Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Lexoterica 2009 – January 2014

April 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Administrative regulation; void. Executive Order No. 566, which grants the CHED the power to
regulate review center, is unconstitutional as it expands Republic Act No. 7722,. The CHED’s
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and
degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO
566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review centers and
similar entities. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA
7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction of the
CHED. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
Agrarian reform; coverage. For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the
coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is agricultural. Here, the
subject parcels of land cannot be considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27 considering that
the subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under
P.D. No. 27. Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra Francia, G.R.
No. 166748, April 24, 2009.
Compensation. Officers who in good faith have discharged the duties pertaining to their office
are legally entitled to the compensation attached to the office for the services they actually
rendered. Although the present petition must inevitably be dismissed on a technicality that
serves as penalty for the pernicious practice of forum shopping, the Court nevertheless cannot
countenance the refund of the compensation differential corresponding to petitioner’s tenure as
HEDF head with the upgraded rank of Director III, since she had actually rendered services in
the office with the elevated grade for that period. Alicia D. Tagaro vs. Ester A. Garcia, etc.,G.R.
No. 173931, April 2, 2009.
COMELEC; voting. Section 5 (a)of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec,
and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. Rodante Marcoleta, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al./ Alagad Party-list represented by Diogenes S. Osabel, President
vs. Commission on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009.
Deportation; power. The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the Philippines is merely
a privilege and a matter of grace; such privilege is not absolute or permanent and may be
revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported from the Philippines only on grounds
and in the manner provided for by the Constitution, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, and administrative issuances pursuant thereto.
It must be remembered that aliens seeking entry in the Philippines do not acquire the right to be
admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. When an alien, such as respondent, has
already physically gained entry in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid
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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is found that he was not lawfully
admissible at the time of his entry. Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude
aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation or
public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the
authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and the domestic
tranquility of the people. The Secretary of Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No.
166199, April 24, 2009.
Double jeopardy. The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had jurisdiction; (3) the
accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted
or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements are present here: (1) the
Information filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 96-
413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and (4) the MeTC dismissed
Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence amounting to an acquittal
from which no appeal can be had. Clearly, for this Court to grant the petition and order the
MeTC to reconsider its decision, just what the RTC ordered the MeTC to do, is to transgress the
Constitutional proscription not to put any person “twice x x x in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense.”David Tiu vs. Court of Appeals and Edgardo Postanes, G.R. No. 162370, April
21, 2009.
Due process; court decisions. Faithful adherence to Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. The parties to
a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and
legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.
In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reiterates the rule that a notarized and
authenticated deed of sale enjoys the presumption of regularity, and is admissible without
further proof of due execution. On the basis thereof, it declared Antonio a buyer in good faith
and for value, despite petitioner’s contention that the sale violates public policy. While it is a
part of the right of appellant to urge that the decision should directly meet the issues presented
for resolution, mere failure by the appellate court to specify in its decision all contentious issues
raised by the appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe appellant’s contentions is not
sufficient to hold the appellate court’s decision contrary to the requirements of the law and the
Constitution. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary findings of
facts to warrant its conclusions, we cannot declare said court in error if it withheld “any specific
findings of fact with respect to the evidence for the defense.” We will abide by the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed,and all matters within an issue in a
case were laid down before the court and were passed upon by it. Marissa R. Unchuan vs.
Antonio J.P. Lozada, Anita Lozada and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City, G.R. No.
172671, April 16, 2009.
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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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Ecozone. R.A. No. 7903 does not authorize the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate and/or
license games of chance/gambling. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, etc. vs.
Philippine EGaming Jurisdiction, Incorporated (PEJI) Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone
Authority (ZAMBOECOZONE), et al., G.R. No. 177333, April 24, 2009.
Election contests; jurisdiction. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s (HRET’s) sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives “begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives.” Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over elections relating to the election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
Señeres filed this petition before this Court on July 23, 2007, the right of the nominees as party-
list representatives had been recognized and declared in the July 19, 2007 Resolution and the
nominees had taken their oath and already assumed their offices in the House of Representatives.
As such, the proper recourse would have been to file a petition for quo warranto before the
HRET within ten (10) days from receipt of the July 19, 2007 Resolution and not a petition for
certiorari before this Court. Dr. Hans Christian M. Señeres vs. Commission on Elections and
Melquiades A. Robles,G.R. No. 178678, April 16, 2009.
Eminent domain; proceedings. In an expropriation proceeding there are two stages: first, the
determination of the validity of the expropriation, and second, the determination of just
compensation. In Tan v. Republic, the Supreme Court explained the two (2) stages in an
expropriation proceeding, to wit:
(1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, with condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation. An order of expropriation is
final. An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, as it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the courts on the merits. The order of
expropriation would also be a final one for after its issuance, no objection to the right of
condemnation shall be heard. The order of expropriation may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby by filing a record on appeal.
(2) Determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before the court and findings of the commissioners
would likewise be a final one, as it would leave nothing more to be done by the court regarding
the issue. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just
compensation. Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No.
175983, April 16, 2009.

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Eminent domain; power. For Metropolitan Cebu Water District to exercise its power of eminent
domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution
authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was
subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioner’s board of directors approved on 27
February 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its general manager to file
expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval
to the filing of a complaint for the expropriation of respondent’s lot. Specifically, the LWUA
through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioner’s manager, Armando H. Paredes,
a letter dated 28 February 2005 authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case “against the
owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant
to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended.” Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and
Sons Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983. April 16, 2009
Eminent domain; writ of possession. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that
“upon compliance with the guidelines…the court shall immediately issue to the implementing
agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.”
Under this statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or government-owned and
controlled corporations, make the required provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial
duty to issue a writ of possession.Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs. J. King and Sons
Company, Inc., G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of the case, the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Excise tax. Section 145 of the Tax Code, as amended by RA 9334: (1) does not violate the
equal protection and unformity of taxation clauses; (2) does not violate the constitutional
prohibition on unfair competition; and (3) does not vilate the constitutional prohibition on
regresssive and inequitable taxation. British American Tobacco vs. Jose Isidro N. Camacho, et
al. G.R. No. 163583, April 15, 2009.
Freedom of expression. Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place
or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e.,
the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are
generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression. Content-neutral regulations of speech or of
conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.
Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it
operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied to a radio station, as
content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or
business enterprise within the LGU.

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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a
content-based restraint.
The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict
scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed appropriate in assessing content-based
restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting
the political process, of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as
other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The
immediate implication of the application of the “strict scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon
respondents as agents of government to prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners’
constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling
reason, the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the
right to free expression. Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Ceasar G. Dy,
et al., G.R. No. 170270/G.R. No. 179411, April 2, 2009.
Immunity from Suit. GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it
enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper
bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint
against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the
Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the
Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiter’s
decision been a “patent nullity.” Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the
complaint, notwithstanding GTZ’s claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could
have translated into a “patent nullity.” Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Techniche Vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009.
Inquiry in aid of legislation. A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings
has different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures to
settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies arising between adverse litigants
and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia,
undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate
wisely and effectively; and to determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or
enact new or remedial legislation, albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential legislation.
On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending criminal and administrative
cases before lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is
no rhyme or reason that these cases’ doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale cannot be
extended to appealed cases and special civil actions awaiting final disposition before this
Court. . .
When the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before it in
connection with its investigation of the aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of
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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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the Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit a
Senate committee from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an
inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. Sabio
emphasizes the importance of the duty of those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature,
even if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to be asked. Reghis M. Romero II,
Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L.
Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on Labor,
Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
Judicial review. It is beyond cavil that the BI has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try
and hear cases against an alleged alien, and that the BOC has jurisdiction over deportation
proceedings. Nonetheless, Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution has vested power of
judicial review in the Supreme Court and the lower courts such as the CA, as established by law.
Although the courts are without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government and are
not empowered to execute absolutely their own judgment from that of Congress or of the
President, the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such judgment has
been made with grave abuse of discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. The Secretary of
Justice, et al. vs. Christopher Koruga, G.R. No. 166199, April 24, 2009.
Judicial review; political question. In asking the Supreme Court to declare Section 19 of the
Oil Deregulation Law as unconstitutional for contravening Section 19, Article XII of the
Constitution, petitioner invokes the exercise by the Supreme Court of its power of judicial
review, which power is expressly recognized under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the
Constitution. The power of judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of
executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such power,
the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the Constitution. For a court to exercise
this power, certain requirements must first be met, namely:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
The Supreme Court ruled that that the issues petitioner presented to thee Supreme Court are
non-justiciable matters that preclude the Supreme Court from exercising its power of judicial
review. The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry
is a policy determination by Congress which the Supreme Court cannot overturn without
offending the Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. Congressman Enrique T.
Garcia Vs. The Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009.
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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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Just compensation. The Special Agrarian Court and the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error when it ruled that it is the provisions of RA 6657 that is applicable to the present
case. The SAC arrived at the just compensation for respondents’ property after taking into
consideration the commissioners’ report on the nature of the subject landholding, its proximity
from the city proper, its use, average gross production, and the prevailing value of the lands in
the vicinity. The SAC correctly determined the amount of just compensation due to respondents
in accordance with, and guided by, RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Carolina vda. de Abello, et al., G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009.
Partisan political activity. Robles’ act of submitting a nomination list for BUHAY cannot, without
more, be considered electioneering or partisan political activity within the context of the
Election Code. The twin acts of signing and filing a Certificate of Nomination are purely internal
processes of the party or organization and are not designed to enable or ensure the victory of the
candidate in the elections. The act of Robles of submitting the certificate nominating Velarde
and others was merely in compliance with the COMELEC requirements for nomination of party-
list representatives and, hence, cannot be treated as electioneering or partisan political activity
proscribed under by Sec. 2(4) of Art. IX(B) of the Constitution for civil servants. Dr. Hans
Christian M. Señeres vs. Commission on Elections and Melquiades A. Robles, G.R. No.
178678, April 16, 2009.
Party list. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11
of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
(1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(2) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
(3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
(4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they
have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections/ Bayan
Muna, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009.
Police power. Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education,
good order or safety, and the general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex – the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Police power primarily
rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative
boards by virtue of a valid delegation. Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA
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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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7722 authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting review
centers. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive Secretatry Eduardo Ermita,
et al.,G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
Public domain; classification. The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types,
i.e., primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. These are lands specifically
mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution,
however, also states that agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural
lands is referred to as secondary classification.
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of government agencies to
effect the secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or
other urban uses. Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Heirs of Antonio Francia and Petra
Francia, G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009.
Public Land Act; encumbrance. Section 118 of the Public Land Act, as amended, prohibits any
encumbrance or alienation of lands acquired under homestead provisions from the date of the
approval of application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant. The same provision provides that no alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any
homestead after five years and before 25 years after issuance of title shall be valid without the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, which approval shall not be
denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
A homestead patent is one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes. Under the Public Land Act, as amended, a homestead patent is one issued to any
citizen of this country, over the age of 18 years or the head of a family, and who is not the
owner of more than 24 hectares of land in the country. To be qualified, the applicant must
show that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality where the land is
situated and must have cultivated at least one-fifth of the land applied for.
The Court also cannot consider the subject property to have been held in trust by Hermogenes
for and on behalf of Hizon. Settled is the rule that a homestead applicant must personally
comply with the legal requirements for a homestead grant. The homestead applicant himself
must possess the necessary qualifications, cultivate the land, and reside thereon. It would be a
circumvention of the law if an individual were permitted to apply “in behalf of another,” as the
latter may be disqualified or might not comply with the residency and cultivation
requirements. Marcelino Lopez, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al./ Noel Rubber and
Development Corp, et al. vs. Jose Esquivel, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 168734/G.R. No. 170621, April
24, 2009.
Small scale mining permits. Petitioners’ small-scale mining permits are legally questionable.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1899, applications of small-scale miners are processed with the
Director of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7076, which
took effect on 18 July 1991, approval of the applications for mining permits and for mining
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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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contracts are vested in the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. Composed of the DENR
representative, a representative from the small-scale mining sector, a representative from the
big-scale mining industry and a representative from an environmental group, this body is tasked
to approve small-scale mining permits and contracts.
In the case under consideration, petitioners filed their small-scale mining permits on 23 August
1991, making them bound by the procedures provided for under the applicable and prevailing
statute, Republic Act No. 7076. Instead of processing and obtaining their permits from the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioners were able to get the same from the governor of
Davao del Norte. Considering that the governor is without legal authority to issue said mining
permits, the same permits are null and void. Leonora P. Calanza, et al. vs. Paper Industries Corp.,
et al., G.R. No. 146622, April 24, 2009.
Speedy Trial. Under the circumstances of the cases, the right to the accused to a speedy tril was
not violated. Dante Tan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009.
Subpoena; Congress. PS Resolution Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letter-
invitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to appear and testify in connection with the
twin resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006 or in the past Congress. On the
postulate that the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
before and after it, the aforesaid invitations and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the
related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all intents and purposes, terminated. Reghis M.
Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero,
Nathaniel L. Romero and Jerome R. Canals vs. Sen. Jinggoy E. Estrada and Senate Committee on
Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development, G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009.
Usurpation of legislative power. EO 566 in this case is not supported by any enabling law. Since
EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the
CHED’s quasi-legislative power. Review Center Associations of the Philippines vs. Executive
Secretatry Eduardo Ermita, et al. G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009.
Warrantless search. There is no question that the police officers went to the house of petitioner
because of the information relayed by Sunit that petitioner had in his possession illegally cut
lumber. When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying
around the vicinity of petitioner’s house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view
doctrine, objects falling in “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked whether
he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner
merely replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for
his furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate
the lumber. There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. The seizure of the lumber
from petitioner who did not have the required permit to possess the forest products cut is
sanctioned by Section 68 of the Forestry Code. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009.

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 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law
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Warrantless arrest. On whether the police officers had the authority to arrest petitioner, even
without a warrant, Section 80 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or employee of
the DENR or any personnel of the PNP to arrest, even without a warrant, any person who has
committed or is committing in his presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and
to seize and confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense or the forest
products gathered or taken by the offender. Petitioner was in possession of the lumber without
the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court, petitioner
categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as well as the
fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended to use the
lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the
proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but that
is the law. Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009.
Election Law
Election contests. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest
the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1, 2009.
Election protests. Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a petition denominated as a
pre-proclamation case or one seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the ten-
day period for filing an election protest. It is required that the issues raised in such a petition be
restricted to those that may be properly included therein. in the absence of any clear showing or
proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects; appear to
have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress; and/or contain discrepancies in
the votes credited to any candidate, which would affect the result of the election, a petition
cannot be properly considered as a pre-proclamation controversy. The purpose of a pre-
proclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the election on the basis of the
election returns duly authenticated by the board of inspectors and admitted by the board of
canvassers. It is a well-entrenched rule that the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are not
to look beyond or behind electoral returns. A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in
nature. It is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies be summarily
decided, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little
as possible. There is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of
voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical examination. That is why such questions
as those involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the campaign and balloting,
which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in
the corresponding election protest. Harlin Castillo Abayon Vs. Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. No. 181295, April 2, 2009.
Administrative Law
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Dishonesty. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the State’s policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service.And no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the judiciary. Persons involved
in the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the
strictest standards of integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the
assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which requires the
highest standards of ethical standards, persons aspiring for public office must observe honesty,
candor and faithful compliance with the law.
While dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal even at the first instance,
jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court lowered the penalty of dismissal to
suspension taking into account the presence of mitigating circumstances such as length of
service in the government and being a first time offender. Office of the Court Administrator Vs.
Ma. Celia A. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366, April 16, 2009.
Re-assignment; detail. A reassignment is a movement of an employee from one organizational
unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank,
status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment. A detail, on the other
hand, is a movement from one agency to another. National Transmission Corp. Vs. Venusto D.
Hamoy, Jr., G.R. No. 179255. April 2, 2009

May 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decision on Political Law

Based on the Supreme Court’s website (as of today), it appears that only one case decided by the
Supreme Court in May 2009 relates to political law. In Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of
Honorio De Leon, represented by Ambrosio De Leon, the Supreme Court reiterated its previous
rulings that when just compensation for land acquired pursuant to the agrarian reform program
was not yet paid when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (or R.A. No. 6557) took effect,
the provisions of R.A. No. 6557 will apply with respect to the payment of just
compensation. The Supreme Court ruled:
On 15 June 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No. 6657 was
enacted to promote special justice to the landless farmers and provide “a more equitable
distribution and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of landowners to just
compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation.”
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural
lands including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Section 7 provides that
rice and corn lands under P.D. No. 27, among other lands, will comprise phase one of the
acquisition plan and distribution program. Section 75 states that the provisions of P.D. No. 27
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and other laws not inconsistent with R.A. No. 6657 shall have
suppletory effect.

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Furthermore, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Domingo, the Court stressed the duty of
the Court to balance the interests of both the landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries, to wit:
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation. As a concept in the Bill of Rights, just compensation is
defined as the fair market value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell.
Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the redistribution of agricultural
lands shall be “subject to the payment of just compensation.” The deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission on this subject reveal that just compensation should not also make
an insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform. Hence, the landowner’s right to just
compensation should be balanced with agrarian reform. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, we
declared that it is the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged, but this duty
should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth
and justice happen to be on his side.
In the instant case, respondents were furnished with the notice of coverage sometime in 1988
only. Even if respondents’ property were acquired pursuant to P.D. No. 27, the fixing of just
compensation based on the values under P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 would render meaningless
respondents’ right to a just compensation.
Thus, the Court ruled in Paris v. Alfeche that when the passage of R.A. No. 6657 supervened
before the payment of just compensation, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation
would be applicable. The same pronouncement has been reiterated in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Natividad, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Estanislao, Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Domingo and LBP v. Heirs of Cruz.
Pertinently, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of
acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment
of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court ruled that the factors enumerated under
Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been translated into a basic formula by the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657.
Thus, the Court held in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998
should be applied in computing just compensation.
Likewise, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the Court ruled that the applicable
formula in fixing just compensation is DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR
A.O. No. 11, series of 1994, then the governing regulation applicable to compulsory acquisition
of lands, in recognition of the DAR’s rule-making power to carry out the objectives of R.A. No.
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6657. Because the trial court therein based its valuation upon a different formula and did not
conduct any hearing for the reception of evidence, the Court ordered a remand of the case to
the SAC for trial on the merits.
The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining just compensation
has been reiterated recently in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim and Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Cruz, where the Court also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC
for the determination of just compensation strictly in accordance with the applicable DAR
regulation.
Conformably with the aforequoted rulings, the instant case must be remanded to the SAC for the
determination of just compensation in accordance with DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, the
latest DAR issuance on fixing just compensation.
See Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Heirs of Honorio De Leon, represented by Ambrosio De
Leon, G.R. No. 164025, May 8, 2009.

June 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Immunity from suit. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle that
antedates the Constitution. It is a universally recognized principle of international law that
exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdiction of another state. The principle is based on
the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of
public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the
sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen
and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a
suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit
against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agency’s performance
of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where
the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was
issued against a government agency covered by its own charter.
The TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within
its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing,
and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the
existence of state immunity applies – i.e., the public policy reason that the performance
of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the
use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
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Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI and thereby gave its
implied consent to be sued, TESDA’s funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the
valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment. Professional Video, Inc. vs. Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority, G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009.
Just compensation; easement right of way. Easement of right of way falls within the purview of
the power of eminent domain. In installing the 230 KV Talisay-Compostela transmission lines
which traverse respondent’s lands, a permanent limitation is imposed by petitioner National
Power Corporation against the use of the lands for an indefinite period. This deprives respondent
of the normal use of the lands. In fact, not only are the affected areas of the lands traversed by
petitioner’s transmission lines but a portion is used as the site of its transmission tower. Because
of the danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath the high-tension live wires, the
landowner will not be able to use the lands for farming or any agricultural purposes.
Thus, there is no reason to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate courts. Respondent is
entitled to just compensation or the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of
the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
Since the determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings is essentially a
judicial function, the Supreme Court held that the amount of P450 per square meter to be just
and reasonable compensation for the expropriated lands of respondent. National Power
Corporation vs. Carlos Villamor, G.R. No. 160080, June 19, 2009.
Ombudsman; prosecutorial powers. Giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the
Ombudsman shall “exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.”
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office
of the Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. The foregoing ruling of the
Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman
v. Valera, the Supreme Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag,
declared that the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only
act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled that
under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman
and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court’s ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to
prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not
been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress
was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing
the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman. Carmelo Lazatin, et al. vs.
Hon. Aniano A. Disierto, et al., G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009.
Ombudsman; removal powers. The Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority, is vested by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 with the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of
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a public officer or employee found to be at fault. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fernando J.
Beltran, G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009.
Judicial review; actual case. This Supreme Court’s power of review may be awesome, but it is
limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The “case-or-controversy”
requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,” lest
the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. Atty.
Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles,
Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. Speaker
Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16,
2009.
Judicial review; ripeness for adjudication. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is
the requisite of “ripeness.” In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with whether a
case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed
may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first,
the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by
withholding court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in
terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative
road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already
been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step
in. Atty. Oliver O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C.
Nograles, Representative, Majority, House of Representatives / Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs.
Speaker Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883,
June 16, 2009.
Judicial review; standing to sue. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. In the cases at bar,
petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the
standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for
significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for the
illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions. The lack of petitioners’
personal stake in this case is no more evident than in Lozano’sthree-page petition that is devoid
of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting
the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It
is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of
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yet. To be sure, standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is
involved. While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand,
the possible consequence of House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse
petitioners with locus standi under the “transcendental importance” doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived
from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which mandates courts of justice to settle only
“actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi,
evolving from the stringent requirements of “personal injury” to the broader “transcendental
importance” doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the
ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit. Atty. Oliver
O. Lozano and Atty. Evangeline J. Lozano-Endriano vs. Speaker Prospero C. Nograles,
Representative, Majority, House of Representatives/Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. Speaker
Prospero C. Nograles, Representative, Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187883, June 16,
2009.
Speedy disposition of cases. In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has
been violated, the following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons
for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is considered violated only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. In the application of
the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must
also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, the Court denied petitioner’s claim of denial of his right to a speedy
disposition of cases considering that the petitioner in that case chose to remain silent for eight
years before complaining of the delay in the disposition of his case. The Court ruled that
petitioner failed to seasonably assert his right and he merely sat and waited from the time his
case was submitted for resolution. In this case, petitioner similarly failed to assert his right to a
speedy disposition of his case. He did not take any step to accelerate the disposition of his case.
He only invoked his right to a speedy disposition of cases after the Sandiganbayan promulgated
its decision convicting him for malversation of public funds. Petitioner’s silence may be
considered as a waiver of his right. Raul S. Tello vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165781,
June 5, 2009
Undue delegation of legislative power. Revenue Regulations Nos. 9-2003, 22-2003, and
Revenue Memorandum Order No. 6-2003, as pertinent to cigarettes packed by machine, are
invalid insofar as they grant the BIR the power to reclassify or update the classification of new
brands every two years or earlier. Hon. Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar and
Cigarette Factory, et al., G.R. No. 166498. June 11, 2009.

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Local Government Code

Boundary disputes between cities. Now that Makati is already a highly urbanized city, the
parties should follow Section 118(d) of the Local Government Code (LGC) and should opt to
amicably settle this dispute by joint referral to the respective sanggunians of the parties. This has
become imperative because, after all, no attempt had been made earlier to settle the dispute
amicably under the aegis of the LGC. The specific provision of the LGC, now made applicable
because of the altered status of Makati, must be complied with. In the event that no amicable
settlement is reached, as envisioned under Section 118(e) of the LGC, a certification shall be
issued to that effect, and the dispute shall be formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned within
sixty (60) days from the date of the aforementioned certification. In this regard, Rule III of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC shall
govern. Municipality of Pateros vs.The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157714,
June 16, 2009
Administrative and Civil Service Law
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The petitioners failed to appeal the decision of
the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the Commission on Audit to the Commission on
Audit proper before filing the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, in derogation of the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The general rule is that before a party may
seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him
by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving
such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. It is,
therefore, imperative that the Commission Proper be first given the opportunity to review the
decision of the ASB. Only after the Commission shall have acted thereon may a petition
for certiorari be brought to the Supreme Court by the aggrieved party. While the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, the Supreme Court did not find any
cogent reason to apply the cited exceptions to the instant case. The non-observance of the
doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. Joseph
Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009.
Preventive suspension. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension
pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by
the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is
exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure
intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by
preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If
the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension
will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation,
respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. Civil
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Service Commission, Anicia De Lima, in her capacity as Regional Director of CSC-NCR vs. Larry
M. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009.

Public officers; power of appointment. Well-settled is the rule that an oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Since
petitioner petitioner took his oath and assumed office only on February 26, it was only then that
his right to enter into the position became plenary and complete. Prior to such
oath, Gasgonia still had the right to exercise the functions of her office. It is also well to note that
per certification issued by Raymond C. Santiago, Accountant of PCUP, Gasgonia received her
last salary for the period covering February 1-25, 2001; and petitioner received his first salary for
the period covering February 26 to March 7, 2001.
Clearly, at the time of respondent’s appointment on February 23, Gasgonia still was the rightful
occupant of the position and was, therefore, authorized to extend a valid promotional
appointment. Chairman Percival C. Chavez, Chair and Chief Executive
Officer, Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor vs. Lourdes R. Ronidel and Honorable
Court of Appeals 9th Division, G.R. No. 180941, June 11, 2009.
Public officers; honorarium. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of
obligation but in appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of
services which admit of no compensation in money. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9184 uses the word
“may” which signifies that the honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right.
The government is not unmindful of the tasks that may be required of government employees
outside of their regular functions. It agrees that they ought to be compensated;
thus, honoraria are given as a recompense for their efforts and performance
of substantially similar duties, with substantially similar degrees
of responsibility and accountability. However, the payment of honoraria to the members of
the BAC and the TWG must be circumscribed by applicable rules and guidelines prescribed by
the DBM, as provided by law. Section 15 of R.A. No. 9185 is explicit as it states: “For this
purpose, the DBM shall promulgate the necessary guidelines.” The word “shall” has always
been deemed mandatory, and not merely directory. Thus, in this case, petitioners should have
first waited for the rules and guidelines of the DBM before payment of the honoraria. As the
rules and guidelines were still forthcoming, petitioners could not just award themselves the
straight amount of 25% of their monthly basic salaries as honoraria. This is not
the intendment of the law. Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, G.R. No. 177011, June
5, 2009.
Election law
Disqualification for public office. R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign

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country. The law provides that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
In the instant case, petitioner’s Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Candidacy did not comply
with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in
the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner
failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice-
mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections. Roseller De Guzman vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009.
Election case; moot. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between
the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Courts will not
determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. It is
unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question, as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.
Since the present Petition is grounded on petitioner Baldo’s specific objections to the 26 ERs in
the previous local elections, no practical or useful purpose would be served by still passing on
the merits thereof. Even if the Court sets aside the assailed COMELEC Resolutions and orders the
exclusion of the disputed ERs from the canvass of votes, and as a result thereof,
petitioner Baldo would emerge as the winning candidate for municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay,
in the 10 May 2004 local elections, it would be an empty victory. It is already impossible for
petitioner Baldo to still assume office as municipal mayor of Camalig, Albay, elected in the 10
May 2004 local elections, since his tenure as such had ended on 30 June 2007.
Petitioner Baldo himself is currently occupying the very same office as the winning candidate in
the 14 May 2007 local elections. Irrefragably, the Court can no longer grant to
petitioner Baldo any practical relief capable of enforcement. Consequently, the Court is left with
no other recourse than to dismiss the instant Petition on the ground of mootness. Carlos Irwin
G. Baldo vs.Commission on Elections. et al., G.R. No. 176135, June 16, 2009.

Agrarian law
Jurisidiction; DAR. Under Section 50 of Rep. Act No. 6657, the DAR is vested with
“primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.”
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted
to agriculture. Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other
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agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. Zosimo Octavio and
Jesus Albona (substituted by his wife, Violeta Albona) vs. Enrico R. Perovano, G.R. No. 172400,
June 23, 2009.
Jurisdiction; DAR. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.
Further exception to the DAR’s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA
No. 6657 is vested in the courts. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rene Ralla Belista, G.R. No.
164631. June 26, 2009.
Just compensation; determination. The procedure for the determination of compensation cases
under Republic Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court, commences with the valuation by
the LBP of the lands taken by the State from private owners under the land reform program.
Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner
through a written notice. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a
summary administrative proceeding is held and, afterwards, depending on the value of the land,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD), or the DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the landowner still does
not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian
Court.
In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is a necessity that
the RTC takes into account several factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No.
6657. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie Plantation
Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No.
178097, June 25, 2009.

Tenants. Tenants are defined as persons who — in themselves and with the aid available from
within their immediate farm households — cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by
another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain
or ascertainable in produce or money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.
Based on the foregoing definition of a tenant, entrenched in jurisprudence are the following
essential elements of tenancy: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
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about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant
or agricultural lessee. The presence of all these elements must be proved by substantial evidence.
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure and is not covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do
not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Joaquin Soliman, et al., vs. Pampanga Sugar
Development Company (PASUDECO), Inc., and Gerry Rodriguez, G.R. No. 169589, June 16,
2009.
Tenants. The CA held that there is no tenancy relationship between the private respondents and
petitioners Apolonia, Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona due to the absence of personal
cultivation of the subject landholding by the latter
In arriving at such a finding, the appellate court gave full credence to the evidence proffered by
private respondents showing that the aforementioned petitioners are not residents of the locality
where the subject landholding is and neither are they tenants of any lot thereat. The evidence,
among others, consists of the Certification dated October 9, 2003 issued by
the Barangay Captain of Mauban, now Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan, stating that Apolonia,
Carlos, Lourdes and Rogelio Tarona are not residents therein and that they do not personally
cultivate the subject property; and the Certification of the election officer of Caloocan City
showing that said persons are residents and registered voters of Caloocan City.
We find no reason to disturb the aforesaid finding of the CA. Clearly, private respondents’
evidence, which significantly the petitioners failed to refute, more than substantially proved
the impossibility of personal cultivation. Petitioners (intervenors) have already left the place
where the subject land lies in Morong, Bataan, and now live in another locality which is in
Caloocan City. Since Bataan is of a considerable distance from Caloocan City, it would
undeniably be physically impossible for the petitioners to personally cultivate the
landholding. Leonardo Tarona, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.G.R. No. 170182. June 18,
2009

July 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Double positions. The office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: “No Senator
or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments

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thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.” Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009.
Illegal search. Even assuming that petitioner or any lawful occupant of the house was not
present when the search was conducted, the search was done in the presence of at least two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Manalo was the barangay
chairman of the place while Velasco was petitioner’s employee. Petitioner herself signed the
certification of orderly search when she arrived at her residence. Clearly, the requirements of
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were complied with by the police authorities who
conducted the search. Further, petitioner failed to substantiate her allegation that she was just
forced to sign the search warrant, inventory receipt, and the certificate of orderly search. In fact,
the records show that she signed these documents together with three other persons, including
the barangay chairman who could have duly noted if petitioner was really forced to sign the
documents against her will.
Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. However, in this case, the
Supreme Court sustained the validity of the search conducted in petitioner’s residence and, thus,
the articles seized during the search are admissible in evidence against petitioner. Rosario
Panuncio vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165678, July 17, 2009.
Just compensation. Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 applies only if the amount of just
compensation of lands acquired through Presidential Decree No. 27 remains unresolved despite
the passage of RA No. 6657. It is only in such a case, and to such extent only, that this provision
on the determination of just compensation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
of 1988 is made to apply retrospectively. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Josefina R. Dumlao,
et al., G.R. No. 167809, July 23, 2009.
Landholding limitation. Section 11 of Article XIV of the governing 1973 Constitution states that
“no private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license, or permit, timber
or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares.”
Complementing this provision was Chapter I, No. 3(e) of Forestry Administrative Order (FAO)
No. 11 prohibiting any individual, corporation, partnership, or association from acquiring a
timber license or license agreement covering an area in excess of 100,000 hectares. Likewise,
Chapter I, No. 3(d) of FAO No. 11 states that no individual corporation, partnership, or
association who is already a holder of an ordinary timber license or license agreement nor any
member of the family, incorporator, director, stockholder, or member of such individual,
corporation, partnership, or association shall be allowed to acquire a new timber license or
license agreement or any interest or participation in it.
The constitutional and statutory limitations on allowable area leases and concessions were
obviously meant to prevent the concentration of large tracts of public land in the hands of a
single individual. Republic of the Philippines vs. Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., et al., G.R. No.
164800, July 22, 2009.
Party List. There are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
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1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is
the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is
automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-
list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat
allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.
3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats,
shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two
percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to
the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold
mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The
additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according
to the two-step procedure laid down in the Supreme Court’s Decision of 21 April 2009 as
clarified in this Resolution.
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to
prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution
because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system.
The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is
not violative of the Constitution. BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271/G.R. No. 179295,
July 8, 2009.
Private corporations. Congress cannot enact a law creating a private corporation with a special
charter. Such legislation would be unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a
general law. If the corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated
differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private corporations.
Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except that the Cooperative Code
governs the incorporation of cooperatives. The Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation. The PNRC should
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.Dante Liban, et al. vs. Richard J.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009.
Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation. It is settled that it is the allegations in
the Information that determine the nature of the offense, not the technical name given by the
public prosecutor in the preamble of the Information. From a legal point of view, and in a very
real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which
he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the
facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical
and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth.

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Gauging such standard against the wording of the Information in this case, the Supreme Court
held that there was no violation of petitioner’s rights. The recital of facts and circumstances in
the Information sufficiently constitutes the crime of qualified theft. Sheala P. Matrido vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 179061, July 13, 2009.
Search warrants. Under Section 12, Chapter V of the Guidelines on the Selection and
Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties, as
embodied in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,The Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official
leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by
Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their respective duly
authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and
Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts. Re: Request of the Police Director General
Avelino I. Razon for authority to delegate the endorsement of application for search
warrant, A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC, July 7, 2009.
Security of tenure. Article IX (B), Section 2(3) of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that
“[n]o officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.” The aforementioned constitutional provision does not distinguish between a
regular employee and a probationary employee.
The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure in the civil service has two legal ramifications.
In Tria v. Chairman Patricia Sto. Tomas, et al., the Supreme Court held that the prohibition
against suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee of the Civil Service “except for cause
provided by law” is “a guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process.” “Not only
must removal or suspension be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, but also
they can only be made on the basis of a valid cause provided by law.”
Procedural due process basically requires that suspension or dismissal comes only after notice
and hearing. Thus, the minimum requirements of due process are: (1) that the employees or
officers must be informed of the charges preferred against them, and the formal way by which
the employees or officers are informed is by furnishing them with a copy of the charges made
against them; and (2) that they must have a reasonable opportunity to present their side of the
matter, that is to say, their defenses against the charges and to present evidence in support of
their defenses

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Here, the ground the petitioner invoked is not sufficient basis for the respondent’s dismissal, and
her dismissal was effected without the observance of both procedural and substantive due
process. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rowena O. Paden, G.R. No. 157607, July 7, 2009.
Writ of habeas corpus. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom.
Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very entity tasked to ensure
the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike) within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant
in extending the habeas corpus remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of
liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ but also waters down the
precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that
guarantees protection to the right is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly
confine the writ of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will betray its
constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights.
Here, petitioner’s continued imprisonment is by virtue of a valid judgment and court
process. Martin Gibbs Fletcher vs. The Director of Bureau of Corrections or his
representative, UDK-14071, July 17, 2009.

Election Law
Appeal fee; election cases. Considering that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15,
2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, and to further affirm the discretion granted to the
Comelec which it precisely articulated through the specific guidelines contained in said
Resolution, the Supreme Court declared that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of
its decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees
in election cases are no longer excusable. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
Appreciation of ballots. Appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves
a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMRLEC, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion
or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual findings, conclusions, rulings and
decisions rendered by the Comelec on matters falling within its competence shall not be
interfered with by this Court. Salvador Divinagracia, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A.
Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016, July 27, 2009.
COMELEC; interlocutory order. Since the COMELEC’s Division issued the interlocutory Order,
the same COMELEC Division should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is neither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to
the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevate the issue to this Court via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia
G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009.
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COMELEC; cancellation of COC. Under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), a
false representation of material fact in the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) is a ground for the
denial or cancellation of the COC. The false representation must pertain to a material fact that
affects the right of the candidate to run for the election for which he filed his COC. Such
material fact refers to a candidate’s eligibility or qualification for elective office like citizenship,
residence or status as a registered voter. Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false
representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC.
In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine
whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.
If the candidate states a material representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is
empowered to deny due course to or cancel the COC. The person whose COC is denied due
course or cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC is not treated as a candidate at all, as if such
person never filed a COC. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs. Commssion on Elections and Mohammad
Ali “Mericano” A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
COMELEC; orders of division. Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised
before the COMELEC en banc. Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that
only motions for reconsideration of final decisions shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It
is clear from the foregoing constitutional provision that the COMELEC en banc shall decide
motions for reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division, meaning those acts having a final
character. Here, the assailed Second Division order did not completely dispose of the case, as
there was something more to be done, which was to decide the election protest. Being
interlocutory, the assailed Second Division orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC en
banc. Eddie T. Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July
15, 2009.
COMELEC; powers. The COMELEC has broad power, derived from our fundamental law, to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall; its power of supervision and control over boards of election
inspectors and boards of canvassers; the concomitant need to do everything in its power to
secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections; the grant to it of broad and
flexible powers to effectively perform its duties and to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections; and its role as the guardian of the people’s sacred right of suffrage.
In particular, the statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the boards of
canvassers includes the power to revise or reverse the action of the boards, as well as to do what
the boards should have done. Such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such
steps or actions as may be required pursuant to law, like reviewing the actions of the board;
conducting an inquiry affecting the genuineness of election returns beyond the election records
of the polling places involved; annulling canvass or proclamations based on incomplete returns
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or on incorrect or tampered returns; invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in an

unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because
the board did not meet at all; or requiring the board to convene. Rafael Flauta, Jr., et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009.
COMELEC; protests. Under Section 2(2), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC
exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials. Since the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s
election protest, it has the authority to issue the assailed Orders. Eddie T.
Panlilio vs. Commission on Elections and Lilia G. Pineda, G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009.
Double registration. Maruhom, at the time she filed her COC, could not have honestly declared
therein that she was a registered voter of Marantao and an eligible candidate for mayor of the
said municipality. It is incumbent upon Maruhom to truthfully state her eligibility in her COC,
especially so because the COC is filled up under oath. An elective office is a public trust. He
who aspires for elective office should not make a mockery of the electoral process by falsely
representing himself. Jamela Salic Maruhom vs. Commssion on Elections and Mohammad Ali
“Mericano” A. Abinal, G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009.
Estoppel by laches. The doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election cases. It has been
applied in at least two cases involving the payment of filing fees. Salvador Divinagracia,
Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Alex A. Centena, G.R. Nos. 186007 & G.R. No. 186016,
July 27, 2009.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Constitution mandates that the HRET
“shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” of its
members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the
HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is exclusive and exhaustive.
Its exercise of power is intended to be its own — full, complete and unimpaired.
Due regard and respect for the authority of the HRET as an independent constitutional body
require that any finding of grave abuse of discretion against that body should be based on firm
and convincing proof, not on shaky assumptions. Any accusation of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the HRET must be established by a clear showing of arbitrariness and improvidence.
The Supreme Court did not find evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET.
At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of
election contests involving its members, the Supreme Court cannot substitute its own sense or
judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial
revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the
revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. That is
what petitioner actually wants the Supreme Court to do. But in the exercise of its checking
function, the Supreme Court should merely test whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or had a
different view. Henry “June” Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes, G.R. No. 185401, July 21, 2009.
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August 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional law
Congress; legislative immunity. The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on
the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution.
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and
distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against
them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution
of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this
representative body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not
interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the
legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity
and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter. Antero J. Pobre vs. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C.
No. 7399. August 25, 2009.
Double jeopardy; judgment of acquittal. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites
are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable. It is also immediately executory and
the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. The
Constitution has expressly adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal
trials, thereby conclusively presuming that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the
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accused has been confirmed by a previous final judgment. Further prosecution via an appeal
from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already been
afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after failing to
persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the
defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of
conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated
by a government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness
and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any
weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second
opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards
of reason, justice and conscience.
Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment
of acquittal through either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal
by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. People of the
Philippines vs. Dir. Cesar P. Nazareno, Dir. Evelino Nartatez, Dir. Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio and
The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 168982, August 5, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compemsation. Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as
sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and
payment ofjust compensation.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated.
Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value of the property are the
cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential uses, and in the
particular case of lands, their size, shape, location, and the tax declarations thereon. The
measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair
not only to the owner but also to the taker.
Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the
owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the government takes possession
before the institution of expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of
the taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing
of the complaint should be the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the
property involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that “[u]pon the rendition of the order of
expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken.” However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67
presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the
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expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated

procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67,
including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and
the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the
Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer
applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable. Republic of the Philippines through
the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Court of Appeals and Rosario Rodriguez
Reyes,G.R. No. 160379, August 14, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the
computation of just compensation. The former uses average crop harvest as a consideration,
whereas, the latter uses the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors as factors for consideration in determining just compensation.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands were acquired under PD 27.
Moreover, it is also undisputed that just compensation has not yet been settled prior to the
passage of RA 6657. Thus, the issue to be determined is what law shall govern in the
determination of just compensation.
If just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in
accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under PD 27. Department of
Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009.
Eminent domain; taking. It is the date of the issuance of emancipation patents that should serve
as the reckoning point for purposes of computation of just compensation. Copies of the
emancipation patents issued to the farmer-beneficiaries, however, have not been attached to the
records of the case. Department of Agrarian Reform (etc.) vs. Carmen S. Tongson, G.R. No.
171674, August 4, 2009.
Free access clause; court filing fees. The basis for the exemption from legal and filing fees is the
free access clause, embodied in Sec. 11, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
The importance of the right to free access to the courts and quasi judicial bodies and to
adequate legal assistance cannot be denied. A move to remove the provision on free access
from the Constitution on the ground that it was already covered by the equal protection clause
was defeated by the desire to give constitutional stature to such specific protection of the poor.
In implementation of the right of free access under the Constitution, the Supreme Court
promulgated rules, specifically, Sec. 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and Sec. 19, Rule 141, Rules of
Court.
The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court
indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality
separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among others, it has the
power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil or
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criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. As a juridical
person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to
indigent litigants. Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi re exemption from legal and filing fees of the
Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August 19, 2009.
Laws; presumption of constitutionality. Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who
petition the court to declare a law unconstitutional must show thta there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative
one. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs.Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
177508, August 7, 2009.
Laws; title. Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll
automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election
returns. Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title
nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369.
The constitutional requirement that “every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” has always been given a practical rather
than a technical construction. The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough
to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The title of
a law does not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the
text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. Moreover, a title which
declares a statute to be an act to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of
the amendatory act need not be further stated.
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled ‘An
Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May
11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises,
to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related
Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.’” Clearly, the subject matter of
RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), Republic Act
No. 7166 (RA 7166), and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting
transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections. The provisions of RA 9369
assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881,
specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively;
and (2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions
are germane to the subject matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among
others. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
177508, August 7, 2009.

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Non-impairment of contract. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes
the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at poll
election day. Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their
right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner
adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non- impairment clause is limited
in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes
the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those
agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable right or
demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to
the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their
respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated
in their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
community. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT)
Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 177508,
August 7, 2009.
Presidential electoral tribunal. Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 of RA 9369 violate
Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution for encroaching
upon the jurisdiciton of the PET and the SET.
Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the
SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en banc,
on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are exercised on different occasions and for
different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. The jurisdiction of the PET
and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial
candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37, Congress and
the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial
candidates. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
177508, August 7, 2009.

Strike; illegal strike. It is hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private sector
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employees to strike is not absolute (see Section 3 of Article XIII of the

Constitution). A. Soriano Aviation vs. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation, et al., G.R.
No. 166879, August 14, 2009.
Taxation; double taxation. Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it
should be taxed only once; that is, “taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for
the same thing.” It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once.
Otherwise described as “direct duplicate taxation,” the two taxes must be imposed on the same
subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction,
during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or character.
Using the aforementioned test, the Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent
is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these
are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter – the privilege of doing business in the City of
Manila; (2) for the same purpose – to make persons conducting business within the City of
Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority – petitioner City of Manila;
(4) within the same taxing jurisdiction – within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila;
(5) for the same taxing periods – per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character – a
local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business. The City of Manila, Liberty
M. Toledo in her capacity as the Treasurer of Manila, et al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 181845, August 4, 2009.
Warrantless search; plain view doctrine. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the
door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved
in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt.
German Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009.

Public Officers
Practice of profession. Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and
transactions of public officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in
the private practice of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public
official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following

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conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second,
the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private
practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the
one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period
applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work
with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and
serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions
between a former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues,
subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of
every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public.
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
also applies.
A clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her separation from
the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section 7
of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot practice her profession
within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. Query of Atty. Karen
M. Silverio-Buffe, former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, on the prohibition from
engaging in the private practice of law, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009.
Agrarian law
Tenants. To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of the rights and privileges granted
by the said decree, the claimant must be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or
more; (2) must have built his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for
the last ten (10) years. The “tenant” covered by PD 1517 is, as defined under Section 3(f) thereof,
“the rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose presence on
the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by
force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation.”
Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation of land is devoid of any legal authority
or those whose contracts of lease are already terminated, or had already expired, or whose
possession is under litigation are not considered “tenants” under the decree. Conversely, a
legitimate tenant is one who is not a usurper or an occupant by tolerance. The petitioners-
defendants whose occupation has been merely by the owner’s tolerance obviously fall outside
the coverage of PD 1517 and cannot seek its protection. Francisco Madrid and Edgardo
Bernardo vs. Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R. No. 150887, August 14,
2009.

