Foreign Office to

preserve the status quo. The Long Term Study Group, in spite of its innovative

approach to foreign policy formulation through the use of scenario/contingency

planning, failed to challenge the dominant rationale underpinning Britain's Middle

Eastern role. Policy was allowed to drift until the 1966 Defence Review, when the final

decision to leave Aden was taken out of pragmatic necessity, although the Foreign

Office's determination to re-locate to the Persian Gulf, questioned by both the Treasury

and Ministry of Defence, provided Britain with a residual capability to undertake military

action East of Suez. Confronted with continuing economic difficulties, Whitehall was
 263

forced to re-examine the appropriate level of resources devoted to defence expenditure

in 1966-1967, a process that resulted in the psychological acceptance of Britain's

inability to finance an independent role in the Middle East. Although Labour's

Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy failed to mention a date for final

withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, cabinet ministers had decided on the need to do so.

The devaluation of sterling in November 1967 merely accelerated this process, moving

the date of final withdrawal from 1975 to 1971.

 264

Chapter V: British Policy in the Far East, 1959-1968.

This chapter addresses the changing nature of Britain's role in South-East Asia during

the late 1950s and 1960s, examining the key external and internal influences on the

formulation of British foreign policy, up until the Wilson government's announcement of

withdrawal from Singapore in 1968 - an act that effectively marked the end of Britain's

regional influence. This section of the thesis aims to answer the following questions:

What were Britain's main interests in South-East Asia during the late 1950s and

1960s? How did policy-makers react to the rapidly transforming regional environment,

which was acutely volatile in the aftermath of French, British and Dutch decolonisation?

Was Britain's disengagement from its remaining colonial responsibilities - Singapore,

Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak - based on a principled approach or a pragmatic

response to changing circumstances? Were there divisions within Whitehall in regard

to the perceived value of Britain's military presence in the area? To what extent did the

'overseas' and 'economic' departments hold divergent views on Britain's appropriate

role in South-East Asia? To what degree was British policy influenced by pressure

from Washington, namely America's insistence that it should not become the only

Western power with a substantial military deployment in the Far East, especially at a

time when US troops were heavily engaged in Vietnam? Did Australian and New

Zealand opposition to British withdrawal inform thinking within Whitehall, or was this

ignored in favour of narrowly defined self-interest? Finally, did a commitment to the

preservation of a global role inhibit a realistic re-appraisal of Britain's defence posture

in South-East Asia?

Historians, until comparatively recently, have viewed the devaluation of sterling as a

convenient date for marking the end of Britain's position as a global power. Robert

Holland, for example, sees devaluation as providing the final coup de grace to Britain's
 265

'
commitment a world-wide role. Sean Greenwood argues that the programme of
to

defence cuts, following devaluation, marked a'brusque conclusion to Britain's

overseas pretensions'? Similarly, A. J. Stockwell has suggested: 'Ultimately, it was

the devaluation of sterling in November 1967 that forced the Labour government to set

in train a plan for withdrawal from the.Singapore base in 19719. The two most

important diarists in the Wilson cabinet, Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle,

provide a similar interpretation on the reasons underpinning the decision to withdraw

from South-East Asia, reinforcing the view that economic circumstances provided the

predominant rationale. Crossman presents a simplistic battle between 'Bevinites', such

as George Brown and Denis Healey, resolutely committed to a continued British

position East of Suez, and a left wing/pro-European axis, who were driven by either

anti-imperialist sentiment or support for membership of the European Economic

Community (EEC), with Roy Jenkins's appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in

the wake of devaluation, tipping the balance in favour of the latter group This has led
.4
John Darwin to argue that devaluation, allied to the cabinet reorganisation which

followed, were as much the 'occasion' as the 'cause' of a fundamental change of

perspective on Britain's overseas interests 5 By arguing that devaluation was the event
.,
that ended an 'official mindset' that emphasised Britain's global role, Chris Wrigley,

David Reynolds and Jeffrey Pickering have to some extent perpetuated this traditional

interpretation 6
g

' R. F. Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness:Britain and the World Role, 1900-1970,(London: Fontana, 1991).
2 S. Greenwood, Britain and the Cold War, 1945-91,(London: Macmillan, 20000), p. 174.
3 A. J. Stockwell, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in South-East Asia' In J. M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (eds.), The
Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 488.
R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons,
vol. II, (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1976).
5J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire In the Post-War World, (London: Macmillan, 1988). p.
295.
6C.Wrigley'Now you see it, now you don't: Harold Wilson and Labour's Foreign Policy 1964-70', In R. Coopey, S.
Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson Governments, 1964-1970,(London: Pinter, 1993), pp. 123-135; D.
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century, (London: Longman, 1991), p.
231; J. Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez The Politics of Retrenchment,(London: Macmillan, 1998), p.
165.
 266

Britain's Principal Geo-Political Interests in South-East Asia.

In the late 1950s, policy-makers generally considered Britain's interests in South-East

Asia as threefold: first, preventing the area from coming under Communist influence;

secondly, ensuring regional stability, since a conflict between the United States and the

Communist powers might lead to a major war, with incalculable consequences,

possibly sparking a world-wide confrontation and the deployment of nuclear weapons;

and, thirdly, to strengthen sterling by maintaining conditions conducive to the

expansion of British commerce and trade. These over-riding policy objectives shaped

Britain's regional role, which involved: contributing to the maintenance of an effective

Western military deterrent towards China; acting as a counter-weight to the Sino-Soviet

'threat', whether in subversive or overt form; supporting the 'forward' defence of

Britain's Commonwealth allies, Australia and New Zealand; and, perhaps most

importantly, preserving close relations with the United States, so as to exert the

greatest possible influence over Washington's policies in the region. Britain's interests

and aims were underpinned by two major treaty commitments. First, UK membership

of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), established under Western

auspices following the French withdrawal from IndoChina, was aimed at containing

Communism, strengthening peace and freedom, upholding the principles of

democracy, and promoting the economic development of all members. Under Article

IV of SEATO, Britain was committed to 'act to meet the common danger', in the event

of an attack on any of the regional parties to the treaty - Thailand, Pakistan and the

Philippines. In the event of a threat, other than armed attack, Britain was bound to

'consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the

common defence', with the other signatories of the treaty - Cambodia, Laos and South

Vietnam.' Secondly, Britain supported the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement

1 South-EastAsia Collective Defence Treaty, Cmnd 265, (London:

HMSO, 1954).
 267

(AMDA), which was extended, in July 1963, to incorporate the entire Malaysian

Federation Britain was also a participant member of the ANZAM (Australia, New
.8
Zealand, and America) consultative machinery and responsible for the defence of

Hong Kong, the Borneo Territories and the Pacific Island colonies. The

Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR), supported by British, Australia and New

Zealand troops stationed in Malaya and Singapore, its

received military directives from

ANZAM.

The strategic lynchpin of Britain's military presence in South-East Asia was

Singapore, which provided the Far East headquarters of the Royal Navy, Army and

Royal Air Force. From the mid-1950s onwards, however, growing demands for

independence undermined Britain's position in Singapore; the granting of internal self-

in the Crown
government in 1959 did little to ameliorate growing anti-colonial sentiment

Colony. From 1959 onwards, Britain retained control over Singapore's defence and

foreign affairs through a Commissioner, while internal security came under the

auspices of the Internal Security Council (ISC), which was chaired by the British

Commissioner, composing the Prime Minister of Singapore, two representatives each

from the British and Singaporean sides, and a representative of the Malayan

in the Indigenous discontent in

government, who held the casting vote event of a split.

Singapore reached a climax in the spring of 1961, when the governing People's Action

Party (PAP), led by Lee Kuan Yew, came under electoral threat from Barisan Socialis

(Socialist Front), a left-wing party that had split from the PAP. It was widely believed

that Lee Kuan Yew would lose in the forthcoming general election to Barisan Socialis,

an event that would precipitate Britain's withdrawal from Singapore, given the

commitment of Lim Chin Siong (leader of Barisan Socialis) to establish independence

from London As such a development would effectively herald the end of British
.9

Article VI of the 1963 Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement provided for the extension of the original Anglo-Malayan
Defence Agreement. See Agreement concluded between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the
Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore, Cmnd 2094, (London: HMSO, 1963), p. 2.
9T. N. Harper, 'Lim Chin Siong and "the Singapore Story"', In KS Jomo. & Tan Jing Quee, (eds.), Comet in Our Sky.
Um Chin Slong In History (Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 2001), pp. 1.56.
 268

power in the region, senior Whitehall figures (along with Lee) believed that a merger

between Singapore and Malaya (which had achieved independence from Britain in

1957) provided the best means of preventing the Crown Colony from coming under

'Communist' control. On 24 August 1961, Lord Selkirk, UK General-Commissioner for

South-East Asia, articulated this view, when he told lain Macleod, Secretary of State

for the Colonies: 'Lee is now mad keen to achieve merger... We have to decide

whether it is worth trying to save him. On balance, I think it is ... Certainly, no other

Singapore leader (except Lee Yew Hock) would be likely to fight for merger'.10 The

political crisis in Singapore provided the stimulus and pretext for the creation of the

Malaysian federation. Malaya, previously lukewarm towards the establishment of a

'Greater Malaysia', was converted to the project in mid-1961, largely because the

Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman (popularly known as the Tunku), was

firmly opposed to the prospect of having a small Communist enclave on his border.11

On 27 May 1961, at the Singapore Press Club, the Tunku announced his support for

the Malaysian scheme; on 26 June, he followed this up - with 'great vigour' in the

words of Sir Norman Brook - by setting out, in some detail, his proposals for a Greater

Malaysia.12 On 10 October 1961, Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for

Commonwealth Relations, informed the cabinet of Malaya's increasing concern in

regard to the situation in Singapore, where Lee Kuan Yew's government had lost

ground to Barisan Socialis, holding a majority of only one in the Legislative Assembly.

The Tunku was 'anxious' to secure a merger, Sandys told his colleagues, while there

was 'still a Government in Singapore with which he 13

could co-operate'. As a quid pro

quo for Malaya's acquiescence in the enterprise, the Macmillan government was

prepared to add Sarawak, North Borneo (modern-day Sabah) and Brunei to the

federation, subject to 'consultation' with these territories.14 It was hoped that this would

'° Selkirk
toMacleod,
24August
1961,
DO169/10.
" Tunku to Macmillan, 11 August 1961, CAB 134/1949.
12Brook to Macmillan,27 June 1961, PREM 11/2946.
13Cabinet minutes, 10 October 1961, CAB 128/35.
14Eventuallyonly the Sultan of Brunei felt unable to
accede to the Malaysian federation.
 269

allay Malayan fears with respect to the predominately Chinese ethnicity of Singapore's

population: Singaporean membership of the Malaysian federation placed, at a stroke,

an additional 1.3 million Chinese under the Tunku's control.

TABLE 5.1. The Ethnic Make-Up of Malaya and Singapore, 1959.

Population in Chinese Malays Indians Total

1959.
Malaya 2,675,000 3,500,000 795,000 6,970,000
Singapore 1,289,000 227,000 145,000 1,661,000
Total 3,964,000 3,727,000 940,000 8,631,000

Source: CAB 134/1959,20 October 1963.

The creation of Malaysia served to strengthen Britain's position in the region: for

example, the Kuala Lumpur government could pursue 'measures' that would

undermine local Chinese radicals in Singapore, something Britain, as a former colonial

power, found difficult. Lord Carver, Director of Army Plans in the Far East, later wrote

that the formation of Malaysia was 'yet another means of divesting Britain of its direct

responsibilities in the hope that not only would subversive movements be defused, but

that the new amalgam would be looking after its 15

own security'. As well as freeing

Britain of its internal security responsibilities, the merger of Singapore and Malaya

benefited UK political and strategic interests. Firstly, Malaya provided a bulwark

against Communist expansion in South-East Asia, as had been ably demonstrated in

its determination to resist the spread of Communism in the 'Emergency' of 1948-1960:

thus, Singapore's inclusion in a Malaysian federation virtually guaranteed its abiding

support towards the West. Secondly, the Malaysian scheme would assist Britain in its

determination to retain control of the military base in Singapore, which was seen as a

vital component of Britain's continued world role. Thus, Britain, Singapore and Malaya

held two shared interests: namely, the preservation of power and the containment of

16M. Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945, (London: Hutchinson, 1992), 65.
p.
 270

Communism. S. J. Ball is right to indicate that Britain did not force the Malaysian

federation upon the Malayans and Singaporeans.16

During the 1950s, Whitehall policy-makers tended to view Britain's tenure of the

Singapore base facilities as a major strategic asset, regarding the prospect of

withdrawal as anathema. In early 1960, however, Treasury civil servants began to

question the wisdom of this commitment, arguing that Singapore was consuming an

ever-increasing proportion of overseas defence expenditure. Sir Richard 'Otto' Clarke,

Second Secretary to the Treasury, was a particularly vociferous critic of the costs

involved in upholding Britain's position in South-East Asia: 'If only we could abandon

this role [in the Far East], the whole of our defence effort would be tremendously

reduced... There is no argument for maintaining forces in the Far East for defending

our economic and financial interests'.17 Moreover, Clarke believed that the 'political

basis' of Britain's military role in South-East Asia was becoming 'increasingly difficult to

understand'; and, as he considered it'highly unlikely' that Britain would be able to

maintain its position there for any great length of time ('I don't think many people would

bet very heavily on our still being there in 10 years' time'), argued in favour of

retrenchment from the 18

region. Nevertheless, this viewpoint only made a limited

impact on thinking within Whitehall: for example, despite the Treasury's scepticism as

to the long-term viability of preserving a presence in Singapore, Macmillan's 'Future

Policy Study, 1960-70', discussed in Chapter III, did not establish any plans for

withdrawal. In early April 1960, senior Treasury mandarins agreed that there should

be, in the light of the Future Policy Study, a further detailed examination of Britain's

policies and defence role in South-East Asia. 19 It is clear that concerns about Britain's

appropriate role had also begun to impinge on the thinking of Macmillan, who thought

1eSee S. J. Ball, 'Selkirk In Singapore', Twentieth Century British History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
vol. 10, No.
2.
"Clarke to Bell, 8 March 1960, Clarke Papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/1/1.
18Clarke to Padmore, 25 July 1960, Clarke
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/1/1.
19'FuturePolicy': Minutes of a Meeting held in Sir Frank Lee's Room, 5 April 1960, T325/65.
 271

deeply, although often inconsistently, about such matters. In August 1960, Macmillan

questioned the rationale underpinning Britain's military presence in the Far East:

Any operations involving China would bring in the United States to whom
we would then be a subsidiary power. Our own purposes would be limited
to police action, jungle warfare against guerrillas and making an acte de
presence. Indonesia may be cited as an opponent against whom we
would fight a limited war but it is inconceivable that we should do so
ourselves.20

This problem was further exacerbated by popular demands for a reduction in the

general level of taxation and greater investment in the domestic economy, both of

which placed further pressure on resources available for defence. Unbeknown to

Macmillan, Britain would become involved in a limited conflict with Indonesia (although

'confrontation' was used as a euphemism to describe what was essentially a small

scale war), in the defence of Malaysia, an event that restricted the ability of the UK to

withdraw from South-East Asia.

The MalaysianScheme:An InauspiciousBeginning?

A number of government ministers questioned whether a merger between Malaya and

Singapore best served Britain's geo-strategic interests. In October 1961, Julian Amery,

Secretary of State for Air, submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee (DC) a

memorandum that cast doubt on the likely benefits accruing from the Malaysian

scheme. Starting with a broad strategic analysis of South-East Asia, Amery argued

that the main threat to regional stability lay in Chinese subversion. It was important to

deny South-East Asia to China, he believed, for two main reasons: first, to protect

Britain's extensive investments (rubber, tin and oil) and commercial interests; secondly,

20Macmillanto Watkinson, 21 August 1960, PREM 11/2946.

 272

the fall of South-East Asia would pose 'an immediate threat' to Australia, India and

Pakistan. Amery questioned the claim of the Defence (Official) Committee (D(O)C)

that the establishment of Malaysia offered the best means of resolving the political

problems in Singapore, posing the question: 'If the Chinese Communists in Singapore

refuse to remain under the present very indirect form of British rule, are they likely to

accept the more direct rule of a right-wing Malayan Government?' Amery also queried

the contention that the Malaysian federation would relieve Britain of its heavy burden in

the field of internal security. If the Chinese Communists in Singapore really constituted

such a significant threat to internal security, Amery argued that the Tunku's forces

would find them even more difficult to control, pointing out that Britain was already

responsible for suppressing and deterring insurrectionist elements in the northern

border provinces of Malaya. According to Amery, the Tunku ('our best friend in South-

East Asia') was under the 'false impression' that Britain was unprepared to hold on to

Singapore; as a consequence, he had seized on the opportunity for merger, as

otherwise he would have been faced with an independent Singapore on his border,

probably under Communist control. If the merger went ahead, Amery predicted,

Malaysia would become a loose confederation, containing a significant Communist

component, with the potential to undermine Britain's capacity to exert influence in the

region: 'Greater Malaysia will not save the political or security problems presented by

the Chinese population in Singapore but, on the contrary, is bound to weaken our title

to the bases without bringing any lasting relief to our manpower and financial

difficulties'21

In November 1961 the Malayan and British governments reached a provisional

agreement on the establishment of 'Greater Malaysia'. Despite Treasury officials' fears

in regard to'over-stretch', Britain agreed to extend the Defence Agreement of 1957 to

the territories of the new Malaysian federation, though it was also agreed to the great
-

21'Greater Malaysia': DC memorandum by J. Amery,

24 October 1961, CAB 131/26. For report by D(O)C see'Greater
Malaysia': note by the Chairman of the D(O)C, CAB 131/26.
 273

relief of the Foreign and Commonwealth Relation Offices - that Britain should retain the

use of the base facilities in Singapore. On 23 November 1961, Sandys informed the

cabinet that Britain could make such use of Singapore as the UK government

'considered necessary for the defence of Malaya, for Commonwealth defence and for

the preservation of peace in South-East Asia... ', with it being '... clearly understood

that this right would enable us to use Singapore to fulfil our obligations under the

South-East Asia Treaty. Fully aware that opposition parties in Malaya were strongly

opposed to any involvement in military alliances, Macmillan cautioned that it might be

'expedient not to emphasise this point unduly', it being sufficient to say that the right to

use the base and facilities in Singapore would remain with Britain, in order to fulfil its

international obligations. 2 In late July 1962, after extensive discussions at an official

level, British and Malayan ministers met in London, where it was agreed that Malaysia

should be created no later than the end of August 1963.3

It is perhaps necessary to re-assess Macmillan's interpretation of how Britain

disengaged from its remaining colonial responsibilities in the Borneo territories, which

formed an essential aspect of the agreement with the Tunku. Contrary to Macmillan's

portrayal of events in his memoirs, Britain's role in decolonisation was characterised by

a rushed relinquishment of remaining colonial responsibilities. Lord Cobbold, Governor

of the Bank of England between 1949 and 1961, was appointed to act as chairman of a

joint Anglo-Malayan Commission of Enquiry to investigate the peoples' views in North

Borneo and Sarawak to the merger scheme. 4 Prior to the establishment of the

Cobbold Commission, British officials (at the highest level) had expressed strong

reservations as to the readiness of the Borneo territories for independence - indeed,

Alan Lennox-Boyd (by this stage Lord Boyd), Secretary of State for the Colonies

between 1954 and 1959, refused to head the Commission because of 'anxiety not "to

22Cabinet minutes, 23 November 1961, CAB 128/38.

23See 'Note of a Meeting at the Commonwealth Relations Office', 17 July 1962, Sandys
papers (Churchill College,
Cambridge) DSND 8/19. On 1 August 1962, Duncan Sandys announced this to the public.
24Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo
and Sarawak 1962,Cmnd 1794, (London: HMSO, 1962).
 274

rush" the matter [of decolonisation], particularly in Sarawak and North Borneo'.25 On

24 August 1961, Lord Selkirk expressed similar concerns to Macmillan:

All three Borneo territories are quite unfitted as yet to enter an association
of this sort on the basis of popular representation. But they will continue to
be so unfitted for many years to come. I should give Sarawak about ten
years and North Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-cut electoral
opinion could be given on this subject.

Whilst conceding that Britain should continue with efforts 'to train the peoples of those

territories for self-government and to bequeath to them a respect for the rule of law',

Selkirk cautioned that Whitehall would have to 'face up to the fact that "one man, one

vote" had not been a wild success in South-East Asia'.26 At a meeting of the DC in

October 1961, Sandys indicated that Britain should 'not simply abide by local opinion in

Borneo', although he recognised the need to carry the indigenous population and

convince the Tunku of the need to do S0.27In March 1962, Lord Cobbold wrote to

Reginald Maudling, Macleod's replacement at the Colonial Office, informing him that in

Sarawak 'the bulk of the population would like to see the continuation of British rule'. 8

The Colonial Office endeavoured to ensure that Britain retained a measure of control

over the administration of the Borneo Territories; however, Enche Ghazali, the leading

Malayan member of the Cobbold Commission, insisted that British expatriate officers in

the Borneo territories should only remain in order to provide technical assistance29

Sandys saw Cobbold and Enche Ghazali separately (and in that order) on the

afternoon of 31 May 1962. Cobbold told Sandys that he was having 'great trouble' in

completing his report, which he thought would be 'too long and unreadable'. Cobbold's

own view was that the key to the whole exercise lay in Britain's ability to maintain an

25Mills (Principal Private Secretary to Sandys) to Gamer (Permanent

Under-Secretaryto the CRO), 20 December 1961,
Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8/19.
26Selkirk to Macleod, 24 August 1961, DO 169/10.
27DC minutes, 24 October 1961, CAB 131/25.
28Cobbold to Maudling, 31 March 1962, PREM
11/3866.
29'Note for Record: "Greater Malaysia"', 28 May
1962, Sandys papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8119.
 275

administration in being in the Borneo territories: without this bureaucratic infrastructure,

he argued, there would be 'great trouble and probably bloodshed'. Cobbold said

Ghazali was obviously under the 'closest orders' from the Tunku, and was not indeed

performing the functions of an independent member of the Commission. 0 Calling the

bluff of British policy-makers, the Tunku threatened to withdraw the Malayan members

of the Commission if the final report failed to conclude in favour of a quick accession of

the Borneo territories to the federation. Although he considered the Malayan members

of the Commission 'intransigent', Sandys re-assured the delegation that the 'real

negotiations' would take place at a later date between Britain and Malaya, thus

confirming that the Cobbold Commission was little more than a 31

fagade. The

Governors of the Borneo territories were unprepared to contemplate a rapid transfer of

sovereignty to Kuala Lumpur, but Macmillan felt that they failed to realise 'a) our

[Britain's] weakness in Singapore, [and] b) our urgent need to hand over our security

problem there. The whole mood is based on a false 32

account of our power' On 4

July 1962, the Tunku rejected the findings of the British members of the Cobbold

Commission, informing Macmillan that he was unprepared to discuss the matter until

the British government revised their position. On the same day, at a meeting of the

Overseas Policy Committee (OPC), Macmillan declared: 'The Tunku had clearly made

the mistake of assuming that the views of Lord Cobbold and of the British members of

the Commission were in fact the views of the British government'33 Hence, Britain was

prepared to sacrifice the Borneo territories in order to preserve wider British strategic

interests in South-East Asia. The Cobbold Commission was a cosmetic and superficial

exercise; British policy was guided by the pragmatic pursuit of self-interest, with

emphasis given to the West's position in the Cold War, rather than what might be in the

interest of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak. Brook told Macmillan that it

3 'Note for Record' [F. S. Mills], 1 June 1962, Sandys (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8/19.
papers
31Mills to Gamer. 'Malaysia Meeting between Duncan Sandys
- and Cobbold', 13 June 1962, Sandys papers (Churchill
College, Cambridge) DSND 8/19.
32Macmillanto Brook, 21 June 1962, PREM 11/3867.
33OPC minutes, 4 July 1962, CAB 134/2370.
 276

would be wise to avoid 'giving any public impression' that the British and Malayan

governments intended 'to force North Borneo or Sarawak into the Federation willy-

nilly'34;in the end, however, this is essentially what happened. The Colonial Office was

strongly opposed to such an approach, but was hampered in its determination to steer

another course by its relative weakness within Whitehall and an inability to convince

the Prime Minister of the demerits of the scheme. This undermines the credibility of

Macmillan's claim that he was not prepared to accept a'shot-gun wedding' when

establishing Malaysia.

