4.

T RANSNATIONAL H UMAN R IGHTS C LASS A CTIONS (A LIEN T ORT S TATUTE ) IN THE

US
138 S.Ct. 1386
Supreme Court of the United States

Joseph JESNER, et al., Petitioners v. ARAB BANK, PLC.

No. 16–499.
Argued Oct. 11, 2017. Decided April 24, 2018.

Justice KENNEDY announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Parts I, II–B–1, and II–C, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A, II–B–2, II–
B–3, and III, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice THOMAS join.

Petitioners in this case, or the persons on whose behalf petitioners now assert claims, allegedly
were injured or killed by terrorist acts committed abroad. Those terrorist acts, it is contended,
were in part caused or facilitated by a foreign corporation. Petitioners now seek to impose
liability on the foreign corporation for the conduct of its human agents, including its then-
chairman and other high-ranking management officials. The suits were filed in a United States
District Court under the Alien Tort Statute, commonly referred to as the ATS. See 28 U.S.C. §
1350.

The foreign corporation charged with liability in these ATS suits is Arab Bank, PLC; and it is
respondent here. Some of Arab Bank’s officials, it is alleged, allowed the Bank to be used to
transfer funds to terrorist groups in the Middle East, which in turn enabled or facilitated criminal
acts of terrorism, causing the deaths or injuries for which petitioners now seek compensation.
Petitioners seek to prove Arab Bank helped the terrorists receive the moneys in part by means of
currency clearances and bank transactions passing through its New York City offices, all by
means of electronic transfers.

It is assumed here that those individuals who inflicted death or injury by terrorism committed
crimes in violation of well-settled, fundamental precepts of international law, precepts essential
for basic human-rights protections. It is assumed as well that individuals who knowingly and
purposefully facilitated banking transactions to aid, enable, or facilitate the terrorist acts would
themselves be committing crimes under the same international-law prohibitions.

Petitioners contend that international and domestic laws impose responsibility and liability on a
corporation if its human agents use the corporation to commit crimes in violation of international
laws that protect human rights. The question here is whether the Judiciary has the authority, in an
ATS action, to make that determination and then to enforce that liability in ATS suits, all without
any explicit authorization from Congress to do so.

The answer turns upon the proper interpretation and implementation of the ATS. The statute
provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” § 1350.
The Court must first ask whether the law of nations imposes liability on corporations for human-

  44  
rights violations committed by its employees. The Court must also ask whether it has authority
and discretion in an ATS suit to impose liability on a corporation without a specific direction
from Congress to do so.
I
A
Petitioners are plaintiffs in five ATS lawsuits filed against Arab Bank in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The suits were filed between 2004 and 2010.

A significant majority of the plaintiffs in these lawsuits—about 6,000 of them—are foreign

nationals whose claims arise under the ATS. These foreign nationals are petitioners here. They
allege that they or their family members were injured by terrorist attacks in the Middle East over
a 10–year period. Two of the five lawsuits also included claims brought by American nationals
under the Anti–Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), but those claims are not at issue.

Arab Bank is a major Jordanian financial institution with branches throughout the world,
including in New York. According to the Kingdom of Jordan, Arab Bank “accounts for between
one-fifth and one-third of the total market capitalization of the Amman Stock Exchange.” Brief
for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae 2. Petitioners allege that Arab Bank helped
finance attacks by Hamas and other terrorist groups. Among other claims, petitioners allege that
Arab Bank maintained bank accounts for terrorists and their front groups and allowed the
accounts to be used to pay the families of suicide bombers.

Most of petitioners’ allegations involve conduct that occurred in the Middle East. Yet petitioners
allege as well that Arab Bank used its New York branch to clear dollar-denominated transactions
through the Clearing House Interbank Payments System. That elaborate system is commonly
referred to as CHIPS. It is alleged that some of these CHIPS transactions benefited terrorists.

Foreign banks often use dollar-clearing transactions to facilitate currency exchanges or to make
payments in dollars from one foreign bank account to another. Arab Bank and certain amici point
out that CHIPS transactions are enormous both in volume and in dollar amounts. The
transactions occur predominantly in the United States but are used by major banks both in the
United States and abroad. The CHIPS system is used for dollar-denominated transactions and for
transactions where the dollar is used as an intermediate currency to facilitate a currency
exchange. Brief for Institute of International Bankers as Amicus Curiae 12–13, and n. 8. In New
York each day, on average, about 440,000 of these transfers occur, in dollar amounts totaling
about $1.5 trillion. Id., at 14. The “clearance activity is an entirely mechanical function; it occurs
without human intervention in the proverbial ‘blink of an eye.’ ” Ibid. There seems to be no
dispute that the speed and volume of these transactions are such that individual supervision is
simply not a systemic reality. As noted below, substantial regulations govern these transactions,
both in the United States and in Jordan.

In addition to the dollar-clearing transactions, petitioners allege that Arab Bank’s New York
branch was used to launder money for the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
(HLF), a Texas-based charity that petitioners say is affiliated with Hamas. According to
petitioners, Arab Bank used its New York branch to facilitate the transfer of funds from HLF to

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the bank accounts of terrorist-affiliated charities in the Middle East.

During the pendency of this litigation, there was an unrelated case that also implicated the issue
whether the ATS is applicable to suits in this country against foreign corporations. See Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (C.A.2 2010). That suit worked its way through the
trial court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Kiobel litigation did not involve
banking transactions. Its allegations were that holding companies incorporated in the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom had, through a Nigerian subsidiary, aided and abetted the Nigerian
Government in human-rights abuses. Id., at 123. In Kiobel, the Court of Appeals held that the
ATS does not extend to suits against corporations. Id., at 120. This Court granted certiorari in
Kiobel. 565 U.S. 961, 132 S.Ct. 472, 181 L.Ed.2d 292 (2011).

After additional briefing and reargument in Kiobel, this Court held that, given all the
circumstances, the suit could not be maintained under the ATS. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 114, 124–125, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013). The rationale of the
holding, however, was not that the ATS does not extend to suits against foreign corporations.
That question was left unresolved. The Court ruled, instead, that “all the relevant conduct took
place outside the United States.” Id., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Dismissal of the action was required
based on the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes.

So while this Court in Kiobel affirmed the ruling that the action there could not be maintained, it
did not address the broader holding of the Court of Appeals that dismissal was required because
corporations may not be sued under the ATS. Still, the courts of the Second Circuit deemed that
broader holding to be binding precedent. As a consequence, in the instant case the District Court
dismissed petitioners’ ATS claims based on the earlier Kiobel holding in the Court of Appeals;
and on review of the dismissal order the Court of Appeals, also adhering to its earlier holding,
affirmed. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144 (2015). This Court
granted certiorari in the instant case. 581 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1432, 197 L.Ed.2d 646 (2017).

Since the Court of Appeals relied on its Kiobel holding in the instant case, it is instructive to
begin with an analysis of that decision. The majority opinion in Kiobel, written by Judge
Cabranes, held that the ATS does not apply to alleged international-law violations by a
corporation. 621 F.3d, at 120. Judge Cabranes relied in large part on the fact that international
criminal tribunals have consistently limited their jurisdiction to natural persons. Id., at 132–137.

Judge Leval filed a separate opinion. He concurred in the judgment on other grounds but
disagreed with the proposition that the foreign corporation was not subject to suit under the ATS.
Id., at 196. Judge Leval conceded that “international law, of its own force, imposes no liabilities
on corporations or other private juridical entities.” Id., at 186. But he reasoned that corporate
liability for violations of international law is an issue of “civil compensatory liability” that
international law leaves to individual nations. Ibid. Later decisions in the Courts of Appeals for
the Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits agreed with Judge Leval and held that
corporations can be subject to suit under the ATS. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643
F.3d 1013, 1017–1021 (C.A.7 2011); Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1020–1022
(C.A.9 2014); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–55 (C.A.D.C.2011), vacated on
other grounds, 527 Fed.Appx. 7 (C.A.D.C.2013). The respective opinions by Judges Cabranes

  46  
and Leval are scholarly and extensive, providing significant guidance for this Court in the case
now before it.

With this background, it is now proper to turn to the history of the ATS and the decisions
interpreting it.
B
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress lacked authority to “ ‘cause
infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be punished.’ ” Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 716, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (quoting J. Madison, Journal of the
Constitutional Convention 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893)). The Continental Congress urged the States to
authorize suits for damages sustained by foreign citizens as a result of violations of international
law; but the state courts’ vindication of the law of nations remained unsatisfactory. Concerns
with the consequent international-relations tensions “persisted through the time of the
Constitutional Convention.” 542 U.S., at 717, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

Under the Articles of Confederation, the inability of the central government to ensure adequate
remedies for foreign citizens caused substantial foreign-relations problems. In 1784, the French
Minister lodged a protest with the Continental Congress after a French adventurer, the Chevalier
de Longchamps, assaulted the Secretary of the French Legation in Philadelphia. See Kiobel, 569
U.S., at 120, 133 S.Ct. 1659. A few years later, a New York constable caused an international
incident when he entered the house of the Dutch Ambassador and arrested one of his servants.
Ibid. Under the Articles of Confederation, there was no national forum available to resolve
disputes like these under any binding laws that were or could be enacted or enforced by a central
government.

The Framers addressed these matters at the 1787 Philadelphia Convention; and, as a result,
Article III of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power to “all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,” and “to controversies ... between a state, or the
citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.” § 2. The First Congress passed a statute
to implement these provisions: The Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized federal jurisdiction over
suits involving disputes between aliens and United States citizens and suits involving diplomats.
§§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 76–79.

The Judiciary Act also included what is now the statute known as the ATS. § 9, id., at 76. As
noted, the ATS is central to this case and its brief text bears repeating. Its full text is: “The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350.

The ATS is “strictly jurisdictional” and does not by its own terms provide or delineate the
definition of a cause of action for violations of international law. Sosa, 542 U.S., at 713–714, 124
S.Ct. 2739. But the statute was not enacted to sit on a shelf awaiting further legislation. Id., at
714, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Rather, Congress enacted it against the backdrop of the general common
law, which in 1789 recognized a limited category of “torts in violation of the law of nations.”
Ibid.

In the 18th century, international law primarily governed relationships between and among

  47  
nation-states, but in a few instances it governed individual conduct occurring outside national
borders (for example, “disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills”).
Id., at 714–715, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (internal quotation marks omitted). There was, furthermore, a
narrow domain in which “rules binding individuals for the benefit of other individuals
overlapped with” the rules governing the relationships between nation-states. Id., at 715, 124
S.Ct. 2739. As understood by Blackstone, this domain included “three specific offenses against
the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of England: violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Ibid. (citing 4 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 68 (1769)). “It was this narrow set of violations of the
law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious
consequences in international affairs, that was probably on the minds of the men who drafted the
ATS.” 542 U.S., at 715, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

This history teaches that Congress drafted the ATS “to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.” Id., at 720, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The
principal objective of the statute, when first enacted, was to avoid foreign entanglements by
ensuring the availability of a federal forum where the failure to provide one might cause another
nation to hold the United States responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen. See id., at 715–719,
124 S.Ct. 2739; Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 123–124, 133 S.Ct. 1659.

Over the first 190 years or so after its enactment, the ATS was invoked but a few times. Yet with
the evolving recognition—for instance, in the Nuremberg trials after World War II—that certain
acts constituting crimes against humanity are in violation of basic precepts of international law,
courts began to give some redress for violations of international human-rights protections that
are clear and unambiguous. In the modern era this began with the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).

In Filartiga, it was alleged that a young man had been tortured and murdered by Paraguayan
police officers, and that an officer named Pena–Irala was one of the supervisors and perpetrators.
Some members of the victim’s family were in the United States on visas. When they discovered
that Pena–Irala himself was living in New York, they filed suit against him. The action, seeking
damages for the suffering and death he allegedly had caused, was filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The Court of Appeals found that there was
jurisdiction under the ATS. For this holding it relied upon the universal acknowledgment that
acts of official torture are contrary to the law of nations. Id., at 890. This Court did not review
that decision.

In the midst of debates in the courts of appeals over whether the court in Filartiga was correct in
holding that plaintiffs could bring ATS actions based on modern human-rights laws absent an
express cause of action created by an additional statute, Congress enacted the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350. H.R. Rep. No.
102–367, pp. 3–4 (1991) (H.R. Rep.) (citing Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(C.A.D.C.1984)); S. Rep. No. 102–249, pp. 3–5 (1991) (S. Rep.) (same). The TVPA—which is
codified as a note following the ATS—creates an express cause of action for victims of torture
and extrajudicial killing in violation of international law.

  48  
After Filartiga and the TVPA, ATS lawsuits became more frequent. Modern ATS litigation has
the potential to involve large groups of foreign plaintiffs suing foreign corporations in the United
States for alleged human-rights violations in other nations. For example, in Kiobel the plaintiffs
were Nigerian nationals who sued Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations for alleged crimes in
Nigeria. 569 U.S., at 111–112, 133 S.Ct. 1659. The extent and scope of this litigation in United
States courts have resulted in criticism here and abroad. See id., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (noting
objections to ATS litigation by Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, South Africa,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).

