Remedial Law Philippine Supreme Court Decisions
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Chil BelgiraPhilippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Lexoterica 2009 – January 2014
February 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Arbitration Law
1. Collection of money claim. Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. (Excellent) entered into a
contract with Multi-Rich Builders (Multi-Rich) for the construction of a garment factory. The
construction contract provided that any dispute, controversy or difference between the parties
shall be settled by arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration Law (Republic Act No. 876). In relation
to the issue of whether the regional trial court (RTC) has jurisdiction over money claims arising
from the construction contract, the Supreme Court ruled that the RTC should not have taken
cognizance of the collection suit. The presence of the arbitration clause vested jurisdiction to
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) over all construction disputes between
Excellent and Multi-Rich. There is nothing in the law which limits the exercise of jurisdiction to
complex or difficult cases. E.O. No. 1008 does not distinguish between claims involving
payment of money or not. The CIAC acquires jurisdiction over a construction contract by the
mere fact that the parties agreed to submit to voluntary arbitration. Excellent Quality Apparel,
Inc vs. Win Multi Rich Builders, Inc., G.R, No.175048, February 10, 2009.
2. Assignment of receivables. A dispute relating to the assignment of receivables by a
construction contactor to a third party does not fall within the jusridiction of the CIAC. Fort
Bonifacio Development Corp. vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 180765, February 27, 2009.
3. Invalidation of arbitral award. The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the order of the
Arbitral Tribunal’s order on the ground that said orders completely failed to give Daiichi (a party
to the arbitration) vital piece of information necessary for the judicious resolution of the
case. According to the Court of Appeals, this ignored the letter, spirit, policy and objective of
the Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration which require, among other things,
that arbitrators must employ all reasonable means to ascertain facts in each case. According to
the Court of Appeals, since it is Daiichi’s claim that the deductive cost can only be established
by finding out the quantities of materials required to complete the project under the original
plan and the revised plan, the Arbitral Tribunal should have allowed the commissioning of an
independent expert who would give an objective information for the tribunal to reach a
sensible, if not well-informed, resolution of the controversy.” The Supreme Court sustained the
Court of Appeals. Federal Builders, Inc. vs. Daiichi Properties and Development, Inc., G.R. No.
142525, February 13, 2009.
4. Court jurisdiction to review awards. The rules of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation cannot confer jurisdiction on the RTC to review arbitral awards. Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company Vs. The Hon. CA, G.R. No.166260, February 18, 2009.
Remedial Law
1. Petition for declaration of nullity of decision. The Court of Appeals erred in taking
cognizance and fully ruling on Pantangco’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the RTC
Decision since Pantangco’s availed of a wrong remedy; Pantangco should have appealed the
RTC decision and the availability of appeal foreclosed all other review remedies. However, the
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Supreme Court refused to rule that the Court of Appeal’s error result sin the full enforcement of
the RTC decision since this decision itself is partly void (as discussed by the Supreme
Court). Vios vs. Patangco, G.R. No. 16310, February 6, 2009.
2. Filing Fees for Real Actions. The true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against
respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real property. Since the action is a real
action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees must be computed in accordance
with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. It provides that in computing the
docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or
estimated value, would use the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax
Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or,
in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same. Ruby Shelter Builders & Reality Devt.
Corporation vs. Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III, et al., G.R. No. 175914, February 10, 2009.
3. Execution inconsistent with CA decisions. The Supreme Court held that it was improper
for the regional trial court to award to respondents possession over the lands in dispute, as the
December 5, 2001 Court of Appeals Decision it sought to execute and the April 11, 2002 CA
Resolution clearly did not award possession to respondents, but instead held that the owner of
the subject lands is the State.Possession was not a relief granted by the aforementioned CA
Decisions. It is therefore not a relief which the RTC may grant on execution. Accordingly, the
CA seriously erred in issuing its June 6, 2005 Resolution affirming the assailed RTC Order
awarding possession to respondents. Sps. Iglecerio Mahinay, et al. vs. Hon. Enrique C. Asis
etc. et al./Sps. Simeon Narrido, et al. Vs. Hon. Enrique C. Asis etc., et al., GR 170349, February
12, 2009.
4. Withdrawal of complaint. Once a complaint or information is filed in court, any
disposition of the case, i.e., its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on
the sound discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of the criminal cases even while the case is already in court, he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The determination of the case is within the court’s exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the option to grant or deny the
same. Rufina L. Caliwan Vs Mario Ocampo, et al., G.R. No. 183270, February 13, 2009.
5. Non-redemption. In foreclosure proceedings, the buyer becomes the absolute owner of
the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the prescribed period of redemption, which
is one year from the date of registration of the sale. In the case at bar, the 3 November 1994
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 not only determined and declared
that the foreclosure sale of the subject properties occurred on 25 March 1976; it also
acknowledged that there existed in the record a Certificate of Sale dated 31 March 1976 issued
by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subsequently annotated on the titles of the subject properties.
Hence, although the said decision did not categorically state the date of the registration of sale,
which was 30 April 1976, and while the inclusion of this piece of information in the decision
would have been ideal, such precision is not absolutely necessary nor the lack thereof fatal to
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the certainty of the judgment. Besides, fixing the date at one year from said registration, or on 1
May 1977, is easily discernible as the logical consequence of the meaning of the period
stated. La Campana Development Corporation Vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 146157, February 13, 2009.
6. Res judicata. The requisites for res judicata to apply are: (1) the former judgment must be
final; (2) the court which rendered said judgment or Order must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) said judgment or order must be on the merits; and (4) there
must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. Concordia Medel Gomez Vs. Corazon Medel Alcantara, G.R. No. 179556, February 13,
2009.
7. Res judicata. Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays the rule that an existing
final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, however, the following requisites must
be present: (1) the judgment or order sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the first case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action
In the present case, the first three elements of res judicata are present. As to the fourth element,
it is important to note that the doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: first, “bar by prior
judgment” which is provided in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Court and second,
“conclusiveness of judgment” which is provided in Section 47 (c) of the same Rule.
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. But where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. This is “conclusiveness of judgment.” Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim
or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues.
In this case, conclusiveness of judgment exists because respondents again seek to enforce their
right and title over the same subject matter, the litigated property, basing their claim on the
nullity of the judgment in Civil Case No. 84-27347, for failure to implead them therein as
indispensable parties, which had been overruled by final and executory judgments. The same
question cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same
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parties. Philippine National Bank Vs. Adela Sia and Robert Ngo, G.R. No. 165836, February 18,
2009.
8. Action in personam. An action for specific performance is an action in personam. Being a
judgment in personam, Civil Case No. 741-93 is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot bind
respondent since he was not a party therein. Sps. Ernesto V. Yu and Elsie Ong Yu Vs. Baltazar
Pacleb, et al., G.R. No. 172172, February 24, 2009.
9. Certiorari as substitute for appeal. Time and again, we said that the special civil action for
certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal under Rule 45.
Petitioner should have appealed the NLRC’s adverse ruling of illegal dismissal to the Court of
Appeals. This, petitioner failed to do. Thus, with regard to petitioner, the factual findings of
illegal dismissal by the NLRC had already become final. Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction
Co. Ltd. vs.. Hon. CA, et al., G.R. No. 167938. February 19, 2009
10. Appeal to the Office of the President. The Omnibus Investments Code contains no
provision specifically governing the remedy of a party whose application for an income tax
holiday was denied by the Board of Investments (in the same manner that Articles 7 and 36 of
the Code allow recourse to the Office of the President in the instances described in those
articles). On the other hand, Article 82 of the Code is the catch-all provision allowing the
appeal to the courts from all decisions of the BOI involving the other provisions of the Omnibus
Investments Code. The Supreme Court ruled that the intention of the law is to afford immediate
judicial relief from the decision of BOI, save in cases mentioned under Articles 7 and
36. Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation vs. Board of Investments, G.R. No.
175787, February 4, 2009.
11. Injunction. The National Commission on Indigenous People has the power to issue
injunctions as provided in the Indigenous Peoples Right Act of 1977. However, in this case, the
respondents were not entitled to injunctive relief. City Government of Baguio vs. Basweng, G.R.
No. 180206, February 4, 2009.
March 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Appeal; failure to file brief. In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court has held that the
authority of the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief is a
matter of judicial discretion. Thus, a dismissal based on this ground is neither mandatory nor
ministerial; the fundamentals of justice and fairness must be observed, bearing in mind the
background and web of circumstances surrounding the case. In the present case, the petitioner
blames its former handling lawyer for failing to file the appellant’s brief on time. This lawyer was
allegedly transferring to another law office at the time the appellant’s brief was due to be filed.
In his excitement to transfer to his new firm, he forgot about the appeal and the scheduled
deadline; he likewise forgot his responsibility to endorse the case to another lawyer in the law
office. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court held the failure to file the
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appeal brief inexcusable. Bachrach Corporation vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. 159915,
March 12, 2009.
Appeal; failure to file brief. Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure
of the appellant to file the appellants’ brief on time. However, the dismissal is directory, not
mandatory. Hence, the court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss the appeal. It is a power
conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion, however, must be a sound one, to be
exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case . . . The circulars of this Court prescribing technical and
other procedural requirements are meant to promptly dispose of unmeritorious petitions that
clog the docket and waste the time of the courts. These technical and procedural rules, however,
are intended to ensure, not suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid
enforcement may thus be allowed to attain their prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. Thus, in a considerable number of cases,
the Court has deemed it fit to suspend its own rules or to exempt a particular case from its strict
operation where the appellant failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period,
resulting in the appellate court’s failure to obtain jurisdiction over the case. With more reason,
there should be wider latitude in exempting a case from the strictures of procedural rules when
the appellate court has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case and, as in this case,
petitioners failed to file the appellants’ brief on time. Felimon Bigornia, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. 173017, March 17, 2009.
Appeal; late payment of docket fees. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal
for late payment of docket fees. Erlinda K. Ilusorio Vs. Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap, G.R. No.
171656, March 17, 2009.
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; certification proceeding. The requirement for a certificate
of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or
applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for
relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification proceeding, even
though initiated by a “petition,” is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and
fact-finding character. Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa Samma-Lakas etc. vs. Samma
Corporation, G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009.
Certiorari; material dates. There are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for
certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or
Resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and
third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. In this case, petitioner failed to indicate
all the three material dates, namely, the date of receipt of the June 18, 2007 Order, the date of
filing of the motion for reconsideration, as well as the date of receipt of the denial thereof,
which is the reckoning date of the 60-day period. Moreover, the certified true copies of the
assailed orders were not attached to the petition. Thus, the petition must be
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dismissed. Macapanton B. Batugan vs. Hon. Rasad G. Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 181384,
March 13, 2009.
Certiorari; motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher
court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for
reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain
exceptions, namely: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2) when public interest is
involved; or (3) in case of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has ruled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,
when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. JP Latex Technology, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Romeo
C. de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 177121, March 16, 2009
Evidence; offer of testimony. The failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the
irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally
offered in court, fatally conflict with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.
It is this same reason that now moves us to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present
case. Ronald Carino and Rosana Andes vs.People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 178757, March
13, 2009
Evidence; testimony. Well settled is the rule that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and
credible witness is sufficient for conviction. Likewise, the prosecution has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. It need not present each and every
witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. We have ruled that the
non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is
not fatal to the prosecution’s case. People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo “Rudy” Soriano, G.R.
No. 171085, March 17, 2009,
Evidence; conspiracy. Jurisprudence teaches us that “proof of the agreement need not rest on
direct evidence, as the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
disclosing a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out.” Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, then a conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Conspiracy was
thus properly appreciated by the Sandiganbayan because even though there was no direct proof
that petitioners agreed to cause injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits to
Amago Construction, their individual acts when taken together as a whole showed that they
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were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The barangay
officials’ award of the contract to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific plans and
specifications, the preparation of work programs only after the constructions had been
completed, the issuance and encashment of checks in favor of Amago Construction even before
any request to obligate the appropriation or to issue a disbursement voucher was made, and the
subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of completion by petitioner employees
despite the absence of material documents were all geared towards one purpose-to cause undue
injury to the government and unduly favor Amago Construction. Felix T. Ripalda, et al. vs.
People of the Philippines / Narcia A. Grefiel vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. / Cesar P. Guy
vs. the People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166880-82, March 20, 2009.
Execution pending appeal. Discretionary execution is allowed only when the period to appeal
has commenced but before the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case. The period to appeal
where a motion for reconsideration has been filed commences only upon the receipt of a copy
of the order disposing of the motion for reconsideration. The pendency of a motion for
reconsideration, therefore, prevents the running of the period to appeal. In the absence of an
appeal from the decision, as the motion for reconsideration is still unresolved, the execution
ordered by the RTC cannot be properly considered as execution pending appeal. JP Latex
Technology, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Romeo C. de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 177121, March 16, 2009
Execution pending appeal. Well-settled is the rule that there can be no execution until and
unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e. the period of appeal has lapsed
without an appeal having been taken, or, having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and
the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in which event, execution shall
issue as a matter of right. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled
to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court’s ministerial duty.
Furthermore, as a matter of settled legal principle, a writ of execution must adhere to every
essential particulars of the judgment sought to be executed. An order of execution may not vary
or go beyond the terns of the judgment it seeks to enforce. A writ of execution must conform to
the judgment and if it is different from, goes beyond or varies the tenor of the judgment which
gives it life, it is a nullity. Otherwise stated, when the order of execution and the corresponding
writ issued pursuant thereto is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life,
they have pro tanto no validity – to maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional
provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law. Simeon
Cabang, et al. vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009.
Final decision. The DARAB decision in DARAB Case No. 4389 had long become final and
executory, hence, immutable and unalterable. It may thus no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Excepted from
this rule is when the modification involves correction of 1) clerical errors, 2) nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and 3) void judgments. None of these exceptions
is present in the case at bar, however. Julio Mercado vs. Edmundo Mercado, G.R. No.
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178672. March 19, 2009; see also Simeon Cabang, et al. vs. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay, G.R.
No. 180587. March 20, 2009.
Final decision. Basic is the rule that when a party to an original action fails to question an
adverse judgment or decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by
law, he loses the right to do so, and the judgment or decision, as to him, becomes final and
binding. In this case, the petitioners are among the several respondents in the cases decided by
the DOLE-NCR and later on appealed to and upheld by the BLR. Notably, however, s pointed
out by Oredina, petitioners did not take any further action after the BLR issued its Resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration. When Peñas challenged the BLR Resolutions by filing
a petition for certiorari with the CA, petitioners did not join him. Such was a serious procedural
lapse that tolled the finality of the BLR Resolutions as against them, thus, warranting the
dismissal of the instant petition. As admitted by petitioners, their counsel received the copy of
the BLR Resolution[15] dated August 24, 2000 denying their Motion for Reconsideration on 31
August 2000. Petitioners, therefore, had sixty (60) days, or until 30 October 2000, to file a
petition under Rule 65 before the CA, This, petitioners failed to do.
For failing to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, petitioners are deemed to have acquiesced
to the adverse BLR judgment. There is, therefore, no cogent reason why petitioners should be
allowed to come before this Court to assail the decision rendered by the CA when they were
never parties to the said action. Dolly A. Ocampo, et al. vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. No. 150334, March 20, 2009
Information; conspiracy. The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential
elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that
petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project
Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the performance of their official
functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C.
Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted
benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of
the government. The felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction
public funds in the amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on
the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works
were undertaken by said construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by
COA.
On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the accused
in the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under
Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of
committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a
crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its
commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.
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When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime
must be set forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime
in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity
of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all
the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each
participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of
all. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. Vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. No. 180122. March
13, 2009
Intervention. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner, even though a non-party, is bound by
the judgment because aside from being a relative of or privy to Spouses Fernandez, she is also
acting as their agent when she occupied the property after the RTC ordered execution pending
appeal in order to frustrate the judgment. Sofia Aniosa Salandanan vs. Spouses Ma. Isabela and
Bayani Mendez, G.R. No. 160280, March 13, 2009.
Intervention. Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing
intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of
a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal
interest as qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation
of the judgment. The interest must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect and contingent, indirect and
remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral. However, notwithstanding the presence of a
legal interest, permission to intervene is subject to the sound discretion of the court, the exercise
of which is limited by considering “whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor’s
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.”
To allow intervention, (a) it must be shown that the movant has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or is otherwise qualified; and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur, as the first is not more important than the second.
The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. The permissive term of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full
measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing intervention. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.
vs. Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc.. G.R. No. 179516. March 17, 2009
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Injunction. In this case, the petitioner’s mortgaged properties were already foreclosed, as
shown by the Certificate of Sale issued on November 19, 2001. The ownership of the lands-
subject of the real estate mortgage had been consolidated and transfer certificates of title had
been issued in the name of the creditor It is on this score that the Supreme Court held that the
petitioner’s prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and academic. The court also held
that it unnecessary for the Court to still dwell on petitioner’s argument that it was not, under its
By-Laws, empowered to mortgage its properties to secure the obligation of a third party. Zomer
Development Co. Inc. vs. International Exchange Bank, et al., G.R. No. 150694. March 13,
2009
Injunction; necessity for hearing. A hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Bank of the Philippines Islands vs. La Suerte Trading & Industrial Corp.
etc., G.R. No. 164875, March 20, 2009.
Jurisdiction. Courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. It
is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the
evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are
framed and the case was tried. The courts, in rendering decisions, ought to limit themselves to
the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings. A judgment that goes outside of the issues
and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is not only
irregular but also extra-judicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair
play.
In an ejectment case, the only issue for resolution is the question of who is entitled to the
physical or material possession of the property in dispute. In this case, respondents’ complaint
for ejectment before the MTCC clearly stated that the subject matter of the complaint was Lot
No. 934-B-4. In their answer to counterclaim, respondents reaffirmed that the subject matter of
the complaint was Lot No. 934-B-4. The MTCC’s preliminary conference order limited the issue
to whether petitioners had cottages on Lot No. 934-B-4. Petitioners and respondents filed their
position papers on the basis of the foregoing issue. Clearly, the issue in the complaint for
ejectment was limited to the possession of Lot No. 934-B-4. Therefore, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals, in ruling on the possession and ownership of Lot No. 934-B-7, went beyond the issue
of the case. Sps. Adriano and Norma Sioson, et al. vs. Heirs of Federico Avancena, etc., G.R.
No. 161387, March 13, 2009
Jurisdiction; allegations in complaint. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in
determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or
relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy. To determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must
look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed
for. Based on the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint, it is the HLURB, not the RTC,
which has jurisdiction over this case. Lourdes L. Eristingcol vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
167702. March 20, 2009.
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Litis pendentia. Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. The underlying
principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than
once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded
on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in
courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake
of the stability of the rights and status of persons. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. etc. Vs. Sps.
Roger & Corazon Gernale, et al. G.R. No. 163344, March 20,
2009.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/march2009/163344.htm
Mandamus. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the
exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise
his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant
the Office of the City Prosecutor’s Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In
effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bay’s exercise of judicial discretion.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are
beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those
matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of
judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken
in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw
Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to
act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not
refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the
same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay
committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to
Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for
Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. Nilo Hipos, Sr. representing Darryl Hipos, et
al. vs. Hon. Teodoro A. Bay etc., G.R. No. 174813-15, March 17, 2009
Motion for Reconsideration. It is a hornbook doctrine that the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. Provisions of the Rules of Court prescribing
the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken are considered
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
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discharge of judicial businesses and strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and
imperative.
The citation by the appellate court of the ruling in Amorganda is misplaced. In Amorganda, the
Court stated that the therein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration which was filed two
calendar days late should have been given due course by the appellate court, as the counsel’s
mistaken belief that the last day for filing the motion, a Saturday, was a legal holiday, is
pardonable. The Court went on to note that “anyway, the delay of two (2) calendar days – one
of which was a Sunday- in the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not prejudice the
cause of private respondents, or that said private respondents suffered material injury by reason
of the delay,” and that “private respondents who appear to be guilty of coercion, stand to
unjustly profit from their fraudulent and deceitful act at the expense of petitioners.”
In the case at bar, not only was there a considerable delay of 11 days beyond the 15-day
reglementary period; no explanation therefor was proffered by respondents. That respondents
numbered more than a hundred does not, per se, justify the relaxation of procedural
rules. Motorola Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Imelda B. Ambrocio et al., G.R. No. 173279. March
30, 2009
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given
its attendant facts and circumstances, should be filed or not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the
complaint should the Ombudsman find the complaint insufficient in form or substance, or the
Ombudsman may proceed with the investigation if, in the Ombudsman’s view, the complaint is
in due form and substance. Hence, the filing or non-filing of the information is primarily lodged
within the “full discretion” of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court has consistently adopted a
policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally mandated
powers. The Ombudsman, which is “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” However, the Supreme Court is not
precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is grave abuse of discretion, in
which case the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court may be exceptionally invoked pursuant to
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Severino Vergara Vs.The Honorable Ombudsman
Severino J. Lajara and Virginia G. Baroro, G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009. See also Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Ricardo Evangelista, et al., G.R. No. 177211. March 13, 2009; Dinah C.
Castillo vs. Antonio M. Escutin, et al., G.R. No. 171056. March 13, 2009
Prescription; action to revive judgment. The action to revive the judgment in the forcible entry
case had not prescribed. The judgment sought to be revived was rendered on August 25, 1975
and the motion for reconsideration of the said judgment was denied on September 15, 1976. A
writ of execution was in fact issued. The writ of execution was not enforced, however, within
five years or up to or on or about September 15, 1981. Hence, the filing of Civil Case No.
16681 ─ the action for revival of judgment ─ on August 26, 1985, was well within the 10-year
prescriptive period. STRANGELY, the appellate court, in its challenged decision of May 31,
2006, appears to have reckoned the 10-year prescriptive period from the finality of the trial
court’s decision up to the promulgation of its (the appellate court’s) decision on May 31, 2006,
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hence, its ruling that 30 years had already passed from the finality of the trial court’s
decision. Conrado Quesada, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 177516. March 13,
2009
Prescription; reconveyance. An aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based
on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in 10 years from the date of the issuance of
the Certificate of Title over the property, provided that the property has not been acquired by an
innocent purchaser for value. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully or fraudulently registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. If the registered
owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the free patent was transferred,
knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens title belonged to another,
who together with his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession thereof, and if the
patentee and his successor-in-interest were never in possession thereof, the true owner may
bring an action to have the ownership of or title to the land judicially settled. The court in the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titled issued
upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered owner, to reconvey the parcel of land
to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof. In the instant case, respondents
brought the action for reconveyance of the subject lots before the RTC only on 23 December
2004, or more than 12 years after the Torrens titles were issued in favor of petitioner Perfecta on
9 October 1962. The remedy is, therefore, already time-barred.Perfecta Cavile, et al. vs. Justina
Litania-Hong, et al., G.R. No. 179540. March 13, 2009
Pre-trial; non-appearance. Non-appearance by the plaintiff in the pre-trial is a cause for
dismissal of the action. However, every rule is not without an exception. In fact, Section 4, Rule
18 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides that the non-appearance of a party may be
excused if a valid cause is shown therefor. Such a valid cause extant in the case at bar. Anson
Trade Center, Inc. et al. vs. Pacific Banking Corporation, represented by its liquidator, The
President of the PDIC, G.R. No. 179999. March 17, 2009.
Real party in interest. A co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs since the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all; and that Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 2016, reinforced by
Presidential Decree No. 1517, which prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/occupants,
extends only to landless urban families who are rightful occupants of the land and its structures,
and does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the
benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is
under litigation. James Estreller, et al. Vs. Luis Migue Ysmael, et al.,G.R. No. 170264, March 13,
2009
Res judicata. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that
has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally
and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for
the same cause. The doctrine of res judicata is founded on a public policy against re-opening
that which has previously been decided, so as to put the litigation to an end. The four requisites
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for res judicata to apply are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must
be a judgment or an order on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. National Investment and
Development Corp. vs. Sps. Francisco and Basilisa Bautista, G.R. No. 150388. March 13, 2009.
Service. The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service,
the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail;
and (2) constructive service, the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five
days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster. A party who relies
on constructive service or who contends that his adversary has received a copy of a final order
or judgment upon the expiration of five days from the date the addressee received the first
notice sent by the postmaster must prove that the first notice was actually received by the
addressee. Such proof requires a certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to
the addressee. Service of the NLRC decision via registered mail was deemed completed as of
August 16, 1999, or five days after the first notice on August 11, 1999. As such, PAL only had
10 days from August 16, 1999 to file its motion for reconsideration. Its motion filed on October
29, 1999 was therefore late. Hence the NLRC decision became final and executory. Philippine
Airlines Inc vs. Heirs of Bernandin J. Zamora, G.R. No. 164267/G.R. No. 166996. March 31,
2009
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Certiorari; judicial discretion. A wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in
certiorari proceedings. The Supreme Court has not too infrequently given due course to a
petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have been an appeal, where valid
and compelling considerations would warrant such a recourse. Moreover, the Supreme Court
allowed a Rule 65 petition, despite the availability of plain, speedy or adequate remedy, in view
of the importance of the issues raised therein. The rules were also relaxed by the Supreme Court
after considering the public interest involved in the case; when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictates; when the broader interest of justice so requires; when
the writs issued are null and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. People’s Broadcasting vs. The Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No. 179652, May 8, 2009.
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. The circumstantial evidence available was enough to
convict accused-appellant. Circumstantial evidence may be competent to establish guilt as long
as it is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, and not someone else,
was responsible for the killing. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction as long as
there is (1) more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
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beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines vs. Bonifacio Badriago, G.R. No. 183566,
May 8, 2009.
Evidence; credibility of witness. As a rule, the findings of the trial court relative to the credibility
of the rape victim are normally respected and not disturbed on appeal. More so, if they are
affirmed by the appellate court. It is only in exceptional circumstances that this rule is brushed
aside, such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could affect the result of the case. The People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo
Layco, Sr., G.R. No. 182191, May 8, 2009.
Evidence; Dangerous Drugs Act. The failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key
witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the
irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally
offered in court, fatally conflict with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.
It is this same reason that now moves us to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present
case. Guido Catuiran y Necudemus vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175467, May 8,
2009.
Extrajudicial foreclosure; notice. The Court of Appeals invalidated the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage on the ground that petitioner had failed to furnish respondent personal notice of
the sale contrary to the stipulation in the real estate mortgage. Petitioner, on the other hand,
claims that under paragraph 12 of the real estate mortgage, personal notice of the foreclosure
sale is not a requirement to the validity of the foreclosure sale. A perusal of the records of the
case shows that a notice of sheriff’s sale was sent by registered mail to respondent and received
in due course. Yet, respondent claimed that it did not receive the notice but only learned about
it from petitioner. Paragraph 12 of the real estate mortgage requires petitioner merely to furnish
respondent with the notice and does not oblige petitioner to ensure that respondent actually
receives the notice. On this score, the Supreme Court helds that petitioner has performed its
obligation under paragraph 12 of the real estate mortgage. Producers Bank of the Philippines vs.
Excelsa Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 152071, May 8, 2009.
Extrajudicial foreclosure; writ of possession. It is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of
possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. The governing law,
Act No. 3135, as amended, in Section 7 thereof, explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex
parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral
proceeding in the case of property with Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the
approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the
order for a writ of possession. The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without
the filing and approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title in the name of the purchaser
But the rule is not without exception. Under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is
made suppletory to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6 of Act
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3135, as amended, the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in
the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor. Thus, in the cited case of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor
of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the
debtor/mortgagor. This is substantiated by the Civil Code which protects the actual possessor of
a property. Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Prime Neighborhood Association, G.R. No.
175728 & G.R. No. 178914, May 8, 2009,
Forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both action; (b) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending cases, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other
case. GD Express Worldwide N.V., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136978, May 8,
2009.
Intervention; intestate proceedings. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor “has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x” While the language
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate
proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor
“must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.”
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court, not the Rules on
Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that “[i]n the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings.”
The Supreme Court concluded that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set
forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of “intervention” under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate
contingent claims. Alfredo Hilado, Lopez Sugar Corporation, First Farmers Holding Corporation
vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009.
Judgment; motion to held in abeyance execution. Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition
or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment. Execution of a final judgment is the
fruit and end of the suit. While a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected,
once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should
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not be permitted to initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March
2001 Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer
subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors
or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the
judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has become final
and executory. This is the principle of immutability of final judgment. Panfilo D. Bongcac vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 156687-88, May 21, 2009.
Judicial notice. The labor arbiter took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing business practices
in the coconut industry that copra making activities are done quarterly; that the workers can
contract with other farms; and that the workers are independent from the land owner on all
work aspects. Petitioner wants this Court to take judicial notice of the current business practice
in the coconut industry which allegedly treats copraceros as independent contractors. An
invocation that the Supreme Court take judicial notice of certain facts should satisfy the
requisites set forth by case law. A mere prayer for its application shall not suffice. Thus, in this
case the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged business practices in the copra
industry since none of the material requisites of matters of judicial notice is present in the instant
petition. The record is bereft of any indication that the matter is of common knowledge to the
public and that it has the characteristic of notoriety, except petitioners’ self-serving claim. South
Davao Development Company, Inc., et al. vs. Sergio L. Gamo, et al., G.R. No. 171814, May 8,
2009.
Jurisdiction; CIAC. An examination of the allegations in Fong’s complaint reveals that his cause
of action springs not from a violation of the provisions of the Trade Contract, but from the
assignment of Maxco’s retention money to him and failure of petitioner to turn over the
retention money. The allegations in Fong’s Complaint are clear and simple: (1) That Maxco had
an outstanding obligation to respondent; (2) Maxco assigned to Fong its retention from petitioner
in payment of the said obligation; (3) Petitioner as early as April 18, 2005 was notified of the
assignment; (4) Despite due notice of such assignment, petitioner still refused to deliver the
amount assigned to respondent, giving preference, instead, to the 2 other creditors of Maxco; (5)
At the time petitioner was notified of the assignment, there were only one other notice of
garnishment and there were sufficient residual amounts to satisfy Fong’s claim; and (6) uncertain
over which one between Maxco and petitioner he may resort to for payment, respondent named
them both as defendants in Civil Case No. 06-0200-CFM.
Although the jurisdiction of the CIAC is not limited to the instances enumerated in Section 4 of E.
O. No. 1008, Fong’s claim is not even construction-related at all. This court has held that:
“Construction is defined as referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering structures, from
land clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly and installation
of components and equipment.” Thus, petitioner’s insistence on the application of the
arbitration clause of the Trade Contract to Fong is clearly anchored on an erroneous premise
that the latter is seeking to enforce a right under the trade contract. This premise cannot stand
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since the right to the retention money of Maxco under the Trade Contract is not being impugned
herein. It bears mentioning that petitioner readily conceded the existence of the retention money.
Fong’s demand that the portion of retention money should have been paid to him before the
other creditors of Maxco clearly, does not require the CIAC’s expertise and technical knowledge
of construction. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs. Hon. Edwin D. Sorongon, et
al., G.R. No. 176709, May 8, 2009.
Jurisdiction; HLURB. The HLURB has no jurisdiction to declare petitioners as absolute owners
of the subdivision lots as against the Heirs of Laudiza who filed an action for reconveyance
against respondent Casal, which is still pending before the RTC. However, nothing prevents the
HLURB from adjudicating on the issue of whether the alleged subsequent sale of the subdivision
lots to respondents Ang and Cuason constituted a double sale because the issue is intimately
related to petitioners’ complaint to compel respondents CRS Realty, Casal and Salvador to
perform their obligation under the contracts to sell. Considering that the alleged subsequent sale
to respondents Ang and Cuason apparently would constitute a breach of respondents’ obligation
to issue the certificate of title to petitioners, if not an unsound business practice punishable
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344,[50] the HLURB cannot shirk from its mandate to enforce the
laws for the protection of subdivision buyers. The HLURB may determine if the alleged
subsequent sale to respondents Ang and Cuason of those lots initially sold to petitioners
constituted a double sale and was tainted with fraud as opposed to the respondents’ claim that
only the unsold portions of the subdivision property were sold to them. Vicenta Cantemprate vs.
CRS Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 171399, May 8, 2009.
Jurisdiction; Intra-corporate controversy. There is no question that the prayers for the
appointment of a management receiver, the nullification and amendment of certain provisions
of PEAC’s articles of incorporation and by-laws, the recognition of the election of respondent
Filchart’s directors, as well as the inspection of the corporate books, are intra-corporate in
nature as they pertain to the regulation of corporate affairs.
Even the issue of respondent Filchart’s status as stockholder in PEAC and, concomitantly, its
capacity to file SEC Case No. 08-97-5746 must be threshed out in the intra-corporate
proceedings. Petitioner GD Express’ allegation that respondent Filchart has not fully paid its
subscription to the shares in PEAC and, thus, cannot claim to be a stockholder in PEAC does not
oust the SCC of its jurisdiction over the case. For the purpose of determining whether SEC Case
No. 08-97-5746 should be heard as an intra-corporate proceeding, the allegation in respondent
Filchart’s petition that it is a stockholder in PEAC is deemed hypothetically admitted. It is only
after a full-blown hearing that the SCC may determine whether respondent Filchart’s may be
considered a bona fide stockholder of PEAC and is entitled to the reliefs prayed for in its petition.
However, in view of the transfer of jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes from the SEC to the
SCCs, which are the same RTCs exercising general jurisdiction, the question of jurisdiction is no
longer decisive to the resolution of the instant case. GD Express Worldwide N.V., et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 136978, May 8, 2009.
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Jurisdiction; panel of arbitrators. The regular courts, not the panel of arbitrators, has jurisdiction
over disputes between aprties to an operating agreement. Olympic Mines and Development
Corp., vs. Platinum Group of Metals Corp./Citinickel Mines and Development Corp. vs. Hon.
Judge Beienvenido C. Blancaflor, et al./Platinum Group of Metals vs. Citinickel Mines and
Development Corp. etc./Platinum Group of Metals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Polly C.
Dy, G.R. No. 178188, G.R. No. 180674, G.R. No. 181141 and G.R. No. 183527, May 8, 2009.
Reconveyance. An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as
incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in other persons’ names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to
have a better right. Angel M. Pagaduan vs. Spouses Estanislao & Fe Posadas Ocuma, G.R. No.
176308, May 8, 2009.
Unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
In such case, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination
of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.
It can readily be inferred that petitioner is primarily asserting his ownership over the subject
property. It should be reiterated, at the point of being repetitive, that in an unlawful detainer
case, the only issue to be resolved is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the property in dispute. The trial court and the appellate court were one
in saying that respondent had overwhelmingly established its right of possession by virtue of the
dacion en pago and the torrens title.
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to note that in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised for the simple reason that the Court is not a
trier of facts. It is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below. The factual findings of the trial court, especially when adopted and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals as in the present case, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal.
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the appellate court lent more credence to the validity
of the dacion en pago and respondent’s title. This determination, however, is regarded merely as
provisional. It is a settled doctrine that courts in ejectment cases may determine questions of
ownership whenever necessary to decide the question of possession. In any case, we sustain the
finding that the respondents have the better right to possess the subject property.
Well-established is the rule that if possession is by tolerance as has been alleged in the
complaint such possession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate, with the possessor refusing
to comply with such demand. Samuel Malabanan vs. Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc., G.R. No.
163495, May 8, 2009.
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Actions; quasi in rem. The petition for cancellation of entries annotated at the back of OCT No.
40287 ought to have been directed against specific persons: namely, the heirs of Juan Soriano as
appearing in Entry No. 20102 and, indubitably, against their successors-in-interest who have
acquired different portions of the property over the years because it is in the nature of an
action quasi in rem.Accordingly, the Salazars should have impleaded as party defendants the
heirs of Juan Soriano and/or Vicenta Macaraeg as well as those claiming ownership over the
property under their names because they are indispensable parties. This was not done in this
case. Since no indispensable party was ever impleaded by the Salazars in their petition for
cancellation of entry filed before Branch 63 of the RTC of Tarlac, herein petitioners are not
bound by the dispositions of the said court. Consequently, the judgment or order of the said
court never even acquired finality. Zenaida Acosta, et al. vs. TrinidadSalazar, et al., G.R. No.
161034. June 30, 2009
Answer; counterclaim. There is no merit in petitioners’ contention that the Counter-Petition for
Partition in their Answer was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which does not require
the payment of docket fees.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. It
may either be permissive or compulsory. It is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. A permissive
counterclaim is essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
A counterclaim is compulsory when its object arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction. Unlike permissive counterclaims, compulsory counterclaims should be set up in the
same action; otherwise, they would be barred forever.
Respondents’ action was for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, title and
partition of the property subject of the Deed. On the other hand, in the Counter-Petition filed by
petitioners in their Answer to respondents’ complaint, they were asking for the partition and
accounting of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina,
which are entirely different from the subject matter of the respondents’ action. Petitioners’
claim does not arise out of or is necessarily connected with the action for the Annulment of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the property covered by TCT No. 458396. Thus, payment
of docket fees is necessary before the RTC could acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ petition
for partition. Cristina F. Reillo, et al. vs. Galicano E. San Jose etc., et al., G.R. No. 166393, June
18, 2009.
Appeal; BSP. Having established that the BSP Monetary Board is indeed a quasi-judicial body
exercising quasi-judicial functions; then as such, it is one of those quasi-judicial agencies,
though not specifically mentioned in Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, and
Section 1, Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, are deemed included
therein. Therefore, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, orders,
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resolutions or awards of the BSP Monetary Board on administrative complaints against banks
and quasi-banks, which the former acquires through the filing by the aggrieved party of a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. United Coconut
Planters Bank, et al. vs. E. Ganzon, Inc./E. Ganzon, Inc. vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et
al., G.R. No. 168859/G.R. No. 168897, June 30, 2009.
Appeal; CIAC. Appeals from judgment of the CIAC shall be taken to the Court of Appeals by
filing a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of award,
judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.
Admittedly, Uy received the CIAC decision on June 7, 2000; that instead of filing a verified
petition for review with the CA, Uy filed a motion for correction of computation on June 16,
2000, pursuant to Section 9, Article XV of the Rules of Procedure Governing Construction
Arbitration. With the filing of the motion for correction, the running of the period to appeal was
effectively interrupted.
CIAC was supposed to resolve the motion for correction of computation within 30 days from the
time the comment or opposition thereto was submitted. In Uy’s case, no resolution was issued
despite the lapse of the 30-day period, and Uy considered it as a denial of his motion.
Accordingly, he elevated his case to the CA on July 24, 2000. But not long thereafter, or on
August 1, 2000, the CIAC issued an Order denying the motion for correction of
computation. Obviously, when Uy filed his petition for review with the CA, the period to
appeal had not yet lapsed; it was interrupted by the pendency of his motion for computation.
There is no basis, therefore, to conclude that the petition was belatedly filed. Elpidio S. Uy, etc.
vs. Public Estates Authority and the Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 147925-26, June 8,
2009.
Appeal; defect in notarial document. The Supreme Court had, on numerous occasions, veered
away from the general rule and relaxed the application of technical rules when, in its
assessment, the appeal on its face appeared absolutely meritorious. The Supreme Court had, in
a number of instances, relaxed procedural rules in order to serve and achieve substantial justice.
However, in this case, the circumstances in this case do not warrant the relaxation of the rules.
The Certification issued by the notary public will not save the day for petitioner. The same is
merely a belated attempt to comply with the requirements under the NLRC Rules of Procedure
and the Notarial Rules. Petitioner failed to explain how, if indeed the Unilab representatives and
their legal counsel appeared before the Notary Public together with the bonding company
representative, they failed to indicate their CTC numbers on the document knowing fully well –
the legal counsel most especially – that the same is required by law. To allow such certification
to “cure” the procedural lapse made by petitioner would undermine the integrity of notarized
documents. Pedriatica, Inc. vs. Joselito T. Rafaeles,G.R. No. 180755, June 19, 2009.
Appeal; execution pending appeal. Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal
under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 does not apply to eminent domain proceedings. Spouses Ernesto F.
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Curata, et al. vs. Philippine Ports Authority, Philippine Ports Authority vs. Remedios Rosales-
Bondoc, et al., Philippine Ports Authority vs. Hon. Paterno Tac-an, et al., Rosalina Buenafe, et al.
vs. Philippine Ports Authority, Philippine Ports Authority vs. Caroline B. Acosta, et al., Philippine
Ports Authority vs. Remedios Rosales-Bondoc, et al.G.R. Nos. 154211-12, G.R. No. 158252,
G.R. No. 166200, G.R. No. 168272, G.R. No. 170683, G.R. No. 173392. June 22, 2009
Appeal; failure to file brief. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes,
of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. There are exceptions to this rule, such as
when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or
when the application of the general rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property
through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no reason to exempt petitioner from the
general rule. Nena A. Cariño vs. Estrella M. Espinosa, represented by her atty-in-fact Manuel P.
Mejia, Jr., G.R. No. 166036, June 19, 2009.
Appeal; failure to file brief. Petitioners insist that they relied on the supposed professionalism of
their counsel. According to them, having received the notice from the Court of Appeals to file a
brief, their counsel was supposed to know his duty, not only as their counsel but also as an
officer of the court; and they conclude that they should not be blamed and penalized if the
conduct of their counsel fell way short of what was expected of him. This reasoning of
petitioners merits no consideration.
It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel’s conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. Glen Pascual Y Malumbay, et al. Vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 162286, June 5, 2009.
Appeal; failure to file memorandum on appeal. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In
other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. This, the
petitioner failed to do when he did not submit his memorandum on appeal. Bonifacio M.
Mejillano vs. Enrique Lucillo, et al., G.R. No. 154717, June 19, 2009.
Appeal; Games and Amusement Board. The PBA should have appealed the ruling of
respondent Gaite of the Office of the President to the Court of Appeals within 15 days from
notice, and its failure to comply with the prescribed process is a ground for the dismissal of the
petition. Rule 65 – the legal basis for the present petition – itself bars its use as a mode of review
when an appeal or any other remedy at law is available. While jurisprudence has recognized
exceptions to this rule, the exceptions – like any other exception – must be strictly, rather than
liberally, applied. In other words, a petitioner wrongly filing a Rule 65 petition must show a
clear entitlement to the jurisprudentially-recognized exceptions. These exceptions are: when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; when the interests of substantial
justice so require; and when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. Philippine Basketball Association Vs. Honorable Manuel B. Gaite, in his capacity as
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Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the President, et al.,G.R. No. 170312, June 26,
2009.
Appeal; non-payment of docket fees. Among the grounds that pertinent jurisprudence has
recognized as justifying the loosening up of the stringent requirement on payment of docket
fees are: (1) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure; (2) good faith of the defaulting party by paying within a
reasonable time from the time of the default; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is frivolous and dilatory; (6) no unjust prejudice to
the other party; and (7) importance of the issues involved. Concomitant to a liberal
interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Spouses Ernesto F. Curata, et al.
vs. Philippine Ports Authority, Philippine Ports Authority vs. Remedios Rosales-Bondoc, et al.,
Philippine Ports Authority vs. Hon. Paterno Tac-an, et al., Rosalina Buenafe, et al. vs. Philippine
Ports Authority, Philippine Ports Authority vs. Caroline B. Acosta, et al., Philippine Ports
Authority vs. Remedios Rosales-Bondoc, et al. G.R. Nos. 154211-12, G.R. No. 158252, G.R. No.
166200, G.R. No. 168272, G.R. No. 170683, G.R. No. 173392. June 22, 2009.
Appeal; non-payment of fees. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial court’s decision in
election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and the payment of theP1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the
decision within the five-day reglementary period. The non-payment or the insufficient payment
of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with
Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not affect the
perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
Following, Rule 22, Section 9(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. Pursuant
to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may refuse to
take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. In such a
situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not. Accordingly,
in the instant case, the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss petitioner’s appeal, as it in fact did,
for petitioner’s failure to pay the P3,200.00 appeal fee. Jerry B. Aguilar vs. The Commission on
Elections and Romulo R. Insoy, G.R. No. 185140, June 30, 2009.
Appeal; relief from judgment. While the reglementary periods fixed under the rules for relief
from judgment are mandatory in character, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in
terms of compliance may, in the interest of substantial justice, be relaxed. Since rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, they are not to be
applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale
for their existence. In line with this postulate, the Court can and will relax or altogether suspend
the application of the rules, or except a particular case from the rules’ operation when their rigid
application tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. The peculiarities of the
instant case impel us to do so now. Foremost of these is the fact that the Republic had properly
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made out a prima facie case of double titling over the subject lot, meriting a ventilation of the
factual and legal issues relative to that case. Heirs of the late Jose Luzuriaga, etc., vs. Republic
of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General/Heirs of the late Jose Luzuriaga, etc.,
vs. Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General G.R. No. 168848/G.R. No.
169019, June 30, 2009
Certiorari; abuse of discretion. Settled is the rule that a petition for certiorari is proper to correct
only errors of jurisdiction committed by respondent court, tribunal or administrative agency.
Public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the
case, or in excess of jurisdiction if it oversteps its authority as determined by law. Grave abuse
of discretion is committed when respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or
despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In a
petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope as it is limited to resolving
only cases of jurisdiction.
Here, petitioner argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the denial of
petitioner’s motion to lift or revoke levy without even passing upon the substantive issue on the
propriety of levying her family home. She insists that the levied property in Catanduanes should
have been exempt from execution pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code in relation to
Articles 152 to 154 thereof,which she maintains she could have proven had she been accorded
the opportunity to present evidence to this effect.
The contention must fall. The appellate court, in its assailed resolution, amply explained the
reason for the affirmance of the RTC’s decision. Filomena Soneja vs. Honorable Court of
Appeals and Ramon Saura, Jr., G.R. No. 161533, June 5, 2009.
Certiorari; abuse of process. The petitioner’s unusual approaches and use of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court do not appear to us to be the result of any error in reading Rule 65, given the way
the petition was crafted. Rather, it was a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner
could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65. It was, at the very least, an
attempted bypass of other available, albeit lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court
provide. While we stop short of concluding that the petitioner’s approaches constitute an abuse
of process through a manipulative reading and application of the Rules of Court, we
nevertheless resolve that the petition should be dismissed for its blatant violation of the
Rules. The transgressions alleged in a petition, however weighty they may sound, cannot be
justifications for blatantly disregarding the rules of procedure, particularly when remedial
measures were available under these same rules to achieve the petitioner’s objectives. For our
part, we cannot and should not – in the name of liberality and the “transcendental importance”
doctrine – entertain these types of petitions. As we held in the very recent case of Lozano, et al.
vs. Nograles, albeit from a different perspective, our liberal approach has its limits and should
not be abused. Jose Concepcion, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 178624, June 30,
2009.
Certiorari; acquittal. Although the Supreme Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of
the remedy of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
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convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave
and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
A judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. In which event, the accused cannot be considered at risk
of double jeopardy — the revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the
risk of answering twice for the same offense. People of the Philippines vs. Joven De Grano, et
al., G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009 .
Certiorari; evaluation of evidence. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and it does not include a review of the
tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. The findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any
other administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are
binding on the Court. The Court is not a trier of facts; it is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of factual allegations. The Court’s function, as mandated by Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, this Court will have no occasion to exercise its corrective power. It has no authority
to inquire into what it thinks is apparent error.
Thus, in this case, the Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as a sectoral
party, because to do so will entail an evaluation of the evidence to determine whether indeed
petitioner qualifies as a party-list organization and whether it has made untruthful statements in
its application for registration. V C. Cadangen, et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
177179, June 5, 2009 .
Evidence; admission. Bascugin’s confession was freely, intelligently, and deliberately
given. Judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no
sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so
by truth and conscience. Admission of guilt constitutes evidence against the accused pursuant
to the following provisions of the Rules of Court. People of the Philippines vs. Leodegario
Bascuguin y Agquiz, G.R. No. 184704, June 30, 2009.
Evidence; burden of proof. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proof. No satisfactory
evidence was presented to prove by preponderance of evidence that respondents committed the
acts imputed against them. As such, there is no more need to discuss whether the assailed
statements are defamatory. Francisco N. Villanueva vs. Virgilio P. Balaquer, et al., G.R. No.
180197, June 23, 2009.
Evidence; findings of trial court. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the
highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. A review of such
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findings by this Court is not warranted except upon a showing of highly meritorious
circumstances, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its factual findings
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; (5) when there is a misapprehension of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on
the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. None of these exceptions
necessitating a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this instance. Siain Enterprises, Inc.
vs.Cupertino Realty Corp. and Edwin R. Catacutan, G.R. No. 170782, June 22, 2009.
Evidence; notarial document. It is a settled rule that a notarial document is evidence of the
facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed; and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. Notarization converts a private document into a public document, thus making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document
is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. Indeed, a notarized deed of absolute sale, being a public
document, has in its favor the presumption of regularity, which may only be rebutted by
evidence so clear, strong, and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the
certificate. Thus, the burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a
notarized document lies on the party contesting such execution.
In this case, it is the petitioner who has the onus of overcoming the presumed regularity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 11, 1975, in favor of respondent Arsenio. Francisco G.
Calma vs. Arsenio Santos, et al., G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009.
Execution; pending appeal. Execution pending appeal does not bar the continuance of the
appeal on the merits and respondents are not left without relief in the event of reversal of the
judgment against it. Section 5, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that where the
executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial
court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as equity and
justice may warrant under the circumstances. Archinet International, Inc., et al. vs. Becco
Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183753, June 19, 2009.
Execution; prescription. It is settled that an original action for certiorari is an independent action
and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained of. It
does not interrupt the course of the original action if there was no writ of injunction, even if in
connection with a pending case in a lower court.
Clearly, the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 36500) assailing the February 22, 1994
resolution did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. The petition for review on certiorari
(G.R. No. L-125418) had the same effect because it was merely a continuation of CA-G.R. SP
No. 36500. Even if these actions sought a reversal of the February 22, 1994 resolution, they did
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not suspend the running of the prescriptive period for execution in favor of respondent. The very
nature of a certiorari proceeding militates against considering it in favor of respondent. Besides,
no writ of injunction was issued in favor of respondent which could have validly suspended the
running of the prescriptive period.
However, the same rule cannot be applied to G.R. No. 138993. Despite being an original
certiorari proceeding, G.R. No. 138993 tolled the running of the prescriptive period. An analysis
of its peculiar nature justifies taking it out of the ambit of the rule that certiorari proceedings do
not toll the running of the prescriptive period. Philippines Veterans Bank vs. Solid Homes, Inc.
Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 170126. June 9, 2009
Execution; real property. t in implementing the involuntary transfer of title of real property
levied and sold on execution, it is not enough for the executing party to file a motion with the
court which rendered judgment. The proper course of action is to file a petition in court, rather
than merely move, for the issuance of new titles. Archinet International, Inc., et al. vs. Becco
Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 183753, June 19, 2009.
Forcible entry. For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the complainant must allege and prove that
he was in prior physical possession of the property and that he was deprived of such possession
by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. A party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain in the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.
A party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
doing so, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the
defendant’s. To prove prior possession, respondent presented his tax declarations, tax receipt
and a certification from the municipal assessor attesting that he has paid real property tax from
previous years. He, likewise, testified that he appointed the spouses Mojica as his caretakers,
and allowed three other spouses to build their houses on the property. Respondent’s counsels
also explained that they were not able to secure the affidavits of the occupants of the property
and the neighbors because they feared for their lives.
Respondent’s evidence fails to make out a prima facie case of forcible entry as it does not
satisfactorily establish that respondent has been in physical possession of the subject property
prior to petitioner’s occupation thereof. Joven De Grano, etc., vs. Gregorio Lacaba, G.R. No.
158877, June 16, 2009.
Forcible entry. In ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical
or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth
by any of the party-litigants. The one who can prove prior possession de facto may recover
such possession even from the owner himself. Possession de facto is the physical possession of
real property. Possession de facto and not possession de jure is the only issue in a forcible entry
case. This rule holds true regardless of the character of a party’s possession, provided, that he
has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully
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ejected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Precy Bunyi and Mila Bunyi vs. Fe S. Factor, G.R. No. 172547, June 30, 2009.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/172547.htm
Foreclosure; redemption. The debtor may redeem his property sold at an auction sale in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage within one year from the date of registration of the
certificate of sale. Under Article 13 of the Civil Code, a year consists of 365 days. Since the
certificate of sale was annotated on the certificate of title (TCT No. 11637) only on 7 February
2001, petitioner could exercise her right to redeem the property until 7 February 2002.
Although petitioner filed a complaint for judicial redemption on 6 February 2002, the records
are bereft of any indication that petitioner ever paid or consigned with the trial court the
redemption price. Furthermore, in all her pleadings, petitioner never indicated that she has
already paid or consigned with the trial court the redemption price.
Considering the lack of consignation of the redemption price since the petitioner’s filing of the
action for judicial redemption on 6 February 2002, it would be unfair to deny respondent the
possession of the property which it bought for P3,958,539.92 in a public auction on 24
September 1999. Between petitioner who has not paid or consigned with the trial court the
redemption price, and respondent who bought the property as the highest bidder in the auction
sale, the latter is more entitled to have possession of the property. Petitioner cannot be granted
possession of the property by the mere expediency of filing an action for judicial redemption
without ever paying or consigning the redemption price with the trial court. Marylou B.
Tolentino, M.D. vs. Shenton Realty Corp., G.R. No. 162103, June 19, 2009.
Information; amended. The public prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not
exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC. Resolution No. 7457, which effectively
revoked the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque, was issued on 4 April
2005, after the Amended Informations were filed on 28 October 2004. The letter dated 11
October 2004, written by Director Alioden D. Dalaig of the COMELEC Law Department, did not
revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor of Parañaque. Bienvenido Diño,
et al. vs. Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, June 23, 2009.
Inhibition. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, we have noted
that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially
when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative
of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose,
in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only
exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable
inference of bad faith or malice. Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Sps. Wilson Dy
Hong Pi and Lolita Dy and Sps Primo Chuyaco, Jr. and Chuyaco, G.R. No. 171137, June 5,
2009.
Judgment; amended. There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental
judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the
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original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the
factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which
supersedes the original decision. Following the Court’s differentiation of a supplemental
pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take
the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to
bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the
original. It does not replace that which it supplements. Eric L. Lee vs. Hon. Henry J. Trocino, et
al., G.R. No. 164648, June 19, 2009.
Judgment; compromise agreement. Under Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions, as they may
deem convenient, provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make
reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences, thereby putting an end to
litigation. Such means of dispute settlement is an accepted, even desirable and encouraged,
practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals. Spouses Eduardo Tankiang and Mayda
Tankiang vs. Metropolitan and Trust Company, Inc., G.R. No. 181675, June 22, 2009.
Judgment; compromise agreement. Article 1306 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides
that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions, as they
may deem convenient, provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make
reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation, or put an end to one already commenced. It is an
accepted, even desirable and encouraged, practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals.
A compromise agreement intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is a judicial
compromise. Having judicial mandate and entered as its determination of the controversy, it
has the force and effect of a judgment. It transcends its identity as a mere contract between the
parties as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules of
Court. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court
attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the
agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance
with the terms of the agreement is decreed. California Manufacturing Company, Inc. vs. The
City of Las Piñas, et al., G.R. No. 178461, June 22, 2009.
Judgment; finality. The CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for review that was filed
way beyond the reglementary period. Rules of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of
substantial justice and in order to give a litigant the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
his complaint. However, concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should
be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to explain its failure to comply with the
rules and prove the existence of exceptionally meritorious circumstances warranting such
liberality.
Respondent proffered no explanation for the delay as, in fact, he did not acknowledge that he
filed his petition for review with the CA beyond the prescriptive period. In his motion for
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extension of time to file the petition for review with the CA, respondent alleged that it was the
October 28, 2001 RTC Order that denied his motion for reconsideration. As a stratagem or out
of plain ignorance, he counted the reglementary period from the date of his receipt of the said
order. But, as the CA was well aware, the reglementary period should have been counted from
the receipt of the March 28, 2001 Order.
Respondent might have been confused with the rule that, when a judgment is amended, the
date of the amendment should be considered the date of the decision in the computation of the
period for perfecting the appeal. For all intents and purposes, the lower court rendered a new
judgment from which the time to appeal must be reckoned. However, this rule presupposes that
the amendment consists of a material alteration of such substance and proportion that would, in
effect, give rise to an entirely new judgment. But when the amendment merely consists of the
correction of a clerical error, no new judgment arises. In such case, the period for filing the
appeal should, still be counted from the receipt of the original judgment. Joven De Grano,
etc., vs. Gregorio Lacaba, G.R. No. 158877. June 16, 2009.
Judgment; finality. As a general rule, the statutory requirement that when no motion for
reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes
executory in due course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The
purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and, second,
to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the giving
of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules of
procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be given due course, such as: (1)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(4) lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other
party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby. Mercedita T. Guasch vs. Arnaldo Dela Cruz, G.R.
No. 176015, June 16, 2009.
Judgment on the pleadings. Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential
question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment
on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s
answer to raise an issue. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny
the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.
In this case, respondents’ principal action was for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and annulment
of title on the ground that petitioners stated in the said Deed that they are the legitimate
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descendants and sole heirs of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. Although petitioners denied
in their Answer that the Deed was falsified, they, however, admitted respondents’ allegation that
spouses Quiterio and Antonina had 5 children, thus, supporting respondents’ claim that
petitioners are not the sole heirs of the deceased spouses. Petitioners’ denial/admission in his
Answer to the complaint should be considered in its entirety and not truncated parts.
Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents Galicano, Victoria, Catalina and
Maribeth are the children and grandchild, respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina,
who were the original registered owners of the subject property, and thus excluding respondents
from the deed of settlement of the subject property, there is no more genuine issue between the
parties generated by the pleadings, thus, the RTC committed no reversible error in rendering the
judgment on the pleadings. Cristina F. Reillo, et al. vs. Galicano E. San Jose etc., et al., G.R. No.
166393, June 18, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. Jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the
coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court.
As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority. Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Sps. Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy
and Sps Primo Chuyaco, Jr. and Chuyaco, G.R. No. 171137, June 5, 2009.
Jurisdiction; after judgment. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the court to execute its
judgment continues even after the judgment had become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment. The present case is no exception. Therefore, notwithstanding the final resolution on
the validity of the expropriation made by this Court on June 19, 2003 in G.R. No. 154411, the
RTC, Branch 19 can still rule on the motions for the issuance of an alias writ of execution and
payment of interest. As the CA correctly stated: “…the duty of the court does not end with the
tender of the decision. Equal is the duty of the court to enforce said decision to the fullest of its
intent, tenor and mandate. To sustain a contrary view would not only trivialize the decision, but
would also render it meaningless; the justice sought by the aggrieved party and supposedly
conferred by the court turned inutile.” National Housing Authority vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelorido,
et al., G.R. No. 166518, June 16, 2009.
Jurisdiction; cadastral court. We hardly can subscribe to the Republic’s argument that the
publication of the amendment in petitioners’ application is a condition sine qua non for the RTC,
acting as cadastral court, to acquire jurisdiction. Sec. 7 of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the
Cadastral Act, and Sec. 35 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree,
provide for the publication of the application for registration and the schedule of the initial
hearing. This is so since judicial cadastral proceedings, like ordinary administrative registration,
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are in rem, and are governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence. Due
publication is required to give notice to all interested parties of the claim and identity of the
property that will be surveyed. And any additional territory or change in the area of the claim
cannot be included by amendment of the plan or application without new publication,
otherwise the cadastral court does not acquire jurisdiction over the additional or amended
claim. But where the identity and area of the claimed property are not the subjects of
amendment but other collateral matters, a new publication is not needed.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that due publication was made for Lot No. 1524, its
identity and area. The amendment in petitioners’ application in the relief portion neither altered
the area and identity of the subject lot nor added any territory. Thus, no new publication is
required. Besides, the Republic, through Prosecutor Bayona, has been duly notified of such
amendment. Consequently, the Republic could not plausibly argue that it was deprived of its
day in court. Heirs of the late Jose Luzuriaga, etc., vs. Republic of the Philippines thru the Office
of the Solicitor General/Heirs of the late Jose Luzuriaga, etc., vs. Republic of the Philippines thru
the Office of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 168848/G.R. No. 169019, June 30, 2009.
Jurisdiction; CIAC. E.O. 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that have
agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. In this case, the CIAC validly acquired
jurisdiction over the dispute. Petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal
when it signed the TOR.
After recognizing the CIAC’s jurisdiction, petitioner cannot be permitted to now question that
same authority it earlier accepted, only because it failed to obtain a favorable decision. This is
especially true in the instant case since petitioner is challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction for the
first time before this Court. Stronghold Insurance, Company, Inc. vs. Tokyu Construction
Company, Ltd., G.R. No. 158820-21, June 5, 2009.
Jurisdiction; CTA. To be very precise, Shell’s petition before the CTA principally questioned the
validity of the cancellation of the TCCs – a decision that was made not by the respondent, but
by the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center. As the CTA has no
jurisdiction over decisions of the Center, Shell’s remedy against the cancellation should have
been a certiorari petition before the regular courts, not a tax protest case before the
CTA. Records do not show that Shell ever availed of this remedy. Alternatively, as we held
in Shell v. Republic of the Philippines, the appropriate forum for Shell under the circumstances
of this case should be at the collection cases before the RTC where Shell can put up the fact of
its payment as a defense. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. Commissioner of
Customs, G.R. No. 176380, June 18, 2009.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/june2009/176380.htm
Jurisdiction; DARAB. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties. It is, therefore, essential to establish all the indispensable
elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3)
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that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Respondents’
complaint did not contain any allegation that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a
tenancy relation between them and the petitioners. Sps. Constante Agbulos and Zanaida Padilla
Agbulos vs. Nicasio Gutierrez, Josefa Gutierrez and Elena G. Garcia, G.R. No. 176530, June 16,
2009.
Jurisdiction; DARAB. Petitioners’ argument that the case involves an agrarian matter divesting
the regular courts of jurisdiction therefore has no merit. They are not farmer-beneficiaries but
mere usurpers of the land. Zosimo Octavio and Jesus Albona (substituted by his wife, Violeta
Albona) vs. Enrico R. Perovano, G.R. No. 172400, June 23, 2009.
Jurisdiction; DOLE. This petition clearly involves a labor standards case, and it is in keeping
with the law that “the worker need not litigate to get what legally belongs to him, for the whole
enforcement machinery of the DOLE exists to insure its expeditious delivery to him free of
charge.” We, therefore, sustain the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director in this
case. Nestor J. Balladares, etal., vs. Peak Ventures Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 161794, June 16,
2009.
Jurisdiction; HLURB. It is apparent that although the complaint was denominated as one for
declaratory relief/annulment of contracts, the allegations therein reveal otherwise. It should be
stressed that respondents neither asked for the interpretation of the questioned by-laws nor did
they allege that the same is doubtful or ambiguous and require judicial construction.
In the instant case, the HLURB has the expertise to resolve the basic technical issue of whether
the house built by the respondents violated the Deed of Restriction, specifically the prohibition
against multi-dwelling. Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc., Vs. Samantha Marie T. Almendras and
Pia Angela T. Almendras, G.R. No. 171763. June 5, 2009.
Jurisdiction; HLURB. Tri-Corp’s chief quest is the cancellation of Entry No. 31976 from TCTs
Nos. 205827 and 205828, and the cancellation of the CCT of the unit sold to it, and it alludes to
Greystone’s use of different descriptions of the condominium project in order to circumvent
existing laws, rules and regulations on registration of real estate projects in its petition. Under
these circumstances, Tri-Corp is alluding to steps allegedly taken by Greystone in consummating
an alleged unsound real estate business practice. The HLURB has the technical expertise to
resolve this technical issue. Jurisdiction therefore properly pertains to the HLURB. Tri-Corp
Land & Development, Inc. represented by Solita S. Jimenez-Paulino vs. Court of Appeals and
Greystone Corporation, G.R. No. 165742, June 30, 2009.
Jurisdiction; Monetary board. Crystal clear in Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act is the
provision that says the “appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively
with the Monetary Board.” The term “exclusively” connotes that only the Monetary Board can
resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative
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finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the fact that the
law allows the Monetary Board to take action “summarily and without need for prior hearing.”
And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that “actions of the Monetary Board taken under
this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be
restrained or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the
action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. Teodoro O. Arcenas, Jr., et
al. vs. Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr., Presiding Judge Branch 138, RTC, Makati City and Ana Maria
Korug, G.R. No. 168332/G.R. No. 169053. June 19, 2009
Mandamus. The remedy of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a
ministerial duty. The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
While it is true that it is the ministerial duty of the government to pay for the appointees’ salaries
while the latter’s appeal of the disapproval of their appointments by CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO is
still pending before the CSC Proper, however, this applies only when the said appointments
have been disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of civil service
law. Such is clearly not the case in the instant Petition. The factual circumstances which would
have made it the ministerial duty of the City Government of Dumaguete to pay petitioners’
salaries have not yet been established. Until this Court resolves the Petition in G.R. No. 181559,
reversing the disapproval of petitioners’ appointments or, at the very least, declaring that the
disapproval of the same was not on grounds which constitute violation of civil service law, this
Court cannot rule in the instant Petition that it is the ministerial duty of the City Government of
Dumaguete to pay petitioners’ salaries during the pendency, before the CSC-RO, then the CSC
Proper, of petitioners’ appeal of the disapproval of their appointments by CSC-FO Director
Abucejo. Thus, there is yet no ministerial duty compellable by a writ of mandamus. Leah M.
Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, represented by City Mayor Agustin Percides, et al., G.R.
No. 177795, June 19, 2009.
Motions; motion for extension of time. The general rule is that no motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. This rule is consistent with the rule in the 2002
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that unless an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary period, the CA’s decision becomes final. Thus,
a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not stop the running of
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the 15-day period for the computation of a decision’s finality. At the end of the period, a CA
judgment becomes final, immutable and beyond our power to review.
This rule, however, is not absolute and admits of exceptions based on a liberal reading of the
rule. In Barnes v. Padilla, (a case very similar to the present case and where the CA found the
petitioner guilty of forum shopping), the Court opted for the exception. The petitioner in Barnes,
instead of filing a motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision, filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied the motion because of the rule
disallowing an extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. This Court, however,
looked into the merits of the forum shopping charge and opted to suspend the prohibition
against a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, after it found the
petitioner not liable for forum shopping. In opting for the liberal application of the rules in the
interest of equity and justice, the Court held that we “cannot look with favor on a course of
action which would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the result
would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all.” Alberto Imperial vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals and the Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 158093, June 5, 2009.
Motions; motion for postponement. We take note of the fact that all motions for postponement
by petitioner were made on the scheduled hearing dates themselves. On the August 20, 2003
hearing, despite previous warning that no further postponement would be allowed, petitioner
still failed to appear. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it pointed out that petitioner
obviously knew in advance that she could not make it to the August 20, 2003 hearing. As of the
last scheduled hearing of July 25, 2003, she was still out of the country. The least that petitioner
could have done was to instruct her counsel to make a timely representation with the trial court
by filing an early motion-manifestation for the resetting of the hearing. Between July 25, 2003
and August 20, 2003 she had sufficient time to file one. Obviously, the warning by the court of
the consequence of another non-appearance in the hearing fell on deaf ears. After having been
granted numerous motions for postponement, petitioner cannot now claim that she was denied
due process. Ma. Lourdes C. De Castro vs. Crispino De Castro, Jr., Office of the City Prosecutor
for Manila, and the Office of the Solicitor General, G.R. No. 172198, June 16, 2009.
Motions; motion for new trial. One of the grounds for the granting of a new trial under Section 1
of Rule 37 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is excusable negligence. It is settled
that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed
by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment against the client. We have, however, carved out exceptions to this rule;
as where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; or
where the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property; or where the interests of justice so requires and relief ought to be accorded to the
client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or palpable mistake or negligence. In order
to apply the exceptions rather than the rule, the circumstances obtaining in each case must be
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looked into. In cases where one of the exceptions is present, the courts must step in and accord
relief to a client who suffered thereby.
Gross negligence has been defined as the want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It examines a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exerting any effort to avoid them.
In the case before us, we find the negligence of petitioner’s former counsel to be so gross that it
was deprived of its day in court, thus denying it due process. Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. vs.
Oriental Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009.
Motions; motion for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration, as a general rule, must have
first been filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought.
This is intended to afford the latter an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error
attributed to it. However, there are several exceptions where the special civil action for
certiorari will lie even without the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:
(1) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(2) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(3) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner, or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
(4) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(5) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(6) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is improbable;
(7) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(8) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and
(9) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
Otherwise stated, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with only if there are concrete,
compelling, and valid reasons for doing so. Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Sps.
Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy and Sps Primo Chuyaco, Jr. and Chuyaco, G.R. No.
171137. June 5, 2009
Motions; motion for reconsideration. The 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. Provisions of the Rules of Court prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken are considered absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial businesses. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative.
Without a motion for reconsideration of the 5 September 2005 Decision having been timely
filed with the Court of Appeals, Enriquita and Federico, who was later on substituted by his heirs,
had also lost their right to appeal the said Decision to us. For purposes of determining its
timeliness, a motion for reconsideration may properly be treated as an appeal. As a step to
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allow an inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion for
reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal. When filed beyond such
period, the motion for reconsideration ipso facto forecloses the right to appeal.
Thus, the Motion for Reconsideration, being filed beyond the reglementary period, did not toll
the Decision dated 5 December 2005 of the Court of Appeals from becoming final and
executory. As such, the Decision is past appellate review and constitutes res judicata as to every
matter offered and received in the proceedings below as well as to any other matter admissible
therein and which might have been offered for that purpose.
We are without jurisdiction to modify, much less reverse, a final and executory
judgment. Enriquita Angat and the Legal Heirs of Federico Angat vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 175788. June 30, 2009
Motions; motion to consolidate. The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid
multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested
dockets, and to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties- litigants. But in the instant case, the consolidation of
PNB’s petition for a writ of possession with GOTESCO’s complaint for annulment of foreclosure
proceeding serves none of the purposes cited above. On the contrary, it defeated the very
rationale of consolidation. Philippine National Bank Vs. Gotesco Tyan Ming Development, Inc.,
G.R. No. 183211, June 5, 2009
Motions; motion to dismiss. A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a
cause of action—(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant;
and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these
elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.
When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only
on the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must resolve the issue on the strength of such
allegations, assuming them to be true. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on
whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can
render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is
the general rule.
However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical
admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
(1) the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
(2) such allegations are legally impossible;
(3) the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
(4) by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear unfounded; or
(5) there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the parties or in
the course of the hearings related to the case.
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In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are
the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies
issued by Insular and Grepalife. Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag, etc. vs. Eva Verna De Guzman
Maramag, et al., G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009.
Motions; motion to quash. Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the
ground that more than one (1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano was charged with
violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly
obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence,
they should be quashed.
Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information
under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the
filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.
By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one
offense.
Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.
In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one
offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense – violation of
DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan,
on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to
quash the Informations. Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan vs. People of the Philippines,
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation G.R. No. 159517-
18, June 30, 2009
Parties; indispensable parties. Well-settled is the rule that joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. It is a condition sine qua non to the exercise of judicial power. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain
finality. One who is not a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court; otherwise,
he will be deprived of his right to due process. That is why the case is generally remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.Dionisia Monis Lagunilla, et al., vs. Andrea Monis Velasco,
et al., G.R. No. 169276, June 16, 2009.
Partition. There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court. The first stage is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a
partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. The second stage commences when it
appears that “the parties are unable to agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that
event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners.
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There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement
under Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under
Sections 3 to 6. Felicidad Dadizon, et al. Vs. Socorro Bernadas, et al., G.R. No. 172367. June 5,
2009
Petition for review; questions of law. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A question of law
exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact
exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to
determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the
evidence, the question posed is one of fact. Romualdo Pagsibigan Vs. People of the Philippines
and Eleazar Cabasal, G.R. No. 163868, June 4, 2009.
Prejudicial question. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other
element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the
issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and
the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
The issue in the criminal cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. Blg. 22, while
in the civil case, it is whether the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner
the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn.
The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if petitioner is declared not liable for the payment of
the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
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insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense. Jesse Y Yap Vs. Hon. Monico
G. Cabales, et al., G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009
Prejudicial question. Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction
agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the
prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private
respondent indeed issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It
is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question,
that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action
may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on
it are inapplicable to the case before us. Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Cleofe S. Janiola and
Hon. Arthur A. Famini, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009.
Probable cause. There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not
a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of
the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may
not be compelled to pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must
satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused
under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or
she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the
public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground
that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It
must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide
latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that
courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person
charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed to the public prosecutor.
Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable cause is limited
only to the judicial kind or for the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be
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issued against the accused. People of the Philippines vs. Jessie B. Castillo and Felicito R.
Mejia, G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009.
Replevin. The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is
unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the
property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with
the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to
provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with
the court’s order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party
to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.
Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty
on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. If the
writ was not served upon the adverse party but was instead merely handed to a person who is
neither an agent of the adverse party nor a person authorized to receive court processes on his
behalf, the service thereof is erroneous and is, therefore, invalid, running afoul of the statutory
and constitutional requirements. The service is likewise invalid if the writ of replevin was served
without the required documents. Under these circumstances, no right to seize and to detain the
property shall pass, the act of the sheriff being both unlawful and unconstitutional. Terlyngrace
Rivera Vs. Florencio L. Vargas, G.R. No. 165895, June 5, 2009.
Rule 64. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise provided by
the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to
the Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For
this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only
to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to the
application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari, subject to the exception clause –
“except as hereinafter provided.”
Even a superficial reading of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has not
challenged our conclusion that his petition was filed outside the period required by Section 3,
Rule 64; he merely insists that the fresh period rule applicable to a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly refers to the latter
rule. They exist as separate rules for substantive reasons as discussed below. Procedurally, the
most patent difference between the two – i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is
Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for certiorari from
decisions or rulings of the COMELEC en banc. The period is 30 days from notice of the decision
or ruling (instead of the 60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the
filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted 30 days (instead
of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65 provides). Nilo T. Pates vs. Commission on Elections
and Emelita B. Almirante, G.R. No. 184915. June 30, 2009
Venue; derivative suits. the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
found that respondents correctly filed the derivative suit before the Makati RTC where HTSI had
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its principal office. Hi-Yield Realty, Incorporated vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
168863, June 23, 2009.
Warrant of arrest. The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination
of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest
cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as
to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the
implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative
of the judge. It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend
proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ
circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance thereof. Thus,
there is no contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest
pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the petition for review that he filed citing
the following directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular: “The appellant and
the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court
are held in abeyance.
The above provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant and the
trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in
court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court
must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to
suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the
appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in consonance with the earlier
ruling of this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound
discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely exercised his judicial discretion when he
denied petitioner’s motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest. Consequently,
the CA was correct when it found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial
judge’s discretion in issuing the challenged orders. Bonifacio M. Mejillano vs. Enrique Lucillo, et
al., G.R. No. 154717, June 19, 2009.
Writ of execution. The rule is that a writ of execution must conform substantially to every
essential particular of the judgment promulgated. An execution which is not in harmony with
the judgment is bereft of validity; it must conform particularly to that ordained in the dispositive
portion of the decision. In the case at bar, the sheriff himself discovered a deficiency in the
execution of the judgment in the amount of P70,300.00. Therefore, upon report of the same by
the sheriff, an alias writ of execution covering said deficiency is only proper to preserve the
tenor of the judgment and to ensure the faithful execution thereof. National Housing
Authority vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelorido, et al.,G.R. No. 166518, June 16, 2009.
Writ of possession; authorization. The corporate powers of a corporation, including the power
to sue and be sued in its corporate name, are exercised by the board of directors. The physical
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acts of the corporation, like the signing of documents such as verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, can only be performed by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose
by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.
In this case, although Virgilio Sintos, Jr. initially failed to show that he was authorized to sign
the verification for the Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, respondent submitted
a Secretary’s Certificate to the Court confirming that Virgilio Sintos, Jr. was indeed authorized
by the board of directors. In the interest of justice, the Court may allow the relaxation of
procedural rules where there is subsequent substantial compliance. Marylou B. Tolentino,
M.D. vs. Shenton Realty Corp.,G.R. No. 162103, June 19, 2009.
Warrant of arrest. No abuse of discretion can be attributed to Judge Madrona when he issued
the Orders, dated 9 March 2005 and 31 March 2005, for the arrest of the respondent due to his
failure to be present for his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond. These Orders
are consistent with criminal procedure.
The filing of an information in the trial court initiates a criminal action. The trial court thereby
acquires jurisdiction over the case. After the filing of the complaint or the information, a
warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court. When the accused voluntarily
submits himself to the court or is duly arrested, the court then acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. In this case, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
accused Carmelo Jaro, Remedios Malibaran, and the respondent, who posted bail bonds after
the trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest on 4 October 2004. While it is true that the fiscal has
the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court,
once the case has been brought to court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel is proper in the
case should be addressed to the consideration of the trial court. Bienvenido Diño, et al. vs.
Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, June 23, 2009.
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Action; certification of non-forum shopping. Under Section 3, par. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records. On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification
under oath by the plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, (1) that he has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (2) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (3) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
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The reason the certification of non-forum shopping is required to be accomplished by the
plaintiff or principal party himself is because he has actual knowledge of whether he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. In case the plaintiff or
principal party is a juridical entity, such as petitioner, the certification may be signed by an
authorized person who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be established by the
documents.
Although petitioner submitted a verification/certification of non-forum shopping, affiant Edgar L.
Chavez had no authority to sign the verification/certification of non-forum shopping attached to
the petition filed in the Court of Appeals. The records disclose that the authority of Chavez was
to represent petitioner only before the NLRC. Moreover, the board resolution showing such
authority was neither certified nor authenticated by the Corporate Secretary. The Corporate
Secretary should have attested to the fact that, indeed, petitioner’s Board of Directors had
approved a Resolution on August 11, 2005, authorizing Chavez, to file the petition and to sign
the verification/certification of non-forum shopping. Davao Contractors Development
Cooperative (DACODECO), represented by Chairman of the Board Engr. L. Chavez vs. Marilyn
A. Pasawa, G.R. No. 172174, July 9, 2009.
Action; certification of non-forum shopping. At the outset, the Court notes that the petition
supposedly filed by petitioners Jocson and Tuising was not signed by Jocson’s counsel. It
was Tuising’s counsel who signed in behalf of Jocson’s counsel. Tuising’s counsel had no
authority to sign the petition in behalf of Jocson. The records are bereft of any proof
that Jocson ever authorized Tuising’s counsel to be her counsel or to act in her behalf. Under
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no legal effect.
Furthermore, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for Non-Forum
Shopping. Jocson did not sign the Verification and Certification. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure requires the petition for review on certiorari to be verified. A pleading
required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Although Tuising belatedly filed on 24 September 2004 a “Special Power of Attorney” allegedly
signed by Jocson and authorizing Tuising to file the petition for review and to verify and to
certify the petition, no explanation was given by Tuising why the Special Power of Attorney was
belatedly filed four months after the petition for review was filed on 12 May 2004. The lack of a
certification against forum shopping or a defective certification is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the rule under special
circumstances or for compelling reasons. Cerefina Argallon-Jocson and Rodolfo Tuising vs. Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corporation and/or Marcelo Steel Corporation,G.R. No. 162836, July 30,
2009; see also Eagle Star Security Services, Inc. vs. Bonifacio L. Mirando, G.R. No.
179512, July 30, 2009.
Action; certification of non-forum shopping. The submission of a false certification of non-
forum shopping or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
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the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be a ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements
of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in
another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant
or lis pendens. Gloria S. Dy vs. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc., G.R. No. 171842, July 22, 2009.
Action; prescription. The order or decision granting an application for a free patent can be
reviewed only within one year from its issuance on the ground of actual fraud via a petition for
review in the Regional Trial Court, provided that no innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the property or any interest thereon. However, an aggrieved party may still file an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, but the right of action prescribes in 10
years counted from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, provided
that it has not been acquired by an innocent purchaser for value. This 10-year prescriptive
period applies only when the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. If
the person claiming to be its owner is in actual possession thereof, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect is an action to quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.
In the instant case, petitioner’s action to recover the property and to annul the patent and title
issued to the respondents was filed beyond the prescriptive period. Thus, it ought to be
dismissed. Modesta Luna vs. Juliana P. Luna, et al., G.R. No. 177624. July 13, 2009.
Action; prescription. An action for reconveyance of property respects the decree of registration
as incontrovertible and merely seeks the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to one who claims to have a better right.
An action for reconveyance of property based on an implied or constructive trust is the proper
remedy of an aggrieved party whose property had been erroneously registered
in another’s name. The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of registered property is ten
years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. However, the ten-year
prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance is not applicable where the complainant is in
possession of the land to be reconveyed and the registered owner was never in possession of the
disputed property. In such a case, the action for reconveyance filed by the complainant who is
in possession of the disputed property would be in the nature of an action to quiet title which
is imprescriptible. Heirs of Toribio Waga, represented
by Merba A. Waga vs. Isabelo Sacabin, G.R. No. 159131, July 27, 2009.
Appeal; conviction. Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been
an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. There is nothing which can conceivably justify the filing
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of Balaba’s appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court
of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal. In this
case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the
period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his
notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its
lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January
2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore,
the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of
lack of jurisdiction. Irenorio B. Balaba vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169519, July 17,
2009.
Appeal; improper remedy. The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or
resolutions of the CA should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Tthe CA, therefore, acted properly when
it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners should have
resorted to the remedy of appeal instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition
for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.
Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for review on certiorari had lapsed by
the time the instant petition was filed, the assailed CA Resolutions have attained finality. Ana
De Guia San Pedro, et al. vs. Hon. Fatima G. Asdala (etc.), et al., G.R. No. 164560,. July 22,
2009.
Appeal; interlocutory order. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory. Under
Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. As a remedy
for the denial, a party has to file an answer and interpose as a defense the objections raised in
the motion, and then to proceed to trial; or, a party may immediately avail of the remedy
available to the aggrieved party by filing an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Let it be stressed though that a petition for certiorari is
appropriate only when an order has been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing, the Order of the RTC denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to Dismiss
is not appealable even on pure questions of law. It is worth mentioning that the proper
procedure in this case is to cite such interlocutory order as an error in the appeal of the case —
in the event that the RTC rules in favor of respondent — and not to appeal such interlocutory
order. On the other hand, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for review under Rule 45, it
would likewise fail because the proper subject would only be judgments or final orders that
completely dispose of the case. Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba vs. Fe vda De Te, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Castañeda, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009.
Appeal; issues raised first time. Well-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below
cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues
is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due process. Issues not raised during
the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and more especially on motion for
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reconsideration. Litigation must end at some point; once the case is finally adjudged, the parties
must learn to accept victory or defeat. Jesus Cuenco vs. Talisay Tourist Sprots Complex,
Incorporated and Matias B. Aznar III, G.R. No. 174154, July 30, 2009. see also Development
Bank of the Philippines vs. Family Foods Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Spouses Juliano and
Catalina Centeno, G.R. No. 180458, July 30, 2009.
Appeal; nonpayment of fees. In the instant case, petitioner failed to perfect his appeal with the
Office of the President, despite having been given reasonable opportunity to do so. Records
would show that petitioner was granted an extension of fifteen (15) days from October 18, 2003
or until November 2, 2003 to file his appeal memorandum and to pay the appeal fee. Instead of
complying, petitioner, on November 10, 2003, when the extension granted had already expired,
requested for another extension of five (5) days. It is specifically provided under Section 4 of
Administrative Order No. 18 that extension of time for the payment of appeal fee and the filing
of pleadings shall not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause and only if the motion
for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended.
In exceptional cases, we had allowed a liberal application of the rule. The recent case
of Villena v. Rupisan, extensively discussed and enumerated the various instances recognized as
exceptions to the stringent application of the rule in the matter of paying the docket fees, such
as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant
to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues
involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant
circumstances.[25]
Considering that petitioner has not proffered an acceptable explanation for the delay in the
payment of the appeal fee, his reason not being one of the recognized exceptions, we agree
with the Court of Appeals that there is no compelling reason to reverse the orders of the Office
of the President dismissing the appeal filed by petitioner. Noli Lim vs. Angelito Delos Santos,
etc., Denia R. Adoyo, et al., (Intervenors) Gloria Murillo, et al., (Protestants), G.R. No.
172574, July 31, 2009.
Appeal; period to appeal. The failure of the petitioner to perfect an appeal within the period
fixed by law renders final the decision sought to be appealed. As a result, no court could
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. It is settled that a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
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Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation and this will set to naught the main role of courts of
justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed
resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of
right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial
court’s ministerial duty. Noli Lim vs. Angelito Delos Santos, etc., Denia R. Adoyo, et al.,
(Intervenors) Gloria Murillo, et al., (Protestants), G.R. No. 172574, July 31, 2009.
Appeal; period to appeal. Even if the Rules of Court may not apply in the proceedings before
the DARAB, the CA was correct in pointing out that the Revised Rules of the DARAB itself
impose a fifteen-day reglementary period to appeal. Since the perfection of an appeal within the
statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, the failure of
petitioners to so perfect their appeal rendered the questioned decision final and executory. This
rule is founded upon the principle that the right to appeal is not part of due process of law, but
is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law.
This, of course, does not mean to say that this Court has not in the past allowed a liberal
application of the rules of appeal. However, the same applies only in exceptionally meritorious
cases.
In the case at bar, there is no showing of a factual setting which warrants a liberal application of
the rules on the period of appeal. To stress, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal only after one
year and five months from the time the Provincial Adjudicator rendered its Decision. Such a
delay is unacceptable. Moreover, what makes matters worse is that petitioners offered no
explanation or excuse for this Court to consider as to why it took them so long to file their
appeal. Heirs of Emiliano San Pedro, etc. vs. Pablito Garcia and Jose Calderon, G.R. No.
166988, July 3, 2009.
Appeal; period to appeal. In addition to the non-perfection of the appeal on time, records show
that the notice of appeal failed to indicate the date when the petitioner received the Order
denying its motion for reconsideration. The rules require that the notice of appeal shall state the
material dates showing the timeliness of the appeal. The indication of date is important in order
for the trial court to determine the timeliness of the petitioner’s appeal.
Likewise, petitioner did not pay the appellate court’s docket and other lawful fees on time.
Respondents pointed out that the payment of the fees, as reflected by the official receipts, was
made only after five months from the filing of the notice of appeal. National Power Corporation
vs. Sps. Lorenzo L. Laohoo, et al., G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009.
Appeal; timeliness of appeal. Timeliness of an appeal is a factual issue that requires a review of
the evidence presented on when the appeal was actually filed.
In a petition for review on certiorari, this Court is limited to the review of errors of law; we do
not pass upon findings of facts under this mode of review unless the lower tribunal’s decision is
shown to be attended by grave abuse of discretion, as when they are shown to have been made
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arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. This rule applies with great force in labor
cases where the ruling tribunal – the NLRC – exercises specialized jurisdiction and has
acknowledged expertise on labor matters; we generally accord the NLRC’s findings not only
respect but even finality, unless the exceptions mentioned above exist, or when a review of the
findings of facts is rendered necessary and appropriate because the factual findings and
conclusions of the labor arbiter, the NLRC and the CA (as the court essentially tasked with
factual review) are in conflict with one another. Eureka Personnel and Management Corp., and
Nari K. Gidwani vs. The Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. G.R. No. 159358,
July 15, 2009.
Certiorari; extension of time. While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the
period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period, the amendments to Rule 65
under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the
deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such
extension. Laguna Metts Corporation Vs. Court of Appeals, Aries C. Caalam and
Geraldine Esguerra, G.R. No. 185220, July 27, 2009.
Certiorari; hierarchy of courts. True, we had, on certain occasions, entertained direct recourse
to this Court as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts. In those exceptional cases,
however, we recognized an exception because it was dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.
In the instant case, however, the questions raised are issues evidently within the normal
precincts of an appeal which cannot be peremptorily addressed by an extraordinary writ. In fact,
the Court of Appeals (CA) has jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary of
the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on the
ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners could have easily availed themselves of such recourse instead
of directly assailing the same before this Court. Cong. Glenn A. Chong, Mr. Charles Chong, and
Mr. Romeo Arribe vs. Hon. Philip L. Dela Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 184948, July 21, 2009.
Certiorari; material dates. On the matter of material dates, the petition for certiorari failed to
indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of
Appeals. It is settled that the following material dates must be stated in a petition
for certiorari brought under Rule 65: first, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration
was filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. In the case before
us, petitioner failed to indicate the first and second dates, particularly the date of receipt of
the NLRC resolution and the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration. As explicitly stated
in Rule 65, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal of the petition. Davao Contractors Development Cooperative (DACODECO),
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represented by Chairman of the Board Engr. L. Chavez vs. Marilyn A. Pasawa, G.R. No. 172174,
July 9, 2009.
Complaint; affidavit of desistance. The desistance of the complainant does not necessarily
result in the dismissal of the administrative complaint because the Court attaches no persuasive
value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. It should be remembered
that the issue in an administrative case is not whether the complaint states a cause of action
against the respondent, but whether the public officials have breached the norms and standards
of the public service. Considering that petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he summarily
removed the concrete posts erected by respondent, allegedly within the parameters of his
authority as Municipal Engineer of Naic, Cavite, it is only proper that this case be decided on its
merits rather than on the basis of the desistance of respondent. Guillermo M. Telmo vs. Luciano
M. Bustamante, G.R. No. 182567, July 13, 2009.
Decision; moot and academic. When respondent was then allowed to avail herself of optional
retirement under the law after having served the government for more than 40 years, within the
15-day period to appeal under Rule 43, petitioner’s July 30, 2003 Resolution had become moot
and academic.
Courts have generally refrained from even expressing an opinion on cases where the issues have
become moot and academic, there being no more justiciable controversy to speak of, so that a
determination thereof would be of no practical use or value. In the present case, when her
appointment was disapproved by petitioner, respondent would still have been able to retire
under the applicable law, R.A. 8291, as said law only requires that the employee concerned
must have rendered at least 15 years of service and must not have been receiving disability
benefits at the time of retirement. Petitioner, having retired on August 31, 2003, the position
of IPRS I is presumed to have been already filled up and to be now occupied by one bearing the
requisite qualifications. Hence, passing on the disapproval of respondent’s appointment no
longer has any practical value. Civil Service Commission vs. Nelia O. Tahanlangit, G.R. No.
180528, July 27, 2009.
Decision; unpromulgated. An unpromulgated decision is no decision at all. At the very least,
they are part of the confidential internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to
the public. A decision becomes binding only after it is validly promulgated. Until such operative
act occurs, there is really no decision to speak of, even if some or all of the Justices have already
affixed their signatures thereto. During the intervening period from the time of signing until the
promulgation of the decision, any one who took part in the deliberation and had signed the
decision may, for a reason, validly withdraw one’s vote, thereby preserving one’s freedom of
action. Limkaichong vs. Comelec/Biraogo vs.Nograles, et al./Paras vs. Nograles, et al./Villando
vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos.
179240-41, July 30, 2009.
Evidence; alibi. It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent
and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
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evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the
defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper in the light of the positive identification by
complainant Guiritan that it was petitioner who stabbed him. Arthur Zarate vs. Regional Trial
Court, Br. Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, G.R. No. 152263, July 3, 2009.
Evidence; alibi. Alibi is generally viewed with suspicion because of its inherent weakness and
unreliability. For this defense to prosper, jurisprudence demands the physical impossibility of
the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the
incident. Where the least chance exists for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the
defense of alibi fails. People of the Philippines vs. Jojo Musa y Santos, et al., G.R. No. 170472,
July 3, 2009.
Evidence; burden of proof. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence. When a plaintiff’s case depends upon the establishment
of a negative fact, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party,
then the burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative fact.
In the instant case, respondents assert the negative fact, i.e., that no copy of the October 16,
1989 Order was sent to petitioners. In short, they have the burden of proof to show that
petitioners were not furnished with a copy of the October 16, 1989 Order. Sps. Henry O
and Pacita Cheng vs. Sps. Jose Javier and Claudia Dailisan, G.R. No. 182485, July 3, 2009.
Evidence; burden of proof. In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
Having made such allegation that the proceeds of the sale were grossly inadequate, the burden
of proof was upon them. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. While
this Court is not unaware of petitioner Ernesto Tagle’s reputation as a known artist and painter,
mere claim of his renown in artistic circles is not proof of the purported high value of his
artwork and pieces that were auctioned or of the inadequacy of the price when such works were
sold during the questioned auction sales. We note that the Tagles presented several receipts to
show the prices at which some of petitioner Ernesto Tagle’s artworks had allegedly been sold.
However, there was no evidence that the artworks auctioned on execution were of the same
kind or worth as those sold to the buyers indicated in the said receipts. Ergo, there were no
bases for comparison for the value of the works mentioned in the said receipts and the value of
those sold at the execution sales questioned herein. What was incumbent upon petitioners was
to produce independent, competent and credible valuations or appraisals of the artwork sold
during the assailed public auctions in order to substantiate their claim that the prices at which
said paintings and artwork were sold were indeed grossly inadequate. Sps. Elizabeth
S. Tagle Ernesto R. Tagle vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97, Sps.
Federico and Rosamyrna Carandang and Sheriff Carol Bulacan, G.R. No. 162738, July 8, 2009.
Evidence; burden of proof. It bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in an
ordinary civil case; rather, it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
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adequate to support a conclusion. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of
the Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in her capacity as the Ombudsman
vs. Rufino V. Maijares, Roberto G. Ferrera, Alfredo M. Ruba and Romeo Querubin. G.R. Nos.
170615-16. July 9, 2009
Evidence; burden of proof. Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence,
refers to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or
her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused
falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime.
The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has presented the evidence it believes is
sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the
circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise
be held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and had
done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the
defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be
exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the crime. The defense,
therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15
years old or less when he committed the rape charged.
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of
the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To
impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make minority and age integral elements
of the crime when clearly they are not. If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this
burden relates to proof of the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of
rape. Roberto Sierra y Caneda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009.
Evidence; conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which
indubitably point to, and are indicative of, a joint purpose, concert of action, and community of
interest. Conspiracy does not require proof of an appreciable period of time for the perpetrators
to come to an agreement, or for proof of an agreement prior to the criminal deed; conspiracy
exists if evidence indicates that at the time of the commission of the offense, the malefactors had
the same purpose and were united in its execution. People of the Philippines vs. Jojo Musa y
Santos, et al., G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009.
Evidence; identification. The fact that Permejo was not able to identify accused-appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime impinges heavily on the credibility of prosecution’s evidence. For if,
indeed, the accused-appellants were the malefactors of the crime who did not hide their faces
during the robbery, the eyewitness, who had such close, traumatic encounter with them, should
automatically have recalled their faces upon seeing them. It behooves this Court to declare that
she was not able to do so positively.
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Having ignored the abovementioned important circumstance, the trial court misconstrued and
misapplied facts and circumstances of the case, warranting the modification or reversal of the
outcome of the case. The trial court grievously erred when it ruled that the lone prosecution
eyewitness categorically and positively identified accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. People of the Philippines vs. Charmen Olivo y Along, Nelson Danda y Sambuto and
Joey Zafra y Reyes, G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009.
Evidence; out of court identification. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in
various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness
to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on
out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test
where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure. People of the Philippines vs. Jojo Musa y
Santos, et al., G.R. No. 170472, July 3, 2009.
Evidence; mentally retarded. People v. Tabio upheld the credibility of the mentally retarded
complaining witness after noting that the witness spoke unequivocally on the details of the
crime. The Court in that case observed that the witness would not have spoken so tenaciously
about her experience had it not really happened to her. In People v. Macapal, Jr., the court
stressed that testimonial discrepancies caused by a witness’ natural fickleness of memory does
not destroy the substance of the testimony of said witness. Likewise, People v.
Martin appreciated the natural and straightforward narration of the mentally deficient victim and
dismissed her inaccurate and unresponsive answers. The Court in Martin reasoned that even
children of normal intelligence can not be expected to give a precise account of events
considering their naiveté and still undeveloped vocabulary and command of language. People
of the Philippines vs. Warlito Martinez, G.R. No. 182687, July 23, 2009.
Evidence; rape. To ascertain the guilt or innocence of the accused in cases of rape, the courts
have been traditionally guided by three settled principles, namely: (a) an accusation for rape is
easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution;
and (c) the evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Since the crime of rape is essentially one committed in relative isolation or even secrecy, it is
usually only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced coitus. In its
prosecution, therefore, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single and most
important issue to deal with. If her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can
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justifiably be convicted on the basis thereof; otherwise, he should be acquitted of the
crime. People of the Philippines vs. Benjie Resurrection, G.R. No. 185389, July 7, 2009.
Evidence; rape. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses in rape cases is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge whose conclusion deserves much weight and respect because
he/she has the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they are telling
the truth or not. People of the Philippines vs. Willy Mardo Ganoy y Mamayabay, G.R. No.
174370, July 23, 2009.
Evidence; rape. It cannot be over-emphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not
diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. Such inconsistencies
are inconsequential when they refer to minor details that have nothing to do with the essential
fact of the commission of the crime––carnal knowledge through force and intimidation. The
alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and are evidently beyond the essential fact of the
commission of rape because they do not pertain to the actual sexual assault itself––that very
moment when Wasit was forcing himself on AAA. A weeping AAA had pointed to Wasit as the
very person who defiled her. People of the Philippines Vs. Felix Wasit, G.R .No. 182454, July 23,
2009.
Evidence; res gestae. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed
as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
In this case, Guiritan lost consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained
consciousness the following morning after the operation. The hospital records showed that the
operation started at 5:00 a.m. and ended at 7:30 a.m. of April 2, 1994. SPO1 Alecha testified
that it was also in the morning of April 2, 1994 that he took the statement of Guiritan, who
stated that it was petitioner who stabbed him.
SPO1 Alecha testified that he had to put his ear near Guiritan’s mouth so that he could
hear Guiritan’s answers as he was catching his breath. The foregoing circumstances reveal that
the statement was taken a few hours after the operation when he regained consciousness. His
statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the
shocking event speaking through him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or
contrive the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae. Contrary to
petitioner’s contention, the statement was signed by Guiritan and its date was established
by SPO1 Alecha. Arthur Zarate vs. Regional Trial Court,
Br. Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, G.R. No. 152263, July 3, 2009.
Foreclosure; notice. Verily, following Section 6, Rule 13, the written notice of sale to the
judgment obligor need not be personally served on the judgment obligor himself. It may be
served on his counsel, or by leaving the notice in his office with his clerk or a person having
charge thereof. If there is no one found at the judgment obligor’s or his counsel’s office or if
such office is not known/inexistent, it may be served at the residence of the judgment obligor or
his counsel and may be received by any person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein.
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Thus, petitioners’ theory (that only written notice of sale served on petitioners’ themselves would
be valid) is utterly bereft of merit. Sps. Elizabeth S. Tagle Ernesto R. Tagle vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97, Sps. Federico and Rosamyrna Carandang and Sheriff
Carol Bulacan, G.R. No. 162738, July 8, 2009.
Information; conspiracy. It is settled that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the
information. A look at the information readily shows that the words “conspiracy,” “conspired”
or “in conspiracy with” does not appear in the information. This, however, does not necessarily
mean that the absence of these words would signify that conspiracy was not alleged in the
information. After carefully reading the information, we find that conspiracy was properly
alleged in the information. The accusatory portion reads in part: “all the above-named accused,
with evident intent to defraud the government of legitimate taxes accruing to it from imported
articles, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly participate in and facilitate the
transportation, concealment, and possession of dutiable electronic equipment and accessories
with a domestic market value of P20,000,000.00 contained in container van no. TTNU9201241,
but which were declared in Formal Entry and Revenue Declaration No. 118302 as assorted
men’s and ladies’ accessories x x x.” We find the phrase “participate in and facilitate” to be a
clear and definite allegation of conspiracy sufficient for those being accused to competently
enter a plea and to make a proper defense. Rene M. Francisco vs. People of the
Philippines/Oscar A. Ojeda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177430/G.R. No. 178935,
July 14, 2009.
Information; probable cause. The general rule is that the courts do not interfere with the
discretion of the public prosecutor in determining the specificity and adequacy of
the averments in a criminal complaint. The determination of probable cause for the purpose of
filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first instance to the
public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases
is merely to determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless made with grave abuse. Melba Rose
R. Sasot vs. Amado Yuson, et al., G.R. No. 141888, July 13, 2009.
Information; probable cause. The general rule has been that the courts will not interfere with
the discretion of the prosecutor or the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his investigative power, to
determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. The
Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed.
Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is
a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise
of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. An examination of the records would show
that the Office of the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
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or in excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint against Balasbas. Hilario
P. Soriano vs. Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, et al., G.R. No. 160772, July 13, 2009.
Information; probable cause. It is hornbook principle that the term “grave abuse of discretion”
means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack ofjurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The DOJ, in reversing the City Prosecutor’s finding of probable cause and ordering the discharge
of Esperanza, noted that although the evidence on record fully supported the finding of probable
cause against Sagum based on his admission that he forged herein respondent’s signature on the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage without the participation of Esperanza, there was no basis to hold
that Esperanza conspired with him to effect the forgery. The DOJ, citing Dans, Jr. v. People,
ruled that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven by competent proof, independently
and beyond reasonable doubt.
A reading of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor does not at all indicate why
conspiracy was present between Esperanza and her uncle. There was thus no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the DOJ in issuing its Resolutions. Sps. Artemio and
Esperanza Aduan vs. Levi Chong, G.R. No. 172796, July 13, 2009.
Judgment; annulment. The remedy of petition for annulment of judgment, final order or
resolution under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary one inasmuch as it is available
only where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other remedies can
no longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner. The relief it affords is equitable in
character as it strikes at the core of finality of such judgments and orders.
The grounds for a petition for annulment are in themselves specific in the same way that the
relief itself is. The Rules restrict the grounds only to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud to
prevent the remedy from being used by a losing party in making a complete farce of a duly
promulgated decision or a duly issued order or resolution that has long attained finality. This
certainly is based on sound public policy for litigations and, despite occasional risks of error,
must be brought to a definite end and the issues that go with them must one way or other be
laid to rest. In turn, lack of jurisdiction — the ground relied upon by petitioner — is confined
only to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. A valid invocation of this ground rests exclusively on absolute lack of
jurisdiction as opposed to a mere abuse of jurisdictional discretion or mere errors in judgment
committed in the exercise of jurisdiction inasmuch as jurisdiction is distinct from the exercise
thereof. Hence, where the facts demonstrate that the court has validly acquired jurisdiction over
the respondent and over the subject matter of the case, its decision or order cannot be validly
voided via a petition for annulment on the ground of absence or lack of jurisdiction. Mandy
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Commodities Co., Inc. vs. The International Commercial Bank of China, G.R. No. 166734, July
3, 2009.
Judgment; execution. The CA correctly held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the issuance of a writ of execution with the correct address of the subject
property. Such act was well within a court’s inherent power “to amend and control its process
and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.”
At the time the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, the RTC had already assumed
jurisdiction over the case. Hence, the MeTC was no longer in a position to correct the error
contained in the dispositive portion. The duty devolved upon the RTC, before which the appeal
was pending, to rectify the error contained in the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to
be executed. Clerical error or ambiguity in the dispositive portion of a judgment may be
rectified or clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision itself and, suppletorily, to
the pleadings previously filed. Lydia Montebon a.k.a. Jingle Montebon Vs. The Honorable Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 180568, July 13, 2009.
Judgment; finality. The trial court’s Order of July 15, 2004 was not a final judgment;
consequently, its entry in the Book of Entries of Judgment on August 10, 2004 was premature
and, therefore, void. In the case at bar, the July 15, 2004 Order did not dispose of all the issues
in the case, as the issues of LVV’s unearned earnings and attorney’s fees remained
unresolved. It was only on November 23, 2004 when the trial court
noted LVV’s voluntary desistance from presenting evidence on these issues that they were
disposed of. Republic of the Philippines represented by the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) vs. Hon. Francisco G. Mendioal, etc., G.R. No. 175551, July 14, 2009.
Judgment; finality. As matters now stand, the CA judgment affirming the accused-appellant’s
conviction for two counts of rape is already final and executory. In light of this development, we
can no longer disturb the assailed CA decision and resolution presently before us following the
principle of immutability of judgments: once a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes unalterable and can no longer be modified nor reversed even to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. We are compelled therefore to dismiss
the present appeal. This conclusion is doubly strengthened by our finding that no compelling
reason exists to disturb the assailed rulings. People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Obero, G.R. No.
169878, July 7, 2009.
Judgment; finality. To emphasize, what is being questioned by respondent was not really the
January 4, 2000 Decision of the RTC declaring their marriage void ab initio on the ground of
mutual psychological incapacity, but the Orders of the trial court dividing their common
properties in accordance with the proposed project of partition without the benefit of a hearing.
The issue on the validity of their marriage has long been settled in the main decision and may
no longer be the subject of review. Marywin Albano-Sales vs. Mayor Reynolan T. Sales and
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 174803, July 13, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. The Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over her person regardless of
the fact that there was allegedly no valid service of summons. It bears noting that, in quasi-
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judicial proceedings, procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed.
Substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. In the cases at bar, petitioner, her husband and
three other relatives, were all individually impleaded in the complaint. The Labor Arbiter
furnished her with notices of the scheduled hearings and other processes. It is undisputed that
HELIOS, of which she and her therein co-respondents in the subject cases were the stockholders
and managers, was in fact heard, proof of which is the attendance of her husband, President-
General Manager of HELIOS, together with counsel in one such scheduled hearing and the
Labor Arbiter’s consideration of their position paper in arriving at the Decision, albeit the same
position paper was belatedly filed.
Clearly, petitioner was adequately represented in the proceedings conducted by the Labor
Arbiter by the lawyer retained by HELIOS. Carmen B. Dy-Dumalasa vs. Domingo Sabado S.
Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. 178760, July 23, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without
invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary
appearance on the part of the respondents under the aforequoted provision of the Rules. The
same conclusion can be drawn from the filing of the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply
to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss dated November 13, 2000 which alleged, as an
additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the
required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the
person of the respondents. Sps. German Anunciacion, et al.
vs. Perpetua M. Bocanegra, et al., G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. We cannot countenance petitioner’s argument that the complaint
against the other defendants should have been dismissed, considering that the RTC never
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over
one’s person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it. Obviously, it is now
impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can petitioner invoke
such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against
all of the defendants. Failure to serve summons on Sereno’s person will not be a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint against the other defendants, considering that they have been served
with copies of the summons and complaints and have long submitted their respective responsive
pleadings. In fact, the other defendants in the complaint were given the chance to raise all
possible defenses and objections personal to them in their respective motions to dismiss and
their subsequent answers. Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba vs. Fe vda De Te, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Castañeda, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. There was already a valid service of summons in the persons of
respondent spouses Mogol. To recapitulate, the process server presented the summons and the
copy of the complaint to respondent spouses at the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch
24. The latter immediately referred the matter to their counsel, who was present with them in
the aforesaid courtroom. At the express direction of his clients, the counsel took the summons
and the copy of the complaint, read the same, and thereby informed himself of the contents of
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the said documents. Ineluctably, at that point, the act of the counsel of respondent
spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted
receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent.
Already accomplished was the operative act of “handing” a copy of the summons to respondent
spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was
already acquired by the MeTC of Manila, Branch 25. That being said, the subsequent act of the
counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the
process server was no longer material.
Furthermore, the instruction of the counsel for respondent spouses not to obtain a copy of the
summons and the copy of the complaint, under the lame excuse that the same must be served
only in the address stated therein, was a gross mistake. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only
at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons. On the contrary, said provision is crystal clear
that, whenever practicable, summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the
defendant; or if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. Nothing more is
required. As correctly held by the RTC of Manila, Branch 50, the service of the copy of the
summons and the complaint inside the courtroom of the MeTC of Manila, Branch 24 was the
most practicable act under the circumstances, and the process server need not wait for
respondent spouses Mogol to reach their given address, i.e., at 1218 Daisy St., Employee
Village, Lucena City, before he could serve on the latter the summons and the copy of the
complaint. Due to the distance of the said address, service therein would have been more costly
and would have entailed a longer delay on the part of the process server in effecting the service
of the summons. Sansio Philippines, Inc. vs. Sps. Alicia Leodegario Mogol, Jr., G.R. No.
177007, July 14, 2009
Jurisdiction; panel of arbitrators. It is clear from the ruling of the Court in Olympic Mines and
Celestial Nickel Mining that the Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims,
conflicts, and oppositions relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over
cancellation of mineral rights already granted and existing.
As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily
includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority
to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB,
and not with the Panel of Arbitrators. Pyro Coppermining Corporation vs. Mines Adjudication
Board-Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., G.R. No. 179674, July 28,
2009.
Jurisdiction; probate proceedings. The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on
the RTC or the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate,
which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises’s estate. Thus, from a
reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed gross error when it
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had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it
did not call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be
ordered motu proprio by the courts. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the case
on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of
the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal,
and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the exception laid down
in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy and clarified recently in Figueroa v. People cannot be applied. First,
because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government.
No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be wrought by the ruling that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the instituted probate proceedings.
Second and most important, because in Tijam, the delayed invocation of lack of jurisdiction has
been made during the execution stage of a final and executory ruling of a court. In Figueroa, the
Court has emphasized that estoppel by laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to
the factual milieu in Tijam. In the Matter of the Allowance of the Will of Moises
F. Banayad Apolonia Banayad Frianela Vs. Servillano Banayad, Jr., G.R. No. 169700, July 30,
2009.
Motions; motion for clarification. This Court finds merit in the respondents’ motion for partial
reconsideration, since the words “inclusive of allowance and x x x other benefits or the
monetary equivalent thereof” are merely descriptive of “full backwages,” which this Court had
already categorically awarded to respondents after a thorough discussion of the merits of the
case. They do not constitute a new or additional award to respondents. The inclusion of these
words in the dispositive part of the Decision serves only to clarify the same so that in the
implementation thereof, none of the rights legally due to the respondents shall be
overlooked. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils, Inc. vs. Alan M. Agito, Regolo S. Oca III, et al., G.R. No.
179546, July 23, 2009.
Motions; motion for new trial. Petitioner argues that the CA should have granted her motion for
reconsideration of the May 15, 2003 resolution. She asserts that under Rule 37, Section 1 (a) of
the Rules of Court, the abandonment of her case by her former counsel amounted to extrinsic
fraud which was a meritorious ground.
Petitioner is incorrect. Extrinsic fraud is a valid ground in a motion for new trial, not a motion for
reconsideration. Nely T. Co vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 160265, July 13, 2009.
Motions; motion to lift order of default. Upon being declared in default,
respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial
thereof, Tansipek filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed
for failure to attach the assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipek’s Motion for Reconsideration with
the Court of Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time. Respondent Tansipek did not
appeal said denial to this Court.
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Respondent Tansipek’s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the very
beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default, and not a
Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should
be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious
defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of
meritorious defenses must concur. Banco De Oro-EPCI, Inc. vs. John Tansipek, G.R. No.
181235, July 22, 2009.
Party; death of party. When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished,
the Rules of Court require a substitution of the deceased. Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court enumerates the actions that survived and may be filed against the decedent’s
representatives as follows: (1) actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon,
(2) actions to enforce liens thereon, and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to a person
or a property. In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client
and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative.
The rule on substitution of parties is governed by Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a
requirement of due process. The rule on substitution was crafted to protect every party’s right to
due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.
Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the
heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the
decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the
deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial
proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.
In the case before Us, it appears that respondent’s counsel did not make any manifestation
before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the proceedings. Neither
had he shown any proof that he had been retained by respondent’s legal representative or any
one who succeeded her.
However, such failure of counsel would not lead Us to invalidate the proceedings that have
long taken place before the RTC. The Court has repeatedly declared that failure of the counsel to
comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is
effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action
survives the death of such party. The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the
death of the party.
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the
litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigants are themselves
protected as they continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed
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legal representative of their estate. Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba vs. Fe vda De Te, represented by her
Attorney-in-Fact Faustino Castañeda, G.R. No. 175910, July 30, 2009.
Parties; indispensable parties. Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable
parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As
such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to
the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties
where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely “when an
indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action should be dismissed.” The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. Erna Casals, et al.
Vs. Tayud Golf and Country Club, et al., G.R. No. 183105, July 22, 2009.
Parties; real parties in interest. Petitioners are not real parties in interest and therefore have no
cause of action in bringing the present case. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. A
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In the present
case, there is no dispute that Juan Santiago owned half of the subject lot while the other half
belonged to his brother Jose. Juan Santiago merely exercised his right when he sold a portion of
his undivided half to Mark Vincent L. Ong. Petitioners question Juan’s transaction even though
petitioners are neither parties to the contract nor heirs or assigns of Juan Santiago. Juan Santiago
left a probated will leaving all his properties to his wife Aurea, to the exclusion of petitioners. As
heirs of Jose Santiago, co-owner of the subject property, petitioners may only question the sale if
their right of preemption under the Civil Code of the Philippines was disregarded, and they wish
to exercise such right. However, petitioners do not seek to exercise the right of preemption.
Thus, they are not real parties in interest in the present case. Heirs of Jose G. Santiago, namely:
Julia G. Santiago, et al. vs.. Aurea G. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 161238, July 13, 2009.
Parties; real party in interest. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” To
qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he
must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to remedies under the suit.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules refers to material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case. One having no material interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff (or petitioner) in an action.
Indisputably, being the administrative agency which resolved the conflicting claims of De
Guzman and Magat over the subject property, the NHA does not stand to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in this case. It does not have any material interest over the subject
property to protect or defend. In other words, the NHA does not have a cause of action
against Magat precisely because the real parties in interest in the present case are De Guzman
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and Magat, who are both claiming the subject property. National Housing Authority
vs. Reynaldo Magat, G.R. No. 164244, July 30, 2009.
Pre-trial; non-appearance. Section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the dismissal of an action due to
the plaintiff’s failure to appear at the pre-trial shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered
by the court. In this case, the trial court deemed the plaintiffs-herein spouses as non-suited and
ordered the dismissal of their Complaint. As the dismissal was a final order, the proper remedy
was to file an ordinary appeal and not a petition for certiorari. The spouses’ petition
for certiorari was thus properly dismissed by the appellate court.
Procedural infirmities aside, this Court took a considered look at the spouses’ excuse to justify
their non-appearance at the pre-trial but found nothing exceptional to warrant a reversal of the
lower courts’ disposition thereof. Spouses Azucena B. Corpuz and Renato
S. Corpuz vs. Citibank, N.A. et al. / Citibank, N.A. vs. Spouses Azucena B. Corpuz and Renato
S. Corpuz, G.R. No. 175677G.R. No. 177133, July 31, 2009.
Preliminary attachment. Attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for not for its own sake but
to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be granted in the
main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such, it is
available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition, and for purposes of the
ultimate effects, of a final judgment in the case. As a corollary proposition, an order granting an
application for a writ of preliminary attachment cannot, owing to the incidental or auxiliary
nature of such order, be the subject of an appeal independently of the main action.
For a writ of attachment to issue, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances
of the alleged fraud.
Fraud may be defined as the voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a willful omission,
knowing and intending the effects which naturally and necessarily arise from such act or
omission. In its general sense, fraud is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts and omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue
and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. Fraud is also described as embracing all
multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of truth
and includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is
cheated. Fraudulent, on the other hand, connotes intentionally wrongful, dishonest, or unfair.
In the case at bar, the Republic has, to us, sufficiently discharged the burden of demonstrating
the commission of fraud committed by respondents Lims as a condition sine qua non for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The main supporting proving document is the
Republic’s Exhibit “B” which the Sandiganbayan unqualifiedly admitted in evidence. And the
fraud or fraudulent scheme principally came in the form of Lim, Sr. holding and/or operating
logging concessions which far exceeded the allowable area prescribed under the 1973
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Constitution. Republic of the Philippines vs.Estate of Alfonso Lim, Sr., et al., G.R. No.
164800, July 22, 2009.
Res judicata. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other
with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle frees the
parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At
the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata
stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.
The requisites of res judicata are: (1) there must be a former final judgment rendered on the
merits; (2) the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (3)
there must be identity of parties, subject matters and causes of action between the first and
second actions. Edgardo A. Quilo Vs. Rogelio G. Jundarino, Sheriff III, Metropolitan Trail Court,
Branch 19, Manila, A.M. No. P-09-2644, July 30, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation. It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and
omission of their counsel. But this rule admits of exceptions – (1) where the counsel’s mistake is
so great and serious that the client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the
counsel is guilty of gross negligence resulting in the client’s deprivation of liberty or property
without due process of law. Tested against these guidelines, we hold that petitioner’s lot falls
within the exceptions.
It is an oft-repeated exhortation to counsels to be well-informed of existing laws and rules and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently
their obligations as members of the Bar. Further, lawyers in the government service are expected
to be more conscientious in the performance of their duties as they are subject to public scrutiny.
They are not only members of the Bar but are also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to
public service. Apparently, the public prosecutor neglected to equip himself with the knowledge
of the proper procedure for BP Blg. 22 cases under the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure such
that he failed to appeal the civil action impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases, the only
remaining remedy available to petitioner to be able to recover the money she loaned to
respondents, upon the dismissal of the criminal cases on demurrer. By this failure, petitioner was
denied her day in court to prosecute the respondents for their obligation to pay their
loan. Anita Cheng vs. Souses William and Tessie Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation. While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-
day reglementary period, the COMELEC however has the discretion to suspend its rules of
procedure or any portion thereof. Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the
spirit of Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power
to “promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its
offices” to attain justice and the noble purpose of determining the true will of the
electorate. Jonas Taguiam vs. Commission on Election, et al., G.R. No. 184801, July 30, 2009.
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Rules of procedure; strict application. The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural technique. The exception to this rule is
when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived
of his day in court. The failure of a party’s counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment
to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence, which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel
of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an
adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a
judgment valid and regular on its face.
To sustain petitioner’s self-serving argument that it cannot be bound by its counsel’s negligence
would set a dangerous precedent, as it would enable every party-litigant to render inoperative
any adverse order or decision of the courts, through the simple expedient of alleging gross
negligence on the part of its counsel. National Power Corporation vs. Sps. Lorenzo
L. Laohoo, et al., G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009.
Supreme Court; trier of facts. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. Isabelita Vda. De Dayao and Heirs of
Vicente Dayao vs. Heirs of Gavino Robles, namely: Placida vda. De Robles, et al., G.R. No.
174830, July 31, 2009.
Writ of injunction. In order that an injunctive relief may be issued, the applicant must show that:
“(1) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; (2) the invasion of the right sought to
be protected is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. Compania General de Tabacos De Filipinas and La Flor De
La Isabela, Inc. vs.Hon. Virgilio A. Sevandal, et al., G.R. No. 161051, July 23, 2009.
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Writ of possession. A writ of possession is an order by which the sheriff is commanded to place
a person in possession of a real or personal property. It may be issued under any of the
following instances: (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2)
judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third
person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a
real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118. The third
instance obtains in the instant case.
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135,
as amended by Act No. 4118. The purchaser at the public auction sale of
an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance with
Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
is not an ordinary civil action by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It is in the nature of an ex parte motion, taken
or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one party, without need of notice to or consent
by any party who might be adversely affected. Moreover, during the period of redemption, it is
ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of the
mortgaged realty. The law requires only that the proper motion be filed, the bond approved, and
no third person is involved. No discretion is left to the court. Any question regarding the
regularity and validity of the sale (and consequent cancellation of the writ) is left to be
determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8. Indeed, such question should
not be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since, under
the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte.
Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the
foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser’s
ownership of the property. In like manner, the mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance
of the writ of possession would suffice and a bond is no longer necessary. This is because
possession has become the absolute right of the purchaser as the confirmed owner. Gloria
R. Motos and Martin Motos vs. Real Bank (A Thrift Bank), Inc., G.R. No. 171386, July 17, 2009.
Writ of possession. Under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, a writ of possession may be issued either (1)
within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond; or (2) after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond.
Within the one-year redemption period, a purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of
possession by filing a petition in the form of an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose.
Upon the filing of such motion with the RTC having jurisdiction over the subject property and
the approval of the corresponding bond, the law, also in express terms, directs the court to issue
the order for a writ of possession.
On the other hand, after the lapse of the redemption period, a writ of possession may be issued
in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale as the mortgagor is now considered to have lost
interest over the foreclosed property. Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession
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after the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when
no redemption is made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can
demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the
issuance to him of a new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of
the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the
absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon
proper application and proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes
merely a ministerial function.
It is settled that the proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to,
or consent by any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted
without an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. No notice is
needed to be served upon persons interested in the subject property. Hence, there is no
necessity of giving notice to the petitioner since he had already lost all his interests in the
property when he failed to redeem the same. Accordingly, the RTC may grant the petition in the
absence of the mortgagor, in this case, the petitioner.
Neither was there a need for the court to suspend the proceedings merely and solely because of
the pendency of the complaint for the nullification of the real estate mortgage and the
foreclosure proceedings. Martin T. Sagarbarria vs. Philippine Business Bank, G.R. No.
178330, July 23, 2009.
Writ of possession. Under the law, the mortgagor may file a petition to set aside the sale and
writ of possession before the RTC. In case the lower court denies the petition, the mortgagor
may appeal in accordance with Section 14 of Act No. 496, also known as The Land Registration
Act. Even then, the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the
appeal. Here, petitioners moved to quash the writ of possession issued by the RTC. Gloria
R. Motos and Martin Motos vs. Real Bank (A Thrift Bank), Inc., G.R. No. 171386, July 17, 2009.
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Action; accion publiciana. Accion publiciana, also known as accion plenaria de posesion, is
an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently
of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to
determine who between or among the parties has the right to possess the property. This
adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is
only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
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provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. Francisco Madrid and
Edgardo Bernardo vs. Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad Martinez, G.R. No. 150887,
August 14, 2009.
Action; filing fees. Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants’ claim has merit. The
600,000 shares of stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were the subject matter of
the complaint, and the relief prayed for entailed the nullification of the transfer thereof and their
return to LLDC. David, et al., are minority shareholders of the corporation who claim to have
been prejudiced by the sale of the shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. Thus, to the
extent of the damage or injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the shares of stock,
the action they filed can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation. The shares of
stock have a definite value, which was declared by plaintiffs themselves in their complaint.
Accordingly, the docket fees should have been computed based on this amount. This is clear
from the version of Rule 141, Section 7 in effect at the time the complaint was filed. David Lu Vs.
Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. Vs. David Lu/ John Lu Ym and Ludo & Luym
Development Corporation Vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Cebu City (former twentieth
division), et al., G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889, August 4, 2009.
Action; filing fees. From the foregoing, it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is availed of
mainly in real actions. Hence, when David, et al., sought the annotation of notices of lis
pendens on the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the complaint they had filed affected a
title to or a right to possession of real properties. At the very least, they must have been fully
aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of the realties involved. Their silence or
inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court who computed their docket fees, therefore,
becomes highly suspect, and thus, sufficient for this Court to conclude that they have crossed
beyond the threshold of good faith and into the area of fraud. Clearly, there was an effort to
defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. David Lu Vs. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym,
Sr., et al. Vs. David Lu/ John Lu Ym and Ludo & Luym Development Corporation Vs. The Hon.
Court of Appeals of Cebu City (former twentieth division), et al., G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No.
157381/G.R. No. 170889, August 4, 2009.
Action; filing fees. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the poor to free access to the courts
and to adequate legal assistance. The legal aid service rendered by the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters nationwide addresses only the right to adequate legal assistance.
Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access
to courts by exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in connection with the filing of a
complaint or action in court. With these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III
of Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by bridging a significant gap and
removing a major roadblock. Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to exempt legal
aid clients from paying filing, docket and other fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009.
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Action; lis pendens. A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires interest over
said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the
said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with notice of the
particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire over
the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit. Such announcement is founded upon public
policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation.
As a general rule, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as
follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any
other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use
or the occupation thereof. Additionally, this Court has held that resorting to lis pendens is not
necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation
also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific
real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. David Lu Vs. Paterno
Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. Vs. David Lu/ John Lu Ym and Ludo & Luym
Development Corporation Vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Cebu City (former twentieth
division), et al., G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889, August 4, 2009.
Action; reconstitution. The sufficiency of the Register of Deeds’ report is not an indispensable
requirement in reconstitution cases. The report may even be disregarded. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Agripina Dela Raga, G.R. No. 161042, August 24, 2009.
Appeal; bond. The filing of a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The requirement that employers post a cash or surety bond to perfect their appeal
is apparently intended to assure workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the
money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the former’s appeal. It was intended to
discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligations to satisfy
their employees’ just and lawful claims. Cesario L. Del Rosario vs. Philippine Journalists,
Inc., G.R. No. 181516, August 19, 2009.
Appeal; fees. Time and again, we have ruled that the payment of the full amount of docket fee
within the period to appeal is a sine qua non requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Such
payment is not a mere technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement, without
which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory, as if no appeal
was filed. Ricardo C. Duco vs.The Hon. Commission on Elections, First Division, and Narciso B.
Avelino, G.R. No. 183366, August 19, 2009.
Appeal; fees. When petitioner’s appeal was perfected on January 10, 2008, within five (5) days
from promulgation, his non-payment or insufficient payment of the appeal fee to the Comelec
Cash Division should not have resulted in the outright dismissal of his appeal. The Comelec
Rules provide in Section 9 (a), Rule 22, that for failure to pay the correct appeal fee, the appeal
may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Comelec. Likewise,
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Section 18, Rule 40 thereof also prescribes that if the fees are not paid, the Comelec may refuse
to take action on the appeal until the said fees are paid and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding.
Here, petitioner paid P1,200.00 to the Comelec on February 14, 2008. Unfortunately, the
Comelec First Division dismissed the appeal on March 17, 2008 due to petitioner’s failure to
pay the correct appeal fee within the five-day reglementary period. In denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, in the Resolution dated January 21, 2009,
declared that the Comelec did not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-
payment of the appeal fee on time.
However, during the pendency of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March 27, 2008,
the Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to clarify the implementation of the Comelec
Rules regarding the payment of filing fees. Thus, applying the mandated liberal construction of
election laws, the Comelec should have initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal
fee with the Comelec Cash Division, and should not have dismissed outright petitioner’s appeal.
This would have been more in consonance with the intent of the said resolution which sought to
clarify the rules on compliance with the required appeal fees. Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.
vs. Commission on Elections and Francisco M. Langi, Sr., G.R. No. 186224, August 25, 2009.
Appeal; non-forum shopping. The perfection of an appeal necessarily includes the filing of a
complete (not a defective) memorandum of appeal within the ten (10) day reglementary period.
Petitioner conveniently disregards that the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires the appeal to be
accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Thus, petitioner’s filing of a
memorandum of appeal without the requisite certificate did not stop the running of the period to
perfect an appeal. In short, the Order of Execution of the Labor Arbiter became final and
executory. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Rizalina Raut, et al., G.R. No.
174209, August 25, 2009.
Appeal; Ombudsman. The threshold issue in this petition is the procedural question of whether
a complainant in an administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman has the right to
appeal a judgment exonerating the respondent from liability.
By statute and regulation, a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of the
administrative charge is final and unappealable. Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr. vs. Simplicio C.
Belisario and Emmanuel S. Malicdem, G.R. No. 154652, August 15, 2009.
Appeal; period. As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new
procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided
in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted. Rodrigo Sumiran vs. Spouses Generoso Damaso and Eva Damaso, G.R. No. 162518,
August 19, 2009.
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Appeal; period. There is no dispute that Guinmapang received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision on 23 June 2003. Thus, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule
VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC, Guinmapang had only until 3 July 2003, the 10th
calendar day from 23 June 2003, within which to file an appeal. However, due to the asthma
attack suffered by Guinmapang’s counsel, Guinmapang’s appeal was filed on 4 July 2003, a day
late.
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
prescribed by law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules
will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception,
unintended lapses are disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the
reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of
justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the
period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an
end to controversies. Republic Cement Corporation vs. Peter Guinmapang, G.R. No. 168910,
August 24, 2009.
Appeal; scope. It is well-settled that issues not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the
first time on appeal. Furthermore, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. Foundation Specialist, Inc. vs. Betonval Ready
Concrete, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 170674, August 24, 2009.
Arbitration. The law speaks of two modes of arbitration: (a) an agreement to submit to
arbitration some future dispute, usually stipulated upon in a civil contract between the parties,
and known as an agreement to submit to arbitration, and (b) an agreement submitting an
existing matter of difference to arbitrators, termed the submission agreement. Article XX of the
milling contract is an agreement to submit to arbitration because it was made in anticipation of
a dispute that might arise between the parties after the contract’s execution.
Except where a compulsory arbitration is provided by statute, the first step toward the settlement
of a difference by arbitration is the entry by the parties into a valid agreement to arbitrate. An
agreement to arbitrate is a contract, the relation of the parties is contractual, and the rights and
liabilities of the parties are controlled by the law of contracts. In an agreement for arbitration,
the ordinary elements of a valid contract must appear, including an agreement to arbitrate some
specific thing, and an agreement to abide by the award, either in express language or by
implication.
The requirements that an arbitration agreement must be written and subscribed by the parties
thereto were enunciated by the Court in B.F. Corporation v. CA.
Simply put, petitioners do not have any agreement to arbitrate with respondents. Ormoc
Sugarcane Planters’ Association, Inc. (OSPA), Occidental Leyte Farmer’s Multi-Purpose
Cooperative Inc., et al. vs. The Court of Appeals (Special Former Sixth Division), et al., G.R. No.
156660, August 24, 2009.
Arrest; warrantless. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or
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private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case,
P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated
the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were
able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the
incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to
give chase. Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they
investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to
the existence of probable cause. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt. German Doria and SPO3
Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009.
Arrest; warrantless. Appellant questions his arrest without warrant, not any of the instances
when a warrantless arrest – the person to be arrested must have committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense –having been allegedly present when he was
arrested.
The records do not show that appellant raised any question on the legality of his arrest before he
was arraigned or in his petition for bail. By submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court and
presenting evidence in his defense, appellant voluntarily waived his constitutional protection
against illegal arrest.
In any event, appellant forgets that from the evidence for the prosecution, he was arrested while
committing a crime – peddling of illegal drugs, a circumstance where warrantless arrest is
justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules. People of the Philippines vs. Willie
Rivera, G.R. No. 177741, August 27, 2009.
Dismissal; forum shopping. Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It
may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. There is
forum shopping where the elements of litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) there is identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there is identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same set of facts; and (c)
the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending
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case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. It is
expressly prohibited by this Court because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades
the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of
the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also
constitute direct contempt.
In this case, there is clearly no forum shopping committed by ASBT. The July 5, 2001 motion it
filed praying for reconsideration of the June 19, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals,
dismissing the petition on the technical ground of lack of proof of the authority of ASBT
President Mildred R. Santos to bind the corporation in its appeal, is simply what it is, a motion
for reconsideration. Sameer cannot insist that it be treated as a new petition just to make it fit the
definition of forum shopping in an attempt to evade liability to pay the amounts awarded to
Santos, et al. Nor was Sameer correct when it asseverated that the Seventh Division, that initially
dismissed then reinstated ASBT’s petition, and the Former Fourth Division, that rendered the
questioned Decision and Resolution in favor of ASBT, can be considered as different fora within
the ambit of the prohibition. They are mere divisions of one and the same Court of Appeals. And
as explained by the appellate court, what actually happened was that after the Seventh Division
issued its June 19, 2001 Resolution dismissing the case for failure of ASBT to show that Mildred
R. Santos was authorized to sign and bind the corporation in the proceedings, ASBT complied
and submitted the requisite proof of authority. The Seventh Division then issued a Resolution on
August 14, 2001 reinstating the petition. After an internal reorganization, it was the Fourth
Division which promulgated a decision on December 10, 2001. ASBT never filed a second
petition. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Mildred R. Santos, etc. et al., G.R. No.
152579, August 4, 2009.
Dismissal; forum shopping. Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the
ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before
RTC-Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258.
Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not guilty of forum shopping, since (1) the two cases
do not have the same ultimate objective – Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 seeks the annulment of
the 8 November 2001 public auction and certificate of sale issued therein, while Civil Case No.
CV-05-0402 prays for the award of actual and compensatory damages for respondents’ tortuous
act of making it appear that an auction sale actually took place on 8 November 2001; and (2)
the judgment in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207, on the annulment of the foreclosure sale, would
not affect the outcome of Civil Case No. CV-05-0402, on the entitlement of petitioners to
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damages. The Court, however, finds these arguments refuted by the allegations made by
petitioners themselves in their Complaints in both cases.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, although with different prayers. Fidel O. Chua and Filiden Realty and Development
Corporation vs.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, et al, G.R. No. 182311, August 19, 2009.
Dismissal; laches. Laches, or what is known as the doctrine of stale claim or demand, is the
neglect or omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a
delay in the assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity
founded on some change in the condition of the property involved or in the relations of the
parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be
denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim.
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine of laches is embraced in the broad
provision in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the various grounds
on which a motion to dismiss may be based. Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the
claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule,
particularly on the relation of the words “abandoned” and “otherwise extinguished” to the
phrase “claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading” is broad enough to include within
its ambit the defense of bar by laches. Antonio Navarro vs.Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company/Clarita P. Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 165697/G.R.
No. 166481, August 4, 2009.
Dismissal; prescription. Initially, we confront the issue of whether the action has prescribed,
considering that several years have already passed since TCT No. N-19781 was issued, and
petitioner’s title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The contention
apparently lacks merit. The records reveal that the respondents have been in possession of the
subject property since 1938. Jurisprudence abounds in holding that, if a person claiming to be
the owner is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect
seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
vs. Heirs of Vicente Coronado, et, G.R. No. 180357, August 4, 2009.
Dismissal; res judicata. The principle of res judicata denotes that a final judgment or decree on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in their former suit. It obtains where
a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment or order on the merits of the
case, which operates as an absolute bar against a subsequent action for the same cause. A
substantial identity is necessary to warrant the application of the rule, and the addition or
elimination of some parties or the difference in form and nature of the two actions would not
alter the situation. In other words, when material facts or questions in issue in a former action
were conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions constitute res
judicata and may not be again litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
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privies regardless of the form of the latter. Antonio Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company/Clarita P. Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 165697/G.R.
No. 166481, August 4, 2009.
Dismissal; res judicata. While the present case and the administrative case are based on the
same essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An
administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the
respondent for the commission of the acts complained of. The case before us deals with the civil
liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no identity of causes of action in the
cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the application of res judicata in the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of
parties in the first and second cases.
There is no identity of parties between the present case and the administrative case. The
administrative case was filed by Benjamin Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against petitioner. Sia Lao is not a
party to this case. Respondents in the present case were not parties to the administrative case
between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present case, petitioner is the complainant against
respondents. Hence, while res judicata is not a defense to petitioner’s complaint for damages,
respondents nevertheless cannot be held liable for damages as discussed above. Judge Felimon
Abelita, III vs. P/Supt. German Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14,
2009.
Evidence; circumstantial. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is
essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which
leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the
others, as the guilty person. Circumstantial evidence on record will be sufficient to convict the
accused if it shows a series of circumstances duly proved and consistent with each other. Each
and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with the
accused’s innocence. The circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. People
of the Philippines vs. Lito Macabare y Lopez, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009.
Evidence; presumption of innocence. In sustaining the prosecution’s case, the lower courts
inevitably relied on the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. Not only is it rebutted
by contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior to the constitutional presumption of innocence.
All told, we find merit in appellant’s claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt due to substantial gaps in the chain of custody,
raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti. People of the Philippines
vs. Marian Coroche y Caber, G.R. No. 182528, August 14, 2009.
Evidence; presumption of regularity. Macabare claims also that the rebuttable presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed cannot by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence that an accused enjoys. This claim is valid to a point. Indeed, the constitutional
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presumption of innocence assumes primacy over the presumption of regularity. We cannot,
however, apply this principle to the instant case. The circumstantial evidence imputing animus
posidendi to Macabare over the prohibited substance found in his kubol coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions constitutes proof of guilt of
Macabare beyond a reasonable doubt. More so, the defense failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they
were inspired by an improper motive in falsely imputing a serious crime to Macabare. People of
the Philippines vs. Lito Macabare y Lopez, G.R. No. 179941, August 25, 2009.
Evidence; pro reo principle. We apply the pro reo principle and the equipoise rule in this case.
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in question or there is doubt on which side the
evidence weighs, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. If inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and will not justify a conviction. Julius Amanquiton vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 186080, August 14, 2009.
Evidence; rape. At the heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of credibility of the witnesses,
to be resolved primarily by the trial court, which is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. The manner
of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who has the unique and unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and assess their credibility. In essence, when the question arises as to
which of the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the
assessment of the trial court is generally given the highest degree of respect, if not finality.
Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would otherwise affect
the result of the case. The assessment made by the trial court is even more enhanced when the
Court of Appeals affirms the same, as in this case. People of the Philippines vs. Dante Gragasin Y
Par, G.R. No. 186496, August 25, 2009.
Evidence; rape. In resolving rape cases, this Court is guided by the following principles: (a) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for
the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit,
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense; and
(d) the evaluation of the trial court judges regarding the credibility of witnesses deserves utmost
respect on the ground that they are in the best position to observe the demeanor, act, conduct,
and attitude of the witnesses in court while testifying. People of the Philippines vs. Edwin
Mejia, G.R .No. 185723, August 4, 2009. see People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Paragas
Cruz; G.R. No. 186129, August 4, 2009. see People of the Philippines vs. Lilio U. Achas, G.R.
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No. 185712, August 4, 2009. see People of the Philippines vs. Armando Ferasol, G.R. No.
185004, August 25, 2009.
Expropriation; classification of land. This Court recognizes the power of a local government to
reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance, especially if said ordinance is approved by
the HLURB. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court Appeals, we acknowledged
the power of local government units to adopt zoning ordinances. Discretion is vested in the
appropriate government agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential,
commercial, industrial or other purposes. It is also a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the
presumption of validity. Having the power to classify lands, the local government unit may
consider factors that are just, reasonable and legal, for it is within the local government unit’s
power to determine these. However, if they abuse their authority in the performance of this duty,
the courts, if prompted, can step in. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department
of Public Works and Highways vs.. Far East Enterprises, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25,
2009.
Expropriation; writ of possession. Under Republic Act No. 8974, the requirements for
authorizing immediate entry in expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the
filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the
defendant; (3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based on
the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of the
improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost
urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4) presentation to
the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the proper officials.
Upon compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is entitled to a
writ of possession as a matter of right, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to
forthwith issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required, and the court exercises neither its
discretion nor its judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of the properties
to be expropriated, as the legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
8974. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Public Works and
Highways vs. Far East Enterprises, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176487, August 25, 2009.
Foreclosure; writ of possession. Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, refers to a situation
wherein the purchaser seeks possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month period
for redemption. Upon the purchaser’s filing of the ex parte petition and posting of the
appropriate bond, the RTC shall, as a matter of course, order the issuance of the writ of
possession in the purchaser’s favor.
But equally well settled is the rule that a writ of possession will issue as a matter of course, even
without the filing and approval of a bond, after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new TCT in the name of the purchaser. In IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corporation v.
Nera, We reasoned that if under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the RTC has the power
during the period of redemption to issue a writ of possession on the ex parte application of the
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purchaser, there is no reason why it should not also have the same power after the expiration of
the redemption period, especially where a new title had already been issued in the name of the
purchaser. Put simply, a purchaser seeking possession of the foreclosed property he bought at
the public auction sale, after the redemption period expired without redemption having been
made, may still avail itself of the procedure under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended; this time,
without any more need for the purchaser to furnish a bond.
Possession of the foreclosed real property, purchased at a public auction sale, becomes the
absolute right of the purchaser upon the consolidation of his title when no timely redemption of
the said property had been made. Hence, the general rule is that upon proper application and
proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession to the purchaser of the foreclosed property at
a public auction sale becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
However, as in all general rules, there is an exception. In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property, when the foreclosed property is in the possession of a third party holding the same
adversely to the defaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in
favor of the purchaser of the said real property ceases to be ministerial and may no longer be
done ex parte. But, for the exception to apply, the property must be possessed by a third party;
and such possession must be adverse to the debtor/mortgagor. Top Art Shirt Manufacturing Inc.,
Maximo Arejola and Tan Shu Keng vs.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Inc. and the Court of the
Appeals, G.R. No. 184005, August 4, 2009.
Foreclosure; writ of possession. The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an
incident in the transfer of title. The trial court does not exercise discretion in the issuance thereof.
For this reason, an order for the issuance of a writ of possession is not the judgment on the
merits contemplated by Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. Hence, the CA correctly
upheld the December 10, 2005 order of the Bulacan RTC.
Furthermore, the mortgagor loses all legal interest over the foreclosed property after the
expiration of the redemption period. Under Section 47 of the General Banking Law, if the
mortgagor is a juridical person, it can exercise the right to redeem the foreclosed property until,
but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale within three months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. Thereafter, such mortgagor loses its right of redemption. GC
Dalton Industries, Inc. vs. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 171169. August 24, 2009.
Guardianship. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking
care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as incompetents who
may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and her properties without outside aid due to her ailments
and weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would
require a reexamination of the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves
questions of fact. Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma, Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun, Teresa C.
Hernandez-Villa Abrille and Natividad Cruz-Hernandez vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos/Cecilio C.
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Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille vs. Jovita
San Juan-Santos, G.R. No. 166470/G.R. No. 169217, August 7, 2009.
Habeas corpus; writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention or by which the rightful custody of person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu, was duty-bound to care for and
protect her ward. For her to perform her obligation, respondent must have custody of Lulu. Thus,
she was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of the custody of her
ward. Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma, Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun, Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa
Abrille and Natividad Cruz-Hernandez vs. Jovita San Juan-Santos/Cecilio C. Hernandez, Ma.
Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille vs. Jovita San Juan-
Santos, G.R. No. 166470/G.R. No. 169217, August 7, 2009.
Judgment; annulment. An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which
is not to be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is a recourse equitable in character allowed
only in exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this extraordinary action
from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision that
has long become final and executory. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. Andrew B. Nudo vs. Hon.
Amado S. Caguioa, et al., G.R. No. 176906, August 4, 2009.
Judgment; conflict. The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the
dispositive part, and the body of the decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the
fallo is the final order and becomes the subject of execution, while the body of the decision
merely contains the reasons or conclusions of the court ordering nothing. However, where one
can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that there was a mistake
in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. Thus, in Spouses Rebuldea v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it corrected the dispositive portion of its decision to make it conform to the
body of the decision, and to rectify the clerical errors which interchanged the mortgagors and
the mortgagee. Judelio Cobarrubias vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 160610, August 14,
2009.
Judgment; finality. A perusal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780, which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177, tells that the complaint therein was dismissed
not on the ground of non-joinder of Belen as an indispensable party, but rather on the ground of
laches. Indeed, what is clear from the said decision is that the dismissal of the case was due to
Clarita’s unjustifiable neglect to timely initiate the prosecution of her claim in court — a
conduct that warranted the presumption that she, although entitled to assert a right, had
resolved to abandon or declined to assert the same.
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the nullity of contracts is not barred by the
statute of limitations, the fact that Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the
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first instance has already been settled by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this
point in the proceedings, the Court can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of
laches vis-à-vis the imprescriptibility of Clarita’s cause of action because the said decision is not
the one on appeal before us. But more importantly, the Court takes notice that the decision
rendered in that case had already become final without any motion for reconsideration being
filed or an appeal being taken therefrom. Thus, we are left with no other recourse than to
uphold the immutability of the said decision.
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled than that once a judgment becomes
final, it is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or reversal, except only for
correction of clerical errors, or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party, or where the judgment itself is void.[26] The underlying reason for the rule is two-
fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus make orderly the discharge of
judicial business, and (2) to put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors,
inasmuch as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. Antonio
Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company/Clarita P. Navarro vs. Metropolitan Bank &
Trust Company, G.R. No. 165697/G.R. No. 166481, August 4, 2009.
Judgment; finality. The trial court’s order of dismissal of petitioners’ complaint attained finality
on September 2, 2005 following their failure to appeal it, which is a final, not an interlocutory
order, within 15 days from August 18, 2005 when their counsel received a copy thereof.
Even if procedural rules were to be relaxed by allowing petitioners’ availment before the
appellate court of Certiorari, instead of appeal, to assail the dismissal of their complaint, not
only was the petition for Certiorari filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. It glaringly
failed to allege how the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint. It merely posited that in dismissing the complaint, petitioners were deprived of the
opportunity to present evidence to “prove the causes of action.” Such position does not lie,
however, for petitioners’ complaint was dismissed precisely because after considering
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and petitioners’ 14-page “VEHEMENT OPPOSITION to the
Motion to Dismiss” in which they proffered and exhaustively discussed the grounds for the
denial of the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. The Heirs of the Late Fernando S. Falcasantos, etc., et al. vs. Spouses Fidel Yeo
Tan and Sy Soc Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 172680, August 28, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. The Court enumerated the requisites of a valid substituted service: (1)
service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible; (2) the person serving the summons
exerted efforts to locate the defendant; (3) the person to whom the summons is served is of
sufficient age and discretion; (4) the person to whom the summons is served resides at the
defendant’s place of residence; and (5) pertinent facts showing the enumerated circumstances
are stated in the return of service. In Sandoval, the Court held that “statutory restrictions for
substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed.”
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In the present case, there is no showing that personal service of summons within a reasonable
time was impossible. On 17 September 2000, Sildo went to 230 Apo Street, Sta. Mesa Heights,
Quezon City, to serve the summons. There, Dominador Galura told him that the Spouses Galura
were presently residing at Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Despite being
told of the Spouses Galura’s correct address, Sildo still went to G.L. Calayan Agro System, Inc.
in Barrio Kalayaan, Gerona, Tarlac to serve the summons, only to find out that the property had
already been foreclosed and that the Spouses Galura no longer resided there. On 26 September
2000, Sildo went to Tierra Pura Subdivision, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, and, without any
explanation, served the summons on Lapuz. Spouses Dante and Ma. Teresa Galura vs. Math-
Agro Corporation, G.R. No. 167230, August 14, 2009.
Jurisdiction; estoppel. The records show that the very first pleading filed by the Lu Ym father
and sons before the court a quo was a motion to dismiss, albeit anchored on the ground of
insufficiency of the certificate of non-forum shopping and failure of the plaintiffs to exert efforts
towards a compromise. When the trial court denied this, they went up to the CA on certiorari,
where they were sustained and the appellate court ordered the dismissal of the complaint below.
Next, the Lu Ym father and sons filed a motion for the lifting of the receivership order, which the
trial court had issued in the interim. David, et al., brought the matter up to the CA even before
the trial court could resolve the motion. Thereafter, David, et al., filed their Motion to Admit
Complaint to Conform to the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. It was at
this point that the Lu Ym father and sons raised the question of the amount of filing fees paid.
They raised this point again in the CA when they appealed the trial court’s decision in the case
below.
We find that, in the circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons are not estopped from challenging
the jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised the insufficiency of the docket fees before the trial
court rendered judgment and continuously maintained their position even on appeal to the CA.