Britain also submitted to pressure from Kuala Lumpur (supported by Lee Kuan Yew)

to prosecute suppressive action against 'subversive' elements in Singapore. Operation

'Cold Store', a repressive series of measures against those suspected of having

'Communist' sympathies, including Lim Chin Siong, was undertaken in order to re-

assure the Tunku that he would inherit a stable Singapore. The legality and moral

basis of Operation 'Cold Store' was disputable, particularly given Lim Chin Siong's

overt commitment to attaining power through constitutional means. Matthew Jones is

therefore correct to conclude that the hand-over of Britain's residual colonial

commitments in Singapore was more of a'hasty scramble' than a'measured transfer'

of power. 7

The Problems of `Overstretch

In October 1960, Macmillan called for a re-examination of armed forces' requirements

in the Far East. Predictably, this elicited objections from the'overseas'

departmentsand the Chiefs of Staff as to the prospectof rationalisationand

34Brook to Macmillan, 12 July 1962, PREM 11/3868.

35Macmillan, End of the Day, pp. 257-258.
36Lim Chin Siong was held in prison, without trial, 1969.
until
37For a fuller account of the machinations 'Operation Cold Store'
of see M. Jones, 'Creating Malaysia: Singapore
Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy, 1961-63', The Journal Imperial
of and
CommonwealthHistory, vol. 28, No. 2, (May 2000).
 277

retrenchment. The central issue facing policy-makers was straightforward: whilst

Britain remained wedded to its existing commitments in the area, there would be little

or no scope for economising defence expenditure in South-East Asia. In late

December 1960, Lord Home, the newly appointed Foreign Secretary, asked Macmillan

whether or not it might be worthwhile to ask the Americans 'how far can we in the UK

exercise any worthwhile influence in Asia by means of our military power. Is this a

case for a division of labour with the USA taking over the Far East while we try to

manage Africa? I don't much like it but power is very, very thin when it is spread so

wide'. Home's suggestion highlighted another problem inherent in Britain's policy

towards South-East Asia: Britain could not contemplate retreat from the area without

alienating the Americans, who were accelerating their military involvement in the

region, and thus resolutely opposed to British retrenchment.

Nevertheless, no consensus had yet been reached on this issue within Whitehall,

despite Macmillan's repeated exhortations on the need to reappraise Britain's strategic

priorities. In September 1961, Macmillan argued for a review of commitments in

South-East Asia that was both 'radical and imaginative' - however, no 'radical' and

'imaginative' departure in established policy was forthcoming. 9 In this regard, an

apparent state of paralysis had been established between the proponents of change

and those in favour of maintaining the status quo. Greater economies in expenditure

simply could not be made without a corresponding reduction in commitments, which in

return required a revision (or, at least, re-evaluation) of Britain's main interests in

South-East Asia, namely the containment of Communism and securing regional

stability. Ministers agreed that the creation of a Malaysian federation would enable

savings in defence expenditure, but fell far short of addressing the question of

complete and immediate withdrawal from the region. In February 1963, when DC

members met to consider a paper by Peter Thorneycroft (Minister of Defence) on

38Home to Macmillan,27 December 1960, CAB 21/5901.

39'Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future':
minute by Macmillan, 6 October 1961, PREM 11/1229.
 278

future defence policy, the 'overseas' departments were successful in arguing that

Britain could not allow its 'forces to be run down to a point at which no assault

operations of any kind would be possible'. The military value of UK forces in the Far

East 'had political and prestige significance', their withdrawal being regarded as a

'major political defeat'; moreover, quite apart from the deleterious effect of

retrenchment on Britain's relations with Australia, New Zealand and the United States,

this would also encourage the spread of Communism40 The Treasury, on the other

hand, argued for a reduction in political commitments, involving the abandonment of

British support for Malaysia and SEATO. Having finally established the cost of

maintaining UK forces East of Suez, which was rising towards £600 million, Treasury

officials thought it prudent to consider the economic consequences of a failure to

withdraw, emphasising the need to meet other claims on resources, such as housing,

roads and education. In late December 1962, when the Treasury was deciding upon

what approach to adopt in regard to Thorneycroft's paper, Clarke told his permanent

secretary at the Treasury, Sir William Armstrong:

It seems to me that unless Treasury Minister's can bring into the centre
of the Government's consideration (i) the relationship with the
Government's social programme and (ii) the formidable arguments
against the Far East role (the abandonment of which is the only possible
practical way of fitting our role into our resources), there is no prospect of
containing the growth of defence expenditure."'

Ministers were reluctant to contemplate immediate withdrawal for three fundamental

reasons: firstly, retrenchment from South-East Asia was seen as likely to damage

Britain'sstandingin Washington,Canberraand Wellington;secondly,ministerswere

apprehensiveabout the destabilisingeffect of immediatewithdrawal,holdingto the

belief that it would be detrimental to Western interests to allow developing nations
-

40DC minutes, 9 February 1963, CAB 131/28. Also

see Chapter IV, pp. 191-192.
41Clarke to Armstrong, 18 December 1962, Clarke
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/311/3.
 279

many of which were former British territories - to come under Communist influence;

thirdly, policy-makers remained committed to the idea of a British world role.

Macmillan favoured a reduction in the cost of Britain's role in South-East Asia, to be

achieved through greater economies in military capability, without a concomitant

reduction in political commitments. The efficacy of this approach was negligible, and

largely resulted from the structural incoherence of Whitehall's foreign policy-making

apparatus. The Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Colonial Office

were unprepared to countenance a reduction in commitments, and successfully

pressed this viewpoint at cabinet committee (official and ministerial) level. The

existence of three 'overseas' ministries, all of which were committed to maintaining

Britain's world-wide commitments, made it difficult for departments ill-disposed to such

a stance, namely the Treasury and Board of Trade, to make their case within Whitehall.

The 'economic' departments could press for a reduction in expenditure, but this

remained ineffective whilst the 'overseas' departments and the politicians concerned

were unprepared to reduce the scope of Britain's international commitments.

Macmillan inadvertently highlighted the inconsistency in 'official' thinking when he

suggested that Britain should 'play a role in the alliances in the area which could be

acceptable to our partners, particularly the Australians and the United States, and

considerably less in
onerous military terms than 2
our present commitments'. Hence,
Macmillan was sympathetic to the idea of reducing the size of Britain's military

commitments in South-East Asia, but simultaneously argued that such a policy would

have to be acceptable to the United States and Australia two nations that expected
-
Britain to retain a substantial defence effort, especially at a time when both were

involved in the rapidly escalating conflict in Vietnam.

42'Our Foreign and Defence Policy for the Future': Memorandum by Macmillan, September
29 1961, CAB 134/1929.
 280

The Conservative's Questioning of the SEATO Commitment.

Since its inauguration in September 1954, Whitehall officials had generally viewed

membership of SEATO as a symbol of Britain's continued support for Washington's

objective of containing Communism in the Far East. Foreign Office civil servants

believed that SEATO membership provided London with increased leverage over

American decision-making, whilst CRO officials emphasised the importance of the

organisation to Britain's relations with Australia and New Zealand. The prevalent

viewpoint within Whitehall on the value of SEATO came under scrutiny in the early

1960s, as US policies in Laos threatened to act as a casus belli for conflict with China,

an event that would have entailed the full-scale mobilisation of SEATO. This 'non-

event' had a profound impact on British views in regard to SEATO: officials were forced

to confront whether or not Britain would be able to make an adequate contribution to

such an operation, questioning whether SEATO membership was worth the potentially

prohibitive military and economic cost that a full-scale war in the region would entail 43

In July 1961, Macmillan wrote to Home: 'I am really beginning to get very unhappy

about this. If we were to be involved in Laos following Kuwait and in the middle of our

other difficulties, I think it might mean the final collapse of the economy. Do you really

not think we ought now to review our whole position regarding SEATO?'44 Macmillan's

fears highlighted the seriousness of the situation, implicitly questioning whether the

value of Britain's commitments in South-East Asia were worth the potential cost of full-

scale military mobilisation. The Treasury was the most sceptical department with

regard to the value of SEATO: 'Otto' Clarke, for example, believed that paying £500

million East of Suez, so as to be 'consulted over Laos', was an 'odd use of

45
resources'

43For a detailed account of the 'Laos Crisis' (1959-1962)

see M. Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
" Macmillanto Home, 8 July 1961, PREM 11/3739.
45Clarke to Armstrong, 18 December 1962, Clarke
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) CLRK 1/3/2/3.
 281

Lord Selkirk also questioned the value of Britain's SEATO role, albeit from a different

perspective from that of the Treasury. Selkirk found it difficult to justify the retention of

British forces in the area and felt that the promotion of non-military means of influence,

such as economic development and the provision of technical assistance, presented a

more effective means of exerting influence in the 46

region Hence, Britain's military

presence in South-East Asia was beginning to be viewed as politically counter-

productive, as well as economically draining. Proponents of this viewpoint emphasised

the strength of anti-colonial sentiment in the Far East, questioning the American 'belief

that guns and dollars are the only solution'.47 Selkirk's view on this issue increasingly

gained ground within Whitehall, and was even accepted by a large section of the

Foreign Office by the time of the second Wilson government. Washington, Canberra

and Wellington were firmly opposed to such an approach, believing that this would

merely serve to undermine the West's position in the area. Moreover, the Australian

and New Zealand governments argued that a scaling down of Britain's SEATO

commitments would represent a serious derogation of 'moral' duty. Such sentiments

obviously influenced the views of policy-makers, especially within the Commonwealth

Relations Office. Many officials continued to believe that SEATO membership

endowed Britain with valuable influence over the formulation and direction of defence

planning throughout South-East Asia. In July 1963, for example, Michael Cary argued:

We should lose if, like the French, we renounced all our military commitments to

SEATO'."' Despite such sentiments, Whitehall increasingly viewed SEATO

membership as detrimental to British interests, having a damaging impact on Britain's

relations with non-aligned states, many of which were developing nations hostile

towards the idea of a 'white man's club', such as SEATO.

" For a detailed account of Lord Selkirk's role in Singapore

see S. J. Ball, 'Selkirk In Singapore', Twentieth Century
British History, vol. 10, No. 2, (1999).
" Selkirk to Macmillan,9 May 1961, PREM 11/3737.
48'Strategy East of Suez', memorandum by A. L M. Cary, 9 July 1963, CAB 21/5902.
 282

British fears over the possibility of SEATO mobilisation dissipated when an

agreement over Laos was reached in July 1962. The United States wanted Britain to

make a large financial contribution to Laos, which Macmillan rejected on the grounds

that any money given would go straight into the 'Paris bank account' of the leader of

Laos, Prince Souvannaphouma49 President Kennedy expressed dissatisfaction at the

British government's proposed contribution to Laos, which totalled £1.3 million over a

five-year period. The Foreign Office were concerned that this would serve to damage

Anglo-American relations, suggesting that Britain should contribute an extra £1 million

a year for three years to finance more imports into Laos. Sir William Armstrong,

Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, argued that such an amount was far more than

was justified by a nation the size of Laos, questioning the assumption that the 'special

relationship' would be damaged by a 'robust stance' against the Americans: 'This is

one of a number of interchanges that we are having with them over a wide field about

the burden of overseas aid should be shared and I cannot help feel that they are using

the specific circumstances of Laos to drive a hard financial bargain'50 The Treasury

did finally accept the request for increased overseas aid to Laos, primarily because of

the importance that Home attached to the issue, rather than as a result of an

intellectual conversion to the Foreign Office's case.

A Decision Deferred: The Problem of Indonesian Confrontation.

Even prior to the formal establishment of Malaysia, Indonesian (and, to a lesser extent,

Philipino) opposition to the scheme had been evident: in early 1963, for example,

British armed forces had to address a number of insurrectionist problems in Sarawak

and Sabah, as covert Indonesian guerrilla activity intensified51 Achmed Sukarno,

President of Indonesia, had a well-known, long-term ambition to seize North Borneo,

49See R. Lamb, The Macmillan Years, 1957-53: The Emerging Truth, (London:
John Murray), p. 394.
50Armstrong to Home, 2 November 1962, PREM 11/4180.
51Sarawak and Sabah were territorially adjacent,
and shared a border with Indonesia on the island of Kalimantan.
 283

Sarawak and Brunei, and was thus resolutely opposed to the creation of Malaysia.52

The conflict with Indonesia became popularly known as confrontation (or Konfrontasi),

a term conceived by Sukarno's Foreign Minister, Dr Subandrio. The Conservative

government's commitment to the Malaysian scheme meant that Britain actually had to

increase the size of its military deployment in South-East Asia, a policy that ran counter

to the previously espoused objective of reducing the size of Britain's defence

expenditure in the region. This concerned Macmillan, who believed that the federation

was likely to become a'formidable liability'. In early April 1963, Macmillan told Home:

I am rather uneasy about our position in this area of the world. We are
committed to bring Malaysia into existence not later than August 31; and
there can, of course, be no question of our not honouring that
undertaking. But I am not sure that we have really sized up the
subsequent problem of defending her or helping her to defend herself
against attack, whether overt or covert, by Indonesia... and I have a
feeling that both the Americans and Australians while not convinced that

we can really defend this new child of ours, are not at all anxious to help
do 53
us to so.

This somewhat differs from the conventional wisdom that British policy-makers were

unprepared to contemplate withdrawal because of an overestimation of Britain's

appropriate place in the world. The documentary evidence does not confirm Phillip

Darby's argument that the commitment of successive British governments to a global

role delayed any realistic re-appraisal of Britain's defence policy in South-East Asia 54

In June 1963, at a meeting of the DC, Macmillan suggested that the 'security of

Malaysia would be more effectively safeguarded in the long-term by the negotiation of

a political understanding with Indonesia than by the maintenance of British forces in

Singapore'55 Despite Macmillan's sympathy towards the idea of seeking a negotiated

52For British Government'sviews on Sukarno see 'The Views President Soekamo

of on Certain Major Issues of Policy':
Memorandumby the Foreign Office, submitted to the DOP(O)C, 10 December 1963, CAB 148/3.
53Macmillan to Home, 3 April 1963, CAB 21/5902.
" P. Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1948-1968,(Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1973), pp. 325-326.
55DC minutes, 19 June 1963, CAB 131/28.
 284

peace with Jakarta, the triumvirate of the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and CRO

effectively argued against such an approach, maintaining that the Malaysian scheme

should be seen to fruition, it being considered against British interests to 'appease' (an

emotive term that still had a profound resonance with Conservative cabinet ministers,

many of whom had been junior ministers or backbenchers at the time of Munich in
.
1938) Indonesian aggression. The CRO argued that a failure to stand up to external

aggression would heighten Australian fears of further Indonesian expansionism (it

should be noted that Sukarno had also pursued a similar policy against the

Netherlands in West New Guinea, which the Indonesians called West Irian), thus

potentially damaging Britain's relations with another important member of the

Commonwealth. These fears prompted the CRO to advocate the giving of substantial

defence aid to Malaysia. Believing he had Treasury support, Sandys offered a

contribution of £15 million towards the capital costs of the Malayan defence

programme up to 1966, an offer rejected by the Tunku, who claimed that this was

insufficient to defend the Borneo Territories after their incorporation into Malaysia. As

Malaya was unwilling to contemplate a curtailment of development aid, Sandys argued

that Britain faced the choice of either accepting a greater liability for the defence of

Malaysia or offering a more generous aid programme. John Boyd-Carpenter, Chief

Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General, pointed out that the offer of £15

million exceeded the £12 Y/zmillion authorised by the cabinet, arguing that this was

excessive, given that Malaysia was the 'richest country' in South-East Asia; moreover,

any increase on this proposal would be liable to have 'serious repercussions', giving

rise to demands for more aid from other countries, such as Pakistan and India56 At an

earlier meeting with Sandys, Boyd-Carpenter had taken an even stronger position,

suggesting that, although Kuala Lumpur would have to run down its reserve balances,

Malaya should pay for the whole cost of the defence programme. In reply, Sandys

56Cabinet minutes, 23 May 1963, CAB 128/37.

 285

argued that it to
was necessary assume that the defence programme was in 'general

reasonable'; moreover, as Sandys considered the Tunku a 'somewhat uncertain starter

[on the creation of Malaysia]', he believed that it was important not to disappoint him on

aid designed to'rid ourselves of an embarrassing Colonial problem', as he might

decide to 'drop the plan'. As a consequence, Boyd-Carpenteraccepted that there

would have to be a 'political "dowry" for Malaysia', but remained unprepared to accept

the figure of El 5 million.57

By mid-1963 it was evident that the Treasury had failed in its objective of reducing

annual defence expenditure in South-East Asia. The Treasury estimated that defence

of the entire East of Suez region cost Britain around £500-600 million a year, about

one-third of the total defence budget (excluding research and development); about

three-quarters of this total, £375 million a year, was devoted to defence commitments

in the Far East. On economic and financial grounds, Clarke considered this figure

that Britain spent approximately 2 per cent of GNP (or £10

objectionable, pointing out

per head of the population) on defence East of Suez, a figure comparable to the entire

Australian and New Zealand defence budgets. In a letter to Armstrong, Clarke

suggested that it was necessary to'impress the importance of £500 m. - 2% of GNP'

on ministers. In order to gain some scale of perspective, he recommended that £500

million expenditure on East of Suez be compared with other claims upon prospective

resources: Hospital (current) expenditure, £550 million; primary and secondary

education, £600 million; expenditure on roads (current and capital, including a major

road programme of £130m), £325 million; electricity investment, £500 million; public

housing investment, £350 million; total investment of manufacturing industry, £1,250

million. Clarke believed that Britain had 'no mass de manoeuvre', contenting that £500

million more resources, becoming available over a 5-year period, would revolutionise

57'Malaysla
Financial
Meeting';
Recordof a Meeting RoomintheHouseof
Secretary's
HeldIntheCommonwealth
Commons,10April1963,Sandyspapers(Churchill
College, DSND8/20.
Cambridge)
 286

the economic prospect and thus our influence, for it is our economic failures and not

our military inadequacy that weaken our international influence',58

It was self-evident that meaningful economies in Britain's overseas expenditure could

not be achieved without a corresponding realignment in the scope of commitments.

Michael Cary's paper, 'British Strategy East of Suez', examined in Chapter IV,

crystallised this point succinctly, stating that there was 'little prospect of savings from

59
economies while our commitments are unchanged'. Even so, Cary's paper

attempted to accommodatethe views of the 'overseas' departments, maintaining that

Britain's appropriate military capability in South-East Asia should be set against the

background of Anglo-American relations, recognising that the United States attached

great importance to British tenure of the Singapore base. Cary indicated that

Washington considered the defence of Malaysia to be primarily a British concern and

would be unwilling to discharge its SEATO duties in the absence of Britain's support; in

addition, the United States lacked any base facilities between the Mediterranean and

the Philippines, and was reluctant to incur the economic cost of financing its own

facilities. Retrenchment in South-East Asia might potentially cause the United States

'to revise their opinion of the United Kingdom as an effective partner in the defence of

the free world'; consequently, American support for other vital British strategic

interests, such as supporting sterling, could be withdrawn. This was a prescient

prediction: when the Wilson government declared its intention to reduce the size of

Britain's deployment in South-East Asia, Washington threatened, on several occasions,

to withdraw its support for sterling.

Cary postulated on the development of South-East Asia up to 1970, forecasting the

possible 'best' and 'worst case scenarios. The 'best' case scenario saw China

pursuing an isolationist policy, leaving countries in the region to develop their

economies in peace; moreover, Indonesia would abandon its expansionist ambitions

68Clarke
to Armstrong,
1 March1963,Clarkepapers(Churchill Cambridge)
College, CLRK
1/3/14.
59'Strategy East of Suez': Memorandumby A. L M. Cary, 9 July 1963, CAB 21/5902. See Chapter IV, pp. 195-199.
 287

and become a 'good neighbour of Malaysia, possibly leading to the establishment of a

non-Communist 'Greater Malaysian Confederation', including the Philippines and

Indonesia. If this were the case, it would be possible to undertake a complete

withdrawal of British forces from the area. On the 'worst' case scenario, Pakistan and

Japan might yield to Chinese pressure and adopt a neutralist stance, with South Korea,

Formosa (modern-dayTaiwan), Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, the Philippines and

parts of Thailand coming under Communist influence; Indonesia might also adopt a

more confrontational posture, potentially leading to Jakarta's annexation of the Borneo

territories and Malaysia. In such an event, Cary suggested, Australia and New

Zealand would become alarmed at the possibility of invasion from their 'Near North'; if

this were to occur, Britain's 'forward' defence of the region would have failed and the

raison d'etre of SEATO would have been fatally undermined. Neither of these extreme

cases was expected to develop, it being predicted that 'the situation in 1970 may well

look in the essentials more or less as it does in 1963'. Even so, it was hoped that

Malaysia would be capable of 'standing on her own feet', prior to the end of this period,

relieving Britain of the liability of internal security and much of the responsibility for

external defence. Cary did not think that the loss of Singapore would result in a

diminution of Britain's power to intervene, if necessary from the UK, in the affairs of

South-East Asia. Conversely, the 'overseas' departments argued that such a policy

course would create a 'power vacuum' in the region, leaving Malaysia open to attack

from China or Indonesia. Cary rejected this analysis, but accepted that this was

'devoutly believed by the Chiefs of Staff and, in spite of a few brave words from time to

time, by a substantial body of opinion in the overseas departments'60 The Cary report

highlighted the merits of retrenchment, but suggested that a precipitate withdrawal

would endanger Anglo-American solidarity, possibly rendering the 'worst case'

scenario of Chinese and Indonesian expansionism more likely.

60Cary to Trend, 8 May 1963, CAB 21/5902.

 288

There was a fundamental division of opinion between the 'economic' and 'overseas'

departments with regard to the value of Britain's role in South-East Asia. The

'overseas' departments did not think it possible to reach decisions on future defence

policy by mere cost accounting. The Foreign Office was particularly hostile to Treasury

involvement in policy formulation,generally viewing contributions from its officials as

myopic and uninformed. On 14 May 1963, Sir Harold Caccia, Permanent Under-

Secretary to the Foreign Office, wrote to Sir Burke Trend, Secretary to the Cabinet,

expressing concern over the Treasury's influence on foreign policy:

After all it is a common article of faith that in matters of foreign affairs as

of religion everyone is an expert. But if we get into the habit of
submitting papers to Ministerswith the views of Treasury officials on
foreign affairs, the next thing will be advice from the Foreign Office on
the Bank Rate and by the Chiefs of Staff on labour relations. It will be a
lively way of proceeding,but I doubt whether it will be conducive to the
orderly conduct of business81

From the Foreign Office perspective, the value of overseas bases - like Singapore -

was to be assessed against the wider strategic context, 'not against a balance sheet of

British national interests and expenditure'62 The 'overseas' departments emphasised

the need to contain Communism and maintain security in the Far East, while the

Treasury considered Britain's world role to be dependent on the strength of sterling,

which required a reduction in overseas commitments (and, by extension, expenditure),

so as to increase export capacity and improve the possibility of securing a regular

balance-of-paymentssurplus. However, it might be argued that there was an inherent

contradiction in Treasury thinking: maintaining sterling's position as an international

reserve currency involved making it attractive to nations that were no longer under

British control, but still members of the sterling area, such as Malaysia, whose

8' Cacciato Trend, 14 May 1963, CAB 21/5902.

