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71 views25 pages

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Glen Mar Gamboa
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Science, Equity, and the War against Carbon

Author(s): Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen


Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter, 2003), pp. 69-92
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Science, Equity,and
the War against Carbon

Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen
Hull University

The scientific evidence is reviewedfor claims that a global transitionto "green"fuels


and technologiesby global treatyobligations is needed. Thelikelyequityimplicationsof
these effortsare discussed, and it is argued that this evidence remainsshaky.Measures
based on this contestedknowledgecannotbe defendedon groundsof eitherenvironmen-
tal effectivenessor equity.Rather,theyrelyon commercialexpectationsand promisesof
secondary (no regretor win-win) benefits usually requiringstate intervention.Poorer
groups and nations are unlikelyto benefitfrom proposals to redirectenergypolicies to
"combatglobal warming."Theadvocateddecarbonizationof global energysupplies is
morelikelyto increasepolitical instabilitythanpreventclimatic change. Tosupportthis
argument,three areas of knowledgeare consulted: controversiesabout the causation
and likely impactsof global warming,advocatedtechnicalandfiscal solutions, and the
interestsof technical, commercial, and political elites.

The claims thatthe combustionof fossil fuels is endangeringthe planet,


thatmajoremission reductionsareneededto preventplanetarywarming,and
thatthese reductionsare achievableat tolerableeconomic andpoliticalcosts
are rejectedand attributedprimarilyto the ambitionsof bureaucraciesfund-
ing the "underpinning"research.A climate protectiontreatythat promises
more equity between countriescould be devised but only if based on a more
skepticalapproachto the role and fundingof science and technology.

The Issue

Since the mid-1980s, therehave been efforts to mitigateclimate change,


or ratherglobal warming, by reducing the emission of greenhouse gases
(ghgs), particularlycarbondioxide (CO2),generatedby the combustionof
fossil fuels.' The legal basis is the FrameworkConvention on Climate
Change(FCCC)of 1992 andits KyotoProtocolof 1997. The treatyis in force
and aims to stabilizeghg concentrationsin the atmosphereat an unspecified

Science, Technology,& HumanValues, Vol. 28 No. 1, Winter2003 69-92


DOI: 10.1177/0162243902238496
? 2003 Sage Publications

69
70 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

but nondangerouslevel, while the protocol, not yet in force, proposes net
emission-reduction targets for industrialized countries only. Problems
include how to identify how much-if any-of the predicted warming is
attributableto humanactionandhence amenableto "policy"interventionand
whatto do aboutexpectedfutureemission increasesin developingcountries.
Big science researchcontinuesin a handfulof countries,and its findings are
summarizedfor policy makers at convenient intervalsby the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).Its scientific consensus is said to
"underpin"the Kyoto process.
Negotiationsbased on the assumptionsof humanattributionand danger-
ous futureincreasesin ghgs succeededonly in 2001 in makingrecommenda-
tions on how to implementthe protocol to the first meeting of the partiesto
the protocol.This is to take place in 2002 providedthatthe requiredcondi-
tions are satisfied. The most recent negotiationstook place at the Hague in
2000, in Bonn in 2001, and Marrakeshin 2001 and have greatlydilutedthe
objectives sought by environmentalistsand the EuropeanUnion (EU). The
United States has withdrawnfrom the protocol, and developing countries,
whileseekingaidundertheprotocol,havenotagreedto anyemission-reduction
obligations(EnvironmentalDataServices 2001). The UnitedStates,the larg-
est emitter of ghgs, justifies its position as a principledstand against UN-
dominatedglobal governanceandwith referenceto economic unfairnessand
scientific uncertainty(Bush 2001, 391).2In contrast,the EU and the United
Kingdomremainwholeheartedsupportersof the protocoland do so largely
with reference to science. What is going on scientifically and politically?
Who is likely to gain from emission reduction?
To answerthesequestions,the climateconvention,its protocol,andsubse-
quentnegotiationsare reviewed, and the logic of these efforts is outlined.A
critiquefollows, outliningthe uncertaintiesand assumptionsunderlyingthe
hypothesisof anthropogeniccausation.The institutionalsourceof this scien-
tific consensus,the IPCC,is exploredto understandthe sourcesof its bias and
influence. Economic and equity issues arising from the proposedsolutions
are identified and supportedby an outline of bureaucraticresponses so far
(WorldBank, EU, and United Kingdom).

The Theory
While agreeingthatsocial realityandknowledgeproductionarenot inde-
pendent and that naturalscience cannot be separatedfrom how concrete
materialinterestsare defined, this articleis a plea againstexcessive relativ-
ism or the view of science as mere social construct.The ideal thattruthabout
naturecan be discovered by science should be upheld, if only to protect
/ TheWaragainstCarbon 71
Boehmer-Christiansen

science from misuse by vested interestsand moralists,environmentalideol-


ogy included. Allowed to progress without excessive steering by interests,
researchmay lead towardtruth.I hope to demonstratethatscience can indeed
be constructed,if well funded,to serveparticularpoliticallydeterminedends
(Proctor1991). Referringto narrativesemergingfrom science and technol-
ogy studies about the common production of knowledge, the normative
stance adoptedhere is

to rendermorevisiblethe connectionsandthe unseenpatternsthatmodem


societieshaveoftentakenpainsto conceal,oftenby enlistingtheunquestion-
ableforces of the physicalworldas representedby thevoices of scientists-seers
or as hardenedinto obedientmachines. (Jasanoff1996, 413)

The Climate Treaty and Its Kyoto Protocol

Stabilizationof global emission at 1990 levels-assuming thatthese can


be known-was the target of the FCCC.3In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol, an
instrument to implement the convention, proposed emission targets
expressedas percentageof totalnationalnetemissions measuredfroma 1990
baseline for developed countries and economies in transition.Developing
countries,where the greatestemission growthis expectedin the future,have
refused to accept emission targets.Organizationfor Economic Cooperation
andDevelopment(OECD)countriesandthe formerUSSR agreed,once rati-
fication had taken place, to reduce their net emissions by differentiated
amountsbetween2008 and2012 to achievea global cut of 5.2 percentof CO2
emissions below 1990 levels. This might be comparedto the 60 percentcut
advocatedby environmentalistsand some scientists.4The protocolwill only
become binding if at least fifty-five governments,whose 1990 emissions
amountto 55 percentof the world'stotal,ratify.At the end of 2001, forty-two
countrieshadratified,but none of these were majorindustrialcountries.The
EU ensuredthatall its membershadratifiedby Julythis year,whenJapanand
Canadaalso promisedto ratifyin the future,makingthe entryinto force of the
much dilutedprotocollikely. The United StatesandAustralia,and of course
all developingcountries,continueto refuseto acceptemissionreductionobli-
gations.The EU was preparedto makelargeconcessions to achievethis. But
from a green perspective,the Kyoto Protocolis now fatally flawed by these
concessions. They include the acceptanceof carbon "sinks,"that is, emis-
sions "sequestered"by assortedlanduse changes,suchas the plantingof new
forests or forgoing planned land clearance;of large-scale emission trading
and aided technology transfer;and the abandonmentof strongcompliance
72 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