Election Law
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COMELEC; powers. We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution
gave the COMELEC the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
election laws.
Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to “investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.” This was an important
innovation introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in the 1935 or 1973]
Constitutions. The phrase “[w]here appropriate” leaves to the legislature the power to determine
the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or concurrently with
other prosecuting arms of the government. Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) Partylist represented by Salvador B. Britanico vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009.

October 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Bail. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that “All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.”
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons
in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with
a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The People of the
Philippines vs.Luis Plaza y Bucalon, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; powers. The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
government, has statutory authority to establish rules and regulations to promote efficiency and
professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the power to issue rules
and regulations and to review appointments. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et
al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009.
Commission on Audit; powers. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by P.D. No.
1445, the COA, as one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is specifically
vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in
trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations. To ensure the effective discharge of its
functions, it is vested with ample powers, subject to constitutional limitations, to define the
scope of its audit and examination and establish the techniques and methods required therefor,
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to promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention
and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Clearly, the matter of allowing or disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the
primary power of the COA to decide. This no doubt includes money claims arising from the
implementation of R.A. No. 6758. Respondents’ claim against petitioner, although it has already
been validated by the trial court’s final decision, likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence,
it must first be filed with the COA before execution could proceed. And from the decision
therein, the aggrieved party is afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this Court via a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules of
Procedure. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No.
166508, October 2, 2009.
COMELEC; certiorari. It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, what
may be brought to this Court on certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en
banc. However, this rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself
and deprives the en banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like in this
case.
In this case, the First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions of the Constitution
and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure when it resolved petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
of its final Order dated November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioner’s appeal. By arrogating
unto itself a power constitutionally lodged in the Commission en banc, the First Division of the
COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by
the First Division of the COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is null and void. Carmelinda C. Barror vs. The Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009.
COMELEC; powers. The COMELEC under our governmental structure is a constitutional
administrative agency and its powers are essentially executive in nature (i.e., to enforce and
administer election laws), quasi-judicial (to exercise original jurisdiction over election contests
of regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over election contests of other
lower ranking officials), and quasi-legislative (rulemaking on all questions affecting elections
and the promulgation of its rules of procedure).
Historically, the COMELEC has always been an administrative agency whose powers have been
increased from the 1935 Constitution to the present one, to reflect the country’s awareness of
the need to provide greater regulation and protection to our electoral processes to ensure their
integrity.
The COMELEC’s adjudicative function is quasi-judicial since it is a constitutional body, other
than a court, vested with authority to decide election contests, and in the course of the exercise
of its jurisdiction, to hold hearings and exercise discretion of a judicial nature; it receives
evidence, ascertain the facts from these submissions, determine the law and the legal rights of
the parties, and on the basis of all these decides on the merits of the case and renders judgment.
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Despite the exercise of discretion that is essentially judicial in character, particularly with
respect to election contests, COMELEC is not a tribunal within the judicial branch of
government and is not a court exercising judicial power in the constitutional sense; hence, its
adjudicative function, exercised as it is in the course of administration and enforcement, is
quasi-judicial.
The 1973 Constitution used the unique wording that the COMELEC shall “be the sole judge of
all contests,” thus giving the appearance that judicial power had been conferred. This
phraseology, however, was changed in the 1987 Constitution to give the COMELEC “exclusive
jurisdiction over all contests,” thus removing any vestige of exercising its adjudicatory power as
a court and correctly aligning it with what it is – a quasi-judicial body.Consistent with the
characterization of its adjudicatory power as quasi-judicial, the judicial review of COMELEC en
banc decisions (together with the review of Civil Service Commission decisions) is via the
prerogative writ of certiorari, not through an appeal, as the traditional mode of review of quasi-
judicial decisions of administrative tribunals in the exercise the Court’s supervisory authority.
This means that the Court will not supplant the decision of the COMELEC as a quasi-judicial
body except where a grave abuse of discretion or any other jurisdictional error exists. Joselito R.
Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308,
October 15, 2009.
COMELEC; decisions. Petitioners argue that the February 28, 2003 resolution of the COMELEC
violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states that “no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based.” The COMELEC allegedly made generalizations without detailing the basis for its
findings.
The assailed resolution substantially complied with the constitutional mandate of Article VIII,
Section 14 of the Constitution. The resolution detailed the evidence presented by the
parties. Thereafter, it weighed the respective pieces of evidence submitted by the prosecution
and the defense and chose the one that deserved credence. It contained findings of facts as well
as an application of case law.
The purpose of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution is to inform the person reading the
decision, especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after a consideration of the
pertinent facts and an examination of the applicable laws. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, if he believes that the decision
should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on
which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially
prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for
review by a higher tribunal. Thus, a decision is adequate if a party desiring to appeal therefrom
can assign errors to it. Roberto Albaña, et al. vs. Pio Jude Belo, et al., G.R. No. 158734,
October 2, 2009.
COMELEC; due process. Based on the pleadings filed, there is no factual and legal basis for the
petitioner to complain of denial of his hearing stage rights. In the first place, he does not dispute
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that he fully participated in the proceedings of the election protest until the case was deemed
submitted for resolution; he had representation at the revision of the ballots, duly presented his
evidence, and summed up his case through a memorandum. These various phases of the
proceedings constitute the hearing proper of the election contest and the COMELEC has more
than satisfied the opportunity to be heard that the Ang Tibay hearing stage rights require. In
these proceedings, the petitioner stood head-to-head with the respondent in an adversarial
contest where both sides were given their respective rights to speak, make their presentations,
and controvert each other’s submission, subject only to established COMELEC rules of
procedures. Under these undisputed facts, both parties had their day in court, so to speak, and
neither one can complain of any denial of notice or of the right to be heard. Joselito R. Mendoza
vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15,
2009.
Eminent domain; damages. In taking respondents’ property without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and without payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter
disregard of respondents’ proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court.
For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to
respondents. Again, in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that
the government agency’s illegal occupation of the owner’s property for a very long period of
time surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs.. Jovito M.
Luis, et al. G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009
Eminent domain; estoppel. Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to
question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990’s)
and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito
Luis, one of the respondents, testified that “when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor
Caruncho we always asked for compensation.” It is likewise undisputed that what was
constructed by the city government on respondents’ property was a road for public use, namely,
A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped
from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation. Hon. Vicente P.
Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. In fixing the just compensation in the present case, the trial
court, adopting the market data approach on which Commissioner Chua relied, merely put
premium on the location of the property and the crops planted thereon which are not among the
factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. And the trial court did not apply the formula
provided in DAR AO 6-92, as amended. This is a clear departure from the settled doctrine
regarding the mandatory nature of Section 17 of RA 6657 and the DAR issuances implementing
it.
Not only did Commissioner Chua not consider Section 17 of RA 6657 and DAR AO 6-92, as
amended, in his appraisal of the property. His conclusion that the market data approach
conformed with statutory and regulatory requirements is bereft of basis. Department of Agrarian

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Reform, rep. OIC-Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman vs. Jose Marie Rufino, et al., G.R. No.
175644/G.R. No. 175702, October 2, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. With regard to the time as to when just compensation
should be fixed, it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof
before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the
time of taking that is controlling. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No.
162474, October 13, 2009.
Eminent domain; just compensation. Petitioner’s interpretation is flawed. In the recent case of
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, the Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No.
6657 is the relevant law for determining just compensation after noting several decided cases
where the Court found it more equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of
the property at the time of payment. This was a clear departure from the Court’s earlier stance in
Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it declared that the reckoning period for the
determination of just compensation is the time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27
and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving lands placed
under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just compensation had not
been completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of just
compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation
control. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. J. L. Jocson and Sons, G.R. No. 180803, October 23,
2009.
Eminent domain; prescription. Where private property is taken by the Government for public
use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the
owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe. Hon. Vicente P.
Eusebio, et al. vs. Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
Right to be informed. Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal
offense has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
Rules of Court, in implementing the right, specifically require that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense, including the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances, must be stated in ordinary and concise language, not necessarily in the language
used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged and the attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances
present, so that the accused can properly defend himself and the court can pronounce judgment.
To broaden the scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon motion of the accused,
of an Information that fails to allege the acts constituting the offense. Jurisprudence has laid
down the fundamental test in appreciating a motion to quash an Information grounded on the
insufficiency of the facts alleged therein. Jose C. Go vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No.
178429, October 23, 2009.
Public Officers
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Mass appointments. It is not difficult to see the reasons behind the prohibition on mass
appointments before and after the elections. Appointments are banned prior to the elections to
ensure that partisan loyalties will not be a factor in the appointment process, and to prevent
incumbents from gaining any undue advantage during the elections. To this end, appointments
within a certain period of time are proscribed by the Omnibus Election Code and related
issuances. After the elections, appointments by defeated candidates are prohibited, except under
the circumstances mentioned in CSC Resolution No. 010988, to avoid animosities between
outgoing and incoming officials, to allow the incoming administration a free hand in
implementing its policies, and to ensure that appointments and promotions are not used as a
tool for political patronage or as a reward for services rendered to the outgoing local officials.
Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections by defeated officials are invalid. CSC
Resolution No. 010988 does not purport to nullify all “mass appointments.” However, it must
be shown that the appointments have undergone the regular screening process, that the
appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy immediately, and that the
appointments are not in bulk. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No.
181559, October 2, 2009.
Administrative Law
Cardinal rights; administrative proceedings. The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the
substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of
due process is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements
for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of
due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are
reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing.
These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those
presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself
and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-
judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is
similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state
distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness
that underlies due process, this is the “duty to give reason” to enable the affected person to
understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to
public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the
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decision-maker. R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R.

No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is true that the general rule is that before a party is
allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction,
then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there are several exceptions to
this rule.
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court
and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of
law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise
of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the
Legislature may establish. Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya vs. Hon. Mariano M. Malones,
etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009.
Election Law
Pre-proclamation controversy. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code limits a pre-
proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated therein. The enumeration is restrictive
and exclusive. Resultantly, the petition for a pre-proclamation controversy must fail in the
absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or
contain material defects (Section 234, Omnibus Election Code); or appear to have been
tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (Section 235, Omnibus Election Code); or
contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the
result of the election (Section 236, Omnibus Election Code).
To be noted, too, is that in a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is restricted to an
examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the
election returns and to investigate election irregularities. For as long as the election returns
appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their faces, the Board of Canvassers cannot
look beyond or behind the election returns in order to verify allegations of irregularities in the
casting or counting of votes. Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on Elections
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(En Banc), The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E. Hayundini, G.R. No.
181869, October 2, 2009.
Residency requirement. The issue of petitioner’s disqualification for failure to comply with the
one-year residency requirement has been resolved by this Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v.
Commission on Elections and Malik “Bobby” T. Alingan. This case stemmed from the first
disqualification case filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611.
Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of Candidacy subject of the
disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition and found that petitioner failed to
comply with the one-year residency requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from running
as mayor of Pantar. Norlainie Mitmug Limbona vs. Commssion on Elections and Malik “Bobby”
T. Alingan, G.R. No. 186006, October 16, 2009.
Statistical improbability doctrine. Under Lagumbay, the doctrine of statistical improbability is
applied only where the unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the
candidates belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates of all the
opposing parties appear in the election return. The doctrine has no application where there is
neither uniformity of tallies nor systematic blanking of the candidates of one party. Thus, the
bare fact that a candidate for public office received no votes in one or two precincts, standing
alone and without more, cannot adequately support a finding that the subject election returns
are statistically improbable. Verily, a zero vote for a particular candidate in the election returns
is but one strand in the web of circumstantial evidence that the electoral returns were prepared
under duress, force and intimidation.
The Court has thus warned that the doctrine of statistical improbability must be restrictively
viewed, with the utmost care being taken lest in penalizing fraudulent and corrupt practices –
which is truly called for – innocent voters become disenfranchised, a result that hardly
commends itself. Such prudential approach makes us dismiss Suhuri’s urging that some of the
electoral results had been infected with the taint of statistical improbability as to warrant their
exclusion from the canvass in a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, his petition and the
records nowhere show that his party-mates received a similar number of votes (or lack of any)
by which to conclude that there were a unique uniformity of tally and a systematic blanking of
other candidates belonging to one party.Ismunlatip H. Suhuri vs. The Honorable Commssion on
Elections (En Banc), The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Patikul, Sulu and Kabir E.
Hayundini, G.R. No. 181869, October 2, 2009.

November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. TThe Civil Service Commission (CSC) Caraga has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of
dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP examination irregularity.

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The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career
service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975
(1990) or the “Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990” provides that the
“Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department,” to which herein petitioner belongs.
Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the “Administrative Code of 1987,” enumerates
the powers and functions of the CSC. In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations specifically confers upon the CSC the authority to take
cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with the examinations. To carry out
this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases
involving CSC examination anomalies.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the
conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity
committed by the petitioner. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
179370, November 18, 2009.

Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service
Commission that the appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the
administrative cases filed against erring employees is in connection with the duties and
functions of their office, and not in cases where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in
the civil service examinations. Eugenio S. Capablanca vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
179370, November 18, 2009.
Constitutionality; equal protection. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is
found under its Section 2, Article III, which provides: “Nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.” Essentially, the equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under
the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial
distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or
circumstances, they may be treated differently in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the
conclusion that no basis exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law
can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the Constitution
itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to length of
term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while
the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it
left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation
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for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-
uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard
because the challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay
officials and all other elective officials. This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the
retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any retroactive
application. Commission on Elections vs.Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20,
2009.
Constitutionality; lis mota. In its last-ditch effort to salvage its case, SEM contends that
Proclamation No. 297, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and declaring the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area as a mineral reservation, is invalid on the ground that it lacks the
concurrence of Congress as mandated by Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution; Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 3092; Section 14 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987; Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 7586, and Section 4(a) of
Republic Act No. 6657.

It is well-settled that when questions of constitutionality are raised, the court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and
appropriate case exists; (2) there is a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Taking into consideration the foregoing requisites of judicial review, it is readily clear that the
third requisite is absent. The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised at the trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. Apex
Mining Co. Inc. Vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al., G.R. No. 152613/G.R. No.
152628, November 20, 2009.
Constitutionality; one subject one title rule. Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one
subject-one title rule.
First, the title of RA No. 9164, “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991,” states the law’s general subject matter – the amendment of
the LGC to synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve
synchronization of the barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of
the terms of office of barangay officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length
of term is term limitation which defines the total number of terms for which a barangayofficial

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may run for and hold office. This natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign
to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they
represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the law’s provisions. Term
limitation therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and
the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title
an index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional
requirement contemplates. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616,
November 20, 2009.
Constitutionality; political question. Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to
determine by legislation not only the duration of the term of barangay officials, but also the
application to them of a consecutive term limit. Congress invariably exercised this authority
when it enacted no less than six (6) barangay-related laws since 1987.
Through all these statutory changes, Congress had determined at its discretion both the length of
the term of office of barangay officials and their term limitation. Given the textually
demonstrable commitment by the 1987 Constitution to Congress of the authority to determine
the term duration and limition of barangay officials under the Constitution, we consider it
established that whatever Congress, in its wisdom, decides on these matters are political
questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny, subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of the
courts provided under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution and to the judicial authority to
invalidate any law contrary to the Constitution.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government; it is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” These questions, previously
impervious to judicial scrutiny can now be inquired into under the limited window provided by
Section 1, Article VIII.
Other than the Section 1, Article VIII route, courts can declare a law invalid when it is contrary
to any provision of the Constitution. This requires the appraisal of the challenged law against the
legal standards provided by the Constitution, not on the basis of the wisdom of the enactment.
To justify its nullification, the breach of the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, not a
doubtful or equivocal one, as every law enjoys a strong presumption of constitutionality. These
are the hurdles that those challenging the constitutional validity of a law must
overcome. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20,
2009.
Constitutionality; retroactivity. The constitutional challenge must fail for a more fundamental
reason – the respondents’ retroactivity objection does not involve a violation of any
constitutional standard.

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Retroactivity of laws is a matter of civil law, not of a constitutional law, as its governing law is
the Civil Code, not the Constitution. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. The application of the Civil Code is of course
self-explanatory – laws enacted by Congress may permissibly provide that they shall have
retroactive effect. The Civil Code established a statutory norm, not a constitutional standard.
The closest the issue of retroactivity of laws can get to a genuine constitutional issue is if a law’s
retroactive application will impair vested rights. Otherwise stated, if a right has already vested in
an individual and a subsequent law effectively takes it away, a genuine due process issue may
arise. What should be involved, however, is a vested right to life, liberty or property, as these are
the ones that may be considered protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In the present case, the respondents never raised due process as an issue. But even assuming
that they did, the respondents themselves concede that there is no vested right to public office.
As the COMELEC correctly pointed out, too, there is no vested right to an elective post in view
of the uncertainty inherent in electoral exercises. Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz,
et al., G.R. No. 186616, November 20, 2009.
Election law
Ballots; appreciation. Although as a rule, the appreciation of contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, still when
it can be shown that, as in this case, it grossly misread evidence of such nature that compels a
different conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse that body’s factual findings.
It is by now a settled truth that no two persons write alike. Even if two handwritings have a
common general outlook, they are apt to be at variance in some basic characteristics that set
them apart. Every person uses his own style for forming letters, technically called personal
characteristics. Whatever features two specimens of handwriting may have in common, they
cannot be regarded as written by one person if they show even but one consistent dissimilarity
in any feature which is fundamental to the structure of the handwriting.
Here, the Court did not find, after examining 93 of the excluded ballots pertaining to petitioner
Torres, any two or more of ballots that were filled in by a single hand. Of the 47 pairs of ballots
that the En Banc excluded, only two pairs were correctly excluded because they were written by
one person for each pair. 45 pairs turned out to have been filled up by different hands. While
the general outlook of the handwritings on each of the two ballots in any given pair is the same,
such handwritings have distinct personal characteristics. In the same way, the three ballots that
were supposedly written on by one person turned out to have been the work of three different
hands. Ramon P. Torres vs. Commission on Elections and Josephine “Joy” H. Gaviola, G.R. No.
187956, November 19, 2009.
Candidates; liability for election offenses. Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is
liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power
to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” Neither can this Court turn a
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blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period.” Rosalinda A. Penera vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25,
2009. Note: The Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision dated September 11, 2009.

December 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Bill of rights; eminent domain. Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property
with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls
within the ambit of the term expropriation. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
Bill of Rights; eminent domain. In computing for the value of the land subject to acquisition, the
formula provided in DAO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended, requires that figures pertaining to
the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) and Market Value (MV) of the property be used as inputs in
arriving at the correct land valuation. Thus, the applicable formula, as correctly used by the LBP
in its valuation, is LV (Land Value) = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1).
To arrive at the figure for the CNI of lands planted to a combination of crops, Item II B.5 of the
said administrative order provides that the same should be computed based on the combination
of actual crops produced on the covered land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kumassie
Plantation Company Incorporated/Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated vs. Land Bank of
the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 177404/G.R. No. 178097. December 4, 2009.
Bill of rights; eminent domain; interest. The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the
State of the power of eminent domain. A basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent
domain is the constitutional directive that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value
of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between
one who receives and one who desires to sell. It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
State. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value,
to be computed from the time the property is taken up to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Amer Ibrahim,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
Bill of rights; eminent domain; interest. In Philippine Railway Company v. Solon, decided in
1909, the Court treated interest as part of just compensation when the payment to the owner
was delayed. Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals,
and Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195. December 4, 2009.
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Bill of rights; eminent domain; just compensation. The term just compensation had been defined
as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the
meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
In Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and National Power
Corporation v. Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, the Court sustained the
award of just compensation equivalent to the fair and full value of the property even if
petitioners only sought the continuation of the exercise of their right-of-way easement and not
the ownership over the land. There is simply no basis for NPC to claim that the payment of fair
market value without the concomitant transfer of title constitutes an unjust enrichment.
Bill of Rights; equal protection. In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the
classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public
Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other
motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and
more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second
requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but
as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of
persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to
the purposes of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
Bill of rights; equal protection. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special
treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100
million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part
provides that no person shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process,
every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It
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has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a
more specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government.
Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a
particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
to cut it down is the equal protection clause. This constitutional protection extends to all
persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the
respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.
In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the
enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be
substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would
not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous
on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not
covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke
constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only
affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such.
As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require
absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal
protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual
differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is
the right to classify,necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court finds that all
these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the
equal protection clause. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December 21, 2009.
Bill of rights; non-impairment clause. PICOP’c cause of action consists in the allegation that
the DENR Secretary, in not issuing an IFMA, violated its constitutional right against non-
impairment of contracts. The 1969 document signed by President Marcos is not a contract
recognized under the non-impairment clause. The conclusion that the 1969 Document is not a
contract recognized under the non-impairment clause has even been disposed of in another
case decided by another division of this Court, PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation, the Decision in which case has become final and executory. Hon.
Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Hon. Heherson T.
Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), G.R.
No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009
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Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial. The time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 do not
preclude justifiable postponements and delays when so warranted by the situation. The reasons
for the postponements and delays attendant to the present case reflected above are not
unreasonable. While the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel was notified of
the resetting of the pre-trial to October 23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned by
oversight or simple negligence which, standing alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution’s
case. The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant
it had issued against petitioner under the mistaken belief that petitioner had been duly notified
of the October 23, 2003 pre-trial setting.
Reiterating the Court’s pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that “speedy trial” is a
relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a delicate
balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand,
and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.
Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account
several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused’s assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the “delay” in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail. Federico Miguel Olbes vs. Hon. Danilo A.
Buemio, etc. et al., G.R. No. 173319. December 4, 2009.
Bill of Rights; right to travel. Petitioner invokes the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo
for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the Hold Departure Order is a continuing actual
restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to
travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the
Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As stated in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, “xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the
very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should
be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound
discretion.”
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his
right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal
recourse or remedy. Rev. Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182161,
December 3, 2009.
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction over court personnel. The CSC’s authority and power to
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. The question is whether the
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CSC’s disciplinary jurisdiction extends to court personnel in view of Section 6, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
In the Julaton and Sta. Ana cases, the CSC recognized the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over court personnel. This is consonant with Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution vesting in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers. This we have ruled in Maceda v. Vasquez and have reiterated in the case of Ampong v.
Civil Service Commission. In Ampong, we also emphasized that in case of violation of the Civil
Service Law by a court personnel, the standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint
against a judicial employee before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme
Court. Civil Service Commission vs. Herminigildo L. Andal, G.R. No. 185749, December 16,
2009.
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation of all
employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Simply put, it is the sole
arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
In this case, petitioners are former local government employees whose services were terminated
due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to the civil service,
the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al. vs. Sonia R.
Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009.
COMELEC; contempt. The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the COMELEC exceeded
its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt proceedings when it was performing its administrative
and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of
senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous acts while
exercising its quasi-judicial functions.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in
pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and required the
attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue
and support their respective positions.
To withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a
fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory
the COMELEC’s investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate
to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the
investigation was however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said
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hearings and to answer questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed,
were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could
punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings. Lintang
Bedol vs. Commssion on Elections, G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009.
Constitutionality; locus standi. Central to the determination of locus standi is the question of
whether a party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In this case, petitioners
allege that they will be directly affected by COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 for they intend, and
they all have the qualifications, to run in the 2010 elections. The OSG, for its part, contends that
since petitioners have not yet filed their CoCs, they are not yet candidates; hence, they are not
yet directly affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution.
The Court, nevertheless, finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the
standing to raise the constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A
restriction on candidacy, such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to
choose their public officials. The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend
themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters. The Court believes that both candidates and voters may challenge,
on grounds of equal protection, the assailed measure because of its impact on voting rights.
In any event, in recent cases, this Court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test and has
observed a liberal policy allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civil
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, December 1, 2009.
Constitutionality; locus standi. A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that the public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained
of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. He must also
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met:
(1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality
and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is
directly affected by the alleged act.
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not
be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a
right to question contracts entered into by the government.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the
proceeds of the bonds, which respondents insist are not taxpayer’s money, a government
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support in the amount of P187 million would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds.
In fact, a Deed of Assignment was executed by the governor in favor of respondent RCBC over
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and other revenues of the provincial government as
payment and/or security for the obligations of the provincial government under the Trust
Indenture Agreement dated September 17, 2003. Records also show that on March 4, 2004, the
governor requested the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to appropriate an amount of P25 million for
the interest of the bond. Clearly, the first requisite has been met.
As to the second requisite, the court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent “direct injury test”
bearing in mind that locus standi is a procedural technicality. By invoking “transcendental
importance”, “paramount public interest”, or “far-reaching implications”, ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury. In cases where serious
legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved, the
court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et
al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009.
Constitutionality; justiciability. A political question is a question of policy, which is to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or by the legislative or the executive branch of
the government to which full discretionary authority has been delegated.
In filing the instant case before the RTC, petitioners seek to restrain public respondents from
implementing the bond flotation and to declare null and void all contracts related to the bond
flotation and construction of the town center. In the petition before the RTC, they alleged grave
abuse of discretion and clear violations of law by public respondents. They put in issue the
overpriced construction of the town center; the grossly disadvantageous bond flotation; the
irrevocable assignment of the provincial government’s annual regular income, including the IRA,
to respondent RCBC to cover and secure the payment of the bonds floated; and the lack of
consultation and discussion with the community regarding the proposed project, as well as a
proper and legitimate bidding for the construction of the town center.
Obviously, the issues raised in the petition do not refer to the wisdom but to the legality of the
acts complained of. Thus, we find the instant controversy within the ambit of judicial review.
Besides, even if the issues were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality
of the government. Manuel Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December
14, 2009.
Constitutionality; overbroad. The challenged provision also suffers from the infirmity of being
overbroad.
First, the provision pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the 2010

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elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in
the government to wield influence in the political world.
While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective office are those
who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be legislated for them alone,
or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public elective office is universal, open and
unrestrained, subject only to the qualification standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the
laws. These qualifications are, as we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest
participation of the citizenry and to give free rein for the pursuit of one’s highest aspirations to
public office. Such is the essence of democracy.
Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether
they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or
barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental
right involved on such a sweeping scale.
Specific evils require specific treatments, not through overly broad measures that unduly restrict
guaranteed freedoms of the citizenry. After all, sovereignty resides in the people, and all
governmental power emanates from them. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.
vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009.
HRET; jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides under Article VI, Section 17
thereof that the HRET and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. The
authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word
sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals, which is conferred upon
the HRET and the SET after elections and the proclamation of the winning candidates. A
candidate who has not been proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said
to be a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, private respondent correctly pointed out that a petition for quo warranto is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if, as in this
case, the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the
issue of the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives while the latter was still
a candidate. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
Natural resources; land ownership. Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British
Virgin Islands. Its office address is at Suite 14021 Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign
corporation, with unknown owners whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not
qualified to own land in the Philippines pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 3, Article
XII of the Constitution.
Consequently, Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the
Philippines. Contrary to the OGCC’s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any
land in the Philippines because Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there
will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private corporation
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from owning land in the Philippines. In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to
ownership of land in the Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or
seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at the time the ownership, or the rights to
the ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. Strategic Alliance Development
Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction
Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4, 2009.
Police power; MMDA. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or
destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by
Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in
Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority vs.. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions,
Inc., G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009.
Public funds; appropriation. Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, as implanted
in Sections 84 and 85 of the Government Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by
Congress appropriating P6.185 billion as compromise money before payment to Radstock can
be made. Otherwise, such payment violates a prohibitory law and thus void under Article 5 of
the Civil Code which states that “[a]cts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.”
Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot lawfully pay P6.185 billion to
Radstock. Any contract allowing such payment, like the Compromise Agreement, “shall be void”
as provided in Section 87 of the Government Auditing Code.
PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputably form part of the General Fund, to
pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for
a public purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the National Government,
which is the owner of the toll fees.
Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the P6.185 billion
compromise amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, specifically
Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment
of the P6.185 billion pertains to CDCP Mining’s private debt to Radstock, the Compromise
Agreement is also void for being contrary to the fundamental public policy that government
funds or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of
the Government Auditing Code. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock
Securities Limited and Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No.
180428, December 4, 2009.

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Suffrage; extension of voter registration. Section 8 of RA 8189 decrees that voters be allowed to
register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a
regular election and 90 days before a special election.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days before a
regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for the COMELEC to make
ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections. The COMELEC’s rule-
making power should be exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
Respecting the authority of the COMELEC under RA 6646 and RA 8436 to fix other dates for
pre-election acts, the same is not in conflict with the mandate of continuing voter registration
under RA 8189. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section 29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the
COMELEC the power to fix other periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same
cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power, however, is
for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage – the common underlying
policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.
In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of continuing voter
registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily
during office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular
elections. There is thus no occasion for the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or
deadlines therefor.
The present case differs significantly from Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC. In said case, the Court
held that the COMELEC did not commit abuse of discretion in denying the request of the therein
petitioners for an extension of the December 27, 2000 deadline of voter registration for the May
14, 2001 elections. For the therein petitioners filed their petition with the Court within the 120-
day prohibitive period for the conduct of voter registration under Section 8 of RA 8189, and
sought the conduct of a two-day registration on February 17 and 18, 2001, clearly within the
120-day prohibitive period.
In the present case, as reflected earlier, both the dates of filing of the petition (October 30, 2009)
and the extension sought (until January 9, 2010) are prior to the 120-day prohibitive period. The
Court, therefore, finds no legal impediment to the extension prayed for. Kabataan Party List
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868, December 15, 2009.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; due process. It is settled that in administrative proceedings, a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due
process. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, since PCMC was properly informed of the supposed discrepancy in its
import and export liquidations, that it was given ample opportunity by the PEZA management to
be heard or to explain its side in relation to its unaccounted imported materials and that it was
subsequently informed of the decision of the PEZA Board to cancel its registration on the basis
of its assessment of the evidence presented or lack thereof, petitioners cannot claim that they
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were denied their right to due process of law. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), et al.
Vs. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009.
Administrative proceedings; due process. The CA correctly concluded that petitioner’s right to
due process was not violated. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in
all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written
explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, filing charges against the person and giving reasonable
opportunity to the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard; or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. She
was given every opportunity to submit various pleadings and documents in support of her claim,
which she, in fact, did through her counter-affidavit and documentary evidence, manifestation
and motion, memorandum on appeal, etc. In her Manifestation and Motion, petitioner moved
and submitted the case for resolution based on the arguments and evidentiary records that were
submitted before the Ombudsman. These were all duly acted upon by the Ombudsman.
Petitioner was given all the opportunity to present her side. Due process was, therefore, properly
observed. Lily O. Orbase Vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R.
No. 175115. December 23, 2009
Administrative proceedings; exhaustion of remedies. The rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies provides that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts. This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it admits of exceptions,
viz:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

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The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for
mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of
mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, being extraordinary
remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of
procedure are powerless to afford relief.
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should have first brought
the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over the case. Evelyn S. Cabungcal, et al.
vs. Sonia R. Lorenzo, et al., G.R. No. 160367, December 18, 2009.
EO 259; lack of implementing rules. Carabeo impugns the validity of EO 259 for lack of
implementing rules and regulations. Indeed, EO 259 lacks any implementing guidelines.
However, such fact is immaterial and does not affect, in any manner, the validity of the criminal
and administrative charges against Carabeo. While the DOF-RIPS derived from EO 259 its
power and authority to gather evidence against DOF officials and employees suspected of graft
and corruption, the DOF-RIPS need not be vested with such power in order to validly file
criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo. In fact, any concerned ordinary citizen
can file criminal and administrative charges against any corrupt government official or
employee if there exists sufficient evidence of culpability. Hence, the DOF-RIPS, even without
EO 259 and whether as subordinates of the Secretary of Finance or as private citizens, can
validly file criminal and administrative charges against Carabeo.
At any rate, the Court finds that EO 259 is basically internal in nature needing no implementing
rules and regulations in order to be enforceable. Principally aimed at curbing graft and
corruption in the DOF and its attached agencies,[14] EO 259 covers only officers and
employees. Liberato M. Carabeo vs.Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178000 & G.R. No.
178003, December 4, 2009.
LLDA; fines. The Laguna Lake Development Authority has the power to impose fines. Pacific
Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority G.R. No. 165299. December 18,
2009
Ombudsman; jurisdiction. At the time of the filing of the case against petitioner, she was the
Assistant Director of the National Library; as such, as an appointive employee of the government,
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to take cognizance of the action against the
petitioner was beyond contestation.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the action,
since the act complained of was committed before her entering government service, cannot be
sustained. Under Section 46 (18), Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 198, even if the
dishonest act was committed by the employee prior to entering government service, such act is
still a ground for disciplinary action. Lily O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman and
Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115. December 23, 2009

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Ombudsman; prescription. Petitioner insists that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 proscribes the
investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed one year after the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun, the Court held that the period stated in Section 20
(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense, but to the discretion given
to the Office of the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative
offense. The use of the word “may” in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to
confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they
must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation
of a complaint filed before it even if it was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of. Thus, while the complaint herein was filed three years after the
occurrence of the act imputed to petitioner, it was within the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to act, to proceed with and conduct an investigation of the subject complaint. Lily
O. Orbase vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, G.R. No. 175115.
December 23, 2009
OSG. Only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the
People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf, as when there is a denial of due process, this exceptional
circumstance does not obtain in the instant case. Elvira O. Ong vs. Jose Casim Genio, G.R. No.
182336, December 23, 2009.
Election Law
Appointive officials; resignation. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso
facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all
other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential
treatment. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, December 1, 2009.
Candidates; residency requirement. The qualifications of a member of the House of
Representatives are found in Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.
The evidence presented by private respondent before the HRET hardly suffices to prove that
petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under the Constitution.
Private respondent’s documentary evidence to disqualify petitioner mainly consisted of (a)
petitioner’s certificates of candidacy (COCs) for various positions in 1998, 2001 and 2004,
which all indicated his residence as Pagsanjan, Laguna within the Fourth District of said
province; (b) his application for a driver’s license in August 2005 that indicated Pagsanjan,
Laguna as his residence; and (c) the statement in his COCs including his 2007 COC for
Congressman for the First District of Laguna that his place of birth was Pagsanjan, Laguna.
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The HRET puts undue emphasis on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta.
Rosa while he owns houses in Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other
places has been taken to mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent
residence or that he had not abandoned his domicile of origin.
Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is not necessarily the domicile of choice of a
candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or our election laws which require a
congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired home in one district and buy a new one in
the place where he seeks to run in order to qualify for a congressional seat in that other district.
Neither do we see the fact that petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of
his candidacy as a barrier for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not
require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run
but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership
of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence
implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This
Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office,
which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
This case must be distinguished from Aquino v. COMELEC and Domino v. COMELEC, where
the disqualified candidate was shown to be merely leasing a residence in the place where he
sought to run for office. In Aquino and Domino, there appeared to be no other material reason
for the candidate to lease residential property in the place where he filed his COC, except to
fulfill the residency requirement under election laws.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as
his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous
domicile. Representative Danila Ramon S. Fernandez vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Jesus L. Vicente, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009.
Term limit; preventive suspension. The preventive suspension of an elected public official does
not interrupt of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160. Simon B. Aldovino, Jr.,
Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong vs. Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F.
Asilo, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.
Local Government Code
Creation of cities. When Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the
reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991. At
the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC,
was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the
embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337.
Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they
did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable
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criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit
this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity.
Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing
layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case,
the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million
toPhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from
the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political
subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s,
effectively decreased the already codified indicators. League of Cities of the Philippines, et al.
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499 & G.R. No. 178056. December 21, 2009.
Sanggunian approval. PICOP had claimed that it complied with Sections 2(c), 26 and 27 of the
Local Government Code (which requires the prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned) by
submitting a purported resolution of the Province of Surigao del Sur indorsing the approval of
PICOP’s application for IFMA conversion. This cannot be deemed sufficient compliance with
the foregoing provision. Surigao del Sur is not the only province affected by the area covered by
the proposed IFMA. Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, Inc./PICOP Resources, Inc.
vs. Hon. Heherson T. Alavarez/Hon. Angelo T. Reyes vs. Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines (PICOP), G.R. No. 162243/G.R. No. 164516/G.R. No. 171875. December 3, 2009
Other laws
Public bidding; dacion en pago. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, the
disposition of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. COA Circular No. 89-
926, issued on 27 January 1989, sets forth the guidelines on the disposal of property and other
assets of the government.
Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of substantial parcels of land, by way of
dacion en pago, in favor of Radstock. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, PNCC argues that a dacion
en pago is an exception to the requirement of a public bidding.
PNCC’s reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in Uy declaring that public bidding is
dispensed with in a dacion en pago transaction.
Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS nor the government suffered any loss in the dacion
en pago transactions, unlike here where the government stands to lose at least P6.185 billion
worth of assets.
Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale, which basically involves a disposition of
a property. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Radstock Securities Limited and
Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 178158/G.R. No. 180428, December 4,
2009.

January 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law

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Eminent domain; prompt payment of just compensation. The concept of just compensation
contemplates just and timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot, as Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals instructs, be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and Heirs of Vicente Adaza,
Heirs of Romeo Adaza, Heirs of Cesar Adaza, represented by Russel Adaza, G.R. No. 183279,
January 25, 2010.
Judicial review; creation of city. On the OSG’s contention that Congress’ choice of means to
comply with the population requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable,
suffice it to say that questions calling for judicial determination of compliance with
constitutional standards by other branches of the government are fundamentally justiciable. The
resolution of such questions falls within the checking function of this Court under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, “The overwhelming weight of
authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts.” Compliance
with constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the “aim
of legislative apportionment is ‘to equalize population and voting power among
districts.’” Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs.Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25,
2010.

Local government; creation of city. RA 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have “a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.” The only issue here is whether the City of
Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of
creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not,
then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
There is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000,
actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010 elections, the immediately following election after
the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a
legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. Victorino Aldaba, et al. vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010.

Administrative Law
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Administrative agencies; findings of fact. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as
the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial
evidence. These factual findings carry even more weight when affirmed by the CA. They are
accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it is
shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly
appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon.
A review of the petition does not show any reversible error committed by the appellate court;
hence, the petition must be denied. Petitioner failed to present any argument that would
convince the Court that the SEC and the CA made any misappreciation of the facts and the
applicable laws such that their decisions should be overturned. Catmon Sales International
Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales International
Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010.
Election Law
Ballots; nuisance candidates. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws
and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so
that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and
confusion in ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case
at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of
candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates
will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the
last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until
elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.
We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the
same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not
considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final
judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ”
should be credited to petitioner giving him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes
of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private respondent with a
winning margin of 4,948 votes. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010.
Election contest; appeal. For the sake of laying down clearly the rules regarding the payment of
the appeal fee, a discussion of the application of the recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to
election contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials is necessary. Divinagracia
explained the purpose of Resolution No. 8486 which, as earlier stated, the COMELEC issued to
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clarify existing rules and address the resulting confusion caused by the two appeal fees required,
for the perfection of appeals, by the two different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC.
Divinagracia stressed that if the appellants had already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the
lower courts within the five-day reglementary period, they are further required to pay the
COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from
the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the lower court. If the appellants failed to pay
the PhP 3,200 within the prescribed period, then the appeal should be dismissed. The Court
went on to state in Divinagracia that Aguilar did not “dilute the force of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the COMELEC-required appeal fees.” The resolution,
to reiterate, was mainly issued to clarify the confusion caused by the requirement of payment of
two appeal fees.
Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that “for notice of appeal filed after
the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter ofnon-payment or incomplete payment of
the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.” Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections and Susana M. Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010.
Election protest; nuisance candidates. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether
the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the
winning candidate. Election contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and
pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the
need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate.
In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates
the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate.
A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no
bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his
sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that
ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for
either of them.
In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer
logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission
to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial
capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Celestino A. Martinez III
vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034,
January 11, 2010.
Electoral tribunal; judicial review. The judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial
interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for such
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abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion
or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent
Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite
the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only “MARTINEZ” or “C. “MARTINEZ”
written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor
of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly
establishing that such votes could not have been intended for “Edilito C. Martinez” who was
declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. Celestino A. Martinez III vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Benhur L. Salimbangon, G.R. No. 189034, January 11,
2010.

February 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Equal protection; requisites. The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the
first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion
that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis-à-vis elected officials is not germane to
the purpose of the law. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
Expropriation; private use. It is well settled that the taking of private property by the
Government’s power of eminent domain is subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is
for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to
enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing
which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the
expropriator to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the
same. Otherwise, the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
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indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely, the
particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted. Accordingly, the private
property owner would be denied due process of law, and the judgment would violate the
property owner’s right to justice, fairness, and equity.
In light of these premises, we now expressly hold that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Government’s exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition
that the property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken. Corollarily, if
this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily
abandoned, then the former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of
the power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required factual
justification. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation
Office (ATO) vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al., G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010.
Gerrymandering; meaning. “Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment
of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined “gerrymandering”
as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a
candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each
legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one
island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories.
It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman
Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010.
House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET); jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over
the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo
and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear
and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. Electoral Tribunal, et al. /Congressman Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), et al., G.R. No. 189466/G.R. No. 189506,. February
11, 2010.
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Judicial review; requisites. The courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Respondents assert that the
second requisite is absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely
to be redressed by a favorable action. The question on standing is whether such parties have
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, summarizing the rules culled from jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing
to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the
fact that he filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for
redress of such illegal act by public officials. Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
Judicial review; standing to sue. In her Memorandum, respondent Governor Geraldine B. Ecleo-
Villaroman of the Province of Dinagat Islands raises procedural issues. She contends that
petitioners do not have the legal standing to question the constitutionality of the creation of the
Province of Dinagat, since they have not been directly injured by its creation and are without
substantial interest over the matter in controversy. Moreover, she alleges that the petition is
moot and academic because the existence of the Province of Dinagat Islands has already
commenced; hence, the petition should be dismissed.
The contention is without merit.
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In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may
be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the same vein, with respect to other alleged procedural
flaws, even assuming the existence of such defects, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion,
brushes aside these technicalities and takes cognizance of the petition considering its
importance and in keeping with the duty to determine whether the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution.
Further, supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from
rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. The courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
180050, February 10, 2010.
Local government; creation of province. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of
local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any
derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
R.A. No. 9355 (creating the province of Dinagat Islands) is unconstitutional for its failure to
comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code. The provision in Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is null and void. Rodolfo G.
Navarro, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, February 10,
2010.
President; immunity from suit. Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of
immunity from suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed
such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a
concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court
subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved
under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during
her incumbency.
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific
presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected
rights. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871,
February 18, 2010.
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Overbreadth. In the United States, claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained only
where, in the judgment of the court, the possibility that protected speech of others may be
muted and perceived grievances left to fester (due to the possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes) outweighs the possible harm to society in allowing some unprotected speech or
conduct to go unpunished. Facial overbreadth has likewise not been invoked where a limiting
construction could be placed on the challenged statute, and where there are readily apparent
constructions that would cure, or at least substantially reduce, the alleged overbreadth of the
statute.
In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to
remain in office, even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of
having arguably protected candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially
overly broad statute.
In this light, the conceivably impermissible applications of the challenged statutes – which are,
at best, bold predictions – cannot justify invalidating these statutes in toto and prohibiting the
State from enforcing them against conduct that is, and has for more than 100 years been,
unquestionably within its power and interest to proscribe. Instead, the more prudent approach
would be to deal with these conceivably impermissible applications through case-by-case
adjudication rather than through a total invalidation of the statute itself. Eleazar P. Quinto and
Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
Public assembly; modification of permit. In modifying the permit outright, respondent Mayor of
Manila gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should
have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the
action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on
the permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against
the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable
condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or modification would, when granted
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny
thereof. Intergrated Bar of the Philippines, represented by its National President Jose Anselmo I.
Cadiz, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. Honorable Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza, G.R. No.
175241, February 24, 2010.
Public officials; multiple office. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to
posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein, without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office.
The reason is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on
said officials. Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any
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compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of
her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the MARINA, we are hardly
persuaded by respondents’ submission that respondent Bautista’s designation as OIC of
MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board, which includes the DOTC
Secretary as Chairman, the MARINA Administrator as Vice-Chairman, and the following as
members: Executive Secretary (Office of the President), Philippine Ports Authority General
Manager, Department of National Defense Secretary, Development Bank of the Philippines
General Manager, and the Department of Trade and Industry Secretary.
It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and
temporary capacity, the words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains
to both appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties
and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well
as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same,
or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual
discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. Civil Liberties Union traced
the history of the times and the conditions under which the Constitution was framed, and
construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by adoption of
such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during
the Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as
members of the governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations. This practice of
holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by unscrupulous public
officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant
betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos
regime. It was therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of
the people that the 1986 Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution
the provisions under consideration, which were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the evils
that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment. Dennis B. Funa vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the President, G.R. No. 184740, February 11,
2010.
Administrative Law
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Proceedings; evidence. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings, the quantum of proof

required for a finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, “that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.”
In the present case, petitioner’s Order of May 18, 2004 finding respondent administratively
liable for neglect of duty, which “implies the failure to give proper attention to a task expected
of an employee arising from either carelessness or indifference,” was adequately established by
substantial evidence. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) vs. Asteria E. Cruzabra, G.R. No.
183507, February 24, 2010.
Election Law
Appointive officials; filing of certificate of candidacy. Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which
reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers
and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. On the other hand,
pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it
considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period
corresponding to the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not deemed to
have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without
forfeiting his seat.
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the second
proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369 are not violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution and does not suffer from overbreadth. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino
A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010. (Note: The
Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision of December 1, 2009.)
Automation project; validity. The contract-award of the 2010 Election Automation Project to
the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic
International Corporation (Smartmatic) is valid. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel R. Butuyan, Romel R.
Bagares, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, represented by Hon. Chaiman Jose Melo, et al., Pete
Quirino-Qaudra (Petitioner-in-intervention) Senate of the Philippines, represented by its
President Juan Ponce Enrili (Movant-Intervenor),G.R. No. 188456, February 10,
2010. (Note: The Supreme Court denied the motion to reconsider its earlier decision of
September 10, 2009.)
Ballot; tampering. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring Peñano, based on
the results of the revision of ballots, the winner in the mayoralty contest for the Municipality of
Alfonso, Cavite. The ballots, after proof of tampering, cannot be considered reflective of the will
of the people of Alfonso. Mayor Virgilio P. Varias vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
189078, February 11, 2010.
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COMELEC; ballot appreciation. The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc
proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested ballots without first ascertaining
whether the ballots to be recounted had been kept inviolate. The COMELEC cannot proceed to
conduct a fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity thereof. Sandra Y
Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526,
February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; elevation to en banc without division decision. The COMELEC, in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the provision set forth in Section 3, Article IX-C of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads: “SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.All such election cases shall be heard
and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided
by the Commission en banc.”
It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is exercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the
present case, the Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division,
and en banc only upon motion for reconsideration.
Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action
is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the agreement of
the parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or
omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the court, more
particularly so in election cases where the interest involved transcends those of the contending
parties.
This being so, the Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be
heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the
Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned
another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in
the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required
quorum may be attained. Sandra Y Eriguel vs. Commission on Elections and Ma. Theresa
Dumpit-Michelena, G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010.
COMELEC; failure of elections. The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC the broad power
to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, as well as the plenary
authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the instances when the COMELEC may
declare failure of elections. The COMELEC en banc based its decision to declare a failure of
elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A on the second instance stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour

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fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud
or other analogous causes.
The COMELEC en banc ruled that since both parties agreed that the elections were suspended
before the hour fixed by law due to violence caused by undetermined persons, there was
obviously a failure of elections in the aforementioned precinct.
The findings of fact of the COMELEC en banc are binding on this Court. The grounds for failure
of election (i.e., force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases) involve
questions of fact, which can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc after due notice to
and hearing of the parties. An application for certiorari against actions of the COMELEC is
confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
TheCOMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with
the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has the expertise in its field so that its
findings and conclusions are generally respected by and conclusive on the Court.
Petitioner’s allegation of grave abuse of discretion by public respondent COMELEC en banc
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. It is not present in this case, as public respondent issued the COMELEC
Resolution dated October 17, 2005 based on the evidence on record and the law on the
matter. Abdul Gaffar P.M. Dibaratun vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 170365,
February 2, 2010.
COMELEC; injunction. If instead of issuing a preliminary injunction in place of a TRO, a court
opts to decide the case on its merits with the result that it also enjoins the same acts covered by
its TRO, it stands to reason that the decision amounts to a grant of preliminary injunction. Such
injunction should be deemed in force pending any appeal from the decision. The view of
petitioner Panlilio—that execution pending appeal should still continue notwithstanding a
decision of the higher court enjoining such execution—does not make sense. It will render quite
inutile the proceedings before such court. Mayor Jose Marquez Lisboa Panlilio vs. Commission
on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 184286. February 26, 2010
COMELEC jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes. The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-
C of the Constitution, “include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its
legitimate officers responsible for its acts.” The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the
persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

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The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is
also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for
candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official
standard bearer of the party. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R.
No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
COMELEC; tampered votes. We find the manner in which the COMELEC excluded the subject
returns to be fatally flawed. In the absence of clearly convincing evidence, the validity of
election returns must be upheld. A conclusion that an election return is obviously manufactured
or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with
extreme caution and only upon the most convincing proof. Corrolarily, any plausible
explanation, one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the
probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, which results in
disenfranchisement of those who exercised their right of suffrage. As will be discussed shortly,
there is a patent lack of basis for the COMELEC’s findings that the subject returns were tampered.
In disregard of the principle requiring “extreme caution” before rejecting election returns, the
COMELEC proceeded with undue haste in concluding that the subject returns were tampered.
This is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In sum, it was highly irregular for the COMELEC to outrightly exclude the subject returns
resulting in the disenfranchisement of some 1,127 voters as per the records of this case. The
proper procedure in case of discrepancy in the other authentic copies of the election returns is
clearly spelled out in Section 236 of the OEC. For contravening this legal provision, the
COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rose Marie D. Doromal vs. Hernan G. Biron and Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 181809, February 17, 2010.
Disqualification; voter inclusion/exclusion proceedings. Voters’ inclusion/exclusion proceedings,
on the one hand, essentially involve the issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or
excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts
presented to show possession of these qualifications.
On the other hand, COC denial/cancellation proceedings involve the issue of whether there is a
false representation of a material fact. The false representation must necessarily pertain not to a
mere innocuous mistake but to a material fact or those that refer to a candidate’s qualifications
for elective office. Apart from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible or, otherwise stated, with the intention to deceive the electorate as
to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office.
In Velasco, the Court rejected Velasco’s contention that the Comelec improperly ruled on the
right to vote when it cancelled his COC. The Court stated that the Comelec merely relied on or

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recognized the RTC’s final and executory decision on the matter of the right to vote in the
precinct within its territorial jurisdiction.
In the present petition, it is Panlaqui’s turn to proffer the novel interpretation that the RTC
properly cancelled Velasco’s COC when it ruled on his right to vote. The Court rejects the same.
It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take
cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no
jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and
whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for
public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency
requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible. Mozart P. Panlaqui vs. Commission
on Elections and Nardo M. Velasco, G.R. No. 188671, February 24, 2010.
Pre-proclamation controversy; contested returns. It is settled that a pre-proclamation controversy
is summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies
be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers
(BOC) will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that
appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished.
Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy,
Section 20 of RA 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before
the BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the
objections as quickly as possible.
Section 20 of RA 7166 and Section 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate
may contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the time the questioned return
is submitted for canvass; the objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing
simultaneously with the oral objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and
opposition, if any, and summarily rule on the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected
by such ruling must immediately inform the BOC if he intends to appeal such ruling.
After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall
suspend the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of
Appeal; the appeal shall be filed within five days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC
will make its report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs
appear to have been tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other
copies of the questioned returns and, if the other copies are likewise tampered with, altered,
falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having given notice to all candidates and satisfied itself that
the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have been duly preserved, shall order a
recount of the votes cast, prepare a new return which shall be used by the BOC as basis for the
canvass, and direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly.