62'BritishStrategy East of Suez': Memorandumby A. L M. Cary,
2 May 1963, CAB 21/5902.
 289

leadership demanded a continued British military presence. The Board of Trade was

considerably weaker than the Treasury within the context of Whitehall politics, but

adopted an even more unsympatheticstance on the value of Britain's military position

in South-East Asia. Sir Richard Powell, who became Permanent Secretary to the

Board of Trade following a period as the top civil servant at the Ministry of Defence,

went so far as to argue that there were 'no really strong arguments, political, economic

or even sentimental for keeping forces in the... Far East, except for the internal

security commitment of Hong Kong and, I suppose, of Singapore and Borneo, until

they become merged in Greater Malaysia'.63

Irreconcilable disagreements within Whitehall on Britain's appropriate role in South-

East Asia led to a re-affirmation of established policy, although the documentary

evidence suggests that the arguments of Treasury officials were beginning to gain

greater prominence in inter-departmental papers. On 14 June 1963, Trend produced a

paper ('Future Defence Policy'), pointing out the economic irrationality of Britain's

policy in the Far East: on the one hand, Britain's military effort in South-East Asia cost

approximately £300 million a year, which was likely to rise to £400 million by 1970,

nearly double that expended in the defence of British interests in the Middle East; on

the other hand, it was pointed out that the defence of Britain's interests did not

comprise 'any single economic interest of the same importance as the oil of the Middle

East'. The economic illogicality of this policy was the foundation on which the

Treasury's case for retrenchment was based. In spite of this, Trend's paper also gave

credence to the views of the 'overseas' departments, arguing that the consequences of

withdrawing could be 'summed up in a single word "instability", with all that might imply

for the future of Malaysia, and the older members of the Commonwealth'.

On 16 September 1963, Indonesian hostility towards Kuala Lumpur was heightened

by the inauguration of Malaysia, resulting in a corresponding increase in the size of

°J Powellto Trend, 1 March 1963, CAB 21/5902.

"'Future DefencePolicy: DOP(O)Cmemorandumby Trend
for DC, 14 June 1963, CAB 131/28.
 290

Britain's military deployment in the region. Identifying the seriousness of the situation,

Thorneycroft warned his cabinet colleagues that the cost of confrontation could

compare with the earlier Malayan 65

Emergency. The Kennedy Administration initially

reacted with hostility to Britain's policy on Malaysia, believing that this would serve to

drive Indonesia further away from the West; Indonesia's Communist Party, Partai

Komunis Indonesia (PKI), was growing in strength at this time and the United States

viewed Sukarno as a strong anti-Communist influence66 Anglo-American

disagreement on this issue became increasingly evident in the months leading up to

the creation of Malaysia:for example, Kennedy appealed for the postponement of the

formal establishment of 'Greater Malaysia', in order to preserve cordial American

relations with Indonesia and the Philippines. Home thought that it might be necessary

to comply with this request, so as not to damage relations with Washington, though

Macmillan was not ready to acquiesce, hyperbolically proclaiming in his memoirs: 'I

was not prepared to win or confirm my friendship [with by s'

Kennedy] appeasement'

Macmillan felt that the question of the date should be left to the Tunku, arguing that

Sukarno - who he considered 'vain, ambitious, truculent' - was trying to prevent Britain

from exercising its legitimate right to use its bases in Malaysia and Singapore68 The

fact that the Conservative government was prepared to pursue such a policy, against

American wishes, illustrates that Britain was still capable of pursuing an independent

(albeit limited) role in the Far East.

On 17 December 1963, at a meeting of the cabinet, R. A. Butler, Home's

replacement at the Foreign Office following Macmillan's retirement, was instructed to

examine the political and military factors affecting Britain's policy of support for

Malaysia. It was unlikely, Butler thought, that Sukarno would change his policy of

confrontation until he could be 'brought to feel that the United States attitude is more

"'Indonesia':DOPCmemorandumbyThomeycroft,
2 October
1963,CAB148/16.
8° In September 1965, fivepro-Western Indonesian generals were murdered and the PKI was held responsible,
sparking an Army take over led by General Suharto in which up to half a million people were killed.
Macmillan, End of the Day, pp. 257-58.
°BIbid. p. 252.
 291

wholeheartedly with us'. Butler was unsettled by'this ambivalent attitude of our major

ally', which he felt inhibited Britain from pursuing a more forcible course of action

against Indonesia. The United States' position made a negotiated settlement to

confrontation more difficult, primarily because 'a reluctant Tunku might be forced from

69
concession concession'. On 19 December 1963, Butler held discussions on this
to

issue with Dean Rusk, but left the meeting disappointed, informing the cabinet that he

'did not derive great hope of any drastic change in United States policy'.70

Anglo-American disagreementon Indonesia's policy towards Malaysia carried over to

the Johnson administration. When the cabinet met on 23 January 1964, ministers

agreed that, although Britain and the United States shared a common purpose in

arresting the advance of Sino-Soviet influence in South-East Asia, there was 'some risk

that the means by which the two Governmentssought to achieve this objective would

diverge'. The United States were chiefly concerned to dissuade Indonesia from

making common purpose with Communist China, whilst Britain attached greater

importance to maintaining the integrity of Malaysia. If, as a result, Britain judged it right

to seek to restrain Malaysia from making any concessions to Indonesia, it might appear

to Washington that London was 'deliberately thwarting their own (the United States')

policy'; moreover, if Indonesia succeeded by these means in promoting Anglo-

American disunity, Britain's position in the region would be grievously undermined. On

the other hand, acquiescing in a settlement, resulting in the withdrawal of British troops

from the Borneo territories, might damage Britain's position; for in the event that these

territories were overrun by Indonesia, the 'integrity of Malaysia would be destroyed',

and Britain's ability to maintain a military presence in South-East Asia for the protection

of its interests would be 'gravely weakened'. While it would be sensible to seek a

political solution between Malaysia and Indonesia, Britain would have to 'guard against

allowing the Government of Malaysia to pay too high a price for it'." In late January

89Cabinetminutes, 17 December1963, CAB 128/37.

7 'Policy Toward Indonesia':
cabinet memorandum by Butler, 6 January 1964, CAB 129/116.
" Cabinet minutes, 23 January 1964, CAB
128/38.
 292

1964, Home informed the US Attorney-General,Robert Kennedy, that Britain could not

agree to withdraw its troops from the Borneo territories until 'we were fully satisfied of

Indonesian good faith'. In response, Kennedy promised that, if Sukarno did not

effectively abandon his present aggressive policy towards Malaysia, the United States

to
would cease supply aid to 72
Indonesia.

After initial Anglo-American disagreementon confrontation, Johnson indicated his

to
preparedness adjust US policy towards Indonesia. Johnson's own view on this

subject appears to have in

changed early 1961. On 2 January 1961, Johnson told

Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defense, in a telephone conversation: 'I don't

think we ought to encourage this guy [Sukarno] to do what he is doing there [in
73
Malaysia]. And I think that any assistance just shows weakness on our part'. Despite

the new President's generally indifferent attitude towards Britain, Johnson was

convinced that Washington and London should 'continue to work together on hard

problems all around the world'.74 Home received a sympathetic reception on his first

visit to Washington in February 1964, though this did not curtail either side from making

robust statements with respect to areas of disagreement. Johnson's backing of British

involvement in confrontation required a simple quid pro quo, whereby London gave

greater support for American involvement in Vietnam, as well as more vocal and visible

resistance to French attempts at neutralising South-East Asia. During the course of

1964, when American support for Britain's involvement in confrontation became more

evident, US-Indonesian relations entered a period of rapid deterioration. Oliver Wright,

Home's Foreign Affairs Private Secretary, believed that Washington had finally began

to appreciate the value of Singapore, as well as other overseas outposts such as Aden,

n Cabinet minutes, 28 January 1964, CAB 128/38. On 22 January 1964, Sandys Informed senior officials and ministers
working In the CRO: 'Mr (Robert] Kennedy seemed rather favourable to the Malaysia case than had been expected'.
See 'Note of a Meeting in the Secretary of State's Room, Commonwealth Relations Office', 22 January 1964, Sandys
papers (Churchill College, Cambridge) DSND 8/21.
Telephone ConversationBetween PresidentJohnson and Secretaryof Defense McNamara',2 January 1964, FRUS,
Indonesia;Malaysia-Singapore;Philippines,vol. XXVI, Document 1. McNamarareplied: 'I feel exactlythe same'.
" PresidentJohnson to Home, 28 February 1964, FRUS, WesternEurope,vol. XII, Document226. Johnson's
ascendancyto the Presidencywas also accompaniedby a change In the foreign policy personnelIn Washington:
Importantly,William Bundy replaced Roger Hilsman at the State Department'sFar East Bureau In February1964.
 293

being convinced that American overtures in relation to the 'colonial' features of British

policy had finally receded. 'In short... ' , Wright wrote to Home, '. .. the unspoken

special relationship has if anything been strengthened,chiefly because the Americans

have come to realise and accept that we are the only ally with a presence in all parts of

the world and one upon which they can rely. This statement neatly summaries how

many within the higher echelons of Whitehall (outside the Treasury and the Board of

Trade) saw Britain's future role: along with the United States, Britain would act as a

world power (not a superpower, but a nation, unlike any other, with global interests),

helping to ensure the containment of Communismand regional stability in South-East

Asia. Presciently, Wright also argued that American respect had the potential to

increase expectations in Washington: Britain, he feared, would 'acquire a reputation,

which will need some living up to... ' and there would be `... plenty of scope in the

future for adding to our responsibilitiesas a world power: none for reducing our

75
commitments'. This struck at the heart of the issue: on the one hand, British policy-

makers had become more sympathetic to the idea of a reduction in the scale of

Britain's role in South-East Asia; on the other, they wanted to impress on Washington

their value to the Western alliance, which served to heighten American expectations of

what Britain was capable of achieving in the region, as well as the wider world.

The Foreign Office Planning Staff Review, 1964.

The Foreign Office Planning Staff (FOPS) produced a major report on British policy in

South-East Asia in June 1964. Under the directorship of Michael Palliser, who later

became Permanent Under-Secretaryto the Foreign Office and Head of the Diplomatic

Service, FOPS officials sought to re-define British policy towards South-East Asia, in

the light of the changing regional environment, taking account of likely developments

"Wright to Home, 17 February. 1964, PREM 11/4794.Added

emphasis
 294

over the next decade. Foreign Office officials generally agreed that South-East Asia

was of little direct economic value to Britain - as had long been argued by the Treasury.

In spite of this, Planning Staff officials agreed that it would be difficult to pursue a policy

of withdrawal, for two main reasons, both of which were political in nature: firstly,

Britain had a substantial interest in preventingthe spread of Communism in the Far

East; secondly, Britain would need to maintain a significant military presence, so as to

retain its 'position as a world power and the United States' principal partner. The

primacy of Anglo-American relations was emphasised in the Foreign Office report:

successive United States Governmentshave always attached great

political importance (mainly for domestic reasons) to British association
with their military commitmentsin the area. As long, therefore, as our
military presence in South-EastAsia enables us to exercise a major
influence on United States policies, it is worth retaining for this reason
alone.

Planning Staff officials recognisedthe merits of ending conflict in South-East Asia by

way of a neutralisation formula (as argued by the French), but felt unable to promote

an independent policy because of the impact this might have on the Anglo-American

relations. A Foreign Office paper, produced in April 1964 for the DOP(O)C, on likely

American policy up to 1970, emphasised the centrality of the Anglo-American

relationship to Britain's global standing, stating 'the fact that Britain, alone of America's

allies, plays a co-operative world role with the United States'.76 In regard to Britain's

policy of confrontation with Indonesia, the FOPS paper concluded: 'a delicate balance

has to be struck between the dangers of staying too long and the opposite dangers of

withdrawing too fast ... Military measures will therefore remain essential until the

7"United States Policy up to 1970': Memorandumby

the Foreign Office for the DOP(O)C,3 April 1964, CAB 148/7.
 295

"
prospects of eventual agreement emerge clearly'.

FOPS officials distinguished betweenwhat was attainable in the 'Continental' and

'Archipelago' regions of South-EastAsia. The 'Continental' region was dominated by

China, covering Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Britain's role in this

area, it was argued, was to encouragethe developmentof non-Communist regimes,

even though the United States would assume primary responsibility for this objective.

The 'Archipelago' region consisted of the Philippines,Indonesia, Malaysia and

Singapore, and it was thought that the West could pursue a more 'vigorous' policy in

this area, without undue fear of causing a diplomatic rift with China.78 In this region it

was believed that some loose association between Indonesia, Malaysia and the

Philippines offered the best hope for future stability. Officials in the Foreign Office

hoped to establish such an association in the aftermath of confrontation, believing that

this would provide the necessary pretext for military disengagement: 'we [Britain] must

accept that part of the price for such an association will probably be our withdrawal

from the area'. In turn, Japanese and Australian influence would replace British

influence, providing a barrier to future Communist expansion.711

It was considered imperative that the whole area should not slide progressively into a

'vassal relationship' with China and subsequently into Communism. Britain had a

major interest in preventing the absorption of a further 230 million people into the

Communist system, as a change in the political balance of the area would undermine

the West's global position: for example, Communist expansionism would significantly

alter the voting balance in the United Nations; make other countries, such as India and

Japan, vulnerable to blandishments from the Soviet Union and China; increase the

military threat to Australia and New Zealand, leaving these countries susceptible to air

"'BritishPolicyTowards
South-East
Asia':Memorandum 7 June,1964,CAB
OfficefortheDOP(O)C,
bytheForeign
148/7.
7° For further information on the Foreign office view of future Chinese policy In Asia see, 'Chinese Policy Towards
Southern Asia up to 1970': Memorandum by the Foreign Office for the DOP(O)C, 25 February, 1964, CAN 148/4.
"'British Policy Towards South-East Asia': Memorandum by the Foreign Office for the DOP(O)C, 7 June, 1964, CAB
148/7.
 296

and sea blockade; and enable the Communist bloc to capitalise on the resources of

South-East Asia, thereby enhancing their collective military and economic strength.

The Foreign Office thought that this would have a potentially devastating impact on

Anglo-American relations, especially if US opinion were to attribute the West's 'defeat'

in the region to a lack of British resolve. This view was re-affirmed by R. A. Butler, in a

memorandum, entitled 'An Anglo-American Balance Sheet', presented to the cabinet:

'The Americans are anxious not to appear as the only Western Power in the area...

For this and other reasons they support our determinationto stay in Singapore. Mr

McNamara once said that a thousand British troops East of Suez were of more value

than in Europe'80 It was widely believed, especially within the Commonwealth

Relations Office, that Britain had a moral responsibilityto defend Australia and New

Zealand, although the Treasury and Board of Trade had long argued that these two

countries should contribute more towards regional defence. In March 1963, Sir

Richard Powell provided perhaps the most scathing criticism of the moral rationale

underpinning Britain's defence of Australia and New Zealand:

I do not accept the argument that because Australia and New Zealand

came to help in two world wars it is incumbent upon us to maintain forces

East of Suez in peacetime in case these countries are attacked. They
have certainly never maintained forces west of Suez in case Great
Britain became involved in war in Europe and their forces, which were
raised almost entirely from volunteers recruited after the war had broken
out, took a very long time to organise, train and move to the theatre of
war. 81

The 'overseas' departments generally accepted the argument that Australia and New

Zealand should contribute more in the defence field, but were not overly assiduous in

pressing this upon Britain's antipodean Commonwealth allies. This represented a

80iAnAnglo-AmericanBalance Sheet', memorandumby R. A. Butler for the

cabinet, 2 September 1964, CAB 129/118.
81Powell to Trend, 1 March 1963, CAB 21/5902.
 297

major error of judgement, as Australia and New Zealand became overly-dependent on

British military support, at a time when they could have been building up their own

defence capacity.

The FOPS agreed that Britain's influence would be enhanced if it retained the use of

the Singapore base. If Singapore were given up, several countries in the area, such as

the re-emergent power of Japan, might revise their views and approach towards

Britain. It was conceded, however, that Singapore's retention might prove impossible,

and that Britain would have to entertain the possibility of establishing alternative

facilities, possibly in Darwin. Even so, a precipitate withdrawal from Singapore was not

Britain a military deployment in

considered likely, and it was thought that would retain

the region for the foreseeable future, in

albeit a more limited form. On 22 September

1964, Palliser's report was circulated to the DOP(O)C, after which it was to be

submitted to ministers and thereafter to Her Majesty's Missions abroad as a 'statement

82 the as the Long-Term

of British policy'. The FOPS study reached same conclusions

Study Group (LSTG) report on the Far East, which the Foreign Office considered a

'more limited paper'83 On 19 November 1964, following Labour's General Election

victory, Patrick Gordon Walker, the new Foreign Secretary, submitted the FOPS study

to the DOPC. As no ministers expressed any objections to the paper, at the meeting or

in the subsequent discussions of the LTSG study at Chequers (on 21 November),

Palliser's report (now a 'Memorandum by the Foreign Secretary') was accepted as the

basis of British policy in South-East Asia. 4

82iBritishPolicyTowards South-EastAsia': Memorandumby the ForeignOffice for the DOP(O)C,22 September1964,

CAB 148/7.
°' 'Report of the Long Term Study Group Regional Study on the Far East: Memorandum by the Foreign Office for
-
DOP(O)C, 21 October 1964, CAB 148/10. Also see'British Interests and Commitments Overseas': report by the
DOP(O)C for the DOPC. 18 November 1964, CAB 130/213.
"'British Policy Towards South-East Asia': DOPC memorandum by Gordon Walker, 19 November 1964, CAB 148/7;
DOPC minutes, 31 March 1965, CAB 148/18. Also see Cabinet (Defence Policy) minutes, 21 November 1964, CAB
130/213.
 298

American Influence on the Policy of the Labour Government, 1964-1966.

The conventional argument advanced to explain British retrenchment from South-East

Asia suggests that economic difficulties forced the decision upon a reluctant

government and foreign policy-makingestablishment. John Darwin, for example,

argues that British officials were disinclined to contemplate retrenchment because of a

collective mindset that'was emotional and romantic rather than coldly rational and
85
cost-effective'. In the light of recently released archival material this contention

requires re-examination. Were policy-makers more realistic about the sustainability of

Britain's role in South-East Asia than has hitherto been suggested? The traditional

picture of the Wilson government's policy towards South-East Asia is too simplistic, as

it does not pay due cognisance to the actual policies advocated in camera by officials

and ministers. Senior ministers, including those who have traditionally been described

as 'Bevinites', such as Brown, Healey and Callaghan, adopted a more realistic policy

stance - with regard to the sustainability of Britain's position in South-East Asia - than

has thus far been appreciated. Policy-makers,both official and ministerial, were aware

of the need to promote policies that reflected Britain's 'new' place in world affairs, but

were hindered from doing so by external pressure from Washington, Canberra and

Wellington. The United States attached great importance on the continuation of a

British world role, a point that was made abundantly clear to the incoming Labour

government when Dean Rusk, the US Secretary of State, met Patrick Gordon Walker

and Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, at the British Embassy on 7

December 1964:

He [Rusk] urged H[er] M[ajesty's] G[overnment] to give weight to the role

of the UK as a world power... The US wanted the UK to play as large a
role as possible. It could do certain things which the US, because of
certain fancies, could not itself do so well. We would look with the

85J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 294.

p.
 299

greatest concern at a diminution of the UK's role, which was of very great
importance to us. 6

Even prior to Labour's assumption of power, Robert McNamara, US Secretary of

Defense, had warned Gordon Walker of Washington's desire for Britain to 'stay in the

Indian Ocean', in view of the fact that the United States 'didn't want to be the

gendarmes of the whole world'.87 Harold Wilson, who had also been in Washington for

talks with President Johnson, informed the cabinet that the Americans had 'been

particularly insistent on the value of the world-wide military role played by the United

Kingdom and the importance of our continuing to discharge that 88

role' Lord Harlech,

Britain's Ambassador in Washington, felt that the visit had strengthened Anglo-

American relations, but warned:

In the years ahead, however, we shall be increasingly treated on our

merits and shall be regarded not so much for who we are as for how we
perform. Above all our influence will depend upon our ability to solve our
own economic problems... We still possess a unique capability of
influencing American policy but this will be a wasting asset unless we
handle our own affairs with considerable skill and attention to the correct

priorities. 89

The Treasury saw South-East Asia as an 'incorrect priority', which undermined Britain's

ability to solve its economic problems; as the relatively poor performance of the British

economy continued during the 1960s, Treasury officials became ever more resolute

and obstinate in this view. Like Macmillan, Wilson was aware of the damaging impact

of defence expenditure on Britain's economic prospects, but was unprepared to

circumvent international commitments in order to achieve greater economies. The

86Memorandum of Conversation held In the library of the British Embassy. Drafted by Mr William R. Tyler, Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs, and approved by the Secretary of State on December 16. December 7,1964.
FRUS, Western Europe, vol. XII, Document 236.
87Gordon Walker's Diary, (Churchill College, Cambridge), 29 May 1963, GNWR 1/15.
" Cabinet minutes, 11 December 1964, CAB 128/39.
89iUnitedStates:Annual Reviewfor 1964', Lord Harlechto GordonWalker, 4 January 1965, FO371/179557.
 300

option of moving British troops from Europe to East of Suez, though not practically

inhibit Wilson from the On 14 May 1965, Wilson

viable, did not exploring possibility.

(in
told Dean Rusk a personal capacity, not as the considered opinion of the British

government) that he 'would rather pull half our troops out of Germany than move any

from the Far East, and this was quite apart from any question of the Malaysia

9Ö
problem' Despite such sentiment, Whitehall was increasingly of the opinion that

British policy should no longer be based on any assumption that the UK would retain

to
the capability undertake a single-handed intervention in South-East Asia;

alternatively, Western interests were to be secured by a 'genuinely collective and

interdependent presence', based on close co-operation with the United States,

Australia and New Zealand91 By the mid-1960s Britain's inability to support a world-

On 1 July 1965, Healey informed

wide defence effort had become glaringly obvious.

Sir Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, that there was no chance of reducing

defence expenditure to £2,000 million target (agreed at Chequers on 21 November

1964) unless commitments were 'shared out' 92 In early August 1965, at a Ministry of

Defence press conference, Healey remarked that if Sukarno decided to declare all-out

war against Malaysia, Britain would have to draw on almost all of its combat

from the 93
manpower, from all three services, every part of world

On 9 August 1965, Lee Kuan Yew announced Singapore's departure from the

Malaysian federation, a development that forced a full-scale re-appraisal of Britain's

strategic objectives in the region.94 The major reason for defending Malaysia had been

that it enabled continued British access to Singapore: thus, there was little reason for

defending the federation when Singapore was no longer a constituent part. From a

9 'Record of ConversationbetweenWilson and Rusk at 10 DowningStreet', 14 May 1965, PREM 13/214.