Although the manner of challenge was erroneous – they should have addressed this issue
directly to the trial court instead of to the OCA – they should not be deemed to have waived
their right to assail the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The matter of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court is one that may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. More importantly, this Court may pass upon this issue motu proprio. David Lu Vs.
Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al./Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., et al. Vs. David Lu/ John Lu Ym and Ludo & Luym
Development Corporation Vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals of Cebu City (former twentieth
division), et al., G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889, August 4, 2009.
Jurisdiction; HLURB. In the cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the HLURB
has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply
with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.
The expansive grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however, that all cases
involving subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction.
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Pursuant to Roxas, we held in Pilar Development Corporation v. Villar and Suntay v. Gocolay
that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases filed bysubdivision or condominium owners or
developers against subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind
this can be found in the wordings of Sec. 1, PD No. 1344, which expressly qualifies that the
cases cognizable by the HLURB are those instituted by subdivision or condomium buyers or
owners against the project developer or owner. This is also in keeping with the policy of the law,
which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and business.
Thus, in the cases of Fajardo Jr. v. Freedom to Build, Inc., and Cadimas v. Carrion, we upheld
the RTC’s jurisdiction even if the subject matter was a subdivision lot since it was the
subdivision developer who filed the action against the buyer for violation of the contract to sell.
The only instance that HLURB may take cognizance of a case filed by the developer is when
said case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim to a pending case filed against it by the
buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit. This was what happened in Francel
Realty Corporation v. Sycip, where the HLURB took cognizance of the developer’s claim against
the buyer in order to forestall splitting of causes of action. Christian Assembly, Inc. vs. Sps.
Avelino C. Ignacio and Priscilla R. Ignacio, G.R. No. 164789, August 27, 2009.
Jurisdiction; Ombudsman. We fully support the finding of the CA that grave abuse of discretion
attended the Ombudsman’s decision. As discussed above, grave abuse of discretion is a
circumstance beyond the legal error committed by a decision-making agency or entity in the
exercise of its jurisdiction; this circumstance affects even the authority to render judgment.
Grave abuse of discretion shares this effect with such grounds as the lack of substantial
supporting evidence, and the failure to act in contemplation of law, among others.
In the absence of any authority to take cognizance of a case and to render a decision, any
resulting decision is necessarily null and void. In turn, a null decision, by its very nature, cannot
become final and can be impugned at any time. In the context of the Ombudsman operations, a
void decision cannot trigger the application of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules.
We note that the Office of the Ombudsman duly noted in its decision that the CSC has primary
jurisdiction over the issue of the reassignments’ validity, declaring that it “can hardly arrogate
unto itself the task of resolving the said issue.” This is a correct reading of the law as the CSC is
the central personnel agency of the government whose powers extend to all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters. Constitutionally, the CSC has the power and
authority to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit
system; promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; subject to certain
exceptions, approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil
service; hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it; and perform
such other functions that properly belong to a central personnel agency. Pursuant to these
powers, the CSC has the authority to determine the validity of the appointments and movements
of civil service personnel. Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr. vs. Simplicio C. Belisario and Emmanuel S.
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Malicdem, G.R. No. 154652, August 15, 2009.
Jurisdiction; panel of arbitrators. Nothing in Gonzales leads to the conclusion that in mining
cases, ordinary courts can only resolve questions of validity of mining contracts or agreements;
rather, Gonzales simply established that these questions are more properly resolved by courts of
law, as these are essentially judicial questions requiring the application of laws. Nothing more
was said beyond this; Gonzales certainly did not limit the courts’ authority to questions of
validity of mining contracts or agreements. Olympic Mines and Development Corp.,
vs. Platinum Group Metals Corporation/Citinickel Mines and Development Corporation vs. Hon.
Judge Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Palawan, Br. 95, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and Platinum Group Metals
Corporation/Platinum Group Metals Corporation vs. Citinickel Mines and Development
Corporation, acting for its own interest and on behalf of Olympic Mines and Development
Corporation/Platinum Group Metals Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Polly C. Dy, G.R. No.
178188/G.R. No. 180674/G.R. No. 181141/G.R. No. 183527, August 15, 2009.
Jurisdiction; Secretary of Labor. The Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case as it does not come under the exception clause in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code. While
petitioner Jethro appealed the inspection results and there is a need to examine evidentiary
matters to resolve the issues raised, the payrolls presented by it were considered in the ordinary
course of inspection. While the employment records of the employees could not be expected to
be found in Yakult’s premises in Calamba, as Jethro’s offices are in Quezon City, the records
show that Jethro was given ample opportunity to present its payrolls and other pertinent
documents during the hearings and to rectify the violations noted during the ocular inspection. It,
however, failed to do so, more particularly to submit competent proof that it was giving its
security guards the wages and benefits mandated by law. Jethro Intelligence & Security
Corporation and Yakult, Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al., G.R. No.
172537, August 14, 2009.
Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan. A member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26
who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
and Victoria Amante, G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009.
Motion; motion for reconsideration. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion
for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days from the
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. Failure to file a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and
executory.
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to
be made by the court rendering it or by this Court. Decisions that have long become final and
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executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to
alter the trial court’s final judgment. This doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy
and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some
point in time. Erlinda Mapagay vs.People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 178984, August 19, 2009.
Parties; criminal proceedings. Only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings
before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. However, jurisprudence lays down two
exceptions where a private complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition
directly with this Court. The two exceptions are: (1) when there is denial of due process of law
to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the
State and the private offended party, and (2) when the private offended party questions the civil
aspect of a decision of a lower court. Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa Pesico
vs. Luisito Q. Gonzales and Antonio T. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009.
Parties; indispensable parties. Records show that Pedro Quilatan died intestate in 1960 and was
survived by his three children, namely, Ciriaco, Francisco and Lorenzo, all of whom are now
deceased. Ciriaco was survived by his children, namely Purita Santos, Rosita Reyes, Renato
Quilatan, Danilo Quilatan, and Carlito Quilatan; Francisco was survived by herein petitioners
and their two other siblings, Solita Trapsi and Rolando Quilatan; while Lorenzo was survived by
his children, herein respondents.
In the complaint filed by petitioners before the trial court, they failed to implead their two
siblings, Solita and Rolando, and all the heirs of Ciriaco, as co-plaintiffs or as defendants. It is
clear that the central thrust of the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 67367 was to revert the
subject properties back to the estate of Pedro Quilatan, thereby making all his heirs pro indiviso
co-owners thereof, and to partition them equally among themselves; and that all the co-heirs
and persons having an interest in the subject properties are indispensable parties to an action for
partition, which will not lie without the joinder of said parties. Ely Quilatan & Rosvida Quilatan-
Elias vs. Heirs of Lorenzo Quilatan, et al., G.R. No. 183059, August 28, 2009.
Parties; non-substitution of heirs. Non-substitution of the heirs of a deceased party is not
jurisdictional. The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement
of due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly
represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.
It is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any
legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting
judgment therein. Andrew B. Nudo vs. Hon. Amado S. Caguioa, et al., G.R. No. 176906,
August 4, 2009.
Pleading; amendment. The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to
avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary
delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the
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amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.
Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real
facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the
taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.
In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the
altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to have
submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that, through
inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the words “IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY” were inserted to conform to the bank’s standard practice. This
alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOM’s counsel had no idea
that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the substitution of the
surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be judiciously
resolved. Henry Ching Tiu, et al. vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 151932.
August 19, 2009
Pleadings; signature. Obviously, the rule allows the pleadings to be signed by either the party
to the case or the counsel representing that party. In this case, ASBT, as petitioner, opted to sign
its petition and its motion for reconsideration in its own behalf, through its corporate president,
Mildred R. Santos, who was duly authorized by ASBT’s Board of Directors to represent the
company in prosecuting this case. Therefore, the said pleadings cannot be considered unsigned
and without any legal effect. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Mildred R. Santos, etc.
et al., G.R. No. 152579, August 4, 2009.
Preliminary attachment; preference. Our decisions in Ruiz v. Court of Appeals and Valdevieso v.
Damalerio oblige us to rule that the duly registered levy on attachment by petitioner Rural Bank
takes preference over the prior but then unregistered sale of respondent Manila Mission. There
was likewise no evidence of knowledge on the part of petitioner Rural Bank of any third-party
interest in the subject property at the time of the attachment. We are, therefore, constrained to
grant the instant Petition for Review and nullify the Orders of the RTC discharging the subject
property from attachment. Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Pangasinan), Inc. vs. The Manila Mission
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc., G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009.
Preliminary attachment; grounds. Mere failure to pay its debt is, of and by itself, not enough to
justify an attachment of the debtor’s properties. A fraudulent intention not to pay (or not to
comply with the obligation) must be present. Foundation Specialist, Inc. vs. Betonval Ready
Concrete, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 170674, August 24, 2009.
Preliminary attachment; remedy. Petitioner argues that, pursuant to the aforequoted section, the
remedy of a third person claiming to be the owner of an attached property are limited to the
following: (1) filing with the Sheriff a third-party claim, in the form of an affidavit, per the first
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paragraph of Section 14; (2) intervening in the main action, with prior leave of court, per the
second paragraph of Section 14, which allows a third person to vindicate his/her claim to the
attached property in the “same x x x action”; and (3) filing a separate and independent action,
per the second paragraph of Section 14, which allows a third person to vindicate his/her claim
to the attached property in a “separate action.”
Respondent explains that it tried to pursue the first remedy, i.e., filing a third-party claim with
the Sheriff. Respondent did file an Affidavit of Title and Ownership with the Sheriff, but said
officer advised respondent to file a motion directly with the RTC in the main case. Respondent
heeded the Sheriff’s advice by filing with the RTC, in Civil Case No. D-10583, a Motion to
Release Property from Attachment. The Court of Appeals recognized and allowed said Motion,
construing the same as an invocation by respondent of the power of control and supervision of
the RTC over its officers, which includes the Sheriff. We agree with the Court of Appeals on this
score. Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Pangasinan), Inc. vs. The Manila Mission of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Inc., G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009.
Preliminary injunction; requisites. Before an injunctive writ is issued, it is essential that the
following requisites are present: (1) the existence of a right to be protected and (2) the acts
against which the injunction is directed are violative of the right. The onus probandi is on the
movant to show that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial,
that the right of the movant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
San Miguel claims that the requisites for the valid issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
were clearly established. The clear and unmistakable right to the exclusive use of the mark
“Ginebra” was proven through the continuous use of “Ginebra” in the manufacture, distribution,
marketing and sale of gin products throughout the Philippines since 1834. To the gin-drinking
public, the word “Ginebra” does not simply indicate a kind of beverage; it is now synonymous
with San Miguel’s gin products.
We hold that the CA committed a reversible error. The issue in the main case is San Miguel’s
right to the exclusive use of the mark “Ginebra.” The two trademarks “Ginebra San Miguel” and
“Ginebra Kapitan” apparently differ when taken as a whole, but according to San Miguel,
Tanduay appropriates the word “Ginebra” which is a dominant feature of San Miguel’s mark.
We find that San Miguel’s right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably
demonstrated. The right to the exclusive use of the word “Ginebra” has yet to be determined in
the main case. The trial court’s grant of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of San Miguel,
despite the lack of a clear and unmistakable right on its part, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Tanduay Distillers, Inc. vs.Ginebra San Miguel,
Inc., G.R. No. 164324, August 14, 2009.
Rule 42; CTA. The taxpayer must file a Petition for Review with the CTA within 30 days from
receipt of said adverse decision or ruling of the RTC.
It is also true that the same provisions are silent as to whether such 30-day period can be
extended or not. However, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282 does state that the Petition for
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Review shall be filed with the CTA following the procedure analogous to Rule 42 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 42[16] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the Petition for Review of an adverse judgment or final order of the RTC must be
filed with the Court of Appeals within: (1) the original 15-day period from receipt of the
judgment or final order to be appealed; (2) an extended period of 15 days from the lapse of the
original period; and (3) only for the most compelling reasons, another extended period not to
exceed 15 days from the lapse of the first extended period.
Following by analogy Section 1, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the 30-day
original period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA under Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9282, as implemented by Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, may be
extended for a period of 15 days. No further extension shall be allowed thereafter, except only
for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extended period shall not exceed 15
days. The City of Manila, Liberty M. Toledo in her capacity as the Treasurer of Manila, et al. vs.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 181845, August 4, 2009.
Rule 45; questions of law. As a general rule, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. However, this rule admits of exceptions, such
as in this case where the findings of the Labor Arbiter vary from the findings of the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals. Lowe, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Irma Mutuc, G.R. Nos. 164813
& G.R. No. 174590, August 14, 2009.
Rule 45; questions of law. We review in this Rule 45 petition the decision of the CA on a Rule
65 petition filed by Montoya with that court. In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of
the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake
under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against
the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the
same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether
the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, we have to be keenly
aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC decision
challenged before it. Rufino C. Montoya vs. Transmed Manila Corporation/Mr. Edilberto Ellena
and Great Lake Navigation Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 183329, August 27, 2009
Rule 65; function. The special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to correct
errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the
abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to
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act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without
jurisdiction. Julie’s Franchise Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Chandler O. Ruiz, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, et al., G.R. No. 180988,
August 28, 2009.
Rule 65; function. The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It does
not include the correction of a tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence and factual findings thereon,
especially since factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be binding and
final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case. Jethro
Intelligence & Security Corporation and Yakult, Inc. vs. The Hon. Secretary of Labor and
Employment, et al., G.R. No. 172537, August 14, 2009.
Rule 65; requisites. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the essential requisites that have to
concur are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The phrase without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority or
want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered
either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority. Excess of jurisdiction occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any
statutory authority; or results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board
or officer (to do) is not authorized, and is invalid with respect to the particular proceeding,
because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it
are wanting. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such
exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The present case failed to comply with the above-stated requisites. In the instant case, the
soundness of the RTC’s Order allowing the substitution of the document involves a matter of
judgment and discretion, which cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. This rule is only intended to correct defects of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions. Henry Ching Tiu, et al.
vs. Philippine Bank of Communications, G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009.
Rule 65; substitute for appeal. A special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost or
lapsed remedy of appeal. We have often enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure lies
only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment or final order
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despite the availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. In this case, petitioner utterly failed to provide any
justification for her resort to a special civil action for certiorari, when the remedy of appeal by
petition for review was clearly available. Pagayanan R. Hadji-Sirad vs.. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 182267, August 28, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation of rules. The Court ruled on several occasions that the right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law.
The party who seeks to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failure to do so
results in the loss of that right. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
Nonetheless, it bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in
the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights,
and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather
than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the rules, or except a
particular case from its operation. Spouses Obdulia H. Espejo and Hildelberto T. Espejo
vs. Geraldine Coloma Ito, G.R. No. 176511, August 4, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation of rules. We have invariably pronounced that the bare invocation
of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this
Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of Procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency
and orderliness, as well as to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that strict adherence
thereto is required. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed, simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they
are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive reasons, when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Rules of Procedure, especially
those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely indispensable
to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of justice. We have
held that the rules may be relaxed only in “exceptionally meritorious cases.”
In the instant case, we find no persuasive or exceptionally meritorious reasons to justify the
relaxation of the rules. The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that petitioner was
accorded opportunity to settle her liability to private complainant and to present her case during
the proceedings. As earlier recounted, the MTC, upon motion of petitioner, provisionally
dismissed the case on the basis of an amicable settlement between her and private complainant.
However, the case was revived, because petitioner failed to comply with the settlement.
Petitioner was given several opportunities during the trial to present evidence in her defense.
Nonetheless, despite being duly notified and subpoenaed, she did not appear during the trial
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proper and promulgation of judgment. Erlinda Mapagay vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
178984, August 19, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation. Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and
orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is
required. However, technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded, for
these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it
is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant
to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and
the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and
situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. In not a few instances, the
Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity
to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This is in line with the time-honored principle that
cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions.
In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties,
bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of
justice.
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for
a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the
case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Pagayanan R. Hadji-
Sirad vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 182267, August 28, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation of rules. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner to comply with the resolution directing him to implead the People of the Philippines
as respondent . The Court of Appeals held that the petition was prosecuted manifestly for delay,
which is a ground for dismissal under Section 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
However, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court also provides that rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Thus, in several cases, the Court has ruled against
the dismissal of petitions or appeals based solely on technicalities especially when there was
subsequent substantial compliance with the formal requirements.
In this case, the Court finds the petitioner’s failure to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent not so grave as to warrant dismissal of the petition. After all, petitioner rectified his
error by moving for reconsideration and filing an Amended Petition, impleading the People of
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the Philippines as respondent. Judelio Cobarrubias vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
160610, August 14, 2009.
Rules pf procedure; relaxation of rules. A one-day delay in the perfection of the appeal was
excused in Gana v. NLRC, Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, City Fair
Corporation v. NLRC, Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v. NLRC, and Insular Life Assurance
Co., Ltd. v. NLRC.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that since no intent to delay the administration of justice
could be attributed to Guinmapang, a one day delay does not justify the appeal’s denial. More
importantly, the Court of Appeals declared that Guinmapang’s appeal, on its face, appears to be
impressed with merit. The constitutional mandate to accord full protection to labor and to
safeguard the employee’s means of livelihood should be given proper attention and sanction. A
greater injustice may occur if said appeal is not given due course than if the reglementary period
to appeal were strictly followed. In this case, we are inclined to excuse the one day delay in
order to fully settle the merits of the case. This is in line with our policy to encourage full
adjudication of the merits of an appeal. Republic Cement Corporation vs. Peter
Guinmapang, G.R. No. 168910, August 24, 2009.
Settlement of estate; letters testamentary. A reading of Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, clearly shows that the subject matter of therein
petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters testamentary to respondents, do not fall within
any ground which can be the subject of a direct appeal to this Court. The CA was thus correct in
declaring that the “issues raised by petitioner do not fall within the purview of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 such that the Supreme Court should take cognizance of the instant case.
Petitioner cannot deny that the determination of whether or not respondents should be
disqualified to act as executors is a question of fact. Hence, the proper remedy was to appeal to
the CA, not to this Court. Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda R.
Marcos, G.R. No. 130371/G.R. No. 130855, August 4, 2009.
Search; plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with
petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the
door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved
in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. Judge Felimon Abelita, III vs. P/Supt.
German Doria and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez, G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009.
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Summary judgment; propriety. Summary or accelerated judgment is proper only when, based
on the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, and after hearing, it is shown that save as
to the amount of damages, there is no veritable issue regarding any material fact in the action
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, where the pleadings
tender an issue, that is, an issue of fact the resolution of which calls for a presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham or contrived, summary judgment is not
proper. D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs.Duvaz Corporation, G.R. No. 155174, August 4, 2009.
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Action; forcible entry. There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical
possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. The
basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. The plaintiff must prove that he
was in prior possession and that he was deprived thereof.
In the instant case, respondents’ house was constructed in 1983 and they had prior physical
possession until they were deprived thereof by petitioners. To substantiate their claims,
respondents submitted the affidavit, dated September 20, 2002, of Carlos C. Menil and Lolito S.
Bito, who witnessed the demolition of respondents’ house during the latter’s absence. Mr. Menil
and Mr. Bito attested that they saw petitioner Rogelio personally supervising the demolition of
respondents’ house, and that he erected a concrete fence enclosing the area where the house
formerly stood. Petitioners failed to refute the foregoing allegations except with bare denials.
While petitioners hold title to the subject property where the house was located, the sole issue
in forcible entry cases is who had prior possession de facto of the disputed property. In Dy, the
Court held that these are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not involved; that is why it
is a special civil action with a special procedure. Spouses Rogelio F. Lopez and Teotima G.
Lopez vs. Samuel R. Espinosa and Angelita S. Espinosa, G.R. No. 184225, September 4, 2009
Action; nature. Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the
material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Undeniably,
Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article
2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution. Zenaida
R. Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009.
Action; reconveyance. An action for reconveyance or accion reivindicatoria has no effect and
can exist at the same time as ejectment cases involving the same property. This is because the
only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved.
Ejectment cases are designed to summarily restore physical possession to one who has been
illegally deprived of such possession, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties’
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. The question of ownership
may only be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to
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possession de facto. Iglesia Evangelisca Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas (IEMELIF), Inc. vs.
Nataniel B. Juane/Nataniel B. Juane Vs. Iglesia Evangelisca Metodista En Las Islas Filipinas
(IEMELIF), Inc, G.R. No. 172447, September 18, 2009.
Appeal; COMELEC appeal fee. iI is undisputed that Batalla had already perfected his appeal
by paying the required appeal fees. He paid the PhP 1,000 appeal fee to the trial court on
February 22, 2008 within the five-day period from receipt of the decision and the additional PhP
3,200 appeal fee to the Comelec Cash Division on March 5, 2008 or within 15 days from the
filing of his notice of appeal. It is, thus, clear that Batalla had perfected his appeal by complying
with the appeal requirements. Ernesto Batalla vs. Commission on Elections and Teodoro
Bataller, G.R. No. 184268, September 15, 2009.
Appeal; COSLAP. all appeals from orders, resolutions or decisions of the COSLAP should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. If a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 is the prescribed remedy due to grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction,
the same should also be brought to the Court of Appeals, as the said court cannot be bypassed
without running afoul of the doctrine of judicial hierarchy. In this case, respondents did not
timely appeal the COSLAP decision to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43, and instead filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, although with the Regional Trial Court, a body that is co-
equal with the COSLAP. Only later did they file a petition for certiorari with the appellate court
assailing the trial court’s dismissal of their petition.
We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondents’ remedy from the decision of
the COSLAP was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as they assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of said body over the dispute. However, the petition should have been filed before
the Court of Appeals and not the trial court. In other words, while respondents availed of the
correct remedy, they sought the same from the wrong court. This mistake would have rendered
the assailed COSLAP decision final and executory, were it not for its patent nullity and
invalidity. Joaquin Ga, Jr., et al. vs. Spouses Antonio Tabungan, et al., G.R. No. 182185,
September 18, 2009.
Appeal; exhaustion of administrative remedies. Prior exhaustion of administrative remedies
may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when
there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d)
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is
irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego
of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Sps. Leonardo and Milagros Chua
vs. Hon. Jacinto G. Ang, et al., G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009.
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Appeal; improper. The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not
toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of
appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC. Recardo S. Silverio, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
and Nelia S. Silverio-Dee, G.R. No. 178933. September 16, 2009
Appeal; NLRC appeal bond. It behooves the Court to give utmost regard to the legislative and
administrative intent to strictly require the employer to post a cash or surety bond securing the
full amount of the monetary award within the 10 day reglementary period. Nothing in the Labor
Code or the NLRC Rules of Procedure authorizes the posting of a bond that is less than the
monetary award in the judgment, or would deem such insufficient posting as sufficient to perfect
the appeal.
While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions
that (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a
reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the
filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC grants the reduction of the cash bond
within the 10 day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to post the cash or surety
bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does eventually grant
the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would be
to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day
period. Andrew Jame Mcburne vs. Eulalio Ganzon, et al., G.R. Nos. 178034 & 178117/G.R. Nos.
186984-85/G.R. No. 179319, September 18, 2009.
Appeal; PARAB. Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly within its
sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision, petitioner’s petition for certiorari to
nullify the PARAD’s decision. Under the grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, PARAD Alegario’s decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CA’s
appellate task comes later––to review the case disposition of the DARAB Proper when properly
challenged. Rosita A. Montanez vs.Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), et al., G.R.
No. 183142, September 17, 2009.
Appeal; right. Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a constitutional
right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must
comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate, perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for
perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge
of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and
executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period,
so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Thus, the
propriety of the monetary awards of the Labor Arbiter is already binding upon this Court, much
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more with the Court of Appeals. Andrew Jame Mcburne vs. Eulalio Ganzon, et al., G.R. Nos.
178034 & 178117/G.R. Nos. 186984-85/G.R. No. 179319, September 18, 2009.
Arrest; legality. To be sure, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused, hence, any defect therein may be deemed cured when, as here, the
accused voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court. An illegal arrest is thus not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a
trial free from error. Elmer Diamante y Sioson, et al. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
180992, September 4, 2009.Bonifacio Dolera y Tejada vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
180693, September 4, 2009.
Arrest; warrantless. We stress at the outset that the petitioner failed to question the legality of his
warrantless arrest. The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
legality of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the Information against him before
his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the
objection is deemed waived.
In any event, we carefully examined the records and now hold that the warrantless arrest
conducted on the petitioner was valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
lists the situations when a person may be arrested without a warrant. Paragraph (a) of Section 5,
Rule 113 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless arrest of an
accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.
After carefully evaluating the evidence in its totality, we hold that the prosecution successfully
established that the petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto. Gilbert Zalameda vs. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009.
Declaratory relief. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been
deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of anaccion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is
a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that
has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as owner. Carmen Danao
Malana, et al. vs. Benigno Tappa, et al., G.R. No. 181303. September 17, 2009
Declatory relief. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be
raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument
or statute.
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The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy
between persons whose interests are adverse; (2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest
in the controversy; and (3) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.
The Court rules that the City of Naga properly resorted to the filing of an action for declaratory
relief.
In the instant case, the controversy concerns the construction of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 305 or the Charter of the City of Naga. Specifically, the City of Naga seeks an interpretation
of Section 2, Article I of its Charter, as well as a declaration of the rights of the parties to this
case thereunder.
To recall, Section 2, Article I of Republic Act No. 305 defines the territory of the City of Naga,
providing that the City shall comprise the present territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Naga. By virtue of this provision, the City of Naga prays that it be granted the right to
administratively control and supervise Plaza Rizal, which is undisputedly within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City. Province of Camarines Sur, represented by Governor Luis Raymund F.
Villafuerte, Jr. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and City of Naga, represented by Mayor Jesse M.
Robredo, G.R. No. 175064, September 18, 2009.
Demurrer to evidence. Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case
without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do,
if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an
aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss,
which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be
granted, thus:
A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff’s evidence together with such inferences and conclusions
as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a
demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when,
admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions
fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the
material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to
his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff’s evidence is prima facie insufficient for a
recovery. Joanie Surposa Uy vs.Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
Evidence; alibi. Regarding appellants’ defense of alibi, the same cannot prevail over the
positive identification of appellants as perpetrators of the crime charged. For alibi to prosper, it
is not enough for the appellants to prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was
committed. They must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. People of the Philippines
vs. Antonio Ortiz, et al., G.R. No. 179944, September 4, 2009.
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Evidence; alibi. While alibi is considered weak and unavailing, it acquires significance where
no proper identification of the assailant has been made. People of the Philippines vs. Aristo
Villanueva, G.R. No. 178543, September 4, 2009.
Evidence; credibility of witness. It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and
attitude under grilling examination. These are important in determining the truthfulness of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. For,
indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are potent aids in ascertaining the
witness’ credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take advantage of these aids.
These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate court can see are the
cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk that some of what
the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As correctly stated by
an American court, “There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any degree of
accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by him,
even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness
may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his
manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony.
Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things
cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the
appellate court. People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Sapigao, Jr., G.R. No. 178485,
September 4, 2009.
Evidence; credibility of witness. Rape is generally unwitnessed and oftentimes, the victim is left
to testify for herself. Thus, in resolving rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the
primordial consideration. If a victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof. To ensure that justice is meted out, extreme care and caution is required in
weighing the conflicting testimonies of the complainant and the accused. People of the
Philippines Vs. Roldan Arcosiba alias “Entoy”, G.R. No. 181081. September 4, 2009
Evidence; denial. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility
with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both
negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various
aspects of the crime committed. Gilbert Zalameda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
183656, September 4, 2009.
Evidence; non-presentation of informant. The settled rule is that the presentation of an informant
in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful
prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. Moreover,
informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and
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preserve their invaluable service to the police. Gilbert Zalameda vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 183656, September 4, 2009.
Evidence; rape. By the peculiar nature of rape cases, conviction thereon most often rests solely
on the basis of the offended party’s testimony, if credible, natural, convincing, and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. Accordingly, the Court has consistently
adhered to the following guiding principles in the review of similar cases, to wit: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility; while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the accused, albeit innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme care; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must succeed or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Corollary to the foregoing principles is the rule that the credibility of the victim is always the
single most important issue in prosecution for rape. Withal, in passing upon the credibility of
witnesses, the highest degree of respect must be accorded to the findings of the trial
court. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Araojo, G.R. No. 185203, September 17, 2009.
Evidence; rape. In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles, to wit: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
As a result of these guiding principles, the credibility of the complainant becomes the single
most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on the
basis thereof. Allan Dizon vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 170342, September 18, 2009.
Evidence; rape. In an attempt to discredit the victim’s testimony, appellant points out certain
discrepancies in her testimony, such as the exact time they went to the farm of Naty Astor. Such
discrepancy is trifling. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
circumstances provided by law. Thus, the precise time when the rape took place has no
substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with
absolute accuracy.
The victim cannot be expected to store methodically in her memory the sordid details of a rape
incident and, when called to testify in court, give a completely detailed and accurate account of
the harrowing experience she suffered. Thus, minor inconsistencies in the narration are
generally given liberal appreciation by the trial court. People of the Philippines vs. Lorenzo
Oliva y Rosela, G.R. No. 187043. September 18, 2009
Evidence; totality of circumstances. The Court, in a long line of cases, has reiterated the totality
of circumstance test set forth in People v. Teehankee, Jr., which dictates that the following
factors be considered in determining the reliability of the out-of-court identification made by a
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witness, i.e., (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the
witness’ degree of attention at the time of the crime; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
To prevent any undue suggestiveness in the identification process, it was held that the correct
way is to: first, present a series of photographs to the witness, not solely the photograph of the
suspect; and second, when showing a group of pictures to the witness, the arrangement and
display of said photographs should give no suggestion whatsoever which one of the pictures
belongs to the suspect. The photographic identification must be free from any impermissible
suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the
identification. However, as held in Teehankee, Jr., the burden to prove that the out-of-court
identification was unduly suggestive rests on the accused. Edgar Mercado vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 161902, September 11, 2009.
Judgment; finality. Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. A
final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest court of the land. This is the doctrine of finality of judgment. It is grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigations, thus negating the main role of courts of justice to
assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality. Vicente Dacanay, in his capacity as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Tereso D. Fernandez vs. Hon. Raphael Prastora Sr., etc., et al., G.R. No.
150664, September 3, 2009.
Judgment; finality. The petition cannot be granted. It seeks a review of a matter that has been
settled with finality by the trial court. Settled is the rule that once a decision acquires finality, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. Thus, despite containing erroneous conclusions of fact or
law, it can no longer be modified. Joaquin P. Obieta vs. Edward Cheok, G.R. No. 170072.
September 3, 2009.
Judgment; finality. Petitioner’s mere filing of the Motion for Reduction of Bond did not suffice
to perfect his appeal. As correctly found by the appellate court, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reduction of Bond dated June 24, 1999 (which was received by the appellate court on June 28,
1999) alleging financial constraints without showing “substantial compliance with the Rules” or
demonstrating a willingness to abide by the [R]ules by posting a partial bond.” That petitioner
questioned the computation of the monetary award ─ basis of the computation of the amount
of appeal bond did not excuse it from posting a bond in a reasonable amount or what it
believed to be the correctamount.Since no exceptional circumstances obtain in the present case
warranting the relaxation of the Rules, the Labor Arbiter’s Decision had become final and
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executory. The Heritage Hotel of Manila vs.National Labor Relations Commission, Rufino C.
Rañon II, and Ismael C. Villa, G.R. No. 180478-79, September 3,
2009.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/170072.htm
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/september2009/170072.htm
Judgment; void. A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of
execution based on it is void. It may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an
outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. Joanie Surposa
Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the
complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either
through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and
their submission to its authority. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient
of due process. As a rule, if defendants have not been validly summoned, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over their person, and a judgment rendered against them is null and void.
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. In case of a domestic private
juridical entity, the service of summons must be made upon an officer who is named in the
statute (i.e., the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or
in-house counsel), otherwise, the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably
certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to
insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that
such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. However, if the
summons cannot be served on the defendant personally within a reasonable period of time, then
substituted service may be resorted to.
Nonetheless, the impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts
have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is
necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a
method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be
followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by
statute is considered ineffective.
In Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., this Court held that in case of
substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of
confidence ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summons. B.D. Long Span
Builders, Inc. vs. R.S. Ampeloquio Realty Development Inc., G.R. No. 169919, September 11,
2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition. Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action
brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either
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upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, is null and void.
Where the action is in personam, i.e., one that seeks to impose some responsibility or liability
directly upon the person of the defendant through the judgment of a court, and the defendant is
in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service
in the manner described in Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is well-established that a summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by
handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
Personal service of summons most effectively ensures that the notice desired under the
constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. The essence of personal service is
the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself.
Under our procedural rules, service of summons in person of defendants is generally preferred
over substituted service. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It
is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the respondent or the defendant to the
consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him but upon
another to whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
The Court requires that the Sheriff’s Return clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or
hopelessness of personal service. Proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility
of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the
defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the
service of summons ineffective. Alexander Tam Wong vs. Catherine Factor-Koyoma, G.R. No.
183802, September 17, 2009.
Jurisdiction; HLURB. The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions
regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was to provide for an appropriate
government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties – buyers and sellers of subdivision and
condominium units – may seek remedial recourse. The law recognized, too, that subdivision
and condominium development involves public interest and welfare and should be brought to a
body, like the HLURB, that has technical expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on
the other hand, is empowered to interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of
private parties under these contracts. This ancillary power, generally judicial, is now no longer
with the regular courts to the extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURB’s jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations
of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly. But hand in
hand with this definition and grant of authority is the provision on criminal penalties for
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violations of the Decree, provided under the Decree’s Section 39, heretofore quoted.
Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section
39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose
administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree.
The Implementing Rules, for their part, clarify that “The implementation and payment of
administrative fines shall not preclude criminal prosecution of the offender under Section 39 of
the Decree.” Thus, the implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that two separate
remedies with differing consequences may be sought under the Decree, specifically, the
administrative remedy and criminal prosecution.
Unless the contrary appears under other provisions of law (and in this case no such provision
applies), the determination of the criminal liability lies within the realm of criminal procedure as
embodied in the Rules of Court. Section 2, Rule 112 of these Rules provide that the prerogative
to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause lies with the persons duly
authorized by law; as provided in this Rule, they are (a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their
assistants; (b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (c)
National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (d) other officers as may be authorized by law. Sps.
Leonardo and Milagros Chua vs. Hon. Jacinto G. Ang, et al., G.R. No. 156164, September 4,
2009.
Minute resolutions. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to
comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other
cases?
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same
parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v.
Baier-Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the same
parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court thru a minute resolution
dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the
previous case “ha(d) no bearing” on the latter case because the two cases involved different
subject matters as they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a
decision. The constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution that the facts and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed
clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is
signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not
require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are
not published in the Philippine Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks
of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which
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constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and certified
by the Chief Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioner’s liability
for DST on its health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner
cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in that case (which is not even binding
precedent) in its favor. Philippine Health Providers, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009.
Motion; motion for reconsideration. A prior motion for reconsideration is unnecessary: (a)
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the
questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is an extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; or (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. Sps. Leonardo and Milagros
Chua vs. Hon. Jacinto G. Ang, et al., G.R. No. 156164, September 4, 2009.
Motion; motion to inhibit. While the rule allows judges, in the exercise of sound discretion, to
voluntarily inhibit themselves from hearing a case, it provides that the inhibition must be based
on just or valid reasons. In prior cases interpreting this rule, the most recent of which is
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi, etc., et al., the Court
noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition,
especially when the charge is without basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice has to be shown. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad
faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. Stated differently, the bare allegations of the judge’s partiality will not
suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the
judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence,
and without fear or favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be considered valid reasons for the
involuntary inhibition of judges, mere suspicion is not enough. Jimmy L. Barnes a.k.a. James
Barnes vs. Teresita C. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 179583, September 3, 2009.
Motion; motion to dismiss. In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the
focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of
facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not the court,
admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. And to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that
the claim for relief in the complaint does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively
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stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. Alice Vitangcol and Norberto Vitangcol
vs. New Vista Properties, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 176014, September 17, 2009.
Motion to dismiss; lack of cause of action. The Rules of Court defines “cause of action” as the
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It contains three elements: (1) a right
existing in favor of the plaintiff; (2) a correlative duty on the part of the defendant to respect that
right; and (3) a breach of the defendant’s duty. It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last
element that a cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff a right to file an action in court for
recovery of damages or other relief.
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the determination of a lack of cause
of action can only be made during and/or after trial. What is dismissible via that mode is failure
of the complaint to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides
that a motion may be made on the ground “that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause
of action.”
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the
material allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the plaintiff’s complaint. When a motion
to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, a ruling thereon should, as rule,
be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. However, this principle of hypothetical
admission admits of exceptions. Among others, there is no hypothetical admission of
conclusions or interpretations of law which are false; legally impossible facts; facts inadmissible
in evidence; facts which appear by record or document included in the pleadings to be
unfounded; allegations which the court will take judicial notice are not true; and where the
motion to dismiss was heard with submission of evidence which discloses facts sufficient to
defeat the claim. Alice Vitangcol and Norberto Vitangcol vs. New Vista Properties, Inc., et
al., G.R. No. 176014, September 17, 2009.
Motion; motive to intervene. The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to
become a party to protect his interest, and the court, incidentally, to settle all conflicting claims.
The spouses Vaca are not strangers to the action. Their legal interest in the litigation springs from
the sale of the subject property by petitioner in their favor during the pendency of this case. As
transferee pendente lite, the spouses Vaca are the successors-in-interest of the transferor, the
petitioner, who is already a party to the action. Thus, the applicable provision is Section 19,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, governing transfers of interest pendente lite. Associated Bank (now
United Overseas Bank [Phils.]) vs. Spouses Rafael and Monaliza Pronstroller/Spouses Eduardo
and Ma. Pilar Vaca (Intervenors), G.R. No. 148444, September 3, 2009.
Motion; second motion for reconsideration. The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a
second motion for reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general
rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a particular case
from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, despite the denial of De
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Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was
actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision
and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s
evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex
technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a
crime which he might not have committed after all. Also in Astorga v. People, on a second
motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the
case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,[by virtue of the
January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend
the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent’s second motion for
reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-examination of the
merits of the case, we granted the second motion for reconsideration and set aside our earlier
decision. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 164815, September 3, 2009
Parties; indispensable parties. The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party
in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the
Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial court’s
order dated May 23, 2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case No. 95-145703.
The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for
certiorari.
The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his
petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for
certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof, but even that he did not do. Thereby, he violated
Section 35(l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative
Code of 1987), which mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers
in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions
and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity
is a party.”
Although the petition for certiorari bore the conformity of the public prosecutor (i.e., Assistant
City Prosecutor Danilo Formoso of Manila), that conformity alone did not suffice. The authority
of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines
was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court. Jowett K. Golango vs. Jone B. Fung, G.R.
No. 157952, September 8, 2009.
Parties; real party in interest. The AREM was executed by Antonio, with the marital consent of
Matilde. Since the mortgaged property is presumed conjugal, she is obliged principally under
the AREM. It is thus she, following Art. 1397 of the Civil Code vis a vis Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, who is the real party in interest, hence, the action must be prosecuted in her
name as she stands to be benefited or injured in the action.
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Assuming that Matilde is indeed incapacitated, it is her legal guardian who should file the action
on her behalf. Not only is there no allegation in the complaint, however, that respondents have
been legally designated as guardians to file the action on her behalf. The name of Matilde, who
is deemed the real party in interest, has not been included in the title of the case, in violation of
Sec. 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc (now known as Banco De Oro-
EPCI, Inc.) vs. Heirs of Antonio C. Tiu, et al., G.R. No. 178529, September 4, 2009.
Parties; substitution. According to Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, a counsel,
within 30 days from his client’s death, is duty-bound to inform the court of such fact, and to
submit the name/s and address/es of the deceased client’s legal representative/s. Thereafter, the
court shall order, forthwith, the appearance of and substitution by the deceased party’s legal
representative/s within another period of 30 days from notice.
We emphasize that the purpose behind Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Procedure is
the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected by
the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself or herself protected, as he/she continues
to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his
estate. The spirit behind the general rule requiring a formal substitution of heirs is “not really
because substitution of heirs is a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance
therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to due process of those who, though not
duly notified of the proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision rendered
therein.” Edwino A. Torres (deceased), represented and substitute by Alfonso P. Torres III, et
al., G.R. No. 177836, September 4, 2009.
Provisional relief. The order to deposit the lease rentals with the trial court is in the nature of a
provisional relief designed to protect and preserve the rights of the parties while the main action
is being litigated. Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, such an order may be issued
even prior to the determination of the issue of co-ownership because it is precisely meant to
preserve the rights of the parties until such time that the court finally determines who is lawfully
entitled thereto. It does not follow, however, that the subject order in this case should be
sustained. Like all other interlocutory orders issued by a trial court, the subject order must not
suffer from the vice of grave abuse of discretion. As will be discussed hereunder, special and
compelling circumstances constrain the Court to hold that the subject order was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. Wilson A. Go vs. Harry A. Go, G.R. No. 183546, September 18, 2009.
Res judicata. The decision of a land registration court in a petition for consolidation of
ownership and registration precludes another action for annulment of auction sale.[11] Hence,
the September 8, 1986 decision of the RTC Branch 93 in LRC Case No. Q-3458(86) barred the
institution of Civil Case No. Q-50553. The RTC Branch 104 should have dismissed the latter on
the ground of res judicata. Spouses Hu Chuan Hai and Leonica Lim Hu vs. Spouses Renato
Unico and Maria Aurora J. Unico, G.R. No. 146534, September 18, 2009.
Res judicata. Res judicata exists when the following elements are present: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the parties and the
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subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be — between the first
and the second actions — identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
Emphasis must be given to the fact that CA-G.R. No. 92474 was dismissed based on pure
technicalities and not on the merits, to wit: (1) therein petitioners’ (now private respondent’s)
counsels failed to indicate their respective Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Official Receipt
numbers, in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132; (2) the Petition did not contain an affidavit of
service, as required by Section 13, Rule 13 and Section 5, Rule 43, of the Rules of Procedure, as
proof that copy of the said Petition had been served on the adverse party; (3) the Petition does
not contain any explanation of why a personal service upon therein private respondent (now
petitioner) was not resorted to pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13; and therein petitioners failed to
furnish the Ombudsman and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) with a copy of their
Petition.
Clearly from the foregoing, the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 92474 was based on sheer
technicality. Since no judgment on the merits was rendered after consideration of the evidence
or stipulation submitted by the parties at the trial of the case, it falls short of one of the essential
requisites of res judicata, that the judgment should be one on the merits. Edgardo H. Catindig
vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 183141, September 18, 2009.
Res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well- regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common
law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause, nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem
causa.
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the
merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. Joanie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
Rule 45. Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision or final order or
resolution of the trial court on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a question of fact
exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the
alleged facts. Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct
application of the law or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts. Joanie Surposa Uy vs. Jose Ngo
Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.
Rule 45. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition for certiorari under Rule
65. Rule 45 provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any
case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us
by filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over
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the original case. Thus, petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 45 instead
of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner’s argument that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy since the CA had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari filed before it as the petition was filed beyond
the 60-day period for filing the same deserves scant consideration. There is no reason why such
issue could not have been raised on appeal. Emcor, Incorporated vs. Ma. Lourdes D.
Sienes, G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009.
Rule 45. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported
by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
As a rule, only questions of law are entertained by this Court in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. It is not our function to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence presented.
It is a settled doctrine that in a civil case, final and conclusive are the factual findings of the trial
court, but only if supported by clear and convincing evidence on record.
In this case, the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the RTC. Hence,
a review thereof is in order. Manila Electric Company vs. Aguida Vda. De Santiago, G.R. No.
170482, September 4, 2009; see also Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Jardine Davies Transport
Services, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc., G.R. No. 181300, September 18, 2009.
Rule 45. It is well-settled that the proper recourse of an aggrieved party to assail the decision of
the Court of Appeals is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if appeal, by way of a
petition for review is available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or successive.
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For a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction but must also show that he has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. Though there
are instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of appeal, none of these
recognized exceptions was shown to be present in the case at bar.Tacloban Far East Marketing
Corporation, et al. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182320, September 11, 2009.
Rule 47. Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a recourse equitable in
character and allowed only in exceptional cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of petitioner. Section 2 of the said Rule provides that the annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, although jurisprudence recognizes denial of
due process as an additional ground. City Government of Tagaytay vs. Hon. Eleuterio F.
Guerrero, etc. et al./Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, et al. vs. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, etc., et
al., G.R. Nos. 140743 & G.R. No. 140745/G.R. No. 141451-52, September 17, 2009.
Rule 47. In this case, the Melencios allege extrinsic fraud on the part of petitioner City of
Tagaytay for its failure to implead them in Civil Case No. TG-1196. They allege that they are
indispensable parties to the case, considering that have vested rights to protect, being purchasers
of the subject parcels of land. Sadly, this contention does not persuade.
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The
fraud or deceit cannot be of the losing party’s own doing, nor must such party contribute to it.
The extrinsic fraud must be employed against it by the adverse party, who, because of some
trick, artifice, or device, naturally prevails in the suit. It affects not the judgment itself but the
manner in which the said judgment is obtained.
Extrinsic fraud is also present where the unsuccessful party has been prevented by his opponent
from exhibiting fully his case by keeping the former away from court or giving him a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, having been
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority assumed to represent a party and connived at his defeat; or where the attorney
regularly employed corruptly sold out his client’s interest to the other side. The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.
In the instant case, we find that the action or inaction of the City of Tagaytay does not amount to
extrinsic fraud. The City of Tagaytay is not the prevailing party in the assailed decision.
Moreover, the Melencios were not totally without fault in protecting their interest. They were
aware of the pendency of Civil Case No. TG-1196, as shown by their filing of a motion to
intervene in the case. When their motion was denied by the trial court, they no longer pursued
their cause. City Government of Tagaytay vs. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, etc. et al./Ameurfina
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Melencio-Herrera, et al. vs. Hon. Eleuterio F. Guerrero, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 140743 & G.R. No.
140745/G.R. No. 141451-52, September 17, 2009.
Rule 47. The remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases.Francisco
R. Llamas, et al. vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 149588, September 29,
2009.
Rule 65; grave abuse. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because
of passion or personal hostility. It must be as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case. Kei Marie and Bianca
Angelica both surnamed Abrera, minors, represented by their parents Evelyn C. Abrera, et al.
vs. Hon. Romeo F. Barza, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Makati City and College Assurance Plan Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 171681. September 11,
2009
Rule 65; motion for reconsideration. For a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to prosper, TACC must show that (1) the LLDA acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2)
there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the court
or agency to rectify its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this
requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply
with the requirement. Petitioner may not arrogate to itself the determination of whether a motion
for reconsideration is necessary or not.[29]
In the present case, TACC did not file a motion for reconsideration of the 4 September 2003
Order. TACC also failed to show sufficient compelling and valid reason to dispense with the
requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration. Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed before it. The Alexandra Condominium
Corporation vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority, G.R. No. 169228. September 11, 2009
Rule 65; requisites. For a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
There is grave abuse of discretion “when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent
and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
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On the other hand, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari,
whereby “a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of
the x x x the Regional Trial Court x x x, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set
forth.”
A perusal of the petition referred to the Court of Appeals lays bare the fact that the same was
undoubtedly a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Not only
does the title of the Petition indicate it as such, but a close reading of the issues and allegations
set forth therein also discloses that it involved pure questions of law. A question of law arises
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. For a question to be one of
law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. The Court of Appeals, thus, could not fault
Camarines Sur for failing to allege, much less prove, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC when such is not required for a Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Likewise, the doctrine that certiorari cannot be resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal applies only when a party actually files a Petition forCertiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of a
Petition for Review under Rule 45, since the latter remedy was already lost through the fault of
the petitioning party. In the instant case, Camarines Sur actually filed a Petition for Review
under Rule 45; the Court of Appeals only mistook the same for a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65. Province of Camarines Sur, represented by Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr.
vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and City of Naga, represented by Mayor Jesse M. Robredo, G.R. No.
175064, September 18, 2009.
Rule 65; availability of appeal. Considering that an appeal was still available as a remedy for
the assailed Orders of the RTC, and that the case did not fall within the exceptions, the filing of
the petition for certiorari was an attempted substitute for an appeal, after respondent failed to
avail itself of the latter remedy. Necessarily, it must be noted that the petition for certiorari was
filed on August 28, 2007 when the questioned RTC Orders had already attained finality. The
Order became final when respondent Financiera received the RTC Order of June 18, 2007
denying the former’s motion for reconsideration on June 29, 2007. Instead of filing a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period lasting until July 14, 2007, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari, way beyond the reglementary period. Hence, the CA had no jurisdiction to decide the
said petition for certiorari. Simeon M. Valdez vs.Financiera Manila Inc., G.R. No. 183387,
September 29, 2009.
Rules of procedure; deportation. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character,
summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary
court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
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seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met. Carlos T. Go., Sr. vs. Luis T. Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio
F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No.
167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation. In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, the Court restated the reasons
that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules, such
as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Herein, BPI instituted Civil Case No. 03-281 before the RTC to recover the amount it had lent to
Dando, plus interest and penalties thereon, clearly, a matter of property. The substantive right of
BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of
procedure, more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by
FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and disputes only the amount of his outstanding
liability to BPI. To dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281 with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from
recovering the amount it had lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense
of BPI.
The counsel of BPI invokes “heavy pressures of work” to explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial
Brief with the RTC and to serve a copy thereof to Dando at least three days prior to the
scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. True, in Olave v. Mistas, we did not find “heavy pressures of
work” as sufficient justification for the failure of therein respondents’ counsel to timely move for
pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents in Olave, the failure of BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief
with the RTC and provide Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period under
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, was the first and, so far, only procedural lapse
committed by the bank in Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI did not manifest an evident pattern or
scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory
requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI, for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable
dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set Civil Case No.
03-281 for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando’s Answer to the Complaint; and in
instantaneously filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC
dismissing Civil Case No. 03-281.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties to Civil Case No.
03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a
full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the
hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived
of due process of law. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Domingo R. Dando, G.R. No. 177456,
September 4, 2009.
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Rule of procedure; relaxation. While it is true that the Court may treat a Petition for Certiorari as
having been filed under Rule 45 in the interest of substantial justice, the present petition could
not be given the same leniency because it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The records of the case show that
petitioners received a copy of the January 24, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying
the motion for reconsideration on February 5, 2008. Instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari within 15 days from receipt thereof, petitioners waited for two months before filing the
instant petition. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals had already become final and
executory and beyond the purview of this Court to act upon. The inescapable conclusion is that
the present petition was filed belatedly to make up for a lost appeal.
Search; warrantless. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers
to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the
permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of
his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a
table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164815. September 3, 2009
Search; plain view. The “plain view doctrine” may not be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 164815. September 3, 2009
Unlawful detainer. The necessary allegations in a complaint for ejectment are set forth in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners alleged that the former owner (Estanislao,
their predecessor) allowed respondents to live on the land. They also stated that they purchased
the property on December 15, 1999 and then found respondents occupying the property. Yet
they demanded that respondents vacate only on March 2, 2001. It can be gleaned from their
allegations that they had in fact permitted or tolerated respondents’ occupancy.
Based on the allegations in petitioners’ complaint, it is apparent that such is a complaint for
unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance of the owner.[19]It is a settled rule that in
order to justify such an action, the owner’s permission or tolerance must be present at the
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beginning of the possession. Such jurisdictional facts are present here. Spouses Lydia Flores-Cruz,
et al. vs. Spouses Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 172217, September 18,
2009.
Unlawful detainer. In the instant case, respondent’s allegations in the complaint clearly make a
case for an unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction on the MTC over the subject matter.
Respondent alleged that she was the owner of the land as shown by Original Certificate of Title
No. 111999 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga; that the land had been declared for
taxation purposes and she had been paying the taxes thereon; that petitioners’ entry and
construction of their houses were tolerated as they are relatives; and that she sent on January 12,
2004 a letter demanding that petitioners vacate the property but they failed and refused to do so.
The complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on June 9, 2004, or within one year from the time
the last demand to vacate was made.
It is settled that as long as these allegations demonstrate a cause of action for unlawful detainer,
the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle holds, even if the facts
proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the
court – after acquiring jurisdiction – may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of
evidence. Rodolfo “Rudy” Canlas, et al. vs. Iluminada Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25,
2009.
Writ of habeas corpus. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the
filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be
allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term
“court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to
order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When
an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of
deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such
alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending
his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its
jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other
arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject. Carlos T. Go., Sr. vs. Luis T.
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Ramos/Jimmy T. Go vs. Luis T. Ramos/Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, etc., et al. vs. Jimmy T. Go
a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, G.R. No. 167569/G.R. No. 167570/G.R. No. 171946, September 4,
2009.
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Action; forum shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum-shopping has been defined as the act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
Although the factual antecedents of the cases brought before this Court are the same, they
involve different issues. The petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages, docketed as
Civil Case No. 13013, and raised before this Court as G.R. No. 177795, challenged respondents’
refusal to recognize petitioners’ appointments and to pay petitioners’ salaries, salary adjustments,
and other emoluments. The petition only entailed the applications for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus and for the award of damages. The present case docketed as G.R. No. 181559, on
the other hand, involves the merits of petitioners’ appeal from theinvalidation and revocation of
their appointments by the CSC-Field Office, which was affirmed by the CSC-Regional Office,
CSC en banc, and the Court of Appeals. Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et
al., G.R. No. 181559, October 2, 2009.
Action; forum shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. This is not the case with respect to the ejectment suit
vis-à-vis the action for damages. Manuel Luis S. Sanchez vs. Republic of the Philippines,
Represented by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, G.R. No. 172885, October 9,
2009.
Action; lis pendens. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment
in order to prevent the final judgment from being defeated by successive alienations; and (2) to
bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree
that the court will promulgate subsequently.
While the trial court has an inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power is to
be exercised within the express confines of the law. As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1)
when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when
the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be
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recorded. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, Heirs of Julian Sy and Oscar Sy vs. Rolando Sy, et al./Iluminada
Tan, et al. vs. Bartolome Sy, et al, G.R. No. 114217G.R. No. 150979. October 13, 2009
Action; preliminary hearing. It is inconsequential that petitioner had already filed an answer to
the complaint prior to its filing of a motion to dismiss. The option of whether to set the case for
preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer which raises affirmative defenses, or to file a
motion to dismiss raising any of the grounds set forth in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules are
procedural options which are not mutually exclusive of each other. Associated Bank vs. Spouses
Justiniano S. Montano, Sr. and Ligaya Montano, et al., G.R. No. 166383, October 16, 2009.
Appeal; COMELEC. The appeal to the COMELEC was perfected when petitioner filed her Notice
of Appeal and paid the appeal fee of P1,000.00 on May 13, 2008, which was two months
before the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486, clarifying the rule on the payment of appeal
fees. As stated in Aguilar, fairness and prudence dictate that the First Division of the COMELEC
should have first directed petitioner to pay the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 in accordance
with the clarificatory resolution; and if petitioner refused to comply, only then should the appeal
be dismissed. The First Division of the COMELEC should have been more cautious in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal on the mere technicality of non-payment of the additional appeal fee of
P3,200.00 given the public interest involved in election cases.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the First Division of the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the Order dated November 25, 2008, dismissing petitioner’s appeal. The
case is remanded to the First Division of the COMELEC for disposition of the appeal in
accordance with this decision, subject to the presentation by petitioner of the receipt evidencing
payment of the appeal fee of P1,000.00 as required under Section 9, Rule 14 of A. M. No. 07-4-
15-SC.
It must be stated, however, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation on July 27,
2009 of Divinagracia v. Commission on Elections, errors in the matter of non-payment or
incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer
excusable. Carmelinda C. Barror vs. The Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 186201,
October 9, 2009.
Arbitration; doctrine of separability. Petitioner argues that it tendered an issue in its Answer as it
disputed the legality of the pre-termination fee clause of the PSPA. Even assuming arguendo that
the clause is illegal, it would not affect the agreement between petitioner and respondent to
resolve their dispute by arbitration.
The doctrine of separability, or severability as other writers call it, enunciates that an arbitration
agreement is independent of the main contract. The arbitration agreement is to be treated as a
separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not automatically terminate when the
contract of which it is a part comes to an end.
The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to the determination of
whether the invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration clause. Indeed, the
doctrine denotes that the invalidity of the main contract, also referred to as the “container”
contract, does not affect the validity of the arbitration agreement. Irrespective of the fact that the
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main contract is invalid, the arbitration clause/agreement still remains valid and
enforceable. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs.Edison (Bataan) CoGeneration
Corporation, G.R. No. 179537, October 23, 2009
Bail; grant. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that “All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law.”
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all persons
in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused charged with
a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution evidence
when he denied the Demurrer and the latter’s statement that the evidence was sufficient to
convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing merely to determine whether
respondent was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was
already presented by the prosecution.
The People’s recourse to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing, for said Section
clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of conviction has
already been handed down by the trial court. The People of the Philippines vs. Luis Plaza y
Bucalon, G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009.
Complaint; cause of action. The issue before us calls for a discussion of a court’s basic
appreciation of allegations in a complaint. The fundamental rule is that reliefs granted a litigant
are limited to those specifically prayed for in the complaint; other reliefs prayed for may be
granted only when related to the specific prayer(s) in the pleadings and supported by the
evidence on record. Necessarily, any such relief may be granted only where a cause of action
therefor exists, based on the complaint, the pleadings, and the evidence on record. Philippine
Charter Insurance Corporation vs. Philippine National Construction Corporation, G.R. No.
185066, October 2, 2009.
Complaint; withdrawal. Without going into the raison d’ etre why the plaintiff, respondent
company herein, withdrew its complaint with the court a quo, its effect, nevertheless, is the
restoration of the rights of the contending parties prior to the filing of the complaint. Quite
simply, the withdrawal of the complaint results in placing them to their original position, as if no
complaint was filed at all. This should be so, otherwise, a plaintiff can peremptorily withdraw
his complaint after securing an order favorable to him. Land Center Construction and
Development Corporation vs. V.C. Ponce, Co., Inc. and Vicente C. Ponce, G.R. No. 160409,
October 2, 2009.
Contempt of court. Contempt of court is defiance of court authority that tends to degrade the
dignity of the court and bring the administration of the law into disrespect, or an act that
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interferes with or prejudices parties-litigants or their witnesses during litigation thereby impeding
the administration of justice. It is also defined as the disobedience to the Court by acting in
opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity, and signifies a willful disregard or disobedience
of the court’s orders; it is conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or otherwise impedes the administration of justice.
The power of contempt is a very powerful weapon, as the court determines for itself whether its
authority, dignity and effectiveness in the administration of justice have been prejudicially
affected. Thus, the rule is to use this power sparingly and only in the defensive and preservative
spirit. Yet, the Court will not hesitate and has never hesitated to wield its power where the
contumacious conduct exhibited by a person or entity is patently and clearly derogatory to the
authority of the courts in their sworn duties. It is with these thoughts that we decide the issue
before us.
The records clearly show that the Resolutions of March 31, 2004 and June 23, 2004 of this
Court in G.R. No. 161807, affirming the CA decision granting the petitioner permanent total
disability benefits, have long become final and executory. Entry of judgment has in fact been
made.
At this point, the doctrine of immutability of judgment became fully operational. Under this
doctrine, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck
down. The only exceptions to this rule are: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4)
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable. In the absence of any effective invocation of these exceptions – and none has
so been made in this case – the judgment of the court must be implemented according to its
terms. Dominador C. Villa vs. Government Service Insurance System, (GSIS), represented by
Angelina A. Patino, Field Office Manager, GSIS, Dinalupihan, Bataan Branch, and/or Winston F.
Garcia, President and General Manager, GSIS, G.R. No. 174642, October 30, 2009.
Criminal cases; due process for State. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG). The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently
adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and
may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result,
a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor General
the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to
refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said decision is,
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therefore, a nullity. People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F. Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 9,
2009.
Demurrer to evidence. This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that, to
determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court
must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at
which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to
evidence. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal cases. Caution
must, however, be exercised in view of its pernicious consequence on the right of the accused
to present evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the
penalty involved. Antonio Cabador vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 186001, October 2,
2009.
Eminent domain proceedings; just compensation. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative. City of Cebu vs. Spouses Ciriaco
and Arminda Ortega/City of Cebu vs. Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega, G.R. Nos. 181562-
63/G.R. Nos. 181583-84, October 2, 2009.
Eminent domain proceedings; just compensation. The prevailing doctrine on judicial
determination of just compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled that even
if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial
court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three
competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the subject property. The Court reiterated its ruling in National Power
Corporation v. Dela Cruz that “trial with the aid of commissioners is a substantial right that may
not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.” It was also emphasized therein that
although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’
findings may only be disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own estimation of the
property’s value only if the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where
the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Hon. Vicente P. Eusebio, et al.
vs.Jovito M. Luis, et al., G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009.
Evidence; burden of proof. The CA, however, made a mistake with regard to the assignment of
the burden of proof. No rule requires a party, who relies on a notarized deed of sale for
establishing his ownership, to present further evidence of such deed’s genuineness lest the
presumption of its due execution be for naught. Under the rules of evidence, “Every instrument
duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved.”
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Here, Atty. Crispulo Ducusin notarized the deed of sale that Riñoza acknowledged as his free
act and deed on June 17, 1989. By signing and affixing his notarial seal on the deed, Atty.
Ducusin converted it from a private document to a public document. As such, the deed of sale
is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. And since Riñoza, the executor of the deed, is
already dead, the notarized deed of absolute sale is the best evidence of his consent to the sale
of the Utod sugarland to the Destreza spouses. Parenthetically, it is not disputed that the
Destrezas immediately and openly occupied the land right after the sale and continuously
cultivated it from then on.
The burden of proof is the duty of a party to present such amount of evidence on the facts in
issue as the law deems necessary for the establishment of his claim. Here, since respondents
Plazo and Alaras claim, despite the Destrezas’ evidence of title over the property and open
possession of it, that grave and serious doubts plague TCT 55396, the burden is on them to
prove such claim. Only when they are successful in doing so will the court be justified in
nullifying the notarized deed of sale that their father Riñoza executed in favor of the
Destrezas. Gregorio Destreza vs. Atty. Ma. Garcia Riñoza-Plazo, et al., G.R. No. 176863,
October 30, 2009.
Forcible entry; burden of proof. It is a basic rule in civil cases, including an action for forcible
entry, that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, which simply means “evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than
that which is offered in opposition to it.” Hence, parties who have the burden of proof must
produce such quantum of evidence, with plaintiffs having to rely on the strength of their own
evidence, not on the weakness of the defendant’s.
After an exhaustive review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondent was not
able to satisfactorily prove her prior physical possession, nor her being deprived thereof by
petitioner through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth. It is noteworthy that absence
alone of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case already warrants the
dismissal of the complaint.
In the present case, respondent, to establish her supposed prior physical possession of the
143,417-square meter property, which included the two parcels of land now being occupied by
petitioner, relied on (1) the DENR Region IV Resolution dated 30 October 2000 in DENR 4 Case
No. 5723; (2) the notarized Transfer of Rights dated 29 October 1990 executed by Danga in
respondent’s favor; and (3) the Tax Declaration in respondent’s name, covering the 143,417-
square-meter property, on file with the Antipolo City Assessor’s Office, together with the real
property tax clearance for the year 2001 from the Antipolo City Treasurer’s Office. Charlie T. Lee
vs. Rosita Dela Paz, G.R. No. 183606, October 27, 2009.
Information; amendment. Assuming that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute
an offense, we find it erroneous for the RTC to immediately order the dismissal of the
Information, without giving the prosecution a chance to amend it.
Although an Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that
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the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal
only upon the prosecution’s failure to do so. The RTC’s failure to provide the prosecution this
opportunity twice constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power that was correctly addressed by the
CA through the certiorari petition. This defect in the RTC’s action on the case, while not central
to the issue before us, strengthens our conclusion that this criminal case should be resolved
through full-blown trial on the merits. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. vs. Nikko Sources
International Corp. and Supermax Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 178479, October 23, 2009.
Information; probable cause. Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest
and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation.
Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the
investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and
requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence to justify a conviction.
To determine the existence of probable cause, there is a need to conduct a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
a case. Its purpose is to
determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering which person or persons may be
reasonably charged with a crime.
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is executive in nature. As we have said, the Court
may not be compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutor’s
function, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Nieva M. Manebo Vs. SPO1 Roel D. Acosta, et
al., G.R. No. 169554, October 28, 2009.
Injunction; BSP Monetary Board. The issuance by the RTC of writs of preliminary injunction is
an unwarranted interference with the powers of the MB. Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 refer to the
appointment of a conservator or a receiver for a bank, which is a power of the MB for which
they need the ROEs done by the supervising or examining department. The writs of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court hinder the MB from fulfilling its function under the law. The
actions of the MB under Secs. 29 and 30 of RA 7653 “may not be restrained or set aside by the
court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
The writs of preliminary injunction order are precisely what cannot be done under the law by
preventing the MB from taking action under either Sec. 29 or Sec. 30 of RA 7653. Bangko
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Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board and Chuci Fonancier vs. Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela,
etc., et al., G.R. No. 184778. October 2, 2009.
Injunction; judicial discretion. The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a
pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of facts left to the said
court for its conclusive determination. Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in
injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse
of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law. The Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to issue a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of Lt. Gen. Yano’s Order of
Arrest against Maj. Gen. Barbieto. Jose T. Barbieto Vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
184645, October 30, 2009.
Injunction; proof. A writ of injunction will lie upon proof that the applicant is entitled to the
relief. For the writ to issue here, forever barring PDCP from collecting on the loan security,
petitioners must prove the nullity of the mortgage contract. As an accessory contract, the
mortgage agreement derives its validity from the principal contract of loan. Petitioners assail the
validity of the loan agreement on the sole ground that PDCP delayed the release of the loan
proceeds. This argument is analytically weak, factually baseless, and legally indefensible.
The claim of delay in the release of the loan proceeds concerns the implementation of the loan
contract, and not its intrinsic validity. Spouses Santiago E. Ibasco and Milagros D. Ibasco, et al.
vs. Private Development Corporation of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 162473, October 12,
2009.
Judgment; compromise. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It
contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when
litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result.
The validity of a compromise agreement is dependent upon its fulfillment of the requisites and
principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order.
After a review of the terms of the Compromise Agreement between the parties herein, we find
that it has been validly executed in accordance with the foregoing requirements. Gov. Antonio P.
Calingin vs.Civil Service Commission and Grace L. Anayron, G.R. No. 183322, October 30,
2009.
Judgment; finality. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was
denied with finality on March 3, 2009. Petitioner filed another Motion for Reconsideration,
which the Court treated as a Second Motion for Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a
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Resolution dated June 2, 2009. Of late, petitioner has filed a “Manifestation” that raises yet
again the issues already resolved in the petition and which the Court has, accordingly, merely
noted without action. Thus, our ruling therein has now attained finality.
Consequently, the issue of petitioner’s compliance with the one-year residency requirement is
now settled. We are bound by this Court’s ruling in the earlierLimbona case where the issue was
squarely raised and categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the merits of this case,
especially since the present Petition merely restates issues already passed upon by the Comelec
and affirmed by this Court. Norlainie Mitmug Limbona vs. Commssion on Elections and Malik
“Bobby” T. Alingan, G.R. No. 186006. October 16, 2009
Judgment; finality. It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable
and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some
definite point in time.
The only recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called
nunc pro tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment
is void. None of these has been shown to be present to justify the “modification” of the
judgment. Parenthetically, the modification was made not by the same court (CFI of Pasig) that
rendered the judgment. Spouses Tomas F. Gomez, et al. vs. Gregorio Correa, et al. G.R. No.
153923, October 2, 2009.
Judgment; finality. The decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the NLRC by any parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof,
with proof of payment of the required appeal fee accompanied by a memorandum of appeal.
And where, as here, the judgment involves monetaryaward, an appeal therefrom by the
employer may be “perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” A mere notice of
appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned does not stop the running of the
period for perfecting an appeal as in fact no motion for extension of said period is allowed.
The perfection of appeals in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional and must, therefore, be strictly observed.
Petitioners’ re-filing on the next working day, November 17, 2003, of the Notice of Appeal with
Appeal Memorandum, which was accompanied, this time, by the appeal bond, did not cure the
fatal defect of their appeal since said bond was filed after the ten-day reglementary period had
expired – at which time the Labor Arbiter’s judgment had already become final and executory
and, therefore, immutable. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. and Scandic Shipmanagement
Limited vs. Eriberto S. Bultron, G.R. No. 185261, October 2, 2009.
Judgment; finality. In the instant case, instead of appealing his conviction to the Sandiganbayan,
Estarija erroneously filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of paragraph 3,
Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. The Court of Appeals did not notice this conspicuous
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misstep, since it entertained the appeal. This fatal flaw committed by Estarija did not toll the
running of the period for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because of Estarija’s
failure to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan within the period granted therefor, the
Decision of the RTC convicting him of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 has thus
become final and executory.
Inasmuch as the decision of the RTC has long been final and executory, it can no longer be
altered or modified. Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final
and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and whether or not made by the highest court of the land. The reason
is grounded on the fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date
fixed by law. Edgardo V. Estarija vs. People of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General
and Edwin Ranada, G.R. No. 173990, October 27, 2009.
Judgment; findings regarding non-parties. With respect to the second and third assignment of
errors, petitioner argues that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC when it passed upon the merits
of petitioner’s cause of action against PNB notwithstanding the fact that the complaint against
the latter was already dismissed. Petitioner contends that a person who was not impleaded in a
case could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. Petitioner then proceeds to conclude
that the CA erred in sustaining the trial court’s finding that PNB was a mortgagee, buyer and
seller in good faith.
It is true that the judgment of the trial and appellate courts in the present case could not bind the
PNB for the latter is not a party to the case. However, this does not mean that the trial and
appellate courts are precluded from making findings which are necessary for a just, complete
and proper resolution of the issues raised in the present case. The Court finds no error in the
determination by the trial and appellate courts of the question of whether or not PNB was a
mortgagee, buyer and, later on, seller in good faith as this would bear upon the ultimate issue of
whether petitioner is entitled to reconveyance. Eufemia vda. De Agatep vs. Roberta L.
Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009.
Judgment; res judicata. Res judicata has two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated
in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in
Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered, and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. Where there is identity of parties and subject matter in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, there is conclusiveness of judgment. The first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, not as to matters merely involved therein.
The Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. SP No. 31125, resolved only the interlocutory issue of
whether the trial court’s Order of April 12, 1993 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
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respondent’s petition for annulment was attended by grave abuse of discretion. The appellate
court did not rule on the merits of the petition as to establish a controlling legal rule which has
to be subsequently followed by the parties in the same case. It merely held that respondent’s
petition in the trial court stated a sufficient cause of action. Its determination of respondent’s
entitlement to notice of the public auction sale was at best prima facie.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot give rise to res judicata,
hence, it is subject to amendments until the rendition of the final judgment. Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation vs. Royal Cargo Corporation, G.R. No. 179756, October 2, 2009.
Judgment; several judgment. A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is
clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of
them could have been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will
not necessarily affect the other.
Petitioners, although sued collectively, each held a separate and separable interest in the
properties of the Sy Bang estate.
The pronouncement as to the obligation of one or some petitioners did not affect the
determination of the obligations of the others. That the properties in the names of petitioners
were found to be part of the Sy Bang estate did not preclude any further findings or judgment on
the status or nature of the properties in the names of the other heirs. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, Heirs
of Julian Sy and Oscar Sy vs.Rolando Sy, et al./Iluminada Tan, et al. vs. Bartolome Sy, et al, G.R.
No. 114217G.R. No. 150979. October 13, 2009
Judicial notice; requisites. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be
assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to
the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found
in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are
such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of
common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
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knowledge. Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip vs. Rosalie Palaña Chua, G.R. No. 177809,
October 16, 2009.
Judicial notice; decision. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in
Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld
the right of herein private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle
of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision in Republic of thePhilippines, through its
trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. “G” Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was recognized as the
rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the
company notes accompanying the said purchase.
In Juaban v. Espina, we held that “in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases
may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial
notice.” The two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such character, and our
review of the instant case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein. “G” Holdings,
Inc. vs. National Mines and Allied Workers Union Locan 103 (NAMAWU), Sheriffs Richard H.
Aprosta and Alberto Munoz, all acting sheriffs, Department of Labor and Employment, Region VI,
Bacolod District Office, Bacolod City, G.R. No. 160236, October 16, 2009.
Jurisdiction; COMELEC. The COMELEC Second Division acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s motions for reconsideration and dismissing his appeal.
Indeed, the February 4 and March 9, 2009 Orders are null and void as they were issued by a
division of the COMELEC, instead of the COMELEC en banc, pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 3,
of the 1987 Constitution and to Rule 19, Sections 5 and 6, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
This rule should apply whether the motion fee has been paid or not. It is the COMELEC en banc,
not the division, which has the discretion either to refuse to take action until the motion fee is
paid, or to dismiss the action or proceeding.
Considering the urgent need to resolve election cases and since the issue was raised in this
petition, we likewise rule that the dismissal of Revilla’s appeal was improper. His payment of
the appeal fee of P1,000.00 before the MCTC on March 31, 2008 already perfected his appeal
pursuant to A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC (Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials). The non-payment or the insufficient
payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division does not
affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in the outright or ipso facto dismissal of
the appeal. Under Rule 22, Section 9(a), of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed.
And under Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may
refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.
Considering that the payment of the appeal fee was made three and a half months before the
issuance of the clarificatory COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 and after the perfection of the
appeal, we find the dismissal of the appeal by the COMELEC Second Division as grave abuse of
its discretion. Eugenio T. Revilla, Sr. vs. The Commission on Elections and Gerardo L. Lanoy G.R.
No. 187428, October 16, 2009.
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Jurisdiction; criminal cases. Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the
sound discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the
case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of its
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The trial court may make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor, which the court
may order the latter to produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the
court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor. Liezl Co vs. Harold
Lim y Go and Avelino uy Go, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30, 2009.
Jurisdiction; exhaustion of administrative remedies. There is no need for petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.
It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first
before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of
the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of
justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. However, there
are several exceptions to this rule.
The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from
arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue
raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court
and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of
law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise
of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the
Legislature may establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present
evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its
enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law,
within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
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Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over
cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance. Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia
Salaya vs. hon. Mariano M. Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009.
Jurisdiction; guardianship. The court hearing the petition for guardianship had limited
jurisdiction. It had no jurisdiction to enforce payment of the widow’s allowance ordered by this
Court. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, Heirs of Julian Sy and Oscar Sy vs. Rolando Sy, et al./Iluminada
Tan, et al. vs. Bartolome Sy, et al, G.R. No. 114217G.R. No. 150979. October 13, 2009
Jurisdiction; RTC. The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended,
to hear actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it now covers
only real properties with assessed value in excess of P20,000.00. But the RTC retained the
exclusive power to hear actions the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation.
Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the
Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of
real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of
these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the
assessed value of such lots.
Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit is P9,910.00. Clearly, this
amount does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value ofP20,000.00 fixed by law. The other
damages that the Sebes claim are merely incidental to their main action and, therefore, are
excluded in the computation of the jurisdictional amount. Heirs of Generoso Sebe, et al.
vs. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, et al., G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009.
Jurisdiction; labor related claims. Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against
the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions
between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-employee relationship between
the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of
obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.
Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or
other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law,
the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the labor
arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor
management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of employment,
but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for
granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears. Patricia Halagueña, et al.
vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 172013, October 2, 2009.
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Jurisdiction; summons. We find that substituted service of summons was validly made upon
respondent through his brother.
We do not intend this ruling to overturn jurisprudence to the effect that statutory requirements of
substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully, and that any substituted service
other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, an overly strict
application of the Rules is not warranted in this case, as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of the
law as well as do injustice to the parties, who have been waiting for almost 15 years for a
resolution of this case. We are not heedless of the widespread and flagrant practice whereby
defendants actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to give their
names, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents, or eluding officers of the court. Of
course it is to be expected that defendants try to avoid service of summons, prompting this Court
to declare that, “the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the
process on the defendant.” However, sheriffs are not expected to be sleuths, and cannot be
faulted where the defendants themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly
administration of justice.
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we find
that respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every opportunity to
answer the charges made by the petitioner. However, since respondent refused to disclose his
true address, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him. Considering that
respondent could not have received summons because of his own pretenses, and has failed to
provide an explanation of his purported “new” residence, he must now bear the
consequences. Arnel Sagana vs.Richard A. Francisco, G.R. No. 161952, October 2, 2009.
Jurisdiction; supervening legislation. In Latchme Motoomull v. Dela Paz, the Court had dealt
with a situation where jurisdiction over certain cases was transferred by a supervening
legislation to another tribunal. Latchme involved a perfected appeal from the decision of the
SEC and pending with the Court of Appeals at the time P.D. No. 902-A was enacted which
transferred appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the SEC from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. On the question of whether the tribunal with which the cases were pending had
lost jurisdiction over the appeal upon the effectivity of the new law, the Court ruled in the
negative. Philippine National Bank Vs. Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., G.R. No. 173615, October 16,
2009.
Mandamus; nature. A writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
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of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.
A favorable judgment rendered in a special civil action for mandamus is in the nature of a
special judgment. As such, it requires the performance of any other act than the payment of
money or the sale or delivery of real or personal property the execution of which is governed by
Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
vs. Mario Abayari, et al., G.R. No. 166508. October 2, 2009
Mortgage; right of redemption. Right of redemption is the prerogative to reacquire a mortgaged
property after registration of the foreclosure sale. It exists only in the case of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure unless the
mortgagee is a bank. An attaching creditor acquires the right to redeem the debtor’s attached
property subsequently foreclosed extra-judicially by a third party.
The “successor-in-interest” of a judgment debtor includes one to whom the debtor has
transferred his statutory right of redemption; one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest
in the property for the purpose of redemption; one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law; one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the property sold; or his
spouse or heirs.
A “redemptioner,” on the other hand, is a creditor with a lien subsequent to the judgment which
was the basis of the execution sale. If the lien of the creditor is prior to the judgment under
which the property was sold, he is not a redemptioner and, therefore, cannot redeem because
his interests in his lien are fully protected, since any purchase at public auction of said property
takes the same subject to such prior lien which he has to satisfy. Unlike the judgment debtor, a
redemptioner must prove his right to redeem by producing the documents called for by Section
30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. German Cayton, et al. vs. Zeonnix Trading Corporation, et
al., G.R. No. 169541, October 9, 2009.
Mortgage; valid redemption. To constitute valid redemption, the amount tendered must comply
with the following requirements: (1) it should constitute the full amount paid by the purchaser;
(2) with one percent per month interest on the purchase price in addition, up to the time of
redemption; (3) together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may
have paid thereon after purchase; (4) interest on the taxes paid by the purchaser at the rate of
one percent per month, up to the time of the redemption; and (5) if the purchaser be also a
creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which
such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.
In exercising the right of redemption, the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the
purchase price. Otherwise, to allow payment by installments would be to allow the indefinite
extension of the redemption period.
The amount tendered by Zeonnix may be considered sufficient for purposes of redemption,
although it failed to include the amount of taxes paid by the Caytons. The payment of the full
amount of the purchase price and interest thereon should be deemed as substantial compliance,
considering that Zeonnix immediately paid the amount of taxes when apprised of the
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deficiency. German Cayton, et al. vs. Zeonnix Trading Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 169541,
October 9, 2009.
Motion to dismiss; hypothetical admission. In filing a motion to dismiss, the movant
hypothetically admits the truth of the material and relevant facts alleged and pleaded in the
complaint. The court, in resolving the motion to dismiss, must consider such hypothetical
admission, the documentary evidence presented during the hearing thereof, and the relevant
laws and jurisprudence bearing on the issues or subject matter of the complaint. Aqualab
Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo, et al., G.R. No. 182673, October 12, 2009.
Motion to dismiss; lack of cause of action. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim
has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. However, a perusal of
respondents’ Complaint before the RTC, in light of Aqualab’s motion to dismiss which
hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint, shows that respondents’
action before the RTC has sufficiently stated a cause of action. Hypothetically admitting fraud in
the transfers of subject lots, which indisputably were first transferred in apparent violation of
pertinent provisions in CA 141 prohibiting alienation of homesteads within five years from the
grant of the homestead patent, and the continuing possession of respondents until 1991 of the
subject lots, the action for reconveyance and nullification filed in 1994 not only sufficiently
stated a cause of action but also has not yet prescribed. Aqualab Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of
Marcelino Pagobo, et al., G.R. No. 182673, October 12, 2009.
Motion to dismiss; litis pendentia. Litis pendentia, a Latin term meaning “a pending suit,” is also
referred to as lis pendens and auter action pendant. While it is normally connected with the
control which the court has over a property involved in a suit during the continuance
proceedings, it is interposed more as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.
Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action contemplates a situation wherein
another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. In fact, it is one of the grounds that
authorizes a court to dismiss a case motu proprio.
Litis pendentia is predicated on the principle that a party should not be allowed to vex another
more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action.[32] This
principle in turn is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the
subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments
may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid
the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites or elements must concur: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity
with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other case. Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. vs. Subic
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Bay Metropolitan Authority and Innove Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 185159. October 12,
2009
Motion to dismiss; litis pendentia. Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means “a
pending suit” and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation where two
actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits.
To constitute litis pendentia, not only must the parties in the two actions be the same; there must
as well be substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought. Further, the
identity should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the case later in time should yield to the earlier
case; what is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action.
Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens can apply; it is
the filing of the action, not the receipt of summons, which determines priority in date.
Under this established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations
predominate in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail:
(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2)
whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to
anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the
appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the parties. Dotmatrix Trading as
represented by its proprietos, namely Romy Yap Chua. Renato Rollan and Rolando D.
Cadiz, G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009.
Motion to dismiss; prescription. Prescription, as a ground for a motion to dismiss, is adequate
when the complaint, on its face, shows that the action has already prescribed. Such is not the
case in this instance. Respondents have duly averred continuous possession until 1991 when
such was allegedly disturbed by Aqualab. Being in possession of the subject lots—hypothetically
admitted by Aqualab—respondents’ right to reconveyance or annulment of title has not
prescribed or is not time-barred.
Verily, an action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where
the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. And the prescriptive period for
the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years, reckoned from the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in possession. Thus, one who is in
actual possession of a piece of land on a claim of ownership thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.
In the instant case, as hypothetically admitted, respondents were in possession until 1991, and
until such possession is disturbed, the prescriptive period does not run. Since respondents filed
their complaint in 1994, or three years after their possession was allegedly disturbed, it is clear
that prescription has not set in, either due to fraud or constructive trust. Aqualab Philippines, Inc.
vs. Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo, et al., G.R. No. 182673, October 12, 2009.
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Pre-trial; amendment of complaint. Petitioner posits that even if an amended complaint is filed
for the purpose of impleading another party as defendant, where no additional cause of action
was alleged and the amount of prayer for damages in the original complaint was the same,
another pre-trial is not required and a second pre-trial brief need not be filed.
It must be pointed out, however, that in the cases cited by petitioner to support her argument,
the Court found no need for a second pre-trial precisely because there are no additional causes
of action alleged and the impleaded defendants merely adopted and repleaded all the pleadings
of the original defendants. Petitioner’s reliance on the above-cited cases is misplaced because,
in the present case, the RTC correctly found that petitioner had a separate cause of action
against PNB. A separate cause of action necessarily means additional cause of action. Moreover,
the defenses adopted by PNB are completely different from the defenses of Lim and Rodriguez,
necessitating a separate determination of the matters enumerated under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court insofar as PNB and petitioner are concerned. On these bases, we find no
error in the ruling of the CA which sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the amended
complaint against PNB for failure of petitioner to file her pre-trial brief. Eufemia vda. De
Agatep vs. Roberta L. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009.
Rule 38; relief from judgment. Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a
remedy provided by law to any person against whom a decision or order is entered into through
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for
new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking the appeal,
he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule 38. The rule is that relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the
petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost
either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by
counsel.
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of fact,
not of law, which relates to the case. The word “mistake” which grants relief from judgment,
does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have
committed in the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal. Romeo Samonte
vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009.
Rule 42. Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines reiterated the settled rule that a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41,
is the appropriate mode of appeal from decisions of RTCs acting as SACs. In Gabatin, the Court
sustained the appellate court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an appeal from the SAC even if its
dismissal had been sought on the ground that the issues presented before the appellate court
were purely legal in nature.
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Clearly, jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the SAC resides in the Court of Appeals via a
Rule 42 petition for review, which may raise either questions of fact, or of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. J. L. Jocson and Sons, G.R. No.
180803, October 23, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. Questions of fact are not proper in a Petition brought under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Time and time again, we have stated that the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts, and this Court will decline to sift through the evidence submitted by the parties,
particularly here, where such evidence was not presented before the trial court. It would be
ludicrous indeed if we were to determine, in the first instance, where respondent actually
resides, his true income, or his current mental state. Such issues are best threshed out before the
trial court; we have neither the inclination or interest to resolve these factual matters
here. Republic of the Philippines vs. Yang Chi Hao, G.R. No. 165332, October 2, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. It is settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over
decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of law; it does not
review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan which, as a rule, are conclusive upon the
Court.
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts. On the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or controversy arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The resolution of a question of fact necessarily
involves a calibration of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the
relevance of surrounding circumstances, and the probability of specific situations.
Simple as it may seem, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is not always
easy. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides for a given set of facts drawn from the evidence presented. Once it is clear that
the issue invites a review of theprobative value of the evidence presented, the question posed is
one of fact. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence
or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that
query is factual.
In the present case, the petitioners seek a review by this Court of the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan, which essentially involve the credibility of the witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies. The question regarding the credibility of witnesses is obviously one
of fact on which the Sandiganbayan had already passed upon in its decision and resolution
dated October 15, 2002 and January 23, 2003, respectively. Arturo C. Cabaron and Brigida
Cabaron vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 156981, October 5, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. Petitioner endeavors to convince us to determine, yet again, the
weight, credence, and probative value of the evidence presented. This cannot be done in this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court where only questions of law
may be raised by the parties and passed upon by us.
It has already been held that the determination of the existence of a breach of contract is a
factual matter not usually reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45.[ We will not review,
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much less reverse, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals especially where, as in this case,
such findings coincide with those of the trial court, since we are not a trier of facts. The
established rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the RTC are
conclusive and binding on us. We are not wont to review them, save under exceptional
circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (7) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and (8) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Engr. Apolinario Dueñas vs. Alice
Guce-Africa, G.R. No. 165679, October 5, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court should
cover only questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on
what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. We note that matters pertaining to the takeover, completion
and delivery of the project are factual issues which had been exhaustively discussed and ruled
upon by the CIAC.
It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but
also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of
construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In this case, IBEX failed to show that any of
these exceptions apply. Ibex International, Inc. vs.. Government Service Insurance System, et
al., G.R. No. 162095. October 12, 2009
Rule 45; question of fact. Preliminarily, on the issue pertaining to whether or not respondent
was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees, the same entails a resort to the parties’ respective
evidence. Thus, AF is clearly asking us to consider a question of fact.
Time and again, we have held that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law, save for certain exceptions, none of
which are present in this case.
Both the RTC and the CA have competently ruled on the issue of respondent’s entitlement to
damages and attorney’s fees as they properly laid down both the factual and legal bases for their
respective decisions. We see no reason to disturb their findings. Air France Philippines/KLM Air
France vs. John Anthony De Camilis, G.R. No. 188961, October 13, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the
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Court of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, as in this case,
this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts. This Court
has held also that when supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court.
Needless to stress, under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petition shall raise only
questions of law.[ The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and
calibrate the evidence on record.
Here, we find no exception to the general rule. The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one
in finding that petitioner bought paddle wheels from respondent, that the same were delivered
to petitioner through his representative, and that petitioner failed to fully pay the price as he
made partial payments only. This finding is amply supported by the evidence on record. Raul
Chua, respondent’s general manager, testified on petitioner’s credit purchase. Respondent also
presented the delivery receipts, charge invoice, official receipts of partial payment, and
petitioner’s reply to the demand letter. Angelito Colmenares vs. Hand Tractor Parts and Agro-
Industrial Corp., G.R. No. 170790, October 23, 2009.
Rule 65; availability of other remedy. Clearly, since the present case involves a final order of
dismissal issued by the CA, the proper course of action would have been to file a petition for
review oncertiorari under Rule 45. Although there are exceptions to the general rule, petitioner
utterly failed to allege and prove that the extraordinary remedy of the writ ofcertiorari should be
granted, because an appeal, although available, would be inadequate, insufficient and not
speedy enough to address the urgency of the matter. There is nothing in the petition to show that
this case qualifies as an exception to the general rule. The circumstances prevailing in this case
reveal that whatever grievance petitioner may be suffering from the dismissal of its petition with
the CA could be properly addressed through a petition for review on certiorari. San Miguel
Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc., etc. vs. City of Mandaluyong, etc., et al., G.R. No.
153653, October 2, 2009.
Rule 65; availability of other remedy. On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner
filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for reconsideration
with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration,
as a general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of
certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct
its assigned errors. This rule, however, is not without exceptions.
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari
without a motion for reconsideration is justified. People of the Philippines vs. Arturo F.
Duca, G.R. No. 171175, October 9, 2009.
Rule 65; availability of other remedy. A basic requisite of the special civil action of certiorari,
which is governed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is that there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where appeal is available, certiorari
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generally does not lie. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of
appeal.
In this case, an appeal was not only available, but also mandated by Sections 11 and 12 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (1939), or the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Notably,
in Keswani v. Republic, we declared that the remedy from a decision by the trial court admitting
an individual as a Filipino citizen is through an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Republic of the
Philippines vs. Yang Chi Hao, G.R. No. 165332, October 2, 2009.
Rule 65; COMELEC. We review the present petition on the basis of the combined application of
Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court. While COMELEC jurisdiction over the Bulacan election
contest is not disputed, the legality of subsequent COMELEC action is assailed for having been
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Thus, our
standard of review is “grave abuse of discretion,” a term that defies exact definition, but
generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.” Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be
grave to merit our positive action.
On the basis of the standards set by Section 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and of the
Constitution itself in the handling of election cases, we rule that the COMELEC action is a valid
exercise of discretion as it is a suitable and reasonable process within the exercise of its
jurisdiction over provincial election contests, aimed at expediting the disposition of this case,
and with no adverse, prejudicial or discriminatory effects on the parties to the contest that
would render the rule unreasonable. Joselito R. Mendoza vs. Commission on Elections and
Roberto M. Pagdanganan, G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009.
Rule 65; corporate authorization. Certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action
invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an original and independent
action that is not part of the trial or the proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court.
The petition for certiorari before the CA is, therefore, a separate and distinct action from the
action for specific performance instituted before the RTC, as the writ of certiorari being prayed
for is directed against the judicial or quasi-judicial body, not against the private parties in the
original action for specific performance. Such being the case, the November 7 1999 Resolution
of the Board of Directors of petitioner association is not and cannot be considered as an
authorization for its President, Evelio Barata, to initiate, sign, file and prosecute another case for
the special civil action of certiorari. The CA was, thus, correct in dismissing the petition for lack
of authority of Evelio Barata to sign the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in representation
of petitioner.
The submission of a Secretary’s Certificate with the Motion for Reconsideration is also
insufficient to cure the initial defect. Said Certificate stated that petitioner’s Board of Trustees
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approved a Resolution at a meeting held on April 7, 2002, confirming and ratifying the authority
of Mr. Barata to sign all necessary papers for the petition for certiorari. Note that the petition was
filed on March 26, 2002, or before the date of said Resolution. There is no certification as to
when petitioner’s Board of Trustees originally granted Mr. Barata authority to show that as of the
date of the filing of the petition for certiorari, Mr. Barata had been authorized to perform such
acts. San Miguel Bukid Homeowners Association, Inc., etc. vs. City of Mandaluyong, etc., et
al., G.R. No. 153653, October 2, 2009.
Rule 65; grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. It also bears stressing that the true function of the writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior
court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from the arbitrary acts of courts.
Viewed against these standards, we find the trial court’s reversal of its decision after the filing of
a Motion for Reconsideration not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Republic of the
Philippines vs.Yang Chi Hao, G.R. No. 165332, October 2, 2009.
Rule 65; grave abuse. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as “such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must
be “so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.” We do not find
this situation to be present in the instant case so as to merit a reversal of the questioned
Resolution and Order issued by respondent Office of the Ombudsman. Ernesto Francisco, Jr.
vs. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, et al. G.R. No. 154117. October 2, 2009
Rule 65; Ombudsman decision. Although we agree with private respondents Velarde that a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy for parties seeking relief
from final judgments, orders, or resolutions of quasi-judicial bodies or agencies like the Office of
the Ombudsman, as has been repeatedly held by this Court, we find that the remedy of appeal
under Rule 43 posited by private respondents Velarde is not proper either. This Court
subsequently held that under the ruling in Fabian, “all appeals from decisions of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.” Said remedy, therefore, is not applicable to cases
involving criminal or non-administrative charges filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
which is the situation in the case before us now.
Thus, due to the nature of this case and the allegations involving grave abuse of discretion
committed by the Office of the Ombudsman, it should have been filed under Rule 65, and not
Rule 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
This case involves a significant amount of money that was already released by the government
to a private institution, AMVEL, as purchase price for the road right-of-way in a major
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infrastructure project that was undertaken by the former and that naturally affected the general
public. Therefore, even if this case was erroneously filed as shown above, and may be dismissed
outright under the rules, the Court deems it appropriate to brush aside technicalities of
procedure, as this involves matters of transcendental importance to the public; and to consider
the petition as one for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Ernesto Francisco, Jr.
vs. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, et al. G.R. No. 154117. October 2, 2009
Rule 65; prohibition. In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person — whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions — who has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that
judgment be rendered, commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the
action or matter specified in the petition. On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to
compel performance of a ministerial duty. The petitioner for such a writ should have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act, and it must be the clear and
imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
In this case, petitioners’ primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees from petitioners and
barring them from occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ
petitioners seek is more in the nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than
mandamus (compelling performance).
For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a “tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions”; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”
The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and what
the legal rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term
quasi-judicial function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies that are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature. In implementing Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon
to adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a
judicial nature.
A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function. Evelyn Ongsuco
and Antonia Salaya vs. hon. Mariano M. Malones, etc., G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009.
Rules of procedure; relaxation. It must be borne in mind that the rules of procedure are intended
to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of
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justice; and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that
prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.
Hence, technicalities must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of
justice. The court’s primary duty is to render or dispense justice. A litigation is not a game of
technicalities. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier’s thrust. Technicality, when
it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on
technicality. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override,
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage, of justice. Ophelia L. Tuatis vs. Spouses Eliseo Escol and Visminda Escol, et
al., G.R. No. 175399. October 27, 2009
Settlement of estate. An Section 4, Rule 74 annotation is placed on new certificates of title
issued pursuant to the distribution and partition of a decedent’s real properties to warn third
persons on the possible interests of excluded heirs or unpaid creditors in these properties. The
annotation, therefore, creates a legal encumbrance or lien on the real property in favor of the
excluded heirs or creditors. Where a buyer purchases the real property despite the annotation,
he must be ready for the possibility that the title could be subject to the rights of excluded
parties. The cancellation of the sale would be the logical consequence where: (a) the annotation
clearly appears on the title, warning all would-be buyers; (b) the sale unlawfully interferes with
the rights of heirs; and (c) the rightful heirs bring an action to question the transfer within the
two-year period provided by law. Delfin Tan vs.Erlinda C. Benolirao, Andrew C. Benolirao,
Romano C. Benolirao, Dion C. Benolirao, Sps. Reynaldo Taningco and Norma D. Benolirao,
Evelyn T. Monreal and Ann Karina Taningco, G.R. No. 153820. October 16, 2009
Settlement of estate; partition. The Sy Bang estate cannot be partitioned or distributed until the
final determination of the extent of the estate and only until it is shown that the obligations
under Rule 90, Section 1, have been settled.
In the settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be
made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the
distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations. Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, Heirs of Julian Sy and Oscar Sy vs. Rolando Sy,
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et al./Iluminada Tan, et al. vs. Bartolome Sy, et al, G.R. No. 114217G.R. No. 150979. October
13, 2009
Venue; libel. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by
the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under
Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus,
its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction. Vicente,Jr.
and Danny G. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 167764, October 9, 2009.
Writ of possession. A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the
sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. A writ of
possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings under
Section 17 of Act 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the
mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3)
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by
Act 4118 (Act 3135). This case involves the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act 3135, a writ
of possession may be issued either (1) within the one year redemption period, upon the filing of
a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate
and independent action. This is founded on the purchaser’s right of ownership over the property
which he bought at the auction sale and his consequent right to be placed in possession thereof.
However, this rule admits of an exception, that is, Section 33 (former Section 35) of Rule 39 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the possession of the mortgaged property shall
be given to the purchaser “unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment obligor.” Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Teofilo Icot, et al., G.R. No. 168061,
October 12, 2009.
Warrants; search warrant. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the
enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this
Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their
Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of
search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an
exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla
vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 158467, October 16, 2009.
Writ of possession; third parties. The right of possession by a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-
in-interest, but not as against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. In this
case, respondents are third parties in possession of the subject real property, holding the same
under a title adverse to that of the mortgagor/judgment obligor, Velasco. Respondents are
claiming title by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of their father’s estate executed in 1964.
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Upon learning of the mortgage of the real property by Velasco to petitioner, respondents filed a
case for quieting of title against Velasco. The latter later acknowledged or “recognized”
respondents’ ownership of the real property in the Compromise Agreement executed by the
parties in the quieting of title case. Velasco even agreed to undertake restitution of the subject
property by contracting anew with and repurchasing the foreclosed property from petitioner.
Moreover, respondents are not parties to the mortgage contract between the spouses Velasco
and petitioner. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the mere mention of the mortgage of
the real property in the Compromise Agreement did not make respondents privies to the
mortgage contract between the spouses Velasco and petitioner. Moreover, respondents’ offer to
repurchase the foreclosed property from petitioner is not tantamount to stepping into the shoes
of Velasco, nor would such offer qualify respondents as Velasco’s successors-in-interest. Rather,
the offer may be considered as respondents’ last ditch effort to avoid being deprived of the
property they claim to have possessed since time immemorial.
Petitioner’s right to issuance of a writ of possession cannot be invoked against respondents.
Respondents’ possession of the subject real property is legally presumed to be pursuant to a just
title which petitioner may endeavor to overcome in a judicial proceeding for recovery of
property. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Teofilo Icot, et al., G.R. No. 168061, October 12,
2009.
November 2009 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Action; forum shopping. Petitioners Espiritu, et al. point out that the certificate of non-forum
shopping that respondents KPE and Petron attached to the petition they filed with the Court of
Appeals was inadequate, having been signed only by Petron, through Atty. Cruz.
But, while procedural requirements such as that of submittal of a certificate of non-forum
shopping cannot be totally disregarded, they may be deemed substantially complied with under
justifiable circumstances. One of these circumstances is where the petitioners filed a collective
action in which they share a common interest in its subject matter or raise a common cause of
action. In such a case, the certification by one of the petitioners may be deemed sufficient.
Here, KPE and Petron shared a common cause of action against petitioners Espiritu, et al.,
namely, the violation of their proprietary rights with respect to the use of Gasul tanks and
trademark. Furthermore, Atty. Cruz said in his certification that he was executing it “for and on
behalf of the Corporation, and co-petitioner Carmen J. Doloiras.” Thus, the object of the
requirement – to ensure that a party takes no recourse to multiple forums – was substantially
achieved. Besides, the failure of KPE to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping does not
render the petition defective with respect to Petron which signed it through Atty. Cruz. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, acted correctly in giving due course to the petition before
it. Manuel C. Espiritu, Jr., et al. vs. Petron Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 170891, November 24,
2009.
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Action; real party in interest. As the successor-in-interest of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion and
co-owner of the subject property, respondent Nenita S. Concepcion is entitled to prosecute the
ejectment case not only in a representative capacity, but as a real party-in-interest. Article 487
of the Civil Code states, “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” Hence,
assuming that respondent failed to submit the proper documents showing her capacity to sue in
a representative capacity for the estate of her deceased husband, the Court, in the interest of
speedy disposition of cases, may deem her capacitated to prosecute the ejectment case as a real
party-in-interest being a co-owner of the subject property considering that the trial court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and has also acquired jurisdiction over the parties, including
respondent Nenita S. Concepcion. Angelina S. Soriente, et al. vs. The Estate of the late Arsenio E.
Concepcion, etc., G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009.
Appeal; locus standi. Petitioners correctly argue that the Credit Cooperative has no locus standi
on appeal, since it failed to file a notice of appeal to the RTC’s September 14, 1999 Decision
granting the motion for summary judgment. It was only the Union which appealed the case
through a notice of appeal filed by its counsel, Atty. Luciano R. Caraang (Atty. Caraang). There
is also no showing that Atty. Caraang represented both the Union and the Credit Cooperative in
filing such notice of appeal. In fact, the Credit Cooperative did not deny its failure to file an
appeal; however, it argued that it filed with the Court of Appeals an appellant’s brief in
compliance with the appellate court’s directive to submit one. Suffice it to state that the Court of
Appeals’ directive for the Credit Cooperative to file its brief did not clothe the Credit
Cooperative with locus standi on appeal. The purpose of the filing of the brief is merely to
present, in coherent and concise form, the points and questions in controversy, and by fair
argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper
conclusion. The Court of Appeals may have ordered the Credit Cooperative to submit its brief to
enable it to properly dispose of the case on appeal. However, in the Credit Cooperative’s brief,
not only did it ask for the reversal of the Summary Judgment but also prayed for the return of its
garnished funds. This cannot be allowed. It would be grave error to grant the relief prayed for
without violating the well-settled rule that a party who does not appeal from the decision may
not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from
the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.
The rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not
appeal. Jose Feliciano Loy, et al. vs. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-Philippine
Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), et al., G.R. No. 164886,
November 24, 2009.
Arbitration; third parties. We agree with the CA ruling that the BPPA arbitration clause does not
apply to the present case since third parties are involved. Any judgment or ruling to be rendered
by the panel of arbitrators will be useless if third parties are included in the case, since the
arbitral ruling will not bind them; they are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In the present
case, DOLE included as parties the spouses Abujos and Oribanex since they are necessary
parties, i.e., they were directly involved in the BPPA violation DOLE alleged, and their
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participation are indispensable for a complete resolution of the dispute. To require the spouses
Abujos and Oribanex to submit themselves to arbitration and to abide by whatever judgment or
ruling the panel of arbitrators shall make is legally untenable; no law and no agreement made
with their participation can compel them to submit to arbitration. Stanfilco Employees Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. DOLE Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division),
Oribanex Services, Inc., Spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos, G.R. No. 154048, November 27, 2009.
Evidence; parol evidence rule. The “parol evidence rule” forbids any addition to or
contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to
show that, at or before the execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms
were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an
agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to
prove alleged practices which, to all purposes, would alter the terms of the written agreement.
Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned. None
of the above-cited exceptions finds application in this case, more particularly the alleged failure
of the MOA to express the true intent and agreement of the parties concerning the
commitment/service fee of P320,000.00. Norton Resources and Development Corporation
vs. All Asia Bank Corporation, G.R. No. 162523, November 25, 2009.
Injunction; requirements. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear
showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.
The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or
threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the
violation against that right must be shown. Moreover, the rule is well entrenched that the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the
right of a party in a pending case rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. However, if
the court commits grave abuse of its discretion in the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, such that the act amounts to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the same may be nullified
through a writ of certiorari or prohibition. Such grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs
of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or whether the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation
of law. For the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power.
A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence.
The evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
is not conclusive or complete for only a “sampling” is needed to give the trial court an idea of
the justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. As
such, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is commenced or
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terminated. There are vital facts that have yet to be presented during the trial which may not be
obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. The trial
court needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest.
The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits can be
heard. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of
final order, requiring a party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is
a preservative remedy to ensure the protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending
the final judgment on the principal action. A plea for an injunctive writ lies upon the existence
of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for, otherwise, the
outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is
concerned. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Hon. Salvador y Apurillo, et al., G.R. No. 168746,
November 5, 2009.
Injunction; requirements. A preliminary injunction may be granted only where the plaintiff
appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought
to be defended. While the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be
clear. The standard is even higher in the case of a preliminary mandatory injunction.
The evidence presented before us in support of a preliminary injunction is weak and
inconclusive, and the alleged right sought to be protected by petitioner is vehemently
disputed. Power Sites and Signs, Inc. vs. United Neon (A Division of Ever Corporation), G.R. No.
163406, November 24, 2009.
Judgment; finality. Since the Fajardos did not appeal from the May 11, 2006 Order of the RTC,
the same became final and executory as a matter of course. It can no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it is made by the court that rendered it or by an appellate court. As a final and valid
order, it could not be collaterally attacked through the Fajardos’ artful motion to treat Alberto’s
April 24, 2006 motion as a scrap of paper, where the sole object, in truth, is the nullification of
the May 11, 2006 Order. Rufina Fajardo, et al. vs. Alberto Comandante, et al., G.R. No. 185396,
November 24, 2009.
Jurisdiction; DARAB. The case of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
lists down the indispensable elements for a tenancy relationship to exist: “(1) the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the
part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and
the tenant or the agricultural lessee.”
The parties in the present case have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian relationship
that could bring their controversy within the ambit of agrarian reform laws and within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. In fact, SEARBEMCO has no allegation whatsoever in its motion to
dismiss regarding any tenancy relationship between it and DOLE that gave the present dispute
the character of an agrarian dispute.
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We have always held that tenancy relations cannot be presumed. The elements of tenancy must
first be proved by substantial evidence which can be shown through records, documents, and
written agreements between the parties. A principal factor, too, to consider in determining
whether a tenancy relationship exists is the intent of the parties.
SEARBEMCO has not shown that the above-mentioned indispensable elements of tenancy
relations are present between it and DOLE. It also cannot be gleaned from the intention of the
parties that they intended to form a tenancy relationship between them. In the absence of any
such intent and resulting relationship, the DARAB cannot have jurisdiction. Instead, the present
petition is properly cognizable by the regular courts, as the CA and the RTC correctly
ruled. Stanfilco Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. DOLE
Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division), Oribanex Services, Inc., Spouses Elly and Myrna
Abujos, G.R. No. 154048, November 27, 2009.
Jurisdiction; just compensation. The LBP argues that the case before the RTC-SAC is an original
action for determination of just compensation in the exercise of that court’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction; therefore, the RTC-SAC should have conducted its own independent
determination of the facts and law involved. The LBP further argues that the RTC-SAC
completely disregarded the basic requirements of procedural due process when it merely
adopted the decision of the DARAB.
Section 57 of RA 6657 clearly provides that RTC-SACs have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation payable to landowners under the
land reform program. The RTC-SAC is not an appellate court that passes upon DARAB decisions
determining just compensation under the land reform program.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to
the RTC-SACs, the jurisdiction of these designated courts to determine just compensation under
Section 57 of RA 6657 is original and exclusive. Any effort to transfer this original jurisdiction to
the adjudicators and to confer appellate jurisdiction on the RTC-SACs would be contrary to
Section 57 and would result in void rulings. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to
determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners,
leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question on the merits.
Thus, the RTC-SAC should have conducted its own independent and thorough investigation of
the evidence submitted before it by the parties; the case should have been accorded its hearing
and reception of evidence, and independent consideration of the facts and the law on the matter
of just compensation. The RTC-SAC could not simply rely on and adopt the decision of the
DARAB, an administrative body that preliminarily determines the reasonable compensation to
be paid to landowners. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Agustin C. Dizon, G.R. No. 160394,
November 27, 2009.
Jurisdiction; lease. The allegation of existence of implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will
not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case. It is an elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of the court in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the
complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings
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filed by the defendant. This principle holds even if the facts proved during trial do not support
the cause of action alleged in the complaint. In connection with this, it is well to note that in
unlawful detainer cases the elements to be proved and resolved are the facts of lease and
expiration or violation of its terms.
Here, no interpretative exercise is needed to conclude that respondent has complied with such
requirement. In respondent’s Complaint, he specifically alleged that (1) the former owner, Mr.
Chua, and petitioner entered into a contract of lease; (2) subsequently, respondent purchased
the leased premises from Mr. Chua and became the owner thereof; (3) thereafter, the lease
contract between Mr. Chua and petitioner expired; and (4) petitioner refused to vacate the
premises despite the expiration and non-renewal of the lease. Joven Yuki, Jr. vs. Wellington
Co, G.R. No. 178527, November 27, 2009.
Jurisdiction; Ombudsman order. The crux of the matter is whether the CA has jurisdiction over
decisions and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. This issue has been directly
addressed in Kuizon v. Desierto and reiterated in the more recent Golangco v. Fung,wherein the
Court declared, thus: “The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot,
therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal
or non-administrative cases.”
The question that arises next is what remedy should an aggrieved party avail of to assail the
Ombudsman’s finding of the existence or lack of probable cause in criminal cases or non-
administrative cases. In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court emphasized that parties seeking to
question the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases or non-administrative
cases, may file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the CA, when it is
believed that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion. Office of the Ombudsman,
represented by Hon. Aniano A. Desierto vs. Heirs of Margarita vda. De Ventura represented by
Pacita V. Pascual, et al., G.R. No. 151800, November 5, 2009,
Mortgage; extrajudicial foreclosure. In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the party alleging
non-compliance with the publication requirement has the burden of proving the same. In this
case, the records are bereft of any evidence to prove that Citytrust did not comply with the
requisite publication. Neither was there evidence disproving the qualification of “The Guardian”
newspaper to publish the notice of auction sale.
We find that the evidence submitted by Citytrust sufficiently established compliance with the
statutory requirements on posting and publication of notice of auction sale of a mortgaged
property. Bank of the Philippines Islands, etc. vs. Evangeline L. Puzon, G.R. No. 160046,
November 27, 2009.
Mortgage; foreclosure. The collection of surplus is inconsistent with the annulment of
foreclosure because in suing for the return of the surplus proceeds, the mortgagor is deemed to
have affirmed the validity of the sale since nothing is due if no valid sale has been made. It is
only after the dismissal of complaint for annulment or when the foreclosure sale is declared
valid that the mortgagor may recover the surplus in an action specifically brought for that
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purpose. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits, the better recourse is for the mortgagor to file a
case for annulment of foreclosure with an alternative cause of action for the return of the surplus,
if any. Bernando B. Jose, Jr. vs. Michael Phils., Inc. et al., G.R. No. 169606, November 27,
2009.
Motion to dismiss; hypothetical admission. In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically
admits the truth of the material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. This hypothetical
admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences fairly
deductible from, the complaint. Hence, to determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged
in the complaint constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the
facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?
To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the plaintiff’s claim for relief does
not exist at all. On the contrary, the complaint is sufficient “if it contains sufficient notice of the
cause of action even though the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in which event, the
proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars.Stanfilco
Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. DOLE Philippines, Inc.
(Stanfilco Division), Oribanex Services, Inc., Spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos, G.R. No. 154048,
November 27, 2009.
Parties; indispensable parties. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court defines
indispensable parties as parties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of
an action and who, for this reason, must be joined either as plaintiffs or as defendants.
Jurisprudence further holds that a party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the
subject matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a final decree cannot be
made without affecting this interest or without placing the controversy in a situation where the
final determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a person
whose absence disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable
determination of the controversy between or among the contending parties.
When the controversy involves a property held in common, Article 487 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides that “any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.”
We have explained in Vencilao v. Camarenta and in Sering v. Plazo that the term “action in
ejectment” includes a suit for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio). We
also noted in Sering that the term “action in ejectment” includes “also, an accion publiciana
(recovery of possession) or accion reinvidicatoria (recovery of ownership).” Most recently in
Estreller v. Ysmael, we applied Article 487 to an accion publiciana case; in Plasabas v. Court of
Appeals we categorically stated that Article 487 applies to reivindicatory actions.
We upheld in several cases the right of a co-owner to file a suit without impleading other co-
owners, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. We made this ruling in Vencilao, where the
amended complaint for “forcible entry and detainer” specified that the plaintiff is one of the
heirs who co-owns the disputed properties. InSering, and Resuena v. Court of Appeals, the co-
owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owners of the
property. InCelino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, the complaint for quieting of title was
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brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common. In Plasabas, the
plaintiffs alleged in their complaint for recovery of title to property (accion reivindicatoria) that
they are the sole owners of the property in litigation, but acknowledged during the trial that the
property is co-owned with other parties, and the plaintiffs have been authorized by the co-
owners to pursue the case on the latter’s behalf.
These cases should be distinguished from Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan where the
actions for quieting of title and unlawful detainer, respectively, were brought for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone who claimed to be the sole owner. We held that the action will not prosper
unless the plaintiff impleaded the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. In these cases,
the absence of an indispensable party rendered all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
We read these cases to collectively mean that where the suit is brought by a co-owner, without
repudiating the co-ownership, then the suit is presumed to be filed for the benefit of the other
co-owners and may proceed without impleading the other co-owners. However, where the co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership by claiming sole ownership of the property or where the suit
is brought against a co-owner, his co-owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded
as party-defendants, as the suit affects the rights and interests of these other co-
owners. Josephine Marmo, et al. vs. Moises O. Anacay, G.R. No. 182585, November 27, 2009.
Parties; indispensable parties. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the
controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the courts cannot
proceed without their presence. Joining indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being
a requirement of due process. Without their presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain
real finality.
Judgments do not bind strangers to the suit. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to act, not
only as to the absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the responsibility for
impleading all indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in the names of defendant
Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and,
in its place, the reinstatement of the previous declaration in their father Juanito’s name. Further,
the Taronas sought to strike down as void the affidavit in which Juanito renounced his tenancy
right in favor of the same three persons. It is inevitable that any decision granting what the
Taronas wanted would necessarily affect the rights of such persons to the property covered by
the tax declaration.
But the Taronas’ action cannot be dismissed outright. As the Court held in Plasabas v. Court of
Appeals, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. Section 11, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-
joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff
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refuses to implead an indispensable party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the
action.
There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an order to implead Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as defendants so they may, if they so desire, be
heard. Anicia Valdez-Tallorin vs. Heirs of Juanito Tarona, et al., G.R. No. 177429, November
24, 2009.
Parties; real party in interest. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a
natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil
action.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit
from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go
is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a
cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband
signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement
in his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a question we do not
decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a trial on the merits. Roger V. Navarro
Vs. Hon. Jose L. Escobido, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and Karen T.
Go, doing business under the name Kargo Enterprises, G.R. No. 153788, November 27, 2009.
Pleadings; amendment. The rule on amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where
no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. Where there is a variance in defendant’s
pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as if it had
been amended to conform to the evidence. Agripina Panganiban vs. Sps. Romeo Roldan, et
al., G.R. No. 163053, November 25, 2009.
Pleadings; supplemental pleading. Pleadings are amended in order to allege facts which
occurred prior to the filing of the original pleading. An amended pleading supersedes the
pleading that it amends. In the case at bar, the subsequent answer could neither validly amend
the first answer nor result in the withdrawal of the latter. It is to be noted that the new Union
officers, upon their election, moved for their intervention and substitution on the premise that
they became the real party in interest since the defendants in the case have ceased to be the
legal representatives of the Union. Certainly, their election as new officers is an occurrence
which arose after the filing of the first answer. Hence, the purported amended answer should
have been designated as a supplemental answer. A supplemental pleading states the
transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the time the pleading sought to be
supplemented was filed. A supplemental pleading is meant to supply deficiencies in aid of the
original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. It does not supersede the
original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand. As such, the Answer with
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Counterclaim filed by Aquino and Frisnedi did not result in the withdrawal of the Answer with
Cross-Claim filed by the original defendants in this case, but was merely supplemented by the
subsequent answer. Jose Feliciano Loy, et al. vs. San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-
Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEU-PTGWO), et al., G.R. No.
164886, November 24, 2009.
Pre-trial brief. Section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court imposes upon the plaintiff the duty to
set the case for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and filed. Under Section 3 of Rule 17,
failure to comply with the said duty makes the case susceptible to dismissal for failure to
prosecute for an unreasonable length of time or failure to comply with the rules.
Respondents Lazaro filed the Cautionary Answer with Manifestation and Motion to File a
Supplemental/Amended Answer on July 19, 2002, a copy of which was received by petitioners
on August 5, 2002. Believing that the pending motion had to be resolved first, petitioners waited
for the court to act on the motion to file a supplemental answer. Despite the lapse of almost one
year, petitioners kept on waiting, without doing anything to stir the court into action.
In any case, petitioners should not have waited for the court to act on the motion to file a
supplemental answer or for the defendants to file a supplemental answer. As previously stated,
the rule clearly states that the case must be set for pre-trial after the last pleading is served and
filed. Since respondents already filed a cautionary answer and [petitioners did not file any reply
to it] the case was already ripe for pre-trial.
It bears stressing that the sanction of dismissal may be imposed even absent any allegation and
proof of the plaintiff’s lack of interest to prosecute the action, or of any prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the failure of the plaintiff to comply with the rules. The failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute the action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time
will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested in obtaining the relief prayed for.
In this case, there was no justifiable reason for petitioners’ failure to file a motion to set the case
for pre-trial. Petitioners’ stubborn insistence that the case was not yet ripe for pre-trial is
erroneous. Although petitioners state that there are strong and compelling reasons justifying a
liberal application of the rule, the Court finds none in this case. The burden to show that there
are compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the case unjustified is on petitioners, and
they have not adduced any such compelling reason. Jazmin L. Espiritu and Porfirio Lazaro, Jr.
vs. Vladimir G. Lazaro, et al., G.R. No. 181020, November 25, 2009.
Reconveyance; decree of registration. It is well to remember that in an action for reconveyance,
the decree of registration is highly regarded as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of
the property or its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful owner or to one who has a better right. The present action for reconveyance
only entails the segregation of the portion wrongfully included in the certificate of title. The
decree of registration is to be respected, but the certificate of title will be cancelled for the
purpose of amending it in order to exclude the portion wrongfully included therein. A new
certificate covering the portion reconveyed shall then be subsequently issued in the name of the
real owner.
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However, the CA went beyond this and declared the entire deed of sale, covering 273 sq m,
void for being simulated. As such, the CA decision would result not only in the amendment of
petitioners’ certificate of title, but in the absolute revocation of petitioners’ title itself. The
property would then revert to its previous owner, subject to the right of respondents over the
portion of the lot which they claim as their own. Spouses Exequiel Lopez and Eusebia Lopez
vs. Spouses Eduardo Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 161925, November 25, 2009.
Rule 42; annexes to petition. Petitioner contends that the Petition for Review filed by the
respondent with the CA is procedurally infirmed and that the appellate court should have
outrightly dismissed the same. Specifically, petitioner points out that while respondent attached
to the petition the parties’ respective position papers, he failed to attach to said position papers
the annexes thereto. This, petitioner insists, warrants the dismissal of respondent’s petition per
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3 of the same Rule.
We do not agree. Section 2 of Rule 42 does not require that all the pleadings and documents
filed before the lower courts must be attached as annexes to the petition. Aside from clearly
legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, it
merely requires that the petition be accompanied by copies of pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. As to what these
pleadings and material portions of the record are, the Rules grants the petitioner sufficient
discretion to determine the same. This discretion is of course subject to CA’s evaluation whether
the supporting documents are sufficient to make out a prima facie case. Thus, Section 3
empowers the CA to dismiss the petition where the allegations contained therein are utterly
bereft of evidentiary foundation. Since in this case the CA gave due course to respondent’s
Petition for Review and proceeded to decide it on the merits, it can be fairly assumed that the
appellate court is satisfied that respondent has sufficiently complied with Section 2 of Rule
42. Joven Yuki, Jr. vs. Wellington Co, G.R. No. 178527, November 27, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. The issue of whether we can review factual conclusions of the CA,
when contrary to those of the administrative tribunal, need not detain us unnecessarily. We
have long held in a number of cases that factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind the Court when
supported by substantial evidence. Corollary thereto is our well-entrenched holding that this
Court is not a trier of facts; this is strictly adhered to in labor cases. However, the rule admits of
exceptions when: (1) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case,
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in petitioner’s
main and reply briefs, are not disputed by respondent; (10) the findings of fact are premised on
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the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. In the case at bar, we gave due
course to MSD’s petition as the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC differ from those of the CA. Merck Sharp and Dohme (Philippines), et al.
vs. Jonar P. Robles, et al., G.R. No. 176506, November 25, 2009.
Rule 45; question of fact. It has been repeatedly held that, as a rule, the findings of fact of the
CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court if they are borne
out by the records or are based on substantial evidence. The factual issues raised by Napoles in
this petition, specifically the failure of the NBI to recover the marked money from his possession,
the presence of fluorescent powder on his hands, and the alleged violation of his constitutional
right when he was arrested by the NBI have all been squarely discussed and fairly settled in the
appellate court’s decision.
More importantly, Napoles failed to show any of the exceptional circumstances enumerated in
the rules and jurisprudence whereby a review is permitted, namely: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellants and
appellees; (7) when the findings of fact of the CA are at variance with those of the trial court, in
which case this Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings based
on the record; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondents; (10) when the findings of fact of the CA
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (11) when the trial court has overlooked certain material facts and circumstances
which, if taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an
element of reasonable doubt entitling the accused to acquittal. Jimmy R. Napoles vs. Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas), et al., G.R. No. 183834. November 25, 2009
Rule 65; question of fact. The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of
law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is
not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are
contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
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(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds no justification to warrant the
application of any exception to the general rule. Reynaldo G. Cabigting vs. San Miguel Foods,
Inc., G.R. No. 167706, November 5, 2009.
Rule 65; injunction. A Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, is intended
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. It may issue only when the following requirements are alleged in
the petition and established:(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction
means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not
authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which
alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. Without
jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause
or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of
power to exercise authority.
In the case at bar, this Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA that the RTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in granting YKS’ plea for injunctive relief. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc.
vs. Hon. Salvador y Apurillo, et al., G.R. No. 168746, November 5, 2009.
Summary procedure; preliminary conference. Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the
plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to
what is prayed for therein.However, “[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or
more defendants sued under a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense,
shall appear at the preliminary conference.” Petitioner claims that the preceding provision
applies to her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and
she and Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not
have rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
The Court holds that the italicized provision above does not apply in the case of petitioner,
since she and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed
against petitioner was distinct from that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the
cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No.
17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.
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Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and
Sadol, petitioner’s failure to appear in the preliminary conference entitled respondent to the
rendition of judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed
as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Angelina S. Soriente, et al. vs. The Estate of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion, etc., G.R.
No. 160239, November 25, 2009.
Unlawful detainer; issue. In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be
determined is who between the contending parties has the better right to possess the contested
property, independent of any claim of ownership. However, where the issue of ownership is so
intertwined with the issue of possession, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership if only
to determine who has the better right to possess the property. Agripina Panganiban vs. Sps.
Romeo Roldan, et al., G.R. No. 163053, November 25, 2009.
Unlawful detainer; nature. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court are designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to
one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of
the parties’ opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions
are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands
purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession. In these cases, the issue is pure physical
or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in
nature. The provisional determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed
with finality.
In any case, we sustain the finding that respondent has the better right to possess the subject
property. The Contract of Lease executed by petitioners and respondent remains valid. It is
undisputed that petitioners failed to comply with the terms thereof by their failure to pay the
stipulated rent. As lessor of the subject property, respondent has the right to demand that
petitioners pay their unpaid obligations and, in case of their failure, that they vacate the
premises. Considering that the lease contract has long expired, with more reason should
respondent be allowed to recover the subject property. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and
Rosalinda N. Samonte vs. Century Savings Bank, G.R. No. 176413, November 25, 2009
Unlawful detainer; nature. To make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, the Complaint must allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding from
the plaintiff the possession of certain real property after the expiration or termination of the
former’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied, and that the action
is being brought within one year from the time the defendant’s possession became unlawful.
The Complaint alleged that petitioner occupied the subject property by tolerance of the late
Arsenio Concepcion. While tolerance is lawful, such possession becomes illegal upon demand
to vacate by the owner and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such demand.
Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000 to vacate the subject
property, but petitioner did not comply with the demand. A person who occupies the land of
another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
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bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
the one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be
counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that period does the
possession become unlawful. Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioner on April 27,
2001, which was less than a year from the date of formal demand. Clearly, therefore, the action
was filed within the one-year period prescribed for filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession. All
that the trial court can do is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property,
so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve
ownership. Courts in ejectment cases decide questions of ownership only it is necessary to
decide the question of possession. The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from
trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the disputed property. Angelina S. Soriente, et al. vs. The Estate of the late
Arsenio E. Concepcion, etc., G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009.
Unlawful detainer; suspension. The ejectment case should not be suspended pending the
resolution of the action for nullity of foreclosure.
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing of another
action raising ownership of the property as an issue. The Court has, in fact, affirmed this rule in
the following precedents:
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the municipal
trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966]) do not abate
the latter; and neither do proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868
[1956], citing Pue, et al. v. Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]).
2. An “accion publiciana” does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the
former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]).
3. A “writ of possession case” where ownership is concededly the principal issue before the
Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment in an unlawful
detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or possession de facto of
the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v. C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [1988]).
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving the
same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 [1972]).
5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., to
compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA 1184 [1966]; Rosales v.
CFI, 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., 161 SCRA 264 [1988]).
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of sale with
pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith v. Abragan,
66 SCRA 600 [1975]).
7. An action for reconveyance of property or “accion reivindicatoria” also has no effect on
ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963];Salinas
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v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149
SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v. Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987];Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v.
C.A., 174 SCRA 108; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman v. C.A. [annulment of sale
and reconveyance], 177 SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186 SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo
Sy v. C.A., et al., [annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R. No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to
abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA
167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v.
C.A. [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with
damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.[annulment of document], 177
SCRA 288 [1989]).
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of a pending civil action. In
Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, and Amagan v. Marayag,we ordered the suspension of the
ejectment proceedings on considerations of equity. We explained that the ejectment of
petitioners therein would mean a demolition of their house and would create confusion,
disturbance, inconvenience, and expense. Needlessly, the court would be wasting much time
and effort by proceeding to a stage wherein the outcome would at best be temporary but the
result of enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably irreparable. Spouses Danilo T.
Samonte and Rosalinda N. Samonte vs. Century Savings Bank, G.R. No. 176413. November 25,
2009
Writ of amparo; coverage. The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules
for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of the heightening
prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration
of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s commitment towards internationalization of
human rights. More than three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data was promulgated.
The coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And
the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful
act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the
Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts
complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property. P/Supt. Felixberto Castillo, Police
Officers Romeo Bagtas, et al. vs. Dr. Amanda T. Cruz, Nixon T. Cruz and Ferdinand T.
Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009.
Writ of attachment; fraud. Petitioners contend that the writ of attachment was improperly
issued because respondents’ amended complaint failed to allege specific acts or circumstances
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constitutive of fraud. Petitioners insist that the improperly issued writ of attachment may be
discharged without the necessity of filing a counter-bond. Petitioners also argue that respondents
failed to show that the writ of attachment was issued upon a ground which is at the same time
also respondents’ cause of action. Petitioners maintain that respondents’ amended complaint
was not an action based on fraud but was a simple case for collection of sum of money plus
damages.
On the other hand, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that the writ
of attachment can only be discharged by filing a counter-bond. According to respondents,
petitioners cannot avail of Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court to have the attachment set
aside because the ground for the issuance of the writ of attachment is also the basis of
respondents’ amended complaint. Respondents assert that the amended complaint is a
complaint for damages for the breach of obligation and acts of fraud committed by petitioners.
In this case, the basis of respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment is Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
debtor’s mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation.
We rule that respondents’ allegation that petitioners undertook to sell exclusively and only
through JRP/LGD for Target Stores Corporation but that petitioners transacted directly with
respondents’ foreign buyer is sufficient allegation of fraud to support their application for a writ
of preliminary attachment. Since the writ of preliminary attachment was properly issued, the
only way it can be dissolved is by filing a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court. Metro, Inc. and Spouses Frederick and LIza Juan vs. Lara’s Gifts and
Decors, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 171741, November 27, 2009.
Writ of possession; failure to return surplus. In Sulit v. Court of Appeals, we withheld the
issuance of a writ of possession because the mortgagee failed to deliver the surplus from the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale which is equivalent to approximately 40% of the total mortgage
debt. Sulit was considered as an exception to the general rule that it is ministerial upon the court
to issue a writ of possession even during the period of redemption. We explained that equitable
considerations prevailing in said case demand that a writ of possession should not issue.
In the subsequent case of Saguan v. Philippine Bank of Communications, however, we clarified
that the exception made in Sulit does not apply when the period to redeem has already expired
or when ownership over the property has already been consolidated in favor of the mortgagee-
purchaser. In other words, even if the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the surplus, a writ of
possession must still be issued. In the instant case, the period to redeem has already lapsed.
Thus, following the ruling in Saguan, the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the
petitioner is in order.
Relatedly, we held in Sulit that if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale
than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives the
mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
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In the instant case, the cadastral court is without jurisdiction to order petitioner to deliver to
respondent the surplus or excess of the purchase price. The only issue in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession is the purchaser’s entitlement to possession. No documentary or
testimonial evidence is even required for the issuance of the writ as long as the verified petition
states the facts sufficient to entitle the purchaser to the relief requested. As held in Saguan, when
the mortgagee-purchaser fails to return the surplus, the remedy of a mortgagor “lies in a separate
civil action for collection of a sum of money. Bernando B. Jose, Jr. vs. Michael Phils., Inc. et
al., G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009.
Writ of preliminary attachment; bond. A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a
provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending to be levied upon
the property or properties of the defendant therein, the same to be held thereafter by the sheriff
as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment that might be secured in the said action by
the attaching creditor against the defendant.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by
petitioners despite the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In
accepting a surety bond, it is necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise,
the bond should be rejected.
Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the
company concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from
the date of its issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds
offered by Western Guaranty Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of
Makati,Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the surety bond issued by the bonding company should not
have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas, Branch 90, since the certification secured by the
bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance of the bond certified that it may
only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued the writ of attachment
founded on the said bond. Sofia Torres, et al. vs.Nicanor Satsatin, et al., G.R. No. 166759,
November 25, 2009.
Writ of preliminary attachment; jurisdiction. In provisional remedies, particularly that of
preliminary attachment, the distinction between the issuance and the implementation of the writ
of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the writ. The distinction is indispensably
necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired
in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.
This Court has long put to rest the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
should be acquired in cases where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may,
at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the provisional remedies under the Rules of Court.
Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of the remedy “at the
commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment.” This phrase refers to the
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date of the filing of the complaint, which is the moment that marks “the commencement of the
action.” The reference plainly is to a time before summons is served on the defendant, or even
before summons issues.
In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of
attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,
the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is
implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the
court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court
has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from
the Court will not bind the defendant.
Thus, it is indispensable not only for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also upon consideration of fairness, to apprise the defendant of the complaint
against him and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and the grounds therefor that
prior or contemporaneously to the serving of the writ of attachment, service of summons,
together with a copy of the complaint, the application for attachment, the applicant’s affidavit
and bond, and the order must be served upon him. Sofia Torres, et al. vs. Nicanor Satsatin, et
al., G.R. No. 166759, November 25, 2009.
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Civil Procedure
Appeal; certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not similar to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a petition
for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the
specific grounds therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs.
Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Appeal; decision of RTC acting in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In the case at bar, it is
clear that when the case was appealed to the RTC, the latter took cognizance of the case in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. Hence, any further appeal from
the RTC Decision must conform to the provisions of the Rules of Court dealing with said matter.
It is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong remedy. Since the RTC tried the case
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The law is
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clear in this respect. Barangay Sangalang, represented by its Chairman Dante C. Marcellana vs.
Barangay Maguihan, represented by its Chairman Arnulfo Villarez, G.R. No. 159792, December
23, 2009.
Appeal; failure to pay docket fees. The Order denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was silent as to the issue of the non-payment of docket fees; however, this Court deems that the
RTC must have accepted the explanation given by respondent, otherwise, said court would have
dismissed the appeal and reconsidered its decision. The failure to pay docket fees does not
automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, it being discretionary on the part of the
appellate court to give it due course or not. This Court will then not interfere with matters
addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC in the absence of proof that the exercise of such
discretion was tainted with bias or prejudice, or made without due circumspection of the
attendant circumstances of the case. Barangay Sangalang, represented by its Chairman Dante
C. Marcellana vs. Barangay Maguihan, represented by its Chairman Arnulfo Villarez, G.R. No.
159792, December 23, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the CA
are final and conclusive on, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by, this Court as long as they are
borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence. The Court is not a trier of facts,
its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by
the lower courts. Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon, G.R. No.
161424, December 23, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding,
and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misappreciation of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the CA in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings of fact of
the CA are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record. None of these exceptions is present in this case. We find that the Decision of the CA is
supported by the required quantum of evidence. Jesus Campos and Rosemarie Campos-Bautista
vs. Nenita Buevinida Pastrana, et al., G.R. No. 175994, December 8, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. Even assuming that Fuji admitted that the feeds delivered were
defective, the question of whether Fuji had replaced the feeds is a factual matter not usually
reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable by this Court because
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they are final and conclusive especially if borne out by the record or based on substantial
evidence. . . . Whether Fuji delivered defective feeds, or whether the statement is tantamount to
an admission that the feeds delivered were defective, or whether Fuji failed to replace defective
feeds, are questions of fact which necessitate an examination of the probative value of the
evidence adduced before the trial court. Shrimp Specialist, Inc. vs. Fuji-Triumph Agri-Industrial
Corporation/Fuji-Trimph Agri-Industrial Corporation vs. Shrimp Specialist, Inc., et al. G.R. No.
168756/G.R. No. 171476. December 7, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. The factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are generally binding on the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the records, the
Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court. Shrimp Specialist, Inc. vs. Fuji-Triumph Agri-Industrial Corporation/Fuji-Trimph Agri-
Industrial Corporation vs. Shrimp Specialist, Inc., et al. G.R. No. 168756/G.R. No. 171476.
December 7, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. Even assuming that Fuji admitted that the feeds delivered were
defective, the question of whether Fuji had replaced the feeds is a factual matter not usually
reviewable in a petition filed under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable by this Court because
they are final and conclusive especially if borne out by the record or based on substantial
evidence. . . . Whether Fuji delivered defective feeds, or whether the statement is tantamount to
an admission that the feeds delivered were defective, or whether Fuji failed to replace defective
feeds, are questions of fact which necessitate an examination of the probative value of the
evidence adduced before the trial court. Shrimp Specialist, Inc. vs. Fuji-Triumph Agri-Industrial
Corporation/Fuji-Trimph Agri-Industrial Corporation vs. Shrimp Specialist, Inc., et al. G.R. No.
168756/G.R. No. 171476. December 7, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. The petition before us raises factual issues which are not proper in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, we find that one of the
exceptional circumstances qualifying a factual review by the Court exists, that is, the factual
findings of the CA are at variance with those of the trial court. We shall then give due course to
the instant petition and review the factual findings of the CA. Heirs of Domingo Hernandez Sr.,
et al. vs. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr., et al.,G.R. No. 146548, December 18, 2009.
Appeal; findings of fact. While it is a well-settled rule, also applicable in labor cases, that issues
not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, there are exceptions thereto
among which are for reasons of public policy or interest. The NLRC did not err in considering
the issue of the veracity of the confirmatory tests even if the same was raised only in respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision, it being crucial in determining the validity of
respondents’ dismissal from their employment. Technical rules of procedure are not strictly
adhered to in labor cases. In the interest of substantial justice, new or additional evidence may
be introduced on appeal before the NLRC. Such move is proper, provided due process is
observed, as was the case here, by giving the opposing party sufficient opportunity to meet and
rebut the new or additional evidence introduced. The Constitution no less directs the State to
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afford full protection to labor. To achieve this goal, technical rules of procedure shall be
liberally construed in favor of the working class in accordance with the demands of substantial
justice. Plantation Bay Resort & Spa and Efren Belarmino vs. Romel S. Dubrico, et al., G.R. No.
182216, December 4, 2009.
Appeal; issues raised for first time on appeal. Anent the argument that the donation inter
vivos impaired the legitimes of petitioners, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the same.
Said argument was indeed only raised for the first time on appeal to the Court of Appeals and in
the Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s Amended Decision at
that. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot
be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this
rule. Herminio M. Gutierrez, et al. vs. Flora Mendoza-Plaza, et al., G.R. No. 185477, December
4, 2009.
Appeal; requirements of appeal. In HLURB Case No. REM-071597-9831, petitioners failed to
perfect the appeal from the 25 January 2002 Decision of Arbiter Balasolla in the manner
prescribed by the HLURB 1996 Rules of Procedure (HLURB Rules). Petitioners admittedly failed
to comply with Section 3(b), Rule XII of the HLURB Rules, which specifically requires the
attachment to the petition for review of a verified certification against forum shopping jointly
executed by the petitioner and his counsel. The absence of such joint verified certification shall
result in the dismissal of the petition for review, pursuant to Section 1, Rule XIV of the HLURB
Rules. Considering that the petition for review filed by petitioners lacks the required verified
certification against forum shopping, the petition for review was correctly dismissed for failure to
comply with the requirements of the HLURB Rules. Hence, the 25 January 2002 Decision of
Arbiter Balasolla became final for non-perfection of the appeal. Mayon Estate Corporation and
Earthland Developer Corporation vs. Lualhati Beltran, G.R. No. 165387, December 18, 2009.
Certiorari; absence of appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. In addition, Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides that the remedy of certiorari may only be availed of if
“there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.” . . . . It was absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce
evidence to prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. Thus, since
petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director to the Commission Proper under the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a writ of certiorari,
because there was some other speedy and adequate remedy available to him. Petitioner having
failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by the COA-LAO-
Local has become final and executory. Governor Orlando A. Fua, Jr., et al. vs. The Commission
on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 175803, December 4, 2009.
Certiorari; absence of appeal oe any plain, speedy or adequate remedy. Admittedly,
Metrobank’s petition for certiorari before the CA assails the dismissal order of the RTC and,
under normal circumstances, Metrobank should have filed an appeal.
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However, where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may
not prove adequate — either in point of promptness or completeness, so that a partial if not a
total failure of justice could result – a writ of certiorari may still be issued.
Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the
RTC decision dismissing Metrobank’s petition was patently erroneous and clearly contravened
existing jurisprudence. For this reason, we cannot fault Metrobank for resorting to the filing of a
petition for certiorari with the CA to remedy a patent legal error in the hope of obtaining a
speedy and adequate remedy. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Hon. Salvador Abad
Santos, Presiding Judge, RTC, BR. 65, Makati City and Manfred De Koning, G.R. No. 157867,
December 15, 2009.
Certiorari; exhaustion of administrative remedies. By immediately filing the present petition
for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. The
hornbook doctrine, reiterated in Joseph Peter Sison, et al. vs. Rogelio Tablang, etc., is as follows:
“The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and
submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose
of the same after due deliberation.” The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition
having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary consequence
of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious: the disallowance as ruled by the
LAO-C has now become final and executory. Governor Orlando A. Fua, Jr., et al. vs. The
Commission on Audit, et al., G.R. No. 175803, December 4, 2009.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough; it must be so grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Office and Legend
International Resorts, Limited vs. The Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 182013, December 4, 2009.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, this Court holds that there was no grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the Special Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals in not giving due deference to the decision of its co-division. As
correctly pointed out by the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, the decision of its
co-division is not binding on its other division. Further, it must be stressed that judicial decisions
that form part of our legal system are only the decisions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, at the
time petitioners made the aforesaid Manifestation, the Decision dated 14 December 2007 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 96717 of the Special Tenth Division was still on appeal before this Court.
Therefore, the Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not
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giving due deference to the said Decision of its co-division, and its actuation cannot be
considered grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. Quasha
Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Office and Legend International Resorts, Limited vs. The Special
Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182013, December 4, 2009.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. In fine, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of execution and
the notice of garnishment to satisfy the judgment in favor of respondents could not be
considered grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense,
connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive, or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious, usually
used in tandem with the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.
Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness
in the exercise of discretion is imperative. In this case, NPC utterly failed to demonstrate caprice
or arbitrariness on the part of the RTC in granting respondents’ motion for execution.
Accordingly, the CA committed no reversible error in dismissing NPC’s petition
for certiorari. National Power Corporation vs. Omar G. Maruhom, et al., G.R. No. 183297,
December 23, 2009.
Certiorari; interlocutory order. We agree with the Court of Appeals that interlocutory orders,
because they do not dispose of the case on the merits, are not appealable. Likewise, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of
the trial court. In such a case, the proper remedy of the aggrieved party is an ordinary appeal
from an adverse judgment, incorporating in the appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and
the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow
certiorari as a mode of redress. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Maria Leticia Fernandez, et al., G.R.
No. 163117, December 18, 2009.
Certiorari; void judgment. Petitioner also raises the issue of the impropriety of the remedy
resorted to by the respondent which is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, claiming that the said remedy is inappropriate because there are still other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies available, such as an ordinary appeal, the Decision of the RTC
having attained its finality. The question, however, is whether the said Decision has indeed
attained finality. . . . The said doctrine [of finality of judgment], however, is applicable only
when the judgment or decision is valid. In the present case, as earlier pronounced, and as ruled
by the CA, the judgment in question is void, the RTC not having acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent. It is a well-entrenched principle that a void judgment can never
become final. . . . Thus, from the above discussion, the Decision of the RTC, not having attained
its finality due to its being void, the Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65, filed by the respondent
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with the CA, was proper. Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916,
December 4, 2009.
Execution; dispositive portion. It is a fundamental legal axiom that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to be executed. A writ of
execution may not vary from, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. When
a writ of execution does not conform strictly to a decision’s dispositive portion, it is null and
void. Admittedly, the tenor of the dispositive portion of the August 7, 1996 RTC decision, as
modified by the CA and affirmed by this Court, did not order the transfer of ownership upon
payment of the adjudged compensation. Neither did such condition appear in the text of the
RTC decision, and of this Court’s Decision in G.R. No. 168732. As aptly pointed out by the CA
in its assailed Decision: XXX XXX XXX Clearly, the writ of execution issued by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA does not vary, but is, in fact, consistent with the final decision in this case.
The assailed writ is, therefore, valid. National Power Corporation vs. Omar G. Maruhom, et
al., G.R. No. 183297, December 23, 2009.
Execution; EPIRA. The instant petition for injunction was filed directly to this Court as mandated
by Section 78 of the EPIRA Law. In as much as this Court does not have a sheriff of its own to
execute our decision, we deem it appropriate, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court and considering that the principal office of NPC is located in Quezon City, to authorize
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City to execute
our judgment which became final and executory on 10 October 2008 and for which an entry of
judgment was made on 27 October 2008. After receipt of the list containing the names of the
affected NPC employees and benefits due each of them, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Quezon City is directed to forthwith execute our judgment. NPC
Drivers and Mechanics Association [NPC DAMA], et al. vs. National Power Corp., et al.,G.R.
No. 156208, December 2, 2009
Execution; exemption of GSIS’s funds and properties from execution and
garnishment. Regarding the alleged exemption of the funds and properties of GSIS, we quote
with approval pertinent portions of the Decision of the CA dated August 3, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84079: “The petition and pending incidents hinge on the principal issue of whether the
exemption from execution and garnishment of the funds and properties of GSIS under Sec. 39 of
Rep. Act No. 8291 may be invoked to quash the writ of execution issued pursuant to the final
and executory judgment against it. We rule in the negative.” XXX XXX XXX ‘In Rubia vs.
GSIS (432 SCRA 529), the Supreme Court ruled that the exemption from execution enjoyed by
GSIS under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291 is not absolute. XXX XXX XXX In so far as Section 39
of the GSIS charter exempts the GSIS from execution, suffice it to say that such exemption is not
absolute and does not encompass all the GSIS funds. XXX XXX XXX The processual exemption
of the GSIS funds and properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view, should be
read consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial solvency of the GSIS
in the protection of assets which are to be used to finance the retirement, disability and life
insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the exemption should be limited to the purposes and
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objects covered. Any interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all
GSIS assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.’ In the instant case, the final
and executory judgment arose from loans extended by GSIS to private respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest in the course of its business and secured by a mortgage. As in Rubia,
GSIS’ relationship with private respondent’s predecessors-in-interest is purely private and
contractual in nature. As such, GSIS cannot claim immunity from the enforcement of the final
and executory judgment against it.” Petitioner is asking this Court to reverse our findings
in Rubia, supra, and as a result, rule that the immunity granted to it by Rep. Act No. 8291 is
absolute. We see no reason to depart from the conclusions reached in said case. In fact, all the
more should GSIS not be allowed to hide behind such immunity in this case, where its
obligation arises not just from a simple business transaction, but from its utter failure to return
properties that it had wrongfully foreclosed. Government Service Insurance System vs. The
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, et al./Government Service Insurance System vs. Hon. Celso
Laviña, et al., G.R. No. 175393/G.R. No. 177731, December 18, 2009.
Execution; pending appeal. Evident from the usage of the word “may,” the language of the
subject provision denotes that it is merely directory, and not mandatory, for the trial court to
issue the special order before the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court may still
thereafter resolve a motion for execution pending appeal, provided: (i) the motion is filed within
the five-day reglementary period; and (ii) the special order is issued prior to the transmittal of
the records to the Comelec. Both parties concede that the motion for execution pending appeal
must be filed within the five-day period to appeal. In the present case, the Urgent Motion was
filed well within the reglementary period. Indeed, in one case, the Court construed a similarly
phrased provision to mean that the ruling on the motion for execution may issue after the period
of appeal, as long as the motion for execution pending appeal was filed before the expiration of
the time to appeal. Keeping in mind that “hurried justice is not always authentic justice,”
the permissive nature of the rule allows the trial court to apply the same insofar as it is
practicable, albeit the rigid compliance therewith is not altogether impossible, such that a
motion for execution pending appeal may be filed at the latest on the second day after notice of
the decision, and heard and resolved at the latest on the fifth day after notice of the decision, in
compliance with the mandatory three-day notice rule, barring any intervening resetting or non-
working days. Michael L. San Miguel vs. Commission on Elections and Christopher vs.
Aguilar, G.R. No. 188240, December 23, 2009.
Extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage; posting requirement. The petitioners argue that the
posting of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale on Meralco posts did not comply with Act No. 3135
requiring the posting of the same in at least three public places. A public place is a place
exposed to the public and where the public gathers together or passes to and fro. As can be
gleaned from Sheriff Ipac’s Affidavit of Posting, the Notices were posted on the Meralco posts
within the vicinities of Baliuag Roman Catholic Church, Baliuag Public Market and near the
chapel of Sabang, Baliuag, Bulacan. The aforementioned vicinities where the Meralco posts
were erected are public places, to which the general public has a right to resort. The Meralco
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posts where the Notices were posted are but component structures of the public place itself. The
law does not intend that notices to the public be posted on specific bulletin boards or
information areas of a public place. What the law directs is for the notices to be placed in an
area where the same is perceptible to the public. Sps. Rogelio Marcelo & Milagros Marcelo vs.