In Sosa, the Court considered the question whether courts may recognize new, enforceable
international norms in ATS lawsuits. 542 U.S., at 730–731, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The Sosa Court
acknowledged the decisions made in Filartiga and similar cases; and it held that in certain
narrow circumstances courts may recognize a common-law cause of action for claims based on
the present-day law of nations, in addition to the “historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was
enacted.” 542 U.S., at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The Court was quite explicit, however, in holding
that ATS litigation implicates serious separation-of-powers and foreign-relations concerns. Id., at
727–728, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Thus, ATS claims must be “subject to vigilant doorkeeping.” Id., at
729, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

This Court next addressed the ATS in Kiobel, the case already noted. There, this Court held that
“the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in
the statute rebuts the presumption.” 569 U.S., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659. The Court added that “even
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id., at 124–125,
133 S.Ct. 1659.
II
With these principles in mind, this Court now must decide whether common-law liability under
the ATS extends to a foreign corporate defendant. It could be argued, under the Court’s holding
in Kiobel, that even if, under accepted principles of international law and federal common law,
corporations are subject to ATS liability for human-rights crimes committed by their human
agents, in this case the activities of the defendant corporation and the alleged actions of its
employees have insufficient connections to the United States to subject it to jurisdiction under
the ATS. Various amici urge this as a rationale to affirm here, while the Government argues that
the Court should remand this case so the Court of Appeals can address the issue in the first
instance. There are substantial arguments on both sides of that question; but it is not the question
on which this Court granted certiorari, nor is it the question that has divided the Courts of
Appeals.

The question whether foreign corporations are subject to liability under the ATS should be
addressed; for, if there is no liability for Arab Bank, the lengthy and costly litigation concerning
whether corporate contacts like those alleged here suffice to impose liability would be pointless.
In addition, a remand to the Court of Appeals would require prolonging litigation that already
has caused significant diplomatic tensions with Jordan for more than a decade. So it is proper for
this Court to decide whether corporations, or at least foreign corporations, are subject to liability
in an ATS suit filed in a United States district court.

  49  
Before recognizing a common-law action under the ATS, federal courts must apply the test
announced in Sosa. An initial, threshold question is whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the
alleged violation is “of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.” 542 U.S., at 732, 124
S.Ct. 2739 (internal quotation marks omitted). And even assuming that, under international law,
there is a specific norm that can be controlling, it must be determined further whether allowing
this case to proceed under the ATS is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, or instead whether
caution requires the political branches to grant specific authority before corporate liability can be
imposed. See id., at 732–733, and nn. 20–21, 124 S.Ct. 2739. “[T]he potential implications for
the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes should make courts
particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in
managing foreign affairs.” Id., at 727, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

It must be said that some of the considerations that pertain to determining whether there is a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm that is established under international law are applicable
as well in determining whether deference must be given to the political branches. For instance,
the fact that the charters of some international tribunals and the provisions of some congressional
statutes addressing international human-rights violations are specifically limited to individual
wrongdoers, and thus foreclose corporate liability, has significant bearing both on the content of
the norm being asserted and the question whether courts should defer to Congress. The two
inquiries inform each other and are, to that extent, not altogether discrete.

With that introduction, it is proper now to turn first to the question whether there is an
international-law norm imposing liability on corporations for acts of their employees that
contravene fundamental human rights.
A
Petitioners and Arab Bank disagree as to whether corporate liability is a question of international
law or only a question of judicial authority and discretion under domestic law. The dispute
centers on a footnote in Sosa. In the course of holding that international norms must be
“sufficiently definite to support a cause of action,” the Court in Sosa noted that a “related
consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual.” Id., at 732, and n. 20, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

In the Court of Appeals’ decision in Kiobel, the majority opinion by Judge Cabranes interpreted
footnote 20 to mean that corporate defendants may be held liable under the ATS only if there is a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm that corporations are liable for violations of international
law. 621 F.3d, at 127. In Judge Cabranes’ view, “[i]nternational law is not silent on the question
of the subjects of international law—that is, those that, to varying extents, have legal status,
personality, rights, and duties under international law,” “[n]or does international law leave to
individual States the responsibility of defining those subjects.” Id., at 126 (internal quotation
marks omitted). There is considerable force and weight to the position articulated by Judge
Cabranes. And, assuming the Court of Appeals was correct that under Sosa corporate liability is
a question of international law, there is an equally strong argument that petitioners cannot satisfy
the high bar of demonstrating a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of liability for
corporations. Indeed, Judge Leval agreed with the conclusion that international law does “not
provide for any form of liability of corporations.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d, at 186.

  50  
 1
In modern times, there is no doubt, of course, that “the international community has come to
recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic human rights,” leading
“the nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their
individual and collective interest.” Filartiga, 630 F.2d, at 890. That principle and commitment
support the conclusion that human-rights norms must bind the individual men and women
responsible for committing humanity’s most terrible crimes, not just nation-states in their
interactions with one another. “The singular achievement of international law since the Second
World War has come in the area of human rights,” where international law now imposes duties
on individuals as well as nation-states. Kiobel, 621 F.3d, at 118.

It does not follow, however, that current principles of international law extend liability—civil or
criminal—for human-rights violations to corporations or other artificial entities. This is
confirmed by the fact that the charters of respective international criminal tribunals often exclude
corporations from their jurisdictional reach.

The Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, created by the Allies after World War II, provided that
the Tribunal had jurisdiction over natural persons only. See Agreement for Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1547,
E.A.S. 472. Later, a United States Military Tribunal prosecuted 24 executives of the German
corporation IG Farben. 7 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals
Under Control Council Law No. 10, pp. 11–60 (1952) (The Farben Case ). Among other crimes,
Farben’s employees had operated a slave-labor camp at Auschwitz and “knowingly and
intentionally manufactured and provided” the poison gas used in the Nazi death chambers.
Kiobel, 621 F.3d, at 135. Although the Military Tribunal “used the term ‘Farben’ as descriptive
of the instrumentality of cohesion in the name of which” the crimes were committed, the
Tribunal noted that “corporations act through individuals.” 8 The Farben Case, at 1153. Farben
itself was not held liable. See ibid.

The jurisdictional reach of more recent international tribunals also has been limited to “natural
persons.” See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res.
827 (May 25, 1993), adopting U.N. Secretary–General Rep. Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, Art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993); Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 5, S.C. Res. 955, Art. 5 (Nov. 8, 1994). The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, for example, limits that tribunal’s jurisdiction to “natural persons.”
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 25(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90. The drafters of the Rome Statute considered, but rejected, a proposal to give the International
Criminal Court jurisdiction over corporations. Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in 1
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 767, 778–779 (A. Cassese et al. eds. 2002).

The international community’s conscious decision to limit the authority of these international
tribunals to natural persons counsels against a broad holding that there is a specific, universal,
and obligatory norm of corporate liability under currently prevailing international law.
2
In light of the sources just discussed, the sources petitioners rely on to support their contention

  51  
that liability for corporations is well established as a matter of international law lend weak
support to their position.

Petitioners first point to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. This Convention imposes an obligation on “Each State Party” “to enable a legal entity
located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person responsible for
the management or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity,” violated the Convention.
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106–49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 232. But by its terms the Convention imposes its
obligations only on nation-states “to enable” corporations to be held liable in certain
circumstances under domestic law. The United States and other nations, including Jordan, may
fulfill their obligations under the Convention by adopting detailed regulatory regimes governing
financial institutions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (private right of action under the Anti–
Terrorism Act); 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et seq. (Bank Secrecy Act); 31 C.F.R. pt. 595 (2017)
(Terrorism Sanctions Regulations); Brief for Central Bank of Jordan as Amicus Curiae 5
(describing Jordan’s “comprehensive approach to preventing money laundering and terrorist
financing”). The Convention neither requires nor authorizes courts, without congressional
authorization, to displace those detailed regulatory regimes by allowing common-law actions
under the ATS. And nothing in the Convention’s text requires signatories to hold corporations
liable in common-law tort actions raising claims under international law.

In addition, petitioners and their amici cite a few cases from other nations and the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon that, according to petitioners, are examples of corporations being held
liable for violations of international law. E.g., Brief for Petitioners 50–51. Yet even assuming
that these cases are relevant examples, at most they demonstrate that corporate liability might be
permissible under international law in some circumstances. That falls far short of establishing a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of corporate liability.

It must be remembered that international law is distinct from domestic law in its domain as well
as its objectives. International human-rights norms prohibit acts repugnant to all civilized
peoples—crimes like genocide, torture, and slavery, that make their perpetrators “enem[ies] of
all mankind.” Sosa, 542 U.S., at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the
American legal system, of course, corporations are often subject to liability for the conduct of
their human employees, and so it may seem necessary and natural that corporate entities are
liable for violations of international law under the ATS. It is true, furthermore, that the enormity
of the offenses that can be committed against persons in violation of international human-rights
protections can be cited to show that corporations should be subject to liability for the crimes of
their human agents. But the international community has not yet taken that step, at least in the
specific, universal, and obligatory manner required by Sosa. Indeed, there is precedent to the
contrary in the statement during the Nuremberg proceedings that “[c]rimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.” The Nurnberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946).

Petitioners also contend that international law leaves questions of remedies open for
determination under domestic law. As they see it, corporate liability is a remedial consideration,

  52  
not a substantive principle that must be supported by a universal and obligatory norm if it is to be
implemented under the ATS. According to petitioners, footnote 20 in Sosa does no more than
recognize the distinction in international law between state and private actors. But, as just
explained, there is a similar distinction in international law between corporations and natural
persons. And it is far from obvious why the question whether corporations may be held liable for
the international crimes of their employees is a mere question of remedy.

In any event, the Court need not resolve the questions whether corporate liability is a question
that is governed by international law, or, if so, whether international law imposes liability on
corporations. There is at least sufficient doubt on the point to turn to Sosa ‘s second question—
whether the Judiciary must defer to Congress, allowing it to determine in the first instance
whether that universal norm has been recognized and, if so, whether it is prudent and necessary
to direct its enforcement in suits under the ATS.
B
1
Sosa is consistent with this Court’s general reluctance to extend judicially created private rights
of action. The Court’s recent precedents cast doubt on the authority of courts to extend or create
private causes of action even in the realm of domestic law, where this Court has “recently and
repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative
judgment in the great majority of cases.” 542 U.S., at 727, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (citing Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–287, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)). That is because
“the Legislature is in the better position to consider if the public interest would be served by
imposing a new substantive legal liability.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct.
1843, 1857, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “if there are
sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy, ...
courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect the role of Congress.” Id., at –––
–, 137 S.Ct., at 1858.

This caution extends to the question whether the courts should exercise the judicial authority to
mandate a rule that imposes liability upon artificial entities like corporations. Thus, in Malesko
the Court held that corporate defendants may not be held liable in Bivens actions. See Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971).
Allowing corporate liability would have been a “marked extension” of Bivens that was
unnecessary to advance its purpose of holding individual officers responsible for “engaging in
unconstitutional wrongdoing.” Malesko, 534 U.S., at 74, 122 S.Ct. 515. Whether corporate
defendants should be subject to suit was “a question for Congress, not us, to decide.” Id., at 72,
122 S.Ct. 515.

Neither the language of the ATS nor the precedents interpreting it support an exception to these
general principles in this context. In fact, the separation-of-powers concerns that counsel against
courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force in the context of the ATS. See
infra, at 1406 – 1407. The political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and
institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns. See Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 116–117, 133
S.Ct. 1659. That the ATS implicates foreign relations “is itself a reason for a high bar to new

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private causes of action for violating international law.” Sosa, supra, at 727, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

In Sosa, the Court emphasized that federal courts must exercise “great caution” before
recognizing new forms of liability under the ATS. 542 U.S., at 728, 124 S.Ct. 2739. In light of
the foreign-policy and separation-of-powers concerns inherent in ATS litigation, there is an
argument that a proper application of Sosa would preclude courts from ever recognizing any new
causes of action under the ATS. But the Court need not resolve that question in this case. Either
way, absent further action from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS
liability to foreign corporations.
2
Even in areas less fraught with foreign-policy consequences, the Court looks to analogous
statutes for guidance on the appropriate boundaries of judge-made causes of action. See, e.g.,
Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 24, 111 S.Ct. 317, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975). Doing
so is even more important in the realm of international law, where “the general practice has been
to look for legislative guidance before exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”
Sosa, supra, at 726, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

Here, the logical place to look for a statutory analogy to an ATS common-law action is the
TVPA—the only cause of action under the ATS created by Congress rather than the courts. As
explained above, Congress drafted the TVPA to “establish an unambiguous and modern basis for
a cause of action” under the ATS. H.R. Rep., at 3; S. Rep., at 4–5. Congress took care to
delineate the TVPA’s boundaries. In doing so, it could weigh the foreign-policy implications of
its rule. Among other things, Congress specified who may be liable, created an exhaustion
requirement, and established a limitations period. Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 117, 133 S.Ct. 1659. In
Kiobel, the Court recognized that “[e]ach of these decisions carries with it significant foreign
policy implications.” Ibid. The TVPA reflects Congress’ considered judgment of the proper
structure for a right of action under the ATS. Absent a compelling justification, courts should not
deviate from that model.

