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2020-2021

Judicial Notice – When Mandatory 266

Judicial Notice – When Discretionary 282

Judicial Notice- Municipal Ordinances 318

Judicial Notice Of Rivers And Laws Of Nature 327

No Judicial Notice Of Incurability Of Personality Disorders 336

Judicial Notice Of Court’s Own Acts And Records 341

Judicial Notice Of Official Acts Of Legislative Department 348

Judicial Notice- Post Office Practices; Banking Practices; Financial Condition Of The 353
Government

Judicial Notice In Relation To The Doctrine Of Processual Presumption 362

Judicial Admission 378

Negative Pregnant 416

Implied Judicial Admissions 422

Admission In Amended, Superseded, Or Dismissed Pleading 433

Admission Made By Counsel 442

Rule 130 Of The Rules Of Court- Rule Of Admissibility

Object Evidence 451

Object Evidence In Relation To The Rule On Chain Of Custody Under Republic Act 491
No. 9165

Documentary Evidence 515

Photograph As Evidence 526

Best Evidence Rule 532

Parol Evidence Rule 584

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Statute Of Frauds 624

Interpretation Of Documents 632

Testimonial Evidence 641

Voir Dire Examination 678

Dead Man’s Statute Rule/Survivorship Disqualification Rule 682

Marital Disqualification Rule 695

Marital Privileged Communications 707

Attorney-Client Privilege 712

Physician-Patient Privilege 731

Privileged Communications To Public Officers 740

Presidential Communications Privilege 741

Parental And Filial Privilege 754

Other Privileged Communication 755

Admissions And Confessions 764

Admission By Silence 794

Adoptive Admission 800

Recantation 805

Res Inter Alios Acta 811

Offer Of Compromise 835

Previous Conduct 836

Hearsay Evidence 848

Independently Relevant Statement 864

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Dying Declaration 872

Res Gestae 898

Declaration Against Interest 905

Declaration About Pedigree 913

Family Reputation Or Tradition Regarding Pedigree 917

Common Reputation Regarding Marriage 925

Entries In The Course Of Business 927

Entries In The Official Records 939

Testimony Or Deposition At A Former Proceeding 957

Opinion Rule 967

Character Evidence 989

Rule 131- Burden Of Proof And Presumptons

Burden Of Proof Vs. Burden Of Evidence 999

Equipoise Or Equiponderance Rule 1008

Conclusive And Disputable Presumptions 1010

Rule 132- Presentation Of Evidence And Examination Of Witnesses 1043

Authentication And Proof Of Documents 1064

Offer And Objections 1099

Tender Of Excluded Evidence 1125

Rule 133 Of The Rules Of Court – Weight And Sufficiency Of Evidence 1127

Rule 134 Of The Rules Of Court – Perpetuation Of Testimony 1163

Rules On Examination Of Child Witness - A.M. No. 004-07-Sc, 15 December 2000 1171

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Rules On Electronic Evidence - A.M. No. 01-7-01-Sc, 20 July 2001 1183

Rules On DNA Evidence - A.M. No. 06-11-5-Sc, 15 October 2007 1197

Judicial Affidavit Rule – A.M. No. 12-8-8-Sc, 01 January 2013 1219

Republic Act No. 4200 –Anti Wiretapping Act 1229

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PAROL EVIDENCE RULE

ACI PHILIPPINES, INC. v. EDITHA C. COQUIA
G.R. No. 174466 14 July 2008
TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written
document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy
that when the written contract is established as the repository of the parties’ stipulations, any other
evidence is excluded and the same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to
alter or contradict them. This rule, however, is not without exception. Section 9, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely
raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely
disregard petitioner’s evidence.

FACTS:
ACI Philippines, Inc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing fiberglass, which started using
recycled broken glass or flint cullets to save on manufacturing costs. ACI contracted with Editha
Coquia for the purchase of 1 lot of flint cullets at a price of ₱4.20 per kilo under Purchase Order
No. 106211 dated 6 October 1994. Several deliveries made by Coquia were accepted and paid for
by ACI. However, on 28 October 1994, petitioner demanded the reduction of the purchase price
from ₱4.20 per kilo to ₱3.65 per kilo to which respondent acceded. Accordingly Purchase Order
No. 106373 was issued explicitly superseding Purchase Order No. 106211. Deliveries were again
made by Coquia but ACI but refused to pay for them. Coquia then filed a Complaint for specific
performance and damages against ACI and further demanded that petitioner be directed to accept
and pay for the remaining deliveries to complete the 1 lot of flint cullets originally contracted for.
3 days after the complaint against it was filed, ACI paid for the flint cullets delivered. Ruling in
favor of the Coquia, the trial court ordered ACI to accept deliveries contracted for under Purchase

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Order No. 106211 and to pay for the said deliveries at the unit price of ₱4.20 per kilo. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ACI asserts that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s decision which compelled it
to accept and pay for the deliveries at the price of ₱4.20 per kilo. ACI stresses that Purchase Order
No. 106211 was superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373 and that in both contracts, it was made
clear to respondent that her assurance of prompt delivery of the flint cullets motivated the
transaction. ACI believes that the trial court and the appellate court erroneously refused to receive
evidence aliunde to prove that time was an important element of the agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ACI may be bound to accept the deliveries of washed cullets from Coquia.

RULING:
No.
There is every indication in this case that Coquia, a presumably astute businesswoman who has
dealings with big corporations as seller of cullets, gave her assent to Purchase Order No. 106211
with full knowledge. She was, in fact, the one who sought a contract with ACI upon learning of
the latter’s need for a supply of flint cullets. Furthermore, ACI squarely raised the failure of the
purchase order to express the true intent of the parties, i.e., that petitioner entered into a contract
with respondent conditioned upon the latter’s prompt delivery of flint cullets. Unfortunately, the
trial court sustained respondent’s objection based on the parol evidence rule.
It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written
document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy
that when the written contract is established as the repository of the parties’ stipulations, any other
evidence is excluded and the same cannot be used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to
alter or contradict them. This rule, however, is not without exception. Section. 9, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely
raised as an issue in the answer, the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely
disregard petitioner’s evidence.

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Sifting through the testimony of Coquia, she was indeed apprised of ACI’s urgent need for large
quantities thereof. Furthermore, ACI presented the unrebutted testimony of its materials control
manager, to prove that it agreed only because Coquia assured it of prompt deliveries sufficient for
ACI’s production requirements. Further, we find that Purchase Order No. 106211 had indeed been
superseded by Purchase Order No. 106373. Coquia testified that the deliveries of flint cullets on
subsequent dates were already covered by the new purchase order which did indicate the reduced
unit price but did not mention the quantity to be delivered.
Clearly, Coquia knew, at the time she made the deliveries that Purchase Order No. 106373 would
already govern the transaction. Significantly, payments on these deliveries were made after the
complaint for specific performance was filed. By acquiescing to the new purchase order which no
longer indicated a specific quantity of flint cullets to be delivered, respondent knew or should be
presumed to have known that deliveries made thereafter were no longer meant to complete the
original quantity contracted for under Purchase Order No. 106211. ACI, therefore, cannot be
compelled to accept more deliveries of flint cullets from respondent to complete the quantity
originally contracted for. By the same token, ACI cannot be tied down to the ₱4.20 per kilo unit
price under Purchase Order No. 106211, nor even to the ₱3.65 per kilo indicated in Purchase Order
No. 106373, the latter contract not having stated the quantity petitioner is willing to accept delivery
of and pay for under that price.

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SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION v. AUTOCORP GROUP AND PAUL Y.

RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 164326 17 October 2008
NACHURA, J.
DOCTRINE:
Evidence; Parol Evidence; Witnesses; Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal
agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule.—Petitioner does not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice but merely
argues that the same does not reflect the true agreement of the parties.However, petitioner only
had its bare testimony to back up the alleged arrangement with Rodriguez. The Monte de Piedad
checks—the supposedly “clear and obvious link” between the documentary evidence and the true
transaction between the parties—are equivocal at best. There is nothing in those checks to establish
such link. Rodriguez denies that there is such an agreement. Unsubstantiated testimony,offered as
proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule.
FACTS:
Petitioner Seaoil Petroleum Corporation purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator
from respondent Autocorp Group. The original cost of the unit was P2.5m but was increased to
P3,112,519.94 because it was paid in 12 monthly installments. Both sales agreements(embodied
in the Vehicle Sales Invoice No. A-0209 and Vehicle Sales Confirmation No. 258) were signed by
Francis Yu, president of Seaoil, on behalf of said corporation. Furthermore, it was agreed that
ownership was to remain with Autocorp until the obligation is fully settled. In this light, Seaoil’s
contractor, Romeo Valera, issued 12 postdated checks. However, Autocorp refused to accept the
checks because they were not under Seaoil’s name. Hence, Yu, on behalf of Seaoil, signed and
issued 12 postdated checks for P259,376.62 each with Autocorp as payee. After the delivery of the
excavator, the remaining 10 checks were not honored by the bank since Seaoil requested that
payment be stopped. Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance.

Autocorp filed a complaint for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin in RTC.
In Seaoil’s answer, it alleged that Seaoiland Autocorp were only utilized as conduits to settle the obligation
of one foreign entity named Uniline Asia, in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International,
Incorporated. Rodriguez is a stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also the owner of Uniline. On
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the other hand, Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil and is at the same time owner of Focus.
Allegedly, Uniline chartered MV Asia Property in the amount of $315,711.71 from its owner Focus.
Uniline was not able to settle the said amount. Hence Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed to settle the
obligation through conveyance of vehicles and heavy equipment to be procured from Autocorp.
Seaoil claims that the real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus.
In lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid
by checks issued by Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline. It further
claims that when Rodriguez issued a stop payment order on the 10 checks the former was also constrained
to order a stop payment order on the PBCOM checks.
RTC ruled that the transaction between Autocorp and Seaoil was a simple contract of sale payable
in installments and held that the obligation to pay plaintiff the remainder of the purchase price of the
excavator solely devolves on Seaoil. CA affirmed the decision of RTC. It held that the transaction between
Yu and Rodriquez was merely verbal and cannot alter the sales contract between Seaoil and Autcorp as
this will run counter to the parol evidence rule which prohibits the introduction of oral and parol evidence
to modify the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under the exceptions to the parol evidence rule
has not been sufficiently proven. A petition for certiorari was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in applying parol evidence rule to prove only some terms contained in
one portion of the document since the same does not reflect the true agreement of the parties.

RULING:
No. Petitioner does not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice but merely argues
that the same does not reflect the true agreement of the parties. However, petitioner only had its bare
testimony to back up the alleged arrangement with Rodriquez. Unsubstantiated testimony offered as proof
of verbal agreement which tends to vary the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule.
This rule forbids any addition or contradiction of the terms of a written agreement by testimony or
other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport
of the written contract unless it falls under one of the exceptions as provided under:
SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and

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there can be, between the parties and their successors-in- interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if
he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in-interest after the execution
of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.

The Vehicles Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. It is considered a business form
that is commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and at the
very least serves as an acknowledgement that a business transaction has In fact transpired.

In here, the terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They shown that Autocorp sold to Seaoil
one unit of Excavator paid for by checks.The fact that Seaoil as represented by Yu is the customer or
buyer cannot be denied. Petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol
evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or
obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of
the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of
the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contractmay be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.
SC further stated that the transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and distinct from that
under the Lease Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil that owes Autocorp, while in the latter,
Uniline incurred obligations to Focus. There was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that
Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations’ separate personalities
were being used as a means to perpetrate fraud or wrongdoing.

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RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR INOCENTES

G.R. No. 107372 23 January 1997

FRANCISCO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Oral testimony on alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of
a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all
the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever
is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties.

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were
orally agreed upon by the parties.

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.

FACTS:

Oscar Inocentes sold to Ortanez two 2 parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration
of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. Inocentes received the payments for the above-
mentioned lots, but failed to deliver the titles to Oratnez. Ortanez demanded from the former the
delivery of said titles, Inocentes, however, refused on the ground that Ortanez’ acquisition of the
title is subject to certain conditions. Inocentes alleged the existence of oral conditions which were
never reflected in the deeds of sale.

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Despite Ortanez’ timely objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was
barred by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and eventually
dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the parol evidence to establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a contract
of sale are admissible.

RULING:

No. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible.

Inocentes’ oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in
the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract
which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other
than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of
the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the
parties.12 Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject
to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.

Further, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: “The parol evidence rule forbids
any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or
before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the
parties.” Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which
are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or
mistake exists in this case.

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Also, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol evidence is admissible under
the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express
the true intent of the parties. Such exception obtains only where the written contract is so
ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood
from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of
the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances
surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make
a proper, interpretation of the instrument. In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.

Lastly, we are not persuaded by private respondents' contention that they "put in issue by the
pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record
shows that private respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or
that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer and the seller. Such issue must be, "squarely
presented." Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to 4 conditions which they
tried to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not
plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the
general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement.

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BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., V. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 96405 26 June 1996
ROMERO, J.

DOCTRINE:

What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their
contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the

parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for
the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed
by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not
subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

FACTS:

Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he
signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves
jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de
Oro City branch. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983.Said due date expired without the
promissors having paid their obligation.

The petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1983, he was approached by his friend, Rudy
Campos, who told him that he was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of private respondent
in Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos also intimated to him that
Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would contribute a chainsaw to the venture. He
added that, although Naybe had no money to buy the equipment, Pio Tio had assured Naybe of the
approval of a loan he would make with private respondent. Campos then persuaded petitioner to
act as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understanding that
he would only be a co-maker for the loan of P50,000.00.

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Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by
Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound
himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation
that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00.

Petitioner contends that in signing the promissory note, his consent was vitiated by fraud as,
contrary to their agreement that the loan was only for the amount of P5,000.00, the promissory
note stated the amount of P50,000.00.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not parol evidence can be used to prove that petitioner agreed to a different
amount

2. Whether or not for parol evidence to apply, a written contract must be in particular
form, or be signed by both parties

RULING:

1. By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the right direction towards proving
that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parol
contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract, it may be
shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must,
therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving
testimony.

2. The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.

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What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their
contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the

parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for
the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed
by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not
subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

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SABIO VS. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK, INC.

G.R. NO. 132709 4 SEPTEMBER 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written
document is the best evidence of its own contents.

The parol evidence rule is that “when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be between the
parties and their successors in- interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.” There are exceptions to said rule, however, such as when:

1. There is an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the writing;

2. The written agreement fails to express the true agreement and intent of the parties thereto;

3. The validity of the written agreement is in question; and

4. There exists other terms agreed by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

FACTS:

In 1973, spouses Ledonio assigned to spouses Sabio (petitioners) all their rights, interests, title,
and participation over a contiguous portion of the subject property. Similarly, the respondent
Interbank acquired from the Trans-Resource Management and Development Corporation all of the
latter’s rights to the subject property by virtue of a deed of assignment executed between them on
July 12, 1984. The Sabios and Interbank settled their opposing claims by entering into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby the Sabios assigned, conveyed, and transferred all
their rights over the parcel of land to Interbank, with the express exception of a 58,000 square
meter contiguous portion of said lot. The contract stated that Interbank has the obligation to

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segregate the contiguous portion and deliver title thereto to the plaintiff spouses free from liens
and encumbrances. Thereafter, a dispute arose concerning the 58,000 square meter contiguous
portion subject of the MOA that was to be conveyed and transferred back to the Sabios by
Interbank. Later on, the respondents averred that fulfillment of its obligation under the MOA
became impossible due to the plaintiff spouses’ own acts. They claimed that they were ready to
deliver the title but the petitioners refused to sign unless the subject property was cleared of all
squatters and other illegal occupants. Respondents argue that no such obligation was imposed in
the MOA.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, finding that the MOA did not impose,
whether expressly or impliedly, on Interbank and its transferees, the obligation to clear the subject
58,000 square meter portion of squatters and other illegal occupants. Both parties appealed, but
were denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents had an obligation to clear the property of illegal squatters

RULING:

No. The lower courts correctly found that nowhere in the MOA did Interbank commit to clear the
subject parcel of squatters or illegal occupants. Neither was Interbank obliged to remove whatever
unauthorized improvements were introduced in the said property. Since the MOA of the parties
was reduced to writing, such agreement is deemed to contain all its terms and there cannot be,
between the parties and their successors- in- interest, any evidence of the terms of the written
agreement other than the contents of the agreement itself.

The parol evidence rule is that “when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be between the
parties and their successors in- interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.” There are exceptions to said rule, however, such as when:
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1. There is an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the writing;

2. The written agreement fails to express the true agreement and intent of the parties
thereto;

3. The validity of the written agreement is in question; and

4. There exists other terms agreed by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.

In sum, there is no justification in the instant case to admit parol evidence to support the
petitioners’ claims. It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance,
that the written document is the best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both
principle and policy that when the written contract, by agreement of the parties, is established as
the repository of their stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the same cannot be used as
a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them. Although the parol evidence
rule is inflexible, it admits of four (4) exceptions, as earlier discussed Since none of these
exceptions was ever put in issue in the pleadings, in accordance with Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule must be strictly adhered to in this instant case.

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EDENBERT MADRIGAL AND VIRGILIO MALLARI v. THE COURT OF APPEALS

AND JOSE MALLARI
G.R. No. 142944 April 15, 2005
GARCIA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Then, too, there is the ruling of this Court in Lustan vs. CA6 to the effect that even if the document
appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express the true intent
of the parties. In the very words of Lustan:

"Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that
the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does
not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and
admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the
repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court will enforce the
agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent of the parties at the time of the
execution of the contract".

FACTS:

Jose Mallari and his wife Fermina Mallari are the owners of a 340-square meter residential lot with
a 2-storey residential house situated at Olongapo City. In need of money for his wife’s planned
travel to the United States, Jose thought of mortgaging the above property with a bank. However,
his son Virgilio Mallari who is residing with his own family somewhere in Bulacan convinced
Jose not to proceed with the intended mortgage and to instead assign to him a portion of the same
property, assuring his father that the latter could continue in occupancy of the property and that he
will allow his sister Elizabeth who operates a store thereat to continue with the same. Virgilio told
his father, however, that he will occupy one of the rooms in the house in case he goes to Olongapo
City on vacation and that he will renovate the other room and reserve it for his mother when she
comes back from the States. Virgilio assured his father that he will not dispose of the property
without his father’s consent and that the latter could redeem the said property any time he acquires
money.

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Believing Virgilio’s words, Jose did not anymore proceed with his original idea of mortgaging the
property with a bank. Instead, on 22 October 1987, he and his wife Fermina executed a document
denominated as "Deed of Absolute Sale", whereunder the couple appeared to have conveyed to
their son Virgilio Mallari the house and lot in question for a consideration of ₱50,000.00 although
the property easily commands much more at that time. Worse, the deed of conveyance described
the properties sold as a one-storey residential house and the 135-square meter lot whereon it stands
even as the subject properties actually consist of a 2-storey residential house sitting on a 340-
square meter parcel of land.

Things turned for the worse to the unsuspecting Jose Mallari when, without his knowledge, his
son Virgilio, via a document bearing date 25 June 1988 and entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Tuluyan", sold the same property for the same amount of ₱50,000.00 to Edenbert Madrigal, a
longtime neighbor of the Mallaris in the area. he was demanded by Edenbert Madrigal to vacate
the subject property.

Jose Mallari file a case to declare the Deed of Absolute Sale he signed to be null and void,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the TC erred in receiving Parol Evidence to establish the real intention of the
instrument.

RULING:

No. The TC did not err in receiving Parol Evidence to establish that the document was actually an
equitable mortgage and not an absolute sale.

To begin with, we cannot view the Deed of Absolute Sale in question in isolation of the
circumstances under which the same was executed by Virgilio’s parents, more so in the light of
his father’s disavowal of what the document, on its face, purports to state.

Then, too, there is the ruling of this Court in Lustan vs. CA6 to the effect that even if the
document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express
the true intent of the parties. In the very words of Lustan:

"Even when a document appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove
that the contract is really a loan with mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the

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document does not express the true intent of the parties. In this case, parol evidence then
becomes competent and admissible to prove that the instrument was in truth and in fact
given merely as a security for the repayment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such
allegations, the court will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the
true intent of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract".

In any event, at bottom of petitioners’ first submission is their inability to accept the factual
findings of the two (2) courts below that the transaction between petitioner Virgilio Mallari and
his parents, albeit denominated as one of absolute sale, is in reality an equitable mortgage. In short,
petitioners would want us to revisit the factual findings of both courts, scrutinize and examine
those findings anew and calibrate the validity of their conclusions on the basis of our own factual
assessment.

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WILLEX PLASTIC INDUSTRIES, CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

and INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK

G.R. No. 103066 April 25, 1996

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Parol Evidence Rule; Explanatory evidence may be received to show the circumstances under
which a document has been made and to what debt it relates; A party, by failing to object to the
parol evidence presented, waives the protection of the parol evidence rule.—It has been held that
explanatory evidence may be received to show the circumstances under which a document has
been made and to what debt it relates. At all events, Willex Plastic cannotnow claim that its liability
is limited to any amount which Interbank, as creditor, might give directly to Inter-Resin Industrial
as debtor because, by failing to object to the parol evidence presented, Willex Plastic waived the
protection of the parol evidence rule.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1978, Inter-Resin Industrial Corporation opened a letter of credit with the Manila
Banking Corporation. To secure payment of the credit accomodation, Inter-Resin Industrial and
the Investment and Underwriting Corporation of the Philippines (IUCP) executed two documents,
both entitled "Continuing Surety Agreement" and dated December 1, 1978, whereby they bound
themselves solidarily to pay Manilabank.

On April 2, 1979, Inter-Resin Industrial, together with Willex Plastic Industries Corp., executed a
"Continuing Guaranty" in favor of IUCP whereby "For and in consideration of the sum or sums
obtained and/or to be obtained by Inter-Resin Industrial Corporation" from IUCP, Inter-Resin
Industrial and Willex Plastic jointly and severally guaranteed "the prompt and punctual payment
at maturity of the NOTE/S issued by the DEBTOR/S . . . to the extent of the aggregate principal
sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) Philippine Currency and such interests, charges
and penalties as hereafter may be specified."

On January 7, 1981, following demand upon it, IUCP paid to Manilabank the sum of
P4,334,280.61 representing Inter-Resin Industrial's outstanding obligation. (Exh. M-1) On

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February 23 and 24, 1981, Atrium Capital Corp., which in the meantime had succeeded IUCP,
demanded from Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex Plastic the payment of what it (IUCP) had paid
to Manilabank. As neither one of the sureties paid, Atrium filed this case in the court below against
Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex Plastic.

On August 11, 1982, Inter-Resin Industrial paid Interbank, which had in turn succeeded Atrium,
the sum of P687,600.00 representing the proceeds of its fire insurance policy for the destruction
of its properties.

In its answer, Inter-Resin Industrial admitted that the "Continuing Guaranty" was intended to
secure payment to Atrium of the amount of P4,334,280.61 which the latter had paid to Manilabank.
It claimed, however, that it had already fully paid its obligation to Atrium Capital. On the other
hand, Willex Plastic denied the material allegations of the complaint.

On April 5, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment, ordering Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex
Plastic jointly and severally to pay to Interbank.

Inter-Resin Industrial and Willex Plastic appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 22, 1991,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the trial court. Willex Plastic filed
a motion for reconsideration praying that it be allowed to present evidence to show that Inter-Resin
Industrial had already paid its obligation to Interbank, but its motion was denied on December 6,
1991:

ISSUE:

The main issue raised is whether under the "Continuing Guaranty" signed on April 2, 1979
petitioner Willex Plastic may be held jointly and severally liable with Inter-Resin Industrial for the
amount paid by Interbank to Manilabank.

RULING:

Yes.

As already stated, the amount had been paid by Interbank's predecessor-in-interest, Atrium Capital,
to Manilabank pursuant to the "Continuing Surety Agreements" made on December 1, 1978. In
denying liability to Interbank for the amount, Willex Plastic argues that under the "Continuing
Guaranty," its liability is for sums obtained by Inter-Resin Industrial from Interbank, not for sums

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paid by the latter to Manilabank for the account of Inter-Resin Industrial. In support of this
contention Willex Plastic cites the following portion of the "Continuing Guaranty":

For and in consideration of the sums obtained and/or to be obtained by INTER-RESIN

INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, hereinafter referred to as the DEBTOR/S, from you and/or your
principal/s as may be evidenced by promissory note/s, checks, bills receivable/s and/or other
evidence/s of indebtedness (hereinafter referred to as the NOTE/S), I/We hereby jointly and
severally and unconditionally guarantee unto you and/or your principal/s, successor/s and assigns
the prompt and punctual payment at maturity of the NOTE/S issued by the DEBTOR/S in your
and/or your principal/s, successor/s and assigns favor to the extent of the aggregate principal sum
of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, and such interests, charges and
penalties as may hereinafter be specified.

The contention is untenable. What Willex Plastic has overlooked is the fact that evidence aliunde
was introduced in the trial court to explain that it was actually to secure payment to Interbank
(formerly IUCP) of amounts paid by the latter to Manilabank that the "Continuing Guaranty" was
executed. In its complaint below, Interbank's predecessor-in-interest, Atrium Capital, alleged:

5. to secure the guarantee made by plaintiff of the credit accommodation granted to defendant IRIC
[Inter-Resin Industrial] by Manilabank, the plaintiff required defendant IRIC [Inter-Resin
Industrial] to execute a chattel mortgage in its favor and a Continuing Guaranty which was signed
by the other defendant WPIC [Willex Plastic].

In its answer, Inter-Resin Industrial admitted this allegation although it claimed that it had already
paid its obligation in its entirety. On the other hand, Willex Plastic, while denying the allegation
in question, merely did so "for lack of knowledge or information of the same." But, at the hearing
of the case on September 16, 1986, when asked by the trial judge whether Willex Plastic had not
filed a crossclaim against Inter-Resin Industrial, Willex Plastic's counsel replied in the negative
and manifested that "the plaintiff in this case [Interbank] is the guarantor and my client [Willex
Plastic] only signed as a guarantor to the guarantee."

For its part Interbank adduced evidence to show that the "Continuing Guaranty" had been made to
guarantee payment of amounts made by it to Manilabank and not of any sums given by it as loan

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to Inter-Resin Industrial. Interbank's witness testified under cross examination by counsel for
Willex Plastic that Willex "guaranteed the exposure/of whatever exposure of ACP [Atrium
Capital] will later be made because of the guarantee to Manila Banking Corporation."

It has been held that explanatory evidence may be received to show the circumstances under which
a document has been made and to what debt it relates. At all events, Willex Plastic cannot now
claim that its liability is limited to any amount which Interbank, as creditor, might give directly to
Inter-Resin Industrial as debtor because, by failing to object to the parol evidence presented, Willex
Plastic waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.

Accordingly, the trial court found that it was "to secure the guarantee made by plaintiff of the
credit accommodation granted to defendant IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial] by Manilabank, [that]
the plaintiff required defendant IRIC to execute a chattel mortgage in its favor and a Continuing
Guaranty which was signed by the defendant Willex Plastic Industries Corporation."

Similarly, the Court of Appeals found it to be an undisputed fact that "to secure the guarantee
undertaken by plaintiff-appellee [Interbank] of the credit accommodation granted to Inter-Resin
Industrial by Manilabank, plaintiff-appellee required defendant-appellants to sign a Continuing
Guaranty." These factual findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals are binding on us
not only because of the rule that on appeal to the Supreme Court such findings are entitled to great
weight and respect but also because our own examination of the record of the trial court confirms
these findings of the two courts.

Nor does the record show any other transaction under which Inter-Resin Industrial may have
obtained sums of money from Interbank. It can reasonably be assumed that Inter-Resin Industrial
and Willex Plastic intended to indemnify Interbank for amounts which it may have paid
Manilabank on behalf of Inter-Resin Industrial.

Indeed, in its Petition for Review in this Court, Willex Plastic admitted that it was "to secure the
aforesaid guarantee, that INTERBANK required principal debtor IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial] to
execute a chattel mortgage in its favor, and so a "Continuing Guaranty" was executed on April 2,
1979 by WILLEX PLASTIC INDUSTRIES CORPORATION (WILLEX for brevity) in favor of
INTERBANK for and in consideration of the loan obtained by IRIC [Inter-Resin Industrial]."

OLIVARES VS. SARMIENTO

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G.R. No. 158384 June 12, 2008

CARPIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

To presume that a contract is an equitable mortgage based on gross inadequacy of price, it must
be clearly shown from the evidence presented that the consideration was in fact grossly inadequate
at the time the sale was executed; Mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient

FACTS:

Respondent Esperanza de la Cruz Sarmiento (respondent) was the owner of a 230-square

meter parcel of residential land located at Barangay San Antonio, Oton, Iloilo. Respondent and her
husband Manuel Sarmiento (Manuel) obtained a P12,000 loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for the construction of a residential house on the land. Respondent mortgaged
the land to DBP as security for the payment of the loan. Respondent and Manuel failed to pay the
monthly amortizations on the loan.

In 1979, respondent allegedly obtained a loan of P35,000 from Luis Boteros (Boteros) so
she could pay her obligation with the DBP and to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgaged land.
Respondent alleged that instead of getting the amount she loaned from Boteros, she authorized
Boteros and his niece Segunda Planta (Planta) to pay her loan with the DBP. However, respondent
accused Boteros and Planta of forging her signatures in two deeds of sale, making it appear that
respondent and her husband Manuel sold the land and the house (property) constructed thereon to
Boteros.

On the other hand, Boteros alleged that in 1979, respondent offered to sell the property to
him, provided Boteros would pay respondent's loan with the DBP plus the interest due thereon
which Boteros accepted. This was put in writing through a notarized Deed of Definite Sale dated
May 1979, signed by both respondent and Boteros. Hence, he paid respondent's loan plus interest
with the DBP, totaling P21,009.62. Thereafter, DBP issued a certification of cancellation of
mortgage. After Boteros fully paid respondent's loan with the DBP, respondent and Boteros
executed another document, a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 July 1979, stating that spouses

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respondent and Manuel were selling the property to Boteros for P25,000. The Deed of Absolute
Sale was signed by both respondent and her husband Manuel.

On 24 July 1979, the Register of Deeds issued a new title in the name of Boteros. On 7
January 1984, Boteros sold the property to spouses Juan Olivares (Olivares) and Dolores Robles
(Robles) for P27,000. Boteros alleged that respondent was aware of the sale of the property to
Olivares and Robles (petitioners) since respondent was among those who looked for interested
buyers of the property.

Olivares testified that before buying the property from Boteros, he approached the
respondent who confirmed to him that she already sold the property to Boteros. On 7 January 1984,
petitioners bought the property from Boteros and the Register of Deeds issued a new title in
petitioners' name. After the title was transferred to petitioners' name, Olivares demanded that
respondent vacate the property. Respondent allegedly requested that she be given some time to
find a place where her family could transfer.

Consequently, petitioners filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Oton an illegal detainer
case against respondent and Manuel when they continued to stay on the property despite repeated
demands from petitioners for them to vacate the property. The MTC rendered a decision in the
illegal detainer case and ordered respondent and Manuel to vacate the property and deliver the
possession thereof to petitioners.

Respondent filed a civil case for recovery of possession, ownership, annulment of title, and
damages against Boteros and Planta with the MTC which was dismissed.

On 26 September 1986, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo a complaint
for recovery of ownership, annulment of title, and damages against Boteros, Planta, and petitioners
which was also dismissed stating that the deed of absolute sale was valid.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC declaring the
deed of sale null and void.

Hence, this petition for review.

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ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the agreement between respondent Sarmiento and Boteros is the loan
and not the sale of the property.

2. Whether or not the contract was an equitable mortgage.

RULING:

1. No, the agreement is not the loan but the sale of the property.

Respondent failed to substantiate her claim that the transaction was merely a loan. In fact,
there was no written document evidencing the alleged loan transaction. It is quite improbable that
Boteros, who knew that respondent was unable to pay her P12,000 loan from the DBP, would
agree to grant respondent a P35,000 loan which is almost thrice as much as the DBP loan, without
insisting that the loan be embodied in a written document. Furthermore, respondent admitted that
she has never paid a single centavo of her alleged loan with Boteros.

On the other hand, the notarized Deed of Definite Sale and the notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale signed by respondent and Manuel clearly bely respondent's claim that the agreement was
merely a loan transaction. These circumstances clearly indicate that the agreement was indeed a
sale of real property and not merely a loan.

Where the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. The contract is the law
between the parties and when the words of the contract are clear and can be easily understood,
there is no room for construction.

2. No, the contract was not an equitable mortgage.

An equitable mortgage is defined as one that, although lacking some formality or form,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge a real property as security for a debt. A
contract of sale is considered an equitable mortgage when the real intention of the parties was to
secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.

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In this case, the land which was the subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale was already
mortgaged not to the buyer but to another entity who was not a party to the contract. The land was
already mortgaged to DBP by the sellers (respondent and her husband Manuel), who were unable
to pay their loan.

The records show that the property was about to be foreclosed so respondent and Manuel decided
to sell the property to Boteros. Under the terms of the Deed of Definite Sale dated May 1979, the
consideration for the sale was P2,000 plus the assumption of Boteros of the sellers' loan from the
DBP, including all interests. Prior to their sale transaction, there is no evidence that respondent
had an existing debt with Boteros. There is likewise no substantial evidence on the records that the
parties to the contract agreed upon a different transaction other than the sale of real property.

Moreover, The records of the case are bereft of any evidence which could lead to the
conclusion that the sale price was unusually inadequate. No evidence was presented on the market
value of real estate in the area where the property was located at the time of the sale. Neither was
there testimony of any alleged disparity on the price and the market value of the property. There
was no testimony nor evidence presented on the inadequacy of the sale price. Besides, the property
which respondent sold to Boteros for P25,000 in 1979 was subsequently sold by Boteros to
petitioners in 1984 for P27,000. If the price indicated on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 July
1979 was indeed grossly inadequate, then Boteros could have sold the property five years later at
a much higher price than P27,000. To presume that a contract is an equitable mortgage based on
gross inadequacy of price, it must be clearly shown from the evidence presented that the
consideration was in fact grossly inadequate at the time the sale was executed. In fact, mere
inadequacy of price is not sufficient.

Respondent's continuous possession of the property even after the property was sold to
Boteros does not automatically mean that the transaction was an equitable mortgage and not an
absolute sale. In this case, Boteros merely tolerated respondent's continued possession of the
property until Boteros sold the property and the new buyers, petitioners herein, demanded
respondent to vacate the property.

Based on the records of the case, we hold that the transaction between Boteros and
respondent and Manuel was a contract of absolute sale of real property and not merely an equitable

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mortgage. Boteros can therefore validly sell the property to petitioners. In view of the conclusion
we have reached, it is unnecessary to pass upon the last two issues raised by petitioners.

FINANCIAL BUILDING CORPORATION VS. RUDLIN INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION

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G.R. NO. 164186 & G.R. NO. 164347 OCTOBER 4, 2010.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

The exception under (a) and (b) of Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court obtains only
where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument.

FACTS:

On Nov. 22, 1985, Rudlin Corp. executed a construction agreement with FBC for a 3-
storey school building for the price of P6,933,268.00, with a provision in Sec. 12 that time is of
the essence in the agreement and the contractor shall be liable for 0.1% of the total contract price
for every calendar day of delay. The contract provided for a completion date not later than Apr.
30, 1986.

The construction was not finished on said date. On June 5, 1986, the parties made
amendments to their construction agreement whereby FBC shall complete the project on or before
June 10, 1986, payment of the balance due on the contract price shall be made after the parties
have reconciled their accounts, and that Sec. 12 of the original agreement is hereby waived.

On June 15, 1986, the subject school building “Bloomfield Academy” was inaugurated and
utilized by Rudlin Corp. FBC demanded payment of the balance but it was not heeded by Rudlin
Corp.

On Mar. 10, 1987, FBC filed in the RTC a suit for a sum of money (P2,449,208.30 balance)
with prayer for preliminary attachment, and legal interest.

In their Answer with Counterclaim, defendants denied the allegations and averred that the
construction agreement did not reflect the true contract price agreed upon (P6,006,965.00). The
amount of P6,933,268.00, which is FBC’s bid price, was indicated in the agreement solely for the
purpose of obtaining a higher amount of loan from BPI.

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The execution of said document was made with the understanding between FBC and
Rudlin Corp. that the contract price stated therein would be decreased to a mutually acceptable
contract price.

However, due to inadvertence, the parties forgot to sign an agreement fixing the true
contract price.

Rudlin Corp. also denied that the construction of the project was completed by FBC. Rudlin
Corp. likewise claimed that many portions of the work performed by FBC are incomplete and/or
faulty, defective and deficient.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rudlin’s claim of the actual contract price was substantiated.

RULING:

Rudlin failed to substantiate its claim that the contract price stated in the Construction
Agreement (P6,933,268.00) was not the true contract price because it had an understanding with
FBC’s Jaime B. Lo that they would decrease said amount to a mutually acceptable amount.

Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of
an agreement were reduced in writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed
upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.

Rudlin argues that under Section 9, Rule 130, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if it is put in issue in the pleading, “the failure
of the written agreement to express the true intent and the agreement of the parties thereto.”
Assuming as true Rudlin’s claim that Exhibit “7” failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties
to fix the total contract price at P6,006,965.00, Rudlin failed to avail of its right to seek the
reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to

vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.

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Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the Section 9, Rule 130. Such
exception obtains only where “the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In
such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties
to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.”

Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlin’s evidence is admissible to show the
existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract.

But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of
Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of
P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and
Rudlin found mutually acceptable. As to the affidavits executed by Architect Quezon and his
associate Roberto R. Antonio, the same do not serve as competent proof of the purported actual
contract price as they did not testify thereon. Significantly, the June 5, 1986 Letter-Agreement did
not at all mention the total contract price. Likewise, there is nothing in the various letters sent by
Rudlin to FBC while construction was in progress and even subsequent to the execution of the said
Letter- Agreement indicating that Rudlin corrected the contract price of P6,933,268.00 which FBC
had repeatedly mentioned in its letters and documents.

MARQUEZ v. ESPEJO

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G.R. No. 168387 August 25, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict,
vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. However, the parol
evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." This rule
may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party
to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument.

Under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (1) An intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (2) The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto.

FACTS:

Espejos owned two parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located
at Barangay Lantap, while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.
Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez,husband of respondent Elenita Espejo,
while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).

The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to
secure certain loans. But the mortgaged properties were later foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI
eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued
in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong
property while TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property.

Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in "Bagabag Townsite, K-27," without any
reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.

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Later on, Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale did not mention the
barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title TCT No. T-62096, which
corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents took
possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued
to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the
Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi continued working on the Lantap property
without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner.

Meanwhile, RBBI, pursuant to a special law, executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both
VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and
covered by TCT No. T-62836 which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property.

After the petitioners paid the purchase price to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to Marquez and Dela Cruz. Both CLOAs stated
that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong. The CLOAs
were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.

After some time, respondents filed a Complaint for the cancellation of petitioners’ CLOAs, the
deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of
voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on
respondents’ theory that the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the
respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale which refers to
TCT No. 62096 that pertains to Murong property.

Petitioners on the other hand alleged that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries
thereof. They argued that they have always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when
it became the owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief
that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over
the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from
RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and
possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi.

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The OIC-RARAD ruled that since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents’ Deed of Sale and
the said title refers to the Murong property, the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property.
On the other hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds
to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners’ CLOAs necessarily refer to the
Lantap property. Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD
Decision.

The case was then appealed to the CA and the appellate court ruled in favor of respondents. Using
the Best Evidence Rule, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents,
particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale
expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the Murong property – then
that is the property that the respondents repurchased.

Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Parol Evidence Rule was correctly applied in this case.

RULING:

No, the Parol Evidence Rule finds no application in this case.

The Court ruled that the CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents
and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting
parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was
the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict,
vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that
what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of

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the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave
primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would
contradict such terms.

However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the
first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they
are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence
rule is exclusive only as "between the parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence
rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a
party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert
a right originating in the instrument.

Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in
the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;

(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

Here, the petitioners’ VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject
property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the subject
property as being located in "Barangay Murong." Even the respondents’ Deed of Sale falls under
the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-62096" (Murong property), but
RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put
in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.

Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties’
respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the
rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention
is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities.

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To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat
the very purpose of agreements.

In this regard, guidance is provided by the articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation
of contract. Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to
transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the
Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent
acts of the parties.

We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the
Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale,
the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and
believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the Murong
property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the possession of the petitioners,
who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the respondents. Moreover,
petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.

We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in
favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. When the VLTs were
executed in 1990, petitioners were already the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had
been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong property and no
other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution of the VLTs.

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI
covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT
No. T-62096.

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SPS. PARAS VS. KIMWA

G.R. NO. 171601 08 APRIL 2015

LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE:

A party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:

(a )An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity
of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

FACTS:

In their Complaint, Spouses Paras alleged that sometime in December 1994, Lucia was approached
by Kimwa expressing its interest to purchase gravel and sand from her. Kimwa allegedly asked
that it be “assured” of 40,000 cubic meters worth of aggregates. Lucia countered that her
concession area was due to be rechanneled on May 15, 1995, when her Special Permit expired.
Thus, she emphasized that she would be willing to enter into a contract with Kimwa “provided the
forty thousand cubic meter[s] w[ould] be withdrawn or completely extracted and hauled before 15
May 1995[.]” Kimwa then assured Lucia that it would take only two to three months for it to
completely haul the 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates. Convinced of Kimwa’s assurances, Lucia
and Kimwa entered into the Agreement.Spouses Paras added that within a few days, Kimwa was
able to extract and haul 10,000 cubic meters of aggregates. However, after extracting and hauling
this quantity, Kimwa allegedly transferred to the concession area of a certain Mrs. Remedios dela
Torre in violation of their Agreement. They then addressed demand letters to Kimwa. As these
went unheeded, Spouses Paras filed their Complaint. Kimwa asserted that the Agreement
articulated the parties’ true intent that 40,000 cubic meters was a maximum limit and that May 15,
1995 was never set as a deadline. Invoking the Parol Evidence Rule, it insisted that Spouses Paras
were barred from introducing evidence which would show that the parties had agreed differently.

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On May 16, 2001, the Regional Trial Court rendered the Decision in favor of Spouses Paras. The
trial court noted that the Agreement stipulated that the allotted aggregates were set aside
exclusively for Kimwa.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Regional Trial Court’s Decision. It faulted the trial
court for basing its findings on evidence presented which were supposedly in violation of the Parol
Evidence Rule. It noted that the Agreement was clear that Kimwa was under no obligation to haul
40,000 cubic meters of aggregates by May 15, 1995. In a subsequent Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied reconsideration to Spouses Paras.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners Spouses Paras were able to establish that respondent Kimwa was
obliged to haul a total of 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995

RULING:

Yes. Respondent Kimwa is liable for failing to haul the remainder of the quantity which it was
obliged to acquire from petitioner Lucia Paras. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides for the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule on admissibility of documentary evidence
when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing. However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his
pleading:

(a )An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity
of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their
successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term “agreement” includes wills. In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence
to be admitted: first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue in a
party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and second, that the parol
evidence sought to be presented serves to form the basis of the conclusion proposed by the
presenting party.

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Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint
they filed before the trial court a mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the
Agreement’s failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa, through
its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of these issues. This is, thus, an
exceptional case allowing admission of parol evidence.

Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed failure to express the
parties’ true intent was successfully put in issue in petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and even
responded to by respondent Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided
by Rule 130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the testimonial and
documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to
these supposed flaws and what they aver to have been the parties’ true intent, may be admitted and
considered.

Our evidentiary rules impel us to proceed from the position (unless convincingly shown otherwise)
that individuals act as rational human beings, i.e, “[t]hat a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns[.]” This basic evidentiary stance, taken with the supporting evidence petitioners

Spouses Paras adduced, respondent Kimwa’s awareness of the conditions under which petitioner
Lucia Paras was bound, and the Agreement’s own text specifying exclusive allotment for
respondent Kimwa, supports petitioners Spouses Paras’ position that respondent Kimwa was
obliged to haul 40,000 cubic meters of aggregates on or before May 15, 1995. As it admittedly
hauled only 10,000 cubic meters, respondent Kimwa is liable for breach of contract in respect of
the remaining 30,000 cubic meters.

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REPUBLIC V. ROQUE

G.R. NO. 203610 10 OCTOBER 2016

BRION, J.

DOCTRINE:

The exception to the parol evidence rule does not apply when the conditions are not alleged and
proved successively.

FACTS:

Roque along with other landowners were encouraged by the government to sell a portion of land
in Quezon City for a project which happens to be the construction of the National Government
Center will be built. The lands were sold below fair market value since the government was
anticipating that land valuation will increase once the facility has been established. It was also
alleged that the government has extended to the landowners the right to buy back the land should
the project fail to materialize. Unfortunately, the NGC was not constructed so the landowners are
claiming their right to buy back the land.

ISSUE:

Whether the exception to the parol evidence rule applies in this case.

RULING:

No. The exception does not apply since the conditions which in the Rules as follows were not
alleged and proved successively:

(a) an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) the failure of the written agreement to express the parties' true intent and agreement;

(c) the validity of the written agreement; or

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(d) the existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement. The issue must be squarely presented.

“In the present case, the respondents failed to allege that the terms of the deeds of sale are
ambiguous or obscure to require the presentation of parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intent.
Both parties agree that the transaction was clearly a sale to transfer ownership over the properties
to the Republic. Absent any allegation that the contractual terms are ambiguous, the testimonies
of Gonzalo and Viloria are unnecessary to establish the two alleged oral conditions.”

It is also noteworthy that the copy of the Deed of Sale was presented.

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STATUTE OF FRAUDS

ROSA LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 102784 February 28, 1996

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

There are some provisions of the law which require certain formalities for particular contracts. The
first is when the form is required for the validity of the contract; the second is when it is required
to make the contract effective as against third parties such as those mentioned in Articles 1357 and
1358; and the third is when the form is required for the purpose of proving the existence of the
contract, such as those provided in the Statute of Frauds in Article 1403.

A contract of agency to sell on commission basis does not belong to any of these three
categories, hence it is valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.

FACTS:

Rosa Lim, who arrived from Cebu, received from Victoria Suarez two pieces of jewelry
(1) a diamond ring and (2) a bracelet to be sold on commission basis. Lim returned the bracelet to
Suarez, but failed to return the diamond ring or to turn over the proceeds thereof if sold. Suarez
wrote a demand letter asking for the return of the ring or the proceeds of the sale thereof. Lim,
however, alleges that she had returned both the ring and the bracelet, hence she no longer has any
liability.

Lim has a different version of the facts. She denies the transaction was for her to sell the
two pieces of jewelry on commission basis. She told Suarez that she would consider buying the
pieces of jewelry for her own use. Lim took the pieces of jewelry and asked Suarez to prepare the
necessary papers for her to sign because she was not yet prepared to buy it. The document was
prepared, and Lim signed it, but she claims that she didn’t agree to the terms of the receipt
regarding the sale on commission basis. Her proof is that she signed the document on the upper

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portion and not at the bottom where a space is provided for the signature of the persons receiving
the jewelry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not real transaction between Lim and Suarez a real contract of agency to sell
on commission basis as set out in the receipt or a sale on credit?

RULING:

The transaction between Lim and Suarez is a real contract of agency to sell on commission
basis.

Rosa Lim’s signature indeed appears on the upper portion of the receipt immediately below
the description of the items taken. We find that this fact does not have the effect of altering the
terms of the transaction from a contract of agency to sell on commission basis to a contract of sale.
Neither does it indicate absence or vitiation of consent thereto on the part of Rosa Lim which
would make the contract void or voidable. The moment she affixed her signature thereon,
petitioner became bound by all the terms stipulated in the receipt. She, thus, opened herself to all
the legal obligations that may arise from their breach.

There are some provisions of the law which require certain formalities for particular
contracts. The first is when the form is required for the validity of the contract; the second is when
it is required to make the contract effective as against third parties such as those mentioned in
Articles 1357 and 1358; and the third is when the form is required for the purpose of proving the
existence of the contract, such as those provided in the Statute of Frauds in Article 1403. A
contract of agency to sell on commission basis does not belong to any of these three categories,
hence it is valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.

There is only one type of legal instrument where the law strictly prescribes the location of
the signature of the parties thereto. This is in case of notarial wills. But in the case at bar, the parties
didn’t execute a notarial will but a simple contract of agency to sell on commission basis, thus
making the position of Lim’s signature immaterial.
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The issue as to the return of the ring boils down to one of credibility. Weight of evidence
is not determined mathematically upon its practical effect in inducing belief on the part of the
judge trying the case. In the case at bench, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave weight
to the testimony of Vicky Suarez that she did not authorize Rosa Lim to return the pieces of jewelry
to Nadera.

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AGLIBOT v. SANTIA

G.R. No. 185945 December 5, 2012

REYES, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

Under Article 1403(2), concerning a guaranty agreement, which is a promise to answer for
the debt or default of another, the law clearly requires that it, or some note or memorandum thereof,
be in writing. Otherwise, it would be unenforceable unless ratified, although under Article 1358
of the Civil Code, a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document. Contracts
are generally obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present, and the Statute of Frauds simply provides the
method by which the contracts enumerated in Article 1403(2) may be proved, but it does not
declare them invalid just because they are not reduced to writing. Thus, the form required under
the Statute is for convenience or evidentiary purposes only.

On the other hand, Article 2055 of the Civil Code also provides that a guaranty is not
presumed, but must be express, and cannot extend to more than what is stipulated therein. This is
the obvious rationale why a contract of guarantee is unenforceable unless made in writing or
evidenced by some writing.

FACTS:

Private respondent-complainant Engr. Ingersol L. Santia loaned the amount of

P2,500,000.00 to Pacific Lending and Capital Corporation (PLCC) through the latter’s manager,
petitioner Fideliza J. Aglibot. The loan was evidenced by a promissory note dated July 1, 2003,
issued by Aglibot in behalf of PLCC, payable in one year subject to interest of 24% per annum.
Allegedly as a guaranty for the payment, Aglibot also issued and delivered to Santi eleven (11)
post-dated personal checks drawn from he own demand account maintained at Metrobank.

Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds or closed account. Santia demanded payment from PLCC and Aglibot but

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neither heeded his demand. Consequently, eleven (11) Informations for violation of BP 22 were
filed against Aglibot before the MTCC Dagupan City.

The MTCC acquitted Aglibot of the criminal charge but ordered her to pay P3,000,000.00
representing the value of the checks plus 12% interest per annum. On appeal, the RTC absolved
Aglibot of any civil liability, ruling that the contract between Aglibot and PLCC being one of
guaranty. The CA restored the civil liability of Aglibot and ordered her to pay Santia the same
amount as ordered by the MTCC.

In the instant case, Aglibot maintains that she was a mere guarantor of the said debt of
PLCC and that Santia failed to exhaust all means to collect the debt from PLCC, therefore he
cannot now be permitted to go after her subsidiary liability.

ISSUE:

Whether Aglibot is liable to pay the amount of the checks to Santia despite the lack of
exhaustion of the properties of PLCC.

RULING:

Yes, Aglibot is liable.

Article 1403(2) of the Civil Code, embodying the Statute of Frauds, provides that:

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

xxxx

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

xxxx

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b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or

miscarriage of another;

xxxx

Under the above provision, concerning a guaranty agreement, which is a promise to answer
for the debt or default of another, the law clearly requires that it, or some note or memorandum
thereof, be in writing. Otherwise, it would be unenforceable unless ratified, although under Article
1358 of the Civil Code, a contract of guaranty does not have to appear in a public document.
Contracts are generally obligatory in whatever form they may have been entered into, provided all
the essential requisites for their validity are present, and the Statute of Frauds simply provides the
method by which the contracts enumerated in Article 1403(2) may be proved, but it does not
declare them invalid just because they are not reduced to writing. Thus, the form required under
the Statute is for convenience or evidentiary purposes only.

On the other hand, Article 2055 of the Civil Code also provides that a guaranty is not
presumed, but must be express, and cannot extend to more than what is stipulated therein. This is
the obvious rationale why a contract of guarantee is unenforceable unless made in writing or
evidenced by some writing.

In this case. Aglibot has not shown any proof, such as a contract, a secretary’s certificate
or a board resolution, nor even a note or memorandum thereof, whereby it was agreed that she
would issue her personal checks in behalf of the company to guarantee the payment of its debt to
Santia. Certainly, there is nothing shown in the Promissory Note signed by Aglibot herself
remotely containing an agreement between her and PLCC resembling her guaranteeing its debt to
Santia. And neither is there a showing that PLCC thereafter ratified her act of “guaranteeing” its
indebtedness by issuing her own checks to Santia.

Therefore, Aglibot is liable to pay the amount of the checks to Santia despite the lack of
exhaustion of the properties of PLCC.

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IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE vs. HEIRS of BERNARDINO TAEZA

G.R. No. 175997 February 3, 2014

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:
Art. 1403 of the Civil Code. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
1.) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers.

Closely analogous cases of unenforceable contracts are those where a person signs a deed of
extrajudicial partition in behalf of co-heirs without the latter’s authority; where a mother as judicial
guardian of her minor children, executes a deed of extrajudicial partition wherein she favors one
child by giving him more than his share of the estate to the prejudice of her other children; and
where a person, holding a special power of attorney, sells a property of his principal that is not
included in said special power of attorney.

FACTS:

Iglesia Filipina Independiente is a duly registered religious corporation. It Is the owner of

a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan covered by a title. The land was subdivided. Rev. Macario
Ga, as Supreme Bishop of IFI, sold a part of the land in dispute to Bernardino Taeza, which was
alleged to have completed the payment. IFI filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the
parcels of land against Rev. Ga.

IFI argued that according to Article IV (a) of their canons: “All real properties of the
Church located or situated in such parish can be disposed of only with the approval and conformity
of the laymen’s committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop, with the sanction of the Supreme
Council, and finally with the approval of the Supreme Bishop, as administrator of all the
temporalities of the Church.” IFI alleged that the sale to Taeza was done without the required

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approval and conformity of the entities stated in their canons. Hence, they argued that the sale was
void.

In an alternative, IFI contends that if the contract is not declared null and void, it should
nevertheless be found unenforceable, as the approval and conformity of the other entities in their
church was not obtained, as required by their canons.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale of the land to Taeza was unenforceable.

RULING:

The sale was unenforceable under Article 1403 of the Civil Code.

According to the Supreme Court, it is erroneous for the CA to ignore the fact that the
laymen’s committee objected to the sale of the lot in question. The Canons require that ALL the
church entities listed in Article IV (a) thereof should give its approval to the transaction. Thus,
when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of sale of the petitioner's lot despite the opposition
made by the laymen’s committee, he acted beyond his powers. This case clearly falls under the
category of unenforceable contracts mentioned in Article 1403, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code,
which provides: the following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: 1. Those
entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers.

Evidently, under IFI’s Canon’s, any sale of real property requires not just the consent of
the Supreme Bishop but also the concurrence of the laymen’s committee, the parish priest, and the
Diocesan Bishop, as sanctioned by the Supreme Council.

The Supreme Court declared IFI as the rightful owner of the disputed land and ordered the
respondents to reconvey the property to IFI.

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INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS

MULTINATIONAL VILLAGE HOMEOWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. ARA

SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE AGENCY, INC.,

G.R. NO. 154852 21 OCTOBER 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

Remedial Law; Evidence; Section 11 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that “In the
construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”—Section 11 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states that “[i]n the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” Contrary to
petitioners’ contention, paragraph 5 is not inconsistent with paragraph 12. More important, the
former does not in any way deal with the termination of the Contract. Neither does it provide for
a right to rescind.

FACTS:

Ara Security & Surveillance Agency was hired by petitioners to provide security services at the
Multinational Village in Parañaque. Their agreement was embodied in a Conract of Guard
Services. Not long after, Danilo F. Cuneta, President of Multinationals wrote a letter to Ara
terminating the aforesaid contract having found that the guards’ services to be unsatisfactory and
for repeated violations of the Security Guards Code of Ethics and Conduct and total disregard of
the General Order causing loss of confidence in the ability of the security guards to comply with
the terms of the contract. Ara replied requesting the Multinational to reconsider its position, which
fell on deaf ears. Thus, Ara commenced the present suit for injunction and TRO with damages.
TRO was issued enjoining Multinational from replacing the guards with another agency. The RTC
ruled in favor of Ara. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trail court’s findings. Hence, the present
petition. Petitioners contend that the court did not comply with Section 11 of Rule 130 of the ROC
because it failed to give effect to paragraph 5 of the contract. They further invoke Section 12 of

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the same Rule, arguing that relative to the provision of the Contract on the duration of its
effectivity, which is one year, paragraph 5 is a particular provision. They conclude that since the
two provisions are inconsistent, paragraph 5 - - being the particular provision - - should prevail.
The last portion of paragraph 5 of the Contract of Guard Services between petitioners and
respondent provides: "Billing shall be every fifteen (15) days. After three (3) months of satisfactory
performance, the parties may negotiate for the extension of this contract and other matters that
might be advantageous to both parties." Paragraph 12, which clearly states that the term of the
Contract shall be one year: "12. TERM OF CONTRACT: "This Contract shall take effect on May
25, 1994 and shall be for a period of One (1) Year from said date. Thereafter, it shall be deemed
renewed for the same period unless either party notifies the other in writing not later than one (1)
month before the expiry of its intent not to renew. "14. Either party may terminate this contract for
legal cause by written notice given to the other party not later than thirty (30) days prior to the
expiry date."

ISSUE:

Whether the pre-termination of the Contract was valid

RULING:

Section 11 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "[i]n the construction of an instrument
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted
as will give effect to all." Contrary to petitioners' contention, paragraph 5 is not inconsistent with
paragraph 12. More important, the former does not in any way deal with the termination of the
Contract. Neither does it provide for a right to rescind. At this point, we stress that the right to
rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations, as provided for in Article 1191 of the Civil Code,
which states: "ART. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case
one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. Therefore, absent any
provision providing for a right to rescind, the parties may nevertheless rescind the contract should
the other obligor fail to comply with its obligations. As correctly held by the CA in the instant
case, petitioners failed to produce evidence of the alleged breach of obligation by respondent. The
investigation made by Petitioner Danilo F. Cuneta cannot stand as competent evidence. The Letter-
Complaints presented in court were neither identified, nor were their contents affirmed, by their

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authors. Therefore, insofar as they purport to prove that the security guards were remiss in their
duties, the Letter-Complaints are hearsay and inadmissible evidence. In Desierto v. Estrada, we
held as follows: "Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part,
on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath." Finally, it is a settled
principle of law that rescission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of a contract, but
only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties
in entering into the agreement. Petitioners failed to produce evidence of any substantial and
fundamental breach that would warrant the rescission of the Contract.

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BANK OF COMMERCE VS. GOLDMAN FIELDER

G.R. NO. 191561 MARCH 07, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:
SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances - For the proper construction of an instrument,
the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of
the parties to it, may be shown so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose
language he is to interpret.

FACTS: Goodman Fielder International Philippines, Inc. (respondent), a corporation duly

registered and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in marketing
of fats and oil shortening. Keraj Marketing Company (Keraj), represented by its purported owner
Sunil K. Amarnani (Amarnani), sought a distributorship agreement from respondent. As a pre-
requisite to respondent's consent, a credit line/bank guaranty in the amount of ₱500,000.00 was
required from Keraj. Amarnani thus applied for a credit line/bank guaranty with the Bacolod
branch of Bank of Commerce (petitioner).

Pending submission of the required documents for processing and approval of the credit line,
Amarnani requested the issuance of a conditional certification from petitioner's branch manager
Eli Aragon (Aragon) in this wise:

xxx
They are requiring from me a certification issued by my bank that I am arranging for a credit line
with my bank to be used if I cannot pay them. Please tell me the requirements for the credit line
so I can apply. All I need is a conditional certification that I am arranging for a credit line from
our bank. I will prepare the necessary documents you mentioned to me in your letter.

On October 2, 2000, respondent and Keraj entered into a Distributorship Agreement. Aragon
subsequently issued a similar letter (dated October 18, 20004) in favor of Bacolod RK Distributors
and Co., (Bacolod RK), an entity also allegedly owned by Amarnani, attesting to the arrangement

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by Keraj for a credit line in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00, to be utilized for the settlement of Keraj's
accounts with respondent.

Both letters of Aragon contain a "check write" on the left side indicating the amount applied for
as credit line.1avvphil Keraj and Bacolod RK did not pursue their application for a credit line,
however, despite follow-up advice from petitioner.

A year later, respondent informed petitioner, by letter of October 24, 2001, its intent to claim
against the bank guaranty issued to settle Keraj and Bacolod RK's unpaid accounts. By another
letter dated November 20, 2001, respondent advised petitioner its intent to collect the amount of
₱1,817,691.30 representing Keraj and Bacolod RK's unpaid obligations.

Negotiations for the settlement of Keraj and Bacolod RK's obligations having failed, respondent
filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Keraj, Amarnani, Bacolod RK, and
petitioner and its manager Aragon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig.

In defense, petitioner and Aragon claimed that the letters merely certified that Keraj and Bacolod
RK applied for the issuance of a bank guaranty, but no actual bank guaranty was approved, both
companies having failed to present the required documents for processing the application. Bacolod
RK, on the other hand, denied any involvement in the transaction between Keraj and respondent.

RTC absolved Bacolod RK from liability, but faulted Keraj, Amarnani, Aragon and petitioner. The
Court of Appeals, by the assailed Decision of June 17, 2009,9 opined that Aragon's letters clearly
showed approval by petitioner of the application for a credit line.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has issued a bank guaranty in favor of Armarnani

RULING:

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No. The resolution of the case hinges on what Aragon's statement in the letters sent to respondent
that "... we are pleased to inform you that said Corporation has arranged for a credit line " conveys.
Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court on interpretation of an instrument provides:

SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances - For the proper construction of an

instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown so that the judge may be placed in the position
of those whose language he is to interpret.

A consideration of the circumstances under which Aragon's letter-certifications were issued is thus
in order. Amarnani's letter-request of August 21, 2000 for a conditional certification from Aragon
was granted two days later when Aragon issued the letter-certification addressed to respondent.
Within that period, it could not have been possible for petitioner to even process the application,
given that Amarnani had not even complied with the requirements as he, himself, indicated in his
letter-request to Aragon to "please tell [him] the requirements for the credit line so [he] could
apply."

The Distributorship Agreement between respondent and Keraj was forged on October 2, 2000 or
39 days after the issuance of the letter-certification, long enough for respondent to verify if indeed
a bank guaranty was, to its impression, granted.

By respondent's finance manager Leonora Armi Salvador's testimony, upon receipt of the two
letter-certifications,11 she concluded that they were bank guarantees considering their similarity
with other bank guarantees in favor of respondent by other distributors; and she made inquiries
with petitioner only after Keraj defaulted in the payment of its obligation to respondent.
In light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner could not have conveyed that it was issuing a
bank guaranty in favor of Amarnani. Respondent's reliance on Aragon's use of a "check writer," a
machine used to input a numerical or written value impression in the "payment amount field" of a
check that is very difficult to alter, on the left side of each letter- certification, was misplaced, what
prevails being the wordings of the letter-certifications.

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DR. CECILIA DE LOS SANTOS v. DR. PRISCILA BAUTISTA VIBAR

G.R. No. 150931 July 16, 2008
CARPIO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Section 15 of Rule 130 provides: Sec. 15. Written words control printed. - When an instrument
consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the
former controls the latter.

The rationale for this rule is that the written words are the latest expression of the will of the parties.

FACTS:
Cecilia and Priscila were co-workers in the Medical Department of SSS. Cecilia introduced Jose
De Leon to Priscila, as Jose needed money and borrowed P100,000 from Priscila. Jose issued a
promissory note and bound himself to pay the loan 3 months from date with 3% monthly interest;
Cecilia signed as a guarantor.

De Leon asked Priscila for another loan. The parties agreed that the outstanding loan with its
interest would be deducted from the new loan of P500,000 which is payable within 12 months at
3% monthly interest, Cecilia was made a guarantor. Jose failed to pay any of the monthly
installments even upon several verbal demands and a demand letter. Cecilia paid P15,000 for one
month’s interest.

Priscila filed an adverse claim on the property registered under TCT No. T-47375 but the Register
of Deeds denied the claim as the issue involved is a money claim. Priscila filed an action for
recovery of money against Jose and Cecilia. Cecilia denied she signed as a guarantor.

RTC ruled in favor of Cecilia and dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Upon
MR, RTC ruled that Jose De Leon acted fraudulently or in bad faith in refusing to pay his debt,
and that there was no express consent given by Cecilia binding her as guarantor.

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CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC against Jose but modified the same for Cecilia stating that she
is a guarantor of the loan.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cecilia De Los Santos is liable as guarantor of Jose De Leon’s loan?

RULING:
We rule that Cecilia was a guarantor of de Leon’s loan. Cecilia denies that she had actual
knowledge of the guaranty. However, Priscila points to the promissory note and Cecilia’s actions
as the best evidence to prove that Cecilia signed as guarantor. The promissory note indicates that
Cecilia signed as a witness, as manifested by the typewritten format. However, the word
"guarantor" as handwritten beside Cecilia’s name makes Cecilia a guarantor. From the records of
the case and the evidence presented, we are convinced that the insertion was made with the express
consent of Cecilia.

Firstly, Cecilia’s act of "nodding her head" signified her assent to the insertion of the word
"guarantor." The word "guarantor" could have been inserted by Cecilia herself, or by someone
authorized by Cecilia. In either case, Cecilia would be bound as guarantor. In this case, Cecilia, by
nodding her head, authorized de Leon, who prepared the promissory note, to insert the word
"guarantor." Since de Leon made the insertion only after Atty. Bautista had raised the need for
Cecilia to be a guarantor, a positive or negative reaction was expected from Cecilia, who responded
by giving her nod of approval. Otherwise, Cecilia should have immediately expressed her
objection to the insertion of the word "guarantor." Cecilia’s act of nodding her head showed her
consent to be a guarantor.
Secondly, Priscila would not have extended a loan to de Leon without the representations of
Cecilia. Cecilia arranged for de Leon and Priscila to meet so that de Leon could borrow money
from Priscila. Cecilia vouched for de Leon’s capacity to pay. As a friend and common link between
the borrower and lender, Cecilia took active part in the first loan of ₱100,000 and even signed as
guarantor. On the second promissory note, the word "guarantor" again appears, admitted by both
Cecilia and Priscila as an insertion made by de Leon at the time of signing. The first loan of
₱100,000, which Cecilia guaranteed, was paid from the proceeds of the second loan. As shown by

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the intervention of Atty. Bautista in bringing up the need for Cecilia to act as guarantor, Priscila
would not have granted the second bigger loan of ₱500,000 without the guaranty of Cecilia. It was
only natural for Priscila to commit to the second bigger loan subject at least to the same guarantee
as the first smaller loan.
Cecilia acknowledged her liability as guarantor but simply claimed that she had no money to pay
Priscila. Cecilia made an initial payment of ₱15,000 as partial compliance of her obligation as
guarantor. This only shows that Cecilia never denied her liability to Priscila as guarantor until this
case was filed in court.
Cecilia wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds of Baguio City inquiring on the status of the property
mentioned in the promissory note as a mortgage security for de Leon’s loan. Cecilia clearly stated
that she "appears to be a guarantor" in the promissory note. This serves as a written admission that
Cecilia knew she was a guarantor. During the trial, Cecilia did not impugn the letter or its contents.
Cecilia wrote the Register of Deeds to protect her interest, hoping that the property covered by
TCT No. T-47375 could answer for de Leon’s loan and save her from personally paying as
guarantor. This explains Cecilia’s letter admitting that she appears as a guarantor in the promissory
note.
It is axiomatic that the written word "guarantor" prevails over the typewritten word "witness." In
case of conflict, the written word prevails over the printed word.
Section 15 of Rule 130 provides: Sec. 15. Written words control printed. - When an instrument
consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the
former controls the latter.
The rationale for this rule is that the written words are the latest expression of the will of the
parties. Thus, in this case, the latest expression of Cecilia’s will is that she signed the promissory
note as guarantor.
Generally, estoppel is a doctrine that prevents a person from adopting an inconsistent position,
attitude, or action if it will result in injury to another. One who, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts
on such belief, can no longer deny the existence of such fact as it will prejudice the latter. Cecilia
is now estopped from denying that she is a guarantor.

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TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
PEOPLE VS. BONIAO
GR NO. 100800 27 January 1993
DAVIDE, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:
Relationship does not by itself preclude the trial court from believing such testimonies or impair
the witnesses’ credibility.

FACTS:

Boniao was charged with four (4) separate crimes of murder with the RTC – Sirigao del
Norte after shooting to death Adolfo Estampa, Cirilo Dispolo, Alfredo Llano, Sr. and Alfredo
Llano, Jr. in front of a sari-sari store in Sitio Katigahan, Mat-i, Surigao City using his M-14
armalite service rifle.

The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses, namely: Virginita Estampa Llano, the
owner of the store where the shooting occurred; Alfredo Estampa and Jessie Estampa, nephew and
younger brother, respectively, of Virginita who were, at the time of the shooting, at the house
where the store is located; Dra. Milagros T. Regaña, the Municipal Health Officer of Suri-gao City
who conducted the post-mortem examinations on the bodies of the victims; and the widows of
three (3) of the victims. On the other hand, the appellant took the witness stand together with his
witnesses—the two (2) military men to whom he voluntarily surrendered.

According to the prosecution, Virginita Llano Estampa and her husband went to Brazil,
Malimono, Surigao del Norte to report to the Cadre or CAFGU Team Leader, the loss of their
fighting cock wherein one of the suspects for such loss was Boniao, a CAFGU member. Biniao
denied any knowledge regarding the loss of the fighting cock of the Estampas thus, the spouse
went home. Later, while the four victims Estampa, Dispolo, Llano, Jr. and Llano, Sr., in that order,
were having snacks in the store of Virginita Llano Estampa, accused Romeo Boniao arrived from

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behind and immediately gunned the victims with his M-14 rifle, hitting them in different parts of
their bodies resulting to their untimely death.

Bonia, on the other hand, claimed having killed the victims in self-defense. According to
him, when he realized that the fighting cock sold to him by Adolfo Estampa was stolen to put him
into shame and ridicule, he attempted to return the same and demand for the return of his partial
payment. But instead of giving an answer Adolfo Estampa snatched and grabbed the M-14 of
Boniao while the 3 other victims tried to assault him. In the heat of the struggle for possession, the
safety lock released and Boniao unknowingly pressed the trigger sending forth automatic bursts of
fire. He immediately left the scene and surrendered voluntarily and narrated the events that
transpired to the authorities.

The RTC found Boniao guilty of four (4) separate crimes of murder, relying on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and rejected the appellant’s claim of self-defense.

Hence, this petition charging, among others, inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and the alleged error committed by the trial court in giving credence to such testimonies
for the witnesses who gave the same being related to the victims.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in giving more weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses who are all relatives of the victims and are therefore biased.

RULING:
No.

While witnesses Virginita Estampa Llano, Alfredo Estampa and Jessie Estampa were
related in one way or another to the victims, save for Cirilo Dispolo, the relationship does not by
itself preclude the trial court from believing such testimonies or impair the witnesses’ credibility.
They are not disqualified by the Rules on that ground alone; this Court has held that it is not to be

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lightly supposed that relatives of the deceased would callously violate their conscience to avenge
the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons whom they believe to be innocent thereof.

As to the alleged inconsistencies of the witnesses, the Court finds the same to refer to minor
matters. In view of the settled rule that minor inconsistencies do in fact strengthen rather than
weaken the witness’ credibility, as these discrepancies indicate that the responses given were
honest and unrehearsed, the appellant’s challenge must fail.

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PEOPLE V. ELEUTERIO DE LEON

G.R. No. 115367 28 September 1995
DAVIDE, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. In fact, these inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken
their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event would see differently some details
of a startling occurrence. Rather than discredit the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies
serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous
testimony.
With respect to the presence or absence of an ulterior motive, this Court has had occasion to rule
that the relation of superior and subordinate, by itself, does not constitute such ulterior motive: [A]
witness’ relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render it
more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to
accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Nor is the testimony of a witness discredited by the
mere fact that he is an employee of the complainant.

FACTS:
On 23 August 1992, in Angat, Bulacan, Eleuterio De Leon and Reynaldo Manayao armed
with Armalite rifles and Caliber .45 pistols, shoot from behind Marcelino Santiago who was hit at
the head while he was driving his owner-type jeep, and as a result he died instantaneously.
Eleuterio was arrested on 13 April 1993 and Reynaldo on 24 May 1993.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: the two eyewitnesses, namely, Simon Mariano,
a farmer from Angat, Bulacan, and Ramon Chavez, an employee of Robal Transit; and SPO2
Alfredo Bartolome. They said that at approximately 9:30 a.m. of 23 August 1992 in the vicinity of
the Robal Transit Terminal in Angat, Bulacan, they saw the accused gun down Marcelino Santiago,
while the latter was driving his jeep. Mariano was walking in the opposite direction that the jeep
was headed, while Chavez was following the vehicle of the victim as the former wanted to tell the
latter something. The victim's jeep had already passed Mariano when the shots were fired. When

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he turned around, Mariano saw the accused shooting the victim, with De Leon holding an Armalite
at waist level and Manayao, a .45 caliber pistol at shoulder height. Mariano heard six shots in all.
He was about ten meters away from the accused so he could still see the gun barrels emitting
smoke. After shooting the victim, both accused, joined by a third male whom Mariano could not
identify, left the area right in front of Mariano. Mariano immediately recognized the two accused
because they were his townmates. It was only after the funeral that he told the wife of the victim
that he knew her husband's killers. He then gave his statement to the police.
Chavez was about six meters from the accused when the latter fired at the victim. Because of fear,
Chavez went inside the bus terminal, only to return to the scene of the crime later to assist in
carrying into the funeral parlor's vehicle the body of the victim, which was then slumped sidewise
in his jeep. Chavez informed the victim's wife that he had witnessed the commission of the crime.
SPO2 Alfredo Bartolome, a police investigator, took down the statement of Simon Mariano on 24
August 1992.
The prosecution presented Dr. Rosauro Villarama, who concluded that the cause of the victim's
death was "cerebral hemorrhage, gunshot wound, head." which was caused by an Armalite.
Three additional witnesses were presented by the prosecution,

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in giving weight and credence to the evidence for the
prosecution and in the process disregarding the defense of alibi of the accused-appellant.
RULING:
NO.
In his first assigned error, the appellant invites our attention to alleged material inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the eyewitnesses.
First, he alleges that Mariano's testimony regarding the relative positions of the victim and the
appellant is contradictory. He cites Mariano's initial testimony that the two accused were behind
the victim when they shot him. Then, he proceeds to point out that under questions from the court,
Mariano said that the two accused were facing the jeep when they shot the victim; yet, the medico
legal officer testified that the bullet entered the victim's right ear, clearly showing that the assailants
were on the right side of the victim.