rules. The pressureon reducingemissions from energy sectorshas been sig-


nificantlyreduced.
"Flexiblemechanisms"areto be employedgloballyto securecost-effective
reductions,but this will requirethe participationof developing countries.
One instrumentstill being negotiatedis the clean developmentmechanism
(CDM)thatis to aid greenenergydevelopments.Nuclearpoweras a solution
deservingaid remainsexcluded.Presumably,nucleardevelopmentsandreli-
ance on domestic coal might challenge the competitiveness of aid-giving
nations,but the official explanationis environmental.Jointimplementation
and emission trading,on the otherhand, work only between countrieswith
mandatoryemission targets.Theypromiseto transferfinanceandtechnology
to inefficientenergyproducersbutareaccompaniedby calls for the abolition
of fossil fuel subsidies.More efficient and less carbon-intensivetechnology
is the solution the Kyoto process tries to implementworldwide.5
In the rhetoricof the negotiations,OECD countrieswith high past emis-
sions are treatedas villains and had to show willingness to reduceemission
growthimmediately.Countriessuch as Chinaand Indiawith low past emis-
sions and low currentper capita values but high economic growthrates are
the villains of the future.They areundergreatpressureto forgo conventional
technologies and fuels in the future.The likely impactsof this green energy
agenda,includingmore expensive transportsystems for poor countriesand
poorersectorsin all countriesandthose heavily dependenton coal, have not,
to my knowledge,been openly negotiatedor well researched.Rather,bodies
such as the EU and many individual nations have undertakendomestic
energy policy reforms and encourage innovation with reference to their
global emission obligations. The measuresbeing tested at variousnational
levels include subsidies and taxes, energy efficiency standards,emission
trading,and, most recently,the inclusion of carbonsinks in nationalcarbon
accounting.The searchfor sanctionsfor noncompliancecontinues.If imple-
mentedglobally,these measureswouldtransformenergysectorsat enormous
cost butunevenly:severalpercentagepointsof GNP areusuallysuggested.6
Analysis of nationalpositions in the climate negotiationsdemonstrates
that these were shapednot by any futureclimate but by concerns over eco-
nomic futures:development,aid, andtrade.The core issue facing negotiators
remainshow to shareburdensfairly andpreventothersfrombenefitingfrom
the pain of losers. To disguise opportunitiesand presentthem as pain to be
bornfor the sake of the planetis anotherstrategycreatingproblems.7Equity
between statesbut not people predictablybecame the majorissue as negotia-
tions moved from principlesto the instrumentsof implementation.
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 73

The Origin of the Climate Treaty

A morecarbon-richatmospherewas welcomed as enhancingplantgrowth


and fertility when first predictedin the late nineteenthcentury,and some
research groups support this position today (http://www.co2science.org).
Researchinto the subjectof increasedCO2and climate changerelatesto the
development of global climate change models from weather forecasting
since the 1960s. The possibility of warmingwas noted duringthe 1930s but
dismissed as unimportantbecause of the expected developmentof nuclear
power. In the 1970s, the troublednuclearindustry,followed by researchers
into renewable energy technologies and energy efficiency, discovered the
threatof futureplanetarycatastropheand transformedit into opportunities
(Boehmer-Christiansen1997, 1999; Boehmer-Christiansenand Kellow
2002). Theirvehicle was the famous BrundtlandReportthatproposeda cli-
mate treatyand global researchagendas.
Since the early 1980s, technicalexpertshave arguedthatalternativefuels
could replace coal, oil, and gas as these were runningout or becoming too
expensive.The same alternativeswould soon serve "climatechange"mitiga-
tion: the warmingthreatwas preventableby measuresthat would exclude
fossil fuels or keep theirprice high. Alternativeenergy expertsinitiatedand
were partof the IPCCprocess (see below) from the start-the solution con-
structedthe problem. The World Bank and most other global institutions
greeneda little later.In 1987, the TorontoConferencecalled for a 20 percent
reduction in ghg emissions though a 60 percent reduction had been dis-
cussed. At the 1992 EarthSummit,the climate treatywas signed and some
aid made available through the Global EnvironmentFacility (GEF). The
"South"remainedsuspicious.
The decarbonizationof energy supplyhas thereforebeen a formalobjec-
tive of internationalnegotiations since the mid-1980s, that is, the period
when fossil fuel prices returnedto their low pre-1973 values and hence
threatenedthe alternativesdeveloped during the 1970s, including nuclear
power. Planetarysalvation was to be achieved by the reduction (later net
reduction)of emissions of eight gases, primarilyCO2and methane.The for-
mer,assumedto be the mainculpritthoughthis remainscontested,is a most
convenienttargetfor measurementsand abatement,with the optionsranging
from fuel switchingand storagein geological formationsto sequestrationby
new forests.
Whetherman-madewarmingis indeed"discernible"remainsa subjectof
dispute.This is a postglacialera subjectto considerablenaturalfluctuations.
74 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

It is knownthatCO2concentrationhas increasedsince the eighteenthcentury


butalso thatit has fluctuatedconsiderablyandrapidlythroughouthistoryand
prehistory,withoutnecessarilybeing accompaniedby temperaturechanges.
Surfacewarmingis measurable,if the datasets arebelieved, only for periods
duringthe past fifty years. Is this a trendor a cycle? Do temperaturechanges
cause these fluctuations or vice versa? Different sciences give different
answers, though many groups remain adamantin supportof this treaty's
assumptions,especially the scientific advisorto the treatyand protocol,the
IPCC, as it exists to supportthe treaty.If these assumptionsare untrue,as I
believe, why do so many powerfulinstitutionsbelieve in them?
One reasonis skillful andbiasedpresentationof evidence, andthe otheris
interests(Boehmer-Christiansen andKellow 2002). Globalresearchhas long
been skewedtowarddiscoveringthe threat.The tools on offer for implemen-
tationarevery researchintensive.Bureaucraciesat all levels arenow charged
with enormoustasks of gatheringdata on emissions and planningfor their
abatement.Methodologies for establishingemission baselines for projects
areneeded, as are limits for emission tradingthatinvolve estimatingor mea-
suring emissions worldwide. Carbontradingsystems with brokers,banks,
and risk managersare being set up. Carbonsinks and carbonsequestration
need to be included in nationalcarbonbudgets and need to be checked by
intergovernmentalbodies for compliance. Billions of dollars are to change
hands, and legal certainty is therefore needed. For developed countries,
detailed ghg accountingand liability rules have been devised; in the future,
they are also needed for carbon sinks such as forestry,land clearance,and
soils. The Europeanshad wanted to exclude taking sinks into account in
nationalcarbonbalances because this would reduce pressureto modernize
energy sectors by improving efficiency, but they lost the argument.
Developing countriesare to be includedgradually.
Withouta deal as made at Kyoto andMarrakesh,largeinvestmentswould
be lost. Technology seeking new marketsand money seeking investment
opportunitiesin sequesteringcarbon would find it more difficult to obtain
subsidies or helpful regulations.While some "carbon-poor"countries,such
as Japanand Norway,have incentives to buy carboncredits abroad,the EU
with its emphasison renewablesand efficiency also sees opportunitiesfrom
enhancingits energysecurity.Withthe withdrawalof the UnitedStates,how-
ever, it has lost the opportunityof makingenergymore expensivefor a com-
petitor.The EU opposed the sinks and emissions trading,while Japanand
Australia wanted and obtained more of each in order not to have to cut
emissions.
Boehmer-Christiansen
/ TheWaragainstCarbon 75

The Logic behind the Kyoto Process

The link betweenthe scientifichypothesisselected as readyfor actionand


the solutions proposedcan be restated.