91Trend to Wilson, 11 June 1965, PREM 13/315.
92'Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister of Australia, Sir Robert Menzies, In the
Prime Minister's Room at the House of Commons', 1 July 1965, PREM 13/889.
93 The Times, 5 August 1965, p. 10.
°' In the months leading up to Singaporeandeparturefrom the federation,the British governmenthad been receiving
messagesthat Lee Kuan Yew's obstreperousoppositionwas aggravatingrelationswith the Tunku; Wilson was warned
that Lee was on the verge of being arrested and imprisoned. See H. Wilson, The Labour Government:A Personal
Memoir, (London:Weidenfeld& Nicolson, 1971), pp. 130-131.
 301

legalistic point of view, Britain's military commitment to Malaysia could now be

abrogated, since Singapore's departure invalidated Article VI of the 1963 Anglo-

Malaysian Defence Agreement. In addition, the preparatory work of the Defence

Review, which was taking place at the same time as Lee Kuan Yew's announcement,

had determined that British forces would be gradually withdrawn from Singapore, with

alternative arrangements reached once confrontation with Indonesia had reached a

resolution. So why did Britain not withdraw from Singapore in mid-1965, given that

Whitehall had agreed on the need to acquire alternative base facilities in the future? In

1971, Healey told his biographers: 'I was very tempted when, in the middle of

Confrontation - in the summer of 1965 - the Tunku and Harry Lee (Lee Kuan Yew

preferred being called by this name in Western company) gave us an opportunity for

getting out, by breaking their own Federation behind our backs. But you just couldn't

do it. There wasn't a political solution as long as Sukarno was there'95 At the time,

however, Healey felt that Britain should 'state its objective as to initiate negotiations

with Indonesia which would lead to the end of confrontation', making it clear to 'the

Tunku, in the light of the way in which he has acted, that we cannot continue to be

bound in this way so far as he is concerned'. This would increase Britain's 'room for

manoeuvre in the Far East', having the added advantage of demonstrating 'this new

approach for the benefit of others - for example, the Rulers in the Persian Gulf'. The

'price' of this 'new approach' would be a 'clear indication of our intention to retain a

military capability in Singapore so long as we are politically permitted to do so, and to

shift to Australia thereafter'. Therefore, Healey favoured ending confrontation, but

thought that this could only be bought at the price of remaining in Singapore, an ,

interpretation that differs from that which he gave to his biographers, which suggests

that he was against ending confrontation for as long as Sukarno was in power. More

importantly, an immediate withdrawal would damage Britain's relations with the United

95B. Reed and G. Williams, Denis Healey

and the Politics of Power, (London:Sidwick &Jackson, 1971), p. 206.
 302

States, which Foreign Office officials considered fundamental to the continuation of

Britain's role as a global power. Acknowledgingthe arguments against retrenchment,

Healey told Wilson that any indication that Britain was planning to remove its military

capability from South-East Asia might 'lead to withdrawal of American support for

sterling'; furthermore, Healey thought that Washington was concerned that Singapore

had the potential to become 'an Asian "Cuba" under Chinese 96

control' On 26 August

1965, George Brown, Secretary of State for the Department of Economic Affairs, told

Wilson that'some means must be found to bring confrontation with Indonesia to an end

97
quickly'. The DOPC considered the possibility of offering the Indonesians a plebiscite

in Sarawak and Sabah, on whether or not these two small territories wished to adhere

to the Malaysian federation. A partial British withdrawal from Singapore was also cited

as a possible bargaining tool in any negotiations with Sukarno. However, ministers

recognised that it would be difficult to convince Britain's allies of the need to start

winding down the UK role in South-East Asia.

On 3 September 1965, at official quadripartite talks (involving the United States,

Australia, News Zealand and Britain) in London, British officials floated the idea of

negotiations with the Indonesians, but this was firmly rejected by the American,

Australian and New Zealand representatives,who regarded it as likely to undermine

the West's position in South-East Asia. The United States strongly challenged the

British assumption that the secession of Singapore called for urgent contingency

planning with regards to the continuation of British defence commitments in the area.

George Ball, US Under-Secretaryof State, told Wilson that Washington `did not share

the British sense that their position was in imminent danger because of recent political

98
events' A few months earlier, McNamara had argued that Britain must `regard

herself as having an inescapable commitment in the Indian Ocean and the Far East for

96Healeyto Wilson, 13 August 1965, PREM 13/431.

97Brownto Wilson, 26 August 1965, PREM 13/431. Unable to
attend the DOPC meeting,which discussedSingapore,
Brown made his views known to Wilson on this Issuethrough a letter.
98Ball to Wilson, 4 September1965, FRUS: WesternEurope,
vol. XII, Document236.
 303

at least the next ten years', since, although the US had the military resources to police

this part of the world unaided, it lacked the 'political strength either at home or abroad

to do so alone and without allies'. Roy Jenkins, who had met McNamara in his

capacity as Minister for Aviation, took a different position, arguing (in a personal

capacity, and not on behalf of the British government) that it was more important to

keep up British commitments in Europe -a view that differed from the Prime Minister99

However, with the worsening situation in Vietnam, where the Americans and

Australians were increasing the scale of their military deployment, Washington and

Canberra looked for deeds, not words.

The British objective of retaining sterling's parity with the dollar further inhibited

Britain's independence of action. Whitehall policy-makers found themselves in an

almost impossible situation: the maintenance of sterling's parity required support from

the United States, but Washington's backing of sterling depended on Britain retaining

overseas commitments - such as those associated with SEATO - which paradoxically

served to undermine the strength of the pound. In early August 1965, Ball

recommended continuing support for sterling to President Johnson, only on condition

that Britain agreed to retain its international defence commitments. In September

1965, Ball was dispatched to London to ensure that the resolve of the Labour

government was maintained. When Ball met Wilson on 8 September 1965, he warned

the Prime Minister that to 'appear to be envisaging a reduction of the UK commitment

in South-East Asia at a time when the US commitment in Vietnam was increasing

could have led to an unfortunate concatenation of circumstances'. Wilson gave Ball a

categorical assurance that Britain would not withdraw from the region, or even reduce

its commitments, as this would be 'contrary to everything he had said and would make

him eat a great number of his own words'. The Prime Minister was keenly aware of the

need to 'keep sterling strong', telling Ball that the British government 'were quite clear

"Dean (commentingon a meeting betweenJenkins and McNamara)to Gore Booth, 10 June 1965, PREM 13/215.
 304

that finance, foreign policy and defence must hang together, particularly East of Suez.

It would be a tragedy if present economic stringency made us pull out of places to

which we could never hope to return'. Wilson promised to 'soldier on' in the

confrontation with Indonesia, which he considered causa sine qua non, re-assuring Ball

that Britain had abandoned the idea of reaching a negotiated settlement with

Sukarno.1°° On 9 September 1965, Joseph Fowler, the US Treasury Secretary,

oversaw a support operation for the pound, which aggressively intervened in the

international markets to force up the sterling rate. On 10 September, the Chancellor of

the Exchequer, James Callaghan, secured a $1 billion short-term multilateral

stabilisation loan, with the US Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilisation Fund of

the Treasury contributing $400 million.101

Was this reversal of policy a reflection of British weakness or strength? Was it not a

sign of intense weakness that American concerns essentially determined British policy

towards South-East Asia, rather than Britain's own national interests? Sir Burke Trend

was not so despondent: We need not regret having brought our allies up against [the

prevailing] realities; and the violence of their reaction to any suggestion that we should

"pull out of the Far East", still more that we should take any initiative to end

confrontation, is a measure of our bargaining position if we meet the desire that we

should remain East of Suez'.' 02 Singapore's departure from the Malaysian federation

had provided a pretext for withdrawal, but policy-makers rejected this course on the

grounds that it would damage Anglo-American relations. Nonetheless, ministers and

officials remained committed to the idea of a Western withdrawal from South-East Asia,

albeit on a longer timescale than that preferred by Whitehall. On 23 September 1965,

in a cabinet discussion on long term foreign policy aims, Michael Stewart, Gordon

70°'Record of Conversation between Mr Wilson and Mr Ball

at 10 Downing Street', 8 September 1965, PREM 131431.
10' The other contributors were Austria, Belgium, Canada, West Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland
and the Bank of International Settlements. The Bank of France had originally been involved in the package but pulled
out of the deal on 9 September 1965. The loan increased the speculators' confidence in sterling, thus triggering a re-
flow of funds back Into London, and a rise in the rate of sterling against the dollar.
102Trend to Wilson, 21 September 1965, PREM 131431.
 305

Walker's replacement at the Foreign Office, argued: 'In the longer term we must look to

a Western withdrawal from the Far East; but it would be important to ensure, so far as

possible, that the vacuum would be filled by regimes which, although not necessarily

pro-Western, would not be wholly under Chinese domination'. Recognising that Britain

no longer had the ability to 'act decisively in world affairs', Stewart held to the idea of

playing a 'useful' role in an interdependentworld, concluding that 'our influence would

remain very considerable so long as we acted in concert with our allies'.103

In early November 1965, DOP(O)C officials produced a paper for the consideration of

ministers on the subject of British policy after confrontation. Officials suggested that

Britain's post-bel/um policy should be more in harmony with British interests; this had

not been the case hitherto, as Britain's defence spending had been out of proportion to

its economic stake in the region. The central conclusions of the paper attempted to

reconcile three contradictory departmental positions: the necessity for greater

economies in expenditure, representing the views of both the Treasury and the Board

of Trade; the need to retain a military presence in order to satisfy American political

opinion, as advocated by the Foreign Office; and the Commonwealth Relations Office's

concerns over Britain's historic and moral obligations towards the Australasian nations.

With regards to the future of the Singapore base, it was argued that only withdrawal

could reduce defence expenditure to a level commensurate with Britain's financial and

economic interests. Indeed, officials agreed that it would be difficult to retain the use of

Singapore either up to or beyond 1970, even if the British government wished to do so;

as a consequence, it was recognised that it might be wise to impress on the

Australians the need to consider the creation of alternative facilities in northern

Australia. On 19 January 1966, when the DOPC discussed what position Britain ought

to adopt at forthcoming discussions in Washington and Canberra, Healey highlighted

the future of the Singapore base as the 'biggest single issue' in the talks. Healey

703Cabinet minutes,23 September 1965, CAB 128/39.

 306

claimed that the United States and Australian attitude towards Singapore differed from

that of the UK: 'while we regarded Singaporeas a base from which we conducted

military operations, and which local difficulties might increasingly make untenable, they

saw it as a potential Communist strongholdakin to Cuba'. Referring to a

Commonwealth Relations Office brief on this subject, Healey suggested that the United

States and Australian governments 'tended to make light of the difficulties that we

foresaw'. In discussions with the United States and Australia, Britain was put under

to its
severe pressure retain position in 104
Singapore. On 16 December 1965, Wilson

urged Johnson to accept that Britain could not retain its position in Singapore

'indefinitely', being convinced that it was now necessary to begin planning 'an

alternative posture in the Far East'. This 'alternative posture', Wilson posited, might

be based on the concept of a quadpartite arrangement, to which Britain, the United

States, Australia and New Zealand would contribute; however, Britain's contribution to

such an arrangement would be a 'limited one, probably not exceeding £185 million a

year, with the other three countries taking responsibilityfor the 'substantial' new capital

expenditure which would be involved.105As such a policy would entail the

abandonment of the `forward'defence of the Australasian Commonwealth nations, Sir

Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia, expressed his concerns to Wilson:

We regard it as fundamental that Britain, in reviewing its global role,

should not contemplate any significant withdrawal from the defence

posture which, jointly with Australia and New Zealand, she has established
in the Far East For our part we can not envisage an alternative posture
...
which would have the same value and effectiveness as the present
arrangements. I would not leave any doubt as to the depth of our
conviction on this. A new development of bases and facilities in Australia

104DOPC minutes, 19 January 1966, CAB 148/25.

105'Meeting held at the White House', 16 December 1965, PREM
13/889; DOPC minutes, 19 January 1966, CAB
148/25.
 307

would be no adequatesubstitutefor the present defence structure in the

region.106

In February 1966, Harold Holt, Menzies replacementas Prime Minister, told Wilson

that he found it unacceptable'that western power be withdrawn from the mainland and

be [made] available in the background[i.e. in Northern Australia]'.107The general

Australian attitude, in Healey's opinion, could be summarised as a'desire to keep any

fighting in the Far East as far as possible from Australia, and a suspicion that we

wanted Australia to finance in

a change our defence posture which was not in her

interest'.' 08

The Defence Reviews: A Revision of Britain's South-East Asian Role.

The 1965-1966 Defence Review considered, in exhaustive detail, the future of Britain's

military role in South-East Asia. Reflecting the long-held viewpoint of the Treasury, it

was concluded that Britain's material interests in South-East Asia were not by

themselves sufficient to justify the cost of deploying substantive UK forces in the

region. It was therefore accepted that the cost of Britain's contribution would have to

be limited, if defence expenditure was to be reduced by 1970, to an amount that was

'consistent with Britain's economic health' (£2,000 million a year at 1964 prices).

However, it was also agreed that the UK had considerable political interests in the

region, and it was reiterated that Britain had a direct interest in preventing South-East

Asia from being dominated by the Sino-Soviet influence.

Christopher Mayhew, Minister of Defence for the Royal Navy, believed that the

Defence Review failed to take account of the economic realities confronting Britain,

t06Menzies
toWilson,19January
1966,PREM13/889.
107
Holt to Wilson, 8 February1966, PREM 13/889. Also see 'Record of Conversationbetweenthe Prime Minister and
Paul Hasluck,the Australian Ministerfor ExternalAffairs, at 10 DowningStreet', 10 April 1966, PREM 13/890.
106DOPC minutes, 19 January 1966, CAB 148/25.
 308

and subsequently resigned from the 109

government. In late January 1966, when

Healey was in Canberra, Mayhew articulated his concerns to the DOPC, informing his

senior ministerial colleagues that Britain could not maintain a world role in 1969-70 on

a defence budget of £2,000 million at 1964 prices; such a course would either entail an

unacceptable strain upon UK forces or an undue dependence on the United States or

both. Mayhew argued that Britain must accept'a lesser international role', claiming

that the target of £2,000 million was an 'artificial target figure', which had been laid

down before an adequate study of commitmentshad begun, while the sum of £186

million for defence expenditure in the Far East was 'even more artificial', as it

represented only the residual sum after provision had been made within the £2,000

million limit for the level of forces to

necessary maintain commitments other than those

located in the Far East. Reflecting a viewpoint continuously advocated by the Treasury

and Board of Trade, Mayhew claimed that'the maintenance of our economic strength

was essential for any effective foreign and defence policy', emphasising the need for

'drastic changes in the United Kingdom's position in the world'. Mayhew thought that

there was 'grave reason' to doubt the ability of 'white nations' alone to maintain a

peacekeeping role in Asia or to support the effective political and military containment

of China, believing that the presence of UK forces did 'nothing to assist political

containment'. In discussion, ministers dissented from Mayhew's position, generally

accepting the view: We had inherited the obligations of a world power; and it was in

our interest that these should not be abandoned so long as we could make an effective

contribution to the maintenance of international stability'.1' Put simply, Labour

ministers favoured a reduction in the scale of commitments, as opposed to their total

abrogation.

On 14 February 1966, when the cabinet considered a memorandum on the defence

budget (to which was appended Statement on the Defence Estimates, Part I: 1966),

709For Mayhew'saccount for why he resigned, see C. Mayhew, Britain's Role Tomorrow,(London:Hutchinson,1967),
gyp.131.153. Admiral Sir David Luce, First Sea Lord, resigned along with Mayhew.
1°DOPC minutes,30 January 1966, CAB 148/25.
 309

Healey informed his colleagues that he had set three targets for the review of defence

expenditure. The first was to reduce the burden on resources by some 16 per cent as

compared with the plans of the previous Conservative government; the second was to

reduce the burden on foreign exchange;and the third was to reduce the excessive

strain upon Britain's military resources. The decisions taken on the aircraft

programme, Healey notified the cabinet, had saved the government £1,200 million over

a ten-year period. Defence spending in the following year would be just below the

ceiling of £2,000 million at 1964 prices, but because certain expenditure had inevitably

been deferred while decisions were being taken on the Defence Review, there would

be a slight increase thereafter until the target figure was met in 1969-70. Economies

on defence expenditure had focussed on the equipment programme and not resulted in

any diminution in military capability. There still remained, however, a gap of £100

million between the target figure and the expenditure that would be incurred on existing

plans in 1969-70. Healey believed that this disparity could only be closed by reducing

commitments. The Defence Review had achieved major reductions, primarily in the

Mediterranean and the Middle East, in relation to Malta, Cyprus, Libya and Aden. In

the Far East, Britain planned a substantial reduction of its forces as soon as

confrontation was ended, since ministers in the 'overseas' departments had confirmed

that it would not be politically possible for the UK to stay in Singapore for any

considerable period thereafter. This in

would result substantial savings in foreign

exchange and resources. Nonetheless, reductions resulting from these proposals still

left a gap of some £50 million between the target and the estimate in 1969-70. Healey

argued that the target could then be achieved by a number of minor savings: for

instance, by 'failure', owing to difficulties in recruitment, to maintain the carriers in

service for as long as was proposed; by the reduction of commitments, whether in the

Far East through the ending of confrontation and withdrawal from Singapore, in the

Middle East through the ending of the Kuwait commitment as a result of actions by the

Kuwaiti government, or by the reduction of UK forces stationed in Germany, if the

 310

requirementsfor offsetting foreign exchangecosts were not met; or, finally, by cutting

out the P1127 (a prototype of the HarrierJump Jet, which proved that vertical take-off

was possible)."'

In considering the appropriate balance between what the UK could afford and what

part it should play in world affairs, Stewart argued that neither aspect could be

regarded as overriding: 'Our capacity to carry out certain commitments was inevitably

limited by the strain on our resources,but to cut our commitments beyond a certain

point might have consequencesfor world stability which could cause even greater

damage to our economic position'. In regard to the P-1127, Callaghan argued that this

expenditure could not be justified on military grounds. By way of alternative to cutting

the P-1127, Callaghan suggested that savings could be found by a 'further reduction' in

commitments, expressing concern about the wide range of obligations it was proposed

Britain should retain East of Suez, since these might at any time involve an escalation

in military tasks. Callaghan, as a consequence, questioned whether 'we were

proposing to play too large a part in relation to our resources'. Wilson did not support

Callaghan, maintaining that Britain's East of Suez role helped secure world peace in an

area where there was 'real danger of a world war'; accordingly, it was in Britain's own

interests to play a part in seeking to maintain stability in South-East Asia. Wilson also

suggested that ministers take account of the willingness of other countries to prop up

sterling when considering the maintenance of Britain's world role. If Britain cut its

overseas commitments, Wilson contended, other countries would be less willing to give

support for sterling.' 12

The process of British retrenchment from South-East Asia essentially began with the

1966 Defence Review, which severely restricted Britain's capability in the region by

cancelling the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers.' 13 By terminating the Navy's carrier

programme and applying severe conditions to defence commitments East of Suez, it is

"' Cabinet minutes, 14 February 1966, CAB 128/41.

"2 Ibid.
113The existingcarriers, however,
would remain in service Into the 1970s.
 311

questionable whether Britain's South-EastAsian commitments could be met in the

event that they were invoked. The credibility of a military commitment depends, above

all else, on possessingthe means, when called upon to fulfil a political obligation, thus

demonstrating to potential adversariesthe futility of challenging policy objectives

through recourse to military means. The value of a military commitment depends on a

state being able to fulfil it when a casus foederis arises. In this sense, it can be argued

that the 1966 Defence Review severely limited Britain's ability to meet its commitments

in South-East Asia. The DefenceWhite Paper set out, inter alia, the following

important principles:

First, Britain will not undertakemajor operations of war except in co-

operation with allies. Secondly,we will not accept an obligation to provide
another country with military assistanceunless it is prepared to provide us
with the facilities we need to make such assistance effective in time.
Finally, there will be no attempt to maintain defence facilities in an
independent country against its wishes.' 14

This marked a major shift in the direction of British policy, albeit falling short of taking

the decision to withdraw from South-East Asia. The primary reason for holding on to

Singapore was the importance that Washington attached to British possession of its

base facilities. The Vietnam War conditioned the American attitude towards

Singapore, and the 'overseas' departments agreed that the United States 'would find it

little short of treachery for us to sound a retreat on their flank by abandoning our

existing position before we are forced to do so'. Even so, ministers agreed that it

would be inappropriate for Britain to retain its obligations towards Singapore and

Malaysia after the end of confrontation. There were four main reasons underpinning

this conclusion: firstly, it was thought that there would be increasing friction between

Singapore and Malaysia over the coming years; secondly, once confrontation was

114Defence Review,Crnnd2901, (London:HMSO, 1966).

 312

over, local nationalism would become more prominent- as a consequence, Britain

would become increasingly exposed to the charge of 'neo-colonialism'; thirdly, an

open-ended commitment to defend Malaysiaand Singapore - which followed,

inexorably, if Britain retained the use of its bases - would make it impossible to keep

defence expenditure within the limit prescribedby the Defence Review; finally, it was

stressed that Britain should start reducingthe level of its forces no later than 1968.15

In May 1966, Sir Burke Trend produceda paper, entitled 'Indo-Pacific Policy', in

for
preparation quadripartite ministerial discussionsto take place in Canberra on 30

June after a meeting of the SEATO Council.' 16 Since no reduction in commitments

could be achieved, whilst confrontationpersisted,Trend's paper concluded that '1968

was the latest date by in

which one way or another we should have to have brought

to
confrontation an end'. If fallback facilities in Australia failed to materialise, it was

accepted that 'we [Britain] shall have no choice but to go home altogether'.' 17

Commenting on Trend's paper, Healey told the DOPC that Australia's attitude to Indo-

Pacific strategic questions was 'naive and over-simplified'. The DOPC agreed that it

would be counter to Britain's 'economic interests to retain a large military presence in

the Indo-Pacific theatre after the ending of confrontation'. The prospect of containing

Far Eastern military expenditure, within the annual limit of £186, might be at risk if

Britain decided to remain in Singapore `for as long as we could'.18

Despite such reservations, ministerial rhetoric remained robust in public. In February

1966, Healey told the Australian National Press Club: 'we shall remain fully capable of

carrying out all the commitments we have at the present time including those in the Far

East, like the commitments to Malaysia and Singapore'. Healey's public expression of

support for Britain's commitments in South-East Asia were paralleled by an equally

ardent espousal of the need to continue a world role:

15'Defence Review': Cabinet note by Trend, 8 November 1965, CAB 130/213.

1° Preparation for this paper began on 18 March 1966. See DOP(0)C
minutes, 18 March 1966, CAB 148/66.
"'See 'Indo-Pacific Policy: report by Trend for the DOP(O)C, 10 May, 1966, CAB 148/69.
1° DOPC minutes, 13 May 1966, CAB 148/25.
 313

We do not think it is necessary,indeed we do not think it is possible for

Britain to shrink into Europeand confine her political and military and
economic interests exclusivelyto that small part of the world where the
British Isles happen to be situated. We intend to maintain a world
influence.119

Healey was forced to devise a policy that reconciledthe mutually incompatible

objectives of the Treasury and Foreign Office, later reflecting in his memoirs:

The Treasury, which sometimesseemed to know the price of everything

and the value of nothing, was always pressing for further cuts in defence
spending. However, no governmentshould cut a military capability
without cutting the political commitmentwhich made that capability
necessary. And this, the Foreign Office was usually reluctant to do; it
seemed to regard every commitment as an invaluable pearl without price.
So I had to fight a war on two fronts.120

The Treasury was fully aware of the political costs of military withdrawal, but believed

that this was a price that had to be paid, so as to secure future economic stability. In

July 1965, Robert McNamara told Callaghan, that, if the UK were to change its political

commitments in order to meet its financial target of £2,000 million a year, 'the US

would have no alternative but to reconsider its whole defence expenditure posture, its

world-wide treaty obligations and all aspects of its relations with the UK'. By way of

argument, Callaghan pointed out that, taking overseas military expenditure as a

percentage of GNP, the UK was bearing a greater burden than the US. Not

unreasonably, Callaghan argued that it would be 'self-defeating' for the UK to try to

shoulder foreign exchange burdens which were too big -'to do so would cripple the UK

economy and, therefore, the UK's ability to play its proper role as an ally'. 'The UK... ',

Callaghan continued, '. must envisage areas out of which it might be forced in
..