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Second, the appellant calls this Court's attention to the portion of Mariano's testimony that the
appellant was more or less six to seven meters away from the victim, while Chavez testified that
the appellant was approximately twelve meters away from the victim. These estimations, the
appellant concludes, are "incredible" in light of the medico-legal officer's testimony that the
gunman must have been about one meter away when he fired the shots. Such a conclusion is
baseless and can only stem from a misreading of the transcript of the stenographic notes to mislead
this Court. It is based on a single clarificatory question propounded by the lower court to the
medico-legal officer.
Third, the appellant points out that at first Mariano testified that he had heard six shots, but later
he said that he had heard only three shots. This inconsistency was never shown to be of crucial
importance as to affect the credibility of the witness. It is to us a minor, if not trivial one.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of
their testimony. In fact, these inconsistencies, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken
their credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event would see differently some details
of a startling occurrence. Rather than discredit the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies
serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous
testimony.
With respect to the presence or absence of an ulterior motive, this Court has had occasion to rule
that the relation of superior and subordinate, by itself, does not constitute such ulterior motive:
[A] witness' relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render
it more credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime
to accuse somebody other than the real culprit. Nor is the testimony of a witness discredited by the
mere fact that he is an employee of the complainant.
Having now come full circle, this Court is left with no recourse but to reject the defense of alibi
invoked by the appellant.
We have time and again ruled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to prove; it cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
witnesses. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must
be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was

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committed, but he must also demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed.
In the instant case, such physical impossibility was not shown to have existed. By the appellant's
own admission, the place where he claimed to be was only about eight kilometers away from the
scene of the crime and that it would have taken only half an hour to traverse the distance by bus
or passenger jeep. Such distance was not so great as to preclude his having been at the scene of
the crime when the shooting occurred.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROLANDO MENDOZA

G.R. NO. 113791 22 FEBRUARY 1996

DOCTRINE:

Wigmore believes that for a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the
capacity of (1. observation, (2) of recollection, and (3) of communication.

FACTS:

Rolando Mendoza was charged with Parricide in the RTC of Malolos for killing his wife Gina
Mendoza who died of hypostatic pneumonia and infected fourth degree burns. During trial, the
testimony of Paul Mendoza, the 5 year.old son of Rolando and Gina Mendoza, was presented by
the prosecution. Paul declared that one evening, inside their house, the accused boxed his mother
on her mouth and tied her up. However, the child refused to testify further and appeared to be
bothered by the presence of the accused in the courtroom. During his rebuttal testimony, Paul
finally revealed the entire story. The child testified that the accused tied Gina and set her on fire
using kerosene because of a heated quarrel. For difficulties.

The RTC of Malolos convicted the accused of Parricide. Rolando Mendoza appealed and attacked
the competency of Paul as a witness because of his being unintelligible and contradicting his very
young age.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tender age of the child witness and his unintelligible and contradicting
statements make him incompetent and unworthy of belief

RULING:

The child witness is competent and credible. Underhill states that a child is presumptively
incompetent but if shown otherwise, his age is immaterial. According to Wigmore on the other
hand, there is no rule defining any particular age as conclusive of capacity. Wigmore believes that
for a child witness to be competent, it must be shown that he has the capacity of (1. observation,

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(2) of recollection, and (3) of communication. It is the trial court who is called upon to make this
determination.

In this case, the RTC of Malolos determined the capacity of Paul Mendoza correctly. The
testimony of Paul shows that he is of above average intelligence, that he is capable of giving
responsive answers, of recalling events, and of influence over the testimony of Paul and the
sometimes contradicting statements of the child can be reasonably explained by a child’s natural
fear of his father’s reprisal.

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PEOPLE V. JACK SORREL

G.R. NO. 119332 AUGUST 29, 1997

DOCTRINE:

Even when a person convicted of a crime or one who has a pending criminal case is not by that
alone disqualified from testifying. Under the rules, a person qualified and competent to be a
witness if: (1.) he is capable of perceiving; and (2.) perceiving, he can make his perception known.
A person is capable of testifying, unless he is disqualified. ‘

FACTS:

Jack Sorrel was charged with special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for the
death of Teofilo Geronimo.

The victim, Teofilo Geronimo was walking on his way to his office when he was held up
and shot to death. According to the eyewitness, Benito Dela Cruz, he saw Sorrel standing in front
of the pawnshop, while he saw a man, who was Geronimo, passing by. After a few moments, he
saw Sorrel pulling out a gun and heard him demanding from Geronimo to give him his bag. When
the latter refused, Sorrel shot him, gathered his things and left as if nothing happened. Days after
making a sworn statement, he saw a newspaper where the face of Sorrel was published, tagging
him as a member of “dugo-dugo” gang, he went to the police station to identify Sorrel as the
assailant.

In his defense, Sorrel contented that he was at home, waiting for the arrival of one of his
relatives and attended a family reunion. The trial court rendered its decision, finding Sorrel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.

On appeal, Sorrel assailed the credibility of Benito Dela Cruz as witness. He avers that
while Benito claims to be engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry, he was actually a faith
healer.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not Benito Dela Cruz is a credible witness.

RULING:

Yes, Benito Dela Cruz is a credible witness.

In impugning the credibility of Benito, Sorrel points to the discrepancies between the sworn
statement Benito has given to the police investigators and his testimony before the Court. Judicial
experience reminds us that affidavits taken ex parte simply leave too much to be desired. Almost
invariably, sworn declarations are incomplete and inaccurate, it could well be since statements in
an affidavit not testified at the trial are mere hearsay evidence and have no real evidentiary value.

And unlike an affidavit where only the declarant is normally involved in its execution,
testimonial evidence exposes the witness not only to detailed examination by counsel for the
proponent but also to severe cross-examination by the adverse party. It is at the witness stand
where witnesses are tested on the veracity of their averments. Explainably, testimony in court is
that which really counts in weighing the evidence.

Under the Rules, Under the rules, a person qualified and competent to be a witness if: (1.)
he is capable of perceiving; and (2.) perceiving, he can make his perception known. Unless
disqualified, such person would be capable of testifying. Even a person convicted of a crime or
one who has a pending criminal case is not by that alone disqualified from testifying. In this case,
the fact that Benito lied as to his job does not mean that he cannot be trusted on the witness stand.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ADEL TUANGCO, NELSON

PINEDA, JR. and SONNY TUANGCO, accused. ADEL TUANGCO and SONNY
TUANGCO, accused appellants

G.R. No. 130331 November 22, 2000

PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE:

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses
where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts
they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter.

FACTS:

On May 18, 1995 two informations were filed in court charging Adel Tuangco, Nelson Pineda, Jr.
alias “Jun Tattoo” and Sonny Tuangco alias “Baba” with the crimes of rape with homicide and
theft.

The principal evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre
Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. He gave his testimony through sign language, which was interpreted by a
sign language expert.

Adel Tuangco raped the deceased. “Tatoo” and “Baba” likewise successively raped Aurea in that
order. At the time that the three accused were raping Aurea Eugenio, witness Sanggalan was about
three and one half (3 1/2) meters away from them. After raping the victim, Adel Tuangco took her
bag, “Tatoo” got her camera and cash money while “Baba” got her ring, earrings and watch. When
recalled to the witness stand on January 17, 1996, Sanggalan identified accused Sonny Tuangco
as the one he referred to as “Baba.”

The trial court ruled that the guilt of the accused as charged was established and concluded that
the three accused conspired to commit the crimes charged.

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In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused-appellant points out that
because Silvestre Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in a special school for deaf-mutes, the
possibility that resort to conjectures and surmises, brought about by overzealousness to understand
what his witness really wanted to say could not be discounted.

The Solicitor General prays for an affirmance of the decision in all respects. He asserts that a deaf-
mute is qualified to testify, and the interpreter explained that through sign language, Sanggalan
demonstrated how Eugenio was raped and thereafter killed by appellants and Pineda, Jr. It is
claimed that the inconsistencies pointed out are minor and do not detract from the positive
identification made by witness Sanggalan of the accused-appellants as the persons who raped and
killed Eugenio and took her personal effects.

ISSUE:

Whether Sanggalan, a deafmute is a competent witness

RULING:

Yes.

The theory of the accused-appellant that Sanggalan could not truthfully and convincingly
convey what really transpired on that fateful night because he had no formal schooling in a school
for special persons like him and the interpreter was not the one who had taught him is not tenable.

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are
competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath;
(2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas
through a qualified interpreter.

In the instant case, the interpreter was a certified sign language interpreter with twenty-two
(22) years teaching experience at the Philippine School for the Deaf, had exposure in television
programs and had testified in five other previous court proceedings. She possessed special
education and training for interpreting sign language.

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The trial court evaluated her competence to put on record with accuracy the declaration
made by witness Sanggalan on the witness stand, and she testified that she employed the natural
or homemade sign method. Needless to stress, the manner in which the examination of a deaf-
mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its
discretion, and the method adopted will not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence
of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular
method adopted. The imperfections or inconsistencies cited in appellants’ brief arise from the
fact that there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is deaf-mute, but these
do not detract from the credibility of his testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the same.
What is material is that he knew personally the accused-appellants, was with them on the
fateful night when the incident happened, and had personally witnessed the rape-slay and
theft three and one half (3 1/2) meters away from the scene. He did not waver in the
identification of the three accused despite rigorous cross-examination, and positively pointed to
the accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her personal effects.

The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Sanggalan, whose testimony was found to be
candid and straightforward, deserves the highest respect of this Court. Moreover, the testimony of
Sanggalan was corroborated by the doctor who conducted the autopsy. Dr. Aguda testified that
Eugenio had nine (9) stab wounds on the neck, fresh hymenal lacerations and massive blood clots
within the vaginal canal, caused, among others, by the entry of a hard foreign object like a bottle
and that the abrasions and hematomas on the cadaver indicated that Eugenio struggled during the
assault.

WHEREFORE, the judgment convicting Adel Tuangco y Dizon and Sonny Tuangco y Dizon for
the crimes of theft and rape with homicide in Criminal Case Nos. 95-1609(M) and 95-1610(M) is
hereby AFFIRMED.

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PEOPLE VS ROGER RAMA

GR No. 136304 January 25, 2001
PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is
examined. No rule defines any particular age as conclusive of incapacity; in each instance the
capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.

The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of observation,
(b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in ascertaining whether a
child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is setted that the trial court is called
upon to make such determination.

Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself,
shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of
proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

FACTS:
On January 1, 1988, Roxanne, her sister Rose Ann, Mama Weng, Uncle Dony, grandmother Diana,
Joyce Ann and the latter's younger brother Pogi were at the Dagupan public plaza. Roxanne played
with her Uncle Dony, Rose Ann, and Joyce Ann at the plaza's stage while her Mama Weng sat at
the side of the stage, feeding Pogi. Mama Diana went to a store to buy some food.

At that time, accused Rama and another man were at the plaza. Rama called Roxanne and told her
that if she would bring the beautiful girl (Joyce Ann) to him, he would give Roxanne a biscuit.
Rama gave her one biscuit. She ate it. She then carried Joyce Ann to the accused Rama who ran
away with little Joyce Ann. Roxanne told her Mama Weng and Mama Diana that Joyce Ann was
taken by a man. They looked for Joyce Ann and the man but they were nowhere to be found.

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During her testimony, Roxanne pointed to the accused Rama as the man who took away Joyce
Ann. Her testimony was corroborated by Pierre Torio. Torio identified the accused acting
suspiciously at the playground on the said date. On the witness stand, Torio pointed to the accused
as the man who acted suspiciously at the playground and he could not be mistaken because the
accused sat only about five to six meters away from him.

Diana Leviste also testified. Diana, together with Elvira Sebastian, some policement, and three
children (Bryan Ocampo, Benjamin Sarmiento and Jesus Ulanday) playing at the plaza with Joyce
Anne, went to the house of the accused and searched the premises. The search was fruitless but
the kids pointed to the accused as the kidnapper. Jesus even urinated upon seeing the accused
Rama because the latter spanked him when he ran after Rama as the latter took away Joyce Ann.
Rama threatened Jesus not to follow him or else he would throw a stone at him. The three children
did not, however take the witness stand. Bryan's parents were at first willing to let Bryan testify,
but after Rama's wife talked to them, they changed their mind. Benjamin's father was at first also
willing to let his child testify but later on had a change of heart for fear of their safety.

Elvira Sebastian also corroborated Diana Leviste’s testimony. She testified that Diana, along with
some policemen and the three children, went to her house because the first suspect was her uncle,
Eduardo Sebastian. The children were asked if Eduardo was the kidnapper, but they answered in
the negative. Diana asked Elvira's assistance to find the kidnapper. The following day, they asked
around about the missing Joyce Anne. Elvira learned from the former manager of the fish business
where the accused Rama worked that there were other instances of kidnapping in the market place.
The manager informed Elvira that on January 1, 1998, she saw the accused Rama with a child.
They waited for Rama at the Manager’s store but he did not show up for 2 days. They then went
to the place of the accused and the children pointed to Rama as the culprit. The following day,
Elvira and the children went to the Magsaysay market beside Mele's restaurant and saw again the
accused Rama. The children again pointed to the accused as the man behind Joyce Ann's taking.
Rama threatened them not to implicate him or he would kill them. The group left the place. She
executed an affidavit narrating the foregoing incidents.

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SPO3 Teofilo Ubando also took the witness stand. According to him, Roger and his wife, Eufemia,
went to CIDG office to report that accused Rama kidnapped their daughter, Joyce Ann. Bryan and
Benjamin also went to the CIDG to report where accused Rama lived. Eufemia, Ubando, Bryan,
Benjamin, and other policemen went to Rama's house, while Roger was left in the office. When
they reached Rama’s house, the group did not find him there and his wife informed them that he
was in Mele’s restaurant. The group proceeded to the restaurant. Rama arrived at around 4:30 pm
and the police presented to him the letter signed by Azurin and invited him to go to their office.
The accused Rama obliged. His wife went with him. When the group arrived in the CIDG office,
Rama signed the letter inviting him to the police station. The following day, the police presented
the accused Rama and four other persons from their office in a police line-up. Benjamin and Bryan,
and three other witnesses, Rose Anne Cabiguin, Jesus Cabiguin, and Andrew Cabiguin, all pointed
to the accused Rama as the man who took Joyce Ann. Pictures were taken of Benjamin and Bryan,
and Jesus Ulanday pointing to the accused Rama as the man who took away Joyce Ann. Sgt.
Moyano and Sgt Niro took the affidavits of Benjamin and Bryan. Roger Cabiguin's statement was
also taken.

Rama denied the charges and provided his alibi. He testified that he did not know of any reason
why Diana Laviste and Roger Cabiguin filed a case against him, why Bryan and Benjamin
identified him as the culprit during police line-up, and why Roxanne identified him in court as the
man who took Joyce Ann. He also did not have any grudge against Pierre Torio.

Violeta Cayabyab, neighbor of Rama, testified that accused Rama was in his house the whole day
of January 1,1988. On cross examination, however, she testified that as a vegetable vendor, she
would leave her house at dawn and purchase her vegetables in Dagupan at about 3:00 a.m.
everyday. She would sell the vegetables in the morning and return home at around 11:00 am.

Edilberto Aguada took the witness stand. He is a canteen owner and the person from whom the
accused Rama had been getting his cart for two years. On January 1, 1998, the accused Rama
reported for work in the evening. He also worked in the evening of January 2, 1998. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he did not see the accused Rama until evening on January

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1, 1998. The same was true of January 2, 1998. He admitted that he did not know what the accused
Rama did on those days.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s story. It convicted accused Rama and sentenced
him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of kidnapping despite insufficiency of evidence.

RULING:
No, the trial court did not commit an error.

First, the accused makes much of the fact that the prosecution did not present Bryan and Benjamin,
the two children who allegedly saw the accused Rama take Joyce Ann. This fact, however, does
not militate against the story of the prosecution. It is well-settled that the non-presentation of
certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense and the matter of choosing witnesses
to present lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case. Besides, the prosecution
adequately explained that the parents of the two children, Bryan and Benjamin, reneged on their
willingness to have their children testify after the wife of the accused talked to them for fear of
their safety. Likewise, as correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief, nothing could have prevented
the defense from presenting Bryan and Benjamin as its own witnesses in order to discredit the
testimony of Roxanne, the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution. The presumption of
suppressed evidence does not apply when the same is equally accessible or available to the defense.

Secondly, the accused points out that since Bryan and Benjamin were not presented as prosecution
witnesses, Diana Laviste's claim that these children pointed to the accused as the man who took
away Joyce Ann does not bear any weight in evidence. This therefore leaves only the testimony of
Roxanne as the basis for the prosecution's identification of the accused Rama as the culprit. The
defense contends, however, that Roxanne's testimony, coming from the mouth of a five-year old,

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does not deserve credit because she could not answer many questions and appeared to have been
coached by her grandmother, Diana.

We cannot subscribe to the accused's contention. The Rules of Evidence provide in Rule 130, Secs.
20 and 21:

"Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perceptions
to others, may be witnesses.

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. - The following

persons cannot be witnesses:

x x x ..

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully."

In Dulla vs CA and Andrea Ortega, the Court, citing the above provisions, gave credence to the
testimony of a three-year old witness. It held:

"It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and of relating truthfully
facts respecting which he is examined. In the 1913 decision in United States v. Buncad,
this Court stated:

Professor Wigmore, after referring to the common-law precedents upon this point says:
'But this much may be taken as settled, that no rule defines any particular age as conclusive
of incapacity; in each instance the capacity of the particular child is to be investigated.

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The requirements then of a child's competency as a witness are the: (a) capacity of
observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c) capacity of communication. And in
ascertaining whether a child is of sufficient intelligence according to the foregoing, it is
setted that the trial court is called upon to make such determination.

In the case at bar, while the five-year old witness, Roxanne, was not able to answer some questions
such as which was her left and her right, she was straightforward in identifying the accused Rama
as the culprit. We thus find no reason to disturb the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the
child witness, Roxanne. The determination of the competence and credibility of a child as a witness
rests primarily with the trial judge as he had the opportunity to see the demeanor of the witness,
his apparent intelligence or lack of it, and his understanding of the nature of the oath. As many of
these qualities cannot be conveyed by the record of the case, the trial judge's evaluation will not
be disturbed on review, unless it is clear from the record that his judgment is erroneous.

This conclusion is in accord with the spirit and letter of the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness. The following provisions are apropos:

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. --Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern
the examination of child witnesses who are victims of crime, accused of a crime, and
witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings
involving child witnesses.

Section 3. Construction of the Rule. --This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the
best interests of the child and to promote the maximum accommodation of child witnesses
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.

Section 6. Competence. --Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the

court shall conduct a competency examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a
party , when it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty
to tell the truth in court.

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Thirdly, the defense faults the trial court for relying on a single eyewitness account in convicting
the accused Rama. The Court has long held that the testimony of a sole eyewitness is sufficient to
support a conviction so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court.
The Rule also provides in Section 22:

Section 22. Corroboration.-- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child.

His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact,
conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-
criminal cases.

The records of the instant case bear out the clear and straightforward manner by which Roxanne
testified. The trial court thus correctly relied upon the sole testimony of Roxanne.

(a) Proof of necessity. --A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of
necessity of competence examination. The age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis
for a competency examination.

In view of the positive identification made by Roxanne, the accused's defense of denial and alibi
must fall. Well-settled is the rule that positive identification of the accused will prevail over the
defense of denial and alibi. Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, It must be shown that there was
physical impossibility for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime. The defense has failed
to satisfy this requirement. The trial court took judicial notice of the fact that Gayaman where the
accused supposedly was at the time Joyce Ann disappeared is only about five to six kilometers
away from the plaza where Joyce Ann was playing.

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PEOPLE vs. DELA CRUZ

G.R. NO. 135022 JULY 11, 2002

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

DOCTRINE:

Witness

Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.

A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has absolutely no
motive to incriminate and testify against the accused.

It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the
examination of a witness who is immature, aged and infirm, in bad physical condition, uneducated,
ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings, inexperienced, unsophisticated, feeble-
minded, of sluggish mental equipment, confused and agitated, terrified, timid or embarrassed while
on the stand, lacking in comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand, deaf and dumb,
or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith.

The purpose of refreshing the recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and
her present testimony to be put fairly and in their proper light before the court.

FACTS:

Two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz with rape of Jonalyn Yumang,
allegedly committed on July 3 and 4, 1996.

When Jonalyn was presented as its first witness, the prosecution sought to obtain from the
trial court an order for the conduct of a psychiatric examination on her person to determine her
mental and psychological capability to testify in court. The purpose was that should her mental

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capacity be found to be below normal, the prosecution could propound leading questions to
Jonalyn.

The Trial court convicted Dela Cruz of the crime of rape in one of the criminal case, but
acquitted him in another criminal case for insufficiency of evidence.

On appeal, Dela Cruz asserted that the trial court committed errors in having taken that
fatally defective criminal complaint for a valid conferment upon it of jurisdiction to try and dispose
of said two charges of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court validly took cognizance of the complaint filed by Jonalyn, a
mentally deficient person

RULING:

Yes.

The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial
judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack
of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. The prosecution has
proved JONALYN’s competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court,
as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-
year[1]old child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her
testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even a mental retardate is not, per se,
disqualified from being a witness. JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but
with the ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness under Section 20
of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence

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The narrative has established not only JONALYN’s competency but also her credibility.
Moreover, considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge
against BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper motive was
shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against
BIENVENIDO. A rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credible where she has
absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused. It has been held that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.

The Supreme Court likewise agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that JONALYN’s
testimony should be taken and understood from the point of view of an 8-year-old child.
JONALYN’s testimony is consistent with the straightforward and innocent testimony of a child.
Thus, the prosecution’s persistent, repetitious and painstaking effort in asking leading questions
was necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from JONALYN’s lips the
basic details of the grave crime committed against her by BIENVENIDO. The trial court did not
err in allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the
court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature;
aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court
proceedings; inexperienced; unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment;
confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in
comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or
understand the English language or only imperfectly familiar therewith.

The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of
JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. The questions were
indeed carefully phrased and sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN
understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the prosecution’s referral to JONALYN’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her memory was also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the
recollection of a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put fairly
and in their proper light before the court.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. CATALINO MELENDRES, JR.,

BERNARDINO KIRIT and TEODULO KITAY, Appellants.

G.R. No. 134940 April 30, 2003

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
Testimonial Evidence
The well-established rule is that, on the issue of credibility, the trial court is in a better position
than the appellate court because the former had the full opportunity to observe directly the
deportment and manner of testifying of the witness. Thus, unless the trial court plainly overlooked
certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment on credibility must be respected.

FACTS:
An information was filed against the three (3) accused Catalino Melendres, Jr. alias ‘Jun-
Jun’, Bernardino Kirit and Teodulo Kitay and the trial court found them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Double Murder of Syrel and Exor Balasabas and considering the presence of
conspiracy.
The prosecution presented its first witness, Rodrigo Hungoy. In the evening of July 23,
1992, first cousins, Rodrigo Hungoy and Mardie Balasabas together with Mardie’s brothers, Syrel
and Exor, were resting inside the house of one Pacifico Gualingco at Sitio Balatican, Barangay
Casalaan, Siaton Negros Oriental. About 9:00 of the same evening, the barking of the dog
awakened Rodrigo and Mardie. They peeped through the porch and looked at the front yard where
they saw three persons in the yard who they did not immediately recognize because it was dark.
The three persons proceeded to the upper portion of the house and pushed the main door which
was not locked. Syrel and Exor remained asleep while Rodrigo and Mardie jumped out and hid at
the back portion of the house which was not illuminated. They again peeped through a hole in the
bamboo walling of the house which was already dilapidated. There, Rodrigo and Mardie
recognized the faces of the three appellants because the room where Syrel and Exor were sleeping
was illuminated by a "tingkaro", a kerosene lamp. The three went near Syrel and Exor. With the
use of a bolo, Catalino and Bernardino proceeded to hack Syrel while Teodulo hacked Exor. After
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witnessing the hacking of Syrel and Exor, Rodrigo and Mardie went straight to the house of
Rodrigo which is about 150 meters away from the house where the incident happened. Rodrigo
went directly inside the house ahead of Mardie. Mardie, on the other hand, went to another house
which is approximately ten meters away from Rodrigo’s house, occupied by his parents.
The principal defense of appellants is alibi. In support thereof, six witnesses were
presented, namely: Juan Pahayat, appellant Bernardino Kirit, Victoria Kirit, Ricardo Palomar,
appellant Catalino Melendres, Jr., and Editha delos Santos.
All of them testified that they were in Sitio Baliw and Sitio Balatican where the incident happened
is about ten kilometers away from Sitio Baliw. Hence, there is no means of transportation. It would
take about two hours to travel by foot to and from these places.

The trial court found all the three accused Catalino Melendres, Jr. alias ‘Jun-Jun’,
Bernardino Kirit and Teodulo Kitay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder
of Syrel and Exor Balasabas and considering the presence of conspiracy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving weight to the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses.

RULING:

In the present case, the Court find no reason to disturb the trial court’s evaluation and
assessment of the credibility of Rodrigo and Mardie, the same not being tainted by any arbitrariness
or palpable error.

As to the alleged mental derangement of Rodrigo, it is true that during his testimony in
open court on December 15, 1993, he was uncooperative, defiant and even disrespectful to the
court. The trial court even cited him for direct contempt and ordered his incarceration. However,
it appeared from the order of the trial court that Rodrigo’s defiance at that time was not a result of
his alleged mental incapacity but because he was drunk. Moreover, while the prosecution admitted

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that Rodrigo has experienced "some mental shock sometime ago", no evidence was presented by
the defense to impeach him on ground of incompetence. On the other hand, a review of the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the four days that Rodrigo testified and underwent
examination on the witness stand reveals that, except for the incident on December 15, 1993, he is
responsive to the questions propounded and was able to convey sufficiently intelligent answers.
Under Section 20, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details,

and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. In
the present case, granting that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of Rodrigo and Mardie,
the same may be considered only as minor discrepancies that do not affect their credibility. In fact,
minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses bolster rather then weaken their credibility
as they erase any suspicion that their testimonies have been rehearsed. What is important is that
both Rodrigo and Mardie were consistent in positively identifying the three appellants as the
persons who hacked Syrel and Exor.

It is clear from the testimony of Rodrigo that he is of the belief that the police authorities
already have actual knowledge of the killing because they attended the burial of Syrel and Exor.
Hence, his ignorance of the necessity of immediately executing an affidavit before the police
authorities regarding the incident that he witnessed on July 23, 1992 cannot be taken against him.
Considering that he only finished sixth grade and that he is suffering from some form of mental
deficiency, he cannot be faulted in believing that it is no longer necessary to make a formal report
to the police authorities because they already have actual knowledge of the killing of Syrel and
Exor. Delay in making a criminal accusation will not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness
if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In this case, we find the explanation of Mardie and Rodrigo
to be satisfactory.

Time and again, the Court have held that alibi must be supported by the most convincing
evidence since it is an inherently weak defense which can easily be fabricated. In the instant case,
the inconsistencies in the respective testimonies of Bernardino and Victoria vis-a-vis the

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testimonies of Catalino and Juan are not minor discrepancies because they militate against the
claim of the defense that Juan was at the house of Catalino and saw him until 10:00 in the evening
of July 23, 1992. Because of these inconsistencies, we find it difficult to believe that Juan was
indeed present in the house of Catalino on the above-mentioned date.

Appellants’ defense of alibi is negated in the face of the positive identification made by
prosecution witnesses Rodrigo and Mardie. Well settled is the rule that positive identification of
the accused made by an eyewitness prevails over the defense of alibi.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental (Branch 44) finding
Catalino Melendres, Jr., Bernardino Kirit and Teodulo Kitay guilty of the crime of MURDER
beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on two counts, is
AFFIRMED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONAS BUSTAMANTE

G.R. No. 177769 12 September 2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies are best addressed to the
sound judgment of the trial court as it has the singular opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and their manner of testifying.

FACTS:

Jonas Bustamante was charged for the murder of Sergio Lasaca. Sergio was drinking
together with his brother, Illuminado, and friend, Gumersindo, when he was shot from behind at
the back of his head by Jonas with a gun. The instant case was initiated by Sergio’s father.

A month from the incident, Illuminado and Gumersindo finally informed the police that it
was Jonas who shot Sergio. They reasoned that they waited a month due to fear of being harmed
by the persons behind the murder of Sergio. They were also pressured to not testify against Jonas,
and threatened by several persons related to the estranged wife of Sergio, Josefa. Josefa also
prohibited the autopsy on the body of Sergio. Illuminado and Gumersindo remain firm in their
testimony against Jonas despite stern warning of perjury and heavy cross-examinations.

The accused questions the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses positively
identifying the accused for failing to immediately inform the police of what they witnessed. The
Regional Trial Court found Jonas Bustamante guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that the positive
identification by the witnesses negated accused’s denial and alibi.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies of Illuminado and Gumersindo are credible.

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RULING:

YES, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the RTC and CA finding the accused Jonas
Bustamante guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the testimonies and positive identification
thereof by the prosecution witnesses Illuminado and Gumersindo.

The credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies are best addressed to the
sound judgment of the trial court as it has the singular opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and their manner of testifying.

In this case, the testimony of the witnesses were clear, direct and positive compared to the
self-serving and negative denial and alibi.

Wherefore, the appeal was denied and the judgment affirmed.

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RUBEN LASCANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 166241 September 7, 2007

DOCTRINE:

Inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimony of a witness which refer to minor and
insignificant details do not destroy credibility—on the contrary, they are in fact taken as badges of
truth which bolster the probative value of the testimony. —As correctly stated by the Solicitor
General, the supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and minor and do
not go into the substance of Ibacuado’s and Mallari’s testimonies. The important portions
thereof—which the alleged disparities cannot override—are that which coherently narrated the
principal occurrence and established with certainty the identity of petitioner as the one who opened
fire at Fernandez.

FACTS:

Ruben Lascano was charged for the crime of homicide of one Arnold Fernandez. Twelve witnesses
testified for the prosecution, among whom were Ofelia Ibacuado (Ibacuado), Estrellita Mallari
(Mallari).
The eyewitness account of Ibacuado of the operative facts follow. At around 9:00 in the evening
of 31 August 1994, Fernandez, drinking beer by himself, was sitting on the two-step cement stairs
in front of a sari-sari store situated in L. Lupa Street. Ibacuado had gone to the sari-sari store to
use the telephone and saw Fernandez there with a beer in hand. She was busy making a call when
suddenly, petitioner arrived, uttered the words, "Walanghiya ka, oras mo na!" and then proceeded
to kick Fernandez who instantly fell to the ground. Eduardo, Benjamin, Corazon, and Cynthia then
arrived and simultaneously shouted, "Sige, barilin mo na!" Petitioner then pulled out a gun from
his waist and shot the victim. Thereafter, he casually walked away while his companions went
back to their houses. Mallari, the other eyewitness at the scene, basically had the same recollection
of the events. Fernandez was drinking beer by himself when petitioner arrived and kicked him
down. Benjamin and Eduardo followed suit in mauling the victim. A moment later, Corazon and
Cynthia entered the scene. Corazon said, "Sige, barilin mo na, Ben!" Fernandez was struggling to
stand when petitioner shot him.

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At the trial, both Ibacuado and Mallari positively identified in open court petitioner as the gun-
wielder. Being long-time neighbors of both Fernandez and petitioner, with Ibacuado only a meter
away from petitioner at the scene and the place illuminated by a lamp post, the two were able to
see and recognize him.
RTC rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the trial court's decision. Lascano
filed the present petition for review with this Court, attributing error to the Court of Appeals in
relying on the alleged conflicting testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ibacuado and Mallari.
Lascano points to certain alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Ibacuado and Mallari. He
notes that when Ibacuado testified in court in the previous case, she stated that she was facing the
victim when the latter was shot but at the trial of the present case, the same witness recounted that
she was on the left side of the victim when petitioner delivered the shot. At another hearing,
petitioner points out, the same witness stated that Fernandez was standing when he was shot,
contrary to the statement offered in the previous case by another eyewitness, Mallari, who
positively stated that Fernandez was lying down on the ground when the gun was fired at him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the witness testimonies were properly relied on the by RTC and CA in finding
Lascano guilty of the crime charged.
RULING:
Yes
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the supposed inconsistent and inaccurate details are
relatively trivial and minor and do not go into the substance of Ibacuado's and Mallari's
testimonies. The important portions thereof—which the alleged disparities cannot override—are
that which coherently narrated the principal occurrence and established with certainty the identity
of petitioner as the one who opened fire at Fernandez. Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in
the testimony of a witness which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy credibility.
On the contrary, they are in fact taken as badges of truth which bolster the probative value of the
testimony.
The testimonies of Ibacuado and Mallari in open court identifying petitioner as the one who fired
the gun at Fernandez were categorical, coherent, and consistent, devoid of any suspicious
implausibility of a character likely to discredit the same. Notably, it was not shown that the said

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witnesses were harboring ill motives against petitioner that might have urged them to hurl false
accusations against the latter. This only serves to strengthen the presumption that they were not so
moved to testify falsely and thereby entitles their testimonies to full weight and credit. The
unavoidable conclusion is that the identification made of petitioner by Ibacuado and Mallari—an
affirmative testimonies no doubt—must prevail over the negative and self-serving alibi of the
defense. Suffice it to say that the strength of an affirmative testimony is far greater than a negative
one, especially when it proceeds from a credible witness. Thus, no reversible error was committed
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals in rejecting the defense of alibi advanced by
petitioner when the latter's identity has already been sufficiently established.

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NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., V. STEVEN P. CHIONG,

G.R. NO.155550 JANUARY 31, 2008

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together, amply establish the fact that
Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed through the PCG counter without delay,
proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when he presented his confirmed ticket thereat,
he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24
on that day.

The categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp
on his passport and seaman service record book, prevails over Northwest’s evidence, particularly
the Flight Manifest. Further, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay
evidence.

FACTS:

Respondent Steven Chiong was supposed to depart for San Diego, California for an
employment as an engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V Elbia. Thus, on April 1, 1989, Chiong
arrived at the Manila International Airport. Marilyn Calvo, the Liaison Officer of Philimare
(Philippine agent of TransOcean), met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) Counter to present Chiong’s seaman service record book for
clearance. Thereafter, Chiong’s passport was duly stamped, after complying with government
requirements for departing seafarers. Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest (the airline)
check-in counter. When it was Chiong’s turn, the Northwest personnel informed him that his name
did not appear in the computer’s list of confirmed departing passengers. Chiong was then directed
to speak to a "man in barong" standing outside Northwest’s counters from whom Chiong could
allegedly obtain a boarding pass. Posthaste, Chiong approached the "man in barong" who
demanded US$100.00 in exchange therefore. Without the said amount, and anxious to board the

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plane, Chiong queued a number of times at Northwest’s Check-in Counter and presented his ticket.
Ultimately, he was not able to depart for San Diego.

Thus, Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before the RTC.
Northwest contradicted, reiterating that Chiong had no cause of action against it because per its
records, Chiong was a "no-show" passenger.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chiong was able to prove by preponderance of evidence his claim for breach of
contract.

RULING:

YES. In this regard, the Court notes that, in addition to his testimony, Chiong’s evidence consisted
of a Northwest ticket for the April 1, 1989 Flight No. 24, Chiong’s passport and seaman service
record book duly stamped at the PCG counter, and the testimonies of Calvo, Florencio Gomez,
and Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) personnel who all identified
the signature and stamp of the PCG on Chiong’s passport.

Indeed, Chiong’s Northwest ticket for Flight No. 24 on April 1, 1989, coupled with the PCG
stamps on his passport showing the same date, is direct evidence that he was present at MIA on
said date as he intended to fly to the United States on board that flight. As testified to by POEA
personnel and officers, the PCG stamp indicates that a departing seaman has passed through the
PCG counter at the airport, surrendered the exit pass, and complied with government requirements
for departing seafarers.

Calvo, Philimare’s liaison officer tasked to assist Chiong at the airport, corroborated Chiong’s
testimony on the latter’s presence at the MIA and his check-in at the PCG counter without a hitch.
Calvo further testified that she purposely stayed at the PCG counter to confirm that Chiong was
able to board the plane, as it was part of her duties as Philimare’s liaison officer, to confirm with
their principal, TransOcean in this case, that the seafarer had left the country and commenced
travel to the designated port where the vessel is docked. Thus, she had observed that Chiong was

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unable to checkin and board Northwest Flight No. 24, and was actually being given the run-around
by Northwest personnel.

It is of no moment that Chiong’s witnesses – who all corroborated his testimony on his presence
at the airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently bumped-off –
are, likewise, employees of Philimare which may have an interest in the outcome of this case.

This Court has repeatedly held that a witness’ relationship to the victim does not automatically
affect the veracity of his or her testimony. The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence,
taken together, amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed
through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in counter, but when
he presented his confirmed ticket thereat, he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred
from boarding Northwest Flight No. 24 on that day.

Furthermore, it has not escaped our attention that Northwest did not present as a witness their
check-in agent on that contentious date. This omission was detrimental to Northwest’s case
considering its claim that Chiong did not check-in at their counters on said date. It simply insisted
that Chiong was a "no-show" passenger and totally relied on the Flight Manifest, which, curiously,
showed a horizontal line drawn across Chiong’s name, and the name W. Costine written above it.
The reason for the insertion, or for Chiong’s allegedly being a "no-show" passenger, is not even
recorded on the remarks column of the Flight Manifest beside the Passenger Name column.
Clearly, the categorical declaration of Chiong and his other witnesses, coupled with the PCG stamp
on his passport and seaman service record book, prevails over Northwest’s evidence, particularly
the Flight Manifest.

Further, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere hearsay evidence. As a
rule,"entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty". [Rule 130,
Section 43, Revised Rules of Court]

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Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is necessary

that:

(a) the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify; (b) the entries were made at
or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; (c) the entrant was in a position to know
the facts stated in the entries; (d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty; and (e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.

Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere
hearsay evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who
individually made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while they were
making the entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the entries
were regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA
was the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the entries in the
manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no evidence was
presented to prove that the employee who made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-
appellant set forth the circumstances that would show the employee’s inability to testify.

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VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FERNANDO MISCALA JR.

G.R. No. 91016 27 September 1991

SARMIENTO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Voir dire literally means to speak the truth, and denotes in American jurisprudence, preliminary
examination under oath of prospective jurors. The examination is conducted to determine the
competency or qualifications of the witness in case it is objected to. When the court subjects the
witness to voir dire, the court reminds him or her about the consequences of the truth. When the
court is satisfied that the influence of fear or hope has been ruled out, then the confession of the
witness can be deemed voluntary.

FACTS:

Visitacion E. Pineda, accompanied by her "tiyahin" Lilibeth S. Escuto, filed a case of rape
against accused Fernando Miscala y Magtanong, Jr., alias "Boy Gapo," 1es virtual 1aw library
That on or about the 21st day of October 1988, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan, Fernando Miscala did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of
force and intimidation, with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the offended party Visitacion
E. Pineda, a 10 year old girl, against her will and without her consent.

Pineda was firm in branding him as her rapist. Immediately after going through that painful
experience at her tender age and accused had left with his wanton lust satisfied, the poor child
instinctively called out for her uncle in the adjacent room and in childlike honesty told him that
accused they called "Boy Gapo" had just entered her room and molested her. Her uncle confirms
such statement from the girl which of course, is evidence against the accused commanding strong
probative value as part of the res gestae (Sec. 42, Rule 128, Rules of Court.)
Miscala thru his witnesses desperately tried to shift suspicion on somebody else, the
brother-in-law of victim’s uncle. Such attempt cannot overcome the direct and categorical
accusation of victim herself that it was accused, and no one else, who raped her. She has not shown
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all throughout any indication that she could have been mistaken in identifying her tormentor. In
fact she recognized him during the commission of the act inside her room, because the fluorescent
light therein was on throughout the night. And there. appears no reason, as admitted by accused
himself, why complainant should point her accusing finger at him, if, indeed, he was not the culprit
but somebody else, unless he was in fact that culprit. In a similar case the Supreme Court finds
that a 13-year old girl cannot possibly have an ulterior motive to charge appellant with rape
(People v. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511). Neither can the 10-year old victim in this case have any against
the accused under the facts and circumstances established.

According to the defense, Miscala had been drinking with Dasilio at the house of a certain
"Boy Nguso" from 8:00 o’clock to 10:00 o’clock in the evening of October 21, 1988. The group
then proceeded to the store of Mang Simon where they played pool. A little later, "Boy Nguso"
brought Miscala along with him to the house of Arthur Escuto. Here, Miscala heard "Boy Nguso"
say that he planned to rape somebody that evening.

By 11:00 o’clock in the evening, according to Miscala, he had already gone home.

Ironically, Miscala’s alibi conflicted with the testimony of his witness in glaring, and material,
points. Miscala claimed that on the night of October 21, 1988, before 11:00 o’clock in the evening,
he had not gone out at all. He was only at home. He woke up the next day at 6:00 o’clock to find
out that he was going to be arrested. It was a poorly orchestrated defense, made worse by the of a
flimsy alibi or excuse, as against the positive identification made by the victim in court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the victim had been properly placed in voir dire?

RULING:

YES. The complainant's detailed and straight forward narration of how she had been
raped bears earmarks of credibility. Even if the complainant's testimony is uncorroborated, it is

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enough to convict the accused. For the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant to suffice, her
competence as a witness must be established in the trial court.
The evidentiary rule is that in crimes against chastity, the testimony of the injured woman
should not be received with precipitate credulity, and when the conviction depends at any vital
point upon her uncorroborated testimony, it should not he accepted unless her sincerity and candor
are free from suspicion.

In the case at bar, the records show that the young victim complainant-witness had
been properly placed in voir dire.

The trial judge questioned the witness and complainant victim before she gave her
testimony on the bestial assault her person.
Q Visitacion, do you know that telling a lie is bad?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Why do you think that it is bad to tell a lie?
A That if you tell a lie, you will be imprisoned, Your Honor.
Q What else? Do you go to church?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Do you believe in God?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Now that you go to church and you believe in God, what the reason (sic) do you know
why telling a lie is bad?
A It is bad to tell a he because God will push you, your Honor.
Q So all questions that will be asked of you must be answer by only whole truth and nothing
but the truth?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Otherwise as you say, you will not only be imprisoned b God will also punish you?
A Yes, your Honor.

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Voir dire literally means to speak the truth, and denotes American jurisprudence,
preliminary examination under oath of prospective jurors. The examination is conducted to
determine the competency or qualifications of the witness in case it objected to.
When the court subjects the witness to voir dire, the co-reminds him or her about the consequences
of the truth. While the court is satisfied that the influence of fear or hope has b ruled out, then the
confession of the witness can be deem voluntary. In the case at bar, the requisites of voir dire have
been met.

The facts of this case vary significantly from People v. Ganduma, in which there were
strong indications pointing to the possibility that the rape charges were merely motivated some
factors except the truth.

Moreover, the Court generally desists from disturbing findings which have been
established by the trial court, considering that the best forum to pass upon matters of fact and the
credibility of witnesses is the trial court.

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DEAD MAN’S STATUTE RULE/SURVIVORSHIP DISQUALIFICATION

Testate estate of RICHARD THOMAS FITZSIMMONS, deceased, MARCIAL P.

LICHAUCO v. ATLANTIC, GULF and PACIFIC COMPANY OF MANILA,

G.R. No. L-2016 23 August 1949

OZAETA, J.

FACTS:

Richard T. Fitzsimmons was the president and one of the largest stockholders of said
company when the Pacific war broke out on December 8, 1941. Under his agreements with the
company dated April 4 and July 12, 1939, should he die without having fully paid for the said 545
shares of stock, the company, at its option, may either reacquire the said 545 shares of stock by
returning to his estate the amount applied thereon, or issue in favor of his estate the corresponding
number of the company's shares of stock equivalent to the amount paid thereon at P450 a share.

Soon after the Japanese army occupied Manila in January, 1942, it seized and took possession of
the office and all the properties and assets of the appellant corporation and interned all its officials,
they being American citizens.

Richard T. Fitzsimmons died on June 27, 1944, in the Santos Tomas interment camp, and special
proceeding No. 70139 was subsequently instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for he
settlement of his estate.

The Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila resumed business operation in March, 1945.

In due course the said company filed a claim against the estate of Richard T. Fitzsimmons.

In the same claim the company offered to require the 545 shares sold to the deceased Fitzsimmons
upon return to his estate of the amount of P64,500 paid thereon, and asked the court to authorize
the setoff of the amount of its claim of P63,868.67 from the amount of P64,500 returnable to the
estate.

The administrator denied the alleged indebtedness of the deceased to the claimant.

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The Atlantic presented the as evidence the testimony of Santiago Inacay and Modesto Flores
(Chief Accountant and Assistant Accountant) which testified that when creditors of Mr.
Fitzsimmons presented bills to the accounting department for payments, those bills were approved
by Mr. Fitzsimmons and the company paid them and charged them to his account. It further
presented as evidence the testimony of Mr. Henry Belden and Mr. Samuel Garmezy (VP-Treasurer
and President of Atlantic) which testified that the status of Fitzsimmons’ account and the fact of
his indebtedness. The testimony of Belden and Garmezy was opposed by Lichauco on the ground
that said witnesses were incompetent under Section 26 of Rule 123 or the Dead Man’s Statute.

The Trial Court refused to admit the testimony of the witnesses presented by Atlantic as they were
stockholders and member of the Atlantic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officers of a corporation which is a party to an action against an executor or
administrator of a deceased person are disqualified from testifying as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person

RULING:

No. “Dead man's statute" disqualifies only parties to an action, officers and stockholders of the
corporation, have been allowed to testify in favor of the corporation, while in those states where
"parties and persons interested in the outcome of the litigation" are disqualified under the statute,
officers and stockholders of the corporation have been held to be incompetent to testify against the
estate of a deceased person.

As far as Section 26(c) of Rule 123 is concern, it disqualifies only parties or assignors of parties,
we are constrained to hold that the officers and/or stockholders of a corporation are not disqualified
from testifying, for or against the corporation which is a party to an action upon a claim or demand
against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such
deceased person.

It results that the trial court erred in not admitting the testimony of Messrs. Belden and Garmezy.

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The appellant Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila is ordered to pay to the administrator
the sum of P64,500 upon the retransfer by the latter to the former of the 545 shares of stock
purchased by the decedent in 1939.

The administrator is ordered to pay to the said company the sum of P868.67.

The claim of the company against the estate for P63,000 and the counterclaim of the estate against
the company for P90,000 are disapproved.

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TAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 125861 SEPTEMBER 9, 1998

J. MARTINEZ

DOCTRINE:

The object and purpose of the Dead Man’s Statute is to guard against the temptation to give false
testimony in regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to
put the two parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony.
If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.

FACTS:

Fernando Tan Kiat, in his complaint claimed that he bought the subject properties from Mr. Tan
Keh in 1954, built his house thereon, but was unable to effect immediate transfer of title in his
favor in view of his foreign nationality at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an assurance in good
faith of the sales agreement, Mr. Tan Keh turned over to private respondent the owner's duplicate
copy and, in addition, executed a lease contract in favor of private respondent for a duration of
forty (40) years. However, in 1958, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject properties to Remigio Tan, his
brother and father of petitioners, with the understanding that the subject properties are to be held
in trust by Remigio for the benefit of private respondent and that Remigio would execute the proper
documents of transfer in favor of private respondent should the latter at anytime demand recovery
of the subject properties. TCT No. 53284 was then issued in the name of Remigio. Another contract
of lease was executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of private respondent to further
safeguard the latter's interest on the subject properties, but private respondent never paid any rental
and no demand whatsoever for the payment thereof had been made on him. Remigio was killed in
1968. At his wake, petitioners were reminded of private respondent's ownership of the subject
properties and they promised to transfer the subject properties to private respondent who by then
had already acquired Filipino citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners, however, never made good
their promise to convey the subject properties despite repeated demands by private respondent.

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Thus, private respondent filed a complaint for recovery of property. Petitioners on the other hand
filed a Motion To Dismiss claiming, among others that the complaint stated no cause of action.
The RTC indeed dismissed the complaint. On appeal however, the CA set aside the order of
dismissal. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent’s complaint stated a cause of action against petitioners.

RULING:

NO. Petitioners are in possession of TCT No. 117898 which evidences their ownership of the
subject properties. On the other hand, private respondent relies simply on the allegation that
he is entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who
is now dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on parol evidence which, under the
circumstances obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating the "Dead Man's Statute"
found in Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. viz:
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party - Parties or
assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against
an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a
person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of
unsound mind.

The object and purpose of the rule is to guard against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard of the transaction in question on the part of the surviving party, and further to put the two
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one party
to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted
and unexplained account of the transaction.

Clearly then, from a reading of the complaint itself, the annexes attached thereto and relevant laws
and jurisprudence, the complaint indeed does not spell out any cause of action.

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LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA v.LAMBERTO CHUA

G.R. No.143340 1 5August 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.

DOCTRINE:

FIRST: For the rule to apply, it is necessary that:

1) The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a

case is prosecuted.

2) The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased

person or a person of unsound mind;

3) 3)The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind; and

4) His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

SECOND: The filing of the COUNTERCLAIM effectively removes the case from the ambit of the
Dead Man’s Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estate sets up a counterclaim, the respondent may testify to occurrences
before death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.

FACTS:

Lilibeth Sunga-Chan and Cecilia Sunga was the daughter and wife respectively of the
deceased Jacinto Sunga, while Lamberto Chua was the alleged business partner of Jacinto in
Shellite Cas Appliance Center. Lambert filed a complaint against petitioners for the “Winding up
of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment” before the Regional Trial Court of Sandinga, Zamboanga del Norte.

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Allegedly, the partnership was registered as a sole proprietor under Jacinto’s name for
convenience. Jacinto and Lamberto contributed P100,000 each. The business prospered. However,
upon the death of Jacinto, petitioners took over the operations, control and management of the
partnership. Upon demand of Lamberto, Lilibeth gave P200,000 to Lamberto as partial payment
of his share in the partnership, and promised to liquidate the remaining assets of the partnership.
However, the petitioners continued to benefit from the partnership to the damage and prejudice of
Lamberto.

The petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims, contending, among
others, they are not liable for the partnership shares, unreceived income, interests and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lamberto ordering petitioners to pay the former his share in the
partnership and the profits therein with interest and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
upheld the ruling.

In their appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended that Lamberto and his
witness Josephine should not have been heard by the trial court to prove an alleged partnership 3
years after Jacinto’s death invoking “Dead Man’s Statute” or “Survivorship Rule” under Sec.23,
Rule 130 of Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dead Man’s Statute or Survivorship Rule applies.

RULING:

NO, the rule does NOT apply for 2 reasons: 1) petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim;
and 2) Josephine is NOT a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case
is prosecuted.

Sec. 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides “Parties or assignors of

parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or

administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind,

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upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or against such person of

unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased

person or before such person became of unsound mind”

For the rule to apply, it is necessary that:

5) The witness is a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a

case is prosecuted.

6) The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased

person or a person of unsound mind;

7) 3)The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind; and

8) His testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

The filing of the counterclaim by the petitioners effectively removed this case from the
ambit of the Dead Man’s Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or
administrator or representatives of the estate sets up a counterclaim, the respondent may testify to
occurrences before death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Josephine is not covered by
the rule for the simple reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Petitioner’s contention that Josephine is Lamberto’s alter ego
as the latter merely coerced the former. However, Josephine’s candid admission that “she only
testified because her brother-in-law (Lamberto) requested that she testify, otherwise, she would
not have done so” proves otherwise.

The relationship between Lamberto and Josephine also does not affect her credibility.
Furthermore, the documentary evidence was well considered and was proven sufficient to prove
the formation of a partnership. It was further ruled that the petition filed by Lamberto is well within
the prescription period of 6 years as he filed the petition merely 3 years after Jacinto’s death.

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SANSON VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 127745 APRIL 22, 2003

CARPIO-MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:

As for the administratrix's invocation of the

Dead Man's Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1)

parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. . .

. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to

disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the

above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction

between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.

FACTS:

Petitioners-appellants were claiming that the late Juan Bon Fing Sy owes them

money, evidenced by issued checks. Melecia T. Sy, administratrix of the estate, however,

objected thereto and invoked the Dead Man's Statute under Section 23, Rule 130 of the

Revised Rules of Court.

SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse

party. — Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a

case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of

a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon claim or demand

against the estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound

mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such

deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

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She denied the existence and legality of the loans and dispensed with the presentation of evidence
against the claims.

ISSUE:

Whether the Dead Man’s Statute is applicable.

RULING:

The Court sustained the claims of petitioners-appellants. Jade Montinola testified,

on behalf of petitioners-appellants Montinola, as to the genuineness of the late Mr. Sy's

signature on the checks. Thus, Mr. Sy was prima facie presumed to have become a party

to the checks for value, following Section 24 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.

This had not been rebutted. As to the application of the Dead Man's Statute, it does not lie against
Jade who was only a witness, not a party to the case. Neither does it apply to the Sansons, as their
separate claims were supported by checks. As to the authenticity of the signature in their checks,
while their testimonies had not discharged the quantum of proof, the same had not been
controverted.

As for the administratrix's invocation of the

Dead Man's Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1)

parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted. . .

The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to

disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the

above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction

between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein. . . . (Italics

supplied)

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GARCIA vs. VDA. DE CAPARAS

G.R. No. 180843 April 17, 2013

DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:

If one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or
other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.

FACTS:

Flora Makapugay (Makapugay) is the owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Barangay Lugam,

Malolos, Bulacan (the land) and being tilled by Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as agricultural lessee
under a leasehold agreement. Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by her nephews and
niece, namely Amanda dela Paz-Perlas (Amanda), Justo dela Paz (Justo) and Augusto dela Paz
(Augusto). On the other hand, Eugenio’s children – Modesta Garcia (Garcia), Cristina Salamat
(Salamat) and Pedro – succeeded him. Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as
her attorney-in-fact. After Eugenio died, or in 1974, Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement
entitled "Kasunduan sa Buwisan", followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold
Contract,covering the land. In said agreements, Pedro was installed and recognized as the lone
agricultural lessee and cultivator of the land. Pedro passed away in 1984, and his wife, herein
respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de Caparas (Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee.

On July 10, 1996, the landowners Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one hand, and
Pedro’s sisters Garcia and Salamat on the other, entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa"
whereby Garcia and Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees.

On October 24, 1996, herein petitioners Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint for
nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Pedro’s heirs,
represented by his surviving spouse and herein respondent Dominga. Before the office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Bulacan.

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In their Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed that when their father Eugenio died, they
entered into an agreement with their brother Pedro that they would alternately farm the land on a
"per season basis".

And that when Amanda learned of Pedro’s misrepresentations, she executed on July 10,
1996 an Affidavit stating among others that Pedro assured her that he would not deprive Garcia
and Salamat of their "cultivatory rights";

That in order to correct matters, Amanda, Justo and Augusto executed in their favor the
1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa", recognizing them as Pedro’s co-lessees;

Dominga claimed that that Amanda’s July 10, 1996 Affidavit and "Kasunduan sa Buwisan
ng Lupa" of even date between her and the petitioners are self-serving

PARAD dismissed the case and favored defendant Dominga. DARAB upheld PARAD’s
decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission
and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead
Man’s Statute

RULING:

YES.

Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule, "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."1
Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas (Pedro) that he entered into a sharing
of leasehold rights with the petitioners cannot be used as evidence against the herein respondent
as the latter would be unable to contradict or disprove the same.

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What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s
declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the alternate
farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead Man’s Statute, which provides
that "if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other
mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.”

Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which pertains to the leasehold
agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" which she as assignor entered into
with petitioners, and which is now the subject matter of the present case and claim against Pedro’s
surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-interest Dominga, such declaration cannot be admitted
and used against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation by reason of her being unable to
contradict or disprove such declaration as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior death.

If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual
agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme, then they should
have confronted Pedro or sought an audience with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their
institution as co-lessees of the land; and they should have done so soon after the passing away of
their father Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro was installed as tenant
in 1979 and long after his death in 1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s succession to
the leasehold. As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus
precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.

With the above pronouncements, there is no other logical conclusion than that the 1996
"Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa'' between Amanda and petitioners, which is grounded on Pedro’s
inadmissible verbal admission, and which agreement was entered into without obtaining
Dominga’s consent, constitutes an undue infringement of Dominga’s rights as Pedro’s successor-
in-interest under Section 9, and operates to deprive her of such rights and dispossess her of the
leasehold against her will. Under Section 7 of RA 3844, Dominga is entitled to security of tenure;
and under Section 16,any modification of the lease agreement must be done with the consent of
both parties and without prejudicing Dominga's security of tenure.

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MARITAL DISQUALIFICATION RULE

ALVAREZ VS. RAMIREZ

G.R. NO. 143439 14 OCTOBER 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

General rule: During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse.

Exception: in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.

FACTS:

Esperanza Alvarez testified against her estranged husband, Maximo Alvarez during a
criminal prosecution of the latter for the crime of Arson against the former’s sister, Susan Ramirez,
with both Esperanza and Susan in the house when Maximo committed the crime.

Maximo filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification, of which the RTC granted, but
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband

RULING:

Esperanza Alvarez may testify against her husband

During their marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a

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criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or
ascendants.” The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of
perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even
at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and
unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one

spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to the petitioner, directly impairs the
conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the
Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such
as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives
and flourishes.

Note.—For marital disqualification to apply, it is necessary that the marriage is valid and
subsisting at the time the testimony is offered.

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AVELINO ORDOÑO v. HON. ANGEL DAQUIGAN

G.R. No. L-39012 January 31, 1975

AQUINO, J.

DOCTRINE:

When an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes
within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one against the other.

Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the
law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by
him against his wife (the victim's mother).

FACTS:

Avelino Ordono was charged with having raped his daughter, Leonora Ordono, a 24 year old
victim on October 11, 1970. Catalina Ordono, the mother of the victim executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on the same date her daughter told her what happened but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino threatened to kill them if they reported the crime to the
police. In her statement, Leonora also revealed that Avelino also raped their other daughter named
Rosa.

During the preliminary investigation of the rape committed against Leonora, Catalina manifested
that she was no longer afraid to denounce Avelino because he was already in jail for having raped
Rosa.

The case against Avelino for the raped committed to Leonora was elevated to the CFI of La Union.
Thereafter, Catalina was presented as the second prosecution witness. However, after she had
stated her personal circumstances, the defense counsel objected to her competency on the ground
of marital disqualification rule. The objection was overruled. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

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Whether the rape committed by the husband against his daughter is a crime committed by him
against his wife within the meaning of the exception found in the marital disqualification rule.

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court citing the rule laid down in Cargill vs. State held that, the rule that the
injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; and the rule that any offense
remotely or indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The
better rule is that, when an offense directly attack or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal
relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other
except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.

Using the criterion thus judiciously enunciated in the Cargill case, it can be concluded that in the
law of evidence the rape perpetrated by the father against his daughter is a crime committed by
him against his wife (the victim's mother).

That conclusion is in harmony with the practices and traditions of the Filipino family where,
normally, the daughter is close to the mother who, having breast-fed and reared her offspring, is
always ready to render her counsel and assistance in time of need. Indeed, when the daughter is in
distress or suffers moral or physical pain, she usually utters the word Inay (Mother) before she
invokes the name of the Lord.

Thus, in this case, when Avelino Ordoño, after having raped his daughter Leonora in the early
morning of October 11, 1970, tried to repeat the beastly act in the evening of that date, Leonora
shouted "Mother" and, on hearing that word, Avelino desisted.

That the rape of the daughter by the father, an undeniably abominable and revolting crime with
incestuous implications, positively undermines the connubial relationship, is a proposition too
obvious to require much elucidation.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. QUIDATO

297 SCRA 1

ROMERO, J.

DOCTRINE:

In People v. De Jesus: admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of
counsel although later reduced to writing a signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under
the constitution. As to the testimony of Gina Quidato – the wife, she is disqualified from testifying
against her husband. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly – marital
disqualification rule.

FACTS:

Bernardo Quidato Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide in the RTC of Davao for
killing his father Bernardo Quidato Sr. together with Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita. During
the trial, the prosecution presented as its witness Leo Quidato, the brother of the accused, Gina
Quidato; the wife of the accused and Patrolman Lucerio Mara. The Prosecution also offered in
evidence the affidavits containing the extrajudicial confessions of Eddie and Reynaldo Malita.
Instead of placing the Malita brothers on the witness stand, the prosecution opted to present Atty.
Jonathan Jocom to attest that the Malita brothers were accompanied by counsels when they
executed their extrajudicial confessions. Prosecution also presented MTC judge George Omelio
who attested to the due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers.

According to the prosecution, Bernardo Quidato Sr. owns a 16 hectare coconut land. He
had [2] sons Bernardo Quidato Jr. and Leo Quidato. He is also a widower. On Sept 16, 1988,
Bernadro Jr. accompanied his father to sell 41 sacks of copra in Davao. They hired the Malita
brothers. After they have sold the copras, Bernardo Sr. paid the Malita brothers and they parted
ways. According to the testimony of Gina Quidato, she allegedly heard that accused appellant and
the Malita brothers were planning to get money from Bernardo Sr. and she went to sleep at around
10pm so she did not know what transpired next. The accused Bernardo Jr. raised the issue of
marital disqualification rule when his wife gave the testimony against him.

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According to the testimony of the Malita brothers, they went to the house of Bernardo Sr.,
Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door and when the old man opened the door, the son pushed his father
and hacked him with his bolo. They looked for money in the aparador but found none so they left.

The body of Bernarndo Sr. was found by his grandson when he called his grandfather for
breakfast. Leo Quidato then confronted his brother and the (3) accused were arrested. During the
custodial investigation, the Malita brothers made an extrajudicial confession of what transpired
even without the presence of the counsel. Their testimonies were reduced to writing, and they
signed the said testimonies in front of Atty. Jonathan Jocom the next morning after having been
apprised of their constitutional rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution are admissible and sufficient to
convict the accused beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:

NO. Bernardo Quidato Jr. must be acquitted for inadmissibility of evidence. His guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by
the Malita brothers. However, the brothers were not presented on the witness stand to testify on
their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the character
of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to
affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceedings, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made
extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co accused when the latter had not been
given the opportunity to hear him testify and cross examine him. Solicitor General invoked Sec
30, Rule 130: this rule is inapplicable because the confession were made after the conspiracy. The
manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in
evidence if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is in writing and in the presence of
counsel – is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their statements

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in the absence of counsel although they signed the same in the presence of the counsel the next
day.

In People v. De Jesus: admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the

benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing a signed in the presence of counsel are still
flawed under the constitution. As to the testimony of Gina Quidato – the wife, she is disqualified
from testifying against her husband. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly –
marital disqualification rule.

Suspicion, no matter how strong, should not sway judgement; it being an accepted axiom
that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense to gain a conviction, but must
establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused.

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PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA

G.R. NO. L-46306 27 FEBRUARY 1979

SANTOS, J.

DOCTRINE:

Exception to Marital Disqualification Rule: “WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR

DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN
THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a
criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one against the other.”

FACTS:

Manaloto forged the signature of his wife in a Deed of Sale involving a conjugal property. He was
charged with a criminal case for falsification of public document with the wife as the witness. A
motion was interposed against the witness on the ground of marital disqualification. The RTC
denied the motion and a petition for certiorari was lodged before the court.

ISSUE:

Whether this case is an exception to the rule on marital disqualification

RULING:

Yes. The case falls within the exception when the crime was committed by one against the other.
By reason of public policy, a spouse cannot use the statute as a refuge from the consequences of a
wrongful act.

In Cargil v. State the Court clarified:

“The better rule is that, WHEN AN OFFENSE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND
VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION
to the statute that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution for
a crime committed (by) one against the other.”

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And the court reiterated the contention of the Solicitor General that:

“(t)o espouse the contrary view would spawn the dangerous precedent of a husband committing as
many falsifications against his wife as he could conjure, seeking shelter in the anti-marital privilege
as a license to injure and prejudice her in secret — all with unabashed and complete impunity.”

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MAXIMO ALVAREZ vs. SUSAN RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.— During their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.”

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.

FACTS:

Susan Ramirez, the respondent filed a criminal case for arson against her brother-in-law
Maximo Alvarez. Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness stand as the first witness against
petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against
him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

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Maximo Alvarez filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the
trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. The
trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and
deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. This prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The appellate court
rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in the Criminal case.

RULING:

Yes.

Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

“Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage.— During their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants.”

The reasons given for the rule are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private life, even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness; and

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4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through
the hostile testimony of the other.

But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own exceptions,
both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases for offenses committed by one
against the other. Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a situation,
the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims at protecting, will be nothing but
ideals, which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as embodied in the Information for arson
filed against him, eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect
and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.

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MARITAL PRIVELEGED COMMUNICATIONS

ZULUETA v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence

[to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order
[from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any
proceeding.”

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the
other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage,
save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with
the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1982, Cecilia entered the clinic of her husband and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet therein

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and took 157 documents which consist of private correspondences between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Cecilia had filed against
Dr. Martin. Dr. Martin filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for the recovery of the
subject documents, which the RTC granted in his favor, declaring that the documents are
inadmissible in evidence thus enjoining Cecilia from using the same. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether the documents and papers obtained by Cecilia are inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:

Yes, the documents and papers obtained by Cecilia were inadmissible in evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The intimacies between husband and wife do
not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is
ever available to him or to her. The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the
spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined
without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the
other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. Therefore, the documents and papers
obtained by Cecilia were inadmissible in evidence.

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UNITED STATES vs. ANTIPOLO

G.R. No. 13109 March 6, 1918
FISHER, J.

DOCTRINE:
The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to testify on
behalf of the defense or the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased
concerning the cause of his death.

FACTS:
Dalmacio Antipolo was charged with murder of Fortunato Dinal. Suzana Ezpeleta, the
widow of Antipolo, was about to testify as witness on behalf of the defense concerning alleged
dying declarations. The fiscal objected and argued that Ezpeleta was not competent to testify unless
with the consent of her husband. Since Antipolo was dead, his consent cannot be obtained by
Ezpeleta. The trial judge of Batangas sustained the fiscal’s objection to the testimony of Ezpeleta.
Dalmacio Antipolo was convicted of homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ezpeleta is not competent to testify on behalf of the defense for being the wife of
the victim, Antipolo.
RULING:
Ezpeleta is a competent witness even she is the widow of the victim. The widow of the
deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to testify on behalf of the defense
or the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of his
death. On grounds of public policy, the wife cannot testify against her husband as to what came to
her from him confidentially or by reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a
dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who killed him. The
declaration of the deceased made in extremis in such cases is a thing to be proven, and this proof
may be made by any competent witness who heard the statement. The lower court is ordered to
have a new trial and to include Ezpeleta’s testimony because the accused was deprived of his
essential rights for that deprivation.

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LACUROM VS. JACOBA

A.C. NO. 5921 10 MARCH 2006

DOCTRINE:

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.

FACTS:

The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro R. Veneracion

(Veneracion) in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant Federico Barrientos
(Barrientos). In the motion for Reconsideration filed by the counsel, it was stated that the resolution
of the court is “an abhorrent nullity. And that there is a legal monstrosity on the part of the RTC;that
the mistakes are very patent and glaring. Thus, it was Horrible and Terrible.” On 6 August 2001,
Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before his sala and explain why she should not
be RULING in contempt of court for the very disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of
the 30 July 2001 motion. In her Explanation, Comments and Answer, Velasco-Jacoba claimed that
His Honor knows beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that
the undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case. On 13 September 2001,
Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and penalized her with imprisonment for
five days and a fine of P1,000. Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September
2001 order. She recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty. Ellis
Jacoba (Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day na, baka mahuli. (Sign
this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She signed the pleading handed to her
without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her
whole life and future. This pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted
but could not sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law. An administrative case
was filed against the spouses Jacoba. IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and
Recommendation of 10 October 2002, recommended the suspension of respondents from the
practice of law for six months. The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP

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Commissioner Navarros Report and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which
the IBP Board reduced to three months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage privilege rule in evidence applies in this case.

RULING:

The marital privilege rule does not apply in this case. Despite the fact that his name in does not
appear in the 30 July 2001 motion, his Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition did not contain
a denial of his wife’s account. Instead, Jacoba impliedly admitted authorship of the motion by
stating that he trained his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic
and monumental.

The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the claimant to
object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed as implied consent. This
waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba is suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years
effective upon finality of this Decision. Likewise, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacobais suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) months.

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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
SAMALA VS. VALENCIA
A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

DOCTRINE:
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. The reason
for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his
clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

FACTS:
Clarita Samala filed a complaint against Atty. Valencia for Disbarment on the following grounds:
(a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading
the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in exchange for
nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate
children. On Civil case for non-payment of rentals (CC No. 95-105), Aville vs. Valdez, defendant
is the counsel of Valdez, and also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante
and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC.

In another civil case, (CC No. 98-6804) Valdez and Alba Jr. vs. Bustamante for ejectment,
respondent represented Valdez against Bustamante one of the tenants in the property of the
controversy. RTC judge warned respondent from repeating the act of being counsel of record for
both parties. However, in another civil case (CC No. 2000-657), Valdez vs. Alba Jr., it is
respondent who acted as counsel for Valdez, he filed the Complaint for Rescission of Contract
with Damages and Cancellation of CTC against Alba, respondent’s former client. During trial,
respondent admitted that he was the lawyer for Lagmay but not for Bustamate and Bayuga on CC
No. 95-105. He also admitted that he represent Valdez in CC No. 98-6804. Although he denied

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having represented Alba in the same case even though the case is entitled Valdez and Alba vs.
Bustamante. Respondent alleged that he already severed representation for Albba when he charged
the respondent with estafa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR which states that a lawyer shall
preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides
no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client. The reason for the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the
expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the
severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client
in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the
clients confidences acquired in the previous relation.

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-
client relation is terminated. The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with
all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action
as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

In this case, respondents averment that his relationship with Alba has long been severed by the act
of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance
with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship precludes an
attorney from representing a new client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may
not be his original client but the fact that he filed a case entitled Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante
and her husband, is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of both Valdez and
Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the lawyer-client relationship between

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him and Alba has long been severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
wherein the written consent of his client is required. From the foregoing, it is evident that
respondent’s representation of Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case,
and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a
corresponding sanction from this Court.

Suspended from the practice for 3 years

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ROSA MERCADO v. ATTY. JULITO VITRIOLO

A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary.

Factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

FACTS:
Ruben Mercado filed for annulment of marriage with Rosa Mercado, the case had been dismissed
on 1992. The counsel of Rosa died, and Atty. Vitriolo entered his appearance as the substituting
counsel. Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal case against Rosa for falsification of public document (Art
171, 172). Atty. Vitriolo alleged that Rosa made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of
her children, indicating that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez and that their marriage
was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth she is legally married to Ruben Mercado on April
11. 1978.

Rosa denied the accusations. She alleged that the criminal complaint disclosed confidential facts
and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by Vitriolo as her counsel.
Vitriolo maintains that the criminal complaint does not violate the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client because the bases are two certificates of live birth
which are public documents.

IBP BOG approved the findings of Commissioner Datiles, finding Atty. Vitriolo guilty of violating
the rule on privileged communication.

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ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication?

RULING:
In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest. Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his
confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good
cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice. Thus, the preservation and protection
of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of
paramount importance to the administration of justice.

One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep
inviolate his client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to
preserve his client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client
relationship and continues even after the client's death.

It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a
man may safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any
litigation with absolute assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it. With full
disclosure of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will
result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's
cause.

Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to
establish the existence of the privilege, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,

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(4) made in confidence

(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
In fine:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective
client.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client
must intend the communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to
information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence
and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other
than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was given

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information,
but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.

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We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that
complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by
respondent. Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent
without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the
rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a
breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege.

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REGALA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 105938 SEPTEMBER 20, 1996
KAPUNAN, J.

DOCTRINE:
The general rule in our jurisdiction is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to
divulge the name or identity of his client. However, this admits certain exceptions.

FACTS:
ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, including the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the correlative and incidental
services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as stockholders.

In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco admit that
they assisted in the organization and acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033,
acting as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration proceedings.

PCGG filed a “Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint” and “Third Amended
Complaint” which excluded private respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case
No. 33 as party-defendant based on the latter’s undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominees/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
No. 33.