Philippine Commercial International Bank [PCIB], G.R. No. 182735, December 4, 2009.
Extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage; publication requirement – The trial court’s opinion,
that The Times Newsweekly’s minimal readership made it insufficient to meet the publication
requirement is, to our minds, too narrow and limiting as to strip the newspaper of its privilege as
one of the authorized publications for the notices of auction sale in Bulacan. As this Court held
in many cases, to be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the
dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of
paying subscribers; and that it is published at regular intervals. The newspaper need not have
the largest circulation, so long as it is of general circulation. As evidenced by the Affidavit of
Publication executed by The Times Newsweekly’s publisher, Teddy F. Borres, the said
newspaper is of general circulation in the Provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan, Zambales,
Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and other cities. The same is published every Saturday by The Daily Record,
Inc. Sps. Rogelio Marcelo & Milagros Marcelo vs. Philippine Commercial International Bank
[PCIB], G.R. No. 182735, December 4, 2009.
Forum shopping; nature and requisites – Forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. It is an act of malpractice and is prohibited and
condemned as trifling with courts and abusing their processes. In determining whether or not
there is forum shopping, what is important is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants
by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative bodies to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the
possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different bodies upon the same issues.
Forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties,
(2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for, and (3) the two preceding particulars, such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel
Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 181455-
56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Forum shopping; nature and requisites. The test in determining the presence of forum shopping
is whether in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties, (2) rights or causes of
action, and (3) reliefs sought. The case filed by Silvestra, which was pending when respondents
filed the complaint for unlawful detainer, was for annulment of the deed of sale that she
executed in favor of petitioner Divina Barias’ mother. Thus, the causes of action of that case and
respondents’ complaint for unlawful detainer subject of the present petition are different: the
cause of action of the first is the alleged fraud in inducing Silvestra to execute the deed of sale,
while the cause of action of the second is the alleged unlawful possession of petitioners of that
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portion of the property which was allegedly sold by Silvestra. The reliefs sought in both cases
are likewise different. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass
upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication
is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same
parties involving title to the property. Spouses Dennis Barias and Divina Barias vs. Heirs of
Bartolome Boneo, namely, Juanita Leopoldo, et al., G.R. No. 166941, December 14, 2009.
Forum shopping; nature and requisites. Respondents Miguel, et al., cannot insist on identity of
interests between petitioner Santiago Sr. in G.R. No. 182008 and petitioners Santiago Jr., et
al., in G.R. No. 181455-56, when the Complaint itself of respondents Miguel, et al., before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 07-610, impleads the petitioners Santiago Sr. and Santiago
Jr., et al., as defendants a quo in their individual capacities as PRCI directors, and not
collectively as the PRCI Board of Directors. Each individual PRCI director, therefore, is not
precluded from hiring his own counsel, presenting his own arguments and defenses, and
resorting to his own procedural remedies, apart and independent from the other PRCI directors.
In addition, the consolidation of G.R. No. 181455-56 and G.R. No. 182008 has already
eliminated the danger of conflicting decisions being issued in said cases. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al.
vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Forum shopping; rationale. It has not escaped our notice that petitioner deliberately filed two
cases, herein consolidated, involving the same parties and issues, in its desperate attempt to stay
the execution of the judgment against it. Petitioner should be reminded that our rules on forum
shopping are meant to prevent the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different
fora upon the same issues. Petitioner is admonished from bending the rules of procedure to suit
its purposes. Obedience to the rules promulgated by this Court to ensure the efficient
administration of justice must be the norm, and not the exception. Government Service
Insurance System vs. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, et al./Government Service
Insurance System vs. Hon. Celso Laviña, et al., G.R. No. 175393/G.R. No. 177731, December
18, 2009.
Forum shopping; submission of certificate against forum-shopping. Assuming arguendo that
Solomon did have the legal obligation to inform the Court in G.R. No. 182008 of the pendency
of G.R. No. 181455-56, his failure to do so does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the
former. Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it
is not jurisdictional. Hence, in this case in which such a certification was in fact submitted –
only, it was defective — the Court may still refuse to dismiss and may, instead, give due course
to the Petition in light of attendant exceptional circumstances. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs.
Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
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Forum shopping; submission of certificate against forum-shopping. Even if only petitioner
Domingo Hernandez, Jr. executed the Verification/Certification against forum-shopping, this will
not deter us from proceeding with the judicial determination of the issues in this petition. XXX
XXX XXX Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the
land sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in
support thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for
and in behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim
in another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that
Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules. Heirs of Domingo
Hernandez Sr., et al. vs. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 146548, December 18, 2009.
Forum shopping; submission of certificate against forum shopping. Based on [Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118], a writ of possession may issue either (1) within the
one year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the redemption
period, without need of a bond. In order to obtain a writ of possession, the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex parte motion, in the registration or
cadastral proceedings of the registered property. The reason why this pleading, although
denominated as a petition, is actually considered a motion is best explained in Sps. Arquiza vs.
CA, where we said: XXX XXX XXX. Since a petition for a writ of possession under Section 7 of Act
No. 3135, as amended, is neither a complaint nor an initiatory pleading, a certificate against
non-forum shopping is not required. The certificate that Metrobank attached to its petition is
thus a superfluity that the lower court should have disregarded. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company vs. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos, Presiding Judge, RTC, BR. 65, Makati City and
Manfred De Koning, G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009.
Judgment; annulment. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
annulment of judgment is available only when a party is precluded from filing a motion for new
trial, an appeal or a petition for relief without fault on his part. Moreover, such petition will only
be allowed in the presence of either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. In view of these
provisions, recourse to a petition for annulment of judgment is improper if petitioner lost the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief due to a cause or causes attributable
to petitioner himself. Nor can it be resorted to if petitioner has previously availed of any of the
aforementioned remedies. In this case, petitioners filed an appeal and a motion for new trial.
They also failed to establish any of the grounds for a petition for annulment of judgment.
Obviously, petitioners simply intended to unduly delay the enforcement of the December 5,
1993 RTC decision and defeat its execution. Thus, petitioners should be held solidarily liable
with their counsel (who abetted petitioners’ frivolous appeal, motion for new trial and this
petition for annulment of judgment) for treble the costs of suit. Heirs of Rodrigo Yacapin, namely,
Sol Belnas, et al. vs. Felimon Belida [Deceased], represented by Merlyn B. Palos, et al., G.R. No.
171669, December 14, 2009.
Judgment; conclusiveness of judgment – The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two
different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. The second
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concept – conclusiveness of judgment – states that a fact or question, which was in issue in a
former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future
action between such parties or their privies in the same court or any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can
be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit. Identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of issues. Legend
International Resorts, Limited vs. The Special Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 182013, December 4, 2009.
Judgment; enforcement of judgment after transfer of interest. On PSALM’s contention that since
it was not a party to the case and that the petitioners are not its employees, the properties that it
acquired from NPC cannot be levied, is untenable. The issue here is about PSALM’s assets that
were acquired from NPC. As explained above, PSALM took ownership over most of NPC’s
assets. There was indeed a over these assets – from NPC to PSALM – by operation of law. These
properties may be used to satisfy our judgment. This being the case, petitioners may go after
such properties. The fact that PSALM is a non-party to the case will not prevent the levying of
the said properties, including their fruits and proceeds. However, PSALM should not be denied
due process. The levying of said properties and their fruits/proceeds, if still needed in case
NPC’s properties are insufficient to satisfy our judgment, is without prejudice to PSALM’s
participation in said proceedings. Its participation therein is necessary to prevent the levying of
properties other than that it had acquired from NPC. Such a proceeding is to be conducted in
the proper forum where petitioners may take the appropriate action.
Under Section 19, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may, upon
motion, direct the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or
joined with the original party. In petitioners’ Manifestation with Urgent Omnibus Motions dated
9 February 2009, they prayed that the properties acquired by PSALM from NPC be also
levied/garnished. We consider this prayer to be tantamount to a motion to join PSALM as a
party-respondent in this case in so far as to the properties, and any income arising therefrom,
that PSALM acquired from NPC. It is in this light that we order the Clerk of Court of this division
to implead or join PSALM as a party-respondent in this case. As above-explained, PSALM shall
not be denied due process for it can participate in the proper forum by preventing the levying of
properties other than that it had acquired from NPC. NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association
[NPC DAMA], et al. vs. National Power Corp., et al., G.R. No. 156208, December 2, 2009.
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Judgment; finality of judgment. The doctrine of finality of judgments accepts of exceptions only
under certain circumstances, as we have held in Spouses Gomez vs. Correa, et al.: “It is settled
that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the
land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. The only
recognized exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro
tunc entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is
void. Government Service Insurance System vs. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, et
al./Government Service Insurance System vs. Hon. Celso Laviña, et al.,G.R. No. 175393/G.R.
No. 177731, December 18, 2009.
Judgment; finality of judgment. None of the exceptional circumstances to this doctrine exist in
this case. The modification that would result should the petition be granted would not involve
merely clerical errors, but would entail presentation of alleged newly-discovered evidence that
should have been raised as affirmative defenses during trial. Moreover, the judgment involved
herein has been upheld, and not declared void, by this Court. What petitioner seeks to do is for
this Court to now hold that there had already been reconveyance, conducted through various
transactions, of the subject properties even before the commencement of the case with the RTC,
and, in effect, for us to nullify a final and executory judgment that had been passed upon by the
RTC, the CA, and this Court in the first SC case. This we cannot do; not with the submissions
presented to us by petitioner; not during the execution stage of the proceedings; not even under
the veiled threat that in failing to grant the petition, we will be deciding against the fate of the
GSIS funds that exist for the service of government employees who deserve to be favored in law
under the principles of social justice and equity.
Even if petitioner claims that it recognizes the finality of the RTC decision, as affirmed by both
the CA and this Court, and that it only wants that the execution be conducted properly, to grant
the petition would be to negate the factual findings of the RTC and to render useless the
conclusions reached in the three levels of the judiciary on the reconveyance of the subject
properties. Government Service Insurance System vs. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, et
al./Government Service Insurance System vs. Hon. Celso Laviña, et al., G.R. No. 175393/G.R.
No. 177731, December 18, 2009.
Judgment; finality of judgment. Revisiting the records of this case would reveal that the case
attained its finality as of 26 September 2007, and the same has already been recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgment. This Court, in a long line of cases, has maintained that once the
judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified.
Except for clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and
laid to rest. In Dapar vs. Biascan, this Court reiterates that nothing is more settled in law than
that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no
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longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. Just as the
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The instant Petition offers
no cogent reason that would sway this Court to make a radical departure from its hesitancy to
reopen a case that has attained finality. Sps. Rogelio Marcelo & Milagros Marcelo vs. Philippine
Commercial International Bank [PCIB], G.R. No. 182735, December 4, 2009.
Judgment; finality of judgment. The main role of the courts of justice is to assist in the
enforcement of the law and in the maintenance of peace and order by putting an end to
judiciable controversies with finality. Nothing better serves this role than the long established
doctrine of immutability of judgments.
It is never a small matter to maintain that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors. A judgment that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be
made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The reason for the rule is
that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of
the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and
continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the
overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public
policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.
The foregoing considerations show that granting the second motion for reconsideration (with
respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney’s fees) absolutely risks the
trivialization of the doctrine of immutability of a final and executory judgment, and, therefore,
the motion should be rejected. Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. vs. The Hon.
Court of Appeals, and Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009.
Judgment; judgment on the pleadings. It is not correct to say that petitioners were deprived of
their day in court when the RTC dismissed the complaint even before conducting trial on the
merits. As held in Luzon Development Bank vs. Conquilla, the court, motu proprio, may render
judgment on the pleadings based on the parties’ admissions in their pleadings and even without
introduction of evidence, if and when these amply establish that there is insufficiency of factual
basis for the action. In this case, petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of
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land in question and have been ordered by the MeTC to vacate the same. The gist of their claim
in the action for quieting of title with preliminary injunction is that the MeTC Decision in the
ejectment case against them should not be implemented, because respondents’ TCTs are
spurious, having emanated from OCT No. 614, which has been declared null and void in a
Partial Decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-35672. Petitioners’ main prayer is for the
nullification of respondents’ TCTs. From such allegations, it is already clear that petitioners’
action cannot succeed. Firstly, Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree provides that a
certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can only be altered, modified or
cancelled in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In Foster-Gallego vs. Galang, the
Court held that the issue of whether a title was procured by falsification or fraud should be
raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose, not in an action for quieting of title.
Hence, herein petitioners’ action for quieting of title is a mere collateral attack against
respondents’ TCT Nos. 59721, 59725, 59726 and 59727, and is proscribed by the law.
Secondly, as early as 2001 in Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically struck down
the Partial Decision issued in Civil Case No. Q-35672, upon which herein petitioners base their
claim that respondents’ TCTs are spurious. The Court ruled that said Partial Decision was null
and void. Sotero Roy Leonero, et al. vs. Spouses Marcelino B. Barba, et al., G.R. No. 159788,
December 23, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition of jurisdiction through service of summons. In a case where the action
is inpersonam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be done by
personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of
Court. . . . A plain and simple reading of the above provisions indicates that personal service of
summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot
be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service. Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual,G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acquisition of jurisdiction through service of summons. Petitioner contends that
there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in not one, but three Officer’s Return.
He points out that the absence in the officer’s return of a statement about the impossibility of
personal service does not conclusively prove that the service was invalid. He adds that proof of
prior attempts to serve personally can be deduced from the other returns when there are several
in a series of officer’s returns all tending to establish the impossibility of personal service upon
the respondent. However, the said argument of the petitioner is merely a plain deduction that
veers away from the well-established requisite that the officer must show that the defendant
cannot be served promptly, or that there was an impossibility of prompt service. A cursory
reading of the three Officer’s Returns does not show any compliance with the said
requisite. Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009.
Jurisdiction; acqusition of jurisdiction through service of summons. Petitioner further states that
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions must be applied to the
present case. He expounds on the fact that as between the process server’s return of substituted
service, which carries with it the presumption of regularity and the respondent’s self-serving
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assertion that she only came to know of the case against her when she received a copy of the
petitioner’s motion to declare her in default, the process server’s return is undoubtedly more
deserving of credit. The said argument, however, is only meritorious, provided that there was a
strict compliance with the procedure for serving a summons. In the absence of even the barest
compliance with the procedure for a substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of
Court, the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not
apply. Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009.
Jurisdiction; void judgment. Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent was never vested with the RTC, because the manner of substituted service by the
process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such, there was a violation of due
process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or
the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit
to the court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, “any judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.” Constantino
A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009.
Motion; motion for reconsideration. This Court provides in Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or a final order should be filed within the
period for appeal, which is within 15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final
order appealed from. The 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals also states that unless an
appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed within the 15-day reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals’ decision becomes final. Hence, the general rule is that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is allowed. Sps. Rogelio Marcelo &
Milagros Marcelo vs. Philippine Commercial International Bank [PCIB], G.R. No. 182735,
December 4, 2009.
Motion; motion for reconsideration. The rule as to the non-extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration is, however, not absolute. As early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Maximo M. Japson, this Court has pronounced: xxx xxx xxx Accordingly, motions for extension
of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with
cases pending before this Court, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested. No such motion may be filed before any lower courts. In opting for the
liberal application of the rules in the interest of equity and justice, we cannot look with favor on
a course of action which would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then
the result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all. Sps. Rogelio Marcelo &
Milagros Marcelo vs. Philippine Commercial International Bank [PCIB], G.R. No. 182735,
December 4, 2009
Parties; Court of Appeals as party. Anent the contention that the petition erroneously impleaded
the CA as respondent in contravention of Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, we shall apply our ruling in Simon vs. Canlas, wherein we held that: “x x x [The]
Court agrees that the correct procedure, as mandated by Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, is not to implead the lower court which rendered the assailed decision.
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However, impleading the lower court as respondent in the petition for review on certiorari does
not automatically mean the dismissal of the appeal but merely authorizes the dismissal of the
petition. Besides, formal defects in petitions are not uncommon. The Court has encountered
previous petitions for review on certiorari that erroneously impleaded the CA. In those cases, the
Court merely called the petitioners’ attention to the defects and proceeded to resolve the case
on their merits. The Court finds no reason why it should not afford the same liberal treatment in
this case. While unquestionably, the Court has the discretion to dismiss the appeal for being
defective, sound policy dictates that it is far better to dispose of cases on the merits, rather than
on technicality as the latter approach may result in injustice. This is in accordance with Section
6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which encourages a reading of the procedural
requirements in a manner that will help secure and not defeat justice.” Heirs of Domingo
Hernandez Sr., et al. vs. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr., et al., G.R. No. 146548, December 18, 2009.
Parties; indispensable parties in derivative suits. Under Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court,
an indispensable party is a party-in-interest, without whom there can be no final determination
of an action. The interests of such indispensable party in the subject matter of the suit and the
relief are so bound with those of the other parties that his legal presence as a party to the
proceeding is an absolute necessity. As a rule, an indispensable party’s interest in the subject
matter is such that a complete and efficient determination of the equities and rights of the parties
is not possible if he is not joined.
The majority of the stockholders of PRCI are indispensable parties to Civil Case No. 07-610, for
they have approved and ratified, during the Special Stockholders’ Meeting on 7 November 2006,
the Resolution dated 26 September 2006 of the PRCI Board of Directors. Obviously, no final
determination of the validity of the acquisition by PRCI of JTH or of the constitution of the JTH
Board of Directors can be had without consideration of the effect of the approval and ratification
thereof by the majority stockholders. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et
al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 181455-56/G.R. No. 182008,
December 4, 2009.
Parties; indispensable parties in action for forcible entry. The CA upheld respondent District
Engineer’s view that the MCTC should have considered the inhabitants of Barangay Poblacion
indispensable parties to the ejectment case since the land belonged to them and since it was for
their benefit that the gym was to be built. But, ownership of the land is not the issue in forcible
entry actions. The issue in such actions is who among the parties has prior possession de facto.
While the trial court may have to determine the issue of ownership, such determination is only
provisional, to ascertain who among the parties has a better right of possession. The Episcopal
Diocese of the Northern Philippines vs. The District Engineer, MPED-DPWH, G.R. No. 178606,
December 15, 2009.
Procedural rules; construction. Notwithstanding petitioner’s wrong mode of appeal, the CA
should not have so easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local
government units and that what is involved is the determination of their respective territorial
jurisdictions. In the same vein, the CA’s strict reliance on the requirements under Section 13 of
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Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure relating to subject index and page references in an
appellant’s brief is, to stress, putting a premium on technicalities. While the purpose of Section
13, Rule 44, is to present to the appellate court in the most helpful light, the factual and legal
antecedents of a case on appeal, said rule should not be strictly applied considering that
petitioner’s brief before the CA contained only 9 pages, the records of the case consisted only of
a few documents and pleadings, and there was no testimonial evidence. Barangay Sangalang,
represented by its Chairman Dante C. Marcellana vs. Barangay Maguihan, represented by its
Chairman Arnulfo Villarez, G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009.
Procedural rules; construction. The belated filing of the Amended Petition is inexcusable. “Time
and again, we held that rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules,
in the guise of liberal construction, would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules are not to
be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party.
Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following
judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well
served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules.” Susan G. Po and
Lilia G. Mutia vs. Omerio Dampal, G.R. No. 173329, December 21, 2009.
Procedural rules; liberal application. When a party adopts an improper remedy, as in this case,
his Petition may be dismissed outright. However, in the interest of substantial justice, the strict
application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of this case on
the merits. Thus, while the instant Petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the assigned errors are more properly addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45.
The merits of the Petitions in both G.R. No. 181455-56 and No. 182008 compel this Court to
give more weight to substantive justice, instead of technical rules. Indeed, where, as here, there
is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of
the Rules, the Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. It
bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation
of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In
rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a
particular case from its operation. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et
al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 181455-56/G.R. No. 182008,
December 4, 2009.
Procedural rules; liberal application. At first glance, the petition suffers from an incipient
procedural defect. What petitioners assail in their petition is a resolution issued by the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power. Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to
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Rule 64, cannot be availed of, because it is a remedy to question decisions, resolutions and
issuances made in the exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Prohibition is also an
inappropriate remedy, because what petitioners actually seek from the Court is a determination
of the proper construction of a statute and a declaration of their rights thereunder. Obviously,
their petition is one for declaratory relief, over which this Court does not exercise original
jurisdiction. However, petitioners raise a challenge on the constitutionality of the questioned
provisions of both the COMELEC resolution and the law. Given this scenario, the Court may
step in and resolve the instant petition. The transcendental nature and paramount importance of
the issues raised and the compelling state interest involved in their early resolution—the period
for the filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants
intending to run for elective offices are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and
irreparable damage to their means of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the
government’s manpower—further dictate that the Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense
of obligation, entertain the petition so as to expedite the adjudication of all, especially the
constitutional, issues. In any event, the Court has ample authority to set aside errors of practice
or technicalities of procedure and resolve the merits of a case. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the Rules were promulgated to provide guidelines for the orderly
administration of justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise, the courts would
be consigned to being mere slaves to technical rules, deprived of their judicial
discretion. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
189698, December 1, 2009.
Writ of possession; issuance. A writ of possession is defined as “a writ of execution employed to
enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land
and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.” There are three instances
when a writ of possession may be issued: (a) in land registration proceedings under Section 17
of Act No. 496; (b) in judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged
realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) in
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended
by Act No. 4118. The present case falls under the third instance. Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company vs. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos, Presiding Judge, RTC, BR. 65, Makati City and
Manfred De Koning, G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009.
Writ of possession; intervention. We also find merit in Metrobank’s contention that the lower
court should not have allowed De Koning to intervene in the proceedings. A judicial proceeding,
order, injunction, etc., is ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit
of one party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely interested.
Given that the proceeding for a writ of possession, by the terms of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, is
undoubtedly ex partein nature, the lower court clearly erred not only when it notified De
Koning of Metrobank’s ex partepetition for the writ of possession, but also when it allowed De
Koning to participate in the proceedings and when it took cognizance and upheld De Koning’s
motion to dismiss. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos,
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Presiding Judge, RTC, BR. 65, Makati City and Manfred De Koning, G.R. No. 157867,
December 15, 2009.
Writ of preliminary injunction; requisites. For the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and
substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal
right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In this case,
respondents failed to show that they have a right to be protected and that the acts against which
the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right. The records of the case, the Orders of the
trial court and the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals make no mention of respondents’ said
right. In fact, respondents do not deny their indebtedness to EPCIB. Foreclosure is valid where
the debtor is in default in the payment of an obligation. XXX XXX XXX In a real estate mortgage
when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the
mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to
the payment of the obligation. On the face of respondents’ clear admission that they were
unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the mortgages, EPCIB has a clear right
to foreclose the mortgages. We fail to see any reason why the foreclosure of the mortgages
should be enjoined, and the issuance of the preliminary injunction constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. vs. Maria Leticia Fernandez, et al., G.R. No. 163117,
December 18, 2009.
Writ of preliminary injunction; requisites. Indubitably, in the case at bar, the writ of preliminary
injunction was granted by the lower court upon respondent’s showing that he and his poultry
business would be injured by the closure of the subject road. After trial, however, the lower
court found that respondent was not entitled to the easement of right of way prayed for, having
failed to prove the essential requisites for such entitlement, hence, the writ was lifted. The
present case having been heard and found dismissible as it was in fact dismissed, the writ of
preliminary injunction is deemed lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served,
the appeal therefrom notwithstanding. Unionbank vs. Court of Appeals enlightens: “x x x a
dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary
injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction,” regardless of whether the period for filing a motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases
where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does
not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates
automatically on the dismissal of the action.” Purisimo S. Buyco vs. Nelson Baraquia, G.R.
No. 177486, December 21, 2009.
Special Proceedings
Appeal; settlement of estate. In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for
settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30
days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. . . . The appeal period may only
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be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period
expires without an appeal being perfected, the decision or order becomes final, thus: xxx xxx
xxx In the case under consideration, it was on 13 August 1999 that the RTC issued an Amended
Decision. On 12 October 1999, Jaime Robles erroneously filed a notice of appeal instead of
filing a record on appeal. The RTC, in an order dated 22 November 1999, denied this for his
failure to file a record on appeal as required by the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to comply
with the requirements of the rule; hence, the 13 August 1999 Amended Decision of the RTC
lapsed into finality. It was therefore an error for the Court of Appeals to entertain the case
knowing that Jaime Robles’ appeal was not perfected and had lapsed into finality. In the matter
of the Heirship [Intestate Estates] of the late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al., Rene B. Pascual vs.
Jaime M. Robles,G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009.
Appeal; perfection of appeal. This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating
the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the
requirement of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. The reason for rules of this
nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays
would result, without rules governing practice. Public policy and sound practice demand that
judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.
Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial
functions. Thus, we have held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
reglementary period is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional. Just as a losing party has the
privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Failure to meet the requirements of an
appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. There are exceptions
to this rule, unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that would justify the
relaxation of said rule. In the matter of the Heirship [Intestate Estates] of the late Hermogenes
Rodriguez, et al., Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009.
Correction of entry under Rule 108; marriage. In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has
no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by
which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated
therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
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misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be
allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to
nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn
Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to
a DNA test. Ma. Cristina Torres Braza, et al. vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros
Occidental, et al., G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009.
Correction of entry; marriage. Petitioners insist that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of
Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which
causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect
on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be
filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo. Ma. Cristina Torres Braza, et al.
vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. 181174,
December 4, 2009.
Other Proceedings
Derivative suit; appraisal right. It bears to point out that every derivative suit is necessarily
grounded on an alleged violation by the board of directors of its fiduciary duties, committed by
mismanagement, misrepresentation, or fraud, with the latter two situations already implying bad
faith. If the Court upholds the position of respondents Miguel, et al. – that the existence of
mismanagement, misrepresentation, fraud, and/or bad faith renders the right of appraisal
unavailable – it would give rise to an absurd situation. Inevitably, appraisal rights would be
unavailable in any derivative suit. This renders the requirement in Rule 8, Section 1(3) of the
[Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies] superfluous and effectively
inoperative; and in contravention of an elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be
given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute, and that a statute should be so
interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative or superfluous. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs.
Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Derivative suit; separate derivative suit. With the corporation as the real party-in-interest and the
indispensable party, any ruling in one of the derivative suits should already bind the corporation
as res judicata in the other. Allowing two different minority stockholders to institute separate
derivative suits arising from the same factual background, alleging the same causes of action,
and praying for the same reliefs, is tantamount to allowing the corporation, the real party-in-
interest, to file the same suit twice, resulting in the violation of the rules against a multiplicity of
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suits and even forum-shopping. It is also in disregard of the separate-corporate-entity principle,
because it is to look beyond the corporation and to give recognition to the different identities of
the stockholders instituting the derivative suits. It is for these reasons that the derivative suit,
Civil Case No. 08-458, although filed by a different set of minority stockholders from those in
Civil Case No. 07-610, should still not be allowed to proceed. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs.
Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Derivative suit; class suits. A shareholder’s derivative suit seeks to recover for the benefit of the
corporation and its whole body of shareholders when injury is caused to the corporation that
may not otherwise be redressed because of failure of the corporation to act. Thus, ‘the action is
derivative, i.e., in the corporate right, if the gravamen of the complaint is injury to the
corporation, or to the whole body of its stock and property without any severance or distribution
among individual holders, or it seeks to recover assets for the corporation or to prevent the
dissipation of its assets.’ [Citations.]” (Jones, supra, 1 Cal.3d 93, 106, 81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d
464.) In contrast, “a direct action [is one] filed by the shareholder individually (or on behalf of
a class of shareholders to which he or she belongs) for injury to his or her interest as
a shareholder. … [¶] … [T]he two actions are mutually exclusive: i.e., the right of action and
recovery belongs to either the shareholders (direct action) *651 or the corporation (derivative
action).”
Based on allegations in the Complaint of Miguel, et al., in Civil Case No. 07-610, the Court
determines that there is only a derivative suit, based on the devices and schemes employed by
the PRCI Board of Directors that amounts to mismanagement, misrepresentation, fraud, and bad
faith. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Derivative suits; mootness. That a court will not sit for the purpose of trying moot cases and
spend its time in deciding questions, the resolution of which cannot in any way affect the rights
of the person or persons presenting them, is well settled. Where the issues have become moot
and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same
of no practical use or value.
The Resolution dated 26 September 2006 of the PRCI Board of Directors was approved and
ratified by the stockholders, holding 74% of the outstanding capital stock in PRCI, during the
Special Stockholders’ Meeting held on 7 November 2006.
Respondents Miguel, et al., instituted Civil Case No. 07-610 only on 10 July 2007, against
herein petitioners Santiago Sr., Santiago Jr., Solomon, and Robles, together with Renato de Villa,
Lim Teong Leong, Lawrence Lim Swee Lin, Tham Ka Hon, and Dato Surin Upatkoon, in their
capacity as directors of PRCI and/or JTH. Clearly, the acquisition by PRCI of JTH and the
constitution of the JTH Board of Directors are no longer just the acts of the majority of the PRCI
Board of Directors, but also of the majority of the PRCI stockholders. By ratification, even an
unauthorized act of an agent becomes the authorized act of the principal. To declare the
Resolution dated 26 September 2006 of the PRCI Board of Directors null and void will serve no
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practical use or value, or affect any of the rights of the parties, because the Resolution dated 7
November 2006 of the PRCI stockholders — approving and ratifying said acquisition and the
manner in which PRCI shall constitute the JTH Board of Directors — will still remain valid and
binding. Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al./Santiago Cua, Sr., et al. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 181455-56/G.R. No. 182008, December 4, 2009.
Rehabilitation proceedings; labor claims. Labor claims are included among the actions
suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employer-corporations.
This Court notes that PD 902-A itself does not provide for the duration of the automatic stay.
Neither does the Order of the SEC. Hence, the suspensive effect has no time limit and remains
in force as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Order. Gina M.
Tiangco and Salvacion Jenny Manego vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. and Jimmy
Gow, G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009.
Rehabilitation proceedings; stay order. Petitioners seek to have the suspension of proceedings
lifted on the ground that the SEC already approved respondent USWCI’s [second amendment to
the rehabilitation plan]. However, there is no legal ground to do so because the suspensive
effect of the stay order is not time-bound. As we held in Rubberworld, it continues to be in effect
as long as reasonably necessary to accomplish its purpose. This is clarified in the Interim
Rules. Gina M. Tiangco and Salvacion Jenny Manego vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc.
and Jimmy Gow, G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009.
Writ of Amparo; coverage. The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right to
liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject Hold
Departure Order, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. vs. Manalo et al., made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to threats thereof
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his
right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparobecause the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. The Court is
thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the
Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security. Revs.
Father Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009.
Writ of Amparo; coverage. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to
another. As we have stated in Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, “xxx a person’s right to travel is
subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.” Here, the restriction on
petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against
him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired
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in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty
and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Revs. Father
Robert P. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009
Writ of Amparo; nature of remedy. This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a
protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and
security. It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather,
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated
in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand,
refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement
in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary
goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty
and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique
situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures
necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and
procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too,
as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate. Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National Police [PNP], et al. vs. Mary Jean B. Tagitis, herein
represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr. attorney-in-fact, G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.
Writ of Amparo; nature of remedy. Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive
laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not
powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate “rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose,
constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty
and security. Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
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disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and
thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even if
only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have
had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any
issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an
issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws.
Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who
is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations,
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at
disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court
when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The second is to
address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and
security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing
efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is
fully addressed by the complete determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by
the production of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty
parties. Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National Police [PNP], et al. vs. Mary Jean
B. Tagitis, herein represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr. attorney-in-fact, G.R. No. 182498.
December 3, 2009.
Evidence
Admission; language. Shrimp Specialists maintains that the provision “to inform in advance in
case the same checks cannot be deposited for failure to replace the defective feeds” clearly
shows that Fuji admitted that the feeds delivered were defective, otherwise, there would be no
reason to include the statement in an agreement that merely acknowledged receipt of the checks.
On the other hand, Fuji asserts that the statement is too ambiguous to be considered an
admission that Fuji delivered defective feeds to Shrimp Specialists when there is evidence to
support the contrary.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the statement “to inform in advance in case the same checks
cannot be deposited for failure to replace the defective feeds” is not expressed in definite,
certain and unequivocal language that Fuji admitted to delivering defective feeds. The CA also
ruled that to be an admission of any breach of warranty, the evidence must be clear and
convincing. The CA pointed out that the inspection and discovery of the alleged defective feeds
were made as early as March 1989 while the feeds subject of this case were delivered to Shrimp
Specialists only from 3 June to 24 July 1989. Shrimp Specialist, Inc. vs. Fuji-Triumph Agri-
Industrial Corporation/Fuji-Trimph Agri-Industrial Corporation vs. Shrimp Specialist, Inc., et
al. G.R. No. 168756/G.R. No. 171476. December 7, 2009.
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Best evidence; receipt. In order to discredit the claim of ownership by SMP, petitioner questions
the admissibility of the receipt presented by the former, wherein the ownership was reserved for
the buyer until after full payment of the purchase price. Petitioner claims that the same was
inadmissible in evidence and was in contravention of the best evidence rule. We beg to disagree.
The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to
prove a disputed fact. Although there are certain recognized exceptions when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioner’s contention, the receipt
presented by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the triplicate copy of the
provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other copies of the same receipt
involving the same transaction. Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides: “Sec.
4. Original of document. — (a) The original of the document is one the contents of which are
the subject of inquiry. (b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals. (c) When
an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.” Bank of the
Philippine Islands as successor-in-interest of Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. SMP,
Inc., G.R. No. 175466, December 23, 2009.
Burden of proof; invalidity of foreclosure proceedings. We are in complete accord with the
appellate court’s ruling that the dearth of evidence presented by petitioners inevitably failed to
establish their claim that DBP did not comply with the statutory requirements on the
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages. As plaintiffs before the trial court, petitioners rested the
burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence the numerous causes of action they brought
against herein respondents. Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 1
of Rule 133, unequivocally provides: XXX XXX XXX Petitioners are adamant, however, that it
was incumbent upon respondents to prove their denial of petitioners’ claims; i.e., foreclosure
proceedings were validly conducted consistent with Act No. 3135. We disagree. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The burden of
proof that foreclosure proceedings on the subject properties were not validly conducted lies
with mortgagor-party litigant claiming such. We have consistently applied the ancient rule that if
a plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to
prove his exception or defense. Resort Hotels Corporation, Rodolfo M. Cuenca Investment
Corporation vs. Development Bank of the Philippines and SM Investment Corp.,G.R. No.
180439, December 23, 2009.
Burden of proof; reversion proceedings – At the outset, petitioner argues that the burden to
prove that the lands in question are alienable and disposable is upon respondents. The argument
is out of line. This case is not a land registration proceeding but involves reversion of lands
already registered in the names of respondents. At this stage, it would be reasonable to presume
that respondents had established that the properties are alienable and disposable considering
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that they have already succeeded in obtaining free patents and OCTs over the properties. In this
reversion proceeding, premised on the claim that the property is foreshore land or that the
patents were obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, the burden is now upon petitioner to
prove such allegations. Republic of the Philippines vs. Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon, G.R.
No. 161424, December 23, 2009.
Electronic copy; probative value. Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of
registered titles through the cancellation of the original title and the others that emanate from it,
the State bears a heavy burden of proving the ground for its action. Here, the Republic fails to
discharge such burden. For one, it failed to present the original or a certified true copy of LC
[Land Classification] Map 47 but only its electronic reproduction, which has no probative value.
The Court held in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines that a mere
photocopy of an LC Map is not a competent evidence of the existence of such map. While
evidence is admissible when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, as in this case, there is a need to present a certified copy of it issued
by the public officer having custody of the document to prove its contents. The Republic of
course claims that its version of LC Map 47 should be regarded as the original itself because it
was the official copy of the region furnished by the National Mapping and Resources Inventory
Authority where the original is kept. But, as admitted by Crisanto Galo, the Land Evaluation
Coordinator for DENR Region XI, the copy they presented was neither marked nor certified as a
reproduction of the original. Hence, it cannot be considered as an official copy, more so an
original copy. Republic of the Philippines vs. Development Resources Corp., et al., G.R. No.
180218, December 18, 2009.
Findings of administrative agency; weight. This Court shares the view of the RTC. It is
undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government agency tasked with
the survey of lands, and thus, more weight should be given to the documents relating to its
official tasks which are presumed to be done in the ordinary course of business. Between a
geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the conclusion is inevitable that it is the former’s
certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of
abuse of discretion. As correctly observed by respondent and the RTC, the duty of provincial
and municipal assessors is primarily the assessment of taxes and not the survey of
lands. Barangay Sangalang, represented by its Chairman Dante C. Marcellana vs. Barangay
Maguihan, represented by its Chairman Arnulfo Villarez, G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009.
Fraud; presumption. We likewise agree with the CA that petitioner was not able to establish that
fraud or misrepresentation attended the application for free patents. In the same way that
petitioner has the burden of proving that Lot No. 8617 is a foreshore land, petitioner, as the
party alleging that fraud and misrepresentation vitiated the application for free patents, also
bears the burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation are never presumed, but must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence; mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate. To
show that there was fraud, petitioner insists that the three lots do not appear in the cadastral
map of Barangay Nonong Castro, which allegedly indicates that they were not cadastrally
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surveyed. This is manifestly untrue as the said cadastral map of Lemery Cadastre, Cad. 511,
Case 22, clearly includes and indicates the locations of Lot Nos. 8617, 9398 and 9675.
Petitioner also cites discrepancies in the description of Lot No. 9398 in the free patent
application and in the technical description in OCT No. P-1127. If true, such discrepancies
would not necessarily imply that respondents employed fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining
the free patent. After all, there was no proof that the lot referred to in the free patent application
was different from the lot described in OCT No. P-1127. Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ignacio Leonor and Catalino Razon, G.R. No. 161424, December 23, 2009.
Hearsay; inadmissibility. We cannot subscribe to the CA’s computation of RHC’s indebtedness
to DBP which was pegged at P612,476,182.08, inclusive of interest. The CA set aside the RTC’s
holding thereon and based its finding on the Statement of Total Claim prepared by DBP. These
documents show that RHC’s deficiency balance as of August 31, 2002, after deducting the total
purchase price of the subject properties and the insurance proceeds plus the corresponding
interest computed at 21% per annum from 1984 to August 21, 2002, is P612,476,182.08.
However, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, these documents are inadmissible and
constitute hearsay evidence because the persons who prepared the documents were not
presented in court and subjected to cross-examination. Resort Hotels Corporation, Rodolfo M.
Cuenca Investment Corporation vs. Development Bank of the Philippines and SM Investment
Corp.,G.R. No. 180439, December 23, 2009.
Notarized document; presumption. Petitioners seem to have overlooked the fact that the deed
of donation inter vivos is a notarized document. According to Section 30, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, “every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.” A notarial document
is evidence of the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima
facie presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence must be
presented to overcome such legal presumption.
In the instant case, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the above
presumption. The only evidence offered by petitioners to impugn the deed of donation inter
vivos was the testimony of petitioner Elisa, wherein she stated that the contents of the deed
could not have been true, given that petitioners inherited the subject property from Victoria
Mendoza, the daughter of Ignacio with his first wife Juana. Such testimony was utterly lacking.
Furthermore, the Court finds nothing wrong and/or unusual in the fact that the deed of
donation inter vivos was produced and made known to petitioners only in the early part of the
year 2006 or more than sixty (60) years after its execution. Understandably, it was only when
petitioners claimed ownership of a portion of the subject property that respondents were
compelled to assert their own title to the property, which they traced to the deed of
donation inter vivos. Herminio M. Gutierrez, et al. vs. Flora Mendoza-Plaza, et al., G.R. No.
185477, December 4, 2009.
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Writ of Amparo; evidence. These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of
substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of
evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the
framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required – the
duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the
extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent
handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove
the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place
under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately
respond. Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National Police [PNP], et al. vs. Mary Jean
B. Tagitis, herein represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr. attorney-in-fact, G.R. No. 182498.
December 3, 2009.
Writ of Amparo; totality of evidence. The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to
the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of
adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic
minimum test.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence
whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the respondent,
Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person not on the
witness stand (the informant). To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible
evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively suggest
– that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind,
an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule –
despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are
unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to
make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide
effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently,
we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances
with the flexibility that these difficulties demand. To give full meaning to our Constitution and
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the rights it protects, we hold that, as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the
available evidence to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those
usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking into account the
surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum
admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim
evidence before us is relevant and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably
consistent with other evidence in the case. Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr., chief, Philippine National
Police [PNP], et al. vs. Mary Jean B. Tagitis, herein represented by Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla, Jr.
attorney-in-fact, G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.
January 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Civil Procedure
Appeal; factual findings of administrative agencies. We stress the settled rule that the findings of
fact of administrative bodies, such as the SEC, will not be interfered with by the courts in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more
weight when affirmed by the CA. They are accorded not only great respect but even finality,
and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily
disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary
conclusion had such evidence been properly appreciated. By reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in
a better position to pass judgment thereon. A review of the petition does not show any reversible
error committed by the appellate court; hence, the petition must be denied. Petitioner failed to
present any argument that would convince the Court that the SEC and the CA made any
misappreciation of the facts and the applicable laws such that their decisions should be
overturned. Catmon Sales International Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator
of Catmon Sales International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of administrative agencies. No matter how hard it tries to learn the
technical intricacies of certain highly regulated human activities, the Supreme Court will always
be inadequately equipped to identify the facts that matter when resolving issues involving such
activities. Invariably, the Court must respect the factual findings of administrative agencies
which have expertise on matters that fall within their jurisdiction. Here, since the HLURB has
the expertise in applying zonal classifications on specific properties and since petitioner GEA
fails to make out a clear case that it has erred, the Court must rely on its finding that respondent
EGI’s land site does not, for the purpose of applying height restrictions, adjoin an R-1
zone. Greenhills East Association, Inc. vs. E. Ganzon, Inc., G.R. No. 169741, January 22, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. In the case at bench, the issues raised by the petitioners
are essentially factual matters, the determination of which are best left to the courts
below. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of
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the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality
when supported by substantial evidence on the record. Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might
conceivably opine otherwise. But to erase any doubt on the correctness of the assailed ruling,
we have carefully perused the records and, nonetheless, arrived at the same conclusion. We
find that there is substantial evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial court’s
conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed of Absolute Sale were
forged. Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et al., G.R. No.
163271, January 15, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted
the findings of fact of the trial court makes the same binding upon this court. In Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that factual findings of the CA which are supported by
substantial evidence are binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. A departure
from this rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings
and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence on
record. There is no ground to apply the exception in the instant case, however, because the
findings and conclusions of the CA are in full accord with those of the trial court. Spouses
Patricio and Myrna Bernales v. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et al., G.R. No. 163271, January 15,
2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. Petitioner likewise faults the CA in giving full credence
to the Sheriff’s Partial Return dated May 5, 2004 stating that respondent DKS had already turned
over possession of subject premises to the government. Suffice it to state, though, that this
matter is factual in nature and is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and considered binding by the Supreme Court subject only to certain
exceptions, none of which is present in this instant petition. This is especially true when the
findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as in this case. Philippine National Bank
v. DKS International, Inc. and Michael Dy, G.R. No. 179161, January 22, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower court. The core issue for our resolution is whether the CA erred
in giving credence to the deed of sale dated April 26, 1982 and in holding that respondents are
the owners of the disputed lots. This Court is not bound to weigh all over again the evidence
adduced by the parties, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate
court coincide. The resolution of factual issues is a function of the trial court whose findings on
these matters are, as a general rule, binding on this Court, more so where these have been
affirmed by the CA. We have thoroughly reviewed the records of this case and agree that the
deed of sale dated April 26, 1982 is a legal and binding document. The testimonies of the
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witnesses to the document attest to the parties freely signing the document and the occurrence
of the transaction in a clear and definite manner. Moreover, it is a notarized document which
renders it a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. In the absence of documents or
testimonies from disinterested persons proving petitioner’s claim of a fictitious sale, there is no
basis to set aside the deed of sale. In petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of this
Court is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court inasmuch as the latter’s findings of fact are deemed conclusive. Given that the facts of this
case, as gleaned from the records, fully support the decision of the trial court and the CA, we
see no valid reason to overturn the findings of the courts below and therefore sustain the
judgment of the appellate court. Bernarda CH. Osmeña vs. Nicasio CH. Osmeña, et al., G.R. No.
171911, January 26, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower court; exception. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a
trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding with, and are not reviewable by us unless the case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions. One of the exceptions is when the findings of fact of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court or quasi-judicial agency. In this case, the findings of fact of
the CA and the DARAB are conflicting, thus we are compelled to take a look at the factual
milieu of this case. Bienvenido T. Buada, et al. vs. Cement Center, Inc., G.R. No. 180374.
January 22, 2010.
Appeal; scope of review. Lastly, petitioner prays in the alternative that respondents be ordered to
pay the monetary award as contained in the RTC decision. We cannot, however, grant such
relief as again, this is beyond our competence in this petition. To reiterate, we are only
confined here to reviewing errors of law allegedly committed by the CA in its assailed
Decision. Such relief should have been sought in the appeal from the main case. Philippine
National Bank vs. DKS International, Inc. and Michael Dy, G.R. No. 179161, January 22, 2010.
Appeal; statutory privilege. The failure to file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and
executory is not a denial of due process. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. Jaime T. Torres vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R.
No. 165408, January 15, 2010.
Certiorari; claim of forum shopping where appeal taken in main case. The Florendos also point
out that a special civil action of certiorari can no longer be resorted to when, as in this case, the
matter raised in such action may be deemed already covered by the appeal that respondent
Paramount had taken from the RTC decision. These two remedies, they argue, are mutually
exclusive and, when instituted, the second constitutes forum shopping. There is no forum
shopping in this case. What respondent Paramount imputes in the certiorari action is the RTC’s
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the execution pending appeal of its decision. In the
ordinary appeal from the main case, what Paramount challenges is the merit of the trial court’s
decision. Rosario T. Florendo vs. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January 21,
2010.
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Certiorari; generally not available to review final judgment on merits. The CA ruled that there
was nothing novel about a petition for certiorari being filed with that court when the act or
omission complained of involved grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction. This Court
must disagree. In determining whether the proper remedy is a special civil action
for certiorari or a petition for review, it is not so much the nature of the question or questions
that would be raised that matters. With very rare exceptions, what is decisive is whether or not
the challenged order is a final order that disposes of the merit of the case. The Court held
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corp. that the remedy
for seeking the reversal or modification of a judgment rendered on the merits of the case is
appeal. This is true even if the error imputed to the officer, body, or tribunal constitutes alleged
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or grave abuse of discretion in making its
or his findings of fact or of law. The Court cannot countenance the blurring of the distinction
between a special civil action for certiorari and a petition for review. [Note: this case involved a
special civil action for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals to question a decision of the Civil
Service Commission] Department of Labor and Employment, et al. vs. Ruben Y Maceda, G.R.
No. 185112, January 18, 2010.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Besides, it cannot be said that the CSC [Commission on
Civil Service] gravely abused its discretion in dismissing respondent Maceda’s complaint. Grave
abuse of discretion exists where the public respondent acts in a manner so patent and gross that
it amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to do what the law enjoins on
him. It is not sufficient that the CA disagreed with the findings of the CSC or considered them in
error; it had to determine that the CSC’s findings had run berserk, prompted by passion and
personal hostility rather than by reason. The CA did not make this determination. (Department
of Labor and Employment, et al. vs. Ruben Y Maceda, G.R. No. 185112, January 18, 2010.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. It is well to remind petitioner that the sole issue raised
before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 88098, is whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it recalled the writ of execution with
break open order. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law. Grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction or to violations
of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It refers also to cases in which, for various
reasons, there has been gross misapprehension of facts. We find that the CA correctly took
notice of the government’s take-over and repossession of the subject property, as these are the
very same facts which the RTC considered to be the reasons why the writ of execution with
break open order it earlier issued cannot anymore be implemented. Without discussing these
issues, the CA would not be able to make a determination whether the recall of the writ of
execution was proper under the circumstances. Such an assessment is imperative because the
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resolution of the issue of whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion hinges on
it. Philippine National Bank vs. DKS International, Inc. and Michael Dy, G.R. No. 179161,
January 22, 2010.
Certiorari; motion for reconsideration. The Florendos argue that the CA should not have taken
cognizance of respondent Paramount’s special civil action of certiorari considering its failure to
first seek the RTC’s reconsideration of its questioned special order. The general rule is of course
that a motion for reconsideration of the challenged order is a prerequisite to the filing of a
special civil action of certiorari in a higher court to annul such order. This gives the lower court
a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. But one of the exceptions to such requirement is
where the matter involved is urgent. Here, the CA correctly dispensed with the requirement
since the RTC had already issued a writ of execution and so its enforcement was
imminent. Besides, the issue of the validity of the execution pending appeal in this case was a
pure question of law. (Rosario T. Florendo vs. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976,
January 21, 2010.
Certiorari; motion for reconsideration. Settled is the rule that a special civil action for certiorari
can prosper only if the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration, so as to allow the lower court to
correct its alleged error. Respondents did not move for the reconsideration of the May 25, 2004
decision of the RTC. Considering that the RTC leniently granted respondents’ motions for
extension to file an answer, it did not render the assailed order and decision arbitrarily by reason
of personal hostility. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, if meritorious, was not
useless. Consequently, the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed outright for
respondent’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration. Juanito Geronimo, et al. vs. The Heirs of
Carlito Geronimo represented by Angelito Geronimo, G.R. No. 169858, January 26, 2010.
Certiorari; period to file. Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001
denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect
a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999
and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8,
1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed
only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day
limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
requires a petition for certiorari to be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution,” or, in case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, “the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of the said motion.” It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is
considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable
delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their
cases. (Eligio P. Mallari vs. Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of
Pampanga, G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010.
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Contempt; application for indirect contempt. Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect
contempt only by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by
a party; or (2) by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against which the contempt is
committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified
petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court against which the contemptuous act is
committed. Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the filing of a verified
petition for contempt is mandatory:
This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing
contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action
under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any
party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without
complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second
paragraph of this amended section. Worse, and as a consequence of unregulated motions for
contempt, said incidents sometimes remain pending for resolution although the main case has
already been decided. There are other undesirable aspects but, at any rate, the same may now
be eliminated by this amendatory procedure.
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a
formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with
full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the
second paragraph of this section.
Clearly, the petitioner’s charging GSIS, et al. with indirect contempt by mere motions was not
permitted by the Rules of Court. (Eligio P. Mallari vs. Government Service Insurance System and
the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga, G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010.
Contempt; filing fees for indirect contempt application. And, secondly, even assuming that
charges for contempt could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should have tendered filing
fees. The need to tender filing fees derived from the fact that the procedure
for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil
action. Yet, the petitioner did not tender and pay filing fees, resulting in the trial court not
acquiring jurisdiction over the action. Truly, the omission to tender filing fees would have also
warranted the dismissal of the charges. It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the
petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt without regard to the requisites of the Rules
of Court simply to vex the adverse party. He thereby disrespected the orderly administration of
justice and committed, yet again, an abuse of procedures. Eligio P. Mallari vs.Government
Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga, G.R. No. 157659, January 25,
2010.
Ejectment; supersedeas bond. Petitioner next contends that the writ of execution with break
open order was abruptly recalled without respondents complying with the mandatory
requirements of Sec. 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner stresses that in order to stay
the immediate execution of a judgment in an ejectment case while an appeal is pending, the
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defendant must perfect his appeal, file a supersedeas bond and periodically deposit the rentals
which became due during the pendency of the appeal. But despite the failure of respondents to
post the required supersedeas bond, the CA still affirmed the recall of the issuance of the writ of
execution with break open order. Petitioner’s contention fails to persuade us. Sec. 19, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court is not applicable in this case. In Uy v. Santiago, we held that it is only the
execution of the MeTC or Municipal Trial Courts’ judgment pending appeal with the RTC which
may be stayed by compliance with the requisites provided in Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. This can be deduced from the wordings of the subject provision, to wit:
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.- If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved
by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time
to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value
of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate
determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding
month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is
appealed. XXX XXX XXX
This is not the situation here. Respondents are not staying the execution of the judgment of the
MeTC pending appeal to the RTC as the latter court, in fact, had already rendered its judgment
on the appeal. Clearly, the above-quoted provision does not find any application in the present
petition. Philippine National Bank vs. DKS International, Inc. and Michael Dy, G.R. No. 179161,
January 22, 2010.
Execution; recall of writ of execution with break open order. This, notwithstanding a review of
the record, nevertheless shows that the CA was correct in holding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the order which recalled
the writ of execution with break open order. By virtue of the Decisions of the MeTC and the
RTC which both ruled in favor of petitioner in the subject forcible entry case, petitioner was
indeed, as a matter of right, entitled to a writ of execution pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of execution with break open in
the dispositive portion of its March 10, 2004 Decision. But before said writ could be
implemented, inescapable material facts and circumstances were brought to the attention of the
RTC. The respondents had already surrendered possession of the subject premises to the
government. Clearly, the portion of the Decision ordering respondents to vacate the subject
property and peacefully surrender possession thereof to petitioner has become impossible to
implement. For how can respondents surrender possession of the premises when they were no
longer in possession? And, as correctly observed by the RTC, it would be a misstep if the
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government which is admittedly the owner of the subject property and which was not a party to
the ejectment case, would be ordered to vacate the same in order that possession thereof may
be delivered to petitioner. We thus hold that under these circumstances, the recall of the writ of
execution with break open order was warranted. (Philippine National Bank vs. DKS International,
Inc. and Michael Dy, G.R. No. 179161, January 22, 2010.
Execution pending appeal. What is more, on October 28, 2008 the CA decided in the main case
to reverse and set aside the decision of the RTC, dismiss the Florendos’ complaint, and order the
issuance of new titles to the lands in the name of respondent Paramount. Assuming that such
decision has not yet become final, the RTC decision subject of execution pending appeal has
nonetheless already lost its presumptive validity. This development gives the Court all the more
reason to affirm the CA decision subject of the present petition. Rosario T. Florendo
vs. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January 21, 2010.
Execution pending appeal; posting of bond. Lastly, the Florendos’ posting of a P4 million bond
to answer for the damages that respondent Paramount might suffer in case the RTC decision is
reversed on appeal is quite insufficient. The lands had a market value of P42 million in
2001. Rosario T. Florendo vs. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January 21, 2010.
Execution pending appeal; requirement of “special and good reasons”. The Florendos insist that
the CA erred in rejecting as reasonable basis for execution pending appeal a) Rosario’s old age,
given that precedents exist for such justification; b) respondent Paramount’s delaying tactics and
its possible insolvency; and c) the P4 million bond that the Florendos posted. Normally,
execution will issue as a matter of right only (a) when the judgment has become final and
executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; (c) when
the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or (d) when, having been
filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court
of origin. Execution pending appeal is the exception to the general rule. As such exception, the
court’s discretion in allowing it must be strictly construed and firmly grounded on the existence
of good reasons. “Good reasons,” it has been held, consist of compelling circumstances that
justify immediate execution lest the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be
superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing party secure a
reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of execution pending appeal, instead of
an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity. The Florendos point
out that Rosario is already in her old age and suffers from life threatening ailments. But the trial
court has allowed execution pending appeal for all of the Florendos, not just for Rosario whose
share in the subject lands had not been established. No claim is made that the rest of the
Florendos are old and ailing. Consequently, the execution pending appeal was indiscreet and
too sweeping. All the lands could be sold for P42 million, the value mentioned in the petition,
and distributed to all the Florendos for their enjoyment with no sufficient assurance that they all
will and can return such sum in case the CA reverses, as it has in fact done, the RTC
decision. Moreover, it is unclear how much of the proceeds of the sale of the lands Rosario
needed for her old age. The RTC also justified the execution pending appeal on respondent
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Paramount’s delaying tactics and the possibility that it could become insolvent during the
appeal. But these justifications are purely speculative. The RTC has already decided the case
and whether the proceedings on appeal will be delayed is not in the hands of Paramount. The
CA has control of the time elements in appealed cases. As for the Florendos’ fear of
Paramount’s insolvency, such is wholly irrelevant since the judgment did not require it to pay
them any form of damages. Indeed, the Florendos are the ones required by the RTC to
reimburse Paramount the value of its bid and the amounts of real estate taxes that it had paid on
the properties. Rosario T. Florendo vs. Paramount Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 167976, January
21, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; computation of period. Anent the redemption of property
sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale made pursuant to the special power referred to in
Section 1 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the debtor, his successor-in-interest, or any judicial
creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold has the right to
redeem the property at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale,
such redemption to be governed by the provisions of Section 464 to Section 466 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, to the extent that said provisions were not inconsistent with the
provisions of Act 3135. In this regard, we clarify that the redemption period envisioned under
Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of the registration of the sale, not from and after the date of
the sale, as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although the original Rules of Court (effective on July 1,
1940) incorporated Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as its Section 25
(Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and Section 27 (Section 466) of Rule 39, with Section
27 still expressly reckoning the redemption period to be “at any time within twelve months after
the sale;” and although the Revised Rules of Court (effective on January 1, 1964) continued to
provide in Section 30 of Rule 39 that the redemption be made from the purchaser “at any time
within twelve (12) months after the sale,” the 12-month period of redemption came to be held
as beginning “to run not from the date of the sale but from the time of registration of the sale in
the Office of the Register of Deeds.” This construction was due to the fact that the sheriff’s sale
of registered (and unregistered) lands did not take effect as a conveyance, or did not bind the
land, until the sale was registered in the Register of Deeds. Desiring to avoid any confusion
arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of Court(1940 and 1964) and Act No.
3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying the reckoning of the redemption period in
judicial sales of real property, on the other hand, the Court has incorporated in Section 28 of
Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1997) the foregoing judicial
construction of reckoning the redemption period from the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale, to wit:
Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be
given and filed. — The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the
purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of
sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month
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interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any
assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on
such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior
lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made,
the amount of such other lien, with interest. XXX XXX XXX.
Accordingly, the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must redeem the foreclosed
property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds in order to
avoid the title from consolidating in the purchaser. By failing to redeem thuswise, the mortgagor
loses all interest over the foreclosed property. The purchaser, who has a right to possession that
extends beyond the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the
property when no redemption is made, that it is no longer necessary for the purchaser to file the
bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, considering that the possession of
the land becomes his absolute right as the land’s confirmed owner. Eligio P. Mallari
vs. Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga, G.R. No.
157659, January 25, 2010.
Forum-shopping. By forum shopping, a party initiates two or more actions in separate tribunals,
grounded on the same cause, trusting that one or the other tribunal would favorably dispose of
the matter. The elements of forum shopping are the same as in litis pendentia where the final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum shopping
are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration. Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida
involved different causes of action and sought different reliefs. The present civil action that she
filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the property based on Evelina and Aida’s
failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused the two of
misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own benefit. Her complaint
for dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB sought to dispossess the two for
allegedly cutting coconut trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut
Authority. The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela
sought the placing of the properties under receivership in all of them. But receivership is not an
action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its
purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount
to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy
will still depend on the need for it in the particular action. Evelina G. Chavez, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals and Atty. Fidela Y. Vargas,G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010.
Judgments; doctrine of immutability. A judgment that has become final and executory is
immutable and unalterable; the judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
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and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or
by the highest Court of the land. While there are recognized exceptions – e.g., the correction of
clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its
execution unjust and inequitable – none of these exceptions apply to the present
case. Litigation must at some time end, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy
dictates that once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing
party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role and purpose of
the courts to resolve justiciable controversies with finality. In the present case, the lapse of the
period for appeal rendered the RTC without any jurisdiction to entertain, much less grant, the
plaintiffs-respondents’ appeal from the final and immutable MCTC judgment. This very basic
legal reality would forever be lost if we allow the CA to dismiss the defendants-petitioners’
appeal outright on the basis of a technicality that, after all, has been substantially complied
with. Sps. Heber & Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto & Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360,
January 21, 2010.
Mandamus; nature and grounds. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of
competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ
is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the
remedy, and clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the
performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is a proper recourse for
citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty,
most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted
provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to give to
the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection
raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is
meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
[a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded
petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the
part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a
clear l egal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to
perform the act required. Uy Kiao Eng vs. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010.
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Mandamus; nature. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus
cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce
purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless
some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. The writ of mandamus lies to
enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly,
issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a
prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle
followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In
other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and
forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus
is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed,
the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court. Uy Kiao Eng
vs. Nixon Lee, G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010.
Parties; misjoinder not ground for dismissal. Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal
of the action. Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court clearly provides: “Sec.
11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with
separately.” It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property, was
issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by the record, and petitioners themselves
admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-75454, allegedly issued in favor of Littie Sarah,
and the purported deed of sale, allegedly executed by Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not
on record. Considering the allegations in the pleadings, it is best that a trial on the merits be
conducted. We fully agree with the apt and judicious ruling of the CA, when it said:
“As the former owner of the subject property, the same having been titled in her name under
TCT No. T-56923, Dorotea Cariaga Bonete, being the real party [in] interest, has the legal
capacity to file the instant case for reconveyance and annulment of deed of sale. The complaint
was filed by the [respondents] precisely to question the issuance of TCT No. T-75454 in the
name of Littie Sarah Agdeppa as the transaction allegedly contemplated was only to secure
Dorotea’s loan. Why the property became the subject of the deed of sale which is being
disputed by Dorotea should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits in order to afford
the contending parties their respective days in court. As held in Del Bros. Hotel Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 33, the complaint is not supposed to contain evidentiary matters as
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case.” Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa, et
al. vs. Heirs of Ignacio Benete, represented by Doroteo Bonete, et al., G.R. No. 164436. January
15, 2010.
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Petition for relief; remedy for allegations of counsel’s mistake or inexcusable negligence. Further,
the proper remedy for allegations of mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel, which
prevented a party from taking an appeal, is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court. The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final
order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment
or final order was entered. It must be filed within the reglementary period, which is reckoned
from the time the party’s counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the
decision is notice to the party. Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and
executory and Entry of Judgment was issued on November 30, 2001, the Decision can no longer
be reviewed by this Court. Hence, the third and fourth issues raised need not be
discussed. Jaime T. Torres vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal construction. A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations
involving excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not subvert the essence
of the proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
Rules. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn
adherence to procedure would result in the sacrifice of substantial justice for technicality. To
deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims over the subject property on the
strength of sheer technicality would be a travesty of justice and equity. Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa,
et al. vs. Heirs of Ignacio Benete, represented by Doroteo Bonete, et al., G.R. No. 164436.
January 15, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal construction. An appeal to the CA from an RTC Decision rendered in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is via a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 42 prescribes the following
requirements: XXX XXX XXX. Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the Petition, pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule, which
reads: XXX XXX XXX. In not a few cases, we have ruled that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process; it is a mere statutory privilege that may be exercised only
in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of law allowing the appeal. The
party who seeks to appeal must comply with the requirements of the law and the rules; failure to
comply leads to the dismissal and the loss of the right to appeal. But while we have so ruled,
we recognize nonetheless that the right to appeal is an essential part of our system of judicial
processes, and courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal. We invariably made this recognition due to our overriding concern that every party-
litigant be given the amplest opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities. This line of rulings is based, no less, on the Rules of Court
which itself calls for a liberal construction of its provisions, with the objective of securing for the
parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In this line of
rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. The
law and jurisprudence grant to courts – in the exercise of their discretion along the lines laid
down by this Court – the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the
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most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard. Sps. Heber & Charlita
Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto & Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal construction. A commonality and the weightier reason (although not so
given this characterization) behind our rulings in these cited cases is the lack of merit of the
respective petitioners’ underlying cases. In both cases, we took into account the relative merits
of the parties’ cases and found that a liberal interpretation, applied to the interlocutory issues
before us, would be for naught because the petitioners’ underlying cases clearly lacked
merit. As we ruled then, so do we rule now. We assess, albeit preliminarily, if the appeal is
meritorious on its face and relax the applicable rule of procedure only after a prima facie finding
of merit. That there was substantial compliance with the Rules because the background facts
can be found within the four corners of the petition and its incorporated annexes, is not a novel
ruling for this Court. In the case of Deloso v. Marapao (involving the same deficiency for lack of
a specific and separate statement of facts outlining the factual background relied upon), we said:
An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals reveals that while it does not
contain a separate section on statement of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in
the petition particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the decision of the
DARAB which contains the facts of the case was attached to the petition and was even quoted
by the appellate court. The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the
DARAB in its assailed decision.
There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is
settled that liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations where there may be
some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not
subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
with the Rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
they are used only to help secure substantial justice.
Given this precedent, it only remains for us to determine if we can apply a liberal construction
of the Rules because a meaningful litigation of the case can ensue given the Petition’s prima
facie merit. Sps. Heber & Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto & Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No.
188360, January 21, 2010.
Receivership. In any event, we hold that the CA erred in granting receivership over the property
in dispute in this case. For one thing, a petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger
of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its
object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such
protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership. Here Fidela’s main gripe is that
Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim that the
land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor
does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and
preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme
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situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed, in none of
the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her. Besides,
the RTC dismissed Fidela’s action for lack of jurisdiction over the case, holding that the issues it
raised properly belong to the DARAB. The case before the CA is but an offshoot of that RTC
case. Given that the RTC has found that it had no jurisdiction over the case, it would seem
more prudent for the CA to first provisionally determine that the RTC had jurisdiction before
granting receivership which is but an incident of the main action. Evelina G. Chavez, et al.
vs.Court of Appeals and Atty. Fidela Y. Vargas, G.R. No. 174356, January 20, 2010.
Summary judgment; appropriate where there is no genuine issue of fact. A summary judgment is
apt when the essential facts of the case are uncontested or the parties do not raise any genuine
issue of fact. Here, to resolve the issue of the excessive charges allegedly incorporated into the
auction bid price, the RTC simply had to look at a) the pleadings of the parties; b) the loan
agreements, the promissory note, and the real estate mortgages between them; c) the foreclosure
and bidding documents; and d) the admissions and other disclosures between the parties during
pre-trial. Since the parties admitted not only the existence, authenticity, and genuine execution
of these documents but also what they stated, the trial court did not need to hold a trial for the
reception of the evidence of the parties. BPI contends that a summary judgment was not proper
given the following issues that the parties raised: 1) whether or not the loan agreements between
them were valid and enforceable; 2) whether or not the Yus have a cause of action against BPI;
3) whether or not the Yus are proper parties in interest; 4) whether or not the Yus are estopped
from questioning the foreclosure proceeding after entering into a compromise agreement with
Magnacraft; 5) whether or not the penalty charges and fees and expenses of litigation and
publication are excessive; and 6) whether or not BPI violated the Truth in Lending Act. But
these are issues that could be readily resolved based on the facts established by the pleadings
and the admissions of the parties. Indeed, BPI has failed to name any document or item of fact
that it would have wanted to adduce at the trial of the case. A trial would have been such a
great waste of time and resources. Bank of the Philippines Islands, Inc. vs. Sps. Norman and
Angelina Yu, et al., G.R. No. 184122, January 20, 2010.
Summary procedure; effect of filing prohibited motion for reconsideration. According to the
defendants-petitioners, the plaintiffs-respondents’ filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
MCTC judgment did not stop the running of the period for appeal since a motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under the RRSP. We agree with the defendants-
petitioners. Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases belongs to the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The RRSP [Revised Rules of Summary Procedure] applies to
prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases; to achieve this end, the filing of certain
pleadings – a motion for reconsideration, among others – is prohibited. Specifically, Section
19(c) of the Rules of Summary Procedure and Section 13(c) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
consider a motion for reconsideration of a judgment a prohibited pleading. Thus, when the
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plaintiffs-respondents filed on June 5, 2007 a Motion for Reconsideration of the MCTC Judgment,
the motion did not stop the running of the period for appeal. With the continuous running of this
period, the May 23, 2007 MCTC judgment (which the plaintiffs-respondents received through
counsel on May 31, 2007) had long lapsed to finality when the plaintiffs-respondents filed their
Notice of Appeal on July 30, 2007. Sps. Heber & Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto & Desideria
Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010.
Writ of possession; nature and instances of issuance. We sustain the CA, and confirm that the
petitioner, as defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act 3135, as amended, and its
pertinent jurisprudence to any prior notice of the application for the issuance of the writ of
possession. A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of
real property, may be issued in: (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No.
496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and
no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure
of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. Eligio P. Mallari vs.Government Service Insurance System and the Provincial
Sheriff of Pampanga, G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010.
Writ of possession; nature of proceedings for issuance. The consolidation of ownership in the
purchaser’s name and the issuance to him of a new TCT then entitles him to demand possession
of the property at any time, and the issuance of a writ of possession to him becomes a matter of
right upon the consolidation of title in his name. The court can neither halt nor hesitate to issue
the writ of possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to determine whether or not to issue the
writ, for the issuance of the writ to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a
ministerial function. XXX XXX XXX. The proceeding upon an application for a writ of
possession is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and
without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted
even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is
sought. Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the
application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious proceeding. It is clear from
the foregoing that a non-redeeming mortgagor like the petitioner had no more right to challenge
the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession upon the ex parteapplication of
GSIS. He could not also impugn anymore the extrajudicial foreclosure, and could not undo the
consolidation in GSIS of the ownership of the properties covered by TCT No. 284272-R and
TCT No. 284273-R, which consolidation was already irreversible. Hence, his moves against
the writ of execution cum writ of possession were tainted by bad faith, for he was only too
aware, being his own lawyer, of the dire consequences of his non-redemption within the period
provided by law for that purpose. Eligio P. Mallari vs. Government Service Insurance System
and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga, G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010.
Special Proceedings
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Mandamus; unavailable where other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is available (e.g.,
allowance of will). In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the
obligation involved here—the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a
public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent
Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the
production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not
prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same
is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of
the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be
in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the
original holographic will. Thus—
SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall,
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the
court having jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a
will shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty
(20) days after he knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the
death of the testator, present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has
reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in
writing his acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall
be fined not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the
death of the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered
so to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he
delivers the will.
There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state
that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the
demurrer. Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon Lee,G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010.
Other proceedings
Appeal; effect of failure to appeal. For his part, respondent prayed in his Comment that, in
addition to his liquidation fee already awarded in his favor, his claim for reimbursement of
administrative expenses be granted. We answer in the negative. This Court’s ruling in Coca-
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia is instructive: “It is well-settled that a party who has not
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appealed from a decision cannot seek any relief other than what is provided in the judgment
appealed from. An appellee who has himself not appealed may not obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below. The
appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant’s
claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if
such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors in
turn may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other
grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor
and giving him other reliefs.” As aptly observed by the CA, respondent did not appeal the SEC
decision. Thus, the decision of the CA on the amount due the respondent has become final as
to him, and can no longer be reviewed, much less be reversed, by this Court. Catmon Sales
International Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator of Catmon Sales
International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010.
Appeal; perfection of administrative appeal. Petitioner GEA contends that it had already
perfected its appeal when it filed on November 20, 2001 a notice of appeal with the OP from
the decision of the HLURB. The Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to the Office of the
President of the Philippines requires the appellant to file, not only a notice of appeal, but also a
memorandum on appeal that must, among other things, state the grounds relied on for the
appeal, the issues involved, and the reliefs sought. The appellant must, to perfect his appeal,
comply with these requirements within 15 days from receipt of a copy of the HLURB
decision. Petitioner GEA, however, failed to submit an appeal memorandum. Still, the OP
actually gave petitioner GEA a chance to comply with the omitted requirement by directing it in
the Order of November 27, 2001 to submit its appeal memorandum and draft decision within
15 days from notice; otherwise, it would dismiss the case. Since GEA received the above order
on December 12, 2001, it had until December 27, 2001 within which to comply with
it. Petitioner GEA points out that it filed two successive motions for extension of time within
which to file the required memorandum appeal and draft decision. Since GEA had already filed
its memorandum appeal before the OP could deny those motions, it cannot be said that GEA
filed the memorandum appeal out of time. But petitioner GEA gambled when it did not file the
memorandum appeal and draft decision within the extra 15 days that the OP gave it. It asked
first for an extension of 15 days and then an additional extension of five days. GEA had no right
to assume, however, that the OP would grant these extensions. The governing rules did not
provide for them. Consequently, GEA has only itself to blame when its appeal was
dismissed. Notably, the OP also required petitioner GEA to file, along with its memorandum
appeal, a draft decision. GEA did not. It instead filed two more motions for extension of time
within which to do so. Section 5 of the Rules of that office provides that failure to comply with
its orders may warrant a dismissal of the appeal. Consequently, the OP acted within its
authority in dismissing GEA’s appeal for this additional reason. Greenhills East Association, Inc.
vs. E. Ganzon, Inc., G.R. No. 169741, January 22, 2010.
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Appeal in election cases; payment of appeal fee. As Aguilar stated and COMELEC Resolution No.
8654 reiterated, the payment of the PhP 1,000 appeal fee within five days from the
promulgation of the Regional Trial Court or MTC decision technically “perfects” the appeal from
the trial court’s decision. Such appeal is not dismissible as a matter of course on account alone
of the inadequate payment or nonpayment of the filing fee of PhP 3,200. The legal situation,
however, changes if the appellant, in the words of Resolution No. 8654, fails, as directed, to pay
the amount within 15 days from receipt of notice from the COMELEC. In the instant case, albeit
Nollen paid the PhP 3,200 only in October 2008, or long after his receipt of the June 2008 MTC
decision, his appeal may validly be viewed as not fatally belated. COMELEC Resolution No.
8654 is applicable to his appeal, as the appeal was on June 5, 2008, or prior to July 24, 2008
when the more stringent Resolution No. 8486 took effect. Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. vs. Commission
on Elections and Susana M. Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010.
Appeal in election cases; application of rule on payment of appeal fee. For the sake of laying
down clearly the rules regarding the payment of the appeal fee, a discussion of the application
of the recent Divinagracia v. COMELEC to election contests involving elective municipal
and barangay officials is necessary. Divinagracia explained the purpose of Resolution No. 8486
which, as earlier stated, the COMELEC issued to clarify existing rules and address the resulting
confusion caused by the two appeal fees required, for the perfection of appeals, by the two
different jurisdictions: the court and COMELEC. Divinagracia stressed that if the appellants had
already paid the amount of PhP 1,000 to the lower courts within the five-day reglementary
period, they are further required to pay the COMELEC, through its Cash Division, the appeal fee
of PhP 3,200 within fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal with the
lower court. If the appellants failed to pay the PhP 3,200 within the prescribed period, then the
appeal should be dismissed. The Court went on to state in Divinagraciathat Aguilar did not
“dilute the force of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of compliance with the
COMELEC-required appeal fees.” The resolution, to reiterate, was mainly issued to clarify the
confusion caused by the requirement of payment of two appeal fees.
Divinagracia, however, contained the following final caveat: that “for notice of appeal
filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete
payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.” It cannot be
overemphasized, however, that the warning given in Divinagracia is inapplicable to the case at
bar, since the notice of appeal in the instant case was filed on June 5, 2008. In the strict legal
viewpoint, Divinagracia contextually finds applicability only in cases where notices of appeal
were filed at least after the promulgation of the Divinagraciadecision on July 27, 2009. Since
petitioner paid the appeal fee of PhP 1,000 simultaneously with his filing of his notice of appeal
on June 5, 2008, the appeal is considered perfected pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8654,
taking it beyond the ambit of Divinagracia. Again, petitioner’s failure to pay the remaining PhP
3,200 within the prescribed period cannot be taken against him, since the COMELEC failed to
notify him regarding the additional appeal fee, as provided by Resolution No. 8654. Although
Nollen, following superseded jurisprudence, failed to pay the filing fee on time, he nonetheless
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voluntarily paid the remaining PhP 3,200 appeal fee on October 6, 2008. We, thus, credit him
for remitting the amount of PhP 3,200, which, applying extant rules and prevailing
jurisprudence, cannot be considered as having been belatedly paid. Hence, his petition should
be given due course. Mateo R. Nollen, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Susana M.
Caballes, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010.
Execution pending appeal in election case. Section 11, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC sets the
standards in the grant or denial of a motion for execution pending appeal in election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials, to wit – XXX XXX XXX. The sole issue in
this case is whether the RTC abided by the standards set forth in the foregoing rule when it
granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal. In setting aside the RTC special order
dated February 15, 2008, the COMELEC ruled that the issuance of the writ of execution pending
appeal failed to satisfy the requirements laid down in Rule 14, Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC. According to the COMELEC, the notice of the RTC’s clerk of court violated the 3-day notice
rule inasmuch as respondent was only given one day from the filing of the motion within which
to submit his opposition. The relevant rule provides that a motion for execution pending appeal
filed by the prevailing party shall contain a three-day notice to the adverse party and execution
pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. It should be emphasized that
these requirements are for the purpose of avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the
adverse party who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion before a
resolution by the court. Where a party had the opportunity to be heard, then the purpose has
been served and the requirement substantially complied with. In this case, even the COMELEC
admitted that respondent was heard and afforded his day in court; hence, it should not have
annulled the RTC special order on said ground. Jesus M. Calo vs. Commission on Elections and
Ramon “Monching RMC” M. Calo, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010.
Execution pending appeal in election case. The COMELEC also found that respondent’s
presumptive victory must prevail in the light of the fact that, in the event that the RTC’s
appreciation of the votes is overturned, then respondent would still be the winning
candidate. The COMELEC thus concluded that it was more prudent to preserve the status quo
prior to the RTC decision dated February 8, 2008 so as not to disrupt government service. In the
recent case of Pecson v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:
x x x decisions of the courts in election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial
evaluation of the ballots and after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given
similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true
when attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of the
term of the contested elective office, of the case.
The Court also stressed in Pecson that disruption of public service cannot per se be a basis to
deny execution pending appeal –
We additionally note that “disruption of public service” necessarily results from any order
allowing execution pending appeal and is a concern that this Court was aware of when it
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expressly provided the remedy under the Rules. Such disruption is therefore an element that has
been weighed and factored in and cannot be per se a basis to deny execution pending appeal.
Similarly in this case, the COMELEC should have accorded respect and weight to the RTC’s
decision proclaiming petitioner as winner. Note that aside from the evidence presented by the
parties during the election contest and the expert testimony of the witnesses from the National
Bureau of Investigation, the RTC made its own assessment and findings on the contested
ballots. On the basis of all this, the RTC concluded that “[petitioner] will still have the plurality
of 981 votes in favor of [petitioner] and 315 votes also for [petitioner], respectively.” It was also
the RTC’s conclusion that “the victory of the protestant has been clearly established.” Aside
from these, the RTC also laid down the superior circumstances necessitating the grant of
execution pending appeal: (1) allowing the status quo to continue would unjustly give premium
to the perpetrators of fraud, anomalies and irregularities and suppress the will of the electorate;
(2) the sovereign will of the people should be given utmost respect and (3) the injury or damage
to be sustained by petitioner would outweigh the injury or damage of respondent. Given that
the RTC’s exercise of its discretionary power to grant execution pending appeal per special
order dated February 15, 2008 was not tainted with any bias or capricious and whimsical
arbitrariness, we find that the COMELEC committed an error in annulling and setting it
aside. Jesus M. Calo vs. Commission on Elections and Ramon “Monching RMC” M. Calo, G.R.
No. 185222, January 19, 2010.
Jurisdiction; fixing of Liquidator’s fees. Petitioner insists that pursuant to SEC Memorandum
Circular No. 14, Series of 2001 (Circular), the liquidator’s fee shall be determined by the
agreement between the liquidating corporation and the liquidator. Only when they fail to reach
an agreement may the SEC exercise the power to fix the amount. Considering that the SEC
determined the liquidator’s fee without requiring the parties to meet and settle the amount,
petitioner contends that it was denied its right to due process. Indeed, the Circular provides:
The compensation or fees of the MANCOM, receivers and liquidators shall be determined by
the agreement between the parties and the MANCOM members, receiver or liquidator. This
compensation/fees shall be of an amount which the corporation is willing and able to pay and
the MANCOM members, receiver or liquidator is willing to accept as fee or compensation for
the engagement of their/his service.
In case of failure of agreement, the Commission shall determine the fees and/or compensation of
MANCOM, receivers and liquidators in accordance with the guidelines set herein.
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA:
To countenance petitioner’s posturing would be to unduly delimit the broad powers granted to
the SEC under Presidential Decree No. 902-A, specifically the all-encompassing provision in
Section 3 that the SEC has “absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control” over all corporations
who are the grantees of primary franchises and/or license or permit issued by the government to
operate in the Philippines. There is no gainsaying, therefore, that the SEC is authorized to
determine the fees of receivers and liquidators not only when there is “failure of agreement”
between the parties but also in the absence thereof. A contrary ruling would give license to
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corporations under liquidation or receivership to refuse to participate in negotiations for the
fixing of the compensation of their liquidators or receivers so as to evade their obligation to pay
the same.
Petitioner may not have been given the chance to meet face to face with respondent for the
purpose of determining the latter’s fee. But this fact alone should not invalidate the amount
fixed by the SEC. What matters is the reasonableness of the fee in light of the services rendered
by the liquidator. It is the policy of the SEC to provide uniform/fair and reasonable
compensation or fees for the comparable services rendered by the duly designated members of
the Management Committee (MANCOM), rehabilitation receivers and liquidators in
corporations or partnerships placed under MANCOM/receivership or liquidation, pursuant to
Section 6(d) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the SEC Rules on Corporate Recovery, the
Corporation Code of the Philippines, the Securities Regulation Code, and other related laws
enforced by the SEC. The Court notes that respondent initially demanded P623,214.35,
representing his liquidator’s fee of P450,000.00 and out-of-pocket expenses of P173,214.35.
Respondent later manifested that he was amenable to reduce by one-half his liquidator’s
fee. Before fixing the amount due the respondent, the SEC, in fact, ordered that an audit be
conducted to determine the proper amount to be paid. Clearly, the fee fixed by the SEC was not
without basis. Besides, as correctly held by the CA, “respondent actually rendered services in
accordance with his oath of office as liquidator for which he is entitled to be compensated by
petitioner.” Catmon Sales International Corporation vs. Atty. Manuel D. Yngson, Jr. as Liquidator
of Catmon Sales International Corporation, G.R. No. 179761, January 15, 2010.
Evidence
Authentication of private documents. We are not swayed by petitioners’ allegation that the
comparisons made by the document examiner, the CA and the trial court, of Guillerma’s
signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale and her specimen signatures, violated Section 22, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court on the authentication of private documents. It should be borne in
mind that in this case respondents were not presenting evidence to authenticate a private
document. On the contrary, they are challenging the signatures appearing in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et al., G.R. No.
163271, January 15, 2010.
Finding of forged signatures. Moreover, the findings of the NBI document examiner were
corroborated by the trial court’s own observation, as affirmed by the CA, that “even a cursory
examination of Guillerma’s questioned signature from her specimen signatures in the enlarged
photographs (Exhibits ‘F’ and ‘F-1’) would show that it needs no expert witness to notice the
wide difference in stroke, as well as the writing style in capital ‘G’.” What is more, Emma S.
Felicilda, the daughter of then deceased Guillerma, likewise testified that “in fact my mother
was the one who filed the complaint in this instant case because according to her, she did not
sign the said document”. Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et
al., G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010.
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Judicial notice by quasi-judicial body. In relying on the Mandaluyong zoning map, the HLURB
took note of the standard procedure observed in fixing the boundaries of lands, where the
preparation and drafting of the illustrative maps precede the drafting of the text that describes
those boundaries. Although the text of the ordinance is controlling, any doubt or vagueness in
the meaning of its provisions may be cleared up by a reference to the official map. As a quasi-
judicial body, which enjoys an expertise in land zoning classifications, the HLURB can take
judicial notice of such official maps as are generated and used in government zoning
activities. The Court has no reason to disturb its findings in this case. Greenhills East Association,
Inc. vs. E. Ganzon, Inc., G.R. No. 169741, January 22, 2010.
Notarized document. We have thoroughly reviewed the records of this case and agree that the
deed of sale dated April 26, 1982 is a legal and binding document. The testimonies of the
witnesses to the document attest to the parties freely signing the document and the occurrence
of the transaction in a clear and definite manner. Moreover, it is a notarized document which
renders it a prima facieevidence of the facts contained therein. In the absence of documents or
testimonies from disinterested persons proving petitioner’s claim of a fictitious sale, there is no
basis to set aside the deed of sale. (Bernarda CH. Osmeña vs. Nicasio CH. Osmeña, et al., G.R.
No. 171911, January 26, 2010.
Parol evidence rule; exceptions. The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected
Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony that the heirs had intended to establish the easement of right of way
solely for the benefit of the interior Lots D and E which had no access to the city street. The
partition agreement also made Lot A, now owned by the Salimbangons, a beneficiary of that
easement. Thus:
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous road right of
way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
(Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing
testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above. But the
exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto; XXX XXX XXX.
Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when
they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what paragraph 2 quoted above seems to imply,
the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. The complaint thus
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said: XXX XXX XXX XXX. Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were entitled to
introduce evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may
depart from what the partition agreement literally provided. At any rate, as the CA said, the
Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony even
when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition agreement
among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their
right to now question such testimony on appeal. Sps. Manuel and Victoria Salimbangon vs. Sps.
Santos and Erlinda Tan, G.R. No. 185240, January 21, 2010.
Probative value of document examination commissioned by party. It is of no moment that the
examination of the Deed of Absolute Sale was commissioned by the respondents. In the end, it
is the court which has the discretion and authority on whether to give probative value to the
results of the examination. As held in Sali v. Abubakar, the fact that the NBI conducted the
examination of certain contested documents upon the request of a private litigant does not
necessarily nullify the examination thus made: “x x x Its purpose is, presumably, to assist the
court having jurisdiction over said litigations, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly
the issue relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private individual may examine the
same, if there are facts within his knowledge which may help the courts in the determination of
said issue. Such examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private
individual, does not, certainly, become null and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an
officer of the NBI. Indeed, any person, expert or not, either in his private or in his official
capacity, may testify in court on matters, within his personal knowledge, which are relevant to a
suit, subject to the judicial authority to determine the credibility of said testimony and the
weight thereof. [On] the other hand, the question whether a public official may or shall be
ordered or permitted by his superior to examine documents and testify thereon in a given case,
is one mainly administrative in character, which is within the competence of said superior
officer, or the Bureau Director or Head of the Office, or the corresponding department head to
decide, and is independent of the validity of the examination thus made or of the credence and
weight to be given by the Court to the conclusions reached, in consequence of said examination,
by the official who made it.” Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan,
et al., G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010.
Question of fact. The core issue to be resolved in the present controversy is the authenticity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale which is a question of fact rather than of law. In Manila Bay Club
Corporation v.Court of Appeals, we held that for a question to be one of law, it must involve no
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
pertaining to a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales
vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et al., G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010.
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Civil Procedure
Actions; prescription/laches. Petitioners contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that
their cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to them, since the
OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved survey plan, their cause
of action did not prescribe. However, as discussed above, the conclusion of the trial court that
OCT No. 242 is void was not sufficiently borne out by the evidence on record. Verily, the
premise upon which petitioners build their theory of imprescriptibility of their action did not
exist.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the CA’s finding that: “As previously emphasized, OCT No.
242 of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7, 1950, or forty-five (45) years before
plaintiffs-appellees filed their complaint on March 10, 1995. As such, it is the Court’s firmly
held view that plaintiffs-appellees’ claim is barred not only by prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after the lapse of one (1)
year from the time a decree of registration was issued, any action for reconveyance that
plaintiffs-appellees could have availed of is also barred. Although plaintiffs-appellees’
complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence an action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust, considering that plaintiffs-appellees were alleging in said
complaint that there was a serious mistake, if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor
of ALI’s predecessor-in-interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is
a legal remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name, must be filed within ten years from the issuance of the title, since
such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since ALI’s title is traced to an OCT issued in
1950, the ten-year prescriptive period expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined
to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment
to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit. In the instant case, plaintiffs-appellees, as well as their
predecessor-in-interest, have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No.
242, from which ALI’s title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now,
and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on the validity of
said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by the precise provisions of P.D.
1529 . Spouses Morris Carpo and Socorro Carpo vs. Ayala Land, Incorporated, G.R. No.
166577, February 3, 2010.
Annulment of judgment; fraud. On the last point, petitioner posits that the unfavorable Decision
of the Labor Arbiter and the Decision of the NLRC were issued and obtained by means of fraud,
which is a valid ground for their annulment. In our jurisdiction, however, fraud is never
presumed and should be proved as mere allegations are not enough. The burden of proof rests
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on petitioner, which, in this case, he failed to discharge. immy Areno, Jr. vs. Skycable PCC-
Baguio, G.R. No. 180302. February 5, 2010.
Annulment of judgment; ground of lack of jurisdiction. It should be stressed that in a petition for
annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse
of jurisdictional discretion, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the CA has
put to rest the issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction over respondent’s cause of action. The
CA was correct when it concluded that: “In the present case, the action a quo is one for
mandamus and, under Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended, the Regional
Trial Court exercises original jurisdiction in the issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction which may be enforced in any part of
their regions. The court a quo after evaluating the allegations in the initiatory pleading
concluded that the action is one for specific performance and proceeded to hear it as such. In
doing so, the said court retained jurisdiction. The same law grants the Regional Trial Courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and all cases in which the demand exceeds P100,000.00, to which the
action a quo belongs.” Republic of the Philippines (DENR) vs. Technological Advocates for
Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc. (TAFPA, Inc.), G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010.
Annulment of judgment; nature and grounds. An action to annul a final judgment is an
extraordinary remedy, which is not to be granted indiscriminately by the court. It is a recourse
equitable in character and allowed only in exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to
prevent this extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of
a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. Under Section 2, Rule
47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers
to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
the claim. It is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It should be stressed that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion, but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. Republic of the Philippines (DENR) vs. Technological Advocates
for Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc. (TAFPA, Inc.), G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010.
Annulment of judgment; scope of remedy. As regards petitioner’s remaining arguments, suffice it
to say that this is not an appeal from the decision and orders of the RTC, which to reiterate has
become final and executory; the correctness of the judgment is therefore not in issue.
Accordingly, there is no need to address the errors allegedly committed by the trial court in
issuing the assailed orders. Republic of the Philippines (DENR) vs. Technological Advocates for
Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc. (TAFPA, Inc.), G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of administrative agencies. The CA refused to give credence to
petitioner’s assertion of having no knowledge of the suspension because he refused to receive
the suspension order preferring that it be sent by registered mail. The appellate court affirmed
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the factual finding of the NLRC that petitioner was definitely aware of his suspension but only
feigned ignorance of the same. As a rule, we refrain from reviewing factual assessments of
agencies exercising adjudicative functions. Factual findings of administrative agencies that are
affirmed by the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court so long as
these findings are supported by substantial evidence. Anyhow, evidence on record repudiates
petitioner’s pretension. His insistence that he had no notice of his suspension is belied by
evidence as it shows that the suspension order was served on petitioner on February 7, 2002 by
his immediate superior, Al Luzano, but petitioner declined to sign it. No acceptable reason was
advanced for doing so except petitioner’s shallow excuse that it should be sent to him by
registered mail. Jimmy Areno, Jr. vs. Skycable PCC-Baguio, G.R. No. 180302. February 5, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of administrative agencies. Indeed findings of fact and conclusions of an
adjudicative body like the HLURB, which can be considered as a trier of facts on specific
matters within its field of expertise, should be considered as binding and conclusive upon the
appellate courts. This is in addition to the fact that it was in a better position to assess and
evaluate the credibility of the contending parties and the validity of their respective
evidence. However, these doctrines hold true only when such findings and conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, we find it difficult to find sufficient
evidential support for the HLURB’s conclusion that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Viola. We are thus persuaded that there is ample justification to disturb the findings of
the HLURB. Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706,
February 5, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. Ordinarily, this Court will not review, much less reverse,
the factual findings of the CA, especially where such findings coincide with those of the trial
court. The findings of facts of the CA are, as a general rule, conclusive and binding upon this
Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. The above rule,
however, is subject to a number of exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when
the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (4) when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7) when the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence
of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. Republic of the Philippines vs.
Heirs of Julio Ramos, represented by Reynaldo Ramos Medina, et al., G.R. No. 169481,
February 22, 2010.
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Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. As has repeatedly been underscored, in petitions for
review on certiorari, the general rule is that only questions of law may be raised by the parties
and passed upon by the Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on
the Court, especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court, as in the
present case, save for some recognized exceptions. The issues raised by petitioner are
predicated on the appreciation of factual issues. In weighing the evidence of the parties, the
trial court found respondents’ more credible. Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Spouses Edward J.
Heshan and Neilia L. Heshan, et al., G.R. No. 179117, February 3, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. The issue presented before Us is whether the CA
correctly found that petitioner was liable to pay respondent’s claim. This is a factual issue. The
Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower courts. As a general rule, petitions for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed before this Court may only raise questions of law. However,
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to this rule. In this case, the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the RTC; thus, we find it proper to review the
evidence. Lolita Reyes doing business under the name and style, Solid Brothers West Marketing
vs. Century Canning Corporation, G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. Petitioner seeks a review of the factual findings of the
trial court, which were sustained by the Court of Appeals, that petitioner’s driver was negligent
in driving the bus, which caused physical injuries to respondent and the death of respondent’s
husband. The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. The
Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case, and found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court . . . . Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan Lee, G.R. No.
166869, February 16, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts. Ordinarily, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, this
Court only considers questions of law, as it is not a trier of facts. However, there are exceptions
to this general rule, such as, when the findings of fact of the appellate court are contrary to those
of the trial court. Such circumstance exists in this case, hence, the Court is compelled to take a
closer look at the records. Nelson Lagazo vs. Gerald B. Soriano and Galileo B. Soriano, G.R. No.
170864, February 16, 2010.
Appeal; issue raised for first time on appeal. Petitioner also challenges the validity of the
suspension order for being unsigned. The same has no merit. Upon careful examination, it
appears that the contention was raised for the first time in petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
of the Decision of the CA. In Arceno v. Government Service Insurance System, the hornbook
principle that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal was reiterated. We
emphasized therein that the rule is based on principles of fairness and due process and is
applicable to appealed decisions originating from regular courts, administrative agencies or
quasi-judicial bodies, whether rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding or a criminal case,
citing the case of Tan v. Commission on Elections. Even assuming that it was raised, the same
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would be without merit because the suspension order bears the signature of respondent’s
engineering manager and petitioner’s immediate superior, Al Luzano, who, in fact, is a member
of the panel committee that conducted an investigation on the complaint of Soriano against
petitioner. Jimmy Areno, Jr. vs. Skycable PCC-Baguio, G.R. No. 180302. February 5, 2010.
Appeal; scope of review; appellate court may review matters, even if not assigned as errors in
the appeal, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. As regards
the issue on the damages awarded, petitioner contends that it was the only one that appealed
the decision of the trial court with respect to the award of actual and moral damages; hence, the
Court of Appeals erred in awarding other kinds of damages in favor of respondent, who did not
appeal from the trial court’s decision. Petitioner’s contention is unmeritorious. Section 8, Rule
51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides . . .
Philippine National Bank v. Rabat cited the book of Justice Florenz D. Regalado to explain the
section above, thus:
In his book, Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on this section, thus:
1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes some
substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is that only
errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its
jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his assignment of errors
but the same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in his
brief, such error may now be considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential
origin.
2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals,
unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it
finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an
unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar.
18, 1988), or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is
dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as
error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et
al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983).
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is authorized to
consider a plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs
of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities.
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded respondent the sum
of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity (P590,000.00) and actual damages
(P155,575.00 for funeral expenses), plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal to the Court
of Appeals, petitioner assigned as error the award of damages by the trial court on the ground
that it was based merely on suppositions and surmises, not the admissions made by respondent
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during the trial. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the award by the trial court for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased Silvino Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual
damages, although the amount of the latter award was modified.
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondent’s
husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries sustained by
respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial court to respondent. The trial court
overlooked awarding the additional damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her
Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan
Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010.
Certiorari; extension of period to file. On the People’s argument that a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for certiorari is no longer allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds.
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for
extension, unlike in the previous formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading
absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply
been reworded to state that “no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.” Absent
such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound
discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension
sought and, at all events, given its merits. Jaime S. Domdom v. Hon. Third and Fifth Division of
the Sandiganbayan, Commission on Audit and The People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 182382-
83, February 24, 2010.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Even assuming that certiorari may lie, the Court still cannot
grant the instant petition because the petitioners failed to show that public respondent, in issuing
the assailed Orders, acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or gravely abused her discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As mentioned earlier, the RTC issued the assailed
Order in accordance with Section 3, Rule 17, in relation to Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. There is no showing that the RTC judge issued the Order in a despotic
or arbitrary manner, or that she was motivated by passion or personal hostility against
petitioners. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Such is wanting in this case. Benedicta
Samson and Marcial Samson vs. Hon. Judge Geraldine Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356,
February 2, 2010.
Certiorari; improper remedy where appeal is available. The appellate court correctly ruled that
the petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy. A writ of certiorari lies only for an error of
jurisdiction. It can be availed of only if the lower tribunal has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and if
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there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact which is a mistake of
judgment, certiorari is not available. In such case, the remedy is appeal. The assailed RTC
Order dated 20 June 2003 was issued when petitioners failed to move for a pre-trial of the case
for annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with Section 1, Rule 18 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: XXX XXX XXX In said Order, the RTC
dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time,
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states, thus: XXX XXX XXX The
RTC Order dated 20 June 2003 was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the
merits. This was even clarified in the subsequent RTC Order of 22 December 2003 (which
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration) wherein the lower court stated that: “Therefore,
the dismissal was ‘with prejudice’ or a dismissal that had the effect of adjudication upon the
merits in accordance with Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.” The remedy to obtain
reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or
one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The availability of the right to appeal precludes
recourse to the special civil action for certiorari. The RTC Order subject of the petition was a
final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits; hence, it was a subject for an ordinary
appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Benedicta Samson and Marcial Samson vs. Hon. Judge
Geraldine Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010.
Certiorari; improper remedy where appeal is available. At the outset, the petition should have
been dismissed outright because petitioner resorted to the wrong mode of appeal by filing the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of the said Rule explicitly provides that a
petition for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the remedy of appeal by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not only available but also the proper mode of
appeal. For all intents and purposes, we find that petitioner filed the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 as a substitute for a lost appeal. We note that petitioner received a
copy of the January 19, 2005 Resolution of the CA denying his motion for reconsideration on
January 28, 2005. Under Section 2 of Rule 45, petitioner has 15 days from notice of the said
Resolution within which to file his petition for review on certiorari. As such, he should have
filed his appeal on or before February 12, 2005. However, records show that the petition was
posted on March 1, 2005, or long after the period to file the appeal has lapsed. Atty.
Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415. February 26, 2010.
Certiorari; improper remedy where appeal is available. Petitioner should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
since she is assailing the CA decision and resolution which are final judgments. Rule 45 clearly
provides that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for
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review, which is just a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. And the
petition for review must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for a new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. In this case, petitioner received
a copy of the CA Resolution denying her motion for reconsideration on November 24, 2004;
and, thus, under Rule 45, she has 15 days from receipt of such resolution, or until December 9,
2004, to file a petition for review. However, petitioner did not file a petition for review; instead,
she filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on January 24, 2005. Hence, the CA decision
and resolution have already attained finality, and petitioner has lost her right to appeal.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper if a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, petitioner had
the remedy of appeal, and it was the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Thus, a special civil action for certioraricannot be used as a substitute for an appeal that
the petitioner has already lost. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to
appeal a judgment to the proper forum despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not
being a substitute for a lost appeal. Certiorari will not be a cure for failure to timely file a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Flor Martinez, represented by Macario Martinez,
authorized representative and Attorney-in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and Edilberto M. Brua, G.R.
No. 166536, February 4, 2010.
Certiorari; improper remedy where appeal is available; exceptions. While there are instances
where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an
appeal, the long line of decisions denying the special civil action for certiorari, either before
appeal was availed of or in instances where the appeal period had lapsed, far outnumber the
instances where certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions are: (1) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (2) when the broader interests of
justice so require; (3) when the writs issued are null; (4) when the questioned order amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, which we find to be not present in this
case. Notably, petitioner did not even fail to advance an explanation why appeal was not
availed of, nor was there any showing that the issue raised in the petition for certiorari could not
be raised on appeal. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the
rules. Flor Martinez, represented by Macario Martinez, authorized representative and Attorney-
in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and Edilberto M. Brua, G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010.
Certiorari; improper remedy where appeal is available; exceptions. Concededly, the NPC may
have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari instead of an appeal since
the ruling on attorney’s fees is already a ruling on the merits. However, we find that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ordered
NPC solidarily liable with the plaintiffs for the payment of the attorney’s fees. The rule that a
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petition for certiorari is dismissible when the mode of appeal is available admits of exceptions,
to wit: (a) when the writs issued are null; and, (b) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Clearly, respondent has shown its entitlement to the
exceptions. Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415.
February 26, 2010.
Certiorari; motion for reconsideration; exceptions. Concededly, the settled rule is that a motion
for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari, its
purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The
rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent
nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the
lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved. The Court finds that the issue raised by petitioner had
been duly raised and passed upon by the Sandiganbayan Third Division, it having denied
consolidation in two resolutions; that the issue calls for resolution and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of petitioner; and that the issue raised is one purely of law, the facts not
being contested. There is thus ample justification for relaxing the rule requiring the prior filing
of a motion for reconsideration. Jaime S. Domdom v. Hon. Third and Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan, Commission on Audit and The People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 182382-83,
February 24, 2010.
Certiorari; scope of remedy. In fact, the argument raised by petitioner, i.e., that the Court of
Appeals had no legal authority to vary the findings of the trial court and substitute its own
conclusion, which were patently contrary to the trial court’s findings, and conclusion, relates to
the wisdom and soundness of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of
the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special civil action
for certiorari. Erroneous findings and conclusions do not render the appellate court vulnerable
to the corrective writ of certiorari, for where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its
findings are not correct, these would, at the most, constitute errors of law and not abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. For if every error committed by the trial court or quasi-
judicial agency were to be the proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial would never end,
and the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure. Even if we consider this
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petition for certiorari under Rule 65, it must be shown that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and not mere errors of judgment, for the
petition to be granted. As we said, certiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are
correctible by appeal. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not
enough — it must be grave. Flor Martinez, represented by Macario Martinez, authorized
representative and Attorney-in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and Edilberto M. Brua, G.R. No.
166536, February 4, 2010.
Certiorari; strict observance of procedural rules. In petitions for certiorari, procedural rules must
be strictly observed.
The acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute discretion to
reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only x x x when there are procedural errors,
like violations of the Rules of Court. Marcelino Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
169122, February 2, 2010.
Contempt; defiance of court’s orders and abuse of rules of procedure. Petitioner has doggedly
pursued her case in this Court by filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including
the letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that “no further
pleadings shall be entertained in this case.” Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter
defiance of this Court’s orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly
veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy – although the tone of
petitioner’s compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to
her earlier letters – constitutes contempt of court. In Republic v. Unimex, we held: “A statement
of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the Court has
already considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with
finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like
all orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be circumvented
by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.” Florencia G. Diaz vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181502, February 2, 2010.
Docket fees; additional fees payable constitute lien on judgment. The foregoing disposition
notwithstanding, respondent is liable for the balance between the actual fees paid and the
correct payable filing fees to include an assessment on the award of unrealized income,
following Section 2 of Rule 141 . . . and jurisprudence, viz: “The exception contemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is
limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the
amount thereof. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. and Solidbank Corporation vs. Bernardita H.
Perez, represented by her Attorney in fact Patria H. Perez, G.R. No. 181842, February 5, 2010.
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Docket fees; Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) not exempt from payment. Faced
with the differing opinions of the GSIS, the OSG and the OCAT, we now proceed to probe into
the heart of this matter: may Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees? No.
The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption of the
GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS
wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of
procedure promulgated by the Court. However, the Constitution and jurisprudence do not
sanction such view. Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated by this
Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution.
The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a
traditional power of this Court. It necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising
from or connected to the implementation of the said rules. The Rules of Court was promulgated
in the exercise of the Court’s rule-making power. It is essentially procedural in nature as it does
not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 141 is basically
procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to implement
an existing right. In particular, it functions to regulate the procedure of exercising a right of
action and enforcing a cause of action. In particular, it pertains to the procedural requirement
of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a pleading or any application that initiates an
action or proceeding.
The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in
support of its petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from
that of its individual members. The rights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and
functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members. Its capacity to sue and bring
actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves the exemption that it
claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges
that, in claiming exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not asking that rules be made to
enforce the right to social security of its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right
of the GSIS “to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of legal fees.” However, the
alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment of legal fees does not take away the
capacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that capacity may be
implemented.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s institutional independence, the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
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within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails. Re:
Petition for recognition of the exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from
payment of legal fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010.
Docket fees; Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) not exempt from payment. Congress
could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence —
fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy,
assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two
basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the
Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the
identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated
by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source
of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the Court’s fiscal
independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to
government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily
reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs
the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. Re: Petition for
recognition of the exemption of the Government Service Insurance System from payment of
legal fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010.
Ejectment; element of force in forcible entry. We also note that petitioners did not deny in their
Answer respondents’ allegation that they constructed a concrete fence on the subject property.
Failure to specifically deny the allegation amounts to a judicial admission. Unlawfully entering
the subject property, erecting a structure thereon and excluding therefrom the prior possessor
would necessarily imply the use of force. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not
have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. Spouses Eulogio N. Antazo and
Nelia C. Antazo vs. Leonides Doblada, et al., G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010.
Ejectment; issue of prior actual physical possession. Petitioners contend that respondents’ claim
is not supported by competent evidence. They aver that when they bought the property from
Anciano, the latter transferred to them possession and ownership of the subject property. They
point out that, after they purchased the property from Anciano, they declared it in their names
for taxation purposes and paid real property tax thereon. The petition is without
merit. Petitioners’ argument is misplaced, considering that this is a forcible entry case. They are
apparently referring to “possession” flowing from ownership of the property, as opposed to
actual possession. In ejectment cases, possession means nothing more than actual physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Prior physical
possession is the primary consideration in a forcible entry case. A party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
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character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects
him. The party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. We are convinced that respondents were in prior possession of the property
and that petitioners deprived them of such possession by means of force.
While the Letter intimates that petitioners were in possession of the property prior to
respondents and that the latter were the ones who forcibly evicted them therefrom, such
statement is clearly self-serving and unsupported by other evidence. Verily, this information,
assuming that it is true, is not relevant to the resolution of this case. This case involves
respondents’ cause of action against petitioners for evicting them from the subject property
which was in their possession. It is immaterial how respondents came into such possession or by
what right they did so. Even usurpers of land owned by another are entitled to remain on it until
they are lawfully ejected therefrom. Spouses Eulogio N. Antazo and Nelia C. Antazo vs.
Leonides Doblada, et al., G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010.
Ejectment; nature of remedy and issue involved. Prior physical possession is an indispensable
element in forcible entry cases. Thus, the ultimate question here is who had prior physical
possession of the disputed land. Nelson Lagazo vs. Gerald B. Soriano and Galileo B.
Soriano, G.R. No. 170864, February 16, 2010.
Ejectment; rationale of remedy. Granting that petitioners had earlier possession and respondents
were the ones who first forcibly dispossessed them of the property, this circumstance would not
have given petitioners license to recover possession in the same way. Such course of action is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by the rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy
behind ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to compel
the party out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he claims is
his. The party deprived of possession must not take the law into his own hands. Petitioners
would have had a right of action against respondents to file an ejectment suit, but they evidently
let the chance pass and chose the easier and faster way. Unfortunately for them, this time, their
opponents chose to resort to appropriate judicial measures. Spouses Eulogio N. Antazo and
Nelia C. Antazo vs. Leonides Doblada, et al., G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010.
Execution; effect of levy on execution as against prior adverse claim. Petitioner contends that the
adverse claim of respondent Garcia inscribed on the title of the subject property is but a notice
that the latter has an interest adverse to respondent Brua’s title, to the extent of P150,000.00
secured by a real estate mortgage, and such adverse claim cannot be considered superior to
that of a final sale conducted by the sheriff by virtue of a court judgment that has attained
finality. Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: “SEC. 12. Effect of levy on execution as
to third persons. – The levy on execution shall create a lien in favor of the judgment obligee
over the right, title and interest of the judgment obligor in such property at the time of the levy,
subject to liens and encumbrances then existing.”
Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied
upon. He merely obtains a lien. Such levy on execution is subject and subordinate to all valid
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claims and liens existing against the property at the time the execution lien attached, such as
real estate mortgages. Respondent Garcia’s adverse claim, which refers to the deed of
mortgage executed by respondent Brua in his favor, was annotated on respondent Brua’s title
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853. The
adverse claim was already existing when the Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the
Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner, was inscribed on July 11, 1988 and September 2, 1988,
respectively; and, hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to constitute constructive notice to
petitioner regarding the subject property. When petitioner registered her Notice of Levy on
Execution on the title of the subject property, she was charged with the knowledge that the
subject property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the
same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof. Thus, no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the CA when it held that the notice of levy and subsequent sale of the subject
property could not prevail over respondent Garcia’s existing adverse claim inscribed on
respondent Brua’s certificate of title. Flor Martinez, represented by Macario Martinez, authorized
representative and Attorney-in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and Edilberto M. Brua, G.R. No.
166536, February 4, 2010.
Expropriation; damages for taking of property without payment of just compensation. We stress,
however, that the City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking private respondent’s
property without payment of just compensation. In Manila International Airport Authority v.
Rodriguez,the Court held that a government agency’s prolonged occupation of private property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to
damages. City of Iloilo, represented by Hon. Jerry P. Treñas, City Mayor vs. Hon. Loilita-Bersana,
et al., G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010.
Expropriation; determination of just compensation. We now turn to the reckoning date for the
determination of just compensation. Petitioner claims that the computation should be made as
of September 18, 1981, the date when the expropriation complaint was filed. We agree. In a
long line of cases, we have constantly affirmed that: “x x x just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property,
the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.”
When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for
eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the
complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined “as of the date of
the filing of the complaint.” Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the
point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation. City of Iloilo, represented by Hon. Jerry P. Treñas, City Mayor vs.
Hon. Loilita-Bersana, et al.,G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010.
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Expropriation; no recovery of possession. We commiserate with the private respondent. The
school was constructed and has been in operation since 1985. Petitioner and the residents of
Iloilo City have long reaped the benefits of the property. However, non-payment of just
compensation does not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of their
expropriated lot. Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not
bother to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from
his inaction in failing to withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private
respondent not only accepted the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not interested
enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end. As such, private respondent may not
recover possession of the Subject Property, but is entitled to just compensation. It is high time
that private respondent be paid what was due him after almost 30 years. City of Iloilo,
represented by Hon. Jerry P. Treñas, City Mayor vs. Hon. Loilita-Bersana, et al., G.R. No.
168967, February 12, 2010.
Expropriation; stages. Expropriation proceedings have two stages. The first phase ends with an
order of dismissal, or a determination that the property is to be acquired for a public
purpose. Either order will be a final order that may be appealed by the aggrieved party. The
second phase consists of the determination of just compensation. It ends with an order fixing
the amount to be paid to the landowner. Both orders, being final, are appealable.
An order of condemnation or dismissal is final, resolving the question of whether or not the
plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain. Once the first order
becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can
no longer be questioned.
Javellana did not bother to file an appeal from the May 17, 1983 Order which granted
petitioner’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and which authorized petitioner to take
immediate possession of the Subject Property. Thus, it has become final, and the petitioner’s
right to expropriate the property for a public use is no longer subject to review. On the first
question, therefore, we rule that the trial court gravely erred in nullifying the May 17, 1983
Order. City of Iloilo, represented by Hon. Jerry P. Treñas, City Mayor vs. Hon. Loilita-Bersana, et
al., G.R. No. 168967, February 12, 2010.
Injunction; injunction against National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The petition
was accompanied by a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO to prevent the CA
from enforcing its decision. The Court, however, did not issue any TRO or injunctive writ in this
case. This was because R.A. 8371 prohibits the issuance of a restraining order or preliminary
injunction against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to its
interpretation or the interpretation of other laws relating to indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and ancestral domains. The City Mayor of Baguio
and the Head of the Demolition Team-Engr. Nazita Bañez Vs. Atty. Brain Masweng, Regional
Hearing Officer, NCIP-CAR, the heirs of Judith Cariño, Jacqueline Cariño and the Heirs of Mateo
Cariño and Bayosa Ortega, G.R. No. 165003, February 2, 2010.
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Injunction; showing of irreparable injury. What is more, the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Here, since
there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani
cannot claim that the irreparable damage they wanted to prevent by their application for
preliminary injunction is the loss of their properties to auction sale. Their real injury, if it turns
out that the right to foreclose belongs to PIO rather than to BDO, is payment of the proceeds of
the auction sale to the wrong party rather than to their creditor. But this kind of injury is purely
monetary and is compensable by an appropriate judgment against BDO. It is not in any sense
an irreparable injury. G.G. Sportsware Manufacturing Corp., et al. vs. Banco De Oro Unibank,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 184434, February 8, 2010
Injunction; showing of right to main relief. Petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani point out
that BDO’s March 15, 2005 letter and its April 21, 2005 certification show that the bank already
transferred to PIO all its rights to the loan receivables of G.G. Sportswear. Thus, BDO lost its
right to foreclose the mortgages on the properties that secured the unpaid loans, thus, entitling
petitioners to an order enjoining the foreclosures. Further, petitioners claim that BDO bloated
G.G. Sportswear’s outstanding obligation such that it was being made to pay more through the
foreclosure than was actually due. The test for issuing a TRO or an injunction is whether the
facts show a need for equity to intervene in order to protect perceived rights in equity. In
general, a higher court will not set aside the trial court’s grant or denial of an application for
preliminary injunction unless it gravely abused its discretion as when it lacks jurisdiction over
the action, ignores relevant considerations that stick out of the parties’ pleadings, sees the facts
with a blurred lens, ignores what is relevant, draws illogical conclusions, or simply acts in
random fashion. Injunction may be issued only when the plaintiff appears to be entitled to the
main relief he asks in his complaint. This means that the plaintiff’s allegations should show
clearly that he has a cause of action. This means that he enjoys some right and that the
defendant has violated it. And, where the defendant is heard on the application for injunction,
the trial court must consider, too, the weight of his opposition. If one were to go by respondent
BDO’s March 15, 2005 letter to petitioner G.G. Sportswear and its April 21, 2005 certification,
the bank appears to have already assigned all the loan receivables of G.G. Sportswear to
respondent PIO. Logically, BDO no longer had the right to foreclose on the mortgages that
secured the loans. But, judging by its answer to the complaint, BDO wanted that corrected. For
it claimed that it actually assigned just a measly portion of its loan receivables to respondent
PIO. Did the allegations of the parties and the documents they attached to their pleadings give
ample justification for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction order to stop the
foreclosure sale of the Bel-Air property? Two considerations militate against it:
First. The mortgaged properties were due for foreclosure. Admittedly, petitioner G.G.
Sportswear had defaulted on the loans secured by the subject mortgages. Petitioners had,
therefore, no right to complain about losing their properties to foreclosure.
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Second. The issue of which party owns the loan receivables and, consequently, had the right to
foreclose the mortgages is essentially an issue between BDO and PIO. This issue is the concern
of petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani but only to the extent that they are entitled to
ensure that the proceeds of the foreclosure sale were paid to the right party.
As it happens, however, this is not even a genuine issue. Respondent PIO, which had been
impleaded in the case, did not contest BDO’s ownership of the loan receivables and its right to
foreclose the mortgages. It would, therefore, make no sense to insist that PIO be the one to
foreclose when it denounces such right. Besides, the real estate mortgages presented for
foreclosure remained in BDO’s name. No document has been presented superseding it. For the
above reasons, it cannot be said that petitioners G.G. Sportswear and Gidwani have established
a right to the main relief they want, namely, the arrest of the foreclosure sale of their mortgaged
properties after they had admitted not paying their loans. As for their claim that BDO had
bloated G.G. Sportswear’s outstanding obligation, the remedy if this turns out to be true is to
direct BDO to return the excess proceeds with damages as the circumstances may warrant. G.G.
Sportsware Manufacturing Corp., et al. vs. Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 184434,
February 8, 2010
Intervention; period and requisites. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: “A person
who has legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties,
and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.”
Pursuant to the foregoing rule, this Court has held that a motion for intervention shall be
entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the would-be intervenor shows that
he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such right or interest cannot be
adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. Upon the other hand, Section 2, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court provides the time within which a motion for intervention may be
filed, viz.: “SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion for intervention may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall
be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.”
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period
prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be
heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of
the judgment has already been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even
where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to
avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the
parties. In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
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discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. We stress again that
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the
court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino,
Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
Intervention; requirement of specific and substantial right or interest in case. We rule that, with
the exception of the IBP – Cebu City Chapter, all the movants-intervenors may properly
intervene in the case at bar. First, the movants-intervenors have each sufficiently established a
substantial right or interest in the case. As a Senator of the Republic, Senator Manuel A. Roxas
has a right to challenge the December 1, 2009 Decision, which nullifies a long established law;
as a voter, he has a right to intervene in a matter that involves the electoral process; and as a
public officer, he has a personal interest in maintaining the trust and confidence of the public in
its system of government. On the other hand, former Senator Franklin M. Drilon and Tom V.
Apacible are candidates in the May 2010 elections running against appointive officials who, in
view of the December 1, 2009 Decision, have not yet resigned from their posts and are not
likely to resign from their posts. They stand to be directly injured by the assailed Decision,
unless it is reversed. Moreover, the rights or interests of said movants-intervenors cannot be
adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding. Clearly, their rights will be foreclosed
if this Court’s Decision attains finality and forms part of the laws of the land. With regard to the
IBP – Cebu City Chapter, it anchors its standing on the assertion that “this case involves the
constitutionality of elections laws for this coming 2010 National Elections,” and that “there is a
need for it to be allowed to intervene xxx so that the voice of its members in the legal profession
would also be heard before this Highest Tribunal as it resolves issues of transcendental
importance.” Prescinding from our rule and ruling case law, we find that the IBP-Cebu City
Chapter has failed to present a specific and substantial interest sufficient to clothe it with
standing to intervene in the case at bar. Its invoked interest is, in character, too
indistinguishable to justify its intervention. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
Judgment; finality. Respondent should not suffer for petitioner’s failure to avail itself of the
appropriate remedies provided for by law and the Rules. After a decision is declared final and
executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision on the case. Whether through inadvertence or negligence of its
deputized counsel or the OSG itself, the decision has already become final and executory. To
conclude otherwise would run counter to the basic principle of fair play. Besides, there would
be no end to litigations if the parties who have unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of the
appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault or inadvertence could have unfavorable
decisions annulled by simply bringing an action for annulment of judgment. Republic of the
Philippines (DENR) vs. Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc.
(TAFPA, Inc.), G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010.
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Judgment; obiter dictum. Our Fariñas ruling on the equal protection implications of the deemed-
resigned provisions cannot be minimalized as mere obiter dictum. It is trite to state that an
adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered
as obiter dictum. This rule applies to all pertinent questions that are presented and resolved in
the regular course of the consideration of the case and lead up to the final conclusion, and to
any statement as to the matter on which the decision is predicated. For that reason, a point
expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is,
or might have been, made on some other ground; or even though, by reason of other points in
the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular
point, otherwise than it did. Flor Martinez, represented by Macario Martinez, authorized
representative and Attorney-in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and Edilberto M. Brua, G.R. No.
166536, February 4, 2010.
Judgment; res judicata. As to the issue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
decision in the case of Guico v. San Pedro was binding on the Carpos as it proceeded to discuss,
thus:
In Guico vs. San Pedro, the Supreme Court resolved the conflicting claims over a tract of land
situated in barrio Tindig na Manga, Parañaque, Rizal, which was subdivided into eleven (11)
lots. The subject land was sought to be registered by a certain Eduardo C. Guico on the basis of
an accompanying plan Psu-80886, which interestingly is also the basis of ALI’s TCT No. T-5333,
now TCT No. 41262. Guico’s application was opposed by, among others, Florentino Baltazar,
on the basis of plan Psu 56007, under which plaintiffs-appellees’ title was derived.
It appears that Lots 2 and 3 were adjudicated to Guico on the basis of Psu-80886 (Lot 3 is the
subject matter of the instant case), Lot 10 in favor of Baltazar on the basis of Psu 56007, under
which plaintiffs-appellees’ title was based, and the rest to the heirs of Narciso Mayuga. While
Baltazar claimed Lot 3 on the basis of his Psu-56007, his claim was rejected and the Lot was
adjudicated to Guico on the basis of his Psu-80886.
It is clear, therefore, that whatever claim plaintiffs-appellees have on the subject property on the
basis of Lot 3 Psu-56007, through their predecessor-in-interest, Florentino Baltazar, the same
had been clearly and finally denied by the Supreme Court in Guico vs. San Pedro.
For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the former judgment or order must be
final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between
the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
action. Plaintiffs-appellees only have objections with respect to the fourth requisite, offering the
lame excuse that it is not bound by such decision, there being no identity of parties in Guico vs.
San Pedro and the instant case.
We agree with petitioners that it is not apparent from an examination of Guico and the evidence
on record that indeed the predecessors-in-interest of ALI and the Carpos with respect to the
subject property are Eduardo Guico and Florentino Baltazar, especially since the parties’
respective OCTs were not issued in these persons’ names but rather a certain Alberto
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Yaptinchay and Apolonio Sabater. It cannot be categorically said that there was identity of
parties between the Guico case and the instant case. Clearly, one of the elements of res
judicata, i.e., that there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, is
lacking. In any event, the CA’s questioned Decision had sufficient basis in fact and law even
without relying on the Guico case. Spouses Morris Carpo and Socorro Carpo vs. Ayala Land,
Incorporated, G.R. No. 166577, February 3, 2010.
Judgment; requirement to state legal basis. Petitioner next alleges that the CA denied
reconsideration without indicating its legal basis in violation of the mandate of Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that no petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis therefor. This requirement, however, was complied with in the instant case,
when the CA, in its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, stated that it
found no cogent reason to modify, much less reverse itself. Jimmy Areno, Jr. vs. Skycable PCC-
Baguio, G.R. No. 180302. February 5, 2010.
Judgment; stare decisis. In truth, this Court has already ruled squarely on whether these deemed-
resigned provisions challenged in the case at bar violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution in Fariñas, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al. In Fariñas, the constitutionality of
Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, was assailed on the ground, among others, that it unduly discriminates against appointive
officials. As Section 14 repealed Section 67 (i.e., the deemed-resigned provision in respect of
elected officials) of the Omnibus Election Code, elected officials are no longer considered ipso
facto resigned from their respective offices upon their filing of certificates of candidacy. In
contrast, since Section 66 was not repealed, the limitation on appointive officials continues to
be operative – they are deemed resigned when they file their certificates of candidacy. The
petitioners in Fariñas thus brought an equal protection challenge against Section 14, with the
end in view of having the deemed-resigned provisions “apply equally” to both elected and
appointive officials. We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two
classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in
relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection
clause of the Constitution, failed muster.
The case at bar is a crass attempt to resurrect a dead issue. The miracle is that our assailed
Decision gave it new life. We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere. This doctrine, which is really “adherence to precedents,” mandates that once a case
has been decided one way, then another case involving exactly the same point at issue should
be decided in the same manner. This doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for
securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions. XXX XXX XXX Flor Martinez, represented
by Macario Martinez, authorized representative and Attorney-in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and
Edilberto M. Brua, G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010.
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Judgment; sufficiency of minute resolution of Supreme Court. As to petitioner’s complaint
regarding this Court’s denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly
deprived her of due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and
applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or
resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias,
extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on
its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the
Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order, together
with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. Florencia G. Diaz vs.
Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181502, February 2, 2010.
Judgment on the pleadings; defendant’s admission of material averments of complaint. In this
case, the trial court rendered a judgment on the pleadings. Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court reads: “SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. – Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.”
The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party
if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A judgment on the
pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations
appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes. This case is unusual
because it was petitioner, and not the claimant respondent, who moved for a judgment on the
pleadings during the pre-trial. This is clear from the trial court’s Order dated 7 October 1997
which reads: “When this case was called for pre-trial, parties appeared together with
counsel. Defendant [Doris U. Sunbanun] moved that considering that there is no dispute as far
as the contract is concerned and the only disagreement between the parties is on the
interpretation of the contract so that the issue boils down on to which of the parties are correct
on their interpretation. With the conformity of the plaintiff [Aurora B. Go], this case is therefore
considered closed and submitted for judgment on the pleading.”
Petitioner, in moving for a judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of
her own allegations and without giving respondent the opportunity to introduce evidence, is
deemed to have admitted the material and relevant averments of the complaint, and to rest her
motion for judgment based on the pleadings of the parties. Doris U. Sunbanun vs. Aurora B.
Go, G.R. No. 163280, February 2, 2010.
Jurisdiction; action to collect on bond. In the instant case, the original complaint filed with the
trial court was in the nature of a collection case, purportedly to collect on the obligation of
petitioner by virtue of the bonds executed by it in favor of respondent, essentially a contractual
obligation. As petitioner correctly points out, an action to collect on a bond used to secure the
payment of taxes is not a tax collection case, but rather a simple case for enforcement of a
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contractual liability. In Mambulao, Mambulao Lumber Company (MLC) was liable for
deficiency sales tax to the Republic. The parties agreed to an installment plan, whereby MLC
obligated itself to pay such obligation in 12 equal monthly installments. To secure the
installment payments, MLC and Mambulao Insurance and Surety Corporation executed a surety
bond in favor of the Republic. MLC defaulted in the payment of its obligation. Thus, the
Republic proceeded against the surety bond. MLC sought the dismissal of the case against it on
the ground of prescription, arguing that under Sec. 331, in relation to Sec. 183(A), of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), internal revenue taxes must be assessed within five (5)
years from the filing of the corresponding return. Thus, we ruled in that case that the NIRC was
inapplicable to the case and that the Republic had ten (10) years from default of payment within
which to collect the indebtedness of MLC. We explained that an action based upon a surety
bond cannot be considered a tax collection case. Rather, such action would properly be a case
based on a contract. Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Bureau of Customs, G.R. No. 185588, February 2, 2010.
Jurisdiction; civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation over which regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in
the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as
petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of
actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. Indeed, the trial court’s
refusal to entertain petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its
thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is
unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction x x x for the purpose
of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.” Petitioner’s
suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-
divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois
court’s so-called “retained jurisdiction.” Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo
Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010.
Jurisdiction; computation of jurisdictional amount in complaint for damages. Section 19(8)
of BatasPambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states. . . Relatedly,
Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99 was issued declaring that the first adjustment in jurisdictional
amount of first level courts outside of Metro Manila from P100,000.00 to P200,000.00 took
effect on March 20, 1999. Meanwhile, the second adjustment from P200,000.00
to P300,000.00 became effective on February 22, 2004 in accordance with OCA Circular No.
65-2004 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on May 13, 2004. Based on the
foregoing, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004,
the MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00.
But where damages is the main cause of action, should the amount of moral damages prayed for
in the complaint be the sole basis for determining which court has jurisdiction or should the
total amount of all the damages claimed regardless of kind and nature, such as exemplary
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damages, nominal damages, and attorney’s fees, etc., be used? In this regard, Administrative
Circular No. 09-94 is instructive:
2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in determining the jurisdictional
amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main
cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or
one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis ours.)
In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for the recovery of damages
for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame
and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they were at a police
station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged
in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely
incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in
the complaint.
Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals
was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case. Irene Sante and Reynaldo vs.
Hon. Edilberto T. Claravall, etc., et al., G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010.
Jurisdiction; estoppel. On Metrobank’s raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint
for respondent’s failure to pay the correct docket fees, apropos is the ruling in National Steel
Corporation v. Court of Appeals: “Although the payment of the proper docket fees is a
jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an action to pay the same
within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. If the plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the defendant should timely
raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in estoppel. In the latter case, the
balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount actually paid by the plaintiff will
be considered a lien on any award he may obtain in his favor. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Metrobank raised the issue of jurisdiction only before the appellate court after it and its co-
petitioner participated in the proceedings before the trial court. While lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at any time, a party may be held in estoppel if, as in the present case, it has actively
taken part in the proceedings being questioned. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. and Solidbank
Corporation vs. Bernardita H. Perez, represented by her Attorney in fact Patria H. Perez, G.R.
No. 181842, February 5, 2010.
Jurisdiction; payment of docket fees. In Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that a pleading which does not specify in the prayer the amount sought
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shall not be admitted or shall be expunged, and that a court acquires jurisdiction only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee. This rule was relaxed in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion which was echoed in the 2005 case of Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melico, the
pertinent portion of the decision in the latter case reads: “Plainly, while the payment of
prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment at the time of filing
does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when insufficient filing fees
were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the government, the
Manchester rule does not apply.”
Metrobank takes exception to the application of Sun Insurance Office to the present case
because, by its claim, respondent deliberately concealed the insufficient payment of docket
fees. Metrobank’s position fails. The ensuing months in which the leased premises would be
rendered vacant could not be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. It bears
recalling that the building constructed on respondent’s leased premises was specifically
constructed to house a bank, hence, the idle period before another occupant with like business
may opt to lease would be difficult to project. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. and Solidbank
Corporation vs. Bernardita H. Perez, represented by her Attorney in fact Patria H. Perez, G.R.
No. 181842, February 5, 2010.
Jurisdiction; payment of docket fees is jurisdictional requirement. Clearly, therefore, the
payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of
the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement. It
is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same
period for taking an appeal. Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed
from becomes final and executory. Re: Petition for recognition of the excemption of the
Government Service Insurance System from payment of legal fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0,
February 11, 2010.
Jurisdiction; remand to regional trial court for proceedings to settle child custody issue. Instead
of ordering the dismissal of petitioner’s suit, the logical end to its lack of cause of action, we
remand the case for the trial court to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Stephanie is now
nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal
custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on
child custody proceedings – the best interest of the child. As the question of custody is already
before the trial court and the child’s parents, by executing the Agreement, initially showed
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inclination to share custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of justice to allow
the parties to take advantage of the court’s jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial
arrangement best serving Stephanie’s interest, and let the trial court render judgment. This
disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity may
be invoked to serve the child’s best interest. Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del Mundo
Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010.
Jurisdiction; voluntary appearance and submission to jurisdiction. It is settled that if there is no
valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a
voluntary appearance.”
And Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et
al. enlightens:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a
general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the
court for resolution. (italics and underscoring supplied)
In their first Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated January 30, 2006, respondents alleged:
xxxx
4. In the case of respondents, there is no reason why they should not receive the Orders of this
Honorable Court since the subject of the case is their multi-million real estate property and
naturally they would not want to be declared in default or lose the same outright without the
benefit of a trial on the merits;
5. It would be the height of injustice if the respondents is [sic] denied the equal protection of
the laws[;]
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6. Respondents must be afforded “Due process of Law” as enshrined in the New Constitution,
which is a basic right of every Filipino, since they were not furnished copies of pleadings by the
plaintiff and the Order dated May 3, 2005;
xxxx
and accordingly prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, . . . it is most respectfully prayed . . . that the Order dated May 5, 2005 declaring
[them] in default be LIFTED.
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for
the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to
the jurisdiction of the court. Rapid Realty and Development Corporation vs. Orlando Villa, et
al., G.R. No. 184197, February 11, 2010.
Mandamus; requirement of clear legal right. For mandamus to issue, it is essential that the
person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim sought. It will not issue to enforce a
right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial
doubt exists. Thus, unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, it will be denied. Teresita
L. Araos, et al. vs. Hon. Lea Regala, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 226, Quezon City and Social
Security System (SSS), G.R. No. 174237, February 18, 2010.
Orders; service on deputized attorney binding. Verily, it was Atty. Julie who entered his
appearance as counsel for DENR on January 18, 2000 and, as such, was the counsel on
record. It was only later or on June 8, 2000 that the OSG, through Assistant Solicitor General
Mariano M. Martinez, informed Atty. Julie that the latter had been deputized to assist the
Solicitor General in the case pending before the RTC. As such, being the counsel on record,
Atty. Julie had the authority to represent the petitioner, and it was but logical that notices of
court processes sent to him were sufficient to bind petitioner. Thus, the CA correctly concluded
that petitioner’s right to due process was not violated.
Since Atty. Julie had the authority to represent the DENR before the RTC, notices of decision,
orders, and other court processes to him as counsel on record and the duly deputized counsel of
the OSG were sufficient to bind petitioner, and both the counsel and the OSG’s failure to appeal
the decision and to avail themselves of the other remedies provided by the Rules was likewise
binding upon petitioner. Republic of the Philippines (DENR) vs. Technological Advocates for
Agro-Forest Programs Association, Inc. (TAFPA, Inc.), G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010.
Pleadings; amendment of complaint. Lastly, we find no error, much less grave abuse of
discretion, on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the RTC’s order allowing the
amendment of the original complaint from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency
of a petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. While it is a basic jurisprudential
principle that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the
original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here,
the RTC clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint
was then still a matter of right. Irene Sante and Reynaldo vs. Hon. Edilberto T. Claravall, etc., et
al., G.R. No. 173915, February 22, 2010.
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Pleadings; authority to execute verification and certification against forum shopping. It is thus
clear that the failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio
Merelos’s authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not
be considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was
subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents. Considering that
petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was, therefore,
unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely
technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution
so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure that all litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the
constraint of technicalities. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation vs. Mario Tablante, doing
business under the name and style ECRM Enterprises, rockland Construction Company, Laurie
Litam, MC Home Depot, Inc., G.R. No. 162924, February 4, 2010.
Pleadings; Certification of non-forum shopping; presumption of authority of signatory. The same
liberal application should also apply to the question of the alleged lack of authority of Atty.
Doromal to execute the certification of non-forum shopping for lack of a board resolution from
the NPC. True, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of the corporation, and proof of such authority must
be attached to the petition, the failure of which will be sufficient cause for
dismissal. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Atty. Doromal does not enjoy the presumption
that he is authorized to represent respondent in filing the Petition for Certiorari before the
CA. As Special Attorney, he is one of the counsels of NPC in the proceedings before the trial
court, and the NPC never questioned his authority to sign the petition for its behalf. Atty.
Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415. February 26, 2010.
Pleadings; period to file motion for reconsideration in Supreme Court. Pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 56-A of the 1997 Rules of Court, in relation to Section 1, Rule 52 of the same rules,
COMELEC had a period of fifteen days from receipt of notice of the assailed Decision within
which to move for its reconsideration. COMELEC received notice of the assailed Decision on
December 2, 2009, hence, had until December 17, 2009 to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration of COMELEC was timely filed. It was filed on
December 14, 2009. The corresponding Affidavit of Service (in substitution of the one originally
submitted on December 14, 2009) was subsequently filed on December 17, 2009 – still within
the reglementary period. Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010.
Pleadings; personal service and filing generally mandatory. The petition is
unmeritorious. Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court states: ”
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever practicable, the service and filing
of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
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emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be
cause to consider the paper as not filed.”
Section 11 is mandatory. Marcelino Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 169122,
February 2, 2010.
Pre-trial; plaintiff’s duty to move that case be set for pre-trial. We agree with private respondent
BPI that the failure of the Ex-Officio Sheriff to file her Answer should not have prevented
petitioners from performing their duty under Section 1 of Rule 18. Petitioners could have availed
of other remedies, such as the filing of a motion to declare Ex-Officio Sheriff in default, to avoid
unnecessary delay in court proceedings. Benedicta Samson and Marcial Samson vs. Hon. Judge
Geraldine Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010.
Procedural rules; instance where liberal application not allowed. While there are instances
where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an
appeal, the long line of decisions denying the special civil action for certiorari, either before
appeal was availed of or in instances where the appeal period had lapsed, far outnumber the
instances where certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions are: (1) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (2) when the broader interests of
justice so require; (3) when the writs issued are null; (4) when the questioned order amounts to
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, which we find to be not present in this
case. Notably, petitioner did not even fail to advance an explanation why appeal was not
availed of, nor was there any showing that the issue raised in the petition for certioraricould not
be raised on appeal. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the
rules. Flor Martinez, represented by Macario Martinez, authorized representative and Attorney-
in-fact vs. Ernesto G. Garcia and Edilberto M. Brua, G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application. In any case, the substantive issues we have already
discussed are justifiable reasons to relax the rules of procedure. We cannot allow a patently
wrong judgment to be implemented because of technical lapses. This ratiocination is in keeping
with the policy to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding. Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415.
February 26, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in admitting
respondent’s Comment to petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration which was filed 19 days
late. A close scrutiny of Section 6, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which grants discretionary
authority to the CA in ordering parties to file responsive and other pleadings in petitions
for certiorari filed before it, will reveal that such rule is merely directory in nature. This is so
because the word “may” employed by the rule shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary
on the part of the CA to require the filing of pleadings which it deems necessary to assist it in
resolving the controversies. In the same way, the admission of any responsive pleading filed by
party-litigants is a matter that rests largely on the sound discretion of the court. At any rate, rules
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of procedure may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice and in order to afford litigants
maximum opportunity for the proper and just determination of their causes. Strict adherence to
technical adjective rules should never be unexceptionally required because a contrary precept
would result in a failure to decide cases on their merits. The CA could not have erred in
admitting the comment, albeit filed late, when it viewed that the interest of justice would be
better served by the policy of liberality. Jimmy Areno, Jr. vs. Skycable PCC-Baguio, G.R. No.
180302. February 5, 2010.
Procedural rules; requisites for liberal application. Liberal application of procedural rules is
allowed only when two requisites are present: (1) there is a plausible explanation for the non-
compliance, and (2) the outright dismissal would defeat the administration of justice. In Tible &
Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, the Court held that “the two pre-
requisites for the relaxation of the rules are: (1) justifiable cause or plausible reason for non-
compliance; and (2) compelling reason to convince the court that outright dismissal of the
petition would seriously impair the orderly administration of justice.” Both requisites are lacking
in the present case. Marcelino Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 169122, February
2, 2010.
Procedural rules; substantial compliance; liberal application. From the foregoing, it is thus clear
that the failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio
Merelos’s authority to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not
be considered fatal to the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was
subsequently submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents. Considering that
petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was, therefore,
unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized that dismissal of an appeal on a purely
technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of
procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to
help secure, not override, substantial justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution
so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; rather, they must ensure that all litigants are
granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the
constraint of technicalities. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation vs. Mario Tablante, doing
business under the name and style ECRM Enterprises, rockland Construction Company, Laurie
Litam, MC Home Depot, Inc., G.R. No. 162924, February 4, 2010.
Res judicata; requisites. Whether the principle of res judicata applies and whether petitioner has
the legal capacity to maintain the action despite the revocation of her appointment as co-
administratrix of Fr. Balbino’s estate are the core issues in the present case.
The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main rules which may be stated as follows: (1) The
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties and their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action
before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is
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conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two
suits are the same. These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing
the two typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these
cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the afore-quoted paragraph
(b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as “bar by former judgment“; while
the second general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is
known as “conclusiveness of judgment.” (emphasis supplied)
In CA-G.R. SP No. 33118 (the petition for certiorari assailing the probate court’s order for
respondent Nazario to turn over possession of the property to petitioner), the therein petitioner
was herein respondent Nazario, and the therein private respondent was herein petitioner. The
issue presented in that petition for certiorari was whether the probate court validly ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession over the property in favor of herein petitioner, whose legal
capacity and cause of action stemmed from her being the co-special administratrix of the estate
of Fr. Balbino. From the earlier-stated allegations gathered from petitioner’s complaint subject
of the present petition, she is suing respondents for the annulment of the title to the property
issued to them and for the reconveyance of the property to Fr. Balbino’s estate. There is thus
identity of parties and subject matter in the two cases.
As to identity of causes of action, it is hornbook rule that identity of causes of action does not
mean absolute identity, otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by
changing the form of the action or the relief sought. CA-G.R. SP No. 33118 which emanated
from SP. Proc. No. B-894 involved estate proceedings, while Civil Case No. 67043 subject of
the present petition is for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance, Recovery of Possession and
Ownership and Damages. These two cases differ in the form of action, but they raise the same
issue – ownership and possession of the same property, and they invoke the same relief – for Fr.
Balbino’s estate to be declared the owner of the property and for it reconveyed to his estate, and
for the TCT in the name of herein respondents to be annulled. And the evidence required to
substantiate the respective claims of the parties is substantially the same.
Be that as it may, however, an important requisite for the principle of res judicata is
wanting. The appellate court’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 33118 was not a final and executory
decision on the merits to put the present case within the ambit of res judicata. Thus the
dispositive portion of the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 33118 reads: “IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, the orders of respondent court dated June 30, 1993 and January 6, 1994, are
hereby set aside insofar as they direct petitioner[-herein respondent Nazario C. Lopez] to turn-
over to private respondent[-herein petitioner Teresita de Mesa Reforzado] the property located
at 140 Lagmay St., San Juan, Metro Manila, through a writ of execution, the authority of
respondent court in determining the ownership of said property merely
being provisional. Private respondent, as co-special administratrix, should file a separate action
for the recovery thereof, if she has strong reasons to believe that the same belongs to the estate
of Fr. Balbino Caparas.
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The ruling in CA-G.R. No. 33118, relied upon by the appellate court in holding that res
judicata bars petitioner’s present complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance, is not a
decision on the meritson the ownership of the property, the appellate court in said case having
merely resolved the propriety of the probate court’s issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
herein petitioner. The appellate court in fact declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 33118 that herein
petitioner had the remedy of filing a separate action for recovery of the property – a recourse she
availed of when she filed the complaint for annulment of title and reconveyance subject of the
present petition. Contrary then to the ruling of the appellate court, the present action is not
barred by res judicata. Teresita De Mesa Reforzado v. Spouses Nazario C. Lopez and Precila
Lopez, G.R. No. 148306, February 24, 2010.
Summary judgment; requirement of absence of genuine issue of fact. A summary judgment is
allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as to the amount of damages, the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions show no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The purpose of a summary
judgment is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear
undisputed to the mind of the court. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven
summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. For a full-blown
trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently
insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. “Genuine issue” means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived. Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that the parties
intentionally did not inform him of the settlement. He alleged that he never received a copy of
NPC’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the CA and that instead, it was another lawyer who
was furnished and who acknowledged receipt of the motion. When he confronted his clients,
he was allegedly told that the NPC deceived them into believing that what they received was
only a partial payment exclusive of the attorney’s fees. NPC contested these averments. It
claimed good faith in the execution of the compromise agreement. It stressed that the attorney’s
fees were already deemed included in the monetary consideration given to the plaintiffs for the
compromise. The above averments clearly pose factual issues which make the rendition of
summary judgment not proper. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong. It is synonymous with fraud, in that it involves a design to
mislead or deceive another. The trial court should have exercised prudence by requiring the
presentation of evidence in a formal trial to determine the veracity of the parties’ respective
assertions. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and acted in bad faith is a question of fact
and is evidentiary. Bad faith has to be established by the claimant with clear and convincing
evidence, and this necessitates an examination of the evidence of all the parties. As certain facts
pleaded were being contested by the opposing parties, such would not warrant a rendition of
summary judgment.
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Moreover, the validity or the correct interpretation of the alleged compromise agreements is still
in issue in view of the diverse interpretations of the parties thereto. In fact, in the Decision of
the CA dated January 24, 1996, the appellate court ordered the case to be remanded to the trial
court for new trial, thereby ignoring completely NPC’s motion to dismiss appeal based on the
alleged compromise agreements it executed with the plaintiffs. Even in its assailed Decision of
September 9, 2002, the CA did not rule on the validity of the alleged compromise
agreements. This is only to be expected in view of its earlier ruling dated January 24, 1996
which directed the remand of the case to the court of origin for new trial. Considering the
above disquisition, there is still a factual issue on whether the NPC and the plaintiffs had already
validly entered into a compromise agreement. Clearly, the NPC and the plaintiffs have diverse
interpretations as regards the stipulations of the compromise agreement which must be
resolved. According to the NPC, the amounts it paid to the plaintiffs were in full satisfaction of
their claims. Plaintiffs claim otherwise. They insist that the amounts they received were
exclusive of attorney’s claim. They also assert that NPC undertook to pay the said attorney’s
fees to herein petitioner. Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R.
No. 167415. February 26, 2010.
Other proceedings
Execution; satisfaction of judgment; amount (HLURB). After a judgment has gained finality, it
becomes the ministerial duty of the court or quasi-judicial tribunal to order its execution. In the
present case, the final and executory HLURB decision was partially executed by the sale of the
315 sacks of rice belonging to Viola. In determining the amount to be credited to the account of
Viola, we look at the Sheriff’s Partial Report and the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale. Both
documents state that in the auction sale of the 315 sacks of rice, Mrs. Rebecca Genato
submitted the highest bid in the amount of P189,000.00. Drawing from Section 19, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which states that “all sales of property under execution must be made at
public auction, to the highest bidder,” it naturally follows that the highest bid submitted is the
amount that should be credited to the account of the judgment debtor. Spouses William Genato
and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010.
Execution pending appeal of RTC decision in election cases; requirements. There are clear cut
requirements on when RTC decisions may be executed pending appeal.
A valid exercise of discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it must be
manifest in the decision sought to be executed that the defeat of the protestee and the victory of
the protestant have been clearly established. The Rules of Procedure in Election Contests now
embody this doctrine, which the Comelec has in the past given value to and used in resolving
cases before it, and which has formed part of our jurisprudence.
We have taken to heart the need to decide election contests with dispatch; hence, we
promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC to address the matter. Noteworthy is the fact that particular
attention has been given to the decision itself in election contests. For comparison, in the Rules
of Court, Section 1 of Rule 36 merely states: “A judgment or final order determining the merits
of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
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distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of
court.”
Notably, the word “must” is used in the above-quoted rule, thus, clearly indicating the
mandatory — not merely directory — nature of the requirement of what the decision should
contain. The specific rules on the contents of decisions in election contests were formulated so
that the decision could, by itself, be taken as a valuable aid in expeditiously deciding on appeal
incidents peripheral to the main case. In the present case, the contents of the decision become
particularly relevant and useful in light of the need to decide the case before us with utmost
dispatch, based only on the documents submitted before us, considering that the records and
election materials are with another tribunal, as a matter of course. Leonor Dangan-Corral vs.
Commission on Elections and Ernesto Enero Fernandez, G.R. No. 190156, February 12, 2010.