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Based on the records of this case, we find that petitioner failed to timely make his objections to
the contested ERs. Themistocles A. Saño, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
182221, February 3, 2010.
Local Government
Succession; sannggunian. Sec. 45(b) of RA 7160 provides for the rule on succession in cases of
permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian. The law provides for conditions for the rule of
succession to apply: First, the appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy. Second, the appointee must have a nomination
and a Certificate of Membership from the highest official of the political party concerned. Atty.
Lucky M. Damasen vs. Oscar G. Tumamao, G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010.
Public officers
Appointment; submission to Civil Service Commission. The deliberate failure of the appointing
authority (or other responsible officials) to submit respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC
within 30 days from its issuance did not make her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
Under Article 1186 of the Civil Code, “[t]he condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment.” Applying this to the appointment process in the civil
service, unless the appointee himself is negligent in following up the submission of his
appointment to the CSC for approval, he should not be prejudiced by any willful act done in
bad faith by the appointing authority to prevent the timely submission of his appointment to the
CSC. While it may be argued that the submission of respondent’s appointment to the CSC within
30 days was one of the conditions for the approval of respondent’s appointment, however,
deliberately and with bad faith, the officials responsible for the submission of respondent’s
appointment to the CSC prevented the fulfillment of the said condition. Thus, the said condition
should be deemed fulfilled.
The Court has already had the occasion to rule that an appointment remains valid in certain
instances despite non-compliance of the proper officials with the pertinent CSC rules. Arlin B.
Obiasca vs. Jeane O. Basallote, G.R. No. 176707, February 17, 2010.

March 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Constitutionality; justiciable controversy. Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question unless the following requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual
case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the question before the court must be ripe for
adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4)
the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there
is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication.

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An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner’s members have shut
down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being
implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated
(DESAMA) v. Gozun: “By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged act, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to
awaken judicial duty.”
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to
settle such question once and for all. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs.
The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
Constitutionality; justiciable controversy. We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or
controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced
the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to
the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next
Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of
nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit
the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the
situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the
candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the “interview of constitutional
experts, as may be needed.”
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the
process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could
only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of
course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the
provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one
from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate
Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges
to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until
the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel
the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counter-
insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent
President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the
strong position that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII
from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until
June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are
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only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the
controversy, considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy
actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely
hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle – with finality – the
nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already
began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. Arturo M.
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No. 191032, G.R. No.
191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17, 2010.
Constitutionality; justiciable controversy. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the
reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591
are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of
this Court’s judicial review power, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary
questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific
constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities
with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this
obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the
population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional
limitation. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15,
2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue. The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated
adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite
locus standi.The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and
to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners),
regardless of one’s personal interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the
authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent
Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too
great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in
favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise
requires a liberalization of the requirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in
order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely
presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an
obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co.,
Inc., we pointed out: “Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a
law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest.” But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners “are not covered by the
definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
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raised.” Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No.
191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17,
2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue. Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing
to sue: “Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the
Philippines. Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege
any material interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed
provisions].”
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that it
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor, we held that the association had legal
standing because its members stood to be injured by the enforcement of the assailed provisions.
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic
corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their
overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this
petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive
Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
Due process; minimum corporate income tax. Petitioner claims that the MCIT under Section
27(E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is highly oppressive, arbitrary and confiscatory
which amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law. It explains that gross
income as defined under said provision only considers the cost of goods sold and other direct
expenses; other major expenditures, such as administrative and interest expenses which are
equally necessary to produce gross income, were not taken into account. Thus, pegging the tax
base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income is tantamount to a confiscation of capital
because gross income, unlike net income, is not “realized gain.”
Petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that the MCIT is arbitrary
and confiscatory. The Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because of its
yokes. Taxation is necessarily burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects property
rights. The party alleging the law’s unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate the
supposed violations in understandable terms. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Associations,
Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756, March 9, 2010.
Equal protection; creditable withholding tax. Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations
are violative of the equal protection clause because the CWT is being levied only on real estate
enterprises. Specifically, petitioner points out that manufacturing enterprises are not similarly
imposed a CWT on their sales, even if their manner of doing business is not much different from
that of a real estate enterprise. Like a manufacturing concern, a real estate business is involved
in a continuous process of production and it incurs costs and expenditures on a regular basis.
The only difference is that “goods” produced by the real estate business are house and lot units.
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The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” Stated differently, all persons belonging to
the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid,
must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation.
Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption,
infringe no constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be
validly treated differently from other business enterprises. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’
Associations, Inc. Vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 160756,
March 9, 2010.
Equal protection; NPC regulation. The equal protection clause means that “no person or class
of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal protection
of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal
protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the
integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like
Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the
light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction. National Power Corporation
vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Freedom of speech; prior restraint. Petitioner’s threshold posture that the suspension thus
imposed constitutes prior restraint and an abridgement of his exercise of religion and freedom of
expression is a mere rehash of the position he articulated in the underlying petitions for
certiorari and expounded in his memorandum. So are the supportive arguments and some of the
citations of decisional law, Philippine and American, holding it together. They have been
considered, sufficiently discussed in some detail, and found to be without merit in our Decision.
It would, thus, make little sense to embark on another lengthy discussion of the same issues and
arguments.
Suffice it to reiterate that the sanction imposed on the TV program in question does not, under
the factual milieu of the case, constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the nature of subsequent
punishment for past violation committed by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the
program on August 10, 2004. Eliseo F. Soriano Vs. Ma. Consoliza P. Laguardia, etc. et al./Eliseo
F. Soriano Vs. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, et al., G.R. No.
164785/G.R. No. 165636, March 15, 2010.
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HRET; procedure. It is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best interest of the electorate,
ensuring the determination of the latter’s will within a reasonable time. In sum, there is
absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding that the HRET gravely abused its
discretion by not granting petitioner an extension of time to present additional evidence and
formally offer the same. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal Josephine Veronique R. Lacson-Noel and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. No.
190067, March 9, 2010.
Legislative districts; contiguous requirement. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a
legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District,
leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This
contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall
“comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.” It is no argument
to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a district with
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First
Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an insuperable
condition making compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional
mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the
practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills
the constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient
representation of the minimum mass of constituents. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.
President; power of appointment. The incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, G.R. No.
191032, G.R. No. 191057, A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, G.R. No. 191149, G.R. No. 191342, March 17,
2010.
Speedy trial. The constitutional right to a “speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case
tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been
denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
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conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of
the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and the prejudice caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term
and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the
factors that may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay.
Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to
a speedy disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay
of almost five (5) years on the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution
petitioner reasonably found necessary before he could present his defense; (2) the
unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by petitioner of the right to an early
disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the delay was
prejudicial to petitioner’s cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and
during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained
stagnant at the prosecution stage.
The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was
intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice
by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in
an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure but must also be
promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases
renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by
various legislations inutile. Capt. Wilferdo G. Roquero vs. The Chancellor of UP
Manila, et al., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010.
Unfair competition; bidding. The provision imposed the precondition that the contracting parties
should be eligible and qualified. It should be emphasized that the bidding process was not a
“free-for-all” where any and all interested parties, qualified or not, could take part. Section 5(e)
of RA 9184 defines competitive bidding as a “method of procurement which is open to
participation by any interested party and which consists of the following processes:
advertisement, pre-bid conference,eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt and
opening of bids, evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of contract x x x.” The law
categorically mandates that prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier
stated, bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected
to certain reservations or qualifications. Thus, in its pre-qualification guidelines issued for the
sale of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify any applicant who did not
meet the requirements for pre-qualification. Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a bidding
process presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the
principle that only “responsible” and “qualified” bidders can bid and be awarded government
contracts. Our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated
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competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil-
devour-the-hindmost rule.
Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the
exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair
competition. While the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves
to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.
In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper the
government’s effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government
property. This is an evil sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the
authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it. National Power Corporation
vs. Pinatubo Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative due process. Petitioner’s allegation of improper venue and the fact that the
complaint was not under oath are not sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. Well
to remember, the case was an administrative case and as such, technical rules of procedure are
liberally applied. In administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. The intention is to resolve disputes brought before such bodies in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner possible.
Petitioner was likewise amply afforded administrative due process the essence of which is an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. The records show that petitioner filed the following: (1) Compliance-
Answer to the Complaint; (2) Rejoinder; (3) Position paper; (4) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Board of Professional Teachers finding him guilty as charged; and (5) Motion
for Reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. He attended the preliminary
conference and hearing where he was able to adduce his evidence. With the opportunities he
had, he cannot claim he was denied due process. Rene Ventenilla Puse Vs. Ligaya delos Santos-
Puse, G.R. No. 183678, March 15, 2010
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. Considering that the President has the power to review
on appeal the orders or acts of petitioner NEA, the failure of respondent to undertake such an
appeal bars him from resorting to a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot prosper until after
all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to courts. The
party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself
correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one
of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.
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In the present case, respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed a
case with the RTC without appealing the decision of the NEA to the Office of the President. As
such, his petition filed with the RTC must necessarily fail. National Electrification Administration
vs. Val L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
Regulations; publication. NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was
merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law
but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the
proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75
defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification,
bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be
submitted by bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment and release of awarded
scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding
and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of
any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it
did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally. National Power Corporation vs. Pinatubo
Commercial, represented by Alfredo A. Dy, G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010.
Agrarian law
CARL; coverage. Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of the municipality included
Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents’ landholdings were situated. The significance of
this fact cannot be overstated, for, thereby, the respondents’ landholdings were presumed to be
industrial and residential lands. Jurisprudence has been clear about the presumption. In Hilario
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court said: “The presumption assumed by the appellate
court that a parcel of land which is located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to
residential purposes is wrong. It should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion
should be presumed residential, or commercial, or non-agricultural unless there is a clearly
preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.”
To the same effect was Natalia Realty Corporation v. DAR, thus: “We now determine whether
such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall “cover,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural
lands.” As to what constitutes “agricultural land,” it is referred to as “land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.” The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation.
“Agricultural lands” are only those lands which are “arable and suitable agricultural lands” and
“do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.”
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents’ landholdings have been part of the
poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario andNatalia, holding that the
respondents’ landholdings were non-agricultural, and, consequently, outside the coverage of the
CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was within the Central Business District
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of the municipality. Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by

Secretary Hernani A. Braganza vs. Pablo Berenguer, et al., G.R. No. 154094, March 9, 2010.
CARP; coverage. Petitioner insists on exemption of the Alangilan landholding from CARP
coverage. It argues that the subject landholding had already been converted into non-
agricultural use long before the advent of the CARP. The passage of the 1982 Ordinance,
classifying the property as reserved for residential, it asserts, effectively transformed the land into
non-agricultural use, and thus, outside the ambit of the CARL. It cites Natalia, wherein it was
ruled that lands intended for residential use are outside the coverage of the CARL.
Indeed, lands devoted to non-agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These
include lands previously converted into non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL
on June 15, 1988. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to convince us that the Alangilan landholding
ceased to be agricultural at the time of the effectivity of the CARL.
It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for
residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land
from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary,
the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that the
property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential
is not a land classification category.
Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still
agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an
Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding
had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would
have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance. Alangilan Realty &
Development Corporation vs. Office of the President, represented by Alberto Romulo, as
Executive Secretary and Arthur P. Autea, as Deputy Secretary and Department of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 180471, March 26, 2010.
Election law
COMELEC; findings. The appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left
to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of
elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by
substantial evidence, are final and nonreviewable by courts of justice. This principle is applied
with greater force when the case concerns the COMELEC, because the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the poll body—created and explicitly made independent by the
Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. Jesus O. Typoco vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186359. March 5, 2010.
COMELEC; majority vote. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority
vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of
respondent’s Election Protest. Promulgated on 15 February 1993 pursuant to Section 6, Article
IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is clear
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on this matter. Without any trace of ambiguity, Section 6, Rule 18 of said Rule categorically
provides as follows: “Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission
en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed
if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be
denied.” Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R.
No. 191084, March 25, 2010.
COMELEC; firearms ban. The main issue is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section
2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714. The Court finds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in this case. Atty. Reynante B. Orceo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190779,
March 26, 2010.
HRET; vote count. What petitioner questions is the Tribunal’s reliance on election returns and/or
tally sheets and other election documents to arrive at the number of votes for each of the parties.
However, jurisprudence has established that such action of the HRET was well within its
discretion and jurisdiction.
Indeed, the general rule is, if what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes
for each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots themselves. However,
this rule applies only if the ballots are available and their integrity has been preserved from the
day of elections until revision. When the ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then
recourse can be made to untampered and unaltered election returns or other election
documents as evidence. Bai Sandra S.A. Sema vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
and Didagen P. Dilangalen, G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010.
Local Government
City; population requirement. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population
indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional
limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. Victorino B. Aldaba, et al. Vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010.

Public officers
Appointment. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law provides: “(1) Permanent status. – A
permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the
position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in
accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)”
In the CES under which the position of PEZA Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning is
classified, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment is
governed by the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the CES Board.

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Clearly, for an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security
of tenure, she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the
other requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the
President.
Admittedly, before and up to the time of the termination of her appointment, respondent did not
go through the four stages of CES eligibility examinations.
The appellate court’s ruling that respondent became CES eligible upon earning
the MNSA degree, purportedly in accordance with Executive Order No. 696, as amended by
Executive Order No. 771, does not lie.
By respondent’s attainment of an MNSA degree, she was not conferred automatic CES eligibility.
It was, as above-quoted portions of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely accredited as
“equivalent to passing the Management Aptitude Test Battery.” For respondent to
acquire CES eligibility and CES rank, she could “proceed to the second stage of the eligibility
examination process . . . and the other stages of the examination . . . in accordance with existing
policies and regulations”; and that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the three other
stages of the CES eligibility examinations and is conferred CES eligibility, she could “qualify for
appointment to CES ranks,” PROVIDED that she meets and complies “with other requirements
of the CES Board and the Office of the President to qualify for rank appointment.”
Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in 1993, had not
undergone the second, third and fourth stages of the CES eligibility examinations prior to her
appointment or during her incumbency as Deputy Director General up to the time her
appointment was terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed certified to by the CES Board.
Not being a CES eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination by
the PEZA Board on June 1, 2000 of her appointment, as well as the appointment in her stead
of CES eligible by Ortaliz, were not illegal. PEZA Board of Directors and Lilia D. De Lima vs.
Gloria J. Mercado, G.R. No. 172144, March 9, 2010.
Leave. Section 49, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave requires that an application for
leave should be acted upon within 5 working days from receipt, otherwise, such application is
deemed approved. The CSC interpreted said provision in this wise” “It is explicit from
the aforequoted rule that an application for leave of absence which had not been acted upon –
either by approving or disapproving – by the head of agency or his/her authorized representative
within five (5) working days from the date of its filing shall be deemed approved.”
The CSC also ruled that “Section 49 calls for a specific action to be done by the head of the
agency or his duly authorized representative on the application for leave filed which is either to
approve or to deny the same.”
Being the central agency mandated to “prescribe, amend, and enforce rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent
laws,” the CSC has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them, with
its interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. The Court has consistently
yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own
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rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
Clearly, Atty. Nghuatco’s memorandum did not cover the action contemplated by Section 49.
For one, it did not bear the imprimatur of the Commission Chairman (or his duly authorized
representative) who was the proper party to grant or deny the application, as dictated by Section
52 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave. For another, it only submitted to the Commission Secretary
Atty. Nghuatco’s comments and/or recommendations on Paler’s application. It was merely
preliminary and did not propose any definitive action (i.e., approval or disapproval)
on Paler’s application, and simply recommended what action to take. It was obviously not
controlling and the Chairman could have agreed or disagreed with the recommended action. In
fact, the memorandum clearly provided that Paler’s request was still to be referred to the Legal
Service for comment, and that the application “(could) be acted upon depending on the
completion of his work load and submission of the medical certificate.” These circumstances
plainly meant that further action was yet to be made on the application. And since there was no
final approval or disapproval of Paler’s application within 5 working days from receipt as
required by Section 49, the application was deemed approved. Paler, therefore, could not be
considered on AWOL. Commission on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon.
Arturo L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010.
Misconduct. Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law
or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or
be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In
grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest.
Respondent’s acts of grabbing petitioner and attempting to kiss her were, no doubt, intentional.
Worse, the incident occurred months after he had made similar but subtler overtures to De la
Cruz, who made it clear that his sexual advances were not welcome. Considering that the acts
respondent committed against petitioner were much more aggressive, it was impossible that the
offensive nature of his actions could have escaped him. It does not appear that petitioner and
respondent were carrying on an amorous relationship that might have justified his attempt to
kiss petitioner while they were separated from their companions. Worse, as petitioner and
respondent were both married (to other persons), respondent not only took his marital status
lightly, he also ignored petitioner’s married state, and good character and reputation. Teresita
G. Narvasa vs. Benjamin A. Sanchez, Jr., G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010.

April 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
COA; powers. The 1987 Constitution has made the COA the guardian of public funds, vesting it
with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and
the uses of public funds and property including the exclusive authority to define the scope of its
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audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations. Section 11, Chapter 4, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 echoes this constitutional mandate given to COA.
In light of these express provisions of law granting respondent COA its power and authority, we
have previously ruled that its exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional
mechanisms that give life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.
Furthermore, we have also declared that COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures of government funds.
Based on the foregoing discussion and due to the lack or absence of any law or jurisprudence
saying otherwise, we rule that, in resolving cases brought before it on appeal, respondent COA
is not required to limit its review only to the grounds relied upon by a government agency’s
auditor with respect to disallowing certain disbursements of public funds. In consonance with
its general audit power, respondent COA is not merely legally permitted, but is also duty-bound
to make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowed disbursement and not simply restrict
itself to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government
agency concerned. To hold otherwise would render COA’s vital constitutional power unduly
limited and thereby useless and ineffective. Ramon R. Yap vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
158562, April 23, 2010.
Freedom of expression; LGBT group. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in
the party-list system, and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the
COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its views as a political
party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified
party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s
fundamental rights. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582,
April 8, 2010.
Legislative district; population requirement. Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III
and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment.”

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Petitioners contend, citing Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that the
reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act
No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: “Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.” The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned
about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. Senator
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189793, April 7, 2010.
Party list; accreditation. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Party list; moral disapproval as ground for accreditation. Moral disapproval, without more, is
not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts
more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable
conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any
particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that implicates our equal
protection clause.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in themselves
for the purposes of the equal protection clause. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals
as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself
has merely demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made “an unwarranted and impermissible classification not

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justified by the circumstances of the case.” Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Party list; sectors qualified. The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on
the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”.
The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
President; executive prerogative. The Executive Department did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan. From a domestic law perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Isabelita C.
Vinuya, et al. vs. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010.
President; power of appointment. The incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010 as the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary. Arturo M. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 191002, April 20,
2010.
President; power to reorganize. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President
has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with
the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of
previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing
statutes.
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing
authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31,
Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit.
It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary
(which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary
or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.
Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 quoted above
authorizes the President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and
the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the
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Office of the President to any other Department or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice
versa.
There is a view that the reorganization actions that the President may take with respect to
agencies in the Office of the President are strictly limited to transfer of functions and offices as
seemingly provided in Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code significantly provides: “Sec.
20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such
other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and
which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in
accordance with law. ”
Pursuant to Section 20, the power of the President to reorganize the Executive Branch under
Section 31 includes such powers and functions that may be provided for under other laws. To
be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s power to reorganize executive
offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general appropriations
laws. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20,
2010.
Public funds; disbursement. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 lays out the basic
guidelines that government entities must follow in disbursing public funds. Any disbursement of
public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and
officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose.
In this regard, it is necessary for this Court to elaborate on the nature and meaning of the term
“public purpose,” in relation to disbursement of public funds. As understood in the traditional
sense, public purpose or public use means any purpose or use directly available to the general
public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as “an activity as will serve as benefit
to [the] community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of
government.” However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here
as elsewhere, the idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public”
has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term “public
purpose” is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern
standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those
purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as
building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to
promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal
settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated
with public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons.
To our mind, in view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds,
salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate
them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or
employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional
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allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the
official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. We cannot accept
petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for
the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a
public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement. That theory would lead to the
anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums
without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to
someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must
be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. Ramon R. Yap vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative proceedings; due process. On the due process issue, we agree with the
COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity
to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due process,
we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x. We find it obvious under the attendant
circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this
Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds. Philippine
Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April
29, 2010
Procedural due process; requirements. The Ang Tibay formulation was overlapping and
repetitious. Hence, in Air Manila, Inc. v. Balatbat, the formulation was simplified into four basic
rights, as follows:
1. The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that
may affect a person’s legal right;
2. The right to a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights and to introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;
3. The right to a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and
impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and
4. The right to a finding or decision of that tribunal supported by substantial evidence
presented at the hearing or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties.
Gauged upon the foregoing guidelines, Tolentino’s gripe was unwarranted. He was not denied
procedural due process. The Division had required him to provide the names of his revisors
whose tasks included the raising of objections, the claiming votes for him, or the contesting of
the votes in favor of his opponent. He has neither alleged being deprived of this opportunity,
nor indicated any situation in which his revisors were denied access to the revision proceedings.
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He could not also insist that the COMELEC did not consider his legal and factual arguments;
besides, he could still raise them in his memorandum should he chose to. During the revision
stage, he should raise all objections, present his evidence and witnesses, and file his
memorandum before the case would be submitted for resolution. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino
vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P. De Castro vs. Commission on Elections,
et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 & 187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 &
187968. April 7, 2010.
Reorganization; good faith. The presidential power to reorganize agencies and offices in
the executive branch of government is subject to the condition that such reorganization is
carried out in good faith.
If the reorganization is done in good faith, the abolition of positions, which results in loss of
security of tenure of affected government employees, would be valid. In Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Zamora, we even observed that there was no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except those who hold constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as
regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right to an office or
salary. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita etc., et al. G.R. No. 166620, April 20,
2010.
Election Law
Ballots; revision. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it order the
revision of 44 ballots with the Senate Electoral Tribunal without first reolsivng whether 16 of
those 44 ballots should be included in the revision.
In regular election contests, the general averment of fraud or irregularities in the counting of
votes justifies the examination of the ballots and recounting of votes. This process of
examination is the revision of the ballots pursuant to Section 6, Rule 20 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
The protests involved herein assailed the authenticity of the election returns and the veracity of
the counting of the ballots. In that regard, the ballots themselves are the best evidence. The only
means to overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the election returns is to examine and
determine first whether the ballot boxes have been substantially preserved in the manner
mandated by law. Hence, the necessity to issue the order of revision.
No ruling could be handed down against the integrity of the ballot boxes that would effectively
render naught the evidentiary value of the ballots they contained unless a full blown trial on the
merits was first conducted. Tolentino should accept the legal impossibility for the Division to
rule on the issue of inclusion or exclusion of the set-aside ballot boxes except after the revision
process. Mayor Abraham N. Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Vice-Mayor Celso P.
De Castro vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 187958, G.R. No. 187961 &
187962/G.R. No. 187966, G.R. No. 187967 & 187968. April 7, 2010.
Party list; delisting. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or
sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
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First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does
not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To
be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical
language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a
mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained
application of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the
contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.
What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC (Banat) where we partly invalidated the
2% party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows: “We rule that, in computing the
allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when
the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.”
The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations
garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of
additional seats.
We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or
organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be
delisted for the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other
words, the application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the
percentage of party-list votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat
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in the House of Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in
Banat. The disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or
organizations that did not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency
in which it registered.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for
failure to garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in
light of the Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941
should be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and
as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), etc. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010.
Voter; residency requirement. The the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year
residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes
or intends to vote. “Residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean “domicile,” importing not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention inferable from a person’s acts, activities, and utterances. “Domicile” denotes a
fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one
intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three
rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile
somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person
can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an
actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose.
There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years.
His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact,
Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of
Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In
2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the
same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines
above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a
voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has established domicile elsewhere, or that
he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He should,
therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A, Barangay 15,
Caloocan City.
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That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and
2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the
address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter
of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistio’s COC, if true, might serve as
basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due
course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his
domicile in Caloocan City, or that he has established residence outside of Caloocan City. Luis A.
Asistio vs. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, etc. et al., G.R. No. 191124. April 27, 2010.
International Law
International law; binding effect. Although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility
of giving effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of
international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation
of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles
of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that
are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis
in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis
of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status. Ang Ladlad LGBT
Party vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Public Officers
Condonation doctrine; applicability to appointive officials. Petitioners urge this Court to
expand the settled doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions
allegedly committed during their preceding term.
The Court rejects petitioners’ thesis.
More than 60 years ago, the Court in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija issued the
landmark ruling that prohibits the disciplining of an elective official for a wrongful act
committed during his immediately preceding term of office. The Court explained that “[t]he
underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.”
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When the people elect[e]d a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or
misconduct[,] to practically overrule the will of the people. (underscoring supplied)
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Lizares v. Hechanova, et al. replicated the doctrine. The Court dismissed the petition in that
case for being moot, the therein petitioner “having been duly reelected, is no longer amenable
to administrative sanctions.”
Ingco v. Sanchez, et al. clarified that the condonation doctrine does not apply to
a criminal case. Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al., Olivarez v. Judge
Villaluz, and Aguinaldo v. Santos echoed the qualified rule that reelection of a public official
does not bar prosecution for crimes committed by him prior thereto.
Consistently, the Court has reiterated the doctrine in a string of recent jurisprudence including
two cases involving a Senator and a Member of the House of Representatives.
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The
condonation rule was applied even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the
reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct occurred four days before
the elections, respectively. Salalimadid not distinguish as to the date of filing of the
administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior
term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the
wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official’s culpability was committed prior to the date of
reelection.
Petitioners’ theory is not novel.
A parallel question was involved in Civil Service Commission v. Sojor where the Court found no
basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of condonation.
Contrary to petitioners’ asseveration, the non-application of the condonation doctrine
to appointiveofficials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law.
In the recent case of Quinto v. Commission on Elections, the Court applied the four-fold test in
an equal protection challenge against the resign-to-run provision, wherein it discussed the
material and substantive distinctions between elective and appointive officials that could well
apply to the doctrine of condonation.
The electorate’s condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official
cannot be extended to that of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of
the rule being to uphold the will of the people expressed through the ballot. In other words,
there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of the electorate to
speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.
It is the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing
authority, that could extinguish an administrative liability. Since petitioners hold appointive
positions, they cannot claim the mandate of the electorate. The people cannot be charged with
the presumption of full knowledge of the life and character of each and every probable
appointee of the elective official ahead of the latter’s actual reelection.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent
as it would, as respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local government
employees, with blanket immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed

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abuse in the bureaucracy. Atty. Vicente E. Salumbides, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
et al., G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010.
Public office; public trust. Unlike private offices which are held largely on the dictates of
market forces, public offices are public trust. Public officers are tasked to serve the public
interest, thus the excessive burden for their retention in the form of numerous prohibitions. The
liberal evidentiary standard of substantial evidence and the freedom of administrative
proceedings from technical niceties effectuate the fiduciary nature of public office: they are
procedural mechanisms assuring ease in maintaining an efficient bureaucracy, free of rent-
seeking officials who exploit government processes to raise easy money. Respondent’s hold on
his item at the Mandaue City revenue office, which, like our customs offices, is a common situs
for corrupt activities, is no more lasting than his fidelity to his trust. Although no criminal
verdict deprives respondent of his liberty, adequate evidence justifies his removal from the
bureaucracy for forfeiting the public trust. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc. vs. Reynaldo M.
Dosono, G.R. No. 170697, April 30, 2010.

May 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands acquired by the National Housing Authority for resettlement
purposes or housing development are exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform laws. Such
acquisition converts the land by operation of law from agricultural to residential. The National
Housing Authority is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to any tenant in possession of
the purchased land. National Housing Authority vs. Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, et al.,G.R. No. 175200, May 4, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. In computing just compensation for rice lands tenanted as
of October 21, 1972, the grant of 6% yearly interest under DAR Administrative Order No. 13,
Series of 1994, as amended, must be reckoned from October 21, 1972 up to the time of actual
payment of the compensation, and not only up to the time the Land Bank of the Philippines
approves payment of the compensation and deposits the amount in the name of the landowner,
considering that release of such deposit is still subject to compliance with documentary
requirements. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time from
its taking. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Domingo and Mamerto Soriano, G.R. No. 180772 &
G.R. No. 180776, May 6, 2010.
Commission on Elections; registration of party coalition. Comelec may not, through a resolution
setting the deadline for registration of political parties, differentiate between political parties, on
the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other. There is no substantial
distinction among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating
distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 8646, dated July
14, 2009, which sets August 17, 2009 as the deadline for filing petitions for registration of
political parties, without mentioning political organizations and coalitions, should be
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understood as covering the latter entities as well. A petition for registration as a political
coalition filed beyond that deadline is time-barred, and the Comelec resolution granting that
petition constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Political coalitions, even if composed of registered political parties, need to register separately in
accordance with established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be
given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a
different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other
registered parties. If parties want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of
their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members’
democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their
coalition. Liberal Party, etc. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6,
2010.
Electoral tribunals; grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review
decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court will not interfere with the tribunal’s
exercise of its discretion and jurisdiction. There was no grave abuse of discretion when the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ordered to continue the revision and appreciation of
ballots after the case had been submitted for resolution and when it issued its decisions without
the participation of any of the Justices of the Court who were members of that tribunal. Henry
“Jun” Dueñas, Jr. vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. No. 191550, May
4, 2010.
Province; requirements for creation. Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution mandates that
the criteria in the Local Government Code must be followed in the creation of a province. Any
derogation of or deviation from those criteria violates the Constitution. Thus, a law creating a
province, which failed to comply with either the population or territorial requirement of the
Local Government Code, is unconstitutional. The Court can pass upon the validity of such law
even if the province it created has begun its existence. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010.
Right to information; duty to disclose. Comelec has the duty and can be compelled to explain
fully its preparations for the May 10, 2010 elections under Section 7 of Article III of the
Constitution on the people’s right to information and Section 28 of Article II on the State’s
corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest. Any
citizen can file a petition for mandamus if the same is anchored on the people’s right to
information. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6,
2010.

June 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

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Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence

necessary to find an individual administratively liable is substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but
such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. The evidence upon which respondent’s administrative liability would be anchored
lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative cases, because the two separate audits
conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results. Evidence of shortage in
respondent’s cash and accounts, as alleged in the first audit report, is imperative to hold him
liable. In this case, the evidence against respondent could not be relied upon, because the
second audit report, which was favorable to him, necessarily puts into question the reliability of
the initial audit findings. Whether the zero balance as appearing in the second audit report was
correct or inadvertently indicated, the credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were
already tarnished. Even in administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to
support a finding of liability. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Rodolfo Zaldarriaga, G.R.
No. 175349, June 22, 2010.
Agrarian cases; just compensation. The taking of property under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) is a government exercise of the power of eminent domain. Since the
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function, a
court proceeding to fix just compensation cannot be made to depend on the existence of, and is
considered separate and independent from, an administrative case of a similar nature. Thus, the
filing by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) of a new petition for judicial determination of
just compensation after the dismissal without prejudice of another LBP-initiated court
proceeding on the same issue cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter proceeding
beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Although the formula for fixing just
compensation found in Section 17 of the CARL may be justly adopted in certain cases, it is by
no means the only formula that the court may adopt in determining just compensation. Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc., represented by Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010.
Due process; local autonomy; police power. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Administrative Order No. 01-02, as amended, which sets out rules on land use conversion, does
not violate the due process clause, because in providing administrative and criminal penalties,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act, both of which
provide penalties for illegal land conversion. Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the penalties
provided under DAR AO No. 01-02 are imposed upon the illegal or premature conversion of
lands within DAR’s jurisdiction.
In providing that reclassification of agricultural lands by local government units (LGUs) shall be
subject to the requirements of, and procedures for, land use conversion, including DAR
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approval or clearance, DAR AO No. 01-02 did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. The
power of LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute, and the Local Government Code
recognizes the authority of DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands. DAR Memorandum
No. 88, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion
applications, is a valid exercise of police power, as it was issued upon the instruction of the
President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure
was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation
and production may be carried into. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010.

Jurisdiction over election cases; administrative regulation; substitution of party-list nominees.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a controversy in which the petitioner is seeking to be
seated as the second nominee of a party-list group on the basis that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued a resolution
approving that group’s withdrawal of his nomination and substitution by another nominee. Such
controversy is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, both of which are
within the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Petitioner correctly
brought before the Supreme Court this special civil action for certiorari under Section 7 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the proclamation of, and assumption of
office by, the substitute nominee.
The COMELEC exceeded its authority when it issued an implementing regulation allowing a
party-list nominee to be substituted when his nomination is withdrawn by his party, because the
statutory provision (Section 8 of the Party-List System Act) that such regulation seeks to
implement provides an exclusive list of instances in which a party-list organization can
substitute its nominees, and the above ground for substitution is not one of those instances. It is
basic that implementing rules and regulations should remain consistent with, and cannot
override or modify, the law they intend to carry out. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R.
No. 180443. June 22, 2010.
Party list; Qualifications of party-list nominees. The provision in Section 9 of Republic Act No.
7941 (The Party-List System Act) that a nominee of the youth sector must be at least 25 but not
more than 30 years of age on the day of the election applies to all youth sector nominees of any
party-list group. Public respondent erroneously interpreted that provision as applying only to
those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as
representing the youth sector.
Section 15 of RA 7941 provides that a nominee of a sectoral party who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party is not eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation
unless such change occurred at least six months before the elections. There is no textual support
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in the law for public respondent’s argument that Section 15 does not apply to private
respondent’s shift of affiliation from his party’s youth sector to its sector representing overseas
Filipino workers and their families on the basis that there was no resultant change in party
affiliation. Section 15 clearly covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation
within the same party. Milagros E. Amores vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva. G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority; jurisdiction over building and fencing permits. By specific
provision of law, it is the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), through its building
officials, which has authority to issue building permits for the construction of structures within
the areas owned or administered by it, whether on public or private lands. Corollary to this,
PEZA, through its director general, may require owners of structures built without said permit to
remove such structures within 60 days. Otherwise, PEZA may summarily remove them at the
expense of the owner of the houses, buildings or structures. Considering that, in this case, a
fencing permit is issued complementary to a building permit and that, within its premises, PEZA
may properly issue a building permit, it is only fitting that fencing permits be issued by PEZA
within such premises. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Joseph Jude Carantes, et al., G.R.
No. 181274, June 23, 2010.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; power to grant casino licenses in economic
zones. The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) draws its authority and
power to operate, license and regulate casinos from its charter, Presidential Decree No. 1869,
and not from Section 5 of Executive Order No. 80, dated April 3, 1993 (which extended to the
Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) all applicable incentives granted to the Subic Bay Special
Economic Zone), in relation to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7227, which created the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority and empowered it to license tourism related activities except
casinos which shall continue to be licensed by PAGCOR. Thus, PAGCOR did not lose its
power to license and regulate casinos when the Supreme Court nullified Section 5 of EO 80. It
incorrectly argued that such nullification automatically invalidated its memorandum of
agreement with respondent for the operation of a casino inside the CSEZ. It cannot therefore, on
the basis of that position, revoke such memorandum of agreement and replace it with its new
Standard Authority to Operate. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Fontana
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010.
Presidential Commission on Good Government; power to grant immunity. The scope of
immunity that the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) may offer to
witnesses under Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14 may vary. It has discretion to grant
appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of the witness and his
relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree to conditions
expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. In petitioner’s case, respondent
Republic of the Philippines, acting through the PCGG, offered him not only criminal and civil
immunity but also immunity against being compelled to testify in any domestic or foreign
proceeding, other than the civil and arbitration cases identified in the Immunity Agreement, just
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so he would agree to testify. Trusting in the Government’s honesty and fidelity, petitioner
agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the
essence of due process, should hold the Republic on to its promise. The immunity from
criminal or civil prosecution that Section 5 of EO 14 authorizes covers immunity from giving
evidence in a case before a court of law, because in reality the guarantee given to a witness
against being compelled to testify constitutes a grant of immunity from civil or criminal
prosecution. Jesus P. Disini vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 180564, June 22,
2010.
Standing to sue. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not automatically clothe him
with standing to bring suit. The Supreme Court will grant access to citizen’s suits on the
narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of transcendental importance calling for urgent
resolution. Three factors are relevant in the Court’s determination to allow third party suits so it
can resolve the merits of the crucial issues raised – the character of funds or assets involved in
the controversy; a clear disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition; and the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Petitioner’s suspension from
the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Preparing a petition
raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic
rules of statutory construction falls within the proscribed conduct. Allan F. Paguia vs. Office of
the President, et al., G.R. No. 176278, June 25, 2010.
Warrantless search; arrest without warrant. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence
of probable cause. In the instances the Supreme Court has recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the seizure must have
been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause
must be satisfied before a warrantless search can be lawfully conducted. The vehicle that carried
the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. The searching officer had to make a
quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant
before conducting the search under the circumstances. He only had enough time to board the
vehicle before the same left for its destination. Given the above, and the fact that the officer had
probable cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal drugs, the search in this case
was valid. A search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police has probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Given that the search
was valid, appellant’s arrest based on that search was also valid. People of the Philippines vs.
Belen Mariacos, G.R. No. 188611, June 16, 2010.