In defense, the ACCRA lawyers alleged that their participation in the acts with which their
co-defendants are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering and was made in the course
of rendering professional and legal services to clients. They subsequently filed their “COMMENT
AND/OR OPPOSITION” with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG also excludw them as
parties-defendant.

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In its “Comment,” respondent PCGG set the following conditions precedent for the
exclusion of petitioners, namely: (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of
documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of
assignments petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings.

The Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their
refusal to reveal the identity of the client for whom they have acted.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners may refuse to disclose the name of their clients as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.

RULING:
YES.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. Under
this premise, the general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client.

However, this rule admits certain exceptions:

1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s
name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.

2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.

3. Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by
revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client’s name
is privileged.

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The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench clearly reveal
that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of the
alleged client’s name would lead to establish said client’s connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the
subject matter or the substance.

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought
was duly established in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself. The key lies in the three
specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes petitioners’ ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:

a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their clients
covering their respective shareholdings.

From these conditions, particularly the third, it can be deduce that the clients indeed
consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their clients’ shareholdings.

There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated documents was part and parcel
of petitioners’ legal service to their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of their
duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear that identifying their clients would
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been sought.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the client’s name would
obviously provide the necessary link for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, “that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime.”

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PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 115439-41 16 July 1997

REGALADO, J.

DOCTRINE:

For the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date
when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In
other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has
theretofore committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-
client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney without the client's consent. The same
privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends
to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.

It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed out to the
Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted
under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge,
but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest
of justice."

FACTS:

Respondent Ceferino Paredes, Jr., was formerly the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor, and Congressman. Respondent Generoso Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served
as counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present
recourse. Paredes applied for and was granted a free patent over a vast tract of land. However, it
was cancelled because apparently, it has already been designated and reserved as a school site. The
court found that Paredes had obtained title thereto through fraudulent misrepresentations in his

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application, and somebody came forward and filed a case of perjury against him. Then again,
another case was filed against him for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
for using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands
officials to favorably act on his application for patent. In all these cases, Paredes was represented
by respondent Atty. Sansaet, a practicing attorney.

Paredes contends that he has already been charged under the same set of facts and the same
evidence where such complaint has already been dismissed. Hence, double jeopardy has already
attached. In support hereof, Paredes presented court records and transcripts as proof of his
arraignment in the perjury case.

Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent
Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein
for falsification of public documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his
herein co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a
notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken
during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were annexed
to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a
graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the same would constitute double
jeopardy. Another case was then filed.

Respondent Sansaet offered to testify as a state witness against his client Paredes, claiming that
the latter contrived and induced him to have the graft case dismissed on the ground of double
jeopardy by having him and co-respondent prepare and falsify the subject documents. But the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion on the ground of attorney-client privilege since the lawyer could
not testify against his own client. In view of such relationship, confidential matters must have been
disclosed by Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer, in his professional capacity, and
therefore privileged.

ISSUE:

whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred
by the attorney-client privilege

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RULING:

No. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof and actuations of
both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.

It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to
Sansaet in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent
court, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel
therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified
documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal
statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any communication,"
without distinction or qualification.

Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however,
to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set
to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated.

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is
true that by now, insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned,
those crimes were necessarily committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client
privilege, however, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged communication was
made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with respect
to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's
advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the protection
of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the
attorney without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach
with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes
of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.

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Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made
by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between
attorney and client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and client.

In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time
he and Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or
in the process of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet
and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly,
therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of
and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having
been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.

It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an
unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed out to the
Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted
under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge,
but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest
of justice."

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RAMON SAURA, JR. VS. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 4426 17 FEBRUARY 2000

DE LEON, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules of Court provides:

"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The

following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity."

The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking
for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have
the right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E.
Saura and as co-administrators of the property.

FACTS:

The two (2) complaints are related and arose from the handling of the respondent of a
settlement case involving a piece of property owned in common by the petitioners with their other
siblings, Macrina, Romeo and Amelita, all surnamed Saura, who were then the administrators of
the said property of the late Ramon E. Saura who died intestate on May 15, 1992.

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Petitioners Ramon Jr., Raymundo and Helen Baldoria discovered that the administrators
of the property (Macrina, Romeo and Amelita) had with the assistance of herein respondent Atty.
Agdeppa, and who in fact notarized the deed of sale, sold the property to Sandalwood Real Estate
and Development Corp. without the knowledge and participation of the petitioners as co-heirs and
co-owners of the property. Petitioners further alleged that despite repeated demands, the vendors
and their counsel, Atty. Agdeppa, refused to disclose the amount of the sale or account for the
proceeds.

The case was referred to the IBP by the Supreme Court. However, the return was unserved
showing that the postmaster’s notation indicated as “Unclaimed”.

At the scheduled hearing, Atty. Esguerra-Ochoa filed an entry of appearance for the
petitioners. There was no appearance for the respondent. Atty. Ochoa then furnished the court of
the respondent’s new address and was ordered by the court to deliver the copy of the petition and
notice of appearance to the respondent’s new address. Atty. Ochoa complied. However, Atty.
Agdeppa still refused to comply nor serve an answer.

For her continued defiance, the court imposed a penalty of P10,000 and a suspension of 1
year from the practice of law in each of the 2 administrative cases pending against her.

Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the petitions should be
dismissed because she was not accorded her right to due process and that she was unable to file
her answers in the administrative charges because the disclosure of the amount of sale is in
violation of the attorney-client privilege.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is correct in saying that she could not answer the charges
against her without divulging certain pieces of information in violation of the attorney-client
privilege.

RULING:

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NO. The request for the information regarding the sale of the property and to account for
the proceeds is not a violation of the attorney-client privilege. Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules
of Court provides:

"SECTION 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The

following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a
view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity."

The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The petitioners are only asking
for the disclosure of the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have
the right to ask for such information since they own the property as co-heirs of the late Ramon E.
Saura and as co-administrators of the property.

Hence, the respondent cannot refuse to divulge such information to them and hide behind
the cloak of the attorney-client relationship.

WHEREFORE, for the refusal of Atty. Lalaine Lilibeth Agdeppa to comply with our
Resolutions dated June 7 and 19, 1995 directing her to file an answer to the petitions. the Court
hereby penalizes her with a FINE of two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) which. should be paid within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof; otherwise, a penalty of imprisonment for five (5) days shall be
imposed. This resolution shall be immediately executory.

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JESUS DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 180564 JUNE 22, 2010

ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent.
This applies with more reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms of the
Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the Immunity Agreement at a late stage
would run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it had
enjoyed its benefits.

FACTS:

On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity
Agreement under which Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with
the information, affidavits, and documents they needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric
Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and in the arbitration case that
Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before the
International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin,
Herminio, as an executive in the latter's companies from 1971 to 1984. In the Immunity
Agreement, the Republic guaranteed that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not
compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign proceeding brought by the Republic
against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the Republic's
application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and
produce documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio.

Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement. The
Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it.
Subsequently, the PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited
the Republic from requiring Disini to testify against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied
Disinis motion to quash the subpoena.

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Disini, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the
PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section 5 of Executive Order 14 covered only immunity
from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing evidence in court.

The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened
the state's policy to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President
Marcos.

ISSUE:

Did the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement?

RULING:

No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. The language of Section
5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal
immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending
on the situation of the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth
cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to
induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled
his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due process, should
hold the Republic on to its promise. A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be
withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with more reason in this case where Disini
already complied with the terms of the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to revoke the
Immunity Agreement at a late stage would run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot
ask for a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The Court should not allow the Republic, to
put it bluntly, to double cross Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn-out
process of negotiations with each party trying to get the best concessions out of it. The Republic
did not have to enter into that agreement; it was free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its
obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair. PCGG's
revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash the
subpoena were both annulled.

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PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVELEGE

NELLY LIM VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL D. VICTORIO,

G.R. NO. 91114 SEPTEMBER 25, 1992
DAVIDE JR. J

DOCTRINE:

“The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the statutory physician-
patient privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert
opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical
mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based
strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient. But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-
patient privilege where it is asserted in such a case, the physician must base his opinion solely
upon the facts hypothesized in the question, excluding from consideration his personal knowledge
of the patient acquired through the physician and patient relationship. If he cannot or does not
exclude from consideration his personal professional knowledge of the patient’s condition he
should not be permitted to testify as to his expert opinion.”

FACTS:

Petitioner Nelly Lim and respondent Juan Sim were married until the latter filed for annulment on
the ground that petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia
“before, during and after the marriage and until the present.” During the trial, respondent presented
as a witness Dr. Acampado who had examined the petitioner in a professional capacity and had
diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.

Petitioner filed a motion to oppose the testimony claiming that the doctor would divulge privileged
communication pertaining to petitioner which was covered by doctor-patient confidentiality.

Respondent said that Dr. Acampado would only be appearing as an expert witness and would not
testify on any information acquired while attending to the petitioner in a professional capacity.

ISSUE:
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Whether Dr. Acampado is allowed to testify

RULING: YES.

The SC held after a careful scrutiny of the transcript of Dr. Acampado’s testimony. The Court
found no declaration that touched or disclosed any information which she had acquired from her
patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended her patient in a professional capacity. Although
she testified that she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of her patient. Given a set of
facts and asked a hypothetical question, Dr. Acampado rendered an opinion regarding the history
and behavior of the fictitious character in the hypothetical problem. The facts and conditions
alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer and had no bearing on whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the patient. A physician is not
disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can disregard
knowledge acquired in attending such a patient and make answer solely on facts related in the
hypothetical question.

Expert testimony of a physician based on a hypothetical question as to the cause of illness of a

person whom he has attended is not privileged, provided the physician does not give testimony
tending to disclose confidential information related to him in his professional capacity while
attending to the patient.

The rule on privilege communication in the relation of physician and patient proceeds from
the fundamental assumption that the communication to deserve protection must be confidential in
their origin. Confidentiality is not to be blindly implied from the mere relation of physician and
patient. It might be implied according to circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
nature of the ailment and the occasion of the consultation. The claimant of the privilege has the
burden of establishing in each instance all the facts necessary to create the privilege, including the
confidential nature of the information given.”

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GONZALES VS CA
GR NO. 117740 OCTOBER 30, 1998
ROMERO, J.
DOCTRINE:
The rule on confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action
in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation
of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal
representative and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was
acquired by the physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was
necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information
would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.

The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established
precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy
intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the
communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone
to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging
to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.

FACTS:
Petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tiesco sought the
settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In their petition, they
claimed that they were the only heirs of Ricardo, as the latter died a bachelor, leaving no
descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. They later amended their petition by
alleging that some specific real properties listed as belonging to the decedent were actually only
administered by him and the true owner was their mother, Lucila de Mesa. The trial court appointed
Cesar as the administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo.

Meanwhile, petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother
Lucila, including therein the above-mentioned real properties. By virtue thereof, the Register of
Deeds cancelled TCTs in the name of Ricardo Abad and issued, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 108482

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in the name of Dolores, TCT No. 108483 in the name of Cesar and TCT No. 108484 in the name
of Carolina. The three promptly executed real estate mortgages over the real properties in favor of
Mrs. Josefina Viola, the wife of their counsel, Escolastico Viola.

Private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian Abad
Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria
Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for 27 years before his death, and
that during this period, their union had produced two children, Cecilia and Marian. Private
respondents also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo
Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving
children to the exclusion of collateral relatives, private respondents charged petitioners with
deliberately concealing the existence of said three children in other to deprive the latter of their
rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad. And upon discovery of the extrajudicial settlement, private
respondents filed a motion to annul the extrajudicial partition executed by the petitioners as well
as the new TCTs and the real estate mortgage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the three children were entitled to inherit.

RULING:
YES. Petitioners claimed that Cecilia and Marian Abad are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo
Abad, but rather the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao and Honoria Empaynado. In
contesting Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie Abad's filiation, petitioners submit the theory that the
husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were
born in 1948 and 1954, respectively. In addition, among others, petitioners presented the affidavit
of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo Abad's physician, declaring that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo
Abad and found him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the latter had become sterile as a
consequence thereof.

The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to say the least,
far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrollment form that one's parent is "deceased" is

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not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was being
accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as to the
supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's death at
that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate would have
been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however, inexplicably failed to
present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate has been lost or destroyed
as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death.

As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being privileged
communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which the advice or
treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of physician and
patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative and the
physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the
physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the
performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to
blacken the reputation of the patient. Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first
four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding as to Ricardo Abad's "sterility" does not
blacken the character of the deceased. Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad's
"sterility" arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which most assuredly blackens his
reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility alone, without the
attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to
blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the
same remains inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad. As stated by
the trial court:

In the case of Westover vs. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 99 N.Y. 59, it was pointed out that:
"The privilege of secrecy is not abolished or terminated because of death as stated in established
precedents. It is an established rule that the purpose of the law would be thwarted and the policy
intended to be promoted thereby would be defeated, if death removed the seal of secrecy, from the
communications and disclosures which a patient should make to his physician. After one has gone

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to his grave, the living are not permitted to impair his name and disgrace his memory by dragging
to light communications and disclosures made under the seal of the statute.”

On the other hand, evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly proved that they
are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. They were able to prove that he stated in
his individual income tax returns as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and
Rosemarie Abad. He insured his daughters on a 20 year endowment plan. He opened a trust fund
account for his daughters.

Finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners should
have been precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother on the basis of the following Civil
Code provisions:

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are no illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.

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CHAN VS. CHAN

G.R. NO. 179786 24 JULY 2013

ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician

who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined
without the patient’s consent as to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation.

Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after the offer of such
evidence for admission in court.

To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records ― the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he
gave him ― would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, a
pettion for declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Johnny Chan (Johnny), the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her.

Joseilene claimed that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited
drugs. On the other hand, Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in
her wifely duties. He averred that to save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counselling but
when he and Josielene got the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another
gave him an injection.

During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth Claim Form that Johnny
attached to his answer as proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital.
The form carried a physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from “metamphetamine and
alcohol abuse”.

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Following up on this point, Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of a

subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s medical records when
he was there confined. The request was accompanied by a motion to “be allowed to submit in
evidence” the records sought by subpoena duces tecum.

Johnny opposed to the motion, arguing that the medical records were covered by
physicianpatient privilege.

The Regional Trial Court sustained Johnny’s opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It
also denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, which denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that if courts were to allow
the production of medical records, then patients would be left with no assurance that whatever
relevant disclosures they may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates, and pertinent hospital
records.

The Court of Appeals added that, although Johnny can waive the privilege, he did not do
so in this case. He attached the Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing
his alleged forcible confinement.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records on the ground that these are covered
by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication

RULING:

No.

Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a person authorized to practice
medicine, surgery, or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he my have

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acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, and which would blacken the
reputation of the patient.

The physician patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patient’s consent as to any fact which would blacken the latter’s reputation. The purpose of this
rule is to encourage the patient, relate tom him the history of his ailment, and give him access to
his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and
narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus
putting his own health at great risk.

The privilege, says Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of the
physician at the trial. To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital
records — the results of tests that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and
the advice or treatment he gave him — would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the patient’s records.
Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged
matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for subpoena duces tecum is
premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence,
but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is
about non-disclosure of privileged matters.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces
tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery
procedure available to a litigant prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are “not privileged.”

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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICERS

BANCO FILIPINO VS. MONETARY BOARD

G.R. NO. 70054 08 JULY 1986

DOCTRINE:

Public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does
not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure
question.

FACTS:

Banco Filipino filed a motion for the production, inspection, and copying of records of the
administrative proceedings conducted by Central Bank Monetary Board regarding the bank’s
closure. These proceedings are the ones being assailed by Banco Filipino. The Monetary Board
objected on the ground that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the objection is valid.

RULING:

The objection must be overruled. Under the law, the rule that a public officer cannot be examined
as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to
show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question.

In the case at bar, the Monetary Board has not established that public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. Considering that Banco Filipino was already closed, any disclosure of the documents
at this time poses no danger or peril to our economy nor will it trigger any bank run nor compromise
state secrets.

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PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDUARDO ERMITA

G.R. No. 169777 20 April 2006

CARPIO-MORALES, J.

FACTS:

Consolidated petitions herein assail the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 464 which
requires the certain officials in the Executive Department to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of the Congress.

Petitioners herein contend that the said E.O. was unconstitutional and violative of the rights
and impedes upon the fulfillment of the obligations of the Congress including their right to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
This is known as the Congress’ power of inquiry.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. No. 464 was unconstitutional.

RULING:

PARTLY. The Supreme Court ruled Executive Order No. 464 was unconstitutional except
for Sections 1 and 2(a).

Indeed, the Congress has the power of inquiry as provided under Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution which allows the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. However,
this is NOT without respect to the executive privilege of the executive department.

Executive privilege is the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts and the Congress. Matters under this privilege may be either: 1) crucial military
or diplomatic objectives; 2) identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law; or 3)

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internal deliberations. The doctrine is premised on the fact tat certain informations must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of public interest.

The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution.

Section 1 of the said E.O. pertains to the application of the said privilege covering
information to which it applies. Section 2(a) deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive
privilege, and the enumeration of information to which it applies. In other words, Section 2(a)
provides mere guidelines. Thus, their validity.

However, Sections 2(b) and 3 thereof are invalid as the former pertains to persons covered
by the executive privilege which is a misuse of the doctrine, and the latter requires the persons
enumerated in the former to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of the Congress. Thus, their invalidity.

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JOSE ALMONTE, et al. vs. HON. CONRADO VASQUEZ & CONCERNED CITIZENS

G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like
the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution.

FACTS:

Jose Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB), while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.
A subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an
anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB
and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several
government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman. Almonte and Perez denied the
allegations and averred that the only funds released to his agency by the Department of Budget
and Management were those corresponding to 947 plantilla positions which were filled. Also
denied that there were "ghost agents" in the EIIB and claimed that disbursements had been cleared
by the Commission on Audit. Petitioner asked that the complaint be dismissed and the case
considered closed.

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The Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman's office, Jose F. Saño, issued a subpoena duces
tecum to the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him to bring "all documents relating
to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the
whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988." Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum.
But the Ombudsman denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. He ruled that
petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against themselves, since the subpoena
duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant, Nerio Rogado. In addition the Ombudsman
ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB, petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before
the investigator "all documents relating to Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all
documents, salary vouchers for the whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988". Thus, this is a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecum and orders issued by
respondent Ombudsman and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's
documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla will necessarily [lead to]
knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being"
and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman can order Rogado and Rivera to produce documents relating to
personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are
classified.

RULING:

Yes

Petitioners do not question the power of the Ombudsman to issue a subpoena duces tecum nor the
relevancy or materiality of the documents required to be produced, to the pending investigation in
the Ombudsman's office. The question is on the Government's claim of privilege. Thus, at the
outset, the court explained that a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with
respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based
upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual

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interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce
his legal rights.

Citing the foreign case of United States vs. Nixon, where the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
right of the President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, said the Court:

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like
the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we
accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in
Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution.

On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect military,
diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public interest in the confidentiality
of his conversations, courts have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the
President against a subpoena essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. The statutes and regulations invoked
by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents sought in the subpoena duces tecum
of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential nature of the EIIB's functions,
but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the proper authorities. If,
as petitioners claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA and found by it to
be regular in all respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the
government which by constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning
public office.

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On the other hand, the Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were
filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal
purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation. His need for
the documents thus outweighs the claim of confidentiality of petitioners. What is more, while there
might have been compelling reasons for the claim of privilege in 1988 when it was asserted by
petitioners, now, seven years later, these reasons may have been attenuated, if they have not in fact
ceased. On the other hand, the Ombudsman's duty to investigate the complaint that there were in
1988 unfilled positions in the EIIB for which continued funding was received by its officials and
put to illegal use, remains.

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision
would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction. Yet, as a
concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and just to be sure no information of a
confidential character is disclosed, the examination of records in this case should be made in strict
confidence by the Ombudsman himself. There must be a scrupulous protection of the documents
delivered. With these safeguards outlined, it is not amiss to state that even matters of national
security have been inquired into in appropriate in camera proceedings by the courts. We see no
reason why similar safeguards cannot be made to enable an agency of the Government, like the
Office of the Ombudsman, to carry out its constitutional duty to protect public interests while
ensuring the confidentiality of classified documents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined
in this decision.

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FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI

COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 133250 May 6, 2003

CARPIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information
under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to information on military and
diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts have long
recognized as confidential.3The right may also be subject to other limitations that Congress may
impose by law.

FACTS:

In 1973, the Commission on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila
Bay with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under
P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA
entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned
by PEA.

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was
followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI

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entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially
when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain
(famously known as the “mother of all scams”).

Petitioner invoked section 7, Article III of the Constitution which recognizes the right of
people to information on matters of public concern and section 28, Article II of the Constitution
which provides that the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. In fine, the amended JVA was yet inexistent at the time the
petition at bar was filed and could not provide a basis for a finding of bad faith on the part of
respondent AMARI. Secondly, Senate Committee Report No. 560 also pertains to the original
JVA. Precisely because of the report, former President Ramos issued Presidential Order No. 365
which established a presidential legal task force to study the legality of the original JVA. The legal
task force did not reach the same conclusions as the Senate. In any event, the original JVA was
renegotiated and was approved by former President Estrada on May 28, 1999 following intensive
review.

The petition mainly seeks to compel PEA to disclose all facts on the then ongoing negotiations
with respondent AMARI with respect to the reclamation of portions of Manila Bay. Petitioner
relies on the Constitutional provision that the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized and that access to papers pertaining to official transactions shall be
afforded the citizen.

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from
implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether The Right To Information Includes On-Going Negotiations Before A Final Agreement

RULING:

NO.

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The right to information covers three categories of information which are "matters of
public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The
first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of government
agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or
decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether
raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation
reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and
other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the
renegotiation of the JVA. The right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which
means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the
records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government
operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying.

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers. The right does not also apply to information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused,
which courts have long recognized as confidential.3The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information
rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress,are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open
by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free
from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
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independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial

power. This is not the situation in the instant case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-
going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security
and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the right to information
in several legislations.

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AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN") vs. THOMAS G. AQUINO

G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioners – non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – seek via

the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto.

The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad
range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs
procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights,
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, competition policy, mutual
recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement, improvement of the business environment, and
general and final provisions.

From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public
concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full public disclosure.

The Respondents claim of the executive privilege. Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid
depends on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. In the present case,
the ground for respondents’ claim of privilege is set forth in their Comment, viz:

x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged includes matters of

diplomatic character and under negotiation and review. In this case, the privileged character of the
diplomatic negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by respondents
particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.

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The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to negotiations and
legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access to information on matters
of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive
privilege. At the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such documents, the
negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain
and subject to change. Considering the status and nature of such documents then and now, these
are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled
jurisprudence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the full text/content/negotiation of the JPEPA is under the executive
privilege and thus must be confidential

RULING:

We maintain then that when the Executive has already shown that an information is covered by
executive privilege, the party demanding the information must present a "strong showing of need,"
whether that party is Congress or a private citizen.

However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and it has been
established that the subject information is indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a
party overcome the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a matter of
public concern, without any further showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the
doctrine of executive privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an information is a
matter of public concern.

Moreover, in view of the earlier discussions, we must bear in mind that, by disclosing the
documents of the JPEPA negotiations, the Philippine government runs the grave risk of betraying
the trust reposed in it by the Japanese representatives, indeed, by the Japanese government itself.
How would the Philippine government then explain itself when that happens? Surely, it cannot
bear to say that it just had to release the information because certain persons simply wanted to
know it "because it interests them."

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Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the right to
information, a specific "showing of need" for such information is not a relevant consideration, but
only whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the government has claimed
executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then
the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the information is
vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably
participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

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PARENTAL AND FILIAL PRIVILEGE

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE

RECORD OF BIRTH, EMMA K. LEE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE,
LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA
LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-
MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE

G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

FACTS:

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as
immigrants from China. They had 11 children, collectively, the Lee-Keh children.

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved
into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee
(collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This
prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded the mother of
these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably
TIU CHUAN. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate
petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Special
Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee,
one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her
true mother’s name. Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case.
The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive
and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being
Emma Lee’s stepmother. The RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and
oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena

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was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother. The CA rendered a decision,
setting aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum,
not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under
Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone
does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason
must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner
Emma Lee failed to do.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the stepmother may be compelled to testify against the stepdaughter

RULING:

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they
would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lee’s other children, including
petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other children were
not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s testimony
and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a
material witness. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter,
petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against
his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.

Here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner
Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants
and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:Art. 965. The direct line is either
descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from
him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

OTHER PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

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AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION VS. PENNSWELL, INC.

G.R. NO. 172835 DECEMBER 13, 2007

J. CHICO-NAZARIO

DOCTRINE:

Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication,
to wit: (a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and
client; (c) communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters
that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be
compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose
for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d)
bank deposits.

FACTS:

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage
in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner’s
total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the
amount would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said
contracts, respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC. In
its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent
for its previous sale of four items. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which
merely altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been
forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items
complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a
conference was held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties
agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However,
petitioner was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the

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amount of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for Collection
of a Sum of Money against petitioner. During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion
to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients and chemical components of the
following products.

The RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion. Respondent sought reconsideration
of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to disclose the chemical
components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what petitioner endeavored
to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. The RTC
gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004
of the RTC. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought
the instant Petition before SC.

ISSUE:

W/N there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights
over the detailed chemical composition of its products

RULING:

YES. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory
disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the
RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary
rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.

Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication,
to wit: (a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and
client; (c) communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and
penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters
that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be
compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose

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for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and (d)
bank deposits

The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the
recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution.
SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national
security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.

In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act
of the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products.
While it is true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or
imported, shall indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of
packaging, the law does not apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized lubricants — namely,
Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating,
Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound — are not consumer products.

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PER CURIAM DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CONNECTION WITH THE

LETTER OF THE HOUSE OF PROSECUTIOM PANEL TO SUBPOENA JUSTICES OF
THE SUPREME COURT

14 FEBRUARY 2012

DOCTRINE:

Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication. Section 2, Rule

10 of the IRSC provides:

Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. – Court sessions are executive in character,

with only the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and
shall not be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as
authorized by the Court. [emphasis ours]

Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his concurring opinion to the Court Resolution
in Arroyo v. De Lima13 (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on confidentiality will enable
the Members of the Court to “freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding
unpopular positions” or fear of humiliation for one’s comments. The privilege against disclosure
of these kinds of information/communication is known as deliberative process privilege, involving
as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of
individuals is an important element of the government’s decision-making process and that the
interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative
communications.”

Two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well as preventing
members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process: (1) the disqualification by
reason of privileged communication and (2) the pendency of an action or matter.

This rule of judicial ethics complements the rule of evidence that disqualifies public officials
from testifying on information they acquire in confidence in the course of their duties:

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Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged

communication. – The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in
confidence in the following cases:

xxxx

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure. [emphasis ours]

To summarize these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and are not
subject to disclosure:

(1) Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on
each case included in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done material to pending cases,
except where a party litigant requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant
to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;

(2) Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before the Court;

(3) Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature, in particular, documents
and other communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts,
research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and
similar papers.

(4) Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the
course of their official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their
term of office.

(5) Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be
disclosed, except only for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the
court to the general public.

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(6) The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials
of each department be exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.

(7) These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge
in his or her individual capacity. Since the Court is Notice of Resolution - 25 - February 14, 2012
higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice or judge, not even the
Chief Justice, may claim exception without the consent of the Court.

FACTS:

During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel
manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public offices. The list of proposed witnesses
included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will testify on
matters, many of which are, internal to the Court.

It was at about this time that the letters were sent. The letters asked for the examination of records,
and the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the
Deliberations for purposes of the Impeachment Complaint.

There were four letters of Hon. Emilio A. Abaya, Congressman and Impeachment Prosecution
Panel Manager, in behalf of the House Impeachment Panel, requesting for the Public and Private
Prosecutors be permitted to examine for the following cases: FASP vs. PAL; Navarro vs. Ermita;
Gutierrez vs. House of Representative Committee; and League of Cities vs. COMELEC.

Per its MANIFESTATION in open court in the impeachment trial, the House Impeachment Panel
requested the Impeachment Court for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum
for the production of records of cases, and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees of
the Supreme Court, to testify on these records and on the various cases mentioned above.

ISSUE:

Whether or not court records can be a subject of a subpoena.

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RULING:

NO

Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature are thus protected and
cannot be the subject of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved.

The privilege in general insulates the Judiciary from an improper intrusion into the functions of
the judicial branch and shields justices, judges, and court officials and employees from public
scrutiny or the pressure of public opinion that would impair a judge’s ability to render impartial
decisions. The deliberative process can be impaired by undue exposure of the decision-making
process to public scrutiny before or even after the decision is made, as discussed below.

Additionally, two other grounds may be cited for denying access to court records, as well as
preventing members of the bench, from being subjected to compulsory process: (1) the
disqualification by reason of privileged communication and (2) the pendency of an action or
matter.

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the above-cited laws, rules, jurisprudence and principles, the Court
resolves the matter of the House Impeachment Panel’s letters through as follows:

1. The Court cannot grant the requested examination of the FASAP v. PAL rollo as this
is still a pending case and the rollo contains privileged and confidential materials.

2. Regarding the examination of the rollo of Navarro v. Ermita, the Court —although the
case is closed and terminated — cannot grant the requested examination as the rollo contains
privileged and confidential information.

3. Regarding the examination of the rollo of the case of Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, this is a closed and terminated case. However, the court
cannot still allow examination of the rollo as it contains materials that are still covered by
privilege or are still considered confidential.

4. The case of League of Cities v. COMELEC, this is still a pending case and the Court
cannot allow the examination of the rollo.

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The Court, however, can issue certified true copies of the Decisions, Orders and Resolutions it
issued in the case and which have been released to the parties, and certified copies of the parties’
pleadings.

However, on the subpoena duces tecum et ad testificandum in the FASAP v. PAL case that is the
subject of the subpoena, the case is still pending. Therefore, all the requested documents cannot
be produced as discussed above.

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ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS

LADIANA V. PEOPLE

GR NO. 144293 DECEMBER 4, 2002

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement

of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting
the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is
an admission, not a confession.

FACTS:

Josue Ladiana (Ladiana), a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated
National Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting
in relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction, taking
advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan (San Juan) why the latter was
removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent the entry
of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely to insure the
safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan told the accused that
the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was armed with a firearm, attacked
and shot Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting Francisco San Juan at his head and neck
inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing the death of Francisco San Juan.

There were 5 witnesses presented by the prosecution but none of them had any personal
experience as to what happened in the crime scene. 2 of the ladies merely heard that a commotion
had happened (death of San Juan) while the other police officers merely responded to the scene
and saw Ladiana in the cell.

Prior to the conduct of the examination-in-chief on Cortez (one of the witnesses), the
defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the
execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before

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Cortez. In said counter-affidavit, accused Ladiana allegedly admitted to making the fatal shots on
Francisco. However, accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense as Francisco was then
purportedly attacking accused Ladiana and had, in fact, already inflicted a stab wound on the arm
of accused Ladiana.

However, Cortez emphasized that he was not the one who conducted the preliminary
investigation of the complaint which led to the filing of the subject case. Additionally, Cortez
testified that he would not be able to anymore recognize the face of the affiant in the said counter-
affidavit, but maintained that there was a person who appeared and identified himself as Josue
Ladiana before he affixed his signature on the counter-affidavit.

After the presentation of Cortez, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and
rested its case.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution had been able to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit, in which he
had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victims death, may be used as evidence
against him. It underscored the admission made by the defense as to the authorship, the authenticity
and the voluntariness of the execution of the Counter-Affidavit.] In short, it ruled that the document
had sufficiently established his responsibility for the death of the victim. However, it found no
evidence of treachery; thus, it convicted him of homicide only.

ISSUE:

Whether the affidavit executed by Ladiana may be used as an extra-judicial confession to convict
him of the crime of homicide

HELD:

NO, it is not an extrajudicial confession, it is merely an admission

SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him.

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SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a

statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to
commit the offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused
admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal
intent is an admission, not a confession.

The Counter-Affidavit in question contains an admission that petitioner actually shot the
victim when the latter was attacking him. We quote the pertinent portion:

Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. “Kaya itong
si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt upang
ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng aking
pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari ay hindi ko
alam na siya ay tinamaan”

Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led
to the latters death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did
it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him.

Further, we do not doubt the voluntariness of the Counter-Affidavit. Petitioner himself submitted
it to the public prosecutor to justify his actions in relation to the charges hurled against him. It
escapes this Court how he can cavalierly deny a document that he has voluntarily submitted and
originally relied upon in his defense.

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In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they

were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission
was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the
true state of facts.[29] Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had
been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. In addition, admissions made under oath, as in the case
at bar, are evidence of great weight against the declarant. They throw on him the burden of showing
a mistake.[30]

Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually led
to the latter’s death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did
it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is
admissible in evidence against him.

In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they

were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the admission
was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made in ignorance of the
true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization why such admissions had been
made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. Having admitted that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner
had the duty of showing that the killing was justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal
liability therefor. Petitioner should have relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that for the prosecution.

Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing. Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the issue of self-defense.
Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant consideration.

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Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be presumed innocent
of the crime charged. As far as he is concerned, homicide has already been established. The fact
of death and its cause were established by his admissions coupled with the other prosecution
evidence including the Certificate of Death, the Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the
Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by petitioner are
statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly told by other people
that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing that he was not actually arrested;
or that when he went to the police station, he surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither
is there any finding that he has evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters merely to
report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for the killing. Thus,
he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence of sufficient and
convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances, we cannot appreciate
voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioner’s penalty. Petition is DENIED

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PEOPLE VS EMIANO SATORRE

G.R. NO. 133858 AUGUST 12, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission as an “act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact.” A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the
same Rule is the “declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein.” Both may be given in evidence against the person
admitting or confessing. On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a
declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement,
stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime.

The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that if it is made freely and voluntarily,
a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be
the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is—was it voluntarily and freely
made. The term “voluntary” means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord, without
inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and consequences
of the confession, and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the
accused, at the time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in evidence against him.
Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness.

FACTS:

Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified that she and her two
children were asleep inside the house of her parents. Romero, went out to attend a fiesta. While
she was asleep, she was awakened by a gunshot, got up, went out to the porch, found her dead
husband on the ground. Abayata, barangay kagawad, testified that he and barangay kagawad,
Alvarado, confirmed the incident and reported it to the Carcar Police. Rufino narrated that
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Satorre’s father informed them that it was Satorre who shot Pantilgan. Satorre’s brothers
surrendered to Rufino the gun allegedly used by Satorre. Gelle narrated that he accompanied
Satorre and his to the Brgy Capt. Castaares where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. He was
detained. Castaares corroborated the said testimony. Appellant allegedly informed her that he
killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood. He denied the crime of murder
charged against him, claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the incident. He
denied having confessed to the killing of Pantilgan. He disclaimed ownership over the revolver
and stated that he could not even remember having surrendered a firearm to Castaares. His father
corroborated appellants testimony who denied having accompanied appellant to Castaares house
to surrender him.

ISSUE:

WON the oral extrajudicial confession is made voluntarily and shall be admissible as
evidence.

RULING:

No. A confession, as distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time

by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he
had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. Appellants alleged declaration
owning up to the killing before the Brgy Capt. was an oral extrajudicial confession because was
not put in writing and made out of court. There is no question as to the admissibility of appellants
alleged oral extrajudicial confession. Rules of Court makes no distinction whether the confession
is judicial or extrajudicial. The question is the validity of the confession whether it was voluntarily
and freely made. The age, character, and circumstances prevailing at the time it was made,
intelligence of the accused or want of it must be considered. Satorre was a 19-year old farmer who
did not even finish first grade. Granting that he made the confession, he may not have realized the
full import of his confession and its consequences. Due to the personal circumstances of appellant,
voluntariness of his oral confession may not be definitively appraised and evaluated.

Appellant allegedly admitted before policemen that he killed Pantilgan. His statement was
not taken nor was his confession reduced into writing. This circumstance casts doubt not only as

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to the voluntariness of the a confession, but also on whether appellant made an oral confession. A
confession is not required to be in any particular form. However, it is advisable, if not otherwise
recorded by video tape or other means, to reduce the confession to writing, should be read to the
defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it attested by witnesses.

The events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical evidence. Acc. to
Castaares, appellant narrated to her that during the struggle between him and the deceased, he fell
to the ground after the latter hit him on the head with a piece of wood. In the autopsy report, the
entrance wound on the deceased was at the top of the head, indicating that the victim was probably
lying down when shot. An extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction where it is
uncorroborated. The prosecution was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun
other than the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses that appellants brothers surrendered the gun
to them. This was denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking the
gun to him.

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PEOPLE VS. ABADIES Y CLAVERIA

G.R. NOS. 139346-50 JULY 11, 2002

PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:

In criminal cases, except those involving quasi offenses or those allowed by law to be
settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt
to compromise. Plea of forgiveness should be received as an implied admission of guilt.

FACTS:

Jose Abadies appeals the decision that finds him guilty of 4 counts of acts of lasciviousness
against his 17 year old daughter whom he had groped and kissed when the common-law wife of
Abadies was not around. Eventually, he threatened to rape and or kill her, before she escaped and
reported the crime to her mother.

He was arrested, and while in prison, he wrote his daughter asking for forgiveness. During
trial, he claimed alibi and denial, but was found guilty, on account of the implied admission of
guilt, and the credibility of the witness’s testimony.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the letter sent by Abadies is an implied admission of guilt.

RULING:

Yes, the letter containing pleas of forgiveness is an implied admission of guilt.

A cursory reading of the relevant parts of the letter will readily show that accused-appellant
was indeed seeking pardon for his misdeeds. Some of the pertinent portions read as follows: “I
made this letter to ask your ‘forgiveness.’ x x x Alam mo bang sobra- sobra na ang pagsisisi ko sa

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ginawa kong iyon. x x x Parang awa mo na Ne hirap na hirap na ako at ang lahat ay buong puso
ko ng pinagsisisihan. Patawarin mo na ako anak. x x x.”

There is no iota of doubt that accused-appellant was asking forgiveness for having
committed the acts with which he now stands charged. Settled is the rule that in criminal cases,
except those involving quasi offenses or those allowed by law to be settled through mutual
concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some
wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise.
Under the circumstances, accused-appellant’s plea of forgiveness should be received as an implied
admission of guilt.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DONATILLA R. BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 169801 September 11, 2007

TINGA, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence, the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that
no man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.

FACTS:

DOH engaged the services of Rescue Security Service, owned by Donatilla Baustita, to guard the
DOH premises against theft, pilferage, robbery, arson and other unlawful acts of strangers. Later
on, a DOH personnel discovered that the ceiling of their Storeroom no. 1 was forcibly detached
and an inventory revealed that medicines worth P4,244,385 were missing. Thereafter, the DOH
repeatedly notified Rescue Security about the loss. Rescue Security refused to pay the total amount
of loss, prompting DOH to institute an action for damages against respondents based on Rescue
Security’s contractual undertaking that it would guarantee the payment of any loss or damage to
the petitioner's property.

Respondents denied the loss of the medicines and further alleged that they were never placed under
the custody of Rescue Security or any of its security guards assigned at the DOH premises. They
also pointed out that no notification was made within 48 hours from discovery of the loss in
violation of Paragraph 6 of the Contract of Security Services.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of DOH, reasoning that Rescue Security cannot be blamed
because the medicines were not proved to be in custody of the same, plus DOH failed to notify it
in time (48hrs after occurrence). Before the CA, the appellate court affirmed the RTC ruling that
there was failure in notification, though contradicting the trial court in ruling that Rescue Security
had custody of the lost medicines.

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ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that DOH failed to comply with the 48-
hour notice requirement.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that, an examination of the decisions of the courts below warrants the
review of their common finding that Rescue Security was not notified within 48 hours about the
loss of the medicines. The RTC Decision did not cite the specific evidence on which it relied in
concluding that petitioner failed to immediately notify Rescue Security. The Court of Appeals
overlooked relevant testimonial evidence, which, if properly appreciated, would justify a different
conclusion.

As pointed out by petitioner, Rescue Security’s own personnel officer, Oliver Liangco, testified
that in the morning of 8 April 1996, he went to the DOH premises after he received at work a
phone call from a certain Lourdes Macabulos, Planning Officer of DOH-Region 3. According to
Liangco, Macabulos informed him about the incident, prompting him to proceed to the DOH
premises and make an ocular inspection of the storeroom. Furthermore, Liangco testified that
Macabulos accompanied him when he inspected the storeroom and even verbally conveyed to him
that the drugs inside the storeroom were missing. This fact alone is sufficient proof that Rescue
Security had been informed of the loss through its personnel, Oliver Liangco. Under Rule 130,
Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that no man would
make any declaration against himself, unless it is true.

On cross-examination, respondent Palma likewise testified that Liangco reported to her about the
inspection he had conducted on the DOH premises on the day of the alleged loss. Her testimony
corroborated Liangco’s testimony that on the day of the discovery of the loss, Liangco was
summoned to the DOH premises where the reported loss took place.

The Court of Appeals sweepingly brushed aside Liangco’s testimony and was persuaded by
Macabulos’ rebuttal testimony denying that she had spoken to Liangco about the incident. The rule
is that the positive and categorical assertions of witnesses generally prevail over bare denials. Such

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accordance of greater probative value to evidence that is positive in nature than that which is
negative in character is a time-honored principle. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence that
cannot be given greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters. Accordingly, Liangco’s testimony that he was informed about the incident
must be upheld.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OLIQUINO

G.R. NO. 171314 06 MARCH 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

For Oliquino’s defense to prosper, “it should be substantiated by some documentary or other
evidence of the relationship—like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.

FACTS:

Oliquino was charged of raping AAA. AAA claimed that Oliquino forced himself to her
and threatened to harm her with a small knife. AAA was allegedly impregnated by Oliquino.
Oliquino claimed that they were lovers; that BBB (AAA’s grandmother who happened to be his
stepsister) knew their affair; that they made love for more than 50 times and that he offered to
marry AAA when he learned about her pregnancy. The defense presented witnesses supporting
Oliquino. One claimed that he saw the two in “compromising” position when he heard an unusual
sound from Oliquino’s house. The other one claimed that he saw the two riding on a carabao and
when Oliquino saw him, he immediately removed his hand from AAA’s waist.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower courts are correct in finding Oliquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes. For Oliquino’s defense to prosper, “it should be substantiated by some documentary or other
evidence of the relationship—like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.” In this case,
appellant depended on the testimonies of witnesses who claim to have seen him and AAA on
various occasions. What further destroys the veracity of appellant’s contention was his own
testimony that it was only in July 1996, when he sent Ortile to BBB in order to tender his offer of
marriage or support for AAA and the child. Such belated attempt on appellant’s part to appease
AAA and BBB betrays his plea of innocence and amounts to nothing but a desperate attempt at

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evading the consequences of his offense. Not a few number of cases have established that an offer
of marriage is considered an implied admission of guilt of the accused.

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REPUBLIC V. KENRICK DEVT. CORP.

G.R. NO. 149576 8 AUGUST 2006

CORONA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Adoptive admission: By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of
the party embracing or espousing it.

FACTS:

KDC allegedly encroached upon the land of the Air Transportation Office. It presented several
certificates of title as proof of ownership. No records were found upon validation with the Registry
of Deeds that a case for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title was filed by
the Republic. An answer was filed by Atty. Garlitos on behalf of the KDC although he later
testified in Congress that he did not sign the document. The Republic moved to declare KDC in
default for not filing a valid answer. This was granted by the RTC and later reversed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the admission of Atty. Garlitos in the congressional hearing is binding although not
subject to cross-examination

RULING:

Yes. The testimony of Atty. Garlitos is considered as an adoptive admission. KDC did not
contradict the statements of Atty. Garlitos and even corroborated his account by claiming that
someone else signed the answer with the consent of the counsel. KDC built a justification around
the admission of Atty. Garlitos.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when

it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person. 9
By adoptive admission, a third person’s statement becomes the

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admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a
party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further points
which he or she has heard the other make or

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.

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JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R. Nos. 146710-15 April 3, 2001

PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person

when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied
by the other person.

The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in section 29
of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as
such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President. Indeed, he was authorized by
the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacañang Palace.

FACTS:

During the 1998 elections, Joseph E. Estrada and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo were elected
as president and vice-president respectively. The downfall of the Estrada administration began
when fromer Gov. Luis Chavit Singson went to the media and released his exposé that petitioner
was part of the Jueteng scandal as having received large sums of money. After this expose, a lot
of different groups and many personalities had asked for the resignation of the petitioner.
Respondent (Desierto) also resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services
and also asked petitioner for his resignation.

House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115

representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.
This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by
Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.

Several witnesses testified against the petitioner. When by a vote of 11-10 the
senatorjudges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner RULING P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose

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Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator
Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine
and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.

The Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the
legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his
office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang
Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing
a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUES:

Whether the use of the Angara diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the
issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

RULING:

They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.

The Angara diary contains statements of the petitioner, which reflect his state of mind and
are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Sec. Angara from
which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not
covered by the rule on hearsay.

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Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a person’s subjective intent
from the evidence before them. This has long been a quiet area of our law on the evidence and
petitioner’s attempt to foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur. Congress has the
ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of
performing his functions in the manner provided in Sec. 11, Art. VII. We sustained this submission
and RULING that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of
alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If he feels aggrieved, he should have
recourse to Congress and not from courts. There is nothing in Sec.11 of the Constitution which
states that the declaration by Congress of the President’s inability must always be prior or before
the VP assumes the presidency. In the case at bar, special consideration should be given to the fact
that the events, which led to the resignation of the petitioner happened at express speed and
culminated on a Saturday. Congress was then not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to
act a priori on petitioner’s letter claiming inability to govern. In case of Resignation of the
President, it is not disputed that the SC has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to
govern, Sec.11 gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and the petitioner himself
submitted this thesis which was shared by the SC.

The Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings
in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary.
Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the
parties in their pleadings. It was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in
his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use
is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in
whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by
whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1)
absence of cross examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. Not
at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of
hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.

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It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-
binding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive
admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to
treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. Jones
explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the
ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider
the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but
simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related
suggestions can be taken as an admission by him.

On the argument that the use of Angara diary violated the rule on res inter alios acta,
Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President.
Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the critical hours and days before he
abandoned Malacanang Palace. Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary
Angara: Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa
huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you have been the only one I’ve listened to.
And now at the end, you still are.This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after
Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this trust, the
petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave Malacanang after taking their
final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara Diary quotes the petitioner as
saying to Secretary Angara: ed, kailangan ko na bang umalis? Secretary Angara told him to go and
he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with
the team of the respondent Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his
relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows that petitioner was always
briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and
in behalf of the petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and declarations of Secretary Angara. Under our
rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal.

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LACBAYAN v. SAMOY, JR.

G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011

VILLARAMA, JR., J.

DOCTRINE/S:

An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable
to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. Admission
against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.

To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

FACTS:

Petitioner Betty Lacbayan and Respondent Bayani Samoy, Jr. had an illicit relationship,
during which, they, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
services company. Five parcels of land were acquired during the said period and were registered
in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife. When they decided to part
ways, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by
executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership
over the three other properties will go to respondent. However, when petitioner wanted additional
demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said properties before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which the latter dismissed. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s appeal,
hence this petition.

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ISSUE:

Whether respondent Samoy’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an

admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-
ownership between him and petitioner Lacbayan.

RULING:

No, respondent Samoy’s assent to the initial partition agreement did not serve as an
admission against interest.

The Supreme Court ruled that an admission is any statement of fact made by a party against
his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts
alleged by him. Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.

To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

In this case, a careful perusal of the contents of the socalled Partition Agreement indicates
that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves
the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent
not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be
lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive
whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Additionally, petitioner
herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend
the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.

Therefore, respondent Samoy’s assent to the initial partition agreement did not serve as an
admission against interest.

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LNS INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES vs. ARMANDO C. PADUA, JR.,

G.R. No. 179792 March 5, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no probative
value.

Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence, documentary or otherwise, sufficient to
support a claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed.

FACTS:

In 2003, Armando Padua filed a Sworn Statement before Adjudication Office of the POEA
against LNS and Sharikat Al Saedi International Manpower alleging them of violation POEA
Regulations Governing Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas Workers. He
alleged them of the following: a.) charging and accepting an amount greater than that of the
specified in the schedule of allowable fees; b.) collecting fee from worker without issuing the
appropriate receipt; c.) misrepresentation in connection with recruitment and placement of
workers.

Padua alleged that he applied as auto electrician with LNS and was assured of a job in
Saudi Arabia. He paid LNS 15,000 as processing fees and 6,000 for medical expenses, and 1,000
for trade test. He alleged that he was not issued of receipts for these payments. He also alleged that
he signed an employment contract with LNS as body builder with monthly US salary of US$ 370.
He also alleged that Sharikat, another agency, processed his papers and deployed him to Saudi
Arabia.

LNS admitted that Padua applied for employment abroad but withdrew all documents he
submitted to LNS on 2002. As a proof, LNS attached the withdrawal letter signed by Padua.
Sharikat admitted that it processed Padua’s paper for employment in Saudi Arabia. Padua admitted
signing the withdrawal letter but alleged that he signed it because he was made to believe that the
same would be endorsed to Sharikat.

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POEA: LNS is liable for non-issuance of receipt and misrepresentation and no sufficient evidence
against Sharikat.

Secretary of Labor: Affirmed

CA: Petition of LNS was denied

ISSUE:

Whether or not bare allegations of Padua are sufficient to hold LNS liable.

RULING:

Bare and unsubstantiated allegations do not constitute substantial evidence and have no
probative value. Bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence, documentary or
otherwise, sufficient to support a claim, fall short to satisfy the degree of proof needed. The denial
of LNS of these allegations was corroborated by the withdrawal form proffered as evidence, the
existence and due execution of which were not disputed by Padua.

The self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations of Padua cannot defeat the concrete
evidence submitted by LNS. Padua did not deny the due execution of the withdrawal form as well
as the genuineness of his signature and thumb mark affixed therein. On the contrary, he admitted
signing the same. When he voluntarily signed the document, he is bound by the terms stipulated
therein.

In his Sworn Statement filed before the POEA, Padua alleged that he paid the P15,000.00
processing fees and P6,000.00 medical fees to LNS sometime in August, 2002. This self- serving
and unsubstantiated allegation deserves no credence at all considering that even before August,
2002, Padua had already withdrawn his documents from LNS. It has not escaped from Supreme
Court’s observation that the withdrawal form was dated and signed by Padua on July 27, 2002. As
such, after said date, there is no more reason for him to pay any fees to LNS. Hence, the Supreme
Court is not convinced or persuaded by Padua’s allegation that he still paid LNS in August 2002
after having withdrawn his documents on July 27, 2002.

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TAMARGO VS. AWINGAN

G.R. NO. 177727 19 JANUARY 2010

DOCTRINE:

Same; Same; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta; The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another; Reason for the
Rule.—Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that
the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible
against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is
that: on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only
be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Conspiracy; Exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission
made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.—An exception to the res
inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court: This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the
conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in
order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is
necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the
admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators
without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to
cross-examine them.

FACTS:

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Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed
at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila.
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he
admitted his participation as “look out” during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo
Awingan (alias “Mumoy”) as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. During the preliminary
investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter dated May
3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna
disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until
he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in
the killings. On November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of
the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor. Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter
addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was
only forced to withdraw all his statements because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He
requested that he be transferred to another detention center. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the
charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of Justice (DOJ).On May 30, 2005, the DOJ,
through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the
Informa

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT Columna’s extrajudicial confession was admissible against respondents

because of the rule on res inter alios acta.

RULING:

NO. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently,
an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her
co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that: “on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere

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unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.” An exception to the res inter alios acta rule
is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule
prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown
by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to
the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co- conspirators without violating
their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine
them. Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GO

G.R. NO. 191015 AUGUST 6, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:
An offer of compromise is considered an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130, Section 27
of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

FACTS:
The Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) was placed under the receivership of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s past due
loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers. Allegedly among these borrowers of
OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. (ATMI) which appeared to have obtained a
loan of P10 Million each. However, these companies denied having applied, much less being
granted, a loan by OCBC.

The PDIC investigation found that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s and ATMI were
released in the form of manager’s checks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta
International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account
of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to
his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.

An information for two counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed
in the RTC against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans of Timmy’s, Inc. and
ATMI.

ISSUE:
Whether or not compromise a form of admission

RULING:

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Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was “willing to assume the viability and
full payment” of the accounts under examination – which included the Timmy’s, Inc. and ATMI
accounts, among others – is an offer of compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under
Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be considered as
analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be received as an implied admission of
guilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x.

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ADMISSION BY SILENCE

PEOPLE V. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA AKA “BENBEN PARAGSA”

G.R. NO. L-44060 JULY 20, 1978
MAKASIAR, J.

DOCTRINE:
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.

FACTS:
PROSECUTION:
On July 13, 1971, Mirasol Magallanes was alone in her parents’ house in Sitio Tabagac,
Madridejos, Cebu, cooking hog feed. Mirasol was a grade 6 student, she did not go to school that
afternoon so that she could look after the pigs and cook their feeds, upon instructions of her mother.
Paragsa entered the house and closed the door armed with a hunting knife. He placed his arm
around Mirasol’s neck, and pointing the knife at her breast, and threatened her not to shout
otherwise she would be killed. Paragsa pushed her to a bamboo bed, rolled up her dress and
removed her panties. He opened the zipper of his pants, opened Mirasol’s thighs and inserted his
penis into her vagina and made 4 push and pull movement until be ejaculated. Paragsa ran to the
storeroom of the house because he heard Lita Parochel asking Mirasol to open the gate. Mirasol
opened the gate and Lita asked her what Paragsa did to her but she did not answer; Lita walked
away.

Lita revealed the matter to Mirasol’s mother (Bernandina) about what happened to her on July 13,
she thereupon confronted her daughter. Mirasol had to reveal the incident only when her mother
asked about it. Mirasol was brought to Bantayan Emergency Hospital for examination.

Lita Parochel (aunt-in-law) testified that she saw Paragsa running away when she shouted to
Mirasol to open the gate. Lita asked Mirasol what Paragsa did to her, but she did not answer. Lita
hid and from her hiding place she saw Paragsa emerge and run away passing through the gate.

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DEFENSE:
Paragsa admits having sexual intercourse with Mirasol but he denied that he did so by employing
force or intimidation against Mirasol. He claims that they were sweethearts; it was Mirasol who
invited him to the house where they had sexual intercourse after kissing each other; it is their 3 rd
intercourse. The testimony was corroborated by Mercado Batosbatosan and Eduardo Ducay.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to convict Paragsa of Rape?

RULING:
A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and
inconclusive to justify a conviction. Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant
of the crime charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant
and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did
not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have
easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she
did not. She was allegedly raped in her own home, not far from her neighbors and during the
daytime. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have
revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the
accused did to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and when
the accused ran from the bed to a storeroom of the house to hide upon seeing and/or hearing the
voice of her aunt Lita. or, she could have grabbed the hunting knife by her side when the copulation
was going on, and with it she could have possibly prevented the accused from consummating the
sexual act. But she did not.

Another circumstance is that Mirasol did not reveal immediately to her parents that she was raped.
It was only after her mother arrived from Sagay, Negros Occidental, three (3) days after the
incident, and confronted her about the rape incident that her mother learned through her aunt Lita
that she eventually revealed to her mother what the accused did to her in the afternoon of July 13,
1971.

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Still another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the
appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts;
and that they had had two previous sexual communications before July 13, 1971, one of which
happened on June 29, 1971 in the house of the accused, where Mirasol and the accused slept
together in the evening of the same day after the mother of the accused and Mirasol had returned
from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the
statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party
can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear:
(1) that he heard and understood the statement;
(2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial;
(3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer;
(4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and
(5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the
issue

These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol
on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of
the truth of such assertion.

One more circumstance which engenders serious doubt on the truthfulness of Mirasol is the
testimony of Dr. Gandiongco that he did not notice any laceration in the walls of Mirasol's vagina.
Considering Mirasol's tender age, if she had no previous sexual experience, she must have been a
virgin when she was allegedly raped by the accused. Yet she did not state that she felt some pain
as the accused tried to insert his organ into her private part. Neither did she state that she was
bleeding during and after the alleged forced coition.

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We believe the absence of lacerations in the walls of Mirasol's vagina, as testified to by Dr.
Gandiongco eloquently confirms the truth of the accused's assertion that before the incident in
question, he and Mirasol had two prior copulations.

That Mirasol was pale, afraid and trembling can only be attributed to the fact that her aunt
discovered her having sexual intercourse at so young an age and that she feared that her aunt would
report the same to her parents. Mrs. Parochel's close relationship to her niece-daughter of her
brother-in-law — vitiates her credibility.

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ORTIZ, JR. VS. DE GUZMAN

A.M. NO. P-03-1708 FEBRUARY 16, 2005
PER CURIAM:

DOCTRINE:
The respondent’s refusal to face the charges against him head-on is contrary to the principle in
criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is to express
his innocence at the first opportune time. For his silence and inaction can easily be misinterpreted
as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse, an admission of guilt.

FACTS:
This administrative case stems from the letter of Atty. Jose R. Ortiz, Jr., regarding falsified
receipts and other documents emanating from Branch 31, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City. The falsifications were allegedly committed by respondent branch clerk of court
Larry de Guzman.

Atty. Ortiz’s initial investigation revealed that on various dates, respondent demanded and
received cash bond deposits in violation of standing regulations of this Court. After issuing either
fake receipts or unauthorized provisional receipts, he then overstepped the limits of his authority
by ordering jail officers to release the accused in several cases.

According to Atty. Ortiz, the falsifications committed were apparent after comparing the
fake receipts with the original receipts duly issued by the property division of OCA thus, he
requested that a formal investigation be conducted.

Meanwhile, Judge Henri Jean-Paul Inting brought to the attention of the Honorable Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. other irregularities respondent was involved in. He submitted to the
Deputy Court Administrator photocopies of complaints, fake receipts and a copy of a criminal
complaint for falsification of public document and estafa against respondent.

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OCA recommended that respondent be suspended and ordered to comment on the

allegations against him. It also noted the arrest of respondent in an entrapment operation conducted
by the NBI where he was caught extorting P5,000 from a winning party litigant for the
implementation of a certain court decision.

ISSUE:

Whether OCA’s recommendation that respondent be dismissed from service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, and further disqualified from being reemployed in any branch, agency, or
instrumentality of the government, including government-owned-and-controlled corporations and
government financial institutions be sustained.

RULING:

YES.

It is noteworthy that throughout the entire process, and despite the many opportunities given to
respondent, he refused to comment and present his side. The gravity of the charges and the weight
of the evidence against him would have prompted an innocent man to come out and clear his name.
However, he opted to maintain his silence. The respondent’s refusal to face the charges against
him head-on is contrary to the principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent man,
when accused of wrongdoing, is to express his innocence at the first opportune time. For his silence
and inaction can easily be misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives issued, or worse, an
admission of guilt. We are therefore inclined to believe that the respondent is guilty of all the
charges against him.

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ADOPTIVE ADMISSION
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146710-15 2 March 2001
PUNO, J.
DOCTRINE:
To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges
have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case
at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial.
An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other
person.

FACTS:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was
elected Vice-President. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the
petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of
pesos from jueteng lords. Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader,
accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor Singson
from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The House Committee on
Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the
exposẻ of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto
Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner and others call for
petitioner’s resignation.
The impeachment trial was put to a halt after the public prosecutors tendered their collective
resignation before the Impeachment Tribunal caused by the decision of 11 Senators not to open
the second envelope with an alleged secret account of Erap amounting to 3.3B Pesos in the name

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of Jose Velarde. An indefinite postponement of the Impeachment proceedings was granted by the
Chief Justice.
Supreme Court declared the seat for presidency as vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively
resigned his post.” The Chief Justice administered the oath to Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. That same afternoon, Estrada and his family left Malacañang and transmitted a signed
letter appointing then Vice-President Arroyo as Acting President.
Several cases were filed against Estrada in the Office of the Ombudsman. Estrada filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for prohibition which sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting
any further proceedings in cases filed against him, not until his term as president ends. He also
filed a petition for quo warranto praying for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Philippines “temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.”
Note: The Angara Diary was used as evidence against petitioner.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.
2. Whether the Angara diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following rules on
evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication, admissions and res inter alios acta (this is in the
motion for reconsideration)

RULING:
1. No. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of
Appeals, et al., we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just
like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances
accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded
as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

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Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one,
it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings
news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form
part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed
the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially.
xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-
camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity
stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the
barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed
actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial
and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of change even by
evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has
not discharged the burden.
We hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special
panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has
been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special

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panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias.
To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage
of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the
mobs." News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has
already prejudged the cases of the petitioner and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating
the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the
news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled.
Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. They can be reversed but they can
not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating
prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent
Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings
of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the
proper court.
2. No. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is
part of the pleadings in the cases of bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy
of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently
referred to by the parties in their pleadings. The three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from
February 4-6, 2001 were attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private
respondents Romeo T. Capulong, Et Al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third parts of
the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the Comment of private respondents
Capulong, Et Al., dated February 12, 2001. In fact, petitioner even cited in his Second
Supplemental Reply Memorandum both the second part of the diary, published on February 5,
2001, and the third part, published on February 6, 2001. It was also extensively used by Secretary

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of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest
the use of the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not
covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole
or in part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath. 8 Not all hearsay
evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence
has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.
It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding
on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a
party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s
reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. Jones explains that
the "basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or
adoption by the party of the statements which the other person had made." To use the blunt
language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common
sense." In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces
withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus, Executive Secretary
Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of
"dignified exit or resignation." Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he
could never leave the country. Petitioner’s silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as an admission by him.

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RECANTATION

MOLINA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 70168-69. July 24, 1996

ERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

DOCTRINE:

EFFECT OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF RECANTATION. — Affidavits of recantation made by a

witness after the conviction of the accused is unreliable and deserves scant consideration. Indeed,
it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of
justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and forestall
falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his
mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Unless there be special circumstances which, coupled with the
retraction of the witness, really raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial
and accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of
conviction, or its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, an acquittal of
the accused based on such a retraction would not be justified. This Court has always looked with
disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously given in court. The asserted motives for the
repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the statements made in the affidavit of
repudiation are frequently and deservedly subject to serious doubt.

Mere retraction by a prosecutions witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony if
credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent
different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony
to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A
testimony solemnly given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this
can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared
and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized,
and the reasons or motives for the change, discriminatingly analyzed.

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The unreliable character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is also
shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the burdensome process of reporting
to and/or having the accused arrested by the law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-
affidavit against the accused, attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said
complaining witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and the truth
is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation.

And in situations, like the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently
executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled rules that an affidavit
is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the witness stand and that affidavits taken ex-parte are
generally considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.

FACTS:

On August 23, 1977, petitioner Reynaldo C. Soneja was the Administrative Officer,
Cashier Supply and Disbursing Officer of Juan M. Alberto Memorial Hospital (JMA) of Virac,
Catanduanes, a government-owned institution. Accused Aristeo T. Arcilla, Jr., was the
bookkeeper. On the other hand, accused Oliver Vargas was the checker-inspector of the Provincial
Auditor's Office and petitioner Rafael T. Molina was the Assistant Provincial Auditor of
Catanduanes.

On November 11, 1977 at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning, Asuncion Tabuzo was in their
house at Salvacion, Virac, Catanduanes. Her husband Homer Tabuzo left that morning for Manila.
Molina arrived and asked her to give him an invoice of their business establishment, the D'Vinta
Marketing Center. She refused as she was not authorized by her husband Homer to give their
invoice. Molina intimated to her that he will use the invoice to facilitate the processing of a check
from JMA Memorial Hospital in favor of D'Vinta Marketing Center. Molina left as she stood pat
on her decision not to give him any invoices.

In the afternoon of the same day, Molina returned to the Tabuzo residence with Arcilla, Jr.
With them were two Treasury Warrants payable to the order of D'Vinta Marketing Center. Molina
asked her to indorse the Treasury Warrants in his favor . Again, she refused because her husband
had no transaction with JMA Memorial Hospital. They left when they could not convince her.

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Later, Asuncion 's son, Ronald Tabuzo, went to their house. He came from PNB Virac
Branch to withdraw from their savings deposit. He said that in the PNB Branch he saw Arcilla, Jr.
cash two checks which are payable to the order of the D'Vinta Marketing Center. Immediately,
Asuncion went to the PNB Virac Branch and asked Manuel Romero how the Treasury Warrant
were encashed despite their non-indorsement by her and her husband. Romero explained to her
that he thought the signatures on the two checks were the signatures of Homer Tabuzo; that the
second indorsement contains what appears to be the genuine signature of Molina and that the third
indorsement thereat appears to be by Arcilla, Jr.. In view thereof Manuel Romero claimed that he
paid the amount of P7,610.00 to Arcilla, Jr.

In the investigation of the transaction by Fiscal Surtida on January 18, 1978, Benita T.
Reyes, the owner of Catanduanes Pharmacy, denied having signed her name on the canvass paper.
Likewise, Deogena S. Garcia, proprietor of Virac Pharmacy denied in the aforestated investigation
that she signed her name on the canvass paper (Exh.’A’) dated August 23, 1977 of JMA Memorial
Hospital.

On October 25, 1978, Bienvenido G Albacea, Document Examiner of the National Bureau
of Investigation rendered his report on the result of his examination of the questioned signatures
and the standard signatures ‘HOMER TABUZO’ appearing on the Treasury Warrant SN 3-
9982422 (Exh.’Q-1’) and Treasury Warrant SN 3-9982421 (Exh ‘Q-2’). According to him, the
questioned signature and the standard signature ‘HOMER TABUZO’ were not written by one and
the same person.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court erred in holding that all the accused conspired with one another
and that they were guilty of the crimes charged.

RULING:

All other circumstances point to no other conclusion than that the appellants conspired with
one another and falsified public documents for monetary gain, which circumstances are patently
inconsistent with their innocence.

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Evidently, the appellants would not have resorted to these falsities and irregular
transactions if they had not colluded with each other. The totality of the evidence clearly
establishes that Soneja requisitioned for 10 gallons of merthiolate, 10 gallons of lysol, 10 gallons
of muriatic acid, 50 pieces of bed sheets and 25 pieces of patient’s gowns; the hospital voucher for
P5,000.00 was not pre-audited by the Provincial Auditor as required; no canvass was made from
the supposed bidders namely, Virac Pharmacy, Catanduanes Pharmacy, Catanduanes Pharmacy
and D’Vinta Marketing Center; all of the Bidders’ Tenders submitted by the three firms were
fabricated, no invitations to bid were sent to other alleged bidders and, despite the lack of basis in
the Bidders’ Tenders, the transactions were awarded to D’Vinta, the sale of 50 pieces of bed sheets
and 25 pieces of patient’s gowns was not signed by Homer Tabuzo, proprietor of D’Vinta, Soneja
and Vargas acknowledged the receipt and inspections of these materials and the delivery to the
JMA Memorial Hospital by D’Vinta although no such delivery was made; Vargas did not submit
supporting documents of the vouchers to the Provincial Auditor and, instead, concealed said
documents in his private files; Arcilla certified to the availability of funds in the vouchers; Molina
and Arcilla got the checks from Soneja and encashed the same with the PNB, Virac Branch, and
appropriated the amounts for themselves.

The appellants also maintain that the Court a quo erred in holding them guilty of
transgressing RA. No. 3019 despite the fact that the Government did not suffer any damage
because the goods were actually delivered by D’Vinta Marketing Center to JMA Memorial
Hospital.

We find no merit in this claim. The record clearly shows that no delivery of the materials
in question was made by D’Vinta Marketing Center to JMA. Homer Tabuzo, himself positively
testified that his firm D’Vinta Marketing Center did not deliver anything to the hospital because
he had no contract therewith.

We are satisfied that the evidence on record amply substantiates the trial Court’s findings
of guilt. Respondent Appellate Court was not persuaded, and neither are we.

What gains unquestionable prominence amidst the nexus of the aforecited circumstances
and the avalanche of documentary evidence therein established is that petitioners did conspire to
defraud the government of a definite amount of money corresponding to the pecuniary worth of

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medical supplies which, through falsification of various government requisition, contract and
purchase forms, were made to appear by petitioners to have been ordered and purchased by JMA
Memorial Hospital from the D’Vinta Marketing Center of Homer Tabuzo.

The assertion of petitioners that the said medical supplies had been delivered, is mere lip
service, and no clear evidence thereof has been proffered, which evidence is necessitated to shake
the formidable case which the prosecution has made against the petitioners.

RECANTATION OF TESTIMONY

Affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused is unreliable and
deserves scant consideration

In his affidavit, complainant Homer Tabuzo affirmed that he had actually delivered the hospital
supplies to the JA Memorial Hospital and that the payment therefore was borrowed by Rafael
Molina. Tabuzo explained the reason why he testified in the manner he did at the trial by saying
that at the time of trial the amount taken by Molina had not been paid by the latter and that he was
now recanting his testimony because he had already been paid in full and was no longer interested.

"A F F I D A V I T

I, HOMER TABUZO, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Salvacion, Virac,
Catanduanes, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and say:

1. That I am the owner of the D'Vinta Marketing;

2. That on the month of November 1977, I was expecting a payment from the Juan M.

Alberto Memorial Hospital for supplies delivered by me and received by said Hospital and covered
by the necessary vouchers;

3. That on November 17, 1977, due to some circumstances, I had to go to Manila so I requested
Mr. Rafael Molina to claim the payment from the Juan M. Alberto Memorial Hospital as he usually
do (sic) for me and I authorized him to encash it for me and sign the Check in my behalf and give
the amount to my wife;

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4. That when I came back from Manila my wife informed me that the money was not turned over
to her by Mr. Rafael Molina because he said he wanted to borrow first the amount because he
needed it badly;

5. That it is for this reason that I filed a case against Mr. Molina and denied the whole transaction;

6. That after some years, the amount thus borrowed was paid back by Mr. Rafael Molina to me
and therefore I am no longer interested in prosecuting this case.”

Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now says
is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such
reasoning has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be
impeached by a previous contradictory statement x x x not that a previous statement is presumed
to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this
Court has always been otherwise, i.e., that contradictory testimony given subsequently does not
necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the contradictions are satisfactorily explained.

Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before
a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and
forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on
changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of
the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.

Unless there be special circumstances which, coupled with the retraction of the witness,
really raise doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial and accepted by the trial
judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction, or its elimination
would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, an acquittal of the accused based on such a
retraction would not be justified.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original testimony
if credible. The rule is settled that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent
different, if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony
to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence.

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RES INTER ALIOS ACTA

DYNAMIC SIGNMAKER ADVERTISING SERVICES, INC. V. FRANCISCO

POTONGAN

G.R. NO. 156589 JUNE 27, 2005

DOCTRINE:

Even if the administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are not strictly bound by
procedural requirements. They are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process. Res inter alios acta nocere non debet. Things done between strangers
ought not to injure those who are not parties to them.

FACTS:

Respondent Francisco Potongan worked for Dynamic Signmaker Outdoor Advertising

Services Corporation as a Production Supervisor. The union of rank-and-file employees of the
corporation declared a strike on the ground that the corporation replaced all its supervisors.
Subsequently, Potongan did not receive his salary and he was advised to take an indefinite leave
of absence. Then, Potongan was being charged by the company for the alleged burning of the
corporation's main building and for the disruption of work. However, Potangan denied all
allegations. Potongan then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with NLRC against the
corporation.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case on the ground that the action was barred by prior
judgment regarding the strike of union. Potongan then appealed, contending that the Labor Arbiter
did not acquire jurisdiction over him because he was not even a member of the union. The NLRC
set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision and directed respondent Potongan to go back to work.

The Labor Arbiter eventually dismissed Potongan’s complaint for lack of merit, holding
that, inter alia, Potongan should have reported back to work and/or inquired into the results of the
investigation of the charges against him. The Court of Appeals (CA) however, reversed the
decision of NLRC holding that Potongan was denied due process and was dismissed without cause.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of Potongan was a valid exercise of management prerogatives

RULING:

No, the dismissal of Potongan is NOT a valid exercise of management prerogatives.

The Supreme Court recognizes that management has wide latitude to regulate, according
to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the freedom to transfer
and reassign employees according to the requirements of its business. The scope and limits of the
exercise of management prerogatives, must, however, be balanced against the security of tenure
given to labor.

If exercised in good faith for the purpose of advancing business interests, not of defeating
or circumventing the rights of employees, the managerial prerogative to transfer personnel from
one area of operation to another is justified.

The Supreme Court finds it difficult, however, to attribute good faith on the part of
Dynamic. Potongan was instructed to go on indefinite leave. He was asked to return to work only
after more than three years from the time he was instructed to go on indefinite leave during which
period his salaries were withheld, and only after the NLRC promulgated its decision of May 21,
1998 reversing the labor arbiter’s dismissal of his complaint.

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GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM AKBAR, AND
NOR-RHAMA J. INDANAN

G.R. NO. 184681. FEBRUARY 25, 2013

VELASCO, JR. J.

DOCTRINE:

An extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or
her co-accused and is considered hearsay against them.

FACTS:

On November 13, 2007, shortly after the adjournment of the day's session in Congress, a bomb
exploded near the entrance of the South Wing lobby of the House of Representatives (HOR) in the
Batasan Complex.