The key feature of the TVPA for this case is that it limits liability to “individuals,” which, the
Court has held, unambiguously limits liability to natural persons. Mohamad v. Palestinian
Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 453–456, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182 L.Ed.2d 720 (2012). Congress’ decision
to exclude liability for corporations in actions brought under the TVPA is all but dispositive of
the present case. That decision illustrates that significant foreign-policy implications require the
courts to draw a careful balance in defining the scope of actions under the ATS. It would be
inconsistent with that balance to create a remedy broader than the one created by Congress.
Indeed, it “would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role in exercising a jurisdiction that
remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries.” Sosa, supra, at 726, 124 S.Ct.
2739.

According to petitioners, the TVPA is not a useful guidepost because Congress limited liability
under that statute to “individuals” out of concern for the sovereign immunity of foreign
governmental entities, not out of general hesitation about corporate liability under the ATS. The
argument seems to run as follows: The TVPA provides a right of action to victims of torture and
extrajudicial killing, and under international law those human-rights violations require state

  54  
action. For a corporation’s employees to violate these norms therefore would require the
corporation to be an instrumentality of a foreign state or other sovereign entity. That concern is
absent, petitioners insist, for crimes that lack a state-action requirement—for example, genocide,
slavery, or, in the present case, the financing of terrorists.

At least two flaws inhere in this argument. First, in Mohamad the Court unanimously rejected
petitioners’ account of the TVPA’s legislative history. 566 U.S., at 453, 458–460, 132 S.Ct.
1702. The Court instead read that history to demonstrate that Congress acted to exclude all
corporate entities, not just the sovereign ones. Id., at 459–460, 132 S.Ct. 1702 (citing Hearing
and Markup on H.R. 1417 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee
on Human Rights and International Organizations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 87–88 (1988)); see
also 566 U.S., at 461–462, 132 S.Ct. 1702 (BREYER, J., concurring). Second, even for
international-law norms that do not require state action, plaintiffs can still use corporations as
surrogate defendants to challenge the conduct of foreign governments. In Kiobel, for example,
the plaintiffs sought to hold a corporate defendant liable for “aiding and abetting the Nigerian
Government in committing,” among other things, “crimes against humanity.” 569 U.S., at 114,
133 S.Ct. 1659; see also, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 761–763 (C.A.9 2011) (en
banc) (corporate defendant allegedly used Papua New Guinea’s military to commit genocide),
vacated and remanded, 569 U.S. 945, 133 S.Ct. 1995, 185 L.Ed.2d 863 (2013).

Petitioners contend that, instead of the TVPA, the most analogous statute here is the Anti–
Terrorism Act. That Act does permit suits against corporate entities. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331(3),
2333(d)(2). In fact, in these suits some of the foreign plaintiffs joined their claims to those of
United States nationals suing Arab Bank under the Anti–Terrorism Act. But the Anti–Terrorism
Act provides a cause of action only to “national[s] of the United States,” and their “estate,
survivors, or heirs.” § 2333(a). In contrast, the ATS is available only for claims brought by “an
alien.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. A statute that excludes foreign nationals (with the possible exception of
foreign survivors or heirs) is an inapt analogy for a common-law cause of action that provides a
remedy for foreign nationals only.

To the extent, furthermore, that the Anti–Terrorism Act is relevant it suggests that there should
be no common-law action under the ATS for allegations like petitioners’. Otherwise, foreign
plaintiffs could bypass Congress’ express limitations on liability under the Anti–Terrorism Act
simply by bringing an ATS lawsuit. The Anti–Terrorism Act, as mentioned above, is part of a
comprehensive statutory and regulatory regime that prohibits terrorism and terrorism financing.
The detailed regulatory structures prescribed by Congress and the federal agencies charged with
oversight of financial institutions reflect the careful deliberation of the political branches on
when, and how, banks should be held liable for the financing of terrorism. It would be
inappropriate for courts to displace this considered statutory and regulatory structure by holding
banks subject to common-law liability in actions filed under the ATS.

In any event, even if the Anti–Terrorism Act were a suitable model for an ATS suit, Congress’
decision in the TVPA to limit liability to individuals still demonstrates that there are two
reasonable choices. In this area, that is dispositive—Congress, not the Judiciary, must decide
whether to expand the scope of liability under the ATS to include foreign corporations.
3

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Other considerations relevant to the exercise of judicial discretion also counsel against allowing
liability under the ATS for foreign corporations, absent instructions from Congress to do so. It
has not been shown that corporate liability under the ATS is essential to serve the goals of the
statute. As to the question of adequate remedies, the ATS will seldom be the only way for
plaintiffs to hold the perpetrators liable. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (criminal prohibition on
genocide); § 1595 (civil remedy for victims of slavery). And plaintiffs still can sue the individual
corporate employees responsible for a violation of international law under the ATS. If the Court
were to hold that foreign corporations have liability for international-law violations, then
plaintiffs may well ignore the human perpetrators and concentrate instead on multinational
corporate entities.

As explained above, in the context of criminal tribunals international law itself generally limits
liability to natural persons. Although the Court need not decide whether the seeming absence of a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of corporate liability under international law by itself
forecloses petitioners’ claims against Arab Bank, or whether this is an issue governed by
international law, the lack of a clear and well-established international-law rule is of critical
relevance in determining whether courts should extend ATS liability to foreign corporations
without specific congressional authorization to do so. That is especially so in light of the TVPA’s
limitation of liability to natural persons, which parallels the distinction between corporations and
individuals in international law.

If, moreover, the Court were to hold that foreign corporations may be held liable under the ATS,
that precedent-setting principle “would imply that other nations, also applying the law of nations,
could hale our [corporations] into their courts for alleged violations of the law of nations.”
Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659. This judicially mandated doctrine, in turn, could
subject American corporations to an immediate, constant risk of claims seeking to impose
massive liability for the alleged conduct of their employees and subsidiaries around the world, all
as determined in foreign courts, thereby “hinder[ing] global investment in developing
economies, where it is most needed.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in American
Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, O.T. 2007, No. 07–919, p. 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In other words, allowing plaintiffs to sue foreign corporations under the ATS could establish a
precedent that discourages American corporations from investing abroad, including in
developing economies where the host government might have a history of alleged human-rights
violations, or where judicial systems might lack the safeguards of United States courts. And, in
consequence, that often might deter the active corporate investment that contributes to the
economic development that so often is an essential foundation for human rights.

It is also true, of course, that natural persons can and do use corporations for sinister purposes,
including conduct that violates international law. That the corporate form can be an instrument
for inflicting grave harm and suffering poses serious and complex questions both for the
international community and for Congress. So there are strong arguments for permitting the
victims to seek relief from corporations themselves. Yet the urgency and complexity of this
problem make it all the more important that Congress determine whether victims of human-
rights abuses may sue foreign corporations in federal courts in the United States. Congress, not
the Judiciary, is the branch with “the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy

  56  
decision where the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so
certain.” Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 116, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted
further below, there are many delicate and important considerations that Congress is in a better
position to examine in determining whether and how best to impose corporate liability. And, as
the TVPA illustrates, Congress is well aware of the necessity of clarifying the proper scope of
liability under the ATS in a timely way.
C
The ATS was intended to promote harmony in international relations by ensuring foreign
plaintiffs a remedy for international-law violations in circumstances where the absence of such a
remedy might provoke foreign nations to hold the United States accountable. Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae 7. But here, and in similar cases, the opposite is occurring.

Petitioners are foreign nationals seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages from a major
Jordanian financial institution for injuries suffered in attacks by foreign terrorists in the Middle
East. The only alleged connections to the United States are the CHIPS transactions in Arab
Bank’s New York branch and a brief allegation regarding a charity in Texas. The Court of
Appeals did not address, and the Court need not now decide, whether these allegations are
sufficient to “touch and concern” the United States under Kiobel. See 569 U.S., at 124–125, 133
S.Ct. 1659.

At a minimum, the relatively minor connection between the terrorist attacks at issue in this case
and the alleged conduct in the United States well illustrates the perils of extending the scope of
ATS liability to foreign multinational corporations like Arab Bank. For 13 years, this litigation
has “caused significant diplomatic tensions” with Jordan, a critical ally in one of the world’s
most sensitive regions. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 30. “Jordan is a key
counterterrorism partner, especially in the global campaign to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria.” Id., at 31. The United States explains that Arab Bank itself is “a constructive partner with
the United States in working to prevent terrorist financing.” Id., at 32 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Jordan considers the instant litigation to be a “grave affront” to its sovereignty. See
Brief for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae 3; see ibid. (“By exposing Arab Bank
to massive liability, this suit thus threatens to destabilize Jordan’s economy and undermine its
cooperation with the United States”).

This is not the first time, furthermore, that a foreign sovereign has appeared in this Court to note
its objections to ATS litigation. Sosa, 542 U.S., at 733, n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (noting objections
by the European Commission and South Africa); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as
Amicus Curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O.T. 2012, No. 10–1491, p. 1; Brief for
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kingdom
of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in No. 10–1491, p. 3. These are the very foreign-relations
tensions the First Congress sought to avoid.

Petitioners insist that whatever the faults of this litigation—for example, its tenuous connections
to the United States and the prolonged diplomatic disruptions it has caused—the fact that Arab
Bank is a foreign corporate entity, as distinct from a natural person, is not one of them. That
misses the point. As demonstrated by this litigation, foreign corporate defendants create unique
problems. And courts are not well suited to make the required policy judgments that are

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implicated by corporate liability in cases like this one.

Like the presumption against extraterritoriality, judicial caution under Sosa “guards against our
courts triggering ... serious foreign policy consequences, and instead defers such decisions, quite
appropriately, to the political branches.” Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659. If, in light of
all the concerns that must be weighed before imposing liability on foreign corporations via ATS
suits, the Court were to hold that it has the discretion to make that determination, then the
cautionary language of Sosa would be little more than empty rhetoric. Accordingly, the Court
holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS.
III
With the ATS, the First Congress provided a federal remedy for a narrow category of
international-law violations committed by individuals. Whether, more than two centuries on, a
similar remedy should be available against foreign corporations is similarly a decision that
Congress must make.

The political branches can determine, referring to international law to the extent they deem
proper, whether to impose liability for human-rights violations upon foreign corporations in this
Nation’s courts, and, conversely, that courts in other countries should be able to hold United
States corporations liable. Congress might determine that violations of international law do, or
should, impose that liability to ensure that corporations make every effort to deter human-rights
violations, and so that, even when those efforts cannot be faulted, compensation for injured
persons will be a cost of doing business. If Congress and the Executive were to determine that
corporations should be liable for violations of international law, that decision would have special
power and force because it would be made by the branches most immediately responsive to, and
accountable to, the electorate.

It is still another possibility that, in the careful exercise of its expertise in the field of foreign
affairs, Congress might conclude that neutral judicial safeguards may not be ensured in every
country; and so, as a reciprocal matter, it could determine that liability of foreign corporations
under the ATS should be subject to some limitations or preconditions. Congress might deem this
more careful course to be the best way to encourage American corporations to undertake the
extensive investments and foreign operations that can be an important beginning point for
creating the infrastructures that allow human rights, as well as judicial safeguards, to emerge.
These delicate judgments, involving a balance that it is the prerogative of the political branches
to make, especially in the field of foreign affairs, would, once again, also be entitled to special
respect, especially because those careful distinctions might themselves advance the Rule of Law.
All this underscores the important separation-of-powers concerns that require the Judiciary to
refrain from making these kinds of decisions under the ATS. The political branches, moreover,
surely are better positioned than the Judiciary to determine if corporate liability would, or would
not, create special risks of disrupting good relations with foreign governments.

Finally, Congress might find that corporate liability should be limited to cases where a
corporation’s management was actively complicit in the crime. Cf. ALI, Model Penal Code §
2.07(1)(c) (1985) (a corporation may be held criminally liable where “the commission of the
offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board
of directors or by a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the scope of

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his office or employment”). Again, the political branches are better equipped to make the
preliminary findings and consequent conclusions that should inform this determination.

These and other considerations that must shape and instruct the formulation of principles of
international and domestic law are matters that the political branches are in the better position to
define and articulate. For these reasons, judicial deference requires that any imposition of
corporate liability on foreign corporations for violations of international law must be determined
in the first instance by the political branches of the Government.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice THOMAS, concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly applies our precedents. I also agree with the
points raised by my concurring colleagues. Courts should not be in the business of creating new
causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute, especially when it risks international strife, see
post, at 1408 (ALITO, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). And the Alien Tort
Statute likely does not apply to suits between foreign plaintiffs and foreign defendants.

Justice ALITO, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Creating causes of action under the Alien Tort Statute against foreign corporate defendants
would precipitate exactly the sort of diplomatic strife that the law was enacted to prevent. As a
result, I agree with the Court that we should not take that step, and I join Parts I, II–B–1, and II–
C of the opinion of the Court. I write separately to elaborate on why that outcome is compelled
not only by “judicial caution,” but also by the separation of powers.
I
The ATS is a jurisdictional statute. It provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. By its terms, the ATS does not create
any causes of action.

In Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004), however,
this Court nevertheless held that federal courts, exercising their authority in limited
circumstances to make federal common law, may create causes of action that aliens may assert
under the ATS. That holding takes some explaining.