Execution pending appeal of RTC decision in election cases; requirement of clear showing of
protestant’s victory and protestee’s defeat in RTC decision. For the limited purpose of
determining whether the essential requisite of a clear showing in the decision of the protestant’s
victory and the protestee’s defeat is present, we have examined the RTC Decision subject of the
present case. It is glaring and unmistakable that the said Decision does not conform to the
requirements set forth in Section 2 of the Rules. It does not give the specifics of its findings. The
general statement invalidating 67% of the total votes cast on the ground that the ballots were
written by one person or written by two persons is grossly infirm. The Decision does not specify
why the court considered particular groups of ballots to have been written by one person, and
other invalidated ballots to have been written by two persons. Worse, the Decision does not
state which and how many ballots were written by one person; and which and how many
ballots were written by two persons. The entire Decision, even the lengthy part enumerating the
exhibits offered by each party, fails to yield the exact number of and which ballots were written
by one person, and the exact number of and which ballots were written by two persons. There
is also no mention in the decision of whether or not the RTC took into consideration the entries
of the Minutes of Voting and Counting relative to illiterate or disabled voters, if any, who cast
their votes through assistors. The Decision merely states that “[a] careful and cursory
examination of these ballots indubitably shows that these ballots are written either by one (1) or
two (2) persons, given the palpable similarity in the handwritings indicated in these ballots
earlier declared by Protestant’s revisors as written by one (1) and two (2) persons.” It utterly
violates the mandatory requirement that “the court must clearly and distinctly specify why the
pair or group of ballots has been written by only one person. The specific figures or letters
indicating that the ballots have been written by one person must be specified.” In the present
case, the victory of the protestant and the defeat of the protestee were not clearly established in
the Decision because of the RTC’s failure to conform to the prescribed form of the
Decision. Because of said infirmity, there is no certainty, it not being mentioned in the Decision,
on whether the ballots of those who voted through assistors were also invalidated or not, in
conjunction with the lack of a specific number of ballots invalidated for being written by one
person. The ballots of those who voted through assistors, if any, could validly be written by one
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person. It being unclear from the Decision whether these ballots, if any, were invalidated, it
follows that the victory of the protestant and defeat of the protestee are unclear and not manifest
therein. Consequently, to allow the execution of such a grossly infirm RTC Decision in
disregard of established jurisprudence and clear and straightforward rules is arbitrary and
whimsical and constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Leonor Dangan-Corral vs. Commission on Elections and Ernesto Enero
Fernandez, G.R. No. 190156, February 12, 2010.
Injunction; NCIP’s jurisdiction to issue TROs or preliminary injunctions. Petitioners contend that
injunction, as an original and principal action, falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The NCIP may issue TROs and writs of preliminary injunction only as an auxiliary
remedy to a pending case before it. Petitioners also assert that there was no factual and legal
basis for the NCIP’s issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. We have already ruled on the
power of the NCIP to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in City Government of Baguio City v.
Atty. Masweng. The facts of that case are practically identical to those of this case save for the
fact that the land being claimed there is a portion of the Busol Forest Reserve. The petitioners in
that case sought the intervention of this Court after the CA upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP
and affirmed the TROs issued by the latter. The City Mayor of Baguio and the Head of the
Demolition Team-Engr. Nazita Bañez v. Atty. Brain Masweng, Regional Hearing Officer, NCIP-
CAR, the heirs of Judith Cariño, Jacqueline Cariño and the Heirs of Mateo Cariño and Bayosa
Ortega, G.R. No. 165003, February 2, 2010.
Injunction; requisite of present and unmistakable right (NCIP). Private respondents base their
claim to the disputed area on an alleged time-immemorial possession and a survey plan
awarded to their forebears by the Director of Lands in 1920. In 1940, Proclamation No. 603
withdrew the contested area from sale or settlement and reserved the same for animal breeding
station purposes, subject to private rights. The claim of respondents on the subject land is still
pending before the NCIP. Thus, their rights are mere expectations, not the present and
unmistakable right required for the grant of the provisional remedy of injunction. Moreover, the
structures subject of the demolition order were either built or being constructed without the
requisite permit at the time the demolition order was issued in 2003. Hence, private
respondents were not entitled to the preliminary injunction issued by the NCIP. (The City Mayor
of Baguio and the Head of the Demolition Team-Engr. Nazita Bañez v. Atty. Brain Masweng,
Regional Hearing Officer, NCIP-CAR, the heirs of Judith Cariño, Jacqueline Cariño and the Heirs
of Mateo Cariño and Bayosa Ortega, G.R. No. 165003, February 2, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Under these terms, the
COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g.,
COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a)
to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case
or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or
classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions
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raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons
and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP
the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO
561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those
involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as
pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants. Undisputably, the
properties involved in the present dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of
whom is a squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public
land claimant or a member of any cultural minority. Moreover, the dispute between the parties
can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate social tension or
unrest, or a critical situation that would require immediate and urgent action. The issues raised
in the present case primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property
and the Easement of Right of Way. As held in Longino v. General, “disputes requiring no special
skill or technical expertise of an administrative body that could be resolved by applying
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts.” The Machados cannot invoke Section 3, paragraph 2(e) of EO 561, which provides
that the COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving “other similar land
problems of grave urgency,” to justify the COSLAP’s intervention in this case. The statutory
construction principle of ejusdem generic prescribes that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned. A dispute between two
parties concerning the right of way over private lands cannot be characterized as similar to
those enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (d) of EO 561. In Davao New Town
Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems – where we ruled
that the COSLAP does not have blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it – we
made it clear that its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the
government has a proprietary or regulatory interest. Felicitas M. Machado and Marcelino P.
Machado vs. Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al., G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010.
Judgment; finality (HLURB). The April 27, 1999 HLURB Resolution, reinstating the December
18, 1996 Decision, has long been final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than
that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no
longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the
highest court of the land. The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction
of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions is present in this
case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a
tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint and, as discussed above, with
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jurisdiction over the parties. Hence, the same can no longer be modified. Spouses William
Genato and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010.
Judgment; finality of judgment in petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The issue raised
in this petition has been settled in the case of Tuason v. Court of Appeals. In Tuason, private
respondent therein filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage on the ground of her
husband’s psychological incapacity. There, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the
nullity of the marriage and awarding custody of the children to private respondent therein. No
timely appeal was taken from the trial court’s judgment. We held that the decision annulling the
marriage had already become final and executory when the husband failed to appeal during the
reglementary period. The husband claimed that the decision of the trial court was null and void
for violation of his right to due process. He argued he was denied due process when, after
failing to appear on two scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right
to present evidence and rendered judgment based solely on the evidence presented by private
respondent. We upheld the judgment of nullity of the marriage even if it was based solely on
evidence presented by therein private respondent. We also ruled in Tuason that notice sent to
the counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of the counsel to
inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the latter’s right to appeal is not
a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. In the present case, the 30
March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had become final and
executory upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the 17 May 2004 resolution, which the trial court received on 28 June 2004,
was clearly filed out of time. Applying the doctrine laid down in Tuason, the alleged negligence
of counsel resulting in petitioner’s loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for vacating the trial
court’s judgments.
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004
decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory
upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed
by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be
disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court was
correct in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when
a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The reason is grounded on the
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a
judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest. Susie Chan-
Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139. February 25, 2010
Jurisdiction; judgment issued by quasi-judicial agency without jurisdiction is void (COSLAP). In
this case, the COSLAP did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by
Gatdula, yet it proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the case and even issued writs of
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execution and demolition against the Machados. The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the
parties’ participation in the proceedings before the COSLAP. Under the circumstances, the
Machados can rightfully question its jurisdiction at anytime, even during appeal or after final
judgment. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be
the source of any right or create any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is likewise void. Felicitas M. Machado and Marcelino P. Machado vs.
Ricardo L. Gatdula, et al., G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010.
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction over person is waivable (HLURB). At this point, it may be beneficial to
elaborate on the matter of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a
court to hear, try and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have
authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties. Elementary is the distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter and
jurisdiction over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution
or by law. In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the
party’s voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive
processes. Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter
which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the parties. In civil case,
courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction
over the defendants is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner
required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its
authority.
The act of filing the complaint with the HLURB is unequivocally a voluntary submission by the
complainants, including Viola, to the authority of the HLURB. Clearly, the HLURB acquired
jurisdiction over Viola, who was one of the complainants, upon the filing of their
complaint. Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706,
February 5, 2010.
Jurisdiction; no estoppel; jurisdiction conferred by law and not by parties’ conduct
(COSLAP). By reason of the Machados’ active participation in the mediation conferences and
the COSLAP verification surveys, the CA declared the Machados estopped from questioning the
body’s jurisdiction and bound by its decisions, orders and resolutions. We disagree with this
ruling. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties’ action or
conduct. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal
where none, by law, exists. Felicitas M. Machado and Marcelino P. Machado vs. Ricardo L.
Gatdula, et al., G.R. No. 156287, February 16, 2010.
Legal fees; exemption of cooperative from payment of legal fees does not apply to petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act No. 3135. The question is whether petitioner’s
application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.
The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited
to two types of actions, namely: (1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by
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the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations contracted in
favor of cooperatives. By simple deduction, it is immediately apparent that Article 62(6) of RA
6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees
in this proceeding because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action
brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under Act
3135. Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim
exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on behalf of cooperatives. Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO), etc. vs. Hon. Iluminada Cabato-
Cortes, Executive Judge, RTC, Baguio City, G.R. No. 165922. February 26, 2010
Motion to Dismiss in petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. As for the applicability to
petitioner’s motion to dismiss of Section 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, petitioner is correct. Section 7 of the
Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages provides: “SEC. 7. Motion to dismiss. – No motion to dismiss the petition shall be
allowed except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties;
provided, however, that any other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case may be
raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.”
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in
an answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that judgment may be made on the
merits. In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important factor to be
considered. Further, the letter of the law admits of no other interpretation but that the provision
applies only to a respondent, not a petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage files an
answer where any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised as an affirmative defense
pursuant to the provision. The only logical conclusion is that Section 7 of the Rule does not
apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who initiated the petition for the declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. Since petitioner is not
the respondent in the petition for the annulment of the marriage, Section 7 of the Rule does not
apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her. Section 7 of the Rule not being applicable,
petitioner’s claim that it is unconstitutional for allegedly setting an obstacle to the preservation
of the family is without basis.
Section 1 of the Rule states that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable marriage. In this
connection, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court allows dismissal of the action upon notice or upon
motion of the plaintiff.
However, when petitioner filed the motion to dismiss on 4 November 2004, the 30 March 2004
decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution of the trial court had long become final and executory
upon the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period without any timely appeal having been filed
by either party. The 30 March 2004 decision and the 17 May 2004 resolution may no longer be
disturbed on account of the belated motion to dismiss filed by petitioner. The trial court was
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correct in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Nothing is more settled in law than that when
a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. The reason is grounded on the
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgments or orders of courts must be final at some definite date fixed by law. Once a
judgment has become final and executory, the issues there should be laid to rest. Susie Chan-
Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139. February 25, 2010
Parties; estoppel (HLURB). Moreover, it was only when the final and executory judgment of the
HLURB was already being executed against Viola that she, for the first time, reversed her
position; and claimed that she was not a party to the case and that the HLURB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her. Viola is estopped from taking such inconsistent positions. Where a party,
by his or her deed or conduct, has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel
effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct
that causes loss or injury to the latter. The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of
public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak
against his own act, representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were
directed and who reasonably relied thereon. After petitioners had reasonably relied on the
representations of Viola that she was a complainant and entered into the proceedings before the
HLURB, she cannot now be permitted to impugn her representations to the injury of the
petitioners. Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706,
February 5, 2010.
Parties; indispensable party (Comelec case). Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court
should dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead the LP as an
indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of
mandatory injunction against the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality
without making the LP a party to the case. But petitioners Atienza, et al.’s causes of action in
this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.’s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the
election of party leaders and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al.
were supposedly excluded from the elections by a series of “despotic acts” of Roxas, et al., who
controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party,
their exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilon’s “railroading” of election
proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al. Since
no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the
LP is not an indispensable party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.’s prayer for the undoing of
respondents Roxas, et al.’s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed against Roxas, et
al. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16,
2010.
Parties; standing; real parties-in-interest (Comelec case). Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim
that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election of Roxas as LP
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president because they are no longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party
or having joined other political parties. As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of
the action. But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, legal standing in suits is
governed by the “real parties-in-interest” rule under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This
states that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.” And “real party-in-interest” is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff’s
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.’s lack
of standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically
assume the truth of the allegations in the petition. Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et
al.’s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP members by
summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election
of its officers and that not all who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If
Atienza, et al.’s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly expelled from the
party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as
members of good standing and to the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list
of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take part in another
election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Court’s decision in this
case. Consequently, they have legal standing to pursue this petition. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010.
Pleadings; allegations rather than caption of pleadings control (HLURB). It is not the caption of
the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion of the names of all
the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into
the substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the
title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the
complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is
specially true before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard
to legal technicalities obtaining in the courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to
promote public interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action, application or other proceedings. Respondent Viola, although
her name did not appear in the title as a party, was one of the persons who caused the
preparation of the complaint and who verified the same. The allegations in the body of the
complaint indicate that she is one of the complainants. She categorically considered, and held
out, herself as one of the complainants from the time of the filing of the complaint and up to the
time the decision in the HLURB case became final and executory. To repeat, the averments in
the body of the complaint, not the title, are controlling. Hence, having been set forth in the
body of the complaint as a complainant, Viola was a party to the case. Spouses William Genato
and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010.
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Pleadings; formal amendments (HLURB). For clarity, the complaint should have been amended
to reflect in the title the individual complainants. There being a “defect in the designation of the
parties”, its correction could be summarily made at any stage of the action provided no
prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party. In the present case, the specification of the
individual complainants in the title of the case would not constitute a change in the identity of
the parties. Only their names were omitted in the title but they were already parties to the case,
most importantly, they were heard through their counsel whom they themselves chose to
prepare the complaint and represent them in the case before the HLURB. No unfairness or
surprise to the complainants, including Viola, or to the Sps. Genato would result by allowing the
amendment, the purpose of which is merely to conform to procedural rules or to correct a
technical error. It is now too late to dismiss this petition, and, in effect, nullify all
proceedings had before the HLURB on the ground that Viola does not appear to have been
impleaded as a party. The error or defect is merely formal and not substantial and an
amendment to cure such defect is expressly authorized by Sec. 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court. Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February
5, 2010.
Reconstitution; Appeal; scope of review; Supreme Court may review jurisdictional infirmities
even if not raised by appellant. Because of these fatal omissions, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over respondents’ petition. Consequently, the proceedings it conducted, as well as
those of the CA, are null and void. It is unfortunate that despite the mandatory nature of the
above requirements and our constant reminder to courts to scrutinize and verify carefully all
supporting documents in petitions for reconstitution, the same still escaped the attention of the
trial court and the CA. And while petitioner also overlooked those jurisdictional infirmities and
failed to incorporate them as additional issues in its petition, this Court has sufficient authority to
pass upon and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction. Republic of the Philippines vs.
Heirs of Julio Ramos, represented by Reynaldo Ramos Medina, et al., G.R. No. 169481,
February 22, 2010.
Reconstitution; Jurisdiction; effect of failure to establish jurisdictional requirements in judicial
reconstitution of title case. Because of these fatal omissions, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over respondents’ petition. Consequently, the proceedings it conducted, as well as
those of the CA, are null and void. It is unfortunate that despite the mandatory nature of the
above requirements and our constant reminder to courts to scrutinize and verify carefully all
supporting documents in petitions for reconstitution, the same still escaped the attention of the
trial court and the CA. And while petitioner also overlooked those jurisdictional infirmities and
failed to incorporate them as additional issues in its petition, this Court has sufficient authority to
pass upon and resolve the same since they affect jurisdiction. Republic of the Philippines vs.
Heirs of Julio Ramos, represented by Reynaldo Ramos Medina, et al., G.R. No. 169481,
February 22, 2010.
Reconstitution; Jurisdiction; jurisdictional requirements for petition for reconstitution of title. RA
26 lays down the specific procedure for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens
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certificates of title. It confers jurisdiction upon trial courts to hear and decide petitions for
judicial reconstitution. However, before said courts can assume jurisdiction over the petition
and grant the reconstitution prayed for, the petitioner must observe certain special requirements
and mode of procedure prescribed by law. Some of these requirements are enumerated in
Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26.
Perusal of respondents’ Petition for Reconstitution, for the purpose of verifying whether the strict
and mandatory requirements of RA 26, particularly Section 12 (b) and (e) thereof, have been
faithfully complied with, would reveal that it did not contain an allegation that no co-owner’s,
mortgagee’s or lessees duplicate had been issued or, if any had been issued, the same had been
lost or destroyed. The petition also failed to state the names and addresses of the present
occupants of Lot 54. Correspondingly, the Notice of Hearing issued by the court a quo did not
also indicate the names of the occupants or persons in possession of Lot 54, in gross violation of
Section 13 of RA 26. Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Julio Ramos, represented by
Reynaldo Ramos Medina, et al., G.R. No. 169481, February 22, 2010.
Res judicata; applicability in land registration case. The Court agrees with the Republic’s
position that Reyes is applicable to this case. To constitute res judicata, the following elements
must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes
exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for
review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two cases are different,
the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each
other. This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of Lands. In that
case, Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his
possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the
trial court’s decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the
public domain. Quintin’s successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite knowledge of the
proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino.
The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this
one, was whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant
constituted res judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain
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constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also
against all persons. Florencia G. Diaz vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181502,
February 2, 2010.
Trial; consolidation (Sandiganbayan). The rule allowing consolidation is designed to avoid
multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression or abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested
dockets, and to simplify the work of the trial court – in short, the attainment of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. Thus, in Philippine Savings Bank v. Mañalac,
Jr., the Court disregarded the technical difference between an action and a proceeding, and
upheld the consolidation of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with an ordinary
civil action in order to achieve a more expeditious resolution of the cases. In the present case, it
would be more in keeping with law and equity if all the cases filed against petitioner were
consolidated with that having the lowest docket number pending with the Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The only notable differences in these cases lie in the date of the transaction,
the entity transacted with and amount involved. The charge and core element are the same –
estafa through falsification of documents based on alleged overstatements of claims for
miscellaneous and extraordinary expenses. Notably, the main witness is also the same –
Hilconeda P. Abril. It need not be underscored that consolidation of cases, when proper, results
in the simplification of proceedings which saves time, the resources of the parties and the courts,
and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and
is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
their cases before the courts. Above all, consolidation avoids the possibility of rendering
conflicting decisions in two or more cases which would otherwise require a single
judgment. Jaime S. Domdom v. Hon. Third and Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan,
Commission on Audit and The People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 182382-83, February 24,
2010.
Writ of amparo; Appeal; effect of appellee’s failure to appeal. The entrenched procedural rule in
this jurisdiction is that a party who did not appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to
have the judgment modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of
errors or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the judgment in
his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court a quo or raised in the
appellant’s assignment of errors or arguments. This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic
principles in our rules of procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues,
facilitate the setting forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its
determinations. A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision of the court has
various remedies to correct an omission by the court. He may move for a correction or
clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through ordinary appeal. There is thus
no basis for the Court to skip the rule and excuse herein respondents for failure to properly avail
themselves of the remedies in the face of the parties’ contentions that have remained disputed.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to measure up to that
standard– substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the
appellate court’s decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review.
Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs
granted by the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify
the appellate court’s judgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by
adding thereto an order for the production of logbooks and reports. At this late stage,
respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for
affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a party
who did not appeal. If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the
appellate court was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the conclusion
of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading under the
Amparo Rule, but they did not. Gen. Alexander B. Yano, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina, G.R. No. 186640, February 11,
2010.
Writ of Amparo; archiving and revival. At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not
provided the CA with the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan,
and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo individually
addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And petitioners’ motion interposed
before the appellate court for notice or service via publication has not been accompanied by
supporting affidavits as required by the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial
judgment––disposing of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement
as to the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2) outright
dismissal of the same petition as to them––hews to the prescription of Sec. 20 of the Amparo
Rule on archiving and reviving cases. Parenthetically, petitioners have also not furnished this
Court with sufficient data as to where the afore-named respondents may be served a copy of
their petition for review. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No.
183871, February 18, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; command responsibility has little bearing in amparo proceedings. As explained
by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that
they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their
subordinates against petitioners. To the appellate court, “the privilege of the writ
of amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason
that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and
illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of the
military or the police force.” The two generals, the CA’s holding broadly hinted, would have
been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the
AFP or PNP. As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded because
they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in investigating and
satisfactorily resolving Lourdes’ disappearance or bringing to justice the actual perpetrators of
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what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts
constituting threats against Mary Joy. While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the
CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the
backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-à-vis the two generals,
i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance owing to the fact that
command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law,
has little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with
the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form
of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be
any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such
proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of
an administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and
effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life,
liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, “is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative
liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.” Of the
same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said
in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats
thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction
are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out
these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter;
the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the
Legislature has the power to enact. x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at
most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the
duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to
devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued
to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to
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administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be
any. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February
18, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; effect of filing of related criminal action. Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes
the filing of an amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been
commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is
filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal
action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the
Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the
outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no
longer technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the Court has,
pursuant to Sec. 6 of the Rule, already issued ex partethe writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a
summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the
complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual
abductors of Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to
investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts
and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to
call for the consolidation of both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-
of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ of amparo as an
inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated or threatened to be violated, the
Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to
fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises. Towards this end, two things are at
once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition
with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in
the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right
to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that
body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the
OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced
before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be
allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to
be fully effective. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No.
183871, February 18, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; interim reliefs. In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides
for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the
witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence.
These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the present case, still order
the inspection of the military camps and order the army units to conduct an investigation into
the disappearance of Nicolas and Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The
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reliefs granted by the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that
petitioners could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims. Respondents
posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to whether the reliefs granted by the
appellate court are final or interlocutory. They thus implore this Court to modify the appellate
court’s judgment by considering the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto
an order for the production of logbooks and reports. At this late stage, respondents can no
longer avail themselves of their stale remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative reliefs in
their Comment. No modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not
appeal. If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court
was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the conclusion of said court,
but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration filed with
the appellate court, it being a prohibited pleading under the Amparo Rule, but they did not. Gen.
Alexander B. Yano, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, et al. vs. Cleofas Sanchez and
Marciana Medina, G.R. No. 186640, February 11, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; nature of remedy. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings
on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and
effective procedural relief against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life,
liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, “is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative
liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.” Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871,
February 18, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; nature of remedy. The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy
available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official
or employee or a private individual. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et
al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; nature of remedy. The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted
in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest
the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of
amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or
on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010.
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Writ of Amparo; requirement that petitioner establish claim by substantial evidence. What is
thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the RELIEFS by the appellate
court after finding want of substantial evidence are valid and proper.
The requisite standard of proof – substantial evidence – speaks of the clear intent of the Rule to
have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in resolving
amparo petitions. To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to
measure up to that standard– substantial evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not avail of any remedy against the
adverse judgment, the appellate court’s decision is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the
ambit of review. Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary measures expected
to be taken in safeguarding every citizen’s constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of
cases of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the
public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the
automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from
establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of
the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the court to
grant certain interim reliefs. Gen. Alexander B. Yano, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, et al. vs. Cleofas Sanchez and Marciana Medina, G.R. No. 186640, February 11,
2010.
Writ of Amparo; requirement of substantial evidence. Petitioners, to be sure, have not
successfully controverted answering respondents’ documentary evidence, adduced to debunk
the former’s allegations directly linking Lourdes’ abductors and tormentors to the military or the
police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-examination,
expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent. The Court is, of course, aware of what was
referred to in Razonas the “evidentiary difficulties” presented by the nature of, and encountered
by petitioners in, enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court
should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any kind or degree of
evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo remedies and protection. Sec.
17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes the minimum
evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action under the Rule.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would
warrant a finding of liability against the person charged; it is more than a scintilla of evidence. It
means such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise. Per the
CA’s evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the three
Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not satisfactorily hurdled the
evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense,
the burden of evidence never even shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no
compelling reason to disturb the appellate court’s determination of the answering respondents’
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role in the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her family’s
security. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871,
February 18, 2010.
Writ of Amparo; requirement of substantial evidence. In their petition for a writ of amparo,
petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the Court order the impleaded respondents “to
immediately desist from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of
the Petitioners and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices
where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court.” Petitioners, however, failed to
adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the predicate facts to support their cause
of action, i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against
responding respondents, as responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained
of. This is not to say, however, that petitioners’ allegation on the fact of the abduction incident
or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is that the military or
police connection has not been adequately proved either by identifying the malefactors as
components of the AFP or PNP; or in case identification is not possible, by showing that they
acted with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is
unable to ascribe the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual respondents. To this
extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct and must, accordingly, be
sustained. Lourdes D. Rubrico, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 183871,
February 18, 2010.
Evidence
Award of temperate damages in absence of competent proof of actual damages. In addition, the
Court of Appeals correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of P10,000.00 for the
damage caused on respondent’s motorcycle. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages “may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.” The cost of the
repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her Complaint. However, the
evidence presented was merely a job estimate of the cost of the motorcycle’s repair amounting
to P17, 829.00. The Court of Appeals aptly held that there was no doubt that the damage
caused on the motorcycle was due to the negligence of petitioner’s driver. In the absence of
competent proof of the actual damage caused on the motorcycle or the actual cost of its repair,
the award of temperate damages by the appellate court in the amount of P10,000.00 was
reasonable under the circumstances. Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan Lee,G.R. No.
166869, February 16, 2010.
Burden of proof in absence of trial. We cannot accept petitioners’ proposition that they did not
have the burden of proof of showing the irregularity of ALI’s title since the burden of proof
purportedly did not shift to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC. This
specious argument deserves scant credit. Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
provides: “Section 1. Burden of proof. — Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present
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evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law.”
With the filing of the complaint, petitioners should already have alleged all the bases of their
cause of action, particularly their allegation that ALI’s title is null and void and that such title
should be cancelled. However, a scrutiny of the complaint would show that petitioners never
alleged the purported lack of an approved survey plan as a defect of ALI’s title. All that the
complaint alleged is that ALI’s titles should be declared void for not being derivatives of the
Carpos’ title. Implicit in that allegation is that petitioners were relying solely on the supposed
priority of their own title over ALI’s. It stands to reason then that ALI did not have to allege in its
Answer that its mother title, OCT No. 242, was supported by a duly approved survey plan when
petitioners did not raise the same as an issue in their complaint or in any other pleading filed
with the trial court. Spouses Morris Carpo and Socorro Carpo vs. Ayala Land, Incorporated, G.R.
No. 166577, February 3, 2010.
Disputable presumption arising from willful suppression of evidence. An examination of the
evidence presented by petitioner shows that it consisted only of depositions of its witnesses. It
had in its possession and disposition pertinent documents such as the flight manifest and the
plane’s actual seating capacity and layout which could have clearly refuted respondents’ claims
that there were not enough passenger seats available for them. It inexplicably failed to offer
even a single piece of documentary evidence. The Court thus believes that if at least the cited
documentary evidence had been produced, it would have been adverse to petitioner’s
case. Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Spouses Edward J. Heshan and Neilia L. Heshan, et al., G.R.
No. 179117, February 3, 2010.
Evidence of actual damages. The Court of Appeals also awarded actual damages for the
expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake, and interment of respondent’s husband
in the amount of P154,575.30, and the medical expenses of respondent in the amount
of P168,019.55. Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as
receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim or the physical
injuries sustained by the victim. A review of the valid receipts submitted in evidence showed
that the funeral and related expenses amounted only to P114,948.60, while the medical
expenses of respondent amounted only to P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in
actual damages. Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February 16,
2010.
Evidence of loss of earning capacity. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to
substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages
for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws. In this case, the records
show that respondent’s husband was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline station in
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Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent testified that her husband earned an annual income of one
million pesos. Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax
Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that respondent’s husband earned a gross
income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use the Certificate and respondent’s
testimony as bases for fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos
before respondent’s husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence
was presented regarding the income derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of
respondent as regards such income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be
considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such
earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In the absence of documentary
evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the gasoline
station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the net
income (gross income less necessary expenses). Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Vivian Tan
Lee, G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010.
Evidence required in judicial reconstitution of title cases. Section 2 of RA 26 enumerates in the
following order the sources from which reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates of
title may be based.
Respondents predicate their Petition for Reconstitution on Section 2(f) of RA 26. And to avail of
its benefits, respondents presented survey plan, technical description, Certification issued by the
Land Registration Authority, Lot Data Computation, and tax declarations. Unfortunately, these
pieces of documentary evidence are not similar to those mentioned in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of
Section 2 of RA 26, which all pertain to documents issued or are on file with the Registry of
Deeds. Hence, respondents’ documentary evidence cannot be considered to fall under
subparagraph (f). Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in Republic of
the Philippines v. Santua, we held that when Section 2(f) of RA 26 speaks of “any other
document,” the same must refer to similar documents previously enumerated therein, that is,
those mentioned in Sections 2(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).
Also, the survey plan and technical description are not competent and sufficient sources of
reconstitution when the petition is based on Section 2(f) of RA 26. They are mere additional
documentary requirements. This is the clear import of the last sentence of Section 12, RA 26
earlier quoted. Thus, in Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, where the trial court ordered
reconstitution on the basis of the survey plan and technical description, we declared the order of
reconstitution void for want of factual support.
Moreover, the Certification issued by the LRA stating that Decree No. 190622 was issued for Lot
54 means nothing. The Land Registration Act expressly recognizes two classes of decrees in
land registration proceedings, namely, (i) decrees dismissing the application and (ii) decrees of
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confirmation and registration. In the case at bench, we cannot ascertain from said Certification
whether the decree alluded to by the respondents granted or denied Julio Ramos’
claim. Moreover, the LRA’s Certification did not state to whom Lot 54 was decreed. Thus,
assuming that Decree No. 190622 is a decree of confirmation, it would be too presumptuous to
further assume that the same was issued in the name and in favor of Julio Ramos. Furthermore,
said Certification did not indicate the number of the original certificate of title and the date said
title was issued. In Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
absence of any document, private or official, mentioning the number of the certificate of title
and date when the certificate of title was issued, does not warrant the granting of such petition.
With regard to the other Certification issued by the Registry of Deeds of Balanga City, it cannot
be deduced therefrom that OCT No. 3613 was actually issued and kept on file with said
office. The Certification of said Registry of Deeds that said title “is not among those salvaged
records of this Registry as a consequence of the last World War,” did not necessarily mean that
OCT No. 3613 once formed part of its records.
Anent the tax declaration submitted, the same covered only taxable year 1998. Obviously, it
had no bearing with what occurred before or during the last world war. Besides, a tax
declaration is not a reliable source of reconstitution of a certificate of title. As we held
in Republic of the Philippines v. Santua, a tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of
claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A
reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of land covered by the lost or destroyed
title but merely determines whether a re-issuance of such title is proper.
We also share the observation of petitioner that the non-submission of an affidavit of loss by the
person who was allegedly in actual possession of OCT No. 3613 at the time of its loss, casts
doubt on respondents’ claim that OCT No. 3613 once existed and subsequently got lost. Under
Section 109 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the owner must file with the proper Registry of
Deeds a notice of loss executed under oath. Here, despite the lapse of a considerable length of
time, the alleged owners of Lot 54 or the persons who were in possession of the same, i.e.,
respondents’ grandparents, never executed an affidavit relative to the loss of OCT No. 3613.
The presentation of such affidavit becomes even more important considering the doubtful
testimony of Reynaldo. When he testified on November 29, 2001, he was only 62 years old
and, therefore, he was barely six years old during the Japanese occupation until the
Liberation. Also, his testimony consisted only of his declaration that his unnamed grandmother
used to keep said copy of OCT No. 3613; that it was buried in a foxhole during the Japanese
occupation; and, subsequently, got lost. He did not testify on how he obtained knowledge of
the alleged facts and circumstances surrounding the loss of the owner’s copy of OCT No.
3613. In fact, he neither named the person responsible for the burying or hiding of the title in a
foxhole nor mentioned the place where that foxhole was located. Reynaldo’s testimony was
also lacking in details as to how he participated in searching for the title’s whereabouts. Indeed,
Reynaldo’s testimony is highly suspect and cannot be given the expected probative
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weight. Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Julio Ramos, represented by Reynaldo Ramos
Medina, et al., G.R. No. 169481, February 22, 2010.
Evidentiary value; unsubstantiated denial as negative and self-serving evidence. We agree with
the CA when it said that if indeed petitioner did not transact with respondent, she should not
have entertained respondent’s collecting officers and should not have offered settlement or
returned some of the canned goods. The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses were further
bolstered by the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify against petitioner; thus,
their testimonies are hereby accorded full faith and credit. Petitioner’s defense consists of denial.
We have held that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative
and self-serving evidence that has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Lolita Reyes
doing business under the name and style, Solid Brothers West Marketing vs. Century Canning
Corporation, G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010.
Offer of evidence; effect of failure to object to purpose of offered exhibit. While petitioner
denies having any transaction with respondent regarding the sale and delivery to her of
respondent’s canned goods, a review of the evidence shows otherwise. Records show that
respondent submitted a certificate of registration of business name under petitioner’s name and
with her photo, which was marked as respondent’s Exhibit “L.” Notably, respondent’s formal
offer of evidence stated that the purpose of Exhibit “L” was to show that petitioner had submitted
such certificate as one of her supporting documents in applying as a distributor of respondent’s
products, and also for the purpose of contradicting petitioner’s allegation that she had no
transaction with respondent. In petitioner’s Objections/Comment to respondent’s offer of
evidence, she offered no objection to this exhibit. In fact, in the same Comment, petitioner
prayed that the other exhibits be denied admission for the purpose for which they were offered,
except Exhibit “L.” In effect, petitioner admitted the purpose for which Exhibit “L” was
offered, i.e., one of the documents she submitted to respondent to be a distributor of the latter’s
products. Thus, such admission belies her allegation in her Answer with compulsory
counterclaim that she had no transaction with respondent for the purchase of the canned goods,
as well as her testimony on direct examination that she did not know respondent. Lolita Reyes
doing business under the name and style, Solid Brothers West Marketing vs. Century Canning
Corporation,G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010.
Preponderance of evidence in civil cases. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case
must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, or that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in
opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side
is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side
than on the other. Lolita Reyes doing business under the name and style, Solid Brothers West
Marketing vs. Century Canning Corporation, G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010.
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Presumption of regularity; no need to allege or prove validity of title which enjoys presumption
of regularity. It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the
registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land registration
proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and its
derivatives, including ALI’s TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity and ALI need
not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued. That is precisely the nature of such a
presumption, it dispenses with proof.
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No. 976 and
OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of a valid title had
been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved survey plan
accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It is the party who
seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to present adequate and
convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even attempt to do. Spouses
Morris Carpo and Socorro Carpo vs. Ayala Land, Incorporated, G.R. No. 166577, February 3,
2010.
Question of fact; Existence of bad faith is question of fact and evidentiary. The above averments
clearly pose factual issues which make the rendition of summary judgment not proper. Bad
faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It is
synonymous with fraud, in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive another. The trial
court should have exercised prudence by requiring the presentation of evidence in a formal trial
to determine the veracity of the parties’ respective assertions. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs
connived and acted in bad faith is a question of fact and is evidentiary. Bad faith has to be
established by the claimant with clear and convincing evidence, and this necessitates an
examination of the evidence of all the parties. As certain facts pleaded were being contested by
the opposing parties, such would not warrant a rendition of summary judgment. Atty.
Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 167415. February 26, 2010.
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Civil Procedure
Actions; action for reformation of instrument; requisites. For an action for reformation of
instrument to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must have been a meeting
of the minds of the parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention
of the parties; and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is
due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident. Petitioner having admitted the existence
and execution of the instrument, what remains to be resolved is whether the contract expressed
the true intention of the parties; if not, whether it was due to mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct
or accident. The onus probandi is upon the party who insists that the contract should be
reformed. Notarized documents, like the deed in question [i.e., “Sale and Transfer of Rights
over a Portion of a Parcel of Land”], enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be
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overturned only by clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence. This
petitioner failed to discharge. Flordeliza Emilio vs.Bilma Rapal, G.R. No. 181855, March 30,
2010.
Actions; annulment of judgment. The Court finds that petitioner properly availed of the remedy
of a petition for annulment of judgment in challenging the Manila RTC Decision. In his petition
with the appellate court, he did not limit his ground to extrinsic fraud, as he invoked as well the
Manila RTC’s lack of jurisdiction to annul the proceedings in the Pagadian RTC which is a court
of co-equal and coordinate jurisdiction. Since petitioner’s petition raised lack of jurisdiction, he
did not have to allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, reconsideration or appeal were no
longer available through no fault of his. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order
issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either
collaterally or in a direct action, or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked. Jose Cabaral Tiu v. First
Plywood Corporation/Jose Cabaral Tiu vs. Timber Exports, Inc. Angel Domingo, Country
Bankers Ins. Corp., Perfecto Mondarte, Jr. and Cesar Dacal, G.R. No. 176123/G.R. No. 185265,
March 10, 2010
Actions; attack on title. The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of title should be
disallowed because it constituted a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449),
citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.– A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
The petitioners’ contention is not well taken. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a
title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which
the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when,
in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an
incident thereof. Teofisto Oño, et al. vs. Vicente N. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010
Actions; exhaustion of administrative remedies. With respect to the procedural aspect of the
case, respondent should have first exhausted the administrative remedies still available to him
by appealing the challenged order of the [National Electrification Administration] the Office of
the President, which exercises the power of supervision over it. Section 13, Chapter II of
Presidential Decree No. 269 (PD 269), otherwise known as the National Electrification
Administration Decree, provides that:
Sec. 13 – Supervision over NEA; Power Development Council – The NEA shall be under the
supervision of the Office of the President of the Philippines. All orders, rules and regulations
promulgated by the NEA shall be subject to the approval of the Office of the President of the
Philippines.
Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of
petitioner NEA, the failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to
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a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have
first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an administrative remedy
must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it
to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the
administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the
grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint. In the present case,
respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he filed a case with the RTC
without appealing the decision of the NEA to the Office of the President. As such, his petition
filed with the RTC must necessarily fail. National Electrification Administration vs. Val
L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
Actions; quieting of title. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action
may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court
is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only
to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said
immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that
whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can
thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse
the property as he deems fit. Lim’s complaint pertinently alleged:
18. If indeed, the genuine original of the Owner’s Duplicate of the Reconstituted Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-9699 (O-20449) for Lot 943, Balamban Cadastre xxx is in
Defendant’s (Oño’s) possession, then VNL submits the following PROPOSITIONS:
xxx
18.2. Therefore, the Original of Owner’s Duplicate Certificate (which Respondents
[Defendants Oños] claim in their Opposition is in their possession) must be surrendered
to VNL upon order of this Court, after the Court shall have determined VNL’s mother’s
acquisition of the attributes of ownership over said Lot 943, in this action, in accordance with
Section 107, P.D. 1529, Property Registration Decree xxx
xxx
[t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for Lot 943 be issued directly in favor of
LUISA NARVIOS, to complete her title to said Lot;
The averments readily show that the action was neither a direct nor a collateral attack on OCT
No. RO-9969-(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name
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of the petitioners’ predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lim’s
mother, and resultantly should be cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of OCT
No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had
been decreed. In other words, the action sought the removal of a cloud from Lim’s title, and the
confirmation of Lim’s ownership over the disputed property as the successor-in-interest of
Luisa. Teofisto Oño, et al. vs.Vicente N. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010
Appeal; dismissal on technical grounds not favored. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of
petitioners’ petition on purely technical grounds was unwarranted. We agree with petitioners
that the late filing and service of a copy of the petition to the RTC was not a substantial infirmity
that should cause the outright dismissal of the petition. Likewise, the verification of a pleading
is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification is to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non-
compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The dismissal
of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon for it is far more better for the courts to
excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the
ends of justice. Spouses Melchor, et al. vs. Ronald B. Bernal, et al., G.R. No. 169336, March 18,
2010
Appeal; findings of fact of administrative agency not binding when made in excess of
jurisdiction.While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies − such as
the DARAB − which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific
matters, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts. Care should be taken so
that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set
by the enabling law for each agency. In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped its legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioners and respondents in
deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in dispute. The CA thus
erred in affirming the decision of the DARAB, which was rendered in excess of
jurisdiction. Romanita Concha, et al. vs. Paulino Rubio, et al., G.R. No. 162446, March 29,
2010
Appeal; findings of fact of administrative body and Court of Appeals. Petitioner harps
on Paler’s alleged bad faith and misrepresentation in filing his previous applications for
leave. However, as correctly found by the CSC and CA, the basis for Paler’s dismissal was his
continuous absence without leave, not bad faith and misrepresentation. The CSC even noted
that Paler never misrepresented or misled petitioner as to where he was spending his vacation
leave. He clearly stated in his application for leave dated April 17, 2003 that he was spending it
not only in the Philippines but also in the U.S. According to the CA, “to utilize Paler’s alleged
misrepresentation in his previously approved applications for leave as basis for his separation
from work, even in the absence of opportunity for him to controvert the matter, would constitute
a violation of the fundamental requirements of fairness and equity and the constitutional
guarantee of due process.” The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of both
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the CSC and CA, given that they concur with each other and should be accorded great weight
and respect. Commission on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo
L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts. Verily, the evaluation and calibration of the evidence
necessarily involves consideration of factual issues — an exercise that is not appropriate for a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides that the parties may raise only
questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, we are not duty-
bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in and considered by the tribunals
below. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any
of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
We note, however, that the findings of fact of the RTC are contrary to those of the CA. Thus, our
review of such findings is warranted. Heirs of Jose Lim, represented by Elenito Lim vs. Juliet
Villa Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts. A petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise
only questions of law. As a rule, findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule admits of only a few exceptions, such as when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; when an inference
made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the
findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions
of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when the findings of
fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by the evidence on record. However,
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not one of the exceptions is present in this case. Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V.
vs. KCD Builders Corporation, represented by its President Celso C. Diokno, G.R. No. 173181,
March 3, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts. The petitioners submit that Lim’s evidence did not
preponderantly show that the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both
the trial and the appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonio’s signature on
the confirmation of sale was a forgery. Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the
evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties. The Court cannot
anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence, because the Court is not a trier
of facts. Although this rule admits of certain exceptions, viz: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the findings are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10)
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record, it does not appear now that any of the
exceptions is present herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal for
that reason. It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the RTC that
the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or forged. The CA ruled that the testimony of
the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa
had appeared before him prevailed over that of the petitioners’ expert witness. The concurrence
of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonio’s signature now binds the
Court. Teofisto Oño, et al. vs. Vicente N. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of trial court. In any event, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that the
factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and
conclusive and will generally not be reviewed on appeal. We are mandated to accord great
weight to the findings of the RTC, particularly as regards its assessment of the credibility of
witnesses since it is the trial court judge who is in a position to observe and examine the
witnesses first hand. Even after a careful and independent scrutiny of the records, we find no
cogent reason to depart from the rulings of the courts below. Titan Construction Corporation vs.
Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of trial court binding on Supreme Court, especially those affirmed by
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the Final Deed of
Conveyance No. V-4477 and TCT No. (T-115094) RT-004 are void while validating the sale
between petitioner and Spouses Arayata, from which TCT No. (T-8718) RT-7973 emanated
from. The ultimate issue to be resolved is which between the titles of petitioner and respondent
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is genuine. Clearly, this issue calls for a re-evaluation of the probative value of the evidence
presented. We agree with respondents’ contention that the issues raised are purely questions of
fact that this Court cannot review in a certiorari petition. As a general rule, factual findings of
the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court
when supported by the evidence on record. There are recognized exceptions to this rule,
among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2)
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the
finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the
issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
However, in the instant case, petitioner failed to demonstrate that their petition falls under any
one of the above exceptions. We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC,
which the Court of Appeals had affirmed. Based on the foregoing, it now becomes unnecessary
to dwell on the issues raised by petitioner, which are a mere rehash of their arguments before
the appellate court. Such arguments had in fact already been passed upon by the Court of
Appeals. Segundo G. Dimaranan vs. Heirs of Spouses Hermogenes Arayata, et al., G.R. No.
184193, March 29, 2010
Appeal; improper direct appeal to Supreme Court from Regional Trial Court. Finally, petitioner
came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to
Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul,
we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal
from decisions of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by
Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Our ruling in Velayo-Fong vs. Velayo is instructive: “A question of law arises when there
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
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same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.”
In her Reply to respondent’s Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the
merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value
of the evidence presented, taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this
controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear
that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.
This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and by immemorial
tradition. Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010
Appeal; issue raised for first time on appeal. Titan argues that the CA erred in not ruling that,
even assuming the sale was void, on grounds of equity, Martha should reimburse petitioner its
payment with legal interest. We note that this equity argument was raised for the first time
before the CA, which disposed of it in this manner: “Anent defendant-appellant’s claim that the
court a quo and this Court never considered the substantial amount of money paid by it to
Martha David as consideration for the sale of the subject property, suffice it to say that said
matter is being raised for the first time in the instant motion for reconsideration. If well-
recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper,
with more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in
a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. Nonetheless, record shows
that only defendant-appellant was initially sued by plaintiff-appellee in his complaint for
annulment of contract and reconveyance upon the allegation that the sale executed by his wife,
Martha David, of their conjugal property in favor of defendant-appellant was without his
knowledge and consent and, therefore, null and void. In its answer, defendant-appellant
claimed that it bought the property in good faith and for value from Martha David and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of his counterclaim for attorney’s fees, moral
and exemplary damages. Subsequently, plaintiff-appellee filed a motion for leave to file
amended complaint by impleading Martha David as a defendant, attaching the amended
complaint thereto, copies of which were furnished defendant-appellant, through counsel. The
amended complaint was admitted by the court a quo in an Order dated October 23, 1996.
Martha David was declared in default for failure to file an answer. The record does not show
[that] a cross-claim was filed by defendant-appellant against Martha David for the return of
the amount of PhP1,500,000.00 it paid to the latter as consideration for the sale of the subject
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property. x x x Thus, to hold Martha David liable to defendant-appellant for the return of the
consideration for the sale of the subject property, without any claim therefore being filed
against her by the latter, would violate her right to due process. The essence of due process is
to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property,
he should be first informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
premised.” (Emphasis supplied)
While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that elementary
considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before
judgment may be rendered. Thus, we cannot, in these proceedings, order the return of the
amounts paid by Titan to Martha. However, Titan is not precluded by this Decision from
instituting the appropriate action against Martha before the proper court. Titan Construction
Corporation vs. Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Appeal; late filing excused. Petitioners allege that the petition filed before the Court of Appeals
should have been dismissed for late filing. Petitioners allege that respondent only had 15 days
from 19 October 2004, the date of receipt of the 18 October 2004 DOJ Resolution, within
which to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, respondent filed his
petition only on 4 November 2004, or one day beyond the reglementary period for filing the
petition for review. Petitioners allege that when the petition was filed, the 18 October
2004 DOJ Resolution had already lapsed into finality. We do not agree. A one-day delay does
not justify the appeal’s dismissal where no element of intent to delay the administration of
justice could be attributed to the petitioner. The Court has ruled: “The general rule is that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are
disregarded so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the
basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a
grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid
an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.”
Respondent had a valid excuse for the late filing of the petition before the Court of Appeals. It is
not disputed that there was a pending petition for prohibition before the trial court. Before filing
the petition for review before the Court of Appeals, respondent had to withdraw the petition for
prohibition before the trial court. The trial court granted the withdrawal of the petition only on
4 November 2004, the date of filing of the petition for review before the Court of
Appeals. Under the circumstances, we find the one-day delay in filing the petition for review
excusable. We reiterate: “Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. If the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from their operation. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance
with the procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to
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reconcile the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to
be heard.”
Hence, we sustain the Court of Appeals in accepting the petition for review although it was filed
one-day late. Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Michael Alfio Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010
Appeal; question of fact distinguished from question of law. This Court had repeatedly clarified
the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when
the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact, on the
other hand, exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. Segundo
G. Dimaranan vs. Heirs of Spouses Hermogenes Arayata, et al., G.R. No. 184193, March 29,
2010.
Appeal; question raised for first time on appeal. Finally, petitioner De Guia’s claim that he was
an innocent purchaser for value, who bought the subject property without notice of the
mortgage on the subject property, was not raised in the trial court. As a rule, no question will
be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily
will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that
late stage. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule. Manuel T. De Guia for himself
and as Attorney-in-fact of Fe Davis-Maramba, et al. vs. Sps. Teofilo Morte and
Angelina Villarico Morte, G.R. No. 161074. March 22, 2010
Appeal; scope of review in Supreme Court. Furthermore, settled is the rule that only errors of
law and not of fact are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. This applies with even greater force here, since the factual findings by
the CA are in full agreement with those of the trial court. Titan Construction Corporation vs.
Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Appeal; scope of review in Supreme Court. The issue for resolution of whether the CA
committed a reversible error when it upheld the RTC judgment declaring
the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan (Exhibit “A”) and
the Kasulatan ng Pagpapabuwis ng Palaisdaan (Exhibit “C”), both dated November 10, 1979, as
valid, is a factual issue. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, the petitioner can raise only questions of law – the Supreme Court is not
the proper venue to consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. A departure from the
general rule may be warranted where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
the findings and conclusions of the trial court, or when the same is unsupported by the evidence
on record, which we found not obtaining in this case. Manuel T. De Guia for himself and as
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Attorney-in-fact of Fe Davis-Maramba, et al. vs. Sps. Teofilo Morte and
Angelina Villarico Morte, G.R. No. 161074. March 22, 2010
Certiorari; burden to show exception to requirement of motion for reconsideration. In the case at
bar, the petitioners stated in their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA as follows:
18. Respondent sheriff and his deputies are now set to implement the said writ of possession and
are now poised to evict the students and teachers from their classrooms, grounds and school
facilities;
19. Petitioners did not anymore file a motion for reconsideration of said order x x x and is
proceeding directly to this Honorable Court because the filing of a motion for reconsideration
would serve no useful purpose x x x Besides the relief sought is extremely urgent as the
respondent sheriff is set to implement the questioned orders x x x and the circumstances herein
clearly indicate the urgency of judicial intervention x x x hence, this petition.
Plainly, the petitioners have the burden to substantiate that their immediate resort to the
appellate court is based on any of the exceptions to the general rule. They have to show the
urgent and compelling reasons for such recourse. The afore-cited allegations of the petitioners
in their petition before the CA did not dispense with the burden of establishing that their case
falls under any of the exceptions to the general rule. Unlike the case of Ronquillo vs. Court of
Appeals cited by the petitioners, where not only was a writ of execution issued but petitioner’s
properties were already scheduled to be sold at public auction on April 2, 1980 at 10:00 a.m.,
the herein petitioners failed to show the specificity and imminence of the urgency confronting
their immediate recourse to the appellate court. We therefore hold that the CA correctly found
the necessity for a prior resort to a motion for reconsideration prior to the institution of the
Petition for Certiorari. The Parents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy, et al. vs.
The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010
Certiorari; determination of sufficiency of petition. The discretion on initially determining the
sufficiency of a petition for certiorari lies with the court before which the petition was filed. In
this matter, the CA determined the petition filed before it to be sufficient. We sustain the CA’s
determination for the reasons specified below. First, the failure to comply with the rule on a
statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the
records. In the case at bar, the petition for certiorari filed before the CA contained a statement
of material dates. Although the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration was not stated, it
is nevertheless evident from the records that the said motion for reconsideration was filed on
time on December 10, 2001. Second, “the Rules do not specify the precise documents,
pleadings or parts of the records that should be appended to the petition other than the
judgment, final order, or resolution being assailed. The Rules only state that such documents,
pleadings or records should be relevant or pertinent to the assailed resolution, judgment or
orders; as such, the initial determination of which pleading, document or parts of the records are
relevant to the assailed order, resolution or judgment, falls upon the petitioner. The CA will
ultimately determine if the supporting documents are sufficient to even make out
a prima facie case”. The CA, having given due course to the petition, must have found the
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documents sufficient. We find no sufficient reason to reverse the Decision of the CA. Third, the
caption of the petition filed with the CA may not have specified the individual names of the
heirs of Dr. Deleste but the verification contained all the names and signatures of the four
heirs. The petition sufficiently contains the full names of the petitioners therein, thus
substantially complying with the requirement of the Rules of Court. Technicalities that impede
the cause of justice must be avoided. In Heirs of Generoso A. Juaban v. Bancale, which also
finds application to the present case, the Court elaborated: “The court has the discretion to
dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.
The discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case. Technicalities, however,
must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of justice. The court’s
primary duty is to render or dispense justice. Litigations must be decided on their merits and not
on technicality. Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and
just determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal
of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.” Atty. Voltaire I. Rovira vs. Heirs of Jose C. Delestre, et al., G.R. No.
160825, March 26, 2010
Certiorari; exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have held in a litany of cases that the
extraordinary remedies of certiorari and mandamus are available only when there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for
reconsideration. The writ of certiorari does not lie where another adequate remedy is available
for the correction of the error. Likewise, mandamus is granted only in cases where no other
remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress because generally, a writ of mandamus
will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason
that neither is inferior to the other. However, there are several exceptions where a petition for
certiorari will lie without the prior filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit:
a. where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
b. where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
c. where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the government or the petitioner or the subject matter of the
action is perishable;
d. where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
e. where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
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f. where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
g. where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
h. where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object;
and
i. where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (Emphasis
supplied)
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence. To this end, administrative agencies are
afforded a chance to correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of
law, comity, and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for
determination by administrative agencies. In this case, a motion for reconsideration is a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order of the Office of the President. They
cannot prematurely resort to a petition for certiorari on the wrong assumption that a plain
reading of the 30 September 2004 order hinted that it was already final and executory. The
parties are presumed to know the hornbook rule that judgments become final and executory
only upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration
without any appeal or motion for reconsideration having been made. Petitioners submit they no
longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order because it would have
been useless. Petitioners point out that the 30 September 2004 order warned that no further
pleadings would be entertained. We are not convinced that this constitutes an exception to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. The language of the
order notwithstanding, petitioners are bound by procedural rules and may not disregard the
same on a wrong assumption that a motion for reconsideration might no longer be entertained.
Even so, they should have awaited the denial of their motion for reconsideration before filing the
extraordinary remedy of petition for certiorari. Pio Delos Reyes, represented by heirs
Fidel Delos Reyes, et al. vs. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010
Certiorari; findings of fact of administrative agency. As to the merits of the case, the question of
whether petitioners owned landholdings used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other
urban purposes from which they derived adequate income is a question of fact. In a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law, not of fact, may be raised
before this Court. Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not this Court’s
function to re-examine the respective sets of evidence submitted by the parties. As this case
involves the application of P.D. No. 27 and LOI No. 474, the DAR Secretary, owing to his
agrarian expertise, is in a better position to make a final determination whether petitioners’
landholdings may be subject of exclusion from operation land transfer or retention. This Court
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need not weigh anew the evidence submitted by the parties and supplant the findings of fact by
the DAR Secretary, especially when such findings are fully supported by evidence consisting of
certifications issued by the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Bataan and the various
certificates of title on record. Pio Delos Reyes, represented by heirs Fidel Delos Reyes, et al. vs.
Hon. Waldo Q. Flores in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, et al., G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010)
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. In Garcia, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, the Court defined grave
abuse of discretion: “Grave abuse of discretion is defined as such capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.”
PCGG failed to show that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Resolutions ordering the release to Silangan and Polygon of their Oceanic cash dividends, with
interest, were grounded on sound legal and factual bases: (1) PCGG agreed to the release
to Silangan of 49% of its cash dividends, with interest; (2) Benedicto ceded to the government
his 51% equity in Silangan, not Oceanic; (3) Silangan, being a stockholder of Oceanic, was
entitled to the cash dividends declared by the company; (4) Silangan engaged the services
of M.M. Lazaro & Associates and agreed to pay 15% of the total amount it may recover as
contingent fee; (5) in its 25 April 1994 Decision, the Sandiganbayan declared void PCGG’s
sequestration of the Oceanic shares of stock in the names of
Polygon, Aerocom, Silangan, Belgor, Jose and Victor — Silanan and Polygon were not
sequestered; (6) In Presidential Commission, the Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s 25 April
1994 Decision; (7) Presidential Commission became final and executory and was entered in the
Book of Entries of Judgments; (8) the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of execution, dated 30
September 2003, to implement the 25 April 1994 Decision; and (9) the 30 September 2003 writ
of execution was implemented. Silangan and Polygon are entitled to their Oceanic cash
dividends, with interest, because they are not sequestered or impleaded in Civil Case No.
0009. In PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court affirmed the Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan ordering the release to Aerocom of its cash dividends because Aerocom was
not sequestered or impleaded in Civil Case No. 0009. Presidential Commission on Good
Government vs. Silangan Investors and Managers, Inc. et al./Presidential Commission on Good
Government vs. Polygon Investors and Managers, Incorporated, et al., G.R. Nos. 167055-
56/G.R. No. 170673, March 25, 2010
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Given petitioner’s flawed arguments, we hold that the
respondent court did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is
present when there is an arbitrary exercise of power owing from passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to a shirking
from or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
law. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross for the act to be held as one made with
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grave abuse of discretion. We find respondent court’s issuance of the assailed orders justified
and with no abuse of discretion. Its reliance on the provisions of PD 1083 in asserting its
jurisdiction was sound and unassailable. Sultan Yahya “Jerry” M. Tomawis vs.
Hon Rasad G. Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. There is grave abuse discretion where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Petitioner contends that
public respondent COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded
to decide and thereby grant private respondent’s Petition for Injunction and Prayer for the
Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order, without considering the fact of dismissal of private
respondent’s Notice of Appeal. Petitioner further avers that the allowance by
the COMELEC Second Division of private respondent’s Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution, notwithstanding the dismissal of private respondent’s Notice of Appeal, amounted
to the reversal of the decision of the RTC via a mere motion and not via an appeal as inscribed
in our Constitution. What the law forbids to be done directly was made possible by private
respondent indirectly.
A careful review of the antecedent facts bears out the fact that, indeed, the COMELEC Second
Division granted private respondent Tolean’s petition for injunction without considering that it
had already dismissed private respondent’s Notice of Appeal. It is undisputed that on April 20,
2009, private respondent filed the subject petition for injunction before the COMELEC Second
Division, to enjoin the execution of the Decision of the RTC, citing mainly as ground the fact
that the victory of petitioner had not been clearly and sufficiently established due to
the pendency of his Notice of Appeal. However, on June 1, 2009, while the petition for
injunction was still pending, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed private respondent’s
Notice of Appeal due to his failure to pay the required appeal fees in violation
of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, which states, thus:
XXX XXX
XXX
With the dismissal by the COMELEC Second Division of private respondent’s Notice of Appeal
without any showing that he had appealed the dismissal to the COMELEC en banc, the decision
of the RTC proclaiming petitioner as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Sabangan, Mountain
Province becomes final and executory. Thus, the dismissal of private respondent’s Notice of
Appeal settles absolutely the victory of petitioner and the defeat of private respondent in the
vice-mayoralty race. Considering the foregoing, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused
its discretion when it granted private respondent’s petition for injunction on September 22, 2009
after the victory of petitioner Bernardez had already become final. To reiterate, the petition for
injunction was filed by private respondent to enjoin the RTC from executing its decision
proclaiming petitioner as Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Sabangan due to the pendency of
the Notice of Appeal. Since it has been ruled that the Notice of Appeal was rightfully dismissed
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and the ruling has become final and executory, it follows then that the right sought to be
protected and the irreparable injury sought to be prevented by the private respondent through
injunction or prohibition has already been rendered fait accompli.Joseph Bernardez vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190382, March 9, 2010
Certiorari; motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration should
precede recourse to certiorari in order to give the trial court an opportunity to correct the error
that it may have committed. The said rule is not absolute and may be dispensed with in
instances where the filing of a motion for reconsideration would serve no useful purpose, such
as when the motion for reconsideration would raise the same point stated in the motion or
where the error is patent for the order is void or where the relief is extremely urgent, as in cases
where execution had already been ordered where the issue raised is one purely of
law. The Parents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy, et al. vs.
The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010
Certiorari; nature of remedy. The Court is not impressed. In petitions for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner must show that respondent tribunal acted with grave abuse
of discretion. In Angara vs. Fedman Development Corporation, the Court held that:
“Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a
general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of review. Its principal
function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error
of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which
is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.” Presidential Commission on Good Government
vs. Silangan Investors and Managers, Inc. et al./Presidential Commission on Good Government
vs. Polygon Investors and Managers, Incorporated, et al., G.R. Nos. 167055-56/G.R. No.
170673, March 25, 2010
Certiorari; not available to review final order; exception. Private respondent’s claim that the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a wrong remedy thus the petition should be dismissed, is
not persuasive. A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. There is “grave abuse of discretion” when public
respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states
that an appeal may be taken only from a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no
appeal may be taken from (a) an order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an
order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an
interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a
motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a
judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
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counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In
all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. In this case, the RTC
Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a final order because it
terminates the proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the Rule since the case
involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these defendants is still
pending. Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law, the
remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve the
aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or
tribunal. Leah Palma vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
Certiorari and mandamus; motion for reconsideration. Petitioners contend the Court of Appeals
erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus despite sufficient allegation in
the petition why the motion for reconsideration would be useless, one of the exceptions to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Petitioners claim they no longer filed a motion
for reconsideration of the 30 September 2004 order because it was already final and executory
on its face as the order itself stated that no further pleadings would be entertained. Petitioners
submit that a disposition of controversies through resolution on the merits is preferred over a
peremptory dismissal by reason of a technicality. Respondents maintain that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari,
being the plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Respondents argue that a petition for certiorari will not prosper unless the administrative agency
has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to
it. Respondents insist the law intends to afford the administrative agency an opportunity to
rectify the errors it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. At the
outset, we must point out that petitioners’ arguments are a mere rehash of their arguments in the
petition for certiorari and mandamus filed in the Court of Appeals. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that petitioners ignored the procedural requirement of filing a motion for
reconsideration and simply went ahead with the filing of a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
The appellate court correctly dismissed the same for prematurity. Pio Delos Reyes, represented
by heirs Fidel Delos Reyes, et al. vs. Hon. Waldo Q. Flores in his capacity as Senior
DeputyExecutive Secretary, Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010
Dismissals; dismissal on motion for preliminary hearing on special and affirmative defenses. But
the CA seems to have missed the point in the RTC decision. It will be recalled that
petitioner Doña Rosana Realty filed a motion with the RTC to hear and resolve its affirmative
defenses. The RTC did so and resolved to deny the motion. On a petition filed with the CA,
however, the latter court directed the RTC to hear and resolve Doña Rosana Realty’s affirmative
defense of good faith in buying Medina’s property. The RTC complied and, after hearing the
evidence of the parties, dismissed the case, holding that Doña Rosana Realty and its president
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were buyers of the property in good faith and Molave Development did not have a cause of
action against them. Clearly, the RTC did not dismiss the case on the ground that the complaint
did not state a cause of action, which is an entirely different matter. Section 1, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court may dismiss a complaint on the ground that
the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished. This ground essentially admits the obligation set out in the complaint
but points out that such obligation has been extinguished, in this case apparently by
abandonment after respondent Molave Development received partial reimbursement from
Medina as a consequence of the cancellation of contract to sell between them. On March 13,
1997, 10 days after it filed its complaint with the RTC, Molave Development acknowledged
having received P1.3 million as a consideration for the cancellation of its contract to sell with
Medina. The acknowledgment receipt its president signed reads:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT
This is to acknowledge the receipt of one (1) Allied Bank Check No. 25111954 dated March 4,
1997 in the amount of ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P1,300,000.00) from
Ms. Carmelita Austria Medina as partial reimbursement pursuant to the cancelled Contract to
Sell (Doc. No. 447; page 190; Book 114; Series of 1994 Notarial Register of
Atty. Delfin R. Supapo, Jr.) entered into between Ms. Medina and Molave Dev. Corporation
over that parcel of land located at Bamban, Tarlac covered by TCT No. T-31590.
Makati City. March 13, 1997.
MOLAVE DEV. CORPORATION
by:
TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN
President
Tinitigan of respondent Molave Development of course later asserted that she signed the above
receipt because Medina’s lawyer would not have released the check to her. But this is not a
valid ground for claiming vitiation of consent. If she did not want to agree to the cancellation,
she had no business signing the receipt and accepting the check. She could very well have
stood her ground and pressed for complete performance of the contract to sell. Having received
the P1.3 million, Molave Development’s remaining remedy was to pursue a claim for the
balance of P1 million that it paid Medina upon the execution of the contract to
sell. Doña Rosana Realty and Development Corp., et al. vs. Molave Development Corp., G.R
No. 180523, March 26, 2010
Execution; execution of judgment for conveyance of land. The petitioner contends that the RTC
did not see to it that the writ of execution be first served on her, and a demand for her
compliance be first made; hence, the deed of absolute sale executed by the Branch Clerk of
Court to implement the judgment was void. We do not agree. The CA found that it was the
petitioner who did not comply with the notice of the sheriff of the implementation of the
judgment through the writ of execution; and that her non-compliance then justified the RTC’s
order to the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale to implement the final
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judgment rendered in G. R. No. 103577. The fact that the petitioner and her counsel
maneuvered to thwart, or, at least, to delay the inevitable execution of the judgment warranted
the RTC’s directing the Branch Clerk of Court execute the deed of absolute sale to implement
the judgment. The RTC’s effort to implement the judgment could not be stymied by the
petitioner’s deliberate refusal to comply with the judgment. Such deliberate refusal called for the
RTC to order the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Ramona,
which move of the trial court was precisely authorized by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to
wit: “Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. — (a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds,
or other specific acts; vesting title. — If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of
land or personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other
specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to comply within the time specified, the
court may direct the act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by the party. If
real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the court in lieu of directing a
conveyance thereof may be an order divest the title of any party and vest it in others, which
shall have the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.” Catalina Balais-
Mabanag, assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag vs. The Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, et al., G.R. No. 153142. March 29, 2010
Filing fees; National Power Corporation not exempt from payment. Hence, the subject letter of
[National Power Corporation] for clarification as to its exemption from the payment of filing fees
and court fees. Section 22 of Rule 141 reads: “Sec. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees
provided in this rule. Local government units and government-owned or controlled
corporations with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
“(emphasis supplied)
Section 70 of Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), on
privatization of NPC assets, expressly states that the NPC “shall remain as a national
government-owned and controlled corporation.”
Thus, NPC is not exempt from payment of filing fees. The non-exemption of NPC is further
fortified by the promulgation on February 11, 2010 of A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, In re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from
Payment of Legal Fees. In said case, the Court, citing Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, stressed
that the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure; and that the power to promulgate these rules is
no longer shared by the Court with Congress and the Executive, thus:
XXX XXX XXX
With the foregoing categorical pronouncement of the Court, it is clear that NPC can no longer
invoke Republic Act No. 6395 (NPC Charter), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 938, as
its basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees. Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from payment of filing/docket fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010
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Foreclosure of mortgage; remedy not barred by B.P. Blg. 22 prosecution. The foregoing findings
notwithstanding, the Spouses Torres contend that the election of Medina from sue them for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 bars Medina from the remedy of foreclosure of mortgage. The Spouses
Torres, citing Bank of America NT & SA vs. American Realty Corporation (Bank of
America), thus argue: “x x x the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the
other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the fling of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such
remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court
of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in
accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.”
The argument of the Spouses Torres is misplaced. The doctrine found in Bank of America, and
in related cases, finds no application to the case at bar, as the filing of a B.P. Blg. 22 case is not
the “collection suit” contemplated by law and jurisprudence, which bars a mortgagee from later
on electing to foreclose the mortgaged property.
XXX XXX XXX
It bears stressing that in Que vs. People, this Court stated that the clear intention of the framers
of B.P. Blg. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum. In
prosecutions for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 therefore, prejudice or damage is not a pre-requisite for
conviction. In the later case of People vs. Nitafan, this Court ruled that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of the checks need not be first looked into since the law has clearly
provided that the mere issuance of any kind of check, regardless of the intent of the
parties, i.e., whether the check is intended merely to serve as a guarantee or deposit, but which
check is subsequently dishonored, makes the person who issued the check liable. The intent of
the law is to curb the proliferation of worthless checks as a means of payment of
obligations. Spouses Fernando Torres and Irma Torres vs. Amparo Medina, et al., G.R. No.
166730, March 10, 2010
Injunction; nature of remedy. In Caneland Sugar Corporation vs. Alon, it was settled
that injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and
interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself, but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer
for provisional remedy should be denied. In Go vs. Looyuko, the Court ruled that when the
events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already happened, nothing
more could be enjoined or prohibited. Indeed, it is a universal principle of law that an
injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. This is so for the
simple reason that nothing more can be done in reference thereto. A writ of injunction becomes
moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has already been
consummated. Joseph Bernardez vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190382, March 9,
2010
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Judgment; binding effect of Supreme Court’s findings. It is important to emphasize at this point
that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc.
vs. CLT Realty Development Corporation (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding
resolution in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy
surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have
been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case
at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions. As stated earlier,
petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court which have held that there
are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-
plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior
title. Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the
2007 Manotok case: “The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court
should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid.
If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles
are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual
predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that
expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the “law of the case” doctrine, and can no longer
be relied upon as precedents.”
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19,
1917 validly and actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the
2007 Manotokcase:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date
which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged,
as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration
on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such
mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an
OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to
an inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS vs. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga vs. Court of
Appealscannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could
the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917
bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at
bar.(Emphases supplied.)
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special
Division, and adopted the latter’s conclusions as to the status of the original title and its
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subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that “there is only one OCT No.
994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not
19 April 1917” and categorically concluded that “OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19
April 1917 as its registration date is null and void.” In the case at bar, petitioner is the last
surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear
several attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she get a
favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a
portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper
because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second,
albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist. Fidela R. Angeles vs. The Secretary of
Justice, et al., G.R. No. 142549, March 9, 2010
Judgment; finality of judgment. Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if
the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering
it or by the highest court of the land. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has
become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest. Utmost respect and
adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of
adjudication. Any act which violates it must be struck down. Jose Cabaral Tiu vs. First
Plywood Corporation/Jose Cabaral Tiu v. Timber Exports, Inc. Angel Domingo, Country Bankers
Ins. Corp., Perfecto Mondarte, Jr. and Cesar Dacal, G.R. No. 176123/G.R. No. 185265, March
10, 2010
Judgment; obiter dictum. Petitioner contends that in Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines, the
cause of action was based on a breach of contract while her cause of action arose from
the tortious conduct of the airline personnel and violation of the Civil Code provisions on
Human Relations. In addition, she claims that our pronouncement in Santos III vs. Northwest
Orient Airlines that “the allegation of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to
exclude the case from the comprehension of the Warsaw Convention,” is more of
an obiter dictum rather than the ratio decidendi. She maintains that the fact that said acts
occurred aboard a plane is merely incidental, if not irrelevant. We disagree with the position
taken by the petitioner. Black defines obiter dictum as “an opinion entirely unnecessary for the
decision of the case” and thus “are not binding as precedent.” In Santos III vs. Northwest Orient
Airlines, Augusto Santos III categorically put in issue the applicability of Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention if the action is based on tort. In the said case, we held that the allegation
of willful misconduct resulting in a tort is insufficient to exclude the case from the realm of the
Warsaw Convention. In fact, our ruling that a cause of action based on tort did not bring the
case outside the sphere of the Warsaw Convention was our ratio decidendi in disposing of the
specific issue presented by Augusto Santos III. Clearly, the contention of the herein petitioner
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that the said ruling is an obiter dictum is without basis. Edna Diago Lhuillier vs. British
Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
Judgment; obiter dictum. We explained the concept of an obiter dictum in Villanueva vs. Court
of Appealsby saying:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case
cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although
only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the
consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter
on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some
other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A
decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because,
owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can
an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one
ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of
which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points,
the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be
regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely
because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.
[emphasis supplied.]
The Board’s pronouncement in its January 31, 2006 decision – that the Agreement could no
longer be rescinded because the CR/LS had already been issued at the time the complaint was
filed – cannot be considered a mere obiter dictum because it touched upon a matter squarely
raised by World Class in its petition for review, specifically, the issue of whether GG Sportswear
was entitled to a refund on the ground that it did not have a CR/LS at the time the parties entered
into the Agreement. G.G. Sportswear Mfg. Corp vs. World Class Properties, Inc., G.R. No.
182720, March 2, 2010
Judgment; finality of judgment or ruling. With this ruling, the Board reversed the Arbiter’s ruling
on this particular issue, expressly stating that “the absence of the certificate of registration and
license to sell no longer existed at the time of the filing of the complaint and could no longer be
used as basis to demand rescission.” This ruling became final when GG Sportswear chose not
to file an appeal with the OP.Thus, even if the Board ultimately awarded a refund
to GG Sportswear based entirely on another ground, the Board’s ruling on the non-
rescissible character of the Agreement is binding on the parties. Consequently, the OP had no
jurisdiction to revert to the Arbiter’s earlier declaration that the Agreement was void due to
World Class’s lack of a CR/LS, a finding that clearly contradicted the Board’s final and executory
ruling. G.G. Sportswear Mfg. Corp vs. World Class Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 182720, March 2,
2010
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Judgment; requirement to state legal and factual basis. Finally, Hutama questions the resolution
of the CA on its motion for reconsideration on the ground that it denied the same without stating
clearly and distinctly the factual and legal basis thereof. In denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, the CA ruled that it found no plausible reason to depart from its earlier decision
wherein all the issues had been exhaustively passed upon. That ruling contained a sufficient
legal reason or basis to deny the motion. There was no need for the CA to restate the rationale
for its decision that the petitioner wanted reconsidered. Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V.
vs. KCD Builders Corporation, represented by its President Celso C. Diokno, G.R. No. 173181,
March 3, 2010
Judgment; res judicata. The petitioner cannot now insist that the RTC did not settle the question
of the respondents’ qualifications to own land due to non-citizenship. It is fundamental that the
judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter
that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity. Thus, in Gabuya v. Layug, this Court had the occasion to hold that a judgment
involving the same parties, the same facts, and the same issues binds the parties not only as to
every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demands, but also as to any
other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose and all other matters that
could have been adjudged in that case. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her
husband, Eleuterio Mabanag vs. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 153142.
March 29, 2010
Judgment; res judicata. The present recourse has not been the only one taken by the petitioner
and her counsel to assail the qualification of Ramona to acquire and own the subject property.
In fact, the Court catalogued such recourses taken for the petitioner herein in A.C. No. 5469,
entitled Foronda vs. Guerrero, an administrative case for disbarment commenced on June 29,
2001 by Ricardo A. Foronda (an attorney-in-fact of the respondents) against Atty. Arnold V.
Guerrero, the attorney of the petitioner, as follows:
XXX XXX XXX
All the aforestated recourses have had the uniform result of sustaining the right of Ramona to
acquire the property, which warranted a finding against Atty. Guerrero of resorting to forum
shopping, and leading to his suspension from the practice of law for two years. Such result fully
affirms that the petitioner’s objection is now barred by res judicata. For res judicata to bar the
institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first
and second actions identity of parties, identity of the subject matter, and identity of cause of
action.
XXX XXX XXX
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The doctrine is also known as estoppel per rem judicatam and involves both cause of action
estoppeland issue estoppel. The purpose of the doctrine is two-fold – to prevent unnecessary
proceedings involving expenses to the parties and wastage of the court’s time which could be
used by others, and to avoid stale litigations as well as to enable the defendant to know the
extent of the claims being made arising out of the same single incident. Under the doctrine
of res judicata, therefore, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation principle upon
which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties
and those in privity with them in law or estate. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her
husband, Eleuterio Mabanag vs. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 153142.
March 29, 2010
Judgment; res judicata; absence of inconsistency test. This Court has previously employed
various tests in determining whether or not there is identity of causes of action as to warrant the
application of the principle of res judicata. One test of identity is the “absence of inconsistency
test” where it is determined whether the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior
judgment. If no inconsistency is shown, the prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to
subsequent actions. Spouses Fernando Torres and Irma Torres vs. Amparo Medina, et al., G.R.
No. 166730, March 10, 2010
Judgment; res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. It bears stressing that the doctrine of res
judicataactually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b)
conclusiveness of judgment. The second concept – conclusiveness of judgment – states that a
fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be
again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or
any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while
the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a
judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between
the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of
that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies
will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required, but merely identity of
issues. Based on the foregoing, the validity of the real estate mortgage can no longer be
attacked, more so because the decision in Civil Case No. Q-94-18962 has become final and
Entry of Judgment has already been entered in our books. It therefore goes without saying that
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the foreclosure of the mortgage is a right given to Medina as the same is embodied in the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage, to wit:
That it is further understood that if the MORTGAGOR shall well and truly perform the obligation
above contracted then this Mortgage shall be null and void; otherwise, it shall remain in full
force and effect and may be foreclosed extrajudicially under Act 3135 as amended.
Thus, this Court finds no error in the decisions of the lower court and the appellate court
declaring that there exists, in fact, res judicata. As succinctly put in FELS Energy, Inc. vs.
Province of Batangas, res judicata, as a ground for dismissal, is based on two grounds, namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an
end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium; and (2) the hardship on the individual of being vexed
twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A conflicting doctrine would
subject the public peace and quiet to the will and dereliction of individuals and prefer the
regalement of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness.
Anent the fourth cause of action in Civil Case No. Q-99-38781, this Court finds that the Spouses
Torres had already raised, in Civil Case No. 94-18962, the fact that eleven (11) counts
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 violations are pending with Branch 36, Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. Thus, the RTC is correct in its observation that res
judicata lies, as the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) checks referred to in the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-38781 are the very same documents subject of Civil Case No.
Q-94-18962. Spouses Fernando Torres and Irma Torres vs. Amparo Medina, et al., G.R. No.
166730, March 10, 2010
Judgment; res judicata; elements. Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res judicata lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the
first suit. The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.
Spouses Fernando Torres and Irma Torres vs. Amparo Medina, et al., G.R. No. 166730, March
10, 2010
Jurisdiction; accion publiciana. Significantly, the Technical Report on Verification Survey by
Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was attached to and formed part of the records,
contained a tax declaration indicating that the subject property has an assessed value
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of P110,220.00. It is basic that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property
enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government
agency. Under Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC in fact has jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action. Taking into consideration the decision of the MTC proclaiming that the case is
one for accion publiciana and the assessed value of the property as evidenced by the case
records, jurisdiction pertains, rightfully so, with the RTC. Perforce, the petition should be
denied. Honorio Bernardo vs. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010
Jurisdiction; action for damages under Warsaw Convention. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before –
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been
made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London,
United Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and
second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the
United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner
and respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the
third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome
in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome,
Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger ticket and
baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome,
Italy. We thus find that the RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over
the case filed by the petitioner. Edna Diago Lhuillier vs. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092,
March 15, 2010
Jurisdiction; estoppel. As already shown, nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of
the subject property ever mentioned. There is no showing on the face of the complaint that the
RTC has jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, it cannot readily be determined which of the two trial courts
had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of
a court may be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those
excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were
not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action. However, estoppel sets in when a party participates in all stages of a
case before challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot belatedly reject or
repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure affirmative
relief against one’s opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. The Court has, time and again,
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frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting a case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
adverse. Honorio Bernardo vs. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010
Jurisdiction; estoppel. Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of
the Balayan RTC. In Lozon vs. NLRC, the Court came up with a clear rule on when jurisdiction
by estoppel applies and when it does not:
The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and
decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same “must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred
by the consent of the parties or by estoppel.” However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction… (underscoring
supplied)
The ruling was echoed in Metromedia Times Corporation vs. Pastorin. In the present case,
the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for
quieting of title filed by petitioners on August 9, 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a liquidation court,
assumed jurisdiction over the claims against the bank only on May 25, 2000, when PDIC’s
petition for assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given due course. While it is
well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not
lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file
and relitigate their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC
which had, in fact, decided petitioners’ complaint (about two years before the appellate court
rendered the assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden
petitioners. The Court, in Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, held that as a general rule, if there is
a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all claims against the bank should be filed in the
liquidation proceeding. The Court in Valenzuela, however, after considering the circumstances
attendant to the case, held that the general rule should not be applied if to order the aggrieved
party to refile or relitigate its case before the litigation court would be “an exercise in
futility.” Among the circumstances the Court considered in that case is the fact that the
claimants were poor and the disputed parcel of land was their only property, and the parties’
claims and defenses were properly ventilated in and considered by the judicial court. In the
present case, the Court finds that analogous considerations exist to warrant the application
of Valenzuela. Petitioner Restituto was 78 years old at the time the petition was filed in this
Court, and his co-petitioner-wife Erlinda died during the pendency of the case. And, except for
co-petitioner Corazon, Restituto is a resident of Ozamis City. To compel him to appear
and relitigate the case in the liquidation court-Nasugbu RTC when the issues to be raised before
it are the same as those already exhaustively passed upon and decided by the Balayan RTC
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would be superfluous. Atty. Restituto G. Cudiamat, et al. vs.Batangas Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. et al., G.R. No. 182403, March 9, 2010
Jurisdiction; estoppel. In Tijam, the Court held that it is iniquitous and unfair to void the trial
court’s decision for lack of jurisdiction considering that it was raised only after fifteen (15) years
of tedious litigation, thus:
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948,
it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
The principle of justice and equity as espoused in Tijam should be applied in this case.
The MTC dismissed the ejectment case upon its ruling that the case is for accion publiciana. It
did not assert jurisdiction over the case even if it could have done so based on the assessed
value of the property subject of the accion publiciana. And there was no showing, indeed, not
even an allegation, that the MTC was not aware of its jurisdictional authority over
an accion publiciana involving property in the amount stated in the law. Moreover, petitioner
did not bring up the issue of jurisdictional amount that would have led the MTC to proceed with
the trial of the case. Petitioner obviously considered the dismissal to be in his favor. When, as
a result of such dismissal, respondents brought the case as accion publiciana before the RTC,
petitioner never brought up the issue of jurisdictional amount. What petitioner mentioned in his
Answer before the RTC was the generally phrased allegation that “the Honorable Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the nature of the action in the above-entitled case.” This
general assertion, which lacks any basis, is not sufficient. Clearly, petitioner failed to point out
the omission of the assessed value in the complaint. Petitioner actively participated during the
trial by adducing evidence and filing numerous pleadings, none of which mentioned any defect
in the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals, after he
obtained an adverse judgment in the trial court, that petitioner, for the first time, came up with
the argument that the decision is void because there was no allegation in the complaint about
the value of the property. Clearly, petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
We note that the decisions of the RTC and of the Court of Appeals discussed extensively the
merits of the case, which has been pending for nearly ten (10) years. It was handled by two (2)
judges and its records had to be reconstituted after the fire that gutted the courthouse. If we
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were to accede to petitioner’s prayer, all the effort, time and expenses of parties who
participated in the litigation would be wasted. Quite obviously, petitioner wants a repetition of
the process hoping for the possibility of a reversal of the decision. The Court will not
countenance such practice. Honorio Bernardo vs. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, G.R. No. 183357,
March 15, 2010
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction over issue determined by pleadings or stipulation or implied consent. It
need not be underlined that jurisdiction over an issue in a case is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation or, at
times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not
covered by the pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. Eugene
L. Lim vs. BPI Agriculture Development Bank, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010
Jurisdiction; prohibition against interference with court of concurrent jurisdiction. Verily, the
Manila RTC lacked jurisdiction over the nature of the action filed by FPC. The Pagadian RTC
which rendered the decision and ordered the execution sale should settle the whole
controversy. Pursuant to the principle of judicial stability, the judgment or order of a court of
competent jurisdiction, Pagadian RTC in this case, may not be interfered with by any court
of concurrent jurisdiction (i.e., another RTC), for the simple reason that the power to open,
modify or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed by but is restricted to the
court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued. Resultantly, the Manila RTC
Decision of July 16, 2001 is void for lack of jurisdiction. As such, it, as well as all subsequent
orders proceeding therefrom, should have been annulled by the appellate court. A judgment
rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It
creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the
proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total
nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Respecting G.R. No.
185265, the Court finds that the action lodged with the Antipolo RTC was essentially the same
as that filed with the Manila RTC. The relief sought was also the annulment of
the Pagadian case execution sale. Hence, the Antipolo RTC was similarly bereft of jurisdiction
over the nature of the action. This should have been its basis for dismissing the complaint. The
various branches of the RTC, having as they do have the same or equal authority and exercising
as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
intervene with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule
would lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.Jose Cabaral Tiu vs.
First Plywood Corporation/Jose Cabaral Tiu vs. Timber Exports, Inc. Angel Domingo, Country
Bankers Ins. Corp., Perfecto Mondarte, Jr. and Cesar Dacal, G.R. No. 176123/G.R.
No. 185265, March 10, 2010
Jurisdiction over person; no voluntary appearance or submission to jurisdiction. Petitioner
argues that respondent has effectively submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when
the latter stated in its Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration that “Defendant
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[is at a loss] x x x how the plaintiff arrived at her erroneous impression that it is/was Euro-
Philippines Airlines Services, Inc. that has been making a special appearance since x x x British
Airways x x x has been clearly specifying in all the pleadings that it has filed with this
Honorable Court that it is the one making a special appearance.” In refuting the contention of
petitioner, respondent cited La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals where we held that
even if a party “challenges the jurisdiction of the court over his person, as by reason of absence
or defective service of summons, and he also invokes other grounds for the dismissal of the
action under Rule 16, he is not deemed to be in estoppel or to have waived his objection to the
jurisdiction over his person.” This issue has been squarely passed upon in the recent case
of Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan, where we reiterated our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals and elucidated thus:
Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance – the first sentence of the above-quoted
rule – means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification,
in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person
due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture
I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit answer; (c) second
motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e)
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or
to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for
special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person
and that of her three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person and of her three children for lack of valid service of summons through improvident
substituted service of summons in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner
never abandoned when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit
their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise,
did not abandon her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted
services of summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the
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1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily appear
before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals applies to the instant case. Said
case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance before the court––
challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to dismiss even if
the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the movant of
his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before the SB
to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they deemed to have waived
such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being no valid substituted services of
summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of petitioner and her
children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and
her three children are concerned, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss
and other pleadings before the trial court cannot be deemed to be voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence disagree with the contention of the petitioner and
rule that there was no voluntary appearance before the trial court that could constitute estoppel
or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction over its person. Edna Diago Lhuillier vs.
British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
Jurisdiction over person; voluntary submission. In addition, we agree with petitioner that the
RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when
the latter’s counsel entered his appearance on private respondent’s behalf, without qualification
and without questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for
Extension of Time to File Answer. In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already
invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions for extension of time
to file answer be granted. We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment,
and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court. When private respondent earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the
RTC to secure affirmative relief in her motions for additional time to file answer, she voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC and is thereby estopped from asserting
otherwise. Leah Palma vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
Mandamus; not available in absence of clear and complete right. Therefore, we must look into
the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order
is compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify
public respondents’ refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient
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legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner’s request? In this regard, we find our discussion
in Laburada vs. Land Registration Authority instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of
negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA’s reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such
issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the
Torrens system of registration.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners’ legal right to
the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by
law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections
raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced
is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of
registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the
double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which
involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled
by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of
title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those
requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be
mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find
merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the
1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee
Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioner’s request. There was, therefore,
sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding,
contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. Fidela R.
Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 142549, March 9, 2010
Mandamus; when available. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance,
when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary
duty. Mandamuswill not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a
substantial doubt exists. It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in
matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of either. Fidela R. Angeles vs. The Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No. 142549,
March 9, 2010
Motion to Dismiss; hypothetical admission of material allegations of complaint. No other
principle in remedial law is more settled than that when a motion to dismiss is filed, the material
allegations of the complaint are deemed to be hypothetically admitted. This hypothetical
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admission, according to Viewmaster Construction Corporation vs. Roxas and Navoa vs. Court of
Appeals, extends not only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, but
also to inferences that may be fairly deduced from them. Thus, where it appears that the
allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which the complaint can be maintained,
the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the
defendants. Stated differently, where the motion to dismiss is predicated on grounds that are not
indubitable, the better policy is to deny the motion without prejudice to taking such measures as
may be proper to assure that the ends of justice may be served. It is interesting to note at this
point that in their bid to have the case dismissed, petitioners theorize that there could not have
been a contract by which the municipality agreed to be bound, because it was not shown that
there had been compliance with the required bidding or that the municipal council had
approved the contract. The argument is flawed. By invoking unenforceability under the Statute
of Frauds, petitioners are in effect acknowledging the existence of a contract between them and
private respondent — only, the said contract cannot be enforced by action for being non-
compliant with the legal requisite that it be reduced into writing. Suffice it to say that while this
assertion might be a viable defense against respondent’s claim, it is principally a matter of
evidence that may be properly ventilated at the trial of the case on the merits. The Municipality
of Hagonoy, Bulacan, represented by the Hon. Felix V. Ople, Municipal Mayor, and Felix
V. Ople, in his capacity vs. Hon. Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, et al., G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
Motion to Dismiss; unenforceability under statute of frauds. In other words, the Statute of Frauds
only lays down the method by which the enumerated contracts may be proved. But it does not
declare them invalid because they are not reduced to writing inasmuch as, by law, contracts are
obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present. The object is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations depending, for evidence thereof, on the unassisted memory of
witnesses by requiring certain enumerated contracts and transactions to be evidenced by a
writing signed by the party to be charged. The effect of noncompliance with this requirement is
simply that no action can be enforced under the given contracts. If an action is nevertheless filed
in court, it shall warrant a dismissal under Section 1(i), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, unless
there has been, among others, total or partial performance of the obligation on the part of either
party.
It has been private respondent’s consistent stand, since the inception of the instant case that she
has entered into a contract with petitioners. As far as she is concerned, she has already
performed her part of the obligation under the agreement by undertaking the delivery of the 21
motor vehicles contracted for by Ople in the name of petitioner municipality. This claim is well
substantiated — at least for the initial purpose of setting out a valid cause of action against
petitioners — by copies of the bills of lading attached to the complaint, naming petitioner
municipality as consignee of the shipment. Petitioners have not at any time expressly denied
this allegation and, hence, the same is binding on the trial court for the purpose of ruling on the
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motion to dismiss. In other words, since there exists an indication by way of allegation that
there has been performance of the obligation on the part of respondent, the case is excluded
from the coverage of the rule on dismissals based on unenforceability under the statute of frauds,
and either party may then enforce its claims against the other. The Municipality
of Hagonoy, Bulacan, represented by the Hon. Felix V. Ople, Municipal Mayor, and Felix
V. Ople, in his capacity vs. Hon. Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, et al., G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010 .
Order of default; when warranted. Second, Hutama avers that the CA committed a reversible
error when it upheld the decision of the RTC, which was based on the ex-parte evidence
presented by KCD. Allegedly, its constitutional right to due process was violated when the RTC
issued an order of default which resulted in its failure to present evidence. However, we find
that the RTC acted within the confines of its discretion when it issued the order of default upon
the motion of KCD when Hutama failed to file an answer within the extended period. The RTC
did not hastily issue the order of default. It gave Hutama the opportunity to explain its side. On
August 22, 2002, the motion to set aside the order of default was set for hearing, but
neither Hutama’s counsel, nor any other representative of petitioner corporation, appeared.
According to the counsel of Hutama, in his Memorandum, he failed to file an answer on time
because he went to the province for the Lenten season. He assigned the case to his associate,
but the latter also went to the province. This flimsy excuse deserves scant
consideration. Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V. vs. KCD Builders Corporation, represented
by its President Celso C. Diokno, G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010
Parties; private litigant is not proper party to challenge adverse litigant’s qualification to acquire
land. It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge
Ramona’s qualifications to acquire land. Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the
Solicitor General or his representative shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators.
Although the law does not categorically state that only the Government, through the Solicitor
General, may attack the title of an alien transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that
only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case
challenging the capacity of a person to acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This
limitation is based on the fact that the violation is committed against the State, not against any
individual; and that in the event that the transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the
affected property reverts to the State, not to the previous owner or any other individual. Herein,
even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject property, the
decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will not inure to the
benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of the State in
accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185. Catalina Balais-Mabanag, assisted by her
husband, Eleuterio Mabanag vs. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 153142.
March 29, 2010
Petition; mootness. The Court notes that Sta. Clara repeatedly argued in its pleadings that the
January 26, 2004 MARINA decision was superseded by the June 6, 2005 LMRO decision, and
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that the old CPC of MV King Frederick was replaced by a new CPC issued in accordance with
RA 9295 and its implementing rules. San Pablo herself agreed that the January 26, 2004
MARINA decision was deemed abandoned when Sta. Clara applied for and obtained a
new CPC. There is no dispute then that the January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and the
old CPC are now defunct. The January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and the old CPC were the
subject matter of the petition of San Pablo before the CA. The reversal of the decision and the
revocation of the CPC were the reliefs sought in that petition. However, the passage of RA 9295
and the filing by Sta. Clara of an application for a new CPC under the new law supervened and
rendered the January 26, 2004 MARINA decision and old CPC of no consequence. There was
no more justiciable controversy for the CA to decide, no remedy to grant or deny. The petition
before the CA had become purely hypothetical, there being nothing left to act upon. Although
Sta. Clara filed with the CA a motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2005 decision without
disclosing the foregoing developments, by the time the CA resolved the motion for
reconsideration, it was already aware of the changes in the situation of the parties: specifically,
that Sta. Clara had filed a new application under RA 9295 and that the LMRO had issued Sta.
Clara a new CPC. More significantly, the new CPC issued to Sta. Clara was now subject to the
rules implementing RA 9295. Under Rule XV, Sec. 1 thereof, a peculiar process of
administrative remedy provides that the MARINA Administrator, and not the CA, is vested with
primary jurisdiction over matters relating to the issuance of a CPC. Under the altered state of
facts, the CA should have refrained from resolving the pending motions before it and should
have declared the case mooted by supervening events. Besides, questions on the validity of the
new CPC are cognizable by the MARINA Administrator and, consonant with the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction, the CA should have referred San Pablo to MARINA for the
resolution of her challenge to the validity of the new CPC of Sta. Clara. The CA ought to have
given due deference to the exercise by MARINA of its sound administrative discretion in
applying its special knowledge, experience and expertise to determine the technical and
intricate factual matters relating to the new CPC of Sta. Clara. Sta. Clara Shipping Corporation
vs. Eugenia T. San Pablo, G.R. No. 169493, March 15, 2010
Petition; not moot. Petitioners allege that the petition had been rendered moot because
respondent already left the country. Petitioners cited Lewin vs. The Deportation Board where
the Court ruled:
x x x. Even if the deportation case is to proceed and even if this Court will decide this appeal on
the merits, there would be no practical value or effect of such action upon Lewin, because he
has already left the country. Consequently, the issues involved herein have become moot and
academic.
However, we agree with respondent that the factual circumstances in Lewin are different from
the case before us. In Lewin, petitioner was an alien who entered the country as a temporary
visitor, to stay for only 50 days. He prolonged his stay by securing several extensions. Before
his last extension expired, he voluntarily left the country, upon filing a bond, without any
assurance from the Deportation Board that he would be admitted to the country upon his
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return. The Court found that he did not return to the country, and at the time he was living in
another country. The Court ruled that Lewin’s voluntary departure from the country, his long
absence, and his status when he entered the country as a temporary visitor rendered academic
the question of his deportation as an undesirable alien. In this case, respondent, prior to his
deportation, was recognized as a Filipino citizen. He manifested his intent to return to the
country because his Filipino wife and children are residing in the Philippines. The filing of the
petitions before the Court of Appeals and before this Court showed his intention to prove his
Filipino lineage and citizenship, as well as the error committed by petitioners in causing his
deportation from the country. He was precisely questioning the DOJ’s revocation of his
certificate of recognition and his summary deportation by the BI. Therefore, we rule that
respondent’s deportation did not render the present case moot. Department of Justice Secretary
Raul M. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Michael Alfio Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010
Petition for review; findings of fact of Court of Appeals binding on Supreme Court; exception
when Court of Appeals’ findings are contrary to those of quasi-judicial agency. It is well-settled
that this Court is not a trier of facts. The factual findings of the CA are regarded as final, binding
and conclusive upon this Court, especially when supported by substantial evidence. However,
there are recognized exceptions to this rule, such as when the factual findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the quasi-judicial agency. In this case, the factual findings of the CA and
the DARAB are conflicting; thus, we are compelled to look at the factual milieu of this case and
review the records. The CA had also overlooked certain relevant facts undisputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Napoleon Magno vs.
Gonzalo Francisco and Regina vda, De Lazaro, G.R. No. 168959, March 25, 2010
Pleadings; adoption of pleading by counsel. There is one final concern raised by petitioners
relative to the denial of their motion for reconsideration. They complain that it was an error for
the Court of Appeals to have denied the motion on the ground that the same was filed by an
unauthorized counsel and, hence, must be treated as a mere scrap of paper. It can be derived
from the records that petitioner Ople, in his personal capacity, filed his Rule 65 petition with the
Court of Appeals through the representation of the law firm Chan Robles & Associates. Later on,
municipal legal officer Joselito Reyes, counsel for petitioner Ople, in his official capacity and for
petitioner municipality, filed with the Court of Appeals a Manifestation with Entry of
Appearance to the effect that he, as counsel, was “adopting all the pleadings filed for and in
behalf of [Ople’s personal representation] relative to this case.” It appears, however, that after
the issuance of the Court of Appeals’ decision, only Ople’s personal representation signed the
motion for reconsideration. There is no showing that the municipal legal officer made the same
manifestation, as he previously did upon the filing of the petition. From this, the Court of
Appeals concluded that it was as if petitioner municipality and petitioner Ople, in his official
capacity, had never moved for reconsideration of the assailed decision, and adverts to the ruling
in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals and Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appealsthat only
under well-defined exceptions may a private counsel be engaged in lawsuits involving a
municipality, none of which exceptions obtains in this case. The Court of Appeals is
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mistaken. As can be seen from the manner in which the Manifestation with Entry of Appearance
is worded, it is clear that petitioner municipality’s legal officer was intent on adopting, for both
the municipality and Mayor Ople, not only the certiorari petition filed with the Court of Appeals,
but also all other pleadings that may be filed thereafter by Ople’s personal representation,
including the motion for reconsideration subject of this
case. XXX XXX XXX The Municipality
of Hagonoy, Bulacan, represented by the Hon. Felix V. Ople, Municipal Mayor, and Felix
V. Ople, in his capacity vs. Hon. Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, et al., G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; execution by president. On the other hand, a
certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal
party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. It is true that the
power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its
corporate powers. However, it is settled – and we have so declared in numerous decisions –
that the president of a corporation may sign the verification and the certification of non-forum
shopping. In Ateneo de Naga University vs. Manalo, we held that the lone signature of the
University President was sufficient to fulfill the verification requirement, because such officer
had sufficient knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
petition. In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. vs. CA, we held that in the absence of
a charter or bylaw provision to the contrary, the president of a corporation is presumed to have
the authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the
scope of his or her usual duties. Moreover, even if a certain contract or undertaking is outside
the usual powers of the president, the corporation’s ratification of the contract or undertaking
and the acceptance of benefits therefrom make the corporate president’s actions binding on the
corporation. Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V. vs. KCD Builders Corporation, represented by
its President Celso C. Diokno, G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010
Pleadings; defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. Yet, now, when the final
decision of the RTC is already being implemented, the petitioner would thwart the execution by
assailing the directive of the RTC for the Branch Clerk of Court to execute the deed of absolute
sale and by blocking the registration of the deed of absolute sale in the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City, on the ground that Ramona was disqualified from owning land in the
Philippines. The petitioner’s move was outrightly unwarranted. First: The petitioner did not
raise any issue against Ramona’s qualifications to own land in the Philippines during the trial or,
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at the latest, before the finality of the RTC judgment. The petitioner was thereby deemed to have
waived the objection, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. — Defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
(2a)
In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available
defenses and objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an
appropriate contest before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity.
Without the rule, there will be no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply
raise “new” or additional issues in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an
already final and executory judgment. The endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs
for the parties, and can surely contribute to the unwarranted clogging of court dockets. The
prospect of a protracted litigation between the parties annuls the very rationale of every
litigation to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end to litigation.Catalina Balais-Mabanag,
assisted by her husband, Eleuterio Mabanag vs. The Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, et al., G.R. No. 153142. March 29, 2010
Pleadings; effect of failure to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution;
exception. Titan claimed that because Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and
due execution of the SPA in his Reply, he is deemed to have admitted the veracity of said
document, in accordance with Rule 8, Sections 7 and 8, of the Rules of Court. On this point,
we fully concur with the findings of the CA that:
It is true that the reply filed by Manuel alleging that the special power of attorney is a forgery
was not made under oath. However, the complaint, which was verified by Manuel under oath,
alleged that the sale of the subject property executed by his wife, Martha, in favor of Titan was
without his knowledge, consent, and approval, express or implied; and that there is nothing on
the face of the deed of sale that would show that he gave his consent thereto. In Toribio v. Bidin,
it was held that where the verified complaint alleged that the plaintiff never sold, transferred or
disposed their share in the inheritance left by their mother to others, the defendants were placed
on adequate notice that they would be called upon during trial to prove the genuineness or due
execution of the disputed deed of sale. While Section 8, Rule 8 is mandatory, it is a discovery
procedure and must be reasonably construed to attain its purpose, and in a way as not to effect
a denial of substantial justice. The interpretation should be one which assists the parties in
obtaining a speedy, inexpensive, and most important, a just determination of the disputed issues.
Moreover, during the pre-trial, Titan requested for stipulation that the special power of attorney
was signed by Manuel authorizing his wife to sell the subject property, but Manuel refused to
admit the genuineness of said special power of attorney and stated that he is presenting an
expert witness to prove that his signature in the special power of attorney is a forgery. However,
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Titan did not register any objection x x x. Furthermore, Titan did not object to the presentation
of Atty. Desiderio Pagui, who testified as an expert witness, on his Report finding that the
signature on the special power of attorney was not affixed by Manuel based on his analysis of
the questioned and standard signatures of the latter, and even cross-examined said witness.
Neither did Titan object to the admission of said Report when it was offered in evidence by
Manuel on the ground that he is barred from denying his signature on the special power of
attorney. In fact, Titan admitted the existence of said Report and objected only to the purpose
for which it was offered. In Central Surety & Insurance Company vs. C.N. Hodges, it was held
that where a party acted in complete disregard of or wholly overlooked Section 8, Rule 8 and
did not object to the introduction and admission of evidence questioning the genuineness and
due execution of a document, he must be deemed to have waived the benefits of said Rule.
Consequently, Titan is deemed to have waived the mantle of protection given [it] by Section 8,
Rule 8.
Titan Construction Corporation vs. Manuel A. David, Sr. and Martha S. David, G.R. No. 169548,
March 15, 2010
Pleadings; verification. Third, Hutama questions the verification and certification on non-forum
shopping of KCD, issued by its board of directors, because the same was signed by the latter’s
president without proof of authority to sign the same. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct as to his
personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party does not need to sign the
verification. A party’s representative, lawyer, or any person who personally knows the truth of
the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V.
vs. KCD Builders Corporation, represented by its President Celso C. Diokno, G.R. No. 173181,
March 3, 2010
Pleadings; verification. Anent private respondent’s allegation that the petition was not properly
verified, we find the same to be devoid of merit. The purpose of requiring a verification is to
secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in good faith, or are true
and correct, not merely speculative. In this instance, petitioner attached a verification to her
petition although dated earlier than the filing of her petition. Petitioner explains that since a draft
of the petition and the verification were earlier sent to her in New York for her signature, the
verification was earlier dated than the petition for certiorari filed with us. We accept such
explanation. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition for certiorari be verified, this is
not an absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the
questions raised are mainly of law. In this case, the issue raised is purely of law. Leah Palma vs.
Hon. Danilo P. Galvez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 24, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
Pleadings; verification is formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. Likewise, the verification of a
pleading is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement. The purpose of requiring a verification
is to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition are true and correct, not merely
speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non-
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compliance therewith does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. Spouses Melchor, et al. vs. Ronald B. Bernal, et al.,G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010
Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear and unmistakable right. One of the requisites for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is that the applicant must have a right in esse. A
right in esse is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, one clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The existence of a right to be protected, and the
acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right must be established. The
complaint filed by petitioner for injunction with damages seeks to enjoin the foreclosure of the
mortgages. Petitioner admitted having executed Promissory Note No. 1000045-08. During the
hearing of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, the cross-default provision of the
note was read to him and he admitted having gone over it before he signed the note. And
petitioner admitted that he failed to honor the note on maturity. Petitioner alleged in his
complaint, however, that respondent’s acceleration of the maturity of his entire obligation is “in
gross bad faith” and in “gross abuse of [his] right” as it “subjected the maturity of the loans to
its own whims and caprices . . . not to mention that it [was] done in the midst of this present
economic crisis . . . .” Respondent’s declaration that petitioner’s availments under the revolving
credit line and medium term loans were immediately due and payable was by virtue of the
cross-default provision of Promissory Note No. 1000045-08. Respondent’s move to foreclose
the mortgages after petitioner defaulted in his obligation under the promissory note was thus in
accordance with said provision which petitioner did not challenge. The trial court thus erred
in ordering the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on the basis of its finding that
“there are legal matters to be looked into with respect to the application of the acceleration
clause or default provisions in the promissory note.”
By the above-quoted allegations and prayer in petitioner’s complaint, however, which
complaint, it bears emphasis, is for injunction and damages, as well as from the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the hearing on petitioner’s application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, petitioner has not laid or established a right in esse to entitle him to the writ. Eugene
L. Lim vs. BPI Agriculture Development Bank, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010
Procedural rules; adherence necessary for orderly and speedy administration of
justice. Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and
litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. It is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, but it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The procedural
shortcut taken by petitioners finds no justification either in law or in jurisprudence. It is fatal to
their cause of action. Accordingly, we rule that the Court of Appeals committed no error in
dismissing for prematurity the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by
petitioners. Pio Delos Reyes, represented by heirs Fidel Delos Reyes, et al. vs. Hon. Waldo Q.
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Flores in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the President, et al., G.R.
No. 168726, March 5, 2010
Procedural rules; misuse. We close with the observation that what is involved here are not only
errors of law, but also the errors of a litigant and his lawyer. As may have been noted,
petitioner Tomawis’ counsel veritably filed two (2) motions to dismiss, each predicated on the
sole issue of jurisdiction. The first may have been understandable. But the second motion was
something else, interposed as it was after the CA, by resolution, denied Tomawis’ petition for
certiorari for want of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate court to review judgments or orders
of the SDC. The CA stated the observation, however, that Tomawis and his counsel may repair
to this Court while the Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized. Petitioner waited two
years after the CA issued its denial before filing what virtually turned out to be his second
motion to dismiss, coming finally to this Court after the same motion was denied. The Court
must express disapproval of the cunning effort of Tomawis and his counsel to use procedural
rules to the hilt to prolong the final disposition of this case. From Alonso v. Villamor, almost a
century-old decision, the Court has left no doubt that it frowns on such unsporting practice. The
rule is settled that a question of jurisdiction, as here, may be raised at any time, even on appeal,
provided its application does not result in a mockery of the basic tenets of fair play. Petitioner’s
action at the later stages of the proceedings below, doubtless taken upon counsel’s advice, is
less than fair and constitutes censurable conduct. Lawyers and litigants must be brought to
account for their improper conduct, which trenches n the efficient dispensation of
justice. Sultan Yahya “Jerry” M. Tomawis vs. Hon Rasad G. Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 182434,
March 5, 2010
Procedural rules; relaxation of rules on service of pleadings. XXX XXX XXX Concededly, the
respondents did not strictly follow Rule 13, Sec. 11 on priorities on modes of service. However,
since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their strict
and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must be avoided. The relaxation of the rules on service is all the
more proper in the present case, where petitioner had already received his copy of the notice of
appeal by registered mail, since the Court has previously ruled that a litigant’s failure to furnish
his opponent with a copy of his notice of appeal is not a sufficient cause for dismissing it and
that he could simply have been ordered to furnish appellee with a copy of his appeal. Atty.
Voltaire I. Rovira vs. Heirs of Jose C. Delestre, et al., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010 G.R. No.
160825, March 26, 2010
Record on appeal; not required where main action is for recovery of ownership and possession,
and multiple appeals cannot be taken. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in
actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain
and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same
case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by the court and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal
becomes indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate
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court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The main action involved herein, being a suit for recovery of ownership and possession,
is not one where multiple appeals can be taken or are necessary. The choice of asserting a
claim for attorney’s fees in the very action in which the services in question have been rendered,
as done by the petitioner herein, will not convert a regular case into one falling under the
category of “other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require.” The main case handled by petitioner lawyer has already been decided with finality up
to the appeal stage and is already in the execution stage. The trial court has also already
resolved the incident of attorney’s fees. Hence, there is no reason why the original records of
the case must remain with the trial court. There was also no need for respondents to file a
record on appeal because the original records could already be sent to the appellate court for
the resolution of the appeal on the matter of the attorney’s fees. To repeat, since the case has
not been made out for multiple appeals, a record on appeal is unnecessary to perfect the
appeal. The only requirement to perfect the appeal in the present case is the filing of a notice of
appeal in due time. This the respondents did. . . . Atty. Voltaire I. Rovira vs. Heirs of Jose
C. Delestre, et al., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010
Summons; service on resident temporarily out of country. In civil cases, the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter’s
voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Private respondent was a
Filipino resident who was temporarily out of the Philippines at the time of the service of
summons; thus, service of summons on her is governed by Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. – When an action is commenced against a
defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service
may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding section.
The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15, which speaks of
extraterritorial service, thus:
SEC. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject
of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant,
or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which
the defendant must answer.
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The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of summons,
she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of summons may be
made only by publication. We do not agree. In Montefalcon vs. Vasquez, we said that because
Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not mandatory. Other methods of
service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a
defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in section 7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service
outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Leah Palma vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Courtof Iloilo City, Branch 24, et al., G.R. No.
165273, March 10, 2010
Summons; substituted service in suit in personam against Philippine resident temporarily out of
country. In Montalban vs. Maximo, we held that substituted service of summons under the
present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the
Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will
confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant. In the same case, we expounded on the
rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for residents
temporarily out of the Philippines.
x x x A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a
dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be
directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his
affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do
all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any
incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a
man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be
contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of
him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is
not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him
upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or
regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against
him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and
cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.
Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and
complaint may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
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discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in
the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily
out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant
that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the
issue of due process as that of jurisdiction. Section 7 also designates the persons with whom
copies of the process may be left. The rule presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists
between the person with whom the copy is left and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that
such person will deliver the process to defendant or in some way give him notice thereof. In
this case, the Sheriff’s Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; thus, the
service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo,
acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and discretion, who was
residing in that place and, therefore, was competent to receive the summons on private
respondent’s behalf. Notably, private respondent makes no issue as to the fact that the place
where the summons was served was her residence, though she was temporarily out of the
country at that time, and that Alfredo is her husband. In fact, in the notice of appearance and
motion for extension of time to file answer submitted by private respondent’s counsel, he
confirmed the Sheriff’s Return by stating that private respondent was out of the country and that
his service was engaged by respondent’s husband. In his motion for another extension of time
to file answer, private respondent’s counsel stated that a draft of the answer had already been
prepared, which would be submitted to private respondent, who was in Ireland for her
clarification and/or verification before the Philippine Consulate there. These statements
establish the fact that private respondent had knowledge of the case filed against her, and that
her husband had told her about the case as Alfredo even engaged the services of her
counsel. Leah Palma vs. Hon. Danilo P. Galvez, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 24, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
Temporary restraining order; non-extension of 20-day period. As to the issue of whether the
temporary restraining order issued by the RTC remained valid even if it was beyond the 20-day
period provided under the Rules of Court, it is settled that under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules
of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order within a limited life of twenty (20)
days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary
injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically
expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being
necessary and the courts having no discretion to extend the same. The rule against the non-
extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order
is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. Hence, the RTC committed error when it ruled that
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the temporary restraining order it issued on December 2, 2003 was effective until January 5,
2004, a period that was beyond the twenty (20) days allowed under the Rules of Court. This
does not mean, however, that the entire TRO was invalidated. The same remained valid and in
effect, but only within the 20-day period, after which it automatically expired. National
Electrification Administration vs. Val L. Villanueva, G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
Venue; no waiver of improper venue. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally.
When the RTC denied his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition
for certiorari and/or prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive his objections
to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioner’s assertion. Notably, after his motion to
dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even
in his Answer Ad Cautelam, respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on
the basis of improper venue. Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No.
183926, March 29, 2010
Venue; real action. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the
RTC of Makati City, the latter being the proper venue in this case. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of venue. Actions affecting
title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced
and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property
is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried
in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. The action in the RTC, other than for
Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale involving the subject
property, which is located at No. 1366 Caballero St., Dasmariñas Village, Makati City. The
venue for such action is unquestionably the proper court of Makati City, where the real property
or part thereof lies, not the RTC of Muntinlupa City. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
principle that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself,
rather than by its title or heading. It is also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a
case is the primary objective for the filing of the case. In her Complaint, petitioner sought the
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of two basic claims that (1) she did not
execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she still owned one half (½) of the subject
property. Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject
property on the basis of her co-ownership thereof. Second. The RTC also committed a
procedural blunder when it denied respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue.
The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even when it was awfully glaring that the
venue was improperly laid, as pointed out by respondent in his motion to dismiss. After trial, the
RTC eventually dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as
justification, the rules and jurisprudence on venue. Despite the conduct of trial, the RTC failed
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to adjudicate this case on the merits. Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No.
183926, March 29, 2010
Writ of preliminary attachment; improper issuance against municipality. With this in mind, the
Court holds that the writ of preliminary attachment must be dissolved and, indeed, it must not
have been issued in the very first place. While there is merit in private respondent’s position
that she, by affidavit, was able to substantiate the allegation of fraud in the same way that the
fraud attributable to petitioners was sufficiently alleged in the complaint and, hence, the
issuance of the writ would have been justified. Still, the writ of attachment in this case would
only prove to be useless and unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the
municipality may not, in the event that respondent’s claim is validated, be subjected to writs of
execution and garnishment — unless, of course, there has been a corresponding appropriation
provided by law. The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, represented by the Hon. Felix V. Ople,
Municipal Mayor, and Felix V. Ople, in his capacity vs. Hon. Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, et al., G.R. No.
168289, March 22, 2010
Special Proceedings
Notice of lis pendens; deemed canceled upon recording of probate court’s approval of
compromise agreement. Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the
annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. The
compromise agreement did not mention the grant of a right of way to respondent. Any
agreement other than the judicially approved compromise agreement between the parties was
outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court. Thus, any other agreement entered into by
the petitioner and respondent with regard to a grant of a right of way was not within the
jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate court. Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not
to cancel the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed
to be protected. Any alleged right arising from the “side agreement” on the right of way can be
fully protected by filing an ordinary action for specific performance in a court of general
jurisdiction. More importantly, the order of the probate court approving the compromise had
the effect of directing the delivery of the residue of the estate of Lourdes to the persons entitled
thereto under the compromise agreement. As such, it brought to a close the intestate
proceedings and the probate court lost jurisdiction over the case, except only as regards to the
compliance and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations under the
compromise agreement. Having established that the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Lourdes came to an end upon the RTC’s promulgation of a decision based on the
compromise agreement, Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Recording the order of partition of estate. – Certified copies of final orders and judgments
of the court relating to the real estate or the partition thereof shall be recorded in the registry of
deeds of the province where the property is situated.
In line with the recording of the order for the partition of the estate, paragraph 2, Section 77 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 provides:
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Section 77. Cancellation of Lis Pendens – xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx
At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant, or other disposition of the action
such as to terminate finally all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings
involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice of lis pendens has been registered as
provided in the preceding section, the notice of lis pendens shall be deemed cancelled upon
the registration of a certificate of the clerk of court in which the action or proceeding was
pending stating the manner of disposal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the September 13, 2000 decision was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, the notice of lis pendens inscribed
on TCT No. 24475 was deemed cancelled by virtue of Section 77 of PD No. 1529. Anita Reyes-
Menugas vs. Alejandro Aquino Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010
Settlement of estate; effect of probate court’s approval of compromise agreement. In this
instance, the case filed with the RTC was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Lourdes. The RTC therefore took cognizance of the case as a probate court. Settled is the rule
that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. It acts on matters pertaining to the estate
but never on the rights to property arising from the contract. It approves contracts entered into
for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court. It is
apparent therefore that when the RTC approved the compromise agreement on September 13,
2000, the settlement of the estate proceeding came to an end. Anita Reyes-Menugas vs.
Alejandro Aquino Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010
Settlement of estate; judgment based on compromise agreement immediately executory. A
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Once submitted to the court and stamped
with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract binding upon the parties;
having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the
force and effect of any judgment. Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement is immediately executory as there is no appeal from such
judgment. When both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request
that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver
of the right to appeal against the said decision. Anita Reyes-Menugas vs. Alejandro Aquino
Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010
Other proceedings
Citizenship proceedings; finality and review. Petitioners allege that the DOJ adduced substantial
evidence warranting the revocation of respondent’s certificate of recognition and the filing of the
deportation proceedings against him. Petitioners likewise allege that the certificate of
recognition did not attain finality as claimed by respondent. We agree with petitioners that the
issuance of certificate of recognition to respondent has not attained finality. In Go v. Ramos, the
Court ruled that citizenship proceedings are a class of its own and can be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship
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only if the following concur: (a) a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a
controversy where said person is a party; (b) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and (c) the finding of citizenship is
affirmed by this Court.
However, the courts are not precluded from reviewing the findings of the [Bureau of
Immigration]. Judicial review is permitted if the courts believe that there is substantial evidence
supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the
belief that the claim is correct. When the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his
citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings. Courts may review the actions of the administrative offices
authorized to deport aliens and reverse their rulings when there is no evidence to sustain the
rulings. Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, et al. vs. Michael Alfio Pennisi, G.R.
No. 169958, March 5, 2010
Consolidation; not available for petition for issuance of writ of possession and petition for
annulment of foreclosure proceedings. Given the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the
proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession should not be consolidated with the case for
the declaration of nullity of a foreclosure sale. The glaring difference in the nature of the two
militates against their consolidation. The long-standing rule is that proceedings for the issuance
of a writ of possession are ex parte and non-litigious in nature. The only exemption from this
rule is Active Wood Products Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals where the consolidation of the
proceedings for the issuance of a writ of possession and nullification of foreclosure proceedings
was allowed following the provisions on consolidation in the Rules of Court. However, the
circumstances in this case are substantially distinct from that in Active Wood. Therefore, the
exception granted in that case cannot be applied here. In Active Wood, the petition for writ of
possession was filed before the expiration of the one-year redemption period while, in this case,
the petition for writ of possession was filed after the one-year redemption period had lapsed.
Moreover, in Active Wood, title to the litigated property had not been consolidated in the name
of the mortgagee. Therefore, in that case, the mortgagee did not yet have an absolute right over
the property. In De Vera vs. Agloro, we ruled:
The possession of land becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. The
purchaser can demand possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his
name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title. After the consolidation of title
in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right.
In another case involving these two parties, Fernandez and United Overseas Bank Phils. vs.
Espinoza, we held:
Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the
foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis of this right to possession is the purchaser’s
ownership of the property.
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In this case, title to the litigated property had already been consolidated in the name of
respondent, making the issuance of a writ of possession a matter of right. Consequently, the
consolidation of the petition for the issuance of a writ of possession with the proceedings for
nullification of foreclosure would be highly improper. Otherwise, not only will the very purpose
of consolidation (which is to avoid unnecessary delay) be defeated but the procedural matter of
consolidation will also adversely affect the substantive right of possession as an incident of
ownership. Finally, petitions for the issuance of writs of possession, a land registration
proceeding, do not fall within the ambit of the Rules of Court. Thus, the rules on consolidation
should not be applied. Gregorio Espinoza, in his own personal capacity and as surviving spouse,
and Jo Anne G. Espinoza, herein represented by their attorney-in-fact, Ban Sangil,G.R. No.
175380, March 22, 2010
Electoral tribunals; review of decisions and orders by Supreme Court. It is hornbook principle
that this Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave
abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its
discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined in Villarosa vs. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.
Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal’s denial of his pleas for an additional period of time within
which to make his formal offer of evidence. However, a review of the proceedings will reveal
that the HRET acted in accordance with its rules of procedure and well within its
jurisdiction. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
Josephine Veronique R. Lacson-Noel and Hon. Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. No. 190067,
March 9, 2010
Extrajudicial foreclosure; petition for annulment of foreclosure proceeding; nature. On the other
hand, by its nature, a petition for nullification or annulment of foreclosure proceedings contests
the presumed right of ownership of the buyer in a foreclosure sale and puts in issue such
presumed right of ownership. Thus, a party scheming to defeat the right to a writ of possession
of a buyer in a foreclosure sale who had already consolidated his ownership over the property
subject of the foreclosure sale can simply resort to the subterfuge of filing a petition for
nullification of foreclosure proceedings with motion for consolidation of the petition for
issuance of a writ of possession. This we cannot allow as it will render nugatory the presumed
right of ownership, as well as the right of possession, of a buyer in a foreclosure sale, rights
which are supposed to be implemented in an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession. Besides, the mere fact that the “presumed right of ownership is contested and made
the basis of another action” does not by itself mean that the proceedings for issuance of a writ of
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possession will become groundless. The presumed right of ownership and the right of possession
should be respected until and unless another party successfully rebuts that presumption in an
action for nullification of the foreclosure proceedings. As such, and in connection with the
issuance of a writ of possession, the grant of a complaint for nullification of foreclosure
proceedings is a resolutory condition, not a suspensive condition. Gregorio Espinoza, in his own
personal capacity and as surviving spouse, and Jo Anne G. Espinoza, herein represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Ban Sangil, G.R. No. 175380, March 22, 2010
Jurisdiction; appeal in case involving Shari’a law. Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact
that decades after the enactment in 1989 of the law creating the Shari’a Appellate Court and
after the Court, per Resolution of June 8, 1999, authorized its creation, the Shari’a Appellate
Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate
Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however,
appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the [Shari’a District Court] filed with the
CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably
composed of Muslim CA Justices. For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the
Rules. To be sure, the Court has, on several occasions, passed upon and resolved petitions and
cases emanating from Shari’a courts. Among these was one involving the issue of whether or not
grave abuse of discretion attended the denial of a motion to implement a writ of execution. Still
another involved the Shari’a courts’ jurisdiction in custody and guardianship proceedings,
nullity of marriage and divorce when the parties were both married in civil and Muslim rites,
and settlement of estate proceedings where the deceased was alleged to be not a Muslim, or
where the estate covered properties situated in different provinces. The instant petition,
involving only a question of law on the jurisdiction of the SDC over a complaint for quieting of
title, was properly instituted before the Court. Sultan Yahya “Jerry” M. Tomawis vs.
Hon Rasad G. Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010
Jurisdiction; concurrent jurisdiction of Sharia’a court and regional trial court in certain cases. As
things stood prior to the effectivity date of BP 129, the SDC had, by virtue of PD 1083, original
jurisdiction, concurrently with the RTCs and MTCs, over all personal and real actions outside
the purview of Art. 143(1)(d) of PD 1083, in which the parties involved were Muslims, except
those for ejectment. Personal action is one that is founded on privity of contracts between the
parties; and in which the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract, or recovery of damages. Real action, on the other hand, is one
anchored on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or
possession of real property or interest in it. On the other hand, BP 129, as amended, vests the
RTC or the municipal trial court with exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions that
involve the title to or possession of real property, or any interest in it, and the value of the
property subject of the case or the jurisdictional amount, determining whether the case comes
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within the jurisdictional competence of the RTC or the MTC. Orbeta vs. Orbeta differentiated
personal action from real action in the following wise:
A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
Civil Case No. 102-97, judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, is basically a
suit for recovery of possession and eventual reconveyance of real property which, under BP 129,
as amended, falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. In an action
for reconveyance, all that must be alleged in the complaint are two facts that, admitting them to
be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely: (1) that the
plaintiff is the owner of the land or has possessed the land in the concept of owner; and (2) that
the defendant has illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the land. A cursory perusal of private
respondents’ complaint readily shows that that these requisites have been met: they alleged
absolute ownership of the subject parcel of land, and they were illegally dispossessed of their
land by petitioner. The allegations in the complaint, thus, make a case for an action
for reconveyance. Given the above perspective, the question that comes to the fore is whether
the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to the exclusion of the SDC. Petitioner’s version of the law
would effectively remove the concurrent original jurisdiction granted by Art. 143, par. 2(b) of
PD 1083 to civil courts and Shari’a courts over, among others:
All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court. x x x
Petitioner’s interpretation of the law cannot be given serious thought. One must bear in mind
that even if Shari’a courts are considered regular courts, these are courts of limited jurisdiction.
As we have observed in Rulona-Al Awadhi vs. Astih, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws creating
said courts was promulgated to fulfill “the aspiration of the Filipino Muslims to have their system
of laws enforced in their communities.” It is a special law intended for Filipino Muslims, as
clearly stated in the purpose of PD 1083:
ARTICLE 2. Purpose of Code. — Pursuant to Section 11 of Article XV of the Constitution of the
Philippines, which provides that “The State shall consider the customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of state
policies,” this Code:
(a) Recognizes the legal system of the Muslims in the Philippines as part of the law of
the land and seeks to make Islamic institutions more effective;
(b) Codifies Muslim personal laws; and
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(c) Provides for an effective administration and enforcement of Muslim personal laws
among Muslims.
A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of
general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions
found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Shari’a courts. A look at the scope
of BP 129 clearly shows that Shari’a courts were not included in the reorganization of courts
that were formerly organized under RA 296. The pertinent provision in BP 129 states:
SECTION 2. Scope. — The reorganization herein provided shall include the Court of Appeals,
the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Courts.
As correctly pointed out by private respondents in their Comment, BP 129 was enacted to
reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In
contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Shari’a courts.
In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent
jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083. . . . . While we recognize the
concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with respect to cases involving only Muslims,
the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to
Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional conferment,
found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not
be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim, who may be the opposing party
against a Muslim. Sultan Yahya “Jerry” M. Tomawis vs. Hon Rasad G.Balindong, et al., G.R.
No. 182434, March 5, 2010
Jurisdiction; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) without jurisdiction
to resolve issues involving identification and selection of farmer-beneficiaries under
CARP. Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not clothed with the power or authority to resolve
the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the
same is an Agrarian Law Implementation case, thus, an administrative function falling within the
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Petitioners’ argument is well
taken. In Lercana vs. Jalandoni, this Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and
selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation
of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB. Romanita Concha, et al.
vs.Paulino Rubio, et al., G.R. No. 162446, March 29, 2010
Jurisdiction; determined by allegations in complaint. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the court
below cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or
in a motion for reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought. In the instant case, private respondents’ petition in Civil Case No.
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102-97 sufficiently alleged the concurrent original jurisdiction of the SDC. Sultan Yahya “Jerry”
M. Tomawis vs. Hon Rasad G.Balindong, et al., G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction of Special Agrarian Court over just compensation cases under
CARL.“Jurisdiction” is the court’s authority to hear and determine a case. The court’s
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law. In this case, the
law that confers jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts designated by the Supreme Court in
every province is Republic Act (R.A.) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. Sections 56 and 57 are the relevant provisions:
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. – The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court.
The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional Special
Agrarian Courts as may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian cases in each
province. In the designation, the Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial
Courts which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were
former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said special
jurisdiction in addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts.
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and
the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for a province has
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that
Special Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases:
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (2) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657. By “special” jurisdiction, Special Agrarian
Courts exercise power in addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction of the RTC,
such as taking cognizance of suits involving agricultural lands located outside their regular
territorial jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they sit as Special Agrarian
Courts. R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court before an RTC Branch can
function as a Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the
single sala courts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City as
Special Agrarian Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just because
the lands subject of such cases happen to be within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated Special Agrarian Court for the
province of Negros Oriental, it has jurisdiction over all cases for determination of just
compensation involving agricultural lands within that province, regardless of whether or not
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those properties are outside its regular territorial jurisdiction. Land Bank of the Philippines
vs. Corazon M. Villegas/Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Catalino V. Noel, et al., G.R.
No. 180384/G.R. No. 180891, March 26, 2010
Jurisdiction; Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction to determine validity of writs of
sequestration issued by PCGG. The task of ascertaining the validity of writs of sequestration
issued by the PCGG, when called into question, is the sole province of the Sandiganbayan, the
issues involved therein being factual in nature. It is well settled that the Sandiganbayan has full
authority to decide any and all incidents pertaining to an ill-gotten [wealth] case, including the
propriety of the issuance of the writs of sequestration. Thus, any question on the correctness of
the lifting of the sequestration writ against Heacock upon its motion, either in Civil Case
No. 0002 – had Heacock been allowed to intervene – or in Civil Case No. 0101, hardly merits
further discussion. The Sandiganbayan’s questioned resolutions lifting the sequestration writ
could be, as it correctly was, decided independently of what petitioner claims to be the
existence of “other controverted issues that require trial on the merits before the reliefs prayed
for . . . may be granted.” Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. H.E. Heacock,
Inc. et al., G.R. No. 165878, March 30, 2010
Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; lack of authority to sign not fatal in Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession. Petitioners further claim that the lack of authority to sign the
certificate on non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of
Possession rendered the same worthless and should be deemed as non-existent. MBTC asserts
otherwise, citing Spouses Arquiza vs. Court of Appeals where we held that an application for a
writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding which is in substance merely
a motion, and therefore does not require such a certification. Petitioners’ contention lacks
basis. In Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, where
the issue of validity of the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping was questioned in an application
for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, we held that:
x x x it bears stressing that a certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a
complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession filed by private respondent is not an initiatory
pleading. Although private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more
properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form
or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not to
initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion is
filed. (Emphasis supplied)
It is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of
possession was denominated as a “petition”, it was in substance merely a motion. Indeed, any
insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not render
the writ irregular. After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be
attached to the motion. Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in
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the MBTC’s petition was signed by its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did not
render the said petition defective in form. TheParents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St.
Matthew Academy, et al. vs. The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518,
March 2, 2010
Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; requirement of proof of authority to execute
(CSC).With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is
that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In
this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to sign
the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There is
nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler’s
allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible. Commission
on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R.
No. 172623. March 3, 2010
Pleadings; verification (CSC). First, we tackle Atty. Tiu’s authority to file the petition and sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The petitioner in this case is the
Commission on Appointments, a government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by
its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the
petition could sign the verification. Commission on Appointments, represented herein by its
Secretary Hon. Arturo L. Tiu vs. CelsoM. Paler, G.R. No. 172623. March 3, 2010
Procedural rules; election cases. In Hofer vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, a case
that is closely analogous to the instant petition, the Court emphasized that “[p]rocedural rules in
election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an expeditious determination
of the popular will of the electorate.” Thus, the time limit set by the rules is not something to be
taken lightly, for it was stressed in the same case that “the observance of the HRET Rules in
conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.” Quoting Baltazar vs.
Commission of Elections, The Court reiterated in Hoferthat:
By their very nature and given the public interest involved in the determination of the results of
an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be resolved speedily, otherwise the
will of the electorate would be frustrated. And the delay brought about by the tactics resorted
to by petitioner is precisely the very evil sought to be prevented by election statutes and
controlling case law on the matter.
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that the Tribunal acted in the best interest of the electorate,
ensuring the determination of the latter’s will within a reasonable time. In sum, there is
absolutely nothing in this case that would justify a finding that the HRET gravely abused its
discretion by not granting petitioner an extension of time to present additional evidence and
formally offer the same. Representative Alvin S. Sandoval vs. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, Josephine VeroniqueR. Lacson-Noel and Hon.
Speaker Prospero Nograles, G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010
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Procedural rules; relaxation of period for appeal (CSC). Section 72 of CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 19, s. 1999, provides for the period of appeal for non-disciplinary actions, to wit:
Section 72. When and Where to File. – A decision or ruling of a department or agency may be
appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil
Service Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the same period.
Paler’s son received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Paler’s motion for
reconsideration on March 18, 2004. Thus, Paler’s had until April 2, 2004 within which to file
his appeal with the CSC. It was filed, however, only on April 5, 2004. Nevertheless,
the CSC entertained the appeal in the interest of substantial justice. We agree with the CSC. We
uphold its decision to relax the procedural rules because Paler’s appeal was meritorious. This is
not the first time that the Court has upheld such exercise of discretion. In Rosales, Jr.
v. Mijares involving Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure, the Court ruled:
On the contention of the petitioner that the appeal of the respondent to the CSC was made
beyond the period therefor under Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure,
the CSC correctly ruled that:
Movant claims that Mijares’ appeal was filed way beyond the reglementary period for filing
appeals. He, thus, contends that the Commission should not have given due course to said
appeal.
The Commission need not delve much on the dates when Mijares was separated from the
service and when he assailed his separation. Suffice it to state that the Commission found his
appeal meritorious. This being the case, procedural rules need not be strictly observed. This
principle was explained by in the case of Mauna vs. CSC, 232 SCRA 388, where the Supreme
Court ruled, to wit:
“Assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioner’s appeal was filed out of time, it is within
the power of this Court to temper rigid rules in favor of substantial justice. While it is desirable
that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so
strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. If
the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the higher
objective they seek which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties. As held by the
Court in a number of cases:
xxx
It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the security of tenure of a public
officer sacrosanctly protected by the Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the
merits of the appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and inordinate
application of Section 49(a) of the CSC Revised Rules of Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
Constantino-David vs. Pangandaman-Gania likewise sustained the CSC when it modified an
otherwise final and executory resolution and awarded backwages to the respondent, in the
interest of justice and fair play. The Court stated –
No doubt, the Civil Service Commission was in the legitimate exercise of its mandate under Sec.
3, Rule I, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service that
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“[a]dministrative investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering strictly to the
technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings.” This authority is
consistent with its powers and functions to “[p]rescribe, amend and enforce rules and
regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent
laws” being the central personnel agency of the Government.
Furthermore, there are special circumstances in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play that warrant such liberal attitude on the part of the CSC and a compassionate like-minded
discernment by this Court. x x x
When substantial justice dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just
disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is to avoid unreasonable
delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. A one-day delay, as in
this case, does not justify denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to
delay justice on the part of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its face. Commission
on Appointments, represented herein by its Secretary Hon. Arturo L. Tiu vs. Celso M. Paler, G.R.
No. 172623. March 3, 2010
Writ of possession; nature. The order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon
the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond if the redemption
period has not yet lapsed. If the redemption period has expired, then the filing of the bond is no
longer necessary. Any and all questions regarding the regularity and validity of the sale is left to
be determined in a subsequent proceeding and such questions may not be raised as a
justification for opposing the issuance of a writ of possession. In Santiago vs. Merchants Rural
Bank of Talavera, Inc., we defined the nature of a petition for a writ of possession:
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a
judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious
proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues
another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. Gregorio Espinoza, in his own personal capacity and as surviving spouse, and Jo Anne G.
Espinoza, herein represented by their attorney-in-fact, Ban Sangil, G.R. No. 175380, March 22,
2010
Writ of possession; nature of proceedings for issuance. The petitioners argue that the court
below did not conduct trial for the presentation of evidence to support its conclusion that the
intervention would have no bearing on the issuance and implementation of the writ of
possession, thereby depriving them of due process. Petitioners’ contention is without merit. It
is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession is a ministerial duty of the court. The
purchaser of the foreclosed property, uponex parte application and the posting of the required
bond, has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed property during the 12-month
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redemption period. This ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession under Section
7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated in Article 433 of
the Civil Code. As a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit by which one party “sues another for
the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.” In Idolor vs. Court of Appeals, we described the nature of the ex parte petition for
issuance of possessory writ under Act No. 3135 to be a non-litigious proceeding and summary
in nature. As an ex parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without
notice to, or consent by any person adversely interested. It is a proceeding where the relief is
granted without requiring an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be
heard. It does not matter even if the herein petitioners were not specifically named in the writ of
possession nor notified of such proceedings. In Sagarbarria vs. Philippine Business Bank, we
rejected therein petitioner’s contention that he was denied due process when the trial court
issued the writ of possession without notice. Here in the present case, we similarly reject
petitioners’ contention that the trial court should have conducted a trial prior to issuing the
Order denying their motion to intervene. As it is, the law does not require that a petition for a
writ of possession may be granted only after documentary and testimonial evidence shall have
been offered to and admitted by the court. As long as a verified petition states the facts
sufficient to entitle the petitioner to the relief requested, the court shall issue the writ prayed
for. There is no need for petitioners to offer any documentary or testimonial evidence for the
court to grant the petition. The Parents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew
Academy, et al. vs. TheMetropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010
Writ of possession; when exception to issuance does not apply. In this case, we find that
petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because they are not claiming a right adverse to
the judgment debtor. Petitioner-teachers and students did not claim ownership of the properties,
but merely averred actual “physical possession of the subject school premises”. Petitioner-
teachers’ possession of the said premises was based on the employment contracts they have
with the school. As regards the petitioner-students, Alcuaz vs. Philippine School of Business
Administration and Non vs. Dames IIcharacterized the school-student relationship as contractual
in nature. As such, it would be specious to conclude that the teachers and students hold the
subject premises independent of or adverse to SMCA. In fact, their interest over the school
premises is necessarily inferior to that of the school. Besides, their contracts are with the school
and do not attach to the school premises. Moreover, the foreclosure of the current school
premises does not prevent the SMCA from continuing its operations elsewhere. At this point, it
is relevant to note that in the Joint Decision dated August 16, 2005, the trial court found
that SMCA was not a third party and was therefore bound by the said writ of
possession. Consequently, it affirmed the issuance of the writ of possession. MBTC thus
correctly argued that petitioners did not have superior rights to that of SMCA over the subject
property because their supposed possession of the same emanated only from the latter. Since
petitioners’ possession of the subject school premises stemmed from their employment or
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enrollment contracts with the school, as the case may be, necessarily, their right to possess the
subject school premises cannot be adverse to that of the school and of its owners. As such, the
petitioners cannot be deemed “third parties” as contemplated in Act No. 3135, as
amended. The Parents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy, et al. vs. The
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010
Writ of possession; when issued; period of redemption. As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court
to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of
redemption. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 explicitly authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
to apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under
oath for that purpose “in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or
in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law” with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or place where the real property or any part thereof is
situated, in the case of mortgages duly registered with the Registry of Deeds. Upon filing of
such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also directs in express terms
the said court to issue the order for a writ of possession. However, this rule is not
without exception. In Barican vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of
a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession
of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. This ruling was
reiterated in Policarpio vs. Active Bank where we held that:
Ordinarily, a purchaser of property in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to possession
of the property. Thus, whenever the purchaser prays for a writ of possession, the trial court has
to issue it as a matter of course. However, the obligation of the trial court to issue a writ of
possession ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the
property claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Where such third party
exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse
possession. (Emphasis supplied)
The Parents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy, et al. vs. The Metropolitan
Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010
Writ of possession; remedy to challenge; appeal. Petitioners assert that Section 8 of Act No.
3135 specifically refers to “the debtor” as the party who is required to file a petition for the
cancellation of the writ of possession in the same proceeding in which possession was
requested. As they are not the debtors referred to in the said law, petitioners argue that the filing
of a petition for the cancellation of the writ of possession in the same proceeding in which
possession was requested, does not apply to them. Hence, they allege that it was improper for
the CA to conclude that the Petition for Certiorariwas the wrong remedy in the case where the
writ of possession was issued. Respondent, on the other hand, avers that certiorari is available
only when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
the instant case, the respondent argues that the court merely granted the Writ of Possession in
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accordance with settled jurisprudence and that the remedy of certiorari does not lie because
there is an available remedy which is an appeal. We hold that the CA correctly held that the
proper remedy is a separate, distinct and independent suit provided for in Section 8 of Act No.
3135 viz:
SEC. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later
than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and
the writ of possession canceled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage
was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the
court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided
for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it
finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond
furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the
order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal.
In De Gracia vs. San Jose, we held that:
x x x the order for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper
motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. No discretion is left to the court. And any
question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the consequent cancellation of
the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8. Such
question is not to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession,
since, under the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the writ of possession had already been issued in LRC Case No. 6438 per Order dated
November 29, 2005, the proper remedy is an appeal and not a petition for certiorari, in
accordance with our ruling in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Tan and Government
Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction,
any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than
mere errors of judgment, correctable by an appeal if the aggrieved party raised factual and legal
issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are
involved. The Parents-Teachers Association [PTA] of St. Matthew Academy, et al. vs.
The Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, G.R. No. 176518, March 2, 2010
Evidence
Documentary evidence and oral evidence; weight accorded. Furthermore, petitioners failed to
adduce any evidence to show that the real and personal properties acquired and registered in
the names of Elfledo and respondent formed part of the estate of Jose, having been derived from
Jose’s alleged partnership with Jimmy and Norberto. They failed to refute respondent’s claim
that Elfledo and respondent engaged in other businesses. Edison even admitted that Elfledo also
sold Interwood lumber as a sideline. Petitioners could not offer any credible evidence other
than their bare assertions. Thus, we apply the basic rule of evidence that between documentary
and oral evidence, the former carries more weight. Heirs of Jose Lim, represented
by Elenito Lim vs. Juliet Villa Lim,G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010
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Evidence of existence of partnership. At this juncture, our ruling in Heirs of Tan Eng Kee vs.
Court of Appeals is enlightening. Therein, we cited Article 1769 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 1769. In determining whether a partnership exists, these rules shall apply:
(1) Except as provided by Article 1825, persons who are not partners as to each other
are not partners as to third persons;
(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not of itself establish a partnership, whether
such co-owners or co-possessors do or do not share any profits made by the use of the property;
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not
the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which
the returns are derived;
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
a prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn
if such profits were received in payment:
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise;
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord;
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased partner;
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amount of payment vary with the profits of the
business;
(e) As the consideration for the sale of a goodwill of a business or other property by
installments or otherwise.
Applying the legal provision to the facts of this case, the following circumstances tend to prove
that Elfledo was himself the partner of Jimmy and Norberto: 1) Cresencia testified that Jose
gave Elfledo P50,000.00, as share in the partnership, on a date that coincided with the payment
of the initial capital in the partnership; (2) Elfledo ran the affairs of the partnership, wielding
absolute control, power and authority, without any intervention or opposition whatsoever from
any of petitioners herein; (3) all of the properties, particularly the nine trucks of the partnership,
were registered in the name of Elfledo; (4) Jimmy testified that Elfledo did not receive wages or
salaries from the partnership, indicating that what he actually received were shares of the profits
of the business; and (5) none of the petitioners, as heirs of Jose, the alleged partner, demanded
periodic accounting from Elfledo during his lifetime. As repeatedly stressed in Heirs of Tan
Eng Kee, a demand for periodic accounting is evidence of a partnership. Heirs of Jose Lim,
represented by Elenito Lim vs. Juliet Villa Lim,G.R. No. 172690, March 3, 2010
Evidence of ownership of real property. We agree with petitioners that respondents failed to
present any evidence to show that they owned parts of the property in dispute. First, in the
stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference before the MCTC, respondents admitted that
the land was owned by Adriano. While both Juanito and Ronald claimed that Adriano donated
to them their respective portions of the property when they got married in 1978 and 1987,
respectively, they did not present any deed of donation. As the MCTC stated in its 19
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November 2003 Decision, “the transfers cannot be by donation because the law requires that
for donation to be effective, it must be in a public instrument and in this case there is none.”
Second, the tax declaration offered by respondents as evidence only mentioned Adriano as the
owner of the whole property. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondents did not present any credible
explanation why the tax declaration was only under the name of Adriano. Third, contrary to
Ronald’s claim, the June 1994 deed of mortgageid not clearly show that he was the owner of the
property and that petitioners recognized him as such. While Ronald’s name appeared in the
body of the deed, the designation as owner of the property under his name was crossed-out. It
was Adriano who signed the deed of mortgage and the designation as owner of the property
appeared under his name. Fourth, Ronald was present when the deed of sale was executed on
22 September 1994 and he even signed as one of the witnesses. We find it hard to believe that
Ronald and Adriano did not understand the contents of the deed when it was written in their
local dialect. Moreover, it took respondents more than seven years to question Adriano’s sale of
the whole property to petitioners. Lastly, respondents claim ownership of the property based on
OCT No. AO-7236. However, a certificate of title is not equivalent to title. In Lee Tek Sheng vs.
Court of Appeals, we explained:
By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document [the Original
Certificate of Title or the Transfer Certificate of Title]. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate
with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title.
The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of
title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be
under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be
a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best
evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeable. (Emphasis supplied)
Spouses Melchor, et al. vs. Ronald B. Bernal, et al., G.R. No. 169336, March 18, 2010
Preponderance of evidence. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of
the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which
is offered in opposition thereto. Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff.
He established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title to the
property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other than
their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the
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registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such
registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be reminded that
a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may
be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. Teofisto Oño, et al. vs. Vicente
N. Lim, G.R. No. 154270, March 9, 2010
Preponderance of evidence; how determined. Petitioners heavily rely on Jimmy’s testimony. But
that testimony is just one piece of evidence against respondent. It must be considered and
weighed along with petitioners’ other evidence vis-à-vis respondent’s contrary evidence. In civil
cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. “Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered synonymous with the term “greater weight of
the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” “Preponderance of evidence” is a
phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Rule
133, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining preponderance of
evidence, thus:
SECTION I. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their
interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately
appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
Heirs of Jose Lim, represented by Elenito Lim vs. Juliet Villa Lim, G.R. No. 172690, March 3,
2010
Presumptions; entries in public record. The memorandum of the DOJ special committee also
cited only the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta and then concluded that the evidence presented
before the Senate Committees had overcome the presumption that the entries in the certificate of
live birth of Quintos are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the
validity of Quintos’ certificate of live birth, such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid
by competent authority. The rule stands that “(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. x x x.” We further sustain the Court of Appeals that there could be reasons
why the Quintoses and Tomedas were not included in the census, such as they could have been
mere transients in the place. As for their absence in the master’s list of voters, they could have
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failed to register themselves as voters. The late registration of Quintos’ certificate of live birth
was made 10 years after her birth and not anytime near the filing of respondent’s petition for
recognition as Filipino citizen. As such, it could not be presumed that the certificate’s late filing
was meant to use it fraudulently. Finally, the Australian Department of Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs itself attested that as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted
Australian citizenship. Respondent submitted a certified true copy of Quintos’ Australian
certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino. These pieces of
evidence should prevail over the affidavits submitted by Soliman and Peralta to the Senate
Committees. Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, et al. vs.
Michael Alfio Pennisi, G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010
Presumptions; presumption of authenticity and due execution of notarial document overcome
by clear and convincing evidnce. It is true that a notarial document is considered evidence of
the facts expressed therein. A notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of
authenticity and due execution and only clear and convincing evidence will overcome such
legal presumption. However, such clear and convincing evidence is present here. While it is
true that the SPA was notarized, it is no less true that there were defects in the notarization
which mitigate against a finding that the SPA was either genuine or duly executed. Curiously,
the details of Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate are conspicuously absent, yet Martha’s are
complete. The absence of Manuel’s data supports his claim that he did not execute the same
and that his signature thereon is a forgery. Moreover, we have Manuel’s positive testimony that
he never signed the SPA, in addition to the expert testimony that the signature appearing on the
SPA was not Manuel’s true signature. Titan Construction Corporation vs. Manuel A. David, Sr.
and Martha S. David, G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010
Presumptions; regularity in performance of official function. The key to resolving the petitions
lies in the validity of the Pagadian case execution sale. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official function here applies. Conformably, any party alleging irregularities
vitiating an auction sale must come forward with clear and convincing proof. In G.R. No.
