KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW

CASE DIGESTS – 2015 - 2021

( Legal Counseling (7049) – Saturday )

Atty. Ian Kenneth Lucero

Submitted to:

Keziah Cyra B. Papas and Lloyd V. Sanchez

Submitted by:
Contents:

G.R. No. 219645. September 21, 2016.

VICTORIA CABBIGAT, petitioner, vs. JACINTO DUMULAG, respondent.

G.R. No. 164594. April 22, 2015.||

MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, petitioner, vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
ANGELITA LAGMAY, respondent

G.R. No. 230590. March 21, 2018

JANE C. SALERA, petitioner, vs. ANALYN VILLACERAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020

ANTONIO G. NGO, petitioner, vs. VISITACION GABELO, ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ,
EDUARDO TRAQUENA, ERLINDA TRAQUENA, ULISYS * MATEO, ALFONSO PLACIDO,
LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSANA ** RENDON, and MATEO TRINIDAD, respondents.

A.C. No. 12121. June 27, 2018

CELESTINO MALECDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, respondent.

A.C. No. 11814. April 23, 2018

JOSEL JAY M. NUYDA, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. NUEVA NUYDA JOSON, respondent

A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851 February 11, 2015

CHUA KENG SIN, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JOB M. MANGENTE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 54, NAVOTAS CITY

G.R. No. 217608. December 10, 2018.

ANTONIO DURAN AND EMMA DURAN, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ARCADIO B. INOFERIO, SR., ET
AL., accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 217609. December 10, 2018.

ARCADIO INOFERIO AND JUSTINIANA JALALON-INOFERIO, SUBSTITUTED BY THEIR
COMPULSORY HEIRS, NAMELY: JULIA J. INOFERIO-ALABASTRO, CRISTINA J. INOFERIO-AGOT,
ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ANTONIO DURAN AND EMMA DURAN, RURAL BANK OF
PAGADIAN, INC., REYNALDO B. REYES AND ERNESTO AGUILAR, accused-appellants.

G.R. No. 212987, August 06, 2018

ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO S. CAISIP, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193140, January 11, 2016

MILA GRACE PATACSIL PIOTROWSKI, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, VENUS G. PATACSIL, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA Q. DAPLIYAN, respondents.

A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017

EMMA G. ALFELOR, complainant, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, QUEZON CITY, respondent.

A.M. No. P-15-3347 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4067-P], July 29, 2015
AMADEL C. ABOS, Complainant, v. SALVADOR A. BORROMEO IV, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BR. 45, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 239727 G.R. No. 239727. July 24, 2019|
SPS. JULIAN BELVIS, SR., AND CECILIA BELVIS, SPS. JULIAN E. BELVIS, JR., AND JOCELYN
BELVIS, SPS. JULIAN E. BELVIS III AND ELSA BELVIS, AND JOUAN E. BELVIS, Petitioners
vs.
SPS. CONRADO V. EROLA AND MARILYN EROLA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAUREEN* FRIAS,
Respondents

G.R. No. 211966. August 7, 2017

JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN,
JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY ABAGATNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, Respondents
VICTORIA CABBIGAT, petitioner, vs. JACINTO DUMULAG, respondent.
G.R. No. 219645. September 21, 20167.

Facts:

The Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo issued an Arbitration Award on August 16, 2009 in favor of Dumulag
against Cabbigat. The parcel of land in dispute is awarded to Dumulag. Cabbigat on September 4, 2009
repudiated under oath before the Pangkat's "settlement agreement for arbitration" on the ground that her consent
was vitiated by fraud.

On December 2010, Dumulag sold a portion of the lot to Buyayo who immediately occupied the said
portion. Cabbigat filed an action for forcible entry against Buyayo in the MCTC. MCTC ruled in favor of
Buyayo. Cabbigat filed an appeal on the MCTC decision in the RTC. The RCTC ruled in favor of Cabbigat as
the rightful owner and possessor of the land in dispute, and ordered Buyayo out of the property and to cease and
desist from disturbing Cabbigat's peaceful possession.

Dumulag filed a petition for execution before the MCTC seeking the issuance of writ of execution to
enforce the Arbitration Award of the Pangkat Tagapagkasundo. Cabbigat filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss
arguing that Dumulag's petition lacked cause of action as the Arbitration Award was timely and properly
repudiated. Since the court upheld Cabbigat's ownership of the property against Buyayo's claim, the said
decision already became final and executory, res judicata had set in.

Undettered, Dumulag sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Review. The
Court of Appeals rendered decision in favor of Dumulag. According to the Court of Appeals, the Arbitration
Award already became final, with the force and effect of a final judgment, because Cabbigat failed to repudiate
the Arbitration Award within 10 days from the date of its execution.