According to Sosa, when the First Congress enacted the ATS in 1789, it assumed that the statute
would “have practical effect the moment it became law” because the general common law
“would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of international law violations.” Id., at
724, 124 S.Ct. 2739. That assumption, however, depended on the continued existence of the
general common law. And in 1938—a century and a half after Congress enacted the ATS—this

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Court rejected the “fallacy” underlying the general common law, declaring definitively that
“[t]here is no federal general common law.” Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 79, 58
S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). That left the ATS in an awkward spot: Congress had not
created any causes of action for the statute on the assumption that litigants would use those
provided by the general common law, but now the general common law was no more.

In Sosa, this Court did its best to resolve that problem. “[I]t would be unreasonable to assume,”
the Court explained, “that the First Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all
capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because the [general] common law
might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism.” 542 U.S., at 730, 124 S.Ct.
2739. Although the general common law was gone, the Court concluded, federal courts could
still exercise their authority to create so-called “federal common law” for those “ ‘few and
restricted’ ” areas “in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive
law.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 68
L.Ed.2d 500 (1981). Sosa interpreted the ATS as conferring such authorization.

As a result, Sosa held that federal courts, subject to certain conditions, may “recognize private
causes of action [under the ATS] for certain torts in violation of the law of nations.” 542 U.S., at
724, 124 S.Ct. 2739. But before doing so, Sosa stressed, courts should follow a two-step process.
First, they should ensure that the contemplated cause of action reflects an international law norm
that is “ ‘specific, universal and obligatory.’ ” Id., at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Second, if a suitable
norm is identified, federal courts should decide whether there is any other reason to limit “the
availability of relief.” Id., at 733, n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739.
II
For the reasons articulated by Justice Scalia in Sosa and by Justice GORSUCH today, I am not
certain that Sosa was correctly decided. See id., at 739–751, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). But even taking that decision on its own terms, this Court should not create causes
of action under the ATS against foreign corporate defendants. As part of Sosa ‘s second step, a
court should decline to create a cause of action as a matter of federal common law where the
result would be to further, not avoid, diplomatic strife. Properly applied, that rule easily resolves
the question presented by this case.

Sosa interpreted the ATS to authorize the federal courts to create causes of action as a matter of
federal common law. We have repeatedly emphasized that “in fashioning federal [common law]
principles to govern areas left open by Congress, our function is to effectuate congressional
policy.” United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 738, 99 S.Ct. 1448, 59 L.Ed.2d 711
(1979). Fidelity to congressional policy is not only prudent but necessary: Going beyond the
bounds of Congress’s authorization would mean unconstitutionally usurping part of the
“legislative Powers.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1. Accordingly, the objective for courts in every case
requiring the creation of federal common law must be “to find the rule that will best effectuate
the federal policy.” Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1
L.Ed.2d 972 (1957).

The ATS was meant to help the United States avoid diplomatic friction. The First Congress
enacted the law to provide a forum for adjudicating that “narrow set of violations of the law of
nations” that, if left unaddressed, “threaten[ed] serious consequences” for the United States.

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Sosa, 542 U.S., at 715, 124 S.Ct. 2739; see also Brief for Professors of International Law et al. as
Amici Curiae 7–12. Specifically, the First Congress was concerned about offenses like piracy,
violation of safe conducts, and infringement of the rights of ambassadors, each of which “if not
adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war.” Sosa, supra, at 715, 124 S.Ct. 2739. That
threat was existentially terrifying for the young Nation. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 123–124, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013). To minimize the danger,
the First Congress enacted the ATS, “ensur[ing] that the United States could provide a forum for
adjudicating such incidents” and thus helping the Nation avoid further diplomatic imbroglios.
Id., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659.

Putting that objective together with the rules governing federal common law generally, the
following principle emerges: Federal courts should decline to create federal common law causes
of action under Sosa‘s second step whenever doing so would not materially advance the ATS’s
objective of avoiding diplomatic strife. And applying that principle here, it is clear that federal
courts should not create causes of action under the ATS against foreign corporate defendants. All
parties agree that customary international law does not require corporate liability as a general
matter. See Brief for Petitioners 30; Brief for Respondent 22. But if customary international law
does not require corporate liability, then declining to create it under the ATS cannot give other
nations just cause for complaint against the United States.

To the contrary, ATS suits against foreign corporations may provoke—and, indeed, frequently
have provoked—exactly the sort of diplomatic strife inimical to the fundamental purpose of the
ATS. Some foreign states appear to interpret international law as foreclosing civil corporate
liability for violations of the law of nations. See Brief for Government of the United Kingdom et
al. as Amici Curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O.T. 2012, No. 10–1491, p. 14.
Creating ATS causes of action against foreign corporate defendants would put the United States
at odds with these nations. Even when states do not object to this sort of corporate liability as a
legal matter, they may be concerned about ATS suits against their corporations for political
reasons. For example, Jordan considers this suit “a direct affront” to its sovereignty and one that
“risks destabilizing Jordan’s economy and undercutting one of the most stable and productive
alliances the United States has in the Middle East.” Brief for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as
Amicus Curiae 4. Courting these sorts of problems—which seem endemic to ATS litigation—
was the opposite of what the First Congress had in mind.

In response, the dissent argues merely that any diplomatic friction “can be addressed with a tool
more tailored to the source of the problem than a blanket ban on corporate liability.” Post, at
1429. Even on its own terms, that argument is problematic: Many of the “more tailored” tools
offered by the dissent will still be hotly litigated by ATS plaintiffs, and it may be years before
incorrect initial decisions about their applicability can be reviewed by the courts of appeals.

In any event, the dissent misunderstands the relevant standard. The question before us is whether
the United States would be embroiled in fewer international controversies if we created causes of
action under the ATS against foreign corporate defendants. Unless corporate liability would
actively decrease diplomatic disputes, we have no authority to act. On that score, the dissent can
only speculate that declining to create causes of action against foreign corporate defendants
“might” lead to diplomatic friction. But the dissent has no real-world examples to support its

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hunch, and that is not surprising; the ATS already goes further than any other statute in the world
in granting aliens the right to sue civilly for violations of international law, especially in light of
the many other avenues for relief available. See ante, at 1405 (plurality opinion). It would be
rather rich for any other nation to complain that the ATS does not go far enough. Indeed, no
country has.

Finally, the dissent invokes “the considered judgment of the Executive Branch and Congress”
that ATS suits against foreign corporations are “necessary ‘to help the United States avoid
diplomatic friction.’ ” Tellingly, however, the dissent cannot muster a single source that actually
supports that bold contention. Instead, the dissent immediately retreats to two far more modest
assertions. First, the dissent observes that the Executive Branch has twice suggested that this
Court should allow causes of action against corporate defendants under the ATS. But both times
the Executive Branch defended that perspective primarily under the first step of Sosa; here,
however, we are dealing with Sosa‘s second step, and with the risk of diplomatic friction in
particular. Second, the dissent also notes that the Executive Branch and Congress have each
taken steps to hold corporations liable for certain acts like terrorism. That is, of course, true, but
it is also entirely irrelevant. Congress and the Executive Branch may be willing to trade off the
risk of some diplomatic friction in exchange for the promotion of other objectives (such as
“holding foreign corporations to account for certain egregious conduct,”). That is their
prerogative as the political branches. But consistent with the separation of powers, we have
neither the luxury nor the right to make such policy decisions ourselves.

Creating causes of action under the ATS against foreign corporate defendants would be a no-win
proposition. Foreign corporate liability would not only fail to meaningfully advance the
objectives of the ATS, but it would also lead to precisely those “serious consequences in
international affairs” that the ATS was enacted to avoid. Sosa, 542 U.S., at 715, 124 S.Ct. 2739.
Under those circumstances, federal courts have a duty to refrain from acting. Although that may
make it more difficult for aliens to hold foreign corporations liable for human rights abuses, we
have repeatedly rejected the view that the ATS was meant to transform the federal courts into
forums for the litigation of all human rights suits. Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 123–124, 133 S.Ct. 1659;
Sosa, supra, at 715–718, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Declining to extend the ATS to foreign corporate
defendants is thus not about “[i]mmunizing corporations that violate human rights,” but rather
about furthering the purpose that the ATS was actually meant to serve—avoiding diplomatic
strife.

Justice GORSUCH, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I am pleased to join the Court’s judgment and Parts I, II–B–1, and II–C of its opinion.
Respectfully, though, I believe there are two more fundamental reasons why this lawsuit must be
dismissed. A group of foreign plaintiffs wants a federal court to invent a new cause of action so
they can sue another foreigner for allegedly breaching international norms. In any other context,
a federal judge faced with a request like that would know exactly what to do with it: dismiss it
out of hand. Not because the defendant happens to be a corporation instead of a human being.
But because the job of creating new causes of action and navigating foreign policy disputes
belongs to the political branches. For reasons passing understanding, federal courts have

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sometimes treated the Alien Tort Statute as a license to overlook these foundational principles. I
would end ATS exceptionalism. We should refuse invitations to create new forms of legal
liability. And we should not meddle in disputes between foreign citizens over international
norms. I write because I am hopeful that courts in the future might pause to consider both of
these reasons for restraint before taking up cases like this one. Whatever powers courts may
possess in ATS suits, they are powers judges should be doubly careful not to abuse.
I
First adopted in 1789, the current version of the ATS provides that “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. More than two hundred
years later, the meaning of this terse provision has still “proven elusive.” Sosa v. Alvarez–
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 719, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). At the same time, this
Court has suggested that Congress enacted the statute to afford federal courts jurisdiction to hear
tort claims related to three violations of international law that were already embodied in English
common law: violations of safe conducts extended to aliens, interference with ambassadors, and
piracy. Id., at 715, 124 S.Ct. 2739; 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 68
(1769) (Blackstone); see also Bellia & Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78
U. Chi. L. Rev. 445 (2011) (arguing that the ATS meant to supply jurisdiction over a slightly
larger set of claims involving intentional torts by Americans against aliens).

In this case, the plaintiffs seek much more. They want the federal courts to recognize a new
cause of action, one that did not exist at the time of the statute’s adoption, one that Congress has
never authorized. While their request might appear inconsistent with Sosa ‘s explanation of the
ATS’s modest origin, the plaintiffs say that a caveat later in the opinion saves them. They point
to a passage where the Court went on to suggest that the ATS may also afford federal judges
“discretion [to] conside[r] [creating] new cause [s] of action” if they “rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable
to the features of the [three] 18th-century” torts the Court already described. 542 U.S., at 725,
124 S.Ct. 2739.

I harbor serious doubts about Sosa‘s suggestion. In our democracy the people’s elected
representatives make the laws that govern them. Judges do not. The Constitution’s provisions
insulating judges from political accountability may promote our ability to render impartial
judgments in disputes between the people, but they do nothing to recommend us as policymakers
for a large nation. Recognizing just this, our cases have held that when confronted with a request
to fashion a new cause of action, “separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to the
analysis.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1843, 1857, 198 L.Ed.2d 290 (2017).
The first and most important question in that analysis “is ‘who should decide’ ..., Congress or the
courts?” and the right answer “most often will be Congress.” Ibid. Deciding that, henceforth,
persons like A who engage in certain conduct will be liable to persons like B is, in every
meaningful sense, just like enacting a new law. And in our constitutional order the job of writing
new laws belongs to Congress, not the courts. Adopting new causes of action may have been a
“proper function for common-law courts,” but it is not appropriate “for federal tribunals”
mindful of the limits of their constitutional authority. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287,
121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Nor can I see any reason to make a special exception for the ATS. As Sosa initially
acknowledged, the ATS was designed as “a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of
action.” 542 U.S., at 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739; accord. And I would have thought that the end of the
matter. A statute that creates no new causes of action ... creates no new causes of action. To the
extent Sosa continued on to claim for federal judges the discretionary power to create new forms
of liability on their own, it invaded terrain that belongs to the people’s representatives and should
be promptly returned to them. 542 U.S., at 747, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).

But even accepting Sosa ‘s framework does not end the matter. As the Court acknowledges,
there is a strong argument that “a proper application of Sosa would preclude courts from ever
recognizing any new causes of action under the ATS.” I believe that argument is correct. For the
reasons just described, separation of powers considerations ordinarily require us to defer to
Congress in the creation of new forms of liability. This Court hasn’t yet used Sosa ‘s assertion of
discretionary authority to recognize a new cause of action, and I cannot imagine a sound reason,
hundreds of years after the statute’s passage, to start now. For a court inclined to claim the
discretion to enter this field, it is a discretion best exercised by staying out of it.