'"'BritishStatements
abouttheRetention
of Forcesin South-East
Asia':Healey's
Address PressClub
attheNational
Luncheon InCanberra,
2 February
1966,PREM13/1456.
120
Healey, Time of My Life, p. 256.
 314

future, e.g. Aden or Malaysia'. Confrontationin Malaysia represented a total burden on

the UK of some £300 million a year; in return,the UK secured from Malaysia about £25

in
million a year remitted advances. McNamara'reacted sharply' to the mention of

in
Malaysia, telling Callaghan that'the US could no circumstances assume any of the

UK's burden in Malaysia,.121

The emergence of a new Indonesian regime in April 1966 made it politically possible

for ministers to consider abrogating Britain's commitments to Malaysia and Singapore.

On 6 April 1966, Stewart told the DOPC that the emergence of a new government was

'to our advantage', believing this outcome to be 'a vindication of the policies which we

had pursued towards Indonesia, which had progressively brought home to Indonesia

that the confrontation of Malaysia was unprofitable'. 122 In June 1966, DOPC ministers

considered a note by Trend on this subject, which argued that the end of confrontation

would remove the main obstacle to reaching the financial target agreed in the 1966

Defence Review (£186 million at 1964 prices), though it was not yet possible to say

how quickly the budgetary and foreign exchange savings could be realised. As soon

as confrontation was over, Trend argued, UK forces should be withdrawn from the

Borneo territories without delay and thereafter all troops should be removed from the

theatre, over and above those which would be required for fulfilling commitments to

Britain's remaining dependent territories, or which had been offered as a contribution to

the long-term allied defence effort in the Indo-Pacific area. The decision - as

announced in the 1966 Defence Review - to remain militarily in Singapore and

Malaysia, for as long as this was possible under acceptable conditions, had been

posed not on the supposition that confrontation would continue, but on the contrary

assumption that it would end well before 1970. Stewart was concerned that the

prospective end of confrontation would put Britain under pressure to provide military

forces for combat in Vietnam and to assist in fighting subversion in Thailand, but

121'Chancellor'sVisit to North America', 2 July 1965, PREM 13/216.

122DOPC minutes, 6 April 1966, CAB 148/25.
 315

concluded that this 'would be '23

not acceptable'. On 10 June 1966, Wilson rejected a

request from Rusk that Britain should contribute military aid to Thailand, arguing that

this was impossible when there was growing Parliamentaryand political opposition to

the whole of Britain's East of Suez policy. This was an 'unnatural alliance', in Wilson's

opinion, comprising those who held 'extreme left-wing or pacifist views and those who

wished Britain to centre all her efforts on 124

Europe'. Stewart argued that Britain should

meet further American pressure by declining each specific request for assistance as it

arose, even though this would be likely to lead to the 'maximum ill will'. He had it in

mind to propose to Britain's allies that there should be a case by case study of the

problems in South-East Asia, in the course of which 'we should make clear the reasons

for our view that it would not be appropriateto commit white troops in a counter

insurgency role'. Stewart accepted that this would be 'most unwelcome to our allies in

the existing situation, but saw "no alternative"'. In discussion there was general

agreement that, as soon as confrontation had come to an end, Britain should seek to

remove UK forces from Borneo as quickly as possible, before any renewal of incidents

which might lead the Malaysian government to request their assistance. In considering

Britain's future military posture, ministers agreed on the need to have 'regard to the

increasing pressure on the United Kingdom economy and to the difficulty of our

sustaining the oversea expenditurewhich would be required to maintain even the

substantially lower level of forces postulated by the Defence Review'.125

Stewart was surprisingly pleased by the reception he received at the four power talks

in Canberra, informing the DOPC that these 'had been less difficult than he expected',

it being agreed that there should be discussions (at an official level) of the problems of

the area, on a country by country basis, in order to define the respective roles of

Britain, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. On route back to London, he

'2' DOPC minutes, 17 June 1966, CAB 148/25.

'24'Recordof Conversationbetweenthe Prime Minister Mr Rusk, the US Secretary State, 10 DowningStreelf, 10
of at
June 1966, PREM 13/890. As regards Singapore,Wilson told Rusk that Britain's retention of the military base was
'criticised at present in Britain as a symbol of the Kiplingesquequality of our Far Eastern policy'.
'25
DOPC minutes, 17 June 1966, CAB 148/25.
 316

also visited Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore. Having spoken to Malik,

Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Stewart was convinced that confrontation would soon

end, given fears in Indonesia about the damaging economic impact of continuing the

conflict. In Kuala Lumpur, Stewart had told Tun Razak, Malaysia's Defence Minister,

that once confrontation was over Britain would wish to hand over military responsibility

to Malaysian forces and withdraw troops from the Borneo territories as rapidity as

possible; and once they had left they would not return. Stewart was disappointed with

Razak's response, finding the atmosphere 'depressing', a situation not helped by the

anti-British statements which Malaysian ministers were inclined to make in the press.

In Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew was concerned that the Indonesian government was not

acting in good faith, believing that Britain's withdrawal would result in Indonesia's

annexation of North Borneo and Sarawak, as a prelude to an attempt to seize power in

Singapore. In assessing the broad geo-strategic situation, Stewart thought that

Britain's two main allies in South-East Asia were insular in their thinking, finding it

'discouraging that in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur the leaders were more pre-occupied

with suspicions of each other than with the threat of China'. Such concerns found little

sympathy in the Treasury: Callaghan suggested that it was necessary to achieve 'the

maximum economies in defence expenditure in the minimum time', involving

withdrawal of troops stationed in the Borneo territories as soon as possible. Whilst

recognising that Britain had a moral obligation to defend Australia in the event of an

external attack, Callaghan indicated that it did not follow that for this purpose it was

necessary to maintain bases in the area, whether in Singapore or in Australia itself. 126

When the government was forced to undertake a number of restrictive economic

measure in July 1966, following severe and persistent speculation against sterling,

Healey's budget was cut again, from £2,000 million to £1,850 million (at 1964 prices).

Accordingly, a second Defence Review was initiated in the middle of 1966, finally being

126DOPC minutes, 5 July 1966, CAB 148/25.

 317

completed in July 1967. This time emphasis was placed on reducing military

commitments in the interests of relieving pressure on the balance of payments.

Labour's Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy, published on 18 July 1967,

announced a phased withdrawal of UK forces from Malaysia and Singapore, halving

British forces in the Far East from 80,000 to 40,000 by 1970-71, as a prelude to final

withdrawal in the 127

mid-1970s. By setting down plans for a final withdrawal from

South-East Asia, Wilson's government had crossed the Rubicon, marking

psychological acceptance of Britain's inability to occupy a genuine extra-European role.

The devaluation of sterling - which followed a few months later on 18 November 1967 -

only accelerated this process of retrenchment.

In March 1967, George Brown, Stewart's replacement at the Foreign Office, told

McGeorge Bundy, Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National

Security Council, that 'his own view was that there was no point in maintaining a British

presence on the East Asian mainland'. This statement clearly contradicts Jeffrey

Pickering's portrayal of Brown as an obstinate Bevinite.128It is also necessary to revise

John Darwin's contention that it took devaluation and an unlikely alliance of Jenkinsite

Europeanists and the Labour left to overcome 'the last ditch resistance' of Bevinite

cabinet ministers (namely Brown, Healey, Callaghan and Stewart), in order to 'extract

the final avowal that the last vestiges of the imperial role were at an end'.129Brown

travelled to Washington for quadripartite talks in April 1967, where he informed the

American, Australian and New Zealand representatives that Britain planned: firstly, to

halve the British forces stationed in Malaysia/Singapore by 1970-71; secondly, leave

South-East Asia completely by the mid-1970s (between 1973 and 1977); and, finally,

announce these decisions to Parliament, when it rose in July. Prior to the quadripartite

talks, this decision was leaked to Henry Brandon, Chief Washington Correspondent for

127 Statement
Supplementary onDefence
Policy,
Cmnd
3357,(London:
HMSO,
1967).
128 Pickering, East of Suez, p. 156.
129J. Darwin, 'British Decolonisationsince 1945: A Pattern
or a Puzzle?', The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, vol. 12, No. 2, (1984).
 318

the Sunday Times, who wrote: 'The British cabinet is about to make an historic

decision: A major withdrawal of British forces from the Far East much earlier than

contemplated'. The US Embassy in London informed the Australian High Commission

that they suspected Brandon had obtained his story from Brown, believing that the

Foreign Secretary was trying 'not only to effect a major withdrawal but at the same time

exploit the opportunity to seek help especially from the Americans in maintaining the

military residue in Singapore and Malaysia'.130If true, greater importance is attached

to the need for a revision of Pickering and Darwin's interpretation of Brown's role in

bringing about British retrenchment from East of Suez. Rusk firmly opposed the policy

course outlined by Brown, rejecting the idea that Britain should withdraw whilst the

Americans were still heavily involved in Vietnam.131 By this stage, however, British

retrenchment from South-East Asia had become an inevitability, even if this negatively

impacted upon American opinion and the 'special' relationship. By announcing a

timetable for withdrawal in 1967 (prior to devaluation), officials hoped to disarm and

weaken opponents of the British presence. Brown tried to assuage American anxieties

by reiterating that Britain would retain some air and sea capability in the region, whilst

re-emphasising that'white forces on the ground could become an embarrassment and

a liability', an argument first mooted by Selkirk in 1961.132Brown in fact repeated this

argument ad nauseam:

The more Britain could release herself from the attacks of the professional
anti-colonialists the less it would be possible for her enemies to undermine
the position of the West in Asia It was necessary to think of the role of
...
the West in tomorrow's context rather than of yesterday.'33

130Australian High Commission in London to Department External Affairs (Inward Cablegram), 18

of April 1967,
NAA: Al 838/1728304.
131'British Plan East of Suez', April 20,1967, FRUS: Mainland South-EastAsia; Regional Affairs,
vol. XXVIII, Document
90.
'32'Record of conversation between Brown
and Rusk', 18 April 1967, PREM 13/1455.
133'Record of conversation between Brown
and McNamara', 18 April 1967, PREM 13/1455.
 319

On 21 April, Rusk urged Brown to postpone the planned announcement to withdraw

from the Singapore/Malaysiabases by the mid-1970s, warning him that the United

States had no intention to fill the resulting power vacuum: 'If there is any thought that

we might be able to take on your commitments when you left, as we did in Greece, I

must say at once that there is no sentiment in this country to take on additional

in
commitments any area'.'3' On the same day, Sir Alexander Downer, Australian High

Commissioner in London, met Michael Halls and Michael Palliser, Wilson's two

principal private secretaries, informing them that Brown's plans would be 'disastrous'

for Commonwealth relations. In reply, Halls and Palliser argued that in future Britain's

military obligations in South-East Asia would have to be discharged by'speedy air

transport' rather than by maintaining 'expensive' military bases.135At this time, it

should be noted, cabinet ministers were becoming increasingly occupied by Britain's

policy towards Europe, fearing that the maintenance of a significant extra-European

role might prejudice the declared policy aim of joining the EEC. (The Labour

government announced its decision to apply for EEC membership on 2 May 1967. At a

press conference on 16 May, President de Gaulle ruled out British membership, citing

the disruptive effects of the continuing sterling crisis on the process of economic

integration). Tom Critchley, Senior Foreign Affairs Representative at Australia House

in London, was given this impression at a diplomatic reception held by Downer, when

he was given the opportunity to talk with senior cabinet ministers, many of whom were

in 'unusually relaxed mood' following the announcement of Britain's decision to join the

EEC. Callaghan, another figure portrayed by Pickering as a Bevinite, left Critchley with

the 'impression that other priorities (i.e. Europe) were more important than South-East

Asia'. This view was 'confirmed' by Callaghan's conversation with Downer, when he

explained retrenchment from East of Suez in terms of his 'great concern' over the

heavy cost in the short term of joining the EEC, and of the need to find savings in

134Rusk to Brown, 21 April 1967, FRUS, Western Europe,

vol. XII, Document 269.
1,15
Downer to Holt (inward telegram), 21 April 1967, NAA: Al 838/1728304.
 320

foreign exchange to meet it.136By 1967 the central thrust of British foreign policy had

begun to turn away from East of Suez towards Europe. On 12 May 1967, Palliser told

the Prime Minister that his credibility in Paris would only'increase if he [de Gaulle]

thinks that we do not intend to stay in Singapore'. Palliser advocated a stronger line

against Britain's SEATO allies, arguing that the UK had in 'the past two years allowed

the Americans and Australians to twist our arms and force us to backtrack. If we let

them do it again, we shall not increase their respect for us but only their suspicion -

is
which already intense'.137

On 30 May 1967, cabinet ministers considered the issue of Far East Defence policy,

which was analysed in the context of the defence expenditure studies being conducted

by Whitehall. Healey informed his colleagues of the discussions he and Brown had

had with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, all of

which opposed Britain's withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia by the mid-1970s,

rejecting the suggestion that this intention should be announced in July when the

defence expenditure studies would be completed. It was agreed that the 'main

objective' of policy should be to obtain the acquiescence of Britain's allies in the plan to

remove UK forces from Singapore/Malaysia. If this were to be achieved, Wilson

believed that it would be necessary to 'pay a price', namely confirming a willingness to

maintain a 'military capability for use' beyond the mid-1970s.138 During a visit to

Washington in early June, President Johnson expressed to Wilson his strong

opposition to Britain's intention to leave the mainland of Asia (save for Hong Kong) in

the mid-1970s, being unimpressed by the decision to maintain a 'military capability for

use' in the area. 139With some degree of justification, Rusk told the Australians that this

phraseology was so 'ambiguous as to be meaningless'.140In spite of such opposition,

136Australian High Commission in London to Department of External Affairs (Inward Cablegram), 3 May 1967,
NAA: Al 838/1728304.
137Palliser to Wilson, 12 May 1967, PREM 13/1455.
138Cabinet minutes, 30 May 1967, CAB 128/42.
139Cabinet minutes, 6 June 1967, CAB 128/42. Wilson also discussed his
meeting with President Johnson In The
Chariot of Israel: Britain, America and the State of Israel, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson/MichaelJoseph, 1981), pp.
346-347.
140iSummary of Cables for Prime Minister, 5 June 1967, NAA: Al 209/1160399.
 321

Whitehall was convinced that plans for withdrawal must be brought to fruition, even if

Britain's allies in South-East Asia resented such a policy. On his return from

Washington, Wilson informed the cabinet:

[the] US Administration realised that we should take our decision in the

light of our own interests, after considering the views of our allies. They
were anxious that we should succeed in our application to join the
European Communities and recognised that in the course of our
negotiations it would be necessary for us to present the Anglo-American
relationship in a manner which would involve the least incompatibility with
our profound desire to become more European in our outlook and
policies.14'

The Australian and New Zealand governments expressed indignation at Britain's

intention to withdraw, urging the need to keep a small Commonwealth force on the

mainland. On 12 June 1967, Jack Marshall, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand

(representing the views of Keith Holyoake, who had to attend a Budget Debate),

'pleaded most insistently' that the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and the

Commonwealth Brigade be maintained, as they provided 'tangible evidence' of the

continuing utility of the Commonwealth.142The next day, Harold Holt told Wilson that

any unequivocal statement that Britain would be 'off the continent of Asia' by the mid-

1970s would have 'a shattering effect on Commonwealth relations in the area, on

Australia in particular and generally throughout the Far East'.143In response, Healey

insisted that it was possible for Britain to defend Western interests in South-East Asia

'without any military presence'. The result of careful analysis in the Treasury had

shown that the British defence budget could not be maintained at the level planned 18

months ago (£2,000 million in 1964 constant prices) because the assumptions then

made about economic growth had not been fully realised. There was a need to make

'' Cabinet minutes, 6 June 1967, CAB 128/42.

142'Recordof conversation between Wilson
and Marshall at 10 Downing Street', 12 June 1967, PREM 13/1456.
143Record of conversation between Wilson and Holt 10 Downing Street, 13 June 1967,
at PREM 13/1456.
 322

the board be made at home if defence

public expenditure cuts across - cuts could not

expenditure abroad was left untouched. Healey informed the Australian delegation that

fixed military bases were 'very expensive' to maintain, arguing that the new aircraft and

carrier facilities would make an 'important contribution' to stability, and that British

troops could be flown to the area for internal security purposes - the result would be a

'substantial capability' in the Far East, even if there were no bases after 1975. In reply,

Holt argued that British defence policy should not be overly informed by European

opinion, suggesting that Britain's place in the Commonwealth - and indeed the

Commonwealth itself - was greatly affected by the extent to which Britain demonstrated

to in
a preparedness participate affairs outside Europe.' 44 On the next day, Callaghan

told Holt that British decisions about defence had to take account of three major factors

the international political situation, which affected all parties; the move towards
-
Europe; and the 'hard' financial and economic facts.145Prior to leaving for Australia,

Holt invited Wilson to consider the consequences of a complete withdrawal from South-

East Asia on the UK's 'world position', stressing that it would be impossible for any

other country to 'discharge Britain's historic role'.148

On 6 July 1967, when the cabinet met to discuss world-wide defence policy, Healey

argued that the background to the decisions to be announced in the forthcoming

Defence White Paper were very different from that of the earlier Defence Review.

Then it had been possible to find £300 million out of the saving of £400 million (at 1964

prices) in defence expenditure for 1969-70 by obtaining better value for money, leaving

something under £100 million to be saved by changes in policy and commitments and

in the size of the forces following the end of confrontation. Healey warned his

colleagues that there was now no further scope for savings without cutting the

'44'Record of Discussion between Mr Wilson and Mr Holt at 10 Downing Street', 13 June 1967, NAA: A1209/3053929.
145'Note of Discussionsbetween the Prime Minister and the At. Hon. James Callaghan MP, Chancellor of the
Exchequer',
14 June 1967, NAA: A1209/3053929;"Record of conversation between the Chancellor of the Exchequerand the Prime
Minister of Australia, at the Treasury', 14 June 1967, PREM 13/1456.
'46Holt to Wilson, 16 June 1967, PREM 13/1456.
 323

capability of UK forces; moreover, the proposals before the cabinet to reduce defence

expenditure in 1970-71 by a further £200 million, rising by 1975-76 to £300 million,

would have to come entirely from a reduction in Britain's military capability, with

'consequent reductions in our commitments and changes in our oversea policy'. About

two-thirds of the reduction in expenditure would flow directly from a decision to

withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia (as well as the Persian Gulf) by 1975. By this

date, Britain would have no forces permanently stationed outside Europe, with the

exception of those located in Hong Kong and a number of strategically important

stationing posts. Accordingly, Britain's world role would be reduced to discharging its

responsibilities for the defence of the remaining dependent territories, to British

communities abroad, and making a contribution to peacekeeping. Healey then invited

the cabinet to make a decision on whether the naval and amphibious element of the

military capability that was to be available for use in the Far East after Britain's

withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia should be provided for by facilities in Australia,

Singapore, or in the UK itself. If Britain were to be able to justify these reductions in

the size of its forces and changes in their deployment, Healey thought it essential that

the tasks of the forces be commensurate with resources; in particular, it would be

necessary to scale down Britain's force declarations to SEATO and to 'change

drastically' the scale of the military assistance that was to be provided to Malaysia and

Singapore.147

Representing opinion on Labour's left-wing, Richard Crossman, Lord President of the

Council and Leader of the House of Commons, questioned whether Healey's proposals

went far enough. Although he recognised that the policies that emerged from the

defenceexpenditurestudieswere 'less inadequate'than those which had transpired

from the earlier DefenceReview,Crossmanfelt that the new proposalswould 'not

stand the test of time', arguingthat it would 'not be credible'to announcea plan to

147Cabinet minutes, 6 July 1967, CAB 126/42.

 324

withdraw from the Far East (and Middle East) over a period of eight to ten years, during

which time Britain's military strength would steadily and obviously diminish. Crossman

argued that `events would overtake us and we should be forced to withdraw more

quickly'. As regards Malaysia and Singapore, Grossman suggested that it would be

wrong for Britain to commit itself to maintaining 'large and expensive' amphibious and

air forces in the Far East after 1970; in view of recent events in South Arabia, he

maintained that it would be wrong for the UK to undertake to provide sophisticated

forces which the local governments could not afford to maintain. Accordingly,

Crossman asked that the cabinet accept a revised timetable, envisaging complete

evacuation of the mainland within five years. Britain's attitude to aid for Singapore and

Malaysia, Grossman contended, should not be that 'we had a responsibility' for making

good the damage to the economies of these two countries caused by the withdrawal of

UK forces, since this would involve heavy and increasing expenditure on aid; instead,

he proposed that the government adopt the principle that Britain would be prepared to

pay somewhat higher amounts of.aid if the governments concerned co-operated in the

rapid withdrawal of UK forces and that these would be reduced if the rundown went

more slowly.148

Despite such reservations, the 'general view' of the cabinet favoured the proposals

outlined by Healey: to plan on the basis of an even faster withdrawal, as suggested by

Grossman, would not be 'realistic'. The cabinet agreed that consultations with the

United States, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore should seek their

acquiescence in plans to reduce UK force levels in Singapore by about half by 1970-

71, and to withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia by 1975-76. These countries were

'much concerned' at the proposal for final withdrawal, being 'unanimously opposed' to

any announcement of a final date for departure - on these grounds alone, Britain could

not contemplate going back to its allies with proposals for an earlier final withdrawal. In

148ibid.
 325

any event, Britain could not 'usefully plan' for a more precipitate departure, particularly

from Singapore where the local economy was heavily dependent on the presence of

British forces; if Britain withdrew more rapidly than was proposed, the rise in local

unemployment might give rise to 'economic and social chaos'. If this resulted in the

collapse of Lee Kuan Yew's government, on whom Britain was depended to ensure an

orderly withdrawal, the lives of British civilians might be endangered, and it was

estimated that £700 million of British assets might be lost.149In a letter to President

Johnson explaining the rationale underpinning British policy, Wilson argued that it was

a 'nonsense' for the UK to provide ground troops to defend Asian countries who had it

in their power to train and provide their own, maintaining that it would be 'simply

impossible' to avoid giving some public indication of Britain's intentions.15o

This decision resulted in a depreciation of Britain's stock in Washington, where

opinion was moving in the direction of the stance adopted by the State Department,

which believed that it was wrong to force the UK to pursue policies that would

undermine the Wilson government's application to join the EEC. The White House/US

Treasury/Pentagon nexus increasingly recognised the inconsistency of demanding that

Britain retain sterling's parity with the dollar, whilst simultaneously opposing the

abrogation of British extra-European commitments. Washington's foreign policy-

making establishment had come to accept that there was no way of reversing British

policy, although this did not preclude serious criticism over the plans to withdraw from

Singapore and Malaysia. Unremitting economic difficulties and the continued

weakness of sterling conspired to push the Wilson government in the direction of

retrenchment, even if this undermined the strength of Commonwealth and Anglo-

American relations, a development policy-makers had long sought to avoid.