The blast led to the death of Representative Wahab Akbar and several others. The explosion was
caused by an improvised bomb planted on a motorcycle that was parked near the entrance stairs of
the South Wing lobby. Acting on confidential information, the police raided an alleged ASG
safehouse located in Payatas, Quezon City, leading to the arrest of several persons, one of which
was Ikram Indama, who was the driver of petitioner Gerry Salapuddin. In one of the affidavits
executed by Ikram, he said that he heard Salapuddin ordering Redwan to kill Rep. Akbar of
Basilan. The prosecution later on included Salapuddin in the complaint for murder and multiple
frustrated murder based on the affidavits of Ikram.

Later on, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution excluding Salapuddin from the charges.

Respondents Jum Akbar and Nor-Rhama Indanan filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
questioning the Secretary of Justice's resolution. The CA reversed the resolution of the Secretary
of Justice stating that the totality of the evidence "sufficiently indicates the probability that
Salapuddin lent moral and material support or assistance to the perpetrators in the commission of
the crime.”

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the inclusion of Salapuddin in the case was proper.

RULING:

NO.

Indeed, probable cause requires less proof than necessary for conviction. Nonetheless, it
demands more than bare suspicion and must rest on competent relevant evidence. A review of the
records, however, show that the only direct material evidence against Salapuddin, as he had
pointed out at every conceivable turn, is the confession made by Ikram. While the confession
is arguably relevant, this is not the evidence competent to establish the probability that Salapuddin
participated in the commission of the crime.

On the contrary, as pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this cannot be considered
against Salapuddin on account of the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet
expressed in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 28. Admission by third-party. – The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

Clearly thus, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant. It cannot be admitted
against his or her co-accused and is considered hearsay against them.

The exception provided under Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the rule allowing
the admission of a conspirator requires the prior establishment of the conspiracy by evidence
other than the confession. In this case, there is a dearth of proof demonstrating the participation
of Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds and thereby kill
Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other persons arrested and subjected to custodial investigation
professed that Salapuddin was involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the Batasan grounds.
Instead, the investigating prosecutors did no more than to rely on Salapuddin’s association with
these persons to conclude that he was a participant in the conspiracy.

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Mere association with the principals by direct participation, without more, does not suffice.
Relationship, association and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Salapuddin’s complicity to
the crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored on his relationship, if any, with the arrested
persons or his ownership of the place where they allegedly stayed while in Manila.

It must be shown that the person concerned has performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance
of the complicity. In fact, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or approval to cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy. There must be positive
and conclusive factual evidence indicating the existence of conspiracy, and not simple inferences,
conjectures and speculations speciously sustained because "it cannot be mere coincidence."

It must not be neglected that strict adherence to the Constitution and full respect of the rights of
the accused are essential in the pursuit of justice even in criminal cases. The presumption of
innocence, and all rights associated with it, remains even at the stage of preliminary investigation.
It is, thus, necessary that in finding probable cause to indict a person for the commission of a
felony, only those matters which are constitutionally acceptable, competent, consistent and
material are considered. No such evidence was presented to sufficiently establish the probable
cause to indict Salapuddin for the non-bailable offenses he is accused of. It, thus, behooves
this Court to relieve petitioner from the unnecessary rigors, anxiety, and expenses of trial, and to
prevent the needless waste of the courts' time and the government's resources. Petition is granted.
Accordingly, let the name of Gerry A. Salapuddin be stricken off and excluded from the
Information for the complex crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder.

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TAMARGO vs AWINGAN
GR No. 177727 January 19, 2010
CORONA, J.

DOCTRINE:
In order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it
is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)
the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was
engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against
them and to cross-examine them.

FACTS:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed
on August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had no
leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an
affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a
drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he
(Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. After conducting a preliminary
investigation and on the strength of Geron’s affidavit, the investigating prosecutor issued a
resolution finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. The corresponding
Informations for murder were filed against them. Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan
on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial.

On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look
out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the
gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda,
Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor
of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold Tamargo, brother of
Atty. Tamargo, filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna. On April 19, 2004,

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Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor who subjected him to
clarificatory questions.

Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for
mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his
political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo
was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed
an election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio.
However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the
elections and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.

During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited

handwritten letter to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been
tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no
participation in the killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May
25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.

Due to the submission of Columna’s letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited
letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the
authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and
denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him. The
investigating prosecutor recommended dismissal of charges.

In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004,
Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during
the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. He
requested that he be transferred to another detention center.

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Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the DOJ. DOJ, through Secretary Gonzales, reversed
the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder. He opined that the March 8,
2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and
that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. However, Secretary
Gonzales granted the Antipordas’ motion for reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of
the Informations. He declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible
against respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence.

RTC ruled that, based on Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the
decision. It ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out
of her assessment and evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken
into account. It also held that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the
respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence
presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only
after Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the admissions or declarations of Columna is admissible against Awingan and
Antipordas.

RULING:
NO. Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as
evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights
of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-
accused and is considered as hearsay against them. The reason for this rule is that:

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On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself,
and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section
30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy
is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that
(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission
relates to the common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying
out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without
violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-
examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the
recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

262

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PEOPLE VS. BUNTAG

G.R. NO. 123070 14 APRIL 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.

DOCTRINE:

Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy.

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of
circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all
without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of the accused for the
offense charged.

Extrajudicial Confession; The general rule is that the extrajudicial confession or admission of one
accused is admissible only against the said accused but is inadmissible against the other accused.

FACTS:

A German national and a tourist, checked in at the Alona Ville Beach Resort,Panglao, Bohol.
Herma Clarabal Bonga-manager assigned Otte to Room No. 9 and gave the room key.
Otte took his dinner at the resort’s restaurant. Bonga talked to him regarding the disco. At about
10:00 p.m., Bonga went to the disco party where she saw Otte seated at one of the tables. She
noticed that he had some companions whom she failed to recognize.

At 2:00 a.m. Mihangos and Guigue,who were at the disco, decided to call it a night and walked
home, with their respective bicycles. At the crossing they saw a man lying on the road but did not
recognize him. They walked past the prostrate man. When they were about twentyfive meters away
from the body by the road, they met Casiano Buntag and Diego Bongo, their barriomates.
Suddenly, Buntag and Bongo jointly and simultaneously lunged at them. Afraid for their lives,
Mihangos and Guigue fled and sought refuge in the house of Guigue’s uncle. They left their
bicycles behind. They retrieved their bicycles, but Buntag and Bongo were no longer there.

The police station of Panglao, Bohol, received a report by radio call about a man, believed to be
dead, lying at the side of the crossroad near the Alona Beach. The man died due to a stab wound.

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Mihangos and Guigue narrated how they found the body at around 2:00 a.m. that day, as well as
their encounter with Bongo and Buntag.

Buntag gave a statement on February 13, 1992 to a police investigator. He stated that at 1:00 a.m.
on February 9, 1992, he was walking back home from the disco place where he caught up with
Diego Bongo and Otte at the crossing of Alona Beach. He saw Bongo poke a knife at Otte. Bongo
then ordered him to box Otte but he refused, and moved back about three meters. Bongo himself
then boxed Otte three times on the face. When Otte fell to the ground, Bongo stabbed him on the
chest. Buntag also stated that he then ran back home, but Bongo followed him and cautioned him
not to reveal the incident to anybody or else he would be implicated.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to kill the victim
Otte and that they, in fact, killed him

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court agreed with the appellants that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence
that they conspired to kill Otte and that they, in fact, stabbed and killed the victim. However, the
Court found and so held, after an incisive review of the records, that the prosecution adduced
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after
the commission of the crime. Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interests. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim.
Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of
their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as
indirect or presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to anchor a

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judgment of conviction if the following requisites are established: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and, (c)
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

In People v. Delim, we held, thus: The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which
constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of each being confirmed by
the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion:
the guilt of the accused for the offense charged.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
controvert the evidence of the prosecution.

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ABAY V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 165896 19 SEPTEMBER 2008

QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:

Exception To Res Inter Alios Acta: “[W]hen the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is
confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a
testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates.”

FACTS:

Ten men were implicated in a highway robbery/brigandage. One of them, Aban, pleaded guilty
and entered an extrajudicial confession for the crime of simple robbery. When he testified in court,
he reiterated the same account. Two witnesses corroborated the testimony identifying Abay,
Ricalde, Reyes and Darilag along with Aban. The nine were convicted by the RTC. The three filed
an appeal before the CA although their conviction was affirmed while Espeleta, Camacho and
Punzalan were acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence. The case was elevated to the SC by
Abay and Darilag.

ISSUE:

Whether the extrajudicial confession of Aban could bind the other accused

RULING:

Yes. While initially treated as hearsay, the extrajudicial confession of Aban turned out to be a
judicial admission when he testified in court and became binding upon the other accused.

The court stated:

“Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial,
it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness
e3admissible in evidence against those it implicates.”

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO

G.R. No. 125938 4 April 2003

QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Inter Alios Acta Rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession of an accused implicating his
co-accused cannot be used against the latter unless repeated in an open court where the latter was
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements.

FACTS:

Accused Joel Janson and Ricky Pinantao were convicted by the Regional Trial Court for
the robbery with rape of Marites Alcantara based on the testimonies of, among others, Marites
herself and the signed affidavit of accused Janson in which he implicated his co-accused Ricky
Pinantao.

On appeal before the Supreme Court, the accused contended that the trial court erred in
considering the affidavit of Janson as it was signed without the presence of a counsel and thus, is
inadmissible in evidence. This extrajudicial confession was contended to wrongly taken against
co-accused Pinantao under the Inter Alios Acta Rule.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Inter Alios Acta Rule applies in this case.

RULING:

YES, the Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in taking the extrajudicial
confession of Janson against co-accused Pinantao.

The Inter Alios Acta Rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession of an accused implicating his

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co-accused cannot be used against the latter unless repeated in an open court where the latter was
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements.

P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, Jr. also identified the signed affidavit of Janson and testified that it was
signed without the presence of a counsel. Thus, the affidavit cannot be admitted as evidence.

In addition, upon cross-examination, Marites admitted she was NOT certain that the
accused herein were among those who raped her.

Wherefore, the accused were both acquitted for grounds of reasonable doubt.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISAGANI GUITTAP y PENGSON (Acquitted) and

DECENA MASINAG VDA. DE RAMOS

G.R. No. 144621. May 9, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; The res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another—it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers, and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought
their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith and
mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So
are his conduct and declarations.

FACTS:

Appellant Decena Masinag Vda. de Ramos assails the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lucena City finding her and accused Cesar Osabel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide. An Amended Information for Robbery with Double Homicide was filed
against appellant Masinag, Isagani Guittap, Wilfredo Morelos, Cesar Osabel, Ariel Dador, Luisito
Guilling. That on 17 July 1992, in Lucena, Quezon robbed spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela
Caringal and, on the same occasion of such robbery, the said accused, armed with bladed weapons,
stab both of said spouses Romualdo Jael and Lionela Caringal thereby inflicting upon the latter
several fatal wounds which directly caused the death of the aforenamed spouses.

Upon arraignment, appellant Masinag pleaded "not guilty." Accused Ariel Dador was discharged
as a state witness. During the investigation, Dador executed an extrajudicial confession admitting
complicity in the robbery and killing of the Jael spouses and implicating appellant and Osabel in
said crime. Thereafter, Osabel likewise executed an extrajudicial confession of his and appellant's
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involvement in the robbery and killing of the Jaels. During trial, Ariel Dador testified that Osabel
asked him and a certain Purcino to go with him to see Masinag at her house. When they got there,
Osabel and Masinag entered a room while Dador and Purcino waited outside the house. On their
way home, Osabel explained to Dador and Purcino that he and Masinag planned to rob the spouses
Romualdo and Leonila Jael. The trial court rendered its decision, finding Cesar Osabel and Decena
Masinag GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant Masinag was correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
ofx robbery with homicide.

RULING: No.

Appellant was found by the court to be correct in her contention that the extrajudicial confessions
of Osabel and Dador were insufficient to establish with moral certainty her participation in the
conspiracy. The testimony of Dador was not based on his own personal knowledge but from what
Osabel told him. He admitted that he was never near appellant and that he did not talk to her about
the plan when they were at her house. Thus, his statements are hearsay and does not prove
appellant's participation in the conspiracy.

Osabel's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant. The res inter allos
acta rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission
of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is
not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of good faith
and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are evidence against him.
So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a
party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as
evidence against him.

The rule on admissions made by a conspirator, while an exception to the foregoing, does not apply
in this case. In order for such admission to be admissible against a co-accused, Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court requires that there must be independent evidence aside from the

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extrajudicial confession to prove conspiracy. In the case at bar, apart from Osabel's extrajudicial
confession, no other evidence of appellant's alleged participation in the conspiracy was presented
by the prosecution. There being no independent evidence to prove it, her culpability was not
sufficiently established.

Unavailing also is rule that an extrajudicial confession may be admissible when it is used as a
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. The
implication of this rule is that there must be a finding of other circumstantial evidence which, when
taken together with the confession, establishes the guilt of a co-accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As earlier stated, there is no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the
extrajudicial confession may corroborate.

The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant with moral certainty. Its evidence falls
short of the quantum of proof required for conviction. Accordingly, the constitutional presumption
of appellant's innocence must be upheld and she must be acquitted.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs BARANGAY CAPTAIN TONY TOMAS, SR.,

BENEDICTO DOCTOR, andNESTOR GATCHALIAN

G.R. No. 192251 February 16, 2011

VELASCO, JR.,J.

DOCTRINE:

Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

It is settled that when credibility is in issue, the Court generally defers to the findings of
the trial court considering that it was in a better position to decide the question having heard the
witnesses themselves, and observed their deportment during trial. The grounds of partiality and ill
motive raised by accused-appellants cannot discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
For one, as the appellate court aptly noted, close relationship to the victim does not make a witness
biased per se. It has to be amply shown that the witness is truly biased and has fabricated the
testimony on account of such bias.

FACTS:

At around 9:45 in the evening on July 19,2006,Estrella was walking ahead of her mother
Damiana and her caretaker Angelita when appellants Tomas, Doctor and Gatchalian suddenly
came out from the side of the road. (Tomas and Doctor were cousins of Estrella). Tomas drew a
gun and show Estrella twice. Gatchalian, without a gun, supported Tomas by standing in a blocking
position along the road, while Doctor positioned himself at the back of Damiana and Angelita, and
poke d a handgun at them, telling them to lie face down on the ground, though they did not totally
drop on the road but were in a kneeling position.

When Tomas, Sr. fired the first two shots at Estrella, the latter fell down but the former still
followed it with three more shots when sheMwas already prone on the ground. After the five shots,
the three accused fled towards the house of Tomas, Sr. Liezl, who was standing about four meters
away from Estrella, shouted,“Saklulu, tulungan ninyo kami (Help, help us),” then ran to her house.
Meanwhile, Angelita came to the aid of 80-year-old Damiana, who suffered a hypertensive attack

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after seeing what happened to her daughter. Angelita waved her hand to seek assistance from
Barangay Kagawad Yolanda Pablo (Kagawad Pablo) who came out on the road.

RTC found accused guilty of murder. CA affirmed. The SC found that Tomas guilt’s has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. As for Doctor and Gatchalian to be shown that they conspired
with Tomas, it must be shown that their every act was in furtherance of a common design or
purpose of such a conspiracy. From the clear testimony of Angelita and Liezl, it was established
that Doctor’s contemporaneous act was such. His cooperation in the shooting of Estrella ensured
its accomplishment and their successful escape from the crime scene. Gatchalian however, is
differently situated as Doctor. We note that the evidence adduced and the records would show that
Gatchalian did not do overt acts for the furtherance of the shooting of Estrella. As mentioned
above, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of
cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. On
the other hand, Gatchalian neve attempted to stop the shooting, which tends to show that he was
aware of the plan and intent to kill Estrella or, at the very least, that he acquiesced to the shooting
of Estrella.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the close relationship to the victim make a witness biased per se

RULING: NO.

It is settled that when credibility is in issue, the Court generally defers to the findings of
the trial court considering that it was in a better position to decide the question having heard the
witnesses themselves, and observed their deportment during trial. The grounds of partiality and ill
motive raised by accused-appellants cannot discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
For one, as the appellate court aptly noted, close relationship to the victim does not make a witness
biased per se. It has to be amply shown that the witness is truly biased and has fabricated the
testimony on account of such bias.

Close relationship to the victim does not make a witness biased per se.

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—The Grounds of partiality and ill motive raised by accused-appellants cannot discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. For one, as the appellate court aptly noted, close
relationship to the victim doesn't make a witness biased per se

. It has to be amply shown that the witness is truly biased and has fabricated the testimony on
account of such bias.Accused-appellants have not sufficiently shown such abias. The fact that Liezl
and Angelita depend on the victim's family for their job as caretakers does not make them biased
witnesses. Besides, their testimonies have not been shown to be fabricated. The Trial court that
had scrutinized their deportment,facial expression, and body language during the trial has found
them more credible. For another, the ill motive raised by accused-appellants has not been shown
to affect the testimony of Liezl to suit her alleged personal ill feelings against Doctor. If it were so
and the content of her testimony was fabricated,why did Liezl not make Doctor as the gunman
who shot Estrella? And why include Gatchalian andTomas, Sr.

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NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. REDMONT

CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.

G.R. No. 195580 April 21, 2014

VELASCO, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during
the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration itself. The same rule
applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission
of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.

FACTS:

Redmont is a domestic corporation interested in the mining and exploration of some areas in
Palawan. Upon learning that those areas were covered by MPSA applications of other three
(allegedly Filipino) corporations – Narra, Tesoro, and MacArthur, it filed a petition before the
Panel of Arbitrators of DENR seeking to deny their permits on the ground that these corporations
are in reality foreign-owned. MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 40% of the shares of
PLMC (which owns 5,997 shares of Narra), 40% of the shares of MMC (which owns 5,997 shares
of McArthur) and 40% of the shares of SLMC (which, in turn, owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro). Aside
from the MPSA, the three corporations also applied for FTAA with the Office of the President. In
their answer, they countered that (1) the liberal Control Test must be used in determining the
nationality of a corporation as based on Sec 3 of the Foreign Investment Act – which as they
claimed admits of corporate layering schemes, and that (2) the nationality question is no longer
material because of their subsequent application for FTAA.

Petitioners questioned the CA’s use of the exception of the res inter alios acta or the “admission
by co-partner or agent” rule and “admission by privies” under the Rules of Court by pointing out
that statements made by MBMI should not be admitted in this case since it is not a party to the

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case and that it is not a “partner” of petitioners. Petitioners claim that before the abovementioned
Rule can be applied to a case, “the partnership relation must be shown, and that proof of the fact
must be made by evidence other than the admission itself.” Thus, petitioners assert that the CA
erred in finding that a partnership relationship exists between them and MBMI because, in fact, no
such partnership exists.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it applied the exceptions to the res inter alios acta
rule

RULING:

NO. Secs. 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent.—The act or declaration of a partner or agent
of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration itself. The same rule applies to the
act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the
party.

Sec. 31. Admission by privies.—Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.

Being that there is no evidence of written agreement to form a partnership between petitioners and
MBMI, no partnership was created. Accordingly, culled from the incidents and records of this
case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered between and among petitioners and MBMI
are no simple “joint venture agreements.” As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering into
partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other
corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.”
Obviously, as the intricate web of “ventures” entered into by and among petitioners and MBMI
was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into partnerships,

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then the relationship created should be deemed as “partnerships,” and the laws on partnership
should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be seen
as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are present.

Considering that the relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be
partnerships, then the CA is justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that “by
entering into a joint venture, MBMI have a joint interest” with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

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OFFER OF COMPROMISE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO BULOS

G.R. No. 123542 June 26, 2001

GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS:

Both the offended party and the accused are working for spouses Mario and Delia Fariolan, who
reside in Barangay Dujali, Panabo, Davao. The offended party was the cook and general househelp
while the accused worked as a truck helper for the business of Mario Fariolan; they both stayed in
the house of the Fariolans.

As testified to by Nancy Cordero, at about 3:00 in the afternoon of December 3, 1992, she was in
her room folding laundry when the accused suddenly entered, locked the door from inside, and
closed the window. At the time, the Fariolans were out of the house. She attempted to flee but the
accused grabbed her and threatened her with a hunting knife. Nancy shouted for help, but the
accused told her to stop shouting or he will kill her. She lost consciousness and when she came to,
she found him on top of her and having carnal knowledge of her. Soon after, a certain "Bong" or
"Bobong", the accused's uncle who allegedly served as a lookout, knocked on the door and warned
that the Fariolans might be returning anytime soon. Before he left her, the accused threatened the
victim not to report the incident to anyone. After he had gone, Nancy examined herself and
discovered that she was bleeding. She did not dare tell anyone but wept alone in pain and anger.

At 5 o'clock the next morning, Nancy left the Fariolan residence for her house, also in Barangay
Duwali, where she told her mother of what happened. Immediately they reported the incident to
the barangay captain. On the same day, the accused also left the house of the Fariolans and was
nowhere to be located. He only turned up on December 14, 1992, Upon which he was immediately
arrested.

Merson Cordero refuted the accused's claim that he was not with the Fariolans but in South
Cotabato on December 3, 1992. Cordero, a brother of the offended party, also worked as a helper
at the rice mill owned by the Fariolans. Cordero testified that the accused in fact left the Fariolans’
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house only on December 4, 1992, after he had already raped his sister;11 he returned only on
December 14, 1992, the day he was also arrested. Cordero also said that the accused in fact offered
marriage to Nancy, that the Fariolan spouses actively persuaded Nancy to accept the offer of
marriage, and that Nancy refused. Because Nancy turned down the accused's offer of marriage, the
Fariolans informed Cordero that he cannot work for them anymore.

In rendering its decision, the trial court upheld the version of the offended party, finding that her
acts immediately after the incident attest to the truth of her accusations. Although she told no one
in the Fariolan household about the rape, she left that house first thing in the morning after the
incident and reported the matter to her mother. They then sought the help of the barangay captain.
When they looked for the accused he was suddenly nowhere to be found.

In contrast, the testimonies of the defense witnesses struck the trial court as instructed and
rehearsed, and contrived merely to cover up for the crime of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the offer of marriage can be used against the accused

RULING:

In this case, the accused-appellant argues that the Fariolan spouses, as the employers of
both the offended party and accused-appellant, were not only unbiased witnesses but even shared
with the offended party an interest in having the perpetrator brought to ,justice as the rape was also
effectively a desecration of their home. This argument is unacceptable, however, in light of the
spouses' active involvement in persuading Nancy to accept accused-appellant's offer of marriage.
It is certainly revealing of which employee they favor, and where their biases lie.

The Court also takes into consideration the flight of accused-appellant the day after the rape, and
his offer of marriage to the victim after the incident had been reported to the authorities. As a rule
in rape cases, an offer of marriage to the offended party is an admission of guilt.

PREVIOUS CONDUCT

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PEOPLE VS. SANTOS, JR.

G.R. NO. 175593 OCTOBER 17, 2007

J. TINGA

DOCTRINE:

Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on
trial.

FACTS:

Salvador Santos, Jr. y Salvador (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 with illegal sale and possession of shabu in violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91651 (R.A. 9165).

The trial court decreed appellant’s guilt as follows:

1. His admission of knowing drug violators in San Mateo, only confirms the fact that he is one of
them and his nefarious activities resulted to his several arrest and convictions in two (2) Courts of
San Mateo, Rizal.

2. Accused, himself admitted he was arrested and convicted by RTC Branch 77 San Mateo, Rizal
and records of this Court confirms this fact.

An examination of the decision of the trial court reveals that apart from heavily relying on the sole
testimony of Tougan, it used appellant’s admission of his previous convictions, his declaration as
a police informer and the presumption of regularity of Tougan’s performance of his duties as
anchor for finding appellant guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the trial court was correct in using the appellant’s admission of his previous
convictions and his declaration as a police informer for finding the appellant’s guilt

RULING:
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NO. On the point that appellant has previously been charged with and convicted of similar
offenses, the Court believes that the trial court wrongly considered such circumstance for the
purpose of showing that he was likely to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. Evidence
of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on trial.

The evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is
consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit.

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ADORACION CRUZ, et al. v.COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No.12671327 July1998

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

Exception to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule is when the evidence is when it is relevant to
an issue in the case and corroborative of evidence already received.

FACTS:

Delfin Cruz died leaving his spouse Adoracion Cruz and children Thelma Debbie, Nerissa,
Gerry and Arnel as his heirs. The heirs executed a notarized Deed of Partial Partition over the
lands in Taytay, Rizal. The following day, they executed a Memorandum Agreement providing
that the co-owners shall receive equal shares from the proceeds of the sale or any lot or lots which
shall be effective until the last lot had been disposed of.

Meanwhile herein respondents Spouses Eliseo and Virginia Malolos filed acase for a sum
of money against Nerissa which was granted by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City ordering
Nerissa to pay respondents P126,529. Later on, a writ of execution was issued, upon which the
lands here in question was levied and sold to the highest bidders, the Spouses Malolos. However,
despite demands and a court order, Nerissa refused to give the owner’s duplicate copy of the lands.

The trial court amended its order upon opposition of herein petitioners ordering for the
annotation of the rights of the Maloloses over the lands instead of for cancellation of the titles
thereof. Herein petitioners Adoracion, Thelma Debbie, Gerry and Arnel filed an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal against Spouses Malolos for the partition of the lands in
question.

The RTC ruled ordering the partition of the lands in 5 equal portions to Adoracion, Thelma,
Gerry, Arnel and Spouses Malolos.

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On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the RTC dismissing the complaint
without prejudice to the claims of the parties in their share in the proceeds of the auction sale of
the 7 parcels of land in question pursuant to the Memorandum Agreement. It ruled that based on
the Memorandum and the transactions entered into over the other parcels of land, there is no co-
ownership as the trial court ruled.

In their appeal before the Supreme Court, the petitioners contended, among others, that the
Court of Appeals violated the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule. They contended that their transactions
entered into relating to the other parcels of land, in the concept of absolute owners, are inadmissible
in evidence to show that the parcels in issue are not co-owned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Inter Alios Acta Rule was violated by the CA in its ruling.

RULING:

NO, this case falls under the exception to the rule.

Res inter alios acta, as a general rule, prohibitsthe admission of evidence that tends to show
that what a person has done at one time isprobative of the contention that he has done a similar act
at another time. However, this is NOT without exceptions. Evidence of similaracts may frequently
become relevant,especially in actions based on fraud and deceit,because it sheds light on the state
of mind or knowledge ofa person; it provides insightinto such person’s motive or intent; it uncovers
a scheme, design or plan; or itreveals amistake. In this case, the transactions over the other parcels
of land are admissible in evidence because it isrelevant to an issue in the case and corroborative of
evidencealready received. The nature ofownership of said property should be the same as that of
the lots in question since theyare all subject to the MOA. If the parcels of land were held and
disposed by petitioners in fee simple, in the concept of absolute owners, thenthe lots in question
should similarly betreated as absolutely owned in fee simple by the Tamayo spouses.
Unmistakably, theevidence in dispute manifests petitioners’ common purpose and design to treat
all theparcels of land covered by the DPP as absolutely owned and not subject to co-ownership.
Hence, the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling there was no co-ownership over the lands here
in question.

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METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. MARINA B. CUSTODIO

G.R. No. 173780 March 21, 2011

SERENO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The general evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time
is not admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time.
However, evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like.

FACTS:

Petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) is a banking corporation. On the
other hand, respondent Marina Custodio is a bank teller employed at the Laoag City branch of
petitioner Metrobank. A cash transfer of two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000) was made
from Teller No. 1 to respondent Custodio. Respondent Custodio was reported to have taken her
lunch break alone and returned to work thereafter security guard testified that respondent went
out for lunch alone and as carrying a shoulder bag and a paper bag. He, however, did not check
the contents of the bags carried by respondent.

Respondent Custodio balanced her transactions for the day and turned over the funds to the
bank’s cash custodian, Ms. Marinel Castro, in the amount of two million one hundred thirteen
thousand five hundred pesos (PhP2,113,500). Ms. Marinel Castro acknowledged receipt of the
bundled cash turned over and signed a Cash Transfer Slip.

Castro discovered that there was a shortage amounting to PhP600,000. 600k was never been found.

Respondent Custodio was allowed to continue to render services. NBI conducted polygraph tests
to all employees except to the Respondents due to pregnancy.

Metrobank files a case against the respondnets. RTC in decided in favor of Metrobank. CA
decided in favor of Respondent.

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ISSUE:

Whether respondent Custodio’s prior involvement in a cash shortage in its Cubao branch is
admissible as evidence to prove a scheme or habit on her part.

RULING:

No.

Petitioner Metrobank argues that respondent Custodio’s prior involvement in a cash shortage in its
Cubao branch is admissible as evidence to prove a scheme or habit on her part. The general
evidentiary rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that one did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time. However,
evidence of similar acts may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity,
plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like. In Citibank N.A., (Formerly First
National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, the Court explained the rationale for this rule:

· The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial convenience. The fact
that a person has committed the same or similar acts at some prior time affords, as a general rule,
no logical guaranty that he committed the act in question. This is so because, subjectively, a man's
mind and even his modes of life may change; and, objectively, the conditions under which he may
find himself at a given time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way.
Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to a multiplicity
of collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well as confuse the court and
prolong the trial.

Although the previous cash shortage in Cubao could possibly shed light on the intent,
scheme or habit of respondent Custodio, that previous cash shortage is not sufficient to affirm a
definitive finding of fact that she took the funds in the Laoag City branch. If the prior cash shortage
in Cubao showed a reasonable intent or habit on the part of respondent, then there was no reason
for petitioner Metrobank to continue to employ her, considering the degree of trust and confidence
required of a bank teller. Nevertheless, respondent Custodio continued to serve the bank even after
the case in petitioner Metrobank’s Cubao branch. Her continued employment was an affirmation
that she was still worthy of the bank’s trust, insofar as she was allowed to continue to handle sums
of money in the Laoag City branch.

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BANK OF COMMERCE vs. MANALO

G.R. No. 158149 February 9, 2006

CALLEJO, SR., J.

DOCTRINES:

It must be stressed that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when
there is plain error. Although a factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may still
be considered and resolved by the Court in the interest of substantial justice, if it finds that to do
so is necessary to arrive at a just decision, or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in
the trial court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the
case. When the trial court decides a case in favor of a party on certain grounds, the Court may base
its decision upon some other points, which the trial court or appellate court ignored or erroneously
decided in favor of a party.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time,
although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of
the parties

Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove
a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.

Courts must contend with the caveat that, before they admit evidence of usage, of habit or
pattern of conduct, the offering party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of
uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather,
conduct that is semi automatic in nature; It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of
conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic conduct that examples
are admissible

FACTS:

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The Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known
as the Xavierville Estate Subdivision, with an area of 42 hectares. XEI caused the subdivision of
the property into residential lots, which was then offered for sale to individual lot buyers.

XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos, as vendor, and The Overseas Bank of
Manila (OBM), as vendee, executed a "Deed of Sale of Real Estate" over some residential lots in
the subdivision.

The transaction was subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of OBM, and was
covered by real estate mortgages in favor of the Philippine National Bank as security for its account
amounting to ₱5,187,000.00, and the Central Bank of the Philippines as security for advances
amounting to ₱22,185,193.74.Nevertheless, XEI continued selling the residential lots in the
subdivision as agent of OBM.

XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr. Carlos Manalo, Jr. who
was in the business of drilling deep water wells and installing pumps under the business name
Hurricane Commercial.

XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM. Subsequently, Commercial Bank of Manila
(CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM. CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any on-
going construction on the property since it (CBM) was the owner of the lot and she had no
permission for such construction. Perla informed them that her husband had a contract with OBM,
through XEI, to purchase the property. She promised to send CBM the documents. However, she
failed to do so. Thus, CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the spouses. But later
on, CBM moved to withdraw its complaint because of the issues raised. In the meantime, CBM
was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines. Then, the spouses filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against the bank before the RTC. The spouses alleged that they had
always been ready and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them but no contract was
forthcoming. The spouses further alleged that upon their partial payment of the down payment,
they were entitled to the execution and delivery of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject
lots. During the trial, the spouses adduced in evidence the separate Contracts of Conditional Sale
executed between XEI and 3 other buyers to prove that XEI continued selling residential lots in
the subdivision as agent of OBM after the latter had acquired the said lots. The trial court ordered

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the petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the spouses upon the payment of the
spouses of the balance of the purchase price. It ruled that under the August 22, 1972 letter
agreement of XEI and the spouses, the parties had a "complete contract to sell" over the lots, and
that they had already partially consummated the same. The Court of Appeals sustained the ruling
of the RTC, but declared that the balance of the purchase price of the property was payable in
fixed amounts on a monthly basis for 120 months, based on the deeds of conditional sale executed
by XEI in favor of other lot buyers. Boston Bank filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the
decision alleging that there was no perfected contract to sell the two lots, as there was no agreement
between XEI and the respondents on the manner of payment as well as the other terms and
conditions of the sale. Boston Bank also asserts that there is no factual basis for the CA ruling that
the terms and conditions relating to the payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property
(as agreed upon by XEI and other lot buyers in the same subdivision) were also applicable to the
contract entered into between the petitioner and the respondents. CA denied the MR.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a factual issue not raised in the trial court, may still be considered and
resolved by this Court.

2. Whether or not the CA correctly held that the terms of the deeds of conditional sale
executed by XEI in favor of the other lot buyers in the subdivision, which contained uniform terms
of 120 equal monthly installments, constitute evidence that XEI also agreed to give the Manalo
spouses the same mode and timeline of payment.

RULING:

1. Yes. The rule is that before this Court, only legal issues may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. The reason is that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not to review and
calibrate the evidence on record. Moreover, the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court unless the case falls under any of the
following exceptions: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a

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misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.

It must be stressed that the Court may consider an issue not raised during the trial when
there is plain error. Although a factual issue was not raised in the trial court, such issue may still
be considered and resolved by the Court in the interest of substantial justice, if it finds that to do
so is necessary to arrive at a just decision, or when an issue is closely related to an issue raised in
the trial court and the Court of Appeals and is necessary for a just and complete resolution of the
case. When the trial court decides a case in favor of a party on certain grounds, the Court may base
its decision upon some other points, which the trial court or appellate court ignored or erroneously
decided in favor of a party

2. NO. The bare fact that other lot buyers were allowed to pay the balance of the purchase
price of lots purchased by them in 120 or 180 monthly installments does not constitute evidence
that XEI also agreed to give the respondents the same mode and timeline of payment.

Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time,
although such evidence may be received to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of
the parties.

Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other facts. The offering
party must establish the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more
than a mere tendency to act in a given manner but rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature.
The offering party must allege and prove specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence
of habit. The examples offered in evidence to prove habit, or pattern of evidence must be numerous
enough to base on inference of systematic conduct. Mere similarity of contracts does not present

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the kind of sufficiently similar circumstances to outweigh the danger of prejudice and confusion.
In determining whether the examples are numerous enough, and sufficiently regular, the key
criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of response. It is only when examples offered to
establish a pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference of systematic
conduct that examples are admissible.

Respondents failed to allege and prove that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern
of conduct, XEI granted all lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in
installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with pre-computed interests, and that XEI and the
respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to the sale of the two lots in
question. Indeed, respondents adduced in evidence the three contracts of conditional sale executed
by XEI and other lot buyers merely to prove that XEI continued to sell lots in the subdivision as
sales agent of OBM after it acquired said lots, not to prove usage, habit or pattern of conduct on
the part of XEI to require all lot buyers in the subdivision to pay the balance of the purchase price
of said lots in 120 months.

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HEARSAY EVIDENCE

MALLARI VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 153911. DECEMBER 10, 2004.

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

Witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge;
otherwise, their testimonies would be inadmissible for being hearsay.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mallari contests his conviction for attempted murder against Boyose, a teacher
who questioned Mallari’s administration as a school principal, for allegedly missing funds, and
lack of school equipment.

Boyose was approached by a man to ask her about enrollment for the man’s nephew, whom
she referred to go to Mallari. Later that day, she recognized the same man while she was riding a
jeepney. The man pulled a gun on her, but it failed to fire. After a struggle for the gun, Boyose was
able to run away, but the man shot her, in the jaw, nape, and arms. However, she survived the
shooting, and was treated in the hospital.

The police investigated the crime, but found no leads, until Andy Magdadaro stepped
forward and claimed that a Edwin Amparado approached him to kill Boyose, but such plans did
not push through. He then pointed out Zaldy Bontia as the person who hired Magdadaro.

Edwin Amparado was then arrested by the police, and in his statement reduced into writing
by the police, he wrote that he approached Magdadaro to kill Boyose.

Zaldy Bonita was then arrested, and allegedly implicated his brother Leonardo Bontia, who
was identified by Boyose as the man who shot her. She also identified Zaldy as the constant
companion and man Friday of Mallari

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The Bontia brothers allegedly executed an extra-judicial confession in the presence of their
counsel, admitting that they were induced by Mallari to kill Boyose for a consideration.

During trial, Mallari asked for a separate trial, which the RTC granted. He did not present
evidence to establish his guilt or innocence, or refute the prosecution’s evidence. The Bontia
brothers pleaded not guilty, and denied their involvement in the crime. The prosecution presented
police witnesses attesting the extra judicial confessions of the Bontia brothers.

The RTC found Mallari, as principal by inducement, and the Bontia brother guilty of
frustrated murder, on account of:

1) Motive from Mallari to kill Boyose

2) The relationship between Zaldy and Mallari
3) The relationship between the Bontia siblings, and Leonardo’s dire need for money
4) The confession of the Bontia brothers in the extrajudicial statement
5) An email allegedly from Leonardo admitting the crime and asking forgiveness from
Boyose.
6) The testimony of Andy Magdadaro

Mallari appealed the judgement, and the CA modified the verdict to attempted murder.
Mallari again appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of attempted murder.

RULING:

There was not enough evidence to convict him.

Only the first circumstance was proven by the testimony of Boyose herself, however the
other circumstances were not directly established against the petitioner as non of the prosecution
witnesses testified thereon. These were derived from the written statements reduced to writing by
the police, but the Bontia brother’s did not testify upon. Only the police witnesses did.

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The testimonies of the police witnesses are considered hearsay evidence.

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that witnesses can testify only with
regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies would be
inadmissible for being hearsay. 34 In the present case, neither of the said witnesses had personal
knowledge of the second to the fourth circumstances considered by the appellate court, or of the
rest of the statements made by the declarants in their respective Written Statements. The witnesses
merely attested to the voluntariness and due execution of the Bontias’ respective extrajudicial
confessions. Thus, insofar as the substance of those confessions is concerned, the testimonies of
the police witnesses are mere hearsay.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNARDO QUIDATO, JR.

G.R. No. 117401 October 1, 1998

ROMERO, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to affirm the
averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not
admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity
to hear him testify and cross-examine him.

FACTS:

Bernardo Jr., was charged with the crime of parricide for the death of his father Bernardo Sr.
allegedly committed by him, and the Malita brothers. The Malita brothers however, withdrew their
not guilty plea. Thus only Bernardo Jr was tried on the merits.

The prosecution, in offering its version of the facts, presented as its witnesses Bernardo Jr’s brother
Leo Quidato, his wife Gina Quidato, as well as Patrolman Lucrecio Mara. Likewise, the
prosecution offered in evidence affidavits containing the extra-judicial confessions of Malita
brothers. The two brothers were, however, not presented by the prosecution on the witness stand.
Instead, it presented Atty. Jonathan Jocom to prove that the two were assisted by counsel when
they made their confessions. Similarly, the prosecution presented MTC Judge George Omelio who
attested to the due and voluntary execution of the sworn statements by the Malita brothers.

On Sept 16, 1988, Bernadro Jr. accompanied his father to sell 41 sacks of copra in Davao.They
hired the Malita brothers. After they have sold the copras, Bernardo Sr. paid the Malita brothers
and they parted ways. According to the testimony of the Malita brothers, they went to the house
of Bernardo Sr., Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door and when the old man opened the door, the son
pushed his father and hacked him with his bolo. They looked for money in the aparador but found
none so they left.The body of Bernarndo Sr. was found by his grandson when he called his

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grandfather for breakfast. Leo Quidato then confronted his brother and the (3) accused were
arrested.

During the custodial investigation, the Malita brothers made an extrajudicial confession of what
transpired even without the presence of the counsel. Their testimonies were reduced to writing,
and they signed the said testimonies in front of Atty. Jonathan Jocom the next morning after having
been apprised of their constitutional rights.

The trial court then found Bernardo Jr guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of paricide.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confessions of the Malita
brothers in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused to confront witnesses.

RULING:

Yes, the Court ruled that in indicting accused-appellant, the prosecution relied heavily on the
affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the
witness stand to testify on their extra-judicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives
these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves
take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded
from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused
made extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not
been given an opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him.

The Solicitor General, in advocating the admissibility of the sworn statements of the Malita
brothers, cites Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[t]he act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration." The inapplicability of this provision is clearly apparent. The confessions were
made after the conspiracy had ended and after the consummation of the crime. Hence, it cannot be

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said that the execution of the affidavits were acts or declarations made during the conspiracy's
existence.

Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the same
inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an
uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in
writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the
Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they
signed the same in the presence of counsel the next day.

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UNCHUAN VS. LOZADA, ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 172671, 16 APRIL 2009

QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are
admissible even if they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against
interest and declaration against interest.

FACTS:

Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the registered coowners
of 2 lots in Cebu City. The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their
nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a Special Power of Attorney from
Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their brother, Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), Dr. Lozada
agreed to advance the purchase price of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The
Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine Consul’s Office and new TCTs
were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.

Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the annotation of an
adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita donated an undivided share in the lots to her
under an unregistered Deed of DonationAntonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for
quieting of title with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order. Marissa filed an
action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel the new TCTs.

At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated sworn statement and
a videotape where Anita denied having donated land in favor of Marissa. In a Decision dated June
9, 1997, RTC disposed of the consolidated cases, ruling among others that:

1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the properties in question;

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2. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and Anita Lozada
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not videotaped statement is hearsay.

RULING:

NO. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency
and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. There
are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence
of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. It is a hornbook doctrine that an affidavit is merely
hearsay evidence where its maker did not take the witness stand. Verily, the sworn statement of
Anita was of this kind because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a
more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover
admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita appears to belong to this class.

Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions
are admissible even if they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions
against interest and declaration against interest.

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EAGLE RIDGE V. CA

G.R. NO. 178989 18 MARCH 2010

VELASCO, JR. J.

DOCTRINE:

“It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.”

Facts: Eagle Ridge Rank and File Employees Union filed an application for registration before the
DOLE which was followed by a petition for certification election. Eagle Ridge, the company,
sought for cancellation of the registration on the ground of misrepresentation as to the required
number of members. Affidavits of withdrawal were presented before the DOLE which resulted to
the cancellation of the registration. This was initially affirmed by the BLR but later reversed with
the Union contending among others that the affiants were not presented to testify during the
hearing thereby contrary to prescribed procedures.

ISSUE:

Whether the affidavits are considered as hearsay evidence upon failure of the affiants to testify
during the hearing.

RULING:

Yes. It is mandatory for affiants to testify during the hearing on account of the affidavits presented
in evidence.

Under the Labor Code and the Implementing Rules and Regulations:

Affirmation of testimonial evidence. – Any affidavit submitted by a party to prove his/her claims
or defenses shall be re-affirmed by the presentation of the affiant before the Med-Arbiter or
Hearing Officer, as the case may be. Any affidavit submitted without the re-affirmation of the
affiant during a scheduled hearing shall not be admitted in evidence, except when the party against

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whom the affidavit is being offered admits all allegations therein and waives the examination of
the affiant.

The Court also reiterated that:

“It is settled that affidavits partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statement,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.”

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ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164457 April 11, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why
testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to
preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be
denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine
the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.

FACTS:

Anna Lerima Patula, a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc. in Dumaguete

City, was charged with estafa. The information filed in the Regional Trial Court in Dumaguete
City charged her of having collected and received the total sum of P 131,286.97 from several
customers of said company but has failed to remit the said amount to the company despite the
repeated demands. She, instead, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated the money
and converted the proceeds of the sale for her own use and benefit. Trials on the merits ensued
having pled not guilty at the arraignment.

The first witness of the Prosecution was Lamberto Go, the branch manager of Footlucker’s
in Dumaguete. He defined the duties and responsibilities that Patula has as sales representative.
He also testified that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later on dropped. He then
confronted her and decided to subject her to an audit by the auditor of the company. It was then
that he learned there were discrepancies between the confirmations from the customers and
Footlucker’s records.

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The second witness was Karen Guivencan, Footlucker’s auditor. It was in the course of her
audit that she discovered differences between the original receipts held by the customers and the
duplicate copies of the receipts submitted by Patula to the office. She then presented a list of the
discrepancies between the customers’ confirmations and the office records as per audit.

During Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioner’s counsel continuously objected and

question the evidences and testimony of Guivencan on the ground that they were hearsay because
the persons who actually made the entries were not themselves presented in court. They also
regarded Guinvencan’s testimonies to be irrelevant because they did were not proof of estafa but
of falsification, an offense not alleged in the information.

The RTC rendered their decision finding Patula guilty of estafa. RTC denied their motion
for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove
petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes.

Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of petitioner as Footlucker’s
sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the
amounts actually received by petitioner from the customers or remitted by petitioner to
Footlucker’s. This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, inclusive, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts
supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footlucker’s corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers. Accordingly, her being
the only witness who testified on the entries effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable
opportunity to validate and test the veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioner’s
misappropriation or conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that

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opportunity rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus
unreliable and untrust worthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy,
and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a
rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in
the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony
derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the
veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.

Guivencan’s testimony on the ledgers was also considered inadmissible as judicial

evidence for being hearsay. Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that witness can testify
only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his
own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Since Guivencan was not the one who
prepared the said ledger, her testimony could not be considered reliable. The Prosecution’s defense
was that the ledgers was done in the ordinary course of business and, therefore, exempt from the
hearsay rule, as per Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. However, Prosecution and the
RTC failed to consider the requisites in applying this rule, such as that the person who made the
entry must be dead or unable to testify. However, this is not true with the current case, therefore
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court could not be applied. The testimony is therefore proven
to be hearsay and inadmissible.

With all the foregoing considerations, Prosecution was then unable to present reliable
evidence on damage to establish the Petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner
was, therefore, acquitted as without prejudice to the filing of a civil action against her for the
recovery of any amount that she may still owe to Footlucker’s.

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LAGMAN v. MEDIALDEA

G.R. No. 231658 July 4, 2017

DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

News articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative
value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The Court in Bedol made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which
is an exception to the hearsay rule, applies in cases “where only the fact that such statements were
made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.”

FACTS:

On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao. He submitted a written Report to Congress on the factual basis of Proclamation No.
216. The Report pointed out the incidences of rebellion and lawless violence in Mindanao, which
includes the attacks by the Maute Group in Marawi City by taking over the Marawi City Jail,
setting up road blockades and checkpoints, burning educational institutions which killed faculty
members, setting ablaze hospitals, and ransacking the Landbank of the Philippines. The Senate
and the House of Representatives expressed their full support to the martial law declaration and
found it to be satisfactory, constitutional, and in accordance with law.

Three separate petitions were filed for the review of the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. G.R.
No. 231658, the Lagman Petition, averred that the President’s declaration has no sufficient and
factual basis – arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman
also contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to create
an appearance of capability for the Maute group. The petition also cited several facts in the
President’s report which was refuted by several media networks and news articles because they
turned out to be false or untrue. Among these was the report about the attack on Amai Pakpak
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Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines, and the burning of several schools. On
the other hand, G.R. No. 231771, the Cullamat Petition, averred that the President fails to show
any acts of rebellion and invasion outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial Law for
the whole island of Mindanao has no sufficient basis. Lastly, G.R. No. 231774, the Mohamad
Petition, contended that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy of last resort. It contends
that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the
power to call out the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus; and finally, the power to declare martial law. These three petitions were consolidated.

The respondent, in its comment, maintains the sufficiency of the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216. The OSG opined that the petitioners miserably failed to validly refute the
facts cited by the President in Proclamation No. 216 and in his Report to the Congress by merely
citing news reports that supposedly contradict the facts asserted therein or by criticizing in
piecemeal the happenings in Marawi. For the OSG, the said news articles are “hearsay evidence,
twice removed,” and thus inadmissible and without probative value, and could not overcome the
“legal presumption bestowed on governmental acts.”

ISSUE:

Whether there is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

RULING:

Yes, there was sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court ruled that the purpose of judicial
review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which the President
anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable
cause that rebellion exists. It must also be reiterated that martial law is a matter of urgency and
much leeway and flexibility should be accorded the President. As such, he is not expected to
completely validate all the information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him

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that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to deprive the Chief
Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the President to believe that there was
probable cause that the crime of rebellion was and is being committed and that public safety
requires the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioners, in their attempt to overturn the proclamation and have the proper authorities revoke
the same, presented counter-evidence which includes statements made by a) Dr. Amer Saber, Chief
of the Hospital; b) Health Secretary Paulyn Ubial; c) PNP Spokesperson Senior Supt. Dionardo
Carlos; d) AFP Public Affairs Office Chief Co. Edgard Arevalo; and e) Marawi City Mayor Majul
Gandamra denying that the hospital was attacked by the Maute Group citing online news articles
of Philstar, Sunstar, Inquirer, and Bombo Radyo. However, the so-called counter evidence were
derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources
shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown that efforts were made to
secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile. As the Court has consistently ruled,
news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value,
unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. This
pronouncement applies with equal force to the Cullamat Petition which likewise submitted online
news articles as basis for their claim of insufficiency of factual basis. Petitioners, however, insist
that in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, news reports may be admitted on grounds of relevance,
trustworthiness, and necessity. Petitioners’ reliance on this case is misplaced. The Court in Bedol
made it clear that the doctrine of independent relevant statement, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule, applies in cases “where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and
the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial.” Here, the question is not whether such statements were
made by Saber, et al., but rather whether what they said are true. Thus, contrary to the view of
petitioners, the exception in Bedol finds no application here.

Therefore, there was sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Proclamation No. 216 is constitutional.

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INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. VICENTE N. Cusi, JR.

No. L-20986 August 14, 1965

DIZON, J.

DOCTRINE:

While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise
if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement.

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 6813 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa,
Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were charged with
robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty. During the trial, and while Sgt.
Lucio Baño of the Police Force of Digos, Davao was testifying as a prosecution witness regarding
the extrajudicial confession made to him by the accused Ai;cadio Puesca, he said that the latter,
aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other
persons conspired with him to to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and everyone
of them. Following up this testimony, the prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court
the names of Puesca’s alleged co- conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and
Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as
far as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness
to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had
interposed the objection. In other words, the witness was allowed to answer the question and name
his co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer’s motion
for reconsideration of this ruling was denied. Hence the present petition for certiorari praying that
the abovementioned ruling of the respondent judge be declared erroneous and for a further order
directing said respondent judge to allow witness Baño to answer the question in full.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not an evidence is hearsay if the purpose is to establish the fact that the statement was
made.

RULING:

While the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to
establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise
if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement.

In the case at bar where the purpose of the prosecuting officer is only to establish the fact that the
accused had mentioned to the witness the names of those who conspired with him to commit the
offense charged, without claiming that said statement or the answer to be given by the witness
would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired
with the accused, it is held that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter
should have been allowed to answer it in full.

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FERIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

325 SCRA 525

DOCTRINE:

Evidence; Admissions; The rule that a party’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against
himself unless such declaration were true.—Petitioner’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is
based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
declaration were true, particularly with respect to such grave matter as his conviction for the crime
of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4 of Rule 129, “[a]n admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake
or that no such admission was made.” Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor does he deny
making such admissions.

Same; Entry in Official Records; A court’s Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records,
which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.—The records also contain a certified true
copy of the Monthly Report dated January 1985 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the
fact that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11, 1985.
Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section 44 of Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence of facts therein stated.

Same; Hearsay Rule; Newspaper Articles; Newspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice
removed” and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether
objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.—
Public respondents likewise presented a certified true copy of People’s Journal dated January 18,
1985, page 2, issued by the National Library, containing a short news article that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and was sentenced to “life imprisonment.”
However, newspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice removed” and are therefore not
only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless offered

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for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein
stated.

Actions; Habeas Corpus; Evidence; If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the
petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.—As a general rule, the burden
of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In
other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which
on its face shows good ground for the deten tion of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the
detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima
facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show
that the restraint is illegal.

FACTS:

Norberto Feria has been under detention since May 21, 1981 by reason of his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide. Twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, Feria sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City, but the Jail
Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge, that the transfer cannot be effected
without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order, Decision, and
Information. It was then discovered that the entire records of the case, including the copy of the
judgment, were missing. The entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire that
occurred in Manila City Hall. Feria filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on
the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.

ISSUE:

Whether Feria’s detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment.

RULING:

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NO. Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence
on record to establish the fact of conviction of Feria which serves as the legal basis for his
detention. Feria made judicial admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and
convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment “habang
buhay.” Feria’s declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him under
Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon the presumption that no man
would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true particularly with
respect to such grave matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further,
under Section 4 of Rule 129, “an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.” Feria
does not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions

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ESPINELI vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 179535 June 9, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:
Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement
has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of
fact, evidence as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement
itself may constitute a fact in issue or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
This is known as the DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS.

FACTS: Accused together with Sotero and three others shot Alberto Berbon with the use of
firearms, causing his instantaneous death, and thereafter immediately fled the crime scene on board
a waiting car. An Information for Murder was filed before RTC. Meanwhile, the NBI arrested
Reyes for another crime. He confided to the NBI that he was willing to give vital information
regarding the Berbon case. Reyes claimed that he saw accused and Sotero board a red car while
armed with a .45 caliber firearm and armalite, and that accused told Sotero that “ayaw ko nang
abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon.” Subsequently, Reyes jumped bail and was never again heard
of. NBI Agent Segunial reduced his statement into writing and testified on these facts during the
trial. Prosecution also presented a witness who testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three
persons and identified the said car from the photographs. Accused filed a Demurrer to Evidence
without leave of court.

RTC convicted the accused for Murder. On appeal, CA convicted the accused for Homicide.

Accused filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of
his conviction on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should not have
been given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the
affiant. He emphasizes that there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime.

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ISSUE:
Whether the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial can be regarded as hearsay evidence

RULING:

No. NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the latter’s statement
into writing declaring, among others, that Reyes overheard petitioner telling Sotero “Ayaw ko
nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon” and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an
armalite, respectively, before boarding a red car. Petitioner insists that the said sworn statement
belongs to the category of hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He asserts that its contents
were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes, thus, it lacks probative value.

The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. – A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and
credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However,
while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person given for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence,
it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement, or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a
statement, when what is relevant is the fact that such statement has been made, the hearsay rule
does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of
the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or is circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. This is known as the DOCTRINE
OF INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENTS.

In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial cannot be regarded as hearsay evidence.
This is considering that it was not presented to prove the truth of such statement but only for the

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purpose of establishing that Reyes executed a sworn statement containing such narration of facts.
This is clear from the offer of the witness’ oral testimony. What the prosecution sought to be
admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature
of an independently relevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such
statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the statement of the witness
is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.

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DYING DECLARATION
PEOPLE V. JOEMARIE CERILLA
G.R. NO. 177147 NOVEMBER 28, 2007
TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:
A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts
which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief
that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an
opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a
statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is
certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.

FACTS:
PROSECUTION:
On April 24, 1998, Alexander Parreño, Michelle (14 y/o daughter), and Phoebe Sendin (neighbor)
went to the house of Cerilla. A blackout occurred, thus Alexander sought permission to leave.
Michelle then heard an explosion, she turned around and saw Cerilla pointing a gun at Alexander
who was staggering towards her. Sendin ran away and proceeded to the house of Parreño.
Alexander told Michelle that it was Cerilla who shot him; later Novie Mae (daughter) arrived and
was told that it was Cerilla who shot him.

SPO3 Dequito rushed to the crime scene and brought Alexander to an ambulance. He asked
Alexander who shot him, the latter said “Pato” which is an alias of Cerilla.

Susan Parreño (wife) rushed to the hospital and was told by Alexander that it was Cerilla who shot
him. The following day, Alexander died.

DEFENSE:
Cerilla interposed alibi claiming that Alexander, Michelle and Sendin had gone to his house at
around 6pm, when the blackout occurred they asked permission to leave. Then he ordered Franlin

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(stepdaughter) to buy candle, he and Madoline (wife) posted themselves at their doorway holding
a flashlight to light Franlin’s path. When they heard an explosion he immediately closed the door.

He was brought to the police station where he was subjected to paraffin test, which turned out to
be negative. The testimony was corroborated by Madoline and Franlin. PO1 Javelora said that
when he asked Alexander who shot him, the latter did not answer. PO3 Sarmiento and Allona
stated that when they interrogated Alexander, the latter could not answer as to who shot him

RTC found Cerilla guilty of Murder. CA affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution’s
eyewitness, as well as the dying declaration of Alexander?

RULING:
Basic is the principle that the findings of fact of a trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is because the
trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and is in the best
position to discern whether they are telling the truth. This rule holds true especially when the trial
court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court.
Appellant’s authorship of the crime was proven by the positive identification of an eyewitness and
the victim’s dying declaration. Michelle’s account of how her father was shot by appellant was
corroborated by the post-mortem examination which reveals that the entrance wound is located at
the back of the victim. In the same vein, the medico-legal expert concluded that the gunshot was
fired at a close range.

Significantly, the eyewitness’s positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime
is fully supported the victim’s dying declaration.

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A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts
which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief
that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an
opportunity of retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a
statement made by a person after a mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is
certain, stating the facts concerning the cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement
is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus admissible to provide the
identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of death of the deceased, and the
circumstances under which the assault was made upon him. The reasons for its admissibility is
necessity and trustworthiness.

Necessity, because the declarant’s death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it
often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore,
prevents a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, because the declaration is made in extremity,
when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind
is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. The law considers the point of
death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed
by an oath administered in court.
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus:
(1) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death.
(2) at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death.
(3) the declarant is competent as a witness.
(4) the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which
the declarant is the victim.

The victim communicated his ante-mortem statement to three persons who testified with unanimity
that they had been told by the victim himself that it was appellant who shot him. These statements

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comply with all the requisites of a dying declaration. First, Alexander’s declaration pertains to the
identity of the person who shot him. Second, the fatal quality and extent of the injuries he suffered
underscore the imminence of his death as his condition was so serious that his demise occurred the
following morning after a thirteen (13)-hour operation. Third, he would have been competent to
testify had he survived. Fourth, his dying declaration is offered in a criminal prosecution for
murder where he was the victim.

It can be recalled that at the time Alexander was being questioned by PO1 Javelora and PO3 Allona
and Sarmiento, he was already being readied for surgery. At that point, he was understandably no
longer fit to respond to questions. Between these two seemingly conflicting testimonies, it is the
positive identification made by Alexander in his dying declaration which must be sustained.

The fact that the crime was committed during a blackout does not cast doubt on Alexander’s and
Michelle’s positive identification of appellant. While the place of occurrence was dark, this did
not prevent the Alexander or Michelle from identifying the assailant, especially since the shot was
delivered at close range.

The positive identification of appellant must necessarily prevail over his alibi. It was not physically
impossible for appellant to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. The distance of his house, where he supposedly was, from the locus criminis is only
120-150 meters, more or less.

Time and again, we have ruled that a negative finding on paraffin test is not a conclusive proof
that one has not fired a gun because it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces
of nitrates or gunpowder, as when the culprit washes his hands or wears gloves. The trial court
correctly rejected the result of the paraffin test in light of the positive identification of appellant.

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PEOPLE VS. BRIOSO

G.R. NO. L-28482 JANUARY 30, 1971
REYES, J.B.L., J.

DOCTRINE:
The testimony of a witness, if corroborated by an ante-mortem statement that satisfied the
requirements set by law, is considered credible and reliable.

FACTS:
One evening, spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house. Cecilia
Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped
through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward in the direction
of the house of Silvino Daria that was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Suspicious,
she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the bamboo
wall of Daria’s house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and
Tumalip call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the
victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being
shot, she rushed to her husband’s side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano
Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg.
A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to
the two accused as the killers.

The motive for the killing appears to have been the disapproval by the spouses Silvino and
Susana Daria of Mariano Taeza’s courtship of their daughter, Angelita. Angelita was even sent to
Manila for her to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted by Mariano Taeza. Brioso and
Taeza were then charged and convicted with the crime of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory testimony and
statement of the prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of the accused.

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RULING: NO.

The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria’s. The
night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for a long
time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been no difficulty in identifying
the accused under the circumstances.

Furthermore, Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder
against the above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a
first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should
testify against him.

The testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who
told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy
the requirements of an ante-mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds,
Silvino Daria must have realized seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he
made the same under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one
hour after being shot.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAGLIAN

G.R. NO. 189834 30 MARCH 2011

DOCTRINE:

While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a report in
open court of a dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against hearsay
if it is “made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the
case.” It is considered as “evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no
person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.”

FACTS:

On 4 January 2000, accused Jay Mandy Maglian and Mary Jay were having dinner at their
home and got into an argument because he did not want her to attend a party. The accused took all
the clothes that Mary gave him and said that he would burn them all, and started pouring kerosene
on the clothes. Mary tried to take the can of kerosene from him and told him not to pour kerosene
on her. However, accused still poured kerosene on her and set both her and the clothes on fire.
Accused brought Mary to the hospital and she was transferred by her aunt to another hospital, but
accused transferred her to another hospital which did not have a burn unit. Lourdes, Mary’s mother,
brought her to PGH because of her deteriorating condition but she died. Before dying, she told her
mother what happened to her, declaring, "Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay Mandy burned
me.)" She passed away on February 24, 2000.

In his defense, accused said that it was an accident. He said that Mary threatened to throw
away the clothes, and to spite her, he told her he would burn them all. Due to their fighting, they
both got drenched in kerosene. Accused his wife and went upstairs to his son. While climbing the
stairs, he heard Mary Jay shouting, "Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako. (Mandy, I’m burning.)" He
ran down the steps and saw the blaze had reached the ceiling of the kitchen. He embraced his wife
and called out to his mother to help them, and brought Mary to the hospital.

The accused asserted that his mother-in-law and their laundrywoman, Norma Saballero, accused
him of burning his wife since his wife’s family had been angry with him ever since they got

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married. His mother-in-law and Mary Jay’s siblings used to ask money from them and would get
angry with him if they did not receive any help.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dying declaration made to her friends by Mary Jay must be admissible.

RULING:

Yes. While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a
report in open court of a dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception to the rule against
hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of inquiry
in the case." It is considered as "evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation." The
Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he
or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry
involves the declarant’s death." The question to be answered is which dying declaration satisfies
the aforementioned circumstances, the one made by Mary Jay to Lourdes and Norma, or the one
she made before Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose.

Accused-appellant contends that his late wife’s dying declaration as told to the defense witnesses
Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose effectively absolved him from any wrongdoing. However, it is the
dying declaration presented by the prosecution that satisfies all the requisites provided in the Rules.
In contrast, the dying declaration for the defense did not show that Mary Jay’s death at the time of
said declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was under a consciousness of impending
death.

Moreover, We defer to the factual finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were more
credible. Mary Jay’s dying declaration to her mother Lourdes and to Norma showed that accused-
appellant was the one who set her in flames. Lourdes and the Maglians’ laundrywoman Norma
both testified that Mary Jay, moments before her actual death, told them that it was accused-

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appellant who was responsible for burning her. Lourdes and Norma both testified that at the time
of May Jay’s declaration, she was lucid and aware that she was soon going to expire. Furthermore,
the so-called dying declaration made by Mary Jay to defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San
Jose suffers from irregularities. The dying declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San
Jose was handwritten by the latter but he did not have it sworn under oath. We reiterate too that it
was not clear that it was executed with the knowledge of impending death since the statements
were made more than a month before Mary Jay died.

We agree with the trial and appellate courts that Lourdes and Norma were both credible witnesses
and had no motive to lie about Mary Jay’s dying declaration. The appellate court correctly pointed
out that although Lourdes was Mary Jay’s mother, this relationship did not automatically discredit
Lourdes’ testimony. And while accused-appellant alleged that Lourdes as his mother-in-law did
not approve of him, he could not give any improper motive for Norma to falsely accuse him.
Between the two competing statements of the two sets of witnesses, the one presented by the
prosecution should clearly be given more weight as it satisfies the requisites of an admissible dying
declaration.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RARUGAL

G.R. NO. 188603 16 JANUARY 2013

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Court has stated in People v. Maglian:

The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he
or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry
involves the declarant’s death.”

FACTS:

Accused Ramil Rarugal stabbed Arnel Florendo while the latter was cycling along
Sampaguita street with the use of a long double-bladed weapon. Florendo bleeding and under
labored breathing was able to reach home and told his brother Renato that it was the accused who
had stabbed him. The victim was then brought to the hospital and died seven days after the stabbing
incident.

ISSUE:

Whether the dying declaration is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

YES. The victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to reach his house and
confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was the appellant who had stabbed him.

Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:

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SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness
of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

The Court has stated in People v. Maglian:

The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he
or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry
involves the declarant’s death." x x x.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother
Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying declaration. It is important to note that Florendo,
after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told
Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an expression
of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of
impending death. There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he
would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state that the deceased was
at the time competent as a witness. Lastly, the dying declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject
of which involves his death. We reproduce the statement of the RTC: Moreover, the victim did not
immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. The victim, apparently conscious that he
could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules, a
statement made by a person under the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as
evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identification made by the victim before
he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability
of the appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413 is AFFIRMED. Appellant RAMIL RARUGAL alias
"Amay Bisaya" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

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PEOPLE V. GREGORIA BINGAAN

NO. 24937 MARCH 20, 1926

JOHNS, J.

DOCTRINE:

Where there are two direct conflicts on the dying declaration of the victim, and the same runs
contrary to actual physical facts, the accused shall be acquitted, due to benefit of reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

Gregoria Bingaan was charged with the crime of parricide of the death of her husband, Gaspar
Balbuena. The victim was able to give his dying declaration stating that he was lying in their bed
at 2 o’clock in the morning when his wife, Bingaan, stabbed her six times. This statement was
refuted by Gaspar when he was asked by the chief of police, stating that he was lying on a bench
when the crime was committed.

The defense counsel invoked the presence of self-defense. According to Binagaan, she was
defending herself from the victim, who scratched her with the knife and threatened to kill her if
she did not confess.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gregoria Bingaan is guilty of the crime parricide.

RULING:

No. Bingaan was acquitted because her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

As ruled by the Court, the contradicting statements of the victim which also contradicted
by physical evidence is not sufficient to convict Bingaan of parricide. The wounds inflicted were
on different parts of the body of the victim and were not that deep. Considering the location of the
wounds, Balbuena would have been dead if he was indeed lying down when he was stabbed.

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JESUS GERALDO AND AMADO ARIATE VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. NO. 173608 NOVEMBER 20, 2008

CARPIO-MORALES JR. J.

DOCTRINE:

Even if the victim’s dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must identify the assailant
with certainty, otherwise it loses its significance.

FACTS:

Petitioners Jesus Geraldo (Geraldo) and Amado Ariate (Ariate) were accused before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Surigao del Sur for Homicide, resulting in Arthur U. Ronquillo‘s death.

Although gasping for breath, Arthur was able to tell his daughter Mirasol and within the
hearing distance of his son Arnel that he was shot by one named, “Badjing” and “Amado”. In a
document and denominated as “Affidavit” which was subscribed and sworn to, the victim’s son
Arnel gave a statement in a question and answer style that herein petitioners Jesus Geraldo and
Amado Ariate were the ones who shot his father. Mirasol also gave a statement in a question and
answer style that her father uttered that herein petitioners shot him.

Geraldo and Ariate, who were suspected to be ―Badjing‖ and ―Amado were subjected to
paraffin tests and were found negative for gunpowder residue.

The RTC found the accused guilty based on the dying declaration of Arthur. On the nature
and weight of the dying declaration of the victim, the trial court observed: xxx Even assuming that
the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae
since it was made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, hence,
under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no opportunity to contrive.

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC‘s decision.

ISSUE:

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Whether the identities of Jesus and Amado has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt

RULING:

NO. Petition is meritorious.

The Court reversed the decision of CA and acquitted Jesus and Amado for failure of the
prosecution to establish the identity of Jesus and Amado by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

A dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present:

(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;

(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of
impending death;

(c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and

(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s
death.

There is no dispute that the victim’s utterance to his children related to the identities of his
assailants. As for the victim’s consciousness of impending death, it is not necessary to prove that
he stated that he was at the brink of death; it suffices that, judging from the nature and extent of
his injuries, the seriousness of his condition was so apparent to him that it may safely be inferred
that such ante mortem declaration was made under consciousness of an impending death. The
location of the victim’s two gunshot wounds, he's gasping forbreath, and his eventual death before
arriving at the hospital meet this requirement. It has not been established, however, that the
victim would have been competent to testify had he survived the attack. There is no showing
that he had the opportunity to see his assailant.

At all events, even if the victim’s dying declaration were admissible in evidence, it must
identify the assailant with certainty; otherwise it loses its significance. In convicting
petitioners, the trial court, as stated earlier, relied on the testimony of the victim’s daughter
Mirasol, which was corroborated by her brother Arnel, that the “Badjing” and “Amado” mentioned

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by the victim as his assailants are herein petitioners whom they claimed to know because they live
in the same barangay. Contrary, however, to the immediately-quoted ruling of the appellate court,
it is the prosecution, not petitioners, which had the burden of proving that petitioners were, at the
material time, the only ones in the barangay who bore such nicknames or aliases. This, the
prosecution failed to discharge. Petition is granted.

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PEOPLE vs PALANAS
GR No. 214453 June 17, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOCTRINE:
For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions
must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered
in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On the
other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.

Dying declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence
since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily,
because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when
every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations
to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation
equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

FACTS:
At around 6:40 am of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his 5-month-old grandson outside his
residence at Pasig. PO3 Zapanta, who slept at SPO2 Borre’s residence, was watching television
when four successive gunshots rang out. He looked through the open door of the house and saw
two men armed with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas
deliver the fourth shot to SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the
two (2) assailants fled on a motorcycle.

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PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to
the Pasig City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3
Zapanta that it was "Abe," "Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -who
shot him. This statement was repeated to his wife, Resurreccion, who followed him at the hospital.
At around 11 o'clock in the morning of the said date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on
his head and trunk.

Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was in Paranaque City
attending to the needs of his sick father.

RTC declared Palanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt stating that SPO2 Borre's statements that
Palanas shot him constituted an ante mortem statement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus,
admissible as evidence against Palanas. It gave no credence to the defense of alibi since it was not
physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus criminis as his own witness even stated that
the distance between Pasig City and Paranaque City could be traversed in less than one (1) hour.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and gave probative weight to the dying declaration of SPO2
Borre that it was Palanas who shot him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statement of SPO2 Borre can be considered as a dying declaration.

RULING:
YES. The CA is correct in admitting SPO2 Borre's statements on his way to the hospital as
evidence, both as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions
must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death; (b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered
in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim. On the
other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another

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exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained
to the cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity
of his wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that
his own death was already imminent. This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order
and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the
party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation
so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae.
"Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as
to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part
of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony." In this case, SPO2 Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i. e.,
him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had
no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his utterance was made in
spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such a statement is relevant
because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

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RES GESTAE

PEOPLE VS. VILLARICO

G.R. NO. 158362 04 APRIL 2011

BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:

In a general way, res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow
out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration
or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

FACTS:

The victim Haide Cagatan was shot twice. The fatal wound that caused his death was that
one at back of his left shoulder which penetrated through his neck. The victim’s sister-in-law, his
mother, and his father all testified on court. Remedios, sister-in-law of the victim said that she saw
the four accused aiming their firearms towards the direction of their kitchen, the victim was there
at that time cooking their food. She also said that one of the accused even pointed a gun at her
upon seeing her witnessing what they were about to do. His father also testified that he saw the
four accused near their kitchen after he heard several gunshots.

The victim, according to his mother, after the shooting incident managed to crawl to him
saying that he was shot by Berting, one of the accused. All of the accused in their defense presented
different alibis saying that they were all not at the scene of the crime when it happened. The four

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accused in this appeal raised the issue that their identity as the perpetrators of the crime was never
established with reasonable certainty because the prosecution failed to present direct evidence
from an eyewitness.

ISSUE:

Whether the pieces of evidence presented in the case were enough to identify the accused
though the prosecution failed to present an eyewitness positively identifying the four accused as
the perpetrator of the crime?

RULING:

Yes.

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, an
identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force. The intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in the
identification simply means that the accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence
until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal, even if doubt may
cloud his innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to every
individual is forever of primary importance, and every conviction for crime must rest on the
strength of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense.

The close relationship of Remedios and Francisco with the victim as well as their
familiarity with the accused who were their neighbors assured the certainty of their identification
as Haide’s assailants. In Marturillas v. People, the Court observed that the familiarity of the witness
with the assailant erased any doubt that the witness could have erred; and noted that a witness
related to the victim had a natural tendency to remember the faces of the person involved in the
attack on the victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be concerned with seeking
justice for the victim and bringing the malefactor before the law.

The term res gestae refers to “those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.” In a general way,

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res gestae includes the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main
fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the
exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. A declaration
or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae that is admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMY FALLONES

G.R. No. 190341 March 16, 2011

ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators
to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the
declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened,
between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus
restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.

For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur:

1. the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

2. the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and

3. the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately

attending circumstances.