The context in which any Sosa discretion would be exercised confirms the wisdom of restraint.
Sosa acknowledged that any decision to create a new cause of action would “inevitably [involve]
an element of judgment about the practical consequences” that might follow. Id., at 732–733,
124 S.Ct. 2739. But because the point of such a claim would be to vindicate “a norm of
international character,” id., at 725, 124 S.Ct. 2739 those “practical consequences” would likely
involve questions of foreign affairs and national security—matters that implicate neither judicial
expertise nor authority. It is for Congress to “define and punish ... Offences against the Law of
Nations” and to regulate foreign commerce. U.S. Const. Art. I., § 8. And it is for the President to
resolve diplomatic disputes and command the armed forces. Art. II, §§ 2–3. Foreign policy and
national security decisions are “delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy” for
which “the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities[,] nor responsibility.” Chicago & Southern
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948)
(Jackson, J.). And I find it difficult to imagine a case in which a federal court might safely
conclude otherwise. Take this very lawsuit by way of example. The Kingdom of Jordan
considers it to be “a ‘grave affront’ to its sovereignty,” and the State Department worries about
its foreign policy implications. Whether American interests justify the “practical consequence”
of offending another nation in this way (or in worse ways yet) is a question that should be
addressed “only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare” such decisions
“advance or imperil.” Waterman S.S. Corp., supra, at 111, 68 S.Ct. 431. So while I have no
quarrel with the dissent’s observation, that lower federal courts are not free to overrule Sosa‘s
framework or treat it as optional, I do know that the analysis Sosa requires should come out the
same way in virtually every case. If Sosa is right—and I am sure it is—that federal courts must
“inevitably” exercise “an element of judgment” about delicate questions of foreign affairs when
deciding whether to create a new cause of action, then judges should exercise good judgment by
declining the project before we create real trouble.
II
Another independent problem lurks here. This is a suit by foreigners against a foreigner over the
meaning of international norms. Respectfully, I do not think the original understanding of the

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ATS or our precedent permits federal courts to hear cases like this. At a minimum, both those
considerations and simple common sense about the limits of the judicial function should lead
federal courts to require a domestic defendant before agreeing to exercise any Sosa-generated
discretion to entertain an ATS suit.

Start with the statute. What we call the Alien Tort Statute began as just one clause among many
in § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which specified the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 1 Stat.
76–78. The ATS clause gave the district courts “cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort
only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”   Like today’s recodified
version, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, the original text of the ATS did not expressly call for a U.S.
defendant. But I think it likely would have been understood to contain such a requirement when
adopted.

That is because the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act in the shadow of the Constitution.
The Act created the federal courts and vested them with statutory authority to entertain claims
consistent with the newly ratified terms of Article III. Meanwhile, under Article III, Congress
could not have extended to federal courts the power to hear just any suit between two aliens
(unless, for example, one was a diplomat). Diversity of citizenship was required. So, because
Article III’s diversity-of-citizenship clause calls for a U.S. party, and because the ATS clause
requires an alien plaintiff, it follows that an American defendant was needed for an ATS suit to
proceed.

Precedent confirms this conclusion. In Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12, 14, 1 L.Ed. 720
(1800), this Court addressed the meaning of a neighboring provision of the Judiciary Act.
Section 11 gave the circuit courts power to hear, among other things, civil cases where “an alien
is a party.” 1 Stat. 78. As with § 9, you might think § 11’s language could be read to permit a suit
between aliens. Yet this Court held § 11 must instead be construed to refer only to cases “where,
indeed, an alien is one party, but a citizen is the other.” Mossman, 4 Dall., at 14 (internal
quotation marks omitted). That was necessary, Mossman explained, to give the statute a
“constructio[n] consistent” with the diversity-jurisdiction clause of Article III. Ibid. And as a
matter of precedent, I cannot think of a good reason why we would now read § 9 differently than
Mossman read § 11. Like cases are, after all, supposed to come out alike. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 828 (C.A.9 2011) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“Mossman ‘s analysis [of § 11] is
equally applicable to [§ 9].... ATS does not give federal courts jurisdiction to hear international
law claims between two aliens”), vacated and remanded, 569 U.S. 945, 133 S.Ct. 1995, 185
L.Ed.2d 863 (2013).

Nor does it appear the ATS meant to rely on any other head of Article III jurisdiction. You might
wonder, for example, if the First Congress considered a “violation of the law of nations” to be a
violation of, and thus “arise under,” federal law. But that does not seem likely. At the founding,
the law of nations was considered a distinct “system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world,” 4 Blackstone 66.
While this Court has called international law “part of our law,” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900), and a component of the “law of the land,” The
Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423, 3 L.Ed. 769 (1815), that simply meant international law was no

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different than the law of torts or contracts—it was “part of the so-called general common law,”
but not part of federal law. Sosa, 542 U.S., at 739–740, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
See Bradley & Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 824, 849–850 (1997); see also Young, Sorting Out
the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 Va. J. Int’l L. 365, 374–375 (2002). The text
of the Constitution appears to recognize just this distinction. Article I speaks of “Offences
against the Law of Nations,” while both Article III and Article VI’s Supremacy Clause, which
defines the scope of pre-emptive federal law, omit that phrase while referring to the “Laws of the
United States.” Congress may act to bring provisions of international law into federal law, but
they cannot find their way there on their own. “The law of nations is not embodied in any
provision of the Constitution, nor in any treaty, act of Congress, or any authority, or commission
derived from the United States.” Caperton v. Bowyer, 14 Wall. 216, 228, 20 L.Ed. 882 (1872).

Even so, that hardly left the ATS without important work to perform. At the time of the
founding, “[i]f a nation failed to redress injuries by its citizens upon the citizens of another
nation, the perpetrators’ nation violated the ‘perfect rights’ of the other nation,” which “provided
the offended nation with just cause for reprisals or war.” Bellia & Clark, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev., at
476. This reality posed an existential threat to the new nation. Under the Articles of
Confederation, States regularly refused to redress injuries their citizens caused foreigners. British
creditors, for example, often found their efforts to collect debts from American debtors thwarted.
Id., at 498–501. Seeking to remedy these and similar problems, the Continental Congress in 1781
passed a resolution encouraging the States, among other things, to establish tribunals for
vindicating “offences against the law of nations” and to “authorise suits to be instituted for
damages by the party injured.” Id., at 495–496. But the States did too little, too late. So when the
framers gathered to write the Constitution they included among their chief priorities endowing
the national government with sufficient power to ensure the country’s compliance with the law
of nations. See 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 24–25 (M. Farrand rev. 1966).

Together with other provisions of the Judiciary Act, the ATS served that purpose. The law of
nations required countries to ensure foreign citizens could obtain redress for wrongs committed
by domestic defendants, whether “through criminal punishment, extradition, or a civil remedy.”
Bellia & Clark, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 509. Yet in 1789 this country had no comprehensive
criminal code and no extradition treaty with Great Britain. Id., at 509–510. Section 11 achieved a
partial solution to the problem by permitting civil diversity suits in federal court between aliens
and domestic parties, but that provision required at least $500 in controversy. 1 Stat. 78; cf. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a) (today’s minimum is $75,000). But, as Professors Bellia and Clark have
explained, “[h]ad Congress stopped there, it would have omitted an important category of law of
nations violations that threatened the peace of the United States: personal injuries that U.S.
citizens inflicted upon aliens resulting in less than $500 in damages.” 78 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 509.
So the ATS neatly filled the remaining gap by allowing aliens to sue in federal court for a tort in
violation of the law of nations regardless of the amount in controversy. One obvious advantage
of this solution “was that it was self-executing—it placed the burden on injured aliens to bring
suit and did not require the still-forming U.S. government immediately to marshal the resources
necessary to prosecute crimes” or aid extraditions. Id., at 510.

Any attempt to decipher a cryptic old statute is sure to meet with challenges. For example, one

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could object that this reading of the Act does not assign to the ATS the work of addressing
assaults by aliens against foreign ambassadors on our soil, even though Sosa suggested the
statute was enacted partly in response to precisely such a case: the “Marbois incident of May
1784, in which a French adventurer, De Longchamps, verbally and physically assaulted the
Secretary of the French Legion in Philadelphia.” 542 U.S., at 716, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Many thought
that the States’ failure to provide a forum for relief to the foreign minister was a scandal and part
of what prompted the framers of the Constitution to strengthen the national government. Id., at
717, 124 S.Ct. 2739; Bellia & Clark, supra, at 467 (“The Confederation’s inability to remedy or
curtail violations like these was a significant factor precipitating the Federal Convention of
1787”).

But worries along these lines may be misplaced. The ATS was never meant to serve as a
freestanding statute, only as one clause in one section of the Judiciary Act. So even if you think
something in the Judiciary Act must be interpreted to address the Marbois incident, that doesn’t
mean it must be the ATS clause. And, as it happens, a different provision of the Act did deal
expressly with the problem of ambassadorial assaults: Section 13 conferred on this Court
“original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public
ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul shall be a party.” 1 Stat. 80–81. That implemented
Article III’s provision empowering us to hear suits “affecting Ambassadors, other public
ministers and Consuls.” § 2. And given that § 13 deals with the problem of “ambassadors” so
directly, it is unclear why we must read § 9 to address that same problem. See Lee, The Safe–
Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 855–858 (2006).

Along different but similar lines, some might be concerned that requiring a U.S. defendant in
ATS suits would leave the problem of piracy inadequately addressed, given that Sosa suggested
that piracy was one of the three offenses the ATS may have meant to capture, and many pirates
were foreigners. See 542 U.S., at 719, 124 S.Ct. 2739. But here the response is much the same. A
separate clause of § 9 gave the district courts “exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” 1 Stat. 77. That statute has long been given a broad
construction covering “all maritime contracts, torts and injuries,” DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F.Cas. 418,
442 (No. 3,776) (C.C.D.Mass. 1815) (Story, J.), along with “prize jurisdiction, which probably
included almost all ‘piracy’ cases after 1789,” Lee, supra, at 867. So it is not clear why it’s
necessary to cram the problem of piracy into the ATS. If anything, it may be necessary not to do
so. Structural features of § 9 make it at least questionable that both provisions were meant to
address the same subject matter: Cases falling within § 9’s ATS clause could also be brought in
state court or in the circuit courts, 1 Stat. 77, while § 9’s admiralty jurisdiction was generally
exclusive, id., at 76–77. See Lee, supra, at 868. And the two provisions also called for
incompatible procedures: Section 9 required jury trials “in all causes except civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” 1 Stat. 77 (emphasis added).

If doubt lingers on these historical questions, it is a doubt that should counsel restraint all the
same. Even if the ATS might have meant to allow foreign ambassadors to sue foreign
defendants, or foreign plaintiffs to sue foreign pirates, what would that prove about more mine-
run cases like ours, where none of those special concerns are implicated? There are at least
serious historical arguments suggesting the ATS was not meant to apply to suits like this one.
And to the extent Sosa affords courts discretion to proceed, these arguments should inform any

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decision whether to exercise that discretion. In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.
108, 116–117, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013), the Court invoked Sosa discretion to
refuse to hear cases involving foreign conduct. I can see no reason why courts should respond
differently when it comes to cases involving foreign defendants.

Any consideration of Sosa ‘s discretion must also account for proper limits on the judicial
function. As discussed above, federal courts generally lack the institutional expertise and
constitutional authority to oversee foreign policy and national security, and should be wary of
straying where they do not belong. See supra, at 1394 – 1396. Yet there are degrees of
institutional incompetence and constitutional evil. It is one thing for courts to assume the task of
creating new causes of action to ensure our citizens abide by the law of nations and avoid
reprisals against this country. It is altogether another thing for courts to punish foreign parties for
conduct that could not be attributed to the United States and thereby risk reprisals against this
country. If a foreign state or citizen violates an “international norm” in a way that offends
another foreign state or citizen, the Constitution arms the President and Congress with ample
means to address it. Or, if they think best, the political branches may choose to look the other
way. But in all events, the decision to impose sanctions in disputes between foreigners over
international norms is not ours to make. It is a decision that belongs to those answerable to the
people and assigned by the Constitution to defend this nation. If they wish our help, they are free
to enlist it, but we should not ever be in the business of elbowing our way in.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice BREYER, and Justice KAGAN
join, dissenting.

The Court today holds that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, categorically
forecloses foreign corporate liability. In so doing, it absolves corporations from responsibility
under the ATS for conscience-shocking behavior. I disagree both with the Court’s conclusion
and its analytic approach. The text, history, and purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and
consistent history of corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims for law-of-nations
violations may be brought against corporations under the ATS. Nothing about the corporate form
in itself raises foreign-policy concerns that require the Court, as a matter of common-law
discretion, to immunize all foreign corporations from liability under the ATS, regardless of the
specific law-of-nations violations alleged. I respectfully dissent.
I
The plurality assumes without deciding that whether corporations can be permissible defendants
under the ATS turns on the first step of the two-part inquiry set out in Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004). But by asking whether there is “a
specific, universal, and obligatory norm of liability for corporations” in international law, the
plurality fundamentally misconceives how international law works and so misapplies the first
step of Sosa.
A
In Sosa, the Court considered whether a Mexican citizen could recover under the ATS for a
claim of arbitrary detention by a Mexican national who had been hired by the Drug Enforcement
Administration to seize and transport him to the United States. See 542 U.S., at 697–698, 124

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S.Ct. 2739. The Court held that the ATS permits federal courts to “recognize private causes of
action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations,” id., at 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739 without the
need for any “further congressional action,” id., at 712, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The Court then
articulated a two-step framework to guide that inquiry. First, a court must determine whether the
particular international-law norm alleged to have been violated is “accepted by the civilized
world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms,”
i.e., “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.” Id., at
724–725, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Only if the norm is “ ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ ” may federal
courts recognize a cause of action for its violation. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569
U.S. 108, 117, 133 S.Ct. 1659, 185 L.Ed.2d 671 (2013) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S., at 732, 124
S.Ct. 2739). Second, if that threshold hurdle is satisfied, a court should consider whether
allowing a particular case to proceed is an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. Sosa, 542
U.S., at 727–728, 732–733, 738, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Applying that framework, Sosa held that the
alleged arbitrary detention claim at issue failed at step one because “a single illegal detention of
less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the
creation of a federal remedy.” Id., at 738, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

Sosa‘s norm-specific first step is inapposite to the categorical question whether corporations may
be sued under the ATS as a general matter. International law imposes certain obligations that are
intended to govern the behavior of states and private actors. See id., at 714–715, 124 S.Ct. 2739;
1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, pt. II, Introductory Note,
pp. 70–71 (1987) (Restatement). Among those obligations are substantive prohibitions on certain
conduct thought to violate human rights, such as genocide, slavery, extrajudicial killing, and
torture. See 2 Restatement § 702. Substantive prohibitions like these are the norms at which
Sosa‘s step-one inquiry is aimed and for which Sosa requires that there be sufficient international
consensus.