July 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

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Agrarian reform; coverage. Lands that are not directly, actually and exclusively used for pasture
nor devoted to commercial livestock raising are not excluded from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the
President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010.
Certificate of candidacy; residency requirement. The Omnibus Election Code provides that a
certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled if there is any false
representation of a material fact. The critical material facts are those that refer to a candidate’s
qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The false
representation must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made
with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for
public office. Thus, the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake,
and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no
deception on the electorate results. The foregoing are the legal standards by which the
COMELEC must act on a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Thus, in considering the residency of a candidate as stated in the certificate of
candidacy, the COMELEC must determine whether or not the candidate deliberately attempted
to mislead, misinform or hide a fact about his or her residency that would otherwise render him
or her ineligible for the position sought. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case
when, in considering the residency issue, it based its decision solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards, such as the nature or design and furnishings of the dwelling
place in relation to the stature of the candidate. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010.
Citizenship; election and constructive registration. The statutory formalities of electing
Philippine citizenship are the following: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. Here, petitioners complied
with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. However, registration
of the documents of election with the civil registry was done belatedly. Under the facts peculiar
to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be
allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Their exercise of suffrage,
being elected to public office, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship do not on their own take the place of
election of citizenship. But where, as here, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and
documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, registration of the documents of
election beyond the timeframe should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of
citizenship have been done publicly, consistently and continuously. These acts constitute
constructive registration. In other words, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over
half a century by the petitioners is actual notice to the Philippine public, which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. It is not the registration of the act of
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election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer
Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that
citizenship has been claimed. Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right
of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in
form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat that
election and negate the permanent fact that petitioners have a Filipino mother. The lacking
requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative
penalties, if any. The documents petitioners submitted supporting their allegations that they
have registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation
purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements
embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the
Department of Justice must be complied with within a reasonable time. Balgamelo Cabiling Ma,
et al. vs. Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., et al. G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; elements. Following are the elements of double jeopardy: (1) the complaint
or information was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had
jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his express consent. These elements
are present in this case. The information filed in each of the criminal cases against respondent
was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. The regional trial court had
jurisdiction over these cases. The respondent was arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty. The court dismissed both cases on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence, which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had as that would
place respondent in double jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526,
July 26, 2010.
Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is not without exceptions. Double
jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion, or when the
prosecution was denied due process. Here, the prosecution was given more than ample
opportunity to present its case. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the trial court
simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance the resolution of the demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused. While it would have been ideal for the trial court to hold in abeyance the
resolution of the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules is it mandated to do so.
Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the
trial court, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an
error of jurisdiction. Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will
not defeat a plea of double jeopardy. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Tan. G.R. No. 167526,
July 26, 2010.
Due process; administrative proceedings. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through
pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of
due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as
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long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for violating due process
for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Even if no formal hearing took place, it is not
sufficient ground for petitioner to claim that due process was not afforded it. In this case,
petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove and establish its claim that the properties were
excluded from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner actively
participated in the proceedings by submitting various pleadings and documentary evidence. It
filed motions for reconsideration of every unfavorable outcome in all tiers of the administrative
and judicial processes. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect in its
observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. vs. Office of the President. G.R. No. 170623, July 7,
2010.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the administrative
agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction before
an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for
dismissal of the action. In this case, however, the doctrine does not apply because petitioners
failed to demonstrate that recourse to the Commission on Higher Education is mandatory – or
even possible – in an action such as that brought by the respondent, which is essentially one for
mandamus and damages. The doctrine admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where
the issues are purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present
case. Petitioners’ liability, if any, for damages will have to be decided by the courts, since any
judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code. As such,
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with. University of Santo Tomas, et al.
vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569. July 29, 2010.
Freedom of speech. Government workers, whatever their rank, have as much right as any
person in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of their
rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of expression. It
would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the members thereof have
renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be reasonably regulated only but can
never be taken away. Thus, Section 5 of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1316,
which regulates the political rights of those in the government service, provides that the
concerted activity or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the “intent of effecting work
stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession.” Such
limitation or qualification in the above rule is intended to temper and focus the application of
the prohibition, as not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government employees is
prohibited. Otherwise, government employees would be deprived of their constitutional right to
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freedom of expression. Respondents’ act of wearing similarly colored shirts, attending a public
hearing for just over an hour at the office of the GSIS Investigation Unit, bringing with them
recording gadgets, clenching their fists, and some even badmouthing the GSIS guards and GSIS
President and General Manager Winston F. Garcia, are not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect
work stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of force
concession. These actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. Government Service Insurance System and Winston F. Garcia vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et
al. G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010.
Government agencies; reorganization. Reorganization in a government agency is valid
provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith is whether or not
the purpose of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more
efficient. Removal from office as a result of reorganization must pass the test of good faith. A
demotion in office, i.e., the movement from one position to another involving the issuance of an
appointment with diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank, which may or may not
involve a reduction in salary, is tantamount to removal, if no cause is shown for
it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to reorganization, the observance
of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential. There was no demotion in this
case because petitioner was appointed to a position comparable to her former position. In fact,
her new position entailed an increase in her salary grade from 20 to 24. There is, thus, no
evidence to suggest that the Development Bank of the Philippines acted in bad faith. Virginia D.
Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No.
185215, July 22, 2010.
Government contracts; perfection. Contracts to which the government is a party are generally
subject to the same laws and regulations that govern the validity and sufficiency of contracts
between private individuals. A government contract, however, is perfected only upon approval
of competent authority, where such approval is required. With respect to contracts of
government-owned and controlled corporations, the provisions of existing laws are clear in
requiring the governing board’s approval thereof. For the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), its
charter (Presidential Decree 857) vests the general manager with power to sign contracts and to
perform such other duties as the Board of Directors may assign. Therefore, unless the Board
validly authorizes the general manager, the latter cannot bind PPA to a contract. The authority
of government officials to represent the government in any contract must proceed from an
express provision of law or valid delegation of authority. Without such actual authority being
possessed by PPA’s general manager, there could be no real consent, much less a perfected
contract, to speak of. A notice of award signed by the general manager does not embody a
perfected contract without the PPA Board’s prior approval of the contract. Sargasso
Construction & Development Corporation, et al. vs. Philippine Ports Authority. G.R. No. 170530,
July 5, 2010.
Local governments; authority of local chief executive. Under Section 444(b)(1)(iv) of the Local
Government Code, a municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of
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the Sangguniang Bayan (municipal council) before entering into a contract on behalf of the
municipality. In this case, theSangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No.
15-92 authorizing the Mayor to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in
the execution of this Court’s Decision in another case. Such authority necessarily carried with it
the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. That
the authorization did not set the terms and conditions of the compensation of the lawyer
signifies that the council empowered the Mayor to reach a mutually agreeable arrangement with
the lawyer of her choice subject to the general limitation that the contractual stipulations should
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, and, considering
that this is a contract of legal services, to the added restriction that the agreed attorney’s fees
must not be unreasonable and unconscionable. On its face, and there is no allegation to the
contrary, the prior authorization given under Resolution No. 15-92 appears to have been given
by the council in good faith in order to expeditiously safeguard the rights of Tiwi. Thus, there is
nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization, and the Mayor was sufficiently
authorized to enter into said Contract of Legal Services. Such contract need not be ratified first
by theSangguniang Bayan to be enforceable against Tiwi. The law speaks of prior authorization
and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive to enter into a contract
on behalf of the local government unit. That authority was granted by the Sangguniang Bayan to
the Mayor under Resolution No. 15-92. Municipality of Tiwi, represented by Hon. Mayor Jiame
C. Villanueva and Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi Vs. Antonio B. Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9,
2010.
Municipal ordinance; deed of restrictions. While a zoning ordinance can override the deed of
restrictions on the use of a property on the basis of the municipality’s exercise of police power,
the Court will reconcile seemingly opposing provisions in the deed of restrictions and the
zoning ordinance rather than nullify one or the other, particularly where, as here, the continued
enforcement of the deed of restrictions is reasonable and the municipality was not asserting any
interest or zoning purpose contrary to the interest of the subdivision developer that is seeking to
enforce the deed of restrictions. The Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village
Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino, minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino
and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang
Village Association, et al. vs. Municipality of Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No.
134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Ombudsman; jurisdiction. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. Republic Act No. 8249 (Act
Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan) limits the cases that are cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and
higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who,
as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14. Under the Local
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Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any
elective barangay official. Clearly, therefore, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against elective barangay officials occupying
positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent in this case. In administrative cases
involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which
the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, since the
complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction
over the complaint, the Ombudsman’s exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayan exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law.
Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the
case is terminated. When complainants first filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction
was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be transferred to the sangguniang
bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants. As a final note,
under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayanhas no power to
remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do
so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the Ombudsman’s powers are not merely
recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring
public official other than officials who may be removed only by impeachment. Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Rolson Rodriquez. G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010.
Primary jurisdiction; Commission on Higher Education. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies
only where the administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions. Petitioners have not shown that the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) has
power to “investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence,
and draw conclusions.” Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 (the Higher Education Act of 1994),
which enumerates the powers and functions of CHED) does not contain any express grant to
CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. In any event, CHED has no authority to adjudicate an
action for damages. University of Santo Tomas, et al. vs. Danes B. Sanchez. G.R. No. 165569.
July 29, 2010.
Public lands; registration. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable
rests with the applicant. A notation on the advanced survey plan stating in effect that the
subject property is alienable and disposable is not sufficient to establish the actual legal
classification of the disputed lot. It is not the kind of evidence required by law to establish that
the land is alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan merely identifies the property
preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title. Republic of the Philippines vs.
Domingo Espinosa. G.R. No. 176885, July 5, 2010.
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Public officers; demotion. There is demotion when an employee is appointed to a position

resulting in diminution of duties, responsibilities, status or rank, which may or may not involve a
reduction in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same duties and
responsibilities but with rank and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there
is no demotion and the appointment is valid. In this case, the appointment of petitioner to Bank
Executive Officer II did not constitute a demotion. Her duties and responsibilities as Account
Officer (her previous position) and as BEO II are practically the same. Rather than lowering her
rank and salary, petitioner’s appointment as BEO II had, in fact, resulted in an increase thereof
from salary grade 20 to 24. Further, her appointment to BEO II was done in good faith and
pursuant to a valid reorganization. Virginia D. Bautista vs. Civil Service Commission and
Development Bank of the Philippines. G.R. No. 185215, July 22, 2010.
Review of COMELEC Decision. In light of the Supreme Court’s limited authority to review
findings of fact, it does not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC’s appreciation
and evaluation of evidence. Findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial
evidence, are final and non-reviewable. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction. In exceptional cases, however, when the
COMELEC’s action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Supreme Court is not only obliged, but
has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting
errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 191938, July
2, 2010.
Right to information. Like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
The people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is
limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law. National board examinations, such as the certified public accountant board
examinations, are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in
particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these
examinations in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning
of the art and science of accounting. On the other hand, there may be valid reasons to limit
access to the examination papers in order to properly administer the tests. More than the mere
convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the
preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of the multiple choice
examinations that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited
duration. However, the Professional Regulation Commission is not a party to the proceedings. It
has not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind the regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the examination documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching
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implications of the cases, which may impact on every board examination administered by the
Professional Regulation Commission, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, the
Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings. Hazel Ma. C.
Antolin vs. Abelardo R. Domondon, et al./Hazel Ma. C. Antolin vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe. G.R.
No. 165036/G.R. No. 175705, July 5, 2010.
Sanggunian resolution; validity. A municipal resolution correcting an alleged typographical
error in a zoning ordinance does not have to comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing, which are required for the validity and effectiveness of zoning ordinances. The
Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al./Jose Marie V. Aquino,
minor and represented by his parents Dr. Errol Aquino and Atty. Marilyn Aquino, et al. vs. Ayala
Alabang Village Association, et al./Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al. vs. Municipality of
Muntinlupa, et al. G.R. No. 134269/G.R. No. 134440/G.R. No. 144518, July 7, 2010.
Standing to sue. Legal standing refers to a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case,
arising from the direct injury it has sustained or will sustain as a result of the challenged
governmental action. Legal standing calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The term
“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the governmental action, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Unless
a person’s constitutional rights are adversely affected by a statute or governmental action, he has
no legal standing to challenge the same. In this case, petitioner challenges the constitutionality
of Section 2.6 of the Distribution Services and Open Access Rules (DSOAR) of the Energy
Regulatory Commission, which obligates residential end-users to advance the cost of extending
power distribution lines and installing additional facilities. However, petitioner’s members
consist of developers, brokers, appraisers, contractors, manufacturers, suppliers, engineers,
architects, and other persons or entities engaged in the housing and real estate business. It does
not question the challenged DSOAR provision as a residential end-user, and it cannot do so
because the challenged provision refers only to the rights and obligations of distribution utilities
and residential end-users; neither the petitioner nor its members are residential end-users. Thus,
neither the petitioner nor its members can claim any injury, as residential end-users, arising from
Section 2.6 of the DSOAR; neither can they cite any benefit accruing to them as residential end-
users that would result from the invalidation of the assailed provision. Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders’ Association, Inc. Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8,
2010.
Waiver of locus standi rule. The Court can waive the procedural rule on standing in cases that
raise issues of transcendental importance. Following are the guidelines in determining whether
or not a matter is of transcendental importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. In
this case, the three determinants are absent. Public funds are not involved. The allegations of
constitutional and statutory violations of the public respondent agency are unsubstantiated by
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facts and are mere challenges on the wisdom of the rules. Parties with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised – the residential end-users – undoubtedly exist and
are not included as parties to the petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders’ Association, Inc.
Vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, et al. G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010.

August 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Civil Service Commission; jurisdiction. The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters, like the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), or those created by special law.
Thus, GSIS employees are part of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the
circulars, rules and regulations issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline,
attendance and general terms and conditions of employment. The CSC has jurisdiction to hear
and decide disciplinary cases against erring employees. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et
al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137, August 18,
2010.
Double compensation. Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present emolument, office or title of any kind from any foreign government. Pensions and
gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double or indirect compensation. This provision,
however, does not apply to the present case as there was no double compensation to the
petitioners. The questioned resolutions of the Monetary Board are valid corporate acts of
petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly representation and
transportation allowance (RATA), as members of the Board of Directors of Philippine
International Convention Center Inc. (PICCI), a government corporation whose sole stockholder
is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). RATA is distinct from salary as a form of
compensation. Unlike salary which is paid for services rendered, RATA is a form of allowance
intended to defray expenses deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, RATA is
paid only to certain officials who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and
transportation expenses. Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have been receiving from the
BSP, the grant of RATA to each of the petitioners for every board meeting they attended, in their
capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, in addition to their per diem, does not
violate the constitutional proscription against double compensation. Gabriel C. Singson, et al. vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010.
Eminent domain; voluntary agreement by landowner. Where the landowner agrees voluntarily
to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the
institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Failure for a long time
of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the
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government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. The landowner’s
remedy in such case is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment. Here, the
Court of Appeals erred in ordering the eviction of petitioner from the property that it has held as
government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the
respondents intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact,
they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought
to have the bigger lot subdivided, the respondents earmarked a specific portion for the City
Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the respondents had
agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of
Lipa or to the Republic of the Philippines, but the parties never formalized and documented
such transfer. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed entitled to possession pending the
respondents’ formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation. Republic of
the Philippines vs. Primo Mendoza and Maria Lucero, G.R. No. 185091, August 8, 2010.
Equal protection clause. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in Congress and municipalities that did not have similar pending bills for purposes
of the income requirement for converting a municipality into a city under Republic Act No.
9009. The pendency of such a bill does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress might even have lower
annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. Thus, the
classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress − is not rationally related
to the purpose of RA 9009, which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from
converting into cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in Congress limits the
exemption (from the income requirement) to a specific condition existing at the time of passage
of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that
a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Also, the exemption
provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 respondent municipalities a unique advantage
based on an arbitrary date − the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress
– as against all other municipalities that may want to convert into cities after the effectiveness of
RA 9009. Lastly, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the Constitutional
requirement that the classification must apply to all those who are similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into
cities, while those 16 municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption found in the
Cityhood Laws would be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. League of
Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August
24, 2010.
Judicial review; justiciable controversy; moot case. Private respondent was not elected President
in the May 10, 2010 election. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase “any
reelection” in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution will be premised on a person’s second
(whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved
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in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no definite, concrete, real
or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by the Court in this case that will
benefit any of the parties. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power
of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. It is not empowered to
decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. When a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable. An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the
matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for
the Court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 election, the same is no longer true today. Following the
results of that election, private respondent was not elected President for the second time. Thus,
any discussion of his “reelection” will simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no
useful or practical purpose. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento vs. Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada and
Commission on Elections. G.R. No. 191988. August 31, 2010.
Operative fact doctrine. Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as
unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity,
may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. However, in this case, the minority’s
novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws
and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and
employees operate to constitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory
misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the
minority’s view, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be
continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton
enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before
the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially violate
the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court.
The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the
general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to
validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. The operative fact doctrine never validates or
constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. The unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional,
but its effects, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. The doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law,
not the unconstitutional law itself. Applying the doctrine to this case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the
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effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such
as the payment of salaries and supplies by the concerned local government units or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. League
of Cities of the Philippines represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August
24, 2010.
Search warrant; requirements for validity. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests
upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause
must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. On the first
requisite, a magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is
paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out
such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched. On the last requirement, a description of the
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness. People of the Philippines vs. Estela Tuan y
Baludda. G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010.
Warrantless arrest. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment operation where he was
caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made during an entrapment
operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode of
apprehending drug pushers. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal
safeguards, a buy-bust operation, such as the one involving appellant, deserves judicial sanction.
Consequently, the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure conducted on the
person of appellant were allowed under the circumstances. The search, incident to his lawful
arrest, needed no warrant to sustain its validity. Thus, there is no doubt that the sachets
ofshabu recovered during the legitimate buy-bust operation are admissible and were properly
admitted in evidence against him. People of the Philippines vs. Michael Sembrano y Castro. G.R.
No. 185848, August 16, 2010.
Administrative Law
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Administrative agencies; findings. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial

bodies, like the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
respect. In this case, there is no ground to disturb the DARAB’s findings, which affirmed those of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board after due hearing and appreciation of the
evidence submitted by both parties.Heirs of Jose M. Cervantes, et al. vs. Jesus G. Miranda. G.R.
No. 183352, August 9, 2010.
Administrative cases; preliminary investigation; due process. Section 45 of the Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997 gives the President and General Manager of GSIS the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, this power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in accordance with civil
service rules. While the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Civil
Service Rules) do not specifically provide that a formal charge issued against a government
employee without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and void, it is required that,
upon receipt of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the disciplining authority
shall require the person complained of to submit a counter-affidavit or comment under oath
within three days from receipt. The use of the word “shall” quite obviously indicates that it is
mandatory for the disciplining authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or at least give
the respondent the opportunity to comment and explain his side. This must be done prior to the
issuance of the formal charge, and the comment required is different from the answer that may
later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, no exception is provided for in the
Civil Service Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
The above rules apply even if the complainant is the disciplining authority himself, as in this
case. To comply with such requirement, petitioner could have issued a memorandum requiring
respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against them instead of
immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents’ comments, petitioner should have
properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making a conclusion that there was a
prima facie case against respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal charges.
It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the administrative cases stemmed from an event that
took place the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears, therefore, that the formal
charges were issued after the sole determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority
that there was a prima facie case against respondents. To condone this would give the
disciplining authority an unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act
complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. Thus, respondents here were denied due
process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and evidence of their
guilt is – in the opinion of their superior – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
taken by petitioner. The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the respondents without
complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least giving the respondents the
opportunity to comment violated their right to due process. Accordingly, the formal charges are
voidab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
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Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al. .G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137,
August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; decision rendered without due process. The cardinal precept is that where
there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The
violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is
equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee
that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by
the type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the same.
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
Molina, et al./Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I. Molina, et al., G.R. No. 157383/G.R. No. 174137,
August 18, 2010.
Administrative cases; quantum of evidence. In administrative cases, the requisite proof is
substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case, substantial evidence consisted of the
uniform findings of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon and the Court of Appeals that petitioner connived with his co-
defendants to destroy the improvements introduced by respondent on the subject property so
they could construct their own cottages thereon. Josephil C. Bien vs. Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No.
179333, August 3, 2010.
Public officers; statement of assets and liabilities. Even an asset that was acquired through
chattel mortgage must be declared and included in the Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SSAL). The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and in detail without
distinction as to how the property was acquired. Respondent, therefore, cannot escape liability
by arguing that the ownership of the vehicle has not yet passed to him on the basis that it was
acquired only on installment basis. The requirement to file the SSAL not later than the first 15
days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and trivial
routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servant’s duty to the people. It
serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of
officials and employees in the government in compliance with the Constitutional policy to
eradicate corruption, promote transparency in government, and ensure that all government
employees and officials lead just and modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be
sworn to and is made accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative
regulations.Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146,
August 25, 2010.
Local Government

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Abuse of authority. Addressing the argument of petitioner, a barangay official, that there was no
abuse of authority because the incident complained of occurred in another barangay over which
he has no authority and jurisdiction, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is liable for abuse of authority on the basis that he participated in the
unlawful act as a higher authority that gave a semblance of legality over that act and influenced
the actions of his co-defendants. Here, petitioner was president of the organization of barangay
officials in his municipality and sat as ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan, which has
power to review barangay ordinances and authority to discipline barangay officials. His co-
defendants were officials in the barangay where the incident occurred. Josephil C. Bien vs.
Pedro B. Bo, G.R. No. 179333, August 3, 2010.
Creation of local government unit. The Constitution states that the creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other
law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate
in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units
must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Republic Act No. 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the
income requirement from Php20 million to Php100 million for the creation of a city. This law
took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required
that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the Php100 million income
requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not
grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were
pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The laws converting these municipalities
into cities, all enacted after the RA 9009 became effective, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written
in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. League of Cities of the Philippines
represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Trenas, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et
al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, August 24, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian reform; deposit of provisional compensation. The amount of provisional compensation
that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if
the latter rejects the offer of compensation of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the LBP’s initial valuation of the land and not, as
respondent argues, the sum awarded by DAR’s adjudication bodies as compensation in a
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summary administrative proceeding. The deposit of such provisional compensation must be

made even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least
simultaneously with it, once the landowner rejects the initial valuation of the LBP. Such deposit
results from the landowner’s rejection of the DAR offer (based on the LBP’s initial
valuation). Both the conduct of summary administrative proceeding and deposit of provisional
compensation follow as a consequence of the landowner’s rejection. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Heir of Trinidad S. Vda. De Arieta. G.R. No. 161834, August 11, 2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 is the principal basis
for computing just compensation, and the factors set forth therein have been translated into a
formula outlined in DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 (DAR AO 5). While the
determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the Regional Trial
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into
full consideration the factors specifically identified by law and its implementing rules. Special
Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR AO 5, because
unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. Courts
cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian reform law, the formula provided by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for determining just compensation. In this case, the court
adopted a different formula in determining the land value by considering the average between
the findings of DAR using the formula laid down in Executive Order No. 228 and the market
value of the property as stated in the tax declaration. This is obviously a departure from the
mandate of the law and DAR AO 5. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Rizalina Gustilo Barrido, et
al., G.R. No. 183688, August 18, 2010.
Agrarian reform; sale of land. Petitioners’ title shows on its face that the government granted title
to them on January 9, 1990, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. This law explicitly
prohibits any form of transfer of the land granted under it except to the government or by
hereditary succession to the successors of the farmer beneficiary. Upon the enactment of
Executive Order No. 228 in 1987, however, the restriction ceased to be absolute. Land reform
beneficiaries were allowed to transfer ownership of their lands provided that their amortizations
with the Land Bank of the Philippines have been paid in full. In this case, petitioners’ title
categorically states that they have fully complied with the requirements for the final grant of title
under PD 27. This means that they have completed payment of their amortizations with Land
Bank. Consequently, they could already legally transfer their title to another. Heirs of Paulino
Atienza vs. Domingo P. Espidol, G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010.
Agricultural land; conversion. Conversion of the subject landholding under the
1980 Kasunduan is not the conversion of landholding that is contemplated by Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 3844, which governs the dispossession of an agricultural lessee and the
termination of his rights to enjoy and possess the landholding. Conversion here has been
defined as the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use
as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. More to the point is that for conversion to
avail as a ground for dispossession, Section 36 implies the necessity of prior court proceedings
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in which the issue of conversion has been determined and a final order issued directing
dispossession upon that ground. In this case, however, respondent does not profess that there
had been at any tine such proceedings or that there was such court order. Neither does he
assert that the lot in question had undergone conversion with authority from the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Emilia Micking Vda. De Coronel, et al. Vs. Miguel Tanjangco, Jr., G.R. No.
170693, August 8, 2010.
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission; powers. The Court rejected respondent’s contention that he
was deprived of his right to due process when the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC)
proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any
documents supporting the complainant’s assertions. Section 4(c) of Executive Order No. 12
states that the PAGC has the power to give due course to anonymous complaints against
presidential appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based on the supporting
documents attached to the anonymous complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the
allegations may be true. The use of the conjunctive word “or” in the said provision is
determinative since it empowers the PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to
anonymous complaints. Because of the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given
due course even if the same is without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the
face of the complaint that there is probable cause. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores, et al. vs. Atty. Antonio
F. Montemayor. G.R. No. 170146, August 25, 2010.
Water districts; government-owned and controlled corporations. A local water district is a
government-owned and controlled corporation with special charter since it is created pursuant
to a special law, Presidential Decree No. 198 (1973). PD 198 constitutes the special charter by
virtue of which local water districts exist. Unlike private corporations that derive their legal
existence and power from the Corporation Code, water districts derive their legal existence and
power from P.D. No. 198. Section 6 of the decree in fact provides that water districts “shall
exercise the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under existing laws, in
addition to the powers granted in, and subject to such restrictions imposed under this Act.”
Therefore, water districts would not have corporate powers without PD 198. Engr. Ranulfo C.
Feliciano vs. Hon. Cornelio C. Gison. G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010.

September 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Constitutionality; Presidential Proclamation 310; inalienable lands. The Court declared as
unconstitutional Presidential Proclamation 310, which took 670 hectares from petitioner’s
registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities, on the basis
that such lands are inalienable, being part of the functions of an educational institution. It did
not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to
appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities. The
lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated
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them for petitioner’s use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture. They
have ceased to be alienable public lands. Central Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 184869, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. The Court dismissed petitioners’
argument that Republic Act No. 8762, known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 200,
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution for the State to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. The provisions of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not self-
executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to a cause of action in the
courts. Further, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development
of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino
entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic
environment. The objective is simply to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering
our economic policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development. The 1987 Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it
requires the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity; and speaks of industries
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of
Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. Thus, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, it also
recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the 1987 Constitution does not rule out the entry
of foreign investments, goods, and services. While it does not encourage their unlimited entry
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair. The key, as in all
economies in the world, is to strike a balance between protecting local businesses and allowing
the entry of foreign investments and services. More important, Section 10, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution gives Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of
investments upon the recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority
and when the national interest requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and
when to pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the entry of
foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens. In this
case, Congress has decided to open certain areas of the retail trade business to foreign
investments instead of reserving them exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The control and regulation of trade in the interest of the public welfare is of course an exercise
of the police power of the State. A person’s right to property, whether he is a Filipino citizen or
foreign national, cannot be taken from him without due process of law. In 1954, Congress
enacted the Retail Trade Nationalization Act (RA 1180) that restricts the retail business to
Filipino citizens. In denying the petition assailing the validity of such Act for violation of the
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foreigner’s right to substantive due process of law, the Supreme Court held that the law
constituted a valid exercise of police power. The State had an interest in preventing alien control
of the retail trade and R.A. 1180 was reasonably related to that purpose. That law is not
arbitrary. Here, to the extent that RA 8762 lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to
property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to
a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have
the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the
entry of foreign investors. Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of RA 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as the Court has said,
there is no showing that the law has contravened any constitutional mandate. The Court is not
convinced that the implementation of RA 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the
retail trade business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument to
support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign participation in that
business. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., et al. G.R. No.
143855, September 21, 2010.
Constitutionality; standing to sue. The long settled rule is that he who challenges the validity of
a law must have a standing to do so. Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party
to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing refers to his
personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will suffer direct injury as a result of
the passage of that law. The party must show that he has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the law he complains of. In this case, there is no clear
showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 prejudices
petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will
resolve the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when, as here, the public interest so
requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. Representatives Gerardo S. Espina, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora,
Jr., et al. G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010.
Court decisions; statement of fact and law. The Constitution commands that “[n]o decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based.” Judges are expected to make complete findings of fact in their decisions
and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented. They
should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from
which such conclusions are deduced. The Court has sustained decisions of lower courts as
having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction, notwithstanding
the laconic and terse manner in which they were written; and even if “there (was left) much to
be desired in terms of (their) clarity, coherence and comprehensibility,” provided that they
eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal
qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the
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participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts
comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly
rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the
prosecution’s memorandum, but made their own findings and assessment of evidence, before
finally agreeing with the prosecution’s evaluation of the case. On the other hand, the Court has
expressed concern over the possible denial of due process when an appellate court failed to
provide the appeal the attention it rightfully deserved, thus depriving the appellant of a fair
opportunity to be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. The parties to a litigation should
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led
to the conclusions of the trial court. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may
appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it
is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.
The Court of Appeals (CA) decision in this case cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it
clearly stated the facts and law on which the ruling was based, and while it did not specifically
address each and every assigned error raised by appellants, it cannot be said that the appellants
were left in the dark as to how the CA reached its ruling affirming the trial court’s judgment of
conviction. The principal arguments raised in their Memorandum submitted before the Supreme
Court actually referred to the main points of the CA rulings, such as the alleged sufficiency of
prosecution evidence, their common defense of alibi, allegations of torture, probative value of
ballistic and fingerprint test results, circumstances qualifying the offense and modification of
penalty imposed by the trial court. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar
Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo,
et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7, 2010.
Custodial investigation; right to counsel. Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial
stage when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has
begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect. The police officers here claimed that upon
arresting one of the accused and before questioning him, they informed him of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that
he had the right to a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and if
he cannot afford the services of counsel he will be provided with one. However, since these
rights can only be waived in writing and with the assistance of counsel, there could not have
been such a valid waiver by the accused, who was presented by the police investigators to the
lawyer of the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall, for the taking of his formal statement only the
following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was brought to said counsel.
Thus, the constitutional requirement had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the moment
a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a suspect,

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the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
However, the Court rejected the appellants’ contention that the accused was not given a
counsel of his own choice, as he never objected to the IBP lawyer when the latter was presented
to him to be his counsel for the taking down of his statement. The phrase “preferably of his own
choice” does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys
from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation would be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede or obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. Thus,
while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial interrogation cannot
afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred lawyer is not available – is naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice, as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel’s
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.
The Constitution gives the person under custodial investigation the right to a competent and
independent counsel. The modifier “competent and independent” is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable
lawyer. An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his
extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be
presumed innocent. The right to counsel has been written into the Constitution in order to
prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in
a crime. The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a
pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused. The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel. Where the
prosecution failed to discharge the State’s burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence
that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially admitted
his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any probative value. Lenido Lumanog, et
al. vs. People of the Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the
Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar Fortuna y Abudo, et al., G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R.
No. 187745, September 7, 2010.

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Immunity from suit. Petitioner here claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of
state immunity without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, on the basis that under
Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the
development of the Malampaya gas reserves. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot claim
immunity from suit because it is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines, but the latter’s
service contractor for the exploration and development of one of the country’s natural gas
reserves. While the Republic of the Philippines appointed petitioner as the exclusive party to
conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the State’s full control and
supervision, it does not follow that petitioner has become the State’s “agent” within the meaning
of the law. An agent is a person who binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The essence
of an agency is the agent’s ability to represent his principal and bring about business relations
between the latter and third persons. An agent’s ultimate undertaking is to execute juridical acts
that would create, modify or extinguish relations between his principal and third persons. It is
this power to affect the principal’s contractual relations with third persons that differentiates the
agent from a service contractor.
Petitioner’s main undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to “[p]erform all petroleum
operations and provide all necessary technology and finance” as well as other connected
services to the Philippine government. As defined under the contract, petroleum operation
means the “searching for and obtaining Petroleum within the Philippines”, including the
“transportation, storage, handling and sale” of petroleum whether for export or domestic
consumption. Petitioner’s primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the
Philippine government for the purpose of transacting business with third persons. Rather, its
contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf of the State.
Consequently, it is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services,
technology and financing for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. Notably, the Philippine
government itself recognized that petitioner could be sued in relation to the project. This is
evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38. Shell
Philippines Exploration B. V. vs. Efren Jalos, et al., G.R. No. 179918, September 8, 2010.
Judiciary; seniority in appointment of Court of Appeals justices. An appointment to a public
office is the unequivocal act, of one who has the authority, of designating or selecting an
individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. Where the
power of appointment is absolute and the appointee has been determined upon, no further
consent or approval is necessary and the formal evidence of the appointment, the commission,
may issue at once. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the
appointing authority has been complied with. A written memorial that can render title to public
office indubitable is required. This written memorial is known as the commission. For purposes
of completion of the appointment process, the appointment is complete when the commission is
signed by the executive, and sealed if necessary, and is ready to be delivered or transmitted to
the appointee. Thus, transmittal of the commission is an act which is done after the appointment
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has already been completed. It is not required to complete the appointment but only to facilitate
the effectiveness of the appointment by the appointee’s receipt and acceptance thereof.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, therefore, the date the commission has been
signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is the date of
the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of the Court of Appeals
in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246. In other words, the
earlier the date of the commission of an appointee, the more senior he is over the other
subsequent appointees. It is only when the appointments of two or more appointees bear the
same date that the order of issuance of the appointments by the President becomes
material. This provision of statutory law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA
8246) controls over the provisions of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, which
gives premium to the order of appointments as transmitted to this Court. Rules implementing a
particular law cannot override but must give way to the law they seek to implement. Re:
Seniority among the four most recent appointments to the position of Associate Justices of the
Court of Appeals. A.M. No. 10-4-22-SC, September 28, 2010.
Police power; taxation versus regulation. In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police
power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is
primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in some
form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed
a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue
is generated. In this case, the royalty fees were imposed by the Clark Development Corporation
(CDC) primarily for regulatory purposes, and not for the generation of income or profits as
petitioner claims. These fees form part of the regulatory mandate of CDC to ensure “free flow or
movement” of petroleum fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). Being the
administrator of CSEZ, CDC is responsible for ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution
of fuel products within the CSEZ. Addressing specific concerns demanded by the nature of
goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services which respondent CDC is
expected to provide under the law, pursuant to its general power of supervision and control over
the movement of all supplies and equipment into the CSEZ. Chevron Philippines, Inc. vs. Bases
conversion Development Authority and Clark Development Corporation. G.R. No. 173863,
September 15, 2010.
Right to speedy disposition of cases. Section 16, Article III of the Constitution provides that “all
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens and covers the periods
before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees
merely the right to a speedy trial. However, just like the constitutional guarantee of “speedy
trial,” “speedy disposition of cases” is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary
and oppressive delays, which render rights nugatory. The determination of whether the right to
speedy disposition of cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and
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circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held that the delay of
four years during which the case remained pending with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. Lenido Lumanog, et al. vs. People of the
Philippines/Cesar Fortuna vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines vs. SPO2 Cesar
Fortuna y Abudo, et al. G.R. Nos. 182555/G.R. No. 185123/G.R. No. 187745, September 7,
2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; findings of fact. Findings of facts and conclusions of law of the
Securities and Exchange Commission are controlling on the reviewing authority. The rule is that
findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the
reviewing authority. It is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. It
is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court, tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier
of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower
court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. The SEC
Hearing Officer had the optimum opportunity to review the pieces of evidence presented before
him and to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. Administrative decisions on matters within
his jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law, which has not been shown by petitioner in this
case. Queensland-Tokyo Commodities, Inc., et al. vs. Thomas George. G.R. No. 172727,
September 8, 2010.
Administrative investigation; right to counsel; admission. The right to counsel under Section 12
of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. The
exclusionary rule under paragraph 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While
investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the rule under existing laws is that a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner’s capacity
to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the
imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the
purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by
petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. Clarita J.
Carbonel vs. Civil Service Commission. G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
requires that when an administrative remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by
exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention may be availed of. No recourse can be had
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until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special civil actions against administrative
officers should not be entertained if there are superior administrative officers who could grant
relief. This doctrine is a judicial recognition of certain matters that are peculiarly within the
competence of the administrative agency to address. It operates as a shield that prevents the
overarching use of judicial power and thus hinders courts from intervening in matters of policy
infused with administrative character. Dimson (Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water
Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010.
Administrative remedies; exhaustion. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have
availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or
her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal
to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. Resort to administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, courts of justice, for reasons
of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. While the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to several exceptions, the Court finds that the
instant case does not fall under any of them. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September 22,
2010.
Laguna Lake Development Authority; powers. The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
has power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. Adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such
as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. Although the PAB assumed the powers and
functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution
cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its
area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty. Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority, et al. vs. SM Prime Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 170599, September
22, 2010.
Election Law
Automated election system; source code. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 9369 is clear in that “once an [automated election system] technology is selected for
implementation, the [COMELEC] shall promptly make the source code of that technology
available and open to any interested political party or groups which may conduct their own
review thereof.” The COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement of
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the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet
available when petitioner asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done,
apparently for security reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and
that reason is already stale. The Court here ruled on the petition notwithstanding the fact that the
elections for which the subject source code was to be used had already been held. It accepted
petitioner’s claim that the source code remained important and relevant not only for compliance
with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of
errors and claims of fraud in the May 2010 elections. Center for People Empowerment in
Governance vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189546, September 21, 2010.
Local Government
Salary standardization; President’s power over local governments. The Court here reversed the
ruling of the Commission on Audit (COA), which disallowed the premium payment for
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by petitioner to its officials and
employees. COA held that such benefits disregarded Section 2 of Administrative Order No. 103,
series of 1994 (AO 103), which prohibits all heads of government offices and agencies from
granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits
without the President’s prior approval. The Court ruled that petitioner did not violate the rule of
prior Presidential approval since Section 2 of AO 103 states that the prohibition applies only to
“government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as
well as their respective governing boards.” Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the
prohibition also applies to local government units. The approval requirement must be observed
by government offices under the President’s control, i.e., departments, bureaus, offices and
government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. Being an LGU,
petitioner is merely under the President’s general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of
the Constitution.
The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it
that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished from the
President’s power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the President over that of the subordinate officer. The power of control gives the President the
power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the
President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully
executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President
cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the
rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits in this case does not need the approval of the President to be valid. The Province of
Negros Occidental vs. The Commissioners, Commission on Audit, et al.G.R. No. 182574,
September 28, 2010.
Special Laws
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Agrarian reform; just compensation. The Supreme Court here reiterated its previous rulings that
the factors for determining just compensation under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law), which have been translated into a formula through DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11,
series of 1994, are mandatory and should be strictly complied with. In this case, Land Bank’s
valuation correctly reflected the actual use and produce of the subject properties and did not
factor in potential use as what respondent’s appraiser did. (Note that DAR AO No. 6, as
amended by DAR A.O. No. 11, has been superseded by DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series
of 1998.) Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Conrado O. Colarina, G.R. No. 176410, September 1,
2010.
Agrarian reform; just compensation. For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of
an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. There
are three important concepts in this definition – the character of the property, its price, and the
time of actual taking. The time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.
The property’s character refers to its actual use at the time of taking, not its potential
uses. Where, as here, it has been conclusively decided by final judgment in the earlier
cases filed by respondent that his property was validly acquired under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657) and validly distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, the
property should be conclusively treated as an agricultural land and valued as such. The lower
courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has changed from agricultural to
residential, because there is no allegation or proof that the property was approved for
conversion to other uses by the Department of Agrarian Reform. In the absence of such
approval, it cannot be said that the character or use of the property has changed from
agricultural to residential. Respondent’s property remains agricultural and should be valued as
such. Respondent’s evidence of the value of his land as residential property (which the lower
courts found to be preponderant) could, at most, refer to the potential use of the
property. While the potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases
where there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, it should
never control the determination of just compensation. The potential use of a property should
not be the principal criterion for determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the
well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking, not its potential uses. The proper approach should
have been to value respondent’s property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted
in light of the improvements in the locality where it is situated.
As to the price, the factors and requirements set out in Section 17 of RA 6657 must be applied.
Here, the Land Bank’s authority to value the land is only preliminary and the landowner who
disagrees with petitioner’s valuation may bring the matter to court for a judicial determination of
just compensation. The Regional Trial Courts, organized as special agrarian courts, are the final
adjudicators on the issue of just compensation. Land Bank must substantiate its valuation. It is
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not enough that the landowner fails to prove a higher valuation for the property; Land Bank
must still prove the correctness of its claims. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Enrique
Livioco, G.R. No. 170685, September 22, 2010.
Agrarian reform; retention rights. The right of retention, as protected and enshrined in the
Constitution, balances the effect of compulsory land acquisition by granting the landowner the
right to choose the area to be retained subject to legislative standards. Thus, landowners who
have not yet exercised their retention rights under Presidential Decree No. 27 are entitled to
new retention rights provided for by Republic Act No. 6657. However, the limitations under
Letter of Instruction No. 474 still apply to a landowner who filed an application for retention
under RA 6657. LOI 474 amended PD 27 by removing any right of retention from persons who
own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and
their families. Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05 is inconsistent with PD No. 27,
as amended by LOI 474, insofar as it removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention
rights. It is well-settled that administrative officials are empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to implement a statute. The power, however, is restricted such that an
administrative regulation cannot go beyond what is provided in the legislative enactment. It
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law; hence, any resulting discrepancy
between the two will always be resolved in favor of the statute. Celestio Santiago substituted by
Lauro Santiago and Isidro Gutierrez substituted by Rogelio Gutierez vs. Amada R. Ortiz-Luis
substituted by Juan Ortiz-Luiz, Jr. G.R. No. 186184 & G.R. No. 186988, September 20, 2010.
Government Procurement Reform Act; jurisdiction; appeal from decisions of bids and awards
committee. Under Republic Act No. 9184, or the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA),
the proper recourse to a court action from decisions of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) is
to file a certiorari not before the Supreme Court but before the regional trial court, which is
vested by the GPRA with jurisdiction to entertain the same. Compliance with the mandatory
protest mechanisms of the GPRA is jurisdictional in character. Section 58 of that law requires
that there be exhaustion of the statutorily available remedies at the administrative level as a
precondition to the filing of a certiorari petition. This requirement points to the mechanisms for
protest against decisions of the BAC in all stages of the procurement process that are outlined in
both the provisions of Section 55 of the GPRA as well in Section 55 of the implementing
rules. Under these relevant sections of the law and the rules, resort to the judicial remedy of
certiorari must be made only after the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the BAC’s
decision before the said body. Subsequently, from the final denial of the motion for
reconsideration, the aggrieved party must then lodge a protest before the head of the procuring
entity through a verified position paper that formally complies with requirements in Section 55.2
of the GPRA’s Implementing Rules and Regulations – Part A. Only upon the final resolution of
the protest can the aggrieved party be said to have exhausted the available remedies at the
administrative level. In other words, only then can he viably avail of the remedy of certiorari
before the proper courts. Non-compliance with this statutory requirement, under Section 58 of
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the GPRA, constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction. Dimson
(Manila), Inc. and Phesco, Inc. vs. Local Water Utilities Administration. G.R. No. 168656,
September 22, 2010.
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act; vested property rights. When Congress enacted the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that
“property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested” upon its
effectiveness “shall be recognized and respected.” In this case, ownership over the subject
lands had been vested in petitioner as early as 1958. Consequently, a Presidential proclamation
transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with
the IPRA. Central Mindanao University, etc. vs. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No.
184869, September 21, 2010.
Republic Act No. 8975; government ICT projects. This is the first time that the Court is
confronted with the question of whether a government information and communication
technology project is covered by Republic Act No. 8975, which prohibits trial courts from
issuing a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction against the
bidding or awarding of a contract or project of the national government. The term “national
government projects” means (i) national government infrastructure projects, engineering works
and service contracts, (ii) all projects covered by the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law,
and (iii) other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation
of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance,
improvement repair and rehabilitation. The purpose of RA 8975 is to ensure the expeditious
implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects.
Undeniably, under the BOT Law, the entire information technology project, including the civil
works component and the technological aspect thereof, is considered an infrastructure or
development project and treated similarly as traditional infrastructure projects. Such information
technology project is therefore covered by RA 8975.
On the other hand, under Republic Act No. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act
(GPRA), which contemplates projects to be funded by public funds, the term “infrastructure
project” is limited to the “civil works component” of information technology projects. The non-
civil works component of information technology projects is treated as an acquisition of goods
or consulting services. Thus, the civil works component of information technology projects are
subject to the provisions of the GPRA and its implementing regulations on infrastructure projects,
while the technological and other components would be covered by the provisions on
procurement of goods or consulting services as the circumstances may warrant. When Congress
adopted a limited definition of what is to be considered “infrastructure” in relation to
information technology projects under the GPRA, legislators are presumed to have taken into
account previous laws concerning infrastructure projects, including the BOT Law and RA 8975,
and deliberately adopted the limited definition.
Taking into account the different treatment of information technology projects under the BOT
Law and the GPRA, petitioners’ contention the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
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preliminary injunction (because of the prohibition under RA 8975) would have been correct if
the e-Passport Project was pursued under the BOT Law. However, petitioners presented no
proof that the e-Passport Project was a BOT project. On the contrary, evidence adduced by
both sides tended to show that the e-Passport Project was a procurement contract under the
GPRA. Accordingly, only the civil works component of the e-Passport Project would be
considered an infrastructure project that may not be the subject of a lower court-issued writ of
injunction under RA 8975.
Could the e-Passport Project be considered as “engineering works or a service contract” or as
“related and necessary activities” under RA 8975. The Court ruled in the negative. Under that
law, a “service contract” refers to “infrastructure contracts entered into by any department,
office or agency of the national government with private entities and nongovernment
organizations for services related or incidental to the functions and operations of the department,
office or agency concerned.” On the other hand, the phrase “other related and necessary
activities” refers to activities related to a government infrastructure, engineering works, service
contract or project under the BOT Law. In other words, to be considered a service contract or
related activity, petitioners must show that the e-Passport Project is an infrastructure project or
necessarily related to an infrastructure project. This, petitioners failed to do as they saw fit not
to present any evidence on the details of the e-Passport Project before the trial court and this
Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that the e-Passport Project has a civil works
component or is necessarily related to an infrastructure project. In fact, the BSP’s request for
interest and to bid confirms that the e-Passport Project is a procurement of goods and not an
infrastructure project. Thus, within the context of the GPRA – which is the governing law for the
e-Passport Project – the said Project is not an infrastructure project that is protected from lower
court issued injunctions. Department of Foreign Affairs and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Hon.
Franco T. Falcon, G.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010.

