2019 Hilhorst Desportes Miliano Resilience Governance Ethiopia
2019 Hilhorst Desportes Miliano Resilience Governance Ethiopia
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Humanitarian governance is usually understood according to the classic, Dunantist paradigm that
accords central importance to international humanitarian agencies. However, this is increasingly
paralleled by ‘resilience humanitarianism’ that focuses, among other things, on including national
actors in humanitarian governance. This article views humanitarian governance as emerging
through interactions between authorities, implementing agencies and communities. It is based on
interactive ethnography in five countries by Partners for Resilience (PfR). Using the Theory
of Change (ToC) tool, it analyses the various interpretations and priorities of actors involved in
humanitarian problems, solutions and programme governance. For example, PfR had a ‘software’
focus, aiming to unlock communities’ potential for resilience, whereas communities and authori-
ties preferred to receive tangible ‘hardware’ support. The findings highlight the crucial role of
local authorities in shaping humanitarian aid. This is especially pertinent in view of the inter-
national agenda to localise aid, which requires the understanding and support of national actors
in order to responsibly protect the vulnerable.
Introduction
Humanitarian aid has long been dominated by a classical Dunantist paradigm based
on humanitarian ethics. However, in recent years, this paradigm has been paralleled
by ‘resilience humanitarianism’ (Ilcan and Rygiel, 2015; Hilhorst, 2018), which links
relief to development and focuses on local people and institutions as the first respond-
ers to crisis. Resilience humanitarianism first appeared in the domain of disaster risk
reduction (DRR) and increasingly underpins refugee care and aid in countries tran-
sitioning from conflict to peace. Classical and resilience humanitarianism differ
radically as to how interventions are (supposed to be) governed. Governance in
classical humanitarianism centres chiefly on the United Nations (UN), international
donors, and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Resilience
Disasters, 2019, 43(S2): S109−S131. © 2019 The Author(s). Disasters © Overseas Development Institute, 2019
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, dis-
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Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
S110 Dorothea Hilhorst, Isabelle Desportes, and Cecile W.J. de Milliano
While the first two questions do not specify an actor, the last two put humanitar-
ians at the centre of the analysis. Most humanitarian-governance literature focuses
strongly on international humanitarian agencies, and most studies on humanitarian
practice take as a normative and actual point of departure the humanitarian princi-
ples and implementation-styles of large agencies such as the International Committee
of the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières, or UN bodies. Other actors, including
national authorities and affected communities, appear in the analysis through the eyes
of these international humanitarian actors.
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S111
Starting from the idea that governance is not simply steered by these international
agencies but is also formed in practice by a number of actors including humanitarian-
service providers, governments, and local community figures, Barnett’s questions
become layered and complex. For example, the first question (‘What kind of world
is being imagined and produced?’) can be rephrased to ask what kind of world is
imagined by different humanitarian-governance actors. How are different viewpoints
negotiated, and which views gain legitimacy? What contradictions exist between the
formal view and views conveyed in everyday reality, and between agreed govern-
ance roles and real governance as it unfolds in practice? Rather than assuming that
humanitarian action is governed by humanitarian agencies, we advocate studying
humanitarian governance as an interplay between humanitarian agencies, national
authorities and affected communities (Hilhorst and Jansen, 2010).
Given the layers and variations in governance, case studies are important for
analysing humanitarian governance in practice. This article elaborates on the Pf R
country studies, which used a similar set of questions and analytical framework. We
used the Theory of Change (ToC) tool to investigate how different stakeholders framed
DRR and how they viewed different actors’ roles in DRR. The findings provide
insight into the contradictions, possibilities, and impossibilities of humanitarian gov-
ernance which includes local actors and communities.