FACTS:

Amalia the younger sister of the victim Alice, a mental retardate testified that her mother
told Alice, to look for their brother Andoy. Since Andoy arrived without Alice, mother asked
Amalia to look for her. Amalia looked in places where Andoy often played and this led her near
accused Fallones’ house. As she approached the house, Amalia heard someone crying out from
within, “Tama na, tama na!” Recognizing Alice’s voice, Amalia repeatedly knocked on the door
until Fallones opened it. Amalia saw her sister standing behind him. As Amalia went in to take her
sister out, Alice held out a sanitary napkin and, crying, said that Fallones had given her the napkin.
Alice’s shorts were wet and blood-stained.

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Alice was able to positively identify Fallones as the person who sexually abused her. A
rape case was filed against Fallones. During trial, Alice died. Amalia testified on what she heard
during the incident. Eventually, Fallones was convicted of rape.

On appeal, Fallones argued that the testimony of Amalia on what she heard was hearsay
for she only heard the cry of Alice but did not see the act of rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in affirming the RTC’s finding that accused Fallones raped Alice,
a mental retardate.

RULING:

Yes.

Accused Fallones tried to discredit Amalia’s testimony as hearsay, doubtful, and

unreliable. But, although what Alice told Amalia may have been hearsay, the rest of the latter’s
testimony, which established both concomitant (Alice’s voice from within Fallones’ house,
pleading that she was hurting) and subsequent circumstance (Alice coming from behind Fallones
as the latter opened the door, her shorts bloodied), are admissible in evidence having been given
from personal knowledge.

Further, the Court considers a res gestae Amalia’s recital of what she heard Alice utter
when she came and rescued her. Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the
victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These
statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion,
without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration
is whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance
calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an
opportunity for deliberation. For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following
must concur:

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1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

Here, Fallones’ act of forcing himself into Alice is a startling event. And Amalia happened
to be just outside his house when she heard Alice cry out “tama na, tama na!”When Fallones
opened the door upon Amalia’s incessant knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering
“Amalia, may nap kin na binigay si Romy o.” The admissibility of Alice’s spontaneous statements
rests on the valid assumption that they were spoken under circumstances where there had been no
chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression
is a guaranty of trustworthiness

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAMIL PEÑA

G.R. No. 133964 13 February 2002

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DOCTRINE:

A declaration can be deemed as part of res gestae when the following are present: 1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) statements were made before the declarant
had time to contrive or devise; and 3) statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.

FACTS:

Accused Ramil Peña were convicted beyond reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court
for the murder of Jimbo Pelagio y Ferrer with gunshot to the head thereof.

Jimbo was a tricycle driver hired by the accused. Upon reaching the destination, Jimbo was
robbed of his money, struck repreatedly in the head with a gun, and was finally shot by the accused
before fleeing using the tricycle. Jimbo then died in the hospital after 2 months. The statement of
Jimbo to SP01 Bautista was admitted by the RTC as a dying declaration of Jimbo and as an
exception to the hearsay rule.

For his defense, the accused claimed that he was in Pampangga when the killing happened.
The RTC was not convinced and convicted accused thereof.

On his appeal at hand, the accused contended that the trial court erred in admitting the
statement as it does not constitute res gestae.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statement of Jimbo Pelagio constituted res gestae.

RULING:

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YES, the Supreme Court ruled that the statement herein questioned can be admitted as
evidence as it constituted res gestae.

“Res gestae” is a situation which presents a startling or unusual occurrence sufficient to

produce a spontaneous and instinctive reaction, during which interval certain statements are made
under such circumstance as to show lack of forethought or deliberate design in the formulation of
their content.

A declaration can be deemed as part of res gestae when the following are present: 1) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) statements were made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and 3) statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

In this case, all the requisites are present which makes the statement constitute res gestae
as follows: the whopping in the head with a gun and the gunshot thereto is a startling occurrence;
the whooping and gunshot caused pain to the head so much so that he had no opportunity to
contrive the contents of his statements but only the truth of what happened; the statements were
about the incident.

The Court also ruled that the declarant referred to under 2nd requirement refers to victims,
participants or witness – NOT the persons to whom such declarations were made. Therefore, SP01
Bautista is NOT the declarant referred herein but Jimbo himself.

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PEOPLE V. TIRSO SACE Y MONTAYA

G.R. NO. 178063 NOVEMBER 20, 2006

DOCTRINE:

RES GESTAE

a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to

the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a

startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or

devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately

attending circumstances.

FACTS:

Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. At the arraignment, appellant

entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution presented the following as

witnesses: BBB, CCC, Rafael Motol, Bonifacio Vitto, Maribeth Mawac (Maribeth), Carmelita

Mawac, Dr. Erwin Labay, SPO2 Praxedo Seño and Domingo Motol. On the other hand,

appellant testified for his own behalf.Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and

other barangay officials and tanods, including Rafael Motol and Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon

arrival, they noticed the bloodstains on appellant's clothing. Carmelita asked appellant what he

did, but appellant denied any knowledge of what happened. Carmelita then went to the half

naked body of AAA and again asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin. At that

point, appellant admitted to the barangay officials and tanods that he was the one who

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committed the crime. He admitted that he raped and killed AAA. Barangay Tanod Rafael Motol

also obtained the same confession from appellant when he interviewed him in front of other

people. On the part of the defense, appellant denied participation in the crime. Appellant

claimed that he was on his way home from a drinking spree when he passed by AAA's house.

As he was walking, appellant saw AAA who was bloodied and lying on the ground. He held his

cousin to determine whether she was still alive. He then saw in the vicinity of AAA's house, two

(2) men whom he allegedly chased. Appellant could not identify nor remember what the two (2)

men were wearing because it was dark at the time. Convinced that AAA was already dead,

appellant did not any more call for help. Instead, appellant went to the house of his aunt and

slept. When CCC and her companion arrived, he relayed to them how he had chased two (2)

men who may have been responsible for AAA's death. Appellant denied that he confessed to

the crime. RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court did not give

credence to appellant's alibi since he even categorically admitted that he was at the crime

scene and saw AAA's lifeless body. Because the crime occurred more or less around the time

appellant left the drinking session, the trial court held that it was not impossible for appellant to

accomplish his bestial act shortly after he left the drinking session as he had to pass by AAA's

house on his way home. Also, other than his bare denial, appellant did not offer any evidence

to support his alibi. RTC also took into consideration the confession of appellant that he was the

one who raped and killed AAA. The trial court noted that the confession was made voluntarily

and spontaneously in public, and witnessed by prosecution's witnesses, who were not shown to

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have any ill motive against appellant. Thus, appellant's declaration was admissible as part of res

gestae, his statement concerning the crime having been made immediately subsequent to the

rape-slaying before he had time to contrive and devise. The Court of Appeals upheld the

decision of the RTC so the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether appellants confession is admissible.

RULING:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC.

The Supreme Court held that the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the

commission of the crime to the prosecution's witnesses. According to their testimonies,

appellant admitted having raped and killed AAA. Their testimonies were not rebutted by the

defense. Appellant's statements in front of the prosecution witnesses are admissible for being

part of the res gestae. Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of

the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the

following requisites concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the

statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the

statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending

circumstances. All these requisites are present in his case. Appellant had just been through a

startling and gruesome occurrence, AAA's death. His admission was made while he was still

under the in􀁁uence of said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to concoct or

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contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the influence of alcohol at that time, having

engaged in a drinking spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His confession concerned the

rape and killing of AAA. Appellant's spontaneous statements made to private persons, not

agents of the State or law enforcers, are not covered by the constitutional safeguards on

custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in evidence against him.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELICIANO

G.R. NO. 196735 MAY 5, 2014

LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE:

As a general rule, “[a] witness can testify only to the facts he knows of his personal knowledge;
that is, which are derived from his own perception, x x x.” All other kinds of testimony are hearsay
and are inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however, provide several exceptions to the
general rule, and one of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae, thus: Section 42. Part of
res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence
as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act,
declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

FACTS:

On December8, 1994, at around 12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of the
Sigma Rho Fraternity were eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
UP Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead
pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.
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An information [1] for murder of Dennis Venturina, was filed against several members of
the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, namely, Feliciano, Medalla, Zingapan, Alvir, Soliva, Ablanida,
Fajardo, Morano, Narag, Magpantay, Guerrero and Penalosa with the RTC of QC. Separate
informations were also filed for the attempted murder and frustrated murder of five (5) Sigma Rho
Fraternity members. Only 11 of the accused stood trial because Guerrero remain at large.

The RTC, evaluated the voluminous evidence and concluded that of the ten (10) accused,
some were sufficiently identified and some were not. So on Feb 28, 2002, RTC rendered decisions
that Alvir, Feliciano, Soliva, Medalla and Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and attempted murder and were sentenced reclusion perpetua. Acquitted Ablanida,
Fajardo, Magpantay, Morano and Narag.

Due to the penalty case was brought to automatic appeal. However, remanded to the CA.
On Dece 26, 2002, CA affirmed the decisions of the RTC. Therefore, the decisions was then
brought to the SC for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not evidence given in res gestae is admissible.

RULING:

YES, but have little persuasive value.

There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group peacefully eating lunch on a school
campus is a startling occurrence. Considering that the statements of the bystanders were made
immediately after the startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as evidence given in res
gestae.

The statements made by the bystanders, although admissible, have little persuasive value
since the bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at different vantage points and at
different points in time. Even one of the bystanders at the time of the attack, testified that the
attackers had their masks on at first, but later on, some remained masked and some were unmasked.
When the bystanders’ testimonies are weighed against those of the victims who witnessed the
entirety of the incident from beginning to end at close range, the former become merely
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corroborative of the fact that an attack occurred. Their account of the incident, therefore, must be
given considerably less weight than that of the victims.

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DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. EUGENIO TOLEDO and

SISENANDO HOLGADO, EUGENIO TOLEDO

G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928

MALCOLM, J.

DOCTRINE:

The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the
extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In
other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their
untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is
available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the
declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on
other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that
the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this
necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.

FACTS:

Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land
situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15,
1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They
did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly.
Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house.
From there Sisenando Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn
statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales
fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.

The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is
whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno
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Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of
Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her
testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the
theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and
Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord
or master, in helping him to a nearby house. To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of
Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado. The defense also relied upon the affidavit of
Sisenando Holgado.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statement executed by Holgado (a statement of fact against penal interest) be
admitted as evidence.

RULING:

YES. The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the
extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is not the best method of serving this purpose. In
other words, the great possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their
untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as a declarant is
available as a witness, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard. Where, however, the
declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous statements, out of court, if not inadmissible on
other grounds, are the best evidence. But they are not rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that
the declarant is unavailable, — something else is necessary. One fact which will satisfy this
necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarant's interest, and this is because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. Any man outside of a court
and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and
cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other
evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted
to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed.

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FUENTES, JR. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 111692 FEBRUARY 9, 1996

J. BELLOSILLO

DOCTRINE:

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

The admission against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case as the declarant is not
“unable to testify.” No showing that declarant is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent was made which Section 38 of the rules contemplates.

FACTS:

Julieto Malaspina was at a benefit dance in Agusan del Sur when petitioner approached him.
Fuentes called the victim and placed his right arm on the shoulder of the latter saying, “Before, I
saw you with a long hair but now you have a short hair.” Suddenly, petitioner stabbed Malaspina
in the abdomen with a hunting knife. Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his
abdomen, he muttered that Fuentes stabbed him. Fuentes on the other hand claims that it was his
cousin Zoilo alias Jonie Fuentes who knifed the victim. He said that he was compelled to run away
when he heard that somebody with a bolo and spear would kill all those from San Isidro because
Jonie was from that place. Since he was also from there, he sought refuge in his brother’s house.
Also, Jonie admitted that he was the one who stabbed Malaspina.

The Regional Trial Court found Fuentes guilty of murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the RTC. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration made by Zoilo Fuentes is admissible as an exception to

the hearsay rule

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RULING:

NO.

One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to declarations made against
interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that “(t)he declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a reasonable
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons.” The
admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against interest: (a) the
declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact cognizable by the
declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal interest cannot be
accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not “unable to testify.” There is no showing that
Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously
contemplates. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable
under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense to produce each and every piece of evidence
that can break the prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than the gratuitous
statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to the effect that

Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the records show that the defense did not exert any serious
effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the
admission of evidence that would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this
can be open to abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus increasing
the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every reason to lie and falsify;
and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is unable to testify.

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LAZARO VS. AGUSTIN

G.R. NO. 152364 APRIL 15, 2010

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with
a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They
are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.

FACTS:

On November 4, 1998, herein petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint for
partition with the MTCC of Laoag City. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the descendants
of the late Simeon C. Santos, married to Trinidad Duldulao, who died intestate leaving a parcel of
land situated in the Barrio of Natividad Nstra. Sra., Municipality of Laoag.

That in the desire of the children of Simeon C. Santos from whom the parcel of land
originated as owner, his children, namely [:] Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos,
consented that th eparcel of land mentioned in this complaint be titled in the name of Basilisa, the
latter being the eldest and so OCT (parcel of land particularly Lot No. 10676 of the Cadastral
survey of Laoag) in the name of Basilisa Santos was obtained although it was agreed among them
that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner
of this parcel of land. That there is a residential house constructed on the lot mentioned in this
complaint.

During the lifetime of the Basilisa Santos-Agustin, an affidavit was executed by her
recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos, and her sister
Alejandra Santos-Lazaro would each get one fourth (1/4) share of the lot.

Without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs, the title of the lot in this complaint
was transferred inot another title with is now TCT in the names of the children of the late Basilisa
Santos-Agustin who are defendants in this complaint.

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The plaintiffs invoke the intervention of the court to partition the lot in accordance with
the law on intestate succession and to partition the residential house. Respondents prayed that the
petitioners’ complaint be dismissed.

MTCC on Jan 6, 2000 rendered decision dismissing the complaint and denying the
petitioners’ prayer for partition.

Petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC of Laoag City. RTC issued a decision affirming
the judgment of MTCC with modification

CA affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, instant petition to SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sworn Statement of Basilisa Agustin is a declaration against interest which
establishes the co-ownership of lot in this complaint by and among the petitioners and respondents
as heirs of the later Simeon Santos.

RULING:

NO

At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue that Basilisa’s
alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is not a declaration against interest.
Instead, it is an admission against interest.

Indeed, there is a vital distinction between admissions against interest and declarations
against interest. Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in
privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the
declarant is available as a witness. Declarations against interest are those made by a person
who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents’ predecessor-in-

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interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter’s legal interest, the former’s sworn statement,
if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.

A cursory reading of the subject sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of
land denominated as Lot No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On this
basis, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn
statement is the same property claimed by petitioners.

Having made the foregoing observations and discussions, the question that arises is
whether the subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property being disputed in the
present case, can be given full faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its
genuineness and due execution.

The Court rules in the negative. Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However,
this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.

The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie
validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly
executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution
of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the
questioned document was supposedly executed. The trial and appellate courts were unanimous in
giving credence to the testimonies of these witnesses. The Court has repeatedly held that it will
not interfere with the trial court’s determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears
on record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court was in a
better position to do so, because it heard the witnesses testify before it and had every opportunity
to observe their demeanor and deportment on the witness stand.

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Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the MTCC,
the RTC and the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a public document having in its
favor the presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by competent
witnesses.

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DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE

TECSON V. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 161434 2004-03-03

VITUG, J.

FACTS:

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all questioning the citizenship of Fernando Poe Jr.
as a ground for the cancellation of his certification of candidacy for presidency in the 2003
elections.

According to one of the petitioners, FPJ’s parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before
his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F.
Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

According to FPJ’s birth certificate, he was born on August 30, 1939. His father, Allan
Poe, was a Filipino Citizen and his mother was an American Citizen. Under the 1935 Constitution,
those whose fathers are Filipino shall be considered Filipino Citizens. However, no signature of
his father was found on his birth certificate.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of
the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child)
of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
mandatory rules under civil law must be used. In order that the birth certificate could then be
utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required
to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless
as being an authoritative document of recognition

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Since no signature of his father was found on his birth certificate, Allan Poe could not have
made a voluntary acknowledgment on his paternity over FPJ. The citizenship of FPJ must follow
the American citizenship of his mother.

ISSUE:

Whether or not proof of filiation may be obtained by DNA evidence

RULING:

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be
deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law,
do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules
on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not
necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to
testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these
facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.”

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable
to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the
person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would

be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive

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match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

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BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO VS. ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ

G.R. NO. 181258 MARCH 18, 2010

CARPIO MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:

Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or
declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the
controversy and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.

A handwritten note where a person merely undertakes to give and provide financial support
does not establish a child’s filiation to the writer of the note.

FACTS:

Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner to

Araceli. She further alleged that the petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of
Birth and that by a handwritten note, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her financial
support. On the basis of this handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1)
recognize her as his child (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a
month, and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arhbencel has established filiation to Ben-hur.

RULING:

No. Section 39 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

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Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him
by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy
and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

The word “pedigree” includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It also
embraces facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

Also, a handwritten note where a person merely undertakes to give and provide financial
support does not establish a child’s filiation to the writer of the note.

In the instant case, Arhbencel relied on the handwritten note of Ben-hur. However, it does
not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is therefore, not
within the ambit of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation
an admission in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned.

FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE

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FRANCISCO JISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 124853 FEBRUARY 24, 1998

DAVIDE, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph
of Art. 172 of the Family Code, a “high standard of proof” is required—specifically, to prove open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity.

FACTS:

This is an appeal by Francisco against a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as
an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison.

Monina alleged that she is the daughter of Francisco who impregnated her mother
Esperanza F. Amolar, during Amolar’s employment as the nanny of Francisco's daughter. Monina
claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of an illegitimate child of
Francisco and Francisco had also openly and continuously recognized her as such.

The trial court categorized Monina’s many pieces of evidence as hearsay evidence,
incredulous or self-serving evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided
in favour of Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish Monina's
filiation.

ISSUE:

Did Monina successfully establish her filiation under Article 172 par. 2 of the Family Code
(open and continuous possession of the status)?

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RULING:

Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as Monina's, may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. The
Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that Monina was able to prove her illegitimate
filiation.

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a

"high standard of proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally,but continuously.

By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any

particular length of time. In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse
actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or
putative father's protestations. In the instant case, Monina's mother could no longer testify as to
the fact of intercourse, as she had already passed away. But the fact of Monina’s birth and her
parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother.

The testimonial evidence offered by Monina, woven by her narration of circumstances and
events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with Francisco, coupled with
the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established that the following:

1) Francisco is Monina's father and she was conceived at the time when her

mother was in the employ of the former;

2) Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct like
sending her to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board
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and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her hospitalization
expenses, providing her with monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses
of her mother, acknowledging her paternal greetings and calling appellant his
"Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to give

appellant's monthly allowance, recommending her to use his house in Bacolod and
paying for her long distance telephone calls, having her spend her long distance
telephone calls, having her spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also
at his Forbes residence, allowing her to use his surname in her scholastic and other
records; and

3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.

The totality of the evidence on record established Monina’s filiation.

Appeal filed by Francisco Jison should be dismissed

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMAN SARIEGO

G.R. No. 203322 February 24, 2016

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true
copy thereof, and in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as
baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth
certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family
may be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other
authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are
unavailable, the testimony of the victi

m may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

FACTS:

Reman Sariego was charged with 2 counts of crime of rape, committed against him 17-year-old
daughter AAA. According AAA, she was once asked by her father buy cigarette. When she
returned and thereafter went to the room of her father in the 2nd floor of their house, her father
committed rape against her will and despite demands for him to stop. Such incident however, was
repeated 2 months later. AAA refrained from seeking help from her cousins who were in the same
house because of the fear that appellant might hurt her mother. She also revealed that appellant
threatened her that if she revealed the incident to anyone he would kill them all. She, however,
could not keep the secret from her mother anymore because she became pregnant. Hence, they
filed a case against her father. The accused on his part simply denied the said allegations and said
that it was her boyfriend who impregnated her.

The RTC convicted the accused for the crime charged. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of
the RTC. However, the CA deemed it necessary to point out that AAA's minority was not duly
established by the evidence on record. It ruled that while the Informations specifically alleged
minority and relationship as qualifying circumstances, the birth certificate of AAA was not
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formally offered in evidence. Since AAA's birth certificate was not offered in evidence, the same
cannot be considered pursuant to Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Thus,
the CA held that the qualifying circumstance of minority cannot be appreciated. It, however,
deemed the circumstance of relationship sufficient to qualify the offense. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the minority of AAA was sufficiently established to justify the accused’s
conviction for the crime of qualified rape.

RULING: No, the minority of AAA was not established and as a consequence thereof he shall be
held guilty of the crime of simple rape only not qualified rape. The Supreme Court held that while
the accused was guilty of the crime of rape, he, however, cannot be held guilty of rape in its
qualified form. Moreover, in a conviction for qualified rape, the prosecution must prove that (1)
the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape, and (2) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. In other words, it is the concurrence of
both the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender that will be considered as a
special qualifying circumstance, raising the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. Thus, it is
imperative that the circumstance of minority and relationship be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape.

In this case, while it is undisputed that AAA is the daughter of appellant, her minority was not
conclusively established. In People v. Pruna, the Court laid down the following controlling
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents, such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim, would suffice to prove
age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of

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the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that
she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

In line with the foregoing guidelines, the Court holds that AAA' s minority was not duly established
by the evidence on record. As the appellate court ruled, 'while AAA's minority was specifically
alleged in the Informations as qualifying circumstances, the birth certificate, which was identified
by AAA as Exhibit "B" in the course of her testimony, was not formally offered in evidence
because during the prosecution's formal offer of documentary evidence, the document offered as
Exhibit "B" was not actually the birth certificate of AAA but was, in fact, the ultrasound report.

Furthermore, unfortunately for the prosecution, the records show that it likewise failed to present
such other documentary and testimonial evidence which may suffice as substitutes for AAA's birth
certificate, as enumerated in Pruna. For one, apart from AAA's purported birth certificate, which
turned out to be her ultrasound report, the prosecution presented no other similar, authentic
documentary evidence, such as baptismal certificates and school records. For another, while
AAA's testimony may be admitted in evidence to prove her age, Pruna requires that the same must
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be expressly and clearly admitted by the accused. Regrettably, however, there is no such express
admission herein. True, AAA had testified during trial that she was 17 years old at the time of the
unfortunate incidents. Yet, nowhere in the records does it appear that appellant explicitly
acknowledged AAA to be 17 years of age during the time when the alleged incidents occurred.
Thus, AAA' s testimony cannot be considered sufficient enough to prove her age.

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COMMON REPUTATION REGARDING MARRIAGE

TRINIDAD VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 118904, 20 APRIL 1998

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the failure to present
it does not prove that no marriage took place because there are other evidence that could have the
same bearing as a marriage contract.

FACTS:

On August 10, 1978, plaintiff and petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance an action
for partition of four (4) parcels of land. He was claiming that he was the son of the deceased
Inocentes Trinidad. Patricio Trinidad, the father of the deceased, owned four (4) parcels of
land,which he left to his three children namely, Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix. The refusal of the
defendants, Lourdes and Felix, to the demand of Arturo to the partition of the land into three
(3)equal parts caused Arturo to file a case which was decided in his favour.The Appellate court
did not decide in favor of Arturo and reversed the ruling of the lower court on the ground that he
was not able to present sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally married to each
other.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the failure to present a marriage contract would mean that there was no
marriage that transpired.

RULING:

While it is true that a marriage contract is the primary evidence of a marriage, the failure
to present it does not prove that no marriage took place because there are other evidence that could
have the same bearing as a marriage contract. He failed to present the marriage contract due to the
destruction of such records. His act of presenting witnesses who were present during the nuptial

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of his parents, his baptismal certificate and the affirmation of the cohabitation of his parents is
enough evidence to prove the marriage of his parents.

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ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS

SECURITY BANK & TRUST CO., VS. GAN

G.R. NO. 150464 27 JUNE 2006

CORONA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Exception of business entries to the hearsay rule when NOT applicable: “Entries in business
records which spring from the duty of other employees to communicate facts occurring in the
ordinary course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate being itself a
badge of trustworthiness of the entries, but not when they purport to record what were independent
agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a client.”

FACTS:

Security Bank agreed to accommodate the financial transactions of Gan on the condition that the
latter would fund the checking account to be able to draw checks. Under a special agreement with
the bank manager, Gan was allegedly allowed to deposit checks and withdraw or transfer funds
even before clearing through debit memos. Everything went accordingly until Gan was unable to
pay some overdraft claiming that he did not consent to the transactions. The bank presented its
bookkeeper to prove the allegation by testifying on the ledger entries.

ISSUE:

Whether entries fall under the exception to the hearsay rule

RULING:

No. It is noteworthy that the first and third requisites are absent for exception to the hearsay rule
to apply in presenting business entries. The ledger entries only reflect historical records not the
special agreement between Gan and the bank manager which is the fact in issue on this case.

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For exception to the hearsay rule to apply on business entries, the following conditions must be
present:

1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;

2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and

5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Entries in business records which spring from the duty of other employees to communicate facts
occurring in the ordinary course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to communicate
being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the entries, but not when they purport to record what
were independent agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a client.

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NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. vs. STEVEN P. CHIONG

G.R. No. 155550 January 31, 2008

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

‘As a rule, “entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may
be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity
or in the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.” [Rule
130, Section 43, Revised Rules of Court]

Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is

necessary that:

a) the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;

b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and

e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

FACTS:

Philimare Shipping and Seagull Maritime Corporation (Philimare), as the authorized

Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines (TransOcean), hired respondent Steven Chiong as Third
Engineer of TransOcean’s vessel M/V Elbia at the San Diego, California Port. Under the service
crew agreement, Chiong was guaranteed compensation at a monthly salary of

US$440.00 and a monthly overtime pay of US$220.00, or a total of US$7,920.00 for one year.

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Chiong arrived at the Manila International Airport (MIA), at about 6:30 a.m.,

three (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Marilyn Calvo, Philimare's Liaison Officer,
met Chiong at the departure gate, and the two proceeded to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
Counter to present Chiong's seaman service record book for clearance. Thereafter, Chiong's
passport was duly stamped, after complying with government requirements for departing seafarers.
Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the Northwest check-in
counter.

When it was his turn to check in, his name did not appear in the computer list and was told
to obtain a boarding pass from a man wearing a barong for 100 dollars. He was unable to board
and it appeared that his name was crossed out and substituted. He demanded damages in the
amount equal to the salary under the agreement. The Airline denied the allegations and claimed
that Chiong was a no-show. The airline’s exhibits 2 and 3 were excluded by the RTC and CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Northwest’s Exhibits “2” and “3,” the flight manifest and the passenger
name record, respectively, were hearsay evidence and ought to be excluded from the record.

RULING:

Yes.

Suffice it to state that the RTC and CA correctly excluded these documents as hearsay
evidence. We quote with favor the CA’s holding thereon, thus:

‘As a rule, “entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.” [Rule 130,
Section 43, Revised Rules of Court]

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Otherwise stated, in order to be admissible as entries in the course of business, it is

necessary that:

a) the person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;

b) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

c) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

d) the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and

e) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Tested by these requirements, we find the manifest and passenger name record to be mere
hearsay evidence. While there is no necessity to bring into court all the employees who individually
made the entries, it is sufficient that the person who supervised them while they were making the
entries testify that the account was prepared under his supervision and that the entries were
regularly entered in the ordinary course of business. In the case at bench, while MENDOZA was
the supervisor on-duty on April 1, 1989, he has no personal knowledge of the entries in the
manifest since he did not supervise the preparation thereof. More importantly, no evidence was
presented to prove that the employee who made the entries was dead nor did the defendant-
appellant set forth the circumstances that would show the employee’s inability to testify.

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SAPIO v. UNDALOC CONSTRUCTION

G.R. No. 155034 May 22, 2008

TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business, enjoy the presumption of
regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence, while as a general rule, the
burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer, when fraud is alleged in the
preparation of the payroll, the burden of evidence shifts to the employee and it is incumbent upon
him to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim.

FACTS:

Petitioner Virgilio Sapio had been employed by respondent Undaloc Construction, a single
proprietorship engaged in road construction business owned by Cirilo Undaloc, as watchman from
May 1, 1995 to May 30, 1998 when he was terminated on the ground that the project he was
assigned to was already finished, he being allegedly a project employee. Petitioner Sapio filed a
complaint against respondent Undaloc Construction and/or Engineer Cirilo Undaloc for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of statutory benefits. Sapio asserted that he
was a regular employee and claimed that he was underpaid, alleging that he was made to sign two
payroll sheets, the first bearing the actual amount he received wherein his signature was affixed to
the last column opposite his name, and the second containing only his name and signature. He
presented a payroll sheet in which entries were written in pencil. Respondent Cirilo Undaloc, on
the other hand, maintained that petitioner was hired as a project employee and was assigned as
watchman from one project to another until termination of the project on May 30, 1998. He also
refuted the claim of underpayment by presenting the payroll sheets.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Sapio was indeed a project employee and his termination was
for an authorized cause, but found respondent liable to pay Sapio’s salary differential. The NLRC
sustained the findings of the Labor Arbiter. On respondent’s appeal, the CA deleted the award of
salary differential.

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ISSUE:

Whether petitioner overcame the disputable presumption of regularity on entries in the

course of business.

RULING:

No, petitioner failed to overcome the disputable presumption of regularity on entries in the
course of business.

The Supreme Court ruled that entries in the payroll, being entries in the course of business,
enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. Hence, while
as a general rule, the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer, when
fraud is alleged in the preparation of the payroll, the burden of evidence shifts to the employee and
it is incumbent upon him to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim.
Unfortunately, petitioner’s bare assertions of fraud do not suffice to overcome the disputable
presumption of regularity.

While the Court adheres to the position of the appellate court that the “tendency” to alter
the entries in the payrolls was not substantiated, the Court cannot however subscribe to the total
deletion of the award of salary differential and attorney’s fees, as it so ruled. Hence, the total salary
differential that petitioner is lawfully entitled to amounts to P6,578.00 However, pursuant to
Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6727, as amended by R.A. No. 8188. Respondents are
required to pay double the amount owed to petitioner, bringing their total liability to P13,156.00.

Therefore, the petition was PARTIALLY GRANTED.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA

G.R. No. 170375 July 7, 2010

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE:

A baptismal certificate may be appreciated, together with all other documentary and testimonial
evidence to prove person’s filiation.

The entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the
business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and
recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.

FACTS:

This is a consolidation of seven petitions arising from actions for quieting of title,
expropriation, ejectment, and reversion involving the same parcels of land. In 1900’s, Doña
Demetria Cacho applied for registration of two parcels of land found in Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte. In 1914, the court ruled that only a portion of the lands applied for registration was owned
by Cacho.

In 1978, Teofilo Cacho claimed to be the son of Doña Cacho and filed a petition for
reconstitution of the original certificates. Republic National Steel Corporation and the city of Iligan
opposed Teofilo’s petition. In 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Teofilo and reinstated the
decision of the RTC which ordered for the re-issuance of decrees established by certifications and
testimonials of certain officials.

In 1998, Republic alleged that the 1997 Cacho case overlapped with the parcel land subject
of a civil case it filed before the RTC. It was dismissed by Judge Mangotara.

In the same year, 1998, Demetria Vidal and Azimuth filed a petition for quieting of Title
against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo. Vidal claimed that she and not Teofilo was the sole surviving
heir, who is entitled to the parcels of land. She claimed that she is the daughter of Francisco Cacho
Vidal and Fidela Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio Vidal and Doña

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Demetria Cacho. Azimuth filed the petition as Vidal’s successor-in-interest with respect to the 23
hectare land.

Teofilo argued that there was no cause of action because there was no title being disturbed
or in danger of being lost due to the claim of third party. He also argued that Vidal had neither
legal nor beneficial ownership of the parcels of land. He also argued that the petitions concerning
the disputed land was also already settled with finality in the 1997 Cacho case. RTC and CA ruled
in favor of Vidal. It stated that Vidal is sole heiress of the late Doña Cacho. Baptismal certificate
was one of the records relied on by the court.

Landtrade (another party), Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo filed separate motions for
reconsideration. Landtrade rooted on Unlawful Detainer. Landtrade argued that it acquired the
parcels of land from Teofilo through Atty. Cabildo, proved by a Deed of Absolute Sale.

In 2004, Republic filed a complaint for cancellation of titles and reversion against Doña
Cacho, represented by alleged heirs Vidal and Teofilo. It argued that the order way back 1914 was
under the condition of a new plan, which despite non-compliance, a decision in favor Doña Cacho
was made.

The case discussed a lot of issues. However, in relation to Evidence and on the topic entries
in the course of business or Business Records rule, the issue in this case focused on the filiation of
Vidal, which was also challenged by Teofilo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred when it considered the baptismal certificate of Vidal to prove
her filiation.

RULING:

Vidal’s baptismal certificate is not totally bereft of any probative value. It may be
appreciated, together with all the other documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidal’s
filiation.

“Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth
or a parent’s admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by

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the parent. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the
instant case.

The court cited People vs. Ritter to discuss the admissibility of baptismal certificate. In this
case, the admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of
the officiating priest or the official recorder. The court cited that the entries made in the Registry
Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule
130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one
of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church
during the course of its business.

Hence, a baptismal certificate is not totally bereft of any probative value. It may be
appreciated, together with all the other documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidal’s
filiation.

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SPS. DELA CRUZ VS. PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC.

G.R. NO. 158649 18 FEBRUARY 2013

DOCTRINE:

Remedial Law; Evidence; Entries Made in the Course of Business; Entries made in the course of
business enjoy the presumption of regularity.— The petitioners dispute the contents of Exhibit V
by invoking Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 43. Entries in the course
of business.—Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be
received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in
the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business. The invocation of the
rule is misplaced, however, because the rule speaks of a situation where the person who made the
entries is dead or unable to testify, which was not the situation here. Regardless, we have to point
out that entries made in the course of business enjoy the presumption of regularity. If properly
authenticated, the entries serve as evidence of the status of the account of the petitioners. In Land
Bank v. Monet’s Export and Manufacturing Corporation, 618 SCRA 451 (2010), the Court has
explained that such entries are accorded unusual reliability because their regularity and continuity
are calculated to discipline record keepers in the habit of precision; and that if the entries are
financial, the records are routinely balanced and audited; hence, in actual experience, the whole of
the business world function in reliance of such kind of records.

FACTS:

Spouses Quirino V. Dela Cruz and Gloria Dela Cruz, petitioners herein, operated the Barangay
Agricultural Supply, an agricultural supply store in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija engaged in the distribution
and sale of fertilizers and agricultural chemical products, among others. At the time material to the
case, Quirino, a lawyer, was the Municipal Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. On March 23, 1978,
Gloria applied for and was granted by respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) a regular credit line
of P200,000.00 for a 60-day term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Quirino and Gloria submitted
a list of their assets in support of her credit application for participation in the Special Credit
Scheme (SCS) of PPI. On August 28, 1978, Gloria signed in the presence of the PPI distribution

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officer/assistant sales representative two documents labelled “Trust Receipt/Special Credit

Scheme,” indicating the invoice number, quantity, value, and names of the agricultural inputs (i.e.,
fertilizer or agricultural chemicals) she received “upon the trust” of PPI. Gloria thereby subscribed
to specific undertakings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gloria can be held liable on the basis of the signed Trust receipt/SCS.

RULING:

Yes. To be clear, the obligation assumed by Gloria under the Trust Receipt/SCS involved “the
execution of a Trust Agreement by the farmer-participants” in her favor, which, in turn, she would
assign “in favor of PPI with recourse” in case of delivery and sale to the farmer-participants. The
term recourse as thus used means “resort to a person who is secondarily liable after the default of
the person who is primarily liable.” An indorsement “with recourse” of a note, for instance, makes
the indorser a general indorser, because the indorsement is without qualification. Accordingly, the
term with recourse confirms the obligation of a general indorser, who has the same liability as the
original obligor. As the assignor “with recourse” of the Trust Agreement executed by the farmer
participating in the SCS, therefore, Gloria made herself directly liable to PPI for the value of the
inputs delivered to the farmer-participants. Obviously, the signature of the representative of PPI
found in the demand letters Gloria sent to the farmer-participants only indicated that the Trust
Agreement was part of the SCS of PPI. The petitioners could not validly justify the non-compliance
by Gloria with her obligations under the Trust Receipt/SCS by citing the loss of the farm outputs
due to typhoon Kading. There is no question that she had expressly agreed that her liability would
not be extinguished by the destruction or damage of the crops. The use of the term with recourse
was, in fact, consonant with the provision of the Trust Receipt/SCS stating that if Gloria could not
deliver or serve “all the inputs” to the farmer-participants within 60 days, she agreed that “the
undelivered inputs will be charged” to her “regular credit line.” Under her arrangement with PPI,
the trust receipts were mere securities for the credit line granted by PPI, having in fact indicated
in her application for the credit line that the trust receipts were “collaterals” or separate obligations
“attached to any other contract to guaranty its performance.

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ENTRIES IN THE OFFICIAL RECORDS

BARCELON ROXAS SECURITY, INC. VS. CIR

G.R. NO. 157604 AUGUST 07, 2006

QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was
made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had

sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information.

FACTS:

Petitioner Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) is a corporation
engaged in the trading of securities. On 14 April 1988, petitioner filed its Annual Income Tax
Return for taxable year 1987. After an audit investigation conducted by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment for
deficiency income tax in the amount of P826,698.31 arising from the disallowance of the item on
salaries, bonuses and allowances in the amount of P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible business
expense since petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and allowances to withholding taxes.
This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 dated 1
February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to petitioner through registered mail on 6
February 1991. However, petitioner denies receiving the formal assessment notice. On 17 March
1992, petitioner was served with a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy to enforce collection of the
deficiency income tax for the year 1987. Petitioner filed a formal protest, dated 25 March 1992,

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against the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy, requesting for its cancellation. On 3 July 1998,
petitioner received a letter dated 30 April 1998 from the respondent denying the protest with
finality. ‘

ISSUE:

Whether or not section 44, Rule 130 is applicable.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides that entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein

The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must be read in accordance with this Court’s
pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., where it has been RULING that an entrant must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts were acquired by him from reports
made by persons under a legal duty to submit the same.

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was
made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was
made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had

sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally
or through official information.

In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as she
did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it
stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how and from whom she obtained the pertinent
information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons
under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the
present case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule
against hearsay evidence.

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PEOPLE v. FILOMENO, GREGORIO, and TORIBIO MAYINGQUE

G.R. No. 179709 July 6, 2010

BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:

The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused admitted that he was
the author of the death of the victim and his defense was anchored on self-defense, it becomes
incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.

Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime when the crime was perpetrated.

FACTS:

PROSECUTION:

Salvacion Tusi (wife of Edgardo Tusi) testified that she knew the appellants because they usually
had their drinking sessions on Sundays at Edwin Macas’ place, which was beside her residence at
BF Resort Village, Las Piñas. Edgardo was annoyed by the noise made by appellants and Edwin,
thus was prompted to admonish them to tone down their voices, but they resented him. On May
30, 1999, while Edgardo was resting in front of their house, Toribio arrived and stabbed Edgardo
twice on his side, she shouted for help but her cousin Ruben Bernal could not do anything because
Edwin, Filomeno and Gregorio joined in assaulting Edgardo.

Ruben Bernal and Jaime Bernal corroborated the testimony of Salvacion. They said that the
appellants and Edwin ganged up on Edgardo; Toribio stabbed Edgardo twice with a kitchen knife,
Gregorio hacked Edgardo on the head with a bolo, while Filomeno and Edwin restrained Edgardo.

DEFENSE:

Agustin Tano saw Edgardo punch and hit Toribio with a lead pipe, Toribio retaliated by stabbing
Edgardo with a knife. He said that the other appellant were not present.

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Filomeno stated that he attended a birthday party of his nephew in Golden Gate, Las Piñas, where
his wife arrived at around 6:30pm and begged him not to go home yet because Toribio had been
involved in a fight with Edgardo. They stayed in Golden Gate until July 28, 1999. When he visited
Toribio in detention, a police invited him for questioning about the incident, and he was
immediately detained without any investigation being conducted.

Gregorio attested that he was taking care of his 2month old grandson, he was informed that his son
Toribio had been involved in a fight. He went and stayed in Antipolo City for 2months where is
son Gregorio Jr. was residing. When he returned to Las Piñas on July 28, 1999, policemen invited
him for questioning and was detained later on.

Toribio stated that he saw Edgardo, Ruben and Jaime drinking together, and they invited him to
drink with them but he refused. His refusal irked Edgardo and attacked him with a lead pipe on
the left arm, he then ran to Edwin’s house. When he left, the 3 were still drinking, Edgardo held
him by the collar and punched him; Ruben and Jaime also hit him with a lead pipe and a wooden
club injuring his chest. He was able to pick up a small knife when he fell on a table used for selling
mangoes. He stabbed Edgardo on the head, neck and chest; but did not report the incident to the
police. He surrendered to the Antipolo City police authorities 8 days after the incident upon
learning that the other appellants were implicated and were being hunted down.

RTC found appellants guilty of Murder. CA affirmed the RTC

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the CA erred in not giving credence to Toribio’s self-defense theory?

RULING:

It is fundamental that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when
affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not
conclusive effect. Such determination made by the trial court proceeds from its first-hand
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling
examination, thereby placing the trial court in the unique position to assess the witnesses’
credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor.

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In view of the foregoing, we sustain the CA’s affirmance of the conviction. We have not been
shown any fact or circumstance of weight and influence that the CA and the RTC overlooked that,
if considered, should affect the outcome of the case.

The essential elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the accused must prove by clear and
convincing evidence the elements of self-defense. The rule consistently adhered to in this
jurisdiction is that when the accused admitted that he was the author of the death of the victim and
his defense was anchored on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.

The rationale for this requirement is that the accused, having admitted the felonious wounding or
killing of his adversary, is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the
satisfaction of the court the fact of self-defense. Thereby, however, the burden to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is not lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end
of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi has shifted to him, because self-defense
is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory
proof. He must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on
the weakness of that of the Prosecution, for, even if the Prosecution’s evidence is weak, it cannot
be disbelieved in view of the accused’s admission of the killing.

Toribio’s evidence on self-defense was not persuasive enough, and lacked credibility. Simply
stated, such evidence did not prevail over the clear showing by Salvacion and the Bernals that
Toribio and his co-conspirators had ganged up on Edgardo with a knife (Toribio) and bolo
(Gregorio) while the other two had held Edgardo to render him defenseless. Indeed, we agree with
the conclusion of both lower courts that the plea of self-defense was belied by the number (12) and
the different sizes of the wounds inflicted on Edgardo. The presence of a large number of wounds

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on the victim’s body negated self-defense, and indicated, instead, a determined effort to kill the
victim.

Filomeno’s alibi would place him in Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, at the time of the
commission of the crime. The CA rejected such alibi by indicating that the distance between
Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City and Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas
City where the crime was committed could be negotiated through a 30-minute tricycle ride, which
did not render impossible for Filomeno to be in the place of the crime when it was committed.

Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove. To establish alibi, the accused must prove: (a) that he was actually in another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime when the crime was perpetrated. Physical impossibility refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where the crime
was committed, as well as to the facility of access between the two places.

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MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., VS. ALBERTO

G.R. NO. 194320 FEBRUARY 1, 2012

VELASCO, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

There are several exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which are entries in official records,
provided that it meets all the requirements for the admissibility of the exception.

FACTS:

An accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving
four (4) vehicles, to wit: (1) a Nissan Bus; (2) an Isuzu Tanker; (3) a Fuzo Cargo Truck; and (4) a
Mitsubishi Galant.

Based on the Police Report issued by the on-the-spot investigator, SPO1 Dungga, the Isuzu
Tanker was in front of the Mitsubishi Galant with the Nissan Bus on their right side shortly before
the vehicular incident. All three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction
when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and
the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved
forward and the front left portion of the Mitsubishi Galant rammed into the rear right portion of
the Isuzu Tanker.

The Mitsubishi Galant was insured by First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corporation
against third party liability, own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle
against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint that it paid the damages sustained
by the insured amounting to PhP 700,000. It alleged that being subrogated to the rights and interests
of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter, the petitioner sent several demand
letters respondents Alberto and Reyes, the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the
Fuzo Cargo Truck, which bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant in the accident. Due

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to respondent’s refusal to settle their liability, the petitioner was constrained to file a complaint for
damages for gross negligence against them.

In their Answer, respondents asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular
accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner but it was reversed by the CA and held that the
evidence on record has failed to establish not only negligence on the part of respondents, but also
compliance with the other requisites and the consequent right of Malayan Insurance to subrogation.
It noted that the police report, which has been made part of the records of the trial court, was not
properly identified by the police officer who conducted the on- the-spot investigation of the subject
collision thus, its genuineness cannot be appreciated nor accord it with evidentiary value.

ISSUE:

Whether the police report is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

YES.

Under the rules of evidence, a witness can testify only to those facts which the witness
knows of his or her personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from the witness’ own
perception. Concomitantly, a witness may not testify on matters which he or she merely learned
from others either because said witness was told or read or heard those matters. Such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what the witness has learned.
This is known as the hearsay rule.

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However, there are several exceptions to the hearsay rule under the Rules of Court, among
which are entries in official records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides: Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The following are the requisites for the admissibility in evidence, as an exception to the
hearsay rule of entries in official records:

a. that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;

b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his or her duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him or
her stated, which must have been acquired by the public officer or other person
personally or through official information.

Notably, the presentation of the police report itself is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule even if the police investigator who prepared it was not presented in court, as long as
the above requisites could be adequately proved.

Here, there is no dispute that SPO1 Dungga, the on- the-spot investigator, prepared the
report, and he did so in the performance of his duty. However, what is not clear is whether SPO1
Dungga had sufficient personal knowledge of the facts contained in his report. Thus, the third
requisite is lacking.

Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report’s presentation in

evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so. As a result, the police report
is still admissible in evidence.

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PRIMO MIRO V. MARILYN MENDOZA

G.R. Nos. 172532 & 172544-45 20 NOVEMBER 2013

BRION, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of his
own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may
not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has
heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to
written statements, such as affidavits.

FACTS:

Marilyn Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land Transportation Office,
Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos, Mendoza’s niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and
Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO Cebu, were administratively charged with
Grave Misconduct before the Deputy Ombudsman by private complainants, namely: Maricar G.
Huete , Ernesto R. Cantillas, Leonardo , and Romeo C. Climaco . They were also charged for
violation of RA 3019. Private complainants accused Alingasa of selling the confirmation
certificates, supposed to be issued by the LTO free of charge. In the interim, additional
administrative and criminal complaints for the same charges were filed by Rova Carmelotes,
Mildred Regidor , Estrella dela Cerna , and Vevencia Pedroza against the respondents. Mendoza
denied the allegations. Erederos and Alingasa said that they did not collect, demand and receive
any money from the complainants as payment for the confirmation certificates.

Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. When they protested,
Erederos and Alingasa pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They were also told
that the confirmation certificates processed during the previous administration would no longer be
honored under Mendoza's administration; hence, they had to buy new sets of confirmation

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certificates to process the registration of their motor vehicles with the LTO. In their respective
comments, the respondents separately argue that the complainants' statements in their affidavits
lack material details and particulars, particularly on the time, the date, and the specific transactions.
They commonly alleged that the affidavits, which contained general averments, and the
NBI/Progress report that was based on the same affidavits, failed to meet the quantum of proof
required to hold them administratively liable.

Mendoza argues that since the affidavits failed to categorically state that the complainants
personally witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos and eventually to him, his
participation in the anomalous scheme has not been sufficiently shown; hence, he should not have
been found liable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the statements and affidavits are admissible under the hearsay evidence rule

RULING:

No. It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows
of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness
may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has
heard from others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to
written statements, such as affidavits.

The records show that not one of the complainants actually witnessed the transfer of money
from Alingasa to Erederos and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they specifically allege
that they saw Alingasa remit the collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific allegation that
they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza receive money. That the complainants alleged in the
preface of their affidavits that they “noticed and witnessed” the anomalous act complained of does
not take their statements out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their testimonies are
still “evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others.” Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. The affidavits also show

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that the complainants did not allege any specific act of the respondents. All that the affidavits
allege is a description of the allegedly anomalous scheme and the arrangement whereby payments
were to be made to Alingasa. There is no averment relating to any “personal demand” for the
amount of P2,500.00. Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the complainants
have personal knowledge of Erederos’ and Mendoza’s participation in the anomalous act. At most,
their personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who is the recipient of all payments
for the processing of confirmation certificates. This situation, however, is affected by the
complainants’ failure to specify Alingasa’s act of personally demanding P2,500.00 — a crucial
element in determining her guilt.

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DIMAGUILA VS. MONTEIR

G.R. NO. 201011, 27 JANUARY 2014

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall
under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries
in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records
made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.

Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute,
supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map
and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were prepared
by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

FACTS:

On July 5, 1993, the respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro (Spouses Monteiro), along with
Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa, and Clarita Nobleza, filed their Complaint for Partition and Damages before
the RTC, against the petitioners, Theresita, Juan, Asuncion, Patrocinia, Ricardo, and Gloria
Dimaguila (The Dimaguilas), together with Rosalina, et al.

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The complaint alleged that all the parties were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a
residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw, Laguna. Spouses Monteiro anchored
their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila (Pedro).

In their Answer, the Dimaguilas and the other defendants countered that there was no co-ownership
to speak of in the first place. They alleged that the subject property, then owned by Maria Ignacio
Buenaseda, had long been partitioned equally between her two sons, Perfecto and Vitaliano
Dimaguila, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, with its southern-half portion assigned to
Perfecto and the northern-half portion to Vitaliano. They claimed that they were the heirs of
Vitaliano and that Spouses Monteiro had nothing to do with the property as they were not heirs of
either Perfecto or Vitaliano.

The amended complaint abandoned the original claim for partition and instead sought the recovery
of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other defendants,
specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro. Furthermore, only Spouses
Monteiro were retained as plaintiffs and the Dimaguilas as defendants.

In amending their complaint, Spouses Montiero adopted the Dimaguilas' admission in their
original answer that the subject property had already been partitioned between Perfecto and
Vitaliano, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, and that during their
lifetime, the brothers agreed that Perfecto would become the owner of the southern-half portion
and Vitaliano of the northern-half portion, which division was observed and respected by them as
well as their heirs and successors-in-interest.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the
possession of the subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property.

As to the authenticity of the Bilihan, where the 1/3 share of Pedro was sold to Spouses Monteiro,
the RTC found the document to be regular and authentic absent any piece of evidence to the
contrary.

It stated that the proper persons to contest the sale were not the Dimaguilas, who were the heirs of
Vitaliano, but the heirs of Perfecto. It noted that the records showed that the heirs of Esperanza

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and Leandro (Pedro's siblings), had signified their conformity to the partition and to the sale of
Pedro's 1/3 portion.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether there was a partition of the subject property.

RULING:

Yes. Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their
case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side, synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

To prove their claim of partition, the respondent spouses presented the following: (1) the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, dated October 5, 1945, executed by and between the brothers Perfecto and
Vitaliano; (2) the cadastral map of Liliw Cadm-484,dated August 6, 1976, showing that the subject
property had been divided into southern and northern portions, registered as Lot Nos. 876 and
877; and (3) the Municipal Assessor's records showing that the said lots were respectively claimed
by Buenaventura and Perfecto.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition stated that Perfecto and Vitaliano agreed
"to divide between them into two and share and share alike" the subject property, including the
house situated thereon. It appears, however, that the property was actually partitioned into definite
portions, namely, southern and northern halves, as reflected in the cadastral map of Liliw, which
were respectively claimed by an heir of Vitaliano and Perfecto himself. It, thus, appears that the
subject property had already been partitioned into definite portions more than 20 years prior to the
original complaint for partition filed in 1993, and that such division had been observed by the
brothers' heirs.

Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only
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by showing that it was made through a palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission
was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which
was not provided to them. Petitioner Asuncion testified:

Q So, why was that allegation (sic) made in the Answer?

A May be, (sic) in his rush to file the Answer, Atty. Paredes filed the same without giving us a
copy ...

This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of

evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore,
the Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after
their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses.
In their original answer to the complaint for partition, their claim that there was already a partition
into northern-half and southern-half portions, was the very essence of their defense. It was
precisely this admission which moved the respondent spouses to amend their complaint. The
petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable
mistake.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners' admission and so amended their
original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject
property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove that there
was no partition of the property.

Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would
actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate
the petitioners' admission.

The petitioners argue that they timely objected to the cadastral map and the list of claimants
presented by the respondent spouses, on the ground that they violated the rule on hearsay and the
best evidence rule.

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Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3( d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of
Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody or the record.

Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the
area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The first was Crisostomo Arves,
Clerk III of the Municipal Assessor's Office, a repository of such documents. The second was
Dominga Tolentino, a DENR employee, who, as a record officer, certifies and safekeeps records
of surveyed land involving cadastral maps. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified
true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries
in official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records
made in the performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
official's attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty.
The document's trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty.Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys.

It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries
in official records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are
exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

Even granting that the petitioners had not admitted the partition, they presented no evidence to
contradict the evidence of the respondent spouses. Thus, even without the admission of the

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petitioners, the respondent spouses proved by a preponderance of evidence that there had indeed
been a partition of the subject property.

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TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER PROCEEDING

ILAO-QUINAY VS. MAPILE

G.R. NO. 154087 25 OCTOBER 2005

DOCTRINE:

Sec. 47, RULE 130. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—The testimony or

deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given at a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

FACTS:

In the course of the judicial settlement of Ilao’s estate, his heirs found out that the title of
the subject property had an annotation of adverse claim filed by a certain Juanito Ibarra (Ibarra).
Respondent herein, Atty. Rodolfo Mapile (respondent), filed a motion to exclude the property from
the inventory on the ground that the same no longer formed part of Ilao’s estate having been
disposed of during the latter’s lifetime in favor of Ibarra. Acting upon respondent’s allegation, the
heirs of Ilao, through petitioners herein, promptly filed on December 8, 1976 a civil case for
Quieting of Title and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 105865 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 37.

The Court of First Instance of Manila denied respondent’s motion and, authorized the sale
of the subject property to Virgilio Sevilla subject to the outcome of Civil Case No. 105865.
Relevantly, it appears that in 1974, Ibarra filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of the title of the subject property, claiming that he was in possession of said
owner’s duplicate but that he lost the same in a fire that took place in Bo. Sta. Ignacia, Camiling,
Tarlac on April 26, 1974. The case was docketed as LRC Cad. Rec. No. 271 of the RTC of Manila.
This allegation was, however, uncovered by the trial court to be false when, upon the court’s
subpoena, Ilao’s heirs appeared and presented the certificate of title Ibarra claimed to have been
lost.

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Respondent filed Civil Case No. 83-20520 for Specific Performance and Declaration of
Nullity of Contract, claiming that the subject property had been sold by Ilao to Ibarra pursuant to
a Deed of Absolute Sale (deed of sale) dated February 7, 1972, and that Ibarra, in turn, sold the
property to him.

Civil Case No. 105865 and Civil Case No. 83-20520 were consolidated. After trial, the
court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, finding that the deed of sale was genuine and
ordering, among others, that petitioners herein surrender the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
48529 and all documents appurtenant thereto in their possession.3 The decision was primarily
anchored on the trial court’s finding that the conflicting testimonies of the handwriting experts
presented by both parties left it no choice but to favor the notarized deed of sale and to rule that
the same is genuine.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of notary public taken in another case be admitted as evidence.

RULING:

No. We find that the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not commit an error in their evaluation
of the testimonies of the handwriting experts.

In fact, we quite agree that the conflicting testimonies should be completely disregarded.
The validity of the deed of sale should, therefore, be recognized, the only opposition thereto being
the alleged forgery of Ilao’s signature which, as discussed above, was not satisfactorily
demonstrated. There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary
public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. In this
connection, we have to say that petitioners’ objection to the admission in evidence of the testimony
of the notary public who supposedly notarized the deed of sale taken in another case in which
petitioners were not parties is persuasive. Such testimony does not qualify as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

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Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding.—The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given at a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

None of the circumstances for the admission of the testimony given at a former proceeding
obtains in this case. Not only were petitioners not parties to the former proceeding and hence
without opportunity to cross-examine the notary public, there was also no proof that the notary
public was already deceased or unable to testify. Hence, the testimony should not have been
accorded any probative weight.

The same cannot be said, however, of the testimony of respondent relevant to the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of sale between Ilao and Ibarra. It should be
noted that what was sought to be admitted in evidence, and what was actually admitted in evidence,
was the fact that the statements were made by Ibarra, not necessarily that the matters stated were
true. The utterances are in the nature of independently relevant statements which may be admitted
in evidence as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof.

It has been said that where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it
has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, and the statement may be shown.
Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 13
On this basis, the statements attributed to Ibarra regarding the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the deed of sale related to the court by respondent are admissible if only to establish
the fact that such statements were made and the tenor thereof.

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JOWEL SALES VS. CYRIL A. SABINO

G.R. NO. 133154 DECEMBER 9, 2005

GARCIA, J.

DOCTRINE:

As a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is anchored on the ground that such
testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered has no opportunity to cross-examine
the deponent at the time his testimony is offered; The act of cross-examining the deponent during
the taking of the deposition cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to
its admissibility as evidence in the trial proper

FACTS:

Sabino filed an amended complaint for damages against, among others, herein petitioner Jowel
Sales, driver of the vehicle involved in the accident which ultimately caused the death of
respondent’s son, Elbert.

Before any responsive pleading could be filed, respondent, as plaintiff a quo, notified the
defendants that he will take the deposition of one Buaneres Corral before the Clerk of Court, RTC-
Pasig City.

On December 27, 1995 and resumed on January 3, 1996, the deposition on oral examination of
Buaneres Corral was taken, in the presence and with the active participation of petitioner’s counsel,
Atty. Roldan Villacorta, who even lengthily cross-examined the deponent.

In the course of trial, Sabino had the deposition of Buaneres Corral marked as her Exhibits “DD”
and “EE” with submarkings. Upon conclusion of her evidentiary presentation, Sabino made a
Formal Offer of Exhibits among which are Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Likewise offered in evidence
as Exhibit “BB” is a certification from the Bureau of Immigration attesting to the May 28, 1996
departure for abroad of Buaneres Corral via Flight No. PR 658. Sales opposed the admission of
Exhs. “DD” and “EE” and even asked that they be expunged from the records on the ground that

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the jurisdictional requirements for their admission under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court,
infra, were not complied with.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the requirements of Section 4, Rule 24 (now Section 3) of the Revised Rules of Court
were satisfied by the respondent when it presented a certification attesting to the fact that deponent
has left the country but silent as to whether or not at the time his deposition was offered in evidence
is in the Philippines.

2. Whether the petitioner in cross-examining the deponent during the taking of his deposition
waived any and all objections in connection therewith.

RULING:

Petition lacks merit.

1. It is the petitioner's posture that none of the above conditions exists in this case to
justify the admission in evidence of respondent’s Exhibits “DD” and “EE”. Hence, it
was an error for the appellate court to have upheld the admission thereof by the trial court.
Discounting the probative value of the certification from the Bureau of Immigration (Exh.
“BB”) that deponent Buaneres Corral departed for abroad on May 28, 1996, petitioner
argues that said certification merely proves the fact of Corral having left the country on the
date mentioned therein. It does not, however, establish that he has not returned since then
and is unavailable to be present in court to personally testify.

While depositions may be used as evidence in court proceedings, they are generally not meant to
be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Stated a bit differently,
a deposition is not to be used when the deponent is at hand. Indeed, any deposition offered during
a trial to prove the facts therein set out, in lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open
court, may be opposed and excluded on the ground of hearsay.

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being called to the witness stand by the
proponent, provided the existence of certain conditions is first satisfactorily established. Five (5)

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exceptions for the admissibility of a deposition are listed in Section 4, Rule 23, supra, of the Rules
of Court. Among these is when the witness is out of the Philippines.

The trial court had determined that deponent Bueneres Corral was abroad when the offer of his
deposition was made. This factual finding of absence or unavailability of witness to testify
deserves respect, having been adequately substantiated. As it were, the certification by the
Bureau of Immigration Exh. “BB” provides that evidentiary support.

2. No. He is not, thus, estopped from challenging the admissibility of the deposition just
because he participated in the taking thereof.

Suffice it to state that, as a rule, the inadmissibility of testimony taken by deposition is

anchored on the ground that such testimony is hearsay, i.e., the party against whom it is offered
has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time his testimony is offered. But as
jurisprudence teaches, it matters not that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross[1]examination must be
accorded a party at the time the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the
trial or hearing. In fine, the act of cross-examining the deponent during the taking of the deposition
cannot, without more, be considered a waiver of the right to object to its admissibility as evidence
in the trial proper. In participating, therefore, in the taking of the deposition, but objecting to its
admissibility in court as evidence, petitioner did not assume inconsistent positions.

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SAMALIO vs CA

GR No. 140079 March 31, 2005

CORONA, J.

DOCTRINE:

For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c)
the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes
of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case.

FACTS:

On February 2, 1993, Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan passport arrived at NAIA from a
Saipan flight. While waiting for her turn at the arrival immigration counter, her passport was
examined by an Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarillaga, who suspected that her passport was fake.
She was taken out of the queue and brought to respondent Augusto R. Samalio, the duty
Intelligence Officer. Ms. Weng, who could only speak in Chinese, asked the respondent by sign
language that she wanted to meet a friend who was waiting at the NAIA arrival area. Respondent
approved the request and accompanied Ms. Weng to the arrival area. Thereafter, Respondent, with
Ms. Weng and her male friend in tow, returned to the immigration area. While inside the office of
Respondent, Ms. Weng asked that her passport be returned. Sensing a demand for money in
exchange for her passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front of Respondent. The money was
grabbed by the Respondent. Shortly, her passport was returned and she was allowed to leave. When
Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival
stamp. Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against the Respondent.

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On February 4, 1993, the City Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City recommended that Samalio be
prosecuted for Robbery and Violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the
Sandiganbayan. An administrative case against Samalio for violation of CSMC No. 46 Rule 2
Section 1 was commenced. He was suspended as the charge sheet against him involves dishonesty,
oppression and misconduct. He was found guilty of the charges and was ordered dismissed from
service. He appealed the decision to the CSC but the appeal was dismissed. In the meantime, during
the pendency of the instant administrative case, Samalio was convicted of the crime Robbery.
Samalio did not appeal the conviction and instead applied for and was granted probation by the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner assailed the correctness and validity of CSC Resolution. He claimed that he was not
accorded due process. In support of his contention that he was deprived of due process, petitioner
alleges that no witness or evidence was presented against him, that the CA erred in the
interpretation of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and that there was no hearing
conducted on his case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in application of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO. The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
confirming the decision of the Commissioner of the BID are supported by substantial evidence.
The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Commissioner of the BID, decided the case
on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and relied on the records of the
proceedings taken. In particular, the decision was based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng
Sai Qin against petitioner before the City Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City, as well as Resolution
of the same office recommending the prosecution of petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes
of robbery and violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law.

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The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai
Qin in the Sandiganbayan Criminal Case and the fact of the petitioner's conviction in that case.
Thus, there was ample evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in administrative
proceedings - substantial evidence or that quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion to support the decision of the CSC.

The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding petitioner's
administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules
of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided
by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which
are meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to
proceedings before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different
and valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation,
hearing and adjudication of cases before it.

For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is
dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c)
the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes
of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case.

In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the administrative proceedings before the BID
because she left the country on February 6, 1993, or even before the administrative complaint
against the petitioner was instituted. Weng Sai Qin's departure from the country and consequent

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inability to testify in the proceedings had already been disclosed to the parties. Petitioner does not
deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679,
a case which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated
February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutor's Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution used by
Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the issue testified
to by Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same issue in the
administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also
had the opportunity to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to defend and
vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application
of the rule on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130, were satisfied. Thus, the
CSC and the Secretary of Justice committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance of
the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 where
petitioner was convicted.

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OPINION RULE

DIZON VS. TUAZON

G.R. NO. 172167 9 JULY, 2008

TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution of a notarized

document lies on the one contesting the same.

Court is not bound by the findings of a handwriting expert; Expert opinion evidence is to
be considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the light of its own general
knowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the heirs of Segundo Espinosa (Segundo), owner of one-half undivided
share in two parcels of land situated in Tarlac. When Segundo was widowed, he cohabited with
one Laureana Bondoc and sired Estrella Tuazon (Estrella), one of the respondents in this case.’

Petitioner Soledad Dizon (Soledad), daughter of Segundo, discussed with her brother the
transfer of the properties in their name. They informed Segundo of their plan and the latter agreed.
However, Segundo told them that the tiles of the properties were in the name of the spouses Estrella
and respondent Rodrigo Tuazon (Rodrigo). Soledad inquired from respondents and was told that
they had already bought the subject property.

Soledad went to the Register of Deeds and was able to secure copies of the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Affidavit of Non-tenancy allegedly executed by Segundo in favor of
respondents. Respondents also allegedly prepared Agreement of Subdivision and made it appear
therein that Segundo had signed and executed the same. When Segundo was shown the documents,
he claimed that he was fooled by respondents to enter into the transaction and that his signature

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had been forged. He met with a certain Atty. Conrado Genilo, the lawyer who notarized the
documents, and was informed that he had merely notarized the said documents prepared by his
secretary. Atty. Genilo also told Segundo that he was willing to testify in his favor.

Segundo then prepared and signed a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the Affidavit of Non-tenancy and the Agreement of Subdivision. However, the complaint was not
filed in court because Segundo fell ill and Soledad was then working abroad. Segundo then died.

Petitioners filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and damages against
respondents. They claimed that respondents fraudulently prepared the three documents, namely,
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 30, 1985, the Affidavit of Non-tenancy dated August 30,
1985, and the Agreement of Subdivision dated February 21, 1990, in all of which respondents
made it appear the Segundo had signed, executed, and acknowledged the said documents before a
notary public.

Respondents claimed that when Segundo’s mortgage obligation to PNB, fell due, he sought
financial assistance from respondents in order to avert the foreclosure of the mortgage. They
obliged and made several payments on the mortgage debt. In return, Segundo promised to transfer
to respondent Estrella his share in the mortgaged properties which he fulfill when he freely
delivered to her and her husband the Deed of Absolute Sale and Affidavit of Non-tenancy in 1985.
Respondents also alleged that in 1990, Segundo executed the Agreement of Subdivision to effect
the actual conveyance of title to the properties subject of the sale.

ISSUE:

Whether the court was bound to admit and rely on the testimonies of an expert witness as
regards the alleged forged signatures of a person

RULING:

No.

As notarized documents, the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Affidavit of Non-tenancy, and the
Agreement of Subdivision carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due
execution and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so
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clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld. The burden of proof to overcome the presumption of due execution
of a notarized document lies on the one contesting the same.

The court is not bound by the findings of a handwriting expert. Expert opinion evidence is
to be considered or weighed by the court like any other testimony, in the light of its own general
knowledge and experience upon the subject of inquiry. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the aid that he can
render to the courts in showing the facts which serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

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BACALSO v. PADIGOS

G.R. No. 173192 April 18, 2008

CARPIO-MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely
advisory in character. The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject
them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When
faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight and credence to that which is more
complete, thorough, and scientific.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.

FACTS:

The case involves a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 3781 located in Inayawan, Cebu,
covered by an Original Certificate of Title in the name of 13 co-owners, including some of the
respondents herein. Respondents filed a complaint against Rosendo and Rodrigo Bacalso, who are
among the petitioners herein, for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of
possession, and damages. Respondents claimed that they are the children and grandchildren of the
deceased co-owners of the lot, while petitioners are heirs of Alipio Bacalso, Sr. who claimed that
their father purchased via deeds of sale the shares in the lot of the concerned co-owners (Fortunata,
Simplicio, Wenceslao, Geronimo, and Felix) and that their father secured Tax Declarations
covering the lot. Amended complaints were filed to implead other heirs as petitioners and
respondents. Both parties also presented expert witnesses, Wilfredo Espina for petitioners and
Nimrod Vaño for respondents, for the genuineness and authenticity of the signatures and marks in
the deeds of sale allegedly executed. The trial court ruled in favor of therein plaintiffs-herein

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respondents Padigos, et.al. The Court of Appeals affirmed the same, sustaining and upholding the
report and conclusion of Nimrod Vaño that signatures and thumbmarks appearing on all documents
of sale presented are forgeries.

ISSUE:

Whether respondents were able to sufficiently establish their ownership over the lot
through the examination made by their expert witness

RULING:

No, respondents were not able to sufficiently establish their ownership over the lot through
the examination made by their expert witness.

The Supreme Court ruled that expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are
generally regarded as purely advisory in character. The courts may place whatever weight they
choose upon and may reject them, if they find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or
otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts give more weight
and credence to that which is more complete, thorough, and scientific.

The Court observes that in examining the questioned signatures of respondent Gaudencio,
petitioners’ expert witness Espina used as standards 15 specimen signatures which have been
established to be Gaudencio’s, and that after identifying similarities between the questioned
signatures and the standard signatures, he concluded that the questioned signatures are genuine.
On the other hand, respondents’ expert witness Vaño used, as standards, the questioned signatures
themselves. He identified characteristics of the signatures indicating that they may have been
forged. The Court also notes that Vaño also analyzed the signatures of the witnesses to the
questioned documents, the absence of standard specimens with which those signatures could be
compared notwithstanding. On the other hand, Espina refrained from making conclusions on
signatures which could not be compared with established genuine specimens.

Specifically with respect to Vaño’s finding that Maximo’s thumbprint on Exhibit “7” is
spurious, the Court is not persuaded, no comparison having been made of such thumbprint with a
genuine thumbprint established to be Maximo’s.

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Vaño’s testimony should be received with caution, the trial court having abruptly cut short
his cross-examination conducted by petitioners’ counsel, thereby depriving this Court of the
opportunity to determine his credibility. Espina, on the other hand, withstood thorough cross
examination, redirect and re-cross examination.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false
specimens of writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.

Therefore, respondents having failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence,

their action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and
damages must fail.

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EQUITABLE CARDNETWORK, INC., v. JOSEFA BORROMEO CAPISTRANO

G.R. No. 180157 08 February 2012

ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

Expert Opinion is NOT always indispensable.

FACTS:

Petitioner Equitable Cardnetwork Inc. (ECI) filed a complaint against herein respondent
Josefa Borromeo Capistrano for failure to settle her bill amounting to P217,235.36 in her credit
card allegedly issued by ECI to the latter upon her application. The credit card was claimed by
respondent’s daughter, Redulla, and also issued a check amounting to P45,000 which bounced
upon deposit.

In her answer, Capistrano denied ever applying for the credit card and that her alleged
daughter, Redulla, was not her daughter. She also denied the allegations on the ground for “lack
of knowledge” as to their truth. This was ruled by the RTC to be an ineffectual denial since a
person must surely know if he applied for a credit card or not. Thus, being undenied, the allegations
in to documents submitted by ECI had been deemed controverted. The RTC ruled in favor of ECI.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision ruling that ECI’s failure to object to
the allegations of forgery made by Capistrano submitting evidence thereto, such forgery has now
been deemed controverted and cured her defective objections. The CA also found the specimen
signatures presented by Capistrano on several documents executed as about the time to have
clearly varied from the signatures found on ECI’s documents. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that the signatures were forgeries despite lack
of expert opinion.

RULING:

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YES. Expert opinion, while useful, is NOT always indispensable. The matter here is not
too technical as to preclude the CA from examining the signatures and ruling on whether or not
they are forgeries. The Court finds no reason to take exception from CA’s finding.

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PAZ VS. PAVON

G.R. No. 166579 18 February 2010

DOCTRINE: OPINION RULE

In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan's
psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript
of stenographic notes of Jeanice's testimony before the trial court. Gates only diagnosed Jordan
from the statements of Jeanice,

whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.

Consequently, Gates' report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no
personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates' testimony should have thus
been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.

FACTS:

1. Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan. She alleged that
Jordan

was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential marital obligations.

2. Actions by Jordan

a. lying about his whereabouts

b. spent more time with the Play Station

c. she noticed that he resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than
help

her take care of their son.

3. At the beginning of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but the quarrels turned for
the

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worse and Jordan became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt
her

with a pair of scissors

4. Jeanice also alleged that Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit
her

with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited their
son

since she left their conjugal home.

5. Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with Borderline
Personality

Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability. Gates concluded
that

Jordan's psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background.
Gates

added that with no indication of reformation, Jordan's personality disorder appears to be grave and

Incorrigible.

6. Defenses of Jordan

Jordan also objected to the psychological report offered by Jeanice.

Jordan pointed out that he was not subjected to any interview or psychological tests by
Gates.

Jordan argued that Gates' conclusions were mere speculations, conjectures and
suppositions

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from the information supplied by Jeanice.

Jordan alleged that it was patently one-sided and is not admissible in evidence as it was
based

on hearsay statements of Jeanice which were obviously self-serving. Jordan said he wants

Jeanice back and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

7. RTC – granted the petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not Gate's psychological report is admissible as evidence

RULING:

NO.

In granting Jeanice's petition, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Gates to
support its

conclusion that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital

obligations. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from "Borderline Personality Disorder" as

manifested by his being a "mama's boy" and that such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in his
family

background, [and] antedates the marriage."

Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated

should bepersonally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to
prove the

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psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said
disorder

Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the

parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence

of psychological incapacity.

In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordan's
psychological incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript
of stenographic notes of Jeanice's testimony before the trial court. Gates only diagnosed Jordan
from the statements of Jeanice,

whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.

Consequently, Gates' report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no
personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on. Gates' testimony should have thus
been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.

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DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO vs. REBECCA BIONG

G.R. No. 182356 December 4, 2013

BRION, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an
expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding:

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1

Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person.