October 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Presumption of Innocence. In this case, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure
allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration of the police officer who implemented the
search warrant was found, after trial and appellate review, as the true story. It is on firmer
ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up.   The defense
cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is
constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive.   Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated
in her brief that “no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers’ alleged
ill motive.” Stated otherwise, the narration of the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by the
presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof
to the contrary, must be given weight. People of the Philippines vs. Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R.
No. 171980, October 6, 2010.
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Bill of Rights; Probable Cause. There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of
probable cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed,
absent a showing to the contrary. The defense’s reliance of the quoted testimony of the police
officer alone, without any other evidence to show that there was indeed lack of personal
knowledge, is insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court.   The accused-appellant,
having failed to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity of
duty of the issuing judge, cannot not be sustained by the Court. People of the Philippines vs.
Olive Rubio Mamaril. G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010.
Constitutionality; Actual Controversy; Standing to Sue. The power of judicial review can only
be exercised in connection with a  bona fide  controversy involving a statute, its implementation
or a government action.   Without such controversy, courts will decline to pass upon
constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve
hypothetical or moot questions.    The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases
and controversies  defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to
assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government. But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse
judicial review unless the constitutional question or the assailed illegal government act is
brought before it by a party who possesses locus standi  or the standing to challenge it.    To have
standing, one must establish that he has a “personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.”    Particularly, he
must show that (1) he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are, as here, appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive
officials.    The present petitions allege that then President Ramos had exercised vis-à-vis an
assignment of franchise, a function legislative in character. As alleged, too, the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the guise of entering into contracts or agreements
with the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) and other juridical entities,
virtually enlarged, modified and/or extended the statutory franchise of PNCC, thereby usurping a
legislative prerogative. The usurpation came in the form of executing the assailed
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements and the issuance of Toll Operation Certificates. Grave
abuse of discretion is also laid on the doorstep of the TRB for its act of entering into these same
contracts or agreements without the required public bidding mandated by law. In fine, the
certiorari petitions impute on then President Ramos and the TRB, the commission of acts that
translate  inter alia  into usurpation of the congressional authority to grant franchises and violation
of extant statutes.    The petitions make a prima facie case for certiorari and prohibition; an actual
case or controversy ripe for judicial review exists. Verily, when an act of a branch of
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government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In doing so, the judiciary merely
defends the sanctity of its duties and powers under the Constitution.
In any case, the rule on standing is a matter of procedural technicality, which may be relaxed
when the subject in issue or the legal question to be resolved is of transcendental importance to
the public. Hence, even absent any direct injury to the suitor, the Court can relax the
application of legal standing or altogether set it aside for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary
citizens, when the public interest so requires. There is no doubt that individual petitioners,
Marcos, et al., in G.R. No. 169917, as then members of the House of Representatives, possess
the requisite legal standing since they assail acts of the executive they perceive to injure the
institution of Congress. On the other hand, petitioners Francisco, Hizon, and the other
petitioning associations, as taxpayers and/or users of the tollways or representatives of such
users, would ordinarily not be clothed with the requisite standing. While this is so, the Court is
wont to presently relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental
importance and the paramount public interest involved in the implementation of the laws on
the Luzon tollways, a roadway complex used daily by hundreds of thousands of
motorists. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos,
et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and
Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19,
2010.
Constitutionality; Locus Standi. A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of
them faces any charge under RA 9372. Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have
been subjected to “close security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed
by “suspicious persons” and “vehicles with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by
“men with military build.” They likewise claim that they have been branded as “enemies of the
State.” Even conceding such allegations, petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the purported “surveillance” and the implementation of RA 9372. On
the other hand, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581 would like the Court to
take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations
fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National
People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the law. Petitioners’ apprehension is
insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has
been filed against them, three years after its effectiveness, belies any claim of imminence of
their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. The same is true with petitioners
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in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed “link” to the CPP and NPA.
They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
in direct injury to their organization and members. RA 9372 has been in effect for three years
now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities
fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA
9372. Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157, on the other hand, base their claim
of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21
of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law. The
mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law, however, does not suffice to clothe the
IBP or any of its members with standing. The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its
mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover,
both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under
RA 9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of
“political surveillance,” also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal
basis, of the claim of “political surveillance,” the Court finds that she has not shown even the
slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former
Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a
human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these statements,
no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed. Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues
they raise are of transcendental importance, “which must be settled early” and are of “far-
reaching implications,” without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they
have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has
nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show
an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement.
To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause
is an interest shared by the general public. Neither can locus standi be conferred upon
individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an
exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, whereas citizen standing must rest on
direct and personal interest in the proceeding. In sum, it bears to stress that generalized
interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi.
Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network,
Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita.,
et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern
Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. No. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890,
179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy. The Court is not unaware that a
reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest suffices
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to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the
issues. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or
activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged
provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.
No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one. Petitioners’
obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as “communist
fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the
Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any
justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by “double
contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated
reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc, et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council,
et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc., et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita., et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Karapatan,
et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, et al. vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al.
vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157,
179461, October 5, 2010.
Constitutionality; Void for Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrine. A facial invalidation of a
statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are
rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. A “facial” challenge is likewise different
from an “as-applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but
also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. The vagueness
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and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal laws. On the other hand, the allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is
justified by the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged. This rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an “in terrorem effect” in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long
as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. Under no case, therefore, may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. It is settled,
furthermore, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the
court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. In this case, since a penal statute
may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of
the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent
charge against them. In fine, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of “terrorism” is thus legally impermissible.Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. Vs. Hon.
Eduardo Ermita., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-
Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al. G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581,
178890, 179157, 179461, October 5, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that
in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, compensation should be just. The public,
through the State, must balance the injury that the taking of property causes through
compensation for what is taken, value for value. The owner’s loss is not only his property but
also its income-generating potential. While the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance on
the just compensation due to the petitioners after the Supreme Court had fixed the value of the
expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact – from the time that the State took the
petitioners’ properties until the time that the petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years
passed. This is the rationale for imposing the 12% interest – in order to compensate the
petitioners for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their
properties at the time of the taking. Furthermore, while the SC has equitably reduced the amount
of interest awarded in numerous cases in the past, those cases involved interest that was
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essentially consensual in nature, i.e., interest stipulated in signed agreements between the
contracting parties. In contrast, the interest involved in the present case “runs as a matter of
law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good a
position as money can accomplish, as of the date of taking.” Thus, the interest due in the present
case cannot be reduced. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines. G.R.
No. 164195, October 12, 2010.
Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary; GSIS; Exemption from Legal Fees. In In Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of
Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of
Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of
all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution
removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. Any exemption
from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled
corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal
autonomy and erodes its independence. In the instant case, therefore, the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction to try and decide the permissive counterclaim considering that petitioner is
not exempted from the payment of legal fees. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs.
Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al. G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010.
Ombudsman; Disciplinary Authority over Public School Teachers. The administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power
but is concurrent with the proper committee of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS). However, while petitioner has such concurrent authority, Section 23 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper
disciplinary authority. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case, it would have been more
prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint to the DECS given that it would have been
in a better position to serve the interest of justice considering the nature of the controversy.
Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings
before the DECS would have been the more appropriate venue to resolve the dispute. In any
case, the foregoing pronouncement does not automatically mean that the Supreme Court is
nullifying the proceedings before the Ombudsman as estoppel has already set in. Respondent
actively participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. He submitted his counter-
affidavit, an affidavit of his witness, and attached annexes. Respondent even filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asking for affirmative relief from the Ombudsman. Finally, as to the power to
impose administrative liability, the Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to determine the
administrative liability of an erring public official or employee, and to direct and compel the
head of the concerned officer or agency to implement the penalty imposed. This power to
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impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory. Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Pedro Delijero, Jr. G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010.
Office of the Ombudsman; Powers. The Ombudsman’s decision imposing the penalty of
suspension for one year is immediately executory pending appeal. It cannot be stayed by the
mere filing of an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). Clearly, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supersedes the discretion given to the CA in Section
12, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court when a decision of the Ombudsman in an administrative case
is appealed to the CA. The provision in the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
that a decision is immediately executory is a special rule that prevails over the provisions of the
Rules of Court. Moreover, Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of
the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and
27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the
power to “promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its
powers, functions and duties” and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may
require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the
Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render
nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Joel S. Samaniego. G.R. No. 175573, October 5,
2010.
Preliminary Investigation; Decision; Applicability of Constitutional Requirements to DOJ. A
preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since “the prosecutor in a
preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.” Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. While the prosecutor makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the prosecutor. A preliminary investigation thus partakes
of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what
future action of a judicial nature may be taken. Balangauan v. Court of Appeals in fact iterates
that even the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via
appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the “DOJ is
not a quasi-judicial body.” Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to
resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. Atty. Alice Odchique-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio a.k.a.
Henry Tan. G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010.
Validity of Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements.
(a) Public Utility Franchise; Substitution of Grantee. The Court rejected petitioners’ contention
that contractual provisions on substitution of the franchise holder violated the
Constitution. Relying on Clause 17.4.1 of the
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement (STOA) for the North Luzon Expressway that the
lenders have the unrestricted right to appoint a substitute entity in case of default of
Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC) or the occurrence of an event of default in respect
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of MNTC’s loans, petitioners argue that since MNTC is the assignee or transferee
of the franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), then it steps into the
shoes of PNCC. They contend that the act of replacing MNTC as grantee is tantamount to an
amendment or alteration of PNCC’s original franchise and hence unconstitutional, considering
that the constitutional power to appoint a new franchise holder is reserved to Congress. The
Court disagreed. Petitioners’ presupposition that only Congress has the power to directly grant
franchises is misplaced. The Court has held that administrative agencies may be empowered
by the Legislature by means of a law to grant franchises or similar authorizations. In this case,
the Court ruled that the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) is empowered to grant a franchise for toll
road projects.
Petitioners also contend that substituting MNTC as the grantee in case of default with respect to
its loans is tantamount to an amendment of PNCC’s original franchise and
is therefore unconstitutional. The Court also found this assertion to be without merit. Besides
holding that the Legislature may properly empower administrative agencies to grant franchises
pursuant to a law, the Court explained in this case that Presidential Decree No. 1113 and the
amendatory Presidential Decree No. 1894 both vested the TRB with the power to impose
conditions on PNCC’s franchise in an appropriate contract and may therefore amend or alter the
same when public interest so requires, save for the conditions stated in Sections 1 and 2 of PD
1894, which relate to the coverage area of the tollways and the expiration of PNCC’s original
franchise. Presidential Decree No. 1112 provided further that the TRB has the power to amend
or modify a Toll Operation Certificate that it issued when public interest so
requires. Accordingly, there is nothing infirm much less questionable about the provision in
the MNTC STOA allowing the substitution of MNTC in case it defaults in its loans.
Furthermore, the “unrestricted right” of the lender in Clause 17.4.1 of the MNTC STOA to
appoint a substituted entity is never intended to afford such lender the plenary power to do
so. It is clear that the lenders do not actually have an absolute or “unrestricted” right to appoint
the substituted entity in view of TRB’s right to accept or reject the substitution within one month
from notice, and such right to appoint comes into force only if and when the TRB decides to
effectuate the substitution of MNTC as allowed in Clause 17.2 of the MNTC STOA.
(b) Public Utility Franchise; Extension. The Court agreed with petitioners’ contention that the
option in the MNTC STOA to extend the concession for the stated period is
unconstitutional. Clause 17.5 of the MNTC STOA grants MNTC’s lenders the power to extend
the concession in case the Grantor (Republic of the Philippines) takes over the same, for a
period not exceeding 50 years, until full payment of the loans. At the outset, Clause 17.5 does
not grant the lenders the power to unilaterally extend the concession for a period not
exceeding 50 years. The afore-quoted provision should be read in conjunction with Clause
20.12, which expressly provides that the MNTC STOA is “made under and shall be governed by
and construed in accordance with” the laws of the Philippines, and particularly, by the
provisions of PD 1112, PD 1113 and PD 1894. Under the applicable laws, the TRB
may amend, modify, alter or revoke the authority/franchise “whenever the public interest so
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requires.” In a word, the power to determine whether or not to continue or extend the
authority granted to a concessionaire to operate and maintain a tollway is vested in the TRB by
the applicable laws. The necessity of whether or not to extend the concession or the authority
to construct, operate and maintain a tollway rests, by operation of law, with the TRB. As such,
the lenders cannot unilaterally extend the concession period, or, with like effect, demand that
the TRB agree to extend the concession.
It must be noted, however, that while the TRB is vested by law with the power to extend the
administrative franchise or authority that it granted, it cannot do so for an accumulated period
exceeding 50 years. Otherwise, it would violate the proscription under Article XII, Section 11
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no public utility franchise shall be for a longer
period than 50 years.
In this case, the MNTC STOA has an original stipulated period of 30 years. Clause 17.5 allows
the extension of this period if necessary to fully repay the loans of MNTC. If the maximum
extension as provided in Clause 17.5, i.e., 50 years, is used, the accumulated concession
period granted in this case would effectively be 80 years. This is a clear violation of the 50-
year franchise threshold set by the Constitution. It is on this basis that the Court struck down
the provision in Clause 17.5 allowing extension of the concession for up to 50 years. However,
the nullity is only with respect to any extension beyond the 50-year constitutional limit.
(c) Government Guarantee. The Court declared as unconstitutional and grossly
disadvantageous to the Government Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA (and a similar provision in
the STOA for the South Luzon Expressway rehabilitation and extension
project), which guarantees the financial viability of tollway project. Under Clause 11.7 of the
MNTC STOA, the TRB agreed to pay monthly the difference in the toll fees actually collected by
MNTC and that which it could have realized under the STOA. Article VI, Section 29(1) of the
Constitution mandates that “[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.” In this case, the TRB, by
warranting to compensate MNTC for loss of revenue resulting from the non-implementation of
the periodic and interim toll fee adjustments, violates the constitutionally
guaranteed and exclusive power of the Legislature to appropriate money for public purpose
from the General Funds of the Government.
Further, Section 3(e)(5) of PD 1112 explicitly states that no guarantee, Certificate of
Indebtedness, collateral securities, or bonds shall be issued by any government agency or
government-owned or controlled corporation on any financing program of the toll operator in
connection with his undertaking under the Toll Operation Certificate. What the law here seeks
to prevent is the eventuality that the Government, through any of its agencies, could be
obligated to pay or secure, whether directly or indirectly, the financing by the private investor of
the project. In this case, under Clause 11.7 of the MNTC STOA, the Republic of the
Philippines (through the TRB) guaranteed the security of the project against revenue losses that
could result in case the TRB, based on its determination of a just and reasonable toll fee, decides
not to effect a toll fee adjustment under the STOA’s periodic/interim adjustment formula.
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(d) Toll Rate Adjustments. The Court rejected petitioners’ contention that the toll rate
adjustment mechanisms in the STOAs violated the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the
STOAs for the North Luzon Expressway, South Luzon Expressway and South Metro Manila
Skyway (SMMS) projects tie the hands of the TRB, as it is bound by the stipulated periodic and
interim toll rate adjustments provided therein. Petitioners contend that the provisions
on initial toll rates and periodic/interim toll rate adjustments, by using a built-in automatic toll
rate adjustment formula, guaranteed fixed returns for the investors and negated the public
hearing requirement. The Court held that the requisite public hearings under Section 3(d) of PD
1112 and Section 8(b) of PD 1894 are not negated by the fixing of the initial toll rates and the
periodic adjustments under the STOAs.
A clear distinction must be made between the statutory prescription on the fixing of initial toll
rates, on the one hand, and of periodic/interim or subsequent toll rates, on the other. First,
the hearing required under the said provisos refers to notice and hearing for the approval or
denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments – or the subsequent toll rates, not to the fixing of
initial toll rates. By express legal provision, the TRB is authorized to approve the initial toll
rates without the necessity of a hearing. It is only when a challenge on the initial toll rates
fixed ensues that public hearings are required.
In determining the reasonableness of subsequent toll rate increases, the TRB must seek out the
Commission on Audit for assistance in examining and auditing the financial books of the public
utilities concerned. Furthermore, while the periodic, interim and other toll rate adjustment
formulas are indicated in the STOAs, it does not mean that the TRB should accept a rate
adjustment predicated on the economic data, references or assumptions adopted by the toll
operator. The final figures should be determined by the TRB based on its appreciation of the
relevant rate-influencing data. The TRB should exercise its rate-fixing powers within the
context of the agreed formula, but always having in mind that the rates should be just and
reasonable. Conversely, it is very well within the power of the TRB under the law to
approve a change in the current toll fees. Section 3(d) of PD 1112 grants the TRB the power to
“issue, modify and promulgate from time to time the rates of toll that will be charged the direct
users of toll facilities.” But the reasonableness of a possible increase in the fees must first be
clearly and convincingly established by the petitioning entities, i.e., the toll operators. Ernesto
B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the
Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of
San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Administrative Law
Administrative Agencies; Doctrine of Primary Administrative Jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court
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in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in
the proceeding before the court. Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the
factual backdrop of the case while it was pending before the Court. The Supreme Court thus
deferred to the competence and expertise of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
determine whether, given the supervening events, the Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation
Plan is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be
terminated as a consequence. Nestle Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc., et al. G.R.
No. 174674, October 20, 2010.
Government Contracts; Public Bidding. The Court held that public bidding is not required with
respect to the procurement of the South Metro Manila Skyway, North Luzon Expressway and
South Luzon Expressway projects. Private petitioners maintain that public bidding is required
for these projects on the basis that they are in the nature of a build-operate-transfer infrastructure
undertaking under the BOT Law. The Court said that the BOT Law does not squarely apply to
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), which exercised its prerogatives and
obligations under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of
the above toll roads with chosen partners. These tollway projects may very well qualify as a
build-operate-transfer undertaking. However, given that the projects have been undertaken by
PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113 and Presidential
Decree No. 1894, in joint venture with its chosen partners at the time when it was held valid to
do so by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Department of Justice, the
public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply.
The above projects are not ordinary contracts for the construction of government infrastructure
projects, which require, under the Government Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed
Presidential Decree No. 1594, public bidding as the preferred mode of contract
award. Neither are these contracts where financing or financial guarantees for the project are
obtained from the government. Rather, the Supplemental Toll Operating Agreements (pursuant
to which PNCC is undertaking the projects together with its chosen partners) actually constitute
a statutorily-authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCC’s existing franchise to
construct, maintain and operate expressways.
The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an
outfit completely different from, and not related to, PNCC. In such a scenario, the entity
awarded the winning bid in a BOT-scheme infrastructure project will have to construct, operate
and maintain the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in which case,
public bidding is required under the law. Where, as here, a franchisee (PNCC) undertakes the
construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need
for a public bidding. In pursuing the projects with the vast resource requirements, the
franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the exercise of its
management prerogatives. In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in
choosing its partners, as such process was done in the exercise of management prerogatives and
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in pursuit of its right of delectus personae. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory
Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The
Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R.
No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Election Laws
Candidate; Residency Requirement. While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is
Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by
incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early
2009. Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private respondents to establish
the contrary, which the latter failed to do. On the other hand, the COMELEC based its ruling
that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on the photographs
of Mitra’s Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not have been a
residence because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the room. Thus, the
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not
merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more than this, it ruled
that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the qualities of a
home that the Second Division wanted to see. The COMELEC not only grossly misread the
evidence but even used personal and subjective standards in its assessment of Mitra’s dwelling
when, in fact, the law is replete with standards, i.e., the dwelling must be where a person
permanently intends to return and to remain. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Special Laws
Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation. Although the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is
vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988
to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for lands taken under the
CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The CARL vests in the RTCs,
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The jurisdiction of the RTCs is not any less “original and
exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. The proceedings before the
RTC are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Additionally, the administrative
orders providing for the guidelines in determining just compensation are mandatory and not
mere guides that the RTC may disregard. Finally, although in some expropriation cases, the
Court allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for delay in
payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of
forbearance. In this case, respondents are not entitled to interest on the final compensation
considering that petitioner promptly deposited the compensation for their lands after they
rejected petitioner’s initial valuation. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Glenn Y. Escandor, et
al. G.R. No. 171685, October 11, 2010.

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Energy Regulatory Commission; Implementation of RA 7832. SURNECO cannot insist on using

the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss caps under Section 10 of R.A.
No. 7832. Indeed, under National Electrification Administration Memorandum No. 1-A, the
use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses even beyond the caps
mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out pilferage losses as a
component of the recoverable system losses by the distributing utilities such as SURNECO.
However, it is totally repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps established in
R.A. No. 7832, and is repealed by Section 16 of the law. As between NEA Memorandum No.
1-A, a mere administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative enactment, the latter must
prevail. Additionally, the PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a model
to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives in proposing their own PPA formula for
approval by the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the IRR
directed the electric cooperatives to apply for approval of such formula with the ERB so that the
system loss caps under the law would be incorporated in their computation of power cost
adjustments. The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the
IRR that was amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA formula. The IRR left to
the ERB, now the Energy Regulatory Commission, the authority to approve and oversee the
implementation of the electric cooperatives’ PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making
power over them. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) vs. Energy
Regulatory Commission. G.R. No. 183626, October 4, 2010.
PNCC; Authority After Expiration of Franchise. In this case, petitioners assume and harp on the
lack of authority of the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to continue, in
joint venture with private investors, with its North Luzon Expressway (NLEX), South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX) and Metro Manila Expressway (MMEX) operations after the lapse of its
franchise (granted under Presidential Decree No. 1113) on May 1, 2007. However, this
expiration did not carry with it the cancellation of PNCC’s authority and that of its joint venture
partners granted under Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1894 to construct, operate and maintain “any and all such extensions, linkages or
stretches, together with the toll facilities appurtenant thereto, from any part of [NLEX], [SLEX]
and/or [MMEX] and/or to divert the original route and change the original end-points of the
[NLEX] and/or [SLEX] as may be approved by the [TRB].” To highlight the point, Section 2 of
PD 1894 specifically provides that the franchise for the extension and toll road projects
constructed after the approval of PD 1894 shall be 30 years, counted from project completion.
Indeed, prior to the expiration of PNCC’s original franchise in May 2007, the
Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), in the exercise of its special powers under PD 1112, signed
Supplemental Toll Operation Agreements (STOAs) with PNCC and its private joint venture
partners. These STOAs covered the expansion and rehabilitation of NLEX and SLEX, as the case
may be, and/or the construction, operation and maintenance of toll road projects contemplated
in PD 1894. Further, corresponding Toll Operation Certificates (TOCs) have been issued for the
toll road projects. The STOAs TRB entered into with PNCC and its joint venture partners had
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the effect of granting authorities to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities, but with the
injection of additional private sector investments consistent with the intent of PD 1112, PD
1113 and PD 1894. The execution of these STOAs came in 1995, 1998 and 2006, or before
the expiration of PNCC’s original franchise on May 1, 2007. Upon the expiration of PNCC’s
legislative franchise on May 1, 2007, the new authorities to construct, maintain and operate the
subject tollways and toll facilities granted by the TRB pursuant to the validly executed STOAs
and TOCs, shall begin to operate and be treated as administrative franchises or authorities. After
May 1, 2007, the operation and maintenance of the NLEX and the other subject tollways are no
longer be founded on PNCC’s original franchise but on entirely new
authorizations, i.e. the TOCs, granted by the TRB pursuant to its statutory franchising authority
under Sections 3(a) and (e) of PD 1112. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board,
et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./The
Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R.
No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
President’s Power to Approve TRB Contracts. Petitioners here assert that the grant to the
President of the power to peremptorily authorize the assignment by
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), as franchise holder, of its franchise or the
usufruct in its franchise is unconstitutional for being an encroachment of legislative power. The
Court rejected this claim. Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree No. 1112 requires approval by the
President of any contract the Toll Regulatory Board may have entered into or effected for the
construction and operation of toll facilities. Complementing Section 3(a) is 3(e)(3) of PD 1112
enjoining the transfer of the usufruct of PNCC’s franchise without the President’s prior
approval. The President’s approving authority is therefore of statutory origin. There is nothing
illegal, let alone unconstitutional, with the delegation to the President of the authority to
approve the assignment by PNCC of its rights and interest in its franchise, the assignment and
delegation being circumscribed by restrictions in the delegating law itself. Ernesto B. Francisco,
Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the
Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro,
Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.
Public Land; Alienability. Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public
domain, and its occupation in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights. It is only after the property has been declared alienable and
disposable that private persons can legally claim possessory rights over it. This does not mean,
however, that neither of the parties has the right to possess the property. While
the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356 for almost 33 years, this occupation
could not give rise to possessory rights while the property being occupied remain government
land that had not yet been declared alienable and disposable. It was the Modestos,
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however, who were the actual possessors of the property when it was declared alienable and
disposable on October 16, 1987, and continued to possess the property until the present
time. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of
Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al. G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.
Public land; Foreshore. To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between
the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. The land’s proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.
Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two corners of
the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore land since it has not
been proven that the lot was covered by water during high tide. Similarly in this case, it was
clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even during high tide. Indeed, all the
evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed portion of Lot No. 6278-M is not foreshore
land but remains private land owned by respondents. Manuel Almagro, joined by his spouse,
Elizabeth Almagro vs. Salvacion C. Kwan, et al. / Margarita Pachoro, et al. vs. William C. Kwan,
et al. G.R. Nos. 175806, 175810 and G.R. No. 175849. October 20, 2010.
Toll Regulatory Board; Franchising Powers. The Court dismissed petitioners’ argument that only
Congress has, under the 1987 Constitution, the exclusive prerogative to grant franchise to
operate public utilities. With respect to the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), Sections 3(a) and (e) of
Presidential Decree No. 1112 in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1894 have
invested the TRB with sufficient power to grant a qualified person or entity with authority to
construct, maintain, and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll operating
permit or Toll Operation Certificate. By explicit provision of law, therefore, the TRB was given
the power to grant administrative franchise for toll facility projects.
The power to authorize and control a public utility is admittedly a prerogative that stems from
the Legislature. Any suggestion, however, that only Congress has the authority to grant a
public utility franchise is less than accurate. As stressed in Albano v. Reyes — a case
decided under the 1987 Constitution — there is nothing in the Constitution remotely indicating
the necessity of a congressional franchise before each and every public utility may
operate. A special franchise directly emanating from Congress is not necessary if the law
already specifically authorizes an administrative body to grant a franchise or to award a
contract. Under the 1987 Constitution, Congress has an explicit authority to grant a public
utility franchise. However, it may validly delegate its legislative authority, under the power of
subordinate legislation, to issue franchises of certain public utilities to some administrative
agencies. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos,
et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The
Republic of the Philippines, et al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and
Entrepreneurs of San Pedro, Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19,
2010.
Toll Regulatory Board; Quasi-Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Functions. Petitioners in the special
civil actions cases would have the Court declare as invalid (i) Sections 3(a) and (d) of
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Presidential Decree No. 1112 (which accord the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) the power to enter
into contracts for the construction and operation of toll facilities, and, at the same time, grant it
the power to issue and promulgate toll rates) and (ii) Section 8(b) of Presidential Decree
No. 1894 (which grant the TRB adjudicatory jurisdiction over matters involving toll rate
movements). As submitted by petitioners, granting the TRB the power to award toll contracts is
inconsistent with its quasi-judicial function of adjudicating petitions for initial toll and periodic
toll rate adjustments. There cannot, so petitioners would postulate, be impartiality in such a
situation. The Court rejected these arguments. It does not perceive an irreconcilable clash in
the enumerated statutory powers of the TRB, such that the exercise of one negates the other. The
ascription of impartiality on the part of the TRB cannot, under the premises, be accorded
cogency. Petitioners have not shown that the TRB lacks the expertise, competence and capacity
to implement its mandate of balancing the interests of the toll-paying motoring public and the
imperative of allowing the concessionaires to recoup their investment with reasonable
profits. The fact that an administrative agency is exercising its administrative or executive
functions (such as the granting of franchises or awarding of contracts) and at the same time
exercising its quasi-legislative (e.g., rule-making) and/or quasi-judicial functions (e.g., rate-fixing),
does not support a finding of a violation of due process or the Constitution. Ernesto B. Francisco,
Jr., et al. vs. Toll Regulatory Board, et al./Hon. Imee R. Marcos, et al. vs. The Republic of the
Philippines, et al./Gising Kabataan Movement, Inc., et al. vs. The Republic of the Philippines, et
al./The Republic of the Philippines vs. Young Professionals and Entrepreneurs of San Pedro,
Laguna. G.R. No. 166910, 169917, 173630, 183599, October 19, 2010.

November 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. The right to speedy trial is considered violated only when
the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. In this case, far from
being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, the delays entailed by the postponements of the
hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco’s extraordinary remedies
against the interlocutory orders issued by the lower court and the assignment of at least three
public prosecutors to the case. Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate
commencement of trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order, and the continuous
conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3(a)(1) of Rule 119 provides that
delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in
computing the time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused
to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number
of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case and to give particular regard to the facts
and circumstances peculiar to each case. Based on the foregoing, the Court rejected petitioner
Francisco’s claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences before the lower court
violated his right to a speedy trial. Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et al./Santos O.
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Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel Joson Nelson/Imperial, et al. vs.. Hilarion C. Felix, et
al., G.R. No. 160067/G.R. Mo. 170410/G.R. No. 171622, November 17, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Right to Speedy Trial. In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy
trial was violated, any delay should be considered in relation to the entirety of the proceedings.
Here, there had been an undue and inordinate delay in the reinvestigation of the cases by the
Office of the Ombudsman, which failed to submit its reinvestigation report despite the lapse of
the 60-day period set by the Sandiganbayan, and did so only after more than a year
thereafter. However, while such reinvestigation delayed the proceedings, the Court held that
said process could not have been dispensed with as it was undertaken for the protection of the
rights of petitioners and their co-accused. These rights should not be compromised at the
expense of expediency. Thus, even though the Court acknowledged the delay in the criminal
proceedings, as well as the prejudice suffered by petitioners and their co-accused by reason
thereof, the Court held that petitioners’ right to speedy trial and disposition of the cases
involving them do not justify the dismissal of the criminal cases. The Court further held that the
State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply
because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman. Monico V. Jacob, et
al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,G.R. No. 162206, November 17, 2010.
Constitutionality; Legal Standing. Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). The Court held that he has no legal standing. The issue of legal
standing is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry: (1) There must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper
party; (3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4)
The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. The Court said that even if the petitioner’s claim that he is a proper party on the basis that
the creation and operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and the issue he raised is
of transcendental importance, his standing was still imperiled by his appearance as counsel to
then presidential candidate Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2004 election protest filed by her
opponent before the PET. A constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. That appearance would have been the first opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of the PET’s constitution. Instead, petitioner ubiquitously entered his
appearance before the PET and acknowledged its jurisdiction. His failure to raise a seasonable
constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the PET’s
authority, meant that he did not meet the third condition and therefore has no standing to file
the petition. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618,
November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Creation. Petitioner here claimed that the
creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) is unconstitutional as it violates Section 4 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.” He contends that the
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provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. The Court said that, while
the above provision does not specify the establishment of the PET, neither does it preclude,
much less prohibit, the same. The Court further said that its constitutional mandate to act as sole
judge of election contests involving the President or Vice-President, and its rule-making
authority in connection therewith (granted by the provision of Section 4 that the Court “may
promulgate its rules for the purpose”), are not restricted but include all necessary powers
implicit in the exercise of such mandate and authority. These powers are plenary and the
authority of the Court to decide presidential and vice-presidential election contests through the
PET are derived from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction under Section 4 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the creation of the PET implements Section 4 and faithfully
complies with the constitutional directive. The discussions of the Constitutional Commission
clearly support the foregoing conclusion. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Constitutionality; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Function. The Court
here rejected petitioner’s claim that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) exercises quasi-
judicial functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which states that “The
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.” The traditional grant of
judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that the
power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.” Consistent with the presidential system of government, the function of “dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are
legally demandable and enforceable” is apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the
1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” Judicial
power was thus expanded, but it remained absolute.
The Court held that set up embodied in the 1987 Constitution characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as the
PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a
judicial power. The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential
and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly
provided in the Constitution. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 191618, November 23, 2010.
Eminent Domain; Interest. If property is taken for public use before compensation is paid or
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include
interest on its just value to be computed from the time the property was taken to the time when
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compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interest accrue in order to place the owner in a position
as good as (but not better than) that he was in before the taking occurred. As in previous cases,
the Supreme Court affirmed the award of 12% interest on just compensation payable to the
landowner. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431,
November 17, 2010.
Administrative Law
Due Process; Administrative Due Process. Petitioners here assailed the credibility of a witness’s
statement because it was not made under oath and he was not presented as witness during the
hearing. The Court rejected this claim. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, due process
is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or given opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. The measure of due process to be observed by administrative tribunals allows a
certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not compromised. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil
Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010.
Other Laws
Land Bank of the Philippines; Costs of Suit. Since Land Bank of the Philippines is performing a
governmental function in agrarian reform proceedings, it is exempt from the payment of costs of
suit under Rule 142, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that “No costs shall be
allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.” Land Bank
of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson Rivera, et al., G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2010.

December 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Emancipation patent; issuance. Following are the steps in transferring land to a tenant-tiller
under Presidential Decree No. 27: (a) identification of tenant, landowner, and the land covered;
(b) land survey and sketching of portion actually cultivated by the tenant to determine parcel
size, boundaries, and possible land use; (c) issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer; (d) valuation
of the land for purposes of computing the amortization; (e) amortization payments of the tenant-
tiller over a 15-year period; and (f) issuance of Emancipation Patent. In this case, there is no
evidence that these steps were followed. There are several supporting documents that the
tenant-farmer must submit before he can receive the Emancipation Patent. The Supreme Court
found that majority of these supporting documents is lacking. Hence, it was improper for the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to order the issuance of the Emancipation
Patent in favor of respondent. There was also no sufficient evidence to prove that respondent
has fully paid the value of the land. Full payment of just compensation is required prior to
issuance of Emancipation Patents. Renato Reyes, represented by Ramon Reyes vs Leopoldo
Barrios, G.R. No. 172841, December 15, 2010.
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Equal protection clause; concept. The Court here struck down Executive Order No. 1 (which
created the Truth Commission) for violating the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
the Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the
previous administration was plain, patent and manifest. According to the Court, the Arroyo
administration is a member of a class, that is, the class of past administrations. It is not a class of
its own. Not to include in the Commission’s mandate past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness, which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Although Section
17 gives the President discretion to expand the scope of investigations of the Commission so as
to include acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not
guarantee that they would be covered in the future. This expanded mandate of the Commission
will still depend on the discretion of the President. If he decides not to include them, the
provision would be meaningless. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No.
192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
Judicial review; requisites. Judicial review requires the following: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the act or issuance; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very subject matter of the case.As to standing, the Court here held that petitioners,
who are legislators, met the requirement as they are questioning the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 creating the Truth Commission on the basis that the latter’s mandate
constitutes usurpation of the power of the Congress. However, with regard to the petitioner who
is questioning EO No. 1 as a taxpayer, the Court held that he had no standing since he has not
shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable
to the implementation of that EO. The Court took cognizance of the case as the matter involved
was of transcendental importance. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to reorganize. The creation of the Truth
Commission does not fall within the President’s power to reorganize. Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other department
or agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency or vice versa. This provision, according to the Court, refers to
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These refer to situations where a body or an office is already existent
but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The
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Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power of control. The creation of the Commission is
not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the power to alter, modify,
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is
entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive,
while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or the Executive’s
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303, December 7, 2010.
President; creation of Truth Commission; power to conduct investigations. The President’s
power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in this
case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the
President’s powers as the Chief Executive. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. One of the recognized powers of the
President is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed or guide the President in performing his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of laws. Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension,
the Truth Commission will not supplant the Ombudsman or the Department of Justice or erode
their respective powers. The investigative function of the Commission will complement those of
the two offices. The recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of
the Commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected
offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a
function given to the Commission. Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 / Rep. Edcel C. Lagman, et al. vs. Exec. Sec. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 19303,December 7, 2010.
Tenancy relationship; elements. For purposes of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
there is tenancy relationship between parties if the following elements concur: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is
an agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose
of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on
the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between landowner and
tenant or agricultural lessee. All the foregoing requisites must be proved by substantial
evidence. In this case, the continued stay of the purported tenant in the premises of the
company was the result of an amicable settlement in a labor dispute and not because there was
a landlord-tenant relationship. The fact that the stay was free of charge only proves the absence
of such a relationship. Even assuming that the employer was receiving a share of the produce,
the fact of receipt, without an agreed system of sharing, does not ipso facto create a
tenancy. There was no evidence to indicate that the parties agreed to any system of
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sharing. The employee’s activities in the property cannot be classified as one for agricultural
production. There was no record showed that he was engaged in any planting or other
agricultural activity. Heirs of Jose Barredo, namely, Lolita Barredo, et al. vs. Lavoiser
Besañes, G.R. No. 164695, December 13, 2010.
Warrantless arrest. The Supreme Court here found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the accused, as (a) the evidence against them is inadmissible and (b) granting the same to be
admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established. The police went to the house of
one of the accused based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was
going on. Sole reliance on such a tip does not constitute probable cause. The apprehending
officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity and address of
one of the accused had earlier been ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause, a search warrant should have been secured prior
to effecting the arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search is likewise
illegal. The items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. People of the Philippines
vs. Arnold Martinez y Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010.

January 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; Rights under custodial investigation. As found by the Court of Appeals, (1) there is
no evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on the person of Nagares; (2) Nagares did not
complain to the officers administering the oath during the taking of his sworn statement; (3) he
did not file any criminal or administrative complaint against his alleged malefactors for
maltreatment; (4) no marks of violence were observed on his body; and (5) he did not have
himself examined by a physician to support his claim. Moreover, appellant’s confession is
replete with details, which, according to the SC, made it highly improbable that it was not
voluntarily given. Further, the records show that Nagares was duly assisted by an effective and
independent counsel during the custodial investigation in the NBI. As found by the Court of
Appeals, after Nagares was informed of his constitutional rights, he was asked by Atty.
Esmeralda E. Galang whether he accepts her as counsel. During the trial, Atty. Galang testified
on the extent of her assistance. According to her, she thoroughly explained to Nagares his
constitutional rights, advised him not to answer matters he did not know, and if he did not want
to answer any question, he may inform Atty. Galang who would be the one to relay his refusal
to the NBI agents. She was also present during the entire investigation. Thus, the SC held that
there was no duress or violence imposed on the person of Nagares during the custodial
investigation and that Nagares was duly assisted by an independent counsel during such
investigation in the NBI. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Capitle and Arutor Nagares, G.R.
No. 175330, January 12, 2010.
Bill of Rights; Double jeopardy. As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered
because it places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, however, a motion for
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reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as
when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of
jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail the
decision by special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65. Here, although complainant
Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he was not able to bring his pleas for reconsideration under
such exceptions. Complainant Vizconde cited the decision inGalman v. Sandiganbayan as
authority that the Court can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the
Court observed that the government proved in Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due
process since the judgment of acquittal in that case was “dictated, coerced and scripted.” It was
a sham trial. In this case, however, Vizconde does not allege that the Court held a sham review
of the decision of the CA. He has made out no case that the Court held a phony deliberation
such that the seven Justices who voted to acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the
four who inhibited themselves did not really go through the process. Antonio Lejano vs. People
of the Philippines / People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al., G.R. No.
176389/G.R. No. 176864. January 18, 2011.
Bill of Rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. Under the plain view doctrine, objects
falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view,
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. In this case, the SC found that the
seizure of the two receivers of the .45 caliber pistol outside petitioner’s house falls within the
purview of the plain view doctrine. First, the presence of SPO2 Nava at the back of the house
and of the other law enforcers around the premises was justified by the fact that petitioner and
Valerio were earlier seen respectively holding .45 caliber pistols before they ran inside the
structure and sought refuge. The attendant circumstances and the evasive actions of petitioner
and Valerio when the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable ground for the latter to
believe that a crime was being committed. Secondly, from where he was situated, SPO2 Nava
clearly saw, on two different instances, Valerio emerge on top of the subject dwelling and throw
suspicious objects. Lastly, considering the earlier sighting of Valerio holding a pistol, SPO2
Nava had reasonable ground to believe that the things thrown might be contraband items, or
evidence of the offense they were then suspected of committing. The ensuing recovery of the
receivers may have been deliberate; nonetheless, their initial discovery was indubitably
inadvertent. It is not crucial that at initial sighting the seized contraband be identified and
known to be so. The law merely requires that the law enforcer observes that the seized item may
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Hence, the two receivers
were admissible as evidence.Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190889,
January 10, 2010.
Bill of rights; Unreasonable searches and seizures. In this case, there was a valid warrantless
arrest in flagrante delicto. The following are the circumstances immediately prior to and
surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an
operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative,
proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort inBarangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the
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goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six
accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300
van. The crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside
transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting
officers. Furthermore, accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their
arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea. People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun,
et al., G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.
Constitutionality; Lis mota. The SC observed that the issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95
(Philippine National Red Cross charter) was not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the previous decision of the SC; thus, it was not the very lis mota of
the case. The SC reminded that it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the
very lis mota. A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties. Under this rule, the SC
held that it should not have declared void certain sections of R.A. No. 95, as amended by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 1264 and 1643, the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should
have exercised judicial restraint on the matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J.
Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.
Congress; Creation of private corporations. The SC observed that the purpose of the
constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations was to prevent
the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or groups, which were denied
to other groups. The SC found the Philippine National Red Cross Charter is not covered by the
constitutional provision, as it does not grant special privileges to a particular individual, family,
or group, but creates an entity that strives to serve the common good. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs.
Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.
Eminent domain; Just compensation. It is the nature and character of the land at the time of its
taking that is the principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be
given to the landowner. Prior to the NPC’s introduction of improvements in the area where the
subject parcel of land is located, the properties therein, including the disputed lot, remained
agricultural and residential. The SC found that it was only upon entry of the NPC
in Barangay San Roque, and after constructing buildings and other facilities and bringing in
various equipment for its multi-purpose project, that the lands in the said locality were later
classified as commercial or industrial. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio vs. National Power
Corporation/National Power Corporation vs. Moises Tinio, Jr. and Francis Tinio, G.R. No.
160923/G.R. No. 161093, January 24, 2011.
Government contracts; Payment based on quantum meruit for illegal contracts. The government
project involved in this case, the construction of a dike, was completed way back on 9 July
1992. For almost two decades, the public and the government benefitted from the work done by
respondent. According to the SC, public interest and equity dictate that the contractor should be
compensated for services rendered and work done. To deny the payment to the contractor
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would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another. Justice and
equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs.
Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18, 2011.
Philippine National Red Cross; Status. The SC found merit in Philippine National Red Cross’s
contention that its structure is sui generis. National Societies such as the PNRC act
as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their own countries in the humanitarian field and
provide a range of services including disaster relief and health and social programmes. National
societies were held to be organizations that are directly regulated by international humanitarian
law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including NGOs. The auxiliary status of a Red
Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time a private institution and a public service
organization because the very nature of its work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link
with the State. The SC further noted that the creation of the PNRC was a result of the country’s
adherence to the Geneva Convention which has the force and effect of law. Under the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement, can neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not
to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary
of the State. Dante V. Liban, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, January 18, 2011.
State; Immunity from suit. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. It would be the apex of injustice and highly
inequitable to defeat respondent’s right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and
services rendered, where both the government and the public have for years received and
accepted benefits from the project and reaped the fruits of respondent’s honest toil and labor.
The rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any
circumstance.Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January 18,
2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian reform; Coverage. The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and
Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus
exempted from the coverage of the CARL. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands
devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word “agricultural” showed that it
was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the
government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been
classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform. In the instant
case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle,
carabaos, horses, goats and pigs. There were likewise structures on the Lopez lands used for its
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livestock business. Hence, the Court found that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly
and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-raising. The Court affirmed the
findings of the DAR Regional Director and the Court of Appeals that the Lopez lands were
actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock business and, thus, are
exempt from CARP coverage. In contrast, however, the Limot lands were found to be
agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and as such, are thus not subject to
exemption from CARP coverage. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by Dept. Agrarian Reform vs.
Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corp./Agri-Business Corp. vs. Dept. Agrarian Reform, G.R. No.
178895, January 10, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative remedies; Exhaustion. Respondent in this case filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money against petitioners since, according to him, a large amount of money was still due
him under the “Contract of Agreement” involving the construction of a dike, executed between
him and petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a
claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. The SC held that there
was no need to exhaust administrative remedies. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. The exceptions to these
rules are the following: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
(c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where
the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the
controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the
present case, the SC found conditions (c) and (e) as present. The government project contracted
out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by
remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice
respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involved the validity and the
enforceability of the “Contract of Agreement” entered into by the parties. These, according to
the SC, are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the Commission on
Audit or the DPWH. Gregorio R. Vigilar, et al. vs. Arnulfo D. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, January
18, 2011.
Career Executive Service; Coverage. The Career Executive Service covers presidential
appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Department Manager II of the PEZA does not
require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. The Third
Level of Career Service covers only the positions in the CES as enumerated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 and those identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of equivalent rank,
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all of whom are appointed by the President of the Philippines. Modesto Agyao, Jr. vs. Civil
Service Commission, G.R. No. 182591. January 18, 2011.
Election Law
Candidate; Disqualification. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised
on Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is
false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section
68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a
CoC. Thus, a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under
Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person
whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted
because he/she is never considered a candidate. Apart from the qualifications provided for in
the Constitution, the power to prescribe additional qualifications for elective office and grounds
for disqualification therefrom, consistent with the constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress.
However, laws prescribing qualifications for and disqualifications from office are liberally
construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a valuable one. Sergio
G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R. No. 192280, January
25, 2011.
Certificate of Candidacy; Requirement of being sworn. According to the SC, it was grave abuse
of discretion to uphold Olandria’s claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to
possession of a ground for disqualification. This was held not to be a ground for disqualification
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local Government Code.
Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification
of a candidate. Sergio G. Amora, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Arnielo S. Olandria, G.R.
No. 192280, January 25, 2011.
Local Government Code
Local government officials; Suspension pending appeal. Respondent Barriga was held
administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman as a result of anomalous transactions
pertaining to the handling of the trust fund of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu in the Central
Visayas Water and Sanitation Project. This decision was appealed to the CA but was not
implemented immediately. According to the SC, it is clear from Section 7, Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, that when a public
official has been found guilty of an administrative charge by the Office of the Ombudsman and
the penalty imposed is suspension for more than a month, just like in the present case, an
appeal may be made to the CA. However, such appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory and the implementation of the decision follows as a matter of course. The provision in
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman is clear that an appeal by a public
official from a decision meted out by the Ombudsman shall not stop the decision from being
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executory. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and Dinah C. Barriga, G.R. No.
172224, January 26, 2011.