Issue:

Is the Arbitration Award binding between the parties?

Held:

Yes, the Arbitration Award is binding between the parties.

PD 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules provides that failure to repudiate
the settlement or the arbitration agreement within the time limits respectively set, shall be deemed a waiver of
the right to challenge on grounds of fraud, violence, or intimidation. Any party, therefore, who fails to avail
himself of the remedy must face the consequences of the amicable settlement for he can no longer file an action
in court to redress his grievances arising from said settlement. Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement
within the ten-day period, petitioner is left with no recourse but to abide by its terms."

The Katarungang Pambarangay Circular No. 1, dated June 1, 1992, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations, further provides:

RULE VI
Amicable Settlement of Disputes

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Effect of settlement by arbitration or conciliation. — The amicable settlement and arbitration award
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from date of
 the settlement or date of receipt of the award, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition
for nullification of the award has been filed before the proper local trial court. cHDAIS

The arbitration award will have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of 10
days from date of receipt of the award, unless a petition for nullification of the award has been filed before
the appropriate trial court.

Cabbigat received a copy of the Arbitration Award dated August 16, 2009 on August 30, 2009. Cabbigat
had 10 days, or until September 9, 2009, to file a petition for nullification of said Award before the appropriate
trial court. This Cabbigat failed to do. Consequently, the Arbitration Award attained the force and effect of a final
judgment of a court.

Cabbigat argued that the Arbitration Award did not become final because she timely executed her
Repudiation dated September 4, 2009. Preceding from Cabbigat's argument, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated February 25, 2015, cited Section 418 of the Local Government Code of 1991, as amended, which states:

Sec. 418. Repudiation. — Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the date of settlement,
repudiate the same by filling with the lupon chairman a statement to that effect sworn to before him, where
the consent is vitiated by fraud, violence, or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for the
issuance of the certification for filing a complaint as hereinabove provided.

The Court of Appeals did not accord any legal effect to Cabbigat's Repudiation for it was executed
beyond the 10-day prescriptive period set in the foregoing provision.

Repudiation has no application at all in this case. What may be repudiated under the Local Government
Code of 1991, as amended, are: (1) an amicable settlement, as provided under Sections 416 and 418; and (2) an
agreement to arbitrate, per Section 413, in relation to Section 418, of the Local Government Code of 1991, as
amended.

settlement, as opposed to an arbitration award, are executed by the parties following the mediation
efforts of the Lupon Chairman or conciliation proceedings by the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. Mediation and
Conciliation are "interchangeable terms indicating the process whereby disputants are persuaded by the Punong
Barangay or Pangkat to amicably settle their disputes." 19 These are governed by Sections 408 to 412 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, as amended.

What is involved herein is an Arbitration Award by the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo (not an amicable
settlement), which can only be challenged by a party by the filing of a petition to nullify before the appropriate
trial court within 10 days from receipt of notice of such Award.
MICHAEL SEBASTIAN, petitioner, vs. ANNABEL LAGMAY NG, represented by her Attorney-in-fact,
ANGELITA LAGMAY, respondent
G.R. No. 164594. April 22, 2015.||

Facts:

Angelita, acting as representative of her daughter Annabel, filed before the Barangay a complaint for the
collection of sum of money from Michael by the amount of P350,000 that Annabel sent to Michael. Annabel and
Michael were once sweethearts and that they invested their financial resources to buy a truck. After their
relationship ended, Michael refused to return the money to Annabel, prompting the latter to bring the matter to
the Barangay Justice.

On July 9, 1997, the parties entered into an amicable settlement wherein Michael agreed to pay Annabel
the amount of P250,000 on specific dates. Angelita alleged that the kasunduan was not repudiated within a
period of ten (10) days from the settlement, in accordance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law embodied in
the Local Government Code of 1991. When Michael failed to honor the kasunduan, Angelita brought the matter
back to the Barangay, but the Barangay Captain failed to enforce the kasunduan, and instead, issued a
Certification to File Action.

After about one and a half years from the date of the execution of the kasunduan or on January 15, 1999,
Angelita filed with the MCTC, a Motion for Execution of the kasunduan. Michael argued that the action is in
violation of the rules since a civil case must be filed and not a motion for execution. MCTC still ruled in favor of
Annable.