149Ibid.
150Wilson to PresidentJohnson, 13 July 1967, FRUS, Western Europe,
vol. XII, Document 273.
 326

`Never Glad Confident Morning Again': The Impact of Devaluation.

On 4 January 1968, at a meeting of the cabinet, Roy Jenkins, Callaghan's replacement

as Chancellor of the Exchequer, informed his colleagues that a successful devaluation

depended on 'establishing the balance of payments beyond doubt'. In order to restore

foreign confidence in sterling, Jenkins argued that it would be necessary to increase

taxation (both direct and indirect) and restrain public expenditure, involving large cuts

in defence and overseas spending. He suggested that Britain should now withdraw

from its political and defence responsibilities in the area East of Suez by the end of the

financial year 1970-71, instead of by the mid-1970s. On these proposals he differed

from the ministers responsible for overseas and defence policy, who accepted the

principle of withdrawal, but felt that it should not be completed until the end of the

financial year 1971-72. Jenkins believed that the question of timing was a'significant

one', since the earlier date he proposed could be completed within the lifetime of the

Parliament, and almost within the present decade, whereas the latter date would for

these reasons achieve 'less impact as a decisive change from present policy'. It was

essential that these reductions in commitments should be seen to be reflected in a

corresponding reduction in expenditure on defence equipment and personnel and

consequential structural readjustments in UK forces. 151

Having considered the Chancellor's proposed 'post-devaluation measures', cabinet

ministers turned their attention to a memorandum on reductions in defence

commitments, co-written by the Foreign Secretary, George Brown, and the

Commonwealth Secretary, George Thomson. Brown did not question the need to

withdraw from East of Suez; however, he believed that the Chancellor's proposals

failed to address the practicability of withdrawing before the end of the financial year

1971-72. Britain had secured the acceptance of its allies in the decision to retreat from

15'Cabinet minutes, 4 January 1968, CAB 128/43.

 327

the Far East by not giving a precise date for withdrawal, stating that it would be in the

'middle 1970s', and promising a continued military capability for use in the area

thereafter. Given that cuts would be necessary in domestic expenditure, ministers in

the 'overseas' departments did not oppose accelerating the process of retrenchment,

but they did believe that Jenkins' proposals would entail serious risks to regional

stability. Brown and Thomson were firmly of the view, and it was also the unanimous

opinion of their senior advisers, that the earliest date which would be 'tolerable' for the

completion of withdrawal would be 31 March 1972. Substantiating his argument on the

potential risk of instability, Brown pointed out that withdrawal would place 60,000

Singaporeans, directly deriving their employment from British forces, on the labour

market; this might provoke widespread unrest, possibly leading to the overthrow of Lee

Kuan Yew's government and its replacement by a Communist regime. 'One year's

delay.
..
', Brown contended, '... could make a very considerable difference'. The

Chancellor's suggested date for withdrawal would lead to an even more 'serious

diminution' of British influence in the Far East, an area where the UK would still retain

important economic and political interests. Once UK forces had departed, Britain

would depend more than ever for the protection of those interests on the good will of

local administrations, leading Brown to the not unreasonable conclusion: 'Even if we

ceased to be a world power, we should continue to retain world interests and to need

friends and allies to defend them. We could not afford to flout international opinion in

the way the French did'.152

Thomson also accepted that the decision to withdraw from the Far East had already

been taken, acknowledging that the issue under consideration was the date of

withdrawal. To advance withdrawal to 1970-71 from 1971-72, he argued, would

produce no savings in 1968-69 and only £5 million in 1969-70. Whilst endorsing

Brown's arguments on the potential for instability in Singapore, he also indicated that

162ibid
 328

an extra year would be important for consolidating relations with Malaysia, Singapore,

Australia and New Zealand. Thomson informed the cabinet that he was leaving on 5

January for the Far East, where he would explain to Britain's Commonwealth allies the

reasons for undertaking a faster withdrawal, even though this was only a few months

after reassuring them that the Defence Review would be the last in the lifetime of the

Parliament. Another consideration pointing to a later rather than an earlier withdrawal

was the fact that Britain had 35,000 servicemen and 12,000 dependents in Singapore

and Malaysia; if disorder broke out in these countries, their evacuation might become

dangerous and expensive.' 53

During cabinet discussion, it was claimed that Britain's 'credibility as a nation was

involved'. A failure to withdraw by 1970-71, it was agreed, would send the wrong

signal to Britain's allies:

So far our reductions in defence expenditure had always been too little
and come too late. This was our opportunity to make radical final
decisions and to make clear that our future defence role would be
concentrated in Europe... Our standing in the world depended on the
soundness of our economy and not on a world-wide military presence.
We must get our commitments and resources into a sensible long-term
balance as soon as possible. We should be increasingly on our own in
the world for the next few years; and we must therefore concentrate on
safeguarding our own interests.

Having weighed up the arguments for and against an accelerated withdrawal, in some

detail, cabinet ministers found in favour of withdrawing from the Far East (and Persian

Gulf) by the end of the financial year 1970-71. The cabinet decided that Britain should

'not abrogate unilaterally' the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, but it was agreed

that the UK should seek to negotiate with the Malaysian government a 're-interpretation

of it, in order to bring it into conformity with our new policy'. The cabinet accepted that

Britain should not retain a 'special capability' for use (which the Americans considered

153ibid.
 329

worthless, anyway) in the Far East after withdrawal: Britain's general military capability

in Europe, it was agreed, would be available for deployment overseas, if circumstances

it
so required - was hoped that this would provide some re-assurance to Britain's

Commonwealth partners and allies. Cabinet ministers concurred that it was

to
unnecessary withdraw from SEATO, provided there was no question of having to

supply additional military forces and equipment, since Britain's only responsibility was

to consult the members and there was no obligation to provide forces.1 '

On 11 January 1968, Brown travelled to Washington to discuss the implications of

devaluation, informing Rusk that Britain had 'lost the battle [to defend sterling's parity

with the dollar at £1: $2.80] ... because they had been trying to do too much at home

and abroad with too slender resources'. Having been informed of the intended post-

devaluation measures, Rusk told Brown that he was'profoundly dismayed' by the

proposed withdrawal from South-East Asia and the Persian Gulf, being particularly

disturbed by the intention to announce these decisions almost straightaway. Setting

aside diplomatic protocol, Rusk asserted 'be Britain', telling Brown that retrenchment

would have 'profound and detrimental implications' for both the US and UK, dismissing

as of 'no consequence' the idea that British forces located in Europe could support

SEATO and CENTO. Rusk feared that this decision would undermine the position of

the West in the Cold War, heralding as it did Britain's final retreat from the extra-

European world: 'this represented a major withdrawal of the UK from world affairs, and

it was a catastrophic loss to human society.. We were facing a difficult period in world
.
affairs and Britain was saying it would not be there'. Mistakenly believing that Brown

had a 'reputation for being soft spoken', Rusk urged the Foreign Secretary to 'add

several decibels when he conveyed these views to the Cabinet'. 155On the same day

that Rusk held discussions with Brown, President Johnson sent a telegram to Wilson,

explaining the American position in the bluntest terms: I cannot conceal from you my

154ibid.
'55'Memorandumof Conversationbetween Rusk and Brown', 11 January 1968, FRUS, Western Europe,
vol. XII,
Document 288. For Brown's account of the meeting see Cabinet minutes, 12 January 1968, CAB 128/43.
 330

deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are

taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that

means for the future safety and health of the free world'. 156

Tied up with retaining the capability to intervene in the Far East was the contentious

issue of whether to cancel the order to purchase fifty F-111 aircraft from the United

States. Preserving some residual ability to undertake military operations in the Far

East depended on retaining the F-111 contract, as only these aircraft had the range

and overall capability for rapid deployment from Europe. The Chancellor said that the

total cost of the F-111 aircraft over the period up to April 1976 would be £400 million. If

the order were cancelled, Britain would incur 'nugatory' expenditure of some £54

million (mostly in dollars), thus making it possible to secure a total saving over a ten-

year period of £350 million. The saving in 1969-70 would be £10 million, and in 1970-

71 would be £20 million, with larger savings in subsequent years. The ratio of

cancellation costs to savings was much more favourable in respect of the F-111 than it

would be to cancel the order for Phantom aircraft or to withdraw from the Concorde

project. Britain had embarked on a substantial procurement programme of American

aircraft, costing £800 million in total; but the F111, the Chancellor maintained, was the

only aircraft which could be cancelled on reasonable terms. When the British

government originally agreed to the purchase of the F-111's, Jenkins pointed out that

the case for its acquisition had been made 'primarily in terms of our role in the Far

East'. Despite Jenkins' strong argument for cancelling the F-111 order, a policy that

was supported by a majority of his colleagues, Wilson left it open to Healey to present

at the next meeting of the cabinet proposals for alternative measures to secure

equivalent savings in the defence field. 15' When the cabinet next met on 12 January,

Healey and Brown were unable to convince their fellow ministers of the need to retain

the F-111 order, despite arguing that it was crucial to Britain's 'credibility with nations

'58PresidentJohnson toWilson,11 January1968, FRUS,

Western
Europe,
151Cabinet minutes, 4 January 1968, CAB 128/43. vol.XII,Document
289.
 331

outside Europe. Following press reports that the cabinet had decided to cancel the

F-111 order, President Johnson wrote to Wilson to convey his `extreme concern',

contending that Britain must retain the capability to act 'speedily' in the Far East from

its own bases, as this would help smooth the process of British retrenchment. If Britain

decided to forego the acquisition of the F-111, Johnson informed Wilson, 'everyone

here will regard this as a total disengagement from any commitments whatsoever to

the security of areas outside Europe and, indeed, to a considerable extent in Europe as

well'. 158Although this letter was put before the cabinet on 15 January 1968, ministers

agreed to reaffirm the previous decision to cancel the F-111 order.159

Unsurprisingly, Thomson's mission to Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New

Zealand was unsuccessful in convincing Britain's Commonwealth allies as regards the

merits of an accelerated withdrawal. In Kuala Lumpur, Tun Razak, Malaysia's Foreign

Minister, kept returning to the effectiveness the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement

would have in the context of the new withdrawal schedule. The Tunku did not welcome

Thomson's suggestion that Britain's 'special capability' in the area would be replaced

by a'general capability' in the UK. On 9 January 1967, Lee Kuan Yew called the

Australian and New Zealand High Commissioners to 'what was virtually a meeting of

his inner cabinet', in order to discuss the best strategy to adopt with Thomson, who he

was due to meet later that afternoon. In a cablegram to the Australian Department for

External Affairs, A. J. Parsons, Australia's High Commissioner in Singapore, informed

his superiors that 'Singapore was going to play a hard and tough line with the British'.

Lee said that although an acceleration of British withdrawal would mean economic

problems for Singapore, the defence and military implications were of even greater

concern. It would be impossible to train an army, acquire technical skill to operate

modern equipment, build up an air force and navy, work out a quadripartite command

structure between Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, and to improve

15ePresidentJohnson toWilson, 15January 1968,FRUS,

Western
Europe,
159Cabinet minutes, 15 January 1968, CAB 128/43. vol.XII,Document
290.
 332

Singapore's relationship with the Malaysians, all in the space of two or three years.

Having failed to convince the UK of its 'historic role' and 'wider responsibilities' in the

area, Lee would consider withdrawing Singapore's sterling reserves (£200 million) in

London to try and force a reversal in British policy, informing Parsons that this was the

'only language that Roy Jenkins understands'.16° Lee gleaned some hope from

Thomson that the final withdrawal date might be negotiable, gaining an invitation to

discuss the new cuts in London on 14 January. In seeking to defer the date of

withdrawal, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia were essentially

concerned with buying time, recognising that a British General Election was fairly

imminent and that a Conservative government might be inclined to implement a less

radical programme of retrenchment - precisely what Jenkins feared. Arthur de la Mare,

UK High Commissioner-Designateto Singapore and previously Assistant Under-

Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at the Foreign Office, indicated to the

Australians that Labour ministers regarded Britain's presence East of Suez with 'utmost

suspicion' and would not'examine rationally the interests involved'. De la Mare felt

that a small presence could be kept at little cost, but only if the countries in the region

put 'sufficient pressure' on Wilson to postpone the date of withdrawal into 1972, by

which time there 'might be a new government'.' 61 On his visit to London, Lee

emphasised the potential military, financial and geo-political ramifications if Britain

failed to undertake a more protracted withdrawal. In reply, Wilson was not prepared to

go beyond saying that Lee's views would be taken into consideration when the cabinet

made its final decision the next day.162

When the cabinet met on 15 January 1968 to discuss the date of withdrawal from the

Far East, Thomson presented his colleagues with a memorandum on his discussions

with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. After accurately representing

160Australian High Commission In Singapore to Department External Affairs (Inward Cablegram),

of 10 January 1968,
NAA: Al 838/1728306. Also available at www.naa.gov.au.
16'Australian High Commission in London to Department External Affairs (Inward Cablegram),
of 12 January 1968,
NAA: Al 83811728306.
'6'Lee-Wilson meeting', 14 January 1968, PREM 13/2081.
 333

the views of the four respective governments, Thomson urged the cabinet to fix the

date for withdrawal at 31 March 1972, as this would be of 'great value' in enabling

economic and defence planning to proceed with 'some prospect of success'. By

showing willingness to take some practical account of the representations made by the

countries involved, it would also be possible to reduce the risk of retaliatory financial

action. To substantiate this point, Brown set before the cabinet a letter from the

Governor of the Bank of England to the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury,

addressing the possible implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East for

sterling. After lengthy discussion, cabinet ministers agreed that Britain's withdrawal

from Singapore and Malaysia should be completed by the end of 1971 and that these

decisionsshouldbe announcedin the forthcomingstatementon expenditurecuts 163

.
On 16 January1968,as part of the devaluationmeasures,Wilson announced

Britain's intention to withdraw all its forces from Malaysia and Singapore by December

1971.'64 There was to be no attempt to establish alternative base facilities in Australia,

as Britain's deployment in South-East Asia was run down to inconsequential levels.

This marked the end of Britain's role as joint policeman (if only as a junior partner) in

the region. Britain simply no longer had the resources or desire to occupy such a role:

British society had become more consumerist in outlook and more expectant of the

State in terms of social provision, particularly in the fields of education and health care.

The Keynesian-Beveridge consensus, which dominated post-war political thinking in

Britain, was incompatible with the continuation of a British world role. In January 1968,

Rusk told George Brown that 'he could not believe that free aspirin and false teeth

were more important than Britain's role in the world'. 165The decision to withdraw from

South-East Asia did considerable damage to Anglo-American relations, as evidenced

by the annual report of the British Ambassador In Washington, Sir Patrick Dean, who

suggested that 'subsequent Administrations will be liable to consult with us less and

163Cabinet minutes, 15 January 1968, CAB 128/43.

1B4Harold Wilson, 16 January 1968, Parl. Papers (Commons),
vol. 756, cols. 1578-1582.
165Record of meeting at the State Department, 11 January
1968, PREM 13/2081.
 334

take us less into their confidence about areas of the world from which we are

consciously opting out'.166Britain's relations with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia

and Singapore were also damaged by withdrawal. Paul Hasluck, Australian Minister

for External Affairs, ruefully remarked to George Thomson that this policy reduced

'Britain to a status as little as Italy and a little more than Sweden'.167As demonstrated

in the preceding chapters of this thesis, this was something that consecutive British

governments had consistently sought to avoid.

Summary.

Britain's disengagement from its remaining colonial responsibilities (except Hong Kong)

in the Far East - Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak - was based more on a

pragmatic response to changing circumstances rather than a principled approach to

decolonisation. When establishing 'Greater Malaysia', Whitehall was anxious to

establish a viable federal state, create a bulwark to Sino-Soviet expansionism, and

secure Britain's continued use of the naval base facilities in Singapore. In regard to the

perceived value of Britain's military presence in South-East Asia, Whitehall was divided

for most of the period encompassed by this thesis. On the one hand, Treasury and

Board of Trade civil servants questioned the wisdom of Britain's commitments to

Malaysia and Singapore, maintaining that the military capability required to uphold

these obligations consumed an intolerably large percentage of overseas defence costs.

On the other hand, officials in the 'overseas' departments viewed UK forces in the Far

East as having 'political and prestige significance'. Between 1959 and 1963, Whitehall

was reluctant to contemplate withdrawal from South-East Asia for three fundamental

reasons: firstly, Britain's departure from South-East Asia was seen as likely to damage

its reputation in Washington, Canberra and Wellington; secondly, officials were

"'United States: Annual Review for 1967', Dean to Brown,

5 January 1968, FCO 7/738.
167Thomson to Wilson, 12 January 1968, PREM 13/2081.
 335

genuinely apprehensive about the destabilising effect of immediate withdrawal, holding

to the belief that it would be harmful to Western interests to allow developing nations to

come under Communist influence; thirdly, policy-makers remained committed to the

idea of a British world role. In mid-1963, senior cabinet ministers began to consider the

possibility of undertaking a major military withdrawal from the region, so as to bring

down the level of defence expenditure. This policy was impeded by Indonesian

'confrontation' against Malaysia, which prevented the Conservative government from

demobilising UK troops stationed in the region faster than might have otherwise been

the case; in fact, as 'confrontation' with Indonesia persisted, Britain actually had to

increase the size of its military deployment, a policy that ran counter to the previously

espoused objective of reducing the cost of international defence commitments.

Although the Labour government committed itself to reducing defence expenditure in

the Far East to £186 million (at 1964 prices) by 1969-70, it was initially reluctant to

forgo Britain's role in the region. The process of British retrenchment from South-East

Asia essentially began with the 1966 Defence Review, which severely restricted

Britain's capability by cancelling the Royal Navy's new aircraft carriers. The 'July

Crisis' of 1966 forced Whitehall to undertake a second Defence Review, culminating in

the release of the Labour government's Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy,

a document stipulating that UK forces in the Far East would be halved by 1970-71 and

completely withdrawn by the mid-1970s. This was the key moment in regard to the

decision to withdraw from South-East Asia. When devaluation came on 18 November

1967, Britain's withdrawal was merely accelerated. This undermines Jeffery

Pickering's contention that Jenkins's appointment as Chancellor was pivotal in British

retrenchment form East of Suez. Up until the release of the July 1967 Defence White

Paper, British policy was to a large extent informed by the concerns of Australia, New

Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and the United States. Although the Labour government

was willing to listen to representations from these governments after this date,

Whitehall had accepted the economic illogicality of

retaining Britain's extant
 336

commitments. Senior ministers, including those who have traditionally been described

as 'Bevinites' (such as Callaghan, Healey, Brown and Stewart), adopted a more

realistic stance - with regard to the sustainability of Britain's position in South-East Asia

than has thus far been recognised. By demonstrating Whitehall's proficiency in

-

regard to future planning, particularly through the cabinet committee system, this thesis

rejects the contention that a commitment to a global role inhibited a realistic re-

appraisal of Britain's defence posture in South-East Asia.

 337

Conclusion.

In 1776, Adam Smith's An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations

called for Britain to 'accommodateher future views and designs to the real mediocrity of

her circumstances'. The late 1950s and 1960s,some 180 years after the publication of

Smith's magnum opus, were years in which Britain accommodatedher'future views and

designs' to her limited resources,witnessing British decolonisationin Africa and the final

decision to end the permanent stationingof UK forces in the Middle East (Aden and the

Persian Gulf) and Far East (Singaporeand Malaysia). This thesis has sought to explain

and assess how Whitehall planned Britain's withdrawalfrom its extra-European

commitments,to the extent that this impacted upon perceptions of the UK's world role. In

doing so, it has concentrated on the three main regions of strategic Importance- Africa,

the Middle East and Far East. Between 1959 and 1968, Britain changed from being a

power that occupied a world role to one that had mainly regional interests. This transition

was a painful process for the policy-makersconcerned, given the powerful forces which

conspired to make Britain's global role unsustainable,namely relative economic decline,

military overstretch, the emergence of nationalist movements, and increasing anti-imperial

sentiment.

By examining Whitehall's attempts to review future policy, this thesis rejects F. S.

Northedge's argument that an outdated imperial sentiment permeated the political

establishment until economic reality forced Britain to confront the fragility of Its position

during the late 1960s.1 Similarly, the research refutes Bernard Porter's contention that

'delusions of grandeur' infused a degree of confusion into the strategic direction of British

foreign policy.2 Foreign policy development, in the late 1950s and 1960s, was essentially

' F. S. Northedge,Descentfrom Power. British Foreign Policy, 1945-73,(London,Allen Unwin, 1974)

and
2 B. Porter,Britain, Europe and the World, 1850-1986,Delusions Grandeur,(London:Allen Unwln,
of & 1983).
 338

a cross-departmentalprocess, involvinga synthesis of views articulated by the Treasury,

Board of Trade, Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence,Colonial Office and Commonwealth

Relations Office.

Conservativeand Labour ministerswere more realistic about Britain's actual international

position than has hitherto been appreciated. It is difficult to substantiate Richard Aldous

and Sabine Lee's claim that Macmillan'sperceptionof Britain's international status was

informed by past British triumphs, a mindset which led him to exaggerate the country's

actual power, influence and importance.3 Prior to the Anglo-Malaysianconfrontation with

Indonesia,for example, Conservativecabinet ministers had actively considered the

possibility of withdrawing from the Far East (save Hong Kong), so as to make economies

In expenditure. In September 1961, Macmillanargued for a review of commitments In

South-East Asia that was both 'radical and imaginative'. Whilst no 'radical' or 'imaginative'

change in policy was forthcoming, this initiative (along with several others, including the

Macmillan government's 'Future Policy Study, 1960-1970',conducted In 1959-60)

demonstratesthat ministers and officials were not blind to the need for change. More

accurately, a state of paralysis had been established between the proponents of

retrenchmentand those who favoured the retention of extant commitments. Ministers

generally agreed that Britain would have to leave South-East Asia at some point in the

future, but differed on the question of timing, given that possession of the Singaporean

base facilities served Britain's interests in several ways. Setting aside the serious effects

on Britain's relations with Australia, New Zealand and the United States, withdrawal could

encourage the spread of Communism,which would represent a 'major defeat' for the West

in the wider context of the Cold War.