February 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Administrative cases; right to be presumed innocent. The trial court was correct in declaring that
respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that an
employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the
doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven. In this case, respondents were
placed under preventive suspension for 90 days from 23 May 2002 to 21 August 2002. After
serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being
finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and entitled to the grant of step
increment. The Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M.
Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011.
Equal Protection; valid classification. Petitioners argue that there is no substantial distinction
between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that
did not have pending bills, such that the mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the
income requirement. The SC held that the purpose of the enactment of R.A. No 9009 was
merely to stop the “mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities” and the
apprehension that before long the country will be a country of cities and without municipalities.
It found that the imposition of the P100 million average annual income requirement for the
creation of component cities was arbitrarily made as there was no evidence or empirical data,
such as inflation rates, to support the choice of this amount. The imposition of a very high
income requirement of P100 million, increased from P20 million, was simply to make it
extremely difficult for municipalities to become component cities. The SC also found that
substantial distinction lies in the capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become
component cities of their respective provinces. Congress, by enacting the Cityhood Laws,
recognized this capacity and viability of respondent municipalities to become the State’s
partners in accelerating economic growth and development in the provincial regions, which is
the very thrust of the LGC, manifested by the pendency of their cityhood bills during the 11th
Congress and their relentless pursuit for cityhood up to the present. League of Cities of the Phil.
etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League
of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056, February 15, 2011.
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case, the Mactan Cebu International
Airport Authority (MCIAA) and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots subject
of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-1881 for the purpose they were
originally taken by the government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug Airport. In
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fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and abandoned. Also, in this case, it was
preponderantly established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation, MCIAA’s
predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had given assurance to the affected landowners
that they would be entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are no longer
used for airport purposes. The SC held that the government acquires only such rights in
expropriated parcels of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the properties.
This means that in the event the particular public use for which a parcel of land is expropriated
is abandoned, the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a matter of right,
unless such recovery or repurchase is expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the
condemnation judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-1881 enjoined
MCIAA, as a condition of approving expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon
abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the government merely held the properties
condemned in trust until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots were
condemned was actually consummated by the government. Since the government failed to
perform the obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then the lot owners can
demand the reconveyance of their old properties after the payment of the condemnation price.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so desires.
The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and,
in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v.
Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L.
Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha
Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos.
168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property. In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil
Code on mutual compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it may have
obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In turn, the landowners need not require the
accounting of interests earned by the amounts they received as just compensation. Following Art.
1189 of the Civil Code providing that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor, the landowners do not have to settle the
appreciation of the values of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process, since the
value increase is merely the natural effect of nature and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al.
v. Republic of the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v. Ricardo L.
Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha
Suico Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos.
168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
Impeachment; narration of facts. Petitioner urged the Court to look into the narration of facts
constituting the offenses vis-à-vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
The SC denied this as that would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes
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an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question, which the

Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v.
The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; publication requirement. Petitioner contended that she was deprived of due
process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after
public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacked her
contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that “Congress
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.”
While “promulgation” would seem synonymous to “publication,” there is a statutory difference
in their usage. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood,
that is, to make known. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. Between the
restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must prevail unless it was
clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. Since the Constitutional Commission
did not restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be understood to have been
used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to
determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication. It is not for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of
government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific
method of promulgation. The SC observed that it is in no position to dictate a mode of
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. Had the Constitution intended to have the
Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the
rules of procedure in legislative inquiries. Even assuming that publication is required, lack of it
does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectiveness of the Impeachment Rules,
which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; One-Year Bar Rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads:
“No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within
a period of one year.” Petitioner reckoned the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26,
2010 of the 15thCongress. She posited that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second
impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent. Contrary to
petitioner’s claim, the SC found that the previous case of Francisco v. House of
Representatives was applicable to this case. There the SC held that the term “initiate” means to
file the complaint and take initial action on it. It refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. The initial action
taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the complaint to the Committee on
Justice. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchstick light the candle at the same time. According to the SC, what is important is that
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there should only be one candle that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts
burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
Impeachment; sufficiency of form and substance. Petitioner claimed that Congress failed to
ascertain the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards
set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules. The SC found this claim to be untenable.
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an
exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of
Representatives which committed such determinative function to public respondent. Contrary to
petitioner’s position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in
determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing
the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or
resolution,” and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.” Notatu dignum is
the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form
and substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not
explicitly found in the organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically
merely requires a “hearing.” Prudential considerations behooved the Supreme Court to respect
the compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose,
absent any contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No.
193459, February 15, 2011.
Internal Revenue Allotment; just share. Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting
the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their
respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the
enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component
cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local
government units “enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
attainment of national goals,” which is the very mandate of the Constitution. League of Cities of
the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No.
177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the Agreement,
does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving or abandoning its
right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing
international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and
confirmation of the Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction
being primary, it is always the responsibility and within the prerogative of the RP either to
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prosecute criminal offenses equally covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction
of the ICC. Thus, the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is
understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing high
crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In
the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to
“persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their nature,
treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise
encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may decide to
surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial
surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one
contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other. Bayan Muna, as
represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law, there is
no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the
contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their
powers. However, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive agreement, because its
constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President,
the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence
over any prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender
Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it does of the
nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the
case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international
agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties; while
those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of
executive agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of theAgreement does not fall under
any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that may be
covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation
rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements
and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the categorization of subject
matters that may be covered by international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is
not cast in stone. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given
subject, into a treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The
primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to
craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective
interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect
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of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international

agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle. Bayan Muna, as represented by
Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R.
No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
Judicial Review; expanded certiorari jurisdiction. Respondents raised the impropriety of the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They argued that public respondent (the Congress) was
not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two
impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and
that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation. The case of Francisco v.
House of Representativescharacterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the
expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects, includes the power to “determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The SC found it
well-within its power to determine whether Congress committed a violation of the Constitution
or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives that could
translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the
Court. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et
al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Judicial Review; ripeness. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of
ripeness. The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on
an individual by the challenged conduct. In the present petition, the SC found no doubt that
questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on
the need to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for
immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner was,
therefore, found not to have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional
limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable
officer within a period of one year. Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011.
Legal Standing; requirements. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that
the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In this case,
as citizens, petitioners’ interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal. At the
very least, their assertions questioning the Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines
and the US are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement did not go against
established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the State’s obligation to the
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community of nations. Bayan Muna, as represented by Rep. Satur Ocampo, et al. v. Alberto
Romulo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al. G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011.
Stare Decisis; nature. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by the Supreme Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle
is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. The previous case of Lubrica and the present case
involve two different issues. The relief prayed for in the previous case of Lubrica is that the
amount for deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of payment
and not of the time of taking. But in the present case, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of
the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and Department of Agrarian Reform and not
that of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. The principle of stare decisis, therefore, does
not apply. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of RTC,
Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of
Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; expropriation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully
invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the
plaintiffs’ property. The SC cited the previous case of De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate
Court where it ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for
perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the State
exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet, even in
that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action
for payment by the owners. Air Transportation Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R.
No. 159402, February 23, 2011.
Sovereign Immunity; sovereign function and proprietary function. The immunity from suit is
based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. Practical
considerations dictate the establishment of immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise,
and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be
severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State
has to defend against. An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power
of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise,
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing
proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because
its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the
latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
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essentially a business. In this case, the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office
(“ATO”) as an agency of the Government was not performing a purely governmental or
sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. Air Transportation
Office v. Spouses David and Elisea Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011.
Supreme Court; modification of doctrines and principles. The doctrine of immutability of
decisionsapplies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may involve a
modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the judgment rendered by the
Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional, hence, it can never become final. A
decision rendered by a Division of the SC in violation of the constitutional provision, that only
the SC En Banc may modify or reverse a SC doctrine and principle, would be in excess of
jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. Any entry of judgment may thus be said to be “inefficacious”
since the decision is void for being unconstitutional. That a judgment must become final at
some definite point at the risk of occasional error cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils
not only a general allegation of “occasional error” but also a seriousaccusation of a violation of
the Constitution, viz., that doctrines or principles of law were modified or reversed by the
Court’s Special Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution. David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et
al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. v. David Lu/John Lu Ym, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals of
Ceby City, et al.G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889. February 15, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceedings; findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies. Petitioners argue that the
Commission on Audit (COA) committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in declaring the prepayment stipulation in the contract between Land Bank and
Remad Livestock Corporation (REMAD) proscribed by the State Audit Code of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court did not give merit to petitioner’s argument. It emphasized that the COA
Auditor noted that “nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme
with REMAD.” It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA,
are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial
evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction. If the
prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the document to
prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, the Supreme Court was at
a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as its review of “Annex I,” the
document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not contain
such a stipulation or provision. In addition, the Supreme Court noted that much reliance was
made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the Credit Facility Proposal allowed for
prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier
REMAD. It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly a pro forma contract and
emanating from the Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of
loan between Land Bank and the cooperatives. It is in the loan contract that the parties embody
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the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is any agreement to release the loan in
advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan
contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach
the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present petition. Based on the foregoing, the COA
was not faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular
transaction. Ruben Reyna, et al. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; exclusion and exemption from coverage. The deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all
lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising from the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001, it leased
another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. The SC, in this case, accorded respect to
the CA’s observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Team’s Report do not
actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were
actually pastured outside the subject property. Milestone Farms, Inc. v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 182332, February 23, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; just compensation. The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that RA 6657, rather than P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, is the law that
should apply in the determination of just compensation for the subject agricultural land. The
LBP and the DAR argue that P.D. No. 27, as reaffirmed by E.O. No. 228, should be applied in
determining the just compensation for the subject property of the case. They contend that P.D.
No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 prescribe the formula in determining the just compensation of rice and
corn lands tenanted as of October 21, 1972. As the subject property was tenanted and devoted
to rice production in 1972, the just value should be fixed at the prevailing rate at that time,
when the emancipation of the tenant-farmers from the bondage of the soil was declared in P.D.
No. 27. As to R.A. No. 6657, both the LBP and the DAR insist that it applies only to ricelands
and cornlands not tenanted as of October 21, 1972. According to them, the government’s OLT
program on tenanted privately-owned rice and corn lands pursuant to P.D. No. 27 continues
separately and distinctly from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)acquisition
and distribution program under R.A. No. 6657. The SC held that RA 6657 is the applicable law,
with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect. This is so since the provisions of R.A. No.
6657 are also applicable to the agrarian reform process of lands placed under the coverage of
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228, which has not been completed upon the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just
compensation for a considerable length of time.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Magin V. Ferrer,
et al./Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman v.
Antonio V. Ferrer and Ramon V. Ferrer. G.R. No. 172230, February 2, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; initial valuation and just compensation. It is the initial valuation made by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Land Bank of the Philippines that must be
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released to the landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated,
Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not authorize the release of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator’s determination of just compensation for the land which has not yet become final
and executory. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Hon. Ernesto P. Pagayatan, Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro; and Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as
Assignee of Federico Suntay, et al., G.R. No. 177190, February 23, 2011.
Civil Service Law
Regulations; Civil Service. Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency
are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to
be filed. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was
about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the
GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to
internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication
or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center. The Board of Trustees of the Government
Service Insurance System, et al. v. Albert M. Velasco, et al. G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011.
Local Government Code
Cityhood; criteria for conversion. The cases involved here were initiated by the consolidated
petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws, each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and
seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the subject laws. In the Decision dated November 18, 2008, the SC En Banc, by a 6-
5 vote, granted the petitions and struck down the Cityhood Laws as unconstitutional for
violating Sections 10 and 6, Article X, and the equal protection clause. Then, in another
Decision dated December 21, 2009, the SC En Banc, by a vote of 6-4, declared the Cityhood
Laws as constitutional. Thereafter, on August 24, 2010, the Court En Banc, through a Resolution,
by a vote of 7-6, reinstated the November 18, 2008 Decision. The SC held that the Cityhood
laws were constitutional. Based on the deliberations by Congress on R.A. No. 9009, Congress
intended that those with pending cityhood bills during the 11th Congress would not be covered
by the new and higher income requirement of P100 million imposed by R.A. No.
9009. Notwithstanding that both the 11th and 12th Congress failed to act upon the pending
cityhood bills, both the letter and intent of Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No.
9009, were carried on until the 13th Congress, when the Cityhood Laws were enacted. The
exemption clauses found in the individual Cityhood Laws are the express articulation of that
intent to exempt respondent municipalities from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. League of Cities
of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et
al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No.
177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011.
Legislative power; amendment. R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But the SC also held that, in
effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found
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therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the
amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC
itself. League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc.,
et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Phil. etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No.
176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No. 178056, February 15, 2011

March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
COMELEC; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in
this case that despite recourse to it, it cannot rule on the issue of citizenship of petitioner
Gonzalez. Subsequent events showed that Gonzalez had not only been duly proclaimed, he
had also taken his oath of office and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to the candidate’s election and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins. Fernando V. Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8,
2011.
Equal Protection. The main issue in this case is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from
corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337. The Supreme Court held
that under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt from corporate income tax as it has been
effectively omitted from the list of GOCCs that are exempt from it. The burden of proof rests
upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so
claimed. In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the payment of
corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337 amended Section 27 (c) of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the
exemption. PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as
the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the
Committee on Ways and Means, show that PAGCOR’s exemption from payment of corporate
income tax, as provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based on substantial distinctions
and the other requirements of a reasonable classification by legislative bodies, so that the law
may operate only on some, and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The
legislative records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from corporate
income tax was PAGCOR’s own request to be exempted.Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March 15, 2011.
Impeachment; Initiation. The Supreme Court reiterated its previous ruling that the term “initiate”
as used in Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaintcoupled with Congress’ taking initial action on said complaint. The initial action of
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the House of Representatives on the complaint is the referral of the same to the Committee on
Justice. Ma. Merceditas C. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et
al., G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011.
Impeachment; Promulgation of Rules. When the Constitution uses the word “promulgate,” it
does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes
the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. Ma. Merceditas C.
Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., G.R. No. 193459, March
8, 2011.
Non-impairment Clause. Petitioner PAGCOR, in this case, states that the private parties/investors
transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which inure to their benefit, as the main
consideration and inducement for their decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that
the withdrawal of its exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of
changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of private parties with it;
thus, the amendatory provision is violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
The SC held that a franchise partakes of the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution,
PAGCOR’s franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the
amendment under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the exemption of PAGCOR
from corporate income tax, which may affect any benefits to PAGCOR’s transactions with
private parties, is not violative of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172087, March
15, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Due Process. This case refers to the ethics complaint filed against Sen.
Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for the C-5 Road Extension
Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules
of the Ethics Committee by the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar’s
right to due process. The SC did not agree. The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate
its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. The only limitation
to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and
publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied with, according to the
SC, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules. Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan
Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate Ethics Committee; Equal Protection. Petitioners allege that the Senate Committee of the
Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming jurisdiction over the complaint
against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was discriminatory and removed
Senator Villar’s recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics Committee to the Senate as a
body. The SC did not agree with this. The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that “all
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matters relating to the conduct, rights, privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the
Senate and its Members shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on
Ethics and Privileges.” However, in this case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to
the Ethics Committee stalled the investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about
one of its members’ alleged irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics
Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they
refused to nominate their members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics
Committee a kangaroo court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on
the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the
investigation to the Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the
Ethics Committee and approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan
Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the
Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had
been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only
one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.
The SC held that the Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House
or Senate. Since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to
the House or Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for
their publication before the rules can take effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can
take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate
their publication. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own
internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v.
Senate Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a
majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section
16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express
provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and
voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict
between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of
course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole represented
by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Unlawful Expenditure for being Excessive; Factors. Price is considered “excessive” if it is more
than the 10% allowable price variance between the price paid for the item bought and the price
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of the same item per canvass of the auditor. In determining whether or not the price is excessive,
the following factors may be considered: (a) supply and demand forces in the market; (b)
government price quotations; (c) warranty of products or special features; (d) brand of products.
In this case, the issue was whether the computer units bought by Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) from Tetra were overpriced. The records showed that while the respondents
found nothing wrong per se with the criteria adopted by the CDA in the overall evaluation of the
bids, the technical aspect was seriously questioned. The final technical evaluation report was
apparently manipulated to favor Tetra, which offered a Korean-made brand as against
Microcircuits which offered a US-made brand said to be more durable, at a lower price. The SC
concluded that the price per item of the PC units, laptop and UPS were overpriced by almost
50%. This comparison was based on the initial purchase of 23 PC units with the bid price by
Tetra of Php1,269,630.00 (23 PC units, 1 unit 386 Tower and 1 unit 386 Notebook) under
Disbursement Voucher No. 01-92-12-2399. There was an additional (repeat) purchase of 21 PC
units for Php929,649.00 (same price per item of Php44,269.00) and one unit UPS for
Php86,000.00. The total contract price obtained by Tetra was Php2,285,279.00, of which COA
disallowed the amount of Php881,819.00 representing the overprice per the auditor’s
findings. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al., G.R. No. 157838, March 8,
2011.
Unlawful Expenditure; Liability of Public Officers. The SC held the petitioner liable personally
and solidarily for the disallowed amount of Php881,819.00. The doctrine of separate personality
of a corporation finds no application because the Cooperative Development Authority is not a
private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in
compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover,
respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon
the Development Academy of the Philippines-Technical Evaluation Committee (DAP-TEC) to
modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant
grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been
opened. Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. v. Guillermo N. Carague, et al.,G.R. No. 157838, March 8,
2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative Proceeding; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction. This case refers to the ethics
complaint filed against Sen. Manny Villar on the alleged double insertion of Php200 million for
the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act. Respondent avers that
primary recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that the Supreme Court must
uphold the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the
government. The SC held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case.
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which
are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not for an administrative agency or

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the Senate to resolve. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Qualifications of Beneficiary. DAR Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1990,
enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary: (1) Landless; (2) Filipino citizen; (3) Actual
occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family at the time of filing
application; and (4) Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land
productive. The SC found that petitioner Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of
(1) and (3). First, Lebrudo is not landless. According to the records, Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer Amelia Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that Lebrudo
was awarded by the DAR with a home lot consisting of an area of 236 square meters situated at
Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite. Next, Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or
tiller of the lot at the time of the filing of the application. Loyola and her family were the actual
occupants of the lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP. Julian S.
Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Role of Land Bank of the Philippines. In this case, the issue was whether the
Land Bank of the Philippines has the personality to file a petition for determination of just
compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. The SC held that LBP did. The LBP is an
agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform pursuant
to Section 74 of RA 3844 or the Agricultural Reform Code and Section 64 of RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. In the previous case of Heirs of Lorenzo and
Carmen Vidad v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the SC held that LBP is not merely a nominal
party in the determination of just compensation, but an indispensable participant in such
proceedings. It is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for
all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just
compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees
with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even
the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the
Court of Appeals or to this Court, if appropriate. Davao Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,G.R. Nos. 181566 & 181570. March 9, 2011.
Agrarian Reform; Sale or Conveyance of Land. It is clear from Section 27 of RA 6657 that lands
awarded to beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not
be sold, transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four exceptions:
(1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any
sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to
prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. In this case, petitioner Lebrudo insists that he
is entitled to one-half portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for
shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from respondent Loyola’s
mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola’s name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed
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by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim. In other words,
waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being
violative of agrarian reform laws. Julian S. Lebrudo and Reynaldo L. Lebrudo v. Remedios
Loyola, G.R. No. 181370, March 9, 2011.
Election Law
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Disqualification of Candidate; Period for Filing Petition.
Petitioner Fernando V. Gonzalez and private respondent Reno G. Lim both filed certificates of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the 3rd congressional district of the Province of
Albay in the May 10, 2010 elections. On March 30, 2010, a Petition for Disqualification and
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed by Stephen Bichara [SPA No. 10-074
(DC)] on the ground that Gonzalez is a Spanish national, being the legitimate child of a Spanish
father and a Filipino mother, and that he failed to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority in accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625. The SC
explained the difference between Cancellation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
and Disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. A petition to cancel a candidate’s COC may
be filed under Section 78 of the OEC exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required by law is false. On the other hand, a petition for disqualification of
a candidate may also be filed pursuant to Section 68 for committing prohibited acts referred to
in said section. As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, the Court
in a previous case elaborated that the misrepresentation must be material, i.e. misrepresentation
regarding age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In this
case, the petition in SPA No. 10-074 (DC) based on the allegation that Gonzalez was not a
natural-born Filipino which was filed before the elections is in the nature of a petition filed
under Section 78. The recitals in the petition in said case, however, state that it was filed
pursuant to Section 4 (b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 and Section 68 of the OEC to
disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for
disqualification. The COMELEC treated the petition as one filed both for
disqualification and cancellation of COC, with the effect that Section 68, in relation to Section 3,
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is applicable insofar as determining the period for
filing the petition. This Rule provides the prescriptive period of filing to be not later than the date
of proclamation. On the other hand, the procedure for filing a petition for cancellation of COC
is covered by Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides as the prescriptive
period to be within five (5) days following the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 represents another attempt to modify by a mere procedural
rule the statutory period for filing a petition to cancel COC on the ground of false representation
therein regarding a candidate’s qualifications. Section 4(B) of Resolution No. 8696 would
supplant the prescribed period of filing of petition under Section 78 with that provided in
Section 68 even if the latter provision does not at all cover the false representation regarding age,
residence and citizenship which may be raised in a petition under Section 78. If the purpose
behind this rule promulgated by the COMELEC – allowing a petition to cancel COC based on
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the candidate’s non-compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements for elective
office, such as citizenship, to be filed even beyond the period provided in Section 78 – was
simply to remedy a perceived “procedural gap” though not expressly stated in Resolution No.
8696, the Court, in a previous case, had already rejected such justification. Fernando V.
Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011.

April 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Cityhood Laws; Equal protection. The petitioners in this case reiterate their position that the
Cityhood Laws violate Section 6 and Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the right of local governments to a just share in the national taxes. This
was denied by the Supreme Court. Congress clearly intended that the local government units
covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009 (the Cityhood
Law). The House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, entitled Joint Resolution to
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on Joint Resolution No.
29. Even so, the House of Representatives readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded Joint Resolution No. 1 to the Senate for approval.
Again, the Senate failed to approve Joint Resolution No. 1. Thereafter, the conversion bills of
the respondents were individually filed in the House of Representatives, and were all
unanimously and favorably voted upon by the Members of the House of Representatives. The
bills, when forwarded to the Senate, were likewise unanimously approved by the Senate. The
acts of both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in
the Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of R.A. No. 9009. Thereby, R.A. No. 9009,
and, by necessity, the LGC, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions
being embodied in the exemption clauses. League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of
Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R.
No. 178056. April 12, 2011.
Cityhood Laws; Just share in national taxes. The share of local government units is a matter of
percentage under Section 285 of the Local Government Code (LGC), not a specific
amount. Specifically, the share of the cities is 23%, determined on the basis of population
(50%), land area (25%), and equal sharing (25%). This share is also dependent on the number of
existing cities, such that when the number of cities increases, then more will divide and share
the allocation for cities. However, the Supreme Court noted that the allocation by the National
Government is not a constant, and can either increase or decrease. With every newly converted
city becoming entitled to share the allocation for cities, the percentage of internal revenue
allotment (IRA) entitlement of each city will decrease, although the actual amount received may
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be more than that received in the preceding year. That is a necessary consequence of Section
285 and Section 286 of the LGC. In this case, since the conversion by the Cityhood Laws is not
violative of the Constitution and the LGC, the respondents are thus also entitled to their just
share in the IRA allocation for cities. League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC,
et al./League of Cities of the Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al./League of Cities of the
Philippines etc., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 176951/G.R. No. 177499/G.R. No.
178056. April 12, 2011.
Expenditure of Public Funds; Requirements. The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly
prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior
requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure
required in the contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the
proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds
are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void.
The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed
unless supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability. The Supreme
Court found that the three contracts between Philippine National Railways (PNR) and Kanlaon
do not comply with the requirement of a certification of appropriation and fund availability.
Even if a certification of appropriation is not applicable to PNR if the funds used are internally
generated, still a certificate of fund availability is required. Thus, the three contracts between
PNR and Kanlaon were found to be void for violation of Sections 46, 47, and 48, Chapter 8,
Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, as well as Sections 85, 86, and 87
of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.Philippine National Railways v. Kanlaon
Construction Enterprises, Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182967. April 6, 2011.
Locus Standi. For a party to have locus standi, one must allege “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the
relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary question frequently arises as to this
interest in the constitutional question raised. It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will
suffer direct injury in the event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment is denied and
their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution is denied with finality. Indeed, according to the Supreme
Court, they have sufficiently shown that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case,
such that if the Resolution ordering finality be not reconsidered, their election to their respective
positions during the May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and
be put to naught. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R.
No. 180050. April 12, 2011.
Moot and academic Principle; Exception. The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide
cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
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there is an exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. Rodolfo G.
Navarro, et al. Vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.
Administrative Law
Government Employee; Dishonesty; Misconduct. Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or
distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance
of his duty. On the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule
of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the
public officer. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In
this case, petitioner’s acts were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his dishonesty
and grave misconduct. He allowed the Spouses Abuan to use his position as SSS Senior Member
Services Representative to make their “clients” believe that he could give them undue advantage
– over others without the same connection – by processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise, his
acts, according to the SC, imply malevolent intent, and not merely error in judgment. He was
aware of what the Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the same. At the very least,
according to the Supreme Court, he failed to stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes willful
disregard of the laws and rules. Jerome Japson v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.
189479. April 12, 2011.
Agrarian Law
Agrarian Reform; Right to just compensation. Apart from the requirement that compensation for
expropriated land must be fair and reasonable, compensation, to be “just,” must also be made
without delay. In simpler terms, for the government’s payment to be considered just
compensation, the landowner must receive it in full without delay. In the present case, it is
undisputed that the government took the petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996; the petitioners
only received full payment of the just compensation due on May 9, 2008. This circumstance, by
itself, was found by the Supreme Court as already confirming the unconscionable delay in the
payment of just compensation.APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011.
Local Government Code
Local Government; Requisites for creation of province. The central policy considerations in the
creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and
capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units,
particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the
LGC. However, there is an exemption provided in the Local Government Code in terms of the
land area requirement. When the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442
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and Section 450 of the LGC, if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a
component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. The Supreme Court found no reason why this exemption should not
apply also to provinces. In fact, the Supreme Court observed that considering the physical
configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of
islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was
expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC,
but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the
congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. The
Court thus upheld the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. Vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011.

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Declaration of unconstitutionality; doctrine of operative fact. An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The doctrine of operative fact is an exception this
rule. It applies as a matter of equity and fair play, and nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when
a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on
the invalid law. The doctrine cannot be applied to this case, as to hold otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner who was illegally dismissed from employment and would allow his
employer to profit from a violation of an unconstitutional provision of law. Claudio S. Yap v.
Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.,G.R. No. 179532. May
30, 2011.
Judicial review; review of executive policy. Petitioner here seeks judicial review of a question
of Executive policy, which the Court ruled is outside its jurisdiction. Despite the definition of
judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, the determination of where, as
between two possible routes, to construct a road extension is not within the province of
courts. Such determination belongs exclusively to the Executive branch. Barangay Captain
Beda Torrecampo v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, et al., G.R. No.
188296. May 30, 2011.
Administrative Law; Public Officers
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners argue that they were denied due process because
their order of dismissal was not accompanied by any justification from the Board of Directors of
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Philippine Estates Authority, which merely relied on the findings of the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission. The Court dismissed this argument on the basis that petitioners were given the
opportunity to be heard in the course of PAGC’s investigation. The essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s side or seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of, and to submit any evidence a party may have in support of
his defense. The demands of due process are sufficiently met when the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. Petitioners here actively participated in
the proceedings before PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity to explain their actions
through their memoranda. The essence of due process is the right to be heard and this evidently
was afforded to them. Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan
and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R.
No. 165404 & 165489. May 30, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the
application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Petitioner
here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to
the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the
Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly
notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not
denied due process. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No.
180141. May 31, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; length of service as an alternative circumstance. Length of service
as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative cases is not always a
mitigating circumstance. It is an alternative circumstance, which can mitigate or possibly even
aggravate the penalty, depending on the circumstances of the case. Where the government
employee concerned took advantage of his long years of service and position in public office,
length of service may not be considered in lowering the penalty. The Court will take this
circumstance against the public officer or employee in administrative cases involving serious
offenses, even if it was the first time said public officer or employee was administratively
charged. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31,
2011.
Appeal; doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Supreme Court denied this
petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Petitioner here went to the Court of
Appeals to appeal the orders of Laguna Lake Development Authority. Petitioner cites
deprivation of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which
exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
Supreme Court agreed with the CA that such appeal was premature since the law provides for
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an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the
President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial
intervention. Petitioner’s contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary
would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDA’s findings is at best
speculative and presumptuous. Universal Robina Corp. v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority, G.R. No. 191427. May 30, 2011.
Civil service; security of tenure. Career service officers enjoy security of tenure as guaranteed
under the 1987 Constitution and the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, which provides that
no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law and after due process. The tenurial protection accorded to a civil servant is a
guaranty of both procedural and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires that
the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after notice and hearing. Substantive due
process requires, among others, that the dismissal be for legal cause, which must relate to and
effect the administration of the office of which the concerned employee is a member and must
be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the
public. Nevertheless, the right to security of tenure is not tantamount to immunity from
dismissal. Petitioners cannot seek absolute protection from this constitutional provision. As
long as their dismissal was for a legal cause and the requirements of due process were met, the
law will not prevent their removal from office. Theron V. Lacson v. The Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al./Jaime R. Millan and Bernardo T. Viray v. The Hon. Executive Secretary, et
al., G.R. No. 165399 & 165475/G.R. No. 165404 & 165489. May 30, 2011.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; requirements; examples. The acts of
respondent constitute the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, which need not be related to, or connected with, the public officer’s official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public
office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring public officer or
employee. Under the Civil Service law and rules, there is no concrete description of what
specific acts constitute the grave offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
However, the Court has considered the following acts or omissions, inter alia, as Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of
office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe keep public records and
property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge’s act of
brandishing a gun and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation; and a court
interpreter’s participation in the execution of a document conveying complainant’s property
which resulted in a quarrel in the latter’s family. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service
Commission, et al.,G.R. No. 180141. May 31, 2011.
Government owned and controlled corporation; requisites. The Court here ruled that Philippine
Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation is a private corporation. It was not created by a special law
but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although the
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Bases Conversion Development Authority owned almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the
time of the latter’s incorporation, the Board of Directors of Expocorp allowed a private
corporation to buy its shares constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months
after incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be
characterized as a government-owned or controlled corporation. A government-owned or
controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. Since
Expocorp is not a GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines v. Luis J. Morales, G.R. No.
166355. May 30, 2011.
Misconduct; relation to the official performance of duties. To constitute misconduct, the act or
acts must have a direct relation to, and must be connected with, the performance of official
duties. The duties of respondent here as a member of the GSIS Fund Management Accounting
Department do not involve the modification of IP addresses, the offense he committed. The act
was considered unauthorized, precisely because dealing with the GSIS network’s IP addresses is
strictly reserved for personnel of the Information Technology Services Group, who are
expectedly knowledgeable in this field. Government Service Insurance System, et al. v. Arwin T.
Mayordomo, G.R. No. 191218. May 31, 2011.
Procedural due process; right to cross-examine. While the right to cross-examine is a vital
element of procedural due process, the right does not require an actual cross examination but
merely an opportunity to exercise this right if desired by the party entitled to it. In this case,
while National Police Commission Memorandum Circular No. 96-010 provides that the sworn
statements of witnesses shall take the place of oral testimony but shall be subject to cross-
examination, petitioner missed this opportunity precisely because he did not appear at the
deadline for the filing of his supplemental answer or counter-affidavit, and accordingly the
hearing officer considered the case submitted for decision. And even with the grant of his
subsequent motion to be furnished with a copy of the complaint and its annexes, he still failed
to file a supplemental answer or counter-affidavit and instead filed a motion to
dismiss. Rimando A. Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 180141. May 31,
2011.
Agrarian Law
Tenancy relation; elements. RA 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, defines a
tenant as a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter’s consent
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both,
under a leasehold tenancy system. For a tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential
elements must be shown: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter
is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests
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between the parties. The presence of all of these elements must be proved by substantial
evidence. Estate of Pasto Samson v. Mercedes & Ruberto Susano/Julian Chan v. Mercedes and
Ruberto Susano, G.R. No. 179024/G.R. No. 179086. May 30, 2011.

June 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over Boy Scouts. The issue was whether or not the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines (“BSP”) fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The
BSP contends that it is not a government-owned or controlled corporation; neither is it an
instrumentality, agency, or subdivision of the government. The Supreme Court, however, held
that not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be
considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered
institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated
by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of
ownership or control and economic viability but to a different criteria relating to their public
purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship
to the government or any of its departments or offices. As presently constituted, the BSP is a
public corporation created by law for a public purpose, attached to the Department of
Education Culture and Sports pursuant to its Charter and the Administrative Code of 1987. It is
not a private corporation which is required to be owned or controlled by the government and be
economically viable to justify its existence under a special law. The economic viability test
would only apply if the corporation is engaged in some economic activity or business function
for the government, which is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a public corporation, the
funds of the BSP fall under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Boy Scouts of the
Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June 7, 2011.
Local governments; principle of local autonomy. The claim of petitioners in this case that the
subject proclamation and administrative orders violate the principle of local autonomy is
anchored on the allegation that, through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to
take over the operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the
region. The Supreme Court held that in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. The SC observed that after law enforcement agents took
respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post
on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of
RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional
Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG
Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM. Datu Zaldy Uy
Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.

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Presidential Electoral Tribunal; constitutionality. This case involved a motion for

reconsideration, reiterating the contention that the constitution of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the motion and explained that judicial
power granted to the Supreme Court by the Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect. As to the claim of petitioner that the PET
exercises quasi-judicial power and, thus, its members violate the proscription in Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court held that, contrary to petitioner’s claim, the
resolution of electoral contests are judicial in nature. Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Presidential
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011.
Presidential powers; declaration of a state of emergency. Petitioners contend that the President
unlawfully exercised her powers when she declared a state of emergency in the provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato. The President’s call on the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the
factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the
determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion,
the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Here, petitioners failed to show that
the declaration of a state of emergency as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out”
power had no factual basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were
placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG
Secretary had no basis too. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et al., G.R.
No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Presidential powers; calling-out power. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully
exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in
the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato. The Supreme Court
held that such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act
pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary
powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such
places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same. But, apart from the fact that there was no such
take over to begin with, the SC held the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the
President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and as a result, the President had to
act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed
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men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation,
the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the
peace and security in the affected places. Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. v. Hon. Ronaldo
Puno, et al., G.R. No. 190259. June 7, 2011.
Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. On the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it
undermines the right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, applied
in People v. Teehankee, Jr. andEstrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is
not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of
an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of
a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount
to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Re: Petition for radio
and television coverage of the multiple murder cases against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy
Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. June 14,
2011.
Local Government Code
Local government; power to classify lands. Petitioners in this case contend that the subject
property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment of City
Ordinance No. 1313 by the City of Iligan reclassifying the area into a residential/commercial
land. Unconvinced, the DARAB, in its Decision, noted that the record is bereft of any evidence
that the city ordinance has been approved by the HLURB, thereby allegedly casting doubt on
the validity of the reclassification over the subject property. The Supreme Court agreed with
petitioners that the property is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Ordinance
No. 1313 was enacted in 1975. Significantly, there was still no HLURB to speak of during that
time. It was the Task Force on Human Settlements, the earliest predecessor of HLURB, which
was in existence at that time. The Task Force was not empowered to review and approve zoning
ordinances and regulations. As a matter of fact, it was only on August 9, 1978, with the
issuance of Letter of Instructions No. 729, that local governments were required to submit their
existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, enforcement systems and procedures to the Ministry
of Human Settlements for review and ratification. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative cases; due process. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is
putting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their
right to due process of law was violated. The SC agreed. The importance of an actual notice in
subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-
compliance with it violates the essential requirements of administrative due process of law. If
the illegality in the issuance of the CLTs is patent, the Court must immediately take action and
declare the issuance as null and void. Accordingly, there being no question that the CLTs in the
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instant case were “improperly issued, for which reason, their cancellation is warranted.” The
same holds true with respect to the EPs and certificates of title issued by virtue of the void CLTs,
as there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs on which they were grounded are
void. Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 169913. June 8,
2011.
Administrative cases; execution of Ombudsman decisions. Petitioners in this case raise the issue
of whether administrative decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalties of
dismissal and one-year suspension from office are immediately executory pending appeal. The
Supreme Court held that it is immediately executory pending appeal. This is the rule provided
for under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated September 15, 2003, which provides among
others: “An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is
suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that
he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course…” Under this
provision, a respondent who is found administratively liable by the Office of the Ombudsman
and is slapped with a penalty of suspension of more than one month from service has the right
to file an appeal with the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. But although a respondent is given the right to appeal, the act of filing an appeal
does not stay the execution of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. Marcelo G.
Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 170500 & 170510-11. June 1,
2011.

July 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Court proceedings; denial of due process. The SC here ruled that the Energy Regulatory
Commission did not deprive petitioners of their right to be heard. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is granted, there is no denial of due
process. In this case, prior to the issuance of the assailed ERC Decision approving Meralco’s
application for rate increase, petitioners were given several opportunities to attend the hearings
and to present all their pleadings and evidence. Petitioners voluntarily failed to appear in most
of those hearings. Although the ERC erred in prematurely issuing its Decision (as the same was
issued prior to the lapse of the period for petitioners to file their comment on the application), its
subsequent act of ordering petitioners to file their comments on another party’s motion for
reconsideration cured this defect. Even though petitioners never filed their own motion for
reconsideration, the fact that they were still given notice of the other motion and the opportunity
to file their comments renders immaterial ERC’s failure to admit their comment on the rate

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application. National Association of Electricity Consumers of reforms, Inc. [Nasecore], et al. vs.
Energy Regulator Commission (ERC), et al., G.R. No. 190795. July 6, 2011.
Value added tax on toll fees; non-impairment clause. Petitioners argue that since VAT was
never factored into the formula for computing toll fees under the Toll Operation Agreements, its
imposition would violate the non-impairment of contract clause of the constitution. The SC
held that Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke the non-impairment clause on behalf of
private investors in the tollway projects. She will neither be prejudiced nor affected by the
alleged diminution in return of investments that may result from the VAT imposition. She has no
interest in the profits to be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover
investments belongs solely to the private tollway investors. Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F.
Timbol vs. The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
193007. July 19, 2011.
Administrative Law
Public official; effect of resignation on filing of administrative complaint. The Ombudsman can
no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan because the latter was not a public
servant at the time the case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that
Andutan had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the operative
fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public
service. The SC observed that indeed it has held in the past that a public official’s resignation
does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s
resignation. However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In
the past cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases –
resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent
filing of one. Here, neither situation obtains. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice
nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on
July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one year
and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced
to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. If
the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official – even if he has been
separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of
his superiors, ad infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the
same. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
Public officials; prohibited positions. Respondent in this case was charged with violation of
Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713 for solicitation or acceptance of gifts by reason of public
office. The CA found that RA 6713 was repealed by RA 6938; thus, respondent was not
liable. The SC found the contrary. There was no repeal. The ban on Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA) officials holding a position in a cooperative provided in RA 6938 should be
taken as a prohibition in addition to those provided in RA 6713 and specifically applicable to
CDA officials and employees. True, RA 6938 allows CDA officials and employees to become
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members of cooperatives and enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to

membership. However, RA 6938 should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA officials and
employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), RA 6713 considering that the
benefits and privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to
availing of loans and not all cooperatives are established for the sole purpose of providing credit
facilities to their members.Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of Claveria
Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the Ombudsman
vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
Public officials; misconduct. The prohibition in Section 7(d) of RA 6713 is malum
prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Therefore, it is
immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits the mere act of
soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of RA 6713. Neither is undue
influence on respondent’s part required to be proven as held by the CA. Whether respondent
used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the determination of her
administrative liability. And considering that respondent admitted having taken two loans from
CABMPCI, which is a cooperative whose operations are directly regulated by respondent’s
office, respondent was correctly meted the penalty of suspension by the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon for violation of Section 7(d). Petra C. Martinez, In her capacity as General Manager of
Claveria Agri-based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. vs. Filomena L. villanueva/Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Filomena L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196/G.R. No. 169198, July 6, 2011.
Agrarian Reform
Agrarian reform; distribution of shares to farmers. In this case, Farmworkers Agrarian Reform
Movement, Inc. (FARM) argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional as it permits stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of
the farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the
Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court denied FARM’s contention of unconstitutionality. First, there
was a failure on the part of FARM and its members to raise the question of constitutionality at
the first opportunity. It took them 27 years before they raised the same before the SC and after
they have already received some benefits from its implementation. Second, the issue of
constitutionality is not the lis mota of this case, the lis mota being the alleged non-compliance
by Hacienda Luisita, Inc. with the conditions of the Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) to support a
plea for its revocation. And before the Supreme Court, the lis mota is whether or not the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
recall of the SDP for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and
implemented, offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. The SC held that any of
these key issues may be resolved without going into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Finally, there appears to be no breach of the fundamental law. The wording of the
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Section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is unequivocal––the farmers and regular farmworkers
have a right to own directly or collectively the lands they till. Accordingly, the basic law allows
two modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual
farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer
through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of
agricultural land by individual farmers. Therefore, Section 4 expressly authorizes collective
ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or
prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which
collective ownership can be exercised. Hacienda Luisita, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011.

August 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Citizenship; collateral attack prohibited. Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the ground
that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he refers to the alleged nullity of the grant of
naturalization of Limkaichong’s father which, however, is not allowed as it would constitute a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father. Under Philippine law, an attack on a person’s
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. Renald F. Vilando vs. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero
Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Citizenship; forfeiture; application for an alien certificate of registration. Vilando’s assertion that
Limkaichong cannot derive Philippine citizenship from her mother because the latter became a
Chinese citizen when she married Julio Sy, as provided for under Section 1 (7) of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 in relation to Article 2 (1) Chapter II of the Chinese Revised
Nationality Law of February 5, 1959, likewise failed. Vilando was not able to offer in evidence
a duly certified true copy of the alleged Chinese Revised Law of Nationality to prove that
Limkaichong’s mother indeed lost her Philippine citizenship. He failed to establish his case
through competent and admissible evidence to warrant a reversal of the HRET ruling. Also, an
application for an alien certificate of registration (ACR) is not an indubitable proof of forfeiture
of Philippine citizenship. Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichong’s mother was not tantamount to a
repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien
citizenship. The Supreme Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of,
an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in loss of citizenship, the same must be
express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichong’s mother,
being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter. Renald F. Vilando vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero
Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.

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Citizenship; natural-born citizen. With Limkaichong’s father having been conferred the status
as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a Filipino citizen born to a Filipino father. Even
on the assumption that the naturalization proceedings and the subsequent issuance of a
certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkaichong can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached majority age. The HRET was, thus, found to have ruled correctly
in declaring that Limkaichong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero
Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.
Constitutionality of statutes; writ of certiorari and prohibition. Writs of certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes and the acts of the other branches of
government. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167,
August 16, 2011.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; jurisdiction. The HRET has jurisdiction over quo
warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of
citizenship. The 1987 Constitution vests the HRET with the authority to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. This constitutional power is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the
HRET. However, such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not
carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization in the
pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on
the citizenship of the father which is not permissible. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero
Nograles,G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23, 2011.

Constitutionality of statutes; writ of certiorari and prohibition. Writs of certiorari and prohibition
are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes and the acts of the other branches of
government. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167,
August 16, 2011.

International law; UNCLOS III; RA 9522. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ contention
that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national territory” because it discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine
sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine
archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. The Court said
that UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral
treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12
nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], and
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exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits. On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by
UNCLOS III States to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are
drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth
of the maritime zones and continental shelf. In other words, baselines laws are nothing but
statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States to delimit with precision the extent of their
maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),
the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous
zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). In sum, UNCLOS III and its
ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim,
diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or
conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to
land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general
international law. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167,
August 16, 2011.

International law; archipelagic waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 unconstitutionally

“converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of
innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate
that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime
pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. To this the Supreme Court held: Whether
referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic
waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body
of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and
international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not
marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus,
domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of
their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic
waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011.

International law; rights of innocent passage. In the absence of municipal legislation,

international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights
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over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s limitations and conditions
for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,
thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly
invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international
community. The fact that, for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both
the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-
vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these
passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic
States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless
of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More important, the recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters
enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as
separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing
the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS
III. Prof. Merlin M. Magallona, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, August 16,
2011.

Judgment; law of the case. The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same case,
whether correct on general principles or not, continues to be the law of the case for as long as
the facts on which the legal rule was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court. In G.R. No. 137285 (which was the predecessor of this case), the Supreme Court upheld
the annulment of the Compromise Agreement and recognized that the agreed upon mode of
payment of the just compensation for Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 was cancelled. The SC
ratiocinated that it is notable that it mentioned nothing in the said case about the invalidation of
the amount of just compensation corresponding to the mode of payment, which was the value
of Lot 434 at the time, which silence was the Court’s acknowledgment that the parties
understood and accepted, by entering into the Compromise Agreement in 1993, that the just
compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434 (or the value of Lot 434, which at the time of the
swap in 1993 was definitely much higher than Lot 434’s value in 1981). Export Processing Zone
Authority (now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No.
188995. August 24, 2011.
Moot and academic principle; exception. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it
on ground of mootness. Limkaichong’s term of office as Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. Moreover, there was the
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conduct of the 2010 elections, which has also rendered this case moot and academic. However,
citizenship, being a continuing requirement for Members of the House of Representatives, may
be questioned at anytime. For this reason, the Court deemed it appropriate to resolve the
petition on the merits based on the rule that courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and
academic, if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” The question on Limkaichong’s
citizenship is likely to recur if she would run again, as she did, for public office, hence, capable
of repetition. Renald F. Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Jocelyn Sy
Limkaichong and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149. August 23,
2011.
NPC Charter; prescription. The SC ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i)
of Republic Act No. 6395 (the NPC Charter) is applicable only to an action for damages, and
does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC
cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their
land. The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs
from the action for damages. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the
Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use
solely on the basis of statutory prescription. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No.
165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and action for
damages; distinction. An action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating
agency differs from an action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, is
intended to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through
damages. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. The two
actions are different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on
the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the
former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private
property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the
owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the
suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional
prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. National Power
Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed
Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value. The RTC based its fixing of just
compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint,
instead of reckoning it from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No.
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6395. The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the
filing of the complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the
time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be
just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s
entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior
knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due
process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. Reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced
these inverse condemnation proceedings is warranted. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit,G.R. No.
165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals. In this case, the CA upheld the RTC’s
granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of Php30,000.00/month “from 1979 up to July
1999 with 12% interest per annum” by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of
the land to construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent. However, the SC found
that the granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the
land being already justly compensated. Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals
and in its place prescribed interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the
date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. National Power
Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed
Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; limitations. The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited
power. Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations: (a) the
taking must be for a public purpose; and (b) just compensation must be paid to the owner. In
addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of taking until the actual payment
in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in
before the taking occurred. In this case, it is undeniable that just compensation was not
promptly made to the Estate of Salud Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitioner. In
view of this, the SC found the CA’s fixing of legal interest at only 6% per annum as
insufficient for that rate would not ensure that compensation was just in the face of the long
delay in payment. Accordingly, it imposed a 12% per annum legal interest, from August 23,
1993, the date of the approval of the failed Compromise Agreement, until the full amount of the
just compensation is paid, instead. Export Processing Zone Authority (now Philippine Economic
Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No. 188995. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking. There was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that
the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical
taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title,
physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking
includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
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common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or
destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his
property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in
any respect changes hands. In this case, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the
Heirs of Macabangkit without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without
procuring their consent or at least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPC’s
construction adversely affected the owners’ rights and interests because the subterranean
intervention prevented them from introducing any developments on the surface, and from
disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale or mortgage. This was considered by the
SC as compensable taking. NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. National
Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all
surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.