Michael filed an appeal with the RTC arguing that grave abuse of discretion was made by prematurely
deciding the case. Michael argued that: (i) an amicable settlement or arbitration award can be enforced by the
Lupon within six (6) months from date of settlement or after the lapse of six (6) months, by ordinary civil action
in the appropriate City or Municipal Trial Court and not by a mere Motion for execution; and (ii) the MCTC
does not have jurisdiction over the case since the amount of P250,000.00 (as the subject matter of the
kasunduan) is in excess of MCTC's jurisdictional amount of P200,000.00.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the MCTC has the authority and jurisdiction to execute the kasunduan regardless of the
amount involved;

2. Whether or not the kasunduan could be given the force and effect of a final judgment; and

3. Whether or not the kasunduan can be enforced.

Held:

1. Section 417 of the Local Government Code that after the lapse of the six (6) month period from the date of the
settlement, the agreement may be enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for
the execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring
authority over these courts, Section 417 made no distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of
the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the
enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless of the amount. A basic
principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity.
2. Under Section 416 of the Local Government Code, the amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten (10) days from the date of its
execution, unless the settlement or award has been repudiated or a petition to nullify the award has been filed
before the proper city or municipal court.

Moreover, Section 14, Rule VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules states that the
party's failure to repudiate the settlement within the period of ten (10) days shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to challenge the settlement on the ground that his/her consent was vitiated by fraud, violence or intimidation.

In the present case, the records reveal that Michael never repudiated the kasunduan within the period
prescribed by the law. Hence, the CA correctly ruled that the kasunduan has the force and effect of a final
judgment that is ripe for execution.

Furthermore, the irregularities in the kasunduan's execution, and the claim of forgery are deemed waived
since Michael never raised these defenses in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Local
Government Code. Thus, we see no reason to discuss these issues in the present case.

3. Section 417. Execution. — The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the
lupon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be
enforced by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.

Angelita chose to enforce the kasunduan under the second mode and filed a motion for execution. It is
undisputed that what Angelita filed before the MCTC was captioned "motion for execution," rather than a
petition/complaint for execution.

A perusal of the motion for execution, however, shows that it contains the material requirements of an
initiatory action.

The motion is sufficient in form and substance. It is complete with allegations of the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action; the names and residences of the plaintiff and the defendant; it contains the
prayer for the MCTC to order the execution of the kasunduan; and there was also a verification and certification
against forum shopping.

It is well-settled that what are controlling in determining the nature of the pleading are the allegations in
the body and not the caption.
JANE C. SALERA, petitioner, vs. ANALYN VILLACERAN, respondent.||
G.R. No. 230590. March 21, 2018

Facts:

Villaceran, respondent, occupied and leased a building located at Pagadian City. In June 2009, the
building was razed by fire, respondent renovated it and reinforced the fence with galvanized iron sheets. On
Nevember 2012, Salera, who owned the adjoining lot, removed the fence and constructed her own concrete
fence below the floor occupied by the Villaceran. Salera sent to Villaceran a demand to vacate a portion of
property the latter was occupying.

Villaceran filed a complaint for forcible netry against Salera in the MTCC of Pagadian. The MTCC
rendered judgment in favor of the respondent and ordered the petitioner to remove or demolish at her expense
the concrete fence constructed below the two-storey building leased by respondent.

Salera appealed the ruling questioning whether or not the complaint should have been dismissed for
failure of Villaceran to refer the matter to the Katarungan Pambarangay prior to the filing of the complaint in
court.

Issue:

Whether the complaint should have been referred first to the Katarungan Pambarangay prior to filing in court?

Held:

The case is exempt from the requirement because it included a provisional remedy.

In Administrative Circular No. 14-93, issued by the Court, relevantly provided as follows:

All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
(formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec.
515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991), and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in the
following disputes:

xxx xxx xxx

8. Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued, specifically the following:

xxx xxx xxx

c. Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property and support during the pendency of the action; and

xxx xxx xxx

The failure of the respondent to comply with the requirement for prior barangay conciliation was not fatal to her
complaint.
ANTONIO G. NGO, petitioner, vs. VISITACION GABELO, ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ,
EDUARDO TRAQUENA, ERLINDA TRAQUENA, ULISYS * MATEO, ALFONSO PLACIDO,
LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSANA ** RENDON, and MATEO TRINIDAD, respondents.
G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020

Facts:

On September 24, 2008, Ngo filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch 45, a complainant 6 for recovery
of possession of a parcel of land against Gabelo. In his complaint, Ngo alleged that he is the lawful and absolute
owner of the subject property. He averred that despite several demands, Gabelo, refused to vacate the lot.

Gabelo in his answer with affirmative defense claims that Ngo has no legal personality to sue. He
insisted that Ngo failed to comply with the condition precedent for filing the action since he failed to bring the
matter to the barangay for conciliation.

The trial court held that, considering that Ngo admitted that the case did not undergo the required
barangay conciliation proceedings before it was filed with the court, the complaint should be dismissed
accordingly for lack of cause of action. Necessarily, the trial court was empowered to motu proprio dismiss the
complaint for Ngo's failure to comply with the rules.