This article is especially relevant in view of humanitarian sector changes heralded
during the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) of 2016. The WHS made a strong
plea for localising humanitarian aid, giving greater focus to the role of national gov-
ernments, service providers, and affected communities in the governance of humani-
tarian assistance. A major outcome of the WHS was the commitment of approximately
50 key actors to making a ‘Grand Bargain’ in order to accelerate efforts to dispense
humanitarian budgets directly to service providers in crisis-affected areas. Clearly,
governance models and analyses of humanitarian action need to become more con-
scious of these local actors.
We incorporate findings from five of the six case studies conducted.1 To facilitate
insight into the dynamics of local humanitarian governance, we present one of these
case studies in depth, analysing the other four cases more briefly to identify common-
alities and variations in issues of local humanitarian governance. The major case
study presented here concerns Ethiopia, where all three authors participated in the
fieldwork. The first and third authors coordinated the Pf R study, including a joint
visit to Ethiopia, and the second author was the primary researcher for the Ethiopia
case study.
We begin by detailing interactive research, followed by the presentation of Pf R’s
(partly explicit and partly implicit) ToC, which we constructed and validated based
on a review of reports and interviews. A section on Ethiopia then analyses how Pf R,
authorities, and communities each had a different view of the issues and responsi-
bilities in DRR and how this affected the programme. The next section provides
brief analyses of the other case studies, leading to the conclusion, in which a number
of cross-cutting issues and concerns are raised.
S112 Dorothea Hilhorst, Isabelle Desportes, and Cecile W.J. de Milliano
Understanding governance
This article highlights and analyses findings pertaining to humanitarian governance
from the six-country research programme. The concept of governance came into
fashion in the 1990s, partly to clarify the layered and fragmented ways state power
is used to achieve collective purposes, and partly in response to changing ideas and
practices, with collective purposes no longer being solely the domain of the state
(Colebatch, 2009). In Europe, Rhodes (1996, p. 57) described the shift from ‘govern-
ment’ to ‘governance’, where ‘the state becomes a collection of inter-organisational
networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able
to steer or regulate’.
In development processes, the central importance accorded to states in the pursuit
of collective purposes had already been eroded since the early 1980s, when non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) came to be considered more effective and intrin-
sically more inclined to make communities and participatory development the start-
ing point of their endeavours (Edwards and Hulme, 1992, 1996). After a period of
acclaim for NGOs (at the expense of the state), it is now more common to build
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S113
this could potentially lead to infinite, and therefore impossible, levels of fine-tuning
of our understanding of humanitarian governance, it is important to be aware of
these diversities and to bring them into the analysis when they are significant. Finally,
governance always has both formal and informal dimensions, and there may be
large discrepancies and contradictions between formal and practical norms. Studies
of humanitarian governance must therefore address how norms and policies trans-
late into practice (Olivier de Sardan, 2011).
problem? What objective did they want to attain? How, by whom, when, and where
could this be achieved? In the initial phase of the Pf R programme, we observed
that Pf R actors tended to distinguish sharply between so-called hardware approaches
(i.e. predominantly transfer of materials and tangible field-activities) and software
approaches (i.e. working on social structures and processes, and skill transfers). We
maintained this distinction in the interviews. In addition to collecting different views
on how the programme should be carried out, we also asked how the programme
worked out in practice.
In each of the country studies, national-level actors were first interviewed—
individually, through focus-groups and in workshops. In dialogue with the research
participants, the researchers then identified multiple case studies to investigate the
alliance in action at the local level, where government officials, community members,
and NGO staff members running the field operations were approached. The sub-
country cases varied to some extent: they usually comprised geographical areas, but
there were also several specific activities and campaigns selected for investigation.
Data gathering
Data gathering in the five countries largely followed the same pattern. Here, we elab-
orate solely the process for Ethiopia, where the four case-study sites were widely
scattered across the country. As Figure 1 shows, the case study sites were selected to
represent different implementing partners, agro-ecological zone types (the Borena,
Afar, and Dire Dawa lowlands, with different forms of agro-pastoralism, and the
farmed highlands around Ibnat in the Amhara region), timespans of Pf R implemen-
tation (inception in 2009, 2011, and 2013), and activities.