* If increasingenergy demandsin the futurewere to be met by fossil fuels, a


warmingclimate (on average)anda rising sea level, andothersevereenviron-
mentaldislocations,wouldaffectall nations,butthe poorestwouldbe affected
the most. The rich must thereforeact first.
* An impressivemenuof technologicaloptions,regulatoryandfinancialinstru-
ments for reducing CO2, is available. These options seek global markets.
Replacingcarbon-intensiveactivitiesis technicallyfeasible, at a cost thatalso
representsinvestments,or potentialdebts.
* Energy demand is expected to double in the next fifty years, primarilyin
industrializingeconomies thatarethereforemost attractiveto investors.Plan-
etarysalvationwould lead to income streamsmoving from Southto Northand
economic growthin both.8

However,if noncompliancewith treatyobligationswere to remainunpun-


ished, the Kyotoprocess would remainvoluntary,restrictedto nationalregu-
lations and in the hands of the private sector. Governments,lawyers, and
environmentalistsmight benefit less. With stronggovernmentinvolvement,
the global warmingprojectmight gain marketsfor green technologies and
fuels, irrespective of any future "climate protection" effect. Expanded
bureaucraticpowers would be needed "to make and nurturerelationships
with the privatesector,civil society andBrettonWoodsinstitutions"(United
Nations Environmentand DevelopmentForum2000, 8).
The logic of Kyoto reveals not only nonenvironmentaleconomic and
politicalinterestsbutalso pointsto immediatelosers:the owners,miners,and
users of coal and,to a lesser degree,oil, as well as taxpayersandenergycon-
sumerswho arechargedhigherpricesor taxes. The phasingout of fossil fuels
before marketforces or resourceendowmentsdemandit dependson public
supportandis likely to switch public resourcesfrom welfareto privategain.
As the winners are the politically stronger who fund research, considerable
pressureson scientific institutionsto provide an authoritativeunderpinning
for this logic can be expected.The observedemergenceof a strongscientific
consensusmay reflecteitherthe "truth"as we can know it todayor a selected
truth.This requiresa closer look at science.
76 Science,
Technology, Values
&Human

A Critique of the Scientific Consensus

Skepticismwithregardto globalwarmingis not shrinkingbutgrowing....


estimatesof relationships
Reliablequantitative andman-made
betweennatural
changes... donotexist.... TheIPCCReportsdonotreflecttherangeof diver-
genceof relevantscientificopinion.(Kondratyev2000,365)9

Researchon climate models, the impactsof climate change (as predicted


by models), the provisionof technicalsolutions,andtheir"delivery"in prac-
tice has consumedvast amountsof resourcesand intelligence since the mid-
1980s. Initialresearchdatesbackto veryfew institutionsin the UnitedStates,
Germany,and Sweden in the 1970s.'0 The IPCCprovidesthe scientific con-
sensus thatunderpinsthe climatetreatyand is negotiatedin associationwith
the Kyoto process. It acts as a legitimatingauthority.
The scientificconsensusthatunderpinsKyoto is relativelynew. Only two
decades ago, it was arguedthatmankindmightface anotherice age (andthis
remainson the geological agenda).Therewas little political response."Our
knowledgeof the mechanismsof climaticchangeis at least as fragmentaryas
ourdata,"concededthe NationalAcademyof Sciences in 1975, when global
cooling was generallyexpected (Matthews1975).
The IPCC,however,based itself on warming,attractedwidespreadsup-
port, and by the late 1990s had generateda consensus of scientific opinion
that is now rarelychallenged at the political level, especially in Europe,in
spite of numerousattemptsby criticsto be heard(Kondratyev1997;Metzner
1998). Coupledwith simplifiedoceanic models and providedwith emission
scenariosby interestedparties(the technologistswith the solutions),climate
models run on the assumptionthat CO2concentrationwill double from an
eighteenthcenturybaseline some time this century.IPCC users reduce sci-
ence to threeclaims thatare contestedto varyingdegrees:thatglobal warm-
ing is man made, that this will harmthe planet in coming decades, and that
warmingis discernible.Underlyingthese claims we find morefundamentalif
contested beliefs: that climate is predictable,that anthropogenicwarming
can be distinguishedfrom naturalchange, and thatthe availablemodels are
good enough for policy purposes.This issue of causalityis debatedin scien-
tific journals and electronic networksbut is not an issue for many others,
especially those committedto expensive policies or hoping to benefit from
emission controls. Opponents in Europe in particularhave been denied
means of dissemination.They have few naturalallies and tend to be con-
demnedas "unethical.""IPCCcriticstendto be dismissedas "rightwing"or
in the pay of the coal industryandhave clearlylost the argumentin the popu-
list media (Leggett 1999). While critical argumentscannot be rehearsed
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 77

here in detail, they questionthe meritof still primitivemathematicalmodels


for predictiveor even scenario-buildingpurposesandquestionmanyof their
scientific assumptions(Metzner 1998).
As one influentialcritichas pointedout, it is often forgottenthatthe scope
of the climatetreatyis restrictedto anthropogenicimpacts.As pointedout by
John Zillman (1997), director of the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO) and advisorto the Australians,when the IPCC says that

climatehaschangedoverthepastcentury,it is simplysayingtheclimatenowis
notthesameas it wasa centuryago(whatever thecause),whereastheFCCC
listenerwillreasonably sucha statement
interpret as thescientificcommunity
affirmingthathumaninfluence
haschangedclimateoverthepastcentury. (P.v)

He advised thereforethat any action going beyond "no-regrets"policies


would be irresponsible.In otherwords, governmentsshould only undertake
climate-relatedpolicies that promised to have other benefits as well. No-
regretspolicies are of course closely linked to nationalenergy endowments
and wealth, thoughunpopularpolicies may be green washed by associating
themwith planetarysalvation.Suchpolicies were not easily negotiatedat the
global level. I argue that it is these non-climate-relatedpolicy outcomes
sought by the stakeholderslocked in negotiationssince 1990 that drive the
Kyoto process without having been assessed seriously for their equity
effects.
While manyuncertaintiesareadmittedby IPCC,these exclude the under-
lying scientific paradigm(radiativeforcing of temperature)broughtabout
primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels. Combustion is assumed to
increase the concentrationof CO2 by 1 percent per annum, though the
observedvaluesareconsiderablyless. SkepticsarguethatIPCCscenariosare
unrealisticand based on faulty physics.12Oppositionto the "mainstream"
theorycomes from many disciplines but is not integratedinto a single chal-
lenge. These come mainly from the study of solar influences, clouds and
aerosols, and past climates (Calder 1999; Soon et al. 2001). Empiricalsci-
ence demonstrates that past climatic changes were similar to recently
observed ones, with major variationsoccurringlong before human beings
inhabitedthe earth (Karlen 1998). Geologists point out that the earth was
warmerseveraltimes duringthe last interglacialperiod,andthe evidence we
have does not indicate that these warm periods were generally disastrous.
One solarphysicist predictsthatthis warmperiodwill end in a decade or so,
and space physics in generalwith NASA and the EuropeanSpace Associa-
tion in the lead are now the main challengersto IPCCby testing the role of
clouds, cosmic rays, and solar phenomena.
& HumanValues
78 Science,Technology,