Ngo filed his Motion for Reconsideration and alleged that while the trial court indeed had the power to
dismiss the complaint due to his failure to refer the case to barangay conciliation, the RTC also had the discretion
to simply suspend the proceedings and to refer the case to barangay conciliation instead of dismissing outright
the complaint.

Issue:

Can non-compliance with the barangay conciliation requirement be referred back to the barangay and have the
case on-hold?

Held:

No. Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160), or the Local Government Code of 1991, provides that barangay
conciliation proceedings is a pre-condition to filing a complaint in court between persons actually residing in the
same barangay to explore possible amicable settlement.

The Local Government Code provides under Section 412. Conciliation:

(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has
been repudiated by the parties thereto.

The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the
same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the
vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.

The case was never referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa for conciliation. Gabelo successfully prevented the trial
court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by timely invoking the ground in their answer as an affirmative
defense.
CELESTINO MALECDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, respondent.|
A.C. No. 12121. June 27, 2018

Facts:

Malecdan filed a complaint for Estafa against Spouses James and Joesphine Baldo before the Lupon. Atty. Baldo
appeared as counsel of the spouses Baldo during the hearing on the subject before the punong barangay.
Malecdan filed a complaint against Atty. Baldo before the IBP praying for proper sanctions.

Atty. Baldo admitted that he was present during the proceedings before the Punong Barangay. He explained that
he was permitted by the parties to participate in the said hearing.

Malecdan denied the claim of Atty Baldo and pointed out that the lawyer used his influence upon the Punong
Barangay and Barangay Secretary to let him participate in the proceedings intended to settle the grievances of
Malecdan and Spouses James and Josephin Baldo.

Issue:

Is the presence of a lawyer as counsel in the conciliation proceedings with the Punong Barangay allowed?

Held:

No. Lawyers are prohibited in conciliation proceedings pursuant to the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation of the parties because:

"x x x

a personal confrontation between the parties without the intervention of a counsel or representative would
generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In other
words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay
level."

xxx xxx xxx

To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the
effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted
provision is couched in mandatory language.

Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay in
violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in connection with
Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and Josephine Baldo in a hearing before
the Punong Barangay
JOSEL JAY M. NUYDA, JR., petitioner, vs. ATTY. NUEVA NUYDA JOSON, respondent
A.C. No. 11814. April 23, 2018

Facts:

Complainant, Josel Nuyda, claims that his and respondent's families inherited the subject lot from their
predecessors since respondent is the paternal cousing of complainant's father. Respondent, Atty. Nueva Nuyda-
Joson denies this, asserting that she and her nine siblings inherited the lot from their father whose name is
registered in the TCT.

Respondent avers that out of compassion, their father (Faustino) allowed his brother (Elias) and his
family to occupy a house on a portion of the lot free of rent and even after her parents' death, she and her siblings
allowed them to stay on the property rent-free with the agreement that Elias' family would vacate the lot when he
passes away. After the death of Elias, respondent and her siblings permitted complainant and his aunts, Alegria
and Zorayda to stay but only until the end of January 2009 as they intended to build their retirement homes on
the lot. When asked to leave, the complainants insisted on being paid "displacement fees".

Summons was served on complainants to appear before the Barangay Lupon for an ejectment case.
Complainant answered the summons, assailing respondent's personality to bring the issue before the Lupon
because she was not a resident of the barangay and she was a lawyer.

Issue:

Was there misuse of the Katarungang Pambarangay proceedings where the respondent was not an actual resident
of the barangay and was a lawyer, knowing the prohibition against lawyers appearing before the Lupon?

Held:

No. There was no misuse of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

Complainant's assertion that respondent misused the Katarungang Pambarangay law lacks merit. The
rule that lawyers cannot appear in barangay conciliations does not apply when the lawyer himself/herself is the
party to the case. Contrary to complainant's claim, respondent did not disguise herself as a complainant before
the barangay. As the barangay blotter showed, she filed her complaint as heir to/owner of her father's property
and as the representative of her co-heirs/co-owners. Complainant himself acknowledged that respondent had
material interest in the property. Furthermore, invocation of the Lupon's jurisdiction by a party who is not an
actual resident of the barangay does not ipso facto indicate misuse of the Katarungang Pambarangay law.
Complainant has not shown that respondent maliciously resorted to barangay conciliation to cause undue injury
to him and his aunts. Respondent averred that she brought the case to the Barangay so that her agreement with
Alegria could be formally documented. She also averred that Alegria had agreed to finalize the matter of
compensation/displacement fee during a barangay conciliation. It has been held that an administrative case
against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof.
CHUA KENG SIN, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JOB M. MANGENTE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 54, NAVOTAS CITY
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1851 February 11, 2015

Facts:

Chua Keng Sin and his brother, Victorio Chua, separately filed their complaints for slight physical injury
against each other before the Lupon of Barangay Bangkulasi, Navotas City. When Victorio Chua learned that his
complaint would be considered as a counterclaim, since it was filed later that Chua Keng Sin, he decided not to
attend the scheduled hearing. Victorio filed a complaint for attempted murder against his brother.