Sosa does not, however, demand that there be sufficient international consensus with regard to
the mechanisms of enforcing these norms, for enforcement is not a question with which
customary international law is concerned. Although international law determines what
substantive conduct violates the law of nations, it leaves the specific rules of how to enforce
international-law norms and remedy their violation to states, which may act to impose liability
collectively through treaties or independently via their domestic legal systems. See, e.g., L.
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 245 (2d ed. 1996) (“International law
itself ... does not require any particular reaction to violations of law”); Denza, The Relationship
Between International and National Law, in International Law 423 (M. Evans ed. 2006)
(“[I]nternational law does not itself prescribe how it should be applied or enforced at the national
level”); 1 Restatement § 111, Comment h (“In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily
for the United States to decide how it will carry out its international obligations”); Brief for
International Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 9–10.

In keeping with the nature of international law, Sosa consistently used the word “norm” to refer
to substantive conduct. For example, Sosa commands that “federal courts should not recognize
private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar

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when § 1350 was enacted.” 542 U.S., at 732, 124 S.Ct. 2739. That statement would make little
sense if “norm” encompassed enforcement mechanisms like “corporate liability.” Unlike “the
prohibition on genocide,” “corporate liability” cannot be violated. Moreover, “the historical
paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted” are all prohibitions on conduct, and Sosa clearly
contemplated that courts should compare the charged conduct with the historical conduct. See
ibid. (quoting Filartiga v. Pena–Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980), where the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit compared a “ ‘torturer’ ” to “ ‘the pirate and slave trader before him,’ ” id., at
890, and Judge Edwards’ concurrence in Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774
(C.A.D.C.1984), which suggested that the “ ‘limits of section 1350’s reach’ ” be defined by “ ‘a
handful of heinous actions—each of which violates definable, universal and obligatory norms,’ ”
id., at 781). There is no indication in Sosa that the Court also intended for courts to undertake the
apples-to-oranges comparison of the conduct proscribed under customary international law and
the forms of liability available under domestic law.

The text of the ATS also reflects this distinction between prohibiting conduct and determining
enforcement. The statute provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The phrase “of the law of nations” modifies “violation,”
not “civil action.” The statutory text thus requires only that the alleged conduct be specifically
and universally condemned under international law, not that the civil action be of a type that the
international community specifically and universally practices or endorses.
B
1
The plurality nonetheless allies itself with the view that international law supplies the rule of
decision in this case based on its reading of footnote 20 in Sosa. That footnote sets out “[a]
related consideration” to “the determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a
cause of action.” 542 U.S., at 732, and n. 20, 124 S.Ct. 2739. In full, it states:

“A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such
as a corporation or individual. Compare Tel–Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,
791–795 (C.A.D.C.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture
by private actors violates international law), with Kadic v. Karadz̆ ić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–241
(C.A.2 1995) (sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates
international law).” 542 U.S., at 732, n. 20, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

In the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2010), the
majority opinion read footnote 20 to “requir[e] that [courts] look to international law to
determine [their] jurisdiction over ATS claims against a particular class of defendant, such as
corporations.” Id., at 127 (emphasis in original). The plurality today accords “considerable force
and weight to [that] position,” and so proceeds to assess whether there exists a specific,
universal, and obligatory norm of liability for corporations in international law. But the Court of
Appeals mistook the meaning of footnote 20, which simply draws attention to the fact that, under
international law, “the distinction between conduct that does and conduct that does not violate
the law of nations can turn on whether the conduct is done by or on behalf of a State or by a

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private actor independently of a State.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d, at 177 (Leval, J., concurring in
judgment).

The international-law norm against genocide, for example, imposes obligations on all actors.
Acts of genocide thus violate the norm irrespective of whether they are committed privately or in
concert with the state. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Art. II, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045 (defining “genocide” as “any of the following
acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a) (“Whoever” commits genocide “shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b)”). In contrast, other norms, like the prohibition on torture, require
state action. Conduct thus qualifies as torture and violates the norm only when done “by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 114
(Torture Convention).

Footnote 20 in Sosa flags this distinction and instructs courts to consider whether there is
“sufficient consensus” that, with respect to the particular conduct prohibited under “a given
norm,” the type of defendant being sued can be alleged to have violated that specific norm. 542
U.S., at 732, n. 20, 124 S.Ct. 2739. Because footnote 20 contemplates a norm-specific inquiry,
not a categorical one, it is irrelevant to the categorical question presented here. Assuming the
prohibition against financing of terrorism is sufficiently “specific, universal, and obligatory” to
satisfy the first step of Sosa, a question on which I would remand to the Court of Appeals,
nothing in international law suggests a corporation may not violate it.

The plurality briefly acknowledges this critique of its reading of footnote 20, but nonetheless
assumes the correctness of its approach because of its view that there exists a “distinction in
international law between corporations and natural persons.” The plurality attempts to
substantiate this proposition by pointing to the charters of certain international criminal tribunals
and noting that none was given jurisdiction over corporate defendants. That argument, however,
confuses the substance of international law with how it has been enforced in particular contexts.

Again, the question of who must undertake the prohibited conduct for there to be a violation of
an international-law norm is one of international law, but how a particular actor is held liable for
a given law-of-nations violation generally is a question of enforcement left up to individual
states. Sometimes, states act collectively and establish international tribunals to punish certain
international-law violations. Each such tribunal is individually negotiated, and the limitations
placed on its jurisdiction are typically driven by strategic considerations and resource constraints.

For example, the Allies elected not to prosecute corporations at Nuremberg because of pragmatic
factors. Those factors included scarce judicial resources, a preference of the occupation
governments to swiftly dismantle the most culpable German companies without destroying
Germany’s postwar economy, and a desire to focus on establishing the principle of nonstate
criminal responsibility for human-rights violations. See Brief for Nuremberg Scholars as Amici
Curiae 4, 11–13.

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More recently, the delegations that negotiated the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court in the 1990’s elected not to extend that tribunal’s jurisdiction to corporations in part
because states had varying domestic practices as to whether and how to impose criminal liability
on corporations. See Frulli, Jurisdiction Ratione Personae, in 1 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court 527, 532–533 (A. Cassese et al. eds. 2002); Brief for Ambassador David J.
Scheffer as Amicus Curiae 8–10.

Taken to its natural conclusion, the plurality’s focus on the practice of international criminal
tribunals would prove too much. No international tribunal has been created and endowed with
the jurisdiction to hold natural persons civilly (as opposed to criminally) liable, yet the majority
and respondent accept that natural persons can be held liable under the ATS. Tr. of Oral Arg. 62.
It cannot be persuasive evidence for purposes of ascertaining the availability of corporate civil
liability under the ATS, then, that the jurisdiction of the handful of international criminal
tribunals that states have seen fit to create in the last 75 years has not extended to corporate
defendants.

Ultimately, the evidence on which the plurality relies does not prove that international law
distinguishes between corporations and natural persons as a categorical matter. To the contrary,
it proves only that states’ collective efforts to enforce various international-law norms have, to
date, often focused on natural rather than corporate defendants.

In fact, careful review of states’ collective and individual enforcement efforts makes clear that
corporations are subject to certain obligations under international law. For instance, the United
States Military Tribunal that prosecuted several corporate executives of IG Farben declared that
corporations could violate international law. See 8 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
Military Tribunals Under Council Control Law No. 10, p. 1132 (1952) ( “Where private
individuals, including juristic persons, proceed to exploit the military occupancy by acquiring
private property against the will and consent of the former owner, such action ... is in violation of
international law”). Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found that three
nonnatural entities—a private radio station, newspaper, and political party—were responsible for
genocide. See Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No. ICTR–99–52–T, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 953
(Dec. 3, 2003). Most recently, the appeals panel of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon held that
corporations may be prosecuted for contempt. See Prosecutor v. New TV S.A.L., Case No. STL–
14–05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in
Contempt Proceedings ¶ 74 (Oct. 2, 2014).

In addition, various international agreements require signatory states to impose liability on

corporations for certain conduct. Of particular relevance here, the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism provides: “Any person commits an offence within
the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully
and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the
knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out” an act of terrorism.
Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–49, 2178 U.N.T.S. 230. It then requires each
signatory state, “in accordance with its domestic legal principles,” to “take the necessary
measures to enable a legal entity located in its territory or organized under its laws to be held
liable when a person responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that

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capacity,” violated the Convention. Id., Art. 5(1). The Convention provides that “[s]uch liability
may be criminal, civil, or administrative,” ibid., so long as the penalties, which can include
monetary sanctions, are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” Id., Art. 5(3). The United
States is a party to the Convention, along with 131 other states.

The plurality dismisses the relevance of this Convention because it does not require states parties
to hold corporations liable in common-law tort actions, but rather permits them to “fulfill their
obligations ... by adopting detailed regulatory regimes governing financial institutions.” That
critique misses the point. The significance of the Convention is that the international community
agreed that financing terrorism is unacceptable conduct and that such conduct violates the
Convention when undertaken by corporations. That the Convention leaves up to each state party
how to impose liability on corporations, e.g., via erecting a regulatory regime, providing for tort
actions, or imposing criminal sanctions, is unremarkable,6 and simply reflects that international
law sets out standards of conduct and leaves it to individual states to determine how best to
enforce those standards.

Finally, a number of states, acting individually, have imposed criminal and civil liability on
corporations for law-of-nations violations through their domestic legal systems. See, e.g., New
TV S.A.L., Case No. STL–14–05/PT/AP/AR126.1, ¶¶ 52–55 (listing more than 40 countries that
provide for corporate criminal liability); A. Ramasastry & R. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and
Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law
22–24 (2006), available at https://www.biicl.org/files/4364_536.pdf (noting that 15 of 16
countries surveyed permit civil claims against corporations for human rights violations); Brief
for Comparative Law Scholars and Practitioners as Amici Curiae 15–19 (detailing provisions
creating corporate civil liability for international-law violations in England, France, the
Netherlands, and Canada).
C
Instead of asking whether there exists a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of corporate
liability under international law, the relevant inquiry in response to the question presented here is
whether there is any reason—under either international law or our domestic law—to distinguish
between a corporation and a natural person who is alleged to have violated the law of nations
under the ATS. As explained above, international law provides no such reason. See Kiobel, 621
F.3d, at 175 (Leval, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he answer international law furnishes is that
it takes no position on the question”). Nor does domestic law. The text, history, and purpose of
the ATS plainly support the conclusion that corporations may be held liable.

Beginning “with the language of the statute itself,” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989), two aspects of the text of the ATS
make clear that the statute allows corporate liability. First, the text confers jurisdiction on federal
district courts to hear “civil action[s]” for “tort[s].” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Where Congress uses a
term of art like tort, “it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to
[the] borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).

Corporations have long been held liable in tort under the federal common law. See Philadelphia,

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W., & B.R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202, 210, 16 L.Ed. 73 (1859) (“At a very early period, it was
decided in Great Britain, as well as in the United States, that actions might be maintained against
corporations for torts; and instances may be found, in the judicial annals of both countries, of
suits for torts arising from the acts of their agents, of nearly every variety”); Chestnut Hill &
Spring House Turnpike Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6, 17 (Pa.1818) (“[F]rom the earliest
times to the present, corporations have been held liable for torts”). This Court “has assumed that,
when Congress creates a tort action, it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-
related ... rules and consequently intends its legislation to incorporate those rules.” Meyer v.
Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003). The presumption, then, is
that, in providing for “tort” liability, the ATS provides for corporate liability.