In all these sites, field staff, community members, and government officials from
the kebeles (lowest-level governance) and woredas (district governance-level) were
asked about their framing of the problem, interpretation of their role and the roles of
others, and perceptions of the programme. In-country NGO staff members facili-
tated the fieldwork logistics, but, as much as possible, the interviews were one-on-one,
without the presence of NGO or government observers. The federal government’s
perspective could not be directly included in 2014, but we also draw upon an inter-
view with a federal government official conducted by the second author in 2017 as
part of another humanitarian governance research project.
Secondary sources such as project-monitoring reports, local risk assessments, action
plans, and environmental impact-assessments were also analysed to gain a full under-
standing of the programme rationales and the practicalities of its implementation.
PfR’s ToC
Pf R did not have a ready-made ToC, but it did have many policy ideas about how
the programme should work, with building blocks, working principles, and objec-
tives. Based on a content-analysis of reports and a workshop with the Netherlands-
based alliance coordinators, we constructed and validated the following ToC as the
principal storyline of the alliance:
This ToC shows that multi-actor governance is a central element of PfR’s approach.
Starting from the understanding that supporting the resilience of communities requires
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S117
Semi-structured interviews with external stakeholders (e.g. university staff, in-country consult- 6
ants and NGO facilitators)
Observation at the Ethiopian Red Cross Society’s ‘Enhancing system and community resilience’ 5
panel discussion (16/08/2014), key stakeholders (e.g. UN official)
Total 230
Intervention Examples
1. Ecosystem management and restoration Rangeland rehabilitation through enclosures, hillside rehabilitation
through terracing, soil and water conservation with soil band and
check dams
2. Livelihood diversification Setting up savings and loan associations; cooperatives producing aloe
vera soap, honey or energy-saving stoves; distributing goats or chickens;
providing irrigation infrastructure such as ponds, dams, canals, or drip
irrigation; distributing seed and farming tools
3. Establishing and strengthening • Committees responsible for managing disaster risk in their kebele,
community institutions with some also acting as local early-warning committees
• Committees managing specific PfR interventions (e.g. an irrigation
committee)
• Environmental school clubs
4. Training • Theoretical and practical skill transfer, for instance concerning farm-
ing, meteorological forecasts, and accounting (including specific
capacity training for the newly established community institutions)
• Training in the form of exchanges between (implementing) partners,
government officials, and communities, with joint risk assessment
and development of action plans
Diverging ToCs
Table 3 summarises the major ToC building blocks (problem definition, description
of the goal, and specifics of ‘how’, ‘who’, ‘when’, and ‘where’ to attain that goal) by
three major kinds of actor types (PfR staff, government, and communities), although
internal variations did of course occur.
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S119
Problem definition
Table 3 highlights some similarities but also many differences in ToC perspectives.
Although all actors mentioned the strenuous environment and recurrent droughts as
major problems, PfR staff members emphasised a combination of environmental fac-
tors and attitude-problems at sites with a long history of NGO presence. Government
officials stressed the problem of dependency, whereas community members spoke
mainly of acute poverty and difficulty surviving in a degraded environment.
Goal definition
Definition of the overall Pf R programme goal varied among staff members, with
a more basic form given by field staff (e.g. reducing poverty or reducing the impact
of natural hazards on livelihoods) and more holistic representations from the Addis
S120 Dorothea Hilhorst, Isabelle Desportes, and Cecile W.J. de Milliano
Ababa-based office staff. In its most detailed form, the desired goal is a resilient com-
munity characterised by ‘embedded’ and sustainable livelihoods. Embeddedness echoes
the EMR component. As one staff member explained, it means that ‘livelihoods must
be grounded in people’s environment in such a way that the surrounding resources
are sufficient to support them’.5 Sustainability was viewed mainly in relation to CCA,
with viable livelihoods in the long term, resisting climatic variability. DRR, CCA,
and EMR are thus integrated in Pf R’s ToC and linked to livelihoods.