The Lupon issued a certification to file Action in favor of Sin, and a certification to bar
Action/Counterclaim, dated March 3, 2009, against Victorio due to his failure or refusal to appear in the hearing
before the Lupon.

Both brothers were charged with slight physical injuries. The case was raffled to Branch 54 of MTC
Navotas City, presided by Judge Mangente. Sin moved for the dismissal of the criminal case against him on the
ground that it was filed without the required certification to file action. Judge Mangente denied Sin’s Motion to
dismiss.

Issue:

Whether or not the Judge Mangente’s refusal to grant Sin’s Motion to Dismiss violative of Sec. 412 of the Local
Government Code, which prohibits the filing or institution of a complaint petition, action, or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon directly in court of any other government offices for
adjudication?

Held:

Yes. Judge Mangente is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Section 412 of the Local Government Code prohibits the filing or institution of a complaint, petition,
action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon directly in court of any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before the Lupon.

The Court affirms the findings of the Court Administrator that Judge Mangente’s handling of the
Criminal Case 10-13570 showed poor judgment or injudicious. He cannot use as an excuse that it was due to the
bulk of his work and being a newly appointed judge considering the extent of his experience as public attorney
and as prosecutor. The rules he failed to observe were basic and elementary that he should have been aware of
the well-settled doctrines.

The Court have previously held that when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply
apply the law. "Anything less is gross ignorance of the law." There is gross ignorance of the law when an error
committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge
ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.
ANTONIO DURAN AND EMMA DURAN, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ARCADIO B. INOFERIO, SR., ET
AL., accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 217608. December 10, 2018.

ARCADIO INOFERIO AND JUSTINIANA JALALON-INOFERIO, SUBSTITUTED BY THEIR

COMPULSORY HEIRS, NAMELY: JULIA J. INOFERIO-ALABASTRO, CRISTINA J. INOFERIO-
AGOT, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. ANTONIO DURAN AND EMMA DURAN, RURAL BANK OF
PAGADIAN, INC., REYNALDO B. REYES AND ERNESTO AGUILAR, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 217609. December 10, 2018.

Facts:

Duran filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application on 465 sq.m., which includes Cabrera and Inoferio’s lot,
on April 14, 1994. The application was granted and a patent was issued. The land was registered under the name
of Duran. Inoferio filed an adverse claim on July 30, 1996. The day after filing of the adverse claim, Duran
executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the property in favor of Rural Bank of Pagadian.

Inoferio filed a complaint before the Barangay on July 30, 1996 for barangay conciliation. Cabrera
followed suit on October 1, 1996. Duran failed to appear and instead filed a complaint for quieting of title with
preliminary injunction against Inoferio on August 29, 1996.

Issue:

Whether or not Duran’s complaint is exempt from the ambit of Katarungan Pambarangay Law as his
complaint sought for a provisional remedy of preliminary injunction?

Held:

No. The complaint is not exempt from the ambit of the Katarungan Pambarangay Law

The Local Government Code provides under Section 412. Conciliation -

(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court. - The parties may go directly to
xxx

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

xxx

The Court ruled that a reading and scrutiny of Duran’s complaint that the prayer of preliminary
injunction is baseless, since there is no actual relief for preliminary injunction prayed for. Duran failed to prove
the presence of the elements of preliminary injunction, and even failed to recite the requisites of preliminary
injunction. The prayer for preliminary injunction was a recital of general allegations, and merely a ploy to avoid
going under the ambit of the Katarungan Pambarangay
ELIZABETH M. LANSANGAN, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO S. CAISIP, Respondent.
G.R. No. 212987, August 06, 2018

Facts:

Elizabeth Lansangan filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Antonio Caisip before the
MCTC of Capas-Bambam-Concepcion. Lansangan is a resident of Camanse Street, Purok 4, Rose Park,
Concepsion, Tarlac; Antonio Caisip , a resident of Barangay Sto.Niño, Concepcion, Tarlac.

Caisip failed to file any responsive pleading, Lansangan moved to declare him in default and for the
MCTC to render judgment.

MTC motu proprio dismissed without prejudiced the complaint for failure to comply with the provision
of the Local Government Code of 1991, which requires the prior referral of the disputes between residents of the
same barangay for conciliation proceedings before the filing of the case in court.

The RTC and CA affirmed the motu proprio dismissal of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of the lower court?

Held:

No. The Court of Appeals is correct in affirming the dismissal.