176123, FPC has not discharged its burden of proof. Apart from its bare allegations, it has not
come forward with any evidence, let alone a clear and convincing one, of non-compliance with
the requirement of a minimum of five days prior notice of sale of property on execution. Hence,
in the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that the sheriff performed his
official duty of posting the notices of sale within the reglementary period. In finding otherwise,
the Manila RTC placed the burden of proof on the sheriff without jurisprudential
basis. Jose Cabaral Tiu vs. First Plywood Corporation/Jose Cabaral Tiu vs. Timber Exports, Inc.
Angel Domingo, Country Bankers Ins. Corp., Perfecto Mondarte, Jr. and Cesar Dacal, G.R. No.
176123/G.R. No. 185265, March 10, 2010
Presumptions; regularity of notarized documents. Notarized documents, like the deed in
question [i.e., “Sale and Transfer of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of Land”], enjoy the
presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear, convincing and more than
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merely preponderant evidence. This petitioner failed to discharge. Flordeliza Emilio
vs. Bilma Rapal, G.R. No. 181855, March 30, 2010, G.R. No. 181855, March 30, 2010
Presumption; regularity of tax declaration indicating assessed value of property. Significantly,
the Technical Report on Verification Survey by Engineer Robert C. Pangyarihan, which was
attached to and formed part of the records, contained a tax declaration indicating that the
subject property has an assessed value of P110,220.00. It is basic that the tax declaration
indicating the assessed value of the property enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been
issued by the proper government agency. Honorio Bernardo vs. Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, G.R.
No. 183357, March 15, 2010 G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010
April 2010 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Civil Procedure
Actions; action for injunction. As a rule, actions for injunction and damages lie within the
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise
known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
7691. An action for injunction is a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the
defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a specific
act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. It has an independent
existence, and is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist
except only as a part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. In an action for
injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, prohibitory or mandatory, may
issue. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Merlino E. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 160270,
April 23, 2010.
Appeal; argument raised for first time on appeal. Petitioner had, of course, endeavored to
establish that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had served him a demand to vacate the
subject parcel as early as 31 July 1996. Correctly brushed aside by the Court of Appeals on the
ground, among others, that respondent had no participation in its preparation, we find said
demand letter of little or no use to petitioner’s cause in view of its non-presentation before
the MeTC. However, much as it may now be expedient for petitioner to anchor his cause
thereon, said demand letter was first introduced in the record only as an attachment to his reply
to respondent’s comment to the motion for reconsideration of the 14 July 2005 order issued by
the RTC. The rule is settled, however, that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of
due process impels this rule. Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No.
180542, April 12, 2010.
Appeal; computation of period where last day is Sunday or legal holiday. Petitioner’s petition
for review (under Rule 42) and motion for reconsideration before the appellate court were filed
well within the reglementary period for the filing thereof. It must be noted that petitioner
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received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007. Following the Rules of Court, she had
15 days or until April 28, 2007 to file her petition for review before the CA. Section 1 of Rule 42
provides:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court
the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The
petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason
and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed before the CA, via registered mail, her motion for extension
of time to file the petition for review. She pleaded in her motion that she be granted an
additional 15 days, counted from the expiry of the reglementary period. Petitioner likewise
attached to her motion postal money orders representing the docket fees.
Fifteen days from April 28, 2007 would be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. May 14,
2007, the following day, was a legal holiday—the holding of the national and local elections.
Section 1 of Rule 22 states:
Sec. 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
Therefore, when petitioner filed her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15,
2007, the same was well within the extended period for the filing thereof. Alma B. Russel
vs. Teofista Ebasan, et al., G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010.
Appeal; dismissal of appeal for technical defects in service and form of brief. We agree that the
CA had the discretion to dismiss petitioners’ appeal. The discretion, however, must be a sound
one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case. Here, we find that the failure to serve a copy of the
appellant’s brief to two of the adverse parties was a mere oversight, constituting excusable
neglect. A litigant’s failure to furnish his opponent with a copy of his appeal brief does not
suffice to warrant dismissal of that appeal. In such an instance, all that is needed is for the court
to order the litigant to furnish his opponent with a copy of his brief. Anent the failure to append
a copy of the assailed judgment, instead of dismissing the appeal on that basis, it is more in
keeping with equity to simply require the appellants to immediately submit a copy of the
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Decision of the lower court rather than punish litigants for the reckless inattention of their
lawyers. The purpose of a subject index in an appellant’s/appellee’s brief obviates the court to
thumb through a possibly lengthy brief page after page to locate whatever else needs to be
found and considered, such as arguments and citations. In the case at bar, notably, the appeal
brief submitted to the CA consists only of 17 pages which the appellate court may easily peruse
to apprise it of what the case is all about and of the relief sought. Thus, the belated submission
of the subject index may be considered excusable. Our discussion in Philippine Coconut
Authority v. Corona International, Inc. is apropos:
x x x the purpose of the brief is to present the court in coherent and concise form the point and
questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist the
court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. A haphazard and pellmell presentation will not
do for the brief should be so prepared as to minimize the labor of the court in examination of
the record upon which the appeal is heard and determined. It is certainly, ‘the vehicle of
counsel to convey to the court the essential facts of his client’s case, a statement of the questions
of law involved, the law he should have applied, and the application he desires of it by the
court’. There should be an honest compliance with the requirements regarding contents of
appellant’s brief, and among which is that it should contain “a subject index of the matter in the
brief with a digest of the argument and page references.”
We do not disagree with the appellate court’s above exposition. The requirements laid down in
Section 13, Rule 43 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper
conclusion of the case. However, we are of the opinion that despite its deficiencies petitioner’s
appellant’s brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the appellate court of the
essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for the
disposition of the same.
This case involves voluminous records meriting a review on the merits by the CA. Otherwise,
the efforts of the petitioners to protect their collateral in their judicial battle will lead to naught
once they lose their remedy of an appeal just because of procedural niceties. Adherence to
legal technicalities allows individual error to be suffered in order that justice in the maximum
may be preserved. Nonetheless, “we should indeed welcome,” as Judge Learned Hand once
wrote, “any efforts that help disentangle us from the archaisms that still impede our pursuit of
truth”. Our ruling in Aguam v. Court of Appeals also bears recalling:
Every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of
appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the court is to
encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied
in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
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false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a
miscarriage of justice.
Trinidad Go, et al. vs. Vicente Velez Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 182341, April 23, 2010.
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts. However, a question involving the regularity of
notarization as well as the due execution of the subject sworn statement of Basilisa would
require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the trial court. It is not the function of
this Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented. A question of fact would arise in such event. Settled is the rule that questions of fact
cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its
consideration. The rationale behind this doctrine is that a review of the findings of fact of the
trial courts and the appellate tribunal is not a function this Court normally undertakes. The
Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of
the lower courts are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious
abuse of discretion. Although there are recognized exceptions to this rule, none exists in the
present case to justify a departure therefrom. Alejandra S. Lazaro, et al. vs. Modesta
Agustin, et al., G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010.
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts generally binding on Supreme Court; exceptions. It is a
well-recognized principle that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court, more so when they are affirmed by the appellate court. However, the rule
is not without exceptions, such as: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made are manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; and (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or
premised on the absence of evidence on record. Especially in criminal cases where the accused
stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction, the Court must be satisfied that the factual
findings and conclusions of the lower courts leading to his conviction must satisfy the standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Anthony L. Ng vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
173905, April 23, 2010.
Appeal; findings of fact of trial court. The issue of whether or not the accused acted in self-
defense is undoubtedly a question of fact, and it is well entrenched in jurisprudence that
findings of fact of the trial court command great weight and respect unless patent
inconsistencies are ignored or where the conclusions reached are clearly unsupported by
evidence. In the present case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the decision of the trial court,
as modified by the CA. In debunking his claim, we quote with approval the ruling of the CA.
In the instant case, accused-appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the
part Robelyn Rojas when the latter allegedly hit him with a spray gun. However, except this
self-serving statement, no other evidence was presented to prove that indeed he was hit
by Robelyn. Accused-appellant failed to show where he was hit and what injuries he sustained,
if any. Moreover, his own defense witness Roden Macasantos did not see him being hit by a
spray gun. On the contrary, the prosecution has clearly shown that before Robelyn was stabbed,
the two even discussed with each other and accused-appellant even shook hands with
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him. Moreover, if indeed it was true that Robelyn was carrying a spray gun and tried to hit him,
accused-appellant, while he was in a supine position, could have easily just flaunted his knife to
scare his alleged attackers away. On the other hand, even if we assume to be true that he was in
a supine position when he thrust the knife at his attacker, it is however impossible that the back
of Robelyn would be hit, unless the latter could also fell (sic) on his back, which is again far
from reality. In a myriad of cases, it has been ruled that the location, number or seriousness of
the stab or hack wounds inflicted on the victim are important indicia which may disprove
accused’s plea of self defense. In the instant case, it is clear that the victim was stabbed at the
back negating any indication that accused-appellant acted in self defense.
The People of the Philippines vs. Benancio Mortera y Belarmino, G.R. No. 188104, April 23,
2010.
Appeal; hierarchy of courts. The first refers to the petitioners’ breach of the hierarchy of courts
by coming directly to the Court to appeal the assailed issuances of the RTC via petition for
review on certiorari. They should not have done so, bypassing a review by the Court of Appeals
(CA), because the hierarchy of courts is essential to the efficient functioning of the courts and to
the orderly administration of justice. Their non-observance of the hierarchy of courts has
forthwith enlarged the docket of the Court by one more case, which, though it may not seem
burdensome to the layman, is one case too much to the Court, which has to devote time and
effort in poring over the papers submitted herein, only to discover in the end that a review
should have first been made by the CA. The time and effort could have been dedicated to other
cases of importance and impact on the lives and rights of others. The hierarchy of courts is not
to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA stands between the RTC and the Court, and its
establishment has been precisely to take over much of the work that used to be done by the
Court. Historically, the CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts,
issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily
might escape detection. The Court has thus been freed to better discharge its constitutional
duties and perform its most important work, which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, “is
less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and
obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national
policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority
and its impact upon fundamental rights.” The need to elevate the matter first to the CA is also
underscored by the reality that determining whether the petitioners were real parties in interest
entitled to bring this appeal against the denial by the RTC of the OSG’s motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution was a mixed question of fact and law. As such, the CA was in the better
position to review and to determine. In that regard, the petitioners violate Section 1, Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which demands that an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari be limited to questions of law. Francisco Alonso, et al. vs. Cebu Country Club,
Inc., et al., G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2010.
Appeal; issue raised for first time on appeal. In its petition for review with the CA, petitioners
never put as an issue the alleged existence of a consummated sale between the DAR and the
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petitioners under RA 6657. What petitioners questioned was SAC’s jurisdiction over
determination of just compensation cases involving lands covered by RA 6657. Furthermore,
petitioners insist that LBP has no legal personality to institute a case for determination of just
compensation against landowners with the SAC. It is only in the present petition for review that
petitioners raised the alleged existence of a consummated sale between the DAR and petitioners.
The argument that a consummated sale between the DAR and petitioners existed upon
petitioners’ acceptance of the valuation made in the RARAD’s decision of 29 March 2000 is an
issue being raised for the first time. Section 15, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that
the appellant “may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been
raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.” A perusal of the
questions raised in the SAC and the CA shows that the issue on the existence of a consummated
sale between the DAR and petitioners was not among the issues therein. Hence, this issue is
being raised for the first time on appeal. It is a fundamental rule that this Court will not resolve
issues that were not properly brought and ventilated in the lower courts. Questions raised on
appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and, consequently, issues not raised in
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An issue, which was neither averred
in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the lower courts, cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal because it would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play and justice, and would
be violative of the constitutional right to due process of the other party. Heirs of
Lorenzo Vidad and Carmen Vidad, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461,
April 30, 2010.
Appeal; issue raised for first time on appeal; question of fact outside scope of Rule 45
appeal. We note at the outset that the objection on the delineation of the scope and extent of
the excess areas of TCT No. 722 came too late in the day; it is an issue that the Hacienda admits
to have raised for the first time when it sought reconsideration of the CA decision. We
significantly note, too, that this issue involves a question of fact whose determination is
improper in a Rule 45 proceeding before this Court. Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Epifanio V.
Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 174160, April 20, 2010.
Appeal; notice of appeal; computation of period to file. As regards the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the appeal of PCI Leasing was filed out of time, the same was in concurrence with
the findings of the RTC that the Notice of Appeal was filed one day late. On this matter, we
hold that the conclusion of the RTC that PCI Leasing belatedly filed its appeal was correct, but
the premise therefor was evidently mistaken. In accordance with Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Said period shall be interrupted by a
timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, the Court had the
occasion to clarify the rule regarding the period within which an appeal may be taken should a
motion for new trial or reconsideration be filed. Thus:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
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to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
xxxx
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
(Emphases ours.)
In the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated
October 13, 2000, which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. On January 4, 2001, the RTC
rendered a Resolution, denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Said Resolution was received
by PCI Leasing on January 17, 2001. Therefore, PCI Leasing should have filed its Notice of
Appeal within 15 days from January 17, 2001 or until February 1, 2001. PCI Leasing actually
filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001 or 114 days after receipt of the Resolution denying
its Motion for Reconsideration.
Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should
not be reckoned from May 3, 2001, the date of receipt of the RTC Resolution dated April 6,
2001, which denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of PCI Leasing. The
aforesaid Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration was already the second attempt on the part
of PCI Leasing to seek a reconsideration of the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, dismissing
Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. It is, thus, in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. Under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, such motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, which does not toll the period within which an appeal
may be taken, to wit:
SEC. 5. Second motion for new trial. – A motion for new trial shall include all grounds then
available and those not so included shall be deemed waived. A second motion for new trial,
based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made, may be filed
within the time herein provided excluding the time during which the first motion had been
pending.
No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
order. (Emphasis ours.)
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As PCI Leasing was not able to file the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period allowed
therefor, the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010, should
be deemed final and executory. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R.
No. 151215, April 5, 2010.
Appeal; notice of appeal; requirements. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Notice of
Appeal involved pure questions of law on the basis of the statement therein that the Order dated
October 13, 2000, the Resolution dated January 4, 2001 and the Resolution dated April 6, 2001
of the RTC would be appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the same were
“contrary to the applicable laws and jurisprudence on the matter.” The Court of Appeals was of
the opinion that it would not have jurisdiction over the intended appeal since the same should
be raised to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
We hold that the Court of Appeals was unreasonably hasty in inferring its lack of jurisdiction
over the intended appeal of PCI Leasing. The above-stated conclusion of the Court of Appeals
was simply uncalled for, notwithstanding the said statement in the Notice of Appeal. Under
Rule 41, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, a notice of appeal is only required to indicate (a) the
parties to the appeal, (b) the final judgment or order or part thereof appealed from, (c) the court
to which the appeal is being taken, and (d) the material dates showing the timeliness of the
appeal. In usual court practice, a notice of appeal would consist of one or two pages. Only after
the specific issues and arguments of PCI Leasing are laid out in detail before the Court of
Appeals in the appropriate substantive pleading can it make a conclusion as to whether or not
the issues raised therein involved pure questions of law. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs.
Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010.
Appeal; requirement to attach pleadings filed below; substantial compliance. We dwell first
with the procedural issues before the main controversy. Respondents contend that the instant
petition is dismissible on the ground that NHA failed to attach pleadings filed in the RTC and the
Court of Appeals as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which partly
provides:
SEC. 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the
original copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall x x x (d)
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment
or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite
number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the
petition; x x x.
In its petition, NHA attached the February 24, 2000 Decision, the November 27, 2000
Amended Decision, and the July 19, 2001 Resolution all of the Court of Appeals; copies of the
transfer certificates of title of the disputed properties; and the June 13, 1994 Order of the
Quezon City RTC ordering the reconstitution of the said titles. This Court finds
that NHA substantially complied with the requirements under Section 4 of Rule 45. The same
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conclusion was arrived at by this Court in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Family Foods
Manufacturing Co., Ltd. when it was faced with the same procedural objection, thus:
As held by this Court in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora:
[E]ven if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the
petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due
course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the
documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on
the merits.
Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and other supporting documents were not attached to the
petition, the dismissal is unwarranted because the CA records containing the promissory notes
and the real estate and chattel mortgages were elevated to this Court. Without a doubt, we have
sufficient basis to actually and completely dispose of the case.
We must stress that cases should be determined on the merits, after all parties have been given
full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or
procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served better. Rules of
procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other
matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of
Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
ensuring the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa, G.R. No.
149121, April 20, 2010.
Certiorari; available where denial of motion to dismiss is with grave abuse of discretion. Anent
respondents’ claim that the RTC Order denying a motion to dismiss is a mere interlocutory order,
thus, not appealable and may not be a subject of a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner
before the CA, the same is also not meritorious. While indeed, the general rule is that the denial
of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari, which is not
intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, and that the appropriate recourse is
to file an answer and to interpose as defenses the objections raised in the motion, to proceed to
trial, and, in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due course, this
rule is not absolute. Even when appeal is available and is the proper remedy, the Supreme
Court has allowed a writ of certiorari(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and
adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; (3) for certain special considerations, as public
welfare or public policy; (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a patent
nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations. In this case,
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we find that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it failed to consider the lack of proof of authority of respondent Neri to file the action on
behalf of the corporation as we have discussed above. Republic of the Philippines
vs. Coalbrine International Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Finally, we note that the instant petition was filed under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which requires the existence of grave
abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion exists where an act of a court or tribunal is
performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. No such grave abuse of discretion exists in this case to warrant issuance of
the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Mediserv, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Special Former
13th Division), et al., G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010.
Certiorari; nature of remedy; available to correct only errors of jurisdiction. The petitioners have
twice erroneously availed of the remedy of a certiorari petition, first, before the CA against the
RTC order dismissing its complaint for annulment of title, and second, before the Court against
the CA’s decision thereon. Time and again, we have discussed the nature of a certiorari petition
– it is intended to correct only errors of jurisdiction where the court or tribunal has acted with
grave abuse of discretion. A writ of certiorari cannot be used for any other purpose; it cannot be
used to resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of
judgment. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the
evidence of the parties, its conclusions anchored on the said findings, and its conclusions of law.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court
on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact – a mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy.
[Emphasis supplied.]
In the two certiorari petitions the petitioners filed before the CA and before the Court, they
assailed rulings of the lower courts by claiming that the findings and conclusions of these courts
were merely speculative and based on misapprehension of facts. These assigned errors,
however, constitute an attack on the correctness or soundness of the decision assailed and does
not at all affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue such decision. In other words, they amount
to no more than errors of judgment correctible by an appeal, not by a writ of certiorari that will
issue only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
XXX XXX XXX X
XX
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As the petitioners now raise before this Court the same errors of judgment already raised before
and resolved by the CA, the dismissal of the present certiorari petition is in order for being the
wrong remedy. Errors of judgment committed by the CA are reviewable by this Court via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Erroneous findings and
conclusion do not render the appellate court vulnerable to the corrective writ
of certiorari. Nemesio Goco, et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157449,
April 6, 2010.
Certiorari; not available against dismissal order from which appeal can be taken. Since an order
of dismissal by the trial court is a final order from which an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 can
be taken, the petitioners should have taken this avenue against the RTC order of September 7,
1999 instead of resorting to a petition for certiorari before the CA. Supreme Court Circular No.
2-90 is unequivocal in directing the dismissal of an inappropriate mode of appeal:
4. Erroneous Appeals – An appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by
the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.
But rather than dismissing outright the petition, the CA, “in the interest of justice,” decided to
treat it as an appeal filed under Rule 41 and consider the errors raised by the petitioners. As it
turned out, however, the CA still ruled for the petition’s dismissal because it found that
petitioners’ did not have any cause of action against respondent Catlys and were not the real
parties in interest. Nemesio Goco, et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
157449, April 6, 2010.
Certiorari; unavailing where appeal period has lapsed; exceptions. Petitioners are questioning a
final decision of the CA by resorting to Rule 65, when their remedy should be based on Rule
45. This case would normally have been dismissed outright for failure of the petitioners to
adopt the proper remedy. While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has
lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs
issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. In the present case, the CA’s act of dismissing petitioners’ petition
for certiorari and in finding the RTC’s Decision already final and executory in its entirety, despite
the filing by the petitioners of a Notice of Appeal within 15 days from their receipt of the
February 7, 2001 RTC Order amending the said RTC Decision is an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. Hence, in the interest of substantial justice, we deem it wise to overlook the
procedural technicalities. Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010.
Contempt. Respondents filed a case for indirect contempt against Augusto L. Canlas, Atty.
Francisco A. Abella, Jr., and Atty. Rizal V. Katalbas, Jr. for allegedly defying the TRO issued by
the RTC in connection with the complaint for injunction and damages previously filed by
respondents. Contempt constitutes disobedience to the court by setting up an opposition to its
authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court’s orders but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the
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administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of
justice. There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and indirect
contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to
answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the
court. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Merlino E. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 160270,
April 23, 2010
Contempt; indirect contempt. Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
includes, among the grounds for filing a case for indirect contempt, the following:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. –
After charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:
xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, x x x
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice;
xxx
When the TRO issued by the RTC was served upon the SBMA officers on 13 June 2002, there
was already an existing warrant of seizure and detention (dated 22 May 2002) issued by
the BOC against the subject rice shipment. Thus, as far as the SBMA officers were concerned,
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject shipment remained with the BOC, and the RTC had no
jurisdiction over cases involving said shipment. Consequently, the SBMA officers refused to
comply with the TRO issued by the RTC. Considering the foregoing circumstances, we believe
that the SBMA officers may be considered to have acted in good faith when they refused to
follow the TRO issued by the RTC. The SBMA officers’ refusal to follow the court order was not
contumacious but due to the honest belief that jurisdiction over the subject shipment remained
with the BOC because of the existing warrant of seizure and detention against said
shipment. Accordingly, these SBMA officers should not be held accountable for their acts
which were done in good faith and not without legal basis. Thus, we hold that the RTC Order
dated 21 November 2002 which found the SBMA officers guilty of indirect contempt for not
complying with the RTC’s TRO should be invalidated. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Merlino E. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010.
Dismissals; dismissal due to plaintiff’s fault. Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is the
applicable rule in the instant case, which provision reads:
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Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
Gomez v. Alcantara explains that “[t]he aforequoted provision enumerates the instances when a
complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s fault: (1) if he fails to appear on the date for
the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the
court. The dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits,
and is necessarily understood to be with prejudice to the filing of another action, unless
otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. Stated differently, the general rule is that dismissal
of a case for failure to prosecute is to be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and with
prejudice to the filing of another action, and the only exception is when the order of dismissal
expressly contains a qualification that the dismissal is without prejudice.” Furthermore,
in Marahay v. Melicor, we pronounced that “[w]hile a court can dismiss a case on the ground
of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the
plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their
authority to dismiss.” Guided by the foregoing principles, we find that the RTC grievously erred
in dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010.
According to the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, the trial court dismissed the case filed
by PCI Leasing in view of the absence of the latter’s counsel at the hearing scheduled for that
day. PCI Leasing had also been directed, on July 13, 2000, to “take the necessary steps to
actively prosecute [its] case, otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.” To our mind, the above
circumstances do not constitute sufficient bases to warrant the conclusion that PCI Leasing had
lost interest in prosecuting Civil Case No. Q-00-40010.
In its Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 13, 2000, PCI Leasing explained
that its counsel merely came late during the hearing scheduled for the said date, arriving at the
time when Judge Domingo-Regala was already dictating the order of dismissal. Said hearing
was not even for the presentation of the evidence in chief of PCI Leasing, where the latter’s
presence would be indispensable, but merely for the issuance of Alias Summons. Incidentally,
the Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is non-litigious in nature, which
does not require a hearing under the Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC
without prejudicing the rights of the respondents. All facts necessary for the determination of the
motion are already specified therein or a matter of record and there was yet no adverse party to
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dispute the same as the court had not even acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents. It was serious error on the part of the trial court to have denied the first motion for
issuance of alias summons for want of notice of hearing. It was also not mandatory for the trial
court to set the second motion for hearing. Despite this, the RTC still dismissed the case and
eventually denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. While trial courts have the discretion
to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for tardiness or absence at hearings, such sanctions
should be proportionate to the offense and should still conform to the dictates of justice and fair
play.
Likewise, only a period of one month has passed since PCI Leasing was ordered by the RTC to
actively pursue its case, up to the time when Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 was actually
dismissed. It does not escape this Court’s notice that PCI Leasing failed to successfully
prosecute the case for several months due to the difficulties it encountered in locating
respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for changing addresses and refusing to accept
court processes. Under these circumstances, the delay in the trial court proceedings was not
entirely the fault of PCI Leasing. Verily, it can hardly be said that PCI Leasing engaged in a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 or committed a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. On this score, Calalang v.
Court of Appeals underscores that “[u]nless a party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible,
contumacious, or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance,
the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired
end.” PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010.
Ejectment; nature of action; summary action to protect right to possession without involvement
of title. Petitioner is, finally, out on a limb in faulting the Court of Appeals with failure to apply
the first paragraph of Article 1676 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to the lease he
claims to have concluded with one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla Sylianteng. In the absence
of proof of his lessor’s title or respondent’s prior knowledge of said contract of lease, petitioner’s
harping over the same provision simply amounts to an implied admission that the premises
occupied by him lie within the metes and bounds of the subject parcel. Even then, the
resolution of said issue is clearly inappropriate since ejectment cases are summary actions
intended to provide an expeditious manner for protecting possession or right to possession
without involvement of title. Moreover, if a defendant’s mere assertion of ownership in an
ejectment case will not oust the MeTC of its summary jurisdiction, we fail to see why it should
be any different in this case where petitioner merely alleged his lessor’s supposed title over the
subject parcel. Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12,
2010.
Execution; execution of judgment for specific acts; removal of improvements. In addition, Rule
39, Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
execution of judgments for specific acts, as follows:
SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.-
x x x x
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(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. – The officer shall demand of the person against
whom the judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons
claiming rights under him to peaceably vacate the property within the three (3) working days,
and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such
persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing
such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the
judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded
by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. – When the property subject of
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent,
the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements, except upon special order
of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former
has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. (Emphasis supplied)
In Buñag v. Court of Appeals, we explained that a judgment for the delivery or restitution of
property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the
defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or
other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the
decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or
other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the
defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements
on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the
issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the
improvements. Narciso Tumibay, et al. vs. Sps. Yolanda T. Sora, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April
13, 2010.
Execution; execution pending appeal. Petitioners received their copy of the February 7, 2001
Order on February 20, 2001. They timely filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2001, or after 14
days. The appeal was duly perfected. When an appeal had been duly perfected, execution of
the judgment, whether wholly or partially, was not a matter of right, but of discretion provided
good reasons therefor existed. The compelling grounds for the issuance of the writ must be
stated in a special order after due hearing. Aside from the existence of good reasons, the rules
also require that the motion for partial execution should have been filed while the trial court still
had jurisdiction over the case. In the present case, the RTC’s May 9, 2002 Order granting the
issuance of the writ of execution failed to state good reasons for the issuance of the writ. The
RTC mistakenly deemed that the execution should issue as a matter of right because it had held
that part of its September 14, 2001 Decision had become final and executory. As previously
discussed, the said proposition is erroneous because the Decision in the present case is not
properly severable.
Furthermore, the motion for partial execution was filed only on August 22, 2001, more than four
months after the appeal was perfected. “In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration
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of the time to appeal of the other parties.” Each party only has at most 15 days from their
receipt of the final order to appeal it. Thus, when respondents filed their motion for partial
execution the RTC no longer had jurisdiction over the case and it no longer had jurisdiction to
act on the said motion for partial execution. Aside from the fact that the appeal was filed on
time and should thus not have been dismissed in the assailed May 9, 2002 Order, the said
Order, which also resolved the motion for partial execution, fell short of the requirements of
Section 2, Rule 39, as previously discussed. Where the order of execution is not in conformity
with the rules, the same is null and void. Therefore, the CA erred in not nullifying the May 9,
2002 Order. Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; burden of party alleging defect in publication and
notice. As regards respondents’ allegation on the defect in the publication and notice
requirements of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the same is unavailing. The rule is that it is
the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite who has the burden of establishing such
fact. This is so because foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity
and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the party who questions it. Here, except for
their bare allegations, respondents failed to present any evidence to support them. In
addition, NHA stated in its Comment to Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene that it had
complied with the publication of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in the Manila Times in the latter’s
issues dated July 14, 21 and 28, 1990. It also claimed that an Affidavit of Publication of said
newspaper was attached as Annex “B” in the said comment. NHA also said that respondents
had been furnished with a copy of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale as shown at the bottom portion of
said notice. From all these, it would tend to show that respondents’ aspersion of non-
compliance with the requirements of foreclosure sale is a futile attempt to salvage its statutory
right to redeem their foreclosed properties, which right had long been lost by inaction. National
Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa, G.R. No. 149121, April
20, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; publication requirement; burden of proof. It is settled that
for the purpose of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, the party alleging non-compliance with
the requisite publication has the burden of proving the same. In this case, respondents
presented the testimony of a newsstand owner to prove that Ang Pinoy is not a newspaper of
general circulation. However, this particular evidence is unreliable, as the same witness testified
that he sells newspapers in Quezon City, not in Caloocan City, and that he is unaware
of Ang Pinoy newspaper simply because he is not selling the same and he had not heard of
it. His testimony states:
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Notwithstanding, petitioner could have easily produced the affidavit of publication and other
competent evidence (such as the published notices) to refute respondents’ claim of lack of
publication of the notice of sale. In Spouses Pulido v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
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While it may be true that the party alleging non-compliance with the requisite publication has
the burden of proof, still negative allegations need not be proved even if essential to one’s cause
of action or defense if they constitute a denial of the existence of a document the custody of
which belongs to the other party.
In relation to the evidentiary weight of the affidavit of publication, the Court ruled in China
Banking Corporation v. Spouses Martir that the affidavit of publication executed by the account
executive of the newspaper is prima facie proof that the newspaper is generally circulated in the
place where the properties are located. In the present case, the Affidavit of Publication or
Exhibit “8,” although formally offered by petitioner, was excluded by the trial court for being
hearsay. Petitioner never challenged the exclusion of the affidavit of publication. Instead,
petitioner relies solely on the testimony of Deputy Sheriff Alberto Castillo to prove compliance
with the publication requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135. However, there is nothing
in such testimony to clearly and convincingly prove that petitioner complied with the
mandatory requirement of publication. When Sheriff Castillo was asked how he knew that the
notice of sale was published, he simply replied that “during the auction sale the mortgagee bank
presented the affidavit of publication.” Evidently, such an answer does not suffice to establish
petitioner’s claim of compliance with the statutory requirement of publication. On the contrary,
Sheriff Castillo’s testimony reveals that he had no personal knowledge of the actual publication
of the notice of sale, much less the extent of the circulation of Ang Pinoy. Moreover, the Court
notes that Ang Pinoy is a newspaper of general circulation printed and published in Manila, not
in Caloocan City where the mortgaged property is located, as indicated in the excluded Affidavit
of Publication. This is contrary to the requirement under Section 3 of Act No. 3135 pertaining
to the publication of the notice of sale in a newspaper of general circulation in the city where
the property is situated. Hence, even if the Affidavit of Publication was admitted as part of
petitioner’s evidence, it would not support petitioner’s case as it does not clearly prove
petitioner’s compliance with the publication requirement. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Spouses
Dionisio Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 170241, April 19, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; publication requirement; strict compliance. Once again,
the Court stresses the importance of the notice requirement, as enunciated in Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company, Inc. v. Peñafiel, thus:
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property
to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice [sale] of the property. The goal of the notice
requirement is to achieve a “reasonably wide publicity” of the auction sale. This is why
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is required. The Court has previously taken
judicial notice of the “far-reaching effects” of publishing the notice of sale in a newspaper of
general circulation.
In addition, the Court reminds mortgagees of their duty to comply faithfully with the statutory
requirements of foreclosure. In Metropolitan Bank v. Wong, the Court declared:
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While the law recognizes the right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagor’s
failure to pay his obligation, it is imperative that such right be exercised according to its clear
mandate. Each and every requirement of the law must be complied with, lest, the valid exercise
of the right would end. It must be remembered that the exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others.
In sum, petitioner failed to establish its compliance with the publication requirement under
Section 3 of Act No. 3135. Consequently, the questioned extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage and sale are void. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo, et al., G.R.
No. 170241, April 19, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; registration of sheriff’s certificate of sale; substantial
compliance. Indeed, the prevailing rule is that there is effective registration once the registrant
has fulfilled all that is needed of him for purposes of entry and annotation, so that what is left to
be accomplished lies solely on the register of deeds. The Court thus once held:
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether
the transaction entered is a voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation, and nothing more
remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
In the case under consideration, NHA presented the sheriff’s certificate of sale to the Register of
Deeds and the same was entered as Entry No. 2873 and said entry was further annotated in the
owner’s transfer certificate of title. A year later and after the mortgagors did not redeem the said
properties, respondents filed with the Register of Deeds an Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership after which the same instrument was presumably entered into in the day book as the
same was annotated in the owner’s duplicate copy. Just like
in DBP, Levin, Potenciano and Autocorp, NHA followed the procedure in order to have its
sheriff’s certificate of sale annotated in the transfer certificates of title. There would be, therefore,
no reason not to apply the ruling in said cases to this one. It was not NHA’s fault that the
certificate of sale was not annotated on the transfer certificates of title which were supposed to
be in the custody of the Registrar, since the same were burned. Neither could NHA be blamed
for the fact that there were no reconstituted titles available during the time of inscription as it
had taken the necessary steps in having the same reconstituted as early as July 15,
1988. NHA did everything within its power to assert its right.
While it may be true that, in DBP, the Court ruled that “in the particular situation here obtaining,
annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of the certificates of title to which
it refers is entirely proper and justified,” this does not mean, as respondents insist, that the ruling
therein applies exclusively to the factual milieu and the issue obtaining in said case, and not to
similar cases. There is nothing in the subject declaration that categorically states
its pro hac vice character. For in truth, what the said statement really conveys is that the current
doctrine that entry in the primary book produces the effect of registration can be applied in the
situation obtaining in that case since the registrant therein complied with all that was required of
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it, hence, it was fairly reasonable that its acts be given the effect of registration, just as the Court
did in the past cases. In fact the Court there continued with this pronouncement:
To hold said entry ineffective, as does the appealed resolution, amounts to declaring that it did
not, and does not, protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions made,
thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the rights created or conveyed by the
transaction thus entered. That, surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable
interpretation of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 be asserted as warranted by its
terms.
National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa, G.R. No.
149121, April 20, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; writ of possession. Considering that the foreclosure sale
and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds were done validly, there is no reason
for the non-issuance of the writ of possession. A writ of possession is an order directing the
sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal property, such as when a property
is extrajudicially foreclosed. Section 7 of Act No. 3135 provides for the rule in the issuance of
the writ of possession involving extrajudicial foreclosure sales of real estate mortgage, to wit:
Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the
[Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated,
to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount
equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in
case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying
with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form
of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or
in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under
section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real property
encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in accordance
with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such
petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of
Act Numbered Four Hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-eight
hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who
shall execute said order immediately.
This provision of law authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for a writ of
possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that
purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property with
Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the
law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession. The time-
honored precept is that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer’s name, for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. The writ of possession
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issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond. The judge issuing the writ following these express provisions of law
neither exercises his official discretion nor judgment. As such, the court granting the writ
cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. To
accentuate the writ’s ministerial character, the Court disallowed injunction to prohibit its
issuance despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself. National
Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo S. Basa, G.R. No. 149121, April
20, 2010.
Forcible entry; element of prior possession. Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the
admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, respondent’s
claim of prior possession is clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof
since 1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an indispensable requirement in
forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in petitioner’s position is, however, evident from the
principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact
that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Because possession can also be acquired by juridical acts
to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution and
registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like, it has
been held that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
property at all times to be considered in possession. In this case, the subject parcel was
acquired by respondent by virtue of the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor
by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the
same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered
in its name as of 27 February 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon
alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical
acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection
in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying the land since 1999. Ordinarily
reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land, the one year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the same had been effected
by means of stealth. Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April
12, 2010.
Forcible entry; elements of cause of action. The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry
where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the
case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they
must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal
possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. As it is not
essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a
sufficient compliance of the requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession
took place under said conditions. The one-year period within which to bring an action for
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forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when
the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned
thereof. Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted the MeTC’s jurisdiction,
our perusal of the record shows that respondent’s 9 January 2004 amended complaint was able
to make out a cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the
subject parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its predecessors-
in-interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all
attributes of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular
inspection conducted in October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants have
succeeded in occupying the property by means of stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent
demands to vacate had been unheeded by said interlopers. Considering that the test for
determining the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff, we
find that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the
case. Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010.
Forcible Entry; question of ownership may be resolved by court to determine issue of prior
possession. Thus, to our mind, the only real questions appropriate for resolution at this stage of
the case are: (1) Do the TCTs of Hacienda Bigaa have probative value in determining the issues
of ownership and possession of the disputed lots? (2) Is Chavez – as successor-in-interest of
government lessee or fishpond permittee Zoila de Chavez – entitled to possession of these
lots? In these lights, the resolution of this case hinges on the question of better title – who,
between the petitioner and the respondent, has the better right of possession of the disputed
lots. Are these issues misplaced in a forcible entry case? To answer this, we hark back to the
origins of the present case – a complaint for forcible entry that
the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas dismissed. Both the RTC and the CA subsequently affirmed this
dismissal. As a forcible entry suit, the threshold question presented is: was the prior possession
of the then plaintiff (now petitioner) Hacienda Bigaa over the disputed lots sufficiently
established to give it cause for the ejectment of then defendant (now
respondent) Epifanio Chavez? We recall in this regard that the MTC issued a pre-trial order
identifying the issues of (1) who has the better right of possession; and (2) res judicata. On the
issue of possession, the MTC found the need to determine the question of title or ownership in
passing upon the question of possession after Chavez raised the issue of ownership at that
level. As a general rule in forcible entry cases, ownership or title is inconsequential; the
primordial issue is possession de factoand not possession de jure. The court, however, may
tackle the issue of ownership or title, if raised, if this issue is indispensable in resolving the issue
of possession. Since Chavez raised the question of ownership or title in his answer, the issue of
ownership became a material consideration in the lower court’s inquiry into the character,
nature and extent of the parties’ claimed possession. The MTC tackled the issue of prior
possession by taking judicial notice of our factual determination in De los Angeles that Zobel of
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Hacienda Calatagan – Hacienda Bigaa’s predecessor-in-interest – had ousted Zoila de Chavez –
Chavez’s predecessor-in-interest – from the lots she occupied as a holder of government-issued
fishpond permits. The MTC in this regard held –
[T]he court holds that the land now in litigation forms part of the public dominion which
properly belongs to the State. Suffice it to say that when [respondent Chavez] entered and
occupied the [premises] on April 29, 1996, it was in representation of the State being the
successor-in-interest of Zoila de Chavez, a government fishpond permittee and/or lessee. It
should be recounted that Zoila de Chavez was in actual physical possession of the land until
she was ousted by Enrique Zobel by bulldozing and flattening the area. (Emphasis supplied.)
Zoila de Chavez’s ouster from the premises became the basis of the MTC’s conclusion that she
had prior possession as she could not have been ousted from the premises had she not been in
prior possession. This point was reiterated in the present petition by Chavez who died pending
the resolution of this case and has been substituted by his brother, Santiago V. Chavez. The
respondent’s comment before us states:
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This argument on the direct issue of prior possession is separate from the issue of ownership that
Chavez raised as an issue determinative of possession. The issue of ownership shifts our
determination to who, between the parties, has title and the concomitant right of possession to
the disputed lots. Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Epifanio V. Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 174160, April 20,
2010.
Judgments; “Amended judgment” distinguished from “Supplemental judgment.” Both parties
agree that the February 7, 2001 Order increased the monetary awards in the Decision,
specifically, the amount of overage from P23,820.16 to P843,383.11 and the award of moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees from P50,000.00 to P2,000,000.00. They however,
differ on whether these changes constituted an amendment of the Decision or merely provided a
supplement to the Decision. Petitioners argue that the change constituted a substantial
amendment, which therefore makes the entire case reviewable on appeal, while respondents
argue that the Order merely supplements the Decision which therefore makes only the changes
reviewable on appeal. They both cite Esquivel v. Alegre which states:
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment. In an
amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the original
judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after considering all the factual
and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which
supersedes the original decision. Following the court’s differentiation of a supplemental
pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision does not take
the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to
bolster or adds something to the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the
original. It does not replace that which it supplements.
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In the present case, the dispositive portion of the February 7, 2001 Order was crafted in such a
way that it initially evades a categorical classification into either of the situations as described in
the above-cited case. Hence, we further take into consideration that what plaintiffs filed was
merely a PartialMotion for Reconsideration. It is clear they were seeking a partial change in the
original Decision. It follows that there were some parts of the Decision that they sought to
remain unchanged. The RTC, thus made a study of only a portion of its original Decision and
then amended the pertinent portion. The RTC Decision was indeed, only partially
amended. The February 7, 2001 Order cannot be considered as a supplemental Decision
because it cannot exist side by side with the original pertinent portion on overage, damages and
attorney’s fees. The former replaced and superceded the latter. Associated Anglo-American
Tobacco Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010.
Judgments; finality of judgments; relaxation of rule. Social Security System v. Isip reiterates the
well-established doctrine regarding finality of judgments, thus:
A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when
the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a
consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case
or modify a decision that has became final.
When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. The
doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on
indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time.
Notwithstanding the doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the Court finds, after a through
review of the records, that compelling circumstances are extant in this case, which clearly
warrant the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Relevantly, Barnes v. Padilla states an exception
to the rule on the finality of judgments in this wise:
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the
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Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be
final.
In the instant case, the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI Leasing, i.e., the sum
of money supposedly owed to it by the respondents. To our mind, it will not serve the ends of
substantial justice if the RTC’s dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would
be perfunctorily upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the
procedural lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to
abuse or misuse of court processes. In this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any
judicial recourse to collect the amount of P2,327,833.33 it loaned to the
respondents. Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from collecting the aforesaid
amount, respondent Antonio stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of PCI Leasing. Thus,
in order to obviate the occurrence of the above-mentioned scenario, the Court finds it necessary
to subject to judicial review the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, dismissing Civil Case No.
Q-00-40010. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C. Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April
5, 2010.
Judgments; ground not cited in challenged judgment. Respondent also argues
that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon
verification by its field personnel, it was shown that “save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.” This argument that
“petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence” is a
new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was “not being truthful when it said
that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.” Nowhere was this ground for denial of
petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself,
is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were already
available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is
irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a
serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural due process. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010.
Judgments; not confined to what appears on face of the decision. We are not persuaded by the
petitioners’ argument that, since the RTC decision to reconvey to respondents the subject
property did not expressly order the removal of improvements thereon, the RTC cannot, by
order, reach these improvements and accordingly act to enforce its decision. As a general rule,
the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed;
an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled
general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of
the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce, nor
may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Nonetheless, we have held
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that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well
to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Thus, in Perez v. Evite, where the
ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the
land was considered included in the decision where the defeated party’s claim to possession
was based solely on his claim of ownership. In Baluyut v. Guiao,we stressed that this rule fully
conforms with Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court that provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)
Narciso Tumibay, et al. vs. Sps. Yolanda T. Sora, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010.
Judgment; partial amended judgment; effect on appeal. Now what is the effect of this partial
amendment? Is the subject RTC Decision divisible, such that a portion may be considered
already final and unappealable while another portion may be considered as not yet final
and unappealable? To answer this question we draw some light from some provisions of the
Rules of Court that permit divisions, to wit:
Rule 37, Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.- If the grounds for a motion under this Rule
appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matter in
controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or
grant reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final
order upon the rest. (Italics and emphasis supplied)
Rule 36, Sec. 5. Separate judgments.-When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim
and all counterclaims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the claim, may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment shall
terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to
the remaining claims.
It can be seen that when matters, issues or claims can properly and conveniently be separately
resolved, then division is permitted, otherwise it is not. We see no hindrance in applying this
thesis to the current situation. In the present case, the matter of the release of the mortgaged
property is material and intertwined with the issue of the amount of overage as well as the issue
on the amount of damages. It is difficult to separate these matters because a determination of
the correct amount of overage would require the examination and computation of
the entire account of deliveries and payments. Necessarily, upon re-examination of the subject
account during an appeal, the possibility of finding a shortage instead of an overage is
present. And dependent on the result of the re-examination of the entire account is the
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determination of the correctness of either the foreclosure or release of the mortgaged
property. It follows that the ruling on the amount of damages and attorney’s fees, if any, may
also be affected by a re-examination of the entire account.
As the disposition of some inter-related issues in the original RTC Decision were materially
amended by the February 7, 2001 RTC Order, these two issuances must be taken in conjunction
with each other. Together, these two issuances form one integrated amended decision. Hence,
an appeal from the February 7, 2001 RTC Order must be deemed to be an appeal from the
whole integrated amended Decision. Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation, et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,G.R. No. 167237, April 23, 2010.
Judgments; res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. As framed above, the case before us
inevitably brings to memory the antecedent decided cases touching on the ownership of the vast
tract of land in Calatagan, Batangas, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 722 in
the name/s of Ayala yCia, Alfonso Zobel, Jacobo Zobel and Enrique Zobel and/or
Hacienda Calatagan – the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner Hacienda Bigaa. We ruled in
the antecedent cases of Dizon, Ayala y Cia, and De los Angeles, that: (1) all expanded
subdivision titles issued in the name of Ayala y Cia, the Zobels and/or
Hacienda Calatagan covering areas beyond the true extent of TCT No. 722 are null and
void because they cover areas belonging to the public domain; (2) Ayala y Cia and the Zobels of
Hacienda Calatagan are mere usurpers of these public domain areas; and that (3) these areas
must revert to the Republic. Significantly, we declared in De los Angeles that the Republic, as
the rightful owner of the expanded areas – portions of the public domain – has the right to
place its lessees and permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez) in possession of the fishpond
lots whose ownership and possession were in issue in the case.
These antecedent cases lay to rest the issues of ownership and of possession as an attribute
thereof, which we both ruled to be in favor of the Republic and its lessees or permittees. The
present case is a stark repetition of scenarios in these cases. The protagonists
remain virtually the same – with petitioner Hacienda Bigaa taking the place of its predecessors-
in-interest Ayala y Cia and/or the Zobels of Hacienda Calatagan, and respondent Epifanio V.
Chavez taking the place of his predecessor-in-interest Zoila de Chavez whose possession was
under bona fide authority from the Republic. Considering that in this case the disputed lots are
among those litigated in the antecedent cases and the issues of ownership and possession are
again in issue, the principle of res judicatainevitably must be considered and applied, if
warranted.
The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which in
its relevant part reads:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered
by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may
be as follows:
x x x x
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(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face
to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former
judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata absolutely
bars any subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (a) the former judgment or
order was final; (b) it adjudged the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (c) it was rendered
by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (d) between the first
and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. Where no identity of causes of action but only identity of issues exists, res
judicata comes under the second concept – i.e., under conclusiveness of judgment. Under this
concept, the rule bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties
even if raised under different claims or causes of action. Conclusiveness of judgment finds
application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and
adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by
final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their
successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains
standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively
settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action
between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only
the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by
former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties
from raising in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were
determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid down in the
earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the
same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case;
the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later
case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier
case. Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Epifanio V. Chavez, et al.,G.R. No. 174160, April 20, 2010.
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Judgments; res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. This case and the antecedent cases all
involve the issue of ownership or better right of possession. In Ayala y Cia, we affirmed an RTC
decision that decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) Declaring as null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9550 (or Exhibit “24”) of the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Batangas and other subdivision titles issued in favor of
Ayala y Cia and;or Hacienda de Calatagan over the areas outside its private land covered
by TCT No. 722, which, including the lots in T-9550 (lots 360, 362, 363 and 182) are
hereby reverted to public dominion. (Emphasis supplied, italics in the original.)
Consequently, lots and their titles derived from the Ayala’s and the Zobels’ TCT No. 722 not
shown to be within the original coverage of this title are conclusively public domain areas and
their titles will be struck down as nullities. Thus, De los Angeles effectively annulled the
subdivision titles disputed in the case for being among the “other subdivision titles” declared
void for covering public domain areas, and ordered their reversion to the
Republic. De los Angeles recognized, too, the right of the Republic’s lessees and public
fishpond permittees (among them Zoila de Chavez, mother and predecessor-in-interest of
Chavez) to possess the fishpond lots in question because they derive their right of possession
from the Republic – the rightful owner of these lots.
We reject, based on these discussions, Hacienda Bigaa’s position that there could be no res
judicata in this case because the present suit is for forcible entry while the antecedent cases
adverted were based on different causes of action – i.e., quieting of title, annulment of titles
and accion reinvindicatoria. For, res judicata, under the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
operates even if no absolute identity of causes of action exists. Res judicata, in its
conclusiveness of judgment concept, merely requires identity of issues. We thus agree with the
uniform view of the lower courts – the MTC, RTC and the CA – on the application of res
judicata to the present case. Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Epifanio V. Chavez, et al., G.R. No.
174160, April 20, 2010.
Judgments; stare decisis. What is more, in Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, the
pertinent DBP ruling was applied, thereby demonstrating that the said ruling in DBP may be
applied to other cases with similar factual and legal issues, viz:
Petitioners contend that the aforecited case of DBP is not apropos to the case at bar. Allegedly,
in DBP, the bank not only paid the registration fees but also presented the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title. We find no merit in petitioner’s posture x x x.
xxxx
Like in DBP v. Acting Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, the instrument involved in the case at
bar, is a sheriff’s certificate of sale, We hold now, as we held therein, that the registrant is under
no necessity to present the owner’s duplicates of the certificates of title affected, for purposes of
primary entry, as the transaction sought to be recorded is an involuntary transaction.
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x x x Such entry is equivalent to registration. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the act sought
to be enjoined had already become a fait accompli or an accomplished act.
Moreover, respondents’ stand on the non-applicability of the DBP case to other cases, absent
any statement thereof to such effect, contravenes the principle of stare decisis which urges that
courts are to apply principles declared in prior decisions that are substantially similar to a
pending case. National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo
S. Basa, G.R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010.
Judgments; summary judgment; improper when there is genuine issue as to material facts. Rule
35 of the Rules of Court provides for summary judgment, the pertinent provisions of which are
the following:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary Judgment for the defending party. A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move
with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to
all or any part thereof.
Section 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days
before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions
and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
As can be deduced from the above provisions, summary judgment is a procedural devise
resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings
on file show that there are no genuine issues of facts to be tried, the Rules of Court allows a
party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. That is, when the facts are not in
dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not
proper. A genuine issue is such fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Here, we find the existence of genuine issues which removes the case from the coverage of
summary judgment. The variance in the allegations of the parties in their pleadings is
evident. Petitioner anchors his complaint for sum of money and/or judicial foreclosure on the
alleged real estate mortgage over the subject property allegedly entered into by Comandante in
behalf of her parents to secure payment of a loan amounting to P1,118,228.00. To support this
claim, petitioner attached to his complaint (1) the SPA alleged to have been executed by
the Diazes; (2) the Real Estate Mortgage Contract pertaining to the amount of P1,118,228.00;
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and, (3) a Promissory Note. Comandante, in her Answer to petitioner’s Amended Complaint,
assailed the validity and due execution of the abovementioned documents. She asserted that
the same were not duly, knowingly and validly executed by her and that it was petitioner who
prepared all of them. Also, although she admitted owing petitioner, same was not an absolute
admission as she limited herself to an obligation amounting only to P600,000.00 inclusive of
charges and interests. She likewise claimed that such obligation is her personal obligation and
not of her parents. The Diazes, for their part, also denied that they executed the SPA
authorizing their daughter to mortgage their property to petitioner as well as having any
obligation to the latter.
Clearly, there are genuine issues in this case which require the presentation of evidence. For
one, it is necessary to ascertain in a full blown trial the validity and due execution of the SPA,
the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Notes because the determination of the following
equally significant questions depends on them, to wit: (1) Are the Diazes obligated to petitioner
or is the obligation a purely personal obligation of Comandante? and, (2) Is the sum
of P1,118,228.00 as shown in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Promissory Note, the amount
which is really due the petitioner?
To stress, trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only
when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the trial court should have refrained from issuing the
summary judgment but instead proceeded to conduct a full blown trial of the case. In view of
this, the present case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and proper
disposition according to the rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an
abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment. Atty. Pedro M. Ferrer vs. Spouses
Alfredo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 165300, April 23, 2010.
Judgments; summary judgment; when proper. Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment has been explained as follows:
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn
out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a
genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim. Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper:
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(1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages;
and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine.
Since we have limited the issues to the damages claimed by the parties, summary judgment has
been properly rendered in this case. Manuel Bungcayao, Sr., et al. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property
Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010.
Judgments; true intent and meaning obtained by reading decision in its entirety. We find that
the petitioners misread the ruling in Nazareno v. Court of Appeals when they understood the
ruling to mean that in all cases, a declaration of ownership does not include a declaration of the
right to possession. What Nazareno actually holds is that adjudication of ownership would
include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the
land independently of his rejected claim of ownership. This ruling, as understood in its correct
sense, fully applies to the present case, as there is no allegation, much less any proof, that the
petitioners have any right to possess the improvements on the land independently of their claim
of ownership of the subject property. Thus, the respondents have full right to possession of the
subject property. We remind the petitioners that we do not allow the piecemeal interpretation
of our Decision as a means to advance one’s case. To get the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context; the decision
must be considered in its entirety. Read in this manner, the respondents’ right to possession of
the subject property fully follows. Narciso Tumibay, et al. vs. Sps. Yolanda T. Sora, et al., G.R.
No. 152016, April 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; court acquires no jurisdiction over permissive counterclaim for non-payment of
docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaim is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction,
the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment of docket fees. Respondent
only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the judgment by the
trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without prejudice
to a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner. Manuel Bungcayao, Sr., et al.
vs. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19,
2010.
Jurisdiction; Court of Appeals has certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of
National Water Resources Board. Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over quasi-judicial agencies under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-judicial agencies, like
petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for procedural
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uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when the law or the Rules itself directs
otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65. The appellate court’s construction that Article 89 of
PD 1067, which reads:
ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may
be appealed to the [RTC] of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated
within fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any
of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of
fact and law (emphasis and underscoring supplied),
is such an exception, is erroneous. Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative
by the passage of BP 129. Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and
the RTCs, Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified:
x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all other
statutes, letters of instructions and general orders or parts thereof, inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act x x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The general repealing clause under Section 47 “predicates the intended repeal under the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.”
In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge of the provision
of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it. The legislative intent to repeal
Article 89 is clear and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to
provide a homogeneous procedure for the review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to
the Court of Appeals. More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was
the power of review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate court
gave significant consideration to the ground of “grave abuse of discretion” to thus hold that the
RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over petitioner’s decisions. A reading of said Article 89 shows,
however, that it only made “grave abuse of discretion” as another ground to invoke in
an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the provision was unique to the Water Code at the time
of its application in 1976. The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, then known as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent formulation
of the Rules, clarified and delineated the appellate and certiorari jurisdictions of the Court of
Appeals over adjudications of quasi-judicial bodies. Grave abuse of discretion may be invoked
before the appellate court as a ground for an error of jurisdiction.
XXX XXX XXX X
XX
While Section 9 (3) of BP 129 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court does not list
petitioner as “among” the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or
awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court of Appeals
has no appellate jurisdiction over petitioner’s judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is
settled that the list of quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to
be exclusive. The employment of the word “among” clearly instructs so.
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BF Northwest Homeowners Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a 1987 case cited by
the appellate court to support its ruling that RTCs have jurisdiction over judgments, orders,
resolutions or awards of petitioner, is no longer controlling in light of the definitive instruction of
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
XXX XXX XXX X
XX
In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner properly belongs
to the Court of Appeals. National Water Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network,
Inc., G.R. No. 186450, April 14, 2010.
Jurisdiction; determined by allegations of the complaint. Designed to provide an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved, there
can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts by express provision of Section 33
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition to being conferred by law, however, a court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims
asserted therein. In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12,
2010.
Jurisdiction; enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 is not exclusive. While Section 9
(3) of BP 129 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court does not list petitioner as “among”
the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards
are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over petitioner’s judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that
the list of quasi-judicial agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be
exclusive. The employment of the word “among” clearly instructs so. National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) vs. A.L. Ang Network, Inc., G.R. No. 186450, April 14, 2010.
Jurisdiction; lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of proceedings; void judgment. The
general rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law. The lack of jurisdiction affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the
inevitable consequence would make the court’s decision a “lawless” thing. Since the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the complaint filed, all the proceedings as well as the Decision of 17 June
2002 are void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. Sps. Joselina Alcantara and
Antonio Alcantara, et al. vs. Brigida L. Nido, as attorney-in-fact of Revelen Srivastava, G.R. No.
165133, April 19, 2010.
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Jurisdiction; MTC jurisdiction over ejectment case. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x
In Geonzon Vda. de Barrera v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, the Court explained:
Before the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 7691, the plenary action
of accion publiciana was to be brought before the regional trial court. With the modifications
introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded
to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first level courts thus
have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where the
assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the
jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property.
Assessed value is understood to be “the worth or value of property established by taxing
authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not
represent the true or market value of the property.”
The appellate court correctly ruled that even if the complaint filed with the RTC involves a
question of ownership, the MTC still has jurisdiction because the assessed value of the whole lot
as stated in Tax Declaration No. 09-0742 is P4,890. The MTC cannot be deprived of
jurisdiction over an ejectment case based merely on the assertion of ownership over the litigated
property, and the underlying reason for this rule is to prevent any party from trifling with the
summary nature of an ejectment suit. Sps. Joselina Alcantara and Antonio Alcantara, et al. vs.
Brigida L. Nido, as attorney-in-fact of Revelen Srivastava, G.R. No. 165133, April 19, 2010.
Motions; motion for issuance of alias summons is non-litigious in nature. Incidentally, the
Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is non-litigious in nature, which does
not require a hearing under the Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC
without prejudicing the rights of the respondents. All facts necessary for the determination of the
motion are already specified therein or a matter of record and there was yet no adverse party to
dispute the same as the court had not even acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents. It was serious error on the part of the trial court to have denied the first motion for
issuance of alias summons for want of notice of hearing. It was also not mandatory for the trial
court to set the second motion for hearing. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. vs. Antonio C.
Milan, et al., G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010.
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Parties; action for reversion of public land can be instituted only by State. In her Comment,
private respondent asserts that petitioners have no personality to question the validity of the
sales patent and the original certificate of title issued in her name. She maintains that only the
government, through the [Office of the Solicitor General], may file an action for reversion on the
ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. As to the second issue, private respondent claims
that petitioners’ annulment suit has prescribed pursuant to Section of Presidential Decree No.
1529. At the outset, we must point out that petitioners’ complaint questioning the validity of the
sales patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47 is, in reality, a reversion suit. The
objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the certificate of title and
the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State. This is why an action for
reversion is oftentimes designated as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
Coming now to the first issue, Section 101 of the Public Land Act clearly states:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad faith, only the
State can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act and our
ruling in Alvarico v. Sola. Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action
which would have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title
issued on the basis of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the
public domain. Only the OSG or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since the title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee. Similarly, in Urquiaga v. CA, this Court held that there is no need to pass upon any
allegation of actual fraud in the acquisition of a title based on a sales patent. Private persons
have no right or interest over land considered public at the time the sales application was filed.
They have no personality to question the validity of the title. We further stated that granting, for
the sake of argument, that fraud was committed in obtaining the title, it is the State, in a
reversion case, which is the proper party to file the necessary action.
In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when Andrada filed the sales patent
application. Any subsequent action questioning the validity of the award of sales patent on the
ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation should thus be initiated by the State. The State has
not done so and thus, we have to uphold the validity and regularity of the sales patent as well as
the corresponding original certificate of title issued based on the patent. Vicente Cawis,
etc., et al. vs. Hon. Antonio Cerilles, et al., G.R. No. 170207, April 19, 2010.
Parties; class suit; adequacy of representation. Indeed, in MVRS Publications, Inc. v.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., we observed that an element of a class suit or
representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and
adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest
of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any
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other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. Previously,
we held in Ibañes v. Roman Catholic Church that where the interests of the plaintiffs and the
other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will
not prosper. It is worth mentioning that a Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously
mentioned Affidavit of Desistance was attached, was filed by the President of the National
Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA). The said manifestation expressed NAPOWA’s
opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. Even if we take into account the
contention of petitioners’ counsel that the NAPOWA President had no legal standing to file such
manifestation, the said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and
views among the members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing
the present suit. There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests and those of
the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently
represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class
suit. Atty. Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Parties; class suit; requisites. Before proceeding to resolve the substantive issues, the Court must
first delve into a procedural matter. Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court,
thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as one. In Board of Optometry v. Colet,
we held that “[c]ourts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the
exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may
arise if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a quandary would result if the decision
were otherwise as those who were deemed impleaded by their self-appointed representatives
would certainly claim denial of due process.” Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a
class suit, as follows:
Sec. 12. Class suit. – When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of
them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the
interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall
have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of
controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned. In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, the Court held that:
An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings.
Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or
other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to
wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the
number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to
determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. (Emphases ours.)
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Here, the petition failed to state the number of [National Printing Office] employees who would
be affected by the assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by
petitioners. It was the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there
were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small
fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the
original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever
signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel
for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the
petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people “close to the
seat of power.” Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the
petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have
instituted this purported class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67
petitioners who signed the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners
were in fact mentioned in the jurat as having duly subscribed the petition before the notary
public. In other words, only 20 petitioners effectively instituted the present case. Atty.
Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Parties; personality to file petition. As to respondents’ claim that petitioner Republic of the
Philippines was not a party to the civil case subject of this petition since
Administrator Quindoza was the sole defendant therein and, thus, has no personality to file this
petition, their claim is not persuasive. Notably, Administrator Quindoza was sued for damages
for certain acts that he allegedly committed while he was the Zone Administrator of the Bataan
Export Processing Zone. Therefore, the complaint is in the nature of suit against the State, and
the Republic has the personality to file the petition. Republic of the Philippines
vs. Coalbrine International Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010.
Parties; real parties in interest. Notably, respondent Neri signed the verification/certification as
one of the plaintiffs. However, we find that respondent Neri is not a real party-in-
interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in interest. – A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.
And “interest,” within the meaning of the rule, means material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest. Cases construing the real party-in-interest provision can be more easily
understood if it is borne in mind that the true meaning of real party-in-interest may be
summarized as follows: An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. The RTC based its conclusion that
respondent Neri had a cause of action against petitioner on the allegations in the complaint. The
CA, however, did not rule on the matter despite the fact that it was raised in petitioner’s petition
for certiorari filed before it and merely said that there was no necessity to discuss such issue after
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deciding the other grounds raised in the petition. We find the RTC in error. A reading of the
allegations in the complaint shows that the acts complained of and said to have been committed
by petitioner against respondents have solely affected the hotel’s operations where
respondent Neri was the hotel’s Managing Director and whose interest in the suit was incidental.
Thus, we find that respondent Neri has no cause of action against petitioner. Consequently, the
plaintiff in this case would only be respondent Coalbrine. Republic of the Philippines
vs. Coalbrine International Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010.
Parties; real parties in interest. In G.R. No. 130876, the Court found that the petitioners did not
validly acquire ownership of Lot No. 727-D-2, and declared that Lot No. 727 D-2 legally
belonged to the Government, thus:
XXX XXX XXX XXX
The pronouncement in G.R. No. 130876 renders beyond dispute that the non-execution of the
judgment would not adversely affect the petitioners, who now hold no right whatsoever in Lot
No. 727-D-2. Otherwise put, they are not the proper parties to assail the questioned orders of
the RTC, because they stand to derive nothing from the execution of the judgment against Cebu
Country Club. Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or the rules. A real party in interest is one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue
and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or
a mere incidental interest. The rule refers to a realor present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy; or from a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-
plaintiff in an action. Thus, an appeal, like this one, is an action to be prosecuted by a party in
interest before a higher court. In order for the appeal to prosper, the litigant must of necessity
continue to hold a real or present substantial interest that entitles him to the avails of the suit on
appeal. If he does not, the appeal, as to him, is an exercise in futility. So it is with the
petitioners!
In contrast, the Government, being the legal owner of Lot No. 727-D-2, is the only party
adversely affected by the denial, and is the proper party entitled to assail the denial. However,
its manifest desistance from the execution of the decision effectively barred any challenge
against the denial, for its non-appeal rendered the denial final and immutable. Francisco
Alonso, et al. vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2010.
Parties; real party in interest in action for annulment of certificates of title. Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
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This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party
in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party
in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. An action for
annulment of certificates of title to property into the issue of ownership of the land covered by
a Torrens title and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s
true owner. The real party in interest in such action therefore is the person claiming title or
ownership adverse to that of the registered owner. The case of Tankiko v. Cezar has illustrated
for us the application of this principle in the following manner:
It is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because they admit that they
are not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents thereon, it is daylight clear
that the land is public in character and that it should revert to the State. This being the case,
Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the government may institute
an action to recover ownership of a public land.
x x x x
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest. It further defines a “real party in interest” as one who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. x x x The interest of the party
must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some
third and unrelated party.
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed. Thus, in Lucas
v. Durian, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the
patent was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for the annulment of said
patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to
bring the action was the government, to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the
dismissal of a Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v. Heirs
of Alivio noted that the plaintiff, being a mere homestead applicant, was not the real party in
interest to institute an action for reconveyance.
x x x x
Verily, the Court stressed that “if the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in
interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The petitioners demand the annulment of respondent Catlys’ titles because they allege that these
included portions belonging to the Municipality of Calapan. This allegation is a clear
recognition of the Municipality’s superior interest over the lot. In instituting the action for
annulment of respondent Catlys’ titles, what the petitioners are asserting is a right that is not
personal to them, but to that of the local government. That they are lessees who were granted
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by the Municipality of Calapan the option to purchase the portion they occupy does not suffice
to constitute as parties with material interest to commence the action. Nemesio Goco, et al. vs.
Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010.
Parties; standing, relaxation of rule. The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had
failed to show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a
result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude
that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716. This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted
with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on
their content and substance. The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the
application of procedural rules, as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever
confronted with an important issue of overreaching significance to society.
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) and Jaworski v. PAGCOR, this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the
principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of
paramount public importance. The Jaworski caseratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is
an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of
procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled
in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Tatad v. Executive Secretary, Chavez v. Public Estates
Authorityand Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, just to name a few, that absence of
direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is
able to craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, this Court
held that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and
definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been
echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province. Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor
Jesse Robredo, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010.
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Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping. The Court has consistently held that the
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement
is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court
may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although
it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. On the other
hand, the lack of certification against non-forum shopping is generally not curable by mere
amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against non-forum shopping signed by a
person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is
authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Flight
Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), we ruled that only individuals
vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping
on behalf of a corporation. We also required that proof of such authority must be
attached. Failure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss
the petition. Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of signatory’s authority. While there were instances where we have
allowed the filing of a certificate against non-forum shopping by someone on behalf of a
corporation without the accompanying proof of authority at the time of its filing, we did so on
the basis of a special circumstance or compelling reason. Moreover, there was a subsequent
compliance by the submission of the proof of authority attesting to the fact that the person who
signed the certification was duly authorized.
XXX XXX XXX X
XX
In the present case, the RTC, in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the complaint when the
latter raised respondent Neri’s lack of authority to sign the certification, found that
respondent Neri testified that she was the Managing Director of the Bataan Hilltop Hotel which
was being leased by respondent Coalbrine, and that she was authorized by the Corporate
Secretary to file the case. Notably, while the matter of lack of authority was raised by petitioner
in its petition for certiorari filed with the CA, it chose not to tackle the issue after disposing of the
other issues raised therein.
We cannot agree with the RTC’s reasoning and find the certification signed by
respondent Neri to be defective. The authority of respondent Neri to file the complaint in the
RTC had not been proven. First, the certification against non-forum shopping did not even
contain a statement that she was authorized by the corporate secretary to file the case on behalf
of Coalbrine as she claimed. More importantly, while she testified that she was authorized by
the corporate secretary, there was no showing that there was a valid board resolution
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authorizing the corporate secretary to file the action, and to authorize respondent Neri to file the
action. In fact, such proof of authority had not been submitted even belatedly to show
subsequent compliance. Thus, there was no reason for the relaxation of the rule. Republic of
the Philippines vs. Coalbrine International Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010.
Pleadings; certification on non-forum shopping. The second violation concerns the omission of
a sworn certification against forum shopping from the petition for review on certiorari. Section 4,
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the petition for review should contain,
among others, the sworn certification on the undertakings provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
Section 2. xxx
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that he has
not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter
learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he
undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within
five (5) days therefrom. (n)
Only petitioner Tomas V. Alonso has executed and signed the sworn certification against forum
shopping attached to the petition. Although neither of his co-petitioners – Mercedes V. Alonso
and Asuncion V. Alonso – has joined the certification, Tomas did not present any written
express authorization in his favor authorizing him to sign the certification in their behalf. The
signing of the certification by only one of the petitioners could not be presumed to reflect the
personal knowledge by his co-petitioners of the filing or non-filing of any similar action or
claim. Hence, the failure of Mercedes and Asuncion to sign and execute the certification along
with Tomas warranted the dismissal of their petition. Francisco Alonso, et al. vs. Cebu Country
Club, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 188471, April 20, 2010.
Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping; substantial compliance through subsequent
submission. Unquestionably, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to hold
that Landheights has substantially complied with the verification and certification
requirements. We have held in a catena of cases with similar factual circumstances that there is
substantial compliance with the Rules of Court when there is a belated submission or filing of
the secretary’s certificate through a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision
dismissing the petition for certiorari. In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, this Court
acknowledged that it has relaxed, under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the
submission of these certifications and has applied the rule of substantial compliance under
justifiable circumstances with respect to the contents of the certification. It also conceded that if
this Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification against forum shopping for
compelling reasons in previous rulings, with more reason should it sanction the timely
submission of such certification though the proof of the signatory’s authority was submitted
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thereafter. The Court is aware of the necessity for a certification of non-forum shopping in filing
petitions for certiorari as this is required under Section 1, Rule 65, in relation to Section 3, Rule
46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. When the petitioner is a corporation, the
certification should obviously be executed by a natural person to whom the power to execute
such certification has been validly conferred by the corporate board of directors and/or duly
authorized officers and agents. Generally, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification
was submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatory’s authority. However, we must make a
distinction between non-compliance with the requirements for certificate of non-forum
shopping and verification and substantial compliance with the requirements as provided in
the Rules of Court. The Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification on the
justification that such act constitutes substantial compliance. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. CA,
the Court allowed the filing of the certification fourteen (14) days before the dismissal of the
petition. In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, the Court reinstated a petition on the ground of
substantial compliance even though the verification and certification were submitted only after
the petition had already been originally dismissed. In Havtor Management Phils. Inc. v. NLRC,
we acknowledged substantial compliance when the lacking secretary’s certificate was submitted
by the petitioners as an attachment to the motion for reconsideration seeking reversal of the
original decision dismissing the petition for its earlier failure to submit such requirement. In the
present case, Landheights rectified its failure to submit proof of Mr. Dickson Tan’s authority to
sign the verification/certification on non-forum shopping on its behalf when the required
document was subsequently submitted to the Court of Appeals. The admission of these
documents, and consequently, the reinstatement of the petition itself, is in line with the cases we
have cited. In such circumstances, we deem it more in accord with substantive justice that the
case be decided on the merits. Mediserv, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Special Former
13th Division), et al., G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010.
Pleadings; compulsory counterclaim distinguished from permissive counterclaim. A compulsory
counterclaim is any claim for money or any relief, which a defending party may have against an
opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s complaint. It is compulsory
in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in
the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim
is permissive. The Court has ruled that the compelling test of compulsoriness characterizes a
counterclaim as compulsory if there should exist a logical relationship between the main claim
and the counterclaim. The Court further ruled that there exists such a relationship when
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail substantial
duplication of time and effort by the parties and the court; when the multiple claims involve the
same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of the same basic controversy
between the parties. The criteria to determine whether the counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive are as follows:
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(a) Are issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim, absent the compulsory rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s
counterclaim?
(d) Is there any logical relations between the claim and the counterclaim?
A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.
In this case, the only issue in the complaint is whether Manuel, Jr. is authorized to sign the Deed
of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of respondent without petitioner’s
express approval and authority. In an Order dated 6 November 2003, the trial court confirmed
the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
and the return of P400,000 to respondent. The only claim that remained was the claim for
damages against respondent. The trial court resolved this issue by holding that any damage
suffered by Manuel, Jr. was personal to him. The trial court ruled that petitioner could not have
suffered any damage even if Manuel, Jr. entered into an agreement with respondent since the
agreement was null and void.
Respondent filed three counterclaims. The first was for recovery of the P400,000 given to
Manuel, Jr.; the second was for recovery of possession of the subject property; and the third was
for damages. The first counterclaim was rendered moot with the issuance of the 6 November
2003 Order confirming the agreement of the parties to cancel the Deed of Assignment, Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim and to return the P400,000 to respondent. Respondent waived and
renounced the third counterclaim for damages. The only counterclaim that remained was for
the recovery of possession of the subject property. While this counterclaim was an offshoot of
the same basic controversy between the parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set
up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Respondent’s second counterclaim,
contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is only a permissive
counterclaim. It is not a compulsory counterclaim. It is capable of proceeding independently of
the main case. Manuel Bungcayao, Sr., et al. vs. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 170483, April 19, 2010.
Pleadings; explanation for service by registered mail; when omission excused. As to the CA’s
dismissal of the petition for review on the ground that petitioner failed to attach a written
explanation for non-personal filing, the Court finds the same improper. Iligan City, where
petitioner resides and where her counsel holds office, and Cagayan de Oro City, where the
concerned division of the CA is stationed, are separated by a considerable distance. The CA, in
the exercise of its discretion, should have realized that it was indeed impracticable for petitioner
to personally file the petition for review in Cagayan De Oro City. Given the obvious time, effort
and expense that would have been spent in the personal filing of the pleadings in this case, the
written explanation why service had not been done personally, as required by Section 11 of
Rule 13, may be considered as superfluous. Alma B. Russel vs. Teofista Ebasan, et al.,G.R. No.
184542, April 23, 2010.
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Pleadings; filing by registered mail; date of mailing considered date of filing. Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration was likewise filed on time. She received a copy of the June 18, 2007 CA
Resolution on July 18, 2007. Under Section 1 of Rule 52, she had 15 days from notice, or until
August 2, 2007, to file a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed by registered mail her
motion for reconsideration on July 27, 2007. The fact of mailing on the said date is proven by
the registry return receipt, the affidavit of service, and the certification of the Office of the
Postmaster of Iligan City. Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that if a pleading is
filed by registered mail, then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does
not matter when the court actually receives the mailed pleading. Thus, in this case, as the
pleading was filed by registered mail on July 27, 2007, within the reglementary period, it is
inconsequential that the CA actually received the motion in October of that year. Alma B.
Russel vs. Teofista Ebasan, et al., G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010.
Pleadings; verification; defective verification excused. Relative to the defective verification, the
Court excuses the same. The purpose of the verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely
speculative. The requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings and non-
compliance therewith is neither jurisdictional nor does it render the pleading fatally
defective. Here, the perceived defect is excusable and does not justify a dismissal of the petition.
In any case, petitioner, in her subsequent pleading, submitted a corrected verification. The same
degree of liberality should apply to petitioner’s failure to attach a copy of the complaint and
answer filed before the MTCC in her petition for review. After all, petitioner substantially
complied with the requirement when she filed her amended petition. Alma B. Russel
vs. Teofista Ebasan, et al., G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010.
Pleadings; verification; substantial compliance. Contrary to respondents’ assertion, NHA’s
verification conforms to the rule. Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Verification. – Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings
need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on “information and
belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.
The reason for requiring verification in the petition is to secure an assurance that the allegations
of a pleading are true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made
in good faith. To achieve this purpose, the verification of a pleading is made through an
affidavit or sworn statement confirming that the affiant has read the pleading whose allegations
are true and correct of the affiant’s personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
The General Manager of NHA verified the petition as follows:
3. I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the
best of my own personal knowledge.
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A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed
that he had read the allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on his
personal knowledge. The addition of the words “to the best” before the phrase “of my personal
knowledge” did not violate the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that
the affiant declared that the allegations in the petition are true and correct based on his personal
knowledge. National Housing Authority vs. Augusto Basa, Jr., Luz Basa and Eduardo
S. Basa, G.R. No. 149121, April 20, 2010.
Pleadings; verification and certification of non-forum shopping; substantial compliance by
subsequent submission. Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. The primary question that has to be resolved in this case is
whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel,
may be cured by subsequent compliance. Generally, subsequent compliance with the
requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to
comply in the first instance. A certification of the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the
reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether
he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition. A certification against forum shopping signed
by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement
and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. However, there are instances
when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality, especially when there are
circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified. In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, while we said that,
strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the
verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it
served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or
proceeding involving the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve such end
and not to derail it. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we categorically stated that while the
petition was flawed as the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and
not by the party, such procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice. Finally, the Court has also on occasion held that the party need not sign the verification;
a party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts
alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s
counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for non-
compliance with the rules, petitioner submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a
verification and certification signed by her in compliance with the said rule. We deem this to
be sufficient compliance especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be considered
as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify tempering the hard
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consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum shopping. Krizia Katrina Ty-
De Zuzuarregui vs. The Hon. Joselito C. Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. 183788, April 5, 2010.
Procedural rules; abuse of judicial process. We lament that the petitioners, by instituting the
present petition, has effectively delayed the full execution of the final and executory RTC
judgment. In doing so, they deprived the winning respondents of the fruits of the judgment, and
made a mockery of the RTC judgment that has stood scrutiny all the way to our level. We have
always frowned upon any scheme to prolong litigations and we view the present dispute as an
unwarranted effort to avoid the implementation of a judgment painstakingly arrived at. We
cannot countenance, and in fact, condemn this kind of abuse of judicial process. Thus, we
deem it fit to impose treble costs against the petitioners. Narciso Tumibay, et al. vs. Sps.
Yolanda T. Sora, et al., G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application. Facing up to all these objections and admitting the
mistakes committed, the Gos beseech liberality in the application of the rules. Even if clearly
their counsel committed a number of palpable mistakes which, as a general rule should bind the
client, we shall grant the petition in the interest of justice. Our rules of procedure are designed
to facilitate the orderly disposition of cases and permit the prompt disposition
of unmeritorious cases which clog the court dockets and do little more than waste the courts’
time. These technical and procedural rules, however, are intended to ensure, rather than
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from their rigid enforcement may thus be allowed, as
petitioners should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case, rather
than lose their property on mere technicalities. We held in Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and
Finance Corporation that:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character,
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’
right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity.
Trinidad Go, et al. vs. Vicente Velez Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 182341, April 23, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal construction. It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be
invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a
pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes
at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they are used only to help secure substantial
justice. Mediserv, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (Special Former 13th Division), et al. G.R. No.
161368, April 5, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application. In sum, the Court finds that the CA erred in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal. The appellate court should have been more prudent in computing
the reglementary period for the filing of petitions. The CA could have been more liberal in the
application of the Rules considering that, in this case, the MTCC and the RTC arrived at
conflicting rulings, necessitating a thorough review of the merits of the case. This is in keeping
with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
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justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and
wiser course of action for the Court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
conscientious review of the case in order to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of it on
a technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases which actually results in more delay, if not in an outright miscarriage of
justice. Alma B. Russel vs. Teofista Ebasan, et al.,G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010.
Temporary restraining order. Until the propriety of granting an injunction, temporary or
perpetual, is determined, the court (i.e., the RTC in this case) may issue a temporary restraining
order. A TRO is an interlocutory order or writ issued by the court as a restraint on the defendant
until the propriety of granting an injunction can be determined, thus going no further in its
operation than to preserve the status quo until that determination. A TRO is not intended to
operate as an injunction pendente lite, and should not in effect determine the issues involved
before the parties can have their day in court. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Merlino E. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010.
Trial; requirement of impartial judge. Citing the foregoing as basis, the accused argues that
Judge Jesus Carbon, Jr. displayed his hostility towards him and condemned him even before the
defense could rest its presentation of evidence. By saying that he was “just making a story,” the
judge already concluded his guilt during trial. The Court is not unaware of the case
of Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,where it was written:
The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to
satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over
which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to
asking clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is
that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor intervening in the
conduct of trial… hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied
itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case
against Tabuena and Peralta…. The “cold neutrality of an impartial judge” requirement of due
process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness,
assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate… A substantial portion of the TSN was
incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on “numbers” alone, but more importantly to
show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from
the common standard of fairness and impartiality. (emphasis added)
The situation in the case at bench is, however, different. As correctly pointed out by the Court
of Appeals, although the trial judge might have made improper remarks and comments, it did
not amount to a denial of his right to due process or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal
of the transcript as a whole, it cannot be said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality.
They were not out of context. Not only did the accused mislead the court by initially invoking a
negative defense only to claim otherwise during trial, he was also not candid to his own lawyer,
who was kept in the dark as to his intended defense. The accused having admitted the killing, a
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reverse order of trial could have proceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook to
discharge the burden of proving his guilt, when the burden of proof to establish that the killing
was justified should have been his. Most probably, the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he
adopted. The trial judge cannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding the
sarcastic tone impressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to conclude that the trial
judge “had taken the cudgels for the prosecution. The invocation of Opida fails to persuade us
either. The facts therein are not at all fours with the case at bench. In Opida, we did not fail to
notice the “malicious,” “sadistic” and “adversarial” manner of questioning by the trial judge of
the accused therein, including their defense witness. In Opida, the accused never admitted the
commission of the crime, and so the burden of proof remained with the prosecution. The
People of the Philippines vs. Benancio Mortera y Belarmino, G.R. No. 188104, April 23, 2010.
Other Proceedings
Actions; forum shopping in agrarian case. Petitioners also submit that LBP is guilty of forum
shopping because after LBP invoked the jurisdiction of the SAC of Santiago City, Isabela, and
obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), LBP filed a petition for certiorari with
the DARAB (DSCA No. 0213) to prevent the execution of the Order of the RARAD.
The DARAB eventually issued a TRO, and later, a writ of preliminary injunction, directed
against the implementation of the RARAD’s decision. Petitioners’ argument is mislaid.
In Canuto, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, we held that forum shopping is manifest
whenever a party “repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in,
or already resolved adversely by, some other court.” It has also been defined as “an act of a
party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or the special civil
action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.”
Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it
clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and
trifles with and mocks judicial processes. In Veluz v. Court of Appeals, we held:
There is forum shopping when, in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action and relief sought. Forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other. For litis pendentia to exist, the following requisites must be present:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in
both actions;
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts;
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3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Reviewing the facts of this case, the SAC, after hearing the parties regarding the propriety of
issuing the injunctive writ against the execution of the RARAD’s decision, found that it had no
jurisdiction to resolve the matter. Hence, LBP filed a petition for certiorari with
the DARAB (DSCA No. 0213) seeking the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction. It is
thus seen that there is no forum shopping because the SAC had no jurisdiction on the issuance
of an injunctive writ against the RARAD’s decision. As the SAC had no jurisdiction over such
matter, any ruling it renders is void and of no legal effect. Thus, LBP’s act of filing the petition
for certiorari with the DARAB, which has the correct jurisdiction for the remedy sought, does
not amount to forum shopping. Heirs of Lorenzo Vidad and Carmen Vidad, et al. vs. Land Bank
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010.
Appeal; notice of appeal; substantial compliance in agrarian case. Guided by the foregoing
principles, we find that the Notices of Appeal substantially complied with all that is required
under the 1994 DARAB Rules. The following provisions are instructive in making this
conclusion:
Rule XIII
APPEALS
Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision
of the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, orally or in writing, within a
period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from,
and serving a copy thereof on the adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant,
and a copy thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of
the oral appeal.
Section 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution
or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:
a) That errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of laws were committed which, if
not corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the appellant;
b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator; or
c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or coercion.
xxxx
Section 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It shall state the date
when the appellant received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of
the notice to the adverse party; and
b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within
the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicators is situated. x x
x
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Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites shall be a ground for dismissal of the
appeal.
Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners were appealing the decision “on the grounds
ofquestions of fact and of law,” which we find sufficient statement of the ground for appeal
under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules. While the notices omitted to state that “the
decision would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the appellant,” we find such
punctilious fidelity to the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary. Surely by appealing the
Decision of the Regional Adjudicator, the petitioners were already manifesting that they will be
damaged by the assailed decision. Requiring a literal application of the rules when its purpose
has already been served is oppressive superfluity. It must be stressed that the purpose of the
notice of appeal is not to detailone’s objections regarding the appealed decision; that is the
purpose of the appellants’ memorandum. In the context of a DARAB case, the notice of appeal
serves only to inform the tribunal or officer that rendered the appealed decision (i.e., the
Regional Adjudicator) of the timeliness of the appeal and of the general reason for the appeal,
and to prepare the records thereof for transmission to the appellate body (i.e.,
the DARAB). Petitioners’ Notices of Appeal contain everything that is necessary to serve these
purposes. Another important consideration is the fact that petitioners were obviously not
assisted by counsel in the filing of the Notices of Appeal. Only the parties were signatories
thereto; Atty. Mena’s signature was missing, which gives credence to petitioners’ assertion that
they had already terminated the services of their counsel at that time. Their new counsel,
Atty. Dauphine B. Go, DAR-Legal Counsel, entered her appearance only on March 13, 2003, or
several days after the Notices of Appeal were filed. The Regional Adjudicator is also correct
when she ruled that she has no power to determine if the appeal is frivolous and intended
merely for delay. Such matters are for the appellate body to determine after it has studied the
appellant’s brief or the appeal memorandum. The body which rendered the appealed decision
should not pass upon the question of whether the appeal was taken manifestly for delay because
such determination belongs to the appellate body. For the lower body to do so would constitute
a review of its own judgment and a mockery of the appellate process. This principle is
applicable to agrarian disputes by virtue of Section 8, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules which states
that the Board (not the Regional Adjudicator) has the power to impose reasonable penalties,
including fine or censure, on parties who file frivolous or dilatory appeals. The implication is
that since the Board is the one which has the power to punish, it is also the one which has the
power to decide if there has been a violation. The Regional Adjudicator has no such
power. She must allow the appeal if it is timely and compliant with
the reglementary requirements. It has been held that when an appeal is filed on time, the
approval of a notice of appeal is a ministerial duty of the court or tribunal which rendered the
decision. Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 165155, April 13, 2010.
Certiorari; exhaustion of administrative remedies in agrarian case. At this juncture, we must
point out that while respondents bewail petitioners’ lack of strict adherence to procedural rules,
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they also failed to observe some rules. It is evident from the records that respondents filed two
motions for reconsideration after the August 5, 2003 Order of the Regional Adjudicator. This is
prohibited under Section 12, Rule VIII of DARAB Rules, which provides that only one motion
for reconsideration shall be allowed. Moreover, respondents failed to exhaust administrative
remedies when they filed their petition for certiorari before the CA, instead of the
Board. The DARAB Rules state that:
Rule XIV
Judicial Review
Section 1. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Any decision, order, resolution, award or ruling of
the Board on any agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement, interpretation of agrarian reform laws or rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, may be brought within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof,
to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.
An aggrieved party can only resort to judicial review after it has invoked the authority of the
Board. Judicial review is not provided for orders, rulings, and decisions of adjudicators. It is
stated in Section 1, Rule II that the Board has primary and exclusive, original
and appellate jurisdiction over agrarian disputes involving agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations. If respondents were strict adherents to procedural rules, they should have
followed Section 2(b) of Rule XIII which provides for an appeal to the Board on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the adjudicator. Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010.
Election case; forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two (2) or more suits in
different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the
same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. There is forum
shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one (1) forum, or in anticipation thereof, a
party seeks favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal
or certiorari. Under paragraph 2, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, if the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendencia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the
following elements must be present: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
must be as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action. In the present case, the second element is wanting.
Under Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, any motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be resolved by the
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Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be
resolved by the division which issued the order. When the COMELEC, Second Division issued
the September 4, 2009 Order, the appeal of respondent’s election protest was still pending
resolution by the COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the September 4, 2009 Order of the COMELEC,
Second Division granting execution pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration is in
the nature of an interlocutory order – one which does not dispose of the case completely but
leaves something to be decided upon. Therefore, in accordance with the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, any motion to reconsider such interlocutory order of the division shall be resolved
by the division which issued it. Otherwise stated, the Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner to question the September 4, 2009 Order issued by
the COMELEC, Second Division had to be resolved also by the Second Division, not by
the COMELEC en banc. Since the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s
Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, its January 20, 2010 Resolution does not amount
to res judicata in relation to the present petition.
Notably, in the certificate of forum shopping of Saludaga’s Petition before us, he disclosed that
an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the September 4, 2009 Order is also
pending before the COMELEC en banc. Even then, the mere filing of a separate case, as in the
original action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner in G.R. No. 189431, after filing a
responsive pleading in the other case, does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. To
reiterate, there is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one (1) forum, or in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks favorable opinion in another forum through means other than
appeal or certiorari. Clearly, there is no forum shopping in this case to warrant an outright
dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 189431. Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010.
Election case; motion for execution pending resolution of motion for reconsideration. On May
3, 2007, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC or the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay
Officials. Section 11(a), Rule 14 of said rules sets the criteria for execution pending appeal as
follows:
SEC. 11. Execution pending appeal. – On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion,
order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period to
appeal, subject to the following rules:
(a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with three-day notice to the adverse party.
Execution pending appeal shall not issue without prior notice and hearing. There must be good
reasons for the execution pending appeal. The court, in a special order, must state the good or
special reasons justifying the execution pending appeal. Such reasons must:
(1) constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or
damage should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and
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(2) be manifest, in the decision sought to be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the
victory of the protestant has been clearly established.
By analogy, this standard is also applicable in the grant of execution pending resolution of the
motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a division of
the COMELEC.
Petitioner assails the September 4, 2009 Order for three (3) reasons. First, the Second Division
of the COMELEC failed to certify and elevate the records of the case upon the lapse of ten (10)
days in accordance with Item 6(b) of Comelec Resolution No. 8654. Second, the September 4,
2009 Order was signed by the Presiding Commissioner alone. Lastly, respondent’s Motion for
Execution Pending Motion for Reconsideration does not satisfy the criteria in A.M. No. 07-4-15-
SC. We shall tackle each objection separately.
On August 4, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. 8654 for the purpose
of adopting rules on the payment of COMELEC appeal fees and on the disposition of motions for
reconsideration of decisions, resolutions and orders on election protest cases, appeal cases and
special relief cases of a division to conform to our ruling in Aguilar v. COMELEC and Insoy.
Item 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 8654 provides:
6. If a motion for the execution of the decision or resolution of the Division is filed prior to the
filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, or within two days after the filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the case was not yet certified to or elevated to the Commission
en banc, the Division may, at its own discretion:
a. Certify and elevate the case, together with the Motion for Execution as part of the records of
the case, to the Commission En Banc within the two day period as prescribed in Section 5, Rule
19 of the Rules of Court.
b. Stay for a period of not more than ten (10) days from the filing of the Motion for Execution,
the elevation of the case to the Commission En Banc, in order to resolve said Motion for
Execution. Upon the expiration of the ten-day period, the Division shall immediately certify and
elevate the case, together with all the records, to the Commission En Banc for appropriate action.
(Emphasis supplied).
Prior to the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution issued by a division
of the COMELEC or during the pendency of such motion for reconsideration but before the case
is certified or elevated to the COMELEC en banc, the motion for execution may be acted upon
by the division that issued the decision or resolution. Under Item 6(a), a division of
the COMELEC may choose to elevate both the main action and the motion for execution to
the COMELEC en banc. Item 6(b), on the other hand, contemplates a situation where the
division decides to rule on the motion for the execution of its decision or resolution. In the
latter, the division may defer the elevation of the case to the Commission en banc in order to
resolve the motion. After the lapse of ten (10) days from the filing of the motion for execution,
however, the division shall immediately certify and elevate the case, together with all the
records – including the motion for execution – to the Commission en banc for appropriate
action. This describes the second scenario when the COMELEC en banc may rule on a motion
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for execution pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration of a decision or
resolution of a division. In the case at hand, respondent filed a motion for execution of the
Resolution dated August 12, 2009 on August 13, 2009. Thus, the Second Division
of COMELEC had only until August 23, 2009 to resolve the same. In the Order dated September
4, 2009, Presiding Commissioner Ferrer, acting for the Second Division, justifies the delay in the
resolution of the motion for execution by saying that it was in the interest of fair play that he
required petitioner to file a comment. The Presiding Commissioner posits that the 10-day period
is reckoned from the day the Second Division received petitioner’s comment on September 1,
2009.
We cannot agree. In accordance with the express provision of the law, the ten (10) days within
which a division of the COMELEC may suspend elevating the case to the Commission en banc is
to be counted from the filing of the motion for execution. The language of the law is clear, plain
and too simple to invite a different interpretation. Moreover, nowhere in COMELEC Resolution
No. 8654 does it say that a comment is required, much less, indispensable before the division
may rule on a motion for execution. ter the lapse of the 10-day period, the only power (and
duty) that a division has is to certify and elevate the case, together with all the records, to the
Commission en banc, for appropriate action. Hence, upon the lapse of the 10-day period or
after August 23, 2009, the Second Division no longer had jurisdiction to rule on respondent’s
motion for execution. Having done so, the September 4, 2009 Order is void for having been
issued by the COMELEC, Second Division without jurisdiction.
Indeed, even if said Order was promulgated within 10 days from the filing of the motion for
execution, it would still be void because Presiding Commissioner Ferrer alone signed it. justify
the Presiding Commissioner’s action, public respondent COMELEC invokes Section 6 (d), Rule 2
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure which provides,
SEC. 6. Powers and Duties of the Presiding Commissioner.-The powers and duties of the
Presiding Commissioner of a Division when discharging its functions in cases pending before
the Division shall be as follows:
xxxx
(d) To sign interlocutory resolutions, orders or rulings and temporary restraining orders in cases
already assigned to the Division;
x x x x.
However, this provision has been qualified by the amendment introduced by the
Commission en bancas reflected in the Excerpts of its regular en banc meeting held on
December 5, 1996. The relevant portion of the Excerpts reads:
3) The ponente in the preceding two paragraphs shall prepare interlocutory orders for signature
of the Chairman or Division Chairman. Orders of substance, however, shall be referred to the
Division/En Banc for clearance. (Emphasis supplied.)
An order resolving a motion for execution is one (1) such order of substance that requires more
than the lone imprimatur of the Division Chairman. This is so because execution pending
resolution of the motion for reconsideration may issue only upon good or special reasons
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contained in a special order. To reiterate, such reasons must: (1) constitute superior
circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injury or damage should the losing
party secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal; and (2) be manifest, in the decision sought to
be executed, that the defeat of the protestee or the victory of the protestant had been clearly
established. These stringent requirements demand more than a cursory evaluation of a motion
for execution pending reconsideration. Hence, the need to refer such order for clearance by the
Division or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be.
This amendment is reflected in Item 6, COMELEC Resolution No. 8654 which identifies
the division as the one (1) in possession of the discretion to either: (1) certify and elevate the
case, together with the motion for execution, to the Commission en banc within the two-day
period prescribed in Section 5, Rule 19 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, or (2) stay, for a
period of not more than ten (10) days from the filing of a motion for execution, the elevation of
the case to the Commission en banc, in order to resolve said motion. Alternatively, upon the
expiration of the 10-day period, the decision may immediately certify and elevate the case,
together with all the records, to the Commission en banc for appropriate action. e discretion to
allow execution pending reconsideration belongs to the division that rendered the assailed
decision, order or resolution, or the COMELEC en banc, as the case may be – not to the
Presiding Commissioner. To be sure, a writ of execution pending resolution of the motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the division is not granted as a matter of right such that its
issuance becomes a ministerial duty that may be dispensed even just by the Presiding
Commissioner. Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos.
189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010.
Election case; questions of fact addressed to COMELEC. Finally, in his Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner raised factual issues, specifically, on the appreciation of votes and
the discrepancy in the number of votes credited to each candidate in four (4)
precincts. However, the appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a
question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with
the supervision of elections all over the country. After all, it is the constitutional commission
vested with the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving regional,
provincial and city officials, as well as appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving
elective municipal and barangay officials. Hence, we deem it proper to remand this case to
the COMELEC en banc, in order that it may resolve petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 12, 2009 on the merits. Mayor Quintin B. Saludaga vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 189431 & 191120, April 7, 2010.
Jurisdiction; exemption from CARL is matter within primary jurisdiction of DAR
Secretary. Petitioners also raise for the first time in the entire proceedings of this case that
respondents had presented to the Regional Adjudicator an entirely spurious and fabricated DAR
Order exempting respondents’ landholdings from the coverage of CARP. It will be recalled that
the Regional Adjudicator’s decision below is based on the assumption that respondents’
landholdings are exempt from CARP coverage, hence the obligation on the part of petitioners to
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pay lease rentals. Petitioners maintain that they only discovered the spurious nature of the
exemption order during the pendency of their appeal to this Court. They presented several
certificates from various DAR offices stating that the latter have no record of the said exemption
order in favor of respondents. If such exemption order is indeed fabricated, their possession
of CLTs and EPs should be respected, thus they should be held under no obligation to pay
rentals to respondents. Thus, they seek the nullification of the exemption order on the ground
that it is counterfeit. On the other hand, respondents assert that the validity of the exemption
order had already been settled in the annulment case filed by petitioners against respondents in
1994, docketed as DARAB Case No. 602-B-94. They likewise maintain that the issue involves
factual matters which are not within the province of the Supreme Court.
DARAB Case No. 602-B ’94 is a complaint for annulment of the regional director’s order, which
granted respondents’ petition for the exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of the
CARP. In that case, petitioners assailed the validity of the order on the ground that they were
not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence and that the title of petitioners to the
land was not registered within the period prescribed by law. Their complaint was dismissed on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The provincial adjudicator, as later affirmed by
the DARAB and the CA, ruled that only the Agrarian Reform Secretary has appellate jurisdiction
over the exemption orders issued by a regional director. Petitioners filed a petition for review
before this Court but it was not timely filed. Hence, a resolution was issued where the case was
deemed closed and terminated. Entry of judgment was made on September 6, 2002.
Contrary to respondents’ arguments, there was never any ruling regarding the validity or
authenticity of the exemption order. What was ruled upon, and became final, was that the
exemption order cannot be reviewed by the provincial adjudicator or DARAB since exclusive
appellate jurisdiction rests in the Office of the DAR Secretary. Thus, it appears that petitioners’
right to question the authenticity of the exemption order in the proper forum has not yet been
foreclosed. The instant case, however, is not the proper place to bring the issue of authenticity.
Exemption from the comprehensive agrarian reform law is an administrative matter the primary
jurisdiction over which has been lodged with the DAR Secretary. Moreover, the issue of
authenticity is entirely factual. Since this was never raised below, we have no basis on record to
rule on the authenticity of the exemption order. Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; remand to Court of Appeals to receive evidence and determine just
compensation. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, we remanded the case to the
SAC for further reception of evidence because the trial court based its valuation upon a different
formula and did not conduct any hearing for the reception of evidence. The mandatory
application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining just compensation has been
reiterated recently in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim and Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, where we also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC for the
determination of just compensation strictly in accordance with the applicable DAR
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regulations. Thus, the remand of the case is necessary for the parties to present their evidence,
as we are not a trier of facts.
Considering, however, that the land was acquired in 1989 and the only surviving petitioner is
now an octogenarian and is in need of urgent medical attention, we find these special
circumstances justifying in the acceleration of the final disposition of this case. This Court deems
it best pro hac vice to commission the CA as its agent to receive and evaluate the evidence of
the parties. The CA’s mandate is to ascertain the just compensation due in accordance with this
Decision, applying Section 17 of RA 6557 and applicable DAR regulations. As explained
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Gallego, Jr., the remand of cases before this Court to the CA
for the reception of further evidence is not a novel procedure. It is sanctioned by Section 6, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court. In fact, the Court availed of this procedure in quite a few cases. Heirs
of Lorenzo Vidad and Carmen Vidad, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461,
April 30, 2010.
Jurisdiction; seizure and forfeiture proceedings within exclusive original jurisdiction of Bureau of
Customs. Petitioner alleges that the RTC of Olongapo City has no jurisdiction over the action
for injunction and damages filed by respondents on 11 June 2002 as said action is within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the BOC pursuant to Section 602 of Republic Act No. 1937,
otherwise known as the “Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,” as amended. Section 602
provides, thus:
Sec. 602. Functions of the Bureau.- The general duties, powers and jurisdiction of the bureau
shall include:
xxx
g. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and
customs laws.
Petitioner contends that the imported 2,000 bags of rice were in the actual physical control and
possession of the BOC as early as 25 October 2001, by virtue of the BOC Subic Port Hold Order
of even date, and of the BOC Warrant of Seizure and Detention dated 22 May 2002. As such,
the BOC had acquired exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject shipment, to the exclusion
of the RTC. We agree with petitioner.
It is well settled that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or
put it at naught. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture
of dutiable goods. Regional trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity
or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or
otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Regional trial courts are precluded from assuming
cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus..
Verily, the rule is that from the moment imported goods are actually in the possession or control
of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant for seizure or detention had previously been
issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with the seizure and forfeiture proceedings,
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the BOC acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing
the customs laws, subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals whose decisions
are appealable to this Court. As we have clarified in Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar, the
rule that RTCs have no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of
placing no unnecessary hindrance on the government’s drive, not only to prevent smuggling and
other frauds upon Customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection
of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the
functions it has been instituted to perform. Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
vs. Merlino E. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 160270, April 23, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Special Agrarian Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over just
compensation cases under CARL. Petitioners insist that the RARAD, in exercising quasi-judicial
powers, has concurrent jurisdiction with the [Special Agrarian Court] in just compensation cases.
Hence, the RARAD’s decision, being a final determination of the appraisal of just compensation
by the DARAB, should be appealed to this Court and not the SAC. For its part, LBP insists that
the RARAD/DARAB decision is merely a preliminary valuation, since the courts have the
ultimate power to decide the question on just compensation.
The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, as summarized by
this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, commences with LBP determining
the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using LBP’s valuation, the DAR makes an
offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA
6657. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary
administrative proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation
for the land. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the
matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just
compensation.
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent
jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is
judicial in nature. The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC in just compensation cases
is not a novel issue. This has been extensively discussed in Land Bank of the Philippines
v. Belista, to wit:
XXX XXX XXX
XXX
We do not agree with petitioners’ submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over
the petition for determination of just compensation filed by LBP after the RARAD rendered its 29
March 2000 decision. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we had the occasion
to rule that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the determination of just
compensation even during the pendency of the DARAB proceedings, for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has “original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
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landowners.” This “original and excusive” jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the
DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make
the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new
rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special
Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine
such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to
Sec. 57 and therefore would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is
valid.
In fact, RA 6657 does not make DAR’s valuation absolutely binding as the amount payable
by LBP. A reading of Section 18 of RA 6657 shows that the courts, and not the DAR, make the
final determination of just compensation. It is well-settled that the DAR’s land valuation is only
preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party. The courts will still have the right to review with finality the determination in
the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
It must be emphasized that the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State’s
power of eminent domain. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts
and not with administrative agencies. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just
compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on
the winning and losing parties. On the other hand, the determination of just compensation in
the RARAD/DARAB requires the voluntary agreement of the parties. Unless the parties agree,
there is no settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB, except if the aggrieved party
fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC. LBP thus correctly filed a
petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC, which has the original and
exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA 6657. DAR’s valuation, being
preliminary in nature, could not have attained finality, as it is only the courts that can resolve
the issue on just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of LBP’s
petition for determination of just compensation. Heirs of Lorenzo Vidad and
Carmen Vidad, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010.
Parties; Land Bank of the Philippines has personality to file agrarian case before Special Agrarian
Court. Petitioners submit that LBP has no legal personality and has no cause of action to
institute the agrarian case before the SAC. Petitioners argue that LBP cannot on its own, separate
and independent of DAR, file an original action for determination of just compensation against
the RARAD and petitioners, because it is a usurpation of the exclusive authority of DAR to
initiate and prosecute expropriation proceedings. Petitioners thus insist that in land acquisition
cases, the only real parties-in-interest are the landowners and the government, the latter acting
through the DAR. We do not agree.
Section 18 of RA 6657 states:
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Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in
such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP x x x, or as
may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.
This provision clearly states that there should be a consensus among the landowner, the DAR,
and the LBP on the amount of just compensation. Therefore, LBP is not merely a nominal party
in the determination of just compensation. RA 6657 directs LBP to pay the DAR’s land
valuation only if the landowner, the DAR and LBP agree on the amount of just compensation.
The DAR proceedings are but preliminary, and becomes final only when the parties have all
agreed to the amount of just compensation fixed by the DAR. However, should a party disagree
with the amount fixed by DAR, then the jurisdiction of the SAC may be invoked for the purpose.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners’ allegation that LBP lacks locus standi to file a case with
the SAC, separate and independent from the DAR. In Heirs of Roque F. Tabuena v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, we ruled that the LBP is an indispensable party in expropriation proceedings
under RA 6657, and thus, has the legal personality to question the determination of just
compensation, independent of the DAR:
LBP is an agency created primarily to provide financial support in all phases of agrarian reform
pursuant to Section 74 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 and Section 64 of RA No. 6657. It is
vested with the primary responsibility and authority in the valuation and compensation of
covered landholdings to carry out the full implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program. It
may agree with the DAR and the land owner as to the amount of just compensation to be paid
to the latter and may also disagree with them and bring the matter to court for judicial
determination.
Once an expropriation proceeding for the acquisition of private agricultural lands is
commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins, which clearly shows that there
would never be a judicial determination of just compensation absent respondent LBP’s
participation. Logically, it follows that respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the
determination of just compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program; as such, it
can file an appeal independently of DAR.
Hence, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, we ruled that LBP is a real
party-in-interest which could file its own appeal in agrarian reform cases, to wit:
XXX XXX XXX X
XX
It is thus beyond question that LBP has the legal personality to file the petition for determination
of just compensation with the SAC. Heirs of Lorenzo Vidad and Carmen Vidad, et al. vs. Land
Bank of the Philippines,G.R. No. 166461, April 30, 2010.
Parties; real party in interest in agrarian case. Respondents claim, and the CA has ruled, that the
March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal (filed by the second group) was a “forgery” and thus void,
because it bore signatures above the names of the deceased Avelino and Pedro, which were
obviously not written by the decedents themselves. First of all, we have to point out that the
confusion in this case was brought about by respondents themselves when they included in their
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complaint two defendants who were already dead. Instead of impleading the decedent’s heirs
and current occupants of the landholding, respondents filed their complaint against the
decedents, contrary to the following provision of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure:
RULE V
PARTIES, CAPTION AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS
SECTION 1. Parties in Interest. Every agrarian case must be initiated and defended in the name
of the real party in interest. x x x
A real party in interest is defined as “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of a suit.” The real parties in interest, at
the time the complaint was filed, were no longer the decedents Avelino and Pedro, but rather
their respective heirs who are entitled to succeed to their rights (whether as agricultural lessees
or as farmers-beneficiaries) under our agrarian laws. They are the ones who, as heirs of the
decedents and actual tillers, stand to be removed from the landholding and made to pay back
rentals to respondents if the complaint is sustained. Since respondents failed to correct their
error (they did not amend the erroneous caption of their complaint to include the real parties-in-
interest), they cannot be insulated from the confusion which it engendered in the proceedings
below. But at any rate, notwithstanding the erroneous caption and the absence of a formal
substitution of parties, jurisdiction was acquired over the heirs of Avelino and Pedro who
voluntarily participated in the proceedings below. This Court has ruled that formal substitution
of parties is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated, and
presented evidence during the proceedings. Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 165155, April 13, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal construction in agrarian cases. There is nothing sacred about the forms
of pleadings or processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate the application of justice to the
rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should be
construed liberally. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon because
rules of procedure should not be applied to override substantial justice. Courts must proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory appeal; they must ensure that all litigants
are granted the amplest opportunity for the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from
technical constraints. If the foregoing tenets are followed in a civil case, their application is
made more imperative in an agrarian case where the rules themselves provide for liberal
construction, thus:
Rule I
General Provisions
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of
the agrarian reform program and to promote just, expeditious, and inexpensive adjudication and
settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.
xxx
Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial
Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in
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the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.
Rule VIII
Proceedings before the Adjudicators and the Board
Section 1. Nature of Proceedings. The proceedings before the Board or its Adjudicators shall be
non-litigious in nature. Subject to the essential requirements of due process, the technicalities of
law and procedure and the rules governing the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence
obtained in the courts of law shall not apply.
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
165155, April 13, 2010.
Evidence
Best Evidence Rule; when not applicable. Petitioner Nissan insists that no judgment can
properly be rendered against it, as respondent United failed, during the trial of the case, to offer
in evidence the service contract upon which it based its claim for sum of money and
damages. As a result, the decisions of the lower courts were mere postulations. Nissan asserts
that the resolution of this case calls for the application of the best evidence rule.
Nissan’s reliance on the best evidence rule is misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule
which requires the highest grade of evidence to prove a disputed fact. However, the same
applies only when the contents of a document are the subject of the inquiry. In this case, the
contents of the service contract between Nissan and United have not been put in issue. Neither
United nor Nissan disputes the contents of the service contract; as in fact, both parties quoted
and relied on the same provision of the contract (paragraph 17) to support their respective
claims and defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no application here. The real issue in
this case is whether or not Nissan committed a breach of contract, thereby entitling United to
damages in the amount equivalent to 30 days’ service. We rule in the affirmative.
At the heart of the controversy is paragraph 17 of the service contract, which reads:
However, violations committed by either party on the provisions of this Contract shall be
sufficient ground for the termination of this contract, without the necessity of prior notice,
otherwise a thirty (30) days prior written notice shall be observed.
Nissan argues that the failure of United’s security guards to report for duty on two occasions,
without justifiable cause, constitutes a violation of the provisions of the service contract,
sufficient to entitle Nissan to terminate the same without the necessity of a 30-day prior
notice. We hold otherwise.
As the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñas City stated in its decision, Nissan did not adduce
any evidence to substantiate its claim that the terms of the contract were violated by
United. What Nissan failed to do is to point out or indicate the specific provisions of the service
contract which were violated by United as a result of the latter’s lapses in security. In so failing,
Nissan’s act of unilaterally terminating the contract constitutes a breach thereof, entitling United
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to collect actual damages. Nissan North Edsa Operating Under the name Motor Carriage, Inc.
vs. United Philippine Scout, G.R. No. 179470, April 20, 2010.
“Admission against interest” distinguished from “Declaration against interest.” At the outset, it
bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa’s alleged sworn statement
is a declaration against interest. It is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission
against interest. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and
declarations against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation
or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible
whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those
made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary
evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when
the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents’
predecessor-in-interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter’s legal interest, the former’s sworn
statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against
interest. Alejandra S. Lazaro, et al. vs. Modesta Agustin, et al., G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010.
Burden of proof. Hacienda Bigaa contends that the rulings in the antecedent cases on the
nullity of its subdivision titles should not apply to the present case because the titles – TCT Nos.
44695 and 56120 – have not been specifically declared void by court order and must be given
probative value. It likewise posits that Chavez failed to introduce evidence before the MTC that
the land subject matter of the suit is the same land covered by the decision of the Supreme
Court in the antecedent cases. We reject this contention in light of our holding in the Ayala
y Cia and De los Angeles cases that apart from those expressly litigated and annulled, all “other
subdivision titles” over the excess areas of Hacienda Calatagan must be nullified for
covering unregisterable lands of the public domain that must revert to the Republic. To
reiterate, lots and their titles derived from the Ayala’s and the Zobels’ TCT No. 722 not shown
to be within the original coverage of this title are conclusively public domain areas and their
titles will be struck down as nullities. What could have saved Hacienda Bigaa, as successor-in-
interest of the Ayalas and the Zobels, is competent evidence that the subdivision titles in its
possession do not fall within the excess areas of TCT No. 722 that are null and void because
they are lands of the public domain.
Hacienda Bigaa however failed to discharge this burden. Therefore, the Court of Appeals,
citing Ayala y Cia and De los Angeles, correctly held that –
x x x [S]uffice it to state that as heretofore shown, the Supreme Court took cognizance of the
fact that Zoila de Chavez’s fishpond permit is within the land covered by the cited
decision.Moreover, the Supreme Court has shifted the burden of proof in this regard to Zobel or
Ayala y Cia when it declared that, “Clearly, the burden of proof lies on respondent Zobel and
other transferees to show that his subdivision titles are not among the unlawful expanded
subdivision titles declared null and void by the said 1965 judgment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. vs. Epifanio V. Chavez, et al., G.R. No. 174160, April 20, 2010.
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Burden of proof; party must prove allegations. A similar dearth of merit may be said of the
exceptions petitioner continues to take against the MeTC’s reliance on the survey plan prepared
by Geodetic Engineer Joseph Padilla to the effect that that the premises occupied by petitioner
lies within the metes and bounds of respondent’s property. As mere allegation is not evidence,
the rule is settled that plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the
material allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter. Given the parties’ failure to
make good on their agreement to cause a survey of the property thru an impartial surveyor from
the Office of the City Assessor or City Engineer, respondent’s submission of said report was
evidently for the purpose discharging the onus of proving petitioner’s encroachment on the
subject parcel, as alleged in the complaint. As the party asserting the contrary proposition,
petitioner cannot expediently disparage the admissibility and probative value of said survey plan
to compensate for his failure to prove his own assertions. Hubert Nuñez vs. SLTEAS Phoenix
Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010.
Burden of proof on party making allegation. This brings us to the second ground raised in the
petition – that Executive Order No. 378, in allowing government agencies to secure their
printing requirements from the private sector and in limiting the budget of the NPO to its
income, will purportedly lead to the gradual abolition of the NPO and the loss of security of
tenure of its present employees. In other words, petitioners avow that the reorganization of
the NPO under Executive Order No. 378 is tainted with bad faith. The basic evidentiary rule is
that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it. A careful
review of the records will show that petitioners utterly failed to substantiate their claim. They
failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO’s budget
to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of
any employee. Neither did petitioners present any shred of proof of their assertion that the
changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do
with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency. Atty.
Sylvia Banda, et al. vs.. Eduardo R. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 166620, April 20, 2010.
Entries in the course of business. The CA of course places no value on the Consolidated Billing
Statement that Land Bank would have adduced in evidence had the RTC granted its motion for
reconsideration and reopened the hearing. Apparently, both courts believe that Land Bank
needed to present in evidence all original documents evidencing every transaction between
Land Bank and Monet to prove the current status of the latter’s loan accounts. But a bank
statement, properly authenticated by a competent bank officer, can serve as evidence of the
status of those accounts and what Monet and the Tagles still owe the bank. Under Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, entries prepared in the regular course of business
are prima facie evidence of the truth of what they state. The billing statement reconciles the
transaction entries entered in the bank records in the regular course of business and shows the
net result of such transactions. Entries in the course of business are accorded unusual reliability
because their regularity and continuity are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of
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precision. If the entries are financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited. In actual
experience, the whole of the business world function in reliance of such kind of
records. Parenthetically, consider a borrower who takes out a loan of P10,000.00 from a bank
and executes a promissory note providing for interests, charges, and penalties and an
undertaking to pay the loan in 10 monthly installments of P1,000.00. If he pays the first five
months installments but defaults in the rest, how will the bank prove in court that the debtor still
owes it P5,000.00 plus interest? The bank will of course present the promissory note to
establish the scope of the debtor’s primary obligations and a computation of interests, charges,
and penalties based on its terms. It must then show by the entries in its record how much it had
actually been paid. This will in turn establish how much the borrower still owes it. The bank
does not have to present all the receipts of payment it issued to all its clients during the entire
year, thousands of them, merely to establish the fact that only five of them, rather than ten,
pertains to the borrower. The original documents need not be presented in evidence when it is
numerous, cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result. Monet and the Tagles can of course dispute the
bank’s billing statements by proof that the bank had exaggerated what was owed it and that
Monet had made more payments than were reflected in those statements. They can do this by
presenting evidence of those greater payments. Notably, Monet and the Tagles have
consistently avoided stating in their letters to the bank how much they still owed it. But,
ultimately, it is as much their obligation to prove this disputed point if they deny the bank’s
statements of their loan accounts. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Monet’s Export and
Manufacturing Corp., et al., G.R. No. 184971, April 19, 2010.
Notarized document; effect and purpose of notarization. The Court further agrees with the
ruling of the RTC that:
The testimony of [the notary public] Atty. Angel Respicio did not suffice to rebut the evidence of
the appellees considering his admission that the affidavit was already thumbmarked when
presented to him by one who claimed to be Basilisa Santos and whom, the witness said he did
not know personally. Further, what makes the documents suspect is the fact that it was
subscribed on the same date as the financial statement of Alejandra Santos.
It may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that the principal function of a notary public is
to authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of
a document under his hand and seal, he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one
of the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition
to the solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. A
notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed before
a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Hence, a notary public must discharge
his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity. A
notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
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very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised
utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn
statement. However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply relied
on the affirmative answers of the person appearing before him attesting that she
was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true; and that
the thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers. However, this would not suffice. He
could have further asked the person who appeared before him to produce any identification to
prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the said person was not personally
known to him, and that the thumbmark appearing on the document sought to be notarized was
not affixed in his presence. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commit any error in
not giving evidentiary weight to the subject sworn statement. Alejandra S. Lazaro, et al. vs.
Modesta Agustin, et al., G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010.
Notarized document; presumption of regularity may be rebutted. Settled is the rule that
generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to
its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Moreover, not all notarized documents are
exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a
public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to
notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization
was regular.
Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized
documents. While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is
notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As earlier discussed, the presumption
is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The
presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where
its prima facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under which it
was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the
improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the
signatory, at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed. The trial and
appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence to the testimonies of these witnesses. The
Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with the trial court’s determination of the
credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. The
reason for this is that the trial court was in a better position to do so, because it heard the
witnesses testify before it and had every opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment
on the witness stand. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings
of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a public
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document having in its favor the presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately
refuted by competent witnesses. Alejandra S. Lazaro, et al. vs. Modesta Agustin, et al., G.R. No.
152364, April 15, 2010.
Presumptions; regularity in the performance of official duty. Petitioner’s invocation of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of Sheriff Castillo is
misplaced. While posting the notice of sale is part of a sheriff’s official functions, the actual
publication of the notice of sale cannot be considered as such, since this concerns the
publisher’s business. Simply put, the sheriff is incompetent to prove that the notice of sale was
actually published in a newspaper of general circulation. The Court further notes that the
Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale, prepared and posted by Sheriff Castillo, does not indicate the
newspaper where such notice would be published. The space provided where the name of the
newspaper should be was left blank, with only the dates of publication clearly written. This
omission raises serious doubts as to whether there was indeed publication of the notice of
sale. Philippine Savings Bank vs. Spouses Dionisio Geronimo, et al., G.R. No. 170241, April 19,
2010.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt. While petitioner admits to his civil liability to Asiatrust, he
nevertheless does not have criminal liability. It is a well-established principle that person is
presumed innocent until proved guilty. To overcome the presumption, his guilt must be shown
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, we held in People v. Mariano that while the principle
does not connote absolute certainty, it means the degree of proof which produces moral
certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the culpability of the accused. Such proof should
convince and satisfy the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it that the accused
is in fact guilty. The prosecution, in this instant case, failed to rebut the constitutional
innocence of petitioner and thus the latter should be acquitted. Anthony L. Ng vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 173905, April 23, 2010.
Proof of public or official record kept in foreign country; general power of attorney. On 25
March 1994, Revelen executed a General Power of Attorney constituting respondent as her
attorney-in-fact and authorizing her to enter into any and all contracts and agreements
on Revelen’s behalf. The General Power of Attorney was notarized by Larry A. Reid, Notary
Public in California, U.S.A. Unfortunately, the General Power of Attorney presented as “Exhibit
C” in the RTC cannot also be the basis of respondent’s written authority to sell the lot. Section
25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied,
if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of embassy or legation consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
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In Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, quoting Lopez v. Court of Appeals, we
explained:
From the foregoing provision, when the special power of attorney is executed and
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official in a foreign country, it cannot
be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision
of the rules by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept of said public document and authenticated by the seal of his
office. A city judge-notary who notarized the document, as in this case, cannot issue such
certification.
Since the General Power of Attorney was executed and acknowledged in the United States of
America, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the
Rules of Court by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the United
States of America. Hence, this document has no probative value. Sps. Joselina Alcantara and
Antonio Alcantara, et al. vs. Brigida L. Nido, as attorney-in-fact of Revelen Srivastava, G.R. No.
165133, April 19, 2010.
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Civil Procedure
Appeal; direct appeal to Supreme Court from trial court decision improper. Records show that
on December 13, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision finding that petitioner can execute
judgment on the additional attorney’s fees but only up to the extent of P1,000,000.00, not the
entire amount of P20,000,000.00 as prayed for in his petition. Petitioner received a copy of the
assailed decision on December 22, 2004. Petitioner moved for reconsideration on December
29, 2004, but the same was denied in the trial court’s Order dated March 1, 2005. Petitioner
received a copy of the challenged order on March 7, 2005. On March 17, 2005, instead of
appealing the assailed decision and order of the trial court to the Court of Appeals via a notice
of appeal under Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the Rules, petitioner filed a petition for review
on certiorari directly with this Court, stating that the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to an excess of jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. This is a procedural
misstep. Although denominated as petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner, in
questioning the decision and order of the trial court which were rendered in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, should have taken the appeal to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the trial court’s March 1, 2005 Order, i.e., within 15 days counted from
March 7, 2005 (date of receipt of the appealed order), or until March 22, 2005, by filing a
notice of appeal with the trial court which rendered the decision and order appealed from and
serving copies thereof upon the adverse party pursuant to Sections 2(a) and 3 of Rule
41. Clearly, when petitioner sought to assail the decision and order of the trial court, an appeal
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to the Court of Appeals was the adequate remedy which he should have availed of, instead of
filing a petition directly with this Court. Hicoblo M. Catly (deceased), subtituted by his wife,
Lourdes A. Catly vs. William Navarro, et al., G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010
Appeal; failure to properly indicate appealing party; ground for dismissal. With respect to the
first case against Marcelina, we resolve to dismiss the appeal of Felisa. Section 5 of Rule 45
provides that the failure of the petitioner to comply, among others, with the contents of the
petition for review on certiorari shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Section 4 of
the same rule mandates, among others, that the petition should state the full name of the
appealing party as the petitioner. In this case, Felisa indicated in the caption as well as in the
parties portion of the petition that she is the landowner. Even in the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping, Felisa attested that she is the petitioner in the instant
case. However, it appears in the PARAD records that the owners of the subject 14,000-square
meter agricultural land are Rosa R. Pajarito (Pajarito), Elvira A. Madolora (Madolora)
and Anastacia F. Lagado (Lagado). Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with
respect to the first case against Marcelina. Thus, for failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing
party with respect to the said case, the appeal must perforce be dismissed. However, such
failure does not affect the appeal on the other three cases as Felisa is the owner/co-owner of the
landholdings subject of said three cases. Felisa Ferrer vs. Domingo Carganillo, et al., G.R. No.
170956, May 12, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of Court of Appeals conclusive upon Supreme Court. Indeed, as the
appellate court held, in order to write finis to the case, the fair market value of the property must
be determined on the basis of the existing records, instead of still remanding the case to the trial
court. “Fair market value” has acquired a settled meaning in law and jurisprudence. It is the
price at which a property may be sold by a seller who is not compelled to sell and bought by a
buyer who is not compelled to buy, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is
adapted and might in reason be applied. The criterion established by the statute contemplates a
hypothetical sale. Given this yardstick, the Court found no cogent reason to disturb the factual
finding of the appellate court that the proper valuation of the property is P13,000 per square
meter as of January 26, 1999. As it correctly explained, the value was arrived at through the
market data approach, which is based on sales and listings of comparable property registered
within the vicinity; and that the property was classified as raw land because there were yet no
houses and facilities like electricity, water and others at the time of the exercise of the
option. The rule is well-established that if there is no showing of error in the appreciation of
facts by the appellate court as in the present case, the Court treats it as conclusive. Public
Estates Authority now Philippine Proclamation Authority vs. Estate of Jesus S. Yujuico, et al., G.R.
No. 181847, May 5, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts conclusive upon Supreme Court. The existence of
malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to
reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter
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disregard of the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship agreement. Allan C. Go,
doing business under the name and style of “ACG Express Liner” vs. Mortimer
F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style of
“ACG Express Liner”, et al., G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No. 164747, May 4, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts conclusive upon Supreme Court. Both the trial and
appellate courts dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that they had failed to prove the
existence of an oral partition. Petitioners now insist that the two courts overlooked facts and
circumstances that are allegedly of much weight and will alter the decision if properly
considered. Petitioners would have the Court review the evidence presented by the parties,
despite the CA’s finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence
presented during the trial. This goes against the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. “Such
questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight,
or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear
and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of
fact.” Questions like these are not reviewable by this Court which, as a rule, confines its review
of cases decided by the CA only to questions of law, which may be resolved without having to
re-examine the probative value of the evidence presented. We find no compelling reason to
deviate from the foregoing rule and disturb the trial and appellate courts’ factual finding that the
existence of an oral partition was not proven. Our examination of the records indicates that,
contrary to petitioners’ contention, the lower courts’ conclusion was justified. Heirs of Pacres vs.
Heirs of Ygoña, G.R. No. 174719, May 5, 2010
Appeal; proper mode of appeal from decision of Regional Trial Court acting as Special Agrarian
Court is petition for review under Rule 42, not ordinary appeal under Rule
41. Landbank admitted in its Memorandum that the issue had already been settled in Land Bank
of the Philippines v. De Leon. In ruling that a petition for review and not an ordinary appeal is
the proper mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC-SAC in cases involving the
determination of just compensation, the Court said:
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by
the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct
amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered “just” for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for
a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such
objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review
hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired
property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. xxx
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On March 20, 2003, the Court issued an En Banc Resolution to address the status of pending
cases which had been appealed through a notice of appeal:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to
the motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are partially granted. While we
clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a
petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts
shall apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution. [emphasis supplied]
As earlier stated, Landbank filed its notice of appeal on August 18, 1998. Pursuant to the ruling
that De Leon can be applied prospectively from March 20, 2003, the appeal of Landbank, filed
prior to that date, could be positively acted upon. Accordingly, the subject CA resolutions
should be set aside and Landbank should be allowed to elevate the matter to it via Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court furnishing a copy to the heirs of Luz Rodriguez at their address of
record. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Luz L. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010
Certiorari; improper remedy where appeal is available. Even if the petition will be treated as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the same should be dismissed. In Madrigal Transport, Inc.
v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, which has been often cited in subsequent cases, the Court
declared that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not
be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, especially if one’s own negligence or error in one’s choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion. Hicoblo M. Catly (deceased), subtituted by his wife, Lourdes A. Catly vs. William
Navarro, et al.,G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010
Certiorari; nature of remedy. Thirdly, the petitioner considers this petition as a petition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and yet petitioner insists (somehow to justify direct resort to this
Court) that the petition involves a PURE QUESTION OF LAW, presenting the lone issue of
“[w]hether or not respondent Judge’s admission of petitioner’s amended complaint can validly
moot its indirect contempt suit against private respondent and its responsible
officers.” Petitioner is confusing this Court. Rule 65 does not deal with pure questions of law. It
involves grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and this grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction should be alleged and proved. In
this regard, petitioner failed again. People’s Air Cargo, et al. vs. Hon. Francisco
G. Mendiola, et al., G.R. No. 181068, May 4, 2010
Certiorari; requirement of motion for reconsideration. The petition should be dismissed
outright. Firstly, no motion for reconsideration was filed before petitioner filed this petition
under Rule 65. Certiorari is not a defense against the unfavorable consequences of a failure to
file the required motion for reconsideration. Petitioner may not designate to itself the
determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. The plain and
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adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the court or agency to rectify its
mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with the requirement of filing a
motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for
doing so. In this case, the petitioner failed. Thus, petitioner should have first interposed a
motion for reconsideration. People’s Air Cargo, et al. vs. Hon. Francisco
G. Mendiola, et al., G.R. No. 181068, May 4, 2010
Contempt; indirect contempt. Even if this Court ignores the mentioned procedural lapses, still
the petition fails on the merits. There was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent in issuing the assailed order. Public
respondent had sufficient basis for not giving due attention to the Urgent Motion to Cite for
Contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for the institution
of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:
“Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motuproprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.”
In this case, petitioner filed a mere motion in the same civil case. People’s Air Cargo, et al.
vs. Hon. Francisco G. Mendiola, et al., G.R. No. 181068, May 4, 2010
Grave abuse of discretion; facial objection test. The respondents next argue that the petition’s
cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition
or as a substantiveone that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the
present topic the facial objection, as it is a threshold issue that determines whether we shall
proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright. A facial objection is
meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are
erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. After due consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial
objection test. In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, the Court, through
former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, gave a very succinct exposition of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in relation to errors of law. The Court then
said:
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A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction.
xxxx
“Without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is
“excess of jurisdiction” when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory
authority. “Grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and
such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
rule in this light:
“When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive
it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error
committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive
such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.”
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court
— on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one
of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy.
[Emphasis supplied.]
The most obvious ground cited in the petition that, if properly established, would constitute
grave abuse of discretion is the alleged unwarranted action of the en banc in acting on the
registration of the NP-NPC when the COMELEC’s own Rules of Procedure provides that
registration is under the jurisdiction of the Division at the first instance. This alleged error is
more than an error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the en banc acted without legal
authority and thereby committed a jurisdictional transgression; its action,
being ultra vires, would be a nullity.
Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate resolution, ordered
that August 17, 2009 be the cut-off date for the registration of parties, and yet approved the
registration of NP-NPC long after this cut-off date had passed without any valid justification or
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reason for suspending the rule. For the en banc to so act was not a mere error of law. The grant
of registration was an act outside mandatory legal parameters and was therefore done when
the COMELEC no longer had the authority to act on it. In this sense, it is a proper allegation of
grave abuse of discretion under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
In our view, these jurisdictional challenges to the en banc Resolution, if established,
constituteultra vires acts that would render the Resolution void. Liberal Party, vs. Commission
on Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Judgments; judicially approved compromise agreement constitutes res judicata upon the
parties. The present case turns on the pivot of the option to purchase provided in the
Compromise Agreement which, having been judicially affirmed, constitutes res judicata upon
the parties.
A compromise agreement intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is a judicial
compromise. Having judicial mandate and entered as its determination of the controversy, such
judicial compromise has the force and effect of a judgment. It transcends its identity as a mere
contract between the parties, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and
duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution
may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is
pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed.
To simply say that, by the earlier-quoted term of the Compromise Agreement respecting
petitioner’s evaluation of the land subject of the option to purchase on the basis of its fair market
value on the date of the exercise of the option, petitioner has the exclusive prerogative to
determine the purchase price of the subject land is a very myopic interpretation. The proper
interpretation of the stipulation is that petitioner is given the right to determine the price of the
subject land, provided it can substantiatethat the same is
its fair market value as of the date of the exercise of the option. The term “fair market value” in
the stipulation cannot be ignored without running afoul of the intent of the parties. It not being
disputed that respondents exercised the option to purchase on January 26, 1999, the valuation
should thus be based on the fair market value of the property on the said date. Public Estates
Authority now Philippine Proclamation Authority vs. Estate of Jesus S. Yujuico, et al., G.R. No.
181847, May 5, 2010 .
Jurisdiction; hierarchy of courts. Secondly, the petition violates the principle of hierarchy of
courts. The assailed Order is an order from the RTC of Pasay. This petition should have been
filed with the Court of Appeals, after the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. People’s Air
Cargo, et al. vs. Hon. Francisco G. Mendiola, et al., G.R. No. 181068, May 4, 2010
Jurisdiction; hierarchy of courts; exception. On the contrary, the direct recourse to this Court as
an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts has been recognized because it was dictated by
public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was
considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. Considering the merits of the present case, the
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Court sees the need to relax the iron clad policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts and, thus, takes cognizance over the case. The trial court, in its Decisions dated
December 1, 2004 and December 13, 2004 (per Presiding Judge Raul Bautista Villanueva),
erred in motu proprio modifying the Separate Judgment dated July 22, 1997 (per Presiding
Judge Florentino M. Alumbres) by reducing the entitlement of petitioner’s additional attorney’s
fees from P20,000,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Hicoblo M. Catly (deceased), subtituted by his
wife, Lourdes A. Catly vs. William Navarror, et al., G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010
Jurisdiction; submission to jurisdiction by voluntary appearance and request for affirmative
relief. We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinson’s objection over the
improper resort to summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action
in personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through
their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. A party who makes a
special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of
invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically
stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack of “personal jurisdiction,” it must be noted that he had
earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time
provided in the summons by publication. Such motion did not state that it was a conditional
appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance
submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued
by the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently,
Robinson having acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the
jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he
effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. He is now estopped from
asserting otherwise, even before this Court. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and
style of “ACG Express Liner” vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go,
doing business under the name and style of “ACG Express Liner”, et al., G.R. No. 164703/G.R.
No. 164747, May 4, 2010
Litis pendentia; requisites. Petitioner contends that the CA erred when it refused to apply the
principle of litis pendentia notwithstanding the similarities in the circumstances of the plaintiffs,
the identities of the defendants and the similarities in some of the antecedent issues in
the Bacolod Case, the Hector Lacson Case and Ramon Monfort Case. The requisites
of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least, such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases, such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. The
underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another
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more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory
is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of
controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be
avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons. The CA was correct when
it opined that:
Our perusal of the record reveals that forum shopping cannot, indeed, be attributed to the
appellants. While it may be readily conceded that the plaintiffs in the instant case are more or
less similarly situated as the plaintiffs in the cases previously filed and that the defendants, or at
least the interest they represent, are basically the same, the fact remains that there is no identity
of causes of action and issues in the cases so far filed against the latter. The instant suit, as may
be gleaned from the complaint, concerns the supposed undervaluation by the appellees of
fifteen (15) sugar export sales of the appellants’ export sugar production for the crop years 1979-
1980 and 1980-1981 (pp. 3-32, Orig. Rec.). In contrast, Civil Case No. 4301, entitled
“Hector Lacson, et al. vs. National Sugar Trading Corporation, et al.” concerns the
overcharging of trading costs for the plaintiffs’ export sugar production for the crop years 1981-
1982 and 1982-1983, underpayment resulting from the defendants’ use of an erroneous peso-
dollar exchange rate and reimbursement for amounts alleged to have been wrongfully withheld
by the latter (pp. 163-171, ibid.) On the other hand, Civil Case No. 88-46368 entitled
“Ramon Monfort, et al. vs. Philippine Sugar Commission, et al.” concerned the deficiency due
the plaintiffs therein from sugar export sales for which a lower exchange rate was allegedly used
by the defendants, the recovery, among others, of excessive trading costs charged, unauthorized
deductions, damages, premiums and other sums supposedly still due from the defendants, as
well as a detailed accounting of the sales of the export sugar produced by the plaintiffs therein.
While the amended complaint filed in the case also sought to claim differentials for three (3)
under-valued/under-declared NASUTRA export sales from the crop year 1980-1981 harvest, the
same significantly pertained to different shipments and were coursed not
through appellee Traders’ Royal Bank but through the Republic Planters Bank (pp. 246-
271, ibid). The variance in the subject matters of the instant case and the aforesaid cases are
even conceded in the brief filed by appellee Roberto Benedicto (pp. 153-155, Rollo).
The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence
necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first,
even if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same
facts or evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the rule
that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This
method has been considered the most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in
subsequent proceedings between the same parties. It has even been designated as
infallible. While the plaintiffs in the Bacolod Case are more or less similarly situated as the
plaintiffs in the Hector Lacson Case and Ramon Monfort Case, the CA was correct when it ruled
that there was no identity of causes of action and issues as it cannot be said that exactly the
same evidence are needed to prove the causes of action in all three cases. Thus, in
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the Bacolod Case, the evidence needed to prove that petitioner undervalued fifteen sugar export
sales of respondents’ export sugar production for the crop years 1979-1980 and 1980-1981 is
not the same evidence needed in the Hector Lacson Case to prove the over-charging of trading
costs for respondents’ export sugar production for the crop years 1981-1982 and 1982-1983,
underpayment resulting from the petitioner’s use of an erroneous peso-dollar exchange rate and
reimbursement for amounts alleged to have been wrongfully withheld by the latter. The same
holds true for the Ramon Monfort Case where the same significantly pertained to different
shipments and were coursed not thru the Traders Royal Bank, but thru the Republic Planters
Bank. The Court of Appeals, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in finding that
no litis pendentia existed in the case at bar. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010
Mandamus; any citizen can be real party-in-interest where petition anchored on people’s right
to information on matters of public concern. In order that a petition for mandamus may be
given due course, it must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right. However, if the petition is anchored on the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The
requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and
therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any
special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are
interested in the faithful execution of the laws. The petitioners in this case
are Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Bishop Leo A. Soriano, Jr., Quintin S. Doromal, Fe
Maria Arriola, Isagani R. Serrano, and Engr. Rodolfo Lozada. All are Filipino citizens. They are
thus clothed with personality to institute this special civil action for
mandamus. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections,G.R. No. 191846, May 6,
2010
Mandamus; available to compel disclosure of information on matters of public concern. It is not
enough, however, that the information petitioners seek in a writ of mandamus is a matter of
public concern. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the
species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. In this case,
respondent Comelec failed to cite any provision of law exempting the information sought by
petitioners from the coverage of the government’s constitutional duty to disclose fully
information of public concern. Respondent’s claim that there is no proof a request has been
made for the release of the public records mentioned in the petition is belied by its allegation in
its own Comment that this matter has already been addressed in the recent case
of Roque v. Comelec. Quoting the Court’s ruling in that case on the issue of disclosure of the
source code, respondent unwittingly admits a prior request for disclosure:
The fact that a source code review is not expressly included in the Comelec schedule of
activities is not an indication, as petitioners suggest, that Comelec will not implement such
review. Comelec, in its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration, manifests its intention to
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make available and open the source code to all political and interested parties, but under a
controlled environment to obviate replication and tampering of the source code.
Petitioners in Roque v. Comelec in fact pressed Comelec for a source code review. To this day,
however, Comelec has yet to disclose the source code as mandated by law. In any case,
considering the lack of material time, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may
even dispense with the requirement of proof of a prior demand in this case. The Court may, and
given the alarming developments of late in the run-up to the 10 May 2010 elections, should
compel Comelec to disclose fully the complete details of its preparations. In Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, the Court stressed that the constitutional duty to disclose information of
public concern may be compelled by mandamus, to wit:
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by
the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case. (Emphasis supplied)
XXX XXX XXX X
XX
In sum, petitioners’ prayer to compel Comelec to explain fully its preparations for the coming 10
May 2010 elections finds overwhelming support in the Constitution, specifically under Section 7
of Article III and Section 28 of Article II on the people’s right to information and the State’s
corresponding duty of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest; the
jurisprudential doctrines laid down in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, and Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino; as well as Section 52(j)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code; Section 5(e) of
Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees; Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9184 otherwise known as the
Government Procurement Reform Act; Sections 1, 11, and 12 of Republic Act No. 9369
otherwise known as An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436; and Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 9525 otherwise known as An Act Appropriating P11 Billion as Supplemental
Appropriations for an Automated Election System. Respondent Comelec cannot shirk its
constitutional duty to disclose fully to the public complete details of all information relating to
its preparations for the 10 May 2010 elections without violating the Constitution and relevant
laws. No less than the Constitution mandates it to enforce and administer election laws.
The Comelec chairman and the six commissioners are beholden and accountable to the people
they have sworn to serve. This Court, as the last bulwark of democracy in this country, will
spare nothing in its constitutionally granted powers to ensure that the fundamental right of the
people to information on matters of public concern, especially on matters that directly affect our
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democratic processes, is fully guaranteed, protected, and implemented. Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. et al. vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191846, May 6, 2010
Motion to dismiss; order of denial interlocutory. It is the position of petitioner that the CA erred
when it chose not to dismiss the case based on the “other grounds” petitioner had earlier raised
in its motion to dismiss. More specifically, petitioner claims that the grounds of lack of cause of
action, res judicata, payment and prescription warrant the dismissal of the complaint. The same
deserves scant consideration. It bears to stress that the RTC, in its June 5, 1996 Order, did not
also consider the other grounds now raised by petitioner, to wit:
In view of the sufficiency of the grounds for dismissal discussed above, the other grounds
invoked by the defendants in their Motion to Dismiss, which do not appear to be indubitable
without additional evidence need not be considered.
While petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its June 5, 1996 Order, the
same Order, however, effectively denied the other grounds raised by petitioner as the same did
not appear to be indubitable without additional evidence. It is a settled rule that an Order
denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be
subject of a petition for review oncertiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary
course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed
in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. While the rule refers to instances when a motion to dismiss is
completely denied, this Court finds no reason not to apply the same in instances when some of
the grounds raised in a motion to dismiss are denied by the lower court. The “other grounds”
now raised by petitioner were not before the CA because the same were not put in issue by
respondents when they chose to assail the RTC’s Order to dismiss the complaint. This is
understandable especially since the “other grounds” were not made the basis of the RTC’s Order.
Procedurally then, the proper remedy of petitioner, should he choose to reassert the “other
grounds,” is to interpose the same as defenses in his answer and not to put them in issue in this
appeal. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010
Parties; real party-in-interest. First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real
party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which defines such party
as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled
to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to
discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy. A case
is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-
interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not Pamana who is the
exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997
issued by Tony Robinson. Petitioner Go mentions the following documents also signed by
respondent Robinson which state that “Pamana Marketing Corporation represented by Mr.
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Mortimer F. Cordero” was actually the exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 1997; (2)
certification dated 5 August 1997; and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997 addressed to
petitioner Cordero concerning “commissions to be paid to Pamana Marketing
Corporation.” Such apparent inconsistency in naming AFFA’s exclusive distributor in the
Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only
with Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship, as
with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFFA’s fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the
stipulated commissions from each progress payments made by Go were directly paid by
Robinson to Cordero. Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too aware of Cordero’s
authority as the person who was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which
can be gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of
bank transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion of
funds received to the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission. Out of
these partial payments of his commission, Cordero would still give Landicho and Tecson their
respective “commission,” or “cuts” from his own
commission. Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute the evidence submitted
by Cordero consisting of receipts signed by them. Said amounts were apart from the earlier
expenses shouldered by Cordero for Landicho’s airline tickets, transportation, food and hotel
accommodations for the trip to Australia. Allan C. Go, doing business under the name and style
of “ACG Express Liner” vs. Mortimer F. Cordero/Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Allan C. Go, doing
business under the name and style of “ACG Express Liner”, et al., G.R. No. 164703/G.R. No.
164747, May 4, 2010
Parties; real parties-in-interest. We do not likewise find the failure to formally implead the NP-
NPC a sufficient reason to dismiss the petition outright. Without any finally confirmed
registration in the coalition’s favor, NP-NPC does not legally exist as a coalition with a
personality separate and distinct from the component NP and NPC parties. We find it sufficient
that the NP and the NPC have separately been impleaded; as of the moment, they are the real
parties-in-interest as they are the parties truly interested in legally establishing the existence of
their coalition. Again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice in the omission to implead NP-
NPC, as the component parties have voiced out the concerns the coalition would have raised
had it been impleaded as a separate and properly existing personality. Liberal Party vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Petitions; prematurity. Is the present petition premature, since its object is to foreclose a ruling
on the unsettled NP-NPC accreditation issue? This is another threshold issue, raised this time by
the OSG, and we rule that the OSG’s objection has no merit.
The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a
coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it
had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPC’s registration,
it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition.
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The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two
separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the act that
bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws; accreditation, on the other hand,
relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered
parties. Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules
regulate the registration of political parties, organizations or coalitions of political
parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8752,
Section 1 of which states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Commission who shall docket it as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC petition
before the COMELEC was docketed. While the registration of political parties is a special
proceeding clearly assigned to a Division for handling under the COMELEC Rules, no similar
clear-cut rule is available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant party. We thus make no
statement on this point, as it is not a matter in issue. Under the circumstances of the present
case where the registration was handled at the en banc, action at the COMELEC ended upon
the en banc’s issuance of the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of
the COMELEC Rules, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading,
except in election offense cases. Any request for accreditation that may be filed is conceptually
a separate matter for the COMELEC to handle. Thus, after the en banc issued the assailed
Resolution resolving the NP-NPC’s application for registration as a coalition, the COMELEC’s
part in the registration process was brought to a close, rendering the Resolution ripe for review
by this Court. The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the
accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition expressly and frontally sought the issuance
of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a
coalition that is not registered as a party. The combination of a petition for certiorari and for
prohibition under the circumstances of the present case is fully justified, as the registration and
the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact sequentially follow one
another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or
coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation
can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to
follow. Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion,
as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary
injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless
restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no
prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event – the accreditation – that
according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view of the
petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the
nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives,
the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless. Liberal Party
vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
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Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner contends that respondents are guilty
of forum shopping because they failed to disclose, at the time of the filing of the Bacolod Case,
the fact that some of the respondents had earlier commenced a similar action in Pasig. Petitioner
claims that respondents should have informed the RTC of Bacolod of the commencement and
subsequent withdrawal of the Pasig Case in the certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioner
insists that even if the Pasig Case was subsequently withdrawn, the same still constituted a
“commenced action,” which is required to be disclosed under the rules of forum
shopping. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the
present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or
claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
A perusal of the records shows that, with the exception of additional party-plaintiffs,
the Pasig Case actually has a strong resemblance to the Bacolod Case. The Pasig Case, however,
was dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiffs even before the Bacolod Case was filed. The
RTC Order allowing the dismissal of the complaint in the Pasig Case is hereunder reproduced,
to wit:
xxxx
On November 14, 1995, A Notice of Dismissal was filed by plaintiffs thru counsel, Attys.
Ricardo G. Nepomuceno, Jr. and Epifanio Sedigo, Jr., pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the Rules
of Court.
According to the said Rule, plaintiff may, at any time before service of answer, dismiss an
action by filing a notice of dismissal.
Records show that no answer has yet been filed by defendants.
Being in conformity to the Rules, the same is hereby granted.
WHEREFORE, herein complaint is hereby DISMISSED and without prejudice to the re-filing
thereof.
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Notify parties and counsel of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in another suit
other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari; the act of filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively for
the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration.