Yet even the IPCC,readcarefullyor in privateconversationswith leading


members, remains uncertain;indeed, without uncertaintyresearch might
grind to a halt. Statements about the likely increasing concentrationof
anthropogenicghgs having contributedsubstantiallyto the observedwarm-
ing overthe pastfifty yearsarebalancedby admittingthatthe influenceof the
individualexternalfactors continues to be limited. Statementsthat support
the "dangerous,man-madewarming"hypothesisarefollowed by othersthat
emphasize remaininguncertainties(Boehmer-Christiansen1994a, 1994b).
Its full 2001 assessment (Third Assessment Report [TAR]), for example,
remainscautious about the causationof the warmingas observedin recent
decades, but the brief "Policy-Makers'Summary"for the first time referred
to human-inducedglobal warming as "fact"ratherthan as a "discernible"
possibility.Therehavebeen angrydisputesinside the IPCC,leadingto major
changes in texts. For example, the following transformationoccurred in
chapterfive betweenAprilandMay 2000. The firstdraftsays of aerosolsthat
"thenet forcingof the climateoverthe last 100 years(andsince pre-industrial
times) may be close to zero or even negative"(IPCC2001). In otherwords,
therehas been no warmingbecauseof complex feedbacks.By May 2001, this
hadbecome "ourabilityto assess the indirectforcingby aerosolshas a much
largeruncertaintyassociated with it. The largest values of negativeforcing
due to the warm-cloudindirecteffect may approachor exceed the positive
forcing by greenhousegases" (IPCC2001).
If man-madeaerosols, by causing cooling, were to balancethe warming
due to CO2alone, it wouldbe othergases thatneededto be reducedas a prior-
ity, as was suggested by laterresearch(Hansenet al. 2000).'3
Uncertaintiesin estimatesof internalvariabilityandnaturalandanthropo-
genic radiativefactors,in particularthe forcings by anthropogenicradiative
factorsandthe climateresponseto these factors,remainto be resolved.While
it is admittedthatwhat advocatesof warmingtend to presentas predictions
are only scenarios based on "story lines" coupled with the precautionary
principle, the message remains persuasive. Inadequateand inconclusive
empirical data and doubtful "socioeconomic"assumptionscan always be
justified as the best availableor one set of values amongmany.The choice of
the futureis then left to the political system.
While the postulatedlink between feasible emission cuts andthe preven-
tion of climate change remainsdebated, some IPCC supporters,especially
those close to the U.K. government,now claim thata cut of 60 percentof cur-
rent emissions would be necessary to "stabilize"climate by the end of this
century. Some doubters argue that if the benefits of reduced population
growth and the technological advances over the next fifteen to thirtyyears
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 79

were includedin model calculations,they would show thatwaitingis the only


sensible solution.
But large-scale overall emission reductionmay not be what proponents
seek most, thatis, underthe win-win label. Whatis now advocatedas a set of
solutionsto global warmingexisted in laboratoriesandon drawingboards,or
in practice,before the climate models predictedcatastropheor were inter-
pretedto do so. Renewables,nuclearpower,andenergyefficiency,initiallyat
least, were responsesto high oil prices.14EnergyR&D in particularhad long
reliedon publicfundingandon governmentfor help. Forexample,in a report
to the U.S. presidentwrittenin the late 1970s, it was assumedthatoil prices
would continueto rise and thatmany countrieswould soon have difficulties
in meeting their energy needs, and researchbodies claimed that "vigorous
changes in public policy aroundthe world are needed to avoid or minimize
these problemsbefore they become unmanageable"(Global 2000, 392).
A huge researchagendawas presentedto PresidentCarterin which it was
statedthat"atmosphericconcentrationof carbondioxideandozone-depleting
chemicals are expected to increase at rates that could alter the world's cli-
mate"(Global 2000 1982, 3). Moderateglobal warmingand cooling were
briefly discussed, but the U.S. Departmentof Energy admittedthat energy
projectionscould not be made and thatthe environmentalimpactsof energy
consumptionbeyond 1990 could not be commentedon. The climate models
would soon change this. Until these were ready to make global prediction,
energy challenges remainednational, and large investmentswere sunk, in
some countries,into nuclearand solar power, as well as energy efficiency.
Oil price rises in the 1970s led to the heaviest investmentsin energy-poor
continentalEuropeandJapan.Only in still fossil fuel-rich countriessuch as
the United States, Australia,and United Kingdom did efficiency increase-
albeit little. After the mid-1980s oil price collapse, (to levels lower in real
terms than in the 1960s) pressuresto protectsunk investmentsincreasedto
differentdegrees.Globalwarmingproveda welcome message for itjustified
interventionsto protect "clean"energy. Convertsto a new ideology-that
carbonwas a pollutantendangeringlife on Earth-were easy to find. When
oil prices briefly trebled in 2000, there were immediate impacts on petrol
prices, growth,and investmentsthatcontributedto the currentrecession.
Withoutthe assertionof scientific supportfor the view thatthe burningof
fossil fuels was initiatingthe climatethreat,the global techno-economicgov-
ernancestrategyin supportof clean energyandenergyefficiency would lack
authority.Before looking at policy and hence equity implications more
closely, the institutionalrole of the IPCCis outlinedto understandthe sources
of its influence and bias.
& HumanValues
80 Science,Technology,

The IPCC: Negotiating Consensus


and Advising on Energy Options

The IPCCwas set up formallyin 1987, afteroil prices had slumped,and


was listenedto immediately.By 1992, the FCCChadbeen agreed.IPCCdoes
not itself fund research but helps to promote "policy-relevant"global
researchat the nationallevel andin UN bodies, often in close associationwith
the InternationalCouncil of Scientific Unions (ICSU). More directlyrelated
to climate science were the WorldClimate ResearchProgrammeof WMO
and the InternationalGeosphereBiosphereProgrammeof ICSU. Both were
in need of funding by nationalgovernments(Boehmer-Christiansen1993,
1994a, 1995). IPCC science leaders were well connected to both. The
Geneva-basedIPCC Bureausoon selected or approvedscientists to partici-
pate andthus significantlyinfluencedIPCCmembership,recommendations,
anddrafting.15 Thisprocessproducedthe famousscientificconsensusreports
of 1990, 1995 (Second Assessment Report),and 2001 (TAR) (IPCC 1995,
2001). On the research side, the institutionalbeneficiaries that emerged
included nationalmeteorologicaloffices, the big nationalscience laborato-
ries in the United States and Australia,the researchcouncils of the United
Kingdom,the Max-PlanckSociety of Germany,many research-basednon-
governmentalorganizations,as well as UN agencies.All becamemajorIPCC
supporters(Boehmer-Christiansen1993). Their research efforts provided
IPCC lead authorswith new "findings,"authorsand reviewerswho needed
nationalapproval,and the whole enterprisewith powerfulgatekeepers.
Startingin the early 1980s, the global researchagendasmentionedabove,
while basedon earlierefforts,have alwaysmadeastonishingclaims to policy
relevance. 6 The IPCCthusemergedin close associationwithresearchon one
side and with environmentalbureaucracieson the other, also a fairly new
development.Both had stronginterestsin atmosphericmodeling and space
technology. A shared objective of both "independent"and governmental
research was to obtain national support for the rapidly expanding IPCC
"community."In the UnitedKingdom,assertingpolicy relevancebecamethe
name of the researchgame.
IPCC decisions relating to its proceduresand publicationsare taken in
close collaborationwith civil servants.Policy and policy-relatedstatements
are left to IPCCgroupleadersand leading authors.Threegroupswere set up
at the startand have been but slightly reorganizedsince. They work more or
less independentlyof each other, with WorkingGroup (WG) I concerned
with scientificassessment,providingthebaselinefor the researchof the other
two, dealingwith impactsandresponseoptions.The groupsreportto govern-
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 81