Second, whereas the ATS expressly limits the class of permissible plaintiffs to “alien[s],” §
1350, it “does not distinguish among classes of defendants,” Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). That silence as
to defendants cannot be presumed to be inadvertent. That is because in the same section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as what is now the ATS, Congress provided the federal district courts with
jurisdiction over “all suits against consuls or vice-consuls.” § 9, 1 Stat. 76–77. Where Congress
wanted to limit the range of permissible defendants, then, it clearly knew how to do so. Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (“[W]here Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Nothing about the historical background against which the ATS was enacted rebuts the
presumption that the statute incorporated the accepted principle of corporate liability for tortious
conduct. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress was unable to provide
redress to foreign citizens for violations of treaties or the law of nations, which threatened to
undermine the United States’ relationships with other nations. See Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 123, 133
S.Ct. 1659. The First Congress responded with, inter alia, the ATS. Although the two incidents
that highlighted the need to provide foreign citizens with a federal forum in which to pursue their
grievances involved conflicts between natural persons, there is “no reason to conclude that the
First Congress was supremely concerned with the risk that natural persons would cause the
United States to be drawn into foreign entanglements, but was content to allow formal legal
associations of individuals, i.e., corporations, to do so,” Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11,
47 (C.A.D.C.2011), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed.Appx. 7 (C.A.D.C.2013); see also Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae 6 (“The ATS was enacted to ensure a private damages
remedy for incidents with the potential for serious diplomatic consequences, and Congress had
no good reason to limit the set of possible defendants in such actions to potentially judgment-
proof individuals”). Indeed, foreclosing corporations from liability under the ATS would have
been at odds with the contemporaneous practice of imposing liability for piracy on ships,
juridical entities. See, e.g., Skinner v. East India Co., 6 State Trials 710, 711 (1666); The
Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 40–41, 6 L.Ed. 405 (1826); Harmony v. United States, 2 How.
210, 233, 11 L.Ed. 239 (1844).

Finally, the conclusion that corporations may be held liable under the ATS for violations of the
law of nations is not of recent vintage. More than a century ago, the Attorney General

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acknowledged that corporations could be held liable under the ATS. See 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 250,
252 (1907) (stating that citizens of Mexico could bring a claim under the ATS against a
corporation, the American Rio Grande Land and Irrigation Company, for violating provisions of
a treaty between the United States and Mexico).
D
In his concurrence, Justice GORSUCH urges courts to exercise restraint in recognizing causes of
action under the ATS. But whether the ATS provides a cause of action for violations of the
norms against genocide, crimes against humanity, and financing of terrorism is not the question
the parties have asked the Court to decide. I therefore see no reason why it is necessary to delve
into the propriety of creating new causes of action. Nevertheless, because I disagree with the
premises on which the concurrence relies, I offer two brief observations.

First, Justice GORSUCH says it “pass[es] understanding” why federal courts have exercised
jurisdiction over ATS claims raised by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for breaches
of international norms. Modern ATS cases, however, are not being litigated against a blank slate.
The Court held in Sosa that Congress authorized the federal courts to “recognize private causes
of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations,” 542 U.S., at 724, 124 S.Ct. 2739 so
long as the underlying norm had no “less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted,” id., at 732, 124 S.Ct.
2739. That holding was no mere “suggestion,” as this Court has made clear. See Kiobel, 569
U.S., at 116–117, 133 S.Ct. 1659.

Given that the First Congress authorized suit for violations based on “the law of nations” and
“treat[ies] of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1350, it is natural to conclude that Congress
intended the district courts to consider new claims under the law of nations as that law and our
Nation’s treaty obligations continued to develop. If Congress intended to limit such cases to
violations of safe conduct, assaults against ambassadors, piracy, and—as Justice GORSUCH
suggests may have been the case—“ ‘personal injuries that U.S. citizens inflicted upon aliens
resulting in less than $500 in damages,’ ” it easily could have said so. Instead, it granted the
federal courts jurisdiction over claims based on “the law of nations,” a body of law that Congress
did not understand to be static. See United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F.Cas. 832, 846
(No. 15,551) (C.C.D.Mass. 1822) (Story, J.) (“What, therefore, the law of nations is ... may be
considered as modified by practice, or ascertained by the treaties of nations at different periods.
It does not follow ... that because a principle cannot be found settled by the consent or practice of
nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period the principle can be
considered as incorporated into the public code of nations”).

The question for courts considering new ATS claims is, “Who are today’s pirates?” Kiobel, 569
U.S., at 129, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). Torturers and those who
commit genocide are now fairly viewed, like pirates, as “common enemies of all mankind.” Id.,
at 131, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (internal quotation marks omitted). On remand, the Court of Appeals
would decide whether the financiers of terrorism are the same. The fact that few norms have
overcome Sosa ‘s high hurdle is strong evidence that the carefully considered standard set forth
in that case is generating exactly the kind of “judicial caution” the Court stressed as necessary.
See 542 U.S., at 725, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

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Second, the concurrence suggests that federal courts may lack jurisdiction to entertain suits
between aliens based solely on a violation of the law of nations. It contends that ATS suits
between aliens fall under neither the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction nor our federal question
jurisdiction. The Court was not unaware of this argument when it decided Sosa. As noted, that
case involved an ATS suit brought by a citizen of Mexico against a citizen of Mexico, and
various amici argued that the Court lacked Article III jurisdiction over such suits. See Brief for
National Foreign Trade Counsel et al. as Amici Curiae in Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, O.T. 2003,
No. 03–339, pp. 24–25; see also Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in
No. 03–339, pp. 14–21. The Court nonetheless proceeded to decide the case, which it could not
have done had it been concerned about its Article III power to do so. See Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). That decision forecloses the
argument the concurrence now makes, as Sosa authorized courts to “recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of” certain international law norms. 542 U.S., at 732,
124 S.Ct. 2739 (emphasis added); see also id., at 729–730, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (explaining that, post-
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), there are “limited
enclaves in which federal courts may derive from substantive law in a common law way,”
including the law of nations, and that “it would be unreasonable to assume that the First
Congress would have expected federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable
international norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the
road to modern realism”); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 671 F.3d 736, 749–754 (C.A.9 2011) (en banc)
(discussing Sosa and concluding that federal courts have Article III jurisdiction to hear ATS
cases between aliens), vacated and remanded, 569 U.S. 945, 133 S.Ct. 1995, 185 L.Ed.2d 863
(2013) (remanding for further consideration in light of Kiobel ).

Sosa was correct as a legal matter. Moreover, our Nation has an interest not only in providing a
remedy when our own citizens commit law of nations violations, but also in preventing our
Nation from serving as a safe harbor for today’s pirates. See Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 133–134, 133
S.Ct. 1659 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). To that end, Congress has ratified treaties
requiring the United States “to punish or extradite offenders, even when the offense was not
committed ... by a national.” 1 Restatement § 404, Reporters’ Note 1, at 255–257; see Torture
Convention, Arts. 5, 7; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Art. 3, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T.
1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Art. 4, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No.
7192; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 129, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364. To the extent suits against foreign defendants may lead
to international friction, that concern is better addressed under the presumption the Court
established in Kiobel against extraterritorial application of the ATS, see 569 U.S., at 124–125,
133 S.Ct. 1659 than it is by relitigating settled precedent.
II
At its second step, Sosa cautions that courts should consider whether permitting a case to
proceed is an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion in light of potential foreign-policy
implications. See 542 U.S., at 727–728, 732–733, 738, 124 S.Ct. 2739. The plurality only
assumes without deciding that international law does not impose liability on corporations, so it
necessarily proceeds to Sosa ‘s second step. Here, too, its analysis is flawed.

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 A
Nothing about the corporate form in itself justifies categorically foreclosing corporate liability in
all ATS actions. Each source of diplomatic friction that respondent Arab Bank and the plurality
identify can be addressed with a tool more tailored to the source of the problem than a blanket
ban on corporate liability.

Arab Bank contends that foreign citizens should not be able “to sue a Jordanian corporation in
New York for events taking place in the Middle East.” Brief for Respondent 42. The heart of that
qualm was already addressed in Kiobel, which held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to the ATS. 569 U.S., at 124, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Only where the claims
“touch and concern the territory of the United States ... with sufficient force” can the
presumption be displaced. Id., at 124–125, 133 S.Ct. 1659. “[M]ere corporate presence” does not
suffice. Id., at 125, 133 S.Ct. 1659. Thus, contrary to the majority’s contention, “the relatively
minor connection between the terrorist attacks at issue in this case and the alleged conduct in the
United States” does not “well illustrat[e] the perils of extending the scope of ATS liability to
foreign multinational corporations,” but merely illustrates the risks of extending the scope of
ATS liability extraterritorially absent sufficient connection to the United States.

Arab Bank also bemoans the unfairness of being sued when others—namely, the individuals and
organizations that carried out the terrorist attacks—were “the direct cause” of the harm
petitioners here suffered. Brief for Respondent 41. That complaint, though, is a critique of the
imposition of liability for financing terrorism, not an argument that ATS suits against
corporations generally necessarily cause diplomatic tensions.

Arab Bank further expresses concern that ATS suits are being filed against corporations in an
effort to recover for the bad acts of foreign governments or officials. See id., at 40. But the
Bank’s explanation of this problem reveals that the true source of its grievance is the availability
of aiding and abetting liability. See ibid. (“[N]umerous ATS suits have alleged that a corporation
has aided or abetted bad acts committed by a foreign government and its officials ” (emphasis in
original)); id., at 41 (“[A]iding and abetting suits under the ATS have given plaintiffs ‘a clear
means for effectively circumventing’ critical limits on foreign sovereign immunity” (quoting
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, O.T. 2007,
No. 07–919, p. 15)). The plurality too points to an aiding and abetting case to support its
contention that plaintiffs “use corporations as surrogate defendants to challenge the conduct of
foreign governments.” Yet not all law-of-nations violations asserted against corporations are
premised on aiding and abetting liability; it is possible for a corporation to violate international-
law norms independent of a foreign state or foreign state officials. In this respect, too, the
Court’s rule is ill fitted to the problem identified.

Notably, even the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan does not argue that there are foreign-policy
tensions inherent in suing a corporation generally. Instead, Jordan contends that this particular
suit is an affront to its sovereignty because of its extraterritorial character and because of the role
that Arab Bank specifically plays in the Jordanian economy. See Brief for Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan as Amicus Curiae 6–12.

The majority also cites to instances in which other foreign sovereigns have “appeared in this

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Court to note [their] objections to ATS litigation,” but none of those objections was about the
availability of corporate liability as a general matter. See Sosa, 542 U.S., at 733, n. 21, 124 S.Ct.
2739 (noting argument of the European Commission that “basic principles of international law
require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any
remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps in other forums such as
international claims tribunals”); ibid. (noting objections by South Africa to “several class actions
seeking damages from various corporations alleged to have participated in, or abetted, the regime
of apartheid” on the basis that the cases “interfere[d] with the policy embodied by its Truth and
Reconciliation Commission”); Brief for Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O.T. 2012, No. 10–1491, p. 1 (“The Federal Republic of
Germany has consistently maintained its opposition to overly broad assertions of extraterritorial
civil jurisdiction arising out of aliens’ claims against foreign defendants for alleged foreign
activities that caused injury on foreign soil”); Brief for Government of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland et al. as Amici Curiae in No. 10–1491, p. 3 (“The
Governments remain deeply concerned about ... suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign
defendants for conduct that entirely took place in the territory of a foreign sovereign”).

As the United States urged at oral argument, when international friction arises, a court should
respond with the doctrine that speaks directly to the friction’s source. See Tr. of Oral. Arg. 28
(acknowledging that “ATS litigation in recent decades has raised international friction” and
explaining that “the way to deal with that friction is with a doctrine that speaks directly to the
international entanglement ... as those questions arise”). In addition to the presumption against
extraterritoriality, federal courts have at their disposal a number of tools to address any foreign-
relations concerns that an ATS case may raise. This Court has held that a federal court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant only if the corporation is
incorporated in the United States, has its principal place of business or is otherwise at home here,
or if the activities giving rise to the lawsuit occurred or had their impact here. See Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). Courts also can dismiss ATS
suits for a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the remedies available in her domestic forum, on forum
non conveniens grounds, for reasons of international comity, or when asked to do so by the State
Department. See Kiobel, 569 U.S., at 133, 133 S.Ct. 1659 (BREYER, J., concurring in
judgment); Sosa, 542 U.S., at 733, n. 21, 124 S.Ct. 2739.

Several of these doctrines might be implicated in this case, and I would remand for the Second
Circuit to address them in the first instance. The majority, however, prefers to use a
sledgehammer to crack a nut. I see no need for such an ill-fitting and disproportionate response.
Foreclosing foreign corporate liability in all ATS actions, irrespective of circumstance or norm,
is simply too broad a response to case-specific concerns that can be addressed via other means.9
B
1
The Court urges that “[t]he political branches, not the Judiciary, have the responsibility and
institutional capacity to weigh foreign-policy concerns.” I agree that the political branches are
well poised to assess the foreign-policy concerns attending ATS litigation, which is why I give
significant weight to the fact that the Executive Branch, in briefs signed by the Solicitor General
and State Department Legal Advisor, has twice urged the Court to reach exactly the opposite

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conclusion of the one embraced by the majority. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 5
(“This Court should vacate the decision below, which rests on the mistaken premise that a
federal common-law claim under the ATS may never be brought against a corporation”); Brief
for United States as Amicus Curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O.T. 2012, No. 10–
1491, p. 7 (“Courts may recognize corporate liability in actions under the ATS as a matter of
federal common law.... Sosa ‘s cautionary admonitions provide no reason to depart from the
common law on this issue”). At oral argument in this case, the United States told the Court that it
saw no “sound reason to categorically exclude corporate liability.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. It
explained that another country would hold the United States accountable for not providing a
remedy against a corporate defendant in a “classic” ATS case, such as one involving a “foreign
officia[l] injured in the United States,” id., at 32–33, and suggested that foreclosing the ability to
recover from a corporation actually would raise “the possibility of friction,” id., at 33. Notably,
the Government’s position that categorically barring corporate liability under the ATS is wrong
has been consistent across two administrations led by Presidents of different political parties.