There is no dispute that the dismissal of the complaint in the Pasig case, upon notice of the
plaintiffs therein, was sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court. Quite
clearly, the Order declared that the dismissal of the complaint was without prejudice to the re-
filing thereof. Moreover, even if the same were tested under the rules on litis pendentia and res
judicata, the danger of conflicting decisions cannot be present, since the Pasig case was
dismissed even before a responsive pleading was filed by petitioner. Since a party resorts to
forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action, it
has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has even been rendered against him
in any of the cases he has brought before the courts. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010
Pleadings; certification of non-forum shopping. While the RTC may have been of the opinion
that the Pasig Case was nevertheless “commenced” and, therefore, the same should have been
stated by respondents in their certification of non-forum shopping in the Bacolod case, this
Court does not share the same view.
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals, this Court had on occasion ruled that when a complaint is
dismissed without prejudice at the instance of the plaintiff, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping
in a subsequent re-filed complaint the fact of the prior filing and dismissal of the former
complaint, thus:
Considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 was dismissed without prejudice by
virtue of the plaintiff’s (herein petitioner’s) Notice of Dismissal dated November 20, 1997 filed
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no need to state in
the certificate of non-forum shopping in Civil Case No. 97-0608 about the prior filing and
dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-0523. In Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that it is
scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 (now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure) must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve the purposes projected by the
Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as
an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules or procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
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possible. The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores
its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under
justifiable circumstances.
Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not
constitute res judicata and litis pendencia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled
in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation
of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with
the objectives of procedural rules which is to “secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding.”
Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010
Procedural rules; liberal application. Verily, in numerous occasions, this Court has relaxed the
rigid application of the rules to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on
the merits. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural
imperfection should thus not serve as basis of decisions. Technicalities should never be used to
defeat the substantive rights of the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration
of justice. In the case at bar, considering that the same involves the various claims of 371
respondents, this Court finds that justice and equity are best served by allowing respondents to
prove their case on the merits rather than denying them their day in court on a strict application
of the rules. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5,
2010
Procedural rules; liberal application; importance of questions raised. We have indicated many
times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and procedural objections is the
nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the
parties’ private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affecting the public, but
have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised when grave
public interests are involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and
procedural where Court intervention has become imperative. Thus, we have recognized
exceptions to the threshold issues of ripeness and mootness of the petitions before us, as well as
questions on locus standi. We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the
issues raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or
weight as precedents deserve the Court’s attention and active intervention. We see every reason
to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to
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the coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their
accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide – particularly, the
on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to
official election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties
enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the
dominant-party status brings – constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if
only in terms of the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing
situations. The value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated
system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some.
To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of
equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure
to transparency and to the election’s credibility. Thus, our focus is on the core issues that
confront us and the parties, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not
anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and
concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties
involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the
coming elections. We note that while the respondents placed in issue defects in the
attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one as they do not deny the existence and
basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we
overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered
above. Liberal Party vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Other proceedings
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; writ of possession. It is settled that questions regarding the
validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the
mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession. Any such
questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding as in fact, herein respondents
commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of
Mortgage. Parenthetically, the court a quo denied the issuance of the writ as it credited
respondents’ opposition to petitioner’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, which
opposition it synthesized as follows:
On the other hand, the mortgagors[-respondents herein] contend that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings conducted by the Notary Public over the mortgaged properties of the
mortgagors suffered jurisdictional infirmities; that the jurisdictional infirmities consisted of the
fact that the requirement of posting the notices of the sale for not less that twenty (20) days in at
least three (3) public places in the city where the property is situated was not complied with;
that the notice of auction sale did not mention with preciseness and particularity the kind of
improvement on the mortgaged property, which consist of a three-storey building; that the bank
(petitioner herein) and the Notary Public colluded to deprive the prospective bidders interested
in the properties from participating in the public auction sale since they were deprived of
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knowing the real status of the subject properties; that the mortgaged properties were auctioned
for a price grossly disproportionate and morally shocking as compared to the real value of the
same properties; that the petitioner also violated the provisions of Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3, governing the procedure of extrajudicial foreclosure, x x x. (underscoring
supplied)
By crediting respondents’ opposition, Branch 77 of the court a quo pre-empted its co-equal
branch, Branch 221, to which jurisdiction over respondents’ annulment petition was laid, from
determining the merits of respondents’ claim-basis of said petition.
Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of
the property; xxx
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. (underscoring supplied)
Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement to
the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial
function. The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into
the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is
annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial. In fact, even during the period of
redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of possession provided a bond is posted
to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without
complying with the requirements of the law. More so when, as in the present case, the
redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the purchaser. The defaulting
mortgagor is not without any expedient remedy, however. For under Section 8 of Act 3135, as
amended by Act 4118, it can file with the court which issues the writ of possession a petition for
cancellation of the writ within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. So
Section 8 of Rule 39 provides:
SECTION 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not
later than thirty days after the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside
and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the
mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof,
and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure
provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six;
and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the
bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from
the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and
ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the
appeal. (underscoring supplied)
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Planters Development Bank vs. James and Anthony Ng, G.R. No. 187556, May 5, 2010
HLURB; authority to issue cease and desist order (CDO). Respecting GSIS’s argument that PD
No. 385 prohibits the issuance of a [Cease and Desist Order], the pertinent provisions of the
decree read:
Section 1. It shall be mandatory for government financial institutions, after the lapse of sixty (60)
days from the issuance of this Decree, to foreclose the collaterals and/or securities for any loan,
credit, accommodation, and/or guarantees granted by them whenever the arrearages on such
account, including accrued interest and other charges, amount to at least twenty percent (20%)
of the total outstanding obligations, including interest and other charges, as appearing in the
books of account and/or related records of the financial institution concerned. This shall be
without prejudice to the exercise by the government financial institutions of such rights and/or
remedies available to them under their respective contracts with their debtors, including the
right to foreclose on loans, credits, accommodations and/or guarantees on which
the arrearages are less than twenty percent (20%).
Section 2. No restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued by the court
against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in
compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided in Section 1 hereof, whether such
restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction is sought by the borrower(s) or any third
party or parties, except after due hearing in which it is established by the borrower and admitted
by the government financial institution concerned that twenty percent (20%) of the
outstanding arrearages has been paid after the filing of foreclosure proceedings.
In case a restraining order or injunction is issued, the borrower shall nevertheless be legally
obligated to liquidate the remaining balance of the arrearages outstanding as of the time of
foreclosure, plus interest and other charges, on every succeeding thirtieth (30th) day after the
issuance of such restraining order or injunction until the entire arrearages have been liquidated.
These shall be in addition to the payment of amortization currently maturing. The restraining
order or injunction shall automatically be dissolved should the borrower fail to make any of the
above-mentioned payments on due dates, and no restraining order or injunction shall be issued
thereafter. This shall be without prejudice to the exercise by the government financial
institutions of such rights and/or remedies available to them under their respective charters and
their respective contracts with their debtors, nor should this provision be construed as restricting
the government financial institutions concerned from approving, solely at its own discretion, any
restructuring, recapitalization, or any other arrangement that would place the entire account on
a current basis, provided, however, that at least twenty percent (20%) of
the arrearages outstanding at the time of the foreclosure is paid.
All restraining orders and injunctions existing as of the date of this Decree on foreclosure
proceedings filed by said government financial institutions shall be considered lifted unless
finally resolved by the court within sixty (60) days from date hereof. (underscoring supplied)
The act subject of the CDO was the intended consolidation by the GSIS of ownership of the
condominium unit, not the mandatory foreclosure of the mortgage. At any rate, the second
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paragraph of the above-quoted Section 2 of PD No. 385 in fact recognizes the eventuality that
an injunction may be issued against a government financial institution, hence, it obliges the
borrower to liquidate the arrearages due in order to safeguard the interests of the government
financial institution-lender.
Undoubtedly, the jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate business is broad enough
to include jurisdiction over a complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and mortgage and the
grant of incidental reliefs such as a CDO. Even Presidential Decree No. 957, “The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree,” authorizes the HLURB as successor of the
National Housing Authority to issue CDOs in relevant cases, viz:
SECTION 16. Cease and Desist Order. — Whenever it shall appear to the Authority
that any person is engaged or about to engage in any act or practice which constitutes or will
constitute a violation of the provisions of this Decree, or of any rule or regulation thereunder, it
may, upon due notice and hearing as provided in Section 13 hereof, issue a cease and desist
order to enjoin such act or practices.
Government Service Insurance System vs. Board of Commissioners (2nd Division), et al., G.R.
No. 180062, May 5, 2010
HLURB; jurisdiction of Division of HLURB Board of Commissioners to entertain motion for
reconsideration or appeal. GSIS’s motion for reconsideration having been denied by the
appellate court by Resolution of October 10, 2007, the present petition for review was
filed. GSIS argues in the main that the HLURB Revised Rules of Procedure did not vest authority
in the Board’s Second Division to entertain appeals. The Court is not persuaded. Section 5 of
E.O. No. 648 specifically mandates the HLURB Board of Commissioners to adopt rules of
procedure for the conduct of its business and perform such functions necessary for the effective
discharge thereof. Such grant of power necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be
an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless, by express provision of
the Act or by implication, it has been withheld. The present composition of the Board of
Commissioners, wherein five out of its nine members sit in ex-officiocapacity while the
remaining four serve as full time commissioners, practicality necessitates the establishment of a
procedure whereby a case on appeal may be decided by members of a division. Since the
2004 HLURB Rules of Procedure provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be assigned to
the Division from which the decision, order or ruling originated, the questioned cognizance by
the HLURB Second Division of GSIS’s motion for reconsideration is in order. Government
Service Insurance System vs. Board of Commissioners (2nd Division), et al., G.R. No. 180062,
May 5, 2010
Evidence
Burden of proof; agricultural lessor has burden to show existence of lawful cause to eject
agricultural lessee. We reiterate that the petitioner, as agricultural lessor, has the burden of
proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. In
support of her allegations, Felisa presented the Investigation Report of MARO Legal
Officer Estimada and an affidavit of a resident of the barangay where both the original
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leaseholder Isabelo and the alleged sublessee, Soledad, reside. The full text of the Investigation
Report with respect to his factual findings on the case against Soledad is as follows:
In the dispute against Soledad Agustin, the lawful tenant was Isabelo Ramirez and
not Soledad Agustin. In the conference/mediation that was conducted it was discovered that the
cultivator and possessor of the land is actually Isabelo Ramirez. This is also being covered by
an Agricultural leasehold Contract.
The findings of fact as expressed above are not relevant and material to the question of sublease
which the petitioner alleges.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Gano reads as follows:
xxxx
That I know for a fact that the above-described parcel of land was being cultivated formerly by
the late, Isabelo Ramirez, a resident of Brgy. Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan, Philippines;
That I also have the knowledge that prior to the death of said Isabelo Ramirez, the same
mortgaged his tenancy rights and possession to Soledad Agustin and in fact,
said Soledad Agustin is at present cultivating and in possession of the above-described
landholding;
That to the best of my knowledge, the transfer of tenancy rights and possession
from Isabelo Ramirez to Soledad Agustin by way of mortgage was made without the knowledge
and consent of the owners thereof;
That I know of the above facts because being a resident of the same barangay with the former
tenant and the present tenant of the said landholding, it is of common knowledge in our
community that Soledad Agustin is presently cultivating the same landholding and that she
acquired such tenancy rights from its former tenant by way of mortgage;
xxxx
In contrast to the Carganillo case above, the evidence presented by Felisa with respect
to Soledad is uncorroborated and unsubstantial. Hence, we rule that Felisa has not discharged
her burden of establishing her claim of sublease. Felisa Ferrer vs.
Domingo Carganillo, et al., G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010
Extrajudicial admissions. Petitioners’ assertion of partition of Lot No. 9 is further belied by their
predecessor-in-interest’s previous assertion of co-ownership over the same lot in the legal
redemption case filed 10 years before. The allegations therein, sworn to as truth by Mario
and Veñaranda, described Lot No. 9 as a parcel of land that is co–owned by
the Pacres siblings pro indiviso. It was further alleged that Ygoña bought the undivided shares of
Rodrigo, Francisco, Margarita, and Simplicia. The statements in the legal redemption case are
extrajudicial admissions, [Extrajudicial admissions are those made out of court, or in a judicial
proceeding other than the one under consideration. Francisco, Evidence, 2nd Ed. (1994), p.
33.] which were not disputed by petitioners. These admissions may be given in evidence
against them. At the very least, the polarity of their previous admissions and their present theory
makes the latter highly suspect. Heirs of Pacres vs. Heirs of Ygoña, G.R. No. 174719, May 5,
2010
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Fact of subleasing proven by clear and convincing evidence in agrarian reform case. We
disagree with the findings of fact of the CA and the agencies below. The confluence of evidence
shows that Felisa has clearly and convincingly established her allegation that Domingo
subleased his landholding to Sergio, to wit:
a) The investigation conducted by MARO Legal Officer Estimada shows that Domingo admitted
that the cultivation and possession of the subject landholding was subleased to Sergio as he was
then applying for work abroad.
b) In her complaint, Felisa stressed that in one of her visits to the subject landholding prior to
the filing of the said complaint, she discovered that Sergio, the sublessee, was in actual
possession and cultivation of the landholding in question. Petitioner further contended that
Domingo subleased the said agricultural leasehold to Sergio for the amount of P15,000.00.
c) The Katulagan or Agreement establishes that indeed Domingo was indebted to Sergio in the
amount of P15,000.00.
d) The affidavit of Clarion, a resident of the municipality where the subject landholding lies,
further corroborates the said facts when she narrated the series of events leading up to Sergio’s
possession of said agricultural land:
xxxx
That I know for a fact that the above-described parcel of land was under cultivation by one
RICARDO PADILLO of Brgy. Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan, formerly, but when the same went
abroad, he transferred his tenancy right to DOMINGO CARGANILLO, who in the year 1995
mortgaged his tenancy rights to SERGIO CARGANILLO, his own brother;
That at present, the said parcel of land is under the cultivation of said SERGIO CARGANILLO;
xxxx
Domingo did not even affirm or deny in his answer that Estimada conducted an investigation
and during such investigation, he admitted that he subleased subject landholding. It is totally
against our human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded imputation. Hence,
silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth
thereof. Likewise, the attestations
of BARC Chairman Costales and Barangay Kagawad Frago that Domingo never violated his
agreement with Felisa or any provision of the Land Reform Code, are conclusions of law bereft
of any factual basis. Time and again, we have held that general statements, which are
mere conclusions of law and not factual proof, are unavailing and do not
suffice. Felisa Ferrer vs. Domingo Carganillo, et al., G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010
New evidence; cannot be submitted with supplemental motion for reconsideration in agrarian
reform case. On March 24, 2004, Felisa filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with
Manifestation with the DARAB, allegedly as an expanded discussion on what she averred in her
Motion for Reconsideration. We note though that aside from amplifying her arguments,
petitioner likewise attached and referred to new pieces of evidence in the form of: (1) affidavit of
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Rudy O. Tubiera dated September 14, 2001; (2) affidavit of Liberato Cabigas; (3) affidavit of
Alberto A. Millan dated July 26, 2002 and (4) survey plan.
Section 12, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedures provide that “only one
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed a party which shall be based on the ground that: (a)
the findings of facts in the said decision, order or resolution are not supported by substantial
evidence, or (b) the conclusions stated therein are against the law and jurisprudence”. As
expressed by the Rule, the office of the Motion for Reconsideration is not for the reception of
new evidence. Hence, when Felisa submitted new pieces of evidence in her Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, she went beyond the stated purpose of the Motion for
Reconsideration. In which case, we rule that the new evidence presented by Felisa in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation to the DARAB cannot be
admitted. Felisa Ferrer vs. Domingo Carganillo, et al., G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010
Parol Evidence Rule. In the first place, under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs (subject to exceptions not applicable
here). Thus, only a party to the contract can maintain an action to enforce the obligations
arising under said contract. Consequently, petitioners, not being parties to the contracts of sale
between Ygoña and the petitioners’ siblings, cannot sue for the enforcement of the supposed
obligations arising from said contracts. It is true that third parties may seek enforcement of a
contract under the second paragraph of Article 1311, which provides that “if a contract should
contain some stipulation in favor of a third person, he may demand its fulfillment.” This refers
to stipulations pour autrui, or stipulations for the benefit of third parties. However, the written
contracts of sale in this case contain no such stipulation in favor of the petitioners. While
petitioners claim that there was an oral stipulation, it cannot be proven under the Parol Evidence
Rule. Under this Rule, “[w]hen the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.” While the Rule admits of exception, no such exception was pleaded, much less
proved, by petitioners.
The Parol Evidence Rule applies to “the parties and their successors in interest.” Conversely, it
has no application to a stranger to a contract. For purposes of the Parol Evidence Rule, a person
who claims to be the beneficiary of an alleged stipulation pour autrui in a contract (such as
petitioners) may be considered a party to that contract. It has been held that a third party who
avails himself of a stipulation pour autrui under a contract becomes a party to that
contract. This is why under Article 1311, a beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui is required to
communicate his acceptance to the obligor before its revocation. Moreover, to preclude the
application of Parol Evidence Rule, it must be shown that “at least one of the parties to the suit is
not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on
the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established
thereby.” A beneficiary of a stipulation pour autrui obviously bases his claim on the
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contract. He therefore cannot claim to be a stranger to the contract and resist the application of
the Parol Evidence Rule.
Thus, even assuming that the alleged oral undertakings invoked by petitioners may be deemed
stipulations pour autrui, still petitioners’ claim cannot prosper, because they are barred from
proving them by oral evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule. Heirs of Pacres vs. Heirs
of Ygoña, G.R. No. 174719, May 5, 2010
Question of law; definition. Also, even if this Court treats this petition as a Petition under Rule
45, it is not convinced that this case involves a pure question of law. A question of law exists
when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. This is not so
in the case at bar. It bears stressing too that the basis of the petitioner for its Urgent Motion to
Cite for Contempt is yet to be determined in a full-blown trial by the public respondent. All told,
there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondent in issuing the assailed July 16, 2008 Order. People’s Air Cargo, et al. vs. Hon.
Francisco G. Mendiola, et al.,G.R. No. 181068, May 4, 2010
Technical rules of evidence not applicable in agrarian reform case. The DARAB held that
the Katulaganis inadmissible in evidence because it was not formally offered before the PARAD,
citing our ruling in People v. Mongado. On appeal, however, the CA considered the Katulagan,
but found the same to be a mere promissory note tending to prove indebtedness and not as an
evidence of mortgage. We cannot subscribe with the reasoning of the DARAB. The Rules of
Court, particularly the Revised Rules on Evidence, are specifically applicable to judicial
proceedings, to wit:
Section 1. Evidence defined. – Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules, of
ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Sec. 2. Scope. – The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (Emphasis supplied)
In quasi judicial proceedings, the said rules shall not apply except “by analogy or in
a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient”. In the instant case, the then
prevailing DARAB Rules of Procedures provide that:
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed to carry out the objectives of
agrarian reform and to promote just, expeditious and inexpensive adjudication and settlement of
agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.
xxxx
Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its Regional and Provincial
Adjudicators shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in
the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all agrarian cases, disputes or
controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the
facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity.
a) If and when a case comes up for adjudication wherein there is no applicable provision under
these rules, the procedural law and jurisprudence generally applicable to agrarian disputes shall
be applied;
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b) The Adjudication Board (Board), and its Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARADs)
and Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (PARADs) hereinafter referred to as Adjudicators,
shall have the authority to adopt any appropriate measure or procedure in any given situation or
matter not covered by these Rules. All such special measures or procedures and the situations
to which they have been applied must be reported to the Board; and
c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in a suppletory character unless
adopted herein or by resolution of the Board. However, due process of the law shall be
observed and followed in all instances. (Emphasis supplied)
The DARAB Rules of Procedures explicitly provides that the Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are
not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor shall the latter
apply even in a suppletory manner. Thus, we find that the DARAB erred in holding
the Katulagan as inadmissible since it was not formally offered and admitted. Moreover,
reliance on our ruling in People v. Mongado, i.e., that “[t]he court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered,” is misplaced. We simply cannot find any legal basis for
the DARAB to cite our ruling in a criminal case; the fundamental rule found in Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court does not find any application in this agrarian case. Felisa Ferrer vs.
Domingo Carganillo, et al., G.R. No. 170956, May 12, 2010
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Civil Procedure
Annulment of judgment; direct recourse to this remedy not allowed if other appropriate
remedies are available. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court impose the conditions
for the availment of the remedy of annulment of judgment, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage.- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Groundsfor annulment. – The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in
a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a petition for annulment of
judgment if other appropriate remedies are available, such as a petition for new trial, appeal or a
petition for relief. If petitioner fails to avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she
cannot resort to the action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would
benefit from her inaction or negligence.
We found no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment. The Spouses Arcenas were declared non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial
conference of Civil Case No. 072-07-2002 on November 11, 2003, and respondent bank was
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allowed to present evidence on its counterclaim on January 8, 2004. Such Order was received
by the secretary of petitioner’s counsel on November 17, 2003. Petitioner did not move to set
aside the RTC’s order of non-suit. While petitioner’s counsel claimed that he only learned of
such Order of non-suit on December 4, 2003, yet no motion to lift the order of non-suit was
filed. Notably, from December 4, 2003 to the scheduled hearing on January 8, 2004, petitioner
did not take any remedial action to lift the order of non-suit when she had the opportunity to do
so. In fact, petitioner and her counsel did not also appear on the scheduled January 8, 2004
hearing wherein respondent bank presented evidence on its counterclaim and submitted the
case for decision. It was only on January 14, 2004 when petitioner and her husband filed a
pleading captioned as Manifestation and Motion, wherein they prayed for the reconsideration of
the Orders dated November 11, 2003 and January 8, 2004 and for further pre-trial conference.
The RTC denied such Manifestation and Motion in its Order dated March 9, 2004, as the same
was filed beyond the reglementary period, and such Order was received by petitioner on March
12, 2004. Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for annulment of order of non-suit under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud. The CA denied the petition as
petitioner failed to avail of the appropriate remedies provided by the Rules to which we agree.
XXX XXX XXX
Petitioner tries to justify her failure to avail of the appropriate remedies on a promise of
settlement. However, such promise was not an excuse for petitioner’s counsel not to lift the
order of non-suit and to file a petition for relief. Petitioner’s claim that she was present when
respondent bank’s counsel moved for the issuance of the order of non-suit against her was not
proven by any evidence. There was indeed a failure to show, to our satisfaction, that petitioner
could not have availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules. Thus, she
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her
inaction or negligence. Spouses Oscar Arcenas and Dolores Arcenas vs. Queen City
Development Bank and Court of Appeals (Nineteenth Division), G.R. No. 166819, June 16,
2010.
Annulment of judgment; extrinsic fraud. Petitioner argues that when respondent bank’s counsel
moved for the issuance of the Order of non-suit against her and her husband during the
November 11, 2003 hearing, extrinsic fraud was committed on them since respondent bank’s
counsel concealed from the RTC that there was a gentleman’s agreement for the settlement of
the subject civil cases. We are not persuaded. It bears stressing that when petitioner’s counsel
filed the Manifestation and Motion asking for reconsideration of the Order declaring the Spouses
Arcenas non-suited, the reason stated was honest mistake or excusable negligence. To show
such mistake, he explained that since there was a pending negotiation for settlement in Civil
Case Nos. V-006-01-2002 and V-072-07-2002, which were both pending in the same court,
and the parties had to come up with a settlement for the hearing of Civil Case No. V-006-01-
2002 scheduled on December 4, 2004, petitioner’s counsel then asked for the postponement of
the scheduled November 11, 2003 hearing set for the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No. V-
072-07-2002 one day before the said date, because of conflict of schedule and since he had in
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mind the December 4, 2003 deadline to submit the settlement. Notably, petitioner’s counsel
admitted that the date set for the submission of settlement in Civil Case No. V-072-07-2002 was
indeed November 11, 2003; and that his failure to attend the hearings and to file a motion for
reconsideration of the declaration of petitioner as non-suited was because of his mistaken belief
that respondent bank was earnestly seeking a settlement. There was nothing in the Manifestation
and Motion which alluded the commission of extrinsic fraud to respondent bank’s
counsel. Moreover, since petitioner claimed that there was extrinsic fraud committed by
respondent bank’s counsel, she could have filed a petition for relief under Rule 38 within the
period provided for by the Rules of Court, but she did not. Section 2, Rule 47 clearly states that
extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground for annulment of order if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. Thus, extrinsic fraud is
effectively barred if it could have been raised as a ground in an available remedial
measure. Spouses Oscar Arcenas and Dolores Arcenas vs. Queen City Development Bank and
Court of Appeals (Nineteenth Division), G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010
Annulment of order of non-suit; no forum shopping where petitioner also files notice of appeal
pertaining to decision on the merits.Finally, we find no merit in respondent bank’s claim that
petitioner committed forum shopping. The issue brought before us is whether the CA correctly
dismissed petitioner’s petition for annulment of the Order dated November 11, 2003 declaring
her non-suited for failure to appear at the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No. V-072-07-
2002. On the other hand, petitioner’s Notice of Appeal in Civil Case Nos. V-006-01-2002 and
V-072-07-2002 pertained to the decision of the RTC rendered on the merits. Spouses Oscar
Arcenas and Dolores Arcenas vs. Queen City Development Bank and Court of Appeals
(Nineteenth Division), G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010
Appeals; effect of failure to appeal. In its Memorandum, SPI prays that petitioners be ordered to
pay 3% interest monthly as stipulated in the Contract for Lease, plus attorney’s fees. However,
as SPI did not appeal the RTC Decision before the appellate court, we cannot act on the
same. It is well-settled that a party who has not appealed from a Decision cannot seek any relief
other than what is provided in the judgment appealed from. SPI did not appeal, thus it cannot
obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the Decision of
the court below. It can only advance any argument that it may deem necessary to defeat
petitioners’ claim or to uphold the Decision that is being disputed, and it can assign errors in its
brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned
errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed
decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in
SPI’s favor and giving it other reliefs.
We find on record that SPI’s counsel, with the concurrence of its Vice President, withdrew his
appearance on November 24, 2000. The RTC granted said withdrawal in its Order dated
January 5, 2001. Subsequently, the case was decided by the RTC and appealed by the
petitioners to the CA. In due time, the CA rendered judgment on the same and petitioners filed
this Petition for Review onCertiorari. SPI did not interpose an appeal from the RTC Decision nor
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from the CA Decision. After more than six years, on September 13, 2007, a new law firm
entered its appearance as counsel of SPI. SPI now claims that it was not able to appeal the
Decision of the RTC and subsequently of the CA which failed to impose 3% monthly interest as
provided in the Contract of Lease because it never received said Decisions, considering that its
counsel has migrated to another country and that petitioners misled the courts about SPI’s
address. We are not persuaded. SPI failed to exercise due diligence in keeping itself updated
on the developments of the case. That its erstwhile counsel has not communicated for a long
period of time and has migrated abroad, should have cautioned it that something was amiss
with the case. By that time, SPI should have initiated moves to locate its counsel or to inquire
from the court on the progress of the case. It should have ensured that its address on record
with the court is updated and current. Thus, it has been equally stressed that litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of the case. Instead, they should give the necessary assistance to their counsel and
exercise due diligence to monitor the status of the case for what is at stake is ultimately their
interest. Selwyn F. Lao, et al. vs. Special Plans, Inc., G.R. No. 164791, June 29, 2010
Appeals; factual findings of trial court. Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of
respect and are considered conclusive between the parties. A review of such findings by this
Court is not warranted except for highly meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings of a
trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower court’s
inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate court go beyond
the issues of the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on
the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. None of the foregoing
exceptions which would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in this
instance. St. Joseph’s College, Sr., Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Rosalinda Tabugo vs. Jayson
Miranda, represented by his father, Rodolfo S. Miranda, G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010
Appeals; “Fresh period rule” in “Neypes v. Court of Appeals” not applicable to administrative
appeal from DENR regional office to DENR Secretary. TheissuebeforetheCourtofAppeals was
whether the “fresh period rule” laid down in Neypes applies to petitioner’s case, i.e., that he had
a fresh period of 15 days to appeal RD Sampulna’s October 16, 2007 Order to the DENR
Secretary, counted from her notice on September 12, 2007 of the RD’s Order of September 6,
2007 denying her motion for reconsideration of the decision. The “fresh period rule”
in Neypes declares:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rulesand to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which
to file the notice of appealin the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
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Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shallalsoapplytoRule40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals; and Rule45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
x x x. This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule41, Section3oftheRules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily
implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may
be filed within 15 days from notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the “final
order,” which we already determined to refer to the x x x order denying the motion for a new
trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section39ofBP129 which shortened the
appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of
appeal x x x remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies.The fresh period of
15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for reconsideration. In this
manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we
aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal
period should be counted–from receipt of notice of judgment x x x or from receipt of notice of
“final order” appealed from x x x.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)
XXX XXX XXX
As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the “fresh period rule” shall
apply toRule40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule43 (appeals
from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule45 (appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules coverjudicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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Petitioner’s present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the decision or
order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed governed by
Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section 1 clearly
provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal
“during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of
denial;” whereas if the decision is reversed,the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to perfect
his appeal. Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as clarified in Neypes, being inconsistent
with Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990, it may not apply to the case of
petitioner whose motion for reconsideration was denied. Julieta Panolino vs. Josephine L.
Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010
Appeals; late filing excused in interest of substantial justice. It is settled that an appeal must be
perfected within the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory. Before the Supreme Court, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. Even then, review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and may
be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. In the case at bar, the
Docket Division of the OSG received a copy of the CA decision on November 7, 2007. It was
not until February 1, 2008 or almost three (3) months however, that the OSG, for petitioner,
filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. The OSG pleads for understanding
considering the scarcity of its lawyers and the inadvertence of the temporarily-designated OIC of
Division XV in overlooking that the CA decision was adverse to PEZA.
While the Court realizes the OSG’s difficulty in having only three (3) lawyers working full time
on its cases, the OSG could have easily asked for an extension of time within which to file the
petition. More importantly, as the government agency tasked to represent the government in
litigations, the OSG should perform its duty with promptness and utmost diligence. However,
upon careful consideration of the merits of this case, the Court is inclined to overlook this
procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice. Although a party is bound by the acts of its
counsel, including the latter’s mistakes and negligence, a departure from this rule is warranted
where such mistake or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client. Indeed, procedural
rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. More so, when to
allow the assailed decision to go unchecked would set a precedent that will sanction a violation
of substantive law. Such is the situation in this case. Philippine Economic Zone Authority,
represented herein by Dir. Gen. Lilia B. De Lima vs. Joseph Jude Carantes and all the other heirs
of Maximino Carantes, G.R. No. 181274. June 23, 2010
Appeals; Rule 45 petition may raise only questions of law. At the outset, we note that this
recourse is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under
Section 1 of the Rule, such a petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
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alleged in the appropriate pleading. In a case involving a question of law, the resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides for a given set of facts drawn from the evidence
presented. Stated differently, there should be nothing in dispute as to the state of facts; the issue
to be resolved is merely the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the said facts. Once it is
clear that the issue invites a review of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses,
or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, then
the issue is necessarily factual. A perusal of the assignment of errors and the discussion set forth
by MSCI would readily show that the petition seeks a review of all the evidence presented
before the RTC and reviewed by the CA; therefore, the issue is factual. Accordingly, the petition
should be dismissed outright, especially considering that the very same factual circumstances in
this petition have already been ruled upon by the CA. Makati Sports Club, Inc. vs. Cecile H.
Cheng, et al., G.R. No. 178523, June 16, 2010
Appeals; withdrawal of appeal. Section 3, Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides:
Sec. 3. Withdrawal of appeal. – An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the
filing of appellee’s brief. Thereafter, the withdrawal may be allowed in the discretion of the
court. (underscoring supplied)
At the time petitioner moved to withdraw her appeal, respondents had not yet filed their brief,
hence, the grant thereof by the appellate court was in order. Nelly Bautista vs. Seraph
Management Group, Inc.,G.R. No. 174039, June 29, 2010
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an
independent action based on the specific grounds therein provided and will lie only if there is
no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
petition forcertiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
“Grave abuse of discretion,” under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having
been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross. Such is not the case here. Rudolfo I. Beluso vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No.
180711. June 22, 2010
Certiorari; hierarchy of courts. Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. In Heirs of BertuldoHinog
v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
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absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A
direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of
this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that
it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling
circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez v. Romulo, on citizens’ right
to bear arms; (b) Government of [the] United States of America v. Hon. Purganan, on bail in
extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, on government
contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora, on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon.
Fortich v. Hon. Corona, on the so-called “Win-Win Resolution” of the Office of the President
which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due
course to this petitionin the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set forth in Heirs
of BertuldoHinog v. Melicor. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of
Appealsin strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is
sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010
Certiorari; nature and requisites. The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
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are: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3)
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though
within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise
of the general power in respect of it are wanting. Without jurisdiction means lack or want of
legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in
general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority. Grave abuse of discretionimplies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010
Certiorari; not a substitute for lost appeal. Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioners filed a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As a rule,
the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. In Mercado v. Court of Appeals, this Court had again stressed the
difference of the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
x x x [T]he proper remedy of the party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical with a petition for review under Rule
65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e.,
regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a
petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original
case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on
the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45. x x x
One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefore is grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy,
his petition may be dismissed outright. Pertinent, therefore, to a resolution of the case at bar is a
determination of whether or not an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy was still
available to petitioners, the absence of which would warrant petitioners’ decision to seek refuge
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. A perusal of the records will show that petitioners filed a
Motion for Reconsideration to the January 4, 2005 CA Decision, which was, however, denied
by the CA via a Resolution dated March 18, 2005. As manifested by petitioners, they received a
copy of the March 18, 2005 CA Resolution on March 28, 2005. Thus, from March 28, 2005,
petitioners had 15 days, or until April 12, 2005, to appeal the CA Resolution under Rule 45.
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Clearly, petitioners had an available appeal under Rule 45 which, under the circumstances, was
the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. However, petitioners instead chose to file a special civil
action for certiorari, under Rule 65, on April 18, 2005, which was 6 days after the reglementary
period under Rule 45 had expired. The fact that the petitioners used the Rule 65 modality as a
substitute for a lost appeal is made plainly manifest by: a) its filing the said petition 6 days after
the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a Rule 45 appeal; and b) its petition
which makes specious allegations of “grave abuse of discretion.” But it asserts that the CA erred
(1) when it declared that the petitioners failed in their undertakings to provide drainage in
accordance with the requirements of the MOA; (2) when it declared that petitioners are solely
culpable for the lack of an environmental compliance certificate, when it awarded temperate
damages; and (3) when it ordered the automatic forfeiture of the performance bond. These are
mere errors of judgment which would have been the proper subjects of a petition for review
under rule 45. Artistica Ceramica, Inc., Ceralinda, Inc. Cyber Ceramics, Inc. and Millennium,
Inc. vs. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc. and Bukluran Purok II Residents’
Association, G.R. No. 167583-84, June 16, 2010
Certiorari; not available to correct errors of judgment. While petitioners would insist that the CA
committed grave abuse of discretion, this Court is of the opinion, however, that the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA, granting the forfeiture of the performance bond among
others, amount to nothing more than errors of judgment, correctible by appeal. When a court,
tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction.
Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not
proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. If every error committed by the trial court
or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari, then
trial would never end and the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure.
For this reason, where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision, not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision, the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari. Since petitioners filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari, instead of appeal via a petition for review, the petition should be
dismissed. Artistica Ceramica, Inc., Ceralinda, Inc. Cyber Ceramics, Inc. and Millennium, Inc. vs.
Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc. and Bukluran Purok II Residents’
Association, G.R. No. 167583-84, June 16, 2010
Certiorari; not available to correct errors of judgment. Nothing in the records of this case
supports petitioner’s bare assertion that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions with
grave abuse of discretion. Beluso alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC
in perpetually disqualifying him to serve in any canvassing board, yet failed to prove where the
abuse existed. Notably, the apparent thrust of Beluso’s petition is the alleged error on the part of
the COMELEC in drawing its conclusions based on its findings and investigation. Thus, in
reality, what Beluso was questioning is the COMELEC’s appreciation of evidence. At this point,
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however, it is not this Court’s function to re-evaluate the findings of fact of the COMELEC, given
its limited scope of its review power, which is properly confined only to issues of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the arguments in the petition and the issues alleged are
only possible errors of judgment, questioning the correctness of the COMELEC’s rulings. Where
the real issue involves the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction of the
court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. It is well settled that a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ
cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court
within the bounds of its jurisdiction. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court to issue
acertiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as to its
intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. Rudolfo I. Beluso vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 180711. June 22, 2010
Certiorari; period for filing counted from denial of first motion for reconsideration. In San Juan,
the Court was also confronted with the question of when the reglementary period for filing a
petition forcertiorari shall be reckoned. Petitioner therein filed second and third motions for
reconsideration from the interlocutory order and when he filed the petition for certiorari with the
CA, he counted the 60-day reglementary period from the notice of denial of his third motion for
reconsideration. He argued that, since there is no rule prohibiting the filing of a second or third
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, the 60-day period should be counted from
the notice of denial of the last motion for reconsideration. Having declared that the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates the arguments in the first motion is
subject to denial, the Court held that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be
reckoned from the trial court’s denial of the first motion for reconsideration, otherwise,
indefinite delays will ensue. Applying the ruling in San Juan, the petition forcertiorari was
evidently filed out of time, as its filing was reckoned from the denial of the last motion. The
subject Motion to Dismiss was filed in an attempt to resurrect the remedy of a petition
forcertiorari, which had been lost long before its filing. Philippine National Bank vs. The
Intestate Estate of Francisco de Guzman, represented by His Heirs: Rosalia, Eleuterio, Joe,
Ernesto, Harison, all surnamed De Guzman, and Gina De Guzman, G.R. No. 182507, June 16,
2010
Certiorari; requirement that tribunal, board or officer be acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity. In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned
requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Secretary of
Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as
Memorandum No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use
conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any judicial
or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasi-
judicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only
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against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer.
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power to
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial
function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise
judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power
and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending
parties. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative
functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative
issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the
parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and administrative functions. Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409,
June 18, 2010
Dismissals; effect of adjudication on the merits unless court declares otherwise. In any case, we
agree with the CA’s conclusion that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. However, we do not agree that the judgment of
dismissal in the first case was not on the merits. A ruling on a motion to dismiss, issued without
trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on the
merits. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a dismissal for failure to
comply with an order of the court shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. In
other words, unless the court states that the dismissal is without prejudice, the dismissal should
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be understood as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. Philippine National Bank
vs. The Intestate Estate of Francisco de Guzman, represented by His Heirs: Rosalia, Eleuterio,
Joe, Ernesto, Harison, all surnamed De Guzman, and Gina De Guzman, G.R. No. 182507, June
16, 2010
Execution of judgment; execution upon motion and effect of failure to redeem. Petitioner, in
essence, argues that the October 11, 1977 Decision was not timely executed because of
respondent’s failure to secure the final certificate of sale within 10 years from the entry of said
judgment. This is erroneous. It is not disputed that shortly after the trial court rendered the
aforesaid judgment, respondent moved for execution which was granted by the trial court. On
June 6, 1978, the subject property was sold on execution sale. Respondent emerged as the
highest bidder, thus, a certificate of sale was executed by the sheriff in her favor on the same
day. As correctly held by the trial court, the October 11, 1977 Decision was already enforced
when the subject property was levied and sold on June 6, 1978 which is within the five-year
period for the execution of a judgment by motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. It is, likewise, not disputed that petitioner failed to redeem the subject property within
one year from the annotation of the certificate of sale on TCT No. 480537. The expiration of the
one-year redemption period foreclosed petitioner’s right to redeem the subject property and the
sale thereby became absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final certificate of sale is a mere
formality and confirmation of the title that is already vested in respondent. Thus, the trial court
properly granted the motion for issuance of the final certificate of sale. Jose dela Reyes vs.
Josephine Anne B. Ramnani, G.R. No. 169135. June 18, 2010
Forum shopping; no forum shopping where petitions have different causes of action and seek
different reliefs. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal
or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files
another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals “in the
hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case
(offering a similar remedy) would still be open”; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of
preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court. What is
truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue. The filing of identical petitions in different courts is
prohibited, because such act constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and
condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an
improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice. Nonetheless, the mere filing of
several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The
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test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances. The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter,
and issues. Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.
Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the
second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing
CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down
the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance
“all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective
cases.” He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his
being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion
and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending
disputes. On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition forcertiorari to assail the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of
Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and
Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804,
the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.
Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the
action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions
involved the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs
they sought were different. Luis K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin vs.
Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010
Injunction; no prohibition against injunction to restrain collection of local taxes. A principle
deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government
should be collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In line with this
principle, the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) expressly provides that no court
shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal
revenue tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. An exception to this rule obtains only when in
the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the collection thereof may jeopardize the interest
of the government and/or the taxpayer.
The situation, however, is different in the case of the collection of local taxes as there is no
express provision in the LGC prohibiting courts from issuing an injunction to restrain local
governments from collecting taxes. Thus, in the case of Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First
Instance of Isabela, Branch II,cited by the petitioner, we ruled that:
Unlike the National Internal Revenue Code, the Local Tax Code does not contain any specific
provision prohibiting courts from enjoining the collection of local taxes. Such statutory lapse or
intent, however it may be viewed, may have allowed preliminary injunction where local taxes
are involved but cannot negate the procedural rules and requirements under Rule 58.
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In light of the foregoing, petitioner’s reliance on the above-cited case to support its view that the
collection of taxes cannot be enjoined is misplaced. The lower court’s denial of the motion for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the collection of the local tax was
upheld in that case, not because courts are prohibited from granting such injunction, but
because the circumstances required for the issuance of writ of injunction were not
present. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that although there is no express prohibition in
the LGC, injunctions enjoining the collection of local taxes are frowned upon. Courts therefore
should exercise extreme caution in issuing such injunctions. Angeles City vs. Angeles Electric
Corporation, G.R. No. 166134, June 29, 2010
Injunction; requisites. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is
directed either to do a particular act, in which case it is called a mandatory injunction or to
refrain from doing a particular act, in which case it is called a prohibitory injunction. As a main
action, injunction seeks to permanently enjoin the defendant through a final injunction issued
by the court and contained in the judgment. Section 9, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, provides,
SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. – If after the trial of the action it appears that the
applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall
grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the party or person enjoined from the commission
or continuance of the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction.
Two (2) requisites must concur for injunction to issue: (1) there must be a right to be protected
and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said
right. Particularly, in actions involving realty, preliminary injunction will lie only after the
plaintiff has fully established his title or right thereto by a proper action for the purpose. To
authorize a temporary injunction, the complainant must make out at least a prima facie showing
of a right to the final relief. Preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right
not inesse. These principles are equally relevant to actions seeking permanent
injunction. Philippine Economic Zone Authority, represented herein by Dir. Gen. Lilia B. De
Lima vs. Joseph Jude Carantes and all the other heirs of Maximino Carantes, G.R. No. 181274.
June 23, 2010
Injunction; requisites; discretion of trial court. Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court lays
down the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, viz:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
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Two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, namely: (1)
the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In issuing the injunction, the RTC ratiocinated that:
It is very evident on record that petitioner resorted and filed an urgent motion for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the scheduled auction sale only
when a warrant of levy was issued and published in the newspaper setting the auction sale of
petitioner’s property by the City Treasurer, merely few weeks after the petition for declaratory
relief has been filed, because if the respondent will not be restrained, it will render this petition
moot and academic. To the mind of the Court, since there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law except this application
for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop the auction sale
and/or to enjoin and/or restrain respondents from levying, annotating the levy, seizing,
confiscating, garnishing, selling and disposing at public auction the properties of petitioner, or
otherwise exercising other administrative remedies against the petitioner and its properties, this
alone justifies the move of the petitioner in seeking the injunctive reliefs sought for.
Petitioner in its petition is questioning the assessment or the ruling of the City Treasurer on the
business tax and fees, and not the local ordinance concerned. This being the case, the Court
opines that notice is not required to the Solicitor General since what is involved is just a
violation of a private right involving the right of ownership and possession of petitioner’s
properties. Petitioner, therefore, need not comply with Section 4, Rule 63 requiring such
notice to the Office of the Solicitor General.
The Court is fully aware of the Supreme Court pronouncement that injunction is not proper to
restrain the collection of taxes. The issue here as of the moment is the restraining of the
respondent from pursuing its auction sale of the petitioner’s properties. The right of ownership
and possession of the petitioner over the properties subject of the auction sale is at stake.
Respondents assert that not one of the witnesses presented by the petitioner have proven what
kind of right has been violated by the respondent, but merely mentioned of an injury which is
only a scenario based on speculation because of petitioner’s claim that electric power may be
disrupted.
Engr. Abordo’s testimony reveals and even his Affidavit Exhibit “S” showed that if the auction
sale will push thru, petitioner will not only lose control and operation of its facility, but its
employees will also be denied access to equipments vital to petitioner’s operations, and since
only the petitioner has the capability to operate Petersville sub station, there will be a massive
power failure or blackout which will adversely affect business and economy, if not lives and
properties in Angeles City and surrounding communities.
Petitioner, thru its witnesses, in the hearing of the temporary restraining order, presented
sufficient and convincing evidence proving irreparable damages and injury which were already
elaborated in the temporary restraining order although the same may be realized only if the
auction sale will proceed. And unless prevented, restrained, and enjoined, grave and
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irreparable damage will be suffered not only by the petitioner but all its electric consumers in
Angeles, Clark, Dau and Bacolor, Pampanga.
The purpose of injunction is to prevent injury and damage from being incurred, otherwise, it
will render any judgment in this case ineffectual.
“As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of
things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case
can be heard” (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Res. Assn. Inc. vs. CA, 254 SCRA 220)
It appearing that the two essential requisites of an injunction have been satisfied, as there exists
a right on the part of the petitioner to be protected, its right[s] of ownership and possession of
the properties subject of the auction sale, and that the acts (conducting an auction sale) against
which the injunction is to be directed, are violative of the said rights of the petitioner, the Court
has no other recourse but to grant the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
considering that if the respondent will not be restrained from doing the acts complained of, it
will preempt the Court from properly adjudicating on the merits the various issues between the
parties, and will render moot and academic the proceedings before this court.
As a rule, the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case and will not be interfered with, except where there is grave abuse
of discretion committed by the court. For grave abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground
for certiorari, it must be demonstrated that the lower court or tribunal has exercised its power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In other words, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough.
Guided by the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing
the writ of injunction. Petitioner, who has the burden to prove grave abuse of discretion, failed
to show that the RTC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the injunction. Neither was
petitioner able to prove that the injunction was issued without any factual or legal
justification. In assailing the injunction, petitioner primarily relied on the prohibition on the
issuance of a writ of injunction to restrain the collection of taxes. But as we have already said,
there is no such prohibition in the case of local taxes. Records also show that before issuing the
injunction, the RTC conducted a hearing where both parties were given the opportunity to
present their arguments. During the hearing, AEC was able to show that it had a clear and
unmistakable legal right over the properties to be levied and that it would sustain serious
damage if these properties, which are vital to its operations, would be sold at public auction. As
we see it then, the writ of injunction was properly issued.
A final note. While we are mindful that the damage to a taxpayer’s property rights generally
takes a back seat to the paramount need of the State for funds to sustain governmental functions,
this rule finds no application in the instant case where the disputed tax assessment is not yet due
and demandable. Considering that AEC was able to appeal the denial of its protest within the
period prescribed under Section 195 of the LGC, the collection of business taxes through levy at
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this time is, to our mind, hasty, if not premature. The issues of tax exemption, double taxation,
prescription and the alleged retroactive application of the RRCAC, raised in the protest of AEC
now pending with the RTC, must first be resolved before the properties of AEC can be levied. In
the meantime, AEC’s rights of ownership and possession must be respected. Angeles City vs.
Angeles Electric Corporation, G.R. No. 166134, June 29, 2010
Jurisdiction; hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it is settled that the normal rule is to strictly follow
the hierarchy of courts, thus:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. A direct
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue said writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy—a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket.
PAGCOR represented by Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. vs. Fontana Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010
Jurisdiction; Regional trial court has jurisdiction over complaint for injunction against
PAGCOR. On the threshold issue of jurisdiction, PAGCOR insists lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court over the complaint of FDC and, hence, all the processes and writs issued by said court are
null and void. It posits that the proper legal remedy of FDC is not through an injunction
complaint before the trial court, but a petition for review on purely questions of law before this
Court or an appeal to the Office of the President. It heavily relies on Sec. 9 of PD 1869, which
states that PAGCOR “shall exercise all the powers, authority and responsibilities vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission,” and Sec. 6 of PD 902-A which provides for a petition for
review to this Court from SEC’s decisions. We are not convinced.
Jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and is conferred
only by the Constitution or by statute. It is settled that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or the petition irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims or reliefs asserted. A perusal of FDC’s complaint in Civil Case No. 08-
120338 easily reveals that it is an action for injunction based on an alleged violation of
contract—the MOA between the parties—which granted FDC the right to operate a casino
inside the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). As such, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over
FDC’s complaint anchored on Sec. 19, Chapter II of BP 129, which grants the RTCs original
exclusive jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.” Evidently, a complaint for injunction or breach of contract is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction “in the issuance
of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions” under Sec. 21 of BP 129.
PAGCOR’s claim of jurisdiction of this Court over the complaint in question heavily leans on
Sec. 9 of PD 1869, PAGCOR’s Charter, which provides:
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Section 9. Regulatory Power.—The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated
entities and shall exercise all the powers, authority and responsibilities vested in the Securities
and Exchange Commission over such affiliated entities x x x.
In view of the vestment to PAGCOR by PD 1869 of the powers, authority, and responsibilities of
the SEC, PAGCOR concludes that any decision or ruling it renders has to be brought to this
Court via a petition for review based on Sec. 6 of SEC’s Charter, PD 902-A, which reads:
The aggrieved party may appeal the order, decision or ruling of the Commission sitting en banc
to the Supreme Court by petition for review in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court.
This reasoning is flawed. A scrutiny of PD 1869 demonstrates that it has no procedure for the
appeal or review of PAGCOR’s decisions or orders. Neither does it make any express reference
to an exclusive remedy that can be brought before this Court. Even a review of PD 1869’s
predecessor laws—PD 1067-A, 1067-B, 1067-C, 1399, and 1632, as well as its amendatory
law, RA 9487––do not confer original jurisdiction to this Court to review PAGCOR’s actions and
decisions. PAGCOR, however, insists that this Court has jurisdiction over an action contesting
its exercise of licensing and regulatory powers, i.e., the revocation of FDC’s license to operate a
casino in CSEZ and that FDC’s complaint is a case of first impression. PAGCOR’s argument is
bereft of merit.
A similar factual setting was presented by PAGCOR in PAGCOR v. Viola, which involves the
controversy between PAGCOR and the Mimosa Regency Casino that operated inside the
CSEZ. Mimosa filed a case for injunction and prayed for the issuance of a TRO before the
Pampanga RTC when PAGCOR decided to close down the casino. In this case, PAGCOR
likewise assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court by claiming that an original action before the
CA is the proper remedy. In PAGCOR v. Viola, we ruled that PAGCOR, in the exercise of its
licensing and regulatory powers, has no quasi-judicial functions, as Secs. 8 and 9 of PD 1869 do
not grant quasi-judicial powers to PAGCOR. As such, direct resort to this Court is not
allowed. While we allowed said recourse in Del Mar v. PAGCOR and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,
that is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts on the grounds of expediency and the
importance of the issues involved. More importantly, we categorically ruled in PAGCOR v.
Viola that cases involving revocation of a license falls within the original jurisdiction of the RTC,
thus:
Having settled that PAGCOR’s revocation of MONDRAGON’s authority to operate a casino was
not an exercise of quasi-judicial powers then it follows that the case was properly filed before
the Regional Trial Court. Hence, as the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the case, petitioner’s contention that the temporary restraining order and the preliminary
injunction by the trial court are void must fail. PAGCOR represented by Atty. Carlos R. Bautista,
Jr. vs. Fontana Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010
Jurisdiction; Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over petition for declaratory
relief. Moreover,although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR
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AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question. (Emphasis supplied.)
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are
involved. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010
Jurisdiction; Supreme Court may resolve complaint on the merits rather than remand to trial
court, where justice and equity require it. While it is the trial court that has original jurisdiction
over FDC’s complaint, PAGCOR nevertheless prays that this Court “suspend the Rules and
directly decide the entire controversy in this proceeding instead of remanding the same to the
trial court.”
In the exercise of its broad discretionary power, we will resolve FDC’s complaint on the merits,
instead of remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings. Moreover, the dispute between
the parties involves a purely question of law—whether the license or MOA was issued pursuant
to PD 1869 or Sec. 5, EO 80, in relation to RA 7227, which does not necessitate a full blown
trial. Demands of substantial justice and equity require the relaxation of procedural
rules. In Lianga Bay v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
Remand of case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the
court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions,
the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such
as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public
interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received
all the evidence of the parties. PAGCOR represented by Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. vs. Fontana
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 187972, June 29, 2010
Motions; notice of hearing not required for non-litigious motions. As to petitioner’s claim that
the subject motion is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, the CA correctly ruled that the
subject motion is a non-litigious motion. While, as a general rule, all written motions should be
set for hearing under Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, excepted from this rule are non-
litigious motions or motions which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing the
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rights of the adverse party. As already discussed, respondent is entitled to the issuance of the
final certificate of sale as a matter of right and petitioner is powerless to oppose the
same. Hence, the subject motion falls under the class of non-litigious motions. At any rate, the
trial court gave petitioner an opportunity to oppose the subject motion as in fact he filed a
Comment/ Opposition on March 1, 2004 before the trial court. Petitioner cannot, therefore,
validly claim that he was denied his day in court. Jose delaReyes vs. Josephine Anne B.
Ramnani, G.R. No. 169135. June 18, 2010
Motions; Three-day notice rule. Furthermore, the RTC likewise erred in dismissing petitioner’s
Omnibus Motion for allegedly failing to comply with the three-day notice requirement. The RTC
found that the notice of hearing of petitioner’s Omnibus Motion which was set to be heard on
12 November 2004 was received by respondent on 9 November 2004. The RTC held that the
service of the notice of hearing was one day short of the prescribed minimum three days
notice. We disagree. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that “[e]very written motion required to be
heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of the hearing, unless the court
for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.” Thus, the date of the hearing should be at
least three days after receipt of the notice of hearing by the other parties. In this case, the
petitioner’s Omnibus Motion was set for hearing on 12 November 2004. Thus, to comply with
the notice requirement, respondent should have received the notice of the hearing at least three
days before 12 November 2004, which is 9 November 2004. Clearly, respondent’s receipt on 9
November 2004 (Tuesday) of the notice of hearing of the Omnibus Motion which was set to be
heard on 12 November 2004 (Friday), was within the required minimum three-days’ notice. As
explained by Retired Justice Jose Y. Feria in his book, Civil Procedure Annotated, when the
notice of hearing should be given:
The ordinary motion day is Friday. Hence, the notice should be served by Tuesday at the latest,
in order that the requirement of the three days may be complied with.
If notice be given by ordinary mail, it should be actually received by Tuesday, or if not claimed
from the post office, the date of the first notice of the postmaster should be at least five (5) days
before Tuesday. (Emphasis supplied)
Fausto R. Preysler vs. Manila South Coast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872, June 28,
2010
Motions; Three-day notice rule; substantial compliance. In upholding the RTC Order denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals relied mainly on petitioner’s
alleged violation of the notice requirements under Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court which read:
SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
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Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served
in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion.
SECTION 6. Proof of service necessary. – No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon
by the court without proof of service thereof.
The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse
party and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of
procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their
strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice. In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there
was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular
because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and
resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified. Likewise,
in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of
notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the
requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard
and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. The Court held:
This Court has indeed held time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court, mandatory is the requirement in a motion, which is rendered defective by failure to
comply with the requirement. As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro
forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
As an integral component of the procedural due process, the three-day notice required by the
Rules is not intended for the benefit of the movant. Rather, the requirement is for the purpose of
avoiding surprises that may be sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study
and meet the arguments in the motion before a resolution of the court. Principles of natural
justice demand that the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to
be heard.
The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion
and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. x x x
A close perusal of the records reveal that the trial court gave petitioner ten days within which to
comment on respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner filed its Opposition to the
Motion on November 26, 2001. In its 14-page Opposition, it not only pointed out that the
Motion was defective for not containing a notice of hearing and should then be dismissed
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outright by the court; it also ventilated its substantial arguments against the merits of the Motion
and of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Notably, its arguments were recited at
length in the trial court’s January 8, 2002 Joint Resolution. Nevertheless, the court proceeded to
deny the Motions on the sole ground that they did not contain any notice of hearing.
The requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only
to apprise the other of the actions of the former. Under the circumstances of the present case,
the purpose of a notice of hearing was served. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the three-day notice
rule. However, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that although respondent received
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration six days after the scheduled hearing on 26 February
2004, the said hearing was reset three (3) times with due notice to the parties. Thus, it was only
on 6 August 2004, or more than five months after respondent received a copy of petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, that the motion was heard by the RTC. Clearly, respondent had
more than sufficient time to oppose petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. In fact, respondent
did oppose the motion when it filed its Motion to Dismiss dated 9 August 2004. In view of the
circumstances of this case, we find that there was substantial compliance with procedural due
process. Instead of dismissing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration based merely on the
alleged procedural lapses, the RTC should have resolved the motion based on the
merits. Fausto R. Preysler vs. Manila South Coast Development Corporation, G.R. No. 171872,
June 28, 2010
Parties; indispensable party. Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the
controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court
cannot proceed without their presence. In contrast, a necessary party is one whose presence in
the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable
such that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. In the instant
case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from
proceeding with its implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a
necessary nor an indispensable party to an action where no positive act shall be required from it
or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar. Neither would it be
an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights
infringed. Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His
Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010
Pleadings; repetitive filing of identical motions. The Court finds insufferable petitioner’s repeated
filing of Motions to Dismiss raising the same ground. In the three previous Motions to Dismiss
and in an omnibus motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that the present case was
barred by prior judgment and that there was forum-shopping. Correspondingly, the issues had
been repetitively passed upon and resolved by the court a quo. The motions were apparently
filed for no other reason than to gain time and gamble on a possible change of opinion of the
court or the judge sitting on the case. The Motions to Dismiss were filed in a span of five years,
the first one having been filed on June 1, 2000 and the last ¾ the subject motion ¾ on February
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15, 2005, three years after petitioner filed its answer. In fact, since the first Motion to Dismiss,
three judges had already sat on the case and resolved the motions. By filing these motions,
petitioner had disrupted the court’s deliberation on the merits of the case. This strategy cannot
be tolerated as it will entail inevitable delay in the disposition of the case.
Although the ground stated in the second Motion to Dismiss was forum-shopping and the
subsequent motions included other grounds, nonetheless, all of these motions raised a similar
argument—that since the dismissal in the first case is already final and executory and there is no
reservation made by the court in its judgment that the dismissal is without prejudice, the filing of
the second case is barred. Therefore, the subsequent motions, being reiterations of the first
motion, technically partook of the nature of a motion for reconsideration of the interlocutory
order denying the first Motion to Dismiss. This is not the first time that the Court disallowed the
repetitive filing of identical motions against an interlocutory order. In a parallel case, San Juan,
Jr. v. Cruz, the Court acknowledged that there is actually no rule prohibiting the filing of a pro
forma motion against an interlocutory order as the prohibition applies only to a final resolution
or order of the court. The Court held, nonetheless, that a second motion can be denied on the
ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of the grounds and arguments already
passed upon and resolved by the court. Philippine National Bank vs. The Intestate Estate of
Francisco de Guzman, represented by His Heirs: Rosalia, Eleuterio, Joe, Ernesto, Harison, all
surnamed De Guzman, and Gina De Guzman, G.R. No. 182507, June 16, 2010
Preliminary injunction; right in esse. We also find that the character of possession and
ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the
action. A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an
injunctive relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or
existing. It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.
In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had
occupied and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio
secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family
dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy
allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in
1966 when Guaranteed Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (“RL 8 ) which
adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of
Parañaque. From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only
one conclusion can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes,
Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register
the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over
the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that
they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of
land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the
applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of
acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer,
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ownership. Office of the City Mayor of Parañaque City, et al. vs. Mario D. Ebio and His
Children/Heirs namely, Arturo V. Ebio, Eduardo, et al., G.R. No. 178411, June 23, 2010
Procedural rules; liberal application not available in absence of explanation for non-observance
of rules. Petitioners ask for leniency from this Court, asking for a liberal application of the rules.
However, it is quite apparent that petitioners offer no explanation as to why they did not appeal
under Rule 45. Petitioners’ Petition, Reply and Memorandum are all silent on this point,
probably hoping that the same would go unnoticed by respondents and by this Court. The
attempt to skirt away from the fact that the 15-day period to file an appeal under Rule 45 had
already lapsed is made even more apparent when even after the same was raised in issue by
respondents in their Comment and memorandum, petitioners did not squarely address the same,
nor offer any explanation for such omission. In Jan-Dec Construction Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court explained why a liberal application of the rules cannot be made to a petition
which offers no explanation for the non-observance of the rules, to wit:
While there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to
despite the availability of an appeal, the long line of decisions denying the special civil action
forcertiorari, either before appeal was availed of or in instances where the appeal period had
lapsed, far outnumbers the instances where certiorari was given due course. The few significant
exceptions are: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when
the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
In the present case, petitioner has not provided any cogent explanation that would absolve it of
the consequences of its failure to abide by the Rules. Apropos on this point are the Court’s
observations in Duremdes v. Duremdes:
Although it has been said time and again that litigation is not a game of technicalities, that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be
properly presented and justly resolved, this does not mean that procedural rules may altogether
be disregarded. Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain
his failure to abide by the rules. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court did not apply a liberal construction of the
rules for failure of petitioner to offer an explanation as to why the petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for under Rule 45, to wit:
Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed
under Rule 45, especially if filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for
review.5 In this case, however, we find no reason to justify a liberal application of the rules. The
petition was filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition for review without
any reason therefor.
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While this Court has in the past allowed the relaxing of the rules on the reglementary periods of
appeal, it must be stressed that there must be a showing of an extraordinary or exceptional
circumstance to warrant such liberality. Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr. so instructs:
True, in few highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the relaxing of the rules on the
application of the reglementary periods of appeal. We cite a few typical examples: In Ramos vs.
Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four days in the filing of a notice of appeal
because the questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a time
when her counsel of record was already dead. Her new counsel could only file the appeal four
days after the prescribed reglementary period was over. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days
to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of
land alreadytitled in its name and had since then been devoted for educational purposes. In
Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 177 SCRA 38, 41, we accepted a tardy appeal
considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled, with finality,
in another case. The dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being
ordered twice to make the same reparation to the appellee.
The case at bench, given its own settings, cannot come close to those extraordinary
circumstances that have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not
be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court
can trifle with.
Withal, this Court must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is
not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Indeed, in no uncertain terms, this Court has held that the said Rules may be relaxed only
in ”exceptionally meritorious cases.” Petitioners have failed to show that this case is one of the
exceptions. Artistica Ceramica, Inc., Ceralinda, Inc. Cyber Ceramics, Inc. and Millennium, Inc.
vs. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner’s Association, Inc. and Bukluran Purok II Residents’
Association, G.R. No. 167583-84, June 16, 2010
Quo warranto; timeliness of petition. On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed
out of time. Its counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules [i.e., Rule 17 of
the 2004 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] from the issuance of NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the
May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations, it was by no measure a
proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Section 13.How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be
proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties,
organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.
AT ALL EVENTS, this Court set aside NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v.COMELEC after revisiting the formula for allocation
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of additional seats to party-list organizations. Considering, however, that the records do not
disclose the exact date of private respondent’s proclamation, the Court overlooks the
technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner’s challenge
goes into private respondent’s qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
Milagros E. Amores vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. The rule is that when material facts or questions,
which were in issue in a former action and were admitted or judicially determined, are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies regardless of the form of the latter. Jurisprudence provides that the concept of res
judicata embraces two aspects. The first, known as “bar by prior judgment,” or “estoppel by
verdict,” is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. The second, known as “conclusiveness of judgment,”
otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendent, ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties
involving a different cause of action. The bar by prior judgment requires the following elements
to be present for it to operate:
(1) A former final judgment that was rendered on the merits;
(2) The court in the former judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
and,
(3) Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second
actions.
In contrast, the elements of conclusiveness of judgment are:
1. Identity of parties; and
2. Subject matter in the first and second cases.
Conclusiveness of judgment does not require identity of the causes of action for it to work. If a
particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or question, a former judgment between the same
parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit; but the adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of
an entirely different and distinct issue arising in the second. Hence, facts and issues actually
and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties, even if the latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action.
Conclusiveness of judgment proscribes the relitigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it
will no longer touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of
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judgment requires only the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action. The instant
petition is denied on the ground of res judicata under the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment. Ley Construction & Development Corporation, et al. vs. Philippine Commercial &
International Bank, et al., G.R. No. 160841, June 23, 2010
Res judicata; res judicata disregarded if rigid application would involve sacrifice of justice to
technicality. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold
that res judicata should not be applied as it would not serve the interest of substantial justice.
Proceedings on the case had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is only fair that the case
be allowed to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Indeed, we have held that res judicata is
to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality,
particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of the substantive issues in
the first case and what is at stake is respondents’ home. Philippine National Bank vs. The
Intestate Estate of Francisco de Guzman, represented by His Heirs: Rosalia, Eleuterio, Joe,
Ernesto, Harison, all surnamed De Guzman, and Gina De Guzman, G.R. No. 182507, June 16,
2010
Special Proceedings
Habeas corpus; nature, objective, and requirements of remedy. Essentially, a writ
of habeascorpusapplies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty. Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be
followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, orby which therightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any
member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any member
thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision on the
merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at
any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
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anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of
an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of
the application.
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody
over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ ofhabeas corpus,
the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpusis to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient. In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into
whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be
refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the
petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be
refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a
mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie,
the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being
unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the
petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan vs. Judge Virgilio V.
Macaraig, RTC, Manila Br., et al., G.R. No. 182497, June 29, 2010
Habeas corpus; restrictive custody of policeman by PNP is not the detention or restraint
contemplated by habeas corpus. Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed
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under the custody of respondents on 20 April 2008, there was yet no administrative case filed
against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva was served upon
respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff
Kabunsuan was illegal because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial authority
against him. On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, argue that the trial court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents
maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had recommended that PO1
Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only insofar as the
criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without
prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case,
PO1 Ampatuan is also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case
ofManalo v. Calderon, where this Court held that a petition for habeascorpus will be given due
course only if it shows that petitioner is being detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully,
but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under
investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. The
Solicitor General is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975
(also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by
Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and
Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the
administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates the
disciplinary actions, including restrictive custodythat may be imposed by duly designated
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent
provision of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 – x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal
from the service; suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not
exceeding one hundred eighty (180) days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall
have the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a
grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave
in nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and
monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best,
nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeascorpus. It is neither actual nor effective
restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary
measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted
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for. Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative case filed
against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan vs.
Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila Br., et al., G.R. No. 182497, June 29, 2010
Settlement of estates; appointment of administrator; order of preference in the Rules is not
absolute. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6.When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator
lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances
of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of
their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate. In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals, we upheld the
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the
decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate. In the same vein, we
declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate
of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Tañedo, but who was likewise
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In
all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled
to move in only one direction,i.e., joint administration of the subject estate. In the matter of the
Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntayl Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuanco-
Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010
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Settlement of estates; distribution of shares in estate; where premature. Indeed, the factual
antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first
descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of
Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the
legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism
between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a
final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates
of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of
the long deceased couple has yet to be settled. Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the
same issue remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been
judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the
estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1.When order for distribution of residue is made. – x x x. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed
by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.
In the matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntayl Emilio A.M. Suntay III
vs. Isabel Cojuanco-Suntay, G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010
Other Proceedings
Appeals; period to appeal order in election case is mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 8 of
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
Section 8. Appeal. – An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Commission on
Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal with the court that
rendered the decision with copy served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by
counsel
Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC on December 15,
2008, she filed her notice of appeal only on December 23, 2008, or eight days after her receipt
of the decision. Her appeal was properly dismissed for being too late under the aforequoted rule
of the COMELEC. Castillo now insists that her appeal should not be dismissed, because she
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claims that the five-day reglementary period was a mere technicality, implying that such period
was but a trivial guideline to be ignored or brushed aside at will.
Castillo’s insistence is unacceptable. The period of appeal and the perfection of appeal are not
mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded, for they
are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the stability of our judicial
system. A greater reason to adhere to this notion exists herein, for the short period of five days as
the period to appeal recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the will
of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the winning candidate is not deprived
of the right to assume office, and so that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly
deserving winning candidate is quickly removed. Contrary to Castillo’s posture, we cannot also
presume the timeliness of her appeal from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal
by its elevating the protest to the COMELEC. The presumption of timeliness would not arise if
her appeal was actually tardy. It is not trite to observe, finally, that Castillo’s tardy appeal
resulted in the finality of the RTC’s dismissal even before January 30, 2002. This result provides
an additional reason to warrant the assailed actions of the COMELEC in dismissing her appeal.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the COMELEC’s assailed actions were appropriate and lawful,
not tainted by either arbitrariness or whimsicality. Minerva Gomez-Castillo vs. Commission on
Elections, et al.,G.R. No. 187231, June 22, 2010
Certiorari and mandamus; available in Supreme Court for review of COMELEC resolutions in
party-list case. The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list
organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under
the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus,
Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil
action for quo warranto in the HRET,not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court. We
do not agree. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is
strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of
electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the
majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding
elections. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or
of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible
person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the
action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because
the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo
warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the
second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-
list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between
the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal
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votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby
wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action
for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of
Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for
her. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action forcertiorari against the COMELEC to
seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of
office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of
review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court
within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC. Luis
K. Lokin, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, et al./Luis K. Lokin vs. Commission on Elections, et
al., G.R. Nos. 179431-32/G.R. No. 180443. June 22, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has no certiorari
jurisdiction over orders of Provincial Adjudicator. Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred
by the Constitution or the law, and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated,
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and
administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot.
The DARAB assumed jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari by virtue of Section 3, Rule VIII
of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which allows the filing of such petition to assail an
interlocutory order of the Provincial Adjudicator. However, a month after the DARAB rendered
its decision, the Court, inDARAB v. Lubrica, declared that such apparent grant of authority to
issue a writ of certiorariis not founded on any law. It declared that neither the DARAB’s quasi-
judicial authority nor its rule-making power justifies the self-conferment of authority. Thus, the
Court concluded that the DARAB has nocertiorari jurisdiction:
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency
may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which
an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. The grant of original jurisdiction
on a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that the legislative grant of
adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals,
is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority to hear and determine a
class of cases within the DAR’s competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory
powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have intended to create a regular
court of justice out of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of
its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose limited jurisdiction does not
include authority over petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No.
6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.
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As intimated in Lubrica, petitioner should have filed the petition for certiorari with the regular
courts, and not with the DARAB. In the absence of a specific statutory grant of jurisdiction, the
DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
petition for certiorari. Julian Fernandez vs. Rufino D. Fulgueras, G.R. No. 178575, June 29,
2010
Jurisdiction; Regional Trial Court, acting as Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for determination of just compensation. Fortune Savings, on the other
hand, claims in its Comment that, even if Land Bank filed the case on time, the fact remains that
the RTC dismissed the same for Land Bank’s failure to serve summons. Fortune Savings’ filing of
another case—Agrarian Case 2000-0155—cannot operate as a continuance of Agrarian Case
99-0214 because it was an entirely different case altogether. Agrarian Case 2000-0155 did not
operate to revive Agrarian Case 99-0214 nor did it give to Land Bank the benefit of having filed
on time the action that the DARAB Rules contemplated.
Although the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 or CARL to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation for
lands taken under the CARP, such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. The CARL
vests in the RTCs, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation. This means that the RTCs do not exercise
mere appellatejurisdiction over just compensation disputes. The RTC’s jurisdiction is not any
less “original and exclusive” because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. The
proceedings before the RTC are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Indeed,
although the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable, still a
resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the
legality of administrative action. The taking of property under the CARL is a government
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Since the determination of just compensation in
eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function, such determination cannot be made to
depend on the existence of administrative proceedings of a similar nature. Thus, even while the
DARAB summary administrative hearing for determination of just compensation is pending, the
interested party may file a petition for judicial determination of the same. In another case, the
Court allowed the filing with the trial court of a petition to fix just compensation despite failure
of the landowner to seek reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation.
Consequently, Land Bank’s filing of Agrarian Case 2000-0155 after the dismissal without
prejudice of Agrarian Case 99-0214 cannot be regarded as barred by the filing of the latter case
beyond the 15-day period prescribed under Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules. The
procedural soundness of Agrarian Case 2000-0155 could not be made dependent on the
DARAB case, for these two proceedings are separate and independent. Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc., represented by Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation, G.R. No. 177511, June 29, 2010 .
Summary Procedure; Prohibition against filing of petition for certiorari. Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, provides:
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Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions.-The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall
not be allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for a new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions. (Emphasis supplied)
Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in connection with the service of
summons, there is no showing of any substantiveinjustice that would be caused to IPI so as to
call for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions for certiorari. It
must be pointed out that the Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits only a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does not
mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. From this it can be gleaned that allegations on the matter of lack of
jurisdiction over the person by reason of improper service of summons, by itself, without a
convincing showing of any resulting substantive injustice, cannot be used to hinder or stop the
proceedings before the MCTC in the ejectment suit. With more reason, such ground should not
be used to justify the violation of an express prohibition in the rules prohibiting the petition
for certiorari. IPI’s arguments attempting to show how the Rule on Summary Procedure or lack
of rules on certain matters would lead to injustice are hypothetical and need not be addressed in
the present case. Of primary importance here is that IPI, the real defendant in the ejectment
case, filed its Answer and participated in the proceedings before the MCTC.
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases without regard to technical rules. In the present case, weighing the
consequences of continuing with the proceedings in the MCTC as against the consequences of
allowing a petition for certiorari, it is more in accord with justice, the purpose of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, the policy of speedy and inexpensive determination of cases, and the
proper administration of justice, to obey the provisions in the Rule on Summary Procedure
prohibiting petitions for certiorari.
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The present situation, where IPI had filed the prohibited petition for certiorari; the CA’s taking
cognizance thereof; and the subsequent issuance of the writ of injunction enjoining the
ejectment suit from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner, and the
ensuing delay is the antithesis of and is precisely the very circumstance which the Rule on
Summary Procedure seeks to prevent. The petition for certiorari questioning the MCTC’s
interlocutory order is not needed here. The rules provide respondent IPI with adequate
relief. At the proper time, IPI has the right to appeal to the RTC, and in the meantime no
injustice will be caused to it by waiting for the MCTC to completely finish resolving the
ejectment suit. The proceedings before the MCTC being summary in nature, the time and
expense involved therein are minimal. IPI has already raised the matter of improper service of
summons in its Answer. The MCTC’s error/s, if any, on any of the matters raised by respondent
IPI can be threshed out during appeal after the MCTC has finally resolved the ejectment case
under summary procedure.
As accurately pointed out by petitioner, Go v. Court of Appeals does not support the case of
respondent IPI. The factual milieu and circumstances of the said case do not fit with the present
case. They are in fact the exact opposite of those in the present case before the court hearing
the original ejectment case. Not only was there an absence of any “indefinite suspension” of
the ejectment suit before the MCTC but likewise there was no “procedural void” that would
otherwise cause delay in the summary and expeditious resolution thereof that transpired to
warrant applicability of Go v. Court of Appeals. It is worth pointing out that in Go v. Court of
Appeals the Supreme Court categorically upheld that “the purpose of the Rule on Summary
Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the
disposition of cases.” Considering that the petition for certiorari filed before the CA is
categorically prohibited, the CA should not have entertained the same but should have
dismissed it outright. Victorias Milling Company, Inc. vs. CA and International Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., G.R. No. 168062, June 29, 2010
Venue; filing of election protest in improper venue not jurisdictional. It is well-settled that
jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction cannot be fixed by the will of the parties;
nor be acquired through waiver nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor conferred by
any acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in Congress, and cannot
be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the courts. In promulgating
the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as
the promulgation of rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means, ways or manner in which said
jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of
Court yields to the substantive law in determining jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over election
contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas
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Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by
specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the
manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on
venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice,
and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of
election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.
Castillo’s filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only to a wrong choice of
venue. Hence, the dismissal of the protest by Branch 19 constituted plain error, considering that
her wrong choice did not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19 should have done
under the circumstances was to transfer the protest to Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite,
which was the proper venue. Such transfer was proper, whether she as the protestant sought it
or not, given that the determination of the will of the electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to
the process set forth by law was of the highest concern of our institutions, particularly of the
courts. Minerva Gomez-Castillo vs. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 187231, June 22,
2010
Writ of Amparo; requirement of extraordinary diligence. Considering the findings of the CA and
our review of the records of the present case, we conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far
failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas
Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance of their duties) that the
Rule on the Writ ofAmparo requires. Because of these investigative shortcomings, we cannot
rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is
undertaken.
From the records, we note that there are very significant lapses in the handling of the
investigation – among them the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two
(one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas based on their interview of
eyewitnesses to the abduction. This lapse is based on the information provided to the petitioner
by no less than State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco of the DOJ who identified the persons who
were possibly involved in the abduction, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl.
Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an
alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of
the AFP. No search and certification were ever made on whether these persons were AFP
personnel or in other branches of the service, such as the Philippine Air Force. As testified to by
the petitioner, no significant follow through was also made by the PNP-CIDG in ascertaining the
identities of the cartographic sketches of two of the abductors despite the evidentiary leads
provided by State Prosecutor Velasco of the DOJ. Notably, the PNP-CIDG, as the lead
investigating agency in the present case, did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these
aspects of the case. We note, too, that no independent investigation appeared to have been
made by the PNP-CIDG to inquire into the veracity of Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonas
was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and a certain @KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit
RYG. The records do not indicate whether the PNP-CIDG conducted a follow-up investigation
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to determine the identities and whereabouts of @KA Dante and @KA ENSO. These omissions
were aggravated by the CA finding that the PNP has yet to refer any case for preliminary
investigation to the DOJ despite its representation before the CA that it had forwarded all
pertinent and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against @KA
DANTE and @KA ENSO.
Based on these considerations, we conclude that further investigation and monitoring should
beundertaken.While significant leads have been provided to investigators, the investigations by
the PNP-CIDG, the AFP Provost Marshal, and even the Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
have been less than complete. The PNP-CIDG’s investigation particularly leaves much to be
desired in terms of the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. For
this reason, we resolve to refer the present case to the CHR as the Court’s directly commissioned
agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation of the Burgos abduction and the
gathering of evidence, with the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to
this Court. We take into consideration in this regard that the CHR is a specialized and
independent agency created and empowered by the Constitution to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal
measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines.
Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings,
including field investigations – acting as the Court’s directly commissioned agency for purposes
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – with the tasks of: (a) ascertaining the identities of the
persons appearing in the cartographic sketches of the two alleged abductors as well as their
whereabouts; (b) determining based on records, past and present, the identities and locations of
the persons identified by State Prosecutor Velasco alleged to be involved in the abduction of
Jonas, namely: T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air
Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), and an alias T.L., all reportedly assigned with
Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence Service of the AFP; further proceedings and
investigations, as may be necessary, should be made to pursue the lead allegedly provided by
State Prosecutor Velasco on the identities of the possible abductors; (c) inquiring into the
veracity of Lipio’s and Manuel’s claims that Jonas was abducted by a certain @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO of the CPP/NPA guerilla unit RYG; (d) determining based on records, past and
present, as well as further investigation, the identities and whereabouts of @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO; and (e) undertaking all measures, in the investigation of the Burgos abduction that
may be necessary to live up to the extraordinary measures we require in addressing an enforced
disappearance under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Edita T. Burgos vs. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Edita T. Burgos vs. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, et al./Edita T.
burgos vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.,
et al., G.R. Nos. 183711/183812/183713, June 22, 2010
Evidence
Burden of proof; party alleging fraud has burden of proof.Fraud is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of
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legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in the damage to another or
by which an undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another.It is a question of fact
that must be alleged and proved. It cannot be presumed and must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, not by mere preponderance of evidence. The party alleging the existence
of fraud has the burden of proof. On the basis of the above disquisitions, this Court finds that
petitioner has failed to discharge this burden. No matter how strong the suspicion is on the part
of petitioner, such suspicion does not translate into tangible evidence sufficient to nullify the
assailed transactions involving the subject MSCI Class “A” share of stock. Makati Sports Club,
Inc. vs. Cecile H. Cheng, et al., G.R. No. 178523, June 16, 2010
Existence of fraud is question of fact. Fraud is deemed to comprise anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in the damage to another or by which an
undue and unconscionable advantage is taken of another.It is a question of fact that must be
alleged and proved. It cannot be presumed and must be established by clear and convincing
evidence, not by mere preponderance of evidence. The party alleging the existence of fraud has
the burden of proof. On the basis of the above disquisitions, this Court finds that petitioner has
failed to discharge this burden. No matter how strong the suspicion is on the part of petitioner,
such suspicion does not translate into tangible evidence sufficient to nullify the assailed
transactions involving the subject MSCI Class “A” share of stock. Makati Sports Club, Inc. vs.
Cecile H. Cheng, et al., G.R. No. 178523, June 16, 2010
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Civil Procedure
Accion Publiciana; nature and purpose. An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. Accion publiciana is
also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the
grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more
than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The
objective of a plaintiff in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. Pio
Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs. Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia
Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010.
Appeals; dismissal of appeal on purely technical ground not favored. Appeal is an essential
part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower
court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
appeal. In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254, the Court reiterated:
While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of
our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the
right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. In the case at
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bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. Cynthia S. Bolos
vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010.
Appeal; dismissal of appeal on purely technical ground not favored. As a final note, it is worthy
to emphasize that the dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon
especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. For this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of
statutory appeal; rather they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of technicalities. Cebu
Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010.
Appeal; effect of failure to attach material and relevant documents to petition. The foregoing
preliminary matters thus clarified, we find that the CA cannot be faulted for dismissing the
petition for review ZFMC filed pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules by way of appeal from the 30
June 2003 decision in O.P. Case No. 5613. A perusal of said petition shows that, instead of
formulating its own “concise statement of the facts and the issues involved” as required under
Rule 43 of the Rules, ZFMC merely quoted the first ten (10) pages of the 25 June 1985 decision
in MNR Case No. 4023. Altogether oblivious of the missing third page of its copy of said
decision and the relevant facts it resultantly omitted, ZFMC also appended copies of only the
following documents to its petition, viz.: (a) the decision in O.P. Case No. 5613; (b) its motion
for reconsideration thereof; and, (c) the 30 September 2003 order denying said motion for lack
of merit. Despite being alerted to the deficiencies of its petition in the CA’s 30 January 2004
resolution directing the submission of the pleadings filed before the MNR and the Office of the
President, ZFMC stubbornly maintained, that said documents were no longer necessary since
the undisputed facts of the case were already narrated in the 25 June 1984 decision rendered in
MNR Case No. 4023.
While it is admittedly the petitioner who decides at the outset which relevant documents will be
appended to his petition, it has been held that the CA has the duty to ensure that “the
submission of supporting documents is not merely perfunctory. The practical aspect of this duty
is to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible time the existence of prima facie merit
in the petition.” With the third page missing from ZFMC’s copy of the 25 June 1985 decision in
MNR Case No. 4023 and the particulars it omitted as a consequence, we find that the CA’s
directive for the submission of the pleadings the parties filed in said case and in O.P. Case No.
5613 was clearly necessary for the proper appreciation of the facts and the issues relevant to the
petition before it. Considering that a petitioner’s failure to attach material and relevant
documents to his petition is a sufficient ground to dismiss it, the CA correctly dealt with ZFMC’s
failure to comply with its directive by dismissing the petition pursuant to Section 7, Rule 43 of
Rules which provides as follows:
Sec. 7. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of docket and other lawful fees,
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the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.
Still insisting on the superfluity of the submission of said pleadings in its 28 July 2004 motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition, ZFMC had, of course, requested for reasonable
time within which to comply with the CA’s earlier directive. In the twenty-two months which
elapsed from the filing of said motion up to the denial thereof in CA’s resolution dated 21 June
2006, however, the record shows that ZFMC miserably failed to submit the pleadings filed by
the parties before the MNR and the Office of the President. To our mind, ZFMC’s omission was
fatal when viewed in the light of the above-discussed deficiencies of its petition and its added
failure to submit copies of the very orders it sought to be affirmed by the CA, i.e., the BFD
Director’s orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11 November 1974. By and of itself, a party’s failure to
comply with the CA’s directive without justifiable cause is also a ground for the dismissal of an
appeal under Section 1 (h), Rule 50 of the Rules.
Granted by the CA an extension of fifteen (15) days from 25 October, 2003 or until 9 November,
2003 within which to file its petition for review, it does not likewise help ZFMC’s cause any that
it was only able to do so on 24 November 2003. Although appeal is an essential part of our
judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a
part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional
and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and
executory. Zamboanga Forest Managers Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply
Company, et al., G.R. No. 173342. October 13, 2010.
Appeal; effect of failure to file appellant’s brief on time; court’s discretion. Lastly, the Court
does not agree with petitioners’ contention that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
not dismissing the LBP’s appeal on the ground that the latter failed to file its Appellant’s Brief on
time.
In The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of Appeals, the Court laid down the
basic rules with respect to the issue of non-filing of appellant’s brief with the CA and its
consequences, to wit:
(1) The general rule is for the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is
filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the rules;
(2) The power conferred upon the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and
directory and not ministerial or mandatory;
(3) The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the
effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal;
(4) In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for
the proper exercise of the court’s leniency it is imperative that:
(a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;
(b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest
of substantial justice;
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(c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;
(d) there is no contention that the appellees’ cause was prejudiced;
(e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed.
(5) In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and
(6) Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse as to call for the
appellate court’s indulgence except:
(a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law;
(b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or
property; or
(c) where the interests of justice so require.
In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Natonton v. Magaway is apropros:
As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), “(T)he expiration of
the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on
appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. Even after the expiration
of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at
least where no motion to dismiss has been made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused
where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay or where
there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced.”
Technically, the Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal for failure to file appellant’s brief on
time. However, the dismissal is directory, not mandatory. It is not the ministerial duty of the
court to dismiss the appeal. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed
does not have the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. The court has discretion to
dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant’s appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty.
The discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and
fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.
We observe that petitioners’ arguments are based on technical grounds. While indeed
respondents did not file their brief seasonably, it was not mandatory on the part of the Court of
Appeals to dismiss their appeal. As held by this Court in the above-cited cases, late filing of brief
may be excused. In other words, the dismissal of respondents’ appeal on that ground is
discretionary on the part of the Appellate Court.
Significantly, there is no showing that petitioners suffered a material injury or that their cause
was prejudiced when respondents failed to submit their brief promptly. What is clear is that the
latter incurred delay in the filing of their brief because when the deadline fell due, they were not
yet represented by a new counsel.
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice, but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in
rendering justice, have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other
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way around. As applied to the instant case, in the language of then Chief Justice Querube
Makalintal, technicalities “should give way to the realities of the situation.”
It is true that in the instant case, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss. However, the same was
submitted only after the CA had already granted the LBP’s motion for extension of time to file its
brief and such brief was already filed with the appellate court. In Aguam v. Court of Appeals,
this Court excused a delay of nine (9) days in the filing of a motion for extension of the
appellant’s brief holding that:
In the higher interest of justice, considering that the delay in filing a motion for extension to file
appellant’s brief was only for nine (9) days, and normally, the Court of Appeals would routinely
grant such extension, and the appellant’s brief was actually filed within the period sought, the
better course of action for the Court of Appeals was to admit appellant’s brief.
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when they arose from
an honest mistake, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party. The Court can overlook
the late filing of the motion for extension, if strict compliance with the rules would mean
sacrificing justice to technicality.
Based on the abovequoted ruling, with more reason should the LBP’s delay in filing its second
motion for extension be excused, because such delay was only for five days. Moreover, the LBP
was able to file its Appellant’s Brief within the second period of extension granted by the CA.
In the same manner, in Heirs of Victoriana Villagracia v. Equitable Banking Corporation, the
petitioners therein failed to file their Appellant’s Brief with the CA within the reglementary
period. They also failed to file their motion for extension before the expiration of the time sought
to be extended. In relaxing the application of the procedural rules and, thus, allowing the appeal
to be reinstated, the Court held as follows:
However, in the instant case, we are of the view that the ends of justice will be better served if it
is determined on the merits, after full opportunity is given to all parties for ventilation of their
causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. It is far better
to dispose of the case on the merits, which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that
may result in injustice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully observed, courts
should not be too strict with procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The rules are intended to ensure the proper and orderly conduct of
litigation because of the higher objective they seek, which is the attainment of justice and the
protection of substantive rights of the parties. In Republic v. Imperial [362 Phil. 466], the Court,
through Mr. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., stressed that the filing of the appellant’s brief in
appeals is not a jurisdictional requirement. But an appeal may be dismissed by the CA on
grounds enumerated under Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. The Court has the power to relax or
suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant,
or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes good and sufficient cause that will
merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon the court.
In the case at bench, without touching on the merits of the case, there appears a good and
efficient cause to warrant the suspension of the rules. Petitioners’ failure to file the appeal brief
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within the extended period may have been rendered excusable by force of circumstances.
Petitioners had to change their counsel because he was appointed judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court. Their new counsel had to go over the six (6) volumes of the records of the
case to be able to file an intelligent brief. Thus, a few days of delay in the filing of the motion for
extension may be justified. In addition, no material injury was suffered by the appellees by
reason of the delay in the filing of the brief.
Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help
secure, not override, substantial justice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a
party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid
application of the rules tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is
empowered to suspend their operation.
In the instant case, the LBP’s delay in filing its Appellant’s Brief is justified by the fact that the
Legal Services Department of the LBP underwent re-organization resulting in the retirement and
transfer of the remaining lawyers, cases and personnel from one department to another as well
as in the merger and dissolution of other departments within the LBP. In its Manifestation,
which petitioners did not dispute, the LBP claimed that by reason of the abovementioned re-
organization, the lawyer handling the present case actually received a copy of the Resolution of
the CA setting the deadline for the filing of its Appellant’s Brief only on May 21, 2001, four days
after the expiration of the period granted by the CA. Besides, there is no indication that the LBP
intended to delay the proceedings, considering that it only filed two motions for extension to file
its brief. As adverted to by this Court in De Leon, the dismissal of the LBP’s appeal, together
with the other appeals it had filed, will have a great impact not only on the LBP as the financial
intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but also on the national treasury
and the already depressed economic condition of our country. In other words, the instant case
is impressed with public interest. As such, and in the interest of substantial justice, the Court
finds that the same must be decided on the merits. Based on the foregoing discussions, the
Court finds that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners’ motion
to dismiss respondent LBP’s appeal. Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010
Appeal; effect of failure to serve required number of copies of appellant’s brief; court’s
discretion.Petitioners also assert that the LBP’s appeal filed with the CA should have been
dismissed on the ground that the LBP failed to serve two copies of its Appellant’s Brief to
petitioners. Petitioners argue that under Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the appellant is
required to serve two copies of his Brief on the appellee and that, in relation with the said Rule,
one of the grounds for dismissing an appeal under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the same Rules is the
failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his Brief or
Memorandum within the time provided by the Rules. The Court is not persuaded. Indeed,
Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court requires the appellant to serve two copies of the
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appellant’s brief to the appellee. However, the failure to serve the required number of copies
does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal. Thus, this Court held in Philippine
National Bank v. Philippine Milling Co., Inc. that:
[P]ursuant to Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, “(a)n appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee” upon the ground, among others,
of “(f)ailure of the appellant x x x to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief,”
within the reglementary period. Manifestly, this provision confers a power and does not impose
a duty. What is more, it is directory, not mandatory.
The CA has, under the said provision of the Rules of Court, discretion to dismiss or not to
dismiss respondent’s appeal. Although said discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining
in each case, the presumption is that it has been so exercised. It is incumbent upon herein
petitioners, as actors in the case at bar, to offset this presumption. Yet, the records before the
Court do not satisfactorily show that the CA has committed grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the LBP’s appeal. There is no question that the LBP was only able to serve on
petitioners one copy of its appellant’s brief. However, settled is the rule that a litigant’s failure to
furnish his opponent with a copy of his appeal brief does not suffice to warrant dismissal of that
appeal. In such an instance, all that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to furnish his
opponent with a copy of his brief. In the instant case, with much less reason should the LBP’s
appeal be dismissed, because petitioners were served with the LBP’s brief, albeit only one copy
was given to them. The Court would be dwelling too much on technicality if the appeal is
dismissed simply on the ground that LBP failed to furnish petitioners with two copies, instead of
only one, of its appeal brief. Indeed, there is no showing, and the Court finds none in the instant
petition, that such procedural lapse on the part of the LBP resulted in material injury to the
latter. Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 153998, October 6,
2010
Appeal; factual findings of Court of Appeals generally binding on Supreme Court. In asking us
to determine which of the parties has a better right to possess the property, we are asked to
resolve a factual issue, involving as it does the weighing and evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties in the courts below. Generally, such an exercise is not appropriate in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to resolve only
questions of law. Moreover, the factual findings of the CA, when supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the following recognized
exceptions:https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K1F8jkfOr-
vW7zvobWe8scU3CQYiiPGWbuqFKqvUlxo/edit?hl=en&pli=1
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
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(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Since the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, we would normally be precluded from re-
examining the factual circumstances of this case. However, it appears that the RTC and the CA,
in concluding that Urbina has the right to lawfully eject the Modestos from the lot in question,
have greatly misapprehended the facts of this case. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs.
Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No.
189859, October 18, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of Court of Appeals and Intellectual Property Office (IPO). Petitioners
raise the factual issue of who the true owner of the mark is. As a general rule, this Court is not a
trier of facts. However, such rule is subject to exceptions.
In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that:
We are very much aware that the rule to the effect that this Court is not a trier of facts admits of
exceptions. As we have stated in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA:
[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not
a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by
the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA
are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Emphasis supplied.)
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In the instant case, the records will show that the IPO and the CA made differing conclusions on
the issue of ownership based on the evidence presented by the parties. Hence, this issue may
be the subject of this Court’s review. E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar
Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of Court of Appeals and trial court entitled to great respect. Both the
trial and the appellate courts ruled that respondent has proven her claims of ownership and
possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners now argue that the two courts erred
in their appreciation of the evidence. They ask the Court to review the evidence of both parties,
despite the CA’s finding that the trial court committed no error in appreciating the evidence
presented during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a review of questions of fact, which is beyond
the province of a Rule 45 petition. A question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. “Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should
be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether the proofs
on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in
issue, are without doubt questions of fact.”
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this assignment of error must be dismissed for it is
settled that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari. There is a
question of law when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions
of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the probative value of evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. The instant case does not present a compelling
reason to deviate from the foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate courts agree
that respondent had proven her claim of ownership as against petitioners’ claims. Their factual
findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be accorded great respect.
In any case, even if petitioners’ arguments attacking the authenticity and admissibility of the
Deed of Quitclaim executed in favor of respondent’s father are well-taken, it will not suffice to
defeat respondent’s claim over the subject property. Even without the Deed of Quitclaim,
respondent’s claims of prior possession and ownership were adequately supported and
corroborated by her other documentary and testimonial evidence. We agree with the trial
court’s observation that, in the ordinary course of things, people will not go to great lengths to
execute legal documents and pay realty taxes over a real property, unless they have reason to
believe that they have an interest over the same. The fact that respondent’s documents traverse
several decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that she and her family never
abandoned their right to the property and have continuously exercised rights of ownership over
the same. Moreover, respondent’s version of how the petitioners came to occupy the property
coincides with the same timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only difference is that
petitioners maintain they came into possession by tolerance of the Smith family, while
respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave permission to petitioners. Given the
context under which the parties’ respective statements were made, the Court is inclined to
believe the respondent’s version, as both the trial and appellate courts have concluded, since
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her version is corroborated by the documentary evidence. Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita
Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of lower courts generally binding on Supreme Court. Clearly, the
petition disputes the factual findings of the CA, which, in turn, merely affirmed the factual
findings of the RTC. It is settled that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and
confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be
reviewed on appeal. Inquiry into the veracity of the CA’s factual findings and conclusions is not
the function of the Supreme Court, because this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither is it our
function to reexamine and weigh anew the respective evidence of the parties. While it is true
that there are well-established exceptions to this principle, petitioner in this case has failed to
show that this case falls under one of such exceptions. The RTC and the CA both found that
respondent was not in default on the monthly payments of his loan obligation. These findings
are supported by the evidence on record.
At the time of foreclosure – April 1999 – respondent’s savings account deposits showed a
balance of P852,913.26. This was more than enough to cover whatever amortizations were due
from him at that time. Moreover, the Amortization Schedule shows that, as of April 27, 1999,
respondent’s loan account with the bank totaled only P269,023.38. The same schedule shows
that, by March 27, 2000, he had “0.00” balance left to pay, meaning he had paid his loan in
full. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura G.R. No. 176479,
October 6, 2010
Appeal; factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies. Next, petitioners challenge the CA’s reversal of
the factual findings of the BLA that Shen Dar and not EYIS is the prior user and, therefore, true
owner of the mark. In arguing its position, petitioners cite numerous rulings of this Court where
it was enunciated that the factual findings of administrative bodies are given great weight if not
conclusive upon the courts when supported by substantial evidence. We agree with petitioners
that the general rule in this jurisdiction is that the factual findings of administrative bodies
deserve utmost respect when supported by evidence. However, such general rule is subject to
exceptions.
In Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, the Court established the rule of conclusiveness of factual
findings of the CA as follows:
Jurisprudence teaches us that “(a)s a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from
the Court of Appeals x x x is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact are deemed conclusive. As such this
Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in
the proceedings below. This rule, however, is not without exceptions.” The findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may admit of review by
this Court:
(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
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(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Thereafter, in Villaflor v. Court of Appeals, this Court applied the above principle to factual
findings of quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
Proceeding by analogy, the exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, enumerated in Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, can also be applied to those of
quasi-judicial bodies x x x.
Here, the CA identified certain material facts that were allegedly overlooked by the BLA and the
IPO Director General which it opined, when correctly appreciated, would alter the result of the
case. An examination of the IPO Decisions, however, would show that no such evidence was
overlooked. E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co.,
Ltd., G.R. No. 184850, October 20, 2010.
Appeal; factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies (in this case, the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission [CIAC]) accorded respect. Despite petitioner’s attempts to make it
appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that what petitioner seeks is for this
Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC. It insists that its evidence
sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for respondent’s use of its manlift equipment,
and even absent proof of the supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on
respondent for the use of said equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on the
principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions the amounts awarded by the CIAC for
inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the work left unfinished
by respondent. As reiterated by the Court in IBEX International, Inc. v. Government Service
Insurance System, to wit:
It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but
also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of
construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources
Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, we said:
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In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions,
factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner
proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section
nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5)
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.
Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair
opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained
through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process.
A perusal of the records would reveal that none of the aforementioned circumstances, which
would justify exemption of this case from the general rule, are present here. Such being the
case, the Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to examine, appraise and analyze
anew the evidence presented before the arbitration body.
XXX XXX XXX
Again, these issues are purely factual and cannot be properly addressed in this petition for
review on certiorari. In Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Dynamic
Planners and Construction Corp., it was emphasized that mathematical computations, the
propriety of arbitral awards, claims for “other costs” and “abandonment” are factual
questions. Since the discussions of the CIAC and the CA in their respective Decisions show that
its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reason why this Court
should not accord finality to said findings. Verily, to accede to petitioner’s request for a
recalibration of its evidence, which had been thoroughly studied by both the CIAC and the CA
would result in negating the objective of Executive Order No. 1008, which created an
arbitration body to ensure the prompt and efficient settlement of disputes in the construction
industry. Thus, the Court held in Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-
Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, that:
x x x The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful
allegation that such body had “misapprehended facts” and will not pass upon issues which are,
at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly disguised they might be as “legal questions.”
The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have
had confidence in such arbitrators. The Court will not, therefore, permit the parties to relitigate
before it the issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save
only where a clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual conclusions, the Arbitral
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Tribunal committed an error so egregious and hurtful to one party as to constitute a grave abuse
of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction.
As discussed above, there is nothing in the records that point to any grave abuse of discretion
committed by the CIAC. Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. vs. RRN Incorporated, G.R. No.
172525, October 20, 2010.
Appeal; modes of appeal from decisions of regional trial court. In Murillo v. Consul, we had the
opportunity to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, where judgment was rendered in a
civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction; (2) by petition for
review under Rule 42, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction; and (3) by petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule
45. The first mode of appeal is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.
XXX XXX XXX
Here, petitioner’s appeal does not only involve a question of law. Aside from the trial court’s
ruling that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint, petitioner likewise questioned the other
basis for the trial court’s ruling, which refers to previously decided cases allegedly upholding
with finality the ownership of the Malabanans over the disputed property. As correctly argued
by petitioner, the question of whether the ownership of the Malabanans has in fact been
sustained with finality is factual in nature as it requires the presentation of evidence. Since the
appeal raised mixed questions of fact and law, no error can be imputed on petitioner for
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of the CA through an ordinary appeal under Rule
41. Republic of the Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6,
2010
Appeal; period to appeal; “fresh period rule.” Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,”
according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals, under Section 3
of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the
original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing
or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v. Damaso, we
presented a survey of the cases applying the fresh period
rule:https://docs.google.com/document/d/1K1F8jkfOr-
vW7zvobWe8scU3CQYiiPGWbuqFKqvUlxo/edit?hl=en&pli=1
As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue
of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in all
courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules
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and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus,
the Court stated:
To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt
of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the “final
order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-
day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final
and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, to wit:
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals, promulgated on 14 September 2005
while the present Petition was already pending before us. x x x.
xxxx
With the advent of the “fresh period rule” parties who availed themselves of the remedy of
motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from
the denial of that motion.
The “fresh period rule” is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that the appeal shall be taken “within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from.” The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of
the “final order,” x x x.
xxxx
The “fresh period rule” finally eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted — from receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of “final order”
appealed from.
Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a
notice of appeal which was purportedly filed five days late. With the fresh period rule, the 15-
day period within which to file the notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the
therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh period
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, we held that a
party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within fifteen days from receipt of the
original decision or within fifteen days from the receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we applied the same principle of “fresh period rule,”
expostulating that procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of
procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
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operation of statutes. The “fresh period rule” is irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner
in which the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or determined and, therefore, can
be made applicable to actions pending upon its effectivity, such as the present case, without
danger of violating anyone else’s rights.
XXX XXX XXX
In the case before us, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of
the RTC-Branch 227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26,
2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on
February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the
fresh period rule, respondent was able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15
days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving due course to said appeal in CA-G.R. CV No.
82610. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010.
Appeal; period to appeal; “fresh period rule;” retroactivity. Also in Sumiran, we recognized the
retroactive application of the fresh period rule to cases pending and undetermined upon its
effectivity:
The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the
date of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by the Court in
Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus:
The determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes could
retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005
when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be answered with the guidance of the
general rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create
new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of
rights already existing. (Emphases supplied.)
Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010.
Certiorari; improper remedy. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order, or resolution of the CA, as in this case, may file before this Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure within 15 days from notice of
the judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from. Petitioners, instead of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, an improper remedy. By availing of a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the
petition merits outright dismissal. Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. v.. Samahang Magkakapitbahay
ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito
Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010
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Certiorari; not available to set aside denial of motion to dismiss in absence of grave abuse of
discretion. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither
terminates nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before
the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion
to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss must have been tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. By “grave abuse of discretion” is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation
of law. In the instant case, Global did not properly substantiate its claim of arbitrariness on the
part of the trial court judge that issued the assailed orders denying the motion to dismiss. In a
petition for certiorari, absent such showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or ill motive in the
disposition of the trial judge in the case, we are constrained to uphold the court’s ruling,
especially because its decision was upheld by the CA. Global Business Holdings, Inc. vs.
Surecomp Software B.V., [G.R. No. 173463. October 13, 2010]
Certiorari; period to file. The petition before the CA was filed out of time. A perusal of the
allegations in the subject petition reveals that though it sought the nullification of the February 2,
2004 Decision of the RTC, what it questioned was the RTC’s resolve to render a judgment
before trial pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies. Said section provides,
Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-trial. – If, after submission of the pre-trial briefs, the court
determines that, upon consideration of the pleadings, the affidavits and other evidence
submitted by the parties, a judgment may be rendered, the court may order the parties to file
simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days
from receipt of the order. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment, either full or otherwise,
not later than ninety (90) days from the expiration of the period to file the memoranda.
As correctly pointed out by the Farmix Group, it is very clear that the issues raised in the subject
petition pertained to previous orders of the RTC – the November 12 and December 3, 2003
Orders – submitting the case for decision.
The November 12, 2003 Order was received by WINCORP on November 13, 2003. It then filed
a Manifestation and Motion adopting the UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration of said order
and even raised additional arguments. Thereafter, the RTC issued the December 3, 2003 Order
denying UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration but there was no mention of WINCORP’s
manifestation and motion.
Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits
the filing of motions for reconsideration, to wit:
Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. – The following pleadings are prohibited:
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(1) Motion to dismiss;
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial;
(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed
due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and
(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to
clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3,
2003 Order denying the UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted.
The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for certiorari within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter
being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before
the CA on or before January 12, 2004. It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With
that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late.
Even if the sixty (60)-day period will be reckoned from WINCORP’s receipt of the December 3,
2003 Order, the petition for certiorari was still filed out of time since it should have been filed
on or before February 2, 2004.
This Court can only conclude that WINCORP filed the petition for certiorari supposedly
assailing the February 2, 2004 Decision as a subterfuge to make it appear that it was filed on
time when in truth it was assailing an earlier order, the period for which to assail the same has
long elapsed. Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al., G.R.
No. 165876, October 4, 2010
Certiorari; requirement that respondents be exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Southern Hemisphere Engagement
Network, Inc. etc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism council, et al./Kilusang Mayo Uno etc., et al. Vs. Hon.
Eduardo Ermit., et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, etc., et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./The Integrated Bar
of the Philippines etc. et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang
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Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 178552,
178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461.October 5, 2010
Consolidation. At this juncture, considering that both the Receivership Case and
the Certiorari Petition have yet to be resolved, we now come to terms with the central issue of
whether the consolidation of these cases is proper under the circumstances. Consolidation of
cases is governed by Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which materially states:
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
It is well recognized that consolidation of cases avoids multiplicity of suits, guards against
oppression and abuse, prevents delay, clears congested court dockets, simplifies the work of the
courts and seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants. Generally,
consolidation applies only to cases pending before the same judge and not to cases pending in
different branches of the same court or in different courts.
Yet in appropriate instances and in the interest of justice, cases pending in different branches of
the court or in different courts may be consolidated, consistent with the rule in our jurisdiction
that leans towards permitting consolidation of cases whenever possible and irrespective of the
diversity of the issues for resolution. Hence, consolidation of cases is proper when the actions
involve the same reliefs or the same parties and basically the same issues, or when there is real
need to forestall the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered in the cases, provided
that the measure will not give one party an undue advantage over the other, or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties.
Indeed, the objectives of judicial economy and simplicity sit well with the prospect of
consolidating the two subject cases. We take note that the Certiorari Petition in this case is only
a pending incident in the Receivership Case, which is the main action and in which a motion
for the recall of the April 30, 2000 Order of the hearing officer is still awaiting resolution before
Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati, where the case was transferred. Thus, the outcome of
the Certiorari Petition will definitely have a bearing on the Receivership Case, involving as they
do the same focal issue of whether or not Excap had been found in possession of Bancapital’s
assets and requiring substantially the same evidence on that matter. In other words, conducting
separate trials of the cases would only entail substantial duplication of time and effort not only
by the parties but also by the courts and could terminate in the two courts rendering conflicting
decisions. Bank of Commerce vs. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, etc., et al., G.R. No. 172393,
October 20, 2010.
Contempt; indirect contempt. Indirect contempt of court is governed by Section 3, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.-After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
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as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court,
including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by
the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership
or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue
of an order or process of a court held by him. x x x.
Do the acts of respondents Enriquez and Sia in filing a motion for partial execution; of LA
Calanza in granting the writ of execution and applying or not applying established
jurisprudence; and of Sheriff Paredes in serving the notice of sale of the real property owned by
petitioner fall under the above enumeration? We answer in the negative.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its
authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. It is a defiance of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court which tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice party-
litigants or their witnesses during litigation. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. However, such power should be exercised on the preservative, not on
the vindictive, principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order
to retain that respect, without which the administration of justice will falter or fail. Only in cases
of clear and contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised. Such power, being
drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest
of justice. It is true that, at the time of the filing by Enriquez and Sia of the motion for the partial
execution of the LA decision which directed their reinstatement, the decision had already been
reversed by the NLRC, and such reversal was affirmed by the CA. The case was then on appeal
to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We find
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that their motion for partial execution was a bona fide attempt to implement what they might
have genuinely believed they were entitled to in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence. This is especially true in the instant case where the means of livelihood of the
dismissed employees was at stake. Any man in such an uncertain and economically threatened
condition would be expected to take whatever measures are available to ensure a means of
sustenance for himself and his family. Clearly, Enriquez and Sia were merely pursuing a claim
which they honestly believed was due them. Their act is far from being contumacious.
On the other hand, LA Calanza, on motion of Enriquez and Sia, issued the writ of execution
considering that at the time of the application of the writ, this Court had yet to decide G.R. No.
172812. LA Calanza opined that so long as there is no finality yet of the decision reversing a
ruling of the LA awarding reinstatement, the same should be enforced. This was how he
interpreted this Court’s pronouncements in Roquero and Zamora; that “even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court.” But as we clearly discussed in Bago v. National Labor
Relations Commission, while it is true that the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision is
immediately executory, the reversal thereof by the NLRC becomes final and executory after ten
(10) days from receipt thereof by the parties. That the CA may take cognizance of and resolve a
petition for the nullification of the NLRC decision on jurisdictional and due process
considerations does not affect the statutory finality of the NLRC decision. It then logically
follows that, at the time of the application for the writ ¾ since the Court eventually sustained the
NLRC and the CA decisions in G.R. No. 172812 ¾ no issue of payroll reinstatement may be
considered at all after the reversal of the LA decision by the NLRC. Still, the erroneous issuance
of the writ of execution by LA Calanza can only be deemed grave abuse of discretion which is
more properly the subject of a petition for certiorari and not a petition for indirect contempt. No
one who is called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
can be infallible in his judgment.
Finally, Sheriff Paredes, in serving the notice of sale, was only performing his duty pursuant to
the writ of execution. No matter how erroneous the writ was, it was issued by LA Calanza and
was addressed to him as the sheriff, commanding him to collect from petitioner the amount due
Enriquez and Sia. In the event he failed to collect the amount, he was authorized to cause the
satisfaction of the same on the movable and immovable properties of petitioner not exempt from
execution. Thus, any act performed by Sheriff Paredes pursuant to the aforesaid writ cannot be
considered contemptuous. At the time of the service of the notice of sale, there was no order
from any court or tribunal restraining him from enforcing the writ. It was ministerial duty for him
to implement it.
To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of
the court or tribunal. A person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the
act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be
no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or
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required. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Labor Arbiter Roderick Joseph Calanza, et al., G.R.
No. 180699. October 13, 2010.
Counsel; withdrawal of appearance. Rule 138, section 26 of the Rules of Court outlines the
procedure in case of withdrawal of counsel. It states:
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Sec. 26. Change of attorneys. – An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time
from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on
notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to
retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the
docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to
the adverse party.
Under the first sentence of Section 26, the withdrawal of counsel with the conformity of the
client is completed once the same is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is
needed other than the mechanical act of the Clerk of Court of entering the name of the new
counsel in the docket and of giving written notice thereof to the adverse party.
In this case, it is uncontroverted that the withdrawal of respondent Samsung’s original counsel,
V.E. Del Rosario and Partners on 19 October 2000, was with the client’s consent. Thus, no
approval thereof by the trial court was required because a court’s approval is indispensable only
if the withdrawal is without the client’s consent. It being daylight clear that the withdrawal of
respondent Samsung’s original counsel was sufficient as the same carried the stamp of approval
of the client, the notice of mediation sent to respondent Samsung’s original counsel was
ineffectual as the same was sent at the time when such counsel had already validly withdrawn
its representation. Corollarily, the absence of respondent Samsung during the scheduled
mediation conference was excusable and justified. Therefore, the trial court erroneously
dismissed Civil Case No. 97-86265. Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et
al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010.
Counterclaims; permissive counterclaims; improper dismissal even if docket fees are due and
unpaid. Be that as it may, the trial court was incorrect in dismissing Bayerphil’s counterclaim
for non-payment of docket fees. All along, Bayerphil has never evaded payment of the docket
fees on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory. It has always argued against
Calibre’s contention that its counterclaim was permissive ever since the latter opposed
Bayerphil’s motion before the RTC to implead the Sebastian spouses. Lastly, Bayerphil’s belief
was reinforced by Judge Claravall’s October 24, 1990 Resolution when she denied Calibre’s
motion to strike out Bayerphil’s counterclaim. Thus:
With respect to the motion to strike out the counterclaim, the Rejoinder and Reply of CALIBRE
mentioned two reasons to support it. These are: 1) that the counterclaim is not against the
opposing party only, and 2) that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is totally unrelated to
the latter’s claim against the Sebastian spouses because they are “not the same.”
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To resolve the issues abovementioned, the elements of a compulsory counterclaim are thus
given:
A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following
circumstances are present: 1) that it arises out of the, or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim, 2) that it does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, and 3) that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. (Javier vs. IAC, 171
SCRA 605)
The provisions of Section 8, Rule 6 must necessarily be mentioned also. To wit:
Sec. 8, Rule 6. Counterclaim or cross-claim in the answer. – The answer may contain any
counterclaim or crossclaim which a party may have at the time against the opposing party or a
co-defendant provided, that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim and can, if the
presence of third parties is essential for its adjudication, acquire jurisdiction of such parties.
The rules and jurisprudence do not require that the parties to the counterclaim be the original
parties only. In fact, the presence of third parties is allowed, the only provision being their
capacity to be subjected under the court’s jurisdiction. As regards the nature of the claims of the
parties, neither is it required that they be of the same nature, only that they arise from the same
transaction or occurrence.
It cannot be gainsaid that the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Rules on the payment of filing fees have already been relaxed:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond
its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.
It is a settled doctrine that “although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, its non-payment x x x should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case
provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive period.” “The prescriptive
period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action must be filed. It
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means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive
period. Chapter 3, Title V, Book III of the Civil Code is the principal law governing prescription
of actions.”
In accordance with the aforementioned rules on payment of docket fees, the trial court upon a
determination that Bayerphil’s counterclaim was permissive, should have instead ordered
Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees for the permissive counterclaim, giving it reasonable
time but in no case beyond the reglementary period. At the time Bayerphil filed its counter-
claim against Calibre and the spouses Sebastian without having paid the docket fees up to the
time the trial court rendered its Decision on December 6, 1993, Bayerphil could still be ordered
to pay the docket fees since no prescription has yet set in. Besides, Bayerphil should not suffer
from the dismissal of its case due to the mistake of the trial court. Calibre Traders Inc., Mario
Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 161431,
October 13, 2010.
Counterclaims; tests to determine if compulsory. Going now to the first assigned error,
petitioner submits that its counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of Fernando against petitioner
for annulment of bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the
other hand, alleged that petitioner’s counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the
prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following
tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would indicate
that the counterclaim is compulsory.
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with the CA’s view that
petitioner’s counterclaim for the recovery of the amount representing rentals collected by
Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the
annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to
establish petitioner’s claim for the recovery of rentals. The issue in the main action, i.e., the
nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely
different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled to receive the
CMTC’s rent payments over the subject property when petitioner became the owner of the
subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its
favor. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et
al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010
Docket fees; GSIS not exempt from payment. Petitioner [GSIS] further argues that assuming that
its counterclaim is permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same,
considering petitioner’s exemption from all kinds of fees.
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In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System
from Payment of Legal Fees, the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e.,
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees,
charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This
was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has
the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
In said case, the Court ruled that:
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they
enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of
exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees
without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s
independence − fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the
Court to levy, assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141
have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance
for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare
the identical purpose of these funds to “guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as
mandated by the Constitution and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a
vital source of the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the
Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress
to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily
reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs
the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R. No.
158090, October 4, 2010
Ejectment; forcible entry and unlawful detainer distinguished. Well settled is the rule that what
determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are
the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Section 1 provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.– Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
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legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
There are two entirely distinct and different causes of action under the aforequoted rule, to wit:
(1) a case for forcible entry, which is an action to recover possession of a property from the
defendant whose occupation thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (2) a case for unlawful detainer, which is an
action for recovery of possession from the defendant whose possession of the property was
inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the plaintiff, but became
illegal when he continued his possession despite the termination of his right thereunder.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior
physical possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by
any of the means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the
possession of defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that
defendant holds possession of the land or building “after the expiration or termination of the
right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.” Corazon D. Sarmienta, et
al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11, 2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer. An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is governed by
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 of which provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. An unlawful
detainer proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction of which lies with the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year from the date
of last demand; and the issue in said case is the right to physical possession. Esmeraldo C.
Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners
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Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6,
2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer; allegations constitute case of unlawful detainer. In the present
case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the allegations clearly constitute a
case of unlawful detainer:
xxxx
3. Plaintiff is the registered owner of that certain parcel of land involved in the instant case
covered by TCT No. 222603 containing an area of 9,936 sq.m. situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase
I, Baranggay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which property was place under community mortgage
program (CMP);
4. Other defendants in the instant case are all member and officers of defendant AMARA who,
through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth entered into the premises herein and
constructed their temporary houses and office building respectively, pre-empting plaintiff from
using the premises thus, depriving the same of its prior possession thereof;
5. On September 2, 1992 as an strategy of the cheapest sort defendants, in conspiracy and
collusion with each other, defendants as representative of Heirs of Antonio and Hermogenes
Rodriquez, the alleged owner of the property at bar, filed civil case no. 92-2454 against plaintiff,
lodge before Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, seeking to annul plaintiff
title;
6. Immediately upon final dismissal of such groundless, baseless and malicious suit, plaintiff
demanded defendants to vacate the premises, but the latter pleaded with the former to be given
a one (1) year period within which to look for a place to transfer, which period, upon pleas of
defendants, coupled with plaintiff’s benevolence was repeatedly extended by said plaintiffs
tolerance of occupancy thereof, but under such terms and conditions. Due to failure to comply
with their undertaking despite repeated demands therefor plaintiffs sent a formal demand letter
upon defendants;
7. Upon receipt of the above-stated demand, defendants propose to become members of
plaintiff, as qualification to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the CMP, to
which plaintiff agreed and tolerated defendants possession by giving the same a period until the
month of December 1999, to comply with all the requirements pre-requisite to the availing of
the CMP benefits but failed and despite repeated demands therefor, thus, the filing of a
complaint with the Baranggay and the issuance of the certificate to file action dated February 8,
2000;
8. As time is of the essence, and the fact that the defendants are mere intruders or usurpers who
have no possessory right whatsoever over the land illegally occupied by them, trifling
technicalities that would tend to defeat the speedy administration of justice formal demand is
not necessary thereto, (Republic vs. Cruz C.A. G.R. No. 24910 R Feb. 7, 1964) however, to
afford a sufficient period of time within which to vacate the premises peacefully another oral
and formal demands were made upon the same to that effect, and demolish the temporary office
and houses they constructed on plaintiff’s property and instead defendants again, as
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representative to alleged “Estate of Julian Tallano” filed a complaint for ejectment against
plaintiffs former President, Hon. Marcelino Aben which case, is docketed as civil case no. 4119,
lodged, before branch 11 of this Honorable court, defendants obstinately refused to peacefully
turn over the property they intruded upon in fact they even dared plaintiff to file a case against
them boasting that nobody can order them to vacate the premises;
9. Defendants’ letter dated August 9, 2000, acknowledged actual receipt of plaintiffs two (2)
formal demands letters. Thus, “the issuance of Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman”
dated September 25, 2000;
10. As a result thereof, plaintiff was compelled to engage the services of the undersigned
counsel in order to immediately institute the instant suit for which services plaintiff agreed to
pay the amount of P35,000.00 plus P3,500.00 per court appearance;
xxxx
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of
the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated
petitioners’ stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming
members of MAHA. Petitioners’ continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition
that they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their
obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of
possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required
petitioners to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. Well settled is
the rule that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him. Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA. Corazon D.
Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953. October 11,
2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer; complaint sufficiently alleges cause of action for unlawful
detainer.Based on the foregoing, we have held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession;
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(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of
the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In this case, respondent’s allegations in the complaint clearly make a case for unlawful detainer,
essential to confer jurisdiction on the MeTC over the subject matter. Thus, we accord respect to
the CA’s findings, to wit:
A review of the Complaint readily reveals that land titles were issued in the name of the
respondent after it purchased the land referred to as the Bayanihan Compound through the
Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation.
The lots allocated to the petitioners formed part of the Bayanihan Compound which they
received as members/beneficiaries of the respondent. However, their refusal to pay the
monthly amortizations despite demands resulted in their expulsion as members and loss of
recognition as beneficiaries of the lots in question. Even when the case was referred to the
barangay, no settlement was reached. Petitioners likewise did not conform to respondent’s
demand to vacate the premises and return its possession. As such, respondent sought to
recover possession of the said lots by filing a case for ejectment within a year after final demand.
Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound
Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687,
October 6, 2010
Ejectment; unlawful detainer; sole issue is physical or material possession of property,
independent of claim of ownership. As to petitioners’ argument that MAHA’s title is void for
having been secured fraudulently, we find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful
detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties. Since the only issue
involved is the physical or material possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and
not possession de jure, the question of ownership must be threshed out in a separate
action. Corazon D. Sarmienta, et al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No.
182953. October 11, 2010
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; notice requirement. In Olizon v. Court of Appeals, the
Court expounded on the purpose for giving notice of the foreclosure sale; and if such purpose
could be attained by publication alone, then the absence of actual posting should not nullify the
sale. Thus:
We take judicial notice of the fact that newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects
than posting on bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an
announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation, which is distributed
nationwide, shall have a readership of more people than that posted in a public bulletin board,
no matter how strategic its location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence, the
publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more than
sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law. By such publication, a
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reasonably wide publicity had been effected such that those interested might attend the public
sale, and the purpose of the law had been thereby subserved.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and condition of the property
to be sold, and of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects are attained,
immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice; but if mistakes or
omissions occur in the notices of sale, which are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to
depreciate the value of the property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or
omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale made pursuant thereto.
In the instant case, the aforesaid objective was attained since there was sufficient publicity of the
sale through the newspaper publication. There is completely no showing that the property was
sold for a price far below its value as to insinuate any bad faith, nor was there any showing or
even an intimation of collusion between the sheriff who conducted the sale and respondent
bank. This being so, the alleged non-compliance with the posting requirement, even if true, will
not justify the setting aside of the sale.
Olizon squarely applies in this case. It is not disputed that the Notice of Sale was duly
published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for three consecutive
weeks. Respondents did not allege, much less prove, any mistake or omission in the published
Notice of Sale calculated to deter or mislead bidders, depreciate the value of the property, or to
prevent it from bringing a fair price; or sale of the mortgaged properties for a price far below
their value as to insinuate bad faith; or collusion between Notary Public Magpantay, who
conducted the sale, and petitioner. Hence, the alleged non-compliance with the posting
requirement, even if true, shall not justify the setting aside of the foreclosure sale. Century
Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212,
October 20, 2010.
Extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage; requirement that debtor be in default. Foreclosure is valid
only when the debtor is in default in the payment of his obligation. It is a necessary
consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. As a rule, the mortgage can be
foreclosed only when the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due. In a real estate mortgage,
when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose on
the mortgage, to have the property seized and sold, and to apply the proceeds to the
obligation. RCBC’s own Amortization Schedule readily shows the applicability of Article 1176
of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor, without reservation with respect to the
interest, shall give rise to the presumption that the said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall
likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid.
Respondent’s passbooks indicate that RCBC continued to receive his payments even after it
made demands for him to pay his past due accounts, and even after the auction sale. RCBC
cannot deny receipt of the payments, even when it claims that the deposits were “not
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withdrawn.” It is not respondent’s fault that RCBC did not withdraw the money he deposited.
His obligation under the mortgage agreement was to deposit his payment in the savings account
he had opened for that purpose, in order that RCBC may debit the amount of his monthly
liabilities therefrom. He complied with his part of the agreement. This bolsters the conclusion of
the CA that respondent had no unpaid installments and was not in default as would warrant the
application of the acceleration clause and the subsequent foreclosure and auction sale of the
property. Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Pedro P. Buenaventura, G.R. No. 176479,
October 6, 2010
Factual findings of administrative agencies generally accorded respect and even finality. Factual
findings of administrative agencies are generally respected and even accorded finality because
of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from handling matters falling
under their specialized jurisdiction. Given that the LMB is the administrative agency tasked with
assisting the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the
management and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, we defer
to its specialized knowledge on these matters. Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera-Modesto vs.
Carlos Urbina, substituted by the heirs of Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, et al., G.R. No.
189859, October 18, 2010.
Injunction; preliminary injunction; nature of remedy and evidence relied on. It must also be
pointed out that there was a preliminary issue – that of the parties’ respective petitions for
injunction – that had to be determined before the resolution of the main case. When the case
was transferred from the SEC to the RTC, only the matter of the petitions for preliminary
injunctions had been heard and submitted for resolution. The hearings to resolve the petition to
nullify the Foundation’s Amended By-laws were yet to be held.
An injunctive writ is not a judgment on the merits of the case. A writ of preliminary injunction
is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The evidence submitted during the
hearing on an application for a writ of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete, for
only a “sampling” is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits.
An order granting a preliminary injunction is not a final resolution or decision disposing of the
case. It is based on a preliminary determination of the status quo and on petitioner’s entitlement
to the Writ. Thus, the findings of fact and opinion of a court when issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made before the trial on the merits is
commenced or terminated. There may be vital facts to be presented at trial which may not be
obtained or presented during the hearing on the application for the injunctive writ. The trial
court needs to conduct substantial proceedings in order to put the main controversy to rest. As
such, even as respondents claim that the RTC correctly ruled that the Amended By-laws are not
valid, they are still contesting the latter’s finding on the number of qualified apostles. This only
further underscores the need for trial to determine which of the parties’ claims are true and
relevant. There are other questions raised that cannot be answered in the present petition, and
nothing less than a full-blown trial is needed in order to test the conflicting claims of the
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parties. Manuel D. Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al., G.R. No. 173179,
October 20, 2010.
Judgment; finality. Elemental is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be
determined by the averments in it and not by its title. Hence, while petitioner’s Motion (to
Recall the April 19, 2000 Order) was so denominated, it is not difficult to see that the remedy it
was seeking was actually a reconsideration of the dismissal of the Receivership Case. This
Motion, to reiterate, does not appear to have been acted upon by the hearing officer at any time
during the interim that the subject order was issued and the two cases were eventually
transferred to Branches 138 and 142 of the RTC of Makati. In particular, when the Receivership
Case was transferred to Branch 138, petitioner’s Motion to Recall was still a pending incident in
the case. With the transfer of the records to the said court, the accompanying duty to resolve
the motion likewise had devolved on the said court. In other words, contrary to the findings of
the Court of Appeals, the Receivership Case has not yet attained finality, as indeed the motion
seeking reconsideration of its dismissal had not been acted upon by the hearing officer himself
and had not yet, in fact, been acted upon by Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati. Moreover, the
November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc reads in full:
Under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission, parties in an
intra-corporate dispute are allowed to file a petition for certiorari questioning interlocutory
orders of the Hearing Officer based on grave abuse of discretion. Such remedy was allowed by
the Commission in order for it to have oversight power over the acts of the Hearing
Officer. With the passage [of] Republic Act 8799 otherwise known as the “Securities Regulation
Code,” the jurisdiction of the Commission over intra-corporate dispute was transferred to the
regular courts. With the transfer of this function to the regular courts, the oversight power of the
Commission en banc over the acts of their Hearing Officers, has now become functus
officius. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari herein shall no longer be acted upon by the
Commission and denied due course. A copy of this order, together with the records of the case,
[is] hereby forwarded to the Regional Trial Court where the main case shall be heard for their
consideration.
SO ORDERED.
As can be gleaned from the aforequoted order, the SEC En Banc has chosen not to act on
the Certiorari Petition which principally assailed the October 22 and December 16, 1999
Orders of Hearing Officer Bacalla respectively accepting the Committee Report and denying
reconsideration, precisely because it acknowledged that it has lost jurisdiction over the petition
as a result of the supervening transfer of jurisdiction over the case to the trial court. This is
evident in its recognition of the fact that by virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, it has
thereby also lost the oversight power to correct abuses of discretion in the issuance of
interlocutory orders by its hearing officers. More to the point, it likewise ordered the transfer of
the records of the case to the trial court where it may supposedly be heard for further
consideration. On these observations, it is clear that this Order could not have written finis to
the Certiorari Petition for the basic reason that the SEC En Banc, at that given point, could no
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longer validly act on the same —much less to rule on the merits of the petition. Bank of
Commerce vs. Hon. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, etc., et al. G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010.
Judgment; finality. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case irrespective
of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court – not even the Supreme Court – has the
power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become
final at some definite date fixed by law.
Admittedly, the rule that a judgment that has become final and executory can no longer be
disturbed, altered or modified admits of exceptions in special cases. In filing the petition at
hand, however, ZFMC has once again hindered the proper appreciation of the facts of the case
by failing to submit copies of the BFD Director’s orders dated 8 May 1974 and 11 November
1974, a complete copy of the 25 June 1985 decision in MNR Case No. 4023 and the pleadings
the parties filed before the MNR and the Office of the President. Even if we were, therefore, to
excuse ZFMC’s procedural lapses before the CA, there would still be a paucity of bases for the
reversal of the 30 June 2003 decision in O.P. Case No. 5613. Zamboanga Forest Managers
Corporation vs. New Pacific Timber and Supply Company, et al., G.R. No. 173342. October 13,
2010.
Judgment; finality; party cannot re-litigate claims already resolved with finality. In their
Memorandum, respondents’ claim that CMTC cannot purchase real estate or invest its funds in
any purpose other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence of a
corporate board resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT No. T-76183, issued
in favor of the CMTC, should be nullified; the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel
have regularly performed their official duty when they conducted the public bidding; Fernando,
as former owner of the subject property and former member of the GSIS, has the preemptive
right to repurchase the foreclosed property. These additional averments cannot be taken
cognizance by the Court, because they were substantially respondents’ arguments in their
petition for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No. 156609.
Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a Resolution dated April 23, 2003,
for petitioners’ (respondents herein) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by this
Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. [The petition was also denied for lack of proof of
the petition on the adverse party and its failure to attach the affidavit of service of copy of the
petition on the adverse parties. (Id. at 190.)] Said resolution became final and executory on June
9, 2003. Respondents’ attempt to re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with
finality by the Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be allowed. Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando P. Caballero, et al., G.R. No. 158090, October 4, 2010
Judgment; immutability; exceptions. As a rule, a final judgment may no longer be altered,
amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court, be
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it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. In the past, however, we have recognized
exceptions to this rule by reversing judgments and recalling their entries in the interest of
substantial justice and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions.
Notably, in San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, Galman v.
Sandiganbayan, Philippine Consumers Foundation v. National Telecommunications
Commission, and Republic v. de los Angeles, we reversed our judgment on the second motion
for reconsideration, while in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission, we did so on a third motion for reconsideration. In Cathay Pacific v.
Romillo and Cosio v. de Rama, we modified or amended our ruling on the second motion for
reconsideration. More recently, in the cases of Munoz v. Court of Appeals, Tan Tiac Chiong v.
Hon. Cosico, Manotok IV v. Barque, and Barnes v. Padilla, we recalled entries of judgment after
finding that doing so was in the interest of substantial justice. In Barnes, we said:
x x x Phrased elsewise, a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of
the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering
(a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the
Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so
pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared to be
final.
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is not hard to discern from
these discussions. A constitutional limitation, guaranteed under no less than the all-important
Bill of Rights, is at stake in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain be “just”
when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has been unreasonably
delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does, that only private interest is involved in this
case is to forget that an expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets,
too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards apply to government who
carries the burden of showing that these standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss this
case as a private interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should not
leave uncorrected. As duly noted in the above discussions, this issue is not one of first
impression in our jurisdiction; the consequences of delay in the payment of just compensation
have been settled by this Court in past rulings. Our settled jurisprudence on the issue alone
accords this case primary importance as a contrary ruling would unsettle, on the flimsiest of
grounds, all the rulings we have established in the past. More than the stability of our
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jurisprudence, the matter before us is of transcendental importance to the nation because of the
subject matter involved – agrarian reform, a societal objective that the government has
unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century. This reform program and its objectives
would suffer a major setback if the government falters or is seen to be faltering, wittingly or
unwittingly, through lack of good faith in implementing the needed reforms. Truly, agrarian
reform is so important to the national agenda that the Solicitor General, no less, pointedly linked
agricultural lands, its ownership and abuse, to the idea of revolution. This linkage, to our mind,
remains valid even if the landowner, not the landless farmer, is at the receiving end of the
distortion of the agrarian reform program.
As we have ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. As we explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm
that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
“should give way to the realities of the situation.
We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a court’s primordial
and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice,
it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment.
Based on all these considerations, particularly the patently illegal and erroneous conclusion that
the petitioners are not entitled to 12% interest, we find that we are duty-bound to re-examine
and overturn the assailed Resolution. We shall completely and inexcusably be remiss in our
duty as defenders of justice if, given the chance to make the rectification, we shall let the
opportunity pass. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
164195, October 12, 2010.
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Judgment on the pleadings. At the outset, we lay stress on the Court’s policy that cases should
be promptly and expeditiously resolved. The Rules of Court seeks to abbreviate court procedure
in order to allow the swift disposition of cases. Specifically, special strategies like demurrer to
evidence, judgment on the pleadings, and summary judgment were adopted to attain this
avowed goal. Full-blown trial is dispensed with and judgment is rendered on the basis of the
pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions of the parties. In the instant
petition, the Court is confronted with the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered
by the Makati City RTC. Petitioners claim such adjudication on said papers and attachments is
proper. The petitioner’s position is impressed with merit.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that “where an answer fails to tender an issue or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.” Judgment on the pleadings is,
therefore, based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and
the annexes, if any, without consideration of any evidence aliunde. When what is left are not
genuinely issues requiring trial but questions concerning the proper interpretation of the
provisions of some written contract attached to the pleadings, judgment on the pleadings is
proper.
From the pleadings, the parties admitted the following facts:
(1) EIB is the stockbroker of petitioners.
(2) Petitioners and EIB entered into a SDAA, Annex “1” of EIB’s answer, which governed the
relationship between petitioners as clients and EIB as stockbroker. Sec. 7 of the SDAA provides:
7. Lien
The client agrees that all monies and/or securities and/or all other property of the Client
(plaintiffs) in the Company’s (defendant) custody or control held from time to time shall be
subject to a general lien in favour of Company for the discharge of all or any indebtedness of
the Client to the Company. The Client shall not be entitled to withdraw any monies or
securities held by the Company pending the payment in full to the Company of any
indebtedness of the Client to the Company. The company shall be entitled at any time and
without notice to the Client to retain, apply, sell or dispose of all or any of the [client’s] property
ifany such obligation or liability is not discharged in full by the client when due or on demand
in or towards the payment and discharge of such obligation or liability and the Company shall
be under no duty to the client as to the price obtained or any losses or liabilities incurred or
arising in respect of any such sale or disposal. Subject to the relevant law and regulation on the
matter, the client hereby authorizes the Company, on his/its behalf, at any time and without
notice to the client’s property if any such obligation or liability is not discharged. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from the SDAA that all monies, securities, and other properties of petitioners in EIB’s
custody or control shall be subject to a general lien in favor of the latter solely for the discharge
of all or any indebtedness to EIB.
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(3) From June 2003 to March 2004, petitioners, through their broker, EIB, bought 60,790,000
KKP shares of stock at the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE).
(4) On various dates in July and August 2003, petitioners bought 16,180,000 DMCI shares of
stock through EIB likewise at the PSE, while 16,000,000 DMCI shares of petitioners were
transferred to EIB by Westlink Global Equities, Inc. Thus, a total of 32,180,000 DMCI shares of
stock owned by petitioners were placed in the custody or control of EIB.
(5) On April 1, 2004, petitioners ordered the sale of 60,790,000 KPP shares to any buyer at the
price of PhP 0.14 per share. The KPP shares were eventually sold at PhP 0.14 per share to
interested buyers.
(6) Petitioners failed to reacquire or buy back the KPP shares at PhP 0.18 per share after 30 days
from date of transaction.
(7) As petitioners failed to deliver funds to EIB to honor the buy-back obligation, not to mention
the cash account obligations of petitioners in the amount of PhP 70 million to EIB, EIB had no
recourse but to sell the DMCI shares of petitioners to reacquire the KPP shares.
(8) Thus, on various dates in June 2004, EIB, without petitioners’ knowledge and consent, sold
petitioners’ 32,180,000 DMCI shares at the controlling market price. EIB later sent sales
confirmation receipts to petitioners regarding the sale of their DMCI shares, said receipts
containing the common notice, which reads:
All transaction[s] are subject to the rules and customs of the Exchange and its Clearing House. It
is agreed that all securities shall secure all my/our liabilities to e.securities and is authorized in
their discretion to sell all or any of them without notice to we/us whenever in the opinion of
e.securities my/our account is not properly secured. (Emphasis supplied.)
(9) EIB sent statements of accounts to petitioners showing the sale of the DMCI shares which
uniformly contained the following notice:
This statement will be considered correct unless we receive notice in writing of any exceptions
within 5 days from receipt. Please address all correspondence concerning exceptions to our
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT. Kindly notify us in writing of any changes in your address.
(10) On January 12, 2005, petitioners wrote EIB demanding the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI
shares.
(11) On January 12, 2005, EIB rejected petitioners demand for the return of the DMCI shares, as
those were already sold to cover the buy back of the KPP shares.
(12) Petitioners’ prayer is the return of the 32,180,000 DMCI shares by EIB to them.
The principal issue in petitioners’ complaint is whether EIB can be compelled to return DMCI
shares to petitioners based on the alleged unauthorized disposal or sale of said shares to comply
with the buy back of the KKP shares. The threshold issue raised in the answer is the lack of
jurisdiction over the complaint due to the alleged nonpayment of the proper docket fees.
Affirmative defenses presented are that EIB disposed of the DMCI shares pursuant to Sec. 7 of
the SDAA, and the notices of sale, ratification and laches.
Based on the admissions in the pleadings and documents attached, the Court finds that the
issues presented by the complaint and the answer can be resolved within the four corners of
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said pleadings without need to conduct further hearings. As explained by the Court in Philippine
National Bank v. Utility Assurance & Surety Co., Inc., when what remains to be done is the
proper interpretation of the contracts or documents attached to the pleadings, then judgment
on the pleadings is proper. In the case at bar, the issue of whether the sale of DMCI shares to
effectuate the buy back of the KKP shares is valid can be decided by the trial court based on the
SDAA, Notices of Sale, Sales Confirmation Receipts, the letters of the parties, and other
appendages to the pleadings in conjunction with the allegations or admissions contained in the
pleadings without need of trial. The Makati City RTC is, therefore, correct in issuing the October
18, 2005 Resolution granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
The CA nullified the October 18, 2005 Resolution on the ground that there are other issues that
must be resolved during a full-blown trial, ratiocinating this way:
While it may be true that the Appellant has already admitted that the sale of the DMCI shares
was for the purpose of buying back the KPP shares and that such admission strengthened
Appellees’ claim that the sale of the DMCI shares is a nullity, there were other issues raised by
the Appellant that can only be threshed out during a full blown trial, viz: the average price of the
KPP shares of stock, the scope of the collaterals stated in the Notices of Sale and the monetary
claims of the Appellant against the Appellees.
To the mind of the Court, these matters are not genuinely triable issues but actually minor issues
or mere incidental questions that can be resolved by construing the statements embodied in the
appendages to the pleadings. The facts that gave rise to the side issues are undisputed and were
already presented to the trial court rendering trial unnecessary. Pacific Rehouse Corporation, et
al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; bar by laches. For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners
raise the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity
of the IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA,
it is the NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous peoples.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the
agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising the
court’s lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined
to assert it.” Wisely, some cases have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most
exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
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In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the trial court but failed
to do so. Instead, the surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings, other than a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When the case reached the appellate court, the surety
again participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It was only after receiving the
appellate court’s adverse decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a motion to
dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration. The CA certified the matter to this Court, which
then ruled that the surety was already barred by laches from raising the jurisdiction issue.
In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of laches
cannot be ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for raising the issue of
jurisdiction for the first time in the CA, what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised
the issue for the first time in their petition before this Court. At the time that the complaint was
first filed in 1998, the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a
ground for dismissal; instead they filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the
property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC. They obviously neglected to take the
IPRA into consideration. When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the petitioners no
longer raised the issue of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all
the time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by the cross-examination conducted
by petitioners’ lawyer on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-examination, it
was revealed that the petitioners were aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its
jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the
validity of the CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that the CSTFAL had been
rendered functus officio under the IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial
court’s jurisdiction.
When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they only raised as errors the trial court’s
appreciation of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In their brief, they
once again assailed the CSTFAL’s resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the
enactment of IPRA. But nowhere did petitioners assail the trial court’s ruling for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court had
already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the appellate
court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice encountered
adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts — that petitioners now want to
expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start all
over again. This practice cannot be allowed. Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’
theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need not be decided here), they are
already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the
circumstances. Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20,
2010.
Jurisdiction; determined by allegations in complaint. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction in
ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint. It cannot be made to
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depend on the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. Neither can it
be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties. The test
for determining the sufficiency of those allegations is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff. Esmeraldo C.
Romullo, et al. vs.. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners
Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687, October 6,
2010
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction by estoppel. Considering the foregoing discussion, we find no need to
remand the case to the trial court for the resolution of Bayerphil’s counterclaim. In Metromedia
Times Corporation v. Pastorin, we discussed the rule as to when jurisdiction by estoppel applies
and when it does not, thus:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed
(Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court). This defense may be interposed at any time, during
appeal(Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge
Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146). Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
conveniently set aside. InPeople vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94), this Court, on the issue of
estoppel, held:
“The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may not
be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel’ (5 C.J.S., 861-863). However, if the lower
court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for
instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will
not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.”
In this case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the counterclaim although it erroneously
ordered its automatic dismissal. As already discussed, the trial court should have instead
directed Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees within a reasonable time. Even then, records
show that the trial court heard the counterclaim although it again erroneously found the same to
be unmeritorious. Besides, it must also be mentioned that Bayerphil was lulled into believing
that its counterclaim was indeed compulsory and thus there was no need to pay docket fees by
virtue of Judge Claravall’s October 24, 1990 Resolution. Petitioners also actively participated in
the adjudication of the counterclaim which the trial court adjudge to be unmeritorious. Calibre
Traders Inc., Mario Sison Sebastian and Minda Blanco Sebastian vs. Bayer Philippines, Inc., G.R.
No. 161431, October 13, 2010.
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Jurisdiction; payment of docket fees. EIB asserts that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the
complaint on account of insufficient dockets fees. Although petitioners paid a total of PhP
120,758.80 in legal fees with the RTC, EIB argues that what was paid is based merely on
petitioners’ prayer for moral damages of PhP 3 million, exemplary damages of PhP 3 million,
and attorney’s fees of PhP 2 million, but not including petitioners’ claim for PhP 4.5 million as
actual damages as averred in paragraph 9 of the complaint. Thus, EIB, relying on Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals (Manchester) and Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion, maintains that the RTC should not have entertained the case.
It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fee. A plain reading of the prayer does not show that petitioners asked for the
payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million. The reliefs asked by petitioners in the prayer
are:
1. Upon the filing of the Complaint, a writ of preliminary attachment be issued ex
parteagainst defendant pursuant to Section 2, Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure;
2. After trial, judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant as follows:
On the FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – declaring void the sale by defendant of the 32,180,000
DMCI shares of stock of plaintiffs and directing defendant to return to plaintiffs the latter’s
32,180,000 DMCI shares of stock, or in the event the return thereof is not possible, holding
defendant liable under Articles 1888,1889,1909 and other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.
On the SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – directing defendant to pay plaintiffs moral damages in
the amount of at least P3,000,000.00;
On the THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION – directing defendant to pay plaintiffs exemplary damages
in the amount of at least P3,000,000.00; and
On the FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – directing defendant to pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees in
the amount of P2,000,000.00 and such amounts as may be proven at the trial as litigation
expenses.
Other just and equitable relief are likewise prayed for.
Since the prayer did not ask for the payment of actual damages of PhP 4.5 million, the clerk of
court correctly assessed the amount of PhP 120,758.80 as docket fees based on the total amount
of PhP 8 million consisting of PhP 3 million as moral damages, PhP 3 million as exemplary
damages, and PhP 2 million as attorney’s fees.
In disputing the fees paid by petitioners, respondent relies on our ruling in Manchester, where
we said that “all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.”
EIB insinuates that petitioners, by alleging the substantial loss of PhP 4.5 million from the sale of
the DMCI shares but not specifying the amount in their prayer, circumvented
the Manchester ruling to evade the payment of the correct filing fees. This postulation is
incorrect. It is clear that petitioners demanded the return of the DMCI shares in the prayer of the
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complaint and NOT the alleged loss in the value of the shares. If the DMCI shares are returned,
then no actual damages are suffered by petitioners. A recall of the averment in par. 9 of the
complaint shows that the alleged loss of PhP 4.5 million to petitioners resulted from the sale of
DMCI shares at PhP 0.24 per share when they acquired it at PhP 0.38 per share. More
importantly, the court was proscribed by the Manchester ruling from granting actual damages of
PhP 4.5 million to petitioners, because precisely the alleged damages were never sought in the
prayer. Ergo, EIB’s attack on the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction must fail. Pacific Rehouse
Corporation, et al. vs. EIB Securities, Inc., G.R. No. 184036, October 13, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court
improperly exercised its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitra’s petition failed to
allege and show errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC. They also stress that the Court should respect and consider the COMELEC’s findings
of fact to be final and non-reviewable. The COMELEC’s submission in this regard – that the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the
factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari – is wholly erroneous. This submission appears to have confused the standards of
the Court’s power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, leading the
COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitra’s petition before the Court.
To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via a petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we
emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not
under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground, i.e., on the
jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The basis for the
Court’s review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that “[U]nless otherwise provided by
[the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought
to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.” For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64)
specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This
Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for certiorari,
subject to the exception clause – “except as hereinafter provided.”
In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited
constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
(although with a different reglementary period for filing) and not to an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court now clearly specifies that the mode of review is the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65, except as therein provided. In Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:
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The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.
The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power,
pointedly states that –
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave
abuse of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review by
appeal that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC’s position that patently
confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with
the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs.
Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938,
October 19, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction over rulings of COMELEC; review of factual
issues.We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents’ proposition that the Court
erred in exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction. Although the COMELEC is admittedly the
final arbiter of all factual issues as the Constitution and the Rules of Court provide, we stress that
in the presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not to
shy away from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to
resolve the factual issues. As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized
exceptions to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in a certiorari case the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence. One such exception is when the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the
point of being grossly unreasonable. In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution
to intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave abuse of
discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.
Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitra’s submissions and arguments on grave abuse of
discretion, namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a
COC proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material
representation to deceive the electorate. In fact, Mitra’s petition plainly argued that the
COMELEC’s grave abuse of discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to
deny a COC is deliberate false representation. We completely addressed this issue and, in the
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process, analyzed the reasoning in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.
Second, the private respondents contend that the COMELEC did not use subjective non-legal
standards (i.e., interior decoration of the room) in arriving at its decision; it merely stated how it
perceived Mitra’s alleged residence. The private respondents additionally claim that the
quantum of evidence necessary to overturn the findings of the COMELEC should be clear and
convincing evidence, which level of evidence does not obtain in the present case. The assailed
COMELEC ruling speaks for itself on the matter of the standards the COMELEC used. We found
that the COMELEC plainly used a subjective non-legal standard in its analysis and thereby, the
COMELEC used wrong considerations in arriving at the conclusion that Mitra’s residence at the
Maligaya Feedmill is not the residence contemplated by law. We reiterate that the COMELEC
based its ruling that Mitra did not take up residence in Aborlan largely on the photographs of
Mitra’s Aborlan premises; it concluded that the photographed premises could not have been a
residence because of its assessment of the interior design and furnishings of the room. Thus, the
COMELEC Second Division’s Resolution (which the COMELEC en banc fully supported) did not
merely conclude that Mitra does not live in the photographed premises; more than this, it ruled
that these premises cannot be considered a home or a residence, for lack of the qualities of a
home that the Second Division wanted to see. To quote:
The pictures presented by Mitra of his supposed “residence” are telling. The said pictures show
a small, sparsely furnished room which is evidently unlived in and which is located on the
second floor of a structure that appears like a factory or a warehouse. These pictures likewise
show that the “residence” appears hastily set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any [personality]
which would have imprinted Mitra’s personality thereto such as old family photographs and
memorabilia collected through the years. In fact, an appreciation of Mitra’s supposed
“residence” raises doubts whether or not he indeed lives there. Verily, what is lacking therein
are the loving attention and details inherent in every home to make it one’s residence. Perhaps,
at most, and to this Commission’s mind, this small room could have served as Mitra’s resting
area whenever he visited the said locality but nothing more.
This observation coupled with the numerous statements from former employees and customers
of Maligaya Feed Mill and Farm that Mitra’s residence is located in an unsavory location,
considering the noise and pollution of being in a factory area, and that the same, in fact, had
been Maligaya Feed Mill’s office just a few months back, militates against Mitra’s claim that the
same has been his residence since early 2008. These information make it clear to this
Commission that this room is not a home.
Thus presented, the COMELEC’s requirement of what should be considered a “residence”
cannot but be a highly subjective one that finds no basis in law, in jurisprudence, or even in fact.
Third, we cannot likewise agree with the private respondents’ theory that the quantum of
evidence necessary to overturn the factual findings of the COMELEC should be clear and
convincing evidence, as it misappreciates that we nullified the COMELEC’s findings because it
used the wrong considerations in arriving at its conclusions. The private respondents fail to
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realize that the important considerations in the present case relate to questions bearing on the
cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points are the alleged deliberate
misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan,
Palawan. While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra
adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan
beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. As our Decision discussed and as
repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently
convincing evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly
misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted
evidence. To convince us of their point of view, the private respondents point out that we (1)
totally disregarded the other evidence they submitted, which the COMELEC, on the other hand,
properly considered; (2) disregarded the import of the effectivity of the lease contract, which
showed that it was only effective until February 28, 2010; and (3) disregarded the evidence
showing that Mitra failed to abandon his domicile of origin. These issues are not new issues; we
extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in our July 2, 2010 Decision. At this
point, we only need to address some of the private respondents’ misleading points in order to
clear the air.
1. The private respondents’ reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove
Mitra’s claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced. This
argument is flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-
barred and was only up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the
parties. That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice. What is important is
that it is renewable at the option of the parties. In the absence of any objection from the parties,
the lease contract simply continues and is deemed renewed.
2. In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the
private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy
of Mitra’s alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009
allegedly showing Mitra’s signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before us,
the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra. Although the private
respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined the recently
submitted colored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding;
the “alleged signature” appears to us to be a mere hazy “superimposition” that does not bear
any resemblance at all to Mitra’s signature. We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3,
2009 CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value. It did it not at all carry Mitra’s signature;
his secretary’s positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latter’s
participation and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.
3. The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010,
from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of
the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission
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was made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan. The Certification
pertinently states:
This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office
regarding the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. However, the
Office of the Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of
Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
This certification is issued to MR. BENJAMIN KATON a resident in Penida Subdivision, Puerto
Princesa City for whatever legal purposes may serve him best.
We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons. First, it was filed only
on reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for
resolution. Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove anything; it
is, on its face, contradictory. On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing
records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it
also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is “on the process of gathering
data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in
Aborlan.” Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list
of agricultural business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.
At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitra’s business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed
in the present case. Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental
pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr.
Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple and other witnesses. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Litis pendentia; requisites. Moreover, this Court rejects the contention of petitioners that the
RTC and the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint of respondent on the ground of litis
pendentia, in view of the pendency of the HLURB case. The requisites of litis pendentia are the
following: (a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicatain the other. The causes of action and, logically, the
issues in the two cases, are clearly different, each requiring divergent adjudication. In short,
while there is identity of parties, there are different issues, causes of action, and reliefs prayed
for between them. Contrary to petitioners’ posture, not all the elements of litis pendentia are
present. Appropos is the CA’s ruling:
The suit filed with the HLURB involves: (1) the reinstatement of the petitioners as members of
the respondent, which was their community association; (2) a call for regular annual meetings;
(3) elections for board of directors; ([4]) an accounting of funds; and ([5]) the annulment of the
board resolutions which expelled them as members and disqualified them to be beneficiaries of
the housing program. On the other hand, the ejectment case has in issue the better right of the
petitioners or of the respondent to the physical possession of the lots occupied by petitioners.
Clearly, therefore, no identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for exist in both
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cases. Esmeraldo C. Romullo, et al. vs. Samahang Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound
Homeowners Association, Inc. represented by its President, Paquito Quitalig, G.R. No. 180687,
October 6, 2010
Mediation; effect of failure to appear. In Senarlo v. Judge Paderanga, this Court accentuated that
mediation is part of pre-trial and failure of the plaintiff to appear thereat merits sanction on the
part of the absent party. This court held:
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated 16 October 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised
Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings and Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court grant judges the discretion to dismiss an action for failure of the plaintiff to appear at
mediation proceedings.
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA considers mediation a part of pre-trial and provides sanctions for
the absent party:
12. Sanctions.
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction
including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such sanctions as are provided
under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties
absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.
Under Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, failure of the plaintiff to appear at pre-trial shall
be cause for dismissal of the action:
Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear. – The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal
shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of
the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court
to render judgment on the basis thereof.
Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010.
Mootness. Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she
is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively,
accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may
not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In
short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.” David
E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. etc., et al.
/ Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So
Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010.
Motions; motion for reconsideration. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private
respondents’ arguments are mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same
arguments addressing the issues we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010
Decision. Thus, both the COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and
substantial argument meriting reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments
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proceeds from this same reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties’ original submissions on
issues our Decision has sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and
attention that an oral argument shall require. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on
Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Motions; period to file motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The appellate court was
correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. As pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs.
Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension
of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when
petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court. Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No.
186400, October 20, 2010.
Oral argument. We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondents’ arguments are
mere rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues
we already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision. Thus, both the
COMELEC and private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting
reconsideration. The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same
reasoning; mere reiterations of the parties’ original submissions on issues our Decision has
sufficiently covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral
argument shall require. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V.
Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Parties; foreign corporation; capacity to sue; estoppel. The determination of a corporation’s
capacity is a factual question that requires the elicitation of a preponderant set of facts. As a
rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations doing business in the Philippines cannot file
suits in the Philippines. This is mandated under Section 133 of the Corporation Code, which
reads:
Sec. 133. Doing business without a license. – No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or
intervene in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines, but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or
administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws.
A corporation has a legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For
this reason, a corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the
Philippines. In order to subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country to the
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jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from the Securities and Exchange
Commission and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it cannot
institute a suit in the Philippines.
The exception to this rule is the doctrine of estoppel. Global is estopped from challenging
Surecomp’s capacity to sue. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without
license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted
with and benefited from it. A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a
corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. The
principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking
advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such person has
received the benefits of the contract. Global Business Holdings, Inc. vs. Surecomp Software
B.V., G.R. No. 173463. October 13, 2010
Pleadings; certification on forum shopping; authority of President to execute on behalf of
corporation even without board authorization. In Hutama-RSEA/Super Max Phils., J.V. v. KCD
Builders Corporation,Hutama as petitioner therein questioned the verification and certification
on non-forum shopping of respondent KCD which the latter attached to its Complaint for Sum of
Money filed before the RTC. According to Hutama, KCD’s president did not present any proof
that he is authorized by the corporation to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. In explaining the requirement of verification and certification against forum-shopping
and upholding the authority of the president of the corporation to execute the same sans proof
of authority, this Court has this to say:
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The
party does not need to sign the verification. A party’s representative, lawyer, or any person who
personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
On the other hand, a certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the
plaintiff or principal party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for
relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
It is true that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors
that exercises its corporate powers. However, it is settled – and we have so declared in
numerous decisions – that the president of a corporation may sign the verification and the
certification of non-forum shopping.
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In Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, we held that the lone signature of the University
President was sufficient to fulfill the verification requirement, because such officer had sufficient
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition.
In People’s Aircargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. v. CA, we held that in the absence of a charter
or by-law provision to the contrary, the president of a corporation is presumed to have the
authority to act within the domain of the general objectives of its business and within the scope
of his or her usual duties. Moreover, even if a certain contract or undertaking is outside the
usual powers of the president, the corporation’s ratification of the contract or undertaking and
the acceptance of benefits therefrom make the corporate president’s actions binding on the
corporation. (Citations omitted.)
Moreover, this Court’s pronouncement in Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, reiterated in PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division
Workers Organization v. PNCC Skyway Corporation and Mid-Pasig Land Development
Corporation v. Tablante, on the authority of certain officers and employees of the corporation to
sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping is likewise significant, to wit:
It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the Corporation Code, clearly
enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised, all business conducted, and all properties
controlled by the board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from
its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the board of
directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot solely exercise any
corporate power pertaining to the corporation without authority from the board of
directors. This has been our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.
In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of some corporate officers to sign
the verification and certification against forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. CA, we recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager to
sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; in Pfizer v. Galan, we upheld the
validity of a verification signed by an “employment specialist” who had not even presented any
proof of her authority to represent the company; in Novelty Philippines Inc., v. CA, we ruled that
a personnel officer who signed the petition but did not attach the authority from the company is
authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping certificate; and in Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company v. WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (Lepanto), we ruled
that the Chairperson of the Board and President of the Company can sign the verification and
certificate against non-forum shopping even without the submission of the board’s authorization.
In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the
Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.
While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the
verification and certification required by the rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the
authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to
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justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the
verification or certificate against forum shopping, being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition’. (Citations omitted.)
From the foregoing, it is clear that Albao, as President and Manager of Cebu Metro, has the
authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping even without the
submission of a written authority from the board. As the corporation’s President and Manager,
she is in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. In
addition, such an act is presumed to be included in the scope of her authority to act within the
domain of the general objectives of the corporation’s business and her usual duties in the
absence of any contrary provision in the corporation’s charter or by-laws. Having said this,
there is therefore no more need to discuss whether the authority granted to Albao under Board
Resolution No. 2001-06 is only limited to representing Cebu Metro in the court hearings before
the MTCC or extends up to signing of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
on appeal. Again, even without such proof of authority, Albao, as Cebu Metro’s President and
Manager, is justified in signing said verification and certification. Thus, the CA should not have
considered as fatal Cebu Metro’s failure to attach a Secretary’s Certificate attesting to Albao’s
authority to sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and dismissed the
petition or should have reinstated the same after Cebu Metro’s submission of the Secretary’s
Certificate showing that Board Resolution No. 2001-06 confirmed the election of Albao as the
corporation’s President and Manager. Moreover, the fact that the Board of Directors of Cebu
Metro ratified Albao’s authority to represent the corporation in the appeal of the MTCC Decision
in Civil Case No. R-44430 before the RTC, CA, and this Court, and consequently to sign the
verification and certification on its behalf by the passage of Resolution No. 2004-05 confirming
and affirming her authority only gives this Court more reason to uphold such authority. Cebu
Metro Pharmacy, Inc. vs. Euro-Med Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 164757, October 18, 2010.
Pleadings; certification on forum shopping; necessity of board resolution; subsequent
compliance does not excuse failure to comply with requirement in first instance. In particular,
on the matter of the certificate of non-forum shopping that was similarly at issue, Tible pointedly
said:
x x x the requirement under Administrative Circular No. 04-94 for a certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory. The subsequent compliance with said requirement does not excuse a
party’s failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where this Court excused
the non-compliance with the requirement of the submission of a certificate of non-forum
shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict
application of said Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
This same rule was echoed in Mediserv v. Court of Appeals where we said in the course of
allowing a liberal justification:
It is settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in situations where there may
be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not
subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
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with the rules. After all, rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
they are used only to help secure substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
To be sure, BPI’s cited Shipside case also involved the absence of proof – attached to the
petition – that the filing officer was authorized to sign the verification and non-forum shopping
certification. In the Motion for Reconsideration that followed the dismissal of the case, the
movant attached a certificate issued by its board secretary stating that ten (10) days prior to the
filing of the petition, the filing officer had been authorized by petitioner’s board of directors to
file said petition. Thus, proper authority existed but was simply not attached to the petition. On
this submission, the petitioner sought and the Court positively granted relief.
In the present case, we do not see a situation comparable to the cited Shipside. BPI did not
submit any proof of authority in the first instance because it did not believe that a board
resolution evidencing such authority was necessary. We note that instead of immediately
submitting an appropriate board resolution – after the First Union and Linda filed their motion to
dismiss – BPI argued that it was not required to submit one and even argued that:
The Complaint can only be dismissed under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure if there was no certification against forum shopping. The Complaint has. The
provision cited does not even require that the person certifying show proof of his authority to do
so x x x.
In fact, BPI merely attached to its opposition a special power of attorney issued by Mr. Kabigting,
a bank vice-president, granting Asis and Ong the authority to file the complaint. Thus, no direct
authority to file a complaint was initially ever given by BPI – the corporate entity in whose name
and behalf the complaint was filed. Only in its Reply to the Comment to plaintiff’s Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss did BPI “beg the kind indulgence of the Honorable Court as
it inadvertently failed to submit with the Special Power of Attorney the Corporate Secretary’s
Certificate which authorized Mr. Zosimo Kabigting to appoint his substitutes. Even this
submission, however, was a roundabout way of authorizing the filing officers to file the
complaint.
BPI, interestingly, never elaborated nor explained its belatedly claimed inadvertence in failing to
submit a corporate secretary’s certificate directly authorizing its representatives to file the
complaint; it particularly failed to specify the circumstances that led to the claimed inadvertence.
Under the given facts, we cannot but conclude that, rather than an inadvertence, there was an
initial unwavering stance that the submission of a specific authority from the board was not
necessary. In blunter terms, the omission of the required board resolution in the complaint was
neither an excusable deficiency nor an omission that occurred through inadvertence. In the
usual course in the handling of a case, the failure was a mistake of counsel that BPI never cared
to admit but which nevertheless bound it as a client. From this perspective, BPI’s case is
different from Shipside so that the ruling in this cited case cannot apply.
Under the circumstances, what applies to the present case is the second paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which states:
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Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
We thus hold that the dismissal of the case is the appropriate ruling from this Court, without
prejudice to its refiling as the Rules allow.
We end this Decision by quoting our parting words in Melo v. Court of Appeals:
We are not unmindful of the adverse consequence to private respondent of a dismissal of her
complaint, nor of the time, effort, and money spent litigating up to this Court solely on a so-
called technical ground. Nonetheless, we hold that compliance with the certification
requirement on non-forum shopping should not be made subject to a party’s afterthought, lest
the policy of the law be undermined.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168313. October 6,
2010
Pleadings; failure to state cause of action. We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the
RTC-Branch 227 should not have dismissed respondent’s complaint for damages on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action. According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a
cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. When the
ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined
only from the facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider
other matters aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the
complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with the prayer stated
therein.
Respondent made the following allegations in support of his claim for damages against
petitioners:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
28. After the promulgation of the Metropolitan Trial Court of its Decision dated August 3,
1999, ordering the [herein respondent] and all person claiming rights under him to –
(a) Vacate the leased premises;
(b) pay the [herein petitioners] the sum of P306,000.00 as unpaid rentals from May 23,
1997 to November 22, 1998; and
(c) pay the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees;
But while said Decision was still pending appeal with the Regional Trial Court, the [petitioners],
through [petitioner] Manaloto, already distributed copies of said Decision to some of the
homeowners of Horseshoe Village, who personally know the [respondent]. This act is a direct
assault or character assassination on the part of the [respondent] because as stated in the said
decision, [respondent] has been staying in the premises but did not or refused to pay his
monthly rentals for a long period of time when in truth and in fact was untrue.
29. That from the time the said decision was distributed to said members homeowners, the
[respondent] became the subject of conversation or talk of the town and by virtue of which
[respondent’s] good name within the community or society where he belongs was greatly
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damaged; his reputation was besmirched; [respondent] suffered sleepless night and serious
anxiety. [Respondent], who is the grandson of the late Senator Jose Veloso and Congressman
Ismael Veloso, was deprived of political career and to start with was to run as candidate for
Barangay Chairman within their area which was being offered to him by the homeowners but
this offer has started to fade and ultimately totally vanished after the distribution of said
Decision. Damages to his good names and reputations and other damages which he suffered as
a consequence thereof, may be reasonably compensated for at least P1,500,000.00 as moral
and consequential damages.
30. In order to deter [petitioners] and others from doing as abovementioned, [petitioners]
should likewise be assessed exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
A cause of action (for damages) exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages. We find that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent
may not have specifically identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined from
the allegations in his complaint.
First, respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and reputation. Every
man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name. This right is protected by law
with the recognition of slander and libel as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or
tortuous conduct.
Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent’s good name even though they are
opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19 of the Civil Code requires, “[e]very
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” A violation of such principle
constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct. We expounded in Sea Commercial Company,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals that:
XXX XXX XXX
Petitioners are also expected to respect respondent’s “dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind” under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which provides:
XXX XXX XXX
Thus, Article 2219(10) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages for acts and
actions referred to in Article 26, among other provisions, of the Civil Code.
And third, respondent alleged that the distribution by petitioners to Horseshoe Village
homeowners of copies of the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case, which was adverse
to respondent and still on appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, had no apparent lawful or just
purpose except to humiliate respondent or assault his character. As a result, respondent suffered
damages – becoming the talk of the town and being deprived of his political career.
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Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MeTC decision
in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records.
It is already settled that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records and
documents. However, this is not a case of the public seeking and being denied access to
judicial records and documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners of
the MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners, who were not
involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly affecting negatively respondent’s
good name and reputation among said homeowners. The unlawful detainer case was a private
dispute between petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was
then still pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect petitioners’ intentions for
distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-parties in the case. While petitioners were free
to copy and distribute such copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether
they did so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter’s good name and
reputation in the community. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365,
October 6, 2010.
Pleadings; failure to state cause of action; hypothetical admission. We cannot subscribe to
respondent’s argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties
since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for damages,
hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations. The hypothetical admission of respondent’s
allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint
sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious;
it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for
presentation of evidence by the parties. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso III, G.R.
No. 171365, October 6, 2010.
Procedural rules; cannot be discarded with mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit. There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the
novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation
of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must
be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming
substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to
orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded
as mandatory. Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010.
Procedural rules; instance where strict application is unwarranted. Herein respondent Samsung
instituted Civil Case No. 97-86265 before the RTC, to recover the amount it claims to have lost
due to the negligence of petitioner Real Bank, Inc., clearly a property right. The substantive
right of respondent Samsung to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be diminished
by an unwarranted strictness in the application of a rule of procedure. In Calalang v. Court of
Appeals, this Court underscored that unless a party’s conduct is so negligent, irresponsible,
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contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal for non-appearance, the
court should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount into achieving the desired
end. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that in the absence of a
pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the
mandatory requirement of the rules, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their
authority to dismiss.
While not at the fore of this case, it may be stated that the state of the court docket cannot justify
injudicious case dismissals. Inconsiderate dismissals, even without prejudice, do not constitute
apanacea or a solution to the congestion of court dockets; while they lend a deceptive aura of
efficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between
the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by
a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of cases before the court.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties in Civil Case No.
97-86265 are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues in a full blown trial. Besides,
petitioner Real Bank, Inc. would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with Civil Case No.
97-86265 as it is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.
Real Bank Inc. vs. Samsung Mabuhay Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 175862, October 13, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application must be justified by ample reasons. This Court has
repeatedly emphasized the need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements
it imposes. The verification of a complaint and the attachment of a certificate of non-forum
shopping are requirements that – as pointed out by the Court, time and again – are basic,
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness. Thus, we cannot simply and in a general
way apply – given the factual circumstances of this case – the liberal jurisprudential exception
in Shipside and its line of cases to excuse BPI’s failure to submit a board resolution. While we
may have excused strict compliance in the past, we did so only on sufficient and justifiable
grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the effective negation of the intent of
the rule on non-forum shopping. In other words, the rule for the submission of a certificate of
non-forum shopping, proper in form and substance, remains to be a strict and mandatory rule;
any liberal application has to be justified by ample and sufficient reasons that maintain the
integrity of, and do not detract from, the mandatory character of the rule. The rule, its relaxation
and their rationale were discussed by the Court at length in Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal
Savings and Loan Association where we said:
Much reliance is placed on the rule that “Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn
of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around.” This rule must always be used in the right
context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.
It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld, and the
suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This Court previously
explained:
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The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times
encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of
indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. It has long
been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the
prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit
the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of
substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not
intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under
which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge.
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the
orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order
to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. We have been cautioned and reminded
in Limpot v. Court of Appeals, et al., that:
Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the
protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to
propose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as often
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much
misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the courts is to give both kinds of law, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the
parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever
the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
xxxx
x x x (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
them may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. x x x While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the
issues and their just resolution. Justice eschews anarchy.
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 168313. October 6,
2010
Procedural rules; strict and rigid application avoided to secure substantial justice. As we have
ruled often enough, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense;
rules of procedure are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. As we
explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
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eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already
declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case.
x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied
rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. [Emphasis supplied.]
Similarly, in de Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, we had occasion to state:
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in
rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm
that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around.Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
“should give way to the realities of the situation. [Emphasis supplied.]
We made the same recognition in Barnes, on the underlying premise that a court’s primordial
and most important duty is to render justice; in discharging the duty to render substantial justice,
it is permitted to re-examine even a final and executory judgment. Apo Fruits Corporation, et al.
vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164195, October 12, 2010.
Writ of possession; issuance not ministerial where third party holds property adversely to
judgment debtor. This rule, however, is not without exception. Under Section 33, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, which is made to apply suppletorily to the extrajudicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgages by Section 6, Act 3135, as amended, the possession of the mortgaged property
may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. Section 33 provides:
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given.
If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate
of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so
redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and
notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled
to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire
period of one (1) year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The
deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the
latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in
office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser
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or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
The same issue had been raised in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Icot, Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood Association, Dayot v. Shell Chemical Company (Phils.),
Inc., and Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, and we uniformly held that the
obligation of the court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in
possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The
purchaser’s right of possession is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his
successor-in-interest but not against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter. In
this case, petitioner opposed the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground that he is in
actual possession of the mortgaged property under a claim of ownership. He explained that his
title to the property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified deed of donation executed in favor of
spouses Peñaredondo. Because of this falsification, he filed civil and criminal cases against
spouses Peñaredondo to nullify the deed of donation and to punish the party responsible for the
falsified document. Petitioner’s claim that he is in actual possession of the property is not
challenged, and he has come to court asserting an ownership right adverse to that of the
mortgagors, the spouses Peñaredondo.
The third party’s possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a
presumption which may be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of
the property. Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of the adverse possession by the
third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the
opportunity to be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property only after he has been
given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with the time-honored principle of due
process. The Civil Code protects the actual possessor of a property, as Article 433 thereof
provides:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
One who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by another must bring the appropriate
judicial action for its physical recovery. The “judicial process” could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or a reivindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending
parties may be properly heard and adjudicated. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession filed by respondent, strictly speaking, is not the kind of judicial process
contemplated in Article 433 of the Civil Code. Even if the same may be considered a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it
is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court where an action for foreclosure is filed
before the RTC where the mortgaged property or any part thereof is situated, any property
brought within the ambit of Act 3135 is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court
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of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made. As such,
a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed property, who claims a right
superior to that of the original mortgagor, is given no opportunity to be heard on his claim. It
stands to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the strength of a
mere ex partepossessory writ, since to do so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in
violation of the basic tenets of due process.
The Court cannot sanction a procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against petitioner, an
unwitting third party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would amount
to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention. Hence, it was
not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act 3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster
of petitioner from the lot subject of this instant case, particularly in light of the latter’s opposition,
claim of ownership and rightful possession of the disputed properties.
In granting respondent’s petition, the appellate court cited Ancheta v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, Inc. and PNB v. Sanao Marketing Corporation. The invocation of these cases is
misplaced. These cases involved the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession pending
the determination of the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure proceedings filed by the
mortgagor or by at least one of the mortgagors who was a party to the foreclosure proceedings.
We held then that the pendency of such determination is not a bar to the issuance of the
possessory writ as no discretion is left to the issuing judge. The above-cited cases have different
factual milieu which makes them inapplicable to the present case. In Ancheta and PNB, the
oppositors were parties to the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings; in the present case, the
oppositor was a third party who was a stranger to the mortgage and who did not participate in
the foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, in Ancheta and PNB, the oppositors objected to the
issuance of the writ because of the pendency of a case for the annulment of the real estate
mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings; while petitioner herein objected because he is in
actual possession of the foreclosed property and he is claiming the right of ownership adverse to
that of the mortgagor, the spouses Peñaredondo. These factual circumstances in the instant case
call for the application not of Ancheta and PNB but of the other set of cases thoroughly
discussed above declaring that the issuance of the possessory writ is not a ministerial duty of the
RTC judge. Emmanuel C. Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors Corporation, G.R. No.
177881. October 13, 2010
Writ of possession; nature and instances of issuance. A writ of possession is an order of the court
commanding the sheriff to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. It may
be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act 3135,
as amended by Act 4118, either 1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a
bond, or 2) after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond or of a separate and
independent action. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner
of the property purchased if it is not redeemed within one year after the registration of the sale.
As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in
possession at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to
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him of a new TCT. Time and again, we have held that it is ministerial upon the court to issue a
writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. Upon the filing
of an ex parte motion and the approval of the corresponding bond, the court issues the order for
a writ of possession. The writ of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing
and approval of a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new TCT in the
name of the purchaser. Emmanuel C. Villanueva vs. Cherdan Lending Investors
Corporation, G.R. No. 177881. October 13, 2010
Special Proceedings
Writ of Habeas Corpus. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas
corpusand amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s
daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of
his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was “life threatening”; although
Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat
Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical
treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with
a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s
Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation
from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail
because she was charged with a non-bailable offense. Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the
CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is
there an affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the
NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared
unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not
held in high regard by petitioner So’s and accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit
for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the
threatened act or omission complained of – confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases – should
be illegal or unlawful.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ ofhabeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
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The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules.
In Lourdes D.Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy
a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan,
P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, we qualified:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.
It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought
to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted
and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37,
Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, we intoned:
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact,
is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ
of habeas corpuswas devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the
cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to
state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance
and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the
petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
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restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred
for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was procedurally
proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be
arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on
his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same
breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for
Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the
law to answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer
under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused
Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have,
can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the
cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.”
Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably
foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court. In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA
said:
We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court
when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the
hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that
Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object.
Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for habeas
corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elena’s
confinement at NCMH was lawful.
Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is
rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open
court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that
the latter raised the issue of contempt.
Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente
and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17,
2010Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
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David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.
etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter
Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010.
Other Proceedings
Appeal; petition for review is correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts.Petitioners contend that the proper mode or remedy that should have been taken by the
LBP in assailing the Decision of the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, is a petition for
review and not an ordinary appeal. The Court does not completely agree. This same issue was
squarely addressed and settled by the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, wherein
it was ruled that a petition for review is indeed the correct mode of appeal from decisions of
Special Agrarian Courts. Therein, the Court held that “Section 60 of Republic Act No. 6657
clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted.”
However, in a Resolution issued by the Court en banc, dated March 20, 2003, which ruled on
the motion for reconsideration filed by the LBP, the Court clarified that its decision in De
Leon shall apply only to cases appealed from the finality of the said Resolution. The Court held:
x x x LBP pleads that the subject Decision should at least be given prospective application
considering that more than 60 similar agrarian cases filed by LBP via ordinary appeal before the
Court of Appeals are in danger of being dismissed outright on technical grounds on account of
our ruling herein. This, according to LBP, will wreak financial havoc not only on LBP as the
financial intermediary of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program but also on the national
treasury and the already depressed economic condition of our country. Thus, in the interest of
fair play, equity and justice, LBP stresses the need for the rules to be relaxed so as to give
substantial consideration to the appealed cases.
xxxx
On account of the absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657
regarding the proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts, as well as the
conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for availing of the
wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on [a ruling issued by the CA holding
that an ordinary appeal is the proper mode], LBP acted on the mistaken belief that an ordinary
appeal is the appropriate manner to question decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Hence, in the light of the aforementioned circumstances, we find it proper to emphasize the
prospective application of our Decision dated September 10, 2002. A prospective application of
our Decision is not only grounded on equity and fair play, but also based on the constitutional
tenet that rules of procedure shall not impair substantive rights.
xxxx
We hold that our Decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal from
judgments of Special Agrarian Courts, is a rule of procedure which affects substantive rights. If
our ruling is given retroactive application, it will prejudice LBP’s right to appeal because
pending appeals in the Court of Appeals will be dismissed outright on mere technicality thereby
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sacrificing the substantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending
case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith
thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to
the motion for reconsideration dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we
clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September 10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a
petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian Courts shall
apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
In the present case, the LBP filed its Notice of Appeal on September 1, 1998. Thus, pursuant to
the ruling that De Leon shall be applied prospectively from the finality of this Court’s Resolution
dated March 20, 2003, the appeal of the LBP, which was filed prior to that date, could, thus, be
positively acted upon. Jorge L. Tiangco, et al. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 153998,
October 6, 2010
Intra-Corporate Controversies; motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Rule 1 of
theInterim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies specifically prohibits the filing of
motions for reconsideration, to wit:
Sec. 8. Prohibited pleadings. – The following pleadings are prohibited:
(1) Motion to dismiss;
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of judgment or order, or for re-opening of trial;
(4) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper, except those filed
due to clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath; and
(5) Motion for postponement and other motions of similar intent, except those filed due to
clearly compelling reasons. Such motion must be verified and under oath. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
With the above proscription, the RTC in the first place should not have issued the December 3,
2003 Order denying the UOB Group’s motion for reconsideration, which WINCORP adopted.
The remedy of an aggrieved party like WINCORP is to file a petition for certiorari within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the assailed order and not to file a motion for reconsideration, the latter
being a prohibited pleading. Here, WINCORP should have filed the petition for certiorari before
the CA on or before January 12, 2004. It was, however, filed only on February 13, 2004. With
that, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright for being filed late. Westmont
Investment Corporation vs. Farmix Fertilizer Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 165876, October 4,
2010
Intra-Corporate Controversies; pre-trial and judgment before pre-trial. Further, the conduct of a
pre-trial is mandatory under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
Rule 4, Section 1 of the Interim Rules provides:
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Section 1. Pre-trial conference; mandatory nature. – Within five (5) days in Rule 3 hereof,
whichever comes later, the court shall issue and serve an order immediately setting the case for
pre-trial conference and directing the after the period for availment of, and compliance with, the
modes of discovery prescribed parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs. The parties shall
file with the court and furnish each other copies of their respective pre-trial brief in such manner
as to ensure its receipt by the court and the other party at least five (5) days before the date set
for pre-trial.
Rule 4, Section 4 further states:
Sec. 4. Judgment before pre-trial. – If, after submissionof the pre-trial briefs, the court determines
that, upon consideration of the pleadings, the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
parties, a judgment may be rendered, the court may order the parties to file simultaneously their
respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty (20) days from receipt of the
order. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment, either full or otherwise, not later than ninety
(90) days from the expiration of the period to file the memoranda.
However, the RTC never ordered the submission of the parties’ pre-trial briefs. Neither were
they made to submit their memoranda. Earlier in the proceedings, both parties were ordered to
submit their memoranda on the issue of whether the RTC should proceed with the hearing of the
case on the merits. Both parties agreed that it should. They believed that the case was not yet
ripe for final disposition and that the RTC should proceed to hear the case on the principal
prayer for the nullification of the Amended By-laws of the Foundation. Thus, petitioners said:
Therefore, in so far as the Petitioners [herein respondents] are concerned, there appears to be
three remaining matters that needs (sic) to be resolved: the nullification of the by-laws, the
proscription from the enforcement of the recently amended by-laws by the respondents and the
matter of the attorney’s fees. Petitioners [herein respondents] may have presented evidence on
the first two but the third cause of action does not appear to have been ventilated as yet. There
is also the matter of the compulsory counterclaim of the Respondents [herein petitioners], which
was not yet likewise heard. This would verily take this case out of that classification of being
ready for final resolution or disposition of the intra-corporate dispute.
On the other hand, respondents said:
However, the SEC has not ruled yet on the parties’ respective formal offer of Exhibits relative to
the injunction issue; and was yet to hear the main case where one of the main reliefs prayed for
was the declaration of the nullity of the assailed amended By-laws.
Likewise, the Judgment of the RTC is bereft of any justification for dispensing with the pre-trial
and trial. There was no discussion of any agreement by the parties to dispense with the trial and
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. In fact, because there was no pre-
trial, it remains unclear exactly what issues are to be resolved by the trial court. Manuel D.
Recto, et al. vs. Bishop Federico O. Escaler, S.J., et al., G.R. No. 173179, October 20, 2010.
Registration proceeding (application for issuance of Certificate of Ancestral Land Title); does not
constitute litis pendentia over reivindicatory case. The application for issuance of a Certificate of
Ancestral Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration proceeding. It also seeks
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an official recognition of one’s claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of
ancestral lands is for the purpose of “officially establishing” one’s land as an ancestral land. Just
like a registration proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest ownership upon the
applicant but only recognizes ownership that has already vested in the applicant by virtue of his
and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession of the property since time immemorial. As aptly
explained in another case:
It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused with a certificate of
title. Registering land under the Torrens system does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question
involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court
will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present their respective evidence on
the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said issue. x x
x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise apropos is the following explanation:
The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs over the property] did not operate to
vest upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It
has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the [respondents] wished
to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for recovery of
possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. x x x
Certificates of title do not establish ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication of ownership. In fact, if it is later on
found in another case (where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that the registrant
is not the owner of the property, the real owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title
transferred to his name.
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not a
conclusive adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory
case where the issue is ownership. or litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an
action, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding
particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.” The
third element is missing, for any judgment in the certification case would not constitute res
judicata or be conclusive on the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since
there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the reivindicatory case to be suspended or
dismissed in favor of the certification case.
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners’ contention that
respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that “forum shopping exists where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
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to res judicatain the other.” Delfin Lamsis, et al. vs. Margarita Semon Dong-e, G.R. No. 173021,
October 20, 2010.
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages; scope. Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is
unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on
March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage
extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word
“marriages.” A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room
for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule orverba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the
index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from
the words of a statute there should be no departure.” Cynthia S. Bolos vs. Danilo T. Bolos, G.R.
No. 186400, October 20, 2010.
Writ of Amparo. As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s
daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that the conditions and circumstances of
his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was “life threatening”; although
Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat
Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical
treatment and the right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with
a non-bailable offense, the CA directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s
Medical Center, while noting that because of the peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation
from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande should have been confined in jail
because she was charged with a non-bailable offense. Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the
CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court by Justice Pizarro, is
there an affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the
NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente in ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared
unlawful. On the contrary, the NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not
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held in high regard by petitioner So’s and accused Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit
for trial.
The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the
threatened act or omission complained of – confinement and custody for habeas corpus and
violations of, or threat to violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases – should
be illegal or unlawful.
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:
Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ ofhabeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules.
In Lourdes D.Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy
a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan,
P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, we qualified:
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to
life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life.
It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought
to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted
and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the
desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations.
In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37,
Director General Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and
Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson, we intoned:
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus,
the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact,
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is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ
of habeas corpuswas devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. xxx The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the
petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the
cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter
found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to
state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance
and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the
petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not
detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred
for treatment of a supposed mental condition. In addition, we note that it was procedurally
proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be
arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer of accused to St. Clare’s
Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report on
his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same
breath, the CA also ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for
Qualified Theft before the same trial court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the
law to answer for the non-bailable criminal charge against her, and was simply allowed to
pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her choice.
Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer
under peril to be confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused
Guisande’s person, and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not have,
can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the
cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, is defined as “one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.”
Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably
foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before this Court. In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA
said:
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We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court
when they stated in their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the
hearing on the petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that
Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to which [petitioners] did not anymore object.
Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in the instant case for habeas
corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not Elena’s
confinement at NCMH was lawful.
Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is
rendered moot and academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open
court Order on December 8, 2009, which was favorable to [David So], and it was only later that
the latter raised the issue of contempt.
Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente
and the NCMH], and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17,
2010Resolution, the instant petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
SO ORDERED.
David E. So, on behalf of his daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.
etc., et al. / Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., etc., et al. vs. David E. So, on behalf of his daughter
Maria Elena So Guisande, G.R. Nos. 190108, 190473. October 19, 2010.
Evidence
Actual damages; evidence required. As to Rudlin’s counterclaim for reimbursement of its
expenses in repairing the defective waterproofing, not a single receipt was presented by Rudlin
to prove that such expense was actually incurred by it. Under the Civil Code, one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved. The award of actual damages must be based on the evidence presented, not on the
personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
nonsubstantial proof. The testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera on the total cost allegedly spent by
Rudlin in repairing the waterproofing works does not suffice. A court cannot rely on
speculations, conjectures or guesswork as to the fact of damage but must depend upon
competent proof that they have indeed been suffered by the injured party and on the basis of the
best evidence obtainable as to the actual amount thereof. It must point out specific facts that
could provide the gauge for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages were
borne. Financial Building Corporation vs.. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin
International Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation, G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No.
164347. October 4, 2010
Burden of proof in action to annul foreclosure proceedings. It is an elementary rule that the
“burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.” In Cristobal v. Court
of Appeals, the Court explicitly ruled that foreclosure proceedings enjoy the presumption of
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regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving
such fact, to wit:
Further, as respondent bank asserts, a mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the
burden of establishing that fact. Petitioners failed in this regard. Foreclosure proceedings have in
their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the
petitioners. As well said by the respondent appellate court:
“. . . Under the circumstances, there is a basis for presuming that official duty has been regularly
performed by the sheriff. Being a disputable presumption, the same is valid unless controverted
by evidence. The presumption has not been rebutted by any convincing and substantial
evidence by the appellee who has the onus to present evidence that appellant has not complied
with the posting requirement of the law. In the absence therefore of any proof to the contrary,
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stays.” (Emphases supplied.)
In this case, it was respondents who instituted Civil Case No. 01-1564 seeking the annulment of
the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgaged properties on the ground of non-compliance
with the requirements of the law on the posting of the notices of sale. Thus, the burden falls
upon respondents to prove the fact of non-compliance; but respondents miserably failed in this
regard. Respondents did not present any evidence at all to establish that the notices of sale were
not posted as required under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Instead, respondents
merely focused on how Notary Public Magpantay’s Certificate of Posting was worded, and
emphasized on technicalities and semantics. Respondents insist that the phrase “on the 15th day
of November 1999, I have caused the posting of three (3) copies of Notice of Sale” in the
Certificate of Posting meant that Notary Public Magpantay posted the notices for only one
day, i.e., on November 15, 1999. This is a rather specious interpretation of the aforequoted
phrase. It is more logical and reasonable to understand the same phrase as to mean that the
notices were posted beginning November 15, 1999 until the issuance of the certificate on
December 9, 1999. There is also no basis to require the notary public’s certificate to exactly
state that the notices of sale were posted at “public places.” Notary Public Magpantay’s use of
the words “conspicuous places” in his certificate already satisfactorily complies with the legal
requirement for posting. The adjective “public” may refer to that which is “exposed to general
view,” and “conspicuous” is a synonym thereof.
Moreover, it bears to stress that the Certificate of Posting is actually evidence presented by the
petitioner to establish that copies of the Notice of Sale were indeed posted as required by Act
No. 3135, as amended. Without presenting their own evidence of the alleged lack of posting,
respondents contented themselves with challenging the contents of said certificate. As plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 01-1564, respondents must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the petitioner’s. In addition, despite any defect in the posting of the
Notice of Sale, the Court reiterates its ruling in previous jurisprudence that the publication of the
same notice in a newspaper of general circulation is already sufficient compliance with the
requirement of the law. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M.
Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.
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Burden of proof in civil case. Nevertheless, we further declare that the Court of Appeals erred in
already awarding moral and exemplary damages in respondent’s favor when the parties have
not yet had the chance to present any evidence before the RTC-Branch 227. In civil cases, he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is incumbent
upon the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly prove its claim. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under our Rules. In short,
mere allegations are not evidence.
At this point, the finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of
petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the
duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the
acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not
simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or
interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and
speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument that there is no more need for the presentation of
evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint
for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations. The hypothetical admission of
respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said
complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that
the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint
is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the
case for presentation of evidence by the parties. Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. vs. Ismael Veloso
III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010.
Foreign law; burden of proof; processual presumption. As to petitioners’ contentions that
Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly
provided in respondent’s employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the
terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and
Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs and practices of the
host country, the same was not substantiated. Indeed, a contract freely entered into is
considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their
respective obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy. It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application
of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under the doctrine ofprocessual
presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling in EDI-
Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor
Laws will govern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination,
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termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply
to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the
International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into
play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the
issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010
Foreign law; no judicial notice of foreign law. The Philippines does not take judicial notice of
foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign
law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. (emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and
the Ministry, as represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a
probationary period of one (1) year and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and
Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent
stating that she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
translated copy of the certificate of termination, both of which documents were certified by Mr.
Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Inslamic
Certification and Translation Unit; and respondent’s letter of reconsideration to the Ministry,
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wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of
“Excellent” albeit it changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent
was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of
submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by
Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere
certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination
letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and
that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications
read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice
versa was/were presented to this Office for review and certification and the same was/were
found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose
it may serve. (emphasis supplied)
ATCI Overseas Corporation, et al. vs. Ma. Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551. October 11, 2010
Formal Offer of evidence; not required in proceedings before Bureau of Legal Affairs of
Intellectual Property Office. Preliminarily, it must be noted that the BLA ruled that Shen Dar
failed to adduce evidence in support of its allegations as required under Office Order No. 79,
Series of 2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings, having failed to
formally offer its evidence during the proceedings before it. The BLA ruled:
At the outset, we note petitioner’s failure to adduce any evidence in support of its allegations in
the Petition for Cancellation. Petitioner did not file nor submit its marked evidence as required
in this Bureau’s Order No. 2006-157 dated 25 January 2006 in compliance with Office Order
No. 79, Series of 2005, Amendments to the Regulations on Inter Partes Proceedings. x x x
In reversing such finding, the CA cited Sec. 2.4 of BLA Memorandum Circular No. 03, Series of
2005, which states:
Section 2.4. In all cases, failure to file the documentary evidences in accordance with Sections
7 and 8 of the rules on summary proceedings shall be construed as a waiver on the part of the
parties. In such a case, the original petition, opposition, answer and the supporting documents
therein shall constitute the entire evidence for the parties subject to applicable rules.
The CA concluded that Shen Dar needed not formally offer its evidence but merely needed to
attach its evidence to its position paper with the proper markings, which it did in this case.
The IP Code provides under its Sec. 10.3 that the Director General of the IPO shall establish the
procedure for the application for the registration of a trademark, as well as the opposition to it:
Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs. The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following
functions:
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10.3. The Director General may by Regulations establish the procedure to govern the
implementation of this Section.
Thus, the Director General issued Office Order No. 79, Series of 2005 amending the regulations
onInter Partes Proceedings, Sec. 12.1 of which provides:
Section 12. Evidence for the Parties
12.1. The verified petition or opposition, reply if any, duly marked affidavits of the witnesses,
and the documents submitted, shall constitute the entire evidence for the petitioner or opposer.
The verified answer, rejoinder if any, and the duly marked affidavits and documents submitted
shall constitute the evidence for the respondent. Affidavits, documents and other evidence not
submitted and duly marked in accordance with the preceding sections shall not be admitted as
evidence.
The preceding sections referred to in the above provision refer to Secs. 7.1, 8.1 and 9 which, in
turn, provide:
Section 7. Filing of Petition or Opposition
7.1. The petition or opposition, together with the affidavits of witnesses and originals of the
documents and other requirements, shall be filed with the Bureau, provided, that in case of
public documents, certified copies shall be allowed in lieu of the originals. The Bureau shall
check if the petition or opposition is in due form as provided in the Regulations particularly Rule
3, Section 3; Rule 4, Section 2; Rule 5, Section 3; Rule 6, Section 9; Rule 7, Sections 3 and 5;
Rule 8, Sections 3 and 4. For petition for cancellation of layout design (topography) of integrated
circuits, Rule 3, Section 3 applies as to the form and requirements. The affidavits, documents
and other evidence shall be marked consecutively as “Exhibits” beginning with the letter “A”.
Section 8. Answer
8.1. Within three (3) working days from receipt of the petition or opposition, the Bureau shall
issue an order for the respondent to file an answer together with the affidavits of witnesses and
originals of documents, and at the same time shall notify all parties required to be notified in the
IP Code and these Regulations, provided, that in case of public documents, certified true copies
may be submitted in lieu of the originals. The affidavits and documents shall be marked
consecutively as “Exhibits” beginning with the number “1”.
Section 9. Petition or Opposition and Answer must be verified¾ Subject to Rules 7 and 8 of
these regulations, the petition or opposition and the answer must be verified. Otherwise, the
same shall not be considered as having been filed.
In other words, as long as the petition is verified and the pieces of evidence consisting of the
affidavits of the witnesses and the original of other documentary evidence are attached to the
petition and properly marked in accordance with Secs. 7.1 and 8.1 abovementioned, these shall
be considered as the evidence of the petitioner. There is no requirement under the
abovementioned rules that the evidence of the parties must be formally offered to the BLA. In
any case, as a quasi-judicial agency and as stated in Rule 2, Sec. 5 of the Regulations on Inter
Partes Proceedings, the BLA is not bound by technical rules of procedure. The evidence
attached to the petition may, therefore, be properly considered in the resolution of the case. E.Y.
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Industrial Sales, Inc. and Engracio Yap vs. Shen Dar Electricity Machinery Co., Ltd., G.R. No.
184850, October 20, 2010.
Judicial Notice. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R.
No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of
tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is
tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. The
petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations. The Court cannot
take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must
be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced
by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one
not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2)capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of “common knowledge,” of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge
of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part
of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on
the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners’
apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription
under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of
imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. etc., et al. vs. Anti-Terrorism council, et al./Kilusang
Mayo Uno etc., et al. Vs. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan), et
al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et al./Karapatan, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc.,
et al./The Integrated Bar of the Philippines etc. et al. vs. Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et
al./Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, etc., et
al., G.R. Nos. 178552, 178554, 178581, 178890, 179157, 179461.October 5, 2010
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Parol Evidence Rule; evidence of written agreement. On the issue of the correct total contract
price, we hold that Rudlin failed to substantiate its claim that the contract price stated in the
Construction Agreement (P6,933,268.00) was not the true contract price because it had an
understanding with FBC’s Jaime B. Lo that they would decrease said amount to a mutually
acceptable amount. Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when
the terms of an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all
the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. Rudlin argues that under Section 9,Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, “[t]he
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties
thereto.” Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit “7” failed to accurately reflect an intent of
the parties to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to
seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract. Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Courtstates:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.—When the terms of an agreement have been reduced
to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term “agreement” includes wills.
Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception
obtains only where “the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the
instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the
relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when
they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper
interpretation of the instrument.” Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence is
admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution
of the contract. But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the
testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the
amount of P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that
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FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon
and his associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the
purported actual contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986
Letter-Agreement did not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the
various letters sent by Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to
the execution of the said Letter-Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price
ofP6,933,268.00 which FBC had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents. Financial
Building Corporation vs.. Rudlin International Corporation, et al./Rudlin International
Corporation, et al. vs. Financial Building Corporation, G.R. No. 164186/G.R. No. 164347.
October 4, 2010
Positive testimony stronger than negative testimony. Contrary to the dissent’s view, the sworn
statements of Maligaya Feedmill’s customers and former employees that Mitra did not and could
not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill cannot be given full evidentiary
weight, since these statements are in nature of negative testimonies that do not deserve weight
and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence, particularly, Carme E. Caspe’s testimony,
cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in a process that was accomplished, not in
a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008. It is well-settled in
the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony. Abraham Kahlil
B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No.
191938, October 19, 2010.
Presumptions; conclusive presumption; tenant estopped from denying title of landlord. Finally,
the Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the
validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of
the foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the
tenant or lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, “[t]he tenant is not
permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of
landlord and tenant between them.” The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and
respondents as lessees carries with it a recognition of the lessor’s title. As lessees, then
respondents are estopped to deny their landlord’s title, or to assert a better title not only in
themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased
premises and until they surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel applies even though
the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be
asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title. The
Court quotes with approval the following findings of the RTC:
Further, this Court upholds the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding under the
equitable principle of estoppel. [Herein respondents’] admitted execution of the Contract of
Lease alone establishes that they do not have any cause of action or are estopped from
impugning the validity of the subject extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. In the Contract of
Lease, [respondents’] clearly acknowledge that the subject extrajudicial foreclosure sale was
conducted in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended; that they failed to redeem the
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foreclosed properties within the redemption period; and that [petitioner] has valid and legal
right and title as absolute owner of the foreclosed properties. [Respondents] failed to mention or
question the validity of the Contract of Lease in their Complaint. There being no evidence
presented that [respondents] executed the Contract of Lease by mistake or through violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, [respondents] are bound by the stipulations therein and
to the consequences thereof. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and
Rosalinda M. Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.
Presumptions; disputable presumption; suppression of evidence. Incidentally, the dissent’s
invocation of the adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is erroneous, since it does not
arise when the evidence is at the disposal of both parties. In the present case, the required
proofs of commercial transactions the dissent cites are public documents which are at the
disposal of both parties; they are not solely under the custody of Mitra and can be easily
obtained from the municipal offices of Aborlan had the private respondents been minded to do
so. The bottom line is that no such evidence was ever presented in this case, and none can and
should be considered at this point. Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra vs. Commission on Elections,
Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr., G.R. No. 191938, October 19, 2010.
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. And in Leoncio v. De Vera, this Court has
differentiated a question of law from a question of fact. A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. Republic of
the Philippines vs. Angelo B. Malabanan, et al., G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,
the Court elucidated on the distinction between questions of law and fact:
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is settled. A question of law
exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A
question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Though this
delineation seems simple, determining the true nature and extent of the distinction is sometimes
problematic. For example, it is incorrect to presume that all cases where the facts are not in
dispute automatically involve purely questions of law.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of
reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. If the query requires a re-
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evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Our ruling
in Paterno v. Paterno [G.R. No. 63680, 23 March 1990, 183 SCRA 630] is illustrative on this
point:
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or
weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other
are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt
questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed
in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and
convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full
faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or
not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to
give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact.
It is true that Maxicorp did not contest the facts alleged by petitioners. But this situation does
not automatically transform all issues raised in the petition into questions of law. The issues
must meet the tests outlined in Paterno.
The main issue in the case at bar is whether the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents’
mortgaged properties was valid. The resolution of said issue, however, is dependent on the
answer to the question of whether the legal requirements on the notice of sale were complied
with. Necessarily, the Court must review the evidence on record, most especially, Notary
Public Magpantay’s Certificate of Posting, to determine the weight and probative value to
accord the same. Non-compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual issue. The resolution thereof by the lower courts is
binding and conclusive upon this Court. However, this rule is subject to exceptions, as when
the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in conflict. Also, it must be noted that
non-compliance with the statutory requisites could constitute a jurisdictional defect that would
invalidate the sale. Century Savings Bank vs. Spouses Danilo T. Samonte and Rosalinda M.
Samonte, G.R. No. 176212, October 20, 2010.
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Civil Procedure
Appeal; argument raised for first time on appeal. As a last ditch effort, petitioner asserts that the
property is a road right of way; thus, it cannot be subject of a writ of execution. The argument
must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this petition. In the trial court and the
CA, petitioner’s arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property. It is well
settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the
lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to
the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised
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belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due
process. Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metroplitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 187023,
November 17, 2010.
Appeal; argument raised for first time on appeal. The petitioners now claim that the Motion for
Reconsideration, filed by the respondent on May 18, 1993 from the September 18, 1992 Order
of the RTC, was filed out of time. The petitioners make this claim to justify their contention that
the subsequent rulings of the RTC, including the June 2, 1993 and October 1, 1993 Orders, are
barred by res judicata.
We reject this belated claim as the petitioners raised this only for the first time on appeal,
particularly, in their Memorandum. In fact, the petitioners never raised this issue in the
proceedings before the court a quo or in the present petition for review.
As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and
decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change the theory on appeal. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first
time at such late stage. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity
to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been
aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court. Thus, to permit the petitioners in this
case to change their theory on appeal would thus be unfair to the respondent and offend the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio vs. Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010.
Appeal; findings of administrative agency. All told, Nacu was rightfully found guilty of grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
penalized with dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties. The general rule is that
where the findings of the administrative body are amply supported by substantial evidence, such
findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, and are binding on this Court. It is not
for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses,
or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency
of evidence. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al. G.R. No. 187752,
November 23, 2010.
Appeal; findings of fact of Court of Appeals; when reviewable by Supreme Court. Respondents
To Chip, Yap and Balila next argue that the instant petition raises questions of fact, which are
not allowed in a petition for review on certiorari. They, therefore, submit that the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court categorically states that the petition filed thereunder shall raise only questions of law,
which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
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circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact.
The above rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. As will be discussed further, this
exception is attendant in the case at bar. Cebu Bionic Builders Supply, Inc. and Lydia Sia vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines, et al. G.R. No. 154366, November 17, 2010
Appeal; findings of fact of lower courts. As a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
to it from the CA is limited to the review and revision of errors of law allegedly committed by
the appellate court. The issues raised by petitioners are questions of fact necessarily calling for a
reexamination and reevaluation of the evidence presented at the trial. A question of fact arises
when the doubt or difference pertains to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the
query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole evidence, considering the credibility of
witnesses, the existence and relevance of specific circumstances, and their relation to one
another and to the whole situation. The Court has consistently ruled that findings of fact of trial
courts are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed, except for strong and valid
reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of witnesses
while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and weigh evidence all over
again. The factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive;
hence, they are binding on this Court. The Court will not disturb such factual findings unless
there are compelling or exceptional reasons. No such reasons exist in this case. Constancia G.
Tamayo, et al. vs. Rosalia Abad Señora, et al., G.R. No. 176946, November 15, 2010.
Appeal; findings of fact of trial court. Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with respect to the
operative facts and the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court,
are accorded the highest degree of deference and respect by this Court, except when: (1) the
findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) a
lower court’s inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the court go
beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is misapprehension of facts; and (6) the findings of
fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based are
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. Notably,
none of these exceptions is attendant in this case. Sps. Mariano and Emma Bolaños vs. Roscef
Zuñga Bernarte, et al., G.R. No. 180997, November 17, 2010.
Appeal; notice of appeal; disallowance due to improper substitution of counsel. Given the
foregoing, we are bound to deny a liberal application of the rules on substitution of counsel and
resolve definitively that GOODLAND’s notice of appeal merits a denial, for the failure of Atty.
Mondragon to effect a valid substitution of the counsel on record. Substantial justice would be
better served if the notice of appeal is disallowed. In the same way that the appellant
in Pioneer was not permitted to profit from its own manipulation of the rules on substitution of
counsel, so too can GOODLAND be not tolerated to foster vexatious delay by allowing its
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notice of appeal to carry on. Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051,
November 22, 2010.
Appeal; questions that may be decided; assignment of error. SCP further contends that the CA
denied it its right to procedural and substantive due process, because it granted a relief entirely
different from those sought for by the parties and on which they were neither heard nor given
the opportunity to be heard. Respondent BDO-EPCIB, on the other hand, maintains that the CA
has the power to grant such other appropriate relief as may be consistent with the allegations
and proofs when a prayer for general relief is added to the demand of specific relief. SCP’s
contention deserves merit.
Sec. 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. – No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will
be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an
assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and
clerical errors.
Essentially, the general rule provides that an assignment of error is essential to appellate review
and only those assigned will be considered, save for the following exceptions: (1) grounds not
assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) matters not assigned as
errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law;
(3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at
a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid
dispensing piecemeal justice; (4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised
in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which
the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (5) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal
but which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent. None of these
exceptions exists in this case.
Notably, the prayer portion of the BDO-EPCIB petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 101881 only sought
for the following reliefs:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court that the Decision dated 03
December 2007 of the Court a quo, or the approved Rehabilitation Plan, be MODIFIED
accordingly, thus:
1. Under its Phase 1, the articles of incorporation and by laws of SCP be accordingly
amended to accommodate the additional equity of Php3.0 Billion.
2. Under Phase 2, the present stockholders and/or the Rehabilitation Receiver shall offer for
sale to acceptable investors SCP’s stocks, through negotiated sale or bidding for an amount not
less than Php3.0 Billion, which is equivalent to approximately 64% of SCP; and
3. Under Phase 3, there shall be an immediate conversion of debt to common shares in the
required amount of Php3.0 Billion, which is equivalent to approximately 64% of SCP, pursuant
to the terms and conditions of the Recommended Rehabilitation Plan.
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Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed for.
It is very plain in the language of the prayers of BDO-EPCIB that it only requested the CA
to modify the existing rehabilitation plan. It never sought the termination of the rehabilitation
proceedings. Thus, given the factual backdrop of the case, it was inappropriate for the
CA, motu proprio, to terminate the proceedings. The appellate court should have proceeded to
resolve BDO-EPCIB’s appeal on its merits instead of terminating the proceedings, a result that
has no ground in its pleadings in the CA.
In Abedes v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the difference of appeals in criminal cases
and in civil cases by saying, “Issues not raised in the pleadings, as opposed to ordinary appeal
of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, are deemed waived or
abandoned.” Essentially, to warrant consideration on appeal, there must be discussion of the
error assigned, else, the error will be deemed abandoned or waived.
This Court even went further in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, in which it held
that it is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of the relief sought by the
pleadings, to wit:
The Court of Appeals erred in ordering DBP to return to respondent “the P1,000,000.00” alleged
down payment, a matter not raised in respondent’s Petition for Review before it. In Jose Clavano,
Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, this Court held:
“x x x It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the
pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the theory of the action on which
the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secundum allegata et
probate.” (Italics in original.)
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the
requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent
surprise to the defendant. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, this Court cannot sustain the ruling of the CA insofar as it granted a relief not prayed for by
the BDO-EPCIB. Steel Corporation of the Philippines vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc./DEG-
Deutsche Investitions-Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft MBH vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., G.R. No.
190462G.R. No. 190538, November 17, 2010.
Appeal; scope of review; exceptions. As a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court covers questions of law only. Questions of fact are not reviewable and passed
upon by this Court in its exercise of judicial review. The distinction between questions of law
and questions of fact has been well defined. A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact, on the other
hand, exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The rule, however, admits of exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
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based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The aforementioned exceptions, particularly the seventh exception, finds relevance in the case
at bench since the findings of the CA are clearly in conflict with that of the trial court. For this
reason, the Court is constrained to reevaluate the evidence adduced by both parties to resolve
the issues which boil down to whether or not Losin is liable to Vitarich and, if so, to what
extent. Vitarich Corporation vs. Chona Losin, G.R. No. 181560, November 15, 2010.
Appeal; scope of review by Supreme Court. The Court finds no solid reason to disturb the
findings of the CA. Verily, the evaluation and calibration of the evidence necessarily involves
consideration of factual issues – an exercise that is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of law,
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, the Court is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh again the evidence introduced in, and considered by, the tribunals below.
When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of
the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Unfortunately for the Sevillas, they fail to convince this Court that any of the above exceptions
applies in this case. For this reason, the Court cannot but respect the findings and conclusions
of the lower court. It is precluded from making further investigation on the facts of the case
without violating established rules of procedure. Sps. Eliseo Sevilla and Erna Sevilla vs. Hon.
Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150284, November 22, 2010.
Appeal; scope of review by Supreme Court. The general rule is that in petitions for review on
certiorari, the Court will not re-examine the findings of fact of the appellate court except (a)
when the latter’s findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b)
when its inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is a grave abuse
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of discretion; (d) when its findings of fact are conflicting; and (e) when it goes beyond the issues
of the case. Citibank fails to convince the Court that the case falls under any of the exceptions.
Hence, the findings of fact should no longer be reviewed. Citibank, N.A. vs. Atty. Ernesto S.
Dinopol, G.R. No. 188412, November 22, 2010.
Appeal; scope of review by Supreme Court. After going over the records, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings of the CA on the matter of WSIRI’s claim for commissions.
As this Court has ruled in a long line of cases, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Its
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the
latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. Ledesco
Development Corp. vs. Worldwide Standard International Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 173339.
November 24, 2010.
Certiorari; grant or denial of postponement is matter of discretion. “As a rule, the grant or denial
of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which should
always be predicated on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or
of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby.” Furthermore, this
discretion must be exercised intelligently.
In this case, the Court is of the view that the CTA gave enough opportunity for Milwaukee to
present its rebuttal evidence. Records reveal that when Milwaukee requested for resetting on
September 5, 2005 and October 26, 2005, its motions were granted by the CTA. As a matter of
fact, by January 16, 2006, Milwaukee was already able to partially present its rebuttal
evidence. Thus, when the CTA called on Milwaukee to continue its presentation of rebuttal
evidence on February 27, 2006, it should have been prepared to do so. It cannot be said that the
CTA arbitrarily denied Milwaukee’s supposed simple request of resetting because it had already
given the latter several months to prepare and gather its rebuttal evidence.
Milwaukee tried to reason out that if only the CIR gave an advance notice that it would be
waiving its right to cross-examine its witness, then it could have “rushed the collation and
sorting of its rebuttal documentary exhibits.” The Court, however, is not persuaded.
As stated earlier, Milwaukee was given more than ample time to collate and gather its evidence.
It should have been prepared for the continuance of the trial. True, the incident on said date was
for the cross-examination of Milwaukee’s witness but it could be short; it could be
lengthy. Milwaukee should have prepared for any eventuality. It is discretionary on the part of
the court to allow a piece-meal presentation of evidence. If it decides not to allow it, it cannot
be considered an abuse of discretion. “As defined, discretion is a faculty of a court or an official
by which he may decide a question either way, and still be right.”
Accordingly, Milwaukee’s right to due process was not transgressed. The Court has consistently
reminded litigants that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. The requirement of
due process is satisfactorily met as long as the parties are given the opportunity to present their
side. In the case at bar, Milwaukee was precisely given the right and the opportunity to present
its side. It was able to present its evidence-in-chief and had its opportunity to present rebuttal
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evidence. Milwaukee Industries Corp. vs. Corp. of Appeals and Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 173815, November 24, 2010.
Certiorari; grave abuse of discretion. Our review of the records, particularly the CA decision,
indicates that the CA did not determine the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in
the RTC decision before it. Given that the petition before the CA was a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it appears that the CA instead
incorrectly reviewed the case on the basis of whether the RTC decision on the merits was
correct. To put the case in its proper perspective, the task before us is to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the RTC decision before it. Stated otherwise, did the CA correctly
determine whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling on the case? As discussed below, our review of the records and the CA
decision shows that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing an alias writ of
possession in favor of the respondent. Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio vs. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010.
Certiorari; improper where appeal is available. The Court reiterates that a special civil action
for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. The general rule is that
a writ of certiorari will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved
party. It cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the
availability of that remedy. Certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal, especially if
the party’s own negligence or error in the choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.
The few significant exceptions recognized by the Court are when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate, when the broader interests of justice so require, when the
writs issued are null, or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. Petitioner has not alleged, much less proven, that this case calls for the Court’s
authority to invoke the exceptions.
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege that must be exercised in the manner, and according to procedures, laid down by
law. Perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional; failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, and
deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the judgment or final order, much less to
entertain the appeal.
Thus, given the factual milieu of this case, the trial court had already lost jurisdiction to act on
the motion for clarification. When the decision became final and executory, not even this Court
could have changed the trial court’s disposition absent any showing that the case fell under one
of the recognized exceptions. Victoria L. Teh vs. Natividad Teh Tan, Teh Ki Tiat and Jacinta
Sia, G.R. No. 181956, November 22, 2010.
Certiorari; interlocutory orders of Bureau of Legal Affairs of Intellectual Property Office (BLA-
IPO). As to the second issue raised, the Court, is not persuaded by petitioner’s argument that,
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pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Director General of the IPO and not the CA
has jurisdiction to review the questioned Orders of the Director of the BLA-IPO.
It is true that under Section 7(b) of RA 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code
of the Philippines, which is the presently prevailing law, the Director General of the IPO
exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions rendered by the Director of the BLA-
IPO. However, what is being questioned before the CA is not a decision, but an interlocutory
order of the BLA-IPO denying respondents’ motion to extend the life of the preliminary
injunction issued in their favor. RA 8293 is silent with respect to any remedy available to
litigants who intend to question an interlocutory order issued by the BLA-IPO. Moreover,
Section 1(c), Rule 14 of the Rules and Regulations on Administrative Complaints for Violation of
Laws Involving Intellectual Property Rights simply provides that interlocutory orders shall not be
appealable. The said Rules and Regulations do not prescribe a procedure within the
administrative machinery to be followed in assailing orders issued by the BLA-IPO pending final
resolution of a case filed with them. Hence, in the absence of such a remedy, the provisions of
the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner, as provided under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the same Rules and Regulations. Hence, in the present case, respondents correctly resorted to
the filing of a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to question the assailed Orders of the
BLA-IPO, as they cannot appeal therefrom and they have no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This is consistent with Sections 1 and 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc and Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R.
No. 167715, November 17, 2010.
Certiorari; requirement of motion for reconsideration; exceptions. On the second ground,
Pineda questions DepEd’s failure to move for reconsideration before going to the CA on
certiorari.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a
petition for certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to
correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of
the case. There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil
action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v.
Sandiganbayan, it was written:
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a
patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the
same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the
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proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where
the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. (underscoring supplied)
As previously discussed, the present case concerns the implementation or application of a
DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for
the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the
government. Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the operation of the canteen of a
public secondary school. This is of public interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus,
justifying the relaxation of the settled rule. Michelle I. Pineda vs. Court of Appeals and the
Department of Education, etc., G.R. No. 181643, November 17, 2010.
Certiorari; requisites. In order for a petition for certiorari to succeed, the following requisites
must concur, namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction denotes that the tribunal, board, or officer acted
with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the public respondent
exceeds its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law. Milwaukee Industries Corp. vs. Corp. of Appeals and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 173815, November 24, 2010.
Consolidation; consolidation of appeals in Court of Appeals. Petitioner SCP argues that the CA
deviated from its own Internal Rules when it failed to consolidate the four (4) appeals arising
from the same decision of the rehabilitation court. In fact, it points out to the fact that CA-G.R.
SP No. 101913 had already been consolidated with its own appeal in CA-G.R. SP No. 101732.
However, SCP says that the failure by the CA to consolidate the remaining two appeals, namely
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 101880 and 101881, with its own appeal indicates not only a deviation from
the rules but also a disobedience to their plain language and obvious intent. On the other hand,
BDO-EPCIB refutes SCP’s arguments by saying that the consolidation of cases is only
discretionary, not mandatory, upon the court. The Court agrees with SCP.
Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Sec. 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
Likewise, Rule 3, Sec. 3 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA adopts the same rule:
Sec. 3. Consolidation of Cases. – When related cases are assigned to different Justices, they may
be consolidated and assigned to one Justice.
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(a) At the instance of a party with notice to the other party; or at the instance of the Justice to
whom the case is assigned, and with the conformity of the Justice to whom the cases shall be
consolidated, upon notice to the parties, consolidation may be allowed when the cases involve
the same parties and/or related questions of fact and/or law.
(b) Consolidated cases shall pertain to the Justice –
(1) To whom the case with the lowest docket number is assigned, if they are of the same kind;
(2) To whom the criminal case with the lowest number is assigned, if two or more of the cases
are criminal and the others are civil or special;
(3) To whom the criminal case is assigned and the other are civil or special; and
(4) To whom the civil case is assigned, or to whom the civil case with the lowest docket
number is assigned, if the cases involved are civil and special.
(c) Notice of the consolidation and replacement shall be given to the Raffle Staff and the Judicial
Records Division.
It is a time-honored principle that when two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the
best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. In other words,
consolidation is proper wherever the subject matter involved and relief demanded in the
different suits make it expedient for the court to determine all of the issues involved and
adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits together. The purpose of this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested
dockets, and simplify the work of the trial court. In short, consolidation aims to attain justice
with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants. It contributes to the swift
dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the parties a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Further, it results in the avoidance of
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which
would otherwise require a single judgment. In the instant case, all four (4) cases involve
identical parties, subject matter, and issues. In fact, all four (4) arose from the same decision
rendered by the Rehabilitation Court. As such, it became imperative upon the CA to consolidate
the cases. Even though consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and normally, its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse
of discretion, in this instance, we find that the CA gravely erred in failing to order the
consolidation of the cases. By refusing to consolidate the cases, the CA, in effect, dispensed a
form of piecemeal judgment that has veritably resulted in the multiplicity of suits. Such action is
not regarded with favor, because consolidation should always be ordered whenever it is
possible. Steel Corporation of the Philippines vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc./DEG-Deutsche
Investitions-Und Entwicklungsgesellschaft MBH Vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., G.R. No.
190462G.R. No. 190538, November 17, 2010.
Counsel; requirements for valid substitution. Under Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court,
for a substitution of attorney to be effectual, the following essential requisites must concur: (1)
there must be a written application for substitution; (2) it must be filed with the written consent
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of the client; (3) it must be with the written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case
the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot be obtained, there must at least be proof of
notice that the motion for substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the Rules
of Court.
The courts a quo were uniform and correct in finding that Atty. Mondragon failed to observe the
prescribed procedure and, thus, no valid substitution of counsel was actualized. However, they
took divergent postures as to the repercussion of such non-compliance, thereby igniting the
herein controversy.
The RTC strictly imposed the rule on substitution of counsel and held that the notice of appeal
filed by Atty. Mondragon was a mere scrap of paper. However, relying on our pronouncement
in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Development Co., the CA brushed aside the
procedural lapse and took a liberal stance on considerations of substantial justice, viz.:
It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose
of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of
speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
Thus, substantial justice would be better served by giving due course to petitioner’s notice of
appeal.
AUB argues that the liberality applied by the Court in Land Bank is incompatible with the herein
controversy, and that Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. De Dios Transportation Co.,
Inc., which espouses the same view adopted by the RTC, is more appropriate. GOODLAND, on
the other hand, insists that the CA committed no reversible error in ordering that the notice of
appeal be allowed in order not to frustrate the ends of substantial justice.
We agree with AUB. A revisit of our pronouncements in Land Bank and Pioneer is in
order. In Land Bank, we held that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Notice of Appeal and Notice of
Entry of Appearance filed by petitioner’s new counsel for failure to effect a valid substitution of
the former counsel on record. We clarified that the new counsel never intended to replace the
counsel of record because, although not so specified in the notice, they entered their
appearance as collaborating counsel. Absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who
appear before the court or file pleadings in behalf of a client are considered counsel of the latter.
We pursued a liberal application of the rule in order not to frustrate the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of the controversy.
In Pioneer, we adopted a strict posture and declared the notice of withdrawal of appeal filed by
appellant’s new counsel as a mere scrap of paper for his failure to file beforehand a motion for
the substitution of the counsel on record. Provoking such deportment was the absence of a
special power of attorney authorizing the withdrawal of the appeal in addition to the lack of a
proper substitution of counsel. More importantly, we found that the withdrawal of the appeal
was calculated to frustrate the satisfaction of the judgment debt rendered against appellant,
thereby necessitating a rigid application of the rules in order to deter appellant from benefiting
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from its own deleterious manipulation thereof. Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Company,
Inc.,G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010.
Default; declaration of default improper where answer filed before declaration and no prejudice
caused to plaintiff. Petitioner correctly points out that the rule is that a defendant’s answer
should be admitted where it is filed before a declaration of default and no prejudice is caused to
the plaintiff. Indeed, where the answer is filed beyond the reglementary period but before the
defendant is declared in default and there is no showing that defendant intends to delay the case,
the answer should be admitted. In the case at bar, it is inconsequential that the trial court
declared petitioner in default on the same day that petitioner filed its Answer. As reflected
above, the trial court slept on petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for almost a year, just as it also
slept on respondents’ Motion to Declare petitioner in Default. It was only when petitioner filed
a Motion to Withdraw Motion to Dismiss and to Admit Answer that it denied the Motion to
Dismiss, and acted on/granted respondents’ Motion to Declare petitioner in Default. This is
procedurally unsound.
The policy of the law is to have every litigant’s case tried on the merits as much as possible.
Hence, judgments by default are frowned upon. A case is best decided when all contending
parties are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce
evidence in support thereof. The parties are thus given the chance to be heard fully and the
demands of due process are subserved. Moreover, it is only amidst such an atmosphere that
accurate factual findings and correct legal conclusions can be reached by the courts.San Pedro
Cineplex Properties, Inc. vs. Heirs of Manual Humada Enaño, et al., G.R. No. 190754,
November 17, 2010.
Execution; annulment of writ of execution. Petitioner takes exception to the CA ruling that she
committed a procedural gaffe in seeking the annulment of the writ of execution, the auction sale,
and the certificate of sale. The issue on the conjugal nature of the property, she insists, can be
adjudicated by the executing court; thus, the RTC correctly gave due course to her motion. She
asserts that it was error for the CA to propose the filing of a separate case to vindicate her
claim. We agree with petitioner.
The CA explained the faux pas committed by petitioner in this wise:
Under [Section 16, Rule 39], a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, can opt
to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on
him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the terceria, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A third-
party claimant may also resort to an independent “separate action,” the object of which is the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages
arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a
“separate action” is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being
enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both
remedies are cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the
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other. Availment of the terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a “separate
action.”
It is worthy of note that Sina Imani should have availed of the remedy of “terceria” authorized
under Section 16 of Rule 39 which is the proper remedy considering that he is not a party to the
case against [petitioner]. Instead, the trial court allowed [petitioner] to file an urgent motion to
cancel and nullify the levy of execution the auction sale and certificate of sale over TCT No.
T27957 [P](M). [Petitioner] then argue[s] that it is the ministerial duty of the levying officer to
release the property the moment a third-party claim is filed.
It is true that once a third-party files an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
property levied upon, the sheriff is bound to release the property of the third-party claimant
unless the judgment creditor files a bond approved by the court. Admittedly, [petitioner’s]
motion was already pending in court at the time that they filed the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen,
the former owner, dated July 27, 2005.
In the instant case, the one who availed of the remedy of terceria is the [petitioner], the party to
the main case and not the third party contemplated by Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the one who made the affidavit is not the third-party referred to in said Rule but
Crisanto Origen who was the former owner of the land in question.
Apparently, the CA lost sight of our ruling in Ong v. Tating, elucidating on the applicability of
Section 16 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
When the sheriff thus seizes property of a third person in which the judgment debtor holds no
right or interest, and so incurs in error, the supervisory power of the Court which has authorized
execution may be invoked by the third person. Upon due application by the third person, and
after summary hearing, the Court may command that the property be released from the mistaken
levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor. What the Court can do in these instances
however is limited to a determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the
performance of his duties in the execution of the judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed
taken hold of property not belonging to the judgment debtor. The Court does not and cannot
pass upon the question of title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat the
matter only in so far as may be necessary to decide if the Sheriff has acted correctly or not. x x x.
xxxx
Upon the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution
proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may
only be applied with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a
new party has been impleaded in the suit.
The filing of the motion by petitioner to annul the execution, the auction sale, and the certificate
of sale was, therefore, a proper remedy. As further held by this Court:
Certain it is that the Trial Court has plenary jurisdiction over the proceedings for the
enforcement of its judgments. It has undeniable competence to act on motions for execution
(whether execution be a matter of right or discretionary upon the Court), issue and quash
writs, determine if property is exempt from execution, or fix the value of property claimed by
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third persons so that a bond equal to such value may be posted by a judgment creditor to
indemnify the sheriff against liability for damages, resolve questions involving redemption,
examine the judgment debtor and his debtors, and otherwise perform such other acts as may be
necessary or incidental to the carrying out of its decisions. It may and should exercise control
and supervision over the sheriff and other court officers and employees taking part in the
execution proceedings, and correct them in the event that they should err in the discharge of
their functions.
Contrary to the CA’s advice, the remedy of terceria or a separate action under Section 16, Rule
39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because he is not deemed a stranger to the case filed
against petitioner:
[T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted
and adjudged against his wife.
Thus, it would have been inappropriate for him to institute a separate case for annulment of writ
of execution.
In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, we explained:
Is a spouse, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on
account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor, considered a “stranger?” In Mariano v.
Court of Appeals, we answered this question in the negative. In that case, the CFI of Caloocan
City declared the wife to be the judgment obligor and, consequently, a writ of execution was
issued against her. Thereupon, the sheriff proceeded to levy upon the conjugal properties of the
wife and her husband. The wife initially filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
praying for the annulment of the writ of execution. However, the petition was adjudged to be
without merit and was accordingly dismissed. The husband then filed a complaint with the CFI
of Quezon City for the annulment of the writ of execution, alleging therein that the conjugal
properties cannot be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by the wife. The
executing party moved to dismiss the annulment case, but the motion was denied. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals, in Mariano, ruled that the CFI of Quezon City, in continuing to hear the
annulment case, had not interfered with the executing court. We reversed the Court of Appeals’
ruling and held that there was interference by the CFI of Quezon City with the execution of the
CFI of Caloocan City. We ruled that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a
“stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife, which would allow the filing of
a separate and independent action.
The facts of the Mariano case are similar to this case. Clearly, it was inappropriate for petitioners
to institute a separate case for annulment when they could have easily questioned the execution
of their conjugal property in the collection case. We note in fact that the trial court in
the Rizal annulment case specifically informed petitioners that Encarnacion Ching’s rights could
be ventilated in the Manila collection case by the mere expedient of intervening therein.
Apparently, petitioners ignored the trial court’s advice, as Encarnacion Ching did not intervene
therein and petitioners instituted another annulment case after their conjugal property was
levied upon and sold on execution.
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There have been instances where we ruled that a spouse may file a separate case against a
wrongful execution. However, in those cases, we allowed the institution of a separate and
independent action because what were executed upon were the paraphernal or exclusive
property of a spouse who was not a party to the case. In those instances, said spouse can truly
be deemed a “stranger.” In the present case, the levy and sale on execution was made upon the
conjugal property.
Ineluctably, the RTC cannot be considered whimsical for ruling on petitioner’s motion. The CA,
therefore, erred for declaring otherwise. Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metroplitan Bank and Trust
Company, G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010.
Execution; effect of levy and sale. In their petition, the Spouses Ching mainly argues that the
trial court gravely erred in granting the Bank’s motion, because the RTC no longer had
jurisdiction to issue the questioned Orders since the Bank failed to execute the judgment, to
consolidate title, and to secure possession of the subject property. They maintain that the RTC
erred in totally disregarding the ruling of this Court in the cases of Ayala Investment &
Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals and Ching v. Court of Appeals. Finally, the Spouses
Ching posit that the execution sale of the subject property was void, considering that the
property was conjugal in nature and Encarnacion was not a party to the original action.
First, the Spouses Ching’s reliance on prescription is unavailing in the case at bar. The Spouses
Ching are implying that the RTC violated Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
However, it must be noted that contrary to their allegation, the summary judgment of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 142309 had in fact already been enforced. During the pendency of the case, the
subject property was already levied upon. Subsequently, after summary judgment and while the
case was on appeal, the RTC granted the Bank’s motion for execution pending
appeal. Consequently, on October 10, 1983, an auction sale of the subject property was
conducted, with the Bank emerging as the highest bidder. Later, a Certificate of Sale in its favor
was executed by the Sheriff and, thereafter, inscribed as a memorandum of encumbrance on
TCT No. S-3151.
It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The result of such execution
was that title over the subject property was vested immediately in the purchaser subject only to
the Spouses Ching’s right to redeem the property within the period provided for by law. The
right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute
until after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of redemption having been
exercised. But inchoate though it be, it is, like any other right, entitled to protection and must
be respected until extinguished by redemption. Since, the Spouses Ching failed to redeem the
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subject property within the period allowed by law, they have been divested of their rights over
the property.
Verily, the Bank’s “Motion to Retrieve Records, For Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance, To
Order the Register of Deeds of Makati City to Transfer Title and For Writ of Possession” was
merely a consequence of the execution of the summary judgment as the judgment in Civil Case
No. 142309 had already been enforced when the lot was levied upon and sold at public auction,
with the Bank as the highest bidder. Sps. Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Family Savings
Bank and Sheriff of Manila / Alfredo Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and the Sheriff of
Manila, G.R. No. 167835 and G.R. No. 188480, November 15, 2010.
Forum shopping. Lastly, petitioner avers that respondents are guilty of forum shopping for
having filed separate actions before the IPO and the RTC praying for the same relief. The Court
agrees.
Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum
(other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of
parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of
the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
There is no question as to the identity of parties in the complaints filed with the IPO and the
RTC.
Respondents argue that they cannot be held guilty of forum shopping because their complaints
are based on different causes of action as shown by the fact that the said complaints are founded
on violations of different patents. The Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which
a party violates a right of another. In the instant case, respondents’ cause of action in their
complaint filed with the IPO is the alleged act of petitioner in importing, distributing, selling or
offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products, acts that are supposedly violative of
respondents’ right to the exclusive sale of the said products which are covered by the latter’s
patent. However, a careful reading of the complaint filed with the RTC of Makati City would
show that respondents have the same cause of action as in their complaint filed with the IPO.
They claim that they have the exclusive right to make, use and sell Sulbactam Ampicillin
products and that petitioner violated this right. Thus, it does not matter that the patents upon
which the complaints were based are different. The fact remains that in both complaints the
rights violated and the acts violative of such rights are identical.
In fact, respondents seek substantially the same reliefs in their separate complaints with the IPO
and the RTC for the purpose of accomplishing the same objective.
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It is settled by this Court in several cases that the filing by a party of two apparently different
actions but with the same objective constitutes forum shopping. The Court discussed this
species of forum shopping as follows:
Very simply stated, the original complaint in the court a quo which gave rise to the instant
petition was filed by the buyer (herein private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest)
against the seller (herein petitioners) to enforce the alleged perfected sale of real estate. On the
other hand, the complaint in the Second Case seeks to declare such purported sale involving the
same real property “as unenforceable as against the Bank,” which is the petitioner herein. In
other words, in the Second Case, the majority stockholders, in representation of the Bank, are
seeking to accomplish what the Bank itself failed to do in the original case in the trial court. In
brief, the objective or the relief being sought, though worded differently, is the same, namely,
to enable the petitioner Bank to escape from the obligation to sell the property to respondent.
In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, the Court ruled as follows:
In the attempt to make the two actions appear to be different, petitioner impleaded different
respondents therein – PNOC in the case before the lower court and the COA in the case before
this Court and sought what seems to be different reliefs. Petitioner asks this Court to set aside the
questioned letter-directive of the COA dated October 10, 1988 and to direct said body to
approve the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between the PNOC and petitioner,
while in the complaint before the lower court petitioner seeks to enjoin the PNOC from
conducting a rebidding and from selling to other parties the vessel “T/T Andres Bonifacio,” and
for an extension of time for it to comply with the paragraph 1 of the memorandum of agreement
and damages. One can see that although the relief prayed for in the two (2) actions are
ostensibly different, the ultimate objective in both actions is the same, that is, the approval of
the sale of vessel in favor of petitioner, and to overturn the letter directive of the COA of
October 10, 1988 disapproving the sale.
In the instant case, the prayer of respondents in their complaint filed with the IPO is as follows:
A. Immediately upon the filing of this action, issue an ex parte order (a) temporarily restraining
respondent, its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing, selling or
offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products to the hospitals named in paragraph 9 of this
Complaint or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.’s
Philippine Patent No. 21116; and (b) impounding all the sales invoices and other documents
evidencing sales by respondent of Sulbactam Ampicillin products.
B. After hearing, issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent, its agents,
representatives and assigns from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam
Ampicillin products to the hospitals named in paragraph 9 of the Complaint or to any other
entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.’s Philippine Patent No. 21116;
and
C. After trial, render judgment:
(i) declaring that respondent has infringed Pfizer Inc.’s Philippine Patent No. 21116 and
that respondent has no right whatsoever over complainant’s patent;
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(ii) ordering respondent to pay complainants the following amounts:
(a) at least P1,000,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P700,000.00 as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses;
(d) P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) costs of this suit.
(iii) ordering the condemnation, seizure or forfeiture of respondent’s infringing goods or
products, wherever they may be found, including the materials and implements used in the
commission of infringement, to be disposed of in such manner as may be deemed
appropriate by this Honorable Office; and
(iv) making the injunction permanent.
In an almost identical manner, respondents prayed for the following in their complaint filed with
the RTC:
(a) Immediately upon the filing of this action, issue an ex parte order:
(1) temporarily restraining Pharmawealth, its agents, representatives and assigns from
importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale infringing sulbactam ampicillin products to
various government and private hospitals or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from
otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.’s Philippine Patent No. 26810.
(2) impounding all the sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales by pharmawealth
of sulbactam ampicillin products; and
(3) disposing of the infringing goods outside the channels of commerce.
(b) After hearing, issue a writ of preliminary injunction:
(1) enjoining Pharmawealth, its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing,
selling or offering for sale infringing sulbactam ampicillin products to various government
hospitals or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Patent No.
26810;
(2) impounding all the sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales
by Pharmawealth of sulbactam ampicillin products; and
(3) disposing of the infringing goods outside the channels of commerce.
(c) After trial, render judgment:
(1) finding Pharmawealth to have infringed Patent No. 26810 and declaring Pharmawealth
to have no right whatsoever over plaintiff’s patent;
(2) ordering Pharmawealth to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
(i) at least P3,000,000.00 as actual damages;
(ii) P500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000,000.00 as litigation expenses;
(iii) P3,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(iv) costs of this suit.
(3) ordering the condemnation, seizure or forfeiture of Pharmawealth’s infringing goods or
products, wherever they may be found, including the materials and implements used in the
commission of infringement, to be disposed of in such manner as may be deemed appropriate
by this Honorable Court; and
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(4) making the injunction permanent.
It is clear from the foregoing that the ultimate objective which respondents seek to achieve in
their separate complaints filed with the RTC and the IPO, is to ask for damages for the alleged
violation of their right to exclusively sell Sulbactam Ampicillin products and to permanently
prevent or prohibit petitioner from selling said products to any entity. Owing to the substantial
identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a decision in one case will
necessarily amount to res judicata in the other action. It bears to reiterate that what is truly
important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation
caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative
agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue. Thus, the Court agrees with petitioner that respondents are
indeed guilty of forum shopping. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc and Pfizer (Phil.)
Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010.
Forum shopping; sanction where forum shopping is not willful and deliberate. Jurisprudence
holds that if the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case
shall be dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata.
However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two)
actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. In the present case, the Court finds that respondents
did not deliberately violate the rule on non-forum shopping. Respondents may not be totally
blamed for erroneously believing that they can file separate actions simply on the basis of
different patents. Moreover, in the suit filed with the RTC of Makati City, respondents were
candid enough to inform the trial court of the pendency of the complaint filed with the BLA-IPO
as well as the petition for certiorari filed with the CA. On these bases, only Civil Case No. 04-
754 should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc
and Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010.
Injunction; preliminary injunction; requisites. Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court lays
down the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, viz:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in requiring
the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
In this connection, pertinent portions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the same Rules provide that if the
matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury,
a temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that
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two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of an injunctive relief, namely: (1) the existence
of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the instant case, it is clear that when the CA
issued its January 18, 2005 Resolution approving the bond filed by respondents, the latter no
longer had a right that must be protected, considering that Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116
which was issued to them already expired on July 16, 2004. Hence, the issuance by the CA of a
temporary restraining order in favor of the respondents is not proper. In fact, the CA should
have granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed before it as the only
issue raised therein is the propriety of extending the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
BLA-IPO. Since the patent which was the basis for issuing the injunction, was no longer valid,
any issue as to the propriety of extending the life of the injunction was already rendered moot
and academic. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc and Pfizer (Phil.) Inc.,G.R. No. 167715,
November 17, 2010.
Injunction; preliminary injunction; requisites. Considering that the determination of the factual
and legal issues presented in the case can proceed independent of those being litigated in the
other cases filed against each other by the members of STRADEC’s Board of Directors, we find
that the CA finally erred in denying STRADEC’s application of a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain (a) CTCII from further exercising proprietary rights over the subject shares; (b) SIDC and
its officers from recognizing the transfer or further transfers of the same; (c) the implementation
of the resolutions passed during the 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders’ special meeting; and (d)
the SEC from acting on any report submitted in respect thereto. A provisional remedy which has,
for its object, the preservation of the status quo, preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a
party in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an
action. By both law and jurisprudence, said provisional writ may be issued upon the
concurrence of the following essential requisites, to wit: (1) that the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and, (3) that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
As the owner, STRADEC is undoubtedly possessed of clear and unmistakable rights over the
subject SIDC shares which respondent Yujuico pledged in favor of respondent Wong. Unless
collectively restrained, the aforesaid acts will completely divest STRADEC of its shares and
unfairly deprive it of participation in SIDC’s corporate affairs pending the determination of the
validity of the impugned transfers. Given that the parties have already submitted their
arguments for and against the writ of preliminary injunction sought, STRADEC is, however,
required to put up an injunction bond pursuant to Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim
Rules.Conditioned to answer for damages respondents may sustain as a consequence of the
issuance of the writ, the amount of the bond is fixed at P10,000,000.00 which is equivalent to
the supposed loan for which STRADEC’s shares were pledged by respondent Yujuico. Strategic
Alliance Development Corporation vs. Star Infrastructure Development Corporation Corporation,
BEDE S. Tabalingcos, et al., G.R. No. 187872. November 17, 2010.
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Injunction; preliminary injunction; right of patent holder. In the first issue raised, petitioner
argues that respondents’ exclusive right to monopolize the subject matter of the patent exists
only within the term of the patent. Petitioner claims that since respondents’ patent expired on
July 16, 2004, the latter no longer possess any right of monopoly and, as such, there is no more
basis for the issuance of a restraining order or injunction against petitioner insofar as the
disputed patent is concerned. The Court agrees. Section 37 of Republic Act No. (RA) 165,
which was the governing law at the time of the issuance of respondents’ patent, provides:
Section 37. Rights of patentees. A patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell
the patented machine, article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of
industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippines for the term of the patent; and
such making, using, or selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee
constitutes infringement of the patent.
It is clear from the above-quoted provision of law that the exclusive right of a patentee to make,
use and sell a patented product, article or process exists only during the term of the patent. In
the instant case, Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116, which was the basis of respondents in
filing their complaint with the BLA-IPO, was issued on July 16, 1987. This fact was admitted by
respondents themselves in their complaint. They also admitted that the validity of the said patent
is until July 16, 2004, which is in conformity with Section 21 of RA 165, providing that the term
of a patent shall be seventeen (17) years from the date of issuance thereof. Section 4, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof and that the admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. In the present case, there is no dispute as to respondents’ admission that
the term of their patent expired on July 16, 2004. Neither is there evidence to show that their
admission was made through palpable mistake. Hence, contrary to the pronouncement of the
CA, there is no longer any need to present evidence on the issue of expiration of respondents’
patent.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioner that after July 16, 2004,
respondents no longer possess the exclusive right to make, use and sell the articles or products
covered by Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc and
Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010.
Injunction; preliminary injunction; status quo. At any rate, the Court finds no cogent reason for
the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued
by the RTC. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for
the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. The DepEd
already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its
questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005,
the RTC’s preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court
agrees with the CA when it explained:
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A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve
and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to
preserve the status quountil the merits of the case can be heard fully.
Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual
controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court
must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status.
In the case at bench, the Decision of Undersecretary Gascon dated February 11, 2005, ordering
Pineda to cease and desist from operating and managing the school canteen and to revert the
management thereof to the Home Economics Department and to the Principal, has already been
partially implemented. This is evident from the allegations of Pineda in her amended petition, to
wit:
“Earlier, in the dawn of same date, 22 February 2004 (should be 2005), the guards of Lakandula
High School, taking strict orders from respondents Mrs. Camilo and Dr. Quiñones who
immediately executed the assailed illegal decision from the respondent undersecretary,
prevented the canteen workers from entering the school and the delivery of softdrinks such as
Pop Cola to the petitioner. On the same date, more canteens sprouted, in addition to those
found in the H.E. and dressmaking rooms, operated by the teachers, under the guise that they
were doing service to the students in the meantime that the canteen was closed. x x x.”
Finally, while the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the
trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status
quo which is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual
controversy. If there is such a commission, it is correctible through a writ of certiorari. In this
case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case
was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reason, the
trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said status. Michelle I. Pineda vs.
Court of Appeals and the Department of Education, etc., G.R. No. 181643, November 17, 2010.
Judgment; finality. A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law. Finality
becomes a fact when the reglementary period to appeal lapses, and no appeal is perfected
within such period. In this case, petitioner herself admitted that she did not appeal the RTC
ruling, believing that respondents failed to prove their cause of action. However, her belief that
she alone should be declared the sole beneficiary of the November 19, 1971 Deed of Donation
has no basis in law and is, in fact, contradicted by the evidence on record. A decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Once a
judgment or order becomes final, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and
laid to rest. No additions can be made to the decision, and no other action can be taken on it,
except to order its execution. Victoria L. Teh vs. Natividad Teh Tan, Teh Ki Tiat and Jacinta
Sia, G.R. No. 181956, November 22, 2010.
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Judgment; finality; exceptions. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of
clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void
judgments, and cases where circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision that render
its execution unjust and inequitable. Not one of these exceptions is present in this
case. Nonetheless, this Court has recognized that even a final and executory judgment or
the fallo thereof may be clarified or rectified by an amendment when there is, in its dispositive
portion, an inadvertent omission of what it should have logically decreed or ordered based on
the discussion in the body of the decision. The Court must emphasize, however, that the court’s
action should be limited to explaining a vague or equivocal part of its decision, which hampers
the proper and full execution of its ruling. The court cannot modify or overturn its decision in
the guise of clarifying ambiguous points. In the present case, petitioner’s Manifestation is, for all
intents and purposes, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision. Consider the prayer in
her Manifestation:
WHEREFORE, in x x x light of the aforequoted rulings of this Honorable Court, it shows that the
sole beneficiary of the Deed of Donation dated November 19, 1971 is Victoria Teh.
Consequently, it is respectfully prayed that an ORDER be issued by this Honorable Court
declaring that the sole beneficiary of the Deed of Donation dated November 19, 1971, is
Victoria Teh and that the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37337 of the Registry of Deed (sic) of
Quezon City be cancelled and Transferred in the name of Victoria Teh.
Clearly, petitioner sought more than just a clarification of the RTC’s decision. Her Manifestation
called for a reexamination and reevaluation of evidence already considered by the RTC in its
assailed judgment. Hence, the CA did not err in holding that the RTC’s decision bound
petitioner and, consequently, in dismissing the petition for certiorari. Victoria L. Teh vs.
Natividad Teh Tan, Teh Ki Tiat and Jacinta Sia, G.R. No. 181956, November 22, 2010.
Judgment; res judicata. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-
regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various
maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation – republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the
hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause – nemo debet bis
vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would certainly subject the public peace and quiet
to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on
the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.
In Cheng Ban Yek & Co. v. IAC, the petition arose when Cheng Ban Yek & Co., together with
Alfredo, appealed the summary judgment in Civil Case No. 142309 to the CA. The CA,
however, affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the lower court. The matter was then
elevated before this Court via a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 73708, but it was
eventually dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of merit. Therefore, the
decision in Civil Case No. 142309 became final.
In Spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching v. Court of Appeals, the case arose when the Spouses
Ching, in an effort to prevent the deputy sheriff from consolidating the sale of the subject
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property, filed an annulment case, Civil Case No. 8389, with the RTC of Makati City. The
Spouses Ching sought to declare void the levy and sale on execution of their conjugal property
by arguing that the branch sheriff had no authority to levy upon a property belonging to the
conjugal partnership. The RTC later rendered judgment in favor of the Spouses Ching and
declared as void the levy and sale on execution upon their conjugal property. The Bank then
elevated the decision to the CA, which decision was reversed and set aside by the latter on the
ground that the annulment case was barred by res judicata in another annulment case. The
Spouses Ching sought recourse before this Court, but the petition was denied and the assailed
decision of the CA was affirmed.
It is undeniable, therefore, that the disquisitions of this Court in the above-cited cases are
controlling and should be given great weight and consideration in the resolution of the issues
raised by the Spouses Ching in the present petition. All matters relevant to the action must, and
should, conform to these precedent cases; otherwise, parallel actions emanating from the same
case could lead to conflicting conclusions. The winning party would not enjoy the fruits of his
victory; instead, it would be an empty victory, ultimately ending in the denial of justice on the
part on the righteous litigant.
Third, the Spouses Ching maintain that the subject property could not be levied upon and be
sold at public auction because it is conjugal in nature. This Court, in G.R. No. 118830, had this
to say:
In any case, even without the intervention of Encarnacion Ching in the collection case, it
appears that Alfredo Ching was able to raise the conjugal nature of the property in both the trial
court and appellate court. A perusal of the records reveals that petitioner Alfredo Ching filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash Writ of Execution before the CFI of Manila. In the
motion, he specifically argued that the execution was invalid for having been enforced upon
their conjugal property. Alfredo Ching raised this argument again on appeal in CA G.R. CV No.
02421. Evidently, due process has been afforded to petitioners as regards the execution on their
conjugal property.
Verily, the issue of the conjugal nature of the subject property has been passed upon by the
courts and this Court several times; it is no longer a novel contention. The Spouses Ching
cannot, therefore, raise the same argument again and again. The Spouses Ching could not even
raise such an argument to bar or prevent the RTC from granting a writ of possession to the Bank
or any other motion in furtherance or as a consequence of the issuance of such writ. From the
foregoing, the Spouses Ching’s petition would logically fail. Sps. Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching
vs. Family Savings Bank and Sheriff of Manila / Alfredo Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and the
Sheriff of Manila, G.R. No. 167835 and G.R. No. 188480, November 15, 2010.
Judgment; res judicata; bar by prior judgment; no finality of judgment in absence of proper
service. Under the rule of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits
and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means a
“matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment.” The principle bars a
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subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The rationalefor
the rule is that “public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given
point in time.”
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: the first is “bar by prior judgment”
under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Court, and the second is
“conclusiveness of judgment” under paragraph (c) thereof. Res judicata applies in the concept
of “bar by prior judgment” if the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there
must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of
causes of action.
The petitioners claim that res judicata under the first concept applies in the present case because
all of the elements thereof are present. In response, the respondent argues that res judicata did
not set in as the first element is lacking. We agree with the respondent.
The following provisions under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court define the proper modes of service
of judgments:
SEC. 2. Filing and service, defined. – x x x
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned. x x x
SEC. 5. Modes of service. – Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other
papers shall be made either personally or by mail.
SEC. 6. Personal service. – Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to
the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having
charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office,
then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at
the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then
residing therein.
SEC. 7. Service by mail. – Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the
office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known,
otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service
is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary
mail.
SEC. 8. Substituted service. – If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and
other papers cannot be made under the two preceding sections, the office and place of
residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the
copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The
service is complete at the time of such delivery.
SEC. 9. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. –Judgments, final orders or resolutions
shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication
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has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him shall be
served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through
registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a
person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor
made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality.
In Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. v. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the Resolution of
the National Labor Relations Commission, denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration,
cannot be deemed to have become final and executory as there is no conclusive proof of service
of the said resolution. In the words of the Court, “there was no proof of actual receipt of the
notice of the registered mail by the respondent’s counsel.” Based on these findings, the Court
concluded that the CA properly acquired jurisdiction over the respondent’s petition
for certiorari filed before it; in the absence of a reckoning date of the period provided by law for
the filing of the petition, the Court could not assume that it was improperly or belatedly filed.
Similarly, in Tomawis v. Tabao-Cudang, the Court held that the decision of the Regional Trial
Court did not become final and executory where, from the records, the respondent had not
received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. The Court also noted
that there was no sufficient proof that the respondent actually received a copy of the said Order
or that she indeed received a first notice. Thus, the Court concluded that there could be no valid
basis for the issuance of the writ of execution as the decision never attained finality.
In the present case, we note that the December 16, 1986 Dismissal Order cannot be deemed to
have become final and executory in view of the absence of a valid service, whether personally
or via registered mail, on the respondent’s counsel. We note in this regard that the petitioners
do not dispute the CA finding that the “records failed to show that the private respondent was
furnished with a copy of the said order of dismissal[.]” Accordingly, the Dismissal Order never
attained finality. Spouses Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, G.R. No. 157644, November 17, 2010.
Jurisdiction; adherence to jurisdiction; exceptions. Lucia’s argument, that the RTC-Iriga is vested
with jurisdiction to continue trying Civil Case No. IR-3128 until its final disposition, evidently
falls out from a strained interpretation of the law and jurisprudence. She contends that:
Since the RTC-Iriga has already obtained jurisdiction over the case it should continue exercising
such jurisdiction until the final termination of the case. The jurisdiction of a court once attached
cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction
until it finally disposes of the case (Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 711).
When a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the case is not affected by a new legislation
transferring jurisdiction over such proceedings to another tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA
211). Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v.
Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 323).
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The afore-quoted cases, cited by Lucia to bolster the plea for the continuance of her case, find
no application in the case at bench.
Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia, however, must
be reminded that such principle is not without exceptions. It is well to quote the ruling of the
CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of
jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has
exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character (Garcia v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro, 149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC
of Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation
court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the adjudication of the disputed
claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265)
becomes more obvious in the light of its intent. InManalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752,
[2001]), the Supreme Court says:
xxx The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation proceedings
filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank
and designed to establish due process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate
the proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253
SCRA 105 [1996]). The lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if
possible, should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court
should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations (citingCentral Bank of the
Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482 [1988]).
As regards Lucia’s contention that jurisdiction already attached when Civil Case No. IR-3128
was filed with, and jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the liquidation
case before the RTC-Makati, her stance fails to persuade this Court. In refuting this assertion,
respondent PDIC cited the case of Lipana v. Development Bank of Rizal where it was held that
the time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial, viz:
It is the contention of petitioners, however, that the placing under receivership of Respondent
Bank long after the filing of the complaint removed it from the doctrine in the said Morfe Case.
This contention is untenable. The time of the filing of the complaint is immaterial. It is the
execution that will obviously prejudice the other depositors and creditors. Moreover, as stated
in the said Morfe case, the effect of the judgment is only to fix the amount of the debt, and not
to give priority over other depositors and creditors.
The cited Morfe case held that “after the Monetary Board has declared that a bank is insolvent
and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal
benefit of all the creditors, including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution
are held in trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain
an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise.”
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Thus, to allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a possibility of
favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of RBCI would not only prejudice
the other creditors and depositors but would defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation
court was constituted as well. Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros vs. Rural Bank of Canaman,
Inc. represented by its Liquidator, The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, G.R. No.
176260, November 24, 2010.
Jurisdiction; doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In the first place, respondents’ act of filing their
complaint originally with the BLA-IPO is already in consonance with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. This Court has held that:
[i]n cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that it cannot or will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a
uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative
body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondents’ initial filing of their complaint with the
BLA-IPO, instead of the regular courts, is in keeping with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
owing to the fact that the determination of the basic issue of whether petitioner violated
respondents’ patent rights requires the exercise by the IPO of sound administrative discretion
which is based on the agency’s special competence, knowledge and experience.
However, the propriety of extending the life of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
BLA-IPO in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power is no longer a matter that falls within the
jurisdiction of the said administrative agency, particularly that of its Director General. The
resolution of this issue which was raised before the CA does not demand the exercise by the IPO
of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in
determining technical and intricate matters of fact. It is settled that one of the exceptions to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately
have to be decided by the courts of justice. This is the case with respect to the issue raised in
the petition filed with the CA.
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Moreover, as discussed earlier, RA 8293 and its implementing rules and regulations do not
provide for a procedural remedy to question interlocutory orders issued by the BLA-IPO. In this
regard, it bears to reiterate that the judicial power of the courts, as provided for under the
Constitution, includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the
validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power also includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Hence, the CA, and not the IPO Director General, has jurisdiction to determine
whether the BLA-IPO committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents’ motion to
extend the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction which the said office earlier
issued. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc and Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R. No. 167715,
November 17, 2010.
Jurisdiction; forcible entry. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the
MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. The RRSP governs the remedial aspects of these suits.
Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the
DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. An
agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted
to agriculture. For a case to involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an
agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental.
In the present case, the petitioner, as one of the plaintiffs in the MTC, made the following
allegations and prayer in the complaint:
3. Plaintiffs are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title Numbered 34267, with an area of five (5) hectares, more or less situated at
Bo. Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. x x x;
4. That so defendant thru stealth, strategy and without the knowledge, or consent of
administrator x x x much more of the herein plaintiffs, unlawfully entered and occupied said
parcel of land;
5. Inspite of x x x demands, defendant Germino, refused and up to the filing of this
complaint, still refused to vacate the same;
6. The continuos (sic) and unabated occupancy of the land by the defendant would work and
cause prejudice and irreparable damage and injury to the plaintiffs unless a writ of preliminary
injunction is issued;
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7. This prejudice, damage or injury consist of disturbance of property rights tantamount to
deprivation of ownership or any of its attributes without due process of law, a diminution of
plaintiffs’ property rights or dominion over the parcel of land subject of this dispute, since they
are deprived of freely entering or possessing the same;
8. The plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded or prayed for, and the whole or part of
such relief/s consist of immediately or permanently RESTRAINING, ENJOINING or STOPPING
the defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from entering, occupying, or in any manner
committing, performing or suffering to be committed or performed for him, any act indicative of,
or tending to show any color of possession in or about the tenement, premises or subject of this
suit, such as described in par. 3 of this complaint;
9. Plaintiffs are ready and willing to post a bond answerable to any damage/s should the
issuance of the writ x x x;
10. As a consequence of defendant’s malevolent refusal to vacate the premises of the land in
dispute, plaintiffs incurred litigation expenses of P1,500.00, availing for the purpose the
assistance of a counsel at an agreed honorarium of P5,000.00 and P250.00 per appearance/ not
to mention the moral damages incurred due to sleepless nights and mental anxiety, including
exemplary damages, the award and amount of which are left to the sound discretion of this
Honorable Court.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that pending the resolution of the
issue in this case, a restraining order be issued RESTRAINING, ENJOINING, or STOPPING the
defendant or any person/s acting in his behalf, from ENTERING OR OCCUPYING the parcel of
land, or any portion thereof, described in paragraph 3 of this complaint, nor in any manner
committing, performing or suffering to be committed or, performed for him, by himself or thru
another, any act indicative of, or tending to show any color of possession in or about the
premises subject of this suit;
THEREAFTER, making said writ of preliminary injunction PERMANENT; and on plaintiffs’
damages, judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the sum alleged
in paragraph 10 above.
GENERAL RELIEFS ARE LIKEWISE PRAYED FOR.
Based on these allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action in the MTC was for
forcible entry. Jose Mendoza vs. Narciso Germino and Benigno Germino, G.R. No. 165676,
November 22, 2010.
Jurisdiction; how determined. It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively by the Constitution
and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired
through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate
or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Jose Mendoza vs. Narciso
Germino and Benigno Germino, G.R. No. 165676, November 22, 2010.
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Jurisdiction; liquidation proceeding involving bank. Anent the second issue, Lucia faults the CA
in directing the consolidation of Civil Case No. IR-3128 with Special Proceedings No. M-
5290. The CA committed no error. Lucia’s complaint involving annulment of deed of mortgage
and damages falls within the purview of a disputed claim in contemplation of Section 30 of R.A.
7653 (The New Central Bank Act). The jurisdiction should be lodged with the liquidation court.
Section 30 provides:
Sec. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. – Whenever, upon report of the head of
the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business:
Provided, That this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced
by financial panic in the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its
liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors;
or
(d) has wilfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final,
involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the
institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior
hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.
For a quasi-bank, any person of recognized competence in banking or finance may be
designated as receiver.
The receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the
institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers
of a receiver under the Revised Rules of Court but shall not, with the exception of administrative
expenditures, pay or commit any act that will involve the transfer or disposition of any asset of
the institution: Provided, That the receiver may deposit or place the funds of the institution in
non-speculative investments. The receiver shall determine as soon as possible, but not later
than ninety (90) days from take over, whether the institution may be rehabilitated or otherwise
placed in such a condition that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its
depositors and creditors and the general public: Provided, That any determination for the
resumption of business of the institution shall be subject to prior approval of the Monetary Board.
If the receiver determines that the institution cannot be rehabilitated or permitted to resume
business in accordance with the next preceding paragraph, the Monetary Board shall notify in
writing the board of directors of its findings and direct the receiver to proceed with the
liquidation of the institution. The receiver shall:
(1) file ex parte with the proper regional trial court, and without requirement of prior notice or
any other action, a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the institution pursuant to a
liquidation plan adopted by the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation for general
application to all closed banks. In case of quasi-banks, the liquidation plan shall be adopted by
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the Monetary Board. Upon acquiring jurisdiction, the court shall, upon motion by the receiver
after due notice, adjudicate disputed claims against the institution, assist the enforcement of
individual liabilities of the stockholders, directors and officers, and decide on other issues as
may be material to implement the liquidation plan adopted. The receiver shall pay the cost of
the proceedings from the assets of the institution.
(2) convert the assets of the institution to money, dispose of the same to creditors and other
parties, for the purpose of paying the debts of such institution in accordance with the rules on
concurrence and preference of credit under the Civil Code of the Philippines and he may, in the
name of the institution, and with the assistance of counsel as he may retain, institute such
actions as may be necessary to collect and recover accounts and assets of, or defend any action
against, the institution. The assets of an institution under receivership or liquidation shall be
deemed in custodia legis in the hands of the receiver and shall, from the moment the institution
was placed under such receivership or liquidation, be exempt from any order of garnishment,
levy, attachment, or execution. [Emphasis supplied]
xxx
“Disputed claims” refers to all claims, whether they be against the assets of the insolvent bank,
for specific performance, breach of contract, damages, or whatever. Lucia’s action being a claim
against RBCI can properly be consolidated with the liquidation proceedings before the RTC-
Makati. A liquidation proceeding has been explained in the case of In Re: Petition For
Assistance in the Liquidation of the Rural Bank of BOKOD (Benguet), Inc. v. Bureau of Internal
Revenue as follows:
A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly
classified as “claims.” It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with
the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the
assistance of the proper court in the liquidation of a closed entity, all money claims against the
bank are required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the declaration
by the liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may
also end with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be
classified whether it is ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case,
the order allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the
party aggrieved thereby.
The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by the
duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for
distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the
issue of how much property is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of
the liquidation proceeding – payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of
legal priority and the approved distribution plan.
xxx
A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor General
with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, “Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g.,
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Pacific Banking Corporation.”All claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with the
liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is
individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim
applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
separate and distinct from the others. x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear, therefore, that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all claims, including that of
Lucia against the insolvent bank. As declared in Miranda v. Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, regular courts do not have jurisdiction over actions filed by claimants against an
insolvent bank, unless there is a clear showing that the action taken by the BSP, through the
Monetary Board, in the closure of financial institutions was in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion. The same is not obtaining in this present case.
The power and authority of the Monetary Board to close banks and liquidate them thereafter
when public interest so requires is an exercise of the police power of the State. Police power,
however, is subject to judicial inquiry. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably and
could be set aside if it is either capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or is
tantamount to a denial of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
In sum, this Court holds that the consolidation is proper considering that the liquidation court
has jurisdiction over Lucia’s action. It would be more in keeping with law and equity if Lucia’s
case is consolidated with the liquidation case in order to expeditiously determine whether she is
entitled to recover the property subject of mortgage from RBCI and, if so, how much she is
entitled to receive from the remaining assets of the bank. Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros
vs. Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc. represented by its Liquidator, The Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010.
Jurisdiction; MTC not divested of jurisdiction by mere allegation of tenancy as defense. Although
respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer, this
did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It continued to have the
authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the
ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set
up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
Under the RRSP, the MTC is duty-bound to conduct a preliminary conference and, if necessary,
to receive evidence to determine if such tenancy relationship had, in fact, been shown to be the
real issue. The MTC may even opt to conduct a hearing on the special and affirmative defense of
the defendant, although under the RRSP, such a hearing is not a matter of right. If it is shown
during the hearing or conference that, indeed, tenancy is the issue, the MTC should dismiss the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
In the present case, instead of conducting a preliminary conference, the MTC immediately
referred the case to the DARAB. This was contrary to the rules. Besides, Section 2 of P.D. No.
316, which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for
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the preliminary determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship, has
indeed been repealed by Section 76 of R.A. No. 6657 in 1988.
Neither did the amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the DARAB. The plaintiffs
alleged in the amended complaint that the subject property was previously tilled by Efren
Bernardo, and the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth, without their knowledge
and consent. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties, the
action was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. The CA, therefore, committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB
decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution,
we are not in a position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required
in courts is different from that of administrative agencies. Jose Mendoza vs. Narciso Germino
and Benigno Germino,G.R. No. 165676, November 22, 2010.
Mandamus; not available to compel grant of injunctive relief. Petitioner has made an extensive,
effortful and elaborate essay on the factual aspects not only of the Petition for Redemption, but
also of the Petition for Coverage and the Petition for Revocation of Exemption Order —
particularly on the controverted nature of Eutiquio’s possession of the subject land. That issue,
however, is not for this Court to address, and certainly not in the instant petition which brings
only the issue of whether the Court of Appeals was correct in declining to issue the writ
of mandamus and in not compelling the DARAB to resolve Eutiquio’s motion for reconsideration
in the Petition for Redemption and the DAR to issue the cease-and-desist order, or writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, in the Petition for Redemption, Petition for Coverage and
Petition for Revocation. But perhaps as a last-ditch attempt to turn the table in his favor
following the unfavorable issuance of the February 23, 2005 DAR Order denying the “Urgent Ex
Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Cease-and-Desist Order” and of
the April 20, 2005 DARAB Resolution denying Eutiquio’s motion for reconsideration in the
Petition for Redemption, petitioner now pursues a different theory by claiming that the DAR and
the DARAB have exceeded their authority and committed grave abuse of discretion and
manifest injustice in issuing the said order and resolution. Verily, petitioner is grasping at straws.
Established is the procedural law precept that a writ of mandamus generally lies to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty, but not the performance of an official act or duty which
necessarily involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the act sought to be performed
involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act
but not to act in one way or the other. It is, nonetheless, also available to compel action, when
refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
in a particular manner. However, this rule admits of exceptions. Mandamus is the proper
remedy in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess
of authority.
In Valley Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Isabela, it was held that the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the issuing authority,
conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be
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protected. It is an extraordinary peremptory remedy that may be availed of only upon the
grounds expressly provided by law. In Government Service Insurance System v.
Florendo and Searth Commodities Corp. v. Court of Appeals, it was also held that the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction as an ancillary or preventive remedy to secure the rights of a
party in a pending case is entirely within the discretion of the tribunal taking cognizance of the
case, limited only by the requirement that the use of such discretion be based on ground and in
the manner provided by law. Bataclan v. Court of Appealsalso points out that although sufficient
discretion is allowed in the grant of the relief, extreme caution must be taken in determining the
necessity for the grant of the relief prayed for, because it would necessarily affect the protective
rights of the parties in a case.
Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief in this case is not properly compellable by mandamus
inasmuch as it requires discretion and judgment on the part of both the DAR and the DARAB to
find whether petitioner has a clear legal right that needs to be protected and that the acts of
SMPHI are violative of such right. On this score alone, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for its refusal to issue the writ of mandamus prayed for. Froilan Dejuras vs. Hon. Rene C. Villa,
et al., G.R. No. 173428, November 22, 2010.
Parties; real party in interest. On the first ground, Pineda argues that the CA gravely abused its
discretion in entertaining the petition for certiorari of DepEd considering that Asec. Montesa was
not the proper party to file the petition. She adds that, even assuming that DepEd had the locus
standi to file said petition before the CA, Asec. Montesa was not duly authorized to do so. The
Court cannot accommodate the view of Pineda.
In her petition for certiorari before the RTC, Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and
Ms. Camilo in their official capacities as Undersecretary of DepEd, Division Superintendent and
Principal of Lakandula High School, respectively. Although the petition mentioned that Usec.
Gascon was merely a nominal party, it stated therein that Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo were
being sued for “having been tasked to immediately carry out” his order of February 11, 2005.
The Court is of the view that DepEd was the proper party and Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and
Ms. Camilo were just its representatives. Thus, they were sued in their official capacities.
A review of Usec. Gascon’s order discloses that the cancellation of Pineda’s August-MOA was
pursuant to DepEd’s existing guidelines on the turn over of school canteens to teachers’
cooperatives, laid out in Department Order No. 95, series of 1998. He was simply applying a
DepEd policy when he ordered the August-MOA cancelled. So, what was actually being
assailed by Pineda in her petition before the RTC was the implementation of DepEd’s existing
guidelines with the nullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then principal of
LHS. As Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly
authorized to institute the petition before the CA in order to advance and pursue the policies of
his office – DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real
party in interest for it will surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of
the case before the RTC.
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Thus, it would be absurd not to recognize the legal standing of Asec. Montesa, as representative
of DepEd, but consider Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo as the proper parties when they were
merely tasked to implement a directive emanating from a superior official (Asec. Montesa) of the
DepEd. Michelle I. Pineda vs. Court of Appeals and the Department of Education, etc., G.R. No.
181643, November 17, 2010.
Pleading; certification of non-forum shopping by petitioner corporation. Respondents To Chip,
Yap and Balila argue that the instant petition should be dismissed outright as the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was executed only by petitioner Lydia Sia in her personal
capacity, without the participation of Cebu Bionic. The Court is not persuaded.
Except for the powers which are expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those
that are implied by or are incidental to its existence, a corporation has no powers. It exercises
its powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, its
power to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its
corporate powers. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by
natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the
board of directors.
In this case, respondents To Chip, Yap and Balila obviously overlooked the Secretary’s
Certificate attached to the instant petition, which was executed by the Corporate Secretary of
Cebu Bionic. Unequivocally stated therein was the fact that the Board of Directors of Cebu
Bionic held a special meeting on July 26, 2002 and they thereby approved a Resolution
authorizing Lydia Sia to elevate the present case to this Court in behalf of Cebu Bionic, to wit:
Whereas, the board appointed LYDIA I. SIA to act and in behalf of the corporation to file the
CERTIORARI with the Supreme Court in relations to the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 5, 2002 which reversed its owjudgment earlier promulgated on February 14, 2001 entitled
CEBU BIONIC BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC. and LYDIA SIA, (Petitioners- Appellants) –versus – THE
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOSE TO CHIP, PATRICIO YAP and ROGER
BALILA (Respondents- Appelles), docketed CA-G.R. NO. 57216.
Whereas, on mass unanimously motion of all members of directors present hereby approved the
appointment of LYDIA I. SIA to act and sign all papers in connection of CA-G.R. NO. 57216.
Resolved and it is hereby resolve to appoint and authorized LYDIA I. SIA to sign and file with
the SUPREME COURT in connection to decision of the Court of Appeals as above mention.
Cebu Bionic Builders Supply, Inc. and Lydia Sia vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, et
al., G.R. No. 154366, November 17, 2010.
Pleading; new issue raised in pleading which could have been raised in previous pleadings. Still
on the second ground, Pineda points out that the March 14, 2005 Order of the RTC was
received by the DepEd on March 16, 2005 and the latter filed its petition before the CA on June
28, 2005, which was beyond the sixty (60)-day reglementary period. Going over DepEd’s
petition before the CA, it appears that DepEd reckoned the 60-day period from June 28, 2005,
the date of its receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order of the RTC. Pineda’s Comment and
Memorandum, however, did not raise this procedural lapse as an issue. Instead, Pineda put forth
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her own arguments in support of the two RTC orders. The rule in pleadings and practice is that
that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due diligence could have been
raised in previous pleadings. Thus, it is too late in the day for Pineda to question the procedural
lapse. Michelle I. Pineda vs. Court of Appeals and the Department of Education, etc., G.R. No.
181643, November 17, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application; failure to file motion for reconsideration seasonably
excused. First off, petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for admitting the Motion for
Reconsideration of its Decision dated February 14, 2001, which was filed by respondents To
Chip, Yap and Balila more than six months after receipt of the said decision. The motion was
eventually granted and the Court of Appeals issued its assailed Amended Decision, ruling in
favor of respondents.
Indeed, the appellate court’s Decision dated February 14, 2001 would have ordinarily attained
finality for failure of respondents to seasonably file their Motion for Reconsideration
thereon. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the higher interest of substantial
justice will be better served if respondents’ procedural lapse will be excused.
Verily, we had occasion to apply this liberality in the application of procedural rules in Barnes v.
Padilla where we aptly declared that –
The failure of the petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the period fixed by law
renders the decision final and executory. Such failure carries with it the result that no court can
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. Phrased elsewise, a final and executory
judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly,
even by the highest court of the land.
However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
In this case, what are involved are the property rights of the parties given that, ultimately, the
fundamental issue to be determined is who among the petitioners and respondents To Chip, Yap
and Balila has the better right to purchase the subject properties. More importantly, the merits
of the case sufficiently called for the suspension of the rules in order to settle conclusively the
rights and obligations of the parties herein. Cebu Bionic Builders Supply, Inc. and Lydia Sia vs.
Development Bank of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 154366, November 17, 2010.
Procedural rules; liberal application or suspension only for persuasive reasons and only in
meritorious cases.The emerging trend of jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and
flexible application of the Rules of Court. However, we have not been remiss in reminding the
bench and the bar that zealous compliance with the rules is still the general course of action.
Rules of procedure are in place to ensure the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases; to
this end, inflexibility or liberality must be weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural
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rules or the exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling reasons or
when the purpose of justice requires it. As early as 1998, in Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, we
expounded on these guiding principles:
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard since
they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening problem of
delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The requirement is in
pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that “all persons
shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies.” The adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined
to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some instances
wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was
“never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.” A
liberal interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
In Sebastian v. Hon. Morales, we straightened out the misconception that the enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would prejudice the substantive rights of
litigants:
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is
the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however,
that procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party.
Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure
the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a
mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or
as often suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants.
x x x. Hence, rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. x x x.
Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation
or suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only in meritorious cases, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Further, a bare invocation of “the interest of
substantial justice” will not suffice to override a stringent implementation of the rules.
A reading of the CA’s Decision readily shows that the leniency it granted GOODLAND was
merely anchored on substantial justice. The CA overlooked GOODLAND’s failure to advance
meritorious reasons to support its plea for the relaxation of Rule 138, Section 26. The fact that
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GOODLAND stands to lose a valuable property is inadequate to dispense with the exacting
imposition of a rather basic rule. More importantly, the CA failed to realize that the ultimate
consequences that will come about should GOODLAND’s appeal proceed would in fact
contravene substantial justice. The CA and, eventually, this Court will just re-litigate an
otherwise non-litigious matter and thereby compound the delay GOODLAND attempts to
perpetrate in order to prevent AUB from rightfully taking possession of the property. Asia United
Bank vs. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010.
Procedural rules; subsequent and substantial compliance. The Spouses Ching contend, among
other things, that their subsequent submission of the documents, which the CA deemed relevant
and pertinent to the petition in G.R. No. 167835, constituted substantial compliance with the
Rules. Consequently, by invoking strict compliance with the Rules in dismissing the petition
and denying the motion for reconsideration, the CA relied more on technicalities than resolving
the case on the merits. The Bank, on the other hand, argues that the resolution of the CA
dismissing the petition or failure o attach all relevant and pertinent leadings and documents has
legal basis, totally substantiated by the facts of the case, and supported by jurisprudence.
Indeed, this Court has maintained that the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party-
litigant may warrant the relaxation of the rules of procedure. Thus, in Jaro v. Court of Appeals, it
was elucidated that:
x x x In Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz and Piglas-Kamao v. National Labor Relations Commission, we
ruled that the subsequent submission of the missing documents with the motion for
reconsideration amounts to substantial compliance. The reasons behind the failure of petitioners
in these two cases to comply with the required attachments were no longer scrutinized. What
we found noteworthy in each case was the fact that petitioners substantially complied with the
formal requirements. We ordered the remand of the petitions in these cases to the Court of
Appeals, stressing the ruling that by precipitately dismissing the petitions “the appellate court
clearly put a premium on technicalities at the expense of a just resolution of the case.”
We cannot see why the same leniency cannot be extended to petitioner. x x x
If we were to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as what the Court
of Appeals would have it in this case, the ends of justice would be defeated. In Cusi-Hernandez
v. Diaz, where the formal requirements were liberally construed and substantial compliance was
recognized, we explained that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the
decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. Hence, a strict and rigid
application of technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be
avoided. We further declared that:
Cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that
way, the ends of justice would be served better.
In the similar case of Piglas-Kamao v. National Labor Relations Commission, we stressed the
policy of the courts to encourage the full adjudication of the merits of an appeal.
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In the case at bar, the CA dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 87217 for the Spouses
Ching’s failure to attach copies of all pleading and documents which the CA deemed relevant to
the petition. However, in their Motion for Reconsideration, the Spouses Ching stressed that they
have effectively complied and cured their procedural lapses by submitting all the pleadings and
documents required by the CA in their Amended Petition. The Spouses Ching even explained
that the said documents and pleadings were not relevant and pertinent to the petition, yet they
still submitted them. Hence, the amended petition filed by the Spouses Ching should have been
given due course by the CA. Nonetheless, this Court deems that the ends of justice would be
better served if the issues raised by the Spouses Ching in their petition before the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 87217 be resolved in the present petition. Sps. Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Family
Savings Bank and Sheriff of Manila / Alfredo Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and the Sheriff of
Manila, G.R. No. 167835 and G.R. No. 188480, November 15, 2010.
Summary judgment; partial summary judgment. PBB’s motion for partial summary judgment
against respondent Chua was based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules, which provides:
Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose
of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions,
admissions and affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. When the
pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party
to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in
dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material
facts.
The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not always result in the full adjudication
of all the issues raised in a case. For these instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. – If on motion under this Rule, judgment is not
rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by
interrogating counsel shall ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts accordingly.
This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section
reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a “final judgment,”
as it does not “[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has
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not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for.” The Rules provide for a partial summary
judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on
the assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute. Philippine
Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010.
Summary judgment; partial summary judgment; certiorari. PBB also maintains that the partial
summary judgment attained finality when respondent Chua failed to file a certiorari petition,
citing the last paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules as basis. We quote:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal maybe taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
x x x x
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless
the court allows an appeal therefrom;
x x x x
In all the above instances where the judgment, or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Contrary to PBB’s contention, however, certiorari was not the proper recourse for respondent
Chua. The propriety of the summary judgment may be corrected only on appeal or other direct
review, not a petition forcertiorari, since it imputes error on the lower court’s judgment. It is
well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judge’s findings and conclusions of law and fact. As we explained in Apostol v. Court of
Appeals:
As a legal recourse, the special civil action of certiorari is a limited form of review. The
jurisdiction of this Court is narrow in scope; it is restricted to resolving errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. Indeed, as long as the courts below act within their jurisdiction, alleged
errors committed in the exercise of their discretion will amount to mere errors of judgment
correctable by an appeal or a petition for review.
In light of these findings, we affirm the CA’s ruling that the partial summary judgment is an
interlocutory order which could not become a final and executory judgment, notwithstanding
respondent Chua’s failure to file acertiorari petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the
RTC grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua.
In view of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by respondent Chua
on the validity of the RTC’s appointment of a special sheriff for the implementation of the
execution writ.
As a final point, we note that respondent Chua has raised with this Court the issue of the
propriety of the partial summary judgment issued by the RTC. Notably, respondent Chua never
raised this issue in his petition for certiorari before the CA. It is well settled that no question will
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be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Basic
considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule.
Furthermore, this issue would be better resolved in the proper appeal, to be taken by the parties
once the court a quo has completely resolved all the issues involved in the present case in a
final judgment. If we were to resolve this issue now, we would be preempting the CA, which
has primary jurisdiction over this issue.
Lastly, taking jurisdiction over this issue now would only result in multiple appeals from a single
case which concerns the same, or integrated, causes of action. As we said in Santos v. People:
Another recognized reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment,
and not from an interlocutory or incidental one, is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single
action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case
during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the
case would necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse
party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as
incidental questions may be raised by him, and interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the
lower court. Philippine Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010.
Summary judgment; partial summary judgment; interlocutory order. After this sifting process, the
court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies the disputed
facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment is
more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment.
The differences between a “final judgment” and an “interlocutory order” are well-
established. We said in Denso (Phils.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court that:
[A] final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants
is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next
move . . . and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
“final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.”
x x x x
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task
of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
“interlocutory”, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules x x x Unlike a ‘final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
‘interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
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Bearing in mind these differences, there can be no doubt that the partial summary judgment
envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to be treated separately
from the main case. As we explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals:
It will be noted that the judgment in question is a “partial summary judgment.” It was rendered
only with respect to the private respondents’ first and second causes of action alleged in their
complaint. It was not intended to cover the other prayers in the said complaint, nor the
supplementary counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the private respondents, nor the
third-party complaint filed by the petitioners against the Security Bank and Trust Company. A
partial summary judgment “is not a final or appealable judgment.”(Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition,
p. 189, citing several cases.) “It is merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the case
shall be deemed established for the trial of the case.” (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p.
429.)
x x x x
The partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court being merely interlocutory and not ‘a
final judgment’, it is puerile to discuss whether the same became final and executory due to the
alleged failure to appeal said judgment within the supposed period of appeal. What the rules
contemplate is that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with
the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material
facts on which a substantial controversy exists.This is on the assumption that the partial
summary judgment was validly rendered, which, as shown above, is not true in the case at bar.
We reiterated this ruling in the cases of Province of Pangasinan v. Court of
Appeals and Government Service Insurance System v. Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. Philippine
Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010.
Temporary restraining order; issuance by Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that the
consummation of transactions conveying the contested property will affect their right to defend
their title to the property thereby causing grave and irreparable injury to them. While this Court
does not agree with that claim, we still deem it to be more prudent to grant the requested TRO.
Petitioners have shown a prima facie right to the exemption that they claim. Former DAR
Secretary Pagdanganan granted petitioners’ application for exemption upon finding that the
subject lots had already been converted to non-agricultural even prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657, due to the property’s reclassification into farmlot subdivision through
the Land Use and Zoning Ordinance of Lipa City. This ordinance was approved by the HLURB
in Resolution No. 35, s. 1981, with a certification issued by HLURB Secretariat OIC Carolina
Casaje that the Town Plan/Zoning Ordinance of Lipa City was approved by the National
Coordinating Council for Town Planning, Housing and Zoning.
Furthermore, the HLURB’s Rules and Regulations Implementing Farmlot Subdivision Plan
categorizes a farmlot subdivision as different from agricultural land as “it is without the intended
qualities of an agricultural land and is never intended to be exclusively used for cultivation,
livestock production and agro-forestry.”
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Finally, the HLURB development permit and license to sell were “indications of the locational
viability and the non-exclusivity for agricultural purposes of the subject lots.” All these
arguments were in fact adopted by the Office of the President on appeal.
We therefore deem it proper to grant temporary protection to petitioners’ prima facie right.
The consummation of acts leading to the disposition of the litigated property can make it
difficult to implement this Court’s decision upon resolution of the case and can only prolong this
protracted battle even more. On the other hand, respondents would not be unduly deprived of
their livelihood as they can continue tilling the land pending the final disposition of this case.
The Court therefore finds that it is to the public interest to maintain the conditions prevailing
before the filing of this case. Posting of a bond by petitioners shall answer for any damages
which may be sustained by respondents as a consequence of the issuance of a TRO if the Court
finally decides that petitioners are not entitled to it.
WHEREFORE, the motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order is GRANTED upon
posting by the petitioners of a bond in the amount of P2 Million. Respondents are enjoinedfrom
entering into transactions resulting in the conveyance of any part of the properties subject of this
case.
The parties in this case are directed to maintain the status quo and to refrain from all actions
which may affect the ownership or present possession of the contested properties until further
orders of this Court. Heirs of Augusto Salas, Jr., represented by Teresita D. Salas vs. Marciano
Cabungcal, et al., G.R. No. 191545. November 22, 2010.
Writ of Possession; execution sale. Moreover, contrary to the Spouses Ching’s contention, this
Court, in Paredes v. Court of Appeals, citing Rodil v. Benedicto, categorically held that the right
of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to request for the issuance of a writ of possession of
the land never prescribes. A writ of possession is employed to enforce a judgment to recover
the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the
person entitled under the judgment. It may be issued in several instances, among which is in
execution sales. There was, therefore, no grave error on the part of the RTC in granting the
motion. Sps. Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and Sheriff of Manila /
Alfredo Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and the Sheriff of Manila, G.R. No. 167835 and G.R. No.
188480, November 15, 2010.
Writ of possession; nature of remedy. Alfredo is assailing the validity of the RTC Order dated
March 28, 2006, which granted the Bank’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion To Resolve Motion for
Designation of Another Sheriff to Serve/Enforce Writ of Possession/Court Processes. It is to be
noted that the said Order was but an ancillary motion emanating from the writ of possession
granted earlier by the RTC. Corollarily, with regard to a petition for writ of possession, it is well
to state that the proceeding is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding
brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to any person adverse
of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom
the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. Consequently, so too was the nature of the
urgent motion, it was ex-parteand summary in nature.
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Moreover, it is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction
is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of
right. To be sure, regardless of whether or not there is a pending action for nullification of the
sale at public auction, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the
outcome of such action. Undeniably, Alfredo failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period and, thereafter, ownership was consolidated in favor of the Bank and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. 221703, was issued in its name. It was, therefore, a purely
ministerial duty for the trial court to issue a writ of possession in favor of the Bank and issue the
Order granting the motion for designation of another sheriff to serve the writ, which is merely an
order enforcing the writ of possession.
We note, with affirmation, the discussion of the CA on the matter:
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the property after the period of redemption has
lapsed and no redemption was made under the old rule, has not been changed with the advent
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The only significant change is the time when the period of
redemption period would start. Under the old Rules, the redemption period would commence
after the sale, while under the present Rule, the period to reckon with is the date of registration
of the certificate of sale with the proper Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the property of the petitioner was sold in an
execution sale in favor of the respondent bank and that no redemption was made by the former
over the said property within the required one-year period. It has been held that a writ of
possession may be issued in favor of the purchaser in an execution sale when the deed of
conveyance has been executed and delivered to him after the period of redemption has expired
and no redemption has been made by the judgment debtor. After such period, the judgment
debtor would be divested of his ownership of the property. Thus, just like in extrajudicial
foreclosure, the issuance of the writ of possession after the lapse of the period of redemption is
ministerial on the part of the court.
It is the contention of the petitioner that a writ of possession could only be validly issued upon
consolidation of title and ownership in the name of the purchaser. We agree. The petitioner
then argues that a valid consolidation could be obtained only upon filing of a separate action
with the RTC acting as a cadastral court. That we don’t agree. The petitioner cited the case of
Padilla, Jr. v. Philippine Producers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to support his
argument. The said case involved the issuance of a new title in the name of the purchaser. In
fact, the primary issue therein is whether in implementing the involuntary transfer of title of real
property levied and sold on execution, it is enough for the executing party to file a motion with
the court which rendered judgment, or does he need to file a separate action with the Regional
Trial Court. There is nothing therein which states that a new title in the name of the purchaser is
necessary for the validity of the writ of possession. On the contrary, a perusal of the said case
would reveal that a purchaser, by virtue of a levy and an execution sale, would become the new
lawful owner of the property sold if not redeemed within the one-year period.
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Following the argument of the petitioner, he might have confused consolidation of title and
ownership with the issuance or application for a new title after the redemption as provided for
in Section 75 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Title and ownership to the property is
consolidated upon the lapse of the period of redemption. It is automatic upon the failure of the
judgment obligor to exercise his right of redemption within the period allowed by law. Title
may be consolidated in the name of the purchaser even without a new title issued in his
name. The term “title” as used in consolidation does not pertain to the certificate of title, or
piece of paper, issued by the Register of Deeds, which is a mere evidence of ownership. It is
synonymous with ownership.
There is neither law nor jurisprudence which requires that the certificate of title to the property
must first be cancelled and a new one be issued in favor of the purchaser before a valid
consolidation of title and ownership could be said to have taken place, and before a court could
issue a writ of possession, or an order designating a sheriff to enforce such writ.
Not even the pendency of another action with the appellate courts involving the validity of the
writ of possession can stop the enforcement of the said writ in the absence of any restraining
order or injunctive writ from the said courts. Accordingly, considering that this Court and the
Supreme Court have not issued any temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
against the order of the court a quo for the issuance of writ of possession, we see no cogent
reason why the said writ could not be effectively enforced.
The RTC, therefore, acted well within its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned order granting the
urgent ex-parte motion of the respondent bank which proceeds from the writ of possession
which had long been issued. For all the foregoing, there is no need to address the other
issues. Sps. Alfredo and Encarnacion Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and Sheriff of Manila /
Alfredo Ching vs. Family Savings Bank and the Sheriff of Manila, G.R. No. 167835 and G.R. No.
188480, November 15, 2010.
Special Proceedings.
Appeal; record on appeal. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the
orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz:
SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. – An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or
a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person,
or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or
the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights
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of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special
proceedings. A record on appeal – in addition to the notice of appeal – is thus required to be
filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of
the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and
held to be final.
In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter
remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed
order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in
the civil registry.
The appellate court’s reliance on Zayco v. Hinlo, Jr. in denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is misplaced. In Zayco which was a petition for letters of administration of a
deceased person’s estate, the decedent’s children appealed the trial court’s order appointing the
grandson of the decedent as administrator of the estate. Their notice of appeal and record on
appeal were denied due course by the trial court on the ground that the appealed order
is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. But even if the appeal were proper, it was belatedly
filed. On certiorari by the decedent’s children, the appellate court sustained the trial court. On
petition for review, this Court reversed the appellate court, holding that “[a]n order appointing
an administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties
in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate,”
hence, the order is “final” and “appealable.” The Court also held that the appeal was filed on
time.
In Zayco, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the
proceedings before the trial court involved the administration, management and settlement of
the decedent’s estate– matters covered by Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals
could, and did in that case, call for them. Republic of the Philippines vs. Nasaida Sumera
Nishina, et al., G.R. No. 186053, November 15, 2010.
Other Proceedings
Intra-corporate dispute; jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts. In addition to being
conferred by law, it bears emphasizing that the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted
therein. Moreover, pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the
Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under Section
5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as
SCCs pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC promulgated on 21 November 2000. Thus, Section
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1(a), Rule 1 of theInterim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim
Rules) provides as follows:
“SECTION 1. (a) Cases covered. — These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed
in civil cases involving the following:
(1) Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors, business associates,
officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation,
partnership, or association;
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations, between
and among stockholders, members, or associates; and between, any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates,
respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of
corporations, partnerships, or associations;
(4) Derivative suits; and
(5) Inspection of corporate books.” (Italics supplied)
In upholding the RTC’s pronouncement that venue was improperly laid, the CA ruled that
STRADEC’s first and second causes of action were not intra-corporate disputes because the
issues pertaining thereto were civil in nature. In support of the foregoing conclusion, the CA
cited Speed Distributing Corporation vs. Court of Appealswhere this Court essentially ruled out
the existence of an intra-corporate dispute from an action instituted by the wife for the
nullification of the transfer of a property between corporations of which her deceased husband
was a stockholder. The CA also relied on this Court’s pronouncement in Nautica Canning
Corporation vs. Yumul to the effect, among others, that an action to determine the validity of the
transfer of shares from one stockholder to another is civil in nature and is, therefore, cognizable
by regular courts and not the SEC. In addition to the fact that the first case involved a civil
action instituted against corporations by one who was not a stockholder thereof, however,
STRADEC correctly points out that, unlike the second case, the limited jurisdiction of the SEC is
not in issue in the case at bench.
Even prescinding from the different factual and legal milieus of said cases, the CA also failed to
take into consideration the fact that, unlike the SEC which is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction,
SCCs like the RTC are still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate
disputes filed before them. In G.D. Express Worldwide N.V. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
ruled as follows:
It should be noted that the SCCs are still considered courts of general jurisdiction. Section 5.2 of
R.A. No. 8799 directs merely the Supreme Court’s designation of RTC branches that shall
exercise jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. Nothing in the language of the law suggests
the diminution of jurisdiction of those RTCs to be designated as SCCs. The assignment of intra-
corporate disputes to SCCs is only for the purpose of streamlining the workload of the RTCs so
that certain branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject matter.
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The designation of certain RTC branches to handle specific cases is nothing new. For instance,
pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
Supreme Court has assigned certain RTC branches to hear and decide cases under Sections 56
and 57 of R.A. No. 6657.
The RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute can be likened to an RTC
exercising its probate jurisdiction or sitting as a special agrarian court. The designation of the
SCCs as such has not in any way limited their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature,
whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.
Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Star Infrastructure Development Corporation
Corporation, BEDE S. Tabalingcos, et al., G.R. No. 187872. November 17, 2010.
Intra-corporate dispute; relationship test and nature of the controversy test. An intra-corporate
dispute is understood as a suit arising from intra-corporate relations or between or among
stockholders or between any or all of them and the corporation. Applying what has come to be
known as the relationship test, it has been held that the types of actions embraced by the
foregoing definition include the following suits: (a) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members, or officers; (c) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and,
(d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. As the definition is broad enough
to cover all kinds of controversies between stockholders and corporations, the traditional
interpretation was to the effect that the relationship test brooked no distinction, qualification or
any exemption whatsoever.
However, the unqualified application of the relationship test has been modified on the ground
that the same effectively divests regular courts of jurisdiction over cases for the sole reason that
the suit is between the corporation and/or its corporators. It was held that the better policy in
determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not only the status or
relationship of the parties but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their
controversy. Under the nature of the controversy test, the dispute must not only be rooted in the
existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must also refer to the enforcement of the parties’
correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code as well as the internal and intra-
corporate regulatory rules of the corporation. The combined application of the relationship test
and the nature of the controversy test has, consequently, become the norm in determining
whether a case is an intra-corporate controversy or is purely civil in character.
In the case at bench, STRADEC’s first and second causes of action seek the nullification of the
loan and pledge over its SIDC shareholding contracted by respondents Yujuico, Sumbilla and
Wong as well the avoidance of the notarial sale of said shares conducted by respondent
Caraos. STRADEC’s 31 July 2006 amended petition significantly set forth the following
allegations common to its main causes of action, to wit:
XXX XXX XXX
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Applying the relationship test, we find that STRADEC’s first and second causes of action qualify
as intra-corporate disputes since said corporation and respondent Wong are incorporators
and/or stockholders of SIDC. Having acquired STRADEC’s shares thru the impugned notarial
sale conducted by respondent Caraos, respondent Wong appears to have further transferred said
shares in favor of CTCII, a corporation he allegedly formed with members of his own family. By
reason of said transfer, CTCII became a stockholder of SIDC and was, in fact, alleged to have
been recognized as such by the latter and its corporate officers. To our mind, these relationships
were erroneously disregarded by the RTC when it ruled that venue was improperly laid for
STRADEC’s first and second causes of action which, applying Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, should have been filed either at the place where it maintained its
principal place of business or where respondents Yujuico, Sumbilla and Wong resided.
Considering that they fundamentally relate to STRADEC’s status as a stockholder and the alleged
fraudulent divestment of its stockholding in SIDC, the same causes of action also qualify as
intra-corporate disputes under the nature of the controversy test. As part of the fraud which
attended the transfer of its shares, STRADEC distinctly averred, among other matters, that
respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla had no authority to contract a loan with respondent Wong;
that the pledge executed by respondent Yujuico was simulated since it did not receive the
proceeds of the loan for which its shares in SIDC were set up as security; that irregularities
attended the notarial sale conducted by respondent Caraos who sold said shares to respondent
Wong; that the latter unlawfully transferred the same shares in favor of CTCII; and, that SIDC
and its officers recognized and validated said transfers despite being alerted about their
defects. Ultimately, the foregoing circumstances were alleged to have combined to rid
STRADEC of its shares in SIDC and its right as a stockholder to participate in the latter’s
corporate affairs. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Star Infrastructure
Development Corporation Corporation, BEDE S. Tabalingcos, et al., G.R. No. 187872,
November 17, 2010.
Intra-corporate dispute; rules of procedure. The rule is settled that rules of procedure ought not
to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure – not
override – substantial justice. Considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities courts
have been exhorted, time and again, to afford every litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case free from the constraints of technicalities. Since rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it is well recognized
that courts are empowered to suspend its rules, when the rigid application thereof tends to
frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. No less than Section 3, Rule 1 of the Interim
Rulesprovides that the provisions thereof are to “be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding.” Strategic Alliance Development Corporation vs. Star Infrastructure Development
Corporation Corporation, BEDE S. Tabalingcos, et al., G.R. No. 187872, November 17, 2010.