Community understanding was often similar to that of Pf R staff, as reflected in
this statement from a male community member in Ibnat (1 October 2014):
The aim is to alleviate the risks which acted on us previously, such as soil erosion and flood
and drought. The project enables [us] to retain our wealth, our livelihood.
Although government officials also aimed for stable livelihoods, they stressed that
this would lessen the need for emergency relief. Their understanding was far less
integrated than the view of Pf R. They tended to conceptualise change in sectoral
terms, such as objectives for agriculture or irrigation, matching the government’s
sectoral organisation.
Solutions: how
In explaining how resilience could be achieved, Ethiopian PfR staff members mainly
emphasised the roles of the community. A community first needed to be empow-
ered through participatory risk assessments and action plans, as well as by software
activities such as training and the formation of community committees. An empow-
ered community was presented as aware of its environment and how it could act
within it. In their focus on communities, alliance partners emphasised the develop-
ment of social institutions over providing material assistance. Several staff interviews
made it clear that their agencies believed institutional development was key for food
security because it would unlock resources available in the community—notably
local knowledge. Staff members from agencies with a more humanitarian background
departed slightly from this dominant understanding, giving more space to hardware
support for community activities.
Whereas the Pf R partners emphasised the strengthening of community institu-
tions as a precondition for resilience, the government and communities stressed the
importance of the provision of material support. This difference was apparent in
interviews, leading to discussion on programme implementation. For example, a
woreda government official from a Borena cooperative office complained that Pf R
did not release funds for a qualified external accountant for the savings group, as is
done by other NGOs in the area.6 Pf R wanted community members to learn this
activity themselves in order to be independent in the long term.7
There were also commonalities in the ToCs. In the Pf R approach, empowered
communities to regain and fortify a natural asset base via community-based natural
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S121
soil and water conservation activities. This clearly resonated with the federal gov-
ernment’s strong focus on environmental resource management in recent decades.8
Communities’ appreciation for this environmental approach differed depending on
how long they had been involved, increasing over time. A community which had
worked with this approach since 2009 had seen more tangible results, including in
terms of livelihoods, than had one where Pf R began more recently.
Although there was significant agreement about the steps required, ideas on how
these should translate into practice differed radically. All parties, for example, agreed
that livelihoods should be diversified to improve resistance to shocks and stresses.
In the case of pastoralist communities, however, government policies tended to be
geared towards (forced) resettlement into consolidated centres, which could become
centres of livelihood activities. These communities were mostly opposed to this
idea, instead favouring alternative options supporting livestock-rearing and small-
scale diversification. PfR staff members emphasised the need to respect communities’
choices and traditional ways of living. The Pf R implementing partners were more
diverse in their attitudes towards pastoralism, with some leaning towards govern-
ment policies and others towards the communities’ perspective, as well as engaging
more openly with parallel pastoralist traditional governance systems. In practice, the
programme took on different shapes in different areas, depending mainly on the local
implementing partner and their relationship with the government. Some local imple-
menting partners could in fact be classified as ‘government-oriented NGOs’, acting
as a local arm of the government.
Solutions: who
Ideas about who should play the lead role on the path towards resilience aligned
closely with the actors’ preferred path. According to Ethiopian Pf R staff, empowered
communities should take the driving seat in building resilience. This was considered
effective (grounded in local context), efficient (involving locals from the start increases
community acceptance), sustainable (built on local structures), and cost-effective.
Moreover, Pf R aimed to move away from competition among agencies ‘working
in silos’ to reach their objectives towards partnership and learning. On a wall in a
Borena DRR community group office set up by Pf R, a poster (Figure 2) unpacked
the ‘big shift’ deemed necessary to implement the programme. Instead of dominat-
ing and teaching, programme staff should facilitate. They should not extract but
empower, preferably with visual means rather than by sending messages. Relations
should be open, and people should think about the community.