ments, the United Nations EnvironmentProgram,and WMO and are now


trying to synthesize their findings. Social scientists have become increas-
ingly involved,but concernfor humanequality-that is, equity inside states
as distinctfrom equitybetween them-unsurprisingly perhaps,is not partof
currentresearchagendas.
WG I reportson the stateof scientificknowledgeandrelies for this, exces-
sively in my view, on the climate-modelingcommunityfound in a handfulof
largeresearchlaboratoriesoften associatedwith meteorologicaloffices. The
groupis managedfromwithinthe HadleyCentreof the U.K. Meteorological
Office and funded by the former U.K. Departmentof the Environment
(Boehmer-Christiansen1995). The U.K. Meteorological Office's research
capacity was upgradedby world-class computerfacilities to study global
warming, an idea that appealed greatly to MargaretThatcherand British
environmentalistsandthathas remainedvirtuallyunchallengedin the United
Kingdom.
Mathematicalexperimentswith generalcirculationmodels arethe tool of
climate change predictions. They consist of highly parameterizedsets of
equationsplotting weatheronto a global grid that links the atmosphereto a
highly simplified ocean system. Fed into the models are emission scenarios
providedby WG III, which envisage the CO2content doubling by various
dates dependingon assumptionsmade about populationgrowth, fuel mix,
and wealth. Authorityis claimed with referenceto numbersof paperscited,
for example, "25 lead authorsfrom 11 countriesbased on 120 contributing
authorsfrom 15 countriesand230 reviewersfrom31 countries"(IPCC 1994,
2). The third scientific assessment (TAR) was published after the Hague
meeting,butthe most scaryscenarios-up to six degreesCelsius warmingon
average-were leakedin advance.The dangerfromclimate changeas popu-
larizedappearedto increasewith the approachof Bonn, while the science, in
my judgment,had become less certain(IPCC2001).
WG II considerspossible biological and socioeconomic (neverpolitical)
impactsof climate change. Includedare possible impactson humanhealth,
agriculture,energydemand,andtransport,with findingsbasedon the worst-
case scenariosreleasedby WG I but generatedwith suppliedemission sce-
narios. Some of these findings can be monetarizedto provide global eco-
nomic cost estimates, and there can be speculationsabout social and legal
changes.Social scientistsandepidemiologistscouldjoin the IPCCprojecton
the basis of "what-if' researchand have generally predictedharmfulout-
comes that served to justify more interventions.These are designed by WG
III (mentionedabove), which advocatesresponse strategiesand options for
governments to consider (Rayner and Malone 1998). Technologists and
82 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

energy interestsfrom industry,governments,and nongovernmentalorgani-


zationsmeet here andhavenow createdtheirown researchcommunityexter-
nal to the innerIPCC (Grubb,Vrolijk, and Brack 1999).
Thus, environmentalsciences have tendedto base researchon the worst-
case scenariosfrom WG I and to propose technological mitigationpolicies
based on the precautionaryprinciple ratherthan win-win strategies.This
requiresa strongerratherthan weakerclimate threat,especially when fossil
fuel prices arelow. Social scientistsand engineersprovidethe emission sce-
nariosfor WG I and advocatetechnology options. Advice for policy makers
seeking no-regretor win-win opportunitiesis constructedin WG III with
investmentsin ecological modernization,improvedenergy efficiency, and
less wasteful technologies as proposedsolutions. Adaptation,an alternative
strategy,has only recentlycreptinto researchagendas.WG IIIis thereforeof
majorpolicy importancebutkeeps a very low profile.Majorinterventionsin
energy policy, agriculture,and forestryare being researchedfor theireffect
on cost-effective ghg mitigation.Resourceefficiency, new sources of reve-
nue income, stimuli to innovation,and investmentare advocated.Govern-
ments were advisedto look for such synergy(the TARtermfor win-win and
no-regret)in theirpolicies, thatis, expect short-termbenefitsfromthe Kyoto
process while hoping for climate benefits later.As a global strategy,this has
created major equity issues that help to explain the long delays and weak
outcome.

Economy, Equity, and Human Equality

Equitybetween statesis a majorissue in the Kyotoprocess,dominatedby


concernsoverthe impactof the proposedinstrumentsandtargetson national
economies. Neitherequity nor equalitybetweenhumangroupsis negotiated
in any depth, intergenerationalequity being an exception: it justifies pain
todayfor the sakeof the future.However,neithertermappearsin the glossary
of the technical summaryof TAR WG III, althoughthe section on decision
frameworksrefers to "equitableburden-sharing"between countries as a
means to encourageparticipation.Equityhere tends to mean preservingthe
economic status quo. Like the negotiationsthemselves, the summarydeals
primarilywith national economic impacts, promises and strategies from
experts that emphasize technological change, and emission trading with
politicallyallocatednationalemission targetsor allowancesas a foundation.
The overridingaim of global climatepolicy thereforeis cost efficiency not
equity,thatis, cuttingemissions at the lowest possible cost to industryworld-
wide in a policy frameworkthat maximizes the opportunitiesfor the trans-
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 83

ition to low-carboneconomies. Synergy,expertspromise,will enhancecom-


petitiveness.Drawingon IPCCand otherevidence, it is thereforeconcluded
that technologies related to combating global warming offer capital-
intensive solutions for application in the North and aided exports to the
South.The precisenatureof new inequalitiesanddebtsthatthis strategymay
createonly the futurewill tell, butwarningscan be heardfrommanyquarters.
One claim is thatevery ton of CO2above an arbitrarilyinternationalset limit
will cost its emitter about U.S.$140, a sum used in scenarios of the U.S.
Departmentof Energyandabout3.5 times the importpriceof coal in Western
Europe. Whatever the precise numbers, considerable cost increases in
energy-intensiveproduction(cement, fertilizer,ceramics, steel, aluminum)
would be unavoidable,hitting developing countriesand coal-based econo-
mies such as China and Australiahardest."Carbonleakage"might follow,
that is, the shift of such industriesto countriesnot requiredto reduce their
emissions. Deindustrializedeconomies with strong service sectors, such as
the UnitedKingdom,butalso relativelyenergy-inefficientones, would suffer
less or might even gain. But burdensharingis not easy when the burdensare
so uncertain.So the Kyoto process dependsfor its persuasivenesson asser-
tions of futurebenefit and appealsto the pursuitof intergenerationalequity
wrappedup in the dubiouspromisethatby protectingthe atmosphereandits
naturalresources now, "we" shall become much wealthier in the future
(Weizsackerand Lovins 1997).
TAR WG III gives one importantinsight relatingto equity and equality
problems.Forclimate mitigation,it is arguedin the technicalsummary,sec-
toral losers are easily identifiedfor their losses are likely to be immediate,
concentrated,and certain.The opposite is truefor the potentialgainers,that
is, groupsthatarethereforeappealingto the publicpursefor the sakeof future
equity. State supportfor renewablesis now availablein most OECD coun-
tries in the hope that lucrativemarketswill emerge. However,virtuallyall
emission reductionachievedso farby the "market"has been due to industrial
collapse (USSR, EastGerman)or a one-off switch fromcoal to naturalgas or
nuclearpower.The marketwill not delivernew technologies and fuels until
fossil fuel prices are very high, possibly facing mankindwith energy short-
ages more dangerousthan climate change. Majortechnological transitions
do not come cheap,andcosts will differgreatlybetweencountries,hence the
deep concern over impactson competitivenessapparentin the negotiations.
Here, the importanceof the fuel prices (and volatility) and taxes cannot be
overemphasizedandwith it the importanceof emission regulationon energy
policy. Both have a majorinfluence on economic growth.Strongpressureis
alreadybeing exertedin favorof switchingsubsidiesfromfossil fuels to even
more expensive energy irrespectiveof social impacts and location.
84 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