On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.

FACTS:

On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car
along North Avenue, Quezon City.

His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at
the backseat.

Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A
few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the
car’s rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed
and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from
these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible
physical injuries.

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In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side
of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became
more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On
June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to
examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused
by the compression of the nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo
physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite
three months of extensive physical therapy.

She then consulted other doctors. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo
a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores
operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.

The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the
practice of her profession since June 2000 despite the surgery.

Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but
Rebecca refused to pay.

Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular
accident and claimed ₱150,000.00 for her medical expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and
an average monthly income of ₱30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral,
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees.

At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness.

Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident.
To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20,
2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a
whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations.

In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met
several days after the vehicular accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a

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good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel. She pointed out that she required
Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he
successfully passed the driving skills test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-
mechanic.

The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
whiplash injury to be Joel’s reckless driving which the CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Dra. Dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason
that she was not presented as an expert witness

RULING:

Dra. Dela Llana merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court. She essentially
claimed in her testimony that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact
that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot
give weight to her opinion that Joel’s reckless driving caused her whiplash injury without violating
the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an
ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in
evidence regarding:

(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;

(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and

(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.1âwphi1

Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior,
condition or appearance of a person.

On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.

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However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much
less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the
probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion.
Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic
of his conclusions is founded.

In the present case, Dra. dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the
reason that she was not presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not
competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on
the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.

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PEOPLE VS. PRIETO

G.R. NO. 141259 JULY 18, 2003

J. CALLEJO, SR.

DOCTRINE:

Findings of facts of the trial court, its conclusion anchored on the said findings, its calibration of
the testimonial evidence of the parties and the probative weight thereof, are accorded by the
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect

A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to
obtain true justice for the death of his relative.

Identification by the sound of the voice of a person identified, is a sufficient and acceptable means
of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had known each other
personally and closely for a number of years.

Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or wicklamps, and flashlights, moonlight or starlight may
in proper situations be considered as sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility
of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.

FACTS:

On July 7, 1995, an Information was filed with the RTC, charging Lambertino with murder of
Geraldo Prieto. Dulcesima, the victim’s wife, gave a sworn statement to SPO1 Manuel M. Buot of
the Danao City Police Station where she identified the accused as the assailant of her husband. The
accused denied killing his uncle Geraldo. However, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
the accused of murder. Lambertino appealed and contended that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he killed the victim and that the trial court erred in rejecting his
defense of alibi.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of Dulcesima is credible

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RULING:

YES.

The ruminations of the appellant are bereft of merit. By arguing that the prosecution failed to prove
that he was the assailant, the appellant thereby assails the credibility of Dulcesima and Felix, the
probative weight of their testimonies, the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusions based
on the said findings. However, it has been the constant ruling of this Court that the findings of
facts of the trial court, its conclusions anchored on the said findings, its calibration of the
testimonial evidence of the parties and the probative weight thereof, are accorded by the appellate
court high respect, if not conclusive effect precisely because of its unique advantage of being able
to observe and monitor, at close range, the demeanor, conduct and deportment of the witnesses as
they testify, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted facts and circumstances
of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.

We have no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution. In People v. Adoviso, we ruled that it is the natural reaction
of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain
their identities, the manner in which the crime is committed and to approximate the assailant’s
next move either as an instinctive reaction or as a recourse to help fend off any further attack. A
relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain
true justice for the death of his relative.

The evidence on record shows that the appellant was the nephew of the victim. He frequented his
uncle’s house for drinking sprees, and on the said occasions, Dulcesima saw and talked with the
appellant. The appellant and the couple had been neighbors for years before the stabbing. On July
2, 1995, Dulcesima talked with the appellant when they were working in their respective farms.
The widow of the victim gained familiarity with the physical built, face and voice of the appellant.
Once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even
from a considerable distance. This Court has ruled that identification by the sound of the voice of
a person identified, is a sufficient and acceptable means of identification where it is established
that the witness and the accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of
years.

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Considering the illumination from the kerosene lamp, and Dulcesima’s proximity to her husband,
to the door, and to the appellant, Dulcesima could easily see and recognize the appellant when the
latter stabbed the victim and punched her in the face. In People v. Adovisowe ruled that the
illumination produced by kerosene lamp or wicklamps, and flashlights, moonlight or starlight may
in proper situations be considered as sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility
of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.

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MARIANO VS. ROXAS

A.M. NO. CA-02-14-P JULY 31, 2002

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Her opinion as to complainant’s genuine signature is admissible in evidence pursuant to

Section 50, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides:

“Sec. 50.Opinion of ordinary witnesses.—The opinion of a witness for which properbasis

is given, may be received in evidence regarding—x x x

(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity ; and

x x x” (Emphasis ours)

FACTS:

The present administrative case arose from the complaint-affidavit of Leonora Mariano
filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) on May 8, 2001,docketed therein as Administrative Case No.
01-01-G, charging Susan Roxas, Clerk III, assigned at the Third Division of the said court, with
forgery and dishonesty.

In her complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that respondent refused to pay P12,110.00.

This is the balance of the price of jewelry items complainant sold to respondent. The latter insists
she made an overpayment as shown by 4 receipts dated (1) January 25, 2001 for P5,525.00; (2)
February 15, 2001 for P6,500.00; (3) April 14, 2000 for P400.00; and (4) April 16, 2000
forP400.00. These receipts were forged.

Complainant further alleged that in a letter dated February 5, 2001 addressed to the Cashier
of the CA, respondent authorized complainant to collect her (respondent’s) benefits “on March
2001 and so on up to the total amount of P30,000.00 more or less” as payment for her outstanding
obligation. However, on April 18,2001, respondent revoked the said authorization without
informing the complainant, thus committing dishonesty.

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CA PresidingJustice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez issued an Order dated February 6,2002,

quoted as follows:

“WHEREFORE, Susan Roxas is hereby found guilty of misconduct and since this is her first
offense, the penalty of suspension for one month and one day is hereby imposed on her. She is
also hereby reprimanded for her willful failure to pay just debts to Mrs. Mariano. Mrs. Roxas is
hereby ordered to pay Mrs. Mariano the balance of her debt in the amount ofP12,110.00.”

Respondent filed a MR but was denied. CA transmitted to SC the records of this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable.

RULING:

YES.

Based on the evidence on record, we hold that respondent is administratively liable.

As correctly found by the CA, respondent has still an unpaid balance of P12,110.00. The
receipts she presented to prove that she overpaid complainant P6,425.00 were forged. As found by
the CA, there are marked differences between the signatures in the receipts and complainant’s
specimen signature which are easily discernible by the naked eye. That the receipts are not genuine
was confirmed by Lorna Caraga. She testified that she is familiar with the signature of complainant
who was her officemate for a period of 5 years in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 130,
Caloocan City. In many occasions, complainant signed documents in her presence. Her opinion as
to complainant’s genuine signature is admissible in evidence pursuant to Section 50, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence which provides:

“Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. —The opinion of a witness for which properbasis is
given, may be received in evidenceregarding—

xxx

(b) A handwriting with which he hassufficient familiarity; and

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x x x” (Emphasis ours)

Corollarily, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides that:

“Sec. 22.How genuineness of handwriting proved.—The handwriting of a person maybe proved

by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”

Respondent’s act of forging those receipts to avoid her contractual obligation affects not
only her integrity as a public servant but more importantly, the integrity of the Judiciary where she
is connected. As a court employee, respondent should bear in mind that the court is regarded by
the public with respect. For this reason, the conduct of every court personnel should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility and must at all times be characterized by,
among othe rthings, uprightness, propriety and decorum. Respondent failed to meet this exacting
standard. Her actuation, although arising from a private transaction, has tarnished the image of her
public office.

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CHARACTER EVIDENCE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AVELINO FELAN

G.R. No. 176631 February 2, 2011

DOCTRINE:

Section 54. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. – Evidence of a person’s
character

or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith
on a

particular occasion, except:

(a) In Criminal Cases:

(1) The character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable

degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

(2) The accused may prove his or her good moral character[,] pertinent to the moral trait

involved in the offense charged. However, the prosecution may not prove his or her bad

moral character unless on rebuttal.

(b) In Civil Cases:

Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent

to the issue of character involved in the case.

(c) In Criminal and Civil Cases:

Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been

impeached.

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In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible,

proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.

On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge,

claim

or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person’s conduct. (51a; 14, Rule
132)

FACTS:

His own daughter commenced the prosecution of Avelino Felan for qualified rape through her
complaint dated May 30, 1996.1 The information subsequently filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Ormoc City alleged:

The accused denied the accusation, branding it as the fabrication of AAA out of anger at him for
not giving her basic needs and for admonishing her to stop using illegal drugs.

After trial, on November 26, 1997, the RTC convicted the accused of qualified rape and imposed
the death penalty. He was also ordered to pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity.4

On July 14, 2006, the Court of Appeals (CA) modified the criminal and civil liabilities of the
accused after finding him guilty of simple rape on account of AAA’s minority not being
established beyond reasonable doubt. The CA lowered the penalty to reclusion perpetua and
sentenced him to pay an amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in addition to the civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00.5

In his appeal to this Court, the accused contends that the RTC and the CA erred in relying mainly
on AAA’s testimony, despite her not being a credible witness and although her testimony was
doubtful by reason of her having used illegal drugs and having engaged in prostitution, aside from
possessing a poor memory. He insists that he could control his sexual urge.6

ISSUE:

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Whether Or not the alleged moral character of the victim was material in the prosecution and
conviction of an accused for rape.

RULING:

The appeal lacks merit and persuasion. We affirm the conviction.

The attempt to discredit AAA on the ground of her being a user of illegal drugs and of her having
engaged in prostitution deserved no consideration. First of all, AAA’s use of illegal drugs and
engaging in prostitution, even if true, did not destroy her credibility as a witness or negate the rape.
Indeed, the Court has ruled that the victim’s moral character was immaterial in the prosecution
and conviction of an accused for rape, there being absolutely no nexus between it and the odious
deed committed. Moreover, even a prostitute or a woman of loose morals could fall victim of rape,
for she could still refuse a man’s lustful advances.

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CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. BELAGAN

G.R. No. 132164 October 19, 2004

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Evidence of one's character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from
the time in question. What is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the
time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit.

Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of
offense charged.

FACTS:

2 separate complaints for sexual harassment and various malfeasances were filed against
Dr. Belagan, the Superintendent of Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).

The 1st case was filed by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the “Mother and Child
Learning Center.” When applying for a permit to operate a pre-school, Belagan, who offered to
conduct the inspection, suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Upon
follow-up of her application, Belagan told her," Mag-date muna tayo." When they reported the
incident, Belagan merely denied any personal relationship with Magdalena.

The 2nd case was filed by Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar
Elementary School. She alleged that on 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed
her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her from behind, pulled her close to him with his organ
pressing against her. Aside from this, Ligaya charged him with delaying teachers' salaries, failing
to release differentials to substitutes, refusing to release teachers' uniforms and allowances, and
failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the DECS rules and
regulation.

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DECS Secretary found Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and ordered that he be
dismissed from service. He was absolved of charges of administrative malfeasance or dereliction
of duty.

Upon appeal, the CSC affirmed the resolution of DECS Secretary and found Belagan guilty
of grave misconduct. His position is that which requires a high degree of moral uprightness.

Belagan filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been charged of
any offense in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with
numerous offenses before MTC Baguio, which casts a doubt on her character, integrity, and
credibility. The CSC denied the Motion for reconsideration but upon petition for review, the CA
reversed the CSC Resolutions and dismissed Magdalena’s complaint stating that Magdalena is an
unreliable witness, her character being questionable, while Belagan has an unblemished service
record for 37 years.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaining witness, Magdalena Gapuz, is credible.

RULING:

YES. Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases, not to
administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only character evidence that would
establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged may be proved. Character
evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.

In this case, no evidence bearing on Magdalena’s chastity. What were presented were
charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Regarding Magdalena’s credibility as a witness, the charges and
complaints against her happened way back in the70s and 80s while the act complained of happened
in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of Magdalena’s character or reputation.

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Evidence of one’s character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from
the time in question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or reputation of the
person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement
of the suit. “It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of moral
righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every person is capable of change or
reform.” The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not permissible
to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a
criminal offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility. This view has
usually been based upon one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven
charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility, (b) that innocent persons
are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent
until his guilt is legally established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by
evidence of particular acts of misconduct.

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PEOPLE VS. LEE

G.R. NO. 139070 MAY 29, 2002

PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:–

(a) In Criminal Cases:

(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged.

(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

None of the exceptions are present in the case.

FACTS:

Joseph Marquez and his mother, Herminia, were in the living room watching television
when suddenly, Noel Lee shot Joseph twice through their living room window. This was all
witnessed by Herminia who eventually dragged her son’s body and shouted for help. Joseph was
brought to the hospital but expired thereat.

Noel Lee is a well-known figure in their neighborhood and has several criminal cases
pending against him in Caloocan City. He was charged with frustrated homicide in 1984 and
attempted murder in 1989. He has known Joseph since childhood and their houses are only two
blocks apart. Joseph had a bad reputation in their neighborhood as a thief and drug addict. Six days
before his death, on September 23, 1996, accused-appellant caught Joseph inside his car trying to
steal his car stereo. Joseph scampered away. As proof of the victim’s bad reputation, Noel

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presented a letter handwritten by his mother, Herminia, addressed to Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo of
Caloocan City, and sent through PO3 Willy Tuazon and his wife, Baby Ruth. In the letter,
Herminia was surrendering her son to the Mayor for rehabilitation because he was hooked on
shabu, a prohibited drug, and was a thief. Herminia was scared that eventually Joseph might not
just steal but kill her and everyone in their household because of his drug habit.

The accused-appellant likewise explained the two criminal cases filed against him in 1984
and 1989. The information for attempted murder was dismissed as a result of the victim’s
desistance while in the frustrated homicide case, the real assailant appeared and admitted his crime.

Noel was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, hence the automatic review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pieces of character evidence Noel Lee presented are admissible in
evidence.

RULING:

Character evidence presented by Lee in the form of the letter of victim’s mother letter
addressed to the mayor, claiming that her son was a drug addict and feared for her life is not
admissible as evidence that her son might have been a target from other people in their
neighborhood.

Character evidence is governed by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
viz:

“Section 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions:–

(a) In Criminal Cases:

(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait
involved in the offense charged.

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(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.

(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.

In the instant case, proof of the bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine
the probability or improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim
was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no connection between the
deceased’s drug addiction and thievery with his violent death in the hands of accused-appellant.
In light of the positive eyewitness testimony, the claim that because of the victim’s bad character
he could have been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.

Moreover, proof of the victim’s bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder
committed with treachery and premeditation. In People v. Solimana murder case, the defense tried
to prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon objection of the
prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme Court held:

“x x x While good or bad moral character may be availed of as an aid to determine the probability
or improbability of the commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123), such is not necessary in
the crime of murder where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof
of such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show “that it has produced a reasonable
belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt
defensive action was necessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p.
126). This rule does not apply to cases of murder.”

In the case at bar, accused-appellant is charged with murder committed through treachery
and evident premeditation. The evidence shows that there was treachery. Joseph was sitting in his
living room watching television when accused-appellant peeped through the window and, without
any warning, shot him twice in the head. There was no opportunity at all for the victim to defend
himself or retaliate against his attacker. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack ensured
his death without risk to the assailant. Following the ruling in People v. Soliman, where the killing

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of the victim was attended by treachery, proof of the victim’s bad character is not necessary. The
presence of this aggravating circumstance negates the necessity of proving the victim’s bad
character to establish the probability or improbability of the offense charged and, at the same time,
qualifies the killing of Joseph Marquez to murder.

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RULE 131- BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTONS

BURDEN OF PROOF VS. BURDEN OF EVIDENCE

FE J. BAUTISTA and MILAGROS J. CORPUS v. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO

G.R. No. L-45137 September 23, 1985

CUEVAS, J.

DOCTRINE:

A prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be sufficient to counter-balance the
general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if not encountered and controlled by
evidence tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or to prove other facts inconsistent with
it, and the establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence
which may in the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and control it.

FACTS: The petitioners, Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus and Teresita Vergere were charged with
estafa before the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. To prove its case, the prosecution presented
during the trial the private complainant, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, as its only witness. Thereafter,
petitioners, believing the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, moved
to dismissal the case by way of demurrer to the evidence. However, the respondent judge denied
said motion on the ground that the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa against said
petitioners based on the evidence presented so far on record.

It is the contention of petitioners that respondent Judge lost jurisdiction to proceed with the trial
of the case and that he was in duty-bound to acquit them, considering his findings in denying their
motion to dismiss that "....the prosecution established a prima facie case of Estafa alleged in the
Information against said accused on the evidence presented so far on record". Petitioners further
argue that in a criminal case, conviction can be had only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt and
not on a mere prima facie case.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners should be acquitted

RULING:

No, they should not be acquitted.

The Supreme Court ruled that, a prima facie case is that amount of evidence which would be
sufficient to counter-balance the general presumption of innocence, and warrant a conviction, if
not encountered and controlled by evidence tending to contradict it, and render it improbable, or
to prove other facts inconsistent with it, and the establishment of a prima facie case does not take
away the presumption of innocence which may in the opinion of the jury be such as to rebut and
control it.

There is no denying that in a criminal case, unless the guilt of the accused is established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial court denies petitioners'
motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution had
established a prima facie case against them, they assume a definite burden. It becomes incumbent
upon petitioners to adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not overthrow, the prima facie case
against them. This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence, and not of the burden of proof as
petitioners would seem to believe.

When a prima facie case is established by the prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at bar,
the burden of proof does not shift to the defense. It remains throughout the trial with the party upon
whom it is imposed—the prosecution. It is the burden of evidence which shifts from party to party
depending upon the exigencies of the case in the course of the trial. This burden of going forward
with the evidence is met by evidence which balances that introduced by the prosecution. Then the
burden shifts back.

A prima facie case need not be countered by a preponderance of evidence nor by evidence of
greater weight. Defendant's evidence which equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or puts the
case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the proof. Should

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it happen that at the trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and
presumptions operate against plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot prevail.

In the case at bar, the order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, required them to present their
evidence. They refused and/or failed to do so. This justified an inference of their guilt. The
inevitable result was that the burden of evidence shifted on them to prove their innocence, or at
least, raises a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.

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VITARICH CORPORATION VS. LOSIN

G.R. NO. 181560 15 NOVEMBER 2010

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

"xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the
plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favour, the duty or the burden of evidence
shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned
in favour of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce
a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of `preponderance of evidence'
refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth."

FACTS:

Respondent Chona Losin (Losin) was in the fastf ood and catering services business named
Glamours Chicken House in Cotabato City. Since 1993, Vitarich, particularly its Davao Branch,
had been her supplier of poultry meat. In 1995, however, her account was transferred to the newly
opened Vitarich branch in General Santos City.

In the months of July to November 1996, Losin's orders of dressed chicken and other meat products
allegedly amounted to P921,083.10. During this said period, Losin's poultry meat needs for her
business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and
authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a supervisor of said corporation.
Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her account started to experience problems
because of the fact that Directo delivered stocks to her even without prior booking which is the
customary process of doing business with her.

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On August 24, 1996, Directo's services were terminated by Vitarich without Losin's knowledge.
He left without turning over some supporting invoices covering the orders of Losin. Rosa and
Baybay, on the other hand, resigned on November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1996, respectively.
Just like Directo, they did not also turn over pertinent invoices covering Losin's account.

On February 12, 1997, demand letters were sent to Losin covering her alleged unpaid account
amounting to P921,083.10. Because of said demands, she checked her records and discovered that
she had an overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of P500,000.00. She relayed this fact to Vitarich
and further informed the latter that checks were issued and the same were collected by Directo.

It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting to P288,463.30 which were dishonored
either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or Stop Payment.

On March 2, 1998, Vitarich filed a complaint for Sum of Money against Losin, Directo, Rosa, and
Baybay before the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an overpayment in this case

RULING:

None. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. In Jimenez v.

NLRC, 256 SCRA 84 (1996), the Court ruled that the burden rests on the debtor to prove

payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The debtor has the burden of

showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment. True, the law

requires in civil cases that the party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Section 1,

Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to prove

the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law.

In this case, however, the burden of proof is on Losin because she alleges an affirmative defense,
namely, payment. Losin failed to discharge that burden.In the case at bar, no cash payment was
proved. It was neither confirmed that the checks issued by Losin were actually encashed by
Vitarich.

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DELA RAMA V. PAPA

G.R. NO. 142309 30 JANUARY 2009

TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The failure to discharge burden of proof by the petitioner is not controlling when the burden of
evidence has already shifted against the defendant and was not able to substantiate the same.

FACTS:

The Dela Rama spouses own a parcel of land which was allegedly sold to the Papa spouses, the
latter having successfully obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title. A petition for annulment of the
TCT was filed by the Dela Rama spouses on the ground of forgery. The RTC granted the petition
while the CA reversed the decision since the burden of proof was not allegedly discharged by the
Dela Rama spouses to prove the forgery by presenting witnesses according to the rules.

ISSUE:

Whether the failure of the Dela Rama spouses to discharge the necessary burden of proof is
sufficient for reversal of the decision.

RULING:

No. While it is incumbent upon the Dela Rama spouses to discharge the burden of proving the
forgery by presenting witnesses, it is not controlling when the burden of evidence has already
shifted to Papa following the latter’s testimony as a hostile witness that he did not see the Dela
Rama spouses sign the Deed of Sale not to mention the former’s documentary evidence of payment
of real estate taxes even after the alleged sale.

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ETERNIT EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR,

HON. JESUS DE VEYRA AND ETERNIT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 50110 September 21, 1990

MEDIALDEA, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation and
therefore, it behooves upon the petitioner claiming overtime pay to prove that he is entitled to the
same.

Where the petitioner union’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish its cause of action
against the employer, the voluntary arbitrator did not commit arbitrariness in his decision in
dismissing the complaint, when the proceedings had in the case were considered in their totality
and the petitioner was given the opportunity to present its side.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a labor union of workers employed in respondent corporations which is

engaged in the manufacture of asbestos cement products. The petitioner union and respondent
corporation entered into a collective bargaining agreement which was renewed for a term of three
(3) years from August 1, 1975 to July 31, 1978.

Due to the failure of respondent corporation to implement some of the provisions of the
CBA, petitioner union filed a complaint with the then Ministry of Labor. The case was thereafter
certified for voluntary arbitration.

During a preliminary hearing, the union agreed to submit for resolution six issues, ranging
from overtime work rendered on a Saturday to the right of 23 employees who were earlier ordered
reinstated to vacation and sick leaves, 13th month pay and adjustment pay.

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The union later filed a motion to re-open the issue on overtime work rendered on Saturdays,
from August to December 1975, on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. The voluntary
arbitrator agreed and allowed the union to present evidence.

When the voluntary arbitrator ruled against the union, holding that no satisfactory evidence
was presented to prove that its members rendered overtime work on the Saturdays mentioned, the
union filed a petition with the Supreme Court to annul the Voluntary arbitrator’s order, alleging
grave abuse of discretion.

Petitioner union contends that the voluntary arbitrator erred in requiring petitioner to
present evidence on its claim for overtime pay since the respondent company had admitted that it
had in fact overpaid petitioner’s claim for overtime work; that the findings and conclusions of
respondent arbitrator are belied by the evidence presented by petitioner, to wit, the joint affidavit
of the employees and time cards in the company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contention of petitioner union that it does not have the legal obligation
to present evidence on its claim for overtime pay is untenable.

RULING:

YES.

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation and
therefore, it behooves upon the petitioner claiming overtime pay to prove that he is entitled to the
same. Moreover, the petitioner's allegation is contrary to the actuations it had before the voluntary
arbitrator. Records show that after the issuance of the award by the voluntary arbitrator on March
16, 1978 granting the other claims of petitioner, the latter on its own initiative moved to reopen
the case and manifested that it will present newly discovered evidence on its claim for overtime
pay. After the petitioner was allowed to do so by the voluntary arbitrator, it cannot now come to
this Court and allege that it had no legal obligation in the first place to prove that they had rendered
overtime work.

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Where the petitioner union’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish its cause of action
against the employer, the voluntary arbitrator did not commit arbitrariness in his decision in
dismissing the complaint, when the proceedings had in the case were considered in their totality
and the petitioner was given the opportunity to present its side. Further, the computation of salaries,
allowances and even overtime pay of the workers are factual questions vested with the labor
official concerned, who in this case, is the voluntary arbitrator chosen by the parties pursuant to
Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. This Court has no authority in certiorari proceedings
to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence before a labor officer. In the absence of any sufficient proof
in this case that the voluntary arbitrator gravely abused its discretion, his decision should be given
the highest respect and finality.

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EQUIPOISE OR EQUIPONDERANCE RULE

FERNANDO MAHAWAN V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 176609 DECEMBER 18, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or in equally
balanced, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden
of proof loses.

The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other with this guilt, in which case the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.

FACTS:

Petitioner Fernando Mahawan was charged with frustrated homicide before the RTC Cebu
City. The prosecution presented the private complainant, Diosdada Paradero as witness. According
to Paradero, she was tending to her store when Mahawan arrived and asked her for a bottle of beer.
She answered him that there was no more beer. Mahawan then entered inside the store and pulled
out a gun. He then proceeded to shot Paradeco in the left chest. Paradero was able to grabbed a
kitchen knife to defend herself, but Paradero shot him again, which merely grazed on her left
earlobe. Mahawan snatched her knife and fled.

On the other hand, Mahawan disclaimed liability, and invoked self-defense.

According to the petitioner, he went to the store to buy cigarettes when Paradero went out of her
store while holding a knife and tried to stab him. Paradero then tried again to stab him and he was
slightly hit by the knife in the stomach. Because of this, he drew his gun and shot Paradero.

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The trial court convicted Mahawan beyond reasonable doubt of the crime frustrated
homicide. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the equipoise doctrine in favor of
Mahawan.

RULING:

No, the Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court did not err in not applying the equipoise
doctrine in this case.

It was stated by the Supreme Court that under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an
issue of fact is in equipoise or in equally balanced, or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other with this guilt, in which case the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

In this case, there are no inculpatory facts and circumstances which are capable of two or
more explanations because Mahawan has already admitted shooting Paradero. There is no more
issue as to the innocence or guilt of Mahawan. What is left to be resolved in this case is whether
or not he can be relieved of liability by virtue of self-defense he pleaded.

The equipoise rule does not apply in this case because Mahawan failed to discharge the
burden of proving with clearing and convincing evidence the presence of the elements of self-
defense.

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CONCLUSIVE AND DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS

JARCO MARKETING vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999

DAVIDE, JR.

DOCTRINE:

In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to

have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same
presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine
and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since
negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability,
either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to
be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under
our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

FACTS:

In 1983, Criselda Aguilar and her six-year old child Zhieneth were at Syvel’s Department
Store in Makati. It is owned by Jarco Marketing. Criselda was signing her credit card slip when
she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She found Zhieneth on the floor, her young
body pinned by the bulk of the store’s gift wrapping counter/structure. The child was crying and
screaming for help. She was brought to the hospital but died 14 days after the accident.

Criselda sued Jarco Marketing for damages. Jarco raised the following arguments: a.)
Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence; b.) Zhieneth was guilty of contributory
negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse; c.) the counter was made
of sturdy wood with strong support and it never fell nor collapsed for the past 15 years; d.) It
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Zhieneth, a six-year old child, is guilty of contributory negligence.

RULING:

Zhieneth is not guilty of contributory negligence. A person under nine years of age is
conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a
case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a
condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy,
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of
age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age
must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the

defendant. It is “a fortuitous circumstance,” event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.” On the other hand,
negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is “the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly18 demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.”

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed
over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners’ theory that the counter
was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the

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counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of
Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all.
Shaped like an inverted “L,” the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It
protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.

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JUANITO ERMITANO VS. PAGLAS

G.R. NO. 174436 23 JANUARY 2013

DOCTRINE:

Civil Law; Lease; What a tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have
been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply.—
The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as
estoppel against tenants, provides as follows: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions.—The following
are instances of conclusive presumptions: x x x x (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title
of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between
them. (Emphasis supplied). It is clear from the above quoted provision that what a tenant is
estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-
tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that
the landlord’s title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to
deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what
respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent
to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the
presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

FACTS:

A contract of lease was executed between Juanita Ermitaño through her attorney-in[1]fact Isabelo
Ermitaño and Lailanee Paglas in the former’s residential lot and house for a period of one year
with a monthly rental rate of Php13,500.00. Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract,
Paglas was informed that the said lot and house was mortgaged in favour of Charlie Yap. The same
was extra-judicially foreclosed in favour of Yap. Yap then offered the sale of the foreclosed
property to Paglas. It was accepted by Paglas resulting to the execution of Deed of Sale between
Yap and Paglas. Meanwhile, Ermitaño demanded the payment of the rentals to Paglas but the latter
refused to do so. Repeated demands for the payment of the rentals were made but to no avail.

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Ermitaño then filed a complaint for forcible entry against Paglas before the MTC but it was
dismissed. On appeal to the RTC and CA, it was again dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conclusive presumption of estoppel against landowner is applicable in the case.

RULING:

No. The conclusive presumption found in Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, known as
estoppel against tenants, provides as follows: Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following
are instances of conclusive presumptions: xxxx (b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of
his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
(Emphasis supplied). It is clear from the above quoted provision that what a tenant is estopped
from denying is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant
relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that
the landlord's title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to
deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. In the present case, what
respondent is claiming is her supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent
to the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the
presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ONG

G.R. No. 137348 June 21, 2004

DOCTRINE:

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken
in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of
the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent
evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally
protected rights of the individual. It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses

FACTS:

On July 27, 1998 accused William Ong, Ching De Ming and Robert Tiu were charged with
violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, for
selling or offering for sale of Methyl Amphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.

Upon arraignment, the two (2) accused, who are Chinese nationals, pled not guilty. The records
do not show whether they had sufficient knowledge of the English language. Their trial proceeded.
In the course of the trial, the two (2) accused were given the services of a Chinese interpreter. The
prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Rodolfo S. Gonzales that a confidential informant
reported the illicit drug activities of William Ong and unidentified Chinese. The team decided to
conduct a buy bust operation The officers brought the two (2) accused to their office where the
corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were prepared. The plastic bag containing the white
crystalline substance was referred to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The two (2)
accused were subjected to a physical and mental examination as required. They were found to be
free from any external signs of trauma. Forensic chemist testified that the specimen she examined
had a net weight of 980.50 grams and manifested "positive results for methyl amphetamine

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hydrochloride"3 or what is commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug. Her testimony was
supported by her Physical Sciences Report.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a valid entrapment

RULING:

No, there is no valid entrapment.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by police
officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody
inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were undertaken
in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure that the details of
the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material and competent
evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied restraint the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement agents. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally
protected rights of the individual. It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent persons are made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started
and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by SPO1
Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales’ testimony
is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same falls within the
exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay statements and convict

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the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his constitutional right to confront
the witness against him, in this case the informant, and to examine him for his truthfulness. As the
prosecution failed to prove all the material details of the buy-bust operation, its claim that there
was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.

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PEOPLE V. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS

G.R. NO. 181492 DECEMBER 16, 2008

TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
merely just that-a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by
the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.

FACTS:

PROSECUTION

PSI Marcelino Pedrozo of MWPD organized a buy-bust team on the information of a confidential
informant that the latter was able to place an order for half a bulto of shabu with Obmiranis. PO
Jerry Velasco was designated as team leader and the poseur-buyer. The team informed the PDEA
of the impending operation, and proceeded to Sampaloc, Manila. The informant joined Velasco
in his car and waited for the arrival of Obmiranis; when Obmiranis arrived and saw the informant,
he approached the latter. The informant introduced Velasco to Obminaris and said Velasco wanted
to buy half bulto of shabu. Velasco negotiated to lower the price but Obmiranis refused. When
Obmiranis took the item, Velasco immediately recognized the item as a plastic sachet containing
a white crystalline substance. When Obmiranis asked for payment, he recognized Velasco’s co-
officer because he uttered the words “may pulis yata”. At this point, he was arrested.

Velasco was the one who effected the arrested but it was PO Wilfredo Cinco who seized the plastic
sachet from Obmiranis. The team brought the seized item to the police headquarters and there
Cinco marked the same “SOO”. He could not remember if the item had been inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused. Cinco did not mark in on the spot and the markings
made on the marked money had not been entered in the blotter. The chemistry report yieled
positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride.

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DEFENSE:

Obmiranis asserted that he was framed-up by the buy-bust team, and strongly denied having
transacted the alleged sale of shabu with Velasco and the informant. He claimed that he was taken
by the team on May 17, 2004 not May 18. He was about to see his girlfriend by he was arrested
by 2 men in civilian clothes, while inside the police car they cuffed him and pulled a gun and hit
him in the neck, kicked him and Velasco asked if he could give them P200,000, but he said he did
not have such money. He was told to find someone who sells drugs in a large-scale.

RTC found Obmiranis guilty for possession of illegal drugs. CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Obmiranis is guilty of the crime committed?

RULING:

In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the
offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of
guilt. In prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti
of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. It is therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the identity of the
dangerous drug be likewise established beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, it must be
established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.

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Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002 defines chain of custody as "the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous
drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction."

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. It would thus include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was seized to the time it is offered in court as evidence, such that every
person who handled the same would admit how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and
the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. It is from
the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be
derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.

The prosecution evidence in the case at bar, however, does not suffice to afford such assurance.
Of all the people who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from
appellant, only Velasco was able to observe the uniqueness thereof in court. Cinco, who, according
to Velasco, took initial custody of the plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked
the same with the initials "SOO" at the police station, was not even presented in court to directly
observe the uniqueness of the specimen and, more importantly, to acknowledge the marking as his
own. The same is true with respect to the laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless
failed to testify on the circumstances under which he received the specimen at the laboratory for
analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the examination which was administered on the
specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his possession and custody. Aside from that,

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it was not reasonably explained why these same witnesses were not able to testify in court. While
indeed the prosecution and the defense had stipulated on the qualification of the forensic chemist,
dispensed with his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist had no personal knowledge
of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for examination, nevertheless, these stipulations and
admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G. Reyes and not to Forensic Chemical Officer Maritess
Mariano who, based on the chemistry report, was the one who examined the contents of the plastic
sachet at the crime laboratory.

In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably
concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in
effect failed to obliterate the hypothesis of appellant's guiltlessness.

Hence, in authenticating narcotic specimens, a standard more stringent than that applied to objects
which are readily identifiable must be applied-a more exacting standard that entails a chain of
custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or contaminated or tampered with.

The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution, alteration or
contamination-whether intentional or unintentional-of narcotic substances at any of the links in the
chain of custody thereof especially because practically such possibility is great where the item of
real evidence is small and is similar in form to other substances to which people are familiar in
their daily lives.

Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity of
narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs to, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
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same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

These guidelines, however, were not shown to have been complied with by the members of the
buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply
with the statutory requirements in handling the evidence. Velasco, the leader of the raiding team,
himself admitted that as soon as appellant was arrested, Cinco had taken custody of the plastic
sachet of shabu, placed it in his pocket and brought the same together with appellant to the police
station. It was at the police station-and not at the place where the item was seized from appellant-
where according to him (Velasco), Cinco had placed the initials "SOO" on the specimen. Velasco
never even mentioned that the identifying mark on the specimen was placed in appellant's
presence; he could not even remember whether or not the specimen had been properly inventoried
and photographed at least in appellant's presence. Even more telling is the fact that, as elicited
from Velasco himself during his cross-examination, no evidence custodian had been designated
by the raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized from
appellant.

All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug
allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled
the same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court,
militates against the prosecution's cause because it not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus
delicti but also tends to discredit, if not totally negate, the claim of regularity in the conduct of
official police operation.

It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must
be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or

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duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words,
obtains only where nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where
the official act in question is irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of
course.

There is indeed merit in the contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was
successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said
police operatives had regularly performed their duty, but the theory is correct only where there is
no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular. Suffice it to say at this point that the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that-a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as
binding truth.

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GAMBOA-HIRSCH VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 174485 JULY 11, 2007

VELASCO, JR., J.

DOCTRINE:

The so-called “tenderage presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome
only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.

FACTS:

Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, and
established their conjugal dwelling in Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December 21,
2002, a child was born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the couple started to have marital
problems as Agnes wanted to stay in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay in Boracay
Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes came to their conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money
and for Franklin’s permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief vacation.
Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter discovered that neither Agnes nor their daughter
Simone would be coming back to Boracay.

Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for Agnes to produce Simone
in court, which was issued by the latter. After a series of hearings and presentation of evidence,
the CA, on June 8, 2006, promulgated the assailed Decision granting Franklin joint custody with
Agnes of their minor child.

ISSUE:

Whether CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint custody of the minor child
to both parents.

RULING:

YES.

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The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “in all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
The Child and Youth Welfare Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.

The so-called “tenderage presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be
overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother is declared
unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease.

Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her
minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mother’s custody.

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DUTCH BOY PHILIPPINES V. RONALD SENIEL

G.R. No. 170008 19 January 2009

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

Petitioner Dutch Boy conducted an audit of its sales accounts with its authorized dealers in
Mindanao. Petitioner discovered that the dealers had outstanding balances from Certified
Mindanao Marketing Corporation (CMMC). This prompted petitioner to send letters of
confirmation to the concerned dealers for the latter to confirm their respective balances. Upon
receipt of said letters, the authorized dealers disclaimed their alleged accountabilities; and
contended instead that the same had already been paid or that they never ordered/received the
goods stated therein.

Petitioner issued a Memorandum to Joyohoy, its sales representative in Mindanao,

requiring him to explain the transactions. He said that the subject stocks were withdrawn by Ronald
and Cesario Seniel, or their representatives and delivered to Teknik Marketing. Due to failure of
payment, petitioner filed an action for Collection of Sum of Money against Joyohoy, Ronald and
Cesario, and claimed that they conspired and acted fraudulently.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in declaring the petition was not able to establish conspiracy
among Joyohoy, Ronald and Cesario despite the clear findings by the lower court?

RULING:

No. We reiterate the well-entrenched principle that this Court is not a trier of facts and does
not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties. A number of
exceptions have nevertheless been recognized. Indeed, the difference between the findings of the

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trial and appellate courts, leading to entirely disparate dispositions, is reason enough for this Court
to review the evidence in this case.

After a careful evaluation of the records, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals. The appellate court is correct in saying that
petitioner failed to sufficiently establish Ronald and Cesario’s liability.

It is a basic rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
“greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” It is evidence which
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Although the evidence adduced by plaintiff is stronger than that presented by defendant, a
judgment cannot be entered in favor of the former, if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his
cause of action.

Petitioner’s cause of action in its complaint against Ronald and Cesario was the act of defraudation
which they allegedly committed in conspiracy with Joyohoy. It is, therefore, imperative for
petitioner to prove that fraud was committed and that conspiracy existed.

It was established that the goods were brought out of the warehouse upon the order of Joyohoy.
Per his job description, Joyohoy should have delivered the products to the authorized dealers,
collected their payments, then remitted his collections to petitioner’s depositary bank.
Unfortunately for petitioner, Joyohoy used his position as an authorized sales representative and
abused the trust reposed in him, in misappropriating the subject paint products.

In finding Ronald and Cesario liable, the trial court relied on the testimony of the warehouseman
Romeo Gutierrez (Romeo) that Joyohoy instructed him on several occasions to release to the
former various paint products. The testimony of Manuel Antolin (Antolin) was also cited to show
how the alleged defraudation was discovered by petitioner. Likewise adduced as evidence was the
handwritten response letter sent by Joyohoy to petitioner stating that the subject paint products
were withdrawn by Ronald and Cesario and/or their representatives.26 Said pieces of evidence,
however, lack probative value.

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A thorough evaluation of the testimony of Romeo shows that, indeed, the subject paint products
were withdrawn from the warehouse upon the authority and instruction of Joyohoy. However, it
is wanting in details as to the alleged participation of Ronald and Cesario that would make them
conspirators in defrauding petitioner. While petitioner claimed in its complaint that Ronald and
Cesario had a hand in the preparation of fictitious sales orders and invoices, Romeo admitted in
his testimony that he himself was the one who prepared them upon the instruction of Joyohoy. If
at all, Ronald and Cesario’s participation was limited to receiving the subject paint products. But
apart from Romeo’s bare allegation, there is no iota of evidence to show such fact of receipt. If we
follow the procedure in releasing petitioner’s products from the warehouse, as testified to by
Romeo, the signature of the person receiving the goods was necessary. Yet again, the signature of
Ronald and Cesario never appeared in any of the documentary evidence presented.

The testimony of Antolin establishes a disparity in the accounts, as appearing in petitioner’s

records and those of the dealers. It shows that Joyohoy was repeatedly involved in anomalous
transactions by preparing fictitious sales invoices, withdrawing paint products from the warehouse,
then selling them to various establishments in Mindanao with whom petitioner had no dealings.
Thus, apart from the P783,097.05 liability charged to Joyohoy in concert with Ronald and Cesario,
the trial court likewise made Joyohoy answerable for the amount of P859,589.57 arising from
another illegal transaction. However, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against
Joyohoy, no clear evidence could link Ronald and Cesario to these fraudulent transactions.
Besides, as correctly observed by the appellate court, sales transactions that were conducted with
non-authorized dealers were sanctioned by petitioner.

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REMENTIZO VS. HEIRS OF PELAGIA VDA. DE MADARIETA

G.R. NO. 170318, 15 JANUARY 2009

CARPIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Madarieta miserably failed to show that Rementizo employed fraud in the awarding of EP No. A-
028390-H in his favor. Fraud is a question of fact which must be alleged and proved. Fraud cannot
be presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, there was no such
evidence showing actual fraud on the part of Rementizo.

FACTS:

The instant controversy stemmed from a Complaint for Annulment and Cancellation of Original
Certificate of Title filed by the late Pelagia Vda. De Madarieta against Rementizo before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Camiguin.

In her complaint, Madarieta claimed that she is the owner of a parcel of land declared in the name
of her late husband Angel Madarieta with an area of 436 square meters situated in Tabulig,
Poblacion, Mambajao, Camiguin.

The trial court ordered the cancellation and/or revocation of the OCT for being null and void ab
initio, and the respondent or anybody in possession or occupation of subject land is hereby ordered
to turn over subject land to the plaintiff and vacate the premises.

Rementizo appealed the Provincial Adjudicator’s order to the DARAB-Central Office. On 7

February 2001, the DARAB-Central Office reversed the Provincial Adjudicator’s order by ruling
in favor of Rementizo.

Madarieta filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the DARAB. But in its Decision of 26 May 2004, the Court of Appeals
held that when Madarieta filed an action on 5 November 1998, for the annulment and cancellation

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of Rementizo’s title, more than 10 years had passed after the issuance of Rementizo’s title
rendering the title incontrovertible.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for the annulment of the emancipation patent, which ultimately seeks the
reconveyance of the title issued to Rementizo, has already been prescribed.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious. In the present case, the DAR, which is presumed to have regularly
performed its official function, awarded EP No. A-028390-H to Rementizo in 1987. Aside from
this emancipation patent, two other emancipation patents and certificates of title (OCT Nos. 183
and 174) were issued to Rementizo covering two different parcels of land.

This means that Rementizo was a qualified beneficiary of various parcels of agricultural land
placed under the government’s Operation Land Transfer.

The Court notes that Madarieta was claiming the subject property as the surviving spouse of Angel.
While Madarieta presented evidence pointing out that Lot No. 153-F was historically owned and
declared in the name of her deceased husband, Angel, there is nothing in the records showing that
Angel during his lifetime opposed Rementizo’s occupation and possession of the subject land.
Madarieta and respondents started claiming the property after the death of Angel. Considering that
the subject property was proximate to the Madarietas’ residence, Angel could have questioned the
legality of Rementizo’s occupation over the land.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what
is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s
name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. The person in whose name the land is
registered holds it as a mere trustee.

Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is
subject to extinctive prescription.

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Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment. (Emphasis supplied)

The 10-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of title. In
the instant case, however, it is the rule rather than the exception which should apply.

In this case, there is no evidence adduced by Madarieta or respondents that Rementizo employed
fraud in the issuance of EP No. A-028390-H and OCT No. EP-195. Madarieta did not even present
any evidence that her late husband objected to Rementizo’s occupation over the subject land after
the issuance of EP No. A-028390-H and OCT No. EP-195.

Thus, Madarieta miserably failed to show that Rementizo employed fraud in the awarding of EP
No. A-028390-H in his favor. Fraud is a question of fact which must be alleged and proved. Fraud
cannot be presumed and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In this case, there was
no such evidence showing actual fraud on the part of Rementizo.

The petition is granted.

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ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO V. MODESTA AGUSTIN

G.R. NO. 152364 APRIL 15, 2010

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have
in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence in the contrary.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule of authentication. Thus, an
affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat.
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular.

FACTS:

Spouses Simeon Santos and Trinidad Duldulao, died intestate, leaving a parcel of land
situated in Laoag to their four legitimate children, namely: Basilisa, Alberto, Leoncio and
Alejandra. Upon the agreement of the siblings, the land was titled to the name of Basilisa Santos,
with the understanding that the said action did not make Basilisa the sole and exclusive owner of
the land.

Alejandra and Basilisa both spent an amount of money in erecting a residential house in
the land. However, upon the death of Basilisa, the land was transferred to her children, herein
respondents, without the consent of Basilisa’s siblings.

Alejandra, Alberto and Leoncio initiated the partition of the land and presented an affidavit
allegedly executed by Basilisa, that each sibling is entitled to ¼ of the subject land. but this was
opposed by the respondents, stating that the petitioners never owned the said land, and that there
was no agreement between Basilisa and her siblings that the latter have share over the lot.

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The MTCC ruled in favor of the respondents, ruling that there is no evidentiary value that
could be given to the affidavit, since the affiant cannot be presented in the witness stand, hence all
statements in the affidavit were mere hearsay. It was also ruled by the Court that credible witnesses
of the respondents testified that at the time the affidavit was supposedly signed by Basilisa, she
was already bedridden and could not even feed herself. The MTCC also gave credence to the
testimony of the notary public, who stated that the document was already complete and thumb
marked when it was presented to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa can be given full faith and credence in view of the
issues raised regarding the genuineness and due execution.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that the statement of Basilisa cannot be given full faith.

As ruled by the Supreme Court, settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document
carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However,
this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence in the
contrary. Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule of authentication. Thus, an
affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat.
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular.

In this case, the fact that the affidavit was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents. The presumption of regularity cannot be applied in this case, since the regularity of the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings when the prima facie validity
was over thrown by the questionable circumstances under which the affidavit was allegedly
executed.

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PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ERNESTO LOPEZ and

FLORENTINA LOPEZ, substituted by JOSEPH WILFRED JOVEN, JOSEPH GILBERT
JOVEN and MARLYN JOVEN

G.R. No. 186332 October 23, 2013

BRION, J.

DOCTRINE:

Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so as to raise

an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that
it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what
his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This doctrine
rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity
will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1983, the spouses Ernesto and Florentina Lopez applied for and obtained a real
estate loan in the amount of P3,000,000.00 from Planters Bank, intended to finance the
construction of a four-story concrete dormitory building. The loan agreement provided that the
loan is payable for fourteen (14) years and shall bear a monetary interest at (21%) per annum.
Furthermore, partial drawdowns on the loan shall be based on project completion, and shall be
allowed upon submission of job accomplishment reports by the project engineer. To secure the
payment of the loan, the spouses Lopez mortgaged a parcel of land.

The parties signed an amendment to the loan agreement. Accordingly, the interest rate was
increased to twenty-three percent (23%) p.a. and the term of the loan was shortened to 3 years.
The parties executed a second and third amendment to the loan agreement. The interest rate was
further increased to twenty-five percent (25%, 27% up to 32%) p.a.

The spouses Lopez failed to avail the full amount of the loan because Planters Bank refused
to release the remaining amount of P700,000.00. The spouses Lopez filed against Planters Bank
a complaint for rescission of the loan agreements and for damages with (RTC) of Makati City.
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They alleged that they could not continue the construction of the dormitory building because
Planters Bank had refused to release the remaining loan balance.

RTC ruled in favor of the bank, held that It maintained that the spouses Lopez violated the loan
agreement by failing to submit accomplishment reports and by deviating from the construction
project plans.

CA reversed the ruling of RTC concluding that Planters Bank was estopped from raising the issue
of the spouses Lopez’s deviation from the construction project.

ISSUE:

Whether the Planters Bank is estopped from opposing the spouses Lopez’s deviation from
the construction project

RULING:

Yes. The Court affirmed the CA's finding that Planters Bank is estopped from opposing Lopez's
construction of a six-story building. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that
whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led
another to believe that a particular thing is true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.

The concurrence of the following requisites is necessary for the principle of equitable estoppel
to apply: (a) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment of material facts or at least
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those
which the party subsequently attempts to assert;

(b) intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the
other party; and

(c) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual facts.

Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so as to

raise an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances

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that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny
what his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This
doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to speak,
equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HONG YEN E and TSIEN TSIEN CHUA

GR No. 181826 January 09, 2013

ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

The evidence on record clearly established that appellant Chua was in possession of the plastic
bags containing prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. Applying Section 3(j), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, a disputable presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag and its
contents.

FACTS:

Chief of the Narcotics Division Atty. Lasala ordered NBI Investigator Suñega to place accused
Yen E under surveillance and arrange a possible buy-bust involving him. Subsequently, they went
to Jollibee Masangkay Branch for a pre-arranged meeting with Yen E. At that meeting, Yen E
agreed to sell two kilograms of shabu to Suñega for P600,000.00 per kilogram. They agreed to
deliver the shabu in the evening of the following day.

Suñega prepared the boodle money and marked the bills at the top of each bundle. As agreed, the
NBI agents met again Yen E. Yen E arrived but requested the police buyers to meet him at Lai-
Lai Restaurant. At the Lai-Lai Restaurant, accused Chua and Ang arrived. Upon the Yen E’s
instruction, Chua handed over the plastic bags she had to Suñega. Convinced that these contained
shabu, Suñega lit his cigarette, the signal that the buy-bust had been completed. After the arrest of
the three, Suñega placed the shabu in plastic bags and marked it. The police then submitted the
suspected shabu for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Analyst Ylao testified that the contents
of the plastic bags proved to be methamphetamine hydrochloride.

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The City Prosecutor of Manila separately charged the Yen E, Chua and Ang before RTC for
violation of Section 15, Article III in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (m), and (o), Article I in relation
to Article 21 of R.A. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree 7659.

Accused Chua and Yen E denied the charges and testified that it was a case of "hulidap" and they
tortured her. They divested her of her jewelry and demanded P2 million for her release. Ang, on
the other hand, jumped bail and thus waived his right to adduce evidence.

On April 29, 2004 the RTC found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution succeeded in proving beyond
reasonable doubt the consummation of the illegal sale of prohibited drugs.

RULING:

Yes. To prove the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution's evidence should
establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Absent any of these two elements, the
prosecution's case must fail.

Here, while SI Suñega claimed that Yen E offered to sell to him two kilograms of shabu for P1.2
million and that he agreed to buy the same, the sale was not consummated. SI Suñega admitted
that the back-up team immediately arrested the appellants before he could deliver the buy- bust
money to the appellants. It is material in illegal sale of dangerous drugs that the sale actually took
place. What consummates the buy-bust transaction is the delivery of the drugs to the poseur-buyer
and, in turn, the seller's receipt of the marked money.

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However, appellant's exoneration from the sale of prohibited drugs does not spell freedom from
all criminal liability as they may be convicted for illegal possession of prohibited drugs under
Section 89 of R.A. 6425. This Court has consistently ruled that possession is necessarily included
in the sale of illegal drugs.

The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.

The evidence on record clearly established that appellant Chua was in possession of the plastic
bags containing prohibited drugs without the requisite authority. Applying Section 3(j), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, a disputable presumption arises that she is the owner of the bag and its
contents. It may be rebutted by contrary proof that the accused did not in fact exercise power and
control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus
shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. Here, Chua failed to present
evidence to rebut the presumption. She claims that she was a victim of frame-up and extortion by
the narcotics agents of the NBI. This defense is viewed with disfavor for it can be easily concocted.
The defense of frame-up, often imputed to police officers, requires strong proof when offered as a
defense, because of the presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of their
official duties.

Although the plastic bags containing shabu were found solely in the possession of Chua, it was
evident that Yen E had knowledge of its existence. As the records would show, Yen E negotiated
for the sale of dangerous drugs. When Chua arrived in the vicinity, she approached Yen E before
delivering the shabu to Suñega. These acts of the accused indubitably demonstrate a coordinated
plan on their part to actively engage in the illegal business of drugs. When conspiracy is shown,
the act of one is the act of all conspirators. Direct evidence of conspiracy is not necessary as it can
be clearly deduced from the acts of the accused.

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PEOPLE VS. GAA

G.R. NO. 212934 07 JUNE 2017

TIJAM, J.

DOCTRINE:

If the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, which means it is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the accused
may be convicted solely on that basis.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Blas Gaa was charged with two counts of Qualified Statutory Rape
under separate Informations. Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges. Trial ensued.

For the first count of qualified statutory rape, the victim AAA testified that in the morning
of April 4, 2001, she was alone with Gaa, when the latter asked her to remove her short and
underwear. Afterwards, Gaa also removed his shorts and underwear, and went on top of AAA.
Gaa did not succeed in penetrating AAA’s vagina but his penis was in the ‘bokana’ of AAA’s
vagina. AAA also testified that Gaa’s fingers was inserted inside her vagina, and described how
Gaa did the act.

For the second count of qualified statutory rape, the crime took place sometime in March
2003, while AAA was inside their bedroom. Gaa threatened to kill her with a bolo. AAA’ brother,
who saw the incident, first reported what happened to their mother. AAA’s mother then asked her
if it were true so AAA told her mother that it was true. AAA’s mother got mad and filed a case
against Blas Gaa.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges, which
was affirmed by the CA.

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ISSUE:

Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant Gaa despite the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

No.

In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is almost always, the single most important issue.
If the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, which means it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the accused may
be convicted solely on that basis.

The rule is settled that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are
accorded finality, unless the records show facts or circumstances of material weight and substance
that the lower court overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case. This is so because trial courts are in the best position
to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation
of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy
the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying, her “furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath” — all of which, are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness’
honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such witnesses are telling the
truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA.

Here, the RTC found AAA’s testimony straightforward, candid and was delivered in a
convincing manner which leaves no room for doubt that AAA was in fact raped by
accused[1]appellant. The Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the foregoing rule, since the

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accused[1]appellant failed to demonstrate that the RTC and the CA overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts of weight and substance that will alter the assailed Decision.

AAA’s testimonies established the fact that accused-appellant’s penis penetrated, however
slight, the lips of the female organ or the labia of the pudendum. As such, the crime of rape was
consummated.

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RULE 132- PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPO1 GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 116281 February 8, 1999

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Rule 119 Section 3 (e) of Criminal Procedure is not mandatory but subject to the discretion of the
court. The present rule is a response to the early case of Alejandro v. Pepito in which it ruled that
even in situations where the plea of self-defense is raised, the constitutional provision that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process still requires that in the
presentation of evidence the prosecution must go forward and present all its proof in the first
instance before the accused is required to substantiate his defense because the latter is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The change found in the present rule is based on the theory
that by pleading self-defense, the accused admits the killing and, therefore, the burden of
justification is now on him. Rule 119, Section 3(e), however, does not require such a change in the
order of trial but only allows it in the discretion of the court. This can be seen in the use of the
permissive “may”.

FACTS:

SPO1 Romulo Gutierrez was charged of murder for the death of Antonio Mercene, Jr.,
inflicting upon him gunshot wound and multiple abrasions and lacerations in different parts of his
body. He pleaded “not guilty” but later withdrew his not guilty plea and invoked self-defense.

The trial court entered a conditional guilty plea on him.

The prosecution testified Mercene, a councilor, was a member of Task Force Dagat. Prior
to his death, Mercene charged Gutierrez of grave misconduct because of an incident that happened.
The prosecution stated that Mercene, with other members, made an inspection along Casiligan
river where Gutierrez had been poaching in the area in which she had been granted the exclusive
right to catch lapu-lapu. Gutierrez shouted at them “Putang ina n’yo bakit may kasama kayong
konsehal. Aranas, the witness learned that Gutierrez killed Mercene after one day.

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Gutierrez argued that what happened was self-defense. According to him, he met Mercene
a little bit drunk and threatened to kill him. He responded “Huwag po konsehal, kaliliitan pa ng
mga anak ko.” However, Mercene threw box of mataches and tried to grab his service pistol which
was tucked at his waist. They grappled for the possession of the gun. According to Gutierrez,
Mercene tried to put his finger and he was not able to do so because his finger was there. He tried
to point the gun upwards but Mercene pointed the gun to him. He further argued that Mercene’s
finger pulled the trigger and accidentally killed himself.

Gutierrez argued that the trial court should have modified the order of trial allowing him
to present his defense first before the prosecution. He was relying on Rule 119 Section 3 (e), which
provides that: when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information
but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly. He also argued
that there were discrepancies with the testimony of one of the witness in the open court and that
of the affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether SPO1 Gutierrez should have been allowed to present his defense first because of his
defense of self-defense.

RULING:

The rule is not mandatory but subject to the discretion of the court. This is shown by the
word “may” in Rule 119 Section 3 (e) of Criminal Procedure.

According to the Supreme Court, the present rule is a response to the early case of
Alejandro v. Pepito in which it ruled that even in situations where the plea of self-defense is raised,
the constitutional provision that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process still requires that in the presentation of evidence the prosecution must go forward and

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present all its proof in the first instance before the accused is required to substantiate his defense
because the latter is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The change found in the
present rule is based on the theory that by pleading self-defense, the accused admits the killing
and, therefore, the burden of justification is now on him. Rule 119, Section 3(e), however, does
not require such a change in the order of trial but only allows it in the discretion of the court. This
can be seen in the use of the permissive “may”.

Although accused-appellant pleaded self-defense, he did not really admit the killing
because his claim was that it was the deceased who accidentally shot himself. There is, therefore,
no basis for reversing the order of trial. The burden was on the prosecution to prove that it was
accused-appellant who really fired his gun at the deceased.

As to his argument regarding affidavits, the Supreme Court ruled that affidavits taken ex
parte are often incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes because of suggestion and at other times
because of want of suggestion and inquiries; Affidavits are generally considered inferior to
testimony given in open court.

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HARRY GO, et. al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 185527 18 July 2012

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOCTRINE:

Oral deposition of the prosecution-witness cannot be taken in lieu of oral testimony. This
violates the accused’s constitutional rights to a public hearing and to meet the witnesses against
him face to face. This also deprives the judge of the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor and credibility.

The exception allowing the taking of oral depositions thereof must be done so before the
judge in the court where the case is pending.

FACTS:

Accused-petitioners herein are charged for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code for fraudulently representing themselves properties which in fact had already been
mortgaged and foreclosed by China Bank Corporation which is not unknown to them. With such
representation, they executed a mortgage in favor of Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li
Luen Ping, herein complainant-witness.

Due to his illness and old age, Li Luen Ping was only able to attend 1 hearing. The
prosecution then filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping. The Metropolitan Trial
Court granted the motion upon a showing of a medical certificate thereof.

The Regional Trial Court, however, reversed the decision ruling that the rules in civil
procedure cannot apply suppletorily to the case herein as there is a specific provision in the Rules
of Court with respect to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and allowed the taking of the deposition.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the taking of the deposition should be allowed.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the taking of the deposition of a prosecution-witness
will violate the constitutional rights of the accused to a public trial and to meet the witnesses
against him face to face.

As the RTC ruled, the Rules opn Civil Procedure cannot apply suppletorily as the case was
covered by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The taking of deposition of a prosecution-witness is
generally NOT allowed as it would infringe the accused’s constitutional rights.

However, this is NOT without an exception. Section 15 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides for the examination allowing the prosecution-witness to be taken
depositions in cases of sickness, infirmity to appeal at the trial as directed by the court, or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning.

However, this exception provides that the deposition be taken before the court where the
case is pending. To allow otherwise would not only deprive the accused of their constitutional
rights but also the judge of the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness and his
credibility.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDA ALVIZ

G.R. No. 177158 February 6, 2013

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony

FACTS:

About 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of February 4, 2003, a confidential informant arrived at Police
Station 1, La Loma, Quezon City and talked to the Officer-in-Charge. Thereafter, the Officer-in-
Charge formed a team to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operations at Isarog Street, Sta.
Teresita, Quezon City. PO2 Edsel Ibasco was designated as the poseur-buyer with SPO4 Edgardo
Reburiano and other policemen as back-up.

Upon arrival, PO2 Ibasco and the confidential informant approached Linda Alviz outside her
house. The confidential informant told Linda that PO2 Ibasco was deeply in need of shabu. Linda
asked for the money and PO2 Ibasco gave a P100.00 bill on which he earlier placed his initials
“EI.” Linda called for Elizabeth dela Vega, who was inside the house, and the two talked. Elizabeth
then went inside the house. After a while, Elizabeth came out and handed a plastic sachet to Linda.
Linda gave the P100.00 bill to Elizabeth and the plastic sachet to PO2 Ibasco. PO2 Ibasco then
gave the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. SPO4 Reburiano, who was only two (2) meters
away, rushed to the group, arrested Elizabeth and recovered from the latter the buy-bust money,
while PO2 Ibasco arrested Linda. The police officers brought Linda and Elizabeth to the police
station. PO2 Ibasco placed the letters “EV-LA” on the plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance. A request for laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance was made by
the La Loma Police Station 1 to the PNP Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office
(CPDCLO).

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the inconsistent statements of the police officers are admissible as evidence.

RULING:

YES. The inconsistencies adverted to by Elizabeth are trivial and insignificant and refer only to
minor details. Time and again, the Court has steadfastly ruled that inconsistencies on minor and
trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they
erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Furthermore, the Court cannot expect the testimonies
of different witnesses to be completely identical and to coincide with each other since they have
different impressions and recollections of the incident. Hence, it is only natural that their
testimonies are at variance on some minor details.

As this Court ruled in People v. Madriaga, 211 SCRA 698 (1992): Settled is the rule that
discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence
as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. These inconsistencies, which may be caused by
the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What is important
is that the testimonies agree on the essential facts and that the respective versions corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL ANDRES Y TRINIDAD

G.R. No. 193184 February 7, 2011

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. The
presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The failure to
present the informant does not vitiate the prosecution’s cause as his testimony is not indispensable
to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing since it would be merely corroborative of, and
cumulative with, that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and testified on the facts and
circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.

FACTS:

Two (2) separate informations for violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 were filed against accused Andres. During the trial, the prosecution presented two (2)
witnesses, namely: Senior Police Officer 2 Lucio Flores (SPO2 Flores) and Police Officer 2
Gaspar Talaue (PO2 Talaue), while the defense presented Andres as its lone witness.

A buy-bust operation was made wherein Andres was arrested.

Accused-appellant, for his part, denied the charges of illegal possession and illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and insisted that no buy-bust operation ever took place and said that he was
framed-up by the police officers.

Despite this, the RTC handed down a joint decision finding Andres guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

The RTC gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the arresting officers and gave no credence
to the claim of Andres that he was framed-up for lack of corroborating evidence.

Aggrieved, Andres appealed the RTC decision to the CA praying for the reversal and setting aside
of the judgment of conviction anchored on the following

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On January 20, 2010, the CA rendered the subject decision affirming in toto the decision of the
RTC. It ruled, among others, that the testimonies of the arresting officers were convincing and the
buy-bust operation was not a fabrication. The CA was of the view that the prosecution was able to
prove all the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The series of events
unmistakably showed that the chain of custody of the subject drugs was established proving that
the pieces of evidence were correctly preserved and identified. It further stated that the procedural
lapses committed by the police officers were not sufficient to render void the seizure of, and
custody over, the confiscated items.

Accused Andres argues that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police
officers cannot apply in this case because the alleged sale of illegal drugs was not established and
no buy-bust operation took place. The single testimony of PO2 Talaue proved nothing because it
was not corroborated. Moreover, the confidential informant was not presented in court to
corroborate his testimony. With respect to the custody and disposition of confiscated drugs, Andres
claims that the procedural requirements of Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA No. 9165 were
not followed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the non-presentment of confidential informant is essential in the prosecution of

drug cases

RULING:

Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which
involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings
are sustained by the CA.

The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. The
presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The failure to

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present the informant does not vitiate the prosecution’s cause as his testimony is not indispensable
to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing since it would be merely corroborative of, and
cumulative with, that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and testified on the facts and
circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug.

At any rate, informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities
and preserve their invaluable services to the police. It is well-settled that, except when the accused
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had
motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that the informant himself acted as the poseur-
buyer and the only one who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the
informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers'
eyewitness accounts.6 In this case, the confidential informant’s testimony was no longer necessary
precisely because PO2 Talaue’s detailed testimony was based on his personal knowledge of what
actually happened during the buy-bust operation.

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PEOPLE VS. CONDES

G.R. NO. 187077 FEBRUARY 23, 2011

MENDOZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial
court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality. Youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

FACTS:

On the evening of February 14, 1999, the 14-year old victim, AAA, was left alone with her
stepfather, appellant Alex Condes, at their house in Brgy. Bitin, Laguna. She was cleaning the
upstairs area of the house, when appellant entered the room, pointed a bolo at her neck, and warned
her not to shout. He pulled her down to the floor, removed her clothes, and when she tried to push
him away· subdued her with a threat of a cut from his bolo. Appellant removed his own garments,
positioned himself on top of his stepdaughter, and succeeded in inserting his penis into the victim.
He made push and pull movement for about ten minutes.

On July 21, 2003, the RTC rendered its judgment convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple rape. It rejected the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by the accused stating
that said defenses fell flat in the face of the testimony of AAA on her harrowing ordeal in the hands
of the accused. It found her testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, consistent with human
nature, and in the normal course of events. In his Brief, the accused put in issue the credibility of
AAAÊs testimony contending that she merely fabricated the accusation to place him behind bars
and rid him out of her life forever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of AAA was credible

RULING:

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YES.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses
and their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great
respect and are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness’
deportment and manner of testifying. Her “furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation,
flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath” are all useful
aids for an accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. The trial judge, therefore,
can better determine if witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected for it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if
they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained
by the CA.

When offended parties are young and immature girls from 12 to 16 years of age, courts are inclined
to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability, but also the public humiliation to which they would be exposed by a court trial, if
their accusation were not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.
It bears stressing that not an iota of evidence was presented by the defense showing that AAA’s
account of her defilement was not true.

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SANTIAGO PAERA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181626 May 30, 2011

CARPIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

No law requires the presentation of the private complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave
Threats, especially if, as here, there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its
commission against the non-testifying complainant.

FACTS:

As punong barangay, Santiago allocated his constituent’s use of communal water coming
from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of his contituents. Despite
Santiago’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. Santiago reminded Indalecio
of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.

The following day, Santiago inspected the tank after constituents complained of water
supply interruption. Santiago discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected.
To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, Santiago, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a
wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. Santiago then, without any warning,
picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!).
Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way, Diosetea. Upon seeing Santiago, Diosetea inquired
what the matter was. Instead of replying, Santiago shouted “Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka,
patyon tikaw!” (I dont spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly
scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, Santiago
turned his attention back to Indalecio. As Santiago chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and,
recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting “Bisag gulang ka, buk-on
nako imo ulo!” (Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!).

Santiago was charged for three (3) counts of Grave Threats.

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Santiago claimed that he can only be charged for a single count of the continued complex crime
of Grave Threats. He argued that there is a single crime committed through series of acts arising
from one criminal intent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the The prosecution proved the commission of grave threats against vicente.

RULING:

YES, We find no reversible error in the RTC’s affirmance of the MCTC’s ruling, holding petitioner
liable for Grave Threats against Vicente.

The prosecution’s evidence, consisting ofthe testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two
other corroborating witnesses, indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente with death.
Vicente’s inability to take the stand, for documented medical reason, does not detract from the
veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence. Petitioner’s claim of denial of his constitutional
right to confront witnesses is untenable as he had every opportunity to cross-examine the four
prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the private complainant as condition
for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as here, there were other victims and witnesses
who attested to its commission against the non-testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did
not raise Vicente’s non-appearance as an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw nothing
significant in the latter’s absence.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. ALBERTO V. SENERIS

G.R. NO. L-48883 AUGUST 6, 1980

MAKASIAR, J.

DOCTRINE:

Where a witness was already rigorously cross-examined on the essential elements of the crime and
what remained for further cross-examination when the witness died was on the alleged remand
received, which is a mere aggravating circumstance in parricide the witness’ testimony is
admissible in evidence, except that relative to the alleged reward.

FACTS:

Respondent Pilar is accused by being a principal by inducement in killing her husband Eduardo
Pimentel. It was alleged that she induced and offer money amounting to P3,000.00 as price to
Mario and Salim. The two accepted it and stabbed Eduardo with a knife. During the trial, Mario,
with the assistance of counsel, plead guilty with the crime charge of murder. Thereafter, he testified
as prosecution witness and as summarized by the petitioner, his testimony on direct examination
contained in seventy-six (76) pages of transcripts of stenographic notes, which was later on
reduced to fifty-three (53) pages of the transcript.

The cross – examination of Mario commenced, but was not completed due to lack of material time.
Thereafter, Mario was shot dead in the police station where he was detained. The conspiracy and
the alleged inducement by Pilar was touched during the cross – examination that was conducted.
Thus, the petitioner filed a motion for the admissibility of the testimony made by Mario. The
motion, however, was denied by respondent Hon. Seneris and rendered that the entire testimony
of Mario is inadmissible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is merit in the contention of the petitioner that the questioned testimony of
the deceased witness is admissible in evidence because the private respondent counsel had already
rigorously cross examined Mario Nemenio.

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RULING:

Yes. There is merit in the contention of the petitioner that the questioned testimony of its deceased
witness is admissible in evidence because private respondent’s counsel had already “rigorously
and extensively cross examined witness Mario on ALL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS of the crime of
parricide, all of which have been testified upon by said witness in his direct examination in chief
and consequently, the cross examination in chief has already been concluded.

The cross examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of the crime charged –
parricide, fact of killing is concerned. What remained was merely cross-examination regarding
price or reward which is not an element of parricide, but only an aggravating circumstance.

From the foregoing discussion, it is submitted that the rigorous and searching cross examination
of witness Mari practically concluded already the cross examination or has already substantially
accomplished the purpose of the cross examination and therefore, the failure to pursue further the
cross examination WOULD NOT adversely affect the admissibility of the direct testimony of said
witness anymore.

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ROSETE VS. LIM

G.R. NO. 136051. JUNE 8, 2006.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

DOCTRINE:

Only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take the witness stand. The right to refuse
to take the stand does not generally apply to parties in administrative cases or proceedings.

FACTS:

Respondents Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed before Branch 77 of the RTC of Quezon City
a Complaint for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and
Separation Benefits System(AFP-RSBS), Espreme Realty and Development Corporation
(Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj.Oscar Mapalo, Chito P. Rosete, Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Provinceof Mindoro Occidental.

It asked that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS covering certain parcels of lands in favor
of EspremeRealty and the titles under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the AFP-RSBS
and Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and title
of said lands to respondents,and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said
land under the name of Espreme Realtyand to transfer the same in the names of respondents.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action or suit and that venue has been improperly laid. Motions to Dismiss
filed by all the defendants were denied as well as their MR.

Petitioners manifested that on 5 June 1996, they filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in
the Court of Appeals challenging the trial court’s Orders that denied their Motions to Dismiss and
Reconsideration, respectively. They likewise informed the trial court that they filed an Ex Parte
Motion to Admit Answers Ex Abudanti Cautela.

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Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving notice that on June
18 and20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the deposition of petitioners Oscar Mapalo and Chito
Rosete.

Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination.They contend that since there are two criminal cases pending before the City
Prosecutors of MandaluyongCity and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in the present
case wherein respondent Juliano Lim isthe private complainant and petitioners are the respondents,
to permit the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination

The RTC denied the motion and objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and scheduled
the taking thereof; CA had affirmed

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to self incrimination in a deposition sustains in a civil case.

RULING:

The right to self incrimination does not find application in the civil cases against Rosete.

The case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. In
order for petitioners to exercise the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their
depositions, the case must partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on hand
certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact that there are two criminal cases pending which
are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of the civil case will not give them the right to
refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions. They are not facing criminal charges
in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only
when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only if and when incriminating
questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on the ground of their right against self-
incrimination.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. BAYANI S. RIVERA

G.R. No. 98376 August 16, 1991

NARVASA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The discretion to recall a witness is not properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant’s mere
general statement that there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to
afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points
and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed
generalities such as these as sufficient ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of
witness no longer discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the need
to propound additional questions is essential before the Court’s discretion may rightfully be
exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory showing of some concrete,
substantial ground for the recall. There must be a satisfactory showing on the movant’s part, for
instance, that particularly identified material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or
that particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose recall is prayed
for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual
absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat, there would be no foundation for a trial court
to authorize the recall of any witness.

FACTS:

Wilfredo L. Sembrano was charged with the crime of arson. It is the prosecution’s theory that he
wilfully caused the fire in the early morning of May 21, 1987 which totally burned and destroyed
the second and third floors of the "I Love You Restaurant and Sauna Bath"

Among the witnesses presented by the Government to demonstrate Sembrano’s culpability was
Benjamin Lee, a room boy of the restaurant and bath. Lee took the witness stand several times and
during which he was cross-examined by defense counsel, gave additional evidence on redirect
examination, was again questioned on recross-examination by the same defense counsel, and
thereafter allowed to step down.