A striking difference in the ToCs is how government officials did not see commu-
nities as key in the bottom-up identification of needs, but rather as the lowest level of
a top-down governance model and a workforce to implement activities. Interviews
with local woreda and kebele government officials indicated that, rather than listening
to the communities’ views, these officials saw working with the communities as an
opportunity to teach them how to implement (government) development programmes.
S122 Dorothea Hilhorst, Isabelle Desportes, and Cecile W.J. de Milliano
Several government officials in Dewe and Ibnat highlighted that the role of com-
munity committees was not to take decisions, but to ‘provide information’.
Having been subject to top-down governance structures for decades, community
members had internalised the government perspective, looking towards governments
and NGOs to provide necessary material support.
The government is fine with us establishing committees. Most did not know this approach
before. When we teach about it, they are happy, appreciate the philosophy behind it. It fails
only if it is associated with politics. We need to focus on practical problem-solving [. . .]
It is invisible politics.
We don’t believe the Red Cross will continue with us. It will leave us. But it gave us the
capacity, the knowledge, technical, materials, in order to handle things. We acknowledge
it with good mood. We have a committee in place, a water management system. We did
the activities without payment until now. We can continue.
On the other hand, communities might have different priorities from those facili-
tated by Pf R. The communities often expressed a preference for hardware support,
but Pf R seemed to actually occupy the driving seat, working to make communities
‘ready’ to internalise Pf R’s emphasis on soft interventions geared towards institutions
and training.
Over the course of the programme, it also became apparent that government
buy-in was lower than Pf R assumed. Although the government shared Pf R’s con-
viction that communities were important, they saw communities as the end-line of
sectoral development programmes, and NGOs as resource-providers and facilitators
for those programmes. A federal government official reflected on community-based
early-warning systems (9 June 2017), which were also implemented as part of the
Pf R programme (with efforts to link early-warning committees with government
offices):
[NGOs] can feed us [with ideas], but they should use the common platforms. For instance,
I would love to have one strong early-warning system in the country. International NGOs
get resources to do their own community-based early-warning systems, etc. Funders love
that. But I tell them not to do that, to go with us. So we can create one strong system.
They invite me to workshops, but I do not go.
Although kebele and woreda government officials tolerated the community commit-
tees, this did not change the government’s approach to resilience. The committees
S124 Dorothea Hilhorst, Isabelle Desportes, and Cecile W.J. de Milliano
remained isolated, with no official legal basis, and unable to advocate for government
services. This hampered the scaling-up and sustainability of the approach. Although
the committees and the participatory style of Pf R were appreciated, tangible out-
comes were lacking; the knowledge and value of the Pf R approach did not reach
the regional government, so no non-NGO funds or efforts supported the new struc-
tures or follow-up on activities. A former Pf R staff member who visited the Borena
Pf R site in 2017 shared the unsurprising news that the local committees had stopped
operating after the programme ended, as did their facilitation and support of the
communities.
and advocacy approach were limited, as political instability and a fragile social fabric
added to uncertainty and restricted space for policy-implementation.
The programme was also not integrated at implementation level, but projects
in the 37 Indonesian Pf R implementation villages usually addressed one or more
components of Pf R, depending on the expertise of the implementing partner.
Implementers seemed to treat Pf R primarily as a funding opportunity to implement
their own programmes. However, during the Pf R implementation, a common
emphasis on local-level advocacy and training emerged, where community members
approached the local government (facilitated by Pf R) to present their DRR-related
needs. However, these local advocacy skills did not result in increased responsiveness
by the local government, and the increased national-level DRR budget did not
trickle down to the local level. As in Ethiopia, local government officials who, influ-
enced by PfR, became sympathetic to local DRR needs felt incapable of meeting these
needs because they had no budget for DRR.
PfR is only a project. But the way it is implemented is very sustainable. The seed has been
planted and the communities are appreciating the approach. Initiatives are increasingly
coming from community members themselves.