Nationaldifferentiation,allowing for very differentnationalemission tar-


gets, was therefore eventually accepted at Kyoto (Boehmer-Christiansen
2000). Even then, concessions made over nationalemission-reductiontar-
gets may merely conceal the attractionof climate protectionpolicies to sec-
toral and political interests.Global warmingprovides a more dramaticand
insurableexplanationfor floods and stormsthannaturalclimatic variability
orpoorlanduse management.Foreignerscan be blamedfor currentproblems
or policy failures. All states would thereforehave some stake in a positive
outcome, thoughthe cost-benefitbalancewould differbetween them, hence
the acceptedprincipleof differentiation.For example, in the EU, the decar-
bonizationagendapromises investmentstoday,more energy efficiency and
securityin the mediumterm,as well as increasedrevenuefrom greenenergy
taxes. However,the link between energy efficiency and aggregateemission
reductionremainstenuous.'7Historically,improvedefficiency in electricity
generationhas been accompaniedby increased consumptionof energy in
transportandby privatehouseholds.Thereis also the opportunityfor protect-
ing nuclearinvestmentsandsupportingnonproliferationpolicies by convert-
ing weapons-gradeplutoniumintoreactorfuel (Moniz 1999) andthe promise
thatgreen exportsmay enhancetradebalancesandthatgreeninvestmentaid
returnsprofitshome.
Even assuming that ghg mitigationwill deliver the promised synergies,
whetherthese benefitswould improvehumanequalitywould still dependon
domestic policies on health, education,welfare, and, above all, income and
its taxation.Increasedenergy prices will hit lower income groups hardest.
The Financial Times(4 July 2001,4) in a reportfromthe Universityof West-
minsterTransportUnitconcludedthatpetroldutyandotheranti-car-usepoli-
cies fall more heavily on low-income groupsthan"previouslythought."The
poorestgroupsspendbetween a fifth anda quarterof all householdexpendi-
tureon runninga car comparedto 16 percentto 18 percentfor othergroups.
Taxredistributionin favorof poorergroupscould alterthis, butthis is notpart
of the Kyoto agenda. Switching to green (and more expensive) energy will
not benefitpoorersections of society.While eventualequalitybetweencoun-
tries' per capita emissions is occasionally advocated, poverty reduction
would only follow if energyconsumptiontaxes were to be lowered,and such
proposalsarenot includedin eitherthe global or nationalclimatepolicies, as
it is inconsistent with the emission-reductioninstruments.Some advocate
emission equality in a system in which rich individualswould have to buy
their carbonallowances or creditsfrom the poor,but this idea seems wildly
utopian.18
The losers from climate protectionpolicies as proposedare not only coal
minersbut all interestsrelatedto carbon-basedfuels-investors, managers,
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 85

experts-and energy-intensiveindustries in general. The Organizationof


Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is extremely worried and has
demandedinternationalcompensationfor its losses. Largeworkforces,espe-
cially in developingcountries,will not find readyreemploymentunless gov-
ernments,or rapideconomic growth,provide alternatives.Most important,
perhaps,developmentprioritieswill be biasedtowarddecarbonizationwhen
educationandhealthmightbe morerelevantat the nationallevel. Developing
countries' governments (including Russia) remain worried that northern
firmswill pick off theircheapestoptions andleave them with high emission-
reductioncosts in the future.Oil producersandexportersof coal, or electric-
ity generatorsdependingon coal, such as the UnitedStates,Australia,China,
andIndia,remaindeeply worriedandarenot likely to acceptemission-reduc-
tion targets in the foreseeable future.Apartfrom seeking delay, they have
thereforecome to supportthe sink idea as well as the flexible mechanisms
that encourageexchanges between North and South.19Regulatingor subsi-
dizing industryto become more eco-efficient in the context of the current
political consensus against higher income taxes would seem to require
switching tax revenuefrom welfare to economic growth.
Emission-reductionpolicies are not likely to serve human equality,
thoughthey can be designed to improveequitybetween states.As envisaged
in the Kyotoprocessso far,the transitioninto a greenerworldwill not be pos-
sible withoutincreasedgovernmentspendingon economic growthaccompa-
nied by reducedinvestmentsin othersocial priorities,with taxpayersbearing
the burden.Whatpolicies are currentlybeing pursued?

Bureaucratic Opportunities

Bureaucraciesin most OECD countries,recentlydeprivedof directcon-


trolof the energy sectorin manycountriesby deregulationandprivatization,
have found promising new tasks in environmentalregulation and have
alreadyemergedas majorwinners.Civil servantsandoffices dedicatedto cli-
matechangeareexpandingin numbers.Are theresigns thattheycan use their
increasedpowers to reduce inequalitiesat home and seek global equity?
The solution on offer to developing countries from the World Bank is
assisted technology transferas partof an economic and financialglobaliza-
tion agenda dedicatedto privatizationand nationalderegulation.Improved
"eco-efficiency"usuallymeanscapital-intensivedevelopmentwith increased
debts.More equalnationalquotasarelikely to increaseinequalitiesin its cli-
ent states as emergingmiddle classes strivefor theirshareof the good life in
the global economy (Boehmer-Christiansen1999). The World Bank was
86 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