As a general rule, grounds for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court must be invoked by the
party-litigant at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise, such grounds are
deemed waived. As an exception, however, the courts may order the motu proprio dismissal of a case on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata, and prescription of action,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint was anchored on Lansangan's failure to refer
the matter for barangay conciliation proceedings which in certain instances, is a condition precedent before filing
a case in court.

In Aquino v. Aure, the Court clarified that such conciliation process is not a jurisdictional requirement,
such that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

In Banares II v. Balising, it was mentioned that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when
so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised
seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading.

The ground of non-compliance with a condition precedent, i.e., undergoing prior barangay conciliation
proceedings, was not invoked at the earliest opportunity, as in fact, Caisip was declared in default for failure to
file a responsive pleading despite due notice. Therefore, it was grave error for the courts a quo to order the
dismissal of petitioner's complaint on said ground. Hence, in order to rectify the situation, the Court finds it
proper that the case be reinstated and remanded to the MCTC, which is the court of origin, for its resolution on
the merits.
MILA GRACE PATACSIL PIOTROWSKI, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, VENUS G. PATACSIL,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA Q. DAPLIYAN, respondents.||
G.R. No. 193140, January 11, 2016

Facts:

The dispute involved a parcel of land located at Barangay Saytan, Pugo, La Union. The land was
allegedly registered under the names of Simeon and his late wife Petra Ternate-Dapliyan between respondent
Gina Dapliyan against her father Simeon Dapliyan.

The RTC found that Dapliyan failed to exert earnest efforts to compromise with her father as required by
the Family Code and the Rules on Katarungang Pambarangay. The RTC thus dismissed the original complaint
against Simeon.

Dapliyan alleged that Simeon sold portions of the undivided land to Piotrowski in 2002. She averred that
Simeon and Piotrowski made it appear that her mother who died in 1992 signed the Deeds of Absolute Sale.
Dapliyan further claimed that Piotrowski registered the falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale with the Office of the
Register of Deeds and consequently took possession of the lots.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC acted properly in dismissing the case against Simeon.

Ruling:

Yes. The RTC dismissed the re-amended complaint against Simeon because there was no proof that the case
passed through the barangay conciliation proceedings, a condition precedent before judicial action.
EMMA G. ALFELOR, complainant, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, QUEZON CITY, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017

Facts:

Before the court is an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Administrator by
Complainant against respondent for ignorance of the law, incompetence and manifest bias and partiality in
connection with the Decision in Criminal Case No. 37-139993, wherein Alfelor was the accused.

Alfelor thereafter received a copy of the Decision dated January 30, 2012 in the subject criminal case,
where Judge Diaz convicted her of violation of BP Blg. 22 not only for the subject check, but also for the nine
(9) other checks which were the subjects of the BP Big. 22 cases raffled to MeTC 43, and where she was already
previously acquitted by Judge Sta. Cruz. 

Astonished by the outcome of the subject criminal case, Alfelor appealed the Decision to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC), and filed with the OCA the instant complaint for gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence and manifest bias and partiality against Judge Diaz.
In his Comment and Supplemental Comment, Judge Diaz acknowledged his grave error and profusely
apologized to Alfelor for his lapses. He attributed it to plain oversight on his part and heavy caseload. He
explained that he was in haste in making the decision and relied heavily on the evidence of the prosecution in
deciding the case. He also stated that he could have made the necessary correction had the parties pointed out
that only one (1) check was involved in the case. In addition, Judge Diaz confirmed with this Court that the
decision in the subject criminal case is pending appeal before the RTC. Judge Diaz expressed his remorse and
asked for clemency, stressing that this was the first time he committed such an error in all his years in the
judiciary.

Issue:

Whether or not there was ignorance of the law, incompetence and manifest bias and partiality committed by the
respondent.

Ruling:

Yes. In Chua Keng Sin v. Mangente, the Court found Judge Job Mangente guilty of gross ignorance of
the law when he carelessly denied the Motion to Dismiss the case for Slight Physical Injuries filed against Chua
Keng Sin by his brother, Victorio Chua, despite the obvious lack of a Certificate to File Action from
the Lupon of the barangay as required under the Local Government Code's provisions on Katarungang
Pambarangay and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The Court did not consider
Judge Mangente's excuse of heavy caseload and his being a newly appointed judge, "considering the extent of
his experience as public attorney for nine (9) years and as prosecutor for twelve (12) years" for his failure to
observe such basic and elementary rules, thus:

Respondent was careless in disposing the Motions filed by complainant, in a criminal case no less. The
Office of the Court Administrator correctly underscores that his experience as a public attorney and prosecutor
should have ingrained in him well-settled doctrines and basic tenets of law. He cannot be relieved from the
consequences of his actions simply because he was newly appointed and his case load was heavy. These
circumstances are not unique to him. His careless disposition of the motions is a reflection of his competency as
a judge in discharging his official duties.
AMADEL C. ABOS, Complainant, v. SALVADOR A. BORROMEO IV, CLERK III, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BR. 45, SAN JOSE, OCCIDENTAL MINDORO, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-15-3347 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4067-P], July 29, 2015

Facts:

Amadel C. Abos (Abos), a resident of Barangay Rumbang, Rizal, Occidental Mindoro, filed
a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pagdedemanda (Complaint-Affidavit)1dated January 29, 2013 before the Office of
the Court Administrator. The Complaint-Affidavit, written in the vernacular, alleged that Abos was the daughter
of Letecia Cadut Abos, the shared tenant of an eight-hectare agricultural land in Barangay Rumbang, Rizal,
Occidental Mindoro. The property was previously owned by Rafael Mondofiedo and was allegedly entrusted to
Abos' grandfather, Vicente Cadut, Sr., and was under the tenancy of her mother, Letecia Cadut Abos, and sister,
Jocelyn.

Abos alleged that on January 19, 2013 at around 1:30 p.m., Salvador A. Borromeo IV (Borromeo), Clerk
III, Branch 45, Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, together with a member of the Philippine
Army known only as "July," and one Elvie Magbanua, arrived in the property and uprooted 150 coconut
seedlings.4She also alleged that July threatened to kill her and her family if they did not leave the property.

The Office of the Court Administrator found that Borromeo should not have acted in a scandalous
manner but instead should have sought judicial remedies to assert his right over the property. It also found that
while Borromeo admitted to uprooting the coconut seedlings, there was no evidence presented to prove that he
threatened to kill Abos or her family.

Issue:

Whether or not Borromeo should be held liable.

Ruling:

Yes. Borromeo carried with him the title and status of his office as he supported and defended one of the parties
in a dispute that had not yet even been resolved in the proper manner. There was no advice given to avail
themselves of the provisions of the Local Government Code on Katarungang Pambarangay. As a court
employee, he should have been aware that there was a judicial remedy. Least of all, he should have accorded
each of the parties a modicum of fairness. He works for an institution that is founded on due process, the
opportunity to be heard in a civil and dispassionate manner. 

Borromeo as Clerk III of Branch 45, Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro violated this
public stewardship. He violated the public's trust. He must thus be penalized not merely to remind him of his
duties, but also to repair the embarrassment he caused in the community he disturbed.

While Borromeo's acts are not connected to his official functions as a Clerk III of the Regional Trial
Court of San Jose, he is, first and foremost, a public servant. As a public servant, he is bound by the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6713 to exhibit the highest degree of professionalism not only in his official duties but also
in his personal endeavors. As a court employee, he is expected to uphold the image of the judiciary not only
within the confines of the Hall of Justice but also in his personal dealings with the public.
SPS. JULIAN BELVIS, SR., AND CECILIA BELVIS, SPS. JULIAN E. BELVIS, JR., AND JOCELYN
BELVIS, SPS. JULIAN E. BELVIS III AND ELSA BELVIS, AND JOUAN E. BELVIS, Petitioners
vs.
SPS. CONRADO V. EROLA AND MARILYN EROLA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAUREEN* FRIAS,
Respondents
G.R. No. 239727 G.R. No. 239727. July 24, 2019|

Facts:

The instant case stems from a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages filed by respondents, as
represented by their attorney-in-fact, Maureen Frias (Maureen). In their complaint, respondents alleged that they
are owners of a 29,772 sq. m.-lot situated in Barangay Malag-it, Pontevedra, Capiz. Lot 597 (subject property) is
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26108 and a tax declaration, both in the name of respondent
Conrado V. Erola (Conrado), who allegedly purchased the same in October of 1978. As the parties were close
relatives, i.e., petitioner Cecilia Erola-Bevis (Cecilia) being the sister of respondent Conrado, respondents
allegedly allowed petitioners to possess the lot, subject to the condition that they would vacate the same upon
demand.

Respondents sent petitioners a letter requiring the latter to vacate the property within 30 days from
receipt of the letter. Petitioners, however, refused to comply. After unsuccessful barangay conciliation
proceedings, respondents filed the instant complaint. In their Answer, petitioners further claimed that
respondents failed to personally appear during the barangay conciliation proceedings and that their
representative, Maureen, had no authority to appear on their behalf.

The MCTC held that although petitioners claimed that respondents failed to personally appear during the
mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings, the Office of the Punong Barangay nevertheless issued a
Certification to File Action in accordance with Section 412 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160.23 Further, the case
was referred to Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) during pre-trial but the parties still failed to amicably settle
the same.