This thesisalso refutesthe popularlyheld belief,recentlyreiteratedby JeffreyPickering,

that Healey, Brown and Callaghan constituted a 'Bevinite' core within the Wilson cabinet,

3 R. Aldous and S. Lee, Harold Macmillan

and Britain's World Role, (Basingstoke:Macmillan,1996).
 339

to
continuing resolutely support the East of Suez policy until devaluation. The key moment

in regard to the decision to retrench from East of Suez was July 1967, when the Labour

government released its Supplemental White Paper on Defence,which stipulated that

British forces in the Far East would be halved by 1970-71 and completelywithdrawn by

the mid-1970s. Pickering does not view this announcementas the pivotal event in

Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez, regardingthe intention to maintain a'continuing

capability' as 'far from superficial'. As the July 1967 DefenceWhite Paper failed to

mention any plans to retreat from the PersianGulf, he also appears to assume that

Whitehall had 'no intention' of withdrawingfrom the Middle East4 The documentary

evidence presented in this thesis challenges this assumption. As George Brown informed

the cabinet, on 4 January 1968, it would be wrong to suppose that devaluation heralded a

'new major change of policy', since this strategic change had 'been made as a result of the

last Defence Review in July 1967, when the decision had been taken to withdraw our

forces from East of Suez and, although it had not been announced at the time, from the

Persian Gulf'.5 By placing undue emphasis on the 'altered dynamics of Cabinet politics' in

late 1967, namely Jenkins' appointment as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Pickering fails to

acknowledge that retrenchment East of Suez was under active considerationwithin

Whitehall throughout the 1960s. Employingthe vocabulary of political science, Pickering

argues that Jenkins was a 'policy entrepreneur, able to almost single-handedlyshape a

radical policy agenda within a "policy window"'. In an attempt to substantiate his

argument, Pickering quotes the new Chancellor on the post-devaluation measures: 'the

keynote to this review must be the dependence of the country's standing in the world upon

the strength of the economy and not upon a world-wide military presence'e But to what

extent did this represent a'radical policy agenda'? On 23 March 1960, when senior
`J. Pickering,Britain's Withdrawalfrom East of Suez The Politics of Retrenchment,(London:Macmillan,1998).
° See Chapter IV, p. 259.
° J. Pickering, 'Politics and 'Black Tuesday': Shifting Power in the Cabinet
and the Decision to Withdraw from East of Suez,
November 1967-January 1968', TCBH, vol. 13, no. 2, (June 2002).
 340

members of the cabinet met to discuss the 'Future Policy Review, 1960-1970', Heathcoat

Amory, Macmillan's then Chancellor of the Exchequer,had argued that'he could not see

how we could continue to carry out present commitmentsoverseas, even with the help of

our friends and allies'.' In July 1965, Callaghantold the US Defense Secretary, Robert

McNamara,that the 'UK must envisage areas out of which it might be forced in future, e.g.

Aden or Malaysia' Similarly, on 14 February 1966, Callaghan asked his cabinet

.8
to
colleagues consider whether the desire to maintain a military presence in the Far East

represented a task that was 'too large in relation to our resources'. Jenkins was not, as

Pickering puts it, a 'policy entrepreneur: on the contrary, he was in effect repeating the

arguments of his predecessors at the Treasury, being able to make his case within

Whitehall due to a shift in the balance of power between the Treasury and the 'overseas'

departments,which resulted from continual economic crises, as opposed to the'altered

dynamic of cabinet politics', an argument underminedin itself by his wrongful portrayal of

Callaghan, Healey and Brown as a 'Bevinite core'.

In relation to the decision-makingprocess within Whitehall, this thesis rejects the

argument - made most forcibly by Crossman and Balogh - that outdated notions of

imperial greatness informed the policies advocated by senior civil servants. British

withdrawal from extra-European commitments might have taken place at a faster rate, but

the rationale underpinning less precipitate action was based on political and economic

considerations. For example, the argument as to whether Britain's Middle Eastern oil

interests should be defended by military or non-military means was based on a rational

economic assessment, even though the Foreign Office and Treasury came to differing

conclusions. In the aftermath of 'Operation Vantage', when officials and ministers

considered the issue of building new facilities in Bahrain (costing £600,000) to defend

' See Chapter II, p. 113.

See ChapterV, pp. 313- 314.
 341

Britain's interests in Kuwait, the Foreign Office argued that the expenditurewas necessary

to maintain regional stability, contain Soviet and pan-Arab influence, and secure the

continued flow of oil, on reasonable terms. Given Britain's heavy dependence on Persian

Gulf oil, it can be concluded that Foreign Office officials were less motivated by'delusions

of grandeur' than by a determination to find the best means of securing UK oil interests. In

addition to being a key Western asset in the wider context of the Cold War, securing

to
access oil (on favourable terms) was important to the functioning of the British

economy.

Policy decisions were the product of inter-departmentaldebate, which meant that some

degree of compromise and consensus was necessary. If British foreign policy was infused

with a 'degree of ambiguity', it was due to the vagaries of Whitehall's policy-making

apparatus. On the question of reducing defence commitments,for example, the

'economic' departments were often unable to force through the economies they deemed

necessary because of the composition of the cabinet committees,which contained

representativesfrom the Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, Colonial Office,

Ministry of Defence, in addition to the Chief of the Defence Staff, the First Sea Lord, the

Chief of the Air Staff and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, all of whom had a vested

interest in maintaining high levels of defence and overseas expenditure. The existence of

three 'overseas' ministries, all of which were committed to maintaining Britain's world-wide

obligations, made it difficult for the Treasury and the Board of Trade to make their case

within Whitehall. Thus, the 'economic' departments could press for a reduction In

overseas expenditure, but this would be ineffective whilst the 'overseas' departments and

the politicians concerned were not prepared to reduce the scope of Britain's extra-

European commitments.

Ill-conceivedgeneralisations have informed criticism of the role played by senior civil

servants in relation to Britain's withdrawal from international commitments. Tony Benn, for
 342

example, has argued that the civil service had a 'political position of its own' to defend

against all-comers, including incoming governmentsarmed with their own philosophy and
9
programmes. Similarly, Crossman wrote of the cabinet committees as being 'the key to

the control by the Civil Service over the politicians'.10 Thus, Whitehall is inaccurately

presented as a unified and monolithic organisation,intent on pursuing its own policy

agenda, irrespective of which political party occupied office. The very reverse was true, as

this thesis demonstrates, during the late 1950s and 1960s:Whitehall was exceptionally

fragmented, with each department fighting for its own departmentalbudget, in pursuit of its

own objectives. Sir William Armstrong's claim that Whitehall was a 'federation of

departments' provides a far more apposite description, at least in relation to the

formulation of foreign policy." Crossman's contention that Whitehall was run for the

convenience of civil servants and not for ministers - the individuals who were supposedly

in command - also lacks substantiation when applied to the field of foreign policy

development. Throughout the period under examination,Whitehall departments held

differing perspectives on what should constitute Britain's appropriate world role. As

evidenced in Chapter II (and re-affirmed in subsequent chapters), the 'economic' and

'overseas' departments held fundamentally opposed views as to the importance of

overseas commitments,the appropriate level of defence expenditure, and the best means

of securing Britain's interests. For the Treasury and Board of Trade, the necessary

condition for maintaining Britain's place in the world was to keep sterling strong, which

implied keeping overseas expenditure in line with prospective resources, constantly

monitoring the external financial position, and securing a regular balance-of-payments

surplus, so as to avoid speculation against the pound. Reducing burdensome defence

spending therefore became a major objective of Treasury policy, especially given recurrent

° T. Benn,Argumentsfor Democracy,(London:Cape, 1981), p. 50.

10R. H. S. Crossman, The Diariesof a CabinetMinister:Minister of Housing, 1964-1966,
vol. I, (1976), p. 616.
" W. Armstrongquoted In P. Hennessy, Whitehall,p. 380.
 343

demands from other departments,such as Health,Transport, and Social Services

(departmentswhich the 'overseas'departmentshad limited contact), for a greater

proportion of national expenditure. These priorities, commanding a high degree of

popularity in the country, informedthe 'economic' departments' views in respect of extra-

Europeancommitments. Therefore, Sir Richard Powell, PermanentSecretary to the

Board of Trade, could argue that there were 'no really strong arguments, political,

economic or even sentimentalfor keeping forces in the Far East'.12 On the other hand, it

can be argued that the 'economic' departmentsoften underratedthe potentially

devastating effects of Britain's precipitatewithdrawalfrom extra-Europeancommitments

on Anglo-American relations; regional stability, particularly in the Middle East and South-

East Asia; the cohesion and strength of the Commonwealth;and, above all else, the

likelihood of Communismextending its influence in the Third World.

The period witnessed a change in the balance of power between the Treasury and the

'overseas' departments,which played an important, though thus far under-appreciated,

role in facilitating Britain's disengagementfrom extra-Europeancommitments. The

centralisation of foreign policy formulation was to the advantage of the Treasury. The

Treasury's influence in foreign policy was strengthened by the creation of the Overseas

Policy Committee (OPC) and Overseas Policy (Official) Committee in July 1962. The

OPC, unlike its predecessor committee (the Colonial Policy Committee), gave the

Chancellor of the Exchequer a seat in debate. Moreover, as the OPC met once a week

(unlike the CPC, which met on an ad hoc basis) the Chancellor was better positioned to

persuade his colleagues to make decisions on policy, forcing ministers to contemplate the

arguments both 'for' and 'against' new expenditure. The Treasury's aim of reducing the

level of defence spending, as a percentage of GDP, was further aided by the incoming

Labour government's decision to set a cap of £2,000 million (at 1964 prices) on such

12See ChapterV, p. 289.

 344

expenditure. This constraintforced ministersto prioritise commitments,although the initial

period of Labour governmentwas marked by a determinationto reduce expenditureby

finding economies in capability. The Treasury's empoweredposition within Whitehall was

accompanied by a correspondingdecline in the standing of the 'overseas' departments,

principally the Foreign and CommonwealthOffices. Up until 1964-65, Foreign Office

officials were relatively successful in securing the retention of overseas commitments. For

example, despite overtures from the Treasury in favour of abrogating Britain's treaty

obligations to Kuwait, Foreign Office officials successfullyargued in favour of retaining

base facilities to uphold Kuwaiti independence. In November 1965, when ministers finally

agreed to leave Aden, Foreign Office civil servants, in a reversal of their previous position,

stipulating that Britain's position in the Middle East 'hinged' on Aden, successfullyargued

for a repositioningof UK troops in the Persian Gulf.13 From this stage onwards, however,

the Foreign Office suffered from institutionalweakness, as relative economic decline

bolstered the position of the Treasury in inter-departmentaldebates.

Throughout the period under examination, Britain retained its position at the intersection

of Churchill's 'three circles' (the Commonwealth, Western Europe, and the English-

speaking world); however, the respective weight attached to each circle was

fundamentally altered. In early 1960, Macmillan's 'Future Policy Study, 1960-70'

concluded that, as the colonial character of the Commonwealth declined, it would be

replaced by'a more wide-spread community of sentiment', having the potential to adopt a

concerted approach to international issues. 14 This aspiration proved to be unrealisable, as

new Commonwealth countries, especially in Africa, often pursued policies contrary to

British interests. South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, in March 1961, dealt a

damaging blow to the Commonwealth ideal, illustrating the fragility of the organisation and

13SeeChapter
IV,p. 247.
14See ChapterII, p. 100.
 345

its inability to undertakecollaborativeaction. Given the need to secure British economic

interests,Whitehall thought it importantto maintain cordial relations with Pretoria. Officials

and ministers felt that the 'old' Commonwealthcountries held a shared 'affinity', whereas

the 'new' members of the organisationwere prone to be unreliable in their support for

Britain, if not altogether hostile. AlthoughWhitehall was concerned by the prospect of

Commonwealthdisintegration,it in effect developed into a "two-tier" organisation,

undermining its ability to act in a concertedfashion and diluting its political value in the
international sphere.

Although this thesis is a study of Britain's withdrawal from extra-Europeancommitments,

it is important to recognisethe increasingsignificanceof the West European circle' In

influencing the thinking of leading policy-makers. The declining efficacy of the

Commonwealth,as an economic unit, coupled with Britain's relative decline in relation to

the six members of the EEC, forced Whitehall to redirect the central thrust of British

foreign policy away from extra-Europeancommitmentstowards Europe; thus, Britain

began its move away from being a country that occupied a world role towards one that

possessed primarily regional interests (albeit with a capability to act East of Suez in

concert with the United States, as evidenced by UK policy towards Iraq in the 1990s and in

the early twenty-first century). The Macmillan government's 'Future Policy Study, 1960-

1970' recognised the need to reach a'permanent understanding' with the EEC at some

point in the next decade. The establishmentof the Lee Committee, in the spring of 1960,

brought further clarity to this issue, setting in train Britain's first application for EEC

membership. De Gaulle's implacable 'Non' to Britain's membership request in 1963

caused consternationwithin Whitehall, and was followed by a second application by the

Wilson government in 1967, which was also rejected. Whitehall's determination to join the

EEC (which was eventually achieved in 1973) highlighted the extent to

which Britain's
economic and political interests had contracted, illustrating that the UK was now primarily
 346

a regional, as opposed to a global, power. The counterbalanceto focusing British policy

more towards Western Europewas a reduction In extra-Europeancommitments.

Macmillan's attempts to mend Anglo-Americanrelations in the aftermath of the Suez

debacle were not without some measure of success. Whilst Britain's ability to act

independentlyin late 1950s and 1960swas severely constrained, it would be misguided to

suggest - as both Ritchie Ovendaleand John Charmley do - that America's influence was

so overwhelmingas to condemnthe UK to the role of a pliant subsidiary power. As this

thesis demonstrates, Britain retained the ability to undertake independentaction, so long

as this did not infringe upon America's vital Interests,as evidenced by the British

intervention In Kuwait in 1961 and Macmillan'sdeterminationto'launch' Malaysia in 1963.

The Labour government pursued a less independentpolicy to that of its predecessor, a

fact largely attributable to the relative weakness of the British economy. Wilson's

determinationto retain sterling's parity with the dollar meant that Britain had to obtain

Washington's cooperation in maintainingthe value of the pound; although this support was

forthcoming, as the United States was keen to prevent speculation against the dollar In the

aftermath of a sterling devaluation, British dependence on US financial assistance

demonstrated the extent to which Britain's position had diminished within the Atlantic

Alliance. In terms of political intimacy - best illustrated by Anglo-American collaboration In

the Labour government's Defence Reviews - relations between London and Washington

were certainly close; in terms of British influence over American policies, however, the

position of the Labour government was less than its Conservative predecessor, arising
from recurrent balance-of-paymentsdifficulties and an inability to place sterling on a

secure financial platform. In late 1965, when Whitehall was seeking economies in

overseas defence expenditure to ease the balance of payments, American opposition

forced Wilson to drop his plans for a negotiated settlement to Indonesian confrontation. In

August 1965, Defence and Overseas Policy Committee ministers

concluded that it was
 347

to
essential to seek a negotiatedend confrontation;less than one month later, however,

American opposition led to the abandonmentof this policy.15 A number of historians -

including Jeffrey Pickeringand Diane Kunz - have suggested that Washington and London

reached a deal on this issue, whereby America would support the pound in return for

Britain retaining its position in South-EastAsia for the duration of the Vietnam War.1e

Whilst the documentaryevidenceconfirms that no explicit formal agreement was

promulgated between the two countries, it does suggest that an implicit understandingwas

reached. On 8 September 1965, Wilson told George Ball that he would 'soldier on' against

Indonesia, recognisingthat'finance, foreign policy and defence must hang together,

particularly East of Suez'. Two days later, Washington provided Britain with a $400 million

loan, whilst aggressively intervening in the internationalmarkets to force up the sterling

rate."

The decision to withdraw from East of Suez marked the point when Britain ceased to be

in
a global power, the sense of being to
able exercise unilateral military power In defence

of British interests in the Middle East and Far East. As history shows, Britain did not

become another'Sweden or Switzerland'; never mind another'France or Italy'. Despite

lacking any permanent bases in the Middle East, Britain's preparednessto act in the

in
region, albeit conjunction with the United States, stands out from any other European

nation. The 1990-1991 and 2004 conflicts in Iraq showed Britain to be more willing than

any other European to

nation undertake military operations In support of the United States.

In November 2001, Britain undertook its largest military operation between the two Gulf

Wars in Oman, involving the deployment of 22,500 personnel, 6,500 vehicles, 21 naval

vessels, 49 fixed wing aircraft, and 44 helicopters. This thesis demonstrates that by

16See ChapterV, pp. 298-308.

See D. Kunz, 'Somewhat Mixed Up Together": Anglo-American Defence and Foreign Policy during the 1960x', In R. D.
King and R. Kilson (eds. ), The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays In Honour of Wm. Roger Louis, (London: Frank
Cass, 1999). J. Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez The Politics of Retrenchment (London: Macmillan, 1998).
" See Chapter V, p. 304.
 348

examiningthe recent historicalpast, some light can be shed on Britain's present-day

foreign policy.

As mentioned in the introduction,two major works on how Whitehall planned Britain's

retreat from the extra-Europeanworld have emerged during the writing of this thesis - Saki

Dockrill's, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World,

and Frank Heinlein's, British GovernmentPolicy and Decolonisation 1945-1963:

Scrutinising the Official Mind.18 By adoptinga different methodologicalapproach from

these two texts, this thesis has cast new light on the subject. By concentrating on how the

Wilson government reached its decision to withdraw from East of Suez, Dockrill ignores

the significance of the approachtaken by the previous Conservativegovernment to the

issue of retreat from the extra-Europeanworld. UtilisingWhitehall's pan-strategic reviews

of policy (in addition to other long-termstrategy papers), this thesis demonstratesthat the

choice between a regional and a world role was under active assessment within

government circles from 1959-1960. By examininghow Whitehall approached the issue of

global retreat prior to Labour's assumption of office, this thesis provides a longer

chronologicalframework, enabling a fuller understandingof the continuities and changes

in British foreign policy during the 1960s. Heinlein's book addresses how Whitehall

planned Britain's withdrawal from extra-Europeancommitments between 1945 and 1963.

Its main weakness lies in giving too little emphasis to the importance of the Cold War in

pan-strategicthinking. As Heinlein only covers the latter years of the Macmillan

government, he does not do justice to the neglected theme of British policy in the post-

decolonisationperiod, or Britain's withdrawal from strategically important areas such as

Aden.

18S. Dockrill, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez The Choice Between Europe
and the World?, (London: Palgrave, 2003); F.
Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind, (London: Frank Cass,
2002).
 349

Dramatis Personae.

Mr Dean Acheson: US Assistant Secretary of State, 1941-45; US Under Secretary of

State, 1945-47; and US Secretary of State, 1949-53.

Mr Julian Amery (later Baron Amery of Lustleigh): Conservative MP, 1945-66,1969-

92; Financial Secretary, War Office 1957-58; Under-Secretary of State, Colonial

Office, 1958-60; Secretary of State for Air, 1960-62; Minister of Aviation 1962-64;

Minister of Public Building and Works, 1970; Minister for Housing and Construction

1970-72; Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1972-74.

Sir William Armstrong (later Baron Armstrong of Sanderstead): Private Secretary to Sir

Edward (later Lord) Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet, 1943-45; Principal Private

Secretary to three Chancellors of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps, Hugh Gaitskell,

and R. A. Butler, 1949-53; Under-Secretary in the Overseas Finance Division of the

Treasury, 1953-57; Third Secretary and Treasury Officer of Accounts, 1958-62; Joint

Permanent Secretary, Treasury, 1962; Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 1962-74,

being Head of the Home Civil Service from 1968 onwards.

Mr George Ball: US Under Secretary of State, 1961-66; US Representative to the

United Nations, 1968.

Dr Thomas Balogh (later Baron Balogh of Hampstead): Economic Advisor to the

Cabinet,1964-67;Consultantto the Prime Minister,1968; Ministerof State,

Department of Energy, 1974-75.

 350

Mr Arthur Bottomley (later Baron Bottomley of Middlesbrough in the County of

Cleveland): Labour MP, 1946-59,1962-83; Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State

for the Dominions, 1947-1951; Secretary for Overseas Trade, Board of Trade, 1947-

51; Chairman of the Commonwealth Relations and Colonies Group of the

Parliamentary Labour Party in 1963; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs,

1964-66; and Minister for Overseas Development, 1966-67. Publications: Why Britain

should Join the Common Market, (1959) and Two Roads to Colonialism, (1960).

Mr George Brown (later Baron George-Brown of Jevington): Labour MP, 1945-70;

DeputyLeaderof the LabourParty,1960;First Secretaryof State and Secretaryof

State for Economic Affairs, 1964-66; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1966-68.

Sir Norman Brook (later Baron Normanbrook of Chelsea): Principal Private Secretary

to Sir John Anderson when Lord Privy Seal, 1938-39, and when Secretary of State for

Home Affairs, 1939-40; Principal Assistant to Sir John Anderson, 1940; Personal

Assistant to Sir John Anderson when Lord President of the Council, 1940-42; Deputy

Secretary (Civil) to the War Cabinet, 1942; Permanent Secretary, Office of Minister of

Reconstruction, 1943-45; Additional Secretary to the Cabinet, 1945-46; Secretary to

the Cabinet, 1947-62; Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury and Head of the

Home Civil Service, 1956-62.

Mr R. A. Butler (later Baron Butler of Saffron Walden): Conservative MP, 1931-64;

Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1938-41; President, Board of Education,

1951-45; Minister of Labour, 1945; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1951-55; Lord Privy

Seal, 1955-59; Leader of the House of Commons, 1955-61; Home Secretary, 1957-62;

First Secretary of State, July. 1962 - Oct. 1963; Deputy Prime Minister, July. 1962
-
 351

Oct. 1963; Minister in charge of Central African Office, July 1962 - Oct. 1963;

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1963-64.

Sir Harold Caccia (later Baron Caccia of Abernant): Assistant Under Secretary of

State, Foreign Office, 1946-49; Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1949-

51; British Ambassador to Austria, 1951-54; Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign

Office, 1954-56; British Ambassador to Washington, 1956-61; Permanent Under-

Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1962-65; Head of HM Diplomatic Service, 1964-65.

Sir Alec Cairncross: Economic Adviser to the Government, 1961-64; Head of

Government Economic Service, 1964-69.

Mr James Callaghan (later Baron Callaghan of Cardiff): Labour MP, 1945-83;

Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Transport, 1947-50; Parliamentary and Financial

Secretary, Admiralty, 1950-51; Opposition Spokesman: Transport, 1951-52; Fuel and

Power, 1953-55; Colonial Affairs, 1955-61; Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer,

1961-64; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1964-67; Secretary of State for Home Affairs,

1967-70; Shadow Home Secretary, 1970-71; Opposition Spokesman on Employment,

1971-72; Shadow Foreign Secretary, 1972-74; Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs, 1974-76; Minister of Overseas Development, 1975-76; Prime

Minister, 1976-79.

Mr Robert Carr (later Baron Carr of Hadley) Conservative MP, 1950-76; Parliamentary

Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1951-55; Parliamentary

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1955; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of

Labour and National Insurance, 1955-58; Minister for Technical Co-operation, 1963-
 352

64; Secretary of State for Employment, 1970-72; Secretary of State for Home Affairs,

1972-74.

Lord Carrington: Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1951-

54; Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1954-56; First Lord of the Admiralty,

1959-1963, Minister without Portfolio and Leader of the House of Lords, 1963-64;

Secretary of State for Defence 1970-1974; Secretary of State for Energy, 1974;

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1979-82.

Field Marshall Richard Carver (later Baron Carver of Shakleford): Director, Army Staff

Duties, Ministry of Defence, 1964-66; Commander, Far East Land Forces, 1966-67;

Commander-in Chief, Far East, 1967-69, GOC-in-C, Southern Command, 1969-71;

Chief of the General Staff, 1971-73; Chief of the Defence Staff, 1973-76. Publications:

Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945, (1992).

Michael Cary: Assistant Under Secretary, Air Ministry, 1958-61; Deputy Secretary of

the Cabinet, 1961-64; Second Permanent Under Secretary of State (Royal Navy),

Ministry of Defence, 1964-68; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Building and

Works, 1968-70; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1970-74.

Mrs Barbara Castle (later Baroness Castle of Blackburn): Labour MP, 1945-79;

Minister for Overseas Development, 1964-1965; Minister for Transport, 1965-68; First

Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity, 1968-

1970.