The programme coincided with extensive national policy reforms aiming for
decentralisation and improved coordination among the various bodies involved in
DRR. As in Indonesia, Pf R used this as an entry-point to advocate for community-
based integrated risk management. Conditions in Kenya were more favourable for
a networked type of governance, but this also led to particular challenges: working
through existing community-organisations reinforced existing power-relations and
reduced Pf R’s leverage in the implementation-process.
Beyond the community, an umbrella organisation linking several civil-society
organisations in Kenya was an effective medium for advocacy. The network organ-
ised a 250-kilometre camel march to challenge the national and county governments
on the negative environmental and social impacts of a mega-dam that was planned
upstream. The civil-society organisations also managed to engage private companies,
the local and national media, and some elements of the government in supporting the
Ewaso Ngiro River communities’ cause. This would have been unthinkable in the
authoritarian Ethiopian governance context a few hundred kilometres to the north.
Humanitarian governance, in the Kenyan case, developed into a strong alliance between
Pf R and communities in their effort to mobilise the state.
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S127
Discussion
Humanitarian governance is often treated as a single reality, seen from the point of
view of international humanitarian actors. This article has viewed governance as
emerging through interaction among international and national, state, and non-state
actors. We have analysed governance primarily as the interplay between the state,
implementing agencies, and communities.
More specifically, we explored humanitarian governance in the scenario of
resilience-building programmes. As the cases demonstrate, this type of scenario is
far removed from the high-conflict aid scenario that usually informs discussions on
humanitarian governance. Nonetheless, in view of the turn to DRR and the pro-
motion of resilience in addressing natural disasters (see, for example, the Hyogo
and Sendai Frameworks for Action of 2005 and 2015, respectively (United Nations
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), 2005, 2015), this scenario
represents a widespread and substantial body of practice in the humanitarian domain
(Kelman, 2017).
It is important to recognise that the multiple actors involved in governance have
different understandings of the aims and rules of operation. In this research, we
developed a tool based on theories of change as an entry-point for our enquiry. ToC
language enhanced the interactive nature of the research and enabled dialogue with
Pf R stakeholders who were already familiar with the ToC jargon. Although govern-
ance issues varied greatly across the countries, a number of striking patterns appeared.
Grounded in five in-depth country case studies of a large programme to enhance
resilience and DRR (Hilhorst et al., 2015), this article revealed one major finding.
Actors in the Pf R agencies, local authorities, and communities often had different
interpretations of the ToC and different priorities concerning its implementation.
PfR activities tended to have a strong ‘software’ focus, aiming to unlock communities’
potential to become more resilient, but communities—and often local authorities—
preferred to receive more immediate, local and tangible ‘hardware’ support. This
difference was especially pronounced at the beginning of the programme. One way
of framing this issue is to see the aid organisations in the Pf R alliance as having
changed their approach to resilience humanitarianism, whereas the local actors pre-
ferred more classic forms of handout humanitarianism (Hilhorst, 2018 ). Clarifying
and bridging differences in objectives and expectations are thus pivotal parts of the
humanitarian-governance agenda.
The findings paint a mixed picture of the power and normative rationale of inter-
vening agencies to shape programming. In the context of intervention, a programme
like PfR may be experienced as imposing its ideology, even when that ideology places
communities’ views at the centre. In several countries, community members expressed
a different preference for addressing their resilience, and implementing and national
partners felt that the programme was organised in a top-down fashion by the national
or international headquarters, respectively. However, Pf R’s power to shape the pro-
gramme to achieve its objectives seemed limited in many ways. Pf R seemed a coher-
ent programme on paper, but, in the complexity of the intervention, there was an
S128 Dorothea Hilhorst, Isabelle Desportes, and Cecile W.J. de Milliano
abundance of different attitudes to the approach. The Dutch agencies, their in-country
national counterparts, the authorities, and communities each brought their own
ideas and interests to the programme implementation. Unsurprisingly, Pf R struggled
to realise its mandate amid the messiness of multi-actor humanitarian governance,
where the programme was subject to local realities, interests, and collaborations.