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At the time the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence but before it could rest its
case, the defendant’s original counsel, withdrew his appearance and was substituted by another
attorney, Eduardo S. Rodriguez. The latter then filed a motion to recall Benjamin Lee for further
examination on the ground that "there seems to be many points and questions that should have
been asked but were not profounded by the former defense counsel who conducted the cross
examination."

Despite objections of the prosecution, the Court granted the motion. Efforts were thereafter exerted
to cause witness Benjamin Lee to again appear before the Court for further cross-examination. But
to no avail. So, on October 1, 199O the private prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion" to
dispense with the recall of Benjamin Lee. However, the Trial Court denied the said motion and
instead ordered "the testimony of Benjamin Lee be stricken off the record for lack of complete
cross-examination" because the witness could no longer be found, and "the failure of counsel for
the accused to further cross-examine the witness is not the fault of the defense."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it authorized the recall of
Benjamin Lee over the objections of the prosecution.

RULING:

Yes, the Trial Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing the recall of witness
Benjamin Lee over the objections of the prosecution, and in later striking out said witness’
testimony for want of further cross-examination.

There is no doubt that a Trial Court has discretion to grant leave for the recall of a witness. This is
clear from a reading of Section 9, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended,

"SECTION 9. Recalling witness. — After the examination of a witness by both sides has been
concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of the court. The court will grant or
withhold leave in its discretion, as the interests of justice may require."

But obviously that discretion may not be exercised in a vacuum, as it were, entirely, isolated from
a particular set of attendant circumstances. The discretion to recall a witness is not properly
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invoked or exercisable by an applicant’s mere general statement that there is a need to recall a
witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to afford a party full opportunity to present his
case," or that, as here, "there seems to be many points and questions that should have been asked"
in the earlier interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient ground for
recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer discretionary but ministerial.

Something more than the bare assertion of the need to propound additional questions is essential
before the Court’s discretion may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a
satisfactory showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a
satisfactory showing on the movant’s part, for instance, that particularly identified material points
were not covered in the cross-examination, or that particularly described vital documents were not
presented to the witness whose recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted
in so inept a manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, to repeat,
there would be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.

In the case at bar, the respondent Trial Court granted the defendant’s motion for recall on nothing
more than said movant’s general claim that certain questions — unspecified, it must be stressed
— had to be asked. In doing so it acted without basis, exercised power whimsically or capriciously,
and gravely abused its discretion.

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AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

SISON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NOS. 108280-83 16 NOVEMBER 1995

PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or
reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the
scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify
the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the
object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or
by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its
accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent
witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

FACTS:

This case occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA

Revolution. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups (Marcos supporters vs Cory

supporters or Coryista) sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the

murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known Coryista. The prosecution established that on July 27,

1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they

applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities.

Nevertheless, 3 thousand of Marcos loyalists, led by Attys Lozano and Nuega, gathered at

Luneta and started their rally. Col. Dula of Western Police District gave them 10 minutes to

disperse for not having permit to rally. Attys Lozano and Nuega then uttered “Gulpihin ninyo ang
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lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators.” and “Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!” later, movie starlet Annie Ferrer

continuously chanted the same words and she was arrested. A commotion then ensued as

marcos loyalists attacked coryistas who were then wearing yellow shirts, including victim and

deceased Salcedo who was pummelled and mauled to death by herein petitioners. The

commotion and mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people,

both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became frontpage
news the following day, capturing national and international attention. Later, a reward of P10k was
put up for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers.

Informations for Murder were then filed on the bases of the photos and videos of the event,

together with the cooperation of witnesses Sumilang and Banculo, against herein petitioners.

The prosecution also presented 2 eyewitnesses Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo

(bystanders at the incident). The RTC ruled that the accused are guilty of murder qualified by

treachery and the CA affirmed its decision hence, this petition. In the petition, appellants

questioned the admissibility of the photographs for lack of proper identification by the person or

persons who took the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the exhibits (photographs) are admissible even without authentication by

persons who took them

RULING:

Yes, the exhibits are admissible. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when

presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified

as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies

in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is

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determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer,

however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of

the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie,

either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which

the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be

identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its

exactness and accuracy. This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as

part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their

admissibility for lack of proper identification and that the person who took the same was not

presented to identify them. Some of the accused later used the same evidence to prove that

they were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of

the victim. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their

alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof.

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TORRALBA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 153699 22 AUGUST 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:

Torrabla was accused of libel for allegedly blackening the memory of a judge and his family. The
evidence presented was a tape recorded by the daughter of the witness who did not authenticate
the recording. RTC found Torralba guilty beyond reasonable doubt which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the tape recording is competent and admissible despite lack of authentication by the
writer.

RULING:

No. The tape recording is incompetent and inadmissible absent authentication. It is noteworthy
that the neither the witness nor the daughter was able to authenticate the recording

In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is

admissible in evidence and given probative value, the following requisites must first be
established, to wit:

(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;

(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;

(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;

(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;

(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;

(6) identification of the speakers; and

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(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of
inducement.

In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards
its operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities
of the persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings.
Likewise, a witness’ declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the
voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of authentication. The party seeking the
introduction in evidence of a tape recording bears the burden of going forth with sufficient
evidence to show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of the conversation
recorded.

Additional basis:

Rules on Electronic Evidence

“Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or
transactions shall be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and
shall be identified, explained or authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some
other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof. “

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NORMA B. DOMINGO vs. YOLANDA ROBLES

G.R. No. 153743 March 18, 2005

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

It is a well-settled rule, however, that a notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie

presumption of authenticity and due execution. Clear and convincing evidence must be presented
to overcome such legal presumption. Forgery cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to prove it.

Forgery must be proven by the party alleging it; it cannot be presumed. To prevent a forged
transfer from being registered, the Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the
production of the owner’s certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. A registered owner
who places in the hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively
represents to a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property.

FACTS:

Norma Domingo (petitioner) and her husband, Valentino Domingo, were the registered
owners of a parcel of land. Petitioner discontinued the construction of the house because her
husband failed to send the necessary financial support. They then decided to sell the land and Flor
Bacani, a friend volunteered to sell the same

The title was sent to Bacani but it was lost. For the reconstitution of title, petitioner sent
Bacani all the receipt for payment of real estate taxes. They then waited patiently but Bacani did
not show up anymore. When Norma visited the lot, she was surprised that a house was already
being constructed and when she went to the register of deeds, the reconstitution of title was already
cancelled and a deed of sale was already signed in favor of Robles.

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Petitioner claimed that she did not meet with the Robles and she did not sign any deed of
sale and she said that it was a forgery. Robles however argued that they are buyer in good faith
and for value. They further alleged that Bacani introduced them to supposed owners and
respondents paid the full price. Then sometime later, Robles contracted to sell the lot in issue in
favor of spouses Danilo and Herminigilda Deza for P250,000.00. Yolanda Robles even had to
secure a guardianship authority over the persons and properties of her minor children from the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. When only P20,000.00 remained unpaid of the total purchase price
under the contract to sell, payment was stopped because of the letter received by Yolanda Robles
that petitioner intends to sue her.

The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA saying that respondent is a PURCHASER
IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE affirmed it. Petitioner contends that their signature is forged
and that forged deed is void and conveys no title

ISSUE:

Whether or not the general rule that a “forged deed is void and conveys no title” can be
invoked by Domingo.

RULING:

NO.

A notarized instrument enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution.
Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to overcome such legal presumption. Forgery
cannot be presumed; hence, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove it.

What surprises the Court is that a comparison of the signature of appellant Norma Domingo
in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the appellees and the signature in the verification of the
complaint manifest a striking similarity to the point that without any contrary proof, it would be
safe to conclude that said signatures were written by one and the same person. Sadly, appellant left
that matter that way without introducing counteracting evidence.

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Petitioner also failed to convince the trial court that the person with whom Respondent
Yolanda Robles transacted was in fact not Valentino Domingo. Except for her insistence that her
husband was out of the country, petitioner failed to present any other clear and convincing evidence
that Valentino was not present at the time of the sale. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof.

The sale was admittedly made with the aid of Bacani, petitioner’s agent, who had with him
the original of the owner’s duplicate Certificate of Title to the property, free from any liens or
encumbrances. The signatures of Spouses Domingo, the registered owners, appear on the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Petitioner’s husband met with Respondent Yolanda Robles and received payment
for the property. The Torrens Act requires, as a prerequisite to registration, the production of the
owner’s certificate of title and the instrument of conveyance. The registered owner who places in
the hands of another an executed document of transfer of registered land effectively represents to
a third party that the holder of such document is authorized to deal with the property.

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ST. MARY’S FARM, INC. v. PRIMA REAL PROPERTIES, INC.

G.R. No. 158144 July 31, 2008

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

Mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of proof lies in the party making
the allegation.

The nonappearance of the party before the notary public who notarized the deed does not
necessarily nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio. However, the non-appearance
of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability which warrants sanction by the
Court. This fact notwithstanding, the Court agreed with the respondent court that it is not enough
to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the board
resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be sufficient, clear, and convincing evidence
as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the certificate. In the absence of such
proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.

As explained in the Bautista case: “When the document under scrutiny is a special power
of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be a public document where the notarial
acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due execution.

FACTS:

Petitioner St. Mary’s Farm, the registered owner of an originally 25,598 square meters of
land, passed and approved on June 27, 1988 a board resolution authorizing respondent Rodolfo
Agana to cede to T.S. Cruz Subdivision 4,000 square meters of the subject land. Allegedly, after
the consummation of this transaction, Rodolfo Agana did not return to petitioner the borrowed title
and, instead, allegedly forged a board resolution of the petitioner corporation supposedly to the
effect that petitioner had authorized him to sell the remaining 21,598 square meters of the subject
property. The subject land was sold to respondent Prima Real Properties, Inc. and accordingly a
title was issued in its name. St. Mary’s filed a complaint for its annulment, alleging that the
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authorization used by Rodolfo Agana in selling the subject property was a forgery as the board of
directors never enacted a resolution authorizing the former to sell its property, and that the deed of
absolute sale entered into between Prima Real and Rodolfo Agana was void.. Prima Real argued
that it is a buyer in good faith and relied solely on the face of the purported authorization of Rodolfo
Agana. The trial court rendered a judgment dismissing the complaint for annulment of sale filed
by the petitioner, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether Rodolfo Agana was duly authorized by the petitioner St. Mary’s Farm to enter
into the sale of the subject property with respondent Prima Real.

RULING:

Yes, Rodolfo Agana was duly authorized by the petitioner St. Mary’s Farm to enter into
the sale of the subject property with respondent Prima Real.

The Supreme Court ruled that mere allegation of forgery is not evidence and the burden of
proof lies in the party making the allegation. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to discharge this
burden. The Court found no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the
respondent court affirming those of the trial court on this matter. Anent the forged signature of
Atty. Agcaoili, the CA did not err in not giving evidentiary weight to the findings of the Document
Examiner of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on the ground that the findings were not
really conclusive. In the first place, the procedure for the investigation of questionable handwriting
was not properly followed. There is nothing on record that will conclusively show that the alleged
standard sample signatures of Atty. Antonio Agcaoili, which were submitted to the NBI and made
the basis of comparison, were the genuine signatures of the same Atty. Antonio Agcaoili.
Moreover, the examiner testified that it was possible to have variations in the standard signatures
of Atty. Agcaoili, caused by certain factors such as passage of time, pressure and physical
condition of the writer which may have decisive influences on his handwriting’s characteristics.

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Thus, in the instant case, it cannot readily be concluded that a particular signature appearing in
those documents is not genuine for lack of proper identification and a more accurate comparison
of signatures.

The Court also held that the nonappearance of the party before the notary public who
notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify or render the parties’ transaction void ab initio.
However, the non-appearance of the party exposes the notary public to administrative liability
which warrants sanction by the Court. This fact notwithstanding, the Court agreed with the
respondent court that it is not enough to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the board resolution. To overcome the presumption, there must be
sufficient, clear, and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as to the falsity
of the certificate. In the absence of such proof, the document must be upheld. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity. On the basis of this notarized board resolution, respondent had every reason to rely
on Rodolfo Agana’s authority to sell the subject property. Undeniably then, the respondent is an
innocent purchaser for value in good faith. Respondent had every reason to rely on Rodolfo
Agana’s authority to sell, evidenced by the notarized Certification. As explained in the Bautista
case: “When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we
know it to be a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the
fact of its due execution.

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HEIRS OF GREGORIO MEDINA vs. BONIFACIO NATIVIDAD represented by PHILIP

NATIVIDAD

G.R. NO. 177505 NOVEMBER 27, 2008

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

When the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as
such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of
the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public document
and authenticated by the seal of his office.

A certification or authentication, as required by Rules of Court, by a secretary of the embassy or

legation, consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any other officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office, is required.

The special power of attorney executed before a notary public in a foreign country without the
requirements mentioned in the Rules of Court cannot be admitted in evidence before Philippine
courts.

The failure to have the special power of attorney authenticated is not merely a technicality—it is
a question of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

In 1969, owners of a parcel of land agreed to divide and allot for themselves 2,339 square
meters of land in Nueva Ecija. In 1972, Gorgonio Medina, predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby he sold to Bonifacio Natividad, the
respondent, 1/3 of the second portion of the lot including the improvements. Tirso Medina
instituted a case for partition with damages against Bonifacio Natividad and Gorgonio Medina.
They entered into compromise agreement which was submitted to the Court and was approved.

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In 2001, Bonifacio Natividad, through his alleged attorney-in-fact, Philip Natividad filed a
complaint for annulment of one of the TCT’s and damages against Abiel Medina and Veronica de
Guzman, the occupants of the land. Gorgonio Medina filed a motion to dismiss. One of the grounds
is lack of capacity to sue by Philip Natividad, attorney-in-fact of Bonifacio. Gorgonio argued that
the special power of attorney executed by Bonifacio in Washington and acknowledged before
Perry, a Notary Public of the State of Washington.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of attorney executed by Bonifacio can be admitted in evidence for
Philip’s legal capacity to sue.

RULING:

It is not admissible.

In this case, the supposed special power of attorney involved was executed and acknowledged
before Phyllis Perry, a Notary Public of the State of Washington, USA. This being the case, a
certification or authentication, as required by Rules of Court, by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any other officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office, is required. A notary public in a foreign country is not one
of those who can issue the required certificate.

When the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary public
or other competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is
certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public
document and authenticated by the seal of his office.

Hence, the RTC and CA did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Bonifacio. All
proceedings before those courts regarding this case are void and set aside.

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HEIRS OF AMADO CELESTIAL VS. HEIRS OF EDITHA CELESTIA

408 SCRA 291

DOCTRINE:

Genuineness of Handwriting; Standing alone, the closeness or proximity of time in which these
specimen signatures have been written to the questioned signature is not an important factor in
proving the genuineness of a handwriting.—Standing alone, the closeness or proximity of time in
which these specimen signatures have been written to the questioned signature is not an important
factor in proving the genuineness of a handwriting. If at all, the existence of such fact only bolsters
proof of the authenticity of a handwriting.

Same; Same; Same; Elements; Under the foregoing rule, the genuineness of a handwriting may be
proved by the following elements.—Under the foregoing rule, the genuineness of a handwriting
may be proved: 1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because:
(a) he has seen the person write; or (b) he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged; 2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Notarial Law; Notary Public; It is necessary that a party to any document notarized by a notary
public appear in person before the latter and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated in the
document.—It is necessary that a party to any document notarized by a notary public appear in
person before the latter and affirm the contents and truth of what are stated in the document. The
importance of this requirement cannot be gainsaid. The acknowledgment of a document is
converted into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. For this reason, it behooves every notary public to see to it that this requirement is
observed and that formalities for the acknowledgment of documents are complied with. Heirs of
Amado Celestial vs. Heirs of Editha G. Celestial, 408 SCRA 291, G.R. No. 142691 August 5, 2003

FACTS:

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Prior to 1962, Amado while still single, applied for a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the 466
square meter lot, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter IX of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. During the pendency of his application, Amado got married to Florencia and they
occupied the said 466-square meter lot. Their union was blessed with the birth of their daughter,
Helen. On May 9, 1966, Amados application was granted, resulting in the issuance in his name of
Original Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds. Although the title to the land was issued on
May 25, 1966, Amados civil status was designated as "single" on the title. Petitioner Florencia and
her husband did not bother to correct the said mistake in the civil status of Amado to avoid the
paper work it would entail. On October 10, 1975, Amado allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale conveying to Editha the 466 square meter lot for P20,000.00. Thereafter, Amado died. Editha
executed a Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase conveying the property covered by TCT No.
9145 in favor of respondent Prima Calingacion Chua for P30,000.00. This notwithstanding, Editha
caused the property covered by TCT No. 9145 to be subdivided into three (3) lots, Thereafter, the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in the name of Editha. On September 4,
1979, Erlindo and Editha executed a Deed of Sale of Three Parcels of Land over the aforesaid
subdivided lots in favor of respondent Chua. After eleven years, respondent Chua, through his
lawyer, Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, notified the petitioners and several other occupants of the
subdivided lots to vacate the aforesaid properties within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.
Subsequently, respondent Chua filed a complaint for ejectment against the petitioners. Believing
that respondent Chua had no right to eject them from the properties they occupied, petitioners, on
February 23, 1990, filed a complaint against Editha and respondent Chua before the Regional Trial
Court for "Judicial Declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale Executed by the deceased Amado
G. Celestial in favor of Editha G. Celestial and likewise all deeds of Absolute Sale executed by
said Editha G. Celestial in favor of Prima B. Calingacion covering Lot No. 4112, TS 217, formerly
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-27909) (P-10623) (P-1650), etc." On March 3,
1994, while the case was still pending before the trial court, Editha Celestial died and she was
substituted by the named respondents below. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents filed a motion for new trial,
which was denied on November 29, 1995.Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals

ISSUE:

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Won the CA grossly misappreciated the evidence and committed serious and manifest error when
it reversed the decision of the trial court declaring null and void the deed of absolute sale dated 10
october 1975 in a manner contrary to law and the settled pronouncements of this honorable
tribunal.

RULING:

The fact that the trial court relied on the testimony of a single witness is of no moment. The trial
court has the peculiar advantage to determine the credibility of a witness because of its superior
advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying. Settled is the
rule that it is the quality, not the number of witnesses that will tilt the scale of evidence. Although
the number of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance
does not necessarily lie in the greatest number. Accordingly, absent any showing of a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and assessment on the
credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain binding on an appellate tribunal. In the case
at bar, there appears no cogent reason to set aside the trial courts reliance on the credibility of the
prosecution witness and its appreciation of the circumstantial evidence inasmuch as the evidence
on record amply supports its conclusion. Moreover, the appellate court erred in holding that no
accurate analysis and conclusion can be reached since there is no closeness or proximity of the
time between the specimen signatures and the questioned signature. Standing alone, the closeness
or proximity of time in which these specimen signatures have been written to the questioned
signature is not an important factor in proving the genuineness of a handwriting. If at all, the
existence of such fact only bolsters proof of the authenticity of a handwriting. For the purpose of
proving the genuineness of a handwriting, Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be proved by
any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person
write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the
handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Under the foregoing rule, the genuineness of a handwriting

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may be proved: 1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because:
(a) he has seen the person write; or (b) he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged; 2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Although not all of the eight (8) standard
specimen signatures were in close proximity to the time when the questioned signatures were
written, we cannot close our eyes to the stark differences the questioned signatures show when
placed vis-à-vis with the sample signatures. What is clear is that all the eight (8) specimen
signatures when placed side by side with each other indubitably show that these were written by
one and the same person whose name purports to be that of Amado Celestial. However, when the
specimen signatures were compared to the questioned signature, it clearly shows that the latter was
written by a person other than Amado Celestial. As correctly pointed out by the NBI Senior
Document Examiner Rhoda B. Flores in the Questioned Documents Report No. 108-293, there
were indeed notable variances between the questioned and sample signatures.

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ANNA PATULA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 164457 APRIL 11, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.

DOCTRINE:

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,

specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have
not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;(c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered
as genuine.

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

FACTS:

Petitioner Anna Lerima Patula was charged with estafa under an information filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Dumaguete City. That the said accused, being then a saleswoman of
Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of
P131,286.97 from several customers of said company under the express obligation to account for
the proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying
with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated demands

The Prosecution presented Karen Guivencan, whom Footluckers employed as its store auditor
since November 16, 1995 until her resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had
requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their
accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding balances for them; that she first
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conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanguita in Negros
Oriental, and then in Siquijor; that she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50 customers varied from
the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that
upon completing her audit, she submitted to Go a written report denominated as List of Customers
Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records as per Audit Duly
Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based on the report, petitioner had
misappropriated the total amount of P131,286.92.

In the course of Guivencan’s direct-examination, petitioners counsel interposed a continuing

objection on the ground that the figures entered in Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,
were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not themselves presented in
court.

Nevertheless, Prosecution offered the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers allegedly with
discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the
receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), the confirmation sheets used by Guivencan
in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and Guivencan’s so-called Summary of
Discrepancie.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were
admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged despite their not being duly
authenticated

RULING:

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No, the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were not
admissible as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged despite their not being duly
authenticated

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and a private
document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character,
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or because it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent
public official with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private
writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to
be presented as evidence in court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or
instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or
sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document
requires authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance
as evidence in court.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,

specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have
not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;(c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered
as genuine.

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because
private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses.
Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be
presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to
their authentication in the manner provided in Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

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RE: COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MENBERS OF CHINESE GROCERS

ASSOCIATION AGAINST JUSTICE SOCORRO B. INTING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS

A.M. OCA IPI NO. 10-177-CA-J. APRIL 12, 2011

BRION, J.

DOCTRINE:

While the Certificate of Death is indeed a public document, to prove its contents, there is a need
to present a certified copy of this document, issued by the public officer in custody of the original
document.

FACTS:

CGA is the owner of a parcel of land, registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 42417.

In 2008, Dela Cruz filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 42417, claiming that the old owner’s duplicate copy had been misplaced. The petition
was assigned to the sala of Judge Inting. Dela Cruz claimed, among others, that his interest in filing
this petition is based on his right as a vendee of the property, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated August 19, 2008, allegedly executed between CGA, represented by Ang E. Bio, and
dela Cruz.

The petition was granted by Judge Inting. Thus, a letter complaint was filed by the
Concerned Members of CGA, claiming that Justice Inting acted with gross neglect when she
granted dela Cruz’s petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy. Complainants point
out that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 15, 2008, the basis for dela Cruz’s interest and
right to file the petition, should have aroused Justice Inting’s suspicion as it was allegedly signed
on behalf of CGA by Ang E. Bio, who died on August 28, 2001. A photocopy of Ang Bio’s

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Certificate of Death was attached to their letter The complainants also found it suspicious that
Justice Inting did not question dela Cruz on the particulars of the sale before granting the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the attached photocopy of the Certificate of Death is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

NO.

The complainants attached a mere photocopy of Ang Bio’s Certificate of Death to their
letter complaint. While the Certificate of Death is indeed a public document, to prove its contents,
there is a need to present a certified copy of this document, issued by the public officer in custody
of the original document. Since the Certificate of Death is not a certified copy, it is inadmissible
as proof, and is considered a mere scrap of paper without any evidentiary value.

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SPS. JUAN & EUGENIA DELA RAMA V. SPS. OSCAR & AMEUERFINA PAPA

G.R. NO. 142309 JANUARY 30, 2009

TINGA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The rule upholding the presumption of regularity of a notarized document. Applying that rule, it
is necessary that the forgery must be established not merely by preponderance of evidence, but by
clear, positive and convincing evidence

Under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, "documents acknowledged before a notary
public except for last wills and testaments" are deemed as public documents, and as such, under
Section 23 of the same Rule, they are evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and as
to its date.

FACTS:

Sps. Dela Rama were the registered owners of a land in Calamba, Laguna. The property was
acquired from Canlubang Sugar Estate in 1980. Juan became a resident of the US by 1984 and
acquired American citizenship by 1989, in 1992 Sps Dela Rama were reminded to pay the realty
tax, but they were informed that their title had been cancelled and a new title had been issued in
favor of Sps. Papa.

Oscar had been the VP Marketing of Laguna Estate Development Corp (LEDC), marketing arm
of CSE. The property was transferred to and retitled in the name of Sps. Papa in 1985 by way of
sale, identifying Sps. Dela Rama as vendors. The Deed bears the signatures of petitioners and
respondents, 2 witnesses and the notarial signature of Atty. Gumtang.

Sps. Dela Rama filed a complaint for cancellation of titled obtained under forged deed of sale
against Sps. Papa. Juan claimed hi paid the property taxes since 1980, he denied having executed
the 1985 deed. Also he denied having met Oscar. He purchased the property while being a student
at NYU.

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Oscar testified that he could not recall who had offered to him to buy the property. He signed the
deed witnessed by 2 staff members of LEDC, but he did not see Juan sign the same document.
Neither could he remember signing the deed in front of a notary public.

RTC annulled the deed and cancelled Papa’s title and reinstated Dela Rama’s title. RTC did not
consider Papas as buyers in good faith. CA reversed the RTC and upholding the validity of the
deed. Stating that there is no evidence to support forgery

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the signatures of Sps. Dela Rama on the deed were forged?

RULING:

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that petitioners had the onus probandi to establish such
forgery. In concluding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden, the appellate court cited the
rule upholding the presumption of regularity of a notarized document. Applying that rule, it is
necessary that the forgery must be established not merely by preponderance of evidence, but by
clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the Court of Appeals appears to have applied that
more exacting standard.

Papa’s admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, bear legal significance. With
respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference between a public document and
a private document is the acknowledgment in the former that the parties acknowledging the
document appear before the notary public and specifically manifest under oath that they are the
persons who executed it, and acknowledge that the same are their free act and deed.

Acknowledgment is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was
sworn to before him. It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit
was properly made. In a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his
oath before a notary public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.

The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of
sale. Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually appeared before the notary
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public, a bare minimum requirement under Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto
void the deed of sale. However, it eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public
documents.

The clear requirements of law for a proper acknowledgment may not be dispensed with simply
because generations of transactions have blithely ignored such requirements. If it is physically
impossible for the vendor and the vendee to meet and sign the deed in the presence of one notary
public, there is no impediment to having two or more different notaries ratifying the document for
each party that respectively appears before them. This is the prudent practice adopted by
professional law enterprises, and it is a correct measure in consonance with the law.

There is another implication under our rules of evidence. Under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, "documents acknowledged before a notary public except for last wills and testaments"
are deemed as public documents, and as such, under Section 23 of the same Rule, they are evidence
of the fact which gave rise to its execution and as to its date. Excepting the other public documents
enumerated in Section 19, all other writings are private, and before such private document is
offered as authentic, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

Accordingly, in order that the challenged deed of sale may be accepted by the Court as genuine,
we must be satisfied by the evidence on record establishing that its genuineness was proved by
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness or
handwriting of the maker.

Section 22 of Rule 132 “How genuineness of handwriting proved.—The handwriting of a person

may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court,
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”

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Another corroborative piece of evidence of the petitioners, as found by the trial court, lay in the
fact that the dela Ramas had paid real estate taxes on the property until about 1993, or eight (8)
years after the purported sale. Any reasonable person who had sold his property would not
undertake the unnecessary burden of continuing to pay real property taxes on the same.

The totality of the evidence for the petitioners established a prima facie case that the deed of sale
was not genuine. Even as the burden of proof may have initially lain with petitioners in establishing
the forgery of what is a private document, their evidence was sufficient to shift the burden of
evidence to respondents to establish the authenticity and due execution of said private document,
especially as it is they who rely on the same in their defense.

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CEQUEÑA V. BOLANTE

G.R. No. 137944 6 April 2000

PANGANIBAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

Before a private document offered as authentic can be received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved first. 8 And before a document is admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror must show (a) that the declarant is dead,
insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c)
that at the time the declaration was made, he was aware that the same was contrary to his interest;
and (d) that circumstances render improbable the existence of any motive to falsify

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does
not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore,
the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from
Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.

FACTS:

Prior to 1954, the land having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No.
26-0027 situated in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, the father of respondent Honorata. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit,
the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and
subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza, the father of the petitioners Fernanda
Cequeña and Ruperta Lirio, and brother of Sinforoso.

During the cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land together with
Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court declared the petitioners as the
lawful owner and possessors of the land. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision
because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit. It was said to be insufficient to

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overcome the denial of respondent and her mother.Furthermore, the probative value of petitioners’
tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the
disputed parcel. The actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since
1985 gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The petitioners contended
otherwise that she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in not considering the affidavit as an exception
to the general rule that an affidavit is classified as hearsay evidence?

RULING:

Yes. The petitioners’ allegations are untenable. Before a private document offered as authentic can
be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved first. And before a
document is admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule under the Dead Man's Statute, the offeror
must show (a) that the declarant is dead, insane or unable to testify; (b) that the declaration
concerns a fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that at the time the declaration was made, he was
aware that the same was contrary to his interest; and (d) that circumstances render improbable the
existence of any motive to falsify.

In this case, one of the affiants happens to be the respondent, who is still alive and who testified
that the signature in the affidavit was not hers. A declaration against interest is not admissible if
the declarant is available to testify as a witness. Such declarant should be confronted with the
statement against interest as a prior inconsistent statement.

The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either. An ancient document is one that is
(1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3) unblemished by any alteration
11
or by any circumstance of suspicion. It must on its face appear to be genuine. The petitioners
herein failed, however, to explain how the purported signature of Eduarda Apiado could have been
affixed to the subject affidavit if, according to the witness, she was an illiterate woman who never
had any formal schooling. This circumstance casts suspicion on its authenticity.

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Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does
not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat. Furthermore,
the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was transferred from
Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode of acquiring
ownership.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARMEN SANTORIO GALENO

G.R. No. 215009 January 23, 2017

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOCTRINE:

The foregoing documentary evidence presented by the respondent are not sufficient to warrant the
correction prayed for. SC cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the fact that the
public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated therein.

In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR
cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

FACTS:

On September 2, 2003, respondent Galeno (respondent) filed a petition for correction of the area
of Lot No. 2285 covered by OCT No. 46417, Dingle Cadastre (subject property) before the RTC.
She alleged that when she and her co-owners had the subject property resurveyed for the purpose
of partition, they discovered a discrepancy in the land area of the subject property as appearing in
OCT No. 46417 in that the title reflects an area of 20,948 square meters, while the Certification
issued by the DENR Office of the Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Services,

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shows an area of 21,298 square meters. Hence, she sought to correct the area of the subject property
in order to avoid further confusion, and claimed to have notified the adjoining owners.

Respondent offered in evidence the following documents: (a) the Certification issued by a certain
Althea C. Acevedo (Acevedo), Engineer IV, Chief of the Technical Services Section of the Office
of the Regional Technical Director, Land Management Services of the DENR in Iloilo City, which
states that “the true and correct area of [L]ot 2285, Cad. 246 Dingle Cadastre is 21,928 square
meters;” (b) the technical description of Lot No. 2285, a copy of which was certified by Ameto
Caballero (Caballero), Chief of the Surveys Division, while another copy was certified correct by
Acevedo; and (c) the approved subdivision plan of Lot No. 2258, certified by Rogelio M. Santome
(Santome), Geodetic Engineer; Alfredo Muyarsas (Muyarsas), Chief of the Regional Surveys
Division, and Edgardo R. Gerobin (Gerobin), OIC, Regional Technical Director of the Land
Management Services, DENR. On the strength of these pieces of evidence, respondent sought a
reconciliation of the area of the subject property with the records of the DENR.

The RTC granted the petition upon a finding that respondent was able to substantiate the
allegations in her petition to warrant a correction of the area of the subject property. Hence, it
directed the Register of Deeds of the Province of Iloilo to correct such area in OCT No. 46417
from 20,948 to 21,298 square meters.

CA affirmed the RTC’s order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the correction of the area of the subject property
in OCT No. 46417.

RULING:

No. The respondent failed to prove that there was sufficient basis to allow the correction of the
area of the subject property in OCT No. 46417 from 20,948 square meters to 21,248 square meters.

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Unfortunately, the foregoing documentary evidence presented by the respondent are not sufficient
to warrant the correction prayed for. SC cannot accord probative weight upon them in view of the
fact that the public officers who issued the same did not testify in court to prove the facts stated
therein.

In Republic v. Medida, the Court held that certifications of the Regional Technical Director, DENR
cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, holding that:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as
follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered
therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a),
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

“Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records made
in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise
to their execution and of the date of the latter.”

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the
class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The
certifications do not reflect “entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer,” such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain
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in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions
of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not
even records of public documents.

As such, sans the testimonies of Acevedo, Caballero, and the other public officers who issued
respondent’s documentary evidence to confirm the veracity of its contents, the same are bereft of
probative value and cannot, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. At best, they
may be considered only as prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but do
not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

In fact, the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent’s sole witness and
attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify on the veracity of their contents,
as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned
government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who represented petitioner
interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the proceedings in the court
below, it should be borne in mind that “hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no
probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay evidence rule,” which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while respondent’s
documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party’s lack of objection, it
does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.

The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. However, the lack of objection to
hearsay testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But one should not be misled into
thinking that such declarations are thereby impressed with probative value. Admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.

Besides, case law states that the “absence of opposition from government agencies is of no
controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of
its officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the
petition for reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the basis of the law and the
evidence on record, such petition has no merit.” Moreover, “in civil cases, the party having the

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burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.”

In fine, the Court holds that respondent did not present any competent evidence to prove that the
true and correct area of the subject property is 21,298 square meters instead of 20,948 square
meters to warrant a correction thereof in OCT No. 46417. Accordingly, respondent’s petition for
the correction of the said Certificate of Title must be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2013 and the
Resolution dated September 17, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02085
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Carmen Santorio Galeno’s petition for correction of area
of Lot No. 2285 on Original Certificate of Title No. 46417 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

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OFFER AND OBJECTIONS

PEOPLE V. SATURNINO VILLANUEVA

G.R. NO. 181829 SEPTEMBER 1, 2010

DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.

In Mato v. CA, the Court ruled that evidence, although not formally offered in evidence,
may be admitted and considered by the trial court, provided the following requirements are present:
(1.) The same must have been duly identified by the testimony duly recorded; and (2.) The same
must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

FACTS:

Saturnino Villanueva was charged with 3 counts of qualified rape, committed against her
own daughter, AAA. On pre-trial, it was stipulated that AAA was below the age of 12 years old
when she was raped by Villanueva, and that the appellant in this case is the father of the victim.

According to AAA, she was raped by her father thrice, two of it happened in 1999, and the
other happened in 2002. On the other hand, Saturnino Villanueva admitted that he was the father
of AAA but denied raping her, and that AAA filed a case against him because he forbade him to
entertain suitors.

The trial court found Saturnino Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
qualified rape. Villanueva appealed to the higher court, contending that the prosecution failed to
formally offer in evidence the medical certificate, as well as the birth certificate of AAA. Hence,
assuming that he is guilty, he can only be convicted of simple rape, and not qualified rape.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the contention of Villanueva that the documentary evidence should not be admitted
for failure to formally offer it in court.

RULING:

The appeal was partly meritorious.

The Supreme Court agreed with Villanueva that both medical and birth certificates, though
marked as evidence during pre-trial, should not have been considered by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

However, it must also be considered that the appellant may still be convicted without a
medical certificate. The testimony of the victim in rape cases may be the sole basis of the accused’s
conviction. Hence, Villanueva was convicted of simple rape.

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ELVIRA MATO VDA. DE OÑATE, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS MARIA MATO-

ALAMEDA, AIDA MATO, ZOE MATO, PACITA MATO AND JUAN MATO II VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EULALIA M. TAGUBA

G.R. NO. 116149 NOVEMBER 23, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

For evidence to be considered, the same must be formally of offered.

FACTS:

The controversy involves Lot No. 1571, a Riceland located at Cagayan. On January 10, 1980, an
action for specific performance with damages was filed in the then CFI of Cagayan, by Eulalia
Marcita Taguba in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Leonor Taguba
against Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate.

As the trial court found, the deceased Leonor Taguba bought the subject parcel of land from Elvira
Mato Vda. de Oñate. After full payment was made on July 29, 1976, the parties however failed to
reduce their contract in writing. On December 30, 1976, Leonor Taguba died. The instant
complaint was filed when demand was made upon Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate to execute a public
document of sale in favor of the deceased and her heirs and she refused. The trial court rejected
the petitioners’ defense that Elvira Mato Vda. de Oñate contracted a verbal loan from Leonor
Taguba.

Petitioners appealed to respondent CA faulting the trial court’s factual findings. They contended
that the trial court erred when it took cognizance of the plaintiff’s evidence, particularly Exhibits
“F,” “F-1,” “F-2” and “F-3,” which had been marked but never formally submitted in evidence
as required by the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

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Whether CA erred in not ruling that documents which are marked as exhibits but NOT formally
offered are not to be considered by the Court.

RULING:

No. The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA in toto.

SEC. 35. Offer of evidence—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be
formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party.

In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, the Court had the occasion to make a distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the
first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an
exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party,
therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not
to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules
to consider the same.

However, in People v. Napat-a citing People v. Mate, Court relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided
the following requirements are present, viz:

first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,

second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

In the case at bench, Court find, as respondent court did, that these requisites have been satisfied.

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TIOMICO vs COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 122539 March 04, 1999

PURISIMA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The absence of the words, ‘we are formally offering the testimony for the purpose of . . .’ ” should
be considered merely as an excusable oversight on the part of the private prosecutor. It should be
borne in mind that the rationale behind Section 34 of Rule 132 is to inform the Court of the purpose
of the testimony, to enable the judge to rule whether the said testimony is necessary or is irrelevant
or immaterial. The tendency of the rules on evidence, is towards substantial justice rather than
strict adherence to technicalities.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jesus V. Tiomico, opened a Letter of Credit with BPI to be used for the importation of
two (2) units of Forklifts, Shovel loader and a truck mounted with crane. The said machineries
were received by the accused, as evidenced by the covering trust receipt. Upon maturity of the
trust receipt, he made a partial. Failing to pay the balance amount or to deliver subject machineries
and equipment, despite several demands, the International Operations Department of BPI referred
the matter to the Legal Department of the bank. But the letter of demand sent to him
notwithstanding, Tiomico failed to satisfy his monetary obligation sued upon.

Consequently, he was accused of violation of PD 115/Trust Receipts Law. He entered plea of not
guilty. Gretel Donato, witness for BPI, testified and presented six exhibtis to support her testimony.
During the presentation of evidence, records disclose that the private prosecutor stated the purpose
of the testimony in question although he did not formally offer the same. The proceedings went on
as follows:

“ATTY. SONCUYA: The purpose of the testimony of the witness is to prove that the accused

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applied for a letter of credit, for the opening of a letter of credit and for the importation of
machinery from Japan and that those machinery were delivered and received by the accused as
evidenced by the trust receipt and that the accused failed to comply with the terms and conditions
of the said trust receipt, your Honor.

COURT: All right, proceed.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of a witness be admitted despite the failure of the proponent to offer
it formally in evidence, as required by Section 34 of Rule 132.

RULING:

YES. As aptly stressed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, “the absence of the words, ‘we
are formally offering the testimony for the purpose of . . .’ ” should be considered merely as an
excusable oversight on the part of the private prosecutor. It should be borne in mind that the
rationale behind Section 34 of Rule 132 is to inform the Court of the purpose of the testimony, to
enable the judge to rule whether the said testimony is necessary or is irrelevant or immaterial.

In the case under scrutiny, since the purpose of subject testimony was succinctly stated, the reason
behind the requirement for its formal offer has been substantially complied with. What the defense
counsel should have done should have been to interpose his objection the moment the private
respondent was called to testify, on the ground that there was no prior offer made by the proponent.
The tendency of the rules on evidence, is towards substantial justice rather than strict adherence to
technicalities. To condemn the disputed testimony as inadmissible due to the failure of the private
prosecutor to properly observe the rules on presentation of evidence, would render nugatory, and
defeat the proceedings before the lower court.

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HEIRS OF PEDRO PASAG vs. SPS. PAROCHA

G.R. No. 155483 27 April 2007

DOCTRINE:

Formal Offer of Evidence

Formal offer of evidence is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings of
facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.

The formal offer of one’s evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within a
considerable period of time.

The party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence
on the very day the party presented the last witness.

Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial
but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence.

FACTS:

The case is a dispute over 3 properties which formed part of the estate of petitioner’s
deceased grandparents, Benito and Florentina Pasag owned by respondents, to which Petitioners
alleged that they have a share over for being part of the estate of petitoners’ deceased grandparents,
Benito and Florentina Pasag who died intestate, thus, leaving behind all their properties to their 8
children. However, Severino, the predecessor of respondents, claimed in an affidavit of self-
adjudication that he is the sole, legal, and compulsory heir and appropriated to himself the
properties and thereafter executed a deed of absolute sale over the said properties in favor of his
daughter, respondent Florentina Parocha. Petitioners alleged that Severino used the same affidavit
of self-adjudication to secure a free patent over an agricultural land that had long been under the
possession of Benito and Florentina Pasag. Respondents averred in their Answer that the 2
properties in question were shares of another brother renounced in favor of Severino while the
other property has been in his possession and occupation since 1940, thus, giving him the right to
apply for and be granted a free patent.

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The trial commenced. Petitioners rested their case and were granted 10 days within which
to submit their formal offer of documentary exhibits but failed to submit.

Petitioners asked the RTC for extension to submit their formal offer of evidence, and it
subsequently granted their motion. However, they failed again to submit their offer of evidence
and moved for another extension for five days.

Unfortunately, petitioners still failed to submit their formal offer of evidence within the
extended period.

The RTC consequently deemed waived petitioners’ right to make their formal offer of
evidence.

Petitioners moved for the admission of their offer of evidence. The RTC denied petitioners’
formal offer of evidence for the “consistent failure” to submit it.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower courts erred in deemed waiving petitioners’ right to make their formal
offer of evidence

RULING:

No.

The trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had waived their right to
make a formal offer of documentary or object evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make
their formal offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed almost five
months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners’ failure to comply with the rule on
admissibility of evidence is anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious dispensation of
justice.

The pre-trial guidelines and Sec. 35 of Rule 132 jointly considered, it is made clear that the
party who terminated the presentation of evidence must make an oral offer of evidence on the very

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day the party presented the last witness. Otherwise, the court may consider the party’s
documentary or object evidence waived. While Sec. 35 of Rule 132 says that the trial court may
allow the offer to be done in writing, this can only be tolerated in extreme cases where the object
evidence or documents are large in number––say from 100 and above, and only where there is
unusual difficulty in preparing the offer.

It is apparent from the foregoing provision that both parties should obtain, gather, collate,
and list all their respective pieces of evidence–– whether testimonial, documentary, or object––
even prior to the preliminary conference before the clerk of court or at the latest before the
scheduled pre-trial conference. Otherwise, pieces of evidence not identified or marked during the
pre-trial proceedings are deemed waived and rendered inutile. The parties should strictly adhere
to the principle of “laying one’s cards on the table.” In the light of these issuances and in order to
obviate interminable delay in case processing, the parties and lawyers should closely conform to
the requirement that the offer of evidence must be done orally on the day scheduled for the
presentation of the last witness.

Thus, the trial court is bound to consider only the testimonial evidence presented and
exclude the documents not offered. Documents which may have been identified and marked as
exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were not formally offered in evidence cannot in any
manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized proof be assigned any evidentiary
weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction between identification
of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-trial, and
trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only
when the party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as
an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be
emphasized that any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court
must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded and rejected.

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JOSE R. CATACUTAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 175991 31 AUGUST 2011

DOCTRINE:

Due Process; Evidence; As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due
course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard
is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.—“Due process simply demands an
opportunity to be heard.” “Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.” “Where an opportunity
to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.” Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner
can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was
able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and
explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to
defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for
the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.

Same; Same; There is no violation of due process where the trial court did not allow a party to
introduce an evidence which it considered irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding at hand—
it is well within the court’s discretion to reject the presentation of such evidence.—There is also
no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the court’s discretion to reject the
presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding
on hand. This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding
as in this case, concerns an administrative matter.

Same; Same; Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness; It is not an error to refuse evidence
which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel
states as the ground for offering it.—On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has
no option but to declare that the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of

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the CA Decision. “Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to refuse evidence
which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel
states as the ground for offering it.”

Same; Same; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Tender of Excluded Evidence; If an exhibit
sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask the court’s
permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.—At any rate, even assuming that the trial
court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left
without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If
documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for
the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the
proposed testimony. As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the
RTC admit the CA’s Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in
his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing
it should ask the court’s permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.

Same; Same; Same; Formal Offer of Exhibits; Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected
and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal.—As things stand, the CA Decision does not
form part of the records of the case, thus it has no probative weight. Any evidence that a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is
excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure
and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not
formally offered.

FACTS:

Private complainants filed a formal complaint against the petitioner for grave abuse of authority
and disrespect of lawful orders before the OMB after petitioner opposed their appointments and
said that he would not implement them despite the written orders from CHED. Petitioner now

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claims that he was denied due process because he was not given the opportunity to present in
evidence the CA decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not he was deprived of Due Process because he was not given the opportunity to
present the CA decision as evidence.

RULING:

NO. even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA
Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner could have availed of the remedy
provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides: Section 40. Tender of
excluded evidence.—If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the
offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral,
the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony. As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is
keen on having the RTC admit the CA’s Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have
included the same in his offer of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is
rejected, the party producing it should ask the court’s permission to have the exhibit attached to
the record. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be
formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance
of on appeal. The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary
value to evidence which was not formally offered.

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STAR TWO, INC., v. HOWARD KO et al.

G.R. No. 185454 23 March 2011

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Courts cannot consider evidences not formally offered in evidence. As an exception, courts
can consider evidence provided that have been identified by testimony duly recorded and that it
has been incorporated in the records of the case.

FACTS:

Jianshe Motorcycle Industries Philippines Corporations (Jianshe) obtained in several credit

facilities or loan accomodations from Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) with
Comprehensive Surety Agreement with respondents herein for the amount not exceeding P50M.

Upon failure of Jianshe to pay its obligations, RCBC filed a complaint for Specific
Performance with Preliminary Attachment. The respondents herein filed a Motion to Dismiss
wherein they presented documentary evidences of payment by the sureties even above their
liability of P50M.

The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner, issuing the writ of attachment and later on
allowing the substitution of Star Two in lieu of RCBC through assignment. However, the RTC
discharged the attachment and later on dismissed the case, leaving Jianshe as the only defendants
therein.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this case.

The petitioner contends that the lower court erred in relying on the evidence presented by
the respondents in support of dismissal of the case against them, as the said evidences were NOT
formally offered in evidence.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the evidences were properly relied upon as it was not formally offered in
evidence.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that the said documentary evidence fall under the exception
and thus, are properly considered by the lower court.

The general rule is courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally offered
because parties are required to inform the courts of the purpose of introducing their respective
exhibits to assist the latter in ruling on their admissibility in case an objection thereto is made.

However, as an exception thereto, the courts can consider evidence provided that have been
identified by testimony duly recorded and that it has been incorporated in the records of the case.
This is the situation in the case at hand.

The documentary evidences were properly considered as they incorporated in the records
of the case when the respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss which the petitioner failed to attend
to.

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JOEY P. MARQUEZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN 5TH DIVISION,

GR Nos. 187912-14 JANUARY 31, 2011

DOCTRINE:

Evidence cannot properly be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court.- —While
it is true that the appreciation of whether the signatures of Marquez are genuine or not is subject
to the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Evidence cannot properly
be weighed if not exhibited or produced before the court. Only after evidence is offered and
admitted that the court can appreciate and evaluate it. The prosecution had already offered its
evidence on the matter. The court should not deny the same right to the defense.

FACTS:

Through this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction,[1] petitioner Joey P. Marquez
(Marquez) assails the 1] February 11, 2009 Resolution[2] of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan
(SB-5th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905; and its 2] May 20, 2009

Resolution[3] denying his motion for reconsideration.

In the assailed issuances, the SB-5th Division denied Marquez's Motion to Refer Prosecution's
Evidence for Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).

From the records, it appears that as a result of the Report on the Audit of Selected Transactions
and Walis Ting-ting for the City of Parañaque for the years 1996 to 1998, conducted by the Special
Audit Team of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were... discovered involving
Marquez, then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee of Parañaque City;
and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General Services Office of said city.

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It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan
secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of bullets of different calibers that were
grossly overpriced from VMY Trading, a company not registered as an arms and ammunitions...
dealer with either the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
or the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).

Finding the transactions anomalous, the COA Special Audit Team issued Notices of Disallowances
for the overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and Caunan sought reconsideration of the findings of
the team, but their plea was denied. Aggrieved, they elevated the matter to the COA... but their
appeal was denied.

At the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), in answer to the charges filed against them, Marquez
and Caunan filed their Joint Counter Affidavit[4] with the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau of said office. In the said affidavit, the two... insisted on the propriety of the
transactions and raised the pendency of their appeal with the COA.

Having found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, the OMB, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed three (3)
informations[5] against Marquez and Caunan. The cases were raffled... to the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan (SB-4th Division).

Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez
sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests to the
NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases against him.[6] These were denied by the OSP.

On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused themselves from further
participating in the cases. The cases were then raffled to the SB-5th Division.

Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Marquez filed the subject Motion to Refer Prosecution's Evidence for
Examination by the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation. In his
motion, he again insisted that his purported signatures on the vouchers were... forged.

By way of Comment/Opposition to the motion, the prosecution argued that its documentary
exhibits had already been formally offered in January 2006 and had been duly admitted by the
anti-graft court. The prosecution added that, when confronted with the questioned transactions...

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during the COA audit investigation, Marquez never raised the defense of forgery. Instead, he
insisted on the propriety of the transactions. He did not claim forgery either when he filed his Joint
Counter-Affidavit with the OMB. Also, in his verified Motion for Reconsideration... dated May
29, 2003 and Supplemental Motion dated July 1, 2003 filed with the COA, no allegation of forgery
was made.

The prosecution pointed to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court[7] and posited that
since Marquez alleged in his pleadings that he had relied on the competence of his subordinates,
there could be no "palpable mistake," thus, he was estopped... from alleging that his signatures on
the subject documents were forged. The prosecution accused Marquez of filing the motion merely
to delay the proceedings.[8]

ISSUE:

WON The Sandiganbayan Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion Amounting To Lack Or Excess
Of Jurisdiction When It Issued Its Resolutions Denying The Petitioner's Motion To Refer
Prosecution's Evidence For Examination By The Questioned Documents Section Of The National
Bureau Of Investigation

RULING:

YES. The right of the accused to an opportunity to be heard necessarily implies with it the
reasonable freedom To present its evidence.Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the party alleging it.

In order to discharge this burden, the party alleging it must be afforded reasonable opportunity to
present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures of the documents in question by no less than the country’s premier investigative force,
the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on this matter is negative testimonial
evidence w/c is generally considered as weak.

The findings of NBI will still be subject to scrutiny and evaluation in line w/ Rule 132.22.
Nevertheless, Marquez shouldn’t be deprived of his right to present evidence. While this defense
may seem feeble to SB, Marquez should be allowed to adduce evidence of his own choice.SB’s
reason for denial of the motion is that it may validly determine forgery from its own independent

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examination of the documentary evidence. But while it is true that appreciation of WoN the
signatures are genuine is subject to the discretion of SB, this discretion may rightly be exercised
only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. The prosecution had already offered
its evidence on the matter. The court should not deny the same right to the defense.

Contrary to what the prosecution asserts, Marquez’s motion was not a mere afterthought. As early
as Nov 24, 2003, even before arraignment, Marquez already sought referral of the documents in
question to the NBI and reinvestigation of the case against him. The fact that Marquez did not raise
this issue with COA is irrelevant and immaterial. His failure to do so may affect the weight of his
defense, but it should not bar him from insisting on it during his turn to adduce evidence.

The fact that the documentary exhibit were already offered and admitted by SB cannot preclude
an examination Of the signatures thereon by the defense. With proper handling by court personnel,
this can be accomplished by the NBI expert examiners

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 11, 2009 and May 20, 2009 Resolutions
of the 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27903, 27904 and 27905 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 5th Division of the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered
to allow the petitioner Joey P. Marquez to refer the evidence of the prosecution to the Questioned
Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation for examination as soon as possible
and, after submission of... the results to the court and proper proceedings, to act on the case with
dispatch.

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SPS TAN VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. NO. 177797. DECEMBER 4, 2008.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

DOCTRINE:

The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified. On the basis thereof, it is clear that evidence
should have been presented during trial before the RTC; evidence not formally offered should not
be considered.

FACTS:

The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian citizens on 9
February 1984.They seek to have the subject property previously owned by Lucio and Juanito
Neri, registered in their names. Such lands were declared for taxation purposes.

The subject property was declared alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, as established
by a Certification dated 14 August 2000issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Cagayan
de Oro City.

However, a certain Patermateo Casiño (Casiño) claimed a portion of the subject property,
prompting the spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title against him before the RTC
of Cagayan de Oro City which favored the sps.

Dissatisfied, Casino appealed to CA which the appellate court dismissed for lack of interest
to prosecute. Casiño elevated his case to this Court via a Petition for Review which was denied for
being insufficient in form and substance.

Refusing to give up, Casiño filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property
before the Bureau of Lands which was cancelled. Similarly, a survey plan prepared in the name of
Casiño was also ordered cancelled.

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In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title to the subject
property before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City. The application of the spouses Tan invoked the
provisions of Act No. 496 and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

In compliance with the request of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) dated 29 August
2000.The RTC heard the testimony of John B. Acero (Acero), nephew and lone witness of the
spouses Tan. Acero recounted the facts already presented above and affirmed that the spouses
Tan’s possession of the subject property had been open, public, adverse and continuous.

Republic appealed to CA which granted the appeal finding that:The spouses Tan failed to
comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires possession of the subject
property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945. Hence, the appellate court ordered the spouses Tan
to return the subject property to the Republic. To assail the CA decision, the spouses Tan attached
to their Motion a copy of Tax Declaration No. 4627 covering the subject property.

ISSUE:

Whether the tax declaration No. 4627 is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

The petition fails for other substantive reasons, but the tax declaration is also inadmissible
as evidence as the Sps. Tan failed to formally offer such evidence during trial.

“SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.”

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 189580 February 9, 2011

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

Records show that, when Ruel testified on the alleged admission, appellant did not raise any
objection. It is a rule of evidence that any objection against the admission of any piece of evidence
must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived.
The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness,
or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of evidence
is, or may be, inferred. Therefore, the RTC cannot be faulted for admitting the testimony of Ruel.

FACTS:

In an Information dated January 11, 2005, appellant was charged with murder, committed as
follows:

That on December 20, 2004 at about 9:00 o’clock in the evening [in] Brgy. G. del Pilar,
municipality of Bulan, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of night time, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab one EDWIN GELUA thereby inflicting upon
him mortal wounds on the stomach which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his
legal heirs.

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

Ruel, one of the witnesses, stated that Angelita informed him of the stabbing incident. He went to
the house of appellant after the incident. Initially, appellant denied that he stabbed Edwin; later,
however, appellant admitted that he was Edwin’s assailant, and surrendered to him the bladed
weapon which was allegedly used in the stabbing. He then brought appellant to the Bulan Police
Station.

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Appellant invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. He refused to present any witness in
support of his denial, despite numerous opportunities given him. He decided to simply forego with
the presentation of his evidence.

On August 27, 2007, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict.

Appellant filed an appeal but the CA affirmed the conviction of the appellant.

Appellant faults the RTC for admitting in evidence and for giving credence to the testimony of
Ruel. He insists that his alleged admission that he was Edwin’s assailant cannot be considered as
evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of testimony of Ruel is proper

RULING:

Records show that, when Ruel testified on the alleged admission, appellant did not raise any
objection. It is a rule of evidence that any objection against the admission of any piece of evidence
must be made at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived.
The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the witness,
or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of evidence
is, or may be, inferred.21 Therefore, the RTC cannot be faulted for admitting the testimony of Ruel.

In any event, appellant’s conviction was not based on his alleged admission or confession, but,
primarily, on the positive and credible testimonies of Angelita and Salvador. Hence, we agree with
the OSG that the circumstances surrounding appellant’s alleged admission of the crime are
inconsequential.

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PEOPLE VS. LIBNAO

G.R. NO. 136860 JANUARY 20, 2003

PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly
identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records
of the case.

FACTS:

The intelligence operatives of the PNP stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance
operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman
from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a
month in big bulks.

On Oct. 20, 1996, at about 1AM, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle.
It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the herein appellant and
her co-accused. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy
behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center
No.2. Upon reaching the center, P03 Ferrer fetched Brgy. Captain Pascual to witness the opening
of the black bag. As soon as the brgy. Captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence
of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside were eight bricks of
leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper.

The seized articles were later brought to the PNP Crime Lab in Pampanga. Forensic Chemist Babu
conducted a lab exam on them and concluded that the articles were marijuana. For their part, both
accused denied the accusation against them.

Libnao argued that her arrest was unlawful, capitalizes on the absence of a warrant for her arrest.
She also takes the issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers
interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to

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have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained
therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court exercised grave abuse of discretion when it appreciated and
considered the documentary and object evidence of the prosecution which were not formally
offered

RULING:

NO.

Appellant then faults the trial court for appreciating and taking into account the object and
documentary evidence of the prosecution despite the latter’s failure to formally offer them. Absent
any formal offer, she argues that they again must be deemed inadmissible. The contention is
untenable. Evidence not formally offered can be considered by the court as long as they have been
properly identified by testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the
records of the case. All the documentary and object evidence in this case were properly identified,
presented and marked as exhibits in court, including the bricks of marijuana. Even without their
formal offer, therefore, the prosecution can still establish the case because witnesses properly
identified those exhibits, and their testimonies are recorded. Furthermore, appellant’s counsel had
cross-examined the prosecution witnesses who testified on the exhibits.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by the REGIONALEXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, DENR,REGION VI, ILOILO CITY vs. VALENTINAESPINOSA,
REGISTER OF DEEDSOF THE PROVINCE OF NEGROSOCCIDENTAL,
LEONILACALISTON, and SPOUSESDIOSCORO & ESTRELLAESCARDA

G.R. No. 186603 April 5, 2017

JARDELEZA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The rules require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the
presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in
writing. Due process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the
trial court, and the appellate courts. This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and
oppose the admissibility of the evidence. When evidence has not been formally offered, it should
not be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.

As part of fair play and due process, the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of evidence
as much as every private party is.

FACTS:

A cadastral decree was issued in favor of Espinosa. The OCT was issued in the name of
Espinosa who later sold to Caliston which a TCT was issued.

The State through Regional Executive Director of the DENR field a Complaint for annulment of
title and reversion of land with the RTC claiming the property is inalienable public land because
it fell within the timberland area.

RTC ruled in favor of the State and ordered reversion of the property.

CA ruled in favor of Espinosa and found that the Stare failed to prove fraud or
misrepresentation when she was issued the OCT. It further ruled that the State failed to prove that
the property is forest land. The lone piece of the evidence consisting of LC Map No. 2978 was

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not authenticated pursuant to Section 24 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It noted that the parties
stipulated only as to the existence of the map, nit not as to genuineness of truthfulness of its content.
Assuming that the map is admitted in evidence, Espinosa’s rights over the property, which accrued
in 1962, should not be prejudiced by a subsequent classification by the State done in 1986, or after
24 years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of the inalienable forest
land at the time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.

RULING: NO

These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. undoubtedly apply here. As part
of fair play and due process, the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer of evidence as much
as every private party is. More, the State’s subsequent reclassification of the area where the
property is situated cannot be used to defeat the rights of a private citizen who acquired the land
in a valid and regular proceeding conducted 24 years earlier.

The result would have been different had the State proved that the property was already
classified as part of forest land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title was decreed
to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries
with it the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the alienable character of the property in
the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a subsequent reclassification,
more soon lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private property without just compensation
and due process of law. This, however, is not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due
process are paramount considerations that must still be observed.

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TENDER OF EXCLUDED EVIDENCE

CRUZ-AREVALO VS. LAYOSA

A.M. RTJ-06-2005 14 JULY 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

DOCTRINE:

As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainant’s witness, the rule
is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party’s
offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to
form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

IN RELATION TO: Tender of Excluded Evidence (Rule 132, Section 40)

FACTS:

Cruz executed an authorization letter and a SPA in favor of complainant to represent him in a civil
case while he undergoes medical treatment in the USA. Complainant assails the order of the
respondent judge to exclude several paragraphs in the Affidavit which was adopted as the direct
testimony of her witness without giving her counsel a chance to comment on the objections raised
by the defendants. Complainant prays for the re-raffling of the case to ensure impartiality and
proper dispensation of justice. Respondent judge inhibited himself. In her Comment, respondent
judge points out that she gave the other party the chance to go over the affidavit to make objections
thereto. OCA found complainant’s accusations unmeritorious and recommended the dismissal of
the administrative case for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge erred in ordering the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit.

RULING:

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The Court held no. As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of
complainant’s witness, the rule is that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or
excluded by the court. If a party’s offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may
move or request that it be attached to form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence
is oral, he may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
the substance of the proposed testimony.

This administrative Complaint filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia Querubin-
Layosa with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case No. Q-03-
50379, entitled Josefina Cruz-Arevalo and Conrado R. Cruz v. Home Development Mutual Fund
and Federico S. Quimbo.

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RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF COURT – WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

MANALO VS. ROLDAN-CONFESSOR

G.R. NO. 102358 NOVEMBER 19, 1992

BELLOSILLO, J.

DOCTRINE:

All administrative determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing
evidence.

Clear and convincing proof is more than mere preponderance but not to extent of such certainty as
is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases while substantial evidence consists of
more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.

FACTS:

Petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo responded to a newspaper advertisement looking for a
couple to work as a driver and tutor/babysitter and went to Career Planners Specialists
International, Inc. (CPSI) to do so. Petitioners were hired to work for a family in Saudi Arabia.
Allegedly they had to pay a placement fee of P40,000 as a precondition for the processing f their
papers.

It was subsequently found by the petitioners that their positions had been misrepresented. Gloria
was made to work as a maid, and that the work conditions of Vicente’s employment was
unbearable.

Hence, the spouses Manalo were forced to return home and they sued private respondents before
the POEA charging them with illegal exaction, false advertisement, and other violations. They
demanded the refund of the amount exacted from them plus moral damages.

POEA ruled in favor of spouses Manalo, finding that their version of the case was more convincing
that CPSI’s.

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Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted. The resolution issued
by POEA, however, stated that the sole basis of POEA holding herein respondent liable for illegal
exaction was the uncorroborated testimony of the complainants. On appeal, the Secretary of Labor
sustained the reconsideration of POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not herein public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they required clear
and convincing evidence to establish the charge of illegal exaction.

RULING:

Yes, there was grave abuse of discretion.

In the administrative proceedings for cancellation, revocation or suspension of Authority or

License, no rule requires that testimonies of complainants be corroborated by documentary
evidence, if the charge of unlawful exaction is substantially proven. All administrative
determinations require only substantial proof and not clear and convincing evidence.

Clear and convincing proof is more than mere preponderance but not to extent of such certainly as
is required beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases while substantial evidence consists of
more than a scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.

In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, the Court find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest
level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial
evidence, in that order.

That the administrative determination of facts may result in the suspension or revocation of the
authority of CPSI does not require a higher degree of proof. The proceedings are administrative,
and the consequent imposition of suspension/revocation of Authority/License does not make the
proceedings criminal. Moreover, the sanctions are administrative and, accordingly, their infliction
does not give rise to double jeopardy when a criminal action is instituted for the same act.

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PEOPLE VS. SERENAS

G.R. NO. 188124. JUNE 29, 2010.

PEREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained and they dwell on material
points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit the veracity of the witness’ claim.

FACTS:

Jonel Falabrica Serenas alias "Joe-An" (Joe-An) and Joel Lorica Labad (Joel) are
convicted of the crime of murder. Niño Noel Ramos (Niño) had just brought his girlfriend,
Dianne Charisse Gavino (Dianne), home to Sto. Niño, Parañaque City. On his way back to La
Huerta, he passed by a bridge connecting the barangays of Sto. Niño and La Huerta. Thereat,
Niño was stabbed and mauled.

Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Niño’s brother, was in the vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La
Huerta when he heard a commotion on the bridge. As he was about to proceed to the bridge, he
met Niño and noticed that his brother was soaked in his own blood. Niño relayed to Cesar
that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar immediately brought Niño to the hospital where the
latter expired thirty (30) minutes later.

Dianne, the girlfriend of Nino initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station
that her cousin informed her of the commotion on the bridge, but during the trial, in her testimony
she claimed that she actually saw the stabbing occur.

ISSUE:

Whether Dianne’s conflicting testimonies should be given weight?

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Was the testimony of Cesar Ramos that Nino’s declaration that he was stabbed by Joe-An
admissible as evidence?

RULING:

Dianne’s testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the rule that if
there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be
given more weight since affidavits being taken ex-parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate.
Corollary to this is the doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable and unexplained
and they dwell on material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit the veracity of the
witness’ claim. The second rule is apt to the case at bar.

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem
statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware
of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.

In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first,
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the declaration must
be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the
victim.

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GONZALES VS. BUGAAY

G.R. NO. 173008 22 FEBRUARY 2012

DOCTRINE:

“A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is

presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case."

FACTS:

The deceased spouses Bartolome Ayad and Marcelina Tejada ("Spouses Ayad") had five (5)

children: Enrico, Encarnacion, Consolacion, Maximiano and Mariano. The latter, who was single,
predeceased his parents on December 4, 1943. Marcelina died in September 1950 followed by
Bartolome much later on February 17, 1964. Enrico has remained single. Encarnacion died on
April 8, 1966 and is survived by her children, Nenita Gonzales, Generosa Gonzales, Felipe
Gonzales, Lolita Gonzales, Dolores Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales and Beatriz Gonzales, the
petitioners in this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was married to the late Imigdio Bugaay. Their
children are Mariano Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay,Amelita Bugaay, Rodolfo Bugaay, Letecia Bugaay,
Lydia Bugaay, Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano died single
and without issue on August 20, 1986.

The spouses of petitioners, except Nenita, a widow, and those of the respondents, except Lydia
and Belen, were joined as parties in this case.

In their Amended Complaint for Partition and Annulment of Documents with Damages petitioners
alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children of the Spouses Ayad are Enrico and
Consolacion, and that during the Spouses Ayad's lifetime, they owned several agricultural as well
as residential properties.

Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent documents covering all the properties
owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor of Consolacion and respondents, completely disregarding

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their rights. Thus, they prayed, among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's estate, the
nullification of the documents executed by Enrico, and the award of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision dated November 24, 1995, awarding one
fourth (¼) pro-indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico, Maximiano, Encarnacion and

Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses Ayad, excluding Mariano who predeceased them. It

likewise declared the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by Enrico and

respondents, as well as all other documents and muniments of title in their names, as null and

void.

Motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed by the respondents. Consequently, Judge

Angeles granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial for the specific "purpose
of receiving and offering for admission the documents referred to by the respondents. However,
instead of presenting the documents adverted to, consisting of the documents sought to be
annulled, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence. RTC denied the MR. On appeal, the

RTC decision was reversed. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA's dismissal of the Amended Complaint was in accordance with law, rules of
procedure and jurisprudence.

RULING:

No. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and
is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required
to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being

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considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court
renders its judgment.

In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated its

Decision. While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for

the sole purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial.

As respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their

motion should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision stands.

Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the

Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no
longer an available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had
correctly done.

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ZAPANTA VS. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 170863 20 MARCH 2013

DOCTRINE:

The date of the offense is not controlling as to the sufficiency of the complaint or information
when it is not a material ingredient of the offense.

FACTS: Zapanta, a project manager, was charged of qualified theft of steel beams upon
instructing the delivery thereof to another construction site. The RTC and the CA found him guilty
upon testimony of witnesses. However, he appealed the case for insufficiency of information as to
the date of the commission of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether the date of the offense is indispensible to the sufficiency of complaint or
information

RULING: No. The date is not indispensible to the sufficiency of the complaint or information
when it is not a material ingredient of the offense. In this case, the date is not a material ingredient
in theft.

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MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, et al v. ROMAN SALVADOR and FILOMENA BRAVO

G.R. No. 171497 April 4, 2011

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

FACTS:

A Complaint for quieting of title was filed by respondent spouses Roman Salvador and Filomena
Bravo (respondents) against petitioners. Petitioners are the surviving children and legal heirs of
the Spouses Tamani.

Respondents and the Spouses Tamani are co-owners of an undivided parcel of land with an area
of 776 sq. m. The Spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz as
evidenced by a sum of Php 2,500.00. Thereafter, Cruz sold the disputed property to respondents
for the same consideration. Respondents thus acquired ownership over the whole land.

At the RTC, petitioners filed an Answer wherein they argued that they were the lawful owners and
were in actual possession of the disputed property having inherited the same from their parents.
Petitioners contend that the signature of their parents were forged and thus assail the validity of
the Deed of Absolute sale between Cruz and their parents.

During trial, at the instance of petitioners, the signature of Demetrio Tamani appearing on the deed
of sale and his standard signatures were submitted for examination and comparison. Albacea, a
document examiner of the NBI, filed a Report (NBI report) finding that "the questioned and
standard signatures are written by one and the same person." Dissatisfied with the NBI report,

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petitioners asked for another examination of the signatures, this time submitting the same to the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service. Sorra, a document examiner of the PNP, filed a Report (PNP
report) finding that "the questioned signature and the standard signatures of Demetrio were written
by two different persons."

The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the said Decision. Hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the signature of Tamani was forged.

RULING:

Yes, the signature was forged.

Sorra testified that the questioned signature was executed in a slow and drawn manner, while the
standard signatures were executed in a fast manner. Moreover, the line quality of the questioned
signature, particularly the letters "o," "m" and "n" exhibited hesitation and patchings, while the
standard signatures exhibited equal distribution of ink line and had good line quality. In addition,
the lateral spacing of the questioned signature was crumpled, while the lateral spacing of the
standard signature is normal.

During cross-examination, Sorra explained that the differences she accounted for were not
"variations," which are normal and usual deviations. She explained that variations are attributable
to the fact that humans are not machines, such that it would be impossible to have two perfectly
identical handwriting samples. Instead, Sorra clarified that the differences were "different" based
on the hesitation in writing in the questioned signature. Sorra was steadfast that the similarities
between the questioned signature and the standard signatures is attributable to the fact that the case
involved a "simulated forgery" or a copied forgery, such that there will be similarities, but the
similarities will be superficial.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether
a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing
marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
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which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. While admittedly
this Court was unable to fully comprehend all the differences noted by Sorra given that her
testimony was fairly technical in nature and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state
that this Court has observed a good number of the differences noted by her. Moreover, while We
are not unmindful of the testimony of Albacea, the document examiner from the NBI, this Court
is more inclined to believe the findings of Sorra, because unlike Albacea, Sorra limited her
examination to Exhibits "S-1 to S-11" and "S-19." Albacea, on the other hand, considered all 19
specimen signatures. Noticeably, Exhibits "S-12" to "S-18" were executed several years apart from
the questioned signature which was supposedly written in 1959. However, the dates of execution
of Exhibits "S-12" to "S-18" covered years ranging from 1933 to 1952 and 1974. Thus, this Court
finds that Sorra was correct when she opted to disregard the said Exhibits in her examination.
Lastly, while it was improper for the RTC to rely solely on Sorra’s credentials, her superior
credentials, compared to that of Albacea, give added value to her testimony.

Furthermore, as observed by the RTC, the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property
militate its veracity and truthfulness. As aptly argued by petitioners, the following circumstances
would show that the alleged deed of sale was spurious: First, Cruz never took action to possess the
property from 1959 to 1980; Second, even after the supposed sale, Tamani was continuously
declaring the land in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes due thereon; any reasonable
person who had sold his property would not undertake the unnecessary burden of continuing to
pay real property taxes on the same; Last, the land was allegedly sold to Cruz for P2,500.00 in
1959 and yet twenty-one years (21) after, Cruz sold the land to respondents for the same amount
of P2,500.00. One who alleges forgery has the burden of establishing his case by a preponderance
of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered
in opposition to it. Based on the preceding discussion, this Court finds that petitioners have
satisfactorily discharged such burden.

Withal, although there is no direct evidence to prove forgery, preponderance of evidence

inarguably favors petitioners. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."

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Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.
It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICKY LADIANA y DAVAO, (at-large), accused.

ANTONIO MANUEL UY

G.R. No. 174660 May 30, 2011

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its
conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts
from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to circumstantial
evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting
felons free and deny proper protection to the community.

FACTS:

Antonio Manuel Uy is a maintenance crew of Jeepney Shopping Center. Appellant,

together with a co-accused Ricky Ladiana Davao, was charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. It was alleged that the accused Antonio Uy and Rocky Davao, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the
following jewelry all belonging to JEEPNEY SHOPPING CENTER and an ARMSCOR .38
caliber revolver belonging to ENERGETIC SECURITY AGENCY. On the occasion thereof,
accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed Gilbert V. Esmaquilan and hit on the head
with a 2x2 wood Felix Arañez y Gida and Delfin Biniahan y Cahtong, Security Guard, Janitor and
maintenance of Jeepney Shopping Center, respectively, thereby causing their death; and accused
to facilitate their escape thereafter take, steal and drive away a (sic) one (1) Black Honda Civic.