early attractedto "theseriousnessof the threatof climatechange"because of


the opportunityto lend money for "clean technology" directly or via the
GEF, for upgradingenergy and forestryprojects.Emission reductionsthus
achieved are equated with global environmentalbenefit, while projectsby
definition contributeto development, clearly a "win-win" strategy.Bank
economistsbelieve thatdevelopingcountriescan reduceghg emissions from
five to fifteen dollarsperton of carboncomparedto fifty dollarsin industrial-
ized nations, persuadingthe World Bank to become involved in emission
trading.20 If Kyoto fails, investorswill be out of money buthave lots of emis-
sion permitcertificates.In the meantime,the WorldBank's traditionalsup-
port for the constructionof fossil fuel power plants has groundto a halt in
spite of clients' wishes. China would like to have nuclear power funded
throughthe CDM, but this is not permitted.Will inequalityin developing
countriesdecline thanksto Kyoto?
The CDM has not yet startedfunctioning,but it "mightgeneratecapital
flows of $10 billion per year" (Sandor2000, xix) providing,the GEF has
claimed, marketsin developing nationswith power plants,cars, appliances,
andotherproductsworthmillions. The questionis whetherthese transfersare
what the countriesconcernedneed most. Evidence so far from the GEF and
CDM raises some doubts.The CDM with its certifiedemission reductions-
to startaccumulatingfrom 2000 for use from 2008-has remainedunderthe
controlof the parties,with the WorldBank having starteda separatecarbon
fund. The developing countries must agree to emission trading and joint
implementationin returnfor the CDM aid: clients areto achieve sustainable
developmentanddevelopedcountriescompliancewith theirquantifiedemis-
sion limits. The privatesector may earn reductionunits as credits for their
countriesby investingin permittedcleanertechnologies in developingcoun-
tries.Firmsmay investin orbuy less efficientproducersof electricityabroad,
earningcredits measuredin tons of carbonequivalent.
For the EU, climate negotiations have not only been a major growth
opportunityfor the EuropeanCommunity'sEnvironmentalProtectionDirec-
toratebut for the EU as a whole in its attemptto advancepoliticalintegration
(Sbragia 1999). While committed to an 8 percent reduction of emissions
between 1990 and 2008 to 2012, its environmentcommissionerhas claimed
thatwithoutaction,emissions would increaseby 8 percent,numbersthatwill
be very difficult to confirm. Most memberstates are not on trackfor reach-
ing their allotted targets. The EU commission set out its final policies and
measures in March 2000 without any reference to equity or equality. The
strategy"aimsto reinforce"agreedpolicies, includingvoluntaryagreements
to reduce vehicle emissions and the "developmentof energy markets. ..
incorporatingenvironmentalconsiderations."Furtherinitiatives include a
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 87

directiveto promoterenewableenergyanda paperon integratingsustainable


developmentinto enterprisepolicy, as well as continuingsupportfor nuclear
power.The commission also foresees transportpricingandeconomic instru-
ments in aviation,a fiscal frameworkfor reducingCO2from cars, improve-
mentsin energyefficiency standards,andCO2capturein undergroundreser-
voirs. State aid rules are to be changed to reduce their climate impact. EU
energy taxationis not listed in the proposals,but complaintsare aired that
progresswouldhavebeen"farmorepronounced"hadministers"moreactively
pursued"the idea. An EU-wide ghg emissions trading scheme is planned
to provide experience before global rules are introduced.2'A bonanza for
bureaucraticinterventionin nationaleconomies is outlined, with the com-
missiontryingto protectits win-win strategyfrominternationalthreatsto the
competitivenessof its energy-intensiveindustries."Wewon't allow sinks [to
be used] in such a way thatthey createa big loophole,"the environmentcom-
missionerhad said before Bonn. Persuadingindustryto acceptthese propos-
als remainsa task for the future.22
At the nationallevel, for example in the United Kingdom,taxing energy,
especially when pricesarelow, has long been an importantsourceof revenue.
Most of the costs of petrolin Europemoves into treasuries,andclimatelevies
are now adding to this.23Climate levies or taxes on energy use by business
also exist in severalcountriesand are raisedin the United Kingdom,though
resistancepersists. The United Kingdomis a special case as it is but one of
two countriesthathavereducedghg emissions since 1990. This has given the
former"dirtymanof Europe"a betterimage at little or no cost-because gas
was then very cheap-and with expected future benefits. The public now
needs to be persuadedto pay for furtherinvestmentsneeded to replacecoal
andpossibly nuclearpowerwithina few decades.The applicationof a carbon
tax to fossil fuel use can thereforehave fourdistinctgoals: reduceCO2emis-
sions, preserveoil deposits for futuregenerations,providea cushion against
oil shocks thatarepossible underan oil supplymarketonce againdominated
by OPEC, and raise revenuefor governments.None of these has inevitable
implicationsfor wealth distribution,though any may affect overall wealth.
Blairandhis deputyrecentlymet businessleaders(theEU environmentcom-
missionerattended)to discuss the challengesaheadandthe potentialbenefits
of moving to a low-carboneconomy.Accordingto the environmentministry,
the economicopportunitiesof movingto whatis also to be an energy-efficient
economy were discussed, and U.K. supportfor domestic emissions trading
schemes was reiterated.The U.K. governmenthoped to benefit financially
from emission tradingby selling "spare"carboncredits (Jepma2000, 13).
Business leaders, however, have since called for reductionsin the climate
levy or corporationtax exemptions.The leaderof the advisorycommitteeon
88 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

business and the environmentis reportedto have said, "Therehas to be an


incentive for companies to put themselves on the block by agreeing (emis-
sion) targets.Withoutincentives,it will be very hardto get the system going"
(House of Commons 2001, 11; see www.parliament.uk/commons/selcom/
eahome.htm;for informationon the low-carboneconomy,see U.K. Environ-
ment Ministry,http://www.detr.gov.uk).

Conclusions

The global warmingthreatwas constructedin the 1980s by a coalition of


interestedpartiesoffering expertise and technologies to solve the problem.
The climate threat,like the limits to growth scare beforehand,offered new
opportunitiesto environmentalbureaucraciesand professionalswho found
the proposedsolutions empowering.A belief system was providedby envi-
ronmentalreligiosity, while science, engineering, and economics provided
the rationalizationsfrom which global and selected nationalbureaucracies
would deriveauthorityfor promotingtechnologicalchange, "greenmailing"
opponents,andraisingrevenue.Negotiationshave continuedfor morethana
decade in a majorexperimentin global lawmakingin supportof globalizing
energymarkets.The objectiveis a fastertransitionto a less carbonbuta more
information-andcapital-intensiveenergysupplythanwould happenif left to
marketforces, thatis, to risingfossil fuel prices.Taxpayers,recipientsof pub-
lic welfare, and consumers have for several decades funded research and
bureaucratic interventions.Yetfossil fuels remainabundant,cheap,andwidely
distributed.They do not attractthe availablecapitalandknowledge.Issues of
moreimmediatehumanneeds tendto be ignoredas the presentgenerationof
taxpayersandconsumersratherthaninvestorswill haveto pay for the market
to be "rigged"to favor new fuels and technologies. Given the fundamental
importanceof energy prices, this scenariocreates its own political dangers.
Southernelites attractedto the issue by promisesof aid remainfearfulabout
northernmotives and the implicationsfor theireconomies. Privatecorpora-
tions maybejoining the bandwagonbutonly if given "incentives"andadvan-
tageous regulations.Immediatebenefits accrueprimarilyto elites wherever
they live, while the costs fall disproportionatelyon the majorityof consumers
and taxpayers.Increasesin nationalpublic spendingon renewablesand new
regulations, while assisting in the expansion of global corporations,may
underminehumanwelfareandweakenthe credibilityof science,especiallyin
developingcountries.Higherenergypricesandtaxes may sharpeninequalities
in developed economies. Government-controlledresearch has not con-
structeda more equitableglobal energy policy. For this to happen,govern-
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 89

mentsthemselveswould haveto changetheirpoliticalpriorities.Moreequal-


ity between humangroups is not on the political agenda. Bureaucracyand
researchare the winners of the Kyoto process.