On appeal, the RTC held that despite the non-appearance of respondents, the parties failed to arrive at a
settlement before the Office of the Punong Barangay, the PMC and even before the court during Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) proceedings. In fact, the Certification to File Action was issued upon agreement of the parties.
Thus, the RTC relaxed the technical rules of procedure and held that a remand of the case would be
unnecessarily circuitous.

The CA denied the petition and found that respondents substantially complied with R.A. 7160, that their
failure to personally appear was a mere irregularity and that the same did not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
In either case, the CA held that it was not disputed that the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement of the
dispute.

Issue:

Whether respondents complied with the mandatory conciliation proceedings under R.A. 7160

Ruling:

Yes. Section 412 of R.A. 7160 requires, when applicable, prior resort to barangay conciliation proceedings as a
pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court. In Lumbuan v. Ronquillo, the Court explained:
The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, is to reduce the number of court litigations
and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing
of cases in the courts. To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 requires the parties to
undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint
in court, thus:

SECTION 412. Conciliation.

(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving

any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the
lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman [or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto].

In relation thereto, Section 415 of the same law holds that the parties must personally appear in said
proceedings, without the assistance of counsel or any representative. Failure to comply with the barangay
conciliation proceedings renders the complaint vulnerable to a motion to dismiss for prematurity under Section
10), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

Although mandatory, the Court, in Lansangan v. Caisip, explained that "non-referral of a case for
barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature, and may therefore be
deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading."
In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondents failed to personally appear during the conciliation
proceedings as required by Section 415 of R.A. 7160. They were, however, represented by Maureen. Although
dismissible under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Court finds that respondents have substantially
complied with the law.

The CA, the RTC, and the MCTC unanimously found that petitioners and respondents' representative
underwent barangay conciliation proceedings. Unfortunately, they failed to arrive at any amicable settlement.
Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Office of the Punong Barangay issued a Certification to File
Action. During pre-trial, the parties again underwent mediation before the PMC and JDR before the court. Still,
no settlement was reached. Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the purposes of the law, i.e., to provide
avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent the "indiscriminate filing of cases in the
courts," have been sufficiently met. Considering that the instant complaint for unlawful detainer, an action
governed by the rules of summary procedure, has been pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the
technical rules of procedure in the interest of speedy and substantial justice.
JOSE AUDIE ABAGATNAN, JOSEPHINE A. PARCE, JIMMY ABAGATNAN, JOHN ABAGATNAN,
JENALYN A.DELEON, JOEY ABAGATNAN, JOJIE ABAGATNAN, and JOY
ABAGATNAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO and ELSA CLARITO, Respondents,
G.R. No. 211966. August 7, 2017|||

Facts:

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damagesagainst respondents before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Roxas City, where they claimed to have been unlawfully
deprived of the use and possession of a portion of their land.

Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a pre-
condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas City. Specifically,
petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan (Jimmy) resided in Laguna, while petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon (Jenalyn)
resided in Pasig City.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory

requirement that cannot be dispensed with, considering that Jimmy and J enalyn had already executed a Special
Power of Attomey (SPA) in favor of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine A. Paree (Josephine), who is a
resident of Roxas City.

The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to remove the structures
they erected on the subject property and to vacate the same.

On appeal to the the RTC, it held that the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be brought
on appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order.

The CA dismissed the petitioners' Complaint, albeit without prejudice, for lack of prior referral to
the Katarungang Pambarangay. It pointed out that majority of petitioners actually resided in Barangay Cogon,
Roxas City, while the two non-residents of Roxas City already executed an SP A in favor of Josephine, whom
they authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents. Since respondents also
reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within the ambit of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa's (Lupon) authority.

Issue:

Whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the prior barangay conciliation
requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same
city or municipality.

Ruling:

Yes.

x x x Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court, thus:

SECTION 412. Conciliation - (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
 reached as certified by the lupon or pangkat secretary and attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman [or
unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto. x x x]

The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes," subject to
certain exceptions enumerated in the law.

One such exception is in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to
submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.

Thus, parties who do not actually reside in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays are not
required to submit their dispute to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court.
In Pascual v. Pascual, the Court ruled that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC
pertains specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. It further explained that said requirement cannot be
construed to apply to the attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a "real
party in interest" as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

The same ruling was reiterated in Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz where the Court held that "the
requirement under Section 412 of the [LGC] that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a
precondition to its filing in court applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in
the same city or municipality."

In the present case, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties
in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while Jenalyn
resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral
of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.

This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their sister and co-
petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings before the MTCC. As
previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest is irrelevant in so far as the
"actual residence" requirement under the LGC for prior barangay conciliation is concerned.

Besides, as the RTC correctly pointed out, the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be
brought on appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order.