Likewise, when Members of Congress have weighed in on the question whether corporations can
be proper defendants in an ATS suit, it has been to advise the Court against the rule it now
adopts. See Brief for Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae 7–11; Brief for Former
Sen. Arlen Specter et al. as Amici Curiae in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., O.T. 2012,
No. 10–1491, pp. 17–18. Congress has also never seen it necessary to immunize corporations
from ATS liability even though corporations have been named as defendants in ATS suits for
years. See Monessen Southwestern R. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338, 108 S.Ct. 1837, 100
L.Ed.2d 349 (1988) (“Congress’ failure to disturb a consistent judicial interpretation of a statute
may provide some indication that ‘Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that
[interpretation]’ ” (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703, 99 S.Ct. 1946,
60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979))).

Given the deference to the political branches that Sosa encourages, I find it puzzling that the
Court so eagerly departs from the express assessment of the Executive Branch and Members of
Congress that corporations can be defendants in ATS actions.
2
The plurality instead purports to defer to Congress by relying heavily on the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), 106 Stat. 73, note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350, to support its
categorical bar. The TVPA makes available to all individuals, not just foreign citizens, a civil
cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing that may be brought against natural persons.
See Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 451–452, 454, 132 S.Ct. 1702, 182
L.Ed.2d 720 (2012). The plurality extrapolates from Congress’ decision regarding the scope of
liability under the TVPA a rule that it contends should govern all ATS suits. But there is no
reason to think that because Congress saw fit to permit suits only against natural persons for two
specific law-of-nations violations, Congress meant to foreclose corporate liability for all law-of-
nations violations. The plurality’s contrary conclusion ignores the critical textual differences
between the ATS and TVPA, as well as the TVPA’s legislative history, which emphasizes
Congress’ intent to leave the ATS undisturbed.

On its face, the TVPA is different from the ATS in several significant ways: It is focused on only
two law-of-nations violations, torture and extrajudicial killing; it makes a cause of action

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available to all individuals, not just foreign citizens; and it uses the word “individual” to
delineate who may be liable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. The ATS, by contrast, is concerned with
all law-of-nations violations generally, makes a cause of action available only to foreign citizens,
and is silent as to who may be liable. Because of the textual differences between the two statutes,
the Court unanimously concluded in Mohamad that the ATS “offers no comparative value” in
ascertaining the scope of liability under the TVPA. 566 U.S., at 458, 132 S.Ct. 1702. It makes
little sense, then, to conclude that the TVPA has dispositive comparative value in discerning the
scope of liability under the ATS.

Furthermore, Congress repeatedly emphasized in the House and Senate Reports on the TVPA
that the statute was meant to supplement the ATS, not replace or cabin it. See H.R. Rep. No.
102–367, pt. 1, p. 3 (1991) (“Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be replaced.
There should also, however, be a clear and specific remedy, not limited to aliens, for torture and
extrajudicial killing”); id., at 4 (“The TVPA ... would also enhance the remedy already available
under section 1350 in an important respect: While the [ATS] provides a remedy to aliens only,
the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have been tortured
abroad”); ibid. (“[C]laims based on torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of
actions that may appropriately be covered b[y] section 1350. That statute should remain intact to
permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of
customary international law”); S. Rep. No. 102–249, pp. 4–5 (1991); see also Sosa, 542 U.S., at
731, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (explaining that the TVPA “supplement[ed] the judicial determination” in
Filartiga ).

Lacking any affirmative evidence that Congress’ decision to limit liability under the TVPA to
natural persons indicates a legislative judgment about the proper scope of liability in all ATS
suits, the plurality focuses its efforts on dismissing petitioners’ argument that Congress limited
TVPA liability to natural persons to harmonize the statute with the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which generally immunizes foreign states from suit. Contrary to
the plurality’s contention, however, this Court did not reject petitioners’ account of the TVPA’s
legislative history in Mohamad. In fact, that decision agreed that the legislative history
“clarifi[es] that the Act does not encompass liability against foreign states.” 566 U.S., at 459, 132
S.Ct. 1702. What Mohamad rejected was the argument that because the TVPA forecloses
liability against foreign states, it necessarily permits liability against corporations. In concluding
that the TVPA encompasses only natural persons, Mohamad took no position on why Congress
excluded organizations from its reach.

To infer from the TVPA that no corporation may ever be held liable under the ATS for any
violation of any international-law norm, moreover, ignores that Congress has elsewhere imposed
liability on corporations for conduct prohibited by customary international law. For instance, the
Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA) created a civil cause of action for U.S. nationals injured by an
act of international terrorism and expressly provides for corporate liability. 18 U.S.C. § 2333.
That Congress foreclosed corporate liability for torture and extrajudicial killing claims under the
TVPA but permitted corporate liability for terrorism-related claims under the ATA is strong
evidence that Congress exercises its judgment as to the appropriateness of corporate liability on a
norm-by-norm basis, and that courts should do the same when considering whether to permit
causes of action against corporations for law-of-nations violations under the ATS.

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The plurality dismisses the ATA as “an inapt analogy” because the ATA “provides a cause of
action only to ‘national[s] of the United States,’ ” whereas the ATS “provides a remedy for
foreign nationals only.” Ante, at 1404 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)). But if encompassing
different groups of plaintiffs is what makes two statutes poor comparators for each other, the
TVPA, too, is an inapt analogy, for it permits suits by all individuals, U.S. and foreign nationals
alike.

The plurality also posits that the ATA “suggests that there should be no common-law action
under the ATS for allegations like petitioners’,” because permitting such suits would allow
foreign plaintiffs to “bypass Congress’ express limitations on liability under the [ATA] simply
by bringing an ATS lawsuit.” Yet an ATS suit alleging terrorism-related conduct does not
“bypass” or “displace” any “statutory and regulatory structure,” ibid., any more than an ATA suit
does. As this case demonstrates, U.S. nationals and foreign citizens may bring ATA and ATS
suits in the same court, at the same time, for the same underlying conduct. To the extent the
plurality is suggesting that Congress, in enacting the ATA, meant to foreclose ATS suits based
on terrorism financing, the plurality offers no evidence to support that hypothesis, and the
legislative history suggests that Congress enacted the ATA to provide U.S. citizens with the
same remedy already available to foreign citizens under the ATS. See Hearing on S. 2465 before
the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 90 (1990) (testimony of Joseph A. Morris) (noting that ATS
actions for terrorism “would be preserved”).

At bottom, the ATS and TVPA are related but distinct statutes that coexist independently. There
is no basis to conclude that the considered judgment Congress made about who should be liable
under the TVPA for torture and extrajudicial killing should restrict who can be held liable under
the ATS for other law-of-nations violations, particularly where Congress made a different
judgment about the scope of liability under the ATA for terrorism.
C
Finally, the plurality offers a set of “[o]ther considerations relevant to the exercise of judicial
discretion” that it concludes “counsel against allowing liability under the ATS for foreign
corporations.” None is persuasive.

First, the plurality asserts that “[i]t has not been shown that corporate liability under the ATS is
essential to serve the goals of the statute” because “the ATS will seldom be the only way for
plaintiffs to hold the perpetrators liable,” and because “plaintiffs still can sue the individual
corporate employees responsible for a violation of international law under the ATS.” Ibid. This
Court has never previously required that, to maintain an ATS action, a plaintiff must show that
the ATS is the exclusive means by which to hold the alleged perpetrator liable and that no relief
can be had from other parties. Such requirements extend far beyond the inquiry Sosa
contemplated and are without any basis in the statutory text.

Moreover, even if there are other grounds on which a suit alleging conduct constituting a law-of-
nations violation can be brought, such as a state-law tort claim, the First Congress created the
ATS because it wanted foreign plaintiffs to be able to bring their claims in federal court and sue
for law-of-nations violations. A suit for state-law battery, even if based on the same alleged

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conduct, is not the equivalent of a federal suit for torture; the latter contributes to the uptake of
international human rights norms, and the former does not.

Furthermore, holding corporations accountable for violating the human rights of foreign citizens
when those violations touch and concern the United States may well be necessary to avoid the
international tension with which the First Congress was concerned. Consider again the assault on
the Secretary of the French Legation in Philadelphia by a French adventurer. Would the
diplomatic strife that followed really have been any less charged if a corporation had sent its
agent to accost the Secretary? Or, consider piracy. If a corporation owned a fleet of vessels and
directed them to seize other ships in U.S. waters, there no doubt would be calls to hold the
corporation to account. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d, at 156, and n. 10 (observing that “Somali pirates
essentially operate as limited partnerships”). Finally, take, for example, a corporation posing as a
job-placement agency that actually traffics in persons, forcibly transporting foreign nationals to
the United States for exploitation and profiting from their abuse. Not only are the individual
employees of that business less likely to be able fully to compensate successful ATS plaintiffs,
but holding only individual employees liable does not impose accountability for the institution-
wide disregard for human rights. Absent a corporate sanction, that harm will persist unremedied.
Immunizing the corporation from suit under the ATS merely because it is a corporation, even
though the violations stemmed directly from corporate policy and practice, might cause serious
diplomatic friction.

Second, the plurality expresses concern that if foreign corporations are subject to liability under
the ATS, other nations could hale American corporations into court and subject them “to an
immediate, constant risk of claims seeking to impose massive liability for the alleged conduct of
their employees and subsidiaries around the world,” a prospect that will deter American
corporations from investing in developing economies. The plurality offers no empirical evidence
to support these alarmist conjectures, which is especially telling given that plaintiffs have been
filing ATS suits against foreign corporations in United States courts for years. It does cite to an
amicus brief for the United States in American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, but that case was
concerned with the availability of civil aiding and abetting liability, not corporate liability
generally, and the United States never contended that permitting corporate liability under the
ATS would undermine global investment. Instead, it argued that permitting extraterritorial aiding
and abetting cases would interfere with foreign relations and deter “the free flow of trade and
investment.” See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O.T. 2007, No. 07–919, pp. 12–16,
20. Driven by hypothetical worry about besieged American corporations, today’s decision
needlessly goes much further, encompassing all ATS suits against all foreign corporations, not
just those cases with extraterritorial dimensions premised on an aiding and abetting theory.

***

In sum, international law establishes what conduct violates the law of nations, and specifies
whether, to constitute a law-of-nations violation, the alleged conduct must be undertaken by a
particular type of actor. But it is federal common law that determines whether corporations may,
as a general matter, be held liable in tort for law-of-nations violations. Applying that framework
here, I would hold that the ATS does not categorically foreclose corporate liability. Tort actions
against corporations have long been available under federal common law. Whatever the majority

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might think of the value of modern-day ATS litigation, it has identified nothing to support its
conclusion that “foreign corporate defendants create unique problems” that necessitate a
categorical rule barring all foreign corporate liability.

Absent any reason to believe that the corporate form in itself raises serious foreign-policy
concerns, and given the repeated urging from the Executive Branch and Members of Congress
that the Court need not and should not foreclose corporate liability, I would reverse the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and remand for further proceedings, including
whether the allegations here sufficiently touch and concern the United States, see Kiobel, 569
U.S., at 124–125, 133 S.Ct. 1659 and whether the international-law norms alleged to have been
violated by Arab Bank—the prohibitions on genocide, crimes against humanity, and financing of
terrorism—are of sufficiently definite content and universal acceptance to give rise to a cause of
action under the ATS.
III
In categorically barring all suits against foreign corporations under the ATS, the Court ensures
that foreign corporations—entities capable of wrongdoing under our domestic law—remain
immune from liability for human rights abuses, however egregious they may be.

Corporations can be and often are a force for innovation and growth. Many of their contributions
to society should be celebrated. But the unique power that corporations wield can be used both
for good and for bad. Just as corporations can increase the capacity for production, so, too, some
can increase the capacity for suffering. Consider the genocide that took upwards of 800,000 lives
in Rwanda in 1994, which was fueled by incendiary rhetoric delivered via a private radio station,
the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). Men spoke the hateful words, but the
RTLM made their widespread influence possible.

There can be, and sometimes is, a profit motive for these types of abuses. Although the market
does not price all externalities, the law does. We recognize as much when we permit a civil suit
to proceed against a paint company that long knew its product contained lead yet continued to
sell it to families, or against an oil company that failed to undertake the requisite safety checks
on a pipeline that subsequently burst. There is no reason why a different approach should obtain
in the human rights context.

Immunizing corporations that violate human rights from liability under the ATS undermines the
system of accountability for law-of-nations violations that the First Congress endeavored to
impose. It allows these entities to take advantage of the significant benefits of the corporate form
and enjoy fundamental rights, see, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ––––
, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014), without having to shoulder attendant fundamental
responsibilities.

I respectfully dissent.

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