The findings highlight the importance of analysing the different ways governing
actors view the programme. Particularly striking are the findings about governments.
Programmes like Pf R tend to allot a critical role to the government as a key actor
which could turn DRR into a sustainable, structured, and scaled-up endeavour, if
government actors can be convinced to ‘see the light’. Across the countries studied,
we found many factors cautioning against an optimistic take on this. Despite appar-
ent buy-in on a ToC giving central importance to communities, in practice the
Ethiopian government had a very different understanding compared with that of the
Pf R partners. These differences ultimately prevented the scaling-up of an integrated
approach to DRR. For various reasons, including high turnover in local government
in the Philippines, a local Indonesian government that had hardly any budget and
was therefore ‘sitting on a dry desk’ (Therkildsen and Tidemand, 2007, p. 8), and
a lack of coordinated planning in Nicaragua, it was rare that individual government
actors ‘seeing the light’ would result in changing actual governance practice.
Pf R’s experience provides several ideas on how programmes aiming to realise
resilience can deal with these situations. One chosen strategy was to seek convergence
with other policy agendas or national thematic priorities, such as ongoing policy
reforms. Another strategy was to carefully explore the room for manoeuvre to posi-
tion the programme within existing governance traditions, navigating the prevailing
realities to achieve some of Pf R’s goals. Finally, the duration of the programme could
be extended, so that different actors might implement, internalise or adapt the hoped-
for changes over a longer period of time.
The findings remind us that, in humanitarian programming, a localisation agenda
requires investing in understanding, negotiating, and supporting national actors to
responsibly implement humanitarian programming for vulnerable people. When
we reformulate the final conclusion from the point of view of the governments in
the research, the findings remind us that intervening agencies should avoid setting
unrealistic objectives that would require great changes in existing priorities and
historically grown styles of governance. Reformulating the same conclusion from the
point of view of the communities studied, we are reminded that outsiders intervening
on behalf of communities should start listening to those communities if they want
to achieve sustainable results.
Acknowledgments
We sincerely thank the Partners for Resilience (PfR) for their openness in this research,
with special thanks to our Pf R liaison Raimond Duijsens. We also acknowledge the
contribution of our fellow researchers on Pf R: Marijn Faling, Lisa Strauch, Yvonne
Humanitarian governance and resilience building: Ethiopia in comparative perspective S129
Leung, Mariana Dávila Bustamente and Annisa Srikandini. This article was made pos-
sible through a Vici grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO), grant number 453-14-013.
Correspondence
Dorothea Hilhorst, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University
Rotterdam, Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX Den Haag, Netherlands.
Telephone: +31 70 426 0460; e-mail: [email protected]
Endnotes
1
We did not include findings from the Philippines, as the Pf R programme there focused mainly on
urban areas and would unduly skew governance comparisons (see Leung, 2015).
2
The organisations worked in Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Mali, Nicaragua, the
Philippines, and Uganda together with 74 implementing partner organisations. See http://www.
partnersforresilience.nl for more information.
3
See the full policy brief (Hilhorst, de Milliano, and Strauch, 2015) and the alliance feedback report
at http://www.rug.nl/research/globalisation-studies-groningen/projects/partners-for-resilience.
4
The Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, Action for Development, Ethiopian
Catholic Secretariat, Dire Dawa Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction Association, and
Support for Sustainable Development.
5
Interview, field staff, 29 September 2014.
6
Interview, 1 August 2014.
7
Interview, 12 September 2014.
8
For example, the Climate Resilient Green Economy initiative launched in 2011 linked to the five-
year Growth and Transformation Plans, but also the new Disaster Risk Management policy endorsed
in 2013 (Federal Democratic Government of Ethiopia, 2013).
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