Administrative Law
Administrative offense; exoneration. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not
entitle a government employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against
him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration),
an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be
made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of lesser gravity
than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise
for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the same. The Civil Service Commission vs.
Richard G. Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.

Administrative proceedings; substantial evidence. Self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations

are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies where the quantum of evidence
required establishing a fact is substantial evidence. Often described as more than a mere
scintilla, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably
opine otherwise. In this case, there is no dispute regarding the fact that Esguerra had altogether
failed to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. Beyond his
bare assertion that CSMSI (employer) “never gave him referrals to continue his medications as
recommended by the foreign doctor” despite his call on 8 July 2003 “to inform them that he will
report the next day in order to submit his medical evaluation abroad,” Esguerra did not present
any evidence to prove justification for his inability to submit himself to a post-employment
medical examination by a company-designated physician. Thus, he was not awarded disability
benefits and sickness allowance. Coastal Safeway Marine Services vs. Esguerra, G.R. No.
185352, August 10, 2011.

Public officers; No work-no pay principle; Exception. The general rule is that public officials
are only entitled to compensation if they render service. This is otherwise known as the “no
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work-no pay” principle. However, back salaries may be awarded even for unworked days to
illegally dismissed or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that
“no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.” In order, however, to fall under this exception, two conditions must be
complied with: (a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges; and (b) his suspension
must be unjustified. In this case, the two conditions were present. The first condition was met
since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and
regulations) stemmed from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the act of
dishonesty (claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was
charged with. The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits
neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but only
reprimand. In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was dismissed
until his reinstatement to his former position – i.e., for the period of his preventive suspension
pending appeal. For the period of his preventive suspension pending investigation, the
respondent is not entitled to any back salaries. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G.
Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.

Public officers; kinds of preventive suspension. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of
civil service employees who are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i)
preventive suspension pending investigation and (ii) preventive suspension pending
appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal
should the employee be ultimately exonerated. The Civil Service Commission vs. Richard G.
Cruz, G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011.

Election Law
Election contest; preliminary conference. The questioned notice of preliminary conference
issued in the instant election protest was defective in that (1) the notice issued by the MCTC
clerk of court was a generic notice of hearing without any mention that it was for preliminary
conference, and (2) it was served on the party himself despite being represented by counsel in
contravention of Rule 9, Section 21 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. For this reason the Supreme Court
disagreed with the RTC’s finding that impliedly ascribed all fault to petitioner in failing to timely
file his preliminary conference brief. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres. Judge, 6th
MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.

Election contest; COMELEC’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found no merit in petitioner’s
argument that Rule 28, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure limits the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari in election cases to issues related to elections, returns
and qualifications of elective municipal and barangay officials. According to the Supreme Court,
said provision, taken together with the succeeding section, undeniably shows that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC whenever a judge hearing an election
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case has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral protest is
within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Ceriaco Bulilis vs. Victorino Nuez, Hon. Pres.
Judge, 6th MCTC, Ubay, Bohol, et al., G.R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011.

September 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
COA; Powers and function. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Audit is vested
with authority to determine whether government entities, including LGUs, comply with laws
and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or irregular
disbursements of these funds. Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA
is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such
review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations. The COA is endowed
with enough latitude to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. LGUs, though granted local
fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. Luciano Veloso, Abraham
Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
193677. September 6, 2011.
Local government units; grant of award to employees. In the exercise of its power to “determine
the positions and salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and
employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for the
proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and activities of the city government”, the City
Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040, which authorized the conferment of the EPSA
(Exemplary Public Service Award) to the former three-term councilors and, as part of the award,
the qualified city officials were to be given “retirement and gratuity pay remuneration.” The
Supreme Court, however, noted that the above power is not without limitations, such as the rule
against double compensation. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to
the total compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary,
additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and
transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month
pay and cash gift. Undoubtedly, the awardees’ reward is excessive and tantamount to double
and additional compensation. The remuneration is equivalent to everything that the awardees
received during the entire period that he served as such official. Indirectly, their salaries and
benefits are doubled, only that they receive half of them at the end of their last term. Luciano
Veloso, Abraham Cabochan, Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion and Marlon M. Lacson vs. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 193677. September 6, 2011.
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Constitutionality; Tariff and Customs Code. In this case, the issue was the validity of Customs
Administrative Order No. 7-92 and Section 3506 of the Tariff and Customs Code (on the
assignment of customs employees to overtime work). Section 3506 provides: “Customs
employees may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime work at rates fixed by the
Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be paid by the importers, shippers or
other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be
paid to employees of private enterprise.” The Supreme Court disagreed with the CA in excluding
airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators from the coverage of Section 3506 of the
TCCP. The term “other persons served” refers to all other persons served by the BOC employees.
Airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are among other persons served by the BOC
employees. The processing of embarking and disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as well
as their baggage and cargoes, forms part of the BOC functions. BOC employees who serve
beyond the regular office hours are entitled to overtime pay for the services they render. The SC
also noted that the BOC created a committee to re-evaluate the proposed increase in the rate of
overtime pay and for two years, several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned
to discuss the proposal. BAR and the Airline Operators Council participated in these meetings
and discussions. Hence, BAR cannot claim that it was denied due process in the imposition of
the increase of the overtime rate. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R. No.
193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.
Undue Delegation; Tariff and Customs Code. The SC did not agree with the Court of Appeals
that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient standard tests. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of
the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Contrary to the ruling of
the Court of Appeals, Section 3506 of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law is
complete in itself that it leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the
Collector to assign customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes
the rates; and it provides that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other
persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the Commissioner of
Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that prescribed by law to be paid
to employees of private enterprise. Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Borad of Airlines, et al., G.R.
No. 193247/G.R. No. 194276. September 14, 2011.
Sequestration and Freeze Orders; nature and purpose. Without making a definitive conclusion
as to the validity of the Sequestration and Freeze Orders being the main issue in Civil Case No.
0142 which is yet to be decided by the Sandiganbayan, the SC concluded that the pieces of
evidence enumerated by Tourist Duty Free Shops, Inc. (TDFSI) do not show that it has a right to
be protected and that the implementation of the Sequestration and Freeze Orders violates its
rights. The power of the PCGG to sequester property claimed to be “ill-gotten” means to place
or cause to be placed under its possession or control said property, or any building or office
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wherein any such property and any records pertaining thereto may be found, including
“business enterprises and entities” – for the purpose of preventing the destruction, concealment
or dissipation of, and otherwise conserving and preserving, the same – until it can be
determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth “ill-
gotten.” On the other hand, a freeze order prohibits the person having possession or control of
property alleged to constitute ill-gotten wealth from transferring, conveying, encumbering or
otherwise depleting or concealing such property, or from assisting or taking part in its transfer,
encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation. In other words, it commands the possessor to hold
the property and conserve it subject to the orders and disposition of the authority decreeing such
freezing. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division),
et al., G.R. No. 152500. September 14, 2011.
Administrative Law
Public officers; administrative vs. criminal liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that
public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful
act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the
same act. Administrative liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. First,
there is a difference in the quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure
observed and sanctions imposed. Second, there is the principle that a single act may offend
against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to
criminal as well as administrative liability. Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case for
violation of R.A. No. 3019 by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against
Cataquiz, as the general manager of Laguna Lake Development Authority. Office of the
President and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445,
September 14, 2011.
Public officers; effect of removal or resignation from office on administrative liability. Removal
or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. Despite his removal
from his position, Cataquiz can still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his
service as General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority and he can be made to
suffer the corresponding penalties. Office of the President and Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission vs. Calixto R. Cataquiz, G.R. No. 183445, September 14, 2011.

October 2011 Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Constitutionality of RA 10153. Republic Act 10153 reset the ARMM elections from August 8,
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three years thereafter, to coincide with the
country’s regular national and local elections. The law also granted the President the power to
appoint officers in charge for the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-
Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who will hold said offices

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until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed
office. In addressing the constitutionality of this law, the Court discussed the following issues:
Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections? Yes. While the Constitution
does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials,
done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the
least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national or
local – to once every three years. This intention finds full support in the discussions during the
Constitutional Commission deliberations. These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read
with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators
of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting the
second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections. Although called regional
elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it
is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
Does the passage of RA 10153 violate Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution? No. That
section provides that before a bill passed by either the House or the Senate can become law, it
must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. In this case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections. Following Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the President’s certification exempted
both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA 9054 violate
Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution and the corollary doctrine on
irrepealable laws? Yes. Even assuming that RA 9333 and RA 10153 did in fact amend RA 9054
(the Court ruled in this case that those two laws did not amend RA 9054), the supermajority
(2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 has to be struck
down for giving that law the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the
Constitution demands. RA 9054 is the Second Organic Act of the ARMM, which provided that
the first ARMM elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. RA 9333 is
one of several laws prior to RA 10153 that reset the date of the ARMM regional
elections. Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do business.” As long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct
business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact
laws or approve acts. In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA 9054 requires a vote of no less
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than 2/3 of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in
order to amend that law. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the
Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. While a supermajority is not a total
ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage
of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’
room for action and flexibility.
Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only to the creation of autonomous regions under
paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the Constitution? Yes. RA 9054 enlarged the plebiscite
requirement in the Constitution with respect to the ARMM. This enlargement violates Section
18, Article X of the Constitution. Section 18 states that a plebiscite is required only for the
creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic
areas will be included in the autonomous regions. This means that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation ofautonomous regions –
i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for
in the Organic Act – require ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic
Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s
judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction;
and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional
government under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. The date of the ARMM elections
does not fall under any of the matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to
provide for in the Organic Act. Therefore, any change in the date of elections cannot be
construed as a substantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with
the plebiscite requirement.
Does RA 10153 violate the autonomy granted to the ARMM? No. Petitioners argued that while
synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the
autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would
presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates –
synchronization and regional autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one over the
other. The Court found this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in
constitutional construction that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, and one
mandate should not be given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over
the other is clear. Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional
autonomy. They are interests that the Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that
Congress did in RA 10153, which provides the measure to transit to synchronized regional
elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be respected. Particularly,
regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way
alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as
necessitated by the attendant circumstances. Further, while autonomous regions are granted
political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence.
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The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger framework of the
State and is still subject to the national policies set by the national government, save only for
those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. The
autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national
one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to
exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less
than the Constitution.
Given the constitutional objective of synchronization, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion
or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA 10153 the concomitant problems that
the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it? No. The Court here identified the
following options open to Congress in order to resolve the problems: (1) allow the elective
officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3)
authorize the President to appoint officers in charge, pursuant to Section 3 of RA 10153, until
those elected in the synchronized elections assume office. The Court held that in choosing to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs, Congress chose the correct option and passed RA
10153 as a valid law.
Holdover option is unconstitutional. This option violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they
are covered and bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; Congress
cannot extend their term through a law allowing officials to serve in a holdover capacity. If it
will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term.
This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress
cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend
the term of the incumbents. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress
and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.
COMELEC has no authority to order special elections. Another option proposed by the
petitioner is for this Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections
pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881. The power to fix the date of
elections is essentially legislative in nature. Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for
regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local
elections. By so doing, Congress itself has madea policy decision in the exercise of its
legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
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synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections. After Congress has so acted,
neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections
instead at the call of the COMELEC. The Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. Further, the
constitutional power of COMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for and to set
the date of elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election. COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of special
elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.
The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials. Even assuming that it is
legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM
officials elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office. The Court is not
empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix
the term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case
of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such
power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes in the 1992 congressional elections, and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same
power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute. More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not the Court, has the authority to fix
the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM forless, or more, than the constitutionally
mandated three years, as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. In the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended
through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the
three years that the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than
two years – if a call for special elections shall prevail.
Does the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs violate the Constitution? No. The
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the
exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which pertinently states that the President shall appoint all other
officers of the government whose whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA 10153, it falls under
this group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thus, the assailed law rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive
and legislative officials be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This
requirement indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves
the appointment of OICs constitutionally defective. But the Court said this
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alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA
10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and representative
character of ARMM positions. RA 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the
organic law of the ARMM sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA 10153 in fact
only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice
Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in
the May 2013 elections.
Given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the unavailability of
constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials,
is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period as an interim
measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional
or unreasonable choice for Congress to make? Admittedly, the grant of the power to the
President under other situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not “democratic
and republican.” For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them may be said
to be systemicallywithdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the grant
that would frontally breach the “elective and representative” governance requirement of Section
18, Article X of the Constitution. But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA 10153 where the period is fixed and, more important, the
terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA 9054 – will
not systemically be touched nor affected at all. RA 9054 will govern unchanged and
continuously, with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim and
temporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.
Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election process
in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s choice of leaders, but this will
take place under a situation of necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim
measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local government units and the
adjustments of sub-provinces to the status of provinces. These measures, too, are used in light
of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the
regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no different from
the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of the essential
tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken in light of the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the “representative” character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily be
affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a function of the appointment
process; only the “elective” aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this
regard, RA 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising from the appointments by
providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of
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OIC, the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications. Datu Michael
Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto
Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi
Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs.
Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo vs. The Commission on Elections, et
al./Jacinto V. Paras vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 196271/G.R. No. 196305/G.R. No.
197221/G.R. No. 197280/G.R. No. 197282/G.R. No. 197392/G.R. No. 197454. October 18,
2011.
Ombudsman; power to grant immunity. In this case, petitioner argues that by excluding the
respondents in the information, the Ombudsman is engaged in “selective prosecution” which is
a clear case of grave abuse of discretion. He claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of
the respondents as state witnesses, they must be included first in the information filed with the
court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their discharge so that they can be used
as state witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court. The Supreme Court held petitioner’s claim to be erroneous. The Ombudsman has the
power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of information in court. RA No.
6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant
immunity, subject to “such terms and conditions” as he may determine. The only textual
limitation imposed by law on this authority is the need to take “into account the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court,” – i.e., Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The rule
under RA No. 6770 clarifies that in cases already filed with the courts, the prosecution merely
makes a proposal and initiates the process of granting immunity to an accused-witness in order
to use him as a witness against his co-accused. If there is any distinction at all between the
public prosecutor and the Ombudsman in this endeavor, it is in the specificity of and the higher
priority given by law to the Ombudsman’s purpose and objective. This accounts for the
Ombudsman’s unique power to grant immunity by itself and even prior to the filing of
information in court, a power that the public prosecutor himself generally does not enjoy. Thus,
there was no grave abuse of discretion in this case. Erdito Quarto vs. The Hon. Ombudsman
Simeon Marcelo, et al., G.R. No. 169042. October 5, 2011.
Police power; zoning. Congress expressly granted the city government, through the city council,
police power by virtue of Section 12(oo) of Republic Act No. 537, or the Revised Charter of
Quezon City. With regard to the power of local government units to issue zoning ordinances,
jurisprudence has recognized that the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Based on the
foregoing, the power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived
from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a
locality. In this case, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City
when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health
and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement
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of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe
and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents
of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on
a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA. Consequently, the enactment of the
ordinance in this case is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City and
any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust. Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito
Government of Quezon City and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro Manila
Development Authority vs. Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No.
177933. October 11, 2011.
Right to privacy; unreasonable search and seizure. This case involves a search of office
computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually
dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by
the government employer as evidence of misconduct. Petitioner questions the legality of the
search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent. He said this search violated his constitutional right to privacy. The
right to privacy is a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Relying on US jurisprudence, the Court noted that the existence of privacy right involves a two-
fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;
and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable
(objective). Once the right is established, the next inquiry is whether the search alleged to have
violated such right was reasonable. This proceeds from the principle that the constitutional
guarantee under Section 2, Article III, is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
unreasonable searches and seizures.
In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, the court needs to balance the invasion
of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for
supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. Apublic employer’s
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for non-
investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable. Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will
be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search
will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search
is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose. The search will be permissible in its
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.
Applying the above standards and principles, the Court then addressed the following
issues: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the respondent Civil Service Commission Chair, the
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copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception
and scope? Here, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include: (1) the
employee’s relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of
the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his
privacy in the item.
The Court answered the first issue in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed
office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to
other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means
to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that
being in the public assistance office of the CSC, he normally would have visitors in his
office. Even assuming that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his
computer as he claims, the same is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office
computers. The CSC had implemented a policy that puts its employees on notice that they have
no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office
computers. Under this policy, the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using
both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that computer resources were used only for legitimate business purposes.
On the second issue, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search of petitioner’s computer
files was conducted in connection with an investigation of work-related misconduct. Under the
facts obtaining, the Court held that the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified
at its inception and in scope. Briccio “Ricky” A. Pollo vs. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David,
et al., G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.
Administrative Law
Administrative agencies; due process. Procedural due process is the constitutional standard
demanding that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given before judgment is
rendered. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
would have no reason to complain; the essence of due process is in the opportunity to be
heard. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. In this case, while the petitioner
did not participate in the August 17, 2006 pre-hearing conference (despite receipt on August 14,
2006 of a fax copy of the August 11, 2006 order) conducted by the GSIS, GSIS President and
General Manager Winston Garcia’s decision of February 21, 2007 duly considered and
discussed the defenses raised in the pleadings filed by petitioner’s counsel. Furthermore, what
negates any due process infirmity is the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration
which cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing
the petitioner’s case. Again, Garcia duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration when he rendered the June 6, 2007 resolution. Thus, the petitioner
was actually heard through his pleadings. Monico K. Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service
Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
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Administrative agencies; findings of facts. In this case, petitioner was found to have committed
the acts complained of, i.e., he approved the requests for salary loans of eight GSIS Naga Field
Office employees who lacked the necessary contribution requirements under PPG No. 153-
99. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the findings of the GSIS, the CSC and the CA
that the petitioner’s acts constituted grave misconduct. While great respect is accorded to the
factual findings of administrative agencies, the Supreme Court did not characterize the offense
committed as grave. No substantial evidence was adduced to support the elements of
“corruption,” “clear intent to violate the law” or “flagrant disregard of established rule” that must
be present to characterize the misconduct as grave. Under the circumstances of this case, the
Supreme Court did not see the type of open defiance and disregard of GSIS rules that the CSC
observed. In fact, the CSC’s findings on the petitioner’s actions prior to the approval of the loans
negate the presence of any intent on the petitioner’s part to deliberately defy the policy of the
GSIS. First, GSIS branch managers have been granted in the past the authority to approve loan
applications beyond the prescribed requirements of GSIS; second, there was a customary lenient
practice in the approval of loans exercised by some branch managers notwithstanding the
existing GSIS policy; and third, the petitioner first sought the approval of his immediate
supervisor before acting on the loan applications. These circumstances run counter to the
characteristic flagrant disregard of the rules that grave misconduct requires. Thus, the his
liability under the given facts was found to constitute as simple misconduct only. Monico K.
Imperial, Jr. vs. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 191224. October 4, 2011.
Administrative proceedings; due process. Due process in administrative proceedings requires
compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which
includes the right to present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2)
the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the
views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents
would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. In the present case, the fifth
requirement was not complied with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered
against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty
of grave misconduct. The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the
petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary
Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the
said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due process. As it were,
petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were
not disclosed to Reyes. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and
intelligently answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto. Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Antonio T. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512. October 5, 2011.
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Government contract; lack of appropriation. Petitioner DPWH argues that the contracts with
respondents were void for not complying with Sections 85 and 86 of Presidential Decree 1445,
or the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order No.
292. These sections require an appropriation for the contracts and a certification by the chief
accountant of the agency or by the head of its accounting unit as to the availability of funds. In
this case, there was an appropriation amounting to Php400 million, which was increased
to Php700 million. The funding was for the rehabilitation of the areas devastated and affected by
the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, which included the Sacobia-Bamban-Parua River for which some
of the channeling, desilting and diking works were rendered by respondents’ construction
companies. It was, however, undisputed that there was no certification from the chief
accountant of DPWH regarding the availability of funds for the disputed expenditure. In spite of
the lack of certification, however, the Supreme Court held that jurisprudence has consistently
recognized the rule that payment for services done on account of the government, but based on
a void contract, cannot be avoided. The contract in this case was not illegal per se. Department
of Public Works and Highways vs. Ronald E. Quiwa, doing under the name “R.E.Q.
Construction,” et al.,G.R. No. 183444. October 12, 2011.
Government construction contracts; price escalation. The issue here is whether Presidential
Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price increase of construction materials
was due to the direct acts of the government before a price escalation is granted in a
construction contract. Petitioner argues that Section 8 of PD 1594 requires the following
conditions before an adjustment of the contract price may be made: (i) there was an increase or
a decrease in the cost of labor, equipment, materials and supplies for construction; and (ii) the
increase or decrease is due to the direct acts of the government. Petitioner stresses that
respondent failed to show the existence of these conditions. The Court disagreed. The
contractor does not need to prove that the increase in construction cost was due to the direct
acts of the government. PD 454, which was enacted prior to PD 1594, provides (in relation to
adjustment of contract price for public works projects) that “increase of prices of gasoline and
other fuel oils and of cement shall be considered direct acts of the Government.” Consequently,
when PD 1594 reproduced the phrase “direct acts of the government” without supplying a
contrary or different definition, the definition and coverage provided by the earlier enacted PD
454 were deemed adopted by the later decree. Thus, proof of increase in fuel or cement price
during the contract period is enough to justify a claim for price escalation based on such
increase. Philippine Economic zone Authority vs. Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation, etc., G.R. No. 188866. October 19, 2011.
MMDA; power to demolish. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28,
Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco’s property. It further alleges that
it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904, as
amended. However, the Supreme Court held that the power to enforce the provisions of
the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways, not in
MMDA. Since there was no evidence that the MMDA had been delegated by the DPWH to
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implement the Building Code, it necessarily had no authority to carry out the
demolition.Additionally, the penalty prescribed by Ordinance No. 2904 itself does not include
the demolition of illegally constructed buildings in case of violations. Instead, it merely
prescribes a punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the
court. The ordinance itself clearly states that it is the regular courts that will determine whether
there was a violation of the ordinance. Emilio Gancayco vs. Cito Government of Quezon City
and Metro Manila Development Authority/Metro Manila Development Authority vs. Justice
Emilio A. Gancayco (Retired), G.R. No. 177807/G.R. No. 177933. October 11, 2011.
Election Law
Election protest; failure to file preliminary conference brief. In exercising its powers and
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC “must
not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes.” Here, notwithstanding
the fact that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not verified, the COMELEC should have
considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioner’s meritorious claim that he was not
given timely notice of the date set for the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is
to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of
one’s claim or defense. It is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due
process of law. Procedural due process demands prior notice and hearing. The fact that
petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or information of the date set for the preliminary
conference by means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to
dismiss his protest, because it cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and
time to adequately prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner
was only able to file his Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself. Hence,
by denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, without taking into consideration the
violation of his right to procedural due process, the COMELEC also guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. Salvador D. Violago, Sr. vs. Commission on Elections and Joan V. Alarilla, G.R. No.
194143. October 4, 2011.
Public Officers
Public officers; dishonesty. Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting
honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry. In other words, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although
this is something internal, one can ascertain a person’s intention not from his own protestation
of good faith, which is self-serving, but from evidence of his conduct and outward acts. In this
case, the facts and circumstances surrounding petitioner’s acquisition of the Certificate of
Eligibility cast serious doubts on his good faith. He made a deal with a retired CSC official and
accepted the Certificate of Eligibility from the latter’s representative. These circumstances reveal
petitioner’s knowledge that the CSC official could have pulled strings in order to obtain his
Certificate of Eligibility and have it delivered to his residence. Besides, whether some CSC
personnel should be held administratively liable for falsifying petitioner’s Certificate of Eligibility
is beside the point. The fact that someone else falsified the certificate will not excuse him for
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knowingly using the same for his career advancement. Thus, the Supreme Court held that that
the CA did not err in affirming the penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties imposed
by the CSC. Cesar S. Dumduma vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182606. October 4,
2011.

November 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Agrarian reform; control over agricultural lands. Upon review of the facts and circumstances,
the Court concluded that the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) will never have control over the
agricultural lands as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. Since control over agricultural
lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, the Court reconsidered its earlier ruling that
the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as
these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present proportion of shareholdings in
HLI. A revisit of HLI’s Proposal for Stock Distribution under CARP and the Stock Distribution
Option Agreement upon which the proposal was based reveals that the total assets of HLI is
PhP590,554,220, while the value of the 4,915.7466 hectares is PhP196,630,000. Consequently,
the share of the farmer-beneficiaries in the HLI capital stock is 33.296% (196,630,000 divided
by 590,554.220); 118,391,976.85 HLI shares represent 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of
the 118,391,976.85 HLI shares unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is
unlikely, control will never be placed in the hands of the farmer-beneficiaries. Control, of
course, means the majority of 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other
voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will
constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 divided by 2 plus one HLI
share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short
of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control of HLI. Hence, control can
never be attained by the FWBs. There is even no assurance that 100% of the 118,391,976.85
shares issued to the FWBs will all be voted in favor of staying in HLI, taking into account the
previous referendum among the farmers where said shares were not voted unanimously in favor
of retaining the SDP. In light of the foregoing consideration, the option to remain in HLI granted
to the individual FWBs will have to be recalled and revoked. Moreover, bearing in mind that
with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under SDP and
will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of
HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of
RA 6657. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al., G.R.
No. 171101. November 22, 2011.

Command responsibility. One of the issues raised in this case was whether or not the President,
as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial
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killings and enforced disappearances. The Supreme Court held that the President may be held
responsible or accountable. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command
responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superior-subordinate
relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had
been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The President, being the
commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. On the
issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, the same may nonetheless be established
through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and
superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. Knowledge of the commission of
irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when: (a) the acts are widespread within the
government official’s area of jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly
committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved. As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note
that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the President has the power to effectively
command, control and discipline the military. The Supreme Court held, however, that aside
from Rodriguez’s general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish former
President Arroyo’s responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a
clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty
or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. In the Matter of the
Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H.
Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160. November
15, 2011.

Expropriation; denial of due process. In this case, the petitioner argues that it was deprived of its
right to due process when it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence. The petitioner
claims that the committee tasked by the court to receive evidence on just compensation did not
conduct any hearing to enable the parties to present their respective evidence. Instead, the
committee based the Report on documents submitted by the parties, verifications from offices,
ocular inspections and local market conditions, and unsubstantiated statements as to the highest
and best use of the properties, and the devaluation of the peso. The Supreme Court held that
there was no such deprivation of due process. The pleadings it submitted and the testimonial
evidence presented during the several hearings conducted all prove that the petitioner was given
its day in court. The Court noted that the RTC acceded to the petitioner’s request, over the
respondents’ objection, for the reconvening of the Committee for reception of evidence and
further proceedings. It also heard and allowed both sides to present evidence during the

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clarificatory hearings and rendered a decision based on the evidence presented. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Sps. Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448. November 16, 2011.
Expropriation; valuation of expropriated property. One of the issues in this case was whether or
not the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just
compensation of the subject properties. The Supreme Court held that even in expropriation
cases, “questions of facts are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for
review may only raise questions of law. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.” Thus, the Court
affirmed the ruling of the RTC and the CA that the Report is founded on evidence. The
petitioner’s tax declarations, the BIR zonal valuation and the deeds of sale it presented are not
the only proof of the fair value of properties. Zonal valuation is just one of the indices of the fair
market value of real estate. By itself, this index cannot be the sole basis of “just compensation”
in expropriation cases. Various factors come into play in the valuation of specific properties
singled out for expropriation. Tax values can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes
for just compensation. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sps. Tan Song Bok, G.R. No. 191448.
November 16, 2011.
Operative fact doctrine. The operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently
declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared
as invalid. The Court rejected the view that the applicability of the operative fact doctrine
should be limited to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that
are accorded the same status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in
nature. While orders, rules and regulations issued by the President or the executive branch have
fixed definitions and meaning in the Administrative Code and jurisprudence, the phrase
“executive act” does not have such specific definition under existing laws. The term “executive
act” is broad enough to encompass decisions of administrative bodies and agencies under the
executive department which are subsequently revoked by the agency in question or nullified by
the Court. Even assuming that the operative fact doctrine applies only to executive issuances
like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless be applied, by analogy, to
decisions made by the President or the agencies under the executive department. This doctrine,
in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a broad sense to encompass
said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can
apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not
only on a law or executive act which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or
orders of the executive branch which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such
acts and consequences must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and
fairness. Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be
complied with because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the
President under the Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said
decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said

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decision, which must be respected. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.

Presidential immunity from suit; non-sitting president. The Court of Appeals found respondents
in G.R. No. 191805 – with the exception of Calog, Palacpac or Harry – to be accountable for
the violations of Rodriguez’s right to life, liberty and security committed by the 17th Infantry
Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. It, however, dismissed the petition with
respect to former President Arroyo on account of her presidential immunity from suit. Regarding
this issue, the Supreme Court held that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure. Thus, the rationale for the CA’s dropping of
the case against former President Arroyo no longer exists in the present case. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions.
The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser. The intent
of the framers of the Constitution is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Applying the foregoing rationale to this case,
it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield
herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez. In
the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H.
Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R.
No. 193160. November 15, 2011.

Taking and just compensation in agrarian reform. The Court maintains its earlier ruling in this
case that the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time
that the farm worker beneficiaries (FWBs) were considered to have owned and possessed the
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. These lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP. Such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. The
minority contends that it is the date of the notice of coverage, that is, January 2, 2006, which is
determinative of the just compensation HLI is entitled to for its expropriated lands. To support its
contention, it cited numerous cases where the time of the taking was reckoned on the date of
the issuance of the notice of coverage. However, a perusal of the cases cited by the minority
would reveal that none of them involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not
squarely apply to this case. Moreover, it should be noted that it is precisely because the stock
distribution option is a distinctive mechanism under RA 6657 that it cannot be treated similarly
with that of compulsory land acquisition as these are two different modalities under the agrarian
reform program. In this regard, it should be noted that when HLI submitted the SDP to DAR for
approval, it cannot be gainsaid that the stock distribution scheme is clearly HLI’s preferred
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modality in order to comply with CARP. And when the SDP was approved, stocks were given to
the FWBs in lieu of land distribution. As aptly observed by the minority itself, “[i]nstead of
expropriating lands, what the government took and distributed to the FWBs were shares of stock
of petitioner HLI in proportion to the value of the agricultural lands that should have been
expropriated and turned over to the FWBs.” It cannot, therefore, be denied that upon the
approval of the SDP submitted by HLI, the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita became subject
of CARP coverage. Evidently, the approval of the SDP took the place of a notice of coverage
issued under compulsory acquisition. Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council, et al., G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011.

Election Law
Barangay elections; three-consecutive term limit rule. Mendoza was a candidate
for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro, in the 29 October
2007 Barangay Elections. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Balatasan for three consecutive terms, on 9 May 1994, 12 May 1997 and 15 July
2002. On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to
Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run
again for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served in the
same position for three consecutive terms immediately prior to the
2007Barangay Elections. When the case was brought to the Supreme Court, one of the issues
Mendoza raised was the constitutionality of the retroactive application to the
1994 Barangay Elections of the three-consecutive term limit rule. The Supreme Court held that
the issue has already been settled in the case of COMELEC v. Cruz. The Court reiterated that no
retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early
as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was
continued under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the current
law. Constancio F. Mendoza vs. Senen C. Familara & Commission Elections, G.R. No. 191017.
November 15, 2011.

January 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy disposition of cases. The right to a
speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the
broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by
state agencies. In this case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of
cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. An examination of the petitioners’
arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the absence of any allegation that
petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings. Petitioners are
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deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any,
prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the alleged breach of the right in question was
not raised below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception,
an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto
E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-
58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.

Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be resolved without going into the
constitutionality of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners predicate their
claim over the sequestered shares and necessarily their cause on laws and martial law issuances
assailed by the respondent on constitutional grounds. This case is for the recovery of shares
grounded on the invalidity of certain enactments, which in turn is rooted in the shares being
public in character, purchased as they were by funds raised by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing
and police powers of the state. As may be recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-declaring
provision, authorized the distribution of UCPB shares of stock free to coconut farmers. On the
other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 authorized the PCA to utilize portions of the CCSF to pay
the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCSF
levies with UCPB interest free. The CCSF, CIDF and like levies that Philippine Coconut
Authority is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be
transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.
In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and
1468, could have been the only plausible means by which close to a purported million and a
half coconut farmers could have acquired the said shares of stock. It has, therefore, become
necessary to determine the validity of the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and
acquisitions possible.
It is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of
the constitutional proscription against the use of special funds save for the purpose it was
established. Otherwise, petitioners’ claim of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and
indirectly over SMC shares held by UCPB’s subsidiaries will have no leg to stand on, P.D. No.
755 being the only law authorizing the distribution of the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to
coconut farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually stating and holding that the
coco levy fund shall not be considered as a special – not even general – fund, but shall be
owned by the farmers in their private capacities.
A. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose.
Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private
individuals.
Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes
or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the
public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion
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of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In
this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos.
232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
To hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut
levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private
capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or
levies.
The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect – if not exactly direct – conversion
of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks,
which in turn would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these private
individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of
stocks purchased with special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The fact
that the coconut levy funds were collected from persons or entities in the coconut industry,
among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds – or
more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. The said private individuals cannot own
the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the government.
B. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof
should revert to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a private
fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961
and 1468 are unconstitutional.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation,
enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it
was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer
forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government,
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF “to advance the government’s avowed
policy of protecting the coconut industry.” The CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to
support consumer purchases of coconut products. The protection of the entire coconut industry
and the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund. P.D.
No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein not especially for the coconut farmers but
for the entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless redound
to the benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D.
Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: “[the coconut levy]
fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers
and shall be owned by them in their private capacities;” or the coconut levy fund shall not be
construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the
general fund of the national government later on; or the UCPB shares acquired using the
coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free, violated the special public
purpose for which the CCSF was established.
Not only were the challenged presidential issuances unconstitutional for decreeing the
distribution of the shares of stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore, negating the
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public purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect
the coconut industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut levy fund as private
fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private
capacities, contrary to the original purpose for which the fund was created. To compound the
situation, the offending provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the
cavil of public funds which normally can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made
by law. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact
mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961
and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this
context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy
fund – a special fund of the government – to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
C. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it
provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify
the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes
PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the
CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the
acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as
coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a
coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be
given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a
farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot
be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the
disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the
advancement of the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to “accelerate the
growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so
that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and
development.” The said law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and
converted them exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would
reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals to
whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode
from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline, standard,
condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that
would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the
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coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a
veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may
determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private
capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the law’s national policy or
public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
D. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate
Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut levy funds from the coffer of the
public funds. It privatized revenues derived from the coco levy. The same provision is carried
over in Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468. These provisions violate Article IX (D), Section
2(1) of the Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the Commission on Audit shall have
the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust
by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As
an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law.
Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, “[n]o law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any
investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.” Following the
mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it
has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the COA
has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the
coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said funds.
However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to
private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and
consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent
provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function
and undermine its constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut levy funds is an example of
an investment of public funds. The conversion of these special public funds into private funds by
allowing private individuals to own them in their private capacities is something else. It
effectively deprives the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle such
accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using special public funds into pure and
exclusive private ownership has taken, or will completely take away the said funds from the
boundaries with which the COA has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit
jurisdiction over the receipt or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III, Section
5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being unconstitutional. Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto
E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-
58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
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Decisions; statement of fact and law. Complainant alleges that respondent members of the CA’s
Sixth Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically
stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for review was based. He insists
that the decision promulgated by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal foundation and did not
even address the five issues presented in the petition for review. Section 14 provides that “[n]o
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without starting the legal basis
therefor.” The Court held that the complaint was unfounded. The essential purpose of the
constitutional provision is to require that a judicial decision be clear on why a party has
prevailed under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a
point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary. Re:
Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon.
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al., A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012.

Due process; right to be heard. Petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated
by the mere issuance of partial summary judgments before they can adduce their evidence. As it
were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction
with its “Class Action Omnibus Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around
400 documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said
documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which
were distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. COCOFED et al. even filed their
own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there
are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of
filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section
26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.” Viewed in this light, the Court rejected petitioners’
allegations about being deprived the right to adduce evidence. Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al.,
intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No.
178193, January 24, 2012.

Eminent domain; just compensation. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined

as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the
meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional
limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
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ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between
one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. In this case, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the commissioners
properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties
were expropriated by petitioner. The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the
procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that
was tasked to determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of
committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation.
They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of
improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of
the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested
members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The
members of the new committee even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas.
They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated
properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as
distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members also
considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato
on 15 June 1999, and which provides the value of the properties and the improvements for
taxation purposes. The committee members based their recommendations on reliable data and
considered various factors that affected the value of the land and the improvements.
The Court also upheld the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated
soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the
excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties. In the context of expropriation
proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just
compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner
actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. Republic
of the Philippines, rep. by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) vs.Rural Bank of Kabacan,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012.

Ombudsman; due process. Petitioners were not denied due process of law when the
investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on
record. Section 5(b)(1), Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as
amended by A.O. No. 17, provides that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the
parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified position papers
on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer may consider the
case submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that, based on the
evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section
5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be conducted. But the
determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound discretion of the
hearing officer. As the petitioners have failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing
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officer’s determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this
Court. The Court likewise find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the new procedures under
A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case was already undergoing trial before the hearing
officer, should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a
vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the
statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are not subject
to its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that
application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them. Here, the Office of the
Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to
submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense.
Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot
rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. Due process, as a constitutional
precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when
a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity
for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings
that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the
opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due
process. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation,
Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos.
180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.

Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given
full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving,
processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold
hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents under
preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. The provisions of R.A. No. 6770
taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut
of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints,
conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon
witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public
officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable
on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose
the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose
administrative sanctions. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal
and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R.
Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
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Public funds/assets. The coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any
property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public
funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. In
this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by UCPB using coconut levy funds. On the other
hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. These
companies were acquired using or whose capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds.
However, as in the case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF Oil
Mills to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portions distributed to
the supposed coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78.
And as the administrator of the CIIF holding companies, UCPB authorized the acquisition of the
SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or organized solely for the purpose of
holding the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding companies used
borrowed funds from UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656
Billion. Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using
coconut levy funds – funds that have been established to be public in character – it goes without
saying that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and treated as
government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by the
Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws. Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E.
Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58
& G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.

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Election Law
Supreme Court; review of decision of a COMELEC division. Although Section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and
does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise
stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final
resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of
the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait
for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc
along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
One exception to the above rule is that the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the
ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the
COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members
of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved
party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in
which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. Douglas R. Cagas
vs. the Commission on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012.

Public Officers
Public employee; grave misconduct. Grave misconduct consists in a government official’s
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules
are present. In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s
unlawful and wrongful use of his station or reputation to procure some benefit for himself or for
another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Rigging by a public official of bidding
in the organization where he belongs is a form of corruption. As a public officer, private
respondent had the duty to protect the process of public bidding in his organization. A ruling
that would absolve private respondent of any liability for rigging the bids in the government
office where he works on the pretext that he was not a member of the bids and awards
committee would encourage public officers who are not members of bids committees to make
an industry of rigging bids, using their offices and official reputations. National Power
Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission & Rodrigo A. Tanfelix, G.R. No. 152093. January 24,
2012.

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Public officers; reassignment; detail versus reassignment. The issue here is whether or not
respondent’s reassignment constitutes constructive dismissal entitling her to reinstatement and
back wages. The Court ruled in the affirmative. While a temporary transfer or assignment of
personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the
transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his
permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the
tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service. Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee
quits his work because of the agency head’s unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning
actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have
been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary
of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job.
Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of
tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed
without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount
to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court distinguished between a detail and reassignment. A detail, as defined and governed
by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), is the movement
of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall
be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical
and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he
may appeal his case to the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the
employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. On the other hand, a
reassignment, as defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5,
Section 26 (7), means that an employee is reassigned from one organizational unit to another in
the same agency, provided that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status
or salaries. The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place where
the employee is to be moved and in its effectiveness pending appeal with the CSC. A detail
requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement
within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is
immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
Having ruled that respondent was constructively dismissed, the next question is whether she is
entitled to reinstatement and back wages. The Court held that she is entitled to reinstatement but
not to full back wages and benefits. An illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to
back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from
his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Civil
Service Commission vs. Minerva M.P. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012.

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Public officers; reorganization; termination of employment. The issue here is whether the NEA
Board had the power to terminate all of NEA’s employees in connection with a reorganization of
the agency. Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation
of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of
PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out. Petitioners argue that the power
granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the power to terminate
employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower complement. The Court disagreed and affirmed
the termination of the employees. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
It could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However,
for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be
valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination
of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board’s powers and may not successfully be
impugned absent proof of bad faith. United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. vs.
National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012.

Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No officer or employee in the Civil
Service can be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits
of exceptions, as it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those
employees whose appointments are temporary and coterminous in nature. Here, petitioner’s
appointment was temporary as he did not have the required career executive service eligibility.
An appointee without such eligibility cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. A
temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment’s notice. As to those
with eligibilities, their right to security of tenure pertain to their rank but not to the position to
which they were appointed. Petitioner never alleged that, at any time during which he held the
position in question, he had acquired the requisite eligibility. Petitioner’s temporary
appointment was also coterminous, or one that is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority or at the latter’s pleasure. As such, his replacement was not a removal but rather an
expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same.
The acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of
tenure against removal without cause. One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed
tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority,
there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.Samuel B. Ong vs. Office of the
President, et al., G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.

February 2012 Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law

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Autonomous Region; plebiscite requirement. Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides
that “the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” The Supreme Court
interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically
mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act– require
ratification through a plebiscite. While it agrees with the petitioners’ underlying premise that
sovereignty ultimately resides with the people, it disagrees that this legal reality necessitates
compliance with the plebiscite requirement for all amendments to RA No. 9054. For if we were
to go by the petitioners’ interpretation of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution that all
amendments to the Organic Act have to undergo the plebiscite requirement before becoming
effective, this would lead to impractical and illogical results – hampering the ARMM’s progress
by impeding Congress from enacting laws that timely address problems as they arise in the
region, as well as weighing down the ARMM government with the costs that unavoidably follow
the holding of a plebiscite. Also, Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 10153 cannot be seen as changing the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision clearly preserves
the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices of the
ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to
“perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.” Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs.
Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C.
Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok”
Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.

Citizenship; proceeding for declaration of Philippine citizenship. There is no specific statutory or

procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely
allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the
respondent. The Republic of the Philippines v. Nora Fe Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15,
2012.

COMELEC; authority to hold special elections. The Constitution merely empowers the
COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to
another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the
law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of Sections 5 and 6, which address
instances when elections have already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to
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be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such as violence, fraud,

terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed
by law, in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of national and local
elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section
5 or Section 6 of BP 881. More important, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date. Datu Michael
Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes,
etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al.
vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.

Commission on Audit; authority to determine if price is excessive; power to conduct post-

audit. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of funds by
an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose, the Constitution
has provided that the COA “shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including
those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.” Candelario Verzosa
Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.

Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 07-012; relevance of brand of an equipment as basis

for what is reasonable. The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit
the use of funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose,
the Constitution has provided that the COA “shall have exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and
properties.” As such, CDA’s decisions regarding procurement of equipment for its own use,
including computers and its accessories, is subject to the COA’s auditing rules and regulations
for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant
expenditures. Necessarily, CDA’s preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform
to the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items
purchased. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838,
February 7, 2012.

Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012 (guidelines on evidence to support audit

findings of over-pricing). 3.1 When the price/prices of a transaction under audit is found beyond
the allowable ten percent (10%) above the prices indicated in reference price lists referred to in
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pa[r].2.1 as market price indicators, the auditor shall secure additional evidence to firm-up the
initial audit finding to a reliable degree of certainty. 3.2 To firm-up the findings to a reliable
degree of certainty, initial findings of over-pricing based on market price indicators mentioned
in pa[r]. 2.1 above have to be supported with canvass sheets and/or price quotations indicating:
a) the identities/names of the suppliers or sellers; b) the availability of stock sufficient in quantity
to meet the requirements of the procuring agency; c) the specifications of the items which
should match those involved in the finding of over-pricing; and d) the purchase/contract terms
and conditions which should be the same as those of the questioned transaction. Candelario
Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.

Commission on Audit; Memorandum No. 97-012; no retroactive effect. In Arriola v. COA, this
Court ruled that the disallowance made by the COA was not sufficiently supported by evidence,
as it was based on undocumented claims. The documents that were used as basis of the COA
Decision were not shown to petitioners therein despite their repeated demands to see them; they
were denied access to the actual canvass sheets or price quotations from accredited
suppliers. Absent due process and evidence to support COA’s disallowance, COA’s ruling on
petitioners’ liability has no basis. We categorically ruled in Nava v. Palattao that
neither Arriola nor the COA Memorandum No. 97-012 can be given any retroactive
effect. Thus, although Arriolawas already promulgated at the time, it is not correct to say that
the COA in this case violated the afore-quoted guidelines which have not yet been issued at the
time the audit was conducted in 1993. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA,
et. al, G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.