Sir Richard(Otto)Clarke:Third Secretary,Treasury, 1955-1962;SecondPermanent

Secretary,Treasury,1958-66;PermanentSecretary,Ministryof Technology,1966-70.
 353

Sir Alexander Clutterbuck: Private Secretary to the Permanent Under Secretary,

Dominions Office, 1928-29; Principal, Dominions Office, 1929; Member of UK

Delegation to League of Nations Assembly, 1929-32; Secretary, Newfoundland Royal

Commission, 1933; Deputy High Commissioner for United Kingdom, Union of South

Africa, 1939-40; Assistant Secretary, Dominions Office, 1940; Assistant Under

Secretary of State, Dominions Office, 1942-46 High Commissioner, Canada, 1946-52;

High Commissioner, India, 1952-55; British Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland,

1955-59; Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1959-62.

Lord Cobbold: Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, 1946-49; Governor of the

Bankof England,1949-61;Chairman,MalaysiaCommissionof Enquiry,1962.

Sir Andrew Cohen: Assistant Under Secretary, Colonial Office's African Division, 1947-

52; Governor of Uganda, 1952-57; Permanent Representative, Trusteeship Council at

United Nations, 1957-60; Director-General, Department of Technical Co-operation,

1961-64; Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry for Overseas Development, 1964-68.

Mr Richard Crossman: Labour MP, 1945-70; Minister of Housing and Local

Government, 1964-66; Leader of the House of Commons and Lord President of the

Council, 1966-68; Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security, 1968-

70.

Sir Patrick Dean: Assistant Legal Advisor, Foreign Office, 1939-45; Head of German

Political Department, Foreign Office, 1946-50; Minister at HM Embassy, Rome, 1950-

51; Senior Civilian Instructor at Imperial Defence College, 1952-53; Assistant Under

Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1953-56; Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Foreign

 354

Office, 1956-60; Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United

Nations, 1960-64; British Ambassador to Washington, 1964-69.

Sir William Dickson:Chairmanof the Chiefsof Staff Committee,1956-59;Chief of the

Defence Staff, 1958-59.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home (later Baron Home of the Hirsel): Parliamentary Private

Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1937-39; Junior Parliamentary Under Secretary,

Foreign Office, 1945; Minister of State, Scottish Office, 1951-55; Secretary of State for

Commonwealth Relations, 1955-60; Leader of the House of Lords and Lord President

of the Council, 1957-60; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1960-63; Prime Minster,

1963-64; Leader of HM Opposition, Oct. 1964-65; Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs, 1970-74.

Mr ChristopherEastwood:AssistantUnder-Secretaryof State,ColonialOffice, 1947-

52 and 1954-66.

Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Elworthy (later Baron Elworthy of Timaru): Chief of the

Air Staff, 1963-67; Chief of the Defence Staff, 1967-71.

Mr Frederick Erroll (later Baron Erroll of Hale): Conservative MP, 1945-63;

Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Supply, 1955-56; Parliamentary Secretary, Board

of Trade, 1956-58; Economic Secretary to the Treasury, 1958-59; Minister of State,

Board of Trade, 1959-61; President of the Board of Trade, 1961-63; Minister of Power,

1963-64.
 355

Sir Saville Garner (later Baron Garner of Chiddingley): Deputy High Commissioner,

Ottawa, 1943-48; Assistant Under Secretary of State, Dominions Office, 1948-51;

Deputy High Commissioner, Delhi, 1951-53; Deputy Permanent Under Secretary of

State, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1953-56; High Commissioner, Canada, 1956-

62; Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1962-65;

Permanent Under-Secretary, Commonwealth Office, 1965-68; Head of HM Diplomatic

Service, 1965-68; Chairman, Commonwealth Institute, 1968-74. Publications: The

Commonwealth Office, 1925-68, (1978).

Mr Patrick Gordon-Walker (later Baron Gordon-Walker of Leyton): Labour MP, 1945-

63,1964-74; Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Oct. 1964 -Jan. 1965; Minister

without Portfolio, 1967; Secretary of State for Education, 1967-68.

Sir Paul Gore-Booth (later Baron Gore-Booth of Maltby): Head of United Nations

(Economic and Social) and Refugees Department, Foreign Office, 1947-49; Head of

Economic Recovery Department, Foreign Office, 1948-49; Director, British Information

Services in the United States, 1949-53; Ambassador to Burma, 1953-56; Deputy

Under-Secretary (Economic Affairs) Foreign Office, 1956-60; British High

Commissioner in India, 1960-65; Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 1965-

68; Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1968-69; Head

of HM Diplomatic Service, 1968-69.

Mr Anthony Greenwood (later Baron Greenwood of Rossendale): Labour MP, 1946-70;

Secretaryof Statefor ColonialAffairs, 1964-65;Ministerof OverseasDevelopment,

1965-66; Minister of Housing and Local Government, 1966-70.

 356

Sir Henry Hardman: Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Aviation, 1960; Permanent

Secretary, Ministry of Aviation, 1961-63; Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence,

1963-64; Permanent Under-Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1964-66.

Mr Denis Healey (later lord Healey of Riddlesden): Labour MP, 1952-87; Shadow

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 1960-63; Shadow Secretary of State for

Defence, 1962-64; Secretary of State for Defence, 1966-70; Chancellor of the

Exchequer, 1974-79. Publications: Labour, Britain and the World, (1963); The Time of

My Life, (1989).

Sir Edward Heath: Conservative MP, 1951-2001, Lord Privy Seal (with Foreign Office

responsibilities), 1960-63; Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional

Development and President of the Board of Trade, Oct. 1963-Oct.1964; Leader of HM

Opposition, 1965-70; Prime Minister, 1970-74. Publications: 'Realism in Foreign

Policy', Foreign Affairs, (1969), Old World, New Horizons: Britain, The Common

Market, and the Atlantic Alliance, (1970), The Course of my Life, (1998).

Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar (later Baron Inchyra): Assistant Private Secretary to the

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1934-38; First Secretary, Washington, 1939;

Councillor, Washington, 1941-42; Secretary, British Civil Secretariat, Washington,

1943, Councillor, Foreign Office, 1944; Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign

Office, 1947-48; Minister, British Embassy, Washington, 1948-50; UK Deputy, North

Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1950-52; UK Permanent Representative on North Atlantic

Treaty Organisation Council, 1952-53; United Kingdom High Commissioner in

Germany, 1953-55; British Ambassador to Bonn, 1955-57; Permanent Under-

Secretary, Foreign Office, 1957-62.

 357

Field Marshall Sir Richard Hull: Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1956-58;

Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, 1958-61; Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, 1961-64; Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of Defence, 1964-65; Chief of the

Defence Staff, 1965-67.

Mr Roy Jenkins (later Baron Jenkins of Hillhead): Minister of Aviation, 1964-65; Home

Secretary,1965-67;Chancellorof the Exchequer,1967-70;DeputyLeaderof the

Labour Party, 1970-72; President, European Commission, 1977-81.

Admiral Sir Caspar John: Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, 1957-60; Principal Naval ADC

to the Queen, 1960-62; Admiral of the Fleet, 1962.

President Johnson: Vice-President of the United States, 1960-63; President of the

United States, 1963-69.

Sir Charles Johnston: Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Aden, 1960-63; High

Commissioner for Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia, 1963; Deputy Under

Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1963-65; British High Commissioner,

Commonwealth of Australia, 1965-71.

President Kennedy: President of the United States, 1960-63

Mr Lee Kuan Yew: Prime Minister of Singapore, 1959-90.

Sir GilbertLaithwaite:PrivateSecretaryto Viceroyof India (Marquessof Linlithgow),

1936-43, and a Secretary to the Governor General, 1937-43; Assistant Under

Secretary of State for India, 1943; Under Secretary (Civil) of the War Cabinet, 1944-
 358

45; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Burma, 1945-47; Deputy Under Secretary of

State for India, 1947; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations,

1948-49; Ambassador to the Republic of Ireland, 1950-51; United Kingdom High

Commissioner in Pakistan, 1951-54; Permanent Under Secretary of State for

Commonwealth Relations, 1955-59.

Admiral Sir Charles Lambe: Chief of the Naval Staff and First Sea Lord, 1959-60.

Sir Frank Lee: Deputy Head of Treasury Delegation to Washington, 1944; Deputy

Secretary, Ministry of Supply, 1946; Minister, Embassy in Washington, 1948-49;

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Food, 1949-51; Permanent Secretary, Board of

Trade, 1951-60; Joint Permanent Secretary, Treasury, 1960-62.

Mr Selwyn Lloyd (later Baron Selwyn-Lloyd): Conservative MP, 1945-76; Minister of

State, Foreign Office, 1951-54; Minister of Supply, 1945-55; Minister of Defence, 1955;

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1955-60; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1960-62;

Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons, 1963-64; Speaker of the

House of Commons, 1971-76.

Sir William Luce: advisor to the Governor-General of the Sudan on Constitutional and

External Affairs, 1953-56; Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Aden 1956-60; Political

Resident in the Persian Gulf, 1961-66.

Mr lain Macleod:ConservativeMP, 1950-70;Ministerof Health, 1952-55;Ministerof

Labour, 1955-59; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1959-61; Chancellor of the

Duchy of Lancaster and Leader of the House of Commons, Chairman of the

 359

Conservative Party Organisation, 1961-63; Editor of the Spectator, 1963-65;

Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1970.

Mr Harold Macmillan (later Earl of Stockton): Conservative MP, 1945-64; Minister for

Housing, 1951-54; Minister for Defence, 1954-55; Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, 1955-56; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1955-57; Prime Minister, 1957-1963.

Publications: Riding the Storm, (1971); At the End of the Day, (1972)

Sir Roger Makins (later Baron Sherfield): Minister at British Embassy, Washington,

1945-47; United Kingdom representative on United Nations Interim Commission for

Food and Agriculture, 1945; Alternate Delegate to Fifth Session of U.N.R.R.A. Council,

Atlantic City, 1946; Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1947-48,

Deputy Under Secretary, 1948-52; Ambassador to the United States, 1952-56; Joint

Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 1956-60.

Mr Reginald Maudling: Conservative MP, 1950-79; Economic Secretary to the

Treasury, 1952-55; Minister of Supply, 1955-57; Paymaster-General, 1957-59;

President of the Board of Trade, 1959-61; Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1961-

62; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1963-64; Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party

and Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 1970-72. Publications: Memoirs, (1978).

Mr Christopher Mayhew (Later Baron Mayhew of Wimbledon): Labour MP, 1951-73,

Liberal MP, 1973-74; Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1946-

50; Minister of Defence for the Royal navy, 1964-66. Publications: Britain's Role

Tomorrow, (1967).

Mr Robert McNamara: Secretary of Defence of the United States, 1961-68.

 360

Earl Mountbatten of Burma: Viceroy of India, 1946-47; Governor-General of India,

1947-48; Fourth Sea Lord, 1950-51; Admiral in command of Mediterranean Fleet,

1951-53; Supreme Allied Commander, NATO Mediterranean Command (SACMED),

1953-54; First Sea Lord, 1954-56; Admiral of the Fleet, 1956-59; Chief of the Defence

Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1959-65.

President Nasser: Prime Minister of Egypt, 1954; President of Egypt, 1955-67.

Mr John Samuel Orme: Under-Secretary, Cabinet Office, 1958-60; Assistant Under-

Secretary of State, Air Ministry, 1957-58, and again 1960-64.

Mr DavidOrmsby-Gore(later BaronHarlech):ConservativeMP, 1950-61;Ministerof

State for Foreign Affairs, 1957-61; British Ambassador to Washington, 1961-65.

Sir Michael Palliser: Entered HM Diplomatic Service, 1947; SE Asia Dept, Foreign

Office, 1947-49; Athens, 1949-51; Second Secretary, 1950; German Finance

Department, Foreign Office, 1951-52; Central Department, Foreign Office, 1952-54;

Private Secretary to Permanent Under Secretary, 1954-56; First Secretary, Foreign

Office, 1955; Paris, 1956-60; Head of Chancery, Dakar, 1960-62 (Charge d'Affaires in

1960,1961 and 1962); Counsellor, and seconded to Imperial Defence College, 1963;

Head of Planning Staff, Foreign Office, 1964; Private Secretary to the Prime Minister,

1966; Minister, Paris, 1969; Ambassador and Head of UK Delegation to European

Communities, Brussels, 1971; Ambassador and UK Permanent Representative to

European Communities, 1973-75; Permanent Under Secretary of State to the Foreign

and Commonwealth office and Head of Diplomatic Service, 1975-82.

The Earl of Perth: Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 1957-62.

 361

Sir Thomas Pike: Deputy Chief of Air Staff, Air Ministry, 1953-56; Air Officer

Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, 1956-59; Chief of the Air Staff, 1960-63;

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1964-67.

Sir Edward Playfair: HM Treasury, 1934-46 and 1947-56 (Central Office for Germany

and Austria, 1946-47); Permanent Under Secretary, War Office, 1956-59; Permanent

Secretary, Ministry of Defence, 1960-61.

Sir Hilton Poynton: Private Secretary to the Minister of Supply (Lord Beaverbrook) and

Minister of Production (Lord Chandos), 1941-43; reverted to Colonial Office, 1943;

Permanent Under-Secretary, Colonial Office, 1959-66.

Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim: President of Iraq, 1958-63.

Tunku Abdul Rahman: Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya, 1955-57; Prime

Minister of Malaya, 1957-63; Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1963-70.

Mr Dean Rusk: US Secretary of State, 1961-69.

Nuri es-Said: Prime Minister of Iraq, 1930-58.

Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal: President of the Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-67.

Mr Duncan Sandys (Baron Duncan-Sandys): Minister of Works, 1944-45; Minister of

Supply, 1951-54; Minister of Housing and Local Government, 1954-57; Minister of

Defence, 1957-59; Minister of Aviation, 1959-60; Secretary of State for Commonwealth

Relations, 1960-64 and Secretary of State for Colonies, 1960-64.

 362

Lord Selkirk: Paymaster-General, 1953-55; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1957-59; United

Kingdom Commissioner for Singapore and Commander-Generalfor South-East Asia,

1959-63; also UK Representative to the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation, 1960-

63.

Sir Arthur Snelling: Assistant Under-Secretaryof State, Commonwealth Relations

Office, 1956-59; British High Commander in Ghana, 1959-61; Deputy Under-Secretary

of State, Commonwealth Relations Office, 1961-69; Ambassador to South Africa,

1970-72.

Sir Roger Stevens: Assistant Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1948-51;

British Ambassador to Sweden, 1952-54; British Ambassador to Persia, 1954-58;

Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 1958-62; Adviser to First Secretary

of State on Central Africa, 1963.

Mr Michael Stewart (later Baron Stewart of Fulham): Under-Secretary of State for War,

1947-51;ParliamentarySecretary,Ministryof Supply,1951;Secretaryof State,

Educationand Science,1964-65;Secretaryof Statefor ForeignAffairs, 1965-66;First

Secretary of State and Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1966-67; Secretary of

State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1968-70.

President Sukarno: President of Indonesia, 1945-65.

Mr GeorgeThomson(later BaronThomsonof Monifieth):LabourMP, 1952-72;

Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1964-66; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster,

1966-67; Junior Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1967; Secretary of State for
 363

Commonwealth Affairs, 1967-68; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1969-70;

Shadow Defence Minister, 1970-72.

Mr PeterThorneycroft(later BaronThorneycroftof Dunstan):Presidentof the Boardof

Trade, 1951-57; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1957-58 (resigned); Minister of Aviation,

1960-62; Minister of Defence, 1962-64; Secretary of State for Defence, Apr-Oct. 1964.

Sir Burke Trend (later Baron Trend of Greenwich): Assistant Private Secretary to the

Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1939-1941; Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor

of the Exchequer, 1941-49; Under Secretary, Treasury, 1949-55; Office of the Lord

Privy Seal, 1959; Third Secretary, Treasury, 1959-60; Second Secretary, Treasury,

1960-62; Secretary of the Cabinet 1963-73.

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan (later Baron Trevelyan): Entered Indian Civil Service, 1929;

Indian Political Service, 1932-47; Counsellor to Baghdad, 1948; Economic and

Financial Adviser, UK High Commission, Germany, 1951-55; HM Charge d' Affaires in

Peking, 1953-55; Ambassador to Egypt, 1955-56; Under Secretary at the United

Nations, 1958; Ambassador to Iraq, 1958-61; Deputy Under Secretary of State,

Foreign Office, 1962; Ambassador to the USSR, 1962-65, retired; High Commissioner

in South Arabia, 1967.

Sir Frederick Vinter: Ministry of Economic Warfare, 1939-42; Cabinet Office, 1943-45;

Treasury, 1945-69; Third Secretary, Treasury, 1965-69; Deputy Secretary, Ministry of

Technologyand Departmentfor Trade and Industry,1969-73.

Mr Harold Watkinson (Later Baron Watkinson of Woking): Conservative MP, 1950-64;

Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Technology and Civil Aviation, 1951-
 364

52; Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour and National Service, 1952-55;

Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 1955-59; Minister of Defence, 1959-62;

Cabinet Minister 1957-62.

Mr Harold Wilson (later Baron Wilson of Rievaulx): Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of

Works, 1945-47; Secretary for Overseas Trade, 1947; President of the Board of

Trade, 1947-51; Chairman of Labour Executive Committee, 1961-62; Chairman, Public

Accounts Committee, 1959-63; Prime Minister, 1964-70 and 1974-76; Leader of HM

Opposition, 1970-74.

Mr Oliver Wright: Assistant Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs, 1960-63; Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1963-

64; Private Secretary to the Prime Minister (Home and Wilson), 1964-66; Ambassador

to Denmark, 1966-69; seconded to Home Office as United Kingdom Representative to

Northern Ireland Government, 1969-70; Chief Clerk, HM Diplomatic Service, 1970-72;

Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1972-75;

Ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany, 1975-81.

Sir Solly Zukerman: Chairman, Defence Research Committee, 1960-64; Chief

Scientific Adviser to Secretary of State for Defence, 1960-66; Chief Scientific Adviser

to HM Government, 1964-71.

Mr Philip de Zulueta: (later Sir Philip de Zulueta): Private Secretary to successive

PrimeMinisters(Eden,Macmillan,Home), 1955-64;AssistantSecretary,Treasury,

1962.
 365

Appendix I.

Future Policy Ad Hoc Committee Structure.

Prime Minister (and Cabinet Ministers concerned with the Future Policy Review).

SteeringCommittee(Underthe Chairmanshipof Sir NormanBrook,the Cabinet

Secretary).

WorkingCommittee(Underthe Chairmanshipof Sir PatrickDean,the DeputyUnder-

Secretaryof Stateat the ForeignOffice).

SectionA. SectionB. SectionC.

The International Setting. The Resources of the United The Main Objectives of the
Kingdom. United Kingdom's Overseas
and Strategic Policy.
 366

Appendix II.

Principal Holders of Office, 1959-1968.

Prime Ministers, 1959-1968.

Harold Macmillan Jan 1957-Oct 1963

Sir Alec Douglas-Home Oct 1963-Oct 1964
Harold Wilson Oct 1964-June 1970

Chancellors of the Exchequer, 1959-1968.

Derrick Heathcoat Amory Jan 1958-July 1960

Selwyn Lloyd July 1960-July 1962
Reginald Maudling July 1962-Oct 1964
James Callaghan Oct 1964-Jan 1968
Roy Jenkins Jan 1968-June 1970

Presidents of the Board of Trade, 1959-1968.

David Eccles Jan 1957-Oct 1959

Reginald Maudling Oct 1959-Oct 1961
Frederick Erroll Oct 1961-Oct 1963
Edward Heath Oct 1963-Oct 1964
Douglas Jay Oct 1964-Aug 1967
Anthony Crosland Aug 1967-Oct 1969

Secretaries of State for Foreign (and Commonwealth) Affairs, 1959-1968.

Selwyn Lloyd Dec 1955-July 1960

Earl of Home July 1960-Oct 1963
R. A. Butler Oct 1963-Oct 1964
Patrick Gordon Walker Oct 1964-Jan 1965
Michael Stewart Jan 1965-Aug 1966
George Brown Aug 1966-Mar 1968
Michael Stewart Mar 1968-June 1970

Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1959-1966.

Earl of Home Apr 1955-July 1960

Duncan Sandys Jul 1960-Oct 1964(also Secretary of State for
the Colonies from July 1962)
Arthur Bottomley Oct 1964-Aug1966

Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Affairs, 1966-1968.

Arthur Bottomley Aug 1966

Herbert Bowden Aug 1966-Aug 1967
 367

GeorgeThomson Aug 1967-Oct 1968

Secretaries of State for the Colonies, 1959-1966.

Alan Lennox-Boyd July 1954-Oct 1959

lain Macleod Oct 1959-Oct 1961
Reginald Maudling Oct 1961-July 1962
Duncan Sandys July 1962-Oct 1962(also Secretary of State
for the Colonies from July 1962)
Anthony Greenwood Oct 1964-Dec 1965
Earl of Longford Dec 1965-Apr 1966
Fred Lee Apr 1966-Aug 1966

Secretaries of State for Defence, 1959-1968.

Duncan Sandys Jan 1957-Oct 1959

Harold Watkinson Oct 1959-July 1962
Peter Thorneycroft July 1962-Oct 1964
Denis Healey Oct 1964- June 1970

Minister of State for the Central Africa Office.

R. A. Butler Mar 1962-Oct 1963

Secretaries to the Cabinet, 1959-1968.

Sir Norman Brook 1947-1962

Sir Burke Trend 1963-1972

Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury, 1959-1968.

Sir Norman Brook and Sir Roger Makins 1956-1959

(Joint Permanent Secretaries)
Sir Norman Brook and Sir Frank Lee 1959-1962
(Joint Permanent Secretaries)
Sir Laurence Helsby and Sir William 1962
Armstrong (Joint Permanent Secretaries)
Sir William Armstrong 1962-1968

Permanent Under Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, 1959-1968.

Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar Feb 1957-Feb 1962

Sir Harold Caccia Jan 1962-May 1965
Sir Paul Gore-Booth May 1965-Feb 1969

Permanent Under Secretaries of State for Colonial Affairs, 1959-1968.

Sir John Macpherson 1956-1959

 368

Sir Hilton Poynton 1959-1966

Permanent Under Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations Affairs,

1959-1968.

Sir Gilbert Laithwaite Feb 1955-Aug 1959

Sir Alexander Clutterbuck Sept 1959-Dec 1961
Sir Saville Garner Jan 1962-1968
 369

Appendix III.

Ministry of Defence: After 1964 Re-organisation.

Secretary of State for

Defence.

i
Minister of State for Defence
(Royal Navy)
Minister of State for Defence
(Army)
Minister of State for Defence
(Royal Air Force)

Defence Council
Chaired by the Secretary of State for Defence.

Chief of the Defence Staff Chief of the Air Staff Minister of State for
Defence (Royal Air Force)

Permanent Under Secretary Chief Scientific Adviser

to the MoD

Chief of the Naval Staff Minister of State for Defence (Royal

Navy)

Chief of the General Staff Minister of State for Defence (Army)

Chiefs of Staff Cmtee. PermanentUnder Secretary

Chaired by the Chief of to the MoD
Defence Staff.
Chief of the Naval Staff
Chief of the General
Staff
Chief of the Air Staff

Second PermanentUnder Second Permanent Under

Secretary of State Secretaries of State (Royal
Navy), (Army) and (Royal Air
Force).
The Defence Staff
Central Defence Staffs
The Naval Staff
The General Staff
Tho Air Ct ff

Navy Board of the Defence Army Board of the Defence Air Force Board of the Defem
Council. Council. Council.
 370

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CAB 129 Cabinet: Memoranda.
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CAB 131 Cabinet: Defence Committee: Minutes and Papers.
CAB 133 CabinetOffice: Commonwealthand InternationalConferences
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CAB 134 Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Minutes and Papers
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