Notes

1. Coal is morereadily substitutedthanoil, least likely to be depleted,and widely distrib-


uted.Gas generatesmuchless carbondioxide (CO2)perunitelectricitythancoal or oil. Nuclear
power is almost carbonfree.
2. PresidentBush's (2001) letterto the Senate refersto the "incompletestate of scientific
knowledge of the causes of, and solutions."Hugh Ellsaesser (LawrenceLivermoreNational
Laboratory)had writtento him:
If it is true [thatthere is a solar triggeringmechanismstartingice ages], then some
higherlevel of carbondioxide could very possibly nullify the triggerand allow us to
escape the next Glacial which is geologically imminent.I cannot think of anything
moredangerousthansomethingwhich returnsit to the conditionsof the LastGlacial.
(Email Skeptics Network)
3. The likely effect of the KyotoProtocol'semission reductiontargets,acceptingthe IPCC,
on calculatedglobal averagetemperaturewould be a fall of 0.02 ?C.
4. The EuropeanUnion (EU) agreedto proposeemissions cuts overallby 8 percent,United
Statesby 7 percent,Icelandmay increaseby 10 percent,Australiaby 8 percent,andPortugalby
27 percent.Fiercelyopposedto differentiationglobally,the EU is practicingit at home:France's
targetis 0; United Kingdom, 12.5 percent;and Germany,21 percent.
5. The literaturehereis vast. Itcan be foundin Intergovernmental Panelon ClimateChange
(IPCC)reports(IPCC 1992, 1995, 2001) and in journals,for example,EnergyPolicy,Energy&
Environment,andEnvironmentalFinance.Fordebates,see [email protected].
6. The protocol is likely to cost at least $150 billion a year.Just $70 to $80 billion a year
could give all ThirdWorldinhabitantsaccess to the basics, such as health,education,water,and
sanitation(The Guardian 16 August 2001).
7. A clear statementof opportunitiesis veiled by the "ethical"claims of environmentalism
that hinderratherthan advancenegotiations.
8. Northernenergydemandhas become decoupledfromeconomic growth.In Russia,it has
collapsed, releasingmuch "hotair"(permittedCO2not emitted)for sale. Developing countries
demandinvestmentsin conventionalenergy.
9. Kondratyevis an experton aerosols,nuclearwinter,andradiationat the ResearchCentre
for Ecological Safety, St. Petersburg.
10. U.S. investmentin climate change researchalone is estimatedat $5 billion per annum.
The Global EnvironmentFacility was given $6 billion over threeyears.
11.In the mid-1990s, severalconferenceswere held (Leipzig andBonn) wherethousandsof
scientists signed declarationsagainstthe climate threatas presentedby the IPCC.All failed to
"outshout"environmentalistvoices or impress growing environmentalbureaucracies.IPCC
critics have been publishedsince the early 1990s in Energy & Environmentand include Soon,
Lindzen,Singer,Courtney,Calder,Sharp,Volz, Jelbring,Barrett,Gray,and Ahlbeck.All agree
thatthe empiricalbasis of currentclaims to "discernablewarming"is suspectandthatuncertain-
ties were removed from policy statements.Academic think tanks (MarshallInstitute,United
States;the Institutefor EconomicAffairs,UnitedKingdom;andthe EuropeanScience andEnvi-
ronmentForum)have supportedthese voices on scientific and often ideological grounds.
90 Science, Technology,& HumanValues

12. Solar theoristLangenscheidt(personalcommunication,April 2001) said,

Models are an excellent researchtool to find out whetherspecial physicalprocesses,


based on complex concepts, agree with reality.I appreciatethe endeavourof scien-
tists who are old handsat such work. I only disagreewhen models which are unable
to representthe utterlycomplex climate system aretakento projectwhat will be in a
hundredyears.

Readersmay wantto inspectthe followingWebpages:http://www.marshall.prg/Williecomments


onDMI.htm,www.sepp.org/weekwas/2000/answer.html, and http://www.Vision.net.au/-daly.
13. Hansen also made a majorsubmissionto the U.S. Senate in early 2000 that suggested
directingabatementefforts away from CO2to aerosols and othergases.
14. Oil priceshave a majoreffect on fuel competitionandtechnologychoice. Between 1971
and 1973, they rose sixfold and rose again steeply at the end of the 1970s, to decline sharply
between mid-1980s (except for the brief Gulf Warperiod) and mid-1999.
15. Its leaders,includingJohnHoughton(UnitedKingdom),BertBolin (Sweden), andRob-
ert Watson(United Kingdom/UnitedStates/WorldBank), have used theirscientificstatusto act
as policy advocates. Watson addressedthe opening of the Hague conference with "we can't
afford to delay" technology responses and used worst-case "projectedincreases"in tempera-
tures to outline threatsto agriculture,watersupply,nature,and humanhealth.In 1998, Watson
addressedthe UraniumInstituteto ask this industryfor supportin theirmutualinterest.
16. See the following newsletters:for the InternationalCouncil of Scientific Unions, IGBP:
Global Change Newsletter,Royal Swedish Academy ([email protected]),and for the Human
Dimensions Programmeon Global EnvironmentalChange, Update, from Bonn University
(www.ihdp.org).
17. "HowGreenIs EnergyEfficiency?"a special issue of Energy& Environment(Herring
2000), published the articles from an Open University conference on this subject, all highly
skepticalthatefficiency improvementalone will reduceemissions.
18. "SeekingSupportfor EquitableGlobal ClimatePolicy,"by the Global CommonsInsti-
tute,calls for emission equitybecausegreenhousegases are"causingdeathanddestructionyear
afteryear"(http://www.gciorg.uk).
19. Methodsof emission tradingareof interestto policy designers.All requirepublic inter-
ventionand supervision,createdisputesover power sharing,and involve largetransactioncosts
requiringcomplex contractsbetween firms and governments(Jepma 1999).
20. The following have invested in the World Bank's carbon tradingfund: BP Amoco,
Statoil, Norsk Hydro,Deutsche Bank, Gaz de France,and four governments(UKenNewsletter
4, 3 June2000, www.ukenvironment.com).Also, fromFredSinger,Newsletter(28 January)and
Joint ImplementationQuarterly(Jepma2000).
21. An economic analysis done for the commission shows thatEU-wide tradingwould cut
euro 2 billion off the Kyoto Protocol implementationcosts of euro 9 billion annually.
22. The EU's positionat the Hagueconferencewas thatindustrializedcountriesshouldmeet
at least half of their reductioncommitmentsthroughdomestic action, the clean development
mechanismshould in its early stages exclude nuclearpower,strongeconomic sanctionsshould
apply to countries not in compliance, the use of carbonsinks to soak up emissions should be
deferredfor at least a decade, and developing countries should not be forced to contemplate
bindingcuts later.Most of these had to be given up in Bonn or Marrakesh.
23. Note the headline in the The Guardian:"UK Leads World in CarbonDioxide Cut-
Switch from Coal and Fulfilmentof ManifestoPledge for 20% Reductionin ghg for 2010 Will
Pay Off with ?100m 'CarbonCredit'" (2000).
Boehmer-Christiansen/ The WaragainstCarbon 91

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Sonja Boehmer-Christiansenis a reader in environmentalpolitics and management,


Departmentof Geography,Hull University,UnitedKingdom,and the editorofEnergy &
Environment.She wasformerly a senior researchfellow at the Science Policy Research
Unit, Universityof Sussex. She has published threebooks and more than ninetyarticles
on internationalenvironmentalpolitics with an emphasis on energy.

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