Commission on Audit; pre-audit. On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195,
lifting the system of pre-audit of government financial transactions, albeit with certain
exceptions. With the normalization of the political system and the stabilization of government
operations, the COA saw it fit to issue Circular No. 89-299, which again lifted the pre-audit of
government transactions of national government agencies (NGAs) and government-owned or -
controlled corporations (GOCCs). Petitioner claims that the constitutional duty of COA includes
the duty to conduct pre-audit. The Supreme Court found that there is nothing in section 2 of
Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-
audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is
mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when
the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may
adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence,
the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that the Supreme Court may compel the COA
to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the
COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application.
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Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by the Court. Gualberto J. Dela Llana
v. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National
Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012.

Constitutionality; locus standi. Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7 ordering (1) a
moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary
adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite
period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives
of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. The petitioner claims
that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Locus standi or legal
standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.” This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court
settle only actual cases or controversies. The Supreme Court was not convinced that the
petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of
the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this
case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be
characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to
assail EO 7. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioner’s claim that he is
instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in
ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This
supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon.
Zamora, “as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole
citizenry.” Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in that case. Jelbert B. Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et
al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012.

DAR Administrative Order No. 01; 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and
Acquisition of Agricultural Lands under RA No. 6657; procedure;
commencement. Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) – After
determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and upon accomplishment of
the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NO (CARP Form No. 5-1).
Corolarilly, Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, which outlines the steps in the
acquisition of lands, details that in the 3rd step, the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal
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Office (DARMO) should conduct a “preliminary ocular inspection to determine initially whether
or not the property maybe covered under the CARP,” which findings will be contained in CARP
Form No. 3.a, or the Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report. Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs.
Ruben Alcaide (deceased), substituted by Gloria Alcaide representative of the Farmer-
Beneficiaries, G.R. No. 167952, February 1, 2012.

Declaratory relief. Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed
of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance of an EO is not
judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse to assail the validity of EO 7. Jelbert B.
Galicto vs. H.E. President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012.

Double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy cannot be properly invoked in a Rule 65
petition, predicated on two (2) exceptional grounds, namely: in a judgment of acquittal rendered
with grave abuse of discretion by the court; and where the prosecution had been deprived of
due process. The rule against double jeopardy does not apply in these instances because a Rule
65 petition does not involve a review of facts and law on the merits in the manner done in an
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not examine and assess the evidence of
the parties nor weigh the probative value of the evidence. It does not include an inquiry on the
correctness of the evaluation of the evidence. A review under Rule 65 only asks the question of
whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not the question of whether the decision is
legally correct. In other words, the focus of the review is to determine whether the judgment
is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-
de Castro, et al, G.R. No. 171513, February 6, 2012.

Double jeopardy; exceptions. The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal
justice system. It dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is
terminated – either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused – the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense. This
principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the civil
law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every
system of jurisprudence. It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the
United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, viz:
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under
Rule 45 of the same Rules. The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a)
there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the
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defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendant’s express
consent. A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such
acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State
from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a
multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding
the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of
securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the
defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. An acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. This prohibition,
however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s acquittal of the accused or
the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where
the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a
deprivation of due process; (2) where there is a finding of mistrial; or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion. Artemio Villareal vs. People of the Philippines/People of the
Philippines vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al./Fidelito Dizon vs. People of the
Philippines/Gerarda H. Villa vs. Manuel Lorenzo Escalona II, et al. G.R. No. 151258/G.R. No.
154954/G.R. No. 155101/G.R. Nos. 178057 & G.R. No. 178080, February 1, 2012.

Due process; deprivation of the State’s right to due process. The State, like any other litigant, is
entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents
the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner
consistent with public interest. The State’s right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on
whether the public prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty. The prosecutor’s role in the administration of justice is to lay
before the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist,
without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and
without regard to any personal conviction or presumption on what the judge may or is disposed
to do. The prosecutor owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court
the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying
contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the court’s mind
may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not
escape unpunished. In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample
discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the prosecution evidence, part
of which is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call as witness. In this case,
the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. There was
no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed to present available
evidence or that other evidence could be secured. People of the Philippines, v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), et al., G.R. No. 153304-05, February 7, 2012.
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Elections; synchronization of ARMM elections with local elections. The Court was unanimous in
holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and local elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and
local elections, the intention can be inferred from Sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution. The framers of the Constitution could not have
expressed their objective more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective
officials – from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were
even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet
this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM
elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. It is to be considered that the ARMM, as we now
know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and
ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for
the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains
unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of
what actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding
events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed
and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic
process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not static. Article X of
the Constitution, entitled “Local Government,” clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to
classify autonomous regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. The inclusion of
autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the heading
“Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
regions as one of the forms of local governments. That the Constitution mentions only the
“national government” and the “local governments,” and does not make a distinction between
the “local government” and the “regional government,” is particularly revealing, betraying as it
does the intention of the framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as
separate forms of government, but as political units which, while having more powers and
attributes than other local government units, still remain under the category of local
governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local governments, it follows that
elections held in autonomous regions are also considered as local elections. Datu Michael Abas
Kida, et. al v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.

Eminent domain; just compensation. When the State exercises its inherent power of eminent
domain, the Constitution imposes the corresponding obligation to compensate the landowner
for the expropriated property. When the State exercises the power of eminent domain in the
implementation of its agrarian reform program, the constitutional provision which governs is
Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution. Notably, this provision also imposes upon the State the
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obligation of paying the landowner compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
government’s agrarian reform purposes. That the compensation mentioned here pertains to the
fair and full price of the taken property is evident from the exchange between the members of
the Constitutional Commission during the discussion on the government’s agrarian reform
program. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, G.R. No. 169903,
February 29, 2012.

Equal protection clause. The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not
violated if there is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be
shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the same
class. Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. It was not seen how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came
from. Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v. Hypermix
Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.

Executive agreement; requisites. An executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the
former (a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a
narrower range of subject matters. Despite these differences, to be considered an executive
agreement, the following three requisites provided under the Vienna Convention must
nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it
must governed by international law. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon.
Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.

Executive Power; power to classify or reclassify lands. The power to classify or reclassify lands is
essentially an executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances, may,
subject to certain conditions, very well effect reclassification of land use within their respective
territorial jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees issued by the executive department, through its
appropriate agencies, carry the same force and effect as any statute. As it were, PD 27 and
Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2), Article
XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs.
Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta /
Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J.
Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Irrepealable law. The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054 is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable
laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend and repeal these
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laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or repeal laws,
the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of
Congress. Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve bills by a
mere majority vote, provided there is quorum. In requiring all laws which amend RA No. 9054
to comply with a higher voting requirement than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress,
which enacted RA No. 9054, clearly violated the very principle which the Supreme Court
sought to establish in Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and
cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the
Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections,
etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok”
Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.

President; judicial courtesy. Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of
courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary
injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its
proceedings for practical and ethical considerations. In other words, the principle of “judicial
courtesy” applies where there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court
would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court or court of origin. Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President,
who represents a co-equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard
the principle of separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is founded
upon. Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-7 does not,
and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less effective or binding. Regardless of how
close the voting is, so long as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en
banc who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, a decision garnering only 8 votes
out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as
such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the voting,
“the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration may be granted.” Datu Michael Abas
Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc.,
et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs.
The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012.

President; power to appoint officer in charge. The power to appoint has traditionally been
recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad
strokes the extent of this power. The main distinction between the provision in the 1987
Constitution and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in
the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make are enumerated in a
single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
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empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is
significant; in providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to
make a distinction between the first group of presidential appointments and the second group of
presidential appointments. he first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
Armed Forces, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution, pertains to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The second group of officials the President can appoint are “all other officers
of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
he may be authorized by law to appoint.” The second sentence acts as the “catch-all provision”
for the President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature. The wide latitude given to the President to appoint is further
demonstrated by the recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose
appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words, where there are offices which
have to be filled, but the law does not provide the process for filling them, the Constitution
recognizes the power of the President to fill the office by appointment. There is no
incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and
autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA
No. 10153, to appoint OICs. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et
al./Basari D. Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., etc., et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et
al./Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No.
196271, February 28, 2012.

State immunity; doctrine of state immunity. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to
private acts or acts jure gestionis. Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is
crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity
performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. A thorough examination of the
basic facts of the case would show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. Piecing
together the content and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding
dated 14 September 2002, Amb. Wang’s letter dated 1 October 2003, and the Loan Agreement
would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the Luzon Railways in pursuit of a purely
commercial activity performed in the ordinary course of its business. Even
assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. It is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity
from suit, even if it contends that it performs governmental functions. Its designation as the
Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it immunity, just as the term “implementing
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agency” has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether GTZ was immune from
suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s
ruling in Deutsche Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be
presumed to be a government-owned and -controlled corporation without an original charter.
As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section 36 of the Corporation
Code. China National machinery & Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No.
185572, February 7, 2012.

State immunity; waiver by submission to arbitration. In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state immunity. In the said law,
the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an implicit
waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is reason
to apply the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case. Under the provisions of The
Conditions of Contract which is an integral part of the Contract Agreement,, if any dispute arises
between Northrail and CNMEG, both parties are bound to submit the matter to the HKIAC for
arbitration. In case the HKIAC makes an arbitral award in favor of Northrail, its enforcement in
the Philippines would be subject to the Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution (Special
Rules). Rule 13 thereof provides for the Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral
Award. Under Rules 13.2 and 13.3 of the Special Rules, the party to arbitration wishing to have
an arbitral award recognized and enforced in the Philippines must petition the proper regional
trial court (a) where the assets to be attached or levied upon is located; (b) where the acts to be
enjoined are being performed; (c) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of
the parties; (d) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (e)
in the National Capital Judicial Region. From all the foregoing, it is clear that CNMEG has
agreed that it will not be afforded immunity from suit. Thus, the courts have the competence
and jurisdiction to ascertain the validity of the Contract Agreement. China National machinery &
Equipment Corp. v. Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et. al, G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012.

Supreme Court; respect to factual findings of administrative agencies. It is the general policy of
the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also
for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of quasi-judicial
agencies, such as the COA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined
to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence, and the decision and order are not tainted with
unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. Candelario Verzosa Jr.
v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al,G.R. No. 157838, February 7, 2012.

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Taxpayer’s suit; standing. A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged
contravention of the law or the Constitution. Gualberto J. Dela Llana v. The Chairperson,
Commission on Audit, the Executive Secretary and the National Treasurer, G.R. No. 180989,
February 7, 2012.

Administrative Law
Administrative Rule; due process; publication, when required. The Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified
according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge. The regulation provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was
3%, for feed grade, 7%.CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or
Valuation and Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Considering that the regulation
would affect the substantive rights of respondent, it therefore follows that petitioners should
have applied Sections 3 and 9 of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code. When
an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for
the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least
to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law. Because petitioners failed to follow the
requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be
struck down.Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of Subic v.
Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012.

Void government contract; payment for services. Parties who do not come to court with clean
hands cannot be allowed to profit from their own wrongdoing. The action (or inaction) of the
party seeking equity must be “free from fault, and he must have done nothing to lull his
adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing vigilance on the part of the latter.”
Here, even with the respondents’ supposed failure to ascertain the validity of the contract and
the authority of the public official involved in the construction agreements, there is no such
confusion as to the matter of the contract’s validity and the equivalent compensation. As found
by the court a quo, petitioner had assured the contractors that they would be paid for the work
that they would do, as even DPWH Undersecretary Teodoro T. Encarnacion had told them to
“fast-track” the project. Hence, respondents cannot by any stretch of logic, be deprived of
compensation for their services when – despite their ostensible omissions – they only heeded

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the assurance of DPWH and proceeded to work on the urgent project. DPWH v. Ronaldo
Quiwa, et. al, G.R. No. 183444, February 8, 2012.

Agrarian Reform
Agrarian Reform Law; agricultural lands. The primary governing agrarian law with regard to
agricultural lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement
and crops produced, is now RA 6657. Section 3(c) of RA 6657 defines “agricultural lands” as
“lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in the Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran,
Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Agrarian Reform Law; applicability of PD 27, RA 6657, and Proclamation 1637. From the
standpoint of agrarian reform, PD 27, being in context the earliest issuance, governed at the start
the disposition of the rice-and-corn land portions of the Doronilla property. And true enough,
the DAR began processing land transfers through the OLT program under PD 27 and thereafter
issued the corresponding CLTs. However, when Proclamation 1637 went into effect, DAR
discontinued with the OLT processing. The tenants of Doronilla during that time desisted from
questioning the halt in the issuance of the CLTs. It is fairly evident that DAR noted the effect of
the issuance of Proclamation 1637 on the subject land and decided not to pursue its original
operation, recognizing the change of classification of the property from agricultural to
residential. When it took effect on June 15, 1988, RA 6657 became the prevailing agrarian
reform law. This is not to say, however, that its coming into effect necessarily impeded the
operation of PD 27, which, to repeat, covers only rice and corn land. Far from it, for RA 6657,
which identifies “rice and corn land” under PD 27 as among the properties the DAR shall
acquire and distribute to the landless, no less provides that PD 27 shall be of suppletory
application”. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of
Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased)
represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;
161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Agrarian Reform Law; certificates of title; merely an evidence of recognition by the government;
inchoate right. While the PD 27 tenant-farmers are considered the owners by virtue of that
decree, they cannot yet exercise all the attributes inherent in ownership, such as selling the lot,
because, with respect to the government represented by DAR and LBP, they have in the
meantime only inchoate rights in the lot––the being “amortizing owners.” This is because they
must still pay all the amortizations over the lot to Land Bank before an EP is issued to them.
Then and only then do they acquire, in the phraseology ofVinzons-Magana, “the vested right of
absolute ownership in the landholding.” Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado
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Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran,
Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796; 161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Agrarian Reform Law; private rights; just compensation. As payment the farmer-beneficiaries
who were given the 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283, as amended by
Proclamation 1637, are deemed full owners of the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis-à-vis the real
registered owner. The farmer-beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they were
deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS Townsite reservation or at least are
subrogated to the rights of the registered lot owner. Those farmer-beneficiaries who were issued
CLTs or EPs after June 21, 1974 when Proclamation 1283, as amended, became effective do not
acquire rights over the lots they were claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657, because the lots have
already been reclassified as residential and are beyond the compulsory coverage for agrarian
reform under RA 6657. Perforce, the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21, 1974 have to be
annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis, since the lots in question are no longer subject
to agrarian reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-agricultural
purposes. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian
Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased)
represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830
& 190456, February 8, 2012.

Agricultural tenancy relationship; de jure tenant; grounds for ejection provided by law.
Respondent, as landowner/agricultural lessor, has the burden to prove the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of petitioner, the tenant/agricultural lessee. This rule proceeds from the
principle that a tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure.
The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law,
in this case Section 36 of R.A. No. 3844. SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.–
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural
lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate
family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural
purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections 25 and
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor is not more than five hectares,
in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advance
notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against
him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years
or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
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tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to
demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of
said dispossession; (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the
terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is
caused by fortuitous event orforce majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The
agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of
Section 29; (5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially
damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the
agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of
seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground
for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or (7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of
the terms of paragraph 2 of Section 27. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin, G.R. No. 185669,
February 1, 2012.

Agricultural tenancy relationship; requisites; may be established through written or oral

contract. The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist
upon an oral agreement. Juan Galope v. Cresencia Bugarin,G.R. No. 185669, February 1, 2012.

Jurisdiction of DAR; DARAB. The DARAB has been created and designed to exercise the DAR’s
adjudicating functions. And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB derives its jurisdiction
from law, specifically RA 6657, which invested it with adjudicatory powers over agrarian reform
disputes and matters related to the implementation of CARL. The Supreme Court need not
belabor that DARAB’s jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Doronilla property, cannot be
conferred by the main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-beneficiaries claiming to have
“vested rights” under PD 27. As earlier discussed, the process of land reform covering the 1,266
hectares of the Araneta estate was not completed prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1637. So
the intervenors, with the exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries who were granted CLTs, failed
to acquire private rights of ownership under PD 27 before the effective conversion of the
Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the Doronilla property, being outside of
CARP coverage, is also beyond DARAB’s jurisdiction. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J.
Amado Araneta / Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B.
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Duran, Lope P. Abalos (deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado
Araneta, G.R. Nos. 161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Social justice; laches. There can be little quibble about Duran, et al. being guilty of
laches. They failed and neglected to keep track of their case with their lawyer for 14 long years.
As discussed above, Atty. Lara died even prior to the promulgation of the DARAB
Decision. Even then, they failed to notify the DARAB and the other parties of the case regarding
the demise of Atty. Lara and even a change of counsel. It certainly strains credulity to think that
literally no one, among those constituting the petitioning-intervenors, had the characteristic
good sense of following up the case with their legal counsel. Only now, 14 years after, did
some think of fighting for the right they slept on. Thus, as to them, the CA Decision is deemed
final and executory based on the principle of laches. Agrarian reform finds context in social
justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But social justice itself is not merely
granted to the marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social justice is
intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone
commit an injustice. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta / Department
of Agrarian Reform vs. Estate of J. Armado Araneta / Ernesto B. Duran, Lope P. Abalos
(deceased) represented by Lope Abalos, Jr., et al. vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, G.R. Nos.
161796;161830 & 190456, February 8, 2012.

Public Land
Public Land Act; alienable and disposable land. Public Land Act requires that the applicant for
registration must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land; and (b) that the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land must have been
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. Certifications
of the DENR are not sufficient to prove the foregoing. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No.
20, 18 dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the
DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification
status for areas below 50 hectares. Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify
that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent
failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal
custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and
disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s
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issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Republic of the Philippines v. Lucia
Gomez, G.R. No. 189021, February 22, 2012.

Public Land Act; confirmation of of imperfect titles. It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the
possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an alienable and
disposable public land must be “open, continuous, exclusive and notorious” in character.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, the Supreme Court explained that the intent behind
the use of “possession” in conjunction with “occupation” is to emphasize the need for actual
and not just constructive or fictional possession. The law speaks of possession and occupation.
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
naturally exercise over his own property. On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the
required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for
purposes of prescription must be “in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted”. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and
not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The
party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential
elements of acquisitive prescription. Republic of the Philippines v. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012.

Public Officers
Public officer; preventive suspension. The Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Ysidoro for
90 days in accordance with Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. Clearly, by well-established
jurisprudence, the provision of Section 13, Republic Act 3019 makes it mandatory for the
Sandiganbayan to suspend, for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, any public officer who
has been validly charged with a violation of Republic Act 3019, as amended or Title 7, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code or any offense involving fraud upon government of public funds or
property. Arnold James M. Ysidoro vs. Hon. Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, et al. G.R. No.
171513, February 6, 2012.
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Public officers; liability for overpricing; personal and solidary liability; reimbursement. The
Court upholds the COA’s ruling that petitioner is personally and solidarily liable for the
overpricing in the computers purchased by CDA. The directive for the payment of the amount of
disallowance finally determined by the COA did not change the nature of the obligation as
solidary because the demand thus made upon petitioner did not foreclose his right as solidary
debtor to proceed against his co-debtors/obligors, in this case the members of the PBAC charged
under Notice of Disallowance No. 93-0016-101, for their share in the total amount of
disallowance. Petitioner is therefore liable to restitute the P881,819.00 to the Government
without prejudice, however, to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable
with him. Candelario Verzosa Jr. v. Guillermo Carague and COA, et. al, G.R. No. 157838,
February 7, 2012.

Public officials; holdover. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within
which all elective local officials can occupy their offices. The Supreme Court has already
established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the
three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity.
Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local
officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress. Admittedly, the Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized the validity of
holdover provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the present case and
these past cases is that while these past cases all refer to elective barangay or sangguniang
kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the
present case refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor,
and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year
term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Even assuming that a holdover is
constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article
VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option where no
express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident. Datu Michael Abas Kida, etc., et al. vs. Senate of the Phil., etc., et al./Basari D.
Mapupuno vs. Sixto Brillantes, etc., et al./Rep. Edcel C. Lagman vs. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., etc.,
et al./Almarin Centi Tillah, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, etc., et al./Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis “Barok” Biraogo, G.R. No. 196271, February
28, 2012.

Signing bonus; legality. There is no dispute that the grant of a signing bonus had been previously
disallowed by the express mandate of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
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Arroyo). On July 22, 2002, this Court declared in SSS v. COA that Social Services Commission’s
authority to fix the compensation of its employees under its charter, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
1161 as amended, is subject to the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, which provides for the
consolidation of allowances and compensation in the prescribed standardized salary rates.
While there are exceptions provided under Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. No. 6758 in observance
of the policy on non-diminution of pay, the signing bonus is not one of the benefits
contemplated. This Court also ruled that the signing bonus is “not a truly reasonable
compensation” since conduct of peaceful collective negotiations “should not come with a price
tag”. hat MIAA’s Board of Directors did not make a mistake and their real intention was to
reward the successful conclusion of collective negotiations by some pecuniary means is belied
by simultaneous approval of the grant and the CNA between SMPP and MIAA betrays their real
intention. Moreover, prior to the issuance of AOM No. JPA 03-35 declaring the subject benefit
illegal, there was no effort on the part of its Board of Directors to rectify the alleged mistake in
nomenclature. It was only after then Corporate Auditor Manalo and Director Nacion called
MIAA’s attention as to the illegality of a signing bonus that MIAA alleged that the subject benefit
is a CNA Incentive. Easily, such is a mere afterthought.Manila International Airport Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 194710, February 14, 2012.

Signing bonus; return of illegal bonus. Good faith is anchored on an honest belief that one is
legally entitled to the benefit. In this case, the MIAA employees who had no participation in the
approval and release of the disallowed benefit accepted the same on the assumption that
Resolution No. 2003-067 was issued in the valid exercise of the power vested in the Board of
Directors under the MIAA charter. As they were not privy as to reason and motivation of the
Board of Directors, they can properly rely on the presumption that the former acted regularly in
the performance of their official duties in accepting the subject benefit. Furthermore, their
acceptance of the disallowed grant, in the absence of any competent proof of bad faith on their
part, will not suffice to render liable for a refund. The same is not true as far as the Board of
Directors. Their authority under Section 8 of the MIAA charter is not absolute as their exercise
thereof is “subject to existing laws, rules and regulations” and they cannot deny knowledge
of SSS v. COA and the various issuances of the Executive Department prohibiting the grant of
the signing bonus. In fact, they are duty-bound to understand and know the law that they are
tasked to implement and their unexplained failure to do so barred them from claiming that they
were acting in good faith in the performance of their duty. The presumptions of “good faith” or
“regular performance of official duty” are disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence. Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
194710, February 14, 2012.

July 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional Law
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Bill of rights; right of confrontation. The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a
judge in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to
the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face. The
requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it enables the
judge to test the witness’ credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying. It is
not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional examination
of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony. Go, et al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et al., G.R.
No. 185527, July 18, 2012.

Bill of rights; right of confrontation; conditional examination of witnesses. But for purposes of
taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the
court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure…
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the
accused…
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal
proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the
testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris [G.R. No. L- 48883, August
6, 1980] that the constitutional requirement “insures that the witness will give his testimony
under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to
cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and
it enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.” Go, et
al. v. The People of the Philippines and Highdone Company, Ltd., et al.,G.R. No. 185527, July
18, 2012.

Bill of rights; right to privacy. Clearly [citing Morfe v. Mutuc (130 Phil. 415 [1968]) and Ople v.
Torres (354 Phil. 948 [1998]), the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks [G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007], this Court underscored that the
right to privacy is not absolute…
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts
are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the
right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
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legitimate and compelling. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No. 193636, July
24, 2012.

Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et al., G.R. No.
193636, July 24, 2012.

Bill of rights; writ of habeas data. The notion of informational privacy is still developing in
Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on
which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European
tradition of data protection, this Court can be guided by cases on the protection of personal data
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.
Sweden [26 March 1987, 9 EHRR 433], in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be
free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the state to protect its national
security…
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific component of the right to
privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy,
may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private
life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved. Gamboa v. P/Ssupt. Marlou C. Chan, et
al., G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012.

Constitutional construction; verba legis non est recedendum. One of the primary and basic
rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is
a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum –
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained;
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and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the
rule of law to prevail. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.

Eminent domain; determination of just compensation. We also declared in National Power

Corporation v. Purefoods Corporation [G.R. No. 160725, September 12, 2008] that Section 3A
of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended (which provides a fixed formula in the computation of
just compensation in cases of acquisition of easements of right of way) is not binding upon this
Court. This is in keeping with the established rule that the determination of “just compensation”
in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V.
Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957 & 171558, July 11, 2012.

Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of President. [I]t has already been
established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the
Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive
power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in
his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 541 (1939)]: “With reference to the
Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is
readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that ‘The executive power
shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.’ This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other.” Corollarily, it
is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-
out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M.
Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local executives over police. Regarding the
country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.” A local
chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the
police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day operations … In the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never
intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency
situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as
provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations,
as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government,
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the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by
the President of the power of executive control. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M.
Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local executives. Respondents cannot rely
on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said
provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The
governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and
implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the
case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal
mooring under this provision to justify their actions. Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same
provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does
not fall under the category of a “national law enforcement agency,” to which the National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to uphold the
sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all
enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national
territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police
forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were
inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national
law enforcement agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R.
No. 187298, July 3, 2012.

Executive power; power of reorganization. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing
authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency…
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora [G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001], the
Court affirmed that the President’s authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292,
thus: “But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose
sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987), ‘the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.’ For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President.” Pichay, Jr. v. Office
of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et
al.,G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
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Executive power; power of reorganization; rationale. And in Domingo v. Zamora [G.R. No.
142283, February 6, 2003], the Court gave the rationale behind the President’s continuing
authority in this wise: “The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize his office ‘to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency.’ The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped
by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the President.” Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R.
No. 196425. July 24, 2012.

Executive power; power of reorganization; nature. Generally, this authority to implement

organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a function from the Office of
the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1)
[of the Administrative Code] gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal
structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as
abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring
functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v. Zamora, the Court
noted: “However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section
31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of
the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or bytransferring functions
from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s
power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office
of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.”
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one
hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees’ tenurial
security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the
executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the
PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners
who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly
“under the Office of the President.” On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of
the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the
President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is
allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425, July
24, 2012.
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Eminent domain; what constitutes “taking.” The NPC, relying on [Section 3A of Republic Act
No. 6395], argues that the CA erred when it ordered the payment of just compensation for the
properties in question, given that most of the properties were subject only to an aerial easement
of right of way, with the NPC requiring the use of the area above the subject lands for its
transmission lines. We have already established in a number of cases the flaw behind the NPC’s
argument. At the heart of this argument is the mistaken assumption that what are involved are
mere liens on the property in the form of aerial easements. While it may be true that the
transmission lines merely pass over the affected properties, the easement imposes the additional
limitation that the landowners are prohibited from constructing any improvements or planting
any trees that exceed three (3) meters within the aerial right of way area. This prohibition
clearly interferes with the landowners’ right to possess and enjoy their properties…
Apart from interfering with the attributes of ownership, we have articulated in our observation
inNational Power Corp. v. Sps. Gutierrez [271 Phil. 1 (1991)]that these transmission lines,
because of the high-tension current that passes through them, pose a danger to the lives and
limbs of those in the surrounding areas, and, thus, serve to limit the activities that can be done
on these lands. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Florimon V. Lleto, et al., G.R. Nos. 169957
& 171558, July 11, 2012.

Impeachment; nature of. Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the
arsenal of democracy,” was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or
highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that “the decision will be regulated
more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or
guilt.” Given their concededly political character, the precise role of the judiciary in
impeachment cases is a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in our
government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including those traditionally entrusted to the political departments, are proper
subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the
influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US
Constitution… Corona v. Senate of the Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R.
No. 200242, July 17, 2012.

Impeachment; power of judicial review. In the first impeachment case decided by this
Court, Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc. [G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003], we ruled that the power of judicial review in this
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jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment

proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice [G.R.
No. 193459, February 15, 2011], the Court resolved the question of the validity of the
simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which
was allegedly a violation of the due process clause and of the one year bar provision …
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner
by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted
the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is
already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of the
Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period from
among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts. Corona v. Senate of the
Philippines sitting as an Impeachment Court, et al., G.R. No. 200242, July 17, 2012.

Judicial and Bar Council; composition. As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular
letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had
in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the
intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et
al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.

Judicial and Bar Council; composition. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in
its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible, since,
as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the Court and consultant of the JBC in his
memorandum, “from the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent that each
category of members pertained to a single individual only.” Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council,
et al., G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012.

Judicial and Bar Council; composition. More than the reasoning provided in the above
discussed rules of constitutional construction, the Court finds the above thesis as the paramount
justification of the Court’s conclusion that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation,
should be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral
body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the
Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers such as,inter alia, the power of appropriation, the
declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
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Vice-President, and impeachment. In the exercise of these powers, the Constitution employs
precise language in laying down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of whether
the two houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each house is constitutionally granted
with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its
relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
balances, to the other branches of government.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. A fortiori, a
pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid
with firmness, that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of Congress, as one of the
co-equal branches of government. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., G.R. No. 202242,
July 17, 2012.

Public officers
Public officers; authority of city vice-mayor to enter into contracts. Under [Section 456 of the
Local Government Code], there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to
enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city
mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was
strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically
authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a
power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003
cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Arnold D. Vicencio v. Hon.
Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.

Public officers; compensation and allowances. The issuance of Resolution No. 464 by the NHA
was without legal basis. At the time of its issuance in 1982, Section 3 of P.D. 1597 had already
expressly repealed all decrees, executive orders, and issuances that authorized the grant of
allowances to groups of officials or employees despite the inconsistency of those allowances
with the position classification or rates indicated in the National Compensation and Position
Classification Plan.
Petitioners’ contention that P.D. 1597 only repealed Section 4 of P.D. 985, but not Section 2
thereof, is without basis. While Section 2 of P.D. 1597 only mentions Section 4 of P.D. 985,
Section 3 of P.D. 1597 specifically refers to all inconsistent laws or issuances.

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Thereafter, or in 1989, R.A. 6758 further reinforced this policy by expressly decreeing that all
allowances not specifically mentioned therein, or as may be determined by the DBM, shall be
deemed included in the standardized salary rates prescribed.
Under Section 12 of R.A. 6758, all kinds of allowances are integrated in the standardized salary
rates. Below are the exceptions: 1. Representation and transportation allowance (RATA); 2.
Clothing and laundry allowance; 3. Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on
board government vessels; 4. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel; 5. Hazard pay; 6.
Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and 7. Such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM.
Only those additional compensation benefits being received by incumbents as of 1 July 1989,
which were not integrated into the standardized salary rates, shall continue to be authorized.
In this case, the incentive allowances granted under Resolution No.464 are clearly not among
those enumerated under R.A. 6758. Neither has there been any allegation that the allowances
were specifically determined by the DBM to be an exception to the standardized salary
rates. Hence, such allowances can no longer be granted after the effectivity of R.A.
6758. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on Audit and National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
185806, July 24, 2012.

Public officers; validity of per diems paid to ex-officio members of PEZA. PEZA’s insistence that
there is legal basis in its grant of per diems to the ex officio members of its Board does not hold
water. The constitutional prohibition explained in [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815, February 22, 1991] still stands and this Court finds no reason to
revisit the doctrine laid down therein as said interpretation, to this Court’s mind, is in
consonance with what our Constitution provides … In Civil Liberties Union, this Court clarified
the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution and emphasized that a public
official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive additional
compensation for the ex officio position. This Court ruled: “It bears repeating though that in
order that such additional duties or functions may not transgress the prohibition embodied in
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, such additional duties or functions must
be required by the primary functions of the official concerned, who is to perform the same in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor. Theex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal
office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say,
the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member
thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of his
principal office in defining policy in monetary and banking matters, which come under the
jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any
extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance,
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or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional

compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.” Philippine Economic Zone Authority v.
Commission on Audit and Reynaldo A. Villar, Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
189767, July 3, 2012.

Public officers; liability of public officer executing contract without authority. Section 103 of
P.D. 1445 declares that expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in
violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to
be directly responsible therefor. The public official’s personal liability arises only if the
expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, petitioner’s act of
entering into a contract on behalf of the local government unit without the requisite authority
therefor was in violation of the Local Government Code. While petitioner may have relied on
the opinion of the City Legal Officer, such reliance only serves to buttress his good faith. It does
not, however, exculpate him from his personal liability under P.D. 1445. Arnold D. Vicencio v.
Hon. Reynaldo A. Villar, et al., G.R. No. 182069, July 3, 2012.

Public officers; suspension order. While the suspension of a public officer under [Section 13 or
Republic Act No. 3019] is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the
validity of the information” filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching
consequences of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.” The
accused public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension
order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding
leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the
ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions
on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.

Public officers; suspension order. The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing
is to determine the validity of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either
suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the
suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its
validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a
motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him, [Luciano v. Mariano (148-B Phil. 178 [1971])]likewise emphasizes that no hard and
fast rule exists in regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind,
the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension
order. Miguel v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012.

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No estoppel against Government. In Baybay Water District v. Commission on Audit [425 Phil.
326 [2002]),this Court stated that public officers’ erroneous application and enforcement of the
law do not estop the government from making a subsequent correction of those errors. Where
there is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must be
enforced even if it prejudices certain parties on account of an error committed by public
officials in granting the benefit. Practice, without more – no matter how long continued –
cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law. Abellanosa, et al. v. Commission on
Audit and National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 185806, July 24, 2012.

Local government
Local autonomy; devolution; reservation in favor of national government. While [Section 17 of
the Local Government Code] charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing
for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services, thus: “(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)
hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs
and services.”
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an
LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU…
Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing
basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is
implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. Pimentel, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012.

Other laws
Agrarian reform; procedure for acquisition. The procedure for acquisition of private lands under
Section 16 (e) of the CARL is that upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the
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name of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries… Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm
Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.

Agrarian reform; control and possession of agricultural land. We, however, agree that petitioner
must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare land. The matter has already been settled
in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al. [G.R. No.
171101, April 24, 2012], when we ruled that the Constitution and the CARL intended the
farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over agricultural lands, otherwise all
rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on
the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively the
lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must
always be in the hands of the farmers. Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, et al., G.R. No. 192999, July 18, 2012.

Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. From [Sections 2(10) and 2(13) of
the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)], it is
clear that a GOCC must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation” while an
instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes a
government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the
National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only
governmental but also corporate powers.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become
stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or
instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority,
the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not
organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes
loosely called government corporate entities. They are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense
as understood under the Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal
relationship and status of government entities. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.

Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. In the case at bench, PRA is not a
GOCC because it is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered as a
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stock corporation because although it has a capital stock divided into no par value shares as
provided in Section 74 of P.D. No. 1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus
allotments or profits to stockholders. There is no provision whatsoever in P.D. No. 1084 or in
any of the subsequent executive issuances pertaining to PRA, particularly, E.O. No. 525, E.O.
No. 6546 and EO No. 7987 that authorizes PRA to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or
profits to its stockholders.
PRA cannot be considered a non-stock corporation either because it does not have members. A
non-stock corporation must have members. Moreover, it was not organized for any of the
purposes mentioned in Section 88 of the Corporation Code. Specifically, it was created to
manage all government reclamation projects. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.

Government-owned and -controlled corporations; Constitutional requirements. Furthermore,

there is another reason why the PRA cannot be classified as a GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution provides as follows: “Section 16. The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by
special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.”
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters
on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC
must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition
of common good but failed the second one – economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose
behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it
created to compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing
reclamation companies being operated by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was
created essentially to perform a public service considering that it was primarily responsible for a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation, administration and operation of lands
belonging to the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their
development consistent with the public interest. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, July 18, 2012.

Government-owned and -controlled corporations; definition. This Court is convinced that PRA
is not a GOCC either under Section 2(3) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative
Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The facts, the evidence on
record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was not organized either as
a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by Congress to operate commercially
and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the
Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government
instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property tax. Republic of the Philippines,
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represented by the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) vs. City of Parañaque, G.R. No.
191109, July 18, 2012.

Government contracts; public bidding requirement. Public bidding, as a method of government

procurement, is governed by the principles of transparency, competitiveness, simplicity, and
accountability. By its very nature and characteristic, a competitive public bidding aims to
protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open
competition and in order to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the
execution of public contracts. Except only in cases in which alternative methods of
procurement are allowed, all government procurement shall be done by competitive
bidding. In the case of Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co, Inc. [G.R. Nos.
155001, 155547 & 155661, May 5, 2003], the Court held: “Competition must be legitimate,
fair and honest. In the field of government contract law, competition requires, not only bidding
upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing, the same subject matter, the
same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest; and not designed to injure of
defraud the government.” It has been held that the three principles in bidding are the offer to
the public, opportunity for competition, and a basis for the exact comparison of bids. A
regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of
the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear
John Services, Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.

Government contracts; public bidding requirement; approved budget of contract must be

disclosed. Under the law, the PSC-BAC is mandated to disclose not only the description of the
items to be procured, and the eligibility requirements, among others, but also the approved
budget of the project. Competitive bidding is an essential element of a public bidding. Thus, it
should be conducted fairly and openly with full and free opportunity for competition among
bidders. It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive
bidding required by law is void and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it …
Consequently, the provision in the “Instruction to Bidders” stating that no award of the contract
shall be made to a bidder whose bid price is lower than the allowable government
estimate (AGE) or AAE is not valid. The rule on the matter is clear. The PSC-BAC is obliged to
observe and enforce the same in the procurement of goods and services for the project. The law
on public bidding is not an empty formality. A strict adherence to the principles, rules and
regulations on public bidding must be sustained if only to preserve the integrity and the faith of
the general public on the procedure. Philippine Sports Commission, et al. v. Dear John Services,
Inc., G.R. No. 183260, July 4, 2012.

August 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Political Law

Constitutional law
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Bill of rights; due process. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More
often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present
their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her
interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. … Since petitioner was given the
opportunity to defend himself from the charges against him, as in fact he submitted a Counter-
Affidavit with the PAGC, though he failed to comply with the order for the submission of
position paper, he cannot complain of denial of due process. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D.,
Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.

Bill of rights; unreasonable searches; exclusionary rule. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure
becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the
fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August
15, 2012.

Bill of rights; warrantless arrests; flagrante delicto. Section 5[ of Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure] provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on
personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped
from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was caught by the police officers in the
act of using shabu and, thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo positively
identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an aluminum foil being held by Castro. Ambre,
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however, made much of the fact that there was no prior valid intrusion in the residence of
Sultan. The argument is specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior lawful intrusion is not an element of
an arrest in flagrante delicto. Thus, even granting arguendo that the apprehending officers had
no legal right to be present in the dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of
Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and Mendoza in a pot session by the police
officers. Accordingly, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were also duty-
bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. …
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure
done on her person was likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily
cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. Margarita Ambre Y Cayuni v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191532, August 15,
2012.

Public officers
Public officers; three-fold responsibility. We have ruled that dismissal of a criminal action does
not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding against the same respondent, nor carry
with it the relief from administrative liability. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public
officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or
omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same
act. Administrative liability is thus separate and distinct from penal and civil liability.
Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the case filed before the Ombudsman are
based on the same subject matter is of no moment. It is a fundamental principle of
administrative law that the administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent
independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a
preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the criminal charge. Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by
the Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the Ombudsman did not result in the
absolution of petitioner from the administrative charges. Dr. Fernando A. Melendres M.D.,
Executive Director of the Lung Center of the Philippines [LCP] vs. President Anti-Graft
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 163859, August 15, 2012.

Public officers; three-fold responsibility. Under the ”threefold liability rule,” any act or omission
of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of
which is independent of the other. Ernesto A. Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R.
No. 173268, August 23, 2012.

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Ombudsman; power to dismiss erring public officials. As a last ditch effort to save himself,
petitioner now puts in issue the power of the Ombudsman to order his dismissal from
service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in dismissing him from service disregarded
Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA
No. 6770, which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a
public official or employee. …
It is already well-settled that “the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose
administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.” As we have
explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals [503 Phil. 396 (2003)], “the fact ‘[t]hat the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with [the] order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action [under Section 15(3) of
RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s ‘recommendation’ is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.” Ernesto A. Fajardo vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 173268, August 23, 2012.

January 2014 Philippine Supreme Court Rulings on Political Law

Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing of a motion for
reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case since a
serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity
or invalidity of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority
to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any
ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other
words, since the validity of the OP’s decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably
anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the whole case – including
the constitutional issue – remains alive for the Court’s consideration on motion for
reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-
Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public officers; must be
consistent with the core constitutional principle of independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The intent of the framers of the Constitution in providing that “all other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment” in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from
extending the more stringent rule of “removal only by impeachment” to favoured public officers.
Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no way can this provision be regarded as
blanket authority for Congress to provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the
manner and cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
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consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right to procedural and
substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; the principle of
separation of powers; and the principle of checks and balances. The authority granted by the
Constitution to Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other public
officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the basic principles and
precepts established by the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.

Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence enjoyed by the Office of the
Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics – they do not
owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally,
they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that
these “independent” bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
“independence” would result in the impairment of their core functions. The deliberative
considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional commissions have been
consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or
any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is
not scarce on how the “independence” granted to these bodies prevents presidential
interference. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v.
Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman reviews a case for nine
days. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may
be affected. In case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant
and palpable. The Deputy Ombudsman cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or
inefficiency since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OP’s ruling that
Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days, instead of five days as required for
Hearing Officers, is totally baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.

Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and cumbersome mode of
removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature, a sui generis politico-legal process that
signals the need for a judicious and careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate
the proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited grounds for
impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to try impeachment cases; and the
number of votes required for a finding of guilt. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
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etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.

Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Court’s authority to settle
justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before
the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision in R.A.
9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative power
to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the
function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection
orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs
for violations of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge,
Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Just compensation; determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. In

the exercise of the Court’s essentially judicial function of determining just compensation, the
RTC-SACs are not granted unlimited discretion and must consider and apply the enumerated
factors in R.A. No. 6657 and the DAR formula (in AO 5-98) that reflect these factors. These
factors and formula provide the uniform framework or structure for the computation of the just
compensation for a property subject to agrarian reform. When acting within the parameters set
by the law itself, the RTC-SACs, however, are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its
minute detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the formula’s strict
application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion, relax the formula’s application to fit the
factual situations before them. They must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation
from the factors and formula that the law and the rules have provided.Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.

Just compensation; fair market value of the expropriated property is determined as of the time of
taking. The “time of taking” refers to that time when the State deprived the landowner of the use
and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of
the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.

Justiciable question; definition of. A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are
constitutionally-imposed limits on the exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of
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the government. Our inquiry is limited to whether such statutory grant of disciplinary authority
to the President violates the Constitution, particularly the core constitutional principle of the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No.
196232, January 28, 2014.

Ombudsman; investigative and disciplinary powers; scope. The Ombudsman’s broad

investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers,
during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the
Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influences of officialdom and partisan politics
and from fear of external reprisal by making it an “independent” office. Emilio A. Gonzales III v.
Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Ombudsman; powers and functions. Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the “protector of the people” against the inept,
abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action
bureau. This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the
Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the ills, abuses, and excesses of
the bureaucracy. As the Ombudsman is expected to be an ”activist watchman”, the Court has
upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it by the
Constitution and by R.A. No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official
function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Private lands acquired for agrarian reform; primary jurisdiction. The Land Bank of the
Philippines is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all
private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only preliminary.
The landowner may still take the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication.
Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC. But, in its
determination, the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down by law and the
pertinent DAR regulations. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R.
No. 172551, January 15, 2014.

Public officer; discourtesy in the performance of official duties. As a public officer and trustee
for the public, it is the ever existing responsibility of respondent sheriff to demonstrate courtesy
and civility in his official actuations with the public. Based on the transcript of the altercation, it
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is readily apparent that respondent has indeed been remiss in the duty of observing courtesy in
serving the public. He should have exercised restraint in dealing with the complainant, instead
of allowing the quarrel to escalate into a hostile encounter. The balm of a clean conscience
should have been sufficient to relieve any hurt or harm respondent felt from complainant’s
criticisms in the performance of his duties. On the contrary, respondent’s demeanor tarnished
the image not only of his office but that of the judiciary as a whole, exposing him to disciplinary
measure. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v. Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.

Public officer; making untruthful statements. The charge of making untruthful statements must
fail. While the statements mentioned in respondent’s complaint-affidavit were not reflected in
the transcript submitted by the complainant, this actuality is not conclusive evidence that such
event did not take place. As claimed by respondent, complainant’s clerk was only able to record
a part of the argument. We cannot then discount the probability that there is more to the
argument than what was caught on video and there remains the possibility that what respondent
narrated and what complainant recorded both actually transpired. Atty. Virgillo P. Alconera v.
Alfredo T. Pallanan, A.M. No. P-12-3069, January 20, 2014.

Section 8(2) of RA 6770; constitutional; the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman; not entitled to the independence the
Office of the Ombudsman enjoys under the Constitution. The Court resolved to maintain the
validity of Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned. The
Court does not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the
Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys
under the Constitution. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.

Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770; unconstitutional; vesting of disciplinary authority in the President
over the Deputy Ombudsman; violation of the independence of the Ombudsman. In more
concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by
the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the
constitutionally-granted independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office
of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of
an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and
necessarily be true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of
their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her
subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to
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pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal
setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is
still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770,
providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman, should be declared
void. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.

Special Prosecutor; structural relationship with the Ombudsman; the Special Prosecutor is by no
means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids the Ombudsman in the
exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and prosecution of officials in the
Executive Department. Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a
necessary adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of
the Special Prosecutor and organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting
the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office. This power of control and supervision
includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to the Special
Prosecutor as he or she may deem fit. Even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not
expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as
an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between the
Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the other. What is
true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies but, also for other
lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman herself in the
performance of her duties. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January
28, 2014.

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