Intra-corporate dispute; venue. Viewed in the foregoing light and the intra-corporate nature of
STRADEC’s first and second causes of action, the CA clearly erred in upholding the RTC’s
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finding that venue therefor was improperly laid. Given that the question of venue is decidedly
not jurisdictional and may, in fact, be waived, said error was further compounded when the
RTC handed down its first 30 August 2006 order even before respondents were able to file
pleadings squarely raising objections to the venue for said causes of action. Pursuant to Section
5, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules, at any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that STRADEC correctly
commenced its petition before the RTC exercising jurisdiction over SIDC’s principal place of
business which was alleged to have been transferred from Bayambang, Pangasinan to Lipa,
Batangas. It matters little that STRADEC, as pointed out by respondents, also questions the
validity of the 30 July 2005 SIDC stockholders’ annual meeting where the aforesaid change in
the address of its principal place of business was allegedly approved. Said matter should be
properly threshed out in the proceedings before the RTC alongside such issues as the validity of
the transfers of STRADEC’s shares to respondents Wong and CTCII, the propriety of the
recording of said transfers in SIDC’s books, STRADEC’s status as a stockholder of SIDC, the
legality of the 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders’ special meeting or, for that matter, Cezar T.
Quiambao’s authority to represent STRADEC in the case at bench. Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation vs. Star Infrastructure Development Corporation Corporation, BEDE S.
Tabalingcos, et al., G.R. No. 187872, November 17, 2010.
Judgment; finality. Finally, it must be emphasized that the decision of the HLURB in HLURB
Case No. REM-091699-10646, has already become final and executory due to the failure of the
petitioner to elevate the dismissal of his appeal by the Office of the President to the Court of
Appeals. It is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of
the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. Romulo R.
Peralta vs. Hon. Raul E. De Leon, et al., G.R. No. 187978, November 24, 2010.
Jurisdiction; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Assiduous, petitioner is now
before this Courtvia the present recourse raising the single issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals is correct in affirming the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to enjoin the implementation of
the HLURB decision that was allegedly rendered contrary to Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1344. We affirm the Court of Appeals.
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such
agency. Presidential Decree No. 1344, “Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue
Writ of Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957,”
clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to the HLURB in
the following specific terms:
Sec 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature.
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
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C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.
It is noteworthy that the HLURB in HLURB Case No. REM-091699-10646, rendered a decision
against petitioner ordering him to pay CSDI the unpaid amount due from his purchase of a
condominium unit or in the alternative, the rescission of contract with forfeiture of payments
made by petitioner. A writ of execution was issued against petitioner and his appeal was
dismissed by the Office of the President. Petitioner no longer assailed this dismissal, thus the
same became final and executory. Unable to obtain relief before the Office of the President,
petitioner filed Civil Case No. 07-0141 before the RTC of Parañaque City. As adverted to earlier,
the RTC concluded that the jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint falls on the HLURB. This
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to hear and decide cases is determined by
the nature of the cause of action, the subject matter or property involved and the parties.
In Civil Case No. 07-0141, petitioner prayed for the issuance of temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction to restrain respondent CSDI from cancelling the Contract to Sell,
forfeiting the amortization payment, foreclosing petitioner’s condominium units, and garnishing
his bank deposits. Specifically, petitioner asked that the RTC, Branch 258:
1. Immediately upon receipt of this petition, a temporary restraining Order be issued and/or a
Preliminary Injunction, pending the determination of the merits of the case, by way of
restraining defendants from forfeiting the amortization payments, foreclosure of plaintiff’s
condominium unit, its break opening, and garnishment of plaintiff’s bank deposits at Bank of
Philippine Islands, Forbes Park branch, Makati City.
2. To order the final and permanent injunction.
3. And to order defendant-developer to pay plaintiff the actual damages of his hospitalization
amounting to Php 60,000.00 including the interest until fully paid, caused by the unlawful and
damaging acts of defendants as above shown;
4. To order defendant developer to pay P300,000.00 as moral damages to plaintiff;
5. Another payment of P300,000.00 as exemplary damages to plaintiff;
6. To pay Attorneys fees of P50,000.00 and costs of suit;
7. Ordering defendants to adhere to the License to Sell and all its strict compliance thereto
imposed on defendant developer.
We have to agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the petitioner is with the HLURB.
Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, finds application in this case. The Court ruled:
The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding
subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate
government agency, the HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of
provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate
may take recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued
with public interest and welfare, any question arising from the exercise of that prerogative
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should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how on the matter. In the
exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine
the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely
judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.
This Court was equally explicit in Chua v. Ang, when it pronounced that:
x x x The law recognized, too, that subdivision and condominium development involves public
interest and welfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical
expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, on the other hand, is empowered to
interpret and apply contracts, and determine the rights of private parties under these
contracts. This ancillary power, generally judicial, is now no longer with the regular courts to
the extent that the pertinent HLURB laws provide.
Viewed from this perspective, the HLURB’s jurisdiction over contractual rights and obligations
of parties under subdivision and condominium contracts comes out very clearly.
We are in accord with the RTC when it held:
First: On the matter of lack of jurisdiction of this Court over this case – This Court is fully aware
of the cited decisions of respondents particularly those which pertain to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) as provided for under
pertinent laws to the exclusion of the regular courts and this is one of them. It cannot be
gainsaid that while [plaintiff] harps on Arts. 20 and 21 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
to be the basis of his cause of action for damages before this Court, the issue of his claiming
damages against respondent Concepts & Systems Dev’t. Inc. (CSDI), has already been resolved
in HLURB Case No. REM-091699-10646 in favor of CSDI and against him to which a Writ of
Execution has been issued, partially implemented by co-respondent Sheriff Lucas Eloso Eje and
to which [plaintiff] is asking this Court to issue a temporary restraining order in order to suspend
the full implementation of said writ. While [plaintiff] claims that his cause of action is one of
damages, the truth is his main objective is to have this Court enjoin the enforcement of the writ
of execution issued by the HLURB. Such subterfuge is easily discernible in view of the amount
of damages [plaintiff] is only claiming in this case against that which respondent CSDI is entitled
to if the writ of execution is fully satisfied. This cannot be done for it is tantamount to undue
interference with the decision of a quasi-judicial body which, as above-stated, is vested by law
and jurisprudence with exclusive authority to hear and decide cases between sellers and buyers
of subdivision lots and condominium units, among others.
The Court, therefore, hereby adopts by reference the arguments of respondent CSDI relative to
this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear and decide this case which need no longer be repeated
herein as it will not serve any useful purpose.
As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of
the Civil Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative
bodies now performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This
quasi-judicial function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power
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entrusted to them of regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise. Romulo
R. Peralta vs. Hon. Raul E. De Leon, et al., G.R. No. 187978, November 24, 2010.
Jurisdiction; HLURB. In the main, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the HLURB, inviting
attention to Rule II of the Disputes triable by HIGC/Nature of Proceedings:
Section 1. Types of Disputes. – The HIGC or any person, officer, body, board or committee duly
designated or created by it shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the
following:
xxxx
(9) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations between and among members of the
association of which they are members; and between such association and the state/general
public or other entity insofar as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity. (underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners argue that the HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the case as it does not fall
under the category of an intra-corporate controversy, their being non-members having been
established and acknowledged by respondent. Likewise, they argue that the case cannot be
deemed a controversy between the association and the general public since the main issue does
not pertain to respondent’s juridical personality. Petitioners add that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended, vests exclusive jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer on
first level courts, such as the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
The petition is bereft of merit. Upon conferment of quasi-judicial functions to an administrative
agency, all controversies relating to the subject matter which pertain to its specialization are
deemed included within its jurisdiction. Since the HLURB is vested by law with jurisdiction to
regulate and supervise homeowner associations, respondent correctly lodged their complaint
with the HLURB. Republic Act No. 8763 provides:
Section 26. Powers over Homeowners Associations. – The powers authorities and
responsibilities vested in the Corporation (formerly Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation) with
respect to homeowners association under Republic Act No. 580, as amended by executive
Order No. 535is hereby transferred to the Housing and Land use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). (underscoring supplied)
Petitioners in fact, in their reply to the complaint, acknowledged the HLURB’s jurisdiction when
they challenged respondent’s right to exist as a corporate entity, viz:
(5) That complainant’s statements from number 6-12 in reference to that of the respondents are
already terminated and non members and non program beneficiaries of the CMP would not
hold water. At this point, respondent in this instance, would like to emphasize that they are not
opposing the implementation of the Community Mortgage Program. They are only questioning
the legitimacy and the illegal activities of Erlinda Manalo, highlighted hereunder, to wit:
a. Complainant have been collecting money since year 2000 from actual occupants and
occupants not covered by the Community Mortgage Program. This is illegal for the simple
reason that she has no juridical personality in the absence of a SEC registration. Please take note
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of their half hazard (sic) registration with HLURB dated only September 25, 2003 (please refer to
the receipts of collection marked as Annex “B”)
b. No election to legitimize her presidency.
c. Non-consultation of the majority actual occupants on which she used the names in her
intent of registering with HLURB the so called Sta. Monica Riverside Homeowners Association.
d. Harassment of the child (child abuse) of one of the actual occupant who was deleted from
the beneficiaries. (please refer to the medical certificate marked as Annex “C”)
e. Majority of the names of officers and members as submitted to HLURB are not the actual
occupants(please refer to the master list submitted to the City Government Planning Office
marked as Annex “D”) (underscoring supplied)
If petitioners refuse to recognize respondent’s legitimacy, respondent will not be able to fulfill its
obligation to collect and account for the monthly amortizations with SHFC. Individual titling
would not thus be completed and the laudable objectives of the CMP [Community Mortgage
Program] would not be fully attained.
Undoubtedly, the case is within the competence of HLURB to decide. While the SHFC is the
main government agency tasked to administer the CMP, its authority pertains only to the
administrative and financing aspects of the State’s social housing program
schemes, i.e., evaluation of the community association and originator based on the submitted
documents, site inspection, releasing of funds for land acquisition, site development and
housing assistance, collection of monthly amortizations from community associations and
foreclosure of mortgages.
While a complaint for ejectment, which raises the issue of who has a better right of possession,
falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of first level courts, the right of possession in
the present case is, however, necessarily intertwined with a determination of rights and
privileges under a distinctive social housing concept such as CMP, which falls within the
expertise of the HLURB.
The foregoing discussions leave it unnecessary to delve on petitioners’ assigned error respecting
their extrajudicial and summary eviction from the lots they occupy. It is settled that eviction is a
necessary consequence of petitioners’ exclusion from the benefits of the CMP. Edna Eugenio, et
al. vs. Sta. Monica Riverside Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 187751, November 22, 2010.
Writ of possession; matter of right after consolidation of title in name of buyer in extra-judicial
foreclosure. It is a time-honored legal precept that after the consolidation of titles in the buyer’s
name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes a
matter of right. As the confirmed owner, the purchaser’s right to possession becomes
absolute. There is even no need for him to post a bond, and it is the ministerial duty of the
courts to issue the same upon proper application and proof of title. To accentuate the writ’s
ministerial character, the Court has consistently disallowed injunction to prohibit its issuance
despite a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has
been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As an ex parte proceeding,
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it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or consent by any person
adversely interested.
Subsequent proceedings in the appellate courts would merely involve a reiteration of the
foregoing settled doctrines. The issue involved in the assailed RTC issuances is conclusively
determined by the above cited legal dictum, and it would be unnecessarily vexatious and unjust
to allow the present controversy to undergo protracted litigation. AUB’s right of possession is
founded on its right of ownership over the property which it purchased at the auction sale.
Upon expiration of the redemption period and consolidation of the title to the property, its
possessory rights over the same became absolute. We quote with approval the pronouncement
of the RTC, viz.:
As the purchaser of the property in the foreclosure sale to which new title has already been
issued, petitioner’s right over the property has become absolute, vesting upon it the right of
possession and enjoyment of the property which this Court must aid in effecting its delivery.
Under the circumstances, and following established doctrine, the issuance of a writ of
possession is a ministerial function whereby the court exercises neither discretion nor judgment
x x x. Said writ of possession must be enforced without delay x x x.
The law does not require that a petition for a writ of possession be granted only after
documentary and testimonial evidence shall have been offered to and admitted by the court. As
long as a verified petition states the facts sufficient to entitle petitioner to the relief requested, the
court shall issue the writ prayed for. Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Company, Inc., G.R. No.
188051, November 22, 2010.
Writ of possession; writ issued in relation to extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage is not covered
by rule on execution by motion or by independent action (Rule 39, sec. 6). The petitioners
finally submit that the writ of possession, issued by the RTC on February 16, 1984, may no
longer be enforced by a mere motion, but by a separate action, considering that more than five
years had elapsed from its issuance, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse
of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date
of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
In rejecting a similar argument, the Court held in Paderes v. Court of Appeals that Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court finds application only to civil actions and not to special
proceedings. Citing Sta. Ana v. Menla, which extensively discussed the rationale behind the
rule, the Court held:
In a later case [Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111 Phil. 947 (1961)], the Court also ruled that the provision
in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within five years by motion,
and after five years but within ten years by an action (Section 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as land registration cases. x x x x
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We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except
in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final,
it may not be enforced after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court
to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but
within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because
a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided
in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings
the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has
been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the
land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Subsequently, the Court, in Republic v. Nillas, affirmed the dictum in Sta. Ana and clarified that
“Rule 39 x x x applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or extraordinary proceedings
not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal
modality,” viz:
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not to other or
extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but by some
other specific law or legal modality such as land registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil
actions governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to
establish ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of such
extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition or fact. Hence, upon the
finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership, no further step is required to effectuate the
decision and a ministerial duty exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the
issuance of, and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
In the present case, Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to an ex
parte petition for the issuance of the writ of possession as it is not in the nature of a civil action
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure but a judicial proceeding governed separately by
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 which regulates the methods of effecting an extrajudicial foreclosure
of mortgage. The provision states:
Section 7. Possession during redemption period. In any sale made under the provisions of this
Act, the purchaser may petition the [Regional Trial Court] where the property or any part thereof
is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an
amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without
complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in
form of an ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is
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registered, or in special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law
or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of any other real
property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of any register of deeds in
accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing
of such petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and
fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act Numbered Twenty-
eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who
shall execute said order immediately.
The above-cited provision lays down the procedure that commences from the filing of a motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession, to the issuance of the writ of possession by the Court,
and finally to the execution of the order by the sheriff of the province in which the property is
located. Based on the text of the law, we have also consistently ruled that the duty of the trial
court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial; the writ issues as a matter of course upon the
filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. In fact, the issuance
and the immediate implementation of the writ are declared ministerial and mandatory under the
law.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank v. Adil, we emphatically ruled that “once the writ of
possession has been issued, the trial court has no alternative but to enforce the writ without
delay.” The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is
summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of
title. The trial court does not exercise discretion in the issuance thereof; it must grant the
issuance of the writ upon compliance with the requirements set forth by law, and the provincial
sheriff is likewise mandated to implement the writ immediately.
Clearly, the exacting procedure provided in Act No. 3135, from the moment of the issuance of
the writ of possession, leaves no room for the application of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which we consistently ruled, as early as 1961 in Sta. Ana, to be applicable only to civil
actions. From another perspective, the judgment or the order does not have to be executed by
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Spouses
Ernesto and Vicenta Topacio vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 157644,
November 17, 2010.
Evidence
Admission. In the first issue raised, petitioner argues that respondents’ exclusive right to
monopolize the subject matter of the patent exists only within the term of the patent. Petitioner
claims that since respondents’ patent expired on July 16, 2004, the latter no longer possess any
right of monopoly and, as such, there is no more basis for the issuance of a restraining order or
injunction against petitioner insofar as the disputed patent is concerned. The Court
agrees. Section 37 of Republic Act No. (RA) 165, which was the governing law at the time of
the issuance of respondents’ patent, provides:
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Section 37. Rights of patentees. A patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell
the patented machine, article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of
industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippines for the term of the patent; and
such making, using, or selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee
constitutes infringement of the patent.
It is clear from the above-quoted provision of law that the exclusive right of a patentee to make,
use and sell a patented product, article or process exists only during the term of the patent. In
the instant case, Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116, which was the basis of respondents in
filing their complaint with the BLA-IPO, was issued on July 16, 1987. This fact was admitted by
respondents themselves in their complaint. They also admitted that the validity of the said patent
is until July 16, 2004, which is in conformity with Section 21 of RA 165, providing that the term
of a patent shall be seventeen (17) years from the date of issuance thereof. Section 4, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof and that the admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. In the present case, there is no dispute as to respondents’ admission that
the term of their patent expired on July 16, 2004. Neither is there evidence to show that their
admission was made through palpable mistake. Hence, contrary to the pronouncement of the
CA, there is no longer any need to present evidence on the issue of expiration of respondents’
patent.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioner that after July 16, 2004,
respondents no longer possess the exclusive right to make, use and sell the articles or products
covered by Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc and
Pfizer (Phil.) Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010.
Affidavits; hearsay if affiants not presented at trial for cross-examination. To support her
assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit
of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject
property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the
subject property. Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered
sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by
Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not
presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit:
The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand
to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently,
the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for
cross-examination. Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metroplitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No.
187023, November 17, 2010.
Best Evidence Rule. In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any
probative value. InConcepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr. and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,we held that a photocopy of a document has no
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probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the
said pieces of evidence. Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metroplitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No.
187023, November 17, 2010.
Burden of proof; affirmative defense; payment. It is worth noting that both Vitarich and Losin
failed to make a proper recording and documentation of their transactions making it difficult to
reconcile the evidence presented by the parties to establish their respective claims. As a general
rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. In Jimenez v. NLRC, the Court ruled
that the burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-
payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been
discharged by payment.
True, the law requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a
party to prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence
required by law. In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Losin because she alleges an
affirmative defense, namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.
After examination of the evidence presented, this Court is of the opinion that Losin failed to
present a single official receipt to prove payment. This is contrary to the well-settled rule that a
receipt, which is a written and signed acknowledgment that money and goods have been
delivered, is the best evidence of the fact of payment although not exclusive. All she presented
were copies of the list of checks allegedly issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo, a
Statement of Payments Made to Vitarich, and apparently copies of the pertinent history of her
checking account with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). At best, these may only
serve as documentary records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the
payments made but these are not enough to prove payment.
Article 1249, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides:
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile
documents shallproduce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when
through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired. [Emphasis supplied]
In the case at bar, no cash payment was proved. It was neither confirmed that the checks issued
by Losin were actually encashed by Vitarich. Thus, the Court cannot consider that payment,
much less overpayment, made by Losin. Vitarich Corporation vs. Chona Losin, G.R. No.
181560, November 15, 2010.
Burden of proof; allegation of forgery. Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Lab’s findings,
Nacu should have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the signatures
appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all, whoever alleges forgery has the
burden of proving the same by clear and convincing evidence. Nacu could not simply depend
on the alleged weakness of the complainant’s evidence without offering stronger evidence to
contradict the former. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 187752,
November 23, 2010.
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Damages for loss of earning capacity; documentary evidence. The award of damages for loss of
earning capacity is concerned with the determination of losses or damages sustained by
respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased. This consists not of the full
amount of his earnings, but of the support which they received or would have received from
him had he not died as a consequence of the negligent act. Thus, the amount recoverable is not
the loss of the victim’s entire earnings, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which
the beneficiary would have received. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity is determined by
computing the net earning capacity of the victim. The CA correctly modified the RTC’s
computation. The RTC had misapplied the formula generally used by the courts to determine net
earning capacity, which is, to wit:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary
living expenses).
Life expectancy shall be computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 – age at death]) adopted
from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined Experience
Table of Mortality. Hence, the RTC erred in modifying the formula and using the retirement age
of the members of the PNP instead of “80.”
On the other hand, gross annual income requires the presentation of documentary evidence for
the purpose of proving the victim’s annual income. The victim’s heirs presented in evidence
Señora’s pay slip from the PNP, showing him to have had a gross monthly salary of P12,754.00.
Meanwhile, the victim’s net income was correctly pegged at 50% of his gross income in the
absence of proof as regards the victim’s living expenses.
Consequently, the Court sustains the award of P1,887,847.00 as damages for loss of earning
capacity. All other aspects of the assailed Decision are affirmed. Constancia G. Tamayo, et al.
vs. Rosalia Abad Señora, et al., G.R. No. 176946, November 15, 2010.
Opinion; opinion of ordinary witness on signature/handwriting. In any case, the CA did not rely
solely on the PNP Crime Lab report in concluding that the signatures appearing on the ten SOS
were Nacu’s. Margallo, a co-employee who holds the same position as Nacu, also identified the
latter’s signatures on the SOS. Such testimony deserves credence. It has been held that an
ordinary witness may testify on a signature he is familiar with. Anyone who is familiar with a
person’s writing from having seen him write, from carrying on a correspondence with him, or
from having become familiar with his writing through handling documents and papers known to
have been signed by him may give his opinion as to the genuineness of that person’s purported
signature when it becomes material in the case. Irene K. Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service
Commission, et al.,G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010.
Preponderance of evidence. At any rate, the Court is convinced that the decision of the courts
below are supported by a preponderance of evidence. Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence is determined:
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
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consider all the facts and circumstance of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon
the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.
“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the
evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. If
plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that
of his opponent.
Applying said principle in the case at bench, the factual circumstances established by the
Villareals through their testimonial and documentary evidences are sufficient and convincing
enough to prove that they are entitled to an award of damages for the death of Jose Villareal
compared to the bare allegations to the contrary of the Sevillas. These circumstances, which
were earlier enumerated, have successfully swayed this Court to believe that indeed the Sevillas
are liable for the death of the victim to the exclusion of others except their henchmen.
Furthermore, the Court notes that in the course of their appeal with the CA, the factual
conclusions of the RTC were never assailed by the Sevillas. Instead of questioning the facts that
would garner them a favorable judgment, what they filed were an “urgent motion to resolve one
issue that will make all other issues moot” and a “motion for reconsideration on the sole issue of
the extent of the award of unliquidated damages.” Consequently, with the filing of these motions,
the factual findings of the lower court were deemed admitted. Sps. Eliseo Sevilla and Erna Sevilla
vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150284, November 22, 2010.
Proof of private documents. At any rate, the CA ruling is in accordance with the rules and
prevailing jurisprudence. Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as what it is claimed to be.
Truly, the best evidence of the cancellation of a contract is the original of the deed. The
testimony of Brosas alone, without any supporting documentation, is insufficient to prove that
the sales to the Buyers had indeed been withdrawn or cancelled.
In Harris Sy Chua v. Court of Appeals and State Financing Center, Inc., it was held that before
private documents can be received in evidence, proof of their due execution and authenticity
must be presented. This may require the presentation and examination of witnesses to testify as
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to the due execution and authenticity of such private documents. When there is no proof as to
the authenticity of the writer’s signature appearing in a private document, such private
document may be excluded.
Failure to comply with this rule on authentication of private documents resulted in the exclusion
of the document sought to be admitted.
In this case, the disbursement vouchers referred to by Brosas were never presented and
authenticated. Without satisfactory proof that the buyers withdrew or cancelled their purchases,
the said sales are deemed current, binding and consummated. Therefore, WSIRI is entitled to
recover from Ledesco the corresponding ten percent (10%) commission on these sales. Ledesco
Development Corp. vs. Worldwide Standard International Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 173339,
November 24, 2010.
Substantial evidence. Substantial evidence, the quantum of evidence required in administrative
proceedings, means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that a person is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
Overall, the testimonies of the witnesses, the statements made by Ligan during the preliminary
investigation, and the findings of the PNP Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the
SOS, amounted to substantial evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu was
guilty of the acts complained of. Petitioners’ allegations of unreliability, irregularities, and
inconsistencies of the evidence neither discredited nor weakened the case against Nacu. Irene K.
Nacu, etc. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 187752, November 23, 2010.
Testimony; credibility. More specifically, petitioner-spouses’ contention, i.e., that the subject
property really belonged to Roman’s first spouse Flavia as her paraphernal property, cannot be
sustained. This position was anchored from the testimony of Josefina that the lot was actually
bought by her maternal grandfather and given to her mother Flavia. Josefina’s declarations
before the RTC do not deserve merit and weight, particularly in light of her statement that she
was told so by her elders way back in 1923, when at that time she was only around three (3)
years of age. Besides, such a pronouncement was not supported by any proof, save for the lame
excuse that the deed of sale showing the said transaction was allegedly lost and destroyed by a
typhoon at a time when she was already married, claiming that she was then the custodian of
the supposed document. Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. In other words, it must be natural,
reasonable, and probable to warrant belief. The standard as to the truth of human testimony is
its conformity to human knowledge, observation, and experience; the courts cannot heed
otherwise. Regretfully, petitioner-spouses’ allegations do not measure up to the yardstick of
verity. Sps. Mariano and Emma Bolaños vs. Roscef Zuñga Bernarte, et al., G.R. No. 180997,
November 17, 2010.
Testimony; credibility. The Court holds that the RTC and the CA correctly found Polloso
negligent.
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To be credible, testimonial evidence should not only come from the mouth of a credible witness
but it should also be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience. It should be
positive and probable such that it is difficult for a rational mind not to find it credible. If, as
Pascual testified, the truck stopped when the tricycle bumped the motorcycle from behind, then
there would have been no accident. Even if the motorcycle was nudged into the path of the
truck, as she claimed, there would have been no impact if the truck itself was not moving, and
certainly not an impact that would pin the motorcycle’s driver under the truck and throw the
motorcycle a few meters away. Constancia G. Tamayo, et al. vs. Rosalia Abad Señora, et
al., G.R. No. 176946, November 15, 2010.
March 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Contempt; contempt proceedings distinguished from suspension proceedings. Contempt and
suspension proceedings are supposed to be separate and distinct. They have different objects
and purposes for which different procedures have been established. Judge Blancaflor should
have conducted separate proceedings. As held in the case of People v. Godoy, thus:
A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the
court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court’s officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from
the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose
of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and
should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The
principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure
respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the
orderly administration of justice.
x x x. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of
them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid
down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law
are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
Thus, it was grossly improper for Judge Blancaflor to consider his July 30, 2009 Order on the
contempt charge as the notice required in the disciplinary proceedings suspending petitioners
from the practice of law. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido
Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011.
Contempt; direct contempt. Direct contempt is any misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward
the court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness,
or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so.
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Based on the foregoing definition, the act of Tulali in filing the Ex-Parte Manifestation cannot be
construed as contumacious within the purview of direct contempt. It must be recalled that the
subject manifestation bore Tulali’s voluntary withdrawal from the arson case to dispel any
suspicion of collusion between him and the accused. Its filing on the day before the
promulgation of the decision in the pending criminal case, did not in any way disrupt the
proceedings before the court. Accordingly, he should not be held accountable for his act which
was done in good faith and without malice.
Neither should Rodriguez be liable for direct contempt as he had no knowledge of, or
participation in, the preparation and filing of the subject manifestation. It was signed and filed
by Tulali alone in his capacity as the trial prosecutor in the arson case. The attached complaint
against Awayan was filed with the Office of the Palawan Governor, and not with the RTC.
Apparently, Judge Blancaflor’s conclusion, that the subject manifestation containing derogatory
matters was purposely filed to discredit the administration of justice in court, is unfounded and
without basis. There being no factual or legal basis for the charge of direct contempt, it is clear
that Judge Blancaflor gravely abused his discretion in finding petitioners guilty as charged. Alen
Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011.
Contempt; direct contempt; penalty. Such grave abuse of authority is likewise manifested from
the penalty imposed on the petitioners. Under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court,
direct contempt before the RTC or a court of equivalent or higher rank is punishable by a fine
not exceedingP2,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days, or both. The penalty of
indefinite suspension from the practice of law and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each with the
additional order to issue a public apology to the Court under pain of arrest, is evidently
unreasonable, excessive and outside the bounds of the law. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor
Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171,
March 14, 2011.
Contempt; direct contempt; remedy of contemnor. In fine, having established that Judge
Blancaflor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
petitioners are entitled to the remedy of prohibition under Section 2, Rule 71 of the Rules on
Contempt which provides:
SEC. 2. Remedy therefrom. – The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may not
appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition. The
execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition, provided
such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and conditioned that
he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided against him.
Accordingly, an order of direct contempt is not immediately executory or enforceable. The
contemnor must be afforded a reasonable remedy to extricate or purge himself of the contempt.
Where the person adjudged in direct contempt by any court avails of the remedy of certiorari or
prohibition, the execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such
petition provided the contemnor files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment
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and conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc.
and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011.
Contempt; indirect contempt; due process requirements. Petitioners also fault Judge Blancaflor
for non-observance of due process in conducting the contempt proceedings. It must be
emphasized that direct contempt is adjudged and punished summarily pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 71 of the Rules. Hence, hearings and opportunity to confront witnesses are absolutely
unnecessary.
In the same vein, the petitioners’ alleged “vilification campaign” against Judge Blancaflor cannot
be regarded as direct contempt. At most, it may constitute indirect contempt, as correctly
concluded by the OSG. For indirect contempt citation to prosper, however, the requirements
under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules must be satisfied, to wit:
Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(d) any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
x x x.
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
In the present case, Judge Blancaflor failed to observe the elementary procedure which requires
written charge and due hearing. There was no order issued to petitioners. Neither was there any
written or formal charge filed against them. In fact, Rodriguez only learned of the contempt
proceedings upon his receipt of the July 30, 2009 Order, requiring him to appear before the
Court in order to clarify certain matters contained in the said order. Tulali, on the other hand,
only learned of the proceedings when he was ordered to submit his compliance to explain how
he came in possession of the administrative complaint against Awayan. Alen Ross Rodriguez
and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 190171, March 14, 2011.
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Contempt; nature of contempt power. The power to punish a person in contempt of court is
inherent in all courts to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the orderly
administration of justice. However, judges are enjoined to exercise the power judiciously and
sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindictiveness. It bears
stressing that the power to declare a person in contempt of court must be exercised on the
preservative, not the vindictive principle; and on the corrective, not the retaliatory, idea of
punishment. Such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
to unless necessary in the interest of justice. In this case, the Court cannot sustain Judge
Blancaflor’s order penalizing petitioners for direct contempt on the basis of Tulali’s Ex-
Parte Manifestation. Alen Ross Rodriguez and Regidor Tulali vs. The Hon. Bienvenido
Blancaflor, etc. and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190171, March 14, 2011.
Forum shopping; identity of cause of action. There is forum shopping “when a party repetitively
avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court.” The different ways by which forum shopping may be committed were
explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, but with different prayers (splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is
also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different
cases filed. Cause of action is defined as “the act or omission by which a party violates the right
of another.”
The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its
allegedly falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to the
mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The
Injunction Case involves the same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the
REM as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for
injunction against consolidation of title. While the main relief sought in the Annulment Case
(nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the main relief sought in the Injunction
Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction against consolidation of title),
the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains the same — the alleged
nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing forum
shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
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prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed
for in the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.
There can be no determination of the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure and the propriety
of injunction in the Injunction Case without necessarily ruling on the validity of the REM, which
is already the subject of the Annulment Case. The identity of the causes of action in the two
cases entails that the validity of the mortgage will be ruled upon in both, and creates a
possibility that the two rulings will conflict with each other. This is precisely what is sought to
be avoided by the rule against forum shopping. The substantial identity of the two cases
remains even if the parties should add different grounds or legal theories for the nullity of the
REM or should alter the designation or form of the action. The well-entrenched rule is that “a
party cannot, by varying the form of action, or adopting a different method of presenting his
case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be
twice litigated.”
The CA ruled that the two cases are different because the events that gave rise to them are
different. The CA rationalized that the Annulment Case was brought about by the execution of a
falsified document, while the Injunction Case arose from AUB’s foreclosure based on a falsified
document. The distinction is illusory. The cause of action for both cases is the alleged nullity of
the REM due to its falsified or spurious nature. It is this nullity of the REM which Goodland
sought to establish in the Annulment Case. It is also this nullity of the REM which Goodland
asserted in the Injunction Case as basis for seeking to nullify the foreclosure and enjoin the
consolidation of title. Clearly, the trial court cannot decide the Injunction Case without ruling
on the validity of the mortgage, which issue is already within the jurisdiction of the trial court in
the Annulment Case.
The recent development in Asia United Bank v. Goodland Company, Inc., which involved
substantially the same parties and the same issue is another reason for Goodland’s loss in the
instant case. The issue that Goodland committed deliberate forum shopping when it
successively filed the Annulment and Injunction Cases against AUB and its officers was decided
with finality therein. This ruling is conclusive on the petitioners and Goodland considering that
they are substantially the same parties in that earlier case. Asia United Bank, et al. v. Goodland
Company, Inc., G.R. No. 191388, March 9, 2011.
Judgment; immutability and binding effect. Settled is the rule that a judgment that has become
final and executory is immutable and unalterable; the judgment may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. While there are recognized
exceptions – e.g., the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable – none of these
exceptions apply to the present case.
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There is no dispute that the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703,
which is being questioned by petitioner, had already become final and executory. The petition
for review oncertiorari filed by petitioner assailing the said CA Resolution had been denied with
finality as this Court found no compelling reason to grant the said petition. Consequently, an
entry of judgment was already issued by this Court on September 1, 2003.
It has been established in the assailed CA Resolution that the Certificate of Sale involving TCT
No. T-105375 was not registered with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Owing to the finality of
the said Resolution, the Court as well as the parties therein, which includes herein petitioner,
are now bound by the said factual finding.
The determination of the questions of fact and of law by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703
already attained finality, and may not now be disputed or relitigated by a reopening of the same
questions in a subsequent litigation between the same parties and their privies over the same
subject matter.On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC did not err in relying
on the November 14, 2002 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 65703. Philippine Veterans
Bank v. Ramon Valenzuela, G.R. No. 163530, March 9, 2011.
Jurisdiction; court’s directive for re-raffle is improper where it finds that it has no jurisdiction
over action. Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to
act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the rule is settled
that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the
complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed, and the character of the relief sought
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. Consistent
with Section 1, Rule 141 of theRevised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees
shall be paid in full “upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding”, the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires jurisdiction
over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.
The record shows that R-II Builders’ original complaint dated 23 August 2005 was initially
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a designated Special
Commercial Court. With HGC’s filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative
defenses asserted in its answer and R-II Builders’ filing of its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint dated 31 July 2007, said court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-
raffle of the case upon the finding that the same is not an intra-corporate dispute. In a
clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008, the same court significantly took cognizance of its
lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:
At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special Commercial Court tasked
to try and hear, among others, intra-corporate controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil
cases.
When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified as an intra-corporate
case. However, in the ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative defences raised by
defendants,even the plaintiff conceded that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy or
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even if it is, this Court is without authority to hear the same as the parties are all housed in
Quezon City.
Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare that it does not have the
authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to whether it is personal or
civil, this Court would rather leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court. (Italics
supplied).
We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153, HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding
that Branch 24 of the Manila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the case to
respondent RTC. Being outside the jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled
that cases which are civil in nature, like the one commenced by R-II Builders, should be
threshed out in a regular court. With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case,
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court
without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court. Instead, it should
have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmative defenses for
which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case.
Calleja v. Panday, while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of the RTC exercising
jurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special Commercial Court’s authority, dealt
squarely with the issue:
Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case
has authority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on
venue and jurisdiction.
Calleja ruled on the issue, thus:
Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the
transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br.
58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Certainly, the pronouncement of Br. 24, the Special Commercial Court, in its Joint Order of 2
January 2008 that the case is not an intracorporate controversy, amplified in its Order of 1
February 2008 that it “does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary
civil action” is incompatible with the directive for the re-raffle of the case and to “leave the
resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court.” Such a directive is an exercise of authority
over the case, which authority it had in the same breath declared it did not have. What
compounds the jurisdictional error is the fact that at the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br.
24 had already acted on the case and had in fact, on 26 October 2005, issued the writ of
preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point, there was
absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order that
was supposed to have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of
absence of jurisdiction. So faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left the impression that its
previously issued preliminary injunction remained effective since the case from which it issued
was not dismissed but merely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of
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the case involves courts with the same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts
which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a
case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.
Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, and to show that the proceedings below was
error upon error, we find that the CA also gravely erred in not ruling that respondent RTC’s
(Branch 22, the regular court) jurisdiction over the case was curtailed by R-II Builders’ failure to
pay the correct docket fees. In other words, the jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from
Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the regular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect
which is the non-payment of the correct docket fees. In its order dated 19 May 2008 which
admitted R-II Builders’ Amended and Supplemental Complaint, respondent RTC distinctly ruled
that the case was a real action and ordered the re-computation and payment of the correct
docket fees. In patent circumvention of said order, however, R-II Builders filed its 14 August
2008 motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint which effectively deleted its causes of
action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool and,
in addition to reducing the claim for attorney’s fees and seeking its appointment as a receiver,
reinstated its cause of action for resolution of the DAC. Acting on said motion as well as the
opposition and motion to dismiss interposed by HGC, respondent RTC ruled as follows in its
assailed 3 March 2009 order, to wit: Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011.
Jurisdiction; court’s inherent power to amend and control its process and orders. Applicable,
too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court states as one of the powers of a court:
Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.¾Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice.
Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:
x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question of
fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the
execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to
cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice
or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the
enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want
of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record. (Emphasis supplied.)
The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the
circumstances that merit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue
regarding the execution of judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity
to adduce evidence to determine the period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals
before issuing the writ of execution in the instant case. Should Danilo be unable to substantiate
his claim that he vacated the premises in April 1994, the period to pay monthly rentals should
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be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA that he had already left the
premises. Danilo L. Parel v. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011.
Jurisdiction; effect of failure to pay correct docket fees. For failure of R-II Builders to pay the
correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that matter, its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint as directed in respondent RTC’s 19 May 2008 order, it stands to reason that
jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach. Applying the rule that “a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court” in the
landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled
that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee
which is both mandatory and jurisdictional. To temper said ruling, the Court subsequently
issued the following guidelines in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion, viz.:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no
case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond
its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by
the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee.
True to the foregoing guidelines, respondent RTC admitted R-II Builder’s Amended and
Supplemental Complaint and directed the assessment and payment of the appropriate docket
fees in the order dated 19 May 2008. Rather than complying with said directive, however, R-II
Builders manifested its intent to evade payment of the correct docket fees by withdrawing
its Amended and Supplemental Complaintand, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended
Complaint which deleted its cause of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or
possession of the entire Asset Pool, reduced its claim for attorney’s fees, sought its appointment
as Receiver and prayed for the liquidation and distribution of the Asset Pool. In upholding the
admission of said Second Amended Complaint in respondent RTC’s assailed 3 March 2009
Order, however, the CA clearly lost sight of the fact that a real action was ensconced in R-II
Builders’ original complaint and that the proper docket fees had yet to be paid in the
premises. Despite the latter’s withdrawal of its Amended and Supplemental Complaint, it
cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that respondent RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the case
for non-payment of the correct docket fees.
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In the 15 February 2011 Resolution issued in the case of David Lu v. Paterno Lu Ym, Sr., this
Court, sittingEn Banc, had occasion to rule that an action for declaration of nullity of share issue,
receivership and corporate dissolution is one where the value of the subject matter is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. Subsequent to the trial court’s rendition of a decision on the merits
declared to be immediately executory and the CA’s denial of their application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to enjoin enforcement of said decision,
the defendants questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid a quo which supposedly failed
take into consideration the value of the shares as well as the real properties involved for which
the plaintiff additionally caused notices of lis pendens to be annotated. Finding that defendants
were already estopped in questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground of non-
payment of the correct docket fees, the Court discounted intent to defraud the government on
the part of the plaintiff who can, at any rate, be required to pay the deficiency which may be
considered a lien on the judgment that may be rendered, without automatic loss of the
jurisdiction already acquired, in the first instance, by the trial court.
The factual and legal milieus of the case at bench could not, however, be more different. While
R-II Builders styled its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as one
primarily for the resolution and/or declaration of the DAC, it simultaneously and unmistakably
prayed for the conveyance, possession and control of the Asset Pool. Alongside the fact that
HGC has consistently questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by R-II
Builders, estoppel cannot be said to have set in since, the lapse of more than five years from the
commencement of the complaint notwithstanding, it appears that the case has yet to be tried on
the merits. Having admitted that its original complaint partook the nature of a real action and
having been directed to pay the correct docket fees for itsAmended and Supplemental
Complaint, R-II Builders is, furthermore, clearly chargeable with knowledge of the insufficiency
of the docket fees it paid. Unmistakably manifesting its intent to evade payment of the correct
docket fees, moreover, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaintafter its
admission and, in lieu thereof, filed its’ Second Amended Complaint on the ground that said
earlier pleading cannot be considered admitted in view of its non-payment of the docket and
other fees it was directed to pay. In so doing, however, R-II Builders conveniently overlooked
the fact that the very same argument could very well apply to its original complaint for which –
given its admitted nature as a real action – the correct docket fees have also yet to be paid.
The importance of filing fees cannot be over-emphasized for they are intended to take care of
court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries
and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of
each case. The payment of said fees, therefore, cannot be made dependent on the result of the
action taken without entailing tremendous losses to the government and to the judiciary in
particular. For non-payment of the correct docket fees which, for real actions, should be
computed on the basis of the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof as alleged by the claimant, respondent RTC should have denied admission of R-II
Builders’ Second Amended Complaint and ordered the dismissal of the case. Although
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a catena of decisions rendered by this Court eschewed the application of the doctrine laid down
in the Manchester case, said decisions had been consistently premised on the willingness of the
party to pay the correct docket fees and/or absence of intention to evade payment of the correct
docket fees. This cannot be said of R-II Builders which not only failed to pay the correct docket
fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint but also clearly
evaded payment of the same by filing its Second Amended Complaint.
By itself, the propriety of admitting R-II Builders’ Second Amended Complaint is also cast in
dubious light when viewed through the prism of the general prohibition against amendments
intended to confer jurisdiction where none has been acquired yet. Although the policy in this
jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored and liberally allowed in the
interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the
original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, HGC correctly fault the CA
for upholding respondent RTC’s admission of R-II Builders’Second Amended Complaint despite
non-payment of the docket fees for its original complaint andAmended and Supplemental
Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment thereof.
With the determination of the jurisdictional necessity of the dismissal of the complaint of R-II
Builders docketed as Civil Case No. 05-113407, first before Br. 24 and later before Br. 22 both
of the RTC of Manila, we no longer find any reason to go into a discussion of the remaining
issues HGC proffers for resolution. In view, particularly, of its non-acquisition of jurisdiction
over the case, respondent RTC clearly had no authority to grant the receivership sought by R-II
Builders. It needs pointing out though that the prayer for receivership clearly indicates that the
R-II Builders sought the transfer of possession of property consisting of the assets of the JVA from
HGC to the former’s named Receiver. As already noted, said transfer of possession was sought
by respondent R-II Builders since the very start, overtly at the first two attempts, covertly in the
last, the successive amendments betraying the deft maneuverings to evade payment of the
correct docket fees. Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011.
Jurisdiction; jurisdiction over unlawful detainer case determined by allegations of
complaint. Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
since it involved tenancy relation which comes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB. But the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of
the complaint. Besides, the records show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he
was a tenant of the land. The MTC records show that aside from the assertion that he is a tenant,
he did not present any evidence to prove the same. To consider evidence presented only during
appeal is offensive to the idea of fair play.
The remaining question is the nature of the action based on the allegations of the
complaint. The RTC characterized it as an action for forcible entry, Wilfredo having entered the
property and taken over from widow Emiliana on the sly. The problem with this
characterization is that the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in
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possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit. Nowhere in the recitation of the
amended complaint did the Dionisios assert that they were in prior possession of the land and
were ousted from such possession by Wilfredo’s unlawful occupation of the property.
Is the action one for unlawful detainer? An action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint
sufficiently alleges the following: (1) initially, the defendant has possession of property by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however, such possession became
illegal upon plaintiff’s notice to defendant, terminating the latter’s right of possession; (3) still,
the defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property; and
(4) within a year from plaintiff’s last demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files
a complaint for defendant’s ejectment. If the defendant had possession of the land upon mere
tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendant’s
possession.
Here, based on the allegations of the amended complaint, the Dionisios allowed Emiliana,
tenant Romualdo’s widow, to stay on the land for the meantime and leave when asked to do
so. But, without the knowledge or consent of the Dionisios, she sold her “right of tenancy” to
Wilfredo. When the Dionisios visited the land in April 2002 and found Wilfredo there, they
demanded that he leave the land. They did so in writing on April 22, 2002 but he refused to
leave. The Dionisios filed their eviction suit within the year. Spouses Vicente Dionisio and
Anita Dionisio v. Wilfredo Linsangan, G.R. No. 178159, March 2, 2011.
Jurisdiction; real actions. In upholding the foregoing order as well as its affirmance in
respondent RTC’s 29 September 2009 order, the CA ruled that the case – being one primarily
instituted for the resolution/nullification of the DAC – involved an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation. While it is true, however, that R-II Builder’s continuing stake in the Asset Pool is
“with respect only to its residual value after payment of all the regular SMPPCs holders and
the Asset Pool creditors”, the CA failed to take into account the fact that R-II Builders’ original
complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint both interposed causes of action for
conveyance and/or recovery of possession of the entireAsset Pool. Indeed, in connection with
its second cause of action for appointment as trustee in its original complaint, R-II Builders
distinctly sought the conveyance of the entire Asset Pool which it consistently estimated to be
valued at P5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005. In its opposition to HGC’s motion to dismiss,
R-II Builders even admitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to or possession of real
property or an interest therein. With R-II Builders’ incorporation of a cause of action for
conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool in its Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, on the other hand, no less than respondent RTC, in its 19 May 2008
order, directed the assessment and payment of docket fees corresponding to a real action.
Admittedly, this Court has repeatedly laid down the test in ascertaining whether the subject
matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation by determining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. While a claim is, on the one hand, considered capable of
pecuniary estimation if the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the action is
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considered incapable of pecuniary estimation where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to or merely a
consequence of, the principal relief sought. To our mind, the application of foregoing test does
not, however, preclude the further classification of actions into personal actions and real action,
for which appropriate docket fees are prescribed. In contrast to personal actions where the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery
of damages, real actions are those which affect title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. While personal actions should be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,
the venue for real actions is the court of the place where the real property is located.
Although an action for resolution and/or the nullification of a contract, like an action for specific
performance, fall squarely into the category of actions where the subject matter is considered
incapable of pecuniary estimation, we find that the causes of action for resolution and/or
nullification of the DAC was erroneously isolated by the CA from the other causes of action
alleged in R-II Builders’ original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint which
prayed for the conveyance and/or transfer of possession of the Asset Pool. In Gochan v. Gochan,
this Court held that an action for specific performance would still be considered a real action
where it seeks the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds
of conveyance of real property. More to the point is the case of Ruby Shelter Builders and
Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C. Formaran III where, despite the annulment of
contracts sought in the complaint, this Court upheld the directive to pay additional docket fees
corresponding to a real action in the following wise, to wit:
x x x [I]n Siapno v. Manalo, the Court disregarded the title/denomination of therein plaintiff
Manalo’s amended petition as one for Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages; and
adjudged the same to be a real action, the filing fees for which should have been computed
based on the assessed value of the subject property or, if there was none, the estimated value
thereof. The Court expounded in Siapno that:
In his amended petition, respondent Manalo prayed that NTA’s sale of the property in dispute to
Standford East Realty Corporation and the title issued to the latter on the basis thereof, be
declared null and void. In a very real sense, albeit the amended petition is styled as one
for“Mandamus with Revocation of Title and Damages”, it is, at bottom, a suit to recover from
Standford the realty in question and to vest in respondent the ownership and possession thereof.
In short, the amended petition is in reality an action in res or a real action. Our pronouncement
in Fortune Motors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals is instructive. There, we said:
A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives
and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97,
1948)
An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul
a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950).
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While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent
doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not
operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action.
Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its continuing
stake is, in the first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or
transfer of possession of the same properties sought in the original complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for which appropriate docket fees
computed on the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been
assessed and paid. In support of its original complaint’s second cause of action for
appointment as trustee and conveyance of the properties in theAsset Pool, R-II Builders distinctly
alleged as follows:
5.12. As the Court-appointed Trustee, R-II Builders shall have and exercise the same powers,
rights and duties as if [it] had been originally appointed, having the principal duty of redeeming
and buying back the Regular SMPPC’s and thereafter liquidating the Asset Pool, which are also
the end goals of the Agreement.
5.12.1. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to invest, transfer, convey or
assign any of the assets of the Asset Pool, whether funds, receivables, real or personal property,
in exchange for shares of stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties of any kind, class
or nature, provided that any such investment, transfer, conveyance or assignment shall not
impair the value of the Asset Pool.
5.12.2. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to sell, change, assign or
otherwise dispose of any stocks, bonds, securities, real or personal properties or other assets
constituting the Asset Pool.
5.12. 3. R-II Builders, as the Trustee, shall have the power and right to enter into lease
agreements as lessor or any other related contract for the benefit of the Asset Pool; and
5.12.4. It is understood that the aforecited powers and rights of R-II Builders as the court-
appointed Trustee, are non-exclusive; and is deemed to include all the rights and powers
necessary and incidental to achieve the goals and objectives of the Agreement.
From the foregoing allegations in its original complaint, it cannot be gainsaid that R-II Builders
was unquestionably seeking possession and control of the properties in the Asset Pool which
predominantly consisted of real properties. Having admitted that “the case is a real action as it
affects title to or possession of real property or (an) interest therein”, R-II Builders emphasized
the real nature of its action by seeking the grant of the following main reliefs in the Amended
and Supplemental Complaint it subsequently filed, to wit:
5. After trial on the merits, render judgment:
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(i) Declaring the annulment of the Deed of Assignment and conveyance executed by PDB in
favor of HGC; or in the alternative, declaring the nullity of the said instrument;
(ii) Appointing R-II Builders as the Trustee of the Asset Pool Properties, with powers and
responsibilities including but not limited to those stated in 5.12.1, 5.12.2, 5.12.3 and 5.12.4
herein and those spelled out in the Re-Stated Smokey Mountain Asset Pool Formation Trust
Agreement;
(iii) Ordering HGC to render an accounting of all properties of the Asset Pool transferred thereto
under the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance and thereafter convey title to and/or
possession of the entire Asset Pool to R-II Builders as the Trustee thereof which assets consist of,
but is not limited to the following:
(a) 105 parcels of land comprising the Smokey Mountain Site, and, the Reclamation Area,
consisting of the 539,471.47 square meters, and all the buildings and improvements thereon,
with their corresponding certificates of title;
(b) shares of stock of Harbour Center Port Terminal, Inc. which are presently registered in the
books of the said company in the name of PDB for the account of the Smokey Mountain Asset
Pool; and
(c) other documents as listed in Annex E of the Contract of Guaranty.
(iv) Ordering NHA to pay the Asset Pool the amount of Php1,803,729,757.88 including the
direct and indirect cost thereon as may be found by this Honorable Court to be due thereon;
(v) Making the injunction permanent;
(vi) Ordering HGC and the NHA to pay Attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000,000 and the
costs of suit.
Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc. and National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
192649, March 9, 2011.
Mandamus; allegations in petition. Finally, the Alagars assert that PNB availed of the wrong
remedy when it filed a special civil action of certiorari before the CA rather than one
of mandamus to compel the RTC to give due course to its notice of appeal after the latter held
that its pro forma motion for reconsideration did not toll the period of appeal which had then
already elapsed
But a reading of PNB’s allegations in its petition in CA-G.R. SP 71116 shows that its action was
not only for certiorari and prohibition but also for mandamus. The bank alleged that by its
whimsical, capricious and arbitrary actions the RTC deprived the PNB of its appeal, leaving it
with no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The PNB
petition also specifically prayed the CA to direct the trial court to give due course to its
appeal. Following the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations of the
pleading and the character of the relief sought, it is unmistakable that CA-G.R. SP 71116 was
also a petition for mandamus. Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora Alagar v. Philippine
National Bank, G.R. No. 171870, March 16, 2011.
Mandamus; proper remedy to compel issuance of writ of possession. We rule that mandamus is
a proper remedy to compel the issuance of a writ of possession. The purpose of mandamus is to
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compel the performance of a ministerial duty. A ministerial act is “one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done.”
The issuance of a writ of possession is outlined in Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act
No. 4118, which provides:
SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court
of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to
give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount
equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in
case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying
with the requirements of [this] Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form of
an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who
shall execute said order immediately.
During the period of redemption, the mortgagee is entitled to a writ of possession upon
depositing the approved bond. When the redemption period expires without the mortgagor
exercising his right of redemption, the mortgagor is deemed to have lost all interest over the
foreclosed property, and the purchaser acquires absolute ownership of the property. The
purchaser’s right is aptly described thus:
Consequently, the purchaser, who has a right to possession after the expiration of the
redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is
made. In this regard, the bond is no longer needed. The purchaser can demand possession at
any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a
new TCT. After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of a
confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application
and proof of title becomes merely a ministerial function. Effectively, the court cannot exercise
its discretion.
Therefore, the issuance by the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent in this case
is proper. We have consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession
in such instances is ministerial, and the court may not exercise discretion or judgment x x x
With the consolidated title, the purchaser becomes entitled to a writ of possession and the trial
court has the ministerial duty to issue such writ of possession. Thus, “the remedy of mandamus
lies to compel the performance of [this] ministerial duty.” Spouses Fernando and Angelina
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011.
Mediation; sanction for non-appearance. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001,
otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Mediation
Proceedings, was issued pursuant to par. (5), Section 5, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating this Court to promulgate rules providing for a simplified and inexpensive procedure
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for the speedy disposition of cases. Also, Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, requires the courts to consider the possibility of an amicable settlement
or of submission to alternative modes of resolution for the early settlement of disputes so as to
put an end to litigations. The provisions of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA pertinent to the case at
bench are as follows:
9. Personal appearance/Proper authorizations
Individual parties are encouraged to personally appear for mediation. In the event they cannot
attend, their representatives must be fully authorized to appear, negotiate and enter into a
compromise by a Special Power of Attorney. A corporation shall, by board resolution, fully
authorize its representative to appear, negotiate and enter into a compromise agreement.
12. Sanctions
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction
including but not limited to censure, reprimand, contempt and such other sanctions as are
provided under the Rules of Court for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the
parties absent himself/themselves, or for abusive conduct during mediation proceedings.
[Underscoring supplied]
To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties
are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance, however,
of a party may be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, has been
duly authorized to enter into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of
dispute resolution. To ensure the attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA
specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to appear
in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand, contempt, and even dismissal of the
action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The respective lawyers of the
parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to cooperate with the
mediator for the successful amicable settlement of disputes so as to effectively reduce docket
congestion.
Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13-2007, the Court
finds this sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is
devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There
is no clear demonstration that the absence of petitioner’s representative during mediation
proceedings on March 1, 2008 was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case.
Neither is it indicative of lack of interest on the part of petitioner to enter into a possible
amicable settlement of the case.
The Court notes that Manalang was not entirely at fault for the cancellation and resettings of the
conferences. Let it be underscored that respondents’ representative and counsel, Atty. Miguel,
came late during the January 19 and February 9, 2008 conferences which resulted in their
cancellation and the final resetting of the mediation proceedings to March 1, 2008. Considering
the circumstances, it would be most unfair to penalize petitioner for the neglect of her lawyer.
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Assuming arguendo that the trial court correctly construed the absence of Manalang on March 1,
2008 as a deliberate refusal to comply with its Order or to be dilatory, it cannot be said that the
court was powerless and virtually without recourse. Indeed, there are other available remedies
to the court a quounder A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, apart from immediately ordering the
dismissal of the case. If Manalang’s absence upset the intention of the court a quo to promptly
dispose the case, a mere censure or reprimand would have been sufficient for petitioner’s
representative and her counsel so as to be informed of the court’s intolerance of tardiness and
laxity in the observation of its order. By failing to do so and refusing to resuscitate the case, the
RTC impetuously deprived petitioner of the opportunity to recover the land which she allegedly
paid for.
Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for
non-appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser
sanctions which would still achieve the desired end. The Court has written “inconsiderate
dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the
congestion of court dockets, while they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of the
individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the
absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief
continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court. Linda M.
Chan Kent v. Dionesio C. Micarez, et al., G.R. No. 185758, March 9, 2011.
Motions; motion for reconsideration not pro forma. The Alagars fail to show any reversible error
in the CA’s decision. That court’s finding that PNB’s motion for reconsideration was not pro
forma and, therefore, tolled the running of PNB’s period to appeal, is supported by the evidence
on record. The motion for reconsideration specified the RTC’s findings and conclusions in its
decision that PNB thought to be contrary to law. The latter even raised new arguments, not
previously considered by the trial court, which even the latter recognized in its assailed March
25, 2002 order. From all indications, the motion for reconsideration complied with
requirements of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it was grave abuse of
discretion for the trial court to have simply concluded that the motion was pro forma and did
not toll the running of the period to appeal. The RTC should have given due course to PNB’s
appeal. Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora Alagar v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No.
171870, March 16, 2011.
Petition for Review; motion for extension; Court of Appeals’ discretion to grant or not to grant
motion for extension should be exercised wisely and prudently. Although it is within the CA’s
discretion to grant or not to grant a motion for extension, such discretion should be exercised
wisely and prudently. The rules regulating the filing of motions for extension of time to file
certain pleadings are intended to promote the speedy disposition of cases in the interest of
justice, not throw out such pleadings on pure technicality.
Here, on March 15, 2006 petitioner heirs filed their motion for extension of 30 days (counted
from March 21 when the original period was to run out) within which to file their petition. If the
CA would want to deny that extension or shorten it to only 15 days up to April 5, 2006, it had
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technically at least 20 days (from March 15 to April 4) within which to so warn petitioners that
they might have a chance to finish up and file their petition. Yet, it did not. While the parties
have no right to expect the CA to grant their motion for extension, they have a right to expect
reasonableness from it.
Technically the CA waited 44 days up to April 28, 2006 before acting on the motion that
petitioners filed on March 15, 2006. The CA knew, when it reduced to only 15 days the
extension asked of it, that such reduced extension had already come to pass 23 days earlier on
April 5, 2006. Surely, the CA did not expect petitioners to still be able to cope with the reduced
extension. Since the rules allow the CA to grant an extra 15-day extension “for the most
compelling reason,” the CA ought to have given petitioners reasonable notice that it did not
regard its ground sufficiently compelling. The CA gave petitioner heirs absolutely no chance to
file a timely petition. What is more, when the CA acted on the motion for extension on April 28,
2006 the petition was already at hand, having been filed earlier on April 20. The CA cannot
pretend that it had been waiting with bated breath to have a look at the petition and that,
consequently, it could only grant a shorter extension for its filing. Indeed, the CA did not
dismiss the petition outright when it did not get the same by April 5, its desired deadline. The
CA got the petition on April 20, 2006 but waited eight days more or until April 28, 2006 before
looking at it. So what was the point in its denying the longer extension when it was not ready to
act promptly on the petition? Heirs of Marilou K. Santiago, et al. v. Alfonso Aguila, G.R. No.
174034, March 9, 2011.
Pleading; effect of amendment of complaint on cause of action. An amended complaint that
changes the plaintiff’s cause of action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the action
is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not on the date of the filing
of its original version. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the
filing of the amended pleading. The Court acknowledges, however, that an amendment which
does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously
alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause
of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the
original complaint.
Here, the original complaint alleges that the Dionisios bought the land from Cruz on September
30, 1989; that Romualdo used to be the land’s tenant; that when he died, the Dionisios allowed
his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave the land upon demand; that
in April 2002 the Dionisios discovered on visit to the land that Emiliana had left it and that
Wilfredo now occupied it under a claim that he bought the right to stay from Emiliana under a
“Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan;” that the Dionisios did not know of and gave no consent
to this sale which had not been annotated on their title; that the Dionisios verbally told Wilfredo
to leave the property by April 31, 2002; that their lawyer reiterated such demand in writing on
April 22, 2002; that Wilfredo did not heed the demand; that the Dionisios wanted to get
possession so they could till the land and demolish Wilfredo’s house on it; that Wilfredo did not
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give the Dionisios’ just share in the harvest; and that the Dionisios were compelled to get the
services of counsel for P100,000.00.
The amended complaint has essentially identical allegations. The only new ones are that the
Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdo’s widow to stay “out of their kindness, tolerance, and
generosity;” that they went to the land in April 2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana
of their plan; that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was the previous registered owner and that he
sold the land to the Dionisios; and that a person occupying another’s land by the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without contract, is bound by an implied promise to leave upon
demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy.
To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such
amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is
completely different from that stated in the original complaint. Here, both the original and the
amended complaint required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that he
had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the owner’s mere tolerance and that the latter
had demanded that he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a new
answer. Spouses Vicente Dionisio and Anita Dionisio v. Wilfredo Linsangan, G.R. No.
178159, March 2, 2011.
Procedural rules; exceptions meriting relaxation of rules. Moreover, there are exceptions that
have been previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to
serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. We find that Danilo’s situation merits a
relaxation of the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine if his allegation
were true would allow a final resolution of the case. Danilo L. Parel v. Heirs of Simeon
Prudencio, G.R. No. 192217, March 2, 2011.
Procedural rules; policy for cases to be decided on merits rather than on technicalities. It bears
emphasis that the subject matter of the complaint is a valuable parcel of land measuring 328
square meters and that petitioner had allegedly spent a lot of money not only for the payment of
the docket and other filing fees but also for the extra-territorial service of the summons to the
respondents who are now permanent residents of the U.S.A. Certainly, petitioner stands to lose
heavily on account of technicality. Even if the dismissal is without prejudice, the refiling of the
case would still be injurious to petitioner because she would have to pay again all the litigation
expenses which she previously paid for. The Court should afford party-litigants the amplest
opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from constraints of
technicalities. Technicalities should take a backseat against substantive rights and should give
way to the realities of the situation. Besides, the petitioner has manifested her interest to pursue
the case through the present petition. At any rate, it has not been shown that a remand of the
case for trial would cause undue prejudice to respondents.
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In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds it just and proper that petitioner be allowed to
present her cause of action during trial on the merits to obviate jeopardizing substantive justice.
Verily, the better and more prudent course of action in a judicial proceeding is to hear both
sides and decide the case on the merits instead of disposing the case by technicalities. What
should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life,
liberty or property on technicalities. The ends of justice and fairness would best be served if the
issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Trial courts are reminded to
exert efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits and to adjudge them accordingly to
the satisfaction of the parties, lest in hastening the proceedings, they further delay the resolution
of the cases. Linda M. Chan Kent v. Dionesio C. Micarez, et al., G.R. No. 185758, March 9,
2011.
Procedural rules; purpose. Procedural rules are intended to facilitate the administration of
justice, not frustrate it. It is always better that a case is decided on the merits rather than
disposed of because of procedural infirmities. Considering that the case involves tenancy
relations and possession of agricultural landholding and that PARAD and DARAB have made
conflicting findings, a review of the case by the CA was clearly in order. Heirs of Marilou K.
Santiago, et al. v. Alfonso Aguila, G.R. No. 174034, March 9, 2011.
Writ of execution; effect of compliance with writ on petition in higher court. The Alagars
contend that the issue of whether the RTC validly issued a writ of execution in the case had
become moot since PNB willingly obeyed the writ, returned the General Luna title to the
Alagars, and paid them the damages that the RTC awarded in its decision. Going further, the
Alagars argue that the full implementation of the writ foreclosed any question concerning the
validity of the decision itself.
But the execution of a judgment pending an action in a higher court essentially challenging its
finality cannot be deemed an abandonment of that action. The rules grant parties the right to
question by special civil actions those orders and rulings that inferior courts issue with grave
abuse of discretion. That the PNB complied with the writ of execution after its several attempts
to stop it cannot be deemed a voluntary abandonment of its action before the CA. PNB had no
choice but to obey the RTC orders, given that the CA did not then deem it appropriate to issue a
restraining order. And PNB did not relent in pursuing its action before the CA. Besides, the
Alagars did not raise this issue of estoppel before the CA. Consequently, they cannot raise the
same for the first time before the Court. Spouses Antonio F. Alagar and Aurora Alagar v.
Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 171870, March 16, 2011.
Writ of execution; instances where writ may be appealed. It is true that Danilo should have
brought to the Court’s attention the date he actually left the subject premises at an earlier
time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment involved was already final and
executory. However, it would be inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals “until he
actually vacates” when it has not been determined when he actually vacated the ground floor of
Simeon’s house. He would be paying monthly rentals indefinitely. The RTC should have
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determined via hearing if Danilo’s allegation were true and accordingly modified the period
Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing
justiciable controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the
issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution
of the decision which is a matter of right. Banaga v. Majaducon, however, enumerates the
instances where a writ of execution may be appealed:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or
unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation
thereof; or
6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;
In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be
some mode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That
mode of elevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil
action of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the
property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution
inequitable or unjust. Danilo L. Parel v. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, G.R. No. 192217, March 2,
2011.
OTHER PROCEEDINGS
Expropriation; commissioners to report on just compensation; nature of commissioner’s duties
and functions. Cecilio’s last source of authority to collect payment from the proceeds of the
expropriation is the SPA executed on 18 October 1996 by the Hernandezes in favor of Cecilio
as their “true and lawful” attorney with respect to the expropriation of the Hernandez
property. At the outset, it must be underscored that the SPA did not specify the compensation of
Cecilio as attorney-in-fact of the Hernandezes.
The SPA, however, must be appreciated in the light of the fact that Cecilio was appointed and
acted as appraisal commissioner in the expropriation case under the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. — Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the
court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
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session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their
report shall be submitted to the court. (Emphasis ours).
The commissioner to be appointed is specifically required to be disinterested. As defined, such
person must be free from bias, prejudice or partiality. The record of performance by Cecilio of
his duties as commissioner shows: (1) Order dated 13 September 1996 appointing Cecilio and
three others as court commissioners; (2) Agreement on the course of action of the
commissioners appointed 13 September 1996 whereby respondent Cecilio signed as a court
commissioner; (3) Appraisal Commission Report dated 10 January 1997 signed by respondent
and his fellow court commissioners; (4) Dissenting Opinion on the Lone Minority Report dated
14 February 1997 signed by respondent and two other court commissioners; and (5) Decision
dated 7 February 1997 which sets the fees of the court commissioners.
When Cecilio accepted the position as commissioner and proceeded to perform the duties of
such commissioner until the completion of his mandate as such, he created a barrier that
prevented his performance of his duties under the SPA. Due to the nature of his duties and
functions as commissioner, Cecilio became an officer of the court. As stated in Section 5, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court, the commissioner’s duty is to “ascertain and report to the court the
just compensation for the property to be taken.” The undertaking of a commissioner is further
stated under the rules, to wit:
SEC. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.—Before entering upon the performance of their duties,
the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their duties
as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the
case. Evidence may be introduced by either party before the commissioners who are
authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and the commissioners shall, unless
the parties consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and examine
the property sought to be expropriated and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after
which either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The commissioners shall assess
the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or purpose
of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the
business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the
actual value of his property so taken.
Cecilio acted for the expropriation court. He cannot be allowed to consider such action as an
act for or in behalf of the defendant in the same case. Cecilio could not have been a hearing
officer and a defendant at the same time. Indeed, Cecilio foisted fraud on both the Court and
the Hernandezes when, after his appointment as commissioner, he accepted the appointment by
the Hernandezes to “represent” and “sue for” them. Cornelia M. Hernandez, substituted by
Lourdes H. Castillo v. Cecilio F. Hernandez, G.R. No. 158576, March 9, 2011.
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Extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage; special power of attorney. Moreover, the availability of
extra-judicial foreclosure to a mortgagee depends upon the agreement of the contracting parties.
Section 1 of Act No. 3135 provides:
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate
mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following sections shall govern as to the manner in which the
sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the
power. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, paragraph (c) of the parties’ REM granted Veterans Bank the special power as
attorney-in-fact of the petitioners to perform all acts necessary for the purpose of extrajudicial
foreclosure under Act No. 3135. Thus, there is no obstacle preventing Veterans Bank from
availing itself of the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure. Spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin
v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011.
Writ of possession; non-prescription of purchaser’s right. Petitioners assail the CA’s ruling that
the issuance of a writ of possession does not prescribe. They maintain that Articles 1139, 1149,
and 1150 of the Civil Code regarding prescriptive periods cover all kinds of action, which
necessarily include the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioners posit that, for purposes of the
latter, it is the five-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1149 of the Civil Code which
applies because Act No. 3135 itself did not provide for its prescriptive period. Thus, Veterans
Bank had only five years from September 12, 1983, the date when the Certificate of Sale was
issued in its favor, to move for the issuance of a writ of possession.
Respondent argues that jurisprudence has consistently held that a registered owner of the land,
such as the buyer in an auction sale, is entitled to a writ of possession at any time after the
consolidation of ownership.
We cannot accept petitioners’ contention. We have held before that the purchaser’s right “to
request for the issuance of the writ of possession of the land never prescribes.” “The right to
possess a property merely follows the right of ownership,” and it would be illogical to hold that
a person having ownership of a parcel of land is barred from seeking possession
thereof. In Calacala v. Republic of the Philippines, the Republic was the highest bidder in the
public auction but failed for a long period of time to execute an Affidavit of Consolidation and
to seek a writ of possession. Calacala insisted that, by such inaction, the Republic’s right over
the land had prescribed, been abandoned or waived. The Court’s language in rejecting
Calacala’s theory is illuminating:
[T]he Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the petitioners within ten (10) years
from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever
rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to
cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence, and we are not aware of any, to the effect that
the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ of possession over the property thus
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acquired, within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to
bring ownership back to him whose property has been previously foreclosed and sold. x x x
xxxx
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the
obligors’ right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter of a
final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that is already
vested in the purchaser. x x x
Moreover, the provisions cited by petitioners refer to prescription of actions. An action is
“defined as an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.” On the other
hand “[a] petition for the issuance of the writ, under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended,
is not an ordinary action filed in court, by which one party ‘sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or prevention or redress of a wrong.’ It is in the nature of an ex
parte motion [in] which the court hears only one side. It is taken or granted at the instance and
for the benefit of one party, and without notice to or consent by any party adversely
affected. Accordingly, upon the filing of a proper motion by the purchaser in a foreclosure sale,
and the approval of the corresponding bond, the writ of possession issues as a matter of course
and the trial court has no discretion on this matter.” Spouses Fernando and Angelina Edralin v.
Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 168523, March 9, 2011.
EVIDENCE
Documentary evidence; interpretation of documents according to circumstances. Section 13,
Rule 130, Rules of Court on interpretation of an instrument provides:
SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances – For the proper construction of an
instrument,the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those whose language he is to interpret. (underscoring supplied)
A consideration of the circumstances under which Aragon’s letter-certifications were issued is
thus in order.
Amarnani’s letter-request of August 21, 2000 for a conditional certification from Aragon was
granted two days later when Aragon issued the letter-certification addressed to
respondent. Within that period, it could not have been possible for petitioner to even
process the application, given that Amarnani had not even complied with the requirements as
he, himself, indicated in his letter-request to Aragon to “please tell [him] the requirements for
the credit line so [he] c[ould] apply.”
The Distributorship Agreement between respondent and Keraj was forged on October 2, 2000
or 39 days after the issuance of the letter-certification, long enough for respondent to verify if
indeed a bank guaranty was, to its impression, granted.
By respondent’s finance manager Leonora Armi Salvador’s testimony, upon receipt of the two
letter-certifications, she concluded that they were bank guarantees considering their similarity
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with other bank guarantees in favor of respondent by other distributors; and she made inquiries
with petitioner only after Keraj defaulted in the payment of its obligation to respondent.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner could not have conveyed that it was issuing a
bank guaranty in favor of Amarnani.
Respondent’s reliance on Aragon’s use of a “check writer,” a machine used to input a numerical
or written value impression in the “payment amount field” of a check that is very difficult to
alter, on the left side of each letter- certification, was misplaced, what prevails being the
wordings of the letter-certifications. Bank of Commerce v. Goodman Fielder International
Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 191561, March 7, 2011.
Res gestae; nature and admissibility. Further, the Court considers a res gestae Amalia’s recital of
what she heard Alice utter when she came and rescued her. Res gestae refers to statements
made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before,
during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to
fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened, between
the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus
restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation. For
spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur: 1) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.
Here, Fallones’ act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened to be
just outside his house when she heard Alice cry out “tama na, tama na!” When Fallones
opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering
“Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.” The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous
statements rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there
had been no chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of
the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness. People of the Philippines v. Romy Fallones y
Labana, G.R. No. 190341, March 16, 2011.
January 2013 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Civil Procedure
Annulment of Judgment; exception to final judgment rule; lack of due process as additional
ground. A petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed
to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which
was lost due to the party’s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. “The underlying reason
is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
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judgment, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
affective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest.”
While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may
be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court
of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if,
upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue, Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban
Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013
Appeal; filing of motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration in CA does not
toll fifteen-day period to appeal; rule suspended in exceptional cases to serve substantial
justice. The assailed CA resolution upheld the general rule that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in the CA does not toll the fifteen-day period to appeal, citing Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japson. However, in previous cases we suspended this rule in order to serve
substantial justice.
In Barnes v. Padilla, we exempted from the operation of the general rule the petitioner whose
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA. In the
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated September 30, 2004,
we held that:
A suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the petitioner. Petitioner’s counsel was
understandably confused with the absence of an explicit prohibition in the 2002 Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) that the period of filing a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, which was expressly stated in the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals that
was in effect prior to the IRCA. The lawyer’s negligence without any participatory negligence on
the part of the petitioner is a sufficient reason to set aside the resolution of the CA.
More significantly, a careful study of the merits of the case and the lack of any showing that the
review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, dictated the setting aside of the resolutions of the
CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 69573 and Branch 215 in Civil Case NO. Q-99-37219, as both are
patently erroneous. x x x
Furthermore, the private respondents will not be unjustly prejudiced by the suspension of the
rules. What is subject of the appeal is only a question of law, involving the issue of forum
shopping, and not a factual matter involving the merits of each party’s respective claims and
defenses relating to the enforcement of the MOA, wherein petitioner was given an option to
purchase the subject property. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their
merits and not on mere technicalities. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraint of
technicalities.
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After a conscientious view, we hold that a suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since
the delay of one week and two days in the filing of the motion for reconsideration was not
occasioned by negligence on the part of petitioner’s lawyer in charge of the case, the latter
having a valid excuse to immediately take leave of absence in view of her father’s sudden
demise. There is likewise no showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as President and General Manager of the
GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro; G.R. No. 169005. January 28, 2013
Certification against forum shopping; SPA designating counsel to sign must be executed if party-
pleader cannot sign. The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it
imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural requirements is
the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic,
necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.
In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the guidelines respecting
non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the
relevant portions of which are as follows:
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, xxx,
is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance or presence of ‘special
circumstances or compelling reasons’.
xxxx
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.
The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping is due to the fact that a “certification is a peculiar personal representation on the
part of the principal party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no
pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Obviously, it is
the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have been retained for a
particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or caused the
filing of a petition in that case.” Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to
sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her
counsel of record to sign on her behalf. A certification which had been signed by counsel
without the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the
petition. Mary Louise Anderson v. Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013
Certification against forum shopping; non-compliance is not curable by subsequent submission
unless there is substantial compliance or special circumstance. In this light, the Court finds that
the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of
non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority
to do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later submitting an
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SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing of the petition, this does not
automatically denote substantial compliance. It must be remembered that a defective
certification is generally not curable by its subsequent correction, and while it is true that in
some cases the Court considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it did so
only on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while avoiding the
effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping. Mary Louise Anderson v.
Enrique Ho, G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013
Certification against forum shopping and Verification; ratification by the Board of Directors. A
closer look into the SPA and the Corporate Secretary’s Certificate submitted by BPI reveals that,
at the time the subject complaint was filed on January 26, 1999, Ramos did not have the express
authority to file and sign the verification and certification against forum shopping attached to
BPI’s complaint. The SPA, which appointed Ramos and/or Atty. Mateo G. Delegencia as BPI’s
attorneys-in-fact in the case against the petitioners, was executed only on July 8, 2008. Even the
Corporate Secretary’s Certificate that named the officers authorized by the BPI’s Executive
Committee to grant and extend a SPA to other officers of the bank was executed only on
February 21, 2007. The Executive Committee is part of the bank’s permanent organization and,
in between meetings of BPI’s Board of Directors, possesses and exercises all the powers of the
board in the management and direction of the bank’s affairs.
BPI’s subsequent execution of the SPA, however, constituted a ratification of Ramos’
unauthorized representation in the collection case filed against the petitioners. A corporation
can act only through natural persons duly authorized for the purpose or by a specific act of its
board of directors, and can also ratify the unauthorized acts of its corporate officers. The act of
ratification is confirmation of what its agent or delegate has done without or with insufficient
authority.
In PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division Workers Organization
(PSTMSDWO) v. PNCC Skyway Corporation, we considered the subsequent execution of a
board resolution authorizing the Union President to represent the union in a petition filed
against PNCC Skyway Corporation as an act of ratification by the union that cured the defect in
the petition’s verification and certification against forum shopping. We held that “assuming that
Mr. Soriano (PSTMSDWO’s President) has no authority to file the petition on February 27, 2006,
the passing on June 30, 2006 of a Board Resolution authorizing him to represent the union is
deemed a ratification of his prior execution, on February 27, 2006, of the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any defects thereof.” Sps. Eugene L. Lim and
Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station, et al.; G.R. No. 192615, January 30,
2013
Certification against forum shopping and Verification; requirements not jurisdictional. In any
case, it is settled that the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping
are not jurisdictional. Verification is required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Non-
compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
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defective, and is substantially complied with when signed by one who has ample knowledge of
the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true ad correct. On the other hand, the certification against
forum shopping us required based on the principle that a party litigant should not be allowed to
pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora.While the certification requirement is obligatory,
non-compliance or a defect in the certificate could be cured by its subsequent correction or
submission under special circumstances or compelling reasons or on the ground of “substantial
compliance.” Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station,
et al.; G.R. No. 192615, January 30, 2013
Contempt of Court; definition. Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard
of the court’s order, but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the
order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for contempt for disobedience of an order
of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and exactly
defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing
is forbidden or required. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B.
Nieto, in their capacity as Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, et al., G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013
Ejectment; possession de facto; distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases. At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts
resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a
party’s title to the property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any
of the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Juanita Ermitaño,
represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No. 174436.
January 23, 2013
Execution; issuance of writ is trial court’s ministerial duty once decision is final; writ of
execution must conform to dispositive portion of judgment; order of execution which varies
tenor of judgment is void. In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the
petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse.
It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory.
As a rule, once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the
decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the
issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty. The writ of execution, however, must
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conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It must conform,
more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
Clearly, the RTC exceeded its authority when it insisted on applying its own construal of the
dispositive portion of the CA Decision when its terms are explicit and need no further
interpretation. It would also be inequitable for the petitioners to pay and for the respondents,
who did not appeal the CA decision or questioned the deletion of the 12% per annum interest,
to receive more than what was awarded by the CA. The assailed RTC order of execution dated
December 21, 2009 and the alias writ of execution dated May 17, 2010 are, therefore, void.
Time and again, it has been ruled that an order of execution which varies the tenor of the
judgment, or for that matter, exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.Spouses Ricardo and Elena
Golez v. Spouses Carlos and Amelita Navarro; G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013
Forcible entry; when proper; when issue of ownership can be material and relevant in resolving
the issue of possession. Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides when an action for
forcible entry, and unlawful detainer, is proper:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1)
prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant
through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the burden of proof
lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by
preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and proved
the required elements.
We agree, too, as we have indicated in passing above, that the issue of ownership can be
material and relevant in resolving the issue of possession.
The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the
issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of
possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception
and is allowed only in this limited instance– to determine the issue of possession and only if the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. Save for this
instance, evidence of ownership is not at all material, as in the present case. Nenita Quality
Foods Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191, January 30, 2013
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Forum Shopping; definition and nature. “Forum shopping is defined as an act of a party, against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly
getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable decision.
x x x It is expressly prohibited xxx because it trifles with and abuses court processes, degrades
the administration of justice, and congest our court dockets. A willful and deliberate violation of
the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and may also
constitute direct contempt.”Estrellla Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U.
Tomas; G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013
Grave abuse of discretion; proper ground in a petition for certiorari but not in a petition for
review on certiorari. It is to be noted that the above issues raised by petitioner alleged grave
abuse of discretion committed by the CA, which is proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, but not in the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. Heirs of Faustino C. Ignacio v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust
Company, et al., G.R. No. 177783. January 23, 2013
Hierarchy of courts; concurrence of jurisdiction; non-observance results in dismissal. We
emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the
dismissal of the recourse. InBanez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:
The court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms
that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences, the strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the
competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it, the Court may act
on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only when
absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons justify an exception to the policy.
xxx
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial forum from
which to seek and obtain effective redress of his or her grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court
of last resort, not a court of first instance. Hence, every litigant who brings petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in Section
4 of Rule 65. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Interlocutory and Final orders; distinction. This Court has laid down the distinction between
interlocutory and final orders, as follows:
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xxx A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be
done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of
the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the
ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the court is
ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants
is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the court except to await the parties’ next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment
once it becomes “final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and
executory.”
xxxx
Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Court’s task
of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the court is
“interlocutory” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or
granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or
granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or
things, etc. unlike a “final” judgment or order, which is appealable. As above pointed out, an
“interlocutory” order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case. Ma. Carmina Calderon
represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013
Interlocutory and Final orders; application to provisional remedies especially to
support pendente lite. The assailed orders relative to the incident of support pendent lite and
support in arrears, as the term suggests, were issued pending the rendition of the decision on the
main action for declaration of nullity of marriage and are therefore interlocutory. They did not
finally dispose of the case nor did they consist of a final adjudication of the merits of petitioner’s
claims as to the ground of psychological incapacity and other incidents as child custody,
support, and conjugal assets. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9,
2013
Interlocutory and Final orders; remedy against interlocutory order is not appeal. The remedy
against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65 provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Having chosen the wrong remedy in questioning
the subject interlocutory orders of the RTC, petitioner’s appeal was correctly dismissed by the
CA. Ma. Carmina Calderon represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marycris V. Baldevia v. Jose
Antonio Roxas and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013
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Judgment; compromise agreement. There is no question that the foregoing Agreement was a
compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for the purpose of finally settling
their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial, if the objective is to put an
end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to avoid a litigation. As a contract,
a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a judicial compromise, while
immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not executory until it is approved
by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a compromise is dependent upon its
compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law. Also, the terms and
conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy
and public order. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin
Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013
Jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction in civil cases; voluntary appearance. In civil cases, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority.
In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of
the latter’s voluntary appearance in court. In Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Dy, we had occasion to state:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive
power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a
general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the
filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of
conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) special appearance operates as an
exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth
in an unequivocal manner; (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution.Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil.
Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Litis pendentia; elements. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1)
identity of parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any
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judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case. Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil.
Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Motion to dismiss; remedy against denial is not appeal; denial may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari. The denial of a motion to dismiss, as an interlocutory order, cannot be the
subject of an appeal until a final judgment or order is rendered in the main case. An aggrieved
party, however, may assail an interlocutory order through a petition for certiorari but only when
it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Sps. Eugene L. Lim and Constancia Lim v. The Court of Appeals-Mindanao Station,
et al.; G.R. No. 192615. January 30, 2013
Parties; authority of private counsel to represent local officials in suit. The present case stemmed
from Special Civil Action 2002-0019 for mandamus and damages. The damages sought therein
could have resulted in personal liability, hence petitioner cannot be deemed to have been
improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal liability on the
part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private
counsel, explaining:
it can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity, is later held to
have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten
by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other
hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of
assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held that in the discharge
of governmental functions, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers,
except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in
conformity with the requirements thereof.
In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the representation by private counsel. In one case,
We held that where rigid acceptance to the law on representation of local affairs in court actions
could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel
would be proper. And in Alburra v. Torres, this Court also said that a provincial governor sued
in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the complaint contains
other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be
satisfied by them in their private capacity.Romeo Gontang, in his official capacity as Mayor of
Gainza, Camarines Sur v. Engr. Cecilia Alayan; G.R. No. 191691. January 16, 2013
Parties; dropping of parties; remedies for joinder or misjoinder. Under the Rules, parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Indeed, it would have been just for the
collection court to have allowed Estrella to prosecute her annulment case by dropping her as a
party plaintiff in the collection case, not only so that she could protect her conjugal share, but
also to prevent the interests of her co-plaintiffs from being adversely affected by their conflicting
actions in the same case. By seeking to be dropped from the collection case, Estrella was
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foregoing collection of her share in the amount that may be due and owing from the sale. It does
not imply a waiver in any manner that affects the rights of the other heirs.
While Estrella correctly made use of the remedies available to her – amending the complaint
and filing a motion to drop her as a party – she committed a mistake in proceeding to file the
annulment case directly after these remedies were denied her by the collection court without
first questioning or addressing the propriety of these denials. While she may have been
frustrated by the collection court’s repeated rejection of her motions and its apparent inability to
appreciate her plight, her proper recourse nevertheless should have been to file a petition
for certiorari or otherwise question the trial courts denial of her motion to be dropped as plaintiff,
citing just reasons which call for a ruling to the contrary. Issues arising from joinder or
misjoinder of parties are the proper subject of certiorari. Estrella Aduan Orpiano v. Spouses
Antonio C. Tomas and Myrna U. Tomas, G.R. No. 178611. January 14, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); contents; not an absolute rule that will lead to
dismissal; liberal construction. The court significantly pointed out in F.A.T Kee Computer
Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc. that the requirement in Section 4, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule whose violation would automatically lead
to the petition’s dismissal. The Rules of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact,
the Rules of Court provides that the Supreme Court “may require or allow the filing of the such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda, or documents, as it may deem necessary within such periods and
under such conditions as it may consider appropriate”; and “[i]f the petition is given due course,
the Supreme Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified
parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice.” These provisions are in keeping with the
overriding standard that procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their
objective and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management
Corporation,G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is
a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case. The Court relies on the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals or of the trial court, and accepts such findings as conclusively and binding
unless any of the following exceptions, obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
when in making its findings the Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when
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the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. However, none of the aforementioned exception applies herein. Special
People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et
al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. It is
well settled that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. This Court, in numerous instances, has had the occasion to
explain that it is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. As a rule, the Court
respects the factual findings of the CA and of quasi-judicial agencies like the DAR, giving them a
certain measure of finality. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, one of which
is when the findings of fact are conflicting. Heirs of Luis A. Luna and Remegio A. Luna, et al. v.
Ruben S. Afable, et al., G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; exceptions. We
first address the procedural issue raised. Resolving the contentions raised necessarily requires us
to delve into factual issues, a course not proper in a petition for review on certiorari, for a Rule
45 petition resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. This rule is read with the
equally settled dictum that factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive on the parties and
are therefore not reviewable by this Court. By way of exception, we resolve factual issues when,
as here, conflict attended the findings of the MTCC and of the RTC, on one hand, and of the CA,
on the other. Of minor note, but which we deem important to point, the petition needlessly
impleaded the CA, in breach of Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Nenita Quality Foods
Corporation v. Crisostomo Galabo, et al.; G.R. No. 174191. January 30, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised; applicable to
expropriation cases. This Court is not a trier of facts. Questions of fact may not be raised in a
petition brought under Rule 45, as such petition may only raise questions of law. This rule
applies in expropriation cases. Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
CA, are generally binding on this Court. An evaluation of the case and the issues presented leads
the Court to the conclusion that it is unnecessary to deviate from the findings of fact of the trial
and appellate courts.
Under Section 8 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court sitting as an expropriation court
may, after hearing, accept the commissioners’ report and render judgment in accordance
therewith. This is what the trial court did in this case. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
pronouncement in toto. Given these facts, the trial court and the CA’s identical findings of fact
concerning the issue of just compensation should be accorded the greatest respect, and are
binding on the Court absent proof that they committed error in establishing the facts and in
drawing conclusions from them. There being no showing that the trial court and the CA
committed any error, we thus accord due respect to their findings. Republic of the Philippines,
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represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways v. Heirs of Spouses Pedro
Bautista and Valentina Malabanan, G.R. No. 181218. January 28, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); review errors of judgment; orders granting execution
are interlocutory and should be subject of petition for certiorari under Rule 65; exceptions. The
petition filed in this case is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitions filed under this rule bring up for review errors of judgment. It is an ordinary appeal and
the petition must only raise questions of law which must be distinctly set forth and discussed.
The present petition, however, assails the RTC Order of execution dated December 21, 2009
and alias writ of execution dated May 27, 2010. It is a settled rule that orders granting execution
are interlocutory orders; hence the petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. This is categorically provided in Rule 41, viz:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. – An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules
to be applicable.
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxx
(f) An order of execution;
xxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is when the writ of execution varies
the judgment. Thus, in Shugo Noda & Co., Ltd. V. Court of Appeals the Court acknowledged
that, in the past, it considered an appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the
order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the essence of the judgment. Other exceptions
include: (1) There has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable
or unjust; (2) Execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (3) It
appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (4) The terms of
the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (5) It
appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or
otherwise satisfied, or the writ issued without authority.
In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to
the aggrieved party. Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may
interchangeably treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and vice versa.
In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the
petitioners from their procedural lapse. Spouses Ricardo and Elena Golez v. Spouses Carlos and
Amelita Navarro, G.R. No. 192532. January 30, 2013
Pleadings; relief. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first
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ascertaining the evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Tecson, this Court expounded that:
Due process considerations justify this requirement, it is improper to enter an order which
exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice, which affords the opposing
party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose
of the requirement that allegations of the complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant.
Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant
who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial. For instance,
amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the parties under the
Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section
3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the complaint. xxx The raison d’etre in limiting the
extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not
file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he know that the plaintiff will be
accorded a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No doubt,
the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguard defendant’s right to
due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of the Court, is
akin to the very essence of due process. It embodies “the sporting idea of fair play” and forbids
the grant of relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard
thereon. Leticia Diona, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona v. Romeo Balangue,
Sonny Balangue, Reynaldo Balangue, and Esteban Balangue, Jr.; G.R. No. 173559. January 7,
2013
Preliminary injunction; abuse of discretion if writ issued despite absence of clear legal right. The
issuance of a preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion if the court taking
cognizance of the case and is generally not interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse.
For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the
invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of a writ of
injunction constitutes grave abuse of discretion. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family
Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; injunctive relief not issued for self-inflicted losses which are damnum
absque injuria. In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the “grave
and irremediable” financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156’s
enforcement, finding such prejudice “inequitable.” No doubt, by importing used vehicles in
contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however,
was self- imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for an
injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque
injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage,
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without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection.Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District Collector of Customs, Port of Aparri,
Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union, and Head of the Land
Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; requirement of actual and existing right. Petitioners’ argument fails to
impress. The CA did not nullify the October 15, 2004 Order merely because of the interchanged
pages. Instead, the CA determined that the applicant, Vitaliano, was not able to show that he
had an actual and existing right that had to be protected by a preliminary injunction. The most
that Vitaliano was able to prove was a future right based on his victory in the suit. Contrasting
this future right of Vitaliano with respondents’ existing right under the GIS, the CA determined
that the trial court should not have disturbed the status quo. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre
v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770.
January 9, 2013
Preliminary injunction; requirement of clear legal right. It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in
Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 58 issues only upon a
showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of violation by the
defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right clearly
founded in or granted by law. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes
the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with
the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the
added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances.
These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the
course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against
them. Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of Customs, District collector of
customs, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, District Collector of Customs, Port of San Fernando La Union,
and Head of the Land Transportation Office v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No.
199324. January 7, 2013
Preliminary injunction; requisites. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court lists the grounds for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:
Sec.3. Grounds for the issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:
(a) that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists un restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) that the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) that a party, court, agency, or a person doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the right of the
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applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual
As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an existing
legal right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The requisites of a valid
injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled
to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be
shown. TML Gasket Industries, Inc. v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 188768. January
7, 2013
Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. A perusal of the allegations in the present case
evidently shows that the petitioner broaches the issues similarly raised and already resolved in
G.R. No. 172942.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with them. Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment
bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case.
The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner who
can no longer question the respondent’s entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded by the
CA. The Court’s determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the 12% legal
interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter anew through
the present recourse.
Thus, the judgment in G.R. No. 172942 bars the present case as the relief sought in the latter is
inextricably related to the ruling in the former. City of Cebu v. Apolonio M. Dedamo, Jr.; G.R.
No. 172852. January 30, 2013
Res judicata; elements. In Heirs of Maximino Derla v. Heirs of Catalina Derla Vda. de
Hipolito, we enumerated the following as the elements of res judicata:
a) The former judgment or order must be final;
b) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of
the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
c) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and
d) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and
of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two (2) actions are substantially between the
same parties.
In the case at bar, the validity of the subject mortgage between PALI and PNB was the primary
issue raised by the parties and resolved by the RTC after the conclusion of a full-blown trial. On
September 10, 2004, the issue was finally laid to rest. A final and executory judgment, no matter
how erroneous, cannot be changed even by this Court. Inevitably, res judicata operates to bar
PALI and PNB from raising the same issue lest there will be no end to litigation. Philippine
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National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul
Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013
Res judicata; effect of minute resolutions. In Alonso, we declared that a “minute resolution may
amount to a final action on the case but it is not a precedent.” However, we continued to state
that “it can not bind non-parties to the action.” Corollary thereto, we can conclude that a
minute resolution, while not a precedent relative to strangers to an action, nonetheless binds the
parties therein, and calls for res judicata’s application.
Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama is instructive anent the effects of the
issuance of a minute resolution, viz:
It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a
disposition of the merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the
CA ruling being questioned. As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. x x x
With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same
parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. x x x (Underlining
ours)
It is therefore clear from the above that for purposes of the application of res judicata, minute
resolutions issued by this Court are as much precedents as promulgated decisions, hence,
binding upon the parties to the action Philippine National Bank, substituted by Tranche 1 (SPV-
AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171677. January 30, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; distinction between excess of jurisdiction,
acts without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. A certiorari proceeding is limited in
scope and narrow in character. The special civil action for certiorari lies only to correct acts
rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in
the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction,
any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than
mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, and not a petition for certiorari.
In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the
legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law.
There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
Excess of jurisdiction, as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act, though
within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise
of the general power in respect of it are wanting. The supervisory jurisdiction of the court to
issue a certiorari writ cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court as
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to intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case. In the absence of a showing
that there is a reason for the court to annul the decision of the concerned tribunal or to
substitute its own judgment, it is not the office of the Court in a petition for certiorari to inquire
into the correctness of the assailed decision or resolution. Winston F. Garcia, in his capacity as
President and General Manager of the GSIS v. Court of Appeals and Rudy C. Tesoro, G.R. No.
169005. January 28, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); nature; an extraordinary remedy; judicial and quasi-
judicial functions. The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari as well as to
grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. A petition for
certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail of the same must strictly
observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and non-observance thereof may not be brushed
aside as mere technicality.
As provided in Section 1, Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed
with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with
respect to the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action
or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for
their official action using discretion of a judicial nature.
The Central Bank Monetary Board (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions
with respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit institutions, and
branches and agencies thereof. It does not perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly,
the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was done in the exercise of an executive function.
Certiorari will not lie in the instant case. Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. & Eduardo B.
Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, Represented by its Chairman, Governor Armando M.
Tetangco, Jr., etc., G.R. No. 192986. January 15, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); requisites; burden of proof For a special civil action
of certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the
tribunal, board or officer, must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal nor
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The burden of proof lies
on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65); when available. The writ of certiorari is available
only when any tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in
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the ordinary course of law. “The sole office of the writ of certiorari,” according to Delos Santos v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:
xxx is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave which means
either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded
a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of
law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers
acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 64; proper mode of review of COMELEC en
bancResolutions not relating to pre-proclamation controversies. Section 7, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution in part substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of any of the
Constitutional Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court
on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and decisions
rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc must be final and made in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that
it shall govern the review of final judgments and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit.
In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010
were issued with finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, the said Resolutions can be reviewed by way of filing before us a petition
for certiorari. Besides, the issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or to the
composition and the proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant petition
challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the
COMELEC en banc to issue the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does not
qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation controversy. Kamarudin K. Ibrahim v.
Commission on Elections and Rolan G. Buagas, G.R. No.192289. January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is axiomatic, to
begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court of law upon an administrative
concern should first avail himself of all the remedies afforded by administrative processes. The
issues that an administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken
away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the opportunity to
dispose of the issues upon due deliberation. The court of law must allow the administrative
agency to carry out its functions and discharge its responsibilities within the specialized areas of
its competence. This rests on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to
resolve questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by subordinates
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in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. Special People,
Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberto P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al., G.R.
No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; when available. Similarly, the petition could not be
one formandamus, which is a remedy available only when “any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court.” The main objective of mandamus is to compel
the performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ
of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what petitioners would have the Secretary
of Justice do in their favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the
Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which they were unquestionably entitled. Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia
Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 188056.
January 8, 2013
Special Civil Action for Mandamus; nature; compels performance of ministerial duties. A key
principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary
remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those
that are discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P.
Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et al.,G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013
Unlawful detainer; nature. Going to the main issue in the instant petition, it is settled that in
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In such case,
the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the
right to possess; hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of the
defendant’s right to continue in possession. Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
Isabelo Ermitaño v. Lailanie M. Paglas, G.R. No. 174436. January 23, 2013
Unlawful detainer; failure to pay rentals and expiration of lease as grounds. We find that the
RTC’s ruling upholding the ejectment of Hertz from the building premises was
proper. First, respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and utility bills to Optima;
and second, the Contract of lease expired without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation
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thereof at least 90 days prior to its expiration.Optima Realty Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive
Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Unlawful detainer; award of monthly compensation and attorney’s fees. As to the award of
monthly compensation, we find that Hertz should pay adequate compensation to Optima, since
the former continued to occupy the leased premises even after the expiration of the lease
contract.
Finally we uphold the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P30, 000 and judicial costs in
the light of Hertz unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the leased premises, thus forcing
Optima to file the instant case in order to protect its rights and interest. Optima Realty
Corporation v. Hertz Phil. Exclusive Cars, Inc., G.R. No. 183035. January 9, 2013
Special Proceedings
Settlement of Estate; claims include quasi-contract and contingent claims; In Maclan v.
Garcia, Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben Garcia the necessary expenses he spent
as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner, he set
up the defense that this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the
estate of his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from law
and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the settlement of the
estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (now
Section 5, Rule 86).
The court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent as previous possessor
of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v O’Brien, it explained that the term
“implied contracts,” as used in our remedial law, originated from the common law where
obligations derived from quasi-contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts.
Thus, the term quasi-contract is included in the concept “implied contracts” as used in the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, the liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be filed
as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that
may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent
one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R.
No. 170498. January 9, 2013
Settlement of Estate; specific rules on settlement prevail over general rules. We read with
approval the CA’s use of statutory construction principle of lex specialis derogate
generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court;
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be
filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for
ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply
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suppletorily. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R.
No. 170498. January 9, 2013
Other Proceedings
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; requisites. Based on Section 4
of E.O. No. 1008, in order for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction, two requisites must concur: “first,
the dispute must somehow be related to a construction contract; and second, the parties must
have agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration proceedings.” The Manila Insurance Company,
Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; monetary claims under a
construction contract. In William Golangco Construction Corporation v. Ray Burton
Development Corporation, we declared that monetary claims under a construction contract are
disputes arising from “differences in interpretation of the contract” because the “matter of
ascertaining the duties and obligations of the parties under their contract all involve
interpretation of the provisions of the contract. Following our reasoning in that case, we find that
the issue of whether respondent-spouses are entitled to collect on the performance bond issued
by petitioner is a “dispute arising in the course of the execution and performance of [the CCA]
by reason of difference in the interpretation of the contract documents.” The Manila Insurance
Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628. January 16, 2013
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) jurisdiction; performance bond. A careful
reading of the Performance Bond reveals that the “bond is coterminous with the final
acceptance of the project.” Thus, the fact that it was issued prior to the execution of the
Construction Contract Agreement does not affect its validity or effectivity.
In fact, in Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Anscor Land, Inc., we rejected the
argument that the jurisdiction of CIAC is limited to the construction industry, and thus cannot be
extended to surety contracts. In that case, we declared that “although not the construction
contract itself, the performance bond is deemed as an associate of the main construction
contract that it cannot be separated or severed from its principal. The Performance Bond is
significantly and substantially connected to the construction contract that there can be no doubt
it is the CIAC which has jurisdiction over any dispute arising from or connected with it.” The
Manila Insurance Company, Inc. v. Spouses Roberto and Aida Amurao, G.R. No. 179628.
January 16, 2013
Election Cases; review extends only to final decisions or resolutions of COMELEC en banc and
not to interlocutory orders issued by a division. The petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary
remedy ofcertiorari to assail and interlocutory order issued by the COMELEC First Division is
amiss. “A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the ordr in this Court through a special civil action
for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of
the decision of the Division in due course.
xxx
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Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are
present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the
COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the
members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Governor Sadikul
A. Sahali and Vice-Governor Ruby M. Sahali v. Commission on Elections (First Division),
Rashidin H. Matba and Jilkasi J. Usman, G.R. No. 201796. January 15, 2013
Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act; prospective application of the law. Sec. 146 of the
FRIA, which makes it applicable to “all further proceedings in insolvency, suspension of
payments and rehabilitation cases xxx except to the extent that in the opinion of the court, their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice,” still presupposes a prospective
application. The wording of the law clearly shows that it is applicable to all further proceedings.
In no way could it be made retrospectively applicable to the Stay Order issued by the
rehabilitation court back in 2002. Situs Dev. Corporation, et al., v. Asiatrust Bank, et al., G.R.
No. 180036. January 16, 2013
HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgage; ruling of HLURB affects only the lot subject of the
buyer’s complaint. The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad
enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to
the intent of P.D. No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous
developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects sans the knowledge of
the former and the consent of the HLURB.
In Far East Bank, we held that:
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void. Hence,
themortgage over the lot is null and void insofar as private respondent is concerned.
The remedy granted by the HLURB and sustained by the Office of the President is proper only
insofar as it refers to the lot of respondent. In short, the mortgage contract is void as against him.
Since there is no law stating the specifics of what should be done under the circumstances, that
which is in accord with equity should be ordered. The remedy granted by the HLURB in the first
and the second paragraphs of the dispositive portion of its Decision insofar as it referred to
respondent’s lot is in accord with equity.
The HLURB, however, went overboard in its disposition in paragraphs 3 and 4, which pertained
not only to the lot but to the entire parcel of land mortgaged. Such ruling was improper. The
subject of this litigation is limited only to the lot that respondent is buying, not to the entire
parcel of land. He has no personality or standing to bring suit on the whole property, as he has
actionable interest over the subject lot only. (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
In Far East Bank, we sustained the HLURB when it declared the mortgage entered into between
the subdivision developer and the bank as unenforceable against the lot buyer. However, we
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were categorical that the HLURB acted beyond bounds when it nullified the mortgage covering
the entire parcel of land, of which the lot subject of the buyer’s complaint is merely a part.
In the case now before us, while it is within Lim’s right to file a complaint before the HLURB to
protect her right as a condominium unit buyer, she has no standing to seek for the complete
nullification of the subject mortgage. She has an actionable interest only over Unit 48C of
Cluster Dominiko of Vista de Loro, no more and no less. Philippine National Bank, substituted
by Tranche 1 (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Rina Parayno Lim and Puerto Azul Land, Inc., G.R. No.
171677. January 30, 2013
HLURB; jurisdiction; annulment of mortgages of condominium or subdivision units. Section 1 of
PD No. 957 limits the HLURB’s jurisdiction to three kinds of cases: (a) unsound real estate
business practices; (b) claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(c) cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. While paragraphs (b) and (c) limit the HLURB cases to those between the buyer and
the subdivision or condominium owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman, (a) is broad
enough to include third parties to the sales contract.
Jurisprudence consistently recognizes the rationale behind the enactment of PD No. 957 – to
protect innocent lot buyers from scheming developers. For this reason, the Court has broadly
construed the jurisdiction of the HLURB to include complaints for annulment of mortgages of
condominium or subdivision units. Indeed, in Manila Banking Corporation v. Spouses Rabina,
even if the mortgagee bank was under receivership/liquidation, the Court declared that the
HLURB retains jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of the mortgage:
The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include
jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. To disassociate the issue of nullity of
mortgage and lodge it separately with the liquidation court would only cause inconvenience to
the parties and would not serve the ends of speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as
mandated by the laws vesting quasi-judicial powers in the agency. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Pridisons Realty Corporation, Antonio Gonzales, Bormacheco, Inc., Nazario
Santos, Teresita Chua Tek, Charito Ong Lee, and Ernesto Sibal,G.R. No. 155113. January 9,
2013
Intra-corporate disputes; elements. Thus, to be considered as an intra-corporate dispute, the
case: (a) must arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations; and (b) the nature of the
question subject of the controversy must be such that it is intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation or the enforcement of the parties’ rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and the internal rules of the corporation. So long as these two criteria are
satisfied, the dispute is intra-corporate and the RTC, acting as a special commercial court, has
jurisdiction over it. Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc., Nathaniel Bocobo,
Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa, G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013
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Intra-corporate disputes; application to dissolved corporations. It bears reiterating that Section
145 of the Corporation Code protects, among others, the rights and remedies of corporate actors
against other corporate actors. The statutory provision assures an aggrieved party that the
corporation’s dissolution will not impair, much less remove, his/her rights or remedies against
the corporation, its stockholders, directors and officers. It also states that corporate dissolution
will not extinguish any liability already incurred by the corporation, its stockholders, directors or
officers. In short, Section 145 preserves a corporate actor’s cause of action and remedy against
another corporate actor. In so doing, Section 145 also preserves the nature of the controversy
between the parties as an intra-corporate dispute.
The dissolution of the corporation simply prohibits it from continuing its business. However,
despite such dissolution, the parties involved in the litigation are still corporate actors. The
dissolution does not automatically convert the parties into total strangers or change their intra-
corporate relationships. Neither does it change or terminate existing causes of action, which
arose because of the corporate ties between the parties. Thus, a cause of action involving an
intra-corporate controversy remains and must be filed as an intra-corporate dispute despite the
subsequent dissolution of the corporation.Vitaliano Aguirre II and Fidel Aguirre v. FQB+7, Inc.,
Nathaniel Bocobo, Priscila Bocobo, and Antonio De Villa,G.R. No. 170770. January 9, 2013
Just compensation; compromise agreement. There is no question that the
foregoing Agreement was a compromise that the parties freely and voluntarily entered into for
the purpose of finally settling their dispute in this case. Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a
compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Accordingly, a compromise is either judicial,
if the objective is to put an end to a pending litigation, or extrajudicial, if the objective is to
avoid a litigation. As a contract, a compromise is perfected by mutual consent. However, a
judicial compromise, while immediately binding between the parties upon its execution, is not
executory until it is approved by the court and reduced to a judgment. The validity of a
compromise is dependent upon its compliance with the requisites and principles of contracts
dictated by law. Also, the terms and conditions of a compromise must not be contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of
Spouses Jorja Rigor Soriano and Magin Soriano, G.R. No. 178312. January 30, 2013
Evidence
Evidence; conclusive presumptions; estoppel against tenants. The conclusive presumption found
in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as estoppel against tenants, provides as
follows:
Sec. 2.Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
xxxx
(b) the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title
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asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that
relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord’s title
has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for
rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what respondent is
claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the
presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply. Juanita
Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitaño vs. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No.
174436. January 23, 2013
Evidence; disputable presumptions; presumption of regularity. The court is inclined to give more
evidentiary weight to the certification of the zoning administrator being the officer having
jurisdiction over the area where the land in question is situated and is, therefore, more familiar
with the property in issue. Besides, this certification carried the presumption of regularity in its
issuance and respondents have the burden of overcoming this presumption. Respondents,
however, failed to present any evidence to rebut that presumption. Heirs of Luis A. Luna, et al. v.
Ruben S. Afable, et al.; G.R. No. 188299. January 23, 2013.
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Civil Procedure
Actions; cause of action; elements; failure to state a cause of action is ground for dismissal. A
complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
If the allegations in the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of. A perusal
of the Amended Complaint in the present case would show that there is, indeed, no allegation
of any act or omission on the part of respondents which supposedly violated the legal rights of
petitioners. Thus, the CA is correct in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and
Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013
Actions; moot and academic principle. Verily, in Gancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor and
Employment, the Court emphatically stated that:
It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
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There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition.
Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in the instant
petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced. There
was no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
RTC Orders dated October 31, 2001 and April 10, 2002 since any declaration thereon would be
of no practical use or value. By the very admission of PLDT, it can no longer be compelled to
undo its act of blocking the telecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to Hong
Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since, effectively, there were no more circuits to
speak of.
Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or a
reversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to an
affirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from
the above discussion, and as succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more
for the RTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere
surplusage. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. v. Eastern Telecom
Philippines; G.R. No. 163037. February 6, 2013
Actions; moot and academic principle; nature and exceptions. A moot and academic case is
one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Although the controversy could have
ceased due to the intervening appointment of and assumption by Cadiz as the Solicitor General
during the pendency of this suit, and such cessation of the controversy seemingly rendered moot
and academic the resolution of the issue of the constitutionality of the concurrent holding of the
two positions by Agra, the Court should still go forwards and resolve the issue and not abstain
from exercising its power of judicial review because this case comes under several of the well-
recognized exceptions obtained, namely: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3)
the constitutional issue raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
Bench, the Bar and the public; (4) the case was capable of repetition, yet evading review.
It is the same here. The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions
in the Cabinet, albeit in acting capacities, was as issue that comes under all the recognized
exceptions. The issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation
of exceptional character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental
importance to the people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the
Bench and the Bar in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation
further calls for the review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In
other words, many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to
proceed the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed. Dennis A.B. Funa v. Acting
Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 191644. February 19, 2013
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Actions; separate trials; exception to the general rule; rationale. The rule on separate trials in
civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or
issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should be held,
provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to avoid
prejudice to any party.
The rule is almost identical with Rule 42(b) of the United States Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Federal Rules), a provision that governs separate trials in the United States Federal
Courts (US Federal Courts), x x x.
The US Federal Courts have applied Rule 42(b) by using several principles and parameters
whose application in this jurisdiction may be warranted because our rule on separate trials has
been patterned after the original version of Rule 42(b). There is no obstacle to adopting such
principles and parameters as guides in the application of our own rule on separate trials. This is
because, generally speaking, the Court has randomly accepted the practices in the US Courts in
the elucidation and application of our own rules of procedure that have themselves originated
form or been inspired by the practice and procedure in the Federal Courts and the various US
State Courts.
xxx
Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law,
we conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a
separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank was
distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the Sandiganbayan
veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every case tried at one time,
unreasonably shunting aside the dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a “single trial will generally
lessen the delay, expense, and inconvenience to the parties and the courts.”
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of
the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further convenience, or
when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will
give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company, as successor-in-interest of Asian Bank Corporation v. Hon. Edilberto G.
Sandoval, et al.; G.R. No. 169677. February 18, 2013
Appeals; issues raised for first time on appeal and not raised in proceedings in lower court are
barred by estoppel. As to the first issue, there is no dispute that the issue of timeliness of
respondents’ Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ Amended Complaint was not raised by petitioners
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before the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in their Comment to respondents’ petition
for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision that this matter was raised. It is well established that issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Basic
considerations of due process impel the adoption of this rule. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado,
et al. v. Spouses Aguedo Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013
Contempt; distinction between criminal and civil contempt. In People v. Godoy, this Court
made a distinction between criminal and civil contempt. The Court declared:
A criminal contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt consists in failing to do
something ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party
therein and is, therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.
A criminal contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense
against organized society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice
which raises an issue between the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are
punitive. On the other hand, the proceedings to punish a civil contempt are remedial and for the
purpose of the preservation of the right of private persons. It has been held that civil contempt is
neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, but a power of the court.
It has further been stated that intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and that no
one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it cleat that he
intended to commit it. On the contrary, there is authority indicating that since the purpose of
civil contempt proceedings is remedial, the defendant’s intent in committing the contempt is
immaterial. Hence, good faith or the absence of intent to violate the court’s order is not a
defense in civil contempt. Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.; G.R. No.
194578. February 13, 2013
Contempt; contempt akin to libel and principle of privileged communication may be invoked in
contempt proceeding. In People v. Castelo, the Court ruled that contempt is akin to libel and
that the principle of privileged communication may be invoked in a contempt proceeding. The
Court ruled:
While the present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for
both constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by
our Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the
other. The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press
or freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can
also be invoked in favor of the appellant.
Philip Sigrid A. Fortun v. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas, et al.; G.R. No. 194578. February 13, 2013
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Execution; execution pending appeal; not a bar the continuance of the appeal on the merits.
First of all, as held in Legaspi v. Ong, “[e]xecution pending appeal does not bar the continuance
of the appeal on the merits, for the Rules of Court precisely provides for restitution according to
equity in case the executed judgment is reversed on appeal. O. Ventanilla Enterprises
Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez, Presiding Judge; G.R. No.
180325. February 20, 2013
Execution; execution of RTC judgment does not automatically mean that issues on appeal have
become moot and academic; Moot and academic principle. Moreover, even assuming that the
writ of execution in the instant case were not void, the execution of the RTC judgment cannot
be considered as a supervening event that would automatically moot the issues in the appealed
case for accion publiciana, which is pending before the CA. otherwise, there would be no use
appealing a judgment, once a writ of execution is issued and satisfied. That situation would be
absurd. On the contrary, the Rules of Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or annulment of
an executed judgment. Section 5 of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there should be
restitution or reparation as warranted by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any supervening
event, there is still the possibility of the appellate court’s reversal of the appealed decision –
even if already executed – and, consequently, of a restitution or a reparation.
In any case, the issues in the appealed case for accion publiciana cannot, in any way, be
characterized as moot and academic. In Osmena III v. Social Security System of the
Philippines, we defined a moot and academic case or issue as follows:
A case or issue is considered not and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual
substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness – save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised
requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or
when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.
Applying the above definition to the instant case, it is obvious that there remains an unresolved
justiciable controversy in the appealed case for accion publiciana. In particular, did respondent-
spouses Oria really encroach on the land of the petitioner? If they did, does he have the right to
recover possession of the property? Furthermore, without preempting the disposition of the case
foraccion publiciana pending before the CA, we note that if the respondents built structures on
the subject land, and if they were builders in good faith they would be entitled to appropriate
rights under the Civil Code. This Court merely points out that there are still issues that the CA
needs to resolve in the appealed case before it. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals,
spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013
Execution; effects of void writ of execution; requirement of good reason in execution pending
appeal.In any case, proceed to rule that because the writ of execution was void, all actions and
proceedings conducted pursuant to it were also void and of no legal effect. To recall, this Court
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affirmed the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84632, annulling the RTC’s Omnibus Order
granting the Motion for Immediate Execution pending appeal. We affirmed the CA Decision
because of the RTC’s failure to state any reason, much less good reason, for the issuance thereof
as required under Section 2, Rule 39. In the exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power
to issue a writ of execution pending appeal, we emphasize the need for strict compliance with
the requirement for the statement of good reason, because execution pending appeal is the
exception rather than the rule.
Since the writ of execution was manifestly void for having been issued without compliance with
the rules, it is without any legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ was issued at all.
Consequently, all actions taken pursuant to the void writ of execution must be deemed to have
not been taken and to have had no effect. Otherwise, the Court would be sanctioning a
violation of the right of due process of the judgment debtors – respondent-spouses
herein. Macario Diaz Carpio v. Court of Appeals, spouses Gelacio G. Gloria and Marcelina Pre
Oria; G.R. No. 183102. February 27, 2013
Hierarchy of courts; exceptions. Second, while the principle of hierarchy of courts does indeed
require that recourse should be made to the lower courts before they are made to the higher
courts, this principle is not an absolute rule and admits of certain exceptions under well-defined
circumstances. In several cases, we have allowed direct invocation of this Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue writs ofcertiorari on the ground of special and important reasons clearly
stated in the petition; when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy;
when demanded by the broader interest of justice; when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified
our immediate and direct handling of the case.Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S.
Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013
Judgments; immutability of judgments. The issue on the nullity of Maniego’s title had already
been foreclosed when this Court denied Maniego’s petition for review in the Resolution dated
13 July 2011, which became final and executory on 19 January 2012. It is settled that a decision
that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified
in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
This is without prejudice, however, to the right of Maniego to recover from Poblete what he
paid to Kapantay for the account of Poblete, otherwise there will be unjust enrichment by
Poblete. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February
25, 2013
Judgments; pro hac vice; nature. Petitioners point out that this Court has had occasion to grant a
motion for new trial after the judgment of conviction had become final and executory. In People
v. Licayan, all the accused were convicted of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced
to death by the trial court. More than two years after their conviction became final and
executory, the accused Lara and Licayan filed an Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with
Leave of Court. They attached thereto the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by two of their co-
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accused in the case, to the effect that Lara and Licayan had not participated in the commission
of the crime. Since the OSG also recommended the opening of the case, this Court remanded
the case to the trial court for the reception of newly discovered evidence.
It is worth pointing that the motion in Licayan was granted pro hac vice, which is a Latin term
used by courts to refer to rulings rendered “for this one particular occasion.” A ruling expressly
qualified as such cannot be relied upon as a precedent to govern other cases. Reynante Tadeja,
et al. v. People of the Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013
Judgments; void judgment; nature and effect; may be resisted in any action or proceeding. A
void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In
contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid
a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.
xxx
Accordingly, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of
any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect. Hence, it can never become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void: “x x x it
may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head.”Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Placido and Clara
Dy Orilla; G.R. No. 194168. February 13, 2013
Liberal construction of the rules. In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally
construing its rules in order to promote a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (3) the
merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Secretary
Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
Motions; notice and hearing requirements; effect of non-compliance; notice requirement in the
issuance of preliminary injunction. A motion for intervention, like any other motion, has to
comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing, as well as proof of its service,
save only for those that the courts can act upon without prejudice to the rights of the other
parties. A motion which fails to comply with these requirements is a worthless piece of paper
that cannot and should not be acted upon.
xxx
The notice requirement is even more mandatory when the movant asks for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction and/or a TRO. Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, no
preliminary injunction shall be granted without a hearing and without prior notice to the party
sought to be enjoined, the prior notice under this requirement is as important as the hearing, as
no hearing can meaningfully take place, with both parties present or represented, unless a prior
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notice of the hearing is given. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et
al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013
Motions; motion to dismiss; defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer are deemed waived; exceptions. Under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
defenses and objections not pleaded in the answer are deemed waived, with the following
exceptions: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res
judicata; and (4) prescription of the action. Clearly, petitioner cannot change its defense after the
termination of the period of testimony and after the exhibits of both parties have already been
admitted by the court. The non-inclusion of this belated defense in the pre-trial order barred its
consideration during the trial. To rule otherwise would put the adverse party at a disadvantage
since he could no longer offer evidence to rebut the new theory. Indeed, parties are bound by
the delimitation of issues during the pre-trial. Licomcen, Inc. v. Engr. Salvador Abainza,
etc.; G.R. No. 199781. February 18, 2013
New trial; newly-discovered evidence; requisites. Petitioners premise their motion for a new trial
on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, i.e. Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession, executed
with the assistance of Atty. Cirilo Tejoso, Jr., and the spot report of the police on Plaridel’s
apprehension.
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial; (b) could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted.
The most important requisite is that the evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with reasonable diligence; hence, the term “newly-discovered.” The confession
of Plaridel does not meet this requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and even
gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he and petitioners had been convicted by the
trial court that he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession could not have been
obtained during trial does not hold water. Reynante Tadeja, et al. v. People of the
Philippines; G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013]
Parties; duty of party to inform court of counsel’s death. The Court strikes down the argument
that the CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 58817 did not attain finality because petitioner’s
counsel, who died while the case was pending before the CA, was unable to receive a copy
thereof. The CA was correct in ruling that there is no extraordinary circumstance in this case that
would merit a recall of the entry of judgment to reopen the case. The reason given by petitioner,
that its former counsel had died before the CA Decision was promulgated, hence, it was not
properly notified of the judgment, is too tenuous to be given serious consideration. In Mojar, et
al. v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., the Court explained that it is the party’s
duty to inform the court of its counsel’s demise, and failure to apprise the court of such fact shall
be considered negligence on the part of said party. Expounding further, the Court stated:
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x x x It is not the duty of the courts to inquire, during the progress of a case, whether the law
firm or partnership representing one of the litigants continues to exist lawfully, whether the
partners are still alive, or whether its associates are still connected with the firm.
x x x They cannot pass the blame to the court, which is not tasked to monitor the changes in the
circumstances of the parties and their counsel. x x x x
In Ampo v. Court of Appeals, this Court explained the vigilance that must be exercise by a party:
xxxx
Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back,
relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to
blame. Neither can he invoke due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where a party, such as
petitioner, was afforded this opportunity to participate but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process. If said opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
without violating the constitutional guarantee.
Thus, for failure of petitioner to notify the CA if the death of its counsel of record and have said
counsel substituted, then service of the CA Decision at the places or law office designated by its
counsel of record as his address, is sufficient notice. The case then became final and executory
when no motion for reconsideration was filed within the reglementary period therefor. O.
Ventanilla Enterprises Corporation v. Adelina S. Tan and Sheriff Reynante G. Velasquez,
Presiding Judge; G.R. No. 180325. February 20, 2013
Partition; stages; requisites. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue
of ownership. Such an addition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject
property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in
their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to
effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved. Carolina
(Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No. 151334. February 13,
2013]
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal; rationale for the rule; exceptions. The inconsistent postures
taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet that a party cannot change his theory
on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44, Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – whether or not the appellant has filed a
motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors any question
of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues framed by
the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded in the
answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party deliberately adopts a certain
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theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change the same on appeal, because to permit to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.
Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule. It would be unfair to the adverse party
who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it
could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory, this exception does not, however, obtain in the
case at hand. Carolina (Carlina) Vda. De Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; G.R. No.
151334. February 13, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); questions of fact generally not reviewable; exceptions;
difference between question of fact and question of law. We note that the matters raised by
petitioner ATI involve questions of fact which are generally not reviewable in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, as the
Court is not a trier of facts. Section 1 thereof provides that “[t]he petition x x x shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.”
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issued does not call for an examination of
the probative value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits
certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based; 7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the
findings of the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of
Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions
of both parties. Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Simon Enterprises, Inc.; G.R. No. 177116. February 27,
2013
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Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); only questions of law may be raised. A petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that only questions of law may
be raised, subject to exceptional circumstances which are not present in this case. Hence,
factual findings of the trial court, especially if affirmed by the CA, are binding on us. In this case,
both the RTC and the CA found that the signatures of Poblete and her deceased husband in the
Deed dated 11 August 2000 were forged by Maniego. In addition, the evidence is preponderant
that Maniego did not pay the consideration for the sale. Since the issue on the genuineness of
the Deed dated 11 August 2000 is essentially a question of fact, we are not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh the evidence again. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barbara Sampaga
Poblete; G.R. No. 196577. February 25, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); resolves only questions of law, not questions of
fact. We stress the settled rule that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court resolves only questions of law, not questions of fact. A question, to be one of law, must
not examine the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties; otherwise, the
question is one of fact. Whether an express trust exists in this case is a question of fact whose
resolution is not proper in a petition under Rule 45. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the
Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R.
No. 179096. February 6, 2013
Petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45); change of theory on appeal generally not
allowed. Second, we find that the petitioner changed the theory of his case. The petitioner
argued before the lower courts that an express trust exists between PALII as the trustee and the
HEIRS as the trustor-beneficiary. The petitioner now asserts that the express trust exists between
PALII as the trustor and UCPB as the trustee, with the HEIRS as the beneficiaries. At this stage of
the case, such change of theory is simply not allowed as it violates basic rules of fair play,
justice and due process. Our rulings are clear – “a party who deliberately adopts a certain
theory upon which the case was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change [it]
on appeal”, otherwise, the lower courts will effectively be deprived of the opportunity to decide
on the merits of the case fairly. Besides, courts of justice are devoid of jurisdiction to resolve a
question not in issue. Joseph Goyanko, Jr., as administrator of the Estate of Joseph Goyanko, Sr.
v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Mango Avenue Branch; G.R. No. 179096. February 6, 2013
Pleadings; amended complaint; nature. Moreover, respondent’s filing of their Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint may not be considered as a circumvention of the rules of procedure.
Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original
one. As a consequence, the original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered
part of the record. In the present case, the Amended Complaint is, thus, treated as an entirely
new complaint. As such, respondents had every right to move for the dismissal of the said
Amended Complaint. Were it not for the filing of the said Motion, respondents would not have
been able to file a petition forcertiorari before the CA which, in turn, rendered the presently
assailed judgment in their favor. Padilla Mercado, Zulueta Mercado, et al. v. Spouses Aguedo
Espina and Lourdes Espina; G.R. No. 173987. February 25, 2013
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Service of Pleadings; petition should be served on counsel of party; effect of service on party
represented by counsel of record; exceptions. Lastly, under our rules of procedure, service of the
petition on a party, when the party is represented by a counsel of record, is a patent nullity and
is not binding upon the party wrongfully served. This rule, however, is a procedural standard
that may admit of exceptions when faced with compelling reasons of substantive justice
manifest in the petition and in the surrounding circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can
bow to substantive considerations through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their
objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S. Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385.
February 20, 2013
Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); reglementary period. First, we find that the present
petition was filed within the reglementary period. Contrary to the private respondents’ position,
the 60-day period within which to file the petition for certiorari is counted from the Republic’s
receipt of the July 5, 2006 order denying the latter’s motion for reconsideration. Section 4, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is clear on this point – “In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be
counted from notice of the denial of said motion.” Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Ramon S.
Caguioa, etc., et al.; G.R. No. 174385. February 20, 2013
Special civil action for certiorari (Rule 65); requisites. The following requisites must concur for a
Petition for Certiorari to prosper, namely:
“(a) The writ is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(b) Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(c) There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.”Salvacion Villanueva, et al. v. Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, etc., et
al.; G.R. No. 178347. February 25, 2013
Special Proceedings
Writ of amparo; nature; special proceeding. The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable
and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise
of the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.
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It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs.
It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that,
this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A
writ of Amparo is aspecial proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the
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Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced. Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B.
Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
Writ of amparo; procedure. Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the
procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to be
filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The
judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and
the affidavits submitted “with the attendant circumstances detailed”. After evaluation, the judge
has the option toissue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper
if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to lie liberty or
security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the
issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The
court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for
more permanent protection and interim relies are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return after the issuance of the writ through the clerk of
court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the petition. Unlike an Answer, the
Return has other purposes aside form identifying the issues in the case, Respondents are also
required to detail the actions they had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state the actions
they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii) recover and preserve evidence
related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; (iii) identify
witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the
cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any patter or practice
that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (v) bring the suspected offenders
before a competent court. Clearly these matters are important to the judge so that s/he can
calibrate the means and methods that will be required to further the protections, if any, that will
be due to the petitioner.
There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the merits of the
petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not filed, the hearing will be
done ex parte.After the hearing, the court will render the judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision.
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper ans appropriate. The judgment should contain measures
which the judge views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in
the Amparo case. These measures must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to
verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject
to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioner’s life,
liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
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Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a subsequent
case be filed – either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the
extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy
Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19,
2013
Writ of Amparo; writ is an interlocutory order. The “Decision” dated 20 March 2012 assailed by
the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. x x x
This “Decision” pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo,not the judgment under Section 18. The “Decision” is thus an interlocutory order, as
suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection orders were given
together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders
are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final
judgment is rendered. Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy
Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula;G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
Writ of Amparo; the Return is the proper responsive pleading; memorandum is a prohibited
pleading. First the insistence on filing an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves
as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to
file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court to provide a speedy remedy to those
whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter
disregard of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and
requiring an Answer.
xxx
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing.
Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a
synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the
case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the writ
of Amparo.Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
Writ of Amparo; difference between the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and the actual order
called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from
the actual ordercalled the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes the availment of the entire
procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining
the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondent that will mitigate, if
not totally eradicate, the violation of or threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security.
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A judgment which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount
to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to
avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances.
Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as “granting the privilege of the
Writ of Amparo.” Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director
Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v. Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013
Evidence
Administrative proceedings; quantum of proof; substantial evidence. It is well-entrenched that in
an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty
to justify affirmative findings. Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodrigo v. Mapoy and Don
Emmanuel R. Regalario; G.R. No. 197299. February 13, 2013]
Civil cases; quantum of proof; preponderance of evidence; evidence of fraud. In civil cases,
basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their proponent. This principle equally holds
true, even if the defendant had not been given the opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order. The extent of the relief that may be granted can only be as much as has been
alleged and proved with preponderant evidence required under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence”
or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
As to fraud, the rule is that he who alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must
substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns
and that private transactions have been fair and regular. The Court has stressed time and again
that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because mere allegation is definitely not
evidence. Moreover, fraud is not presumed – it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Spouses Nilo Ramos and Eliadora Ramos v. Raul Obispo and Far East Bank and Trust
Co.; G.R. No. 193804. February 27, 2013
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Civil Procedure
Action to annul judgment or final order; jurisdiction. In 1981, the Legislature enacted Batas
PambansaBlg.129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this
legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment of a judgment or final
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order as an action independent from the generic classification of litigations in which the subject
matter was not capable of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject of the litigation was
incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the RTC, which replaced the CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no
longer had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC, eliminating all
concerns about judicial stability. To implement this change, the Court introduced a
new procedure to govern the action to annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of
the Rules of Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that “[t]he annulment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.” Pinausukan Seafood
House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et
al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; lack of jurisdiction; types. Lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the
jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of
procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other process on the petitioner. A
judgment or final order issued by the trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action is always void, and, in the words of Justice Street in Banco Español-Filipino
v. Palanca (37 Phil 949 [1918]), “in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.”
But the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the person, being a matter of procedural law, may be
waived by the party concerned either expressly or impliedly. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas
Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al.,G.R. No.
159926, January 20, 2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; nature. The Court has expounded on the nature of the
remedy of annulment of judgment or final order in Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (681 SCRA 580, 586-587 [2012]), viz:
“A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or
final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily
and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court
has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction
and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for
annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper. x x x”
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The objective of the remedy of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the
judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his
cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire
proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper
court. If the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the
CA may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein. The remedy is by no means an appeal whereby the correctness of the
assailed judgment or final order is in issue; hence, the CA is not called upon to address each
error allegedly committed by the trial court. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far
East Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al.,G.R. No. 159926, January
20, 2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; prescriptive period. The third requirement sets the time
for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought
before it is barred by laches or estoppel. Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East
Bank and Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20,
2014.
Action to annul judgment or final order; requisites. The first requirement prescribes that the
remedy is available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the
petitioner. This means that the remedy, although seen as “a last remedy,” is not an alternative to
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and petition for relief. The petition must aver,
therefore, that the petitioner failed to move for a new trial, or to appeal, or to file a petition for
relief without fault on his part. But this requirement to aver is not imposed when the ground for
the petition is lack of jurisdiction (whether alleged singly or in combination with extrinsic fraud),
simply because the judgment or final order, being void, may be assailed at any time either
collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless the ground of lack of jurisdiction is meanwhile barred
by laches.
The second requirement limits the ground for the action of annulment of judgment to either
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
Not every kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does.
Fraud is extrinsic, according to Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals (265 SCRA 168,
180 [1996]), “where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a
real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.”
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The third requirement sets the time for the filing of the action. The action, if based on extrinsic
fraud, must be filed within four years from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; and if based on
lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The fourth requirement demands that the petition should be verified, and should allege with
particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the
petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. The need for
particularity cannot be dispensed with because averring the circumstances constituting either
fraud or mistake with particularity is a universal requirement in the rules of pleading. The
petition is to be filed in seven clearly legible copies, together with sufficient copies
corresponding to the number of respondents, and shall contain essential submissions,
specifically: (a) the certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution, to be attached
to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner;
(b) the affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense; and (c) the
sworn certification that the petitioner has not theretofore commenced any other action involving
the same issues in the Supreme Court, the CA or the different divisions thereof, or any other
tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the
same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the Supreme Court, the CA, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the said courts and other tribunal or agency thereof
within five days therefrom.Pinausukan Seafood House-Roxas Blvd., Inc. v. Far East Bank and
Trust Cp., now Bank of the Philippine Islands, et al., G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.
Appeal; trial court’s factual findings as affirmed by CA are binding on appeal. To start with,
considering that the Court of Appeals (CA) thereby affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, the
Court is bound to uphold such findings, for it is axiomatic that the trial court’s factual findings as
affirmed by the CA are binding on appeal due to the Court not being a trier of
facts. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Guariña Agricultural and Realty
Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; covers questions of law only; exceptions. The Court has
consistently held that as a general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
covers questions of law only. The rule, however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following
exceptions, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
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evidence on record. Rodolfo Laborte, et al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et
al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; effect of failure to file motion for reconsideration within 15-
day reglementary period. The Court emphasized that the 15-day period for filing a motion for
new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment
becomes final and executory.Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First
Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No.
189618. January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual questions may not be raised. Well entrenched in this
jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may not be raised before this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari as this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, it is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be put in
issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A
question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their
relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No.
193986, January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; factual findings of trial court, when affirmed by CA, are
binding on Supreme Court. Considering that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the CA, are binding on the Court, the Court affirms the judgment of the CA upholding
Eduardo’s exercise of the right of repurchase. Roberto could no longer assail the factual findings
because his petition for review on certiorari was limited to the review and determination of
questions of law only. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a
certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase were
complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question of fact.Roberto R. David,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v. Eduardo C. David, acting
through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014.
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review limited. Anent the correct amount of surety
bond, it is well to emphasize that our task in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari is
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the CA. The allegations of incorrect computation of the surety bond involve factual matters
within the competence of the trial court. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v.
Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014.
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Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45; scope of review. At the outset, it must be pointed out that
the petitioners’ assignment of errors calls for the Court to again evaluate the evidence to
determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion of the
southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which
are beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia,
Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011,
January 27, 2014.
Ejectment; immediate execution of judgment; requisites for stay. The ruling in Chua v. Court of
Appeals (286 SCRA 437, 444-445 [1998]) is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession of the
property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while the appeal is
pending the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must concur: (1) the
defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he periodically deposits
the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant
to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment,
the duty of the court in this respect being “ministerial and imperative.” Hence, if the defendant-
appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of
the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not
stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then,
thesupersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, but
the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2) file
a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency
of the appeal. Herminia Acbang v. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr., et al.,G.R. No. 164246, January 15,
2014.
Execution; Terceria; when proper. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded
on his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory
power to direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its
rightful owner, the claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of
possession thereon. In Spouses Sy v. Hon. Discaya (260 Phil. 401 [1990]) we declared that for a
third-party claim or a terceria to prosper, the claimant must first sufficiently establish his right on
the property:
“[A] third person whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation of the
judgment debtor may invoke the supervisory power of he court which authorized such
execution. Upon due application by the third person and after summary hearing, the court may
command that the property be released from the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful
owner or possessor. What said court can do in these instances, however, is limited to a
determination of whether the sheriff has acted rightly or wrongly in the performance of his
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duties in the execution of judgment, more specifically, if he has indeed taken hold of property
not belonging to the judgment debtor. The court does not and cannot pass upon the question of
title to the property, with any character of finality. It can treat of the matter only insofar as may
be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted correctly or not. It can require the sheriff to restore
the property to the claimant’s possession if warranted by the evidence. However, if the
claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or right of possession
thereto, the claim will be denied.”
Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia,
et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Execution of judgments; Immediate execution in Small Claims cases. Section 23 of the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that the decision shall immediately be entered by the
Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the
parties. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren
Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.
Execution of judgments; rationale. It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of
the suit. Hailing it as the “life of the law,” ratio legis est anima, this Court has zealously guarded
against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the
fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for
the prevailing party. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely,
Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Grave abuse of discretion; concept. To be sure, grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower
court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. Here,
while the RTC had initially issued a writ of possession in favor of Sps. Marquez, it defied existing
jurisprudence when it effectively rescinded the said writ by subsequently granting Sps. Alindog’s
prayer for injunctive relief.Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito
Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.
Grave abuse of discretion; concept. It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion
when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22,
RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Judicial power; issuance of protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.” Hence, the primary judge of the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the function of the
legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in
pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
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enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations
of such rights. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,
Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Judgments; enforceability of money judgments. It is a basic principle of law that money
judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment
debtor, and if the property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for
another man’s indebtedness, such person has all the right to challenge the levy through any of
the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia,
substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Judgments; Law of the case; concept. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to
be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once
declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having
been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and
should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like
damages. But the law of the case, as the name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues
thereby adjudicated in the former appeal. Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v.
Guariña Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation,G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.
Judgments; remedies of third person claiming property taken by sheriff. Section 16, Rule 39
specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies of either terceria, to
determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not belonging to
the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate his claim of
ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, the person other than the
judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim. Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia,
substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et al.,G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Jurisdiction; concurrence of jurisdiction and hierarchy of courts. To be sure, the Court, the Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom
to choose the venue of his action lest he run afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead,
a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of
certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Supreme
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Court. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar, accompanied by her husband, Efren
Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.
Jurisdiction; Justiciable question; definition. The Court clarified, too, that the issue of whether a
Deputy Ombudsman may be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President (concurrently with that of the Ombudsman) is a justiciable – not a political – question.
A justiciable question is one which is inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds
recognized by law, as where the court finds that there are constitutionally-imposed limits on the
exercise of the powers conferred on a political branch of the government. Emilio A. Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et
al.,G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Jurisdiction; Small Claims cases. Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner
complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously
mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Emma Mondejar,
accompanied by her husband, Efren Mondejar,G.R. No. 200804. January 22, 2014.
Motions; motion to extend time to file motion for reconsideration prohibited in all courts except
in the Supreme Court. While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a
petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a similar
motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is prohibited in all
other courts. This rule was first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon (226
Phil. 144 [1986]) wherein it was held that:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration
may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny
the extension requested.
Rivelisa Realty, Inc., represented by Ricardo P. Venturina v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation,
represented by Ramon A. Pangilinan, as President,G.R. No. 189618. January 15, 2014.
Motion for reconsideration; effect of non-filing. At the outset, the Court noted that Gonzales and
Sulit did not file a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s September 4, 2012
Decision; only the Office of the President, through the OSG, moved for the reconsideration of
our ruling reinstating Gonzales.
This omission, however, poses no obstacle for the Court’s review of its ruling on the whole case
since a serious constitutional question has been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the
validity or invalidity of the presidential action.
If the President does not have any constitutional authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman
and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OP’s
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decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OP’s
decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on
the constitutional issue, the whole case – including the constitutional issue – remains alive for
the Court’s consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the
President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al.,G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Pleadings; Defense and objections not pleaded either in motion to dismiss or in answer are
deemed waived; exceptions. Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed
“within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.”
The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the
condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9
stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and prescription of action.
Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been made but had
failed is not one of the exceptions.Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs
and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son
Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita
D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.
Pleadings; Failure to allege compromise efforts in complaint not jurisdictional defect. Why the
objection of failure to allege a failed attempt at a compromise in a suit among members of the
same family is waivable was earlier explained in the case of Versoza v. Versoza (135 Phil. 84,
94 [1968]), a case for future support which was dismissed by the trial court upon the ground
that there was no such allegation of infringement of Article 222 of the Civil Code, the origin of
Article 151 of the Family Code. While the Court ruled that a complaint for future support cannot
be the subject of a compromise and as such the absence of the required allegation in the
complaint cannot be a ground for objection against the suit, the decision went on to state thus:
The alleged defect is that the present complaint does not state a cause of action. The proposed
amendment seeks to complete it. An amendment to the effect that the requirements of Article
222 have been complied with does not confer jurisdiction upon the lower court. With or
without this amendment, the subject-matter of the action remains as one for support, custody of
children, and damages, cognizable by the court below.
To illustrate, Tamayo v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., allowed an amendment which “merely
corrected a defect in the allegation of plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it then
stood, the original complaint stated no cause of action.” We there ruled out as inapplicable the
holding in Campos Rueda Corporation v. Bautista, that an amendment cannot be made so as to
confer jurisdiction on the court x x x
Therefore, the rule on deemed waiver of the non-jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly
applicable to respondent. If the respondents as parties-defendants could not, and did not, after
filing their answer to petitioner’s complaint, invoke the objection of absence of the required
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allegation on earnest efforts at a compromise, the appellate court unquestionably did not have
any authority or basis to muto proprio order the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint. Heirs of Dr.
Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis and
Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein
by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014.
Pleadings; motu proprio dismissal. Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the
court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d) prescription of action.
Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin (422 Phil. 222, 230 [2001]), cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr. (481
Phil. 168, 180 [2004]), the Court held:
“x x x [T]he muto proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to instances when the
court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear
during trial, failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to
comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio [sic] dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised
Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.
Under the new rules, a court may muto proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.”
Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A.
Favis and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors
represented herein by their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922,
January 15, 2014.
Preliminary injunction; improper where act sought to be enjoined is already consummated.
Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought to be enjoined had
already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or consummated act). Hence, since
the consummation of the act sought to be restrained had rendered Sps. Alindogs injunction
petition moot, the issuance of the said injunctive writ was altogether improper. Spouses Nicasio
C. Marquez and Anita J. Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog,G.R. No.
184045. January 22, 2014.
Res judicata; conclusiveness of judgment. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
the right of Planters Bank to a writ of possession as adjudged in G.R. No. 167998 is binding and
conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that when a right or fact
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.
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All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998
was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of
the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ
of possession. Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present
case. LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No.
187973, January 20, 2014.
Writ of possession; nature. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession.
This is clear from the following disquisitions in Espinoza v United Overseas Bank Phils. (616
SCRA 353) which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, to wit:
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature. It is a
judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the
person against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex
parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It
is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. LZK Holdings and
Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank,G.R. No. 187973, January 20, 2014
Other Proceedings
Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Function of Punong Barangay purely executive in nature. The
issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay
Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman
or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function
of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to “enforce all laws and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in
the barangay.” Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC,
Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Extra-judicial foreclosure; ministerial duty to issue writ of possession to purchaser; exception. It
is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the
possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either
during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. To
this end, the Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada (579 Phil 454 [2008]), citing several
cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser
should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of
the court.
The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extra-judicial
foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a
purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property by
adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno
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(693 SCRA 110 [2013]), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court illumined that “the
phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor’
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such
as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and
usufructuary possess the property in their own right, and they are not merely the successor or
transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably,
the property should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party
adversely to the judgment obligor.” In other words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan
Lending Investors Corporation (633 SCRA 173 [2010]), the third person must therefore claim a
right superior to that of the original mortgagor. Spouses Nicasio C. Marquez and Anita J.
Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog, G.R. No. 184045. January 22, 2014.
Protection Order under Section 15 of RA 9262; concept. In Garcia v. Drilon (699 SCRA 352,
401 [2013]), wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The scope of reliefs in
protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support. The rules
require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner
thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since “time
is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is
authorized to issueex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb
or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order
is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur. There need not be any fear that the judge may
have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses’ affidavits to the petition. The grant of
a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like
a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time in
which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
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ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security. x x x
Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and
Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under Section 15 of RA 9262; court’s authority to issue ex
parte. Clearly, the court, under Section 15 of RA 9262, is authorized to issue a TPO on the date
of the filing of the application after ex parte determination that there is basis for the issuance
thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified or be present in the hearing for
the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within the court’s discretion, based on the petition and the
affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their children for
the issuance of a TPO have been committed. Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang,
Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and Rossan Honrado-Tua,G.R. No. 170701.
January 22, 2014.
Evidence
Admissions; contradiction. Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require
proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake.
The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in
his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them. This contention is
unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion,
Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No.
201011, January 27, 2014.
Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that
through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The respondent spouses had
clearly relied on the petitioners’ admission and so amended their original complaint for partition
to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are
now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the
property. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v.
Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Best evidence rule; concept and exception. Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except when the original is a public record in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule
provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be
evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
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Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the
area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. x x x The cadastral maps and
the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception
to the best evidence rule. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all
surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Burden of proof in civil cases; quantum of evidence. Land Bank failed to prove that the amount
allegedly “miscredited” to Oñate’s account came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans
of its clients. It is worth emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making the allegations has the
burden of proving them by preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not sufficient. Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Emmanuel C. Oñate,G.R. No. 192371, January 15, 2014.
Hearsay rule; entries in official records as exception. As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official records are an exception to
the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule
consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to
testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the
cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they
were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay
rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Theresita, Juan, Asuncion,
Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A. Monteiro,G.R. No.
201011, January 27, 2014.
Judicial notice; discretionary notice of records of other cases. The taking of judicial notice is a
matter of expediency and convenience for it fulfills the purpose that the evidence is intended to
achieve, and in this sense, it is equivalent to proof. Generally, courts are not authorized to “take
judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases even when said cases have been
tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.” They may, however, take
judicial notice of a decision or the facts prevailing in another case sitting in the same court if: (1)
the parties present them in evidence, absent any opposition from the other party; or (2) the
court, in its discretion, resolves to do so. In either case, the courts must observe the clear
boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014.
Offer of evidence; court considers evidence only when formally offered; exceptions. Section
34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides the general rule, to wit:
Section 34. The Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
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Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Lexoterica 2009 – January 2014
From the above provision, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when it is
formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial court to
base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by the parties.
A piece of document will remain a scrap of paper without probative value unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which it is offered. The formal
offer of evidence allows the parties the chance to object to the presentation of an evidence
which may not be admissible for the purpose it is being offered.
However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence
not formally offered to be admitted. Citing People v. Napat-a and People. v. Mate the Court in
Heirs of Romana Saves, et al., v. Heirs of Escolastico Saves, et al. (632 SCRA 236 [2010]),
enumerated the requirements for the evidence to be considered despite failure to formally offer
it, namely: “first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.” In People v.
Vivencio De Roxas et al. (116 Phil 977 [1962]), the Court also considered exhibits which were
not formally offered by the prosecution but were repeatedly referred to in the course of the trial
by the counsel of the accused.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the
relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can be
seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have been
duly identified by testimony duly recorded. To identify is to prove the identity of a person or a
thing. Identification means proof of identity; the proving that a person, subject or article before
the court is the very same that he or it is alleged, charged or reputed to be. Rodolfo Laborte, et
al. v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers’ Cooperative, et al.,G.R. No. 183860, January 15, 2014.
Preponderance of evidence; definition. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had
the burden of proof to establish their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, synonymous with the term “greater
weight of the evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Theresita, Juan,
Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria, all surnamed Dimaguila v. Jose and Sonia A.
Monteiro,G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014.
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or
controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
BPI/MS Insurance Corp., and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd.,G.R. No. 193986, January
15, 2014.
Compiled by
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Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Remedial Law
Lexoterica 2009 – January 2014
Question of law distinguished from question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt
centers on what the law is on a certain set of undisputed facts, while a question of fact exists
when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Whether the conditions for the
right to repurchase were complied with, or whether there was a tender of payment is a question
of fact.Roberto R. David, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Atty. Proceso M. Nacino v.
Eduardo C. David, acting through his Attorney-in-Fact Edwin C. David,G.R. No. 162365.
January 15, 2014.
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