Appellant confessed to Eduardo, the second cousin of Ricky and Uy’s girlfriend Richlie-
that he and Ricky entered a place in Pasay City and they killed two persons and seriously wounded
another whom they left fighting for his life. Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which
contained money and that if “he can open the vault, and even if they die their family will live
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comfortably.” Further, appellant told Eduardo that nothing will be traced to him because his hands
were wrapped such that no fingerprints would be recovered from the crime scene. They arrived at
the house of Panfilo dela Cruz in Zambales around 6:00 o’clock in the morning. Eduardo
introduced appellant to Panfilo dela Cruz and told the latter that appellant will be staying there for
about two (2) days. At noontime, Eduardo went back to Manila. Uy was apprehended in Zambales.
While, Ladiana remained at-larged. Uy claimed that it was only Ladiana who did the crime and
was being implicated by Ladiana. He also claimed that the cross pendant found on his possession
was planted by a police officer. He contended that the recovery of the service firearm of the slain
security guard did not prove his participation in the commission of the crime. He even pointed to
Ricky and his companions as the ones responsible for the crime of robbery with homicide.

The RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of robbery with homicide and
imposing upon him the penalty of death. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the guilt of Uy was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

YES.

Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on

occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi
or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide,
as used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the
central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery.

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In this case, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed
committed.

While there was no direct evidence to establish appellant’s participation in the commission
of the crime, direct evidence is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion
and finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or
series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to
circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community. Thus, Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence requires the concurrence of the
following: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. A judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person

The following pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution established

beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and his co-accused Ricky conspired to commit the crime
of robbery with homicide.

1. Possession of the stolen goods by the accused and his girlfriend was not satisfactorily
explained;

2. Intent to steal was evident in his confession to Eduardo dela Cruz who had no reason to lie
as he even helped him to escape;

3. Participation in the commission of the crime was proven by the tracing of the possession
of the deceased's firearm at Ricky Ladiana's house, accused Antonio's friend and companion right
after the killing;

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4. Antonio Manuel Uy was seen in person by a guard at the scene of the crime on the night
of the robbery and killing;

5. Suspicious presence at the place of robbery immediately before the incident;

6. Antonio Manuel Uy's cellphone was established as the sender of text messages to at least
two co-employees of his;

7. Confession/testimony of Richlie Ladiana, acknowledged sweetheart of accused Uy that the

latter gave her the jewelries, part of the stolen jewelries from the shopping center.

8. Unexplained impromptu vacation of Antonio Manuel Uy. It has been ruled that flight per
se cannot prove the guilt of an accused. But if the same is considered in the light of other
circumstances, it may be deemed a strong indication of guilt.

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JESALVA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 187725 January 19, 2011

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE/S:

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix wherefrom
a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are instances when, although a
witness may not have actually witnessed the commission of a crime, he may still be able to
positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the
latter is the person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of
the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence.
In the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence
to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all circumstances, the
guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in secret or in secluded places will be hard,
if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.

Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In order
that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these
essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

It is well-settled that the positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare
denials of an accused.

FACTS:

On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, filed a criminal complaint for
Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the
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complaint was amended, charging petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia
Aldemo died on September 14, 1992. After conducting a hearing on the bail application of
petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court of Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992, granted him bail. On
January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered
the transmittal of the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon. Thus, petitioner
was charged with the crime of Murder. On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in

favor of the prosecution, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on
circumstantial evidence, not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide, and ratiocinated that, in the
absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established, and
that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner can be convicted of the crime of homicide based on purely

circumstantial evidence.

RULING:

Yes, petitioner can be convicted of the crime of homicide based on purely circumstantial
evidence.

The Supreme Court ruled that direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is
not the only matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Thus, there
can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved
form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused,
to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. In order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

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In this case, the prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial
evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that
petitioner committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances
point to petitioner as the culprit. Petitioner’s mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial
evidence clearly establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive
declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused.

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RUDIGARIO GATMAITAN vs. DR. RICARDO GONZALES

G.R. NO. 149226. June 26, 2006.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Adding a fatal blow to the petitioner’s untenable position is the fact that he failed to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the performance of private respondent’s official duties when he issued
the questioned Hospital Order. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the time honored principle that
the law bestows upon a public official the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one’s
official duties and functions. In the case of Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, this Court categorically held
that: ... public respondents have in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties which petitioners failed to rebut when they did not present evidence to prove
partiality, malice and bad faith. Bad faith can never be presumed; it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. No such evidence exists in the case at bar.

FACTS:

Gatmaitan charged Gonzales for grave misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment
and oppression. He argued that the issuance of Hospital Order 184, which reassigned him from his
previous work station to OR-DR Complex is a demotion, which is a violative of the law. He further
argued that he was constructively dismissed because of such order.

Gonzales argued that it was legitimate for what he did was reassignment and not demotion
and there was no abuse of authority. The Ombudsman and the CA favored Gonzales. It was stated
that the transfer was made in the interest of service. As to his charge of diminution of rank, CA
noted that Gatmaitan’s appointment as Hospital Housekeeper is without any specific station or unit
assignment. As such, he can always be reassigned to clean or maintain the upkeep of one station
to another, whenever and wherever his services are much needed since he cannot claim vested
right to the station to which he was originally assigned nor security of tenure thereat.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Gatmaitan sufficiently proved his allegations against Gonzales.

RULING:

Gatmaitan failed to sufficiently prove.

He failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of private

respondent’s official duties when he issued the questioned Hospital Order. Well-entrenched in
jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that the law bestows upon a public official the
presumption of regularity in the discharge of one’s official duties and functions. In the case of
Fernando v. Sto. Tomas, the Court categorically held that: ... public respondents have in their favor
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties which petitioners failed to rebut
when they did not present evidence to prove partiality, malice and bad faith. Bad faith can never
be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. No such evidence exists in the
case at bar.

The Supreme Court added that public servants are the trustees of the public’s welfare. The
aphorism that public service is a public trust finds more meaning within a hospital setting where
people seek to alleviate their physical pain within its walls. If the services of public servant is
needed in another section of that hospital then a reassignment in accordance with civil service rules
and regulations is proper. A public servant must not place his own personal convenience above
that of the needs of the public he serves.

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ALILING VS. FELICIANO

G.R. NO. 185829 25 APRIL 2012

DOCTRINE:

Labor Law; Findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently
erroneous.—Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not
the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on
certiorari is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being
assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. The more recent Peñafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc., v.
Sarmiento, 634 SCRA 279 (2010), has reaffirmed the above ruling, to wit: Finally, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-established is the
doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies x x x are accorded respect, even finality, if
supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and
conclusive upon this Court and will not normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without
exceptions, the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.

FACTS:

Respondents hired the services of Aliling and after sometime he was promoted as a regular
employee but in his surprise, it is for another company.On October 15, 2004, Aliling tendered his
resignation to San Mateo. While WWWEC took no action on his tender, Aliling nonetheless
demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter dated October 1,
2004 to management that San Mateo had forced him to resign. However, or on October 4, 2004,
Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation, nonpayment of salaries as
well as damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the complaint was Aliling’s
Affidavit dated November 12, 2004, in which he stated: “. At the time of my engagement,

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respondents did not make known to me the standards under which I will qualify as a regular
employee.”

ISSUE:

What is the effect once a decision was assailed for appeal?

RULING:

Settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, when affirmed by the NLRC and the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is not the function of
the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below. The jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not
supported by evidence on record or the impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
The more recent Peñafrancia Tours and Travel Transport, Inc., v. Sarmiento, 634 SCRA 279
(2010), has reaffirmed the above ruling, to wit: Finally, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC
and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-established is the doctrine that findings
of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded respect, even finality, if supported by substantial
evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive upon this
Court and will not normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court
finds that none are applicable to the present case.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LARA

G.R. NO. 199877 AUGUST 13, 2012

DOCTRINE:

The Judicial Affidavit Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission
of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced. The submission of evidence
beyond the mandated period in the Judicial Affidavit Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that:
a) the court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the
evidence proffers a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced
thereby.

FACTS:

Arturo Lara was arrested and charged for the crime of Robbery with Homicide for stealing San
Sebastian Inc.’s money, in the amount of approximately Php 230,000.00, and for the death of one
Joselito Bautista while the alleged stealing happened. When police operatives seized Lara, the
latter was placed in a police line-up whereby Enrique Sumulong, Jeff Atie, and Virgilio Manacob
identified him as the perpetrator of the crime.

Before the Supreme Court he argued that he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed
him in a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution and he maintains that the
police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already attached.

ISSUE:

Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara

RULING:

Yes, there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara.

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Contrary to appellant's assertion, prosecution witness Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista,
the victim. Also, it is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt against
Lara is based on circumstantial evidence.

Not only direct evidence but also circumstantial evidence can overcome the presumption of
innocence. Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence of direct evidence,
conviction can be had if the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent
with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other
hypothesis that he is not.

It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is
charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in
many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.

Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to prove the guilt of appellant:

· While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City,
appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness Sumulong,
demanding from him to produce the bag containing the money.

· Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated at the
backseat of the vehicle.

· The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag

· Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.

· The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.

· The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty shells.

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MICHAEL SAN JUAN V. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 177191 MAY 30, 2011

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

This Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs
raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every
drug-related prosecution.

FACTS:

PROSECUTION:

On December 15, 2003, elements of the Intelligence Unit of Pasay City Police conducted
surveillance, monitoring, and intelligence gathering to arrest violators of law along Buendia due
to numerous reports of snatching, robbery, and holdup. The police notice a blue Toyota Corolla
which had no license plate parked in front of a liquor store. Police officers approached the car and
asked from Michael San Juan the OR/CR of the car but none was produced. PO2 Jovenir noticed
Rolando Pineda was trying to hide a plastic bag under his seat, the contents were found out to be
white crystalline substance which they suspected as shabu.

SPO2 Aure recovered 2 small plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, he turned it
over to PO2 Jovenir. At the back seat, there was Cynthia Coderes. She said that the owner of the
shabu was a certain Mike who was waiting the the accused at her Cityland condo unit.

Police went to Cityland for a follow-up operation with Coderes. Upon reaching unit 1225, she
pretended to knock on the door and immediately opened the door, went inside and locked herself
in. She was rearrested, but no “Mike” was found in the unit. The accused were all brought to the
Pasay City Police HQ. The plastic containers were positively identified as shabu.

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DEFENSE:

Pineda and Coderes denied that they were arrested while on board the car and that they possessed
the illegal drugs. They claimed that they were inside Unit 1225 and were preparing to go out
shopping, then somebody knocked on their door. The door was forcibly opened and armed men
gained entry and ordered them to lie face down on the bed. They presented no warrant of arrest
and/or search warrant. They were brought to Sinta Motel where the police officers demanded
P500,000 for their release and later brought to CID

San Juan testified he was at the lobby of Cityland and was waiting for an elevator in order to see
Pineda and Coderes. 3 men joined him in the elevator; PO2 Jovenir and PInsp Golod. Golod
suddenly held his hand and Jovenir punched him in the stomach and was told to peacefully go with
them. Golod pulled him towards the lobby and later out of Cityland. He said that he was a car sales
agent. Golod demanded for P200,000 for his release. Then was later brought to CID. He was
brought to Fort Bonifacio for drug testing and later brought back to CID where he saw the car
parked at the back of City Hall.

RTC convicted San Juan, Pineda and Coredes of the crime charged possession of illegal drugs.
CA affirmed RTC and opined that the inconsistencies pointed out by the defense were unimportant
matters which do not delve into the material elements of the crime. Also the CA relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties by the police officers.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the CA erred in admitting the prosecution’s evidence despite violations of
petitioner’s constitutional rights?

RULING:

Petitioner was charged specifically with the transport of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or

shabu. However, upon review of the facts of the case, no such transport was proven to have taken
place.

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The RTC found that petitioner and accused were seen in a parked Toyota Corolla car, which had
no rear license plate, by a team from the Pasay City Police Force. When the police approached the
driver and asked for the vehicle’s papers, none were presented, prompting the police to ask the
vehicle’s occupants to disembark for verification purposes. The driver, petitioner, did so, while the
man on the passenger side, Pineda, was seen attempting to hide a paper bag under his seat. The
paper bag dropped on the floor, partially revealing its contents, namely, one of two plastic
containers with a white crystalline substance inside. This prompted the police to search petitioner
as well, and they recovered two small plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance from
him. An examination of the substance by the Southern Police District Crime Laboratory revealed
the contents to be positive for shabu.

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that a conviction for transportation of dangerous drugs cannot
stand. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: "to carry or convey
from one place to another." The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous
drug from one place to another. In the present case, although petitioner and his co-accused were
arrested inside a car, the car was not in transit when they were accosted. The prosecution failed to
show that any distance was travelled by petitioner with the drugs in his possession. The conclusion
that petitioner transported the drugs merely because he was in a motor vehicle when he was
accosted with the drugs has no basis and is mere speculation.

The rule is clear that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. All doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to prove the
element of transport of dangerous drugs, namely, that transportation had taken place, or that the
accused had moved the drugs some distance.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great respect. But when
there is a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate
to reverse the factual findings of the trial court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in
favor of an accused, considering that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The
Court must be satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court leading to an
accused’s conviction has satisfied the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

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According to PO2 Jovenir, these plastic containers were placed inside a bag and Pineda tried to
conceal these under his seat. These facts, standing alone, cannot give rise to a presumption of
conspiracy. Certainly, conspiracy must be proven through clear and convincing evidence. Indeed,
it is possible that petitioner was telling the truth when he said that he merely met with accused in
order to offer the car for sale, as that was his part-time business.

Thus, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of
cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. In
fine, the prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove and establish conspiracy. Necessarily,
petitioner should be held accountable only for his alleged respective participation in the
commission of the offense.

We find that the prosecution also failed to adequately prove petitioner’s participation in the offense
charged with moral certainty. PO2 Aure allegedly found the two sachets in the possession of
petitioner.43 However, it should be noted that SPO2 Aure did not mark the sachets himself. Instead,
he turned over these sachets to PO2 Jovenir. The answers elicited from PO2 Jovenir raise numerous
questions and ultimately cast doubts on the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the two
sachets containing illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner. The prosecution, in its quest to
establish its claim that these two sachets were actually recovered from petitioner, even had to
propound similar questions to PO2 Jovenir twice — only to reveal that the latter merely relied on
SPO2 Aure’s claim. PO2 Jovenir did not actually witness that SPO2 Aure seized these two sachets
from petitioner. Neither was it established that the two sachets were actually marked in the
presence of petitioner by SPO2 Aure himself.

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the

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evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.

This Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs
raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every
drug-related prosecution.

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BENITO VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 204644 FEBRUARY 11, 2015

LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE:

The fact of conspiracy “must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of
the agreement of the parties,” that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:

Agbulos and Benito were charged with Estafa to which they both pleaded not guilty.

According to the prosecution, Abadilla knew Agbulos and Benito through Abadilla’s
friend, Pamintuan. Pamintuan introduced Agbulos to Abadilla as a jeweler. Abadilla and Agbulos
entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry, with Agbulos going to Abadilla’s
residence. In all transactions, Beito accompanied Agbulos.

Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla and they agreed that Agbulos would
return the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them. A check was issued
by Agbulos to Abadilla for the value of the jewelry received. Another batch of jewelry from
Abadilla was received by Agbulos with the same agreement and another check covering it. Then
a last batch of jewelry was received by Agbulos and a check was again issued by the latter. Days
later, Abadilla asked for a security for the jewelries receved by Agbulos to which the latter gave
an owner’s copy of TCT No. 438259. However, upon verification with the LRA, the certificate of
title turned out to be spurious, and the checks issued by Agbulos were dishonored. Abadilla then
tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found.

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After several months, Abadilla learned from Agbulos’ sister-in-law that the latter received
pawn tickets from a friend. Abadilla, through her friend Pamintuan, obtained from Agbulos’ sister-
in-law pawn tickets numbered 45227 and 45306 issued by E. Ochoa Pawnshop. Appearing on the
pawn tickets was the name “Linda Chua”.

Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn tickets and
she learned that the items pawned were among the pieces of jewelry she turned over to Agbulos.
She also learned from Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser, that the “Linda Chua” who pawned her
jewelry was Benito.

For Benito’s defense, she denied that she was the “Linda Chua” who pawned Abadilla’s
jewelry, and Agbulos supported such testimony.

RTC convicted Agbulos and Benito with the crime of Estafa, which was sustained by the
CA.

ISSUE:

Whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in committing estafa.

RULING:

NO.

The fact of conspiracy “must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony
subject of the agreement of the parties,” that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.

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To prove estafa through misappropriation, the prosecution must establish the following
elements:

1. the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on

commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
deliver, or to return, the same;

2. misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or

denial of receipt of the money or property;

3. the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

4. demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy
between Benito and Agbulos.

As testified to by Abadilla, only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from her, and
Benito was merely “present during the negotiation”.

Even assuming that Benito accompanied Agbulos in going to Abadilla’s residence, this
does not prove that Benito received any jewelry from Abadilla. As the helper of Agbulos’ brother,
Benito may have accompanied Agbulos on her employer’s order. “Mere presence at the scene of
the crime is not by itself indicative of conspiracy between the accused.

The strongest evidence against Benito is the testimony of Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser
who positively identified Benito as the “Linda Chua” who pawned Abadilla’s jewelry. According
to the Court of Appeals, Benito’s posing as “Linda Chua” and pawning the jewelry “paved the
way for the presence of the second and third elements of estafa. However, the identification of
Benito as the “Linda Chua” who pawned the jewelry is “open to serious doubt.” As testified to by
Diloria, she saw Benito in E. Ochoa Pawnshop only on two occasions: on June 6 and 17, 1994.
Moreover, there is evidence that Diloria was not the pawnshop appraiser who entertained “Linda
Chua” but a coworker named Mary Ann.

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TRINIDAD V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192241 13 June 2012

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.11 The corollary rule is
that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,
i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
and with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

FACTS:

At around 9:00pm of 16 October 1998, the victim, Dominador Untalasco (Doming),

boarded the tricycle of Salvador Oaña. Upon arriving to his destination, Sonny Lubrica, who was
joining a bonfire with 5 other persons, flagged the tricycle. This angered Dominador, thus he
alighted from the tricycle and said, "You are the one, you are blocking the way of the tricycles."
Doming brought out a fan knife and slapped Sonny prompting the companions of the latter, except
petitioner Romulo Trinidad, to scamper. Doming approached petitioner and said, "You are one of
them." Petitioner replied, "I am not x x x one [of them], uncle." Doming slapped petitioner in the
face and the latter said, "You are boastful, uncle." Doming picked up a bamboo and hit petitioner
on his left arm. Petitioner ran towards the east, while Doming chased him. Totoy Trinidad, father
of petitioner, and Antonio Trinidad, went near the persons hiding behind the tricycle and asked
them if Doming was armed, to which Sonny answered, "Yes, he has a knife." Totoy went beside
Salvador and told him to put off the light of his tricycle, which the latter did not follow. Thus,
Totoy turned off the engine of Salvador's tricycle and headed towards the east shortly after Doming
chased petitioner to the same direction.

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Salvador reported the incident to the police. SPO4 Charlie Abuan, together with policemen
Coloma and Cariaga, with Barangay Kagawad Rudy Sabado and Salvador, went to the scene of
the crime and saw the bloodied body of the victim in a kneeling position with his forehead touching
the ground. Five (5) persons were brought to the police station for investigation. petitioner and
Antonio went to Eliseo Agno to ask him to bring them to town to surrender. At that time, Eliseo
saw Antonio holding a samurai.

Based on the autopsy conducted by Dr. Bernando Parado, the victim died of cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock, hemorrhage, stab wound right auricle, multiple
hack and stab wounds. The victim sustained 14 wounds on his front body with a total of 32 wounds
consisting of multiple stab and hack wounds probably caused by a bolo or a knife.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to convict petitioner
as charged

RULING:

Yes. This Court finds no merit to the petition. Since petitioner was convicted on the basis
of purely circumstantial evidence, this Court has to review the facts and to deliberate on the case
with extra care, cognizant that the prosecution cannot rely on the weakness of the defense, and that
any conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.

The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The corollary rule is that
the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the
circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with
any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.

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The testimonies show a positive identification of the petitioner as the last person seen with the
victim.1âwphi1 That, and the series of circumstances proven during the trial form an unbroken
chain of events leading to the conclusion that petitioner was one of the assailants. Direct evidence
of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt.
Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.

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RULE 134 OF THE RULES OF COURT – PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY

SAN LUIS VS. ROXAS

G.R. NO. 159127 3 MARCH 2008

DOCTRINE:

The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of
evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him."

It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the
Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken
before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign
state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,
or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory"
(Sec. 11, Rule 24).

Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24).

FACTS:

Berdex Int’l. (Private respondent) Filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner alleging
that it is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of US with principal office in
San Francisco California is maintaining an action only to enforce its right by virtue of an isolated
transaction with the pet. That pet received from it certain amounts of money which were meant

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partly as advances or loans and partly for the purchase of 40% shares in both Seanet and Seabest
Corporations.

However, not a single share in those corporations was transferred to private respondent by
petitioner and the shares were retained by the latter; the parties then agreed to treat all the
payments/advances made by private respondent to petitioner as the latter’s loan. Petitioner
proposed the payment of the loan within a period of 3 years, which proposal was accepted by
private respondent with the agreement that in case of non-payment of any instalment on their due
dates, the entire amount shall become due and demandable.

Petitioner later refused to sign a formal contract of loan, petitioner confirmed such loan to private
respondent’s auditors on August 8, 2000 and he hand only paid US$ 20,000 and no further payment
was made despite repeated demands. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay
the amount of US$ 150,335.75 plus interest until fully paid and attorney’s fees. Pre-trial conference
terminated and the case was set for trial, Private respondent filed a motion to authorize deposition-
taking thru written interrogatories alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is set on May 3,
2002.

However, all of its witnesses are Americans who reside or hold office in the USA. That one of the
witnesses is already of advanced age and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not
dangerous, and there is a perceived danger to the in the aftermath of the 9-11 terrorist attack, that
written interrogatories are ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few, that such
mode of deposition taking will save precious judicial and government time and will prevent
needless delays in the case.

This was opposed by Petitioner on the ground that taking the deposition through written
interrogatories would deprive the court of opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor
of witnesses. The claim that travel to the Philippines would be dangerous for the witnesses who
are all Americans is frivolous, since respondent has not presented evidence that the US government
has prohibited its citizens from travelling to the Philippines and if ever there was such prohibition
it was not binding on our own legal system, old age was not a valid reason.

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RTC granted PR’s motion to take deposition thru written interrogatories, Pet’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, Pet filed certiorari with the CA, denied, ruled in favour of PR.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 1, rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident foreign corporation the
privilege of having all its witnesses, all of whom are foreigners, to testify through deposition upon
written interrogatories taken outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract.

RULING:

Yes, Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides that ‘by leave of court after jurisdiction has
been obtained over any defendant for over property which is the subject of the action, or without
such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not,
may be taken, at the instance of any party, by depositions upon oral examination or written
interrogatories.’

Unequivocally, the rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can avail of
deposition. The fact that the private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is immaterial.
The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device
for ascertaining the facts relative to the issue of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and prevent
the said trials from being carried out in the dark.

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts, they are not generally meant to be a substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness. However, under Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of
Court, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by
the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. It has been repeatedly
held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and should
not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and
the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.

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The principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule of
evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. - The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him."

It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the
Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken
before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign
state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,
or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory"
(Sec. 11, Rule 24).

Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1, Rule 24). After answer,
whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does
not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being
that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . (stating) the time
and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if
known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the
particular class or group to which he belongs . . . "(Sec. 15, Rule 24).

The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated
in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking,
or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the
taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel,"
etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is

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being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's
MOTION (To Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering private
respondent's allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S.
This situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of more than one hundred (100) kilometers
from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence
was procured by the party offering the deposition.

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JONATHAN LANDOIL INTERNATIONAL CO., INC. VS. SPS. MANGANDADATU

G.R. NO. 155010 16 AUGUST 2004

DOCTRINE:

A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer
has been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the
parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

FACTS:

Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu (Mangudadatus) filed with the RTC in Tacurong
City, Sultan Kudarat, a complaint for damages against Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc.
("JLI"). During the pre-trial, JLI failed to appear and was thus declared in default. As a result, JLI
filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and Change of Venue. This was eventually denied by the
Court and a Writ of Execution was issued against them.

JLI filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution since they were not able to receive a
copy of an order resolving their motion for new trial. To make matters worse, their counsels, Attys.
Mario Jr. and Peligro submitted withdrawals of appearance. They were replaced by new lawyers
and the affidavits of Mario and Peligro attesting that they had not yet received a copy of the Order
resolving the Motion for New Trial were attached. JLI then received a notice regarding the public
auction sale of their properties. By reason of the immediate threat to implement the Writ of
Execution, it filed with the CA a Petition for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the
Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.

The RTC ordered the Mangudadatus to comment on the motion to quash filed by JLI. In
their comment, they attached two separate Certifications supposedly issued by the postmaster of
Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had been received by
Mario and Peligro. To clear things up, counsel for JLI personally served counsel for the
Mangudadatus a Notice to Take Deposition upon Oral Examination of Attys. Mario and Peligro.

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The Deposition was intended to prove that JLI had not received a copy of the Order denying the
Motion for New Trial. Thus, the depositions of their former counsels were taken. The RTC denied
JLI’s motion to quash. The CA ruled that JLI could no longer avail itself of a deposition under
Rule 23 of Rules of Court, since trial had already been terminated (because a decision was rendered
after JLI’s default).

ISSUE:

Can JLI avail of the depositions of their former counsels despite the case being terminated?

RULING:

Yes, JLI can avail of the depositions of their former counsels despite the case being
terminated.

A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer
has been served. Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the
parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.

The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole
function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand. Thus, depositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition
taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of depositions
after pre-trial.” Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court (that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave
of court if an answer has been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their
admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court).

The Rules of Court vest in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may
be taken or not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have

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intended. However, it is well-settled that this discretion is not unlimited. It must be exercised --
not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with
the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained. In this case, the depositions
involved a circumstance that fell under Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23.1 The witnesses of JLI in Metro
Manila resided beyond 100 kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing.

JLI offered the depositions in support of its Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and
for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was not yet final. As previously explained,
despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition can still be properly taken.

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RULES ON EXAMINATION OF CHILD WITNESS - A.M. NO. 004-07-SC, 15

DECEMBER 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VALENTIN BARING,
JR., ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 137933 January 28, 2002

BUENA, J.

DOCTRINE:

On account of the increased number of children coming into the realm of the judicial system, the
Supreme Court adopted the “Rule on Examination of a Child Witness” to govern the examination
of child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or witnesses to a crime.

FACTS:

Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her grandmother’s common-law husband, of raping
her on several occasions. Since 1990, when she was about 8 months old 5 until 1997, she was left
under her grandmother’s care and custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as “Papa.

Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in Dasmariñas,

Cavite. She learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually abused by accused-appellant.
Acting on her daughter’s accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the National Bureau of
Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical examination at the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory the medico-legal officer at Camp Crame found
that Jennifer was in “non-virgin state physically.

For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. The trial court meted
out its judgment of conviction on the basis of the victim’s clear, trustworthy and positive testimony
that she was raped several times by accused-appellant.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court will give great weight of a 7-year old’s unwavering testimony.

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RULING:

Yes. The Court held Baring guilty beyond reasonable doubt. A medical certificate after all is
not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. It is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that
a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the
victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. Besides,
testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are credible, and the testimonies of child-victims
are given full weight and credit.

The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused-appellant cannot be
overturned by the bare denial and defense of being ‘framed-up’ interposed by accused-appellant.
The victim made a positive, clear and categorical declaration pointing to accused-appellant as the
person who sexually ravaged her.

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GENIL vs JUDGE RIVERA

A.M. No. MTJ-06-1619 January 23, 2006

CARPIO MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:

The parties in a preliminary investigation have no right to examine or cross-examine, the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness provides that the court shall exercise control over the questioning
of children so as to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth and ensure that questions are stated in
a form appropriate to their developmental level and protect them from harassment or undue
embarrassment.

The Rule on Execution of a Child Witness provides that when a child testifies, the court may, motu
proprio, order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons who do not have a direct interest in
the case. In issuing such order, the court is to consider, inter alia, the developmental level of the
child, the nature of the crime, and the nature of his testimony regarding the crime. It may also
exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced is of such character as to be
offensive to decency or public morals.

FACTS:

Nancy Silfaban, a minor, filed two criminal complaints against Roderick Sales for rape and
forcible abduction with rape. Nancy also filed a criminal complaint against Janice Sales for
violation of Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act.

Respondent conducted a criminal investigation two and a half months later after the accused was
ordered to submit his counter-affidavit, which preliminary investigation was made in open court.
During preliminary investigation, Nancy was called to the witness stand and was subjected to
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humiliation since all those present were laughing. Complainant requested for a change of venue.
In his comment, respondent explained that the preliminary investigation was not immediately
conducted as the evidence was weak and unbelievable, it being manifestly inconsistent with, and
repugnant to, the natural course of things. He claimed that not only did Nancy not request
otherwise; she, albeit a minor, looks energetic, psychologically mature and somewhat aggressive
who answers questions quickly, and there was nothing in her affidavit or testimony which
warranted the exclusion of the public from the proceedings. Respondent disclaimed the occurrence
of any laughing incident during the preliminary investigation, he adding that all were eager to
observe the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge Rivera should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:

YES. On top of the above-quoted provision of Sec. 3(e) of Rule 112 that the parties in a preliminary
investigation have no right to examine or cross-examine, the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness provides that the court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth and ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate
to their developmental level and protect them from harassment or undue embarrassment.

The Rule on Execution of a Child Witness provides that when a child testifies, the court may, motu
proprio, order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons who do not have a direct interest in
the case. In issuing such order, the court is to consider, inter alia, the developmental level of the
child, the nature of the crime, and the nature of his testimony regarding the crime. It may also
exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced is of such character as to be
offensive to decency or public morals.

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The criminal complaints of Nancy were filed on May 30, 2003 before the MTC, it was only on
August 13, 2003 or after two and a half months that respondent conducted the preliminary
investigations. And, per the Investigation Report of Judge Velasco, as of October 16, 2003 or more
than four months after Criminal Case was filed, no action had yet been taken thereonby respondent.
By respondents admission, as of August 13, 2004 or more than a year after the criminal complaints
were filed and exactly a year after the preliminary investigation for Criminal Case Nos. 3791 and
3792 was conducted, his resolutions thereon had yet to be transmitted to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City.

As the above-quoted provisions of the Rules direct, after a preliminary investigation is conducted,
the investigating judge must perform his ministerial duty to transmit within ten days after the
conclusion thereof the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the provincial
prosecutor. If on the other hand he determines, after examining the complaint and other documents
offered in support thereof, that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, he should dismiss
the complaint and transmit the order of dismissal together with the records of the case to the
provincial prosecutor within ten days from the filing of the complaint. And, examination or cross-
examination by the parties is proscribed. Yet respondent not only allowed SPO4 Cadungog who
acted as prosecutor to cross-examine the accused Roderick Sales; he also allowed the defense
counsel to propound questions to Nancy and her mother.

It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-
examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit,
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to
be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.

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Indubitably then, respondent was remiss in the performance of his duties when he not only allowed
the cross-examination of the parties during the preliminary investigation but also failed to resolve
the criminal complaints within the period mandated by law.

Judges owe it to the public to be knowledgeable, hence, they are expected to have more than just
a modicum of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. When the law is so elementary,
not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law, the
mainspring of injustice.

And judges must be faithful to the laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed,
competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the
rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance
of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the
duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence.
Basic rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and
precepts as well as with procedural rules. xxx

Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the Rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge.

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TACORDA VS. JUDGE CLEMENS

A.M. NO. RTJ-13-2359 23 OCTOBER 2013

SERRENO, C.J.

DOCTRINE:

The Supreme Court sustains the findings of the Office of the Court Administrator that the
acts of Judge Clemens were far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any
administrative liability on his part. A complete reading of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
(TSN) reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings.

FACTS:

The case from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by Atty. Jerome Tacorda charging respondent
Judge Reynaldo Clemens for gross ignorance of the law and alleged violation of the Witness
Examination Rule. The complainant claims that Odel Gedraga, then fifteen years, was presented
as witness before the sala of Judge Clemens for a criminal case involving the alleged murder of
Odel’s father.

Atty. Tacorda alleges that the Child Witness Examination Rule was not properly followed
by the respondent Judge when he made certain rulings that were not implemented and from Judge
Clemens’ alleged failure to castigate the defense counsel for standing beside the witness.
Furthermore, the Judge also continued the hearing for three hours, during which Gedraga was
subjected to the rigors of trial despite his minority. Finally, Atty. Tacorda claims that Judge
Clemens remained passive in many occasions. In his Comment, Judge Clemens belied all the
allegations of Atty. Tacorda as having no basis.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that charges for gross ignorance of
law against Judge Clemens be dismissed for bare allegations and presumption of regularity.

ISSUE:

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Whether Judge Clemens is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law for
supposedly violating the Child Witness Examination Rule

RULING:

No.

The Supreme Court sustains the findings of the OCA that the acts of Judge Clemens were
far from being ill-motivated and in bad faith as to justify any administrative liability on his part. A
complete reading of the TSN reveals that he was vigilant in his conduct of the proceedings. In the
instances mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit, he had been attentive to the manifestations made
by Atty. Tacorda and had acted accordingly and with dispatch.

It is doubtful that Judge Clemens failed to implement the directives he had issued during
the conduct of the trial. Based on the TSN, Atty. Tacorda did not have to make repeated
manifestations to respondent Judge after pointing out that the defense counsel tended to crowd the
witness and/or that the court interpreter should be the one to translate the testimony. Further,
contrary to the allegations of Atty. Tacorda, the TSN showed that respondent Judge was very much
concerned with following the proper conduct of trial and ensuring that the One-Day Examination
of Witness Rule was followed; but at the same time, he was sensitive to the fact that the witness
was already exhausted, having testified for almost three hours.

In administrative proceedings, the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed
the latter’s duties would prevail and that the complainant has the burden of proving the contrary
by substantial evidence. Charges based on suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.

For respondent judge to be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the
acts complained of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, not only must
the acts be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but they must also be motivated by bad
faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty.

In this case, the OCA found that Atty. Tacorda failed to prove that the acts of Judge
Clemens were ill-motivated.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. IBANES

G.R. NO. 197813 SEPTEMBER 25, 2013

PEREZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified
to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the
child’s competence. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to
perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell
the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct competency
examination of a child.

FACTS:

Wilfredo Atendido was invited by Alredo Nulla to a drinking session with Jesus Monsilla (Jesus)
and Edwin Ibanez (Edwin). Wilfredo went to take a piss, when suddenly Edwin snatched a t- shirt
and covered Wilfredo’s face. Edwin then pinned down Wilfredo, where Jesus then used a long
iron bar to hit the same.At the same time Rachel Atendido (Rachel), Wilfredo’s daughter, was
under the house of their neighbor and saw the assault on her father. She then saw he mother running
out of the house, after which, Jesus and Alfredo ran away and Edwin returned to his house.

Rowena Atendido asked for help and brought Wilfredo to the hospital but did not make it. These
sets of facts was based on the testimony of Rachel. Alfredo and Edwin, in their defense, alleged
that they merely passed by the scene of the crime out of curiosity. RTC and CA adjudged them
guilty for murder.

ISSUE:

Whether the child is qualified to be a witness

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RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and states that it cannot take Rachel’s testimony lightly
simply because she was a mere child when she witnessed the incident and when she gave her
testimony in court. There is no showing that her mental maturity rendered her incapable of
testifying and of relating the incident truthfully. With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which specifies
that every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of
proof lies on the party challenging the child’s competence. Only when substantial doubt exists
regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from
falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion
of a party, conduct competency examination of a child. Thus, petitioners’ flimsy objections on
Rachel’s lack of education and inability to read and tell time carry no weight and cannot overcome
the clear and convincing testimony of Rachel as to who killed her father.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN ESUGON y AVILA

G.R. No. 195244 22 June 2015

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE:

ALL persons are presumed to have been qualified as witness, including a child. This
presumption may be rebutted by evidence by the party challenging the child’s competency.

FACTS:

Accused Alvin Esugon was charged with robbery with homicide of Josephine Castro
Barrera by stabbing her. As a witness thereto, Carl, victim’s 5-year old son, positively identified
the accused as the one who stabbed his mother. The Regional Trial Court found Esugon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt on the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, giving credence to the testimony of Carl despite
inconsistencies, affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in giving credence to the testimony of Carl.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court found the CA to have properly relied on the testimony of Carl in
convicting the accused.

Under the Rules of Court, ALL persons who can perceive, and perceiving, and can make
known their perception to others, may be witnesses except for the following: 1) Those whose
mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others; and 2) Children whose mental maturity
is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and
of relating them truthfully.

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Therefore, every persons, including children enjoys the presumption of being a qualified
witness, unless otherwise rebutted by the party challenging the child’s competency. It is only when
substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate,
distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu
proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

The appellant failed to object to Carl’s competency. He also failed to even attempt to
produce evidence to show he was incapable of perceiving events and of communicating his
perceptions, or that he did not possess the basic qualifications of a competent witness. To discredit
the child’s testimony as witness is different from showing proof as to his competency to stand as
witness.

It was further noted by the Court that Carl was able to positively identify the accused both
during investigation and in trial. It was also noted that he could not have mistaken the accused due
to his familiarity thereto with the accused’s daily presence in the billiard room maintained by the
victim’s family.

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RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE - A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, 20 July 2001

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,

G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
ABAD, J.
DOCTRINE:

Under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC), Electronic
Evidence should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature But, this do not apply to the
present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
FACTS:
Rustan Ang was charged with violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. According to Irish, Rustan used two cellphone numbers for
sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text
messages, but it was to ask him to leave her alone. Then, Irish received through multimedia
message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face
superimposed on the figure. The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. This caused substantial emotional anguish,
psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it
would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread
the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send
sa lahat ng chatter."
Irish sought the help of the police. Under police supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the
cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet
her at the Lorentess Resort, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. There police officers intercepted
and arrested Rustan. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several
SIM cards. Joseph Gonzales testified as an expert in information technology and computer
graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture

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and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated
and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and
spontaneous manner. On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
Rustan now claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as
provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obscene picture was properly admitted in evidence.
RULING: Yes
The elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment: 1. The offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or
through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The
harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
After discussing and ruling that all the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are present in this case, the Court ruled upon the admissibility of the electronic
evidence.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of
the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.

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ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, vs.

CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS

A.M. No. CA-05-20-P September 9, 2005

DOCTRINE:

Evidence; Rules on Electronic Evidence; Electronic Communication as Evidence; Text messages

have been classified as “ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1 (k),Rule 2 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.”—

The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
“ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now
moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was
the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

FACTS:

Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence of official
duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and indirectly
having financial and material interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest in
the service of the order of release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Lagua’s petition for bond was approved in a Resolution where
the appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution
was brought to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.

Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National Penitentiary, where
Lagua was detained for homicide.

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Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced
herself as Lagua’s relative, asking how much more they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s
provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but
was told that they still had a balance. When Atty. Madarang was able to get the mobile number of
respondent, he represented himself as Lagua’s relative and exchanged text messages with said
respondent for a possible pay-off for the Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later
discovered that the respondent did not properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of
Release upon the accused-appellant and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art Baluran,
allegedly Lagua’s relative.

Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent denied
extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however, admitted
serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art
Baluran. Complainant then lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated
November 14, 2003.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation of right to
privacy of the accused?

RULING:

No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
“ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot
and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the
sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that
case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct,

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considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for
a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered
by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and

other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

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ZALDY NUEZ v. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO

A.M. NO. CA-05-18-P April 12, 2005

PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE:

Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and

other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof . . . ."

FACTS:

An administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct was filed by Nuez against Cruz-
Apao, an Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of the 15th Division,CA.
The complaint arose out of respondent's solicitation of P1,000,000.00 from Nuez in exchange for
a speedy and favorable decision of the latter's pending case in the CA.

Complainant lodged a complaint with the Action Center Imbestigador of GMA Network, the crew
of which had accompanied him to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission Special
Projects Group (PAOCC-SPG) in Malacanang where he filed a complaint for extortion against
respondent. This led to the conduct of an entrapment operation by elements of the PAOCTF at the
Jollibee Restaurant.

During the hearing, respondent would like the court to believe that she never had any intention of
committing a crime, that the offer of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from
complainant and that it was complainant and the law enforcers who instigated the whole incident.

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When she was asked if she had sent the text message contained in the complainant’s cellphone
which reflected her cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not incriminating but
claimed she did not remember those that clearly showed she was transacting with complainant.

Respondent would like the court to believe that she met with complainant only to tell the latter to
stop calling and texting her, not to get the 1,000, 0000 as pre-arranged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the text messages are admissible as evidence in court

RULING:

Yes, the text messages are admissible as evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that, complainant was
able to prove by his testimony in conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in
exchange for a favorable decision of the former's pending case with the CA. The text messages
were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2
of the Rules on Electronic Evidence which provides:

"Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text messages . . . and

other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained."

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "Ephemeral electronic

communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who
has personal knowledge thereof . . . ." In this case, complainant who was the recipient of said
messages and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import.
Respondent herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in complainant's cellphone from
which the messages originated was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and
attested to the veracity of the text messages between her and complainant. It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as evidence in
determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

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Complainant's testimony as to the discussion between him and respondent on the latter's demand
for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested
witness, Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in person.
Siringan was privy to the parties' actual conversation since she accompanied complainant on both
meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD

GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER
JALANDONI y ARI

G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

ABAD, J.

DOCTRINE:

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages
are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent
from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.

FACTS:

PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM
Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas
and asked for his documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents
shown them, they invited him in their mobile car to the police station for further questioning.
Enojas complied leaving his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they
stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s
door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot
one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2
Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with two more armed
robbers who managed to escape. He then went back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled.

Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2
Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting
that accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched

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the abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred
instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.

PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’
mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then
conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni.
Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution
presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-
accused.

Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case, the
accused opted to instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They
pointed out that they were entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since
the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.

The RTC rendered judgment, finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms and later on appealed with the CA but was dismissed.

The accused then appealed from the CA to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly
identified.

RULING:

As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages
are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages
with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent
from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.
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The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But,
assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for
rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an
incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been
committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it. The text
messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads
on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment
using this knowledge.

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MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION VS. SSANGYONG CORPORATION

G.R. NO. 170633 OCTOBER 17, 2007

NACHURA, J.

DOCTRINE:

To be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional

equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an
“electronic data message” or an “electronic document.” While “data message” has reference to
information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it does not necessarily mean that it will give
rise to a right or extinguish an obligation, unlike an “electronic document,” nevertheless evident
from the law is the legislative intent to give the two terms the same construction.

Facsimile transmissions are not “paperless” but verily are paper-based. A facsimile transmission
cannot be considered as electronic evidence—it is not the functional equivalent of an original under
the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile transmission
is not an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document,” and cannot be considered as
electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence.

FACTS:

Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila,
is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its
suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two
corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to
MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and
sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.

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Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported
stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000,
canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding
payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.

Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract
against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under
Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong
failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary
evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Order and their
admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and
documentary evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint,
Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible in evidence as such

RULING: NO.

The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document
under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or

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to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.”

We, therefore, conclude that the terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as
defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.
Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as
electronic evidence.

Since a facsimile transmission is not an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document,”

and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy
of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma
Invoice Nos. ST2- POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits “E” and “F”), which are mere
photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of
both the trial and the appellate courts.

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RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE - A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, 15 October 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLAUDIOT EEHANKEE, JR.

G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995

PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE:

Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as

the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing.

FACTS:

In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street,
Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the
village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk
the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late.
Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle
of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show
me your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without
bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why
are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at
him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?”
Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered
him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at
him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.

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The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became
hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a gun.
He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and
from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the
sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from
him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of
accused’s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused’s car, trying
to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused
caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally
sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot
Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to
see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his
knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN,
and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and
MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the
hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to
MURDER.

The defense:

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting
incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused
averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the
newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray
Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be

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in good running condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his
Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother’s house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not
used this car since then. Accused conceded that although the car was not in good running condition,
it could still be used.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the manner of Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification is

correct.

RULING:

YES.

The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who
positively identified him as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his out-of-court
identification by these eyewitnesses.

He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of
the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leino’s identification of him outside an unoccupied
house in Forbes Park was highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and
the newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leino’s interview at the hospital was never
put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the
CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the
evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and,
lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only
five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman’s face.
His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.

It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court identification by the

prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital
evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while
eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms

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of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe
eyewitness evidence as “inherently suspect.” The causes of misidentification are known, thus:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether
as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness
must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate
accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for
whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited
by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-
ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done
thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and
its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility
of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification;
and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did
not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s
identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this
mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for security even compelled
that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials
and brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. Leino’s

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fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of
the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.

There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the
criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.

Accused can’t also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of
the shooting before he personally identified him. The records show that while Leino was still in
the hospital, he was shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified the
accused as the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug
shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused or read any report relative to the shooting
incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive.
Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-
of-court identification by Leino.

There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accused’s identification by Leino. The
scene of the crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. The accused was merely 2-3 meters away
when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely
testify against the accusedt. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by
the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of the
accused. When asked how sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime, he
confidently replied: “I’m very sure. It could not have been somebody else.”

The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a
sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was
sufficiently established that Leino’s extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited
his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak.
He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. There is also no rule of evidence which
requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced
to writing.

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The SC also rejected the accused’s contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared
by the CIS on the basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show
that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the
sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the accused is not evidence.
It is unmitigated guesswork.

The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered the accused’s face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five
minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the
appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the
face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from
their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious
crime to the accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before their chance
encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be because the accused was the real culprit.

The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses. As to the testimony
of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently
explained during the trial – he feared for his and his family’s safety. The Court has taken judicial
notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering
the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered the
initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an
indicium of credibility. As to the testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the records to
suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.

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ANDAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. Nos. 138268-69 May 26, 1999

PER CURIAM

DOCTRINE:

The issue of DNA tests as a more accurate and authoritative means of identification than eye-
witness identification need not be belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by
the prosecutions principal witness. Olimpio Corales, a brother in law of accused Jurry and Ricardo
Andal. DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis of
identification of semen samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim are thus
unnecessary or are forgotten evidence too late to consider now.

FACTS:

Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim of
mistrial and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was
ousted of jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made
without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused.

ISSUE:

WON there is a need for DNA testing for the identification of the accused by the witnesses.

RULING:

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The issue of DNA tests as a more accurate and authoritative means of identification than eye-
witness identification need not be belabored. The accused were all properly and duly identified by
the prosecutions principal witness. Olimpio Corales, a brother in law of accused Jurry and Ricardo
Andal. DNA testing proposed by petitioners to have an objective and scientific basis of
identification of semen samples to compare with those taken from the vagina of the victim are thus
unnecessary or are forgotten evidence too late to consider now.

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EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:

Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test19
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The
DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. 21
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility
of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.22 Though it
is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned
in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

FACTS:

Petitioners are the parents of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served
as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job.
However, Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, so she asked Angelita to wait until
she returned and left a four month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita .

Upon her returned, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida then went to Angelita's house
in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. She also returned after three days, only to discover

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that Angelita had moved to another place. Notwithstanding the serious efforts of Bienvenida and
her husband to find their son, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.

Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law
husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida
went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after
four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of
the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to
return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover
their son. For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is
the son of petitioners?

RULING:

Yes, a close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida
is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she
admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital
in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming
she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a
child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the
child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic
were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of
siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
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fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years,
they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas
Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within thirty days after
the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even
private respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". This false entry puts to doubt the
other data in said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in
court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance
between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the
opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners.
The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using
DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact
that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish

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parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on
the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VALLEJO

G.R. NO. 144656 09 MAY 2002

DOCTINE:

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code.
Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence

sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical

processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:

(1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources

(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

(2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have

similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then
be repeated with the same or different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or (3) The
samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case,
the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance
of the similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among

others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the

possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,

whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the

qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

FACTS:

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On July 10, 1999 (Saturday) in Rosario, Cavite, at about 1pm, a nine-year old Daisy

Diolola went to her the house of Aimee Vallejo, her tutor, to seek help in her assignment. Aimee’s
house was about four to five meters away from Daisy’s house. An hour later, Daisy came back to
her house with Gerrico Vallejo to get a book. At 5:30pm of the same day, Daisy’s mom noticed
that her child wasn’t home yet. She went to Vallejo’s house and Daisy wasn’t there. It turned out
that Aimee was not feeling well that day and was not able to help Daisy with her lessons. At 7pm,
there was still no word of Daisy’s whereabouts. Gerrico told Daisy’s mom that Daisy went to her
classmate’s house to borrow a book.

Daisy’s mom was told that her daughter was seen playing in front of Mateverde’s house and even
watched television in the said house, but she later left with Gerrico. Daisy’s family searched for
her the whole evening but were not able to find her.

The next morning, at around 10am, Daisy’s body was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by
the river. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

Since Gerrico was one of the last persons who was with Daisy, the police invited him for

questioning.

Prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Gerrico was acting strangely during
the afternoon of July. They also testified that Gerrico’s shorts and shirt were wet that afternoon.
The police recovered the clothes (white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13
printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it) which Gerrico
wore the day Daisy disappeared. The shirt and shorts, which were blood-stained, were turned over
to the NBI for laboratory examination.

Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood

samples from Gerrico for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the

basketball shorts and shirt he worn on the day the victim was missing and the victim’s clothing

were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division for the purpose of determining the presence
of human blood and its groups. It was found that the bloodstains in Gerrico’s clothing were positive
for the presence of human blood similar to Daisy’s blood type.

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As he was bothered by his conscience, a handwritten confession was executed by Gerrico,

admitting that he raped and killed Daisy.

Pet Buan also took buccal swabs and hair samples from Daisy’s parents and DNA tests were

conducted. Buan testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken during the autopsy contained
the profiles of Gerrico and Daisy.

During the trial, Gerrico contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not proven to

have been that of the victim as the victim’s blood type was not determined and that samples were
already soaked in smirch waters, hence contaminated and should not be admissible in evidence.

RTC found Gerrico Vallejo guilty of the crime of rape and homicide of Daisy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible in evidence.

RULING:

Yes. The prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing

were not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters
before they were submitted to the laboratory.

DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code.

Except for identical twins, each person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is

committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the

suspect’s DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the

reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence

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sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical

processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:

(1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources

(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

(2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have

similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then
be repeated with the same or different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or

(3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In

such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical
significance of the similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among

others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the

possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,

whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the

qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant,
the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested
negative for the presence of human DNA. It is because the specimens were soaked in smirch water
before they were submitted to laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis
could have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before.

Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that
the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their

examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of

human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, it showed that DNA profile of Gerrico was found in

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the vaginal swabs taken from the victim.

The totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of

the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are

proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his

innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its

effect upon the court.

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ANTONIO LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 176389 DECEMBER 14, 2010

CARPIO-MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:

Due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might
be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or
the police.

FACTS:

On June 30, 1991, Estrelita Vizconde and her daughter Carmela nineteen and Jennifer
seven were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the
police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court
smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real
perpetrators remained a mystery especially to the public whose interest were aroused by the
gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.

Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) announced that it had
solved the crime. It presented star witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed That
she witnessed the crime. She pointed to the accused Herbert Jeffrey Webb, Antonio “Tony Boy”
Lejano, Artemio Dong Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Pyke Fernandez, Peter Estrada,
Miguel Ging Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer Gerardo
Biong as an accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro’s testimony, on August 10, 1995,
the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb etal. The
prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony.
These included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guard
of Pitong Daan subdivision, the former laundry-woman of the Webb’s household, police officer
Biong’s former girlfriend, and Lauro Vizconde, Estrelita’s husband.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not failure to conduct a DNA test on the semen specimen found on Carmela is a
ground for Webb’s acquittal.

RULING:

NO.

Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the
ground of violation of his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the
Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.

The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent with this,
semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as
Carmela’s rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the very
least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other hand, the semen specimen taken
from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or
financial support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the exception of identical
twins. If, on examination, the DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did
not rape Carmela. It is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro
committed perjury in saying that he did.

Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the semen
specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be
overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that due
process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to
the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police.
Here, the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the specimen and Webb
in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA test.

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For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not
yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine
precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of keeping
the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come
up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in
the meantime.

Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed
the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals
or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other
accused. They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed
by the trial court in rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the
appeals Court to have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when
the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the
accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable
notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.

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PEOPLE V. ANTONIO BASALLO

G.R. NO. 182457 JANUARY 30, 2013

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

DOCTRINE:

For a man who vehemently asserts his innocence, it mystifies the mind that appellant would not
exhaust all available avenues to prove his innocence especially DNA testing that would
conclusively prove that he is not the Father of the child of the victim who is alleged to be the fruit
of his crime.

FACTS:

Antonio Basallo was charged with the crime of Rape committed against victim ABC.
According to the prosecution witness and victim in this case, ABC, she was a helper of Basallo for
3 years. One day, she was asked by Basallo to get something in the second floor of the house. ABC
was followed by the accused Basallo and he proceeded to rape her while pointing a knife at her.
The mother of ABC then found out that she was pregnant, and she went into hiding. The child was
already 6 years old.

In his defense, Basallo, his friends, and his wife, testified that Basallo was in the
headquarters to get the assignment for his election day duties and was manning an election post on
the day of the commission of the crime. The trial court found Basallo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant
considering that the prosecution has failed to establish the presence of the twin elements of carnal
knowledge and force and intimidation.

RULING:

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Time and again, the Court has held that, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted
solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with
human nature and the normal course of things.

On the basis of the foregoing consistent narratives from the victim, it is evident that carnal
knowledge and force or intimidation as elements of the crime of rape were unmistakably present
in this instance. This Court has held that the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse
with a woman against her will or without her consent. We also previously declared that when a
victim is threatened with bodily injury as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as
a knife or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the
lustful desires of the rapist.

Thus, appellant's succeeding in having non-consensual sexual intercourse with ABC

through intimidation using a knife plainly constitutes the crime of rape.

It is also worth noting that appellant filed an Urgent Motion dated December 3, 1999 for
the issuance of an order by the trial court to direct ABC, her son allegedly fathered by the appellant,
and appellant himself to undergo DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) testing or any other medically
accepted tests before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) or before any accredited medical
institution for the purpose of determining whether the accused is the putative father of ABC's son.

The said motion was granted by the trial court during the pre-trial hearing of the case on
May 8, 2000. The defense counsel was even reminded of this fact by the prosecutor during a
subsequent pre-trial hearing of the case on January 11, 2001. The defense counsel claimed that
their motion was denied but the trial court rejected his claim by stating that no such denial of the
said motion can be found in the court records.

It perplexes this Court that appellant did not continue with his initial desire to undergo a
paternity test despite being informed by the trial court that his motion was, in fact, granted and not
denied as claimed by his defense counsel. For a man who vehemently asserts his innocence, it
mystifies the mind that appellant would not exhaust all available avenues to prove his innocence
especially DNA testing that would conclusively prove that he is not the father of ABC's son who
is alleged to be the fruit of his crime.

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JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE – A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, 01 January 2013

NG MENG TAM vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 214054 August 5, 2015

VILLARAMA, JR.

DOCTRINE:

Section 2(a) of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) provides that judicial affidavits are mandatorily
filed by parties to a case except in small claims cases. These judicial affidavits take the place of
direct testimony in court

Parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to the provisions of the JAR. Parties are however
allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of Court in
Section 5 of the JAR in certain situations.

Section 5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR) contemplates a situation where there is a (a)
government employee or official or (b) requested witness who is not the (1) adverse party’s witness
nor (2) a hostile witness. If this person either (a) unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial
affidavit or (b) refuses without just cause to make the relevant documents available to the other
party and its presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting party to avail of issuance of
subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

China Banking Corporation filed a collection suit against Ever Electrical Company, the
heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and Ng Meng Tam. It alleged that it granted a loan
backed by two surety agreements executed by Vicente and Ng Meng Tam. Ng Meng alleged that
the agreements were void because they were executed before the date of the loan and further
alleged that no demand letter was received.
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China Bank served interrogatories to the parties and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account
Officer of Account Management Group of China Bank to answer. Yap executed his answer to the
interrogatories. Ng Meng moved for hearing of defenses because he found that the answer of Yap
was evasive and not responsive. He applied for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum against George Yap. China Bank objected and argued that Yap cannot be compelled
to testify because Ng Meng did not obtain Yap’s judicial affidavit.

Ng Meng argued that it does apply to Yap because the rule excludes adverse party witness
and hostile witnesses from the rule. The RTC denied Ng’s motion that Yap be examined even
without executing a judicial affidavit. According to the RTC, Yap was an adverse witness and he
did not unjustifiably decline to execute a judicial affidavit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Yap may be presented as witness.

RULING:

Yap may be presented as witness.

Section 2 (a) of Judicial Affidavit Rule provides that judicial affidavits are mandatorily
filed by parties to a case except in small claims cases. These judicial affidavits take the place of
direct testimony. However, parties are allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena under
Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.

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Section 5 of JAR provides that: Subpoena. - If the government employee or official, or the
requested witness, who is neither the witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness,
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to make the
relevant books, documents, or other things under his control available for copying, authentication,
and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court. The rules
governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as when taking
his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit shall be understood to be ex parte.

In this case, the Supreme Court agreed with RTC that Section 5 has no application
to Yap as he was presented as hostile witness but not to the claim that there is a need for a finding
that witness unjustifiably refused to execute judicial affidavit. In the given case, Yap is a requested
witness who is the adverse party’s witness. Regardless of whether he unjustifiably declines to
execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without a just cause to present the documents, Section 5
cannot be made to apply to him because he is included in a group of individuals expressly exempt
from the provision’s application.

The Supreme Court, in this case, also discussed the procedure if the requested witness is
the adverse party’s witness. JAR being silent on this point, Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court applies.

SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness.— Except with respect to witnesses referred to
in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach
his credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.

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The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be
impeached by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party,
except by evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the
adverse party, but such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-
in-chief.

The procedure calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written
interrogatories are first served upon the latter. Section 6, Rule 125 of the Rules of Court provides
that a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the adverse party to
give testimony in open court, or to give deposition pending appeal. This is to limit the inquiry to
what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from harassing the adverse party when it takes
the witness stand.

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered interrogatories
to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They therefore complied with Section 6 of
Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. Before the present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued
subpoenas for Yap to testify and produce documents. He was called to the witness stand when
China Bank interposed its objection for noncompliance with Section 5 of the JAR. Having
established that Yap, as an adverse party witness, is not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the
rules in presentation of adverse party witnesses as provided for under the Rules of Court shall
apply. There is no reason for the RTC not to proceed with the presentation of Yap as a witness.

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FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT VS. PO

GR NO. 217694 27 JANUARY 2016

DOCTRINE:

Judicial Affidavit Rule; In the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR), the attachments of documentary or
object evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be a pretrial or preliminary
conference or the scheduled hearing.—The Court deems it proper to discuss the relevance of the
Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC, where documentary or object evidence are
required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not applicable because such evidence are required
to be attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint. Moreover, as the rule took effect only on
January 1, 2013, it cannot be required in this case because this was earlier filed on December 12,
2012. Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule being essentially remedial, still it has
no bearing on the ruling of this Court. In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of
documentary or object evidence to the affidavits is required when there would be a pretrial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file
an answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based
solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. Thus, where there is
no answer, there is no need for a pretrial, preliminary conference or hearing.

FACTS:

FAIRLAND filed an unlawful detainer case against ARTURO for the latter’s failure to pay rental
fee of P20,000 a month based on verbal agreement. Hence, FAIRLAND demanded payment of
P220,000 representing rental arrears. ARTURO, however, failed to file his answer on time. And
rather filed Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition to
Motion to Render Judgment. In the attached Comment/Opposition, ARTURO denied the
allegations against him and commented that FAIRLAND failed to prove by preponderance of
evidence its allegations. MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure
to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence.

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ISSUES:

Was the decision of the trial court proper? Whether the complaint above adequately alleges a
cause of action.

RULING:

1. No. Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of evidence is not considered when a
judgment is rendered based on the complaint. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period allowed by Rules, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein. The Rule is clear, when ARTURO failed to file his answer on time, the MeTC
had the option to render judgment motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, based solely on the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. In this case, ARTURO failed to
file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons. He also failed to provide a
sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be
rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint. 2. The pertinent
portion of the complaint reads: x x x Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant,
the premises mentioned above as the residence of the latter; There is no current written lease
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the former the amount of
Php20,000.00 as rent at the beginning of each month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement is
renewable on a month-to-month basis; Since March 2011, defendant has not been paying the
aforesaid rent despite plaintiff’s repeated demands; Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay
rent, plaintiff reached a decision not to renew the lease agreement. It sent a formal letter, x x x
demanding defendant to pay the amount of Php220,000.00, representing defendant’s twelve month
rental arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate the leased premises, both within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of said letter; Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the
fifteen day period given to comply with plaintiff’s demand, defendant neither tendered payment
for the unpaid rent nor vacated the leased premises. Worse, defendant has not been paying rent up
to now; x x Yes, Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful Detainer A complaint
sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially,
possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

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(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession
of the property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year
from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment. The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the
owner of the subject property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral agreement. There was a
demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful detainer was
instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year period prescribed by law. With
all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.

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LARA’S GIGST AND DECORS VS. PNB GENERAL INSURERS and UCPB GENERAL
INSURANCE CO., INC

G.R. Nos. 230429 30 January 24, 2018

DOCTRINE:

The Judicial Affidavit Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission
of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced. The submission of evidence
beyond the mandated period in the Judicial Affidavit Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that:
a) the court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the
evidence proffers a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced
thereby.

FACTS:

Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. (LGDI) is engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, and
exporting various handicraft items and decorative products. It leased buildings/warehouses from
J.Y. & Sons Realty Co., Inc. In 2008, approximately four hours before the policy was about to
expire, a fire broke out. Petitioner immediately claimed from the respondents for the loss and
damage of its insured properties. Taking into consideration the findings of the independent
adjusters and the report of its forensic specialists, respondents denied petitioner's claim. Petitioner
filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents.

In its Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, RTC directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial
briefs. It also contained a stern warning that "no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and
offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in- chief other than those that had been
earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if allowed by the Court for good cause
shown."

After the termination of the Pre-Trial Conference, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order dated
September 12, 2013, in which the parties were given the opportunity to amend or correct any errors

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found therein within five days from receipt thereof. In the same Order, all the parties made a
reservation for the presentation of additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial.

The parties filed their respective Motions to Amend/Correct Pre-Trial Order. None of the parties,
however, sought to amend the Pre-Trial Order for the purpose of submitting additional judicial
affidavits of witnesses or the admission of additional documentary exhibits not presented and pre-
marked during the Pre-Trial Conference. Then petitioner furnished respondents with a copy of the
2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit.

PNB Gen, through a Motion to Expunge, sought to strike from the records the said 2nd
Supplemental Judicial Affidavit. They argued that since these documents were not presented,
identified, marked, and even compared with the originals during the Pre-Trial Conference, they
should be excluded pursuant to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial and Judicial Affidavit Rule.

Respondents separately moved for the reconsideration of the denial of their motions to expunge,
but the trial court denied the same in an Omnibus Order. Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits
during trial and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit

RULING:

Yes, the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits during trial
and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit

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The Judicial Affidavit Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission
of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced. The submission of evidence
beyond the mandated period in the Judicial Affidavit Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that:
a) the court may allow the late submission of evidence only once; b) the party presenting the
evidence proffers a valid reason for the delay; and c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced
thereby.

Finally, no less than UCPB, in its Motion to Correct/Amend Pre-Trial Order, moved that the Pre-
Trial Order be amended to explicitly include the trial court's ruling that it will allow additional
direct testimony of the parties' witnesses to be given in open court so long as they have already
submitted their Judicial Affidavits within the reglementary period required by the Judicial
Affidavit Rule. Therefore, cannot be made to selectively apply the provisions of the rules to the
petitioner and then request to be exempted therefrom.

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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 –ANTI WIRETAPPING ACT

SOCORRO RAMIREZ V. CA & ESTER GARCIA

G.R. NO. 93833 SEPTEMBER 28, 1995

KAPUNAN, J.

DOCTRINE:

Sec.1 of RA 4200 makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication.

FACTS:

Ramirez filed a complaint against Garcia alleging that the latter vexed, insulted, and humiliated
her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality
in the latter’s office. A transcript was provided by Ramirez from a tape recording of the
confrontation. Garcia filed a criminal case against Ramirez for secretly taping the confrontation
under the Anti Wire Tapping Law.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko
naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka
dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

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ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito.
"Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

Ramirez filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute and offense.
TC granted the motion. CA declared the TC decision as null and void.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the act of Ramirez constitutes offense under the Anti Wire Tapping Law?

RULING:

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.”

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording
is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private

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conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under
this provision of R.A. 4200.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the
same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section
1 of R.A. 4200.

The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart."
In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
"process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely
to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office.

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FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. 160261, 10 NOVEMBER 2003

CARPIO-MORALES, J.

DOCTRINE:

Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be
filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.

FACTS:

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by

Representative Fuentebella, directeding the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).” On June 2, 2003, former President
Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice
ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted
to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with
the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

4 months and 3 weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was

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accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of

all the Members of the House of Representatives. Since the first impeachment complaint never
made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one
year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not
have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven
Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective
body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted the word “initiate” to
mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through
the Committee, no impeachment complaint may be filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUES:

1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated?

2. Whether the second impeachment complaint is valid.

RULINGS:

1. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the
Committee on Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress
where an impeachment is initiated upon filing of the impeachment complaint.

2. NO.

Section 3(5), Article XI of the Constitution states that: “No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been
initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one
year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
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PEOPLE V. NAVARRO

G.R. No. 121087 26 August 1999

DOCTRINE:

The law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dicta-phone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie- talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before
or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi- judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.

FACTS:

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On 4 February 1990, in the nighttime, accused Felipe Navarro assault Ike Lingan inside the Lucena
police headquarters, by boxing Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and by banging his head
against the concrete pavement, which caused his death.

The evidence show that, at around 8:40pm, Stanley Jalbuena and Lingan, who were reporters of
DWTI, together with Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was
showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a
scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. The floor manager, Dante Liquin,
with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a
picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job." Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco
was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. In a while, Liquin and
Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.

Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around
fifteen minutes.8 Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall,
said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba
kilala?"9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face
of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito
kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate." Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press,
mag-sampu pa kayo."He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior
of Jalbuena and Lingan.

This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan" Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang
ilalagay ko." The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado,
alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo." Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"18

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As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the
left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but
petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.

Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan
and naghamon."He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at
Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon." He then poked his gun at the right temple of
Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter.Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His
right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.

Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between
petitioner and the deceased.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tape is admissible in evidence under RA No. 4200

RULING:

Yes. The law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dicta-phone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie- talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before
or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal

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investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,
or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi- judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.
Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the
testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in
court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are
claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice
recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape
were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication
of the tape presented by the prosecution.

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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

SALCEDO-ORTAÑEZ VS. COURT OF APPEAL

G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994

PADILLA, J.

DOCTRINE:

RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence.

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

FACTS:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

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Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of the private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. These tape recordings were made and
obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wiretap his home
telephone.

CA denied the petition because: (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se ; and (2) A petition
for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced
during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If
it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be any more than an error of law, properly correctable by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the “Tape Recordings” in violation of RA 4200 is admissible as evidence in court

RULING:

NO. RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence.

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described.

and Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured

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by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Clearly, RTC and CA failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is
mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

We need not address the other arguments raised by the parties, involving the applicability of
American jurisprudence, having arrived at the conclusion that the subject cassette tapes are
inadmissible in evidence under Philippine law.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28545 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence.

SO ORDERED.

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GANAAN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. L-69809 16 October 1896

DOCTRINE:

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement",
although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments
of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor
and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give
their terms for withdrawal of their complaint. Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is
also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him about the proposed settlement. When complainant
called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After
enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is
agreeable to both parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at
the office of the Department of Public Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the
complainant himself. After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by the agents of the
Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange. Appellant stated on his
affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct
assault.

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Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which
he filed against the complainant. In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent.

Trial Court held that both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No.
4200. IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves
an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner
contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of
"commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of
enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. However, respondent argues that an extension
telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned
law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act,
such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

RULING:

No. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200 provides It shall be unlawful for any person, not
being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record
such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized
in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the
same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:

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Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph

or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be
considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. Hence, the phrase "device or
arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would
be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation
or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very
nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or
recording a telephone conversation.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIX ORTOA

GR NO. 176266 AUGUST 8,2007

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

DOCTRINE: Delay and initial reluctance in reporting a crime

There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the misfortune of being
sexually molested. Some may have found the courage early on to reveal the abuse they
experienced; there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to themselves
and tried to move on with their lives.

FACTS:

Ortoa (appellant) was charged with rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No. 7610.

That on or about the 3rd day of April, 2001, Ortoa with lewd designs and by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) his own daughter, AAA, a minor (13 years old), against her will and consent, thus debasing
and/or demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being.

AAA testified that in the afternoon of 3 April 2001, she was at home together with her mother and
four siblings. When appellant arrived home from the barbershop where he worked. Appellant then
closed the windows and the door of their house, removed AAA's underwear and shorts, and
proceeded to molest her on their makeshift bed. After satisfying his sexual urge, appellant ordered
her to put on her panty and shorts. A few minutes later, her mother and her siblings arrived. AAA
was still lying then on the bed while her father was sitting on one of its edges. After about an hour,
appellant decided to go back to work.

AAA also stated that it was not the first time that appellant had sexually molested her. She alleged
that appellant started raping her when she was about three years old by inserting his finger in her
vagina. Thinking that appellant was merely playing a game with her, AAA did not tell anyone
about such incident. Eventually, however, her mother discovered appellant's reprehensible conduct

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when AAA got pregnant. When asked if she delivered a child, AAA claimed that she had an
abortion after appellant made her take medicines.

Appellant vigorously denied the charge hurled at him and claimed that on 3 April 2001, he was
working at the barbershop and he stayed there from 9:00 o'clock in the morning until 9:00 o'clock
in the evening. He also averred that from 1996 until the time of his arrest, he was a stay-in
employee of the barbershop. He asserted that the charge of rape was merely concocted by BBB
out of anger after she discovered his affair with a certain Emily. BBB was allegedly so enraged
that she threatened to send him to jail because of said relationship. AAA, who found out about
Emily through BBB, shared the latter's animosity towards him. As regards AAA's aborted
pregnancy, appellant said that he learned about her condition from BBB but he did not do anything
about it except to ask the latter as to how AAA got pregnant. He claimed ignorance of the
circumstances surrounding the pre-termination of AAA's pregnancy and that AAA has a
relationship with a certain Michael.

When BBB first found out about appellant's sexual transgression, she did not go to the police right
away; instead, she respected AAA's desire to keep her misfortune a private matter. Yet BBB chose
to abide by her child's entreaty. It was only when they were confronted with the hopelessness of
the situation that they finally summoned the courage to have appellant account for his misdeeds.

Appellant harps on the inordinate delay in reporting his alleged wrongdoing when he was supposed
to have even impregnated AAA in the past. He argues that it is highly inconceivable for a mother
such as BBB to stand idly by while her own child suffered enormous distress. In such a situation,
appellant argues, BBB's immediate reaction should have been to report the incident to the
authorities particularly in the absence of an allegation that he threatened them with harm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the truthfulness of the accusation is affected by AAA's failure to report the
purported previous incidents of rape

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RULING: No. There is no uniform behavior that can be expected from those who had the
misfortune of being sexually molested. Some may have found the courage early on to reveal the
abuse they experienced; there are those who have opted to initially keep the harrowing ordeal to
themselves and tried to move on with their lives. Again, to quote our holding in People v. Melivo'

A rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is this fear,
springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of extreme
psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and submissiveness.
Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give
solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access to the victim is guaranteed by
the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the sense of helplessness and the degree of fear.

In the crime of rape, the conviction of an accused invariably depends upon the credibility of the
victim as she is oftentimes the sole witness to the dastardly act. Thus, the rule is that when a woman
claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed and that if her testimony meets the crucible test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof. Ultimately and oftentimes, the resolution of the case hinges on the
credibility of the victim's testimony - a question that this Court usually leaves for the trial court to
determine, for it is doctrinal that factual findings of trial courts, particularly the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, are given much weight and accorded the highest respect on appeal. This
is only proper considering that the trial court has the unique and singular opportunity to personally
observe a witness' demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. It is already well-
settled that an appellate court would generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court in
the absence of a clear showing that the court had failed to appreciate facts and circumstances
which, if taken into account, would materially affect the outcome of the case.

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PEOPLE vs. JOSE BELMAR UMAPAS

G.R. NO. 215742 MARCH 22, 2017

PERALTA, J.

DOCTRINE: Conviction based on dying declaration:

A report in open court of a dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception to the

rule against hearsay if it is “made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject
of inquiry in the case”. It is considered “as evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.

Conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Direct evidence of the actual killing is not indispensable for convicting an accused when
circumstantial evidence can also sufficiently establish his guilt.

Appellant’s defense of alibi:

A mere denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

FACTS:

At around 11 PM of Nov. 30, 1998, Jose Belmar Umapas allegedly mauled his wife Gema
using alcohol intended for lantern, which set her ablaze at their home in Lower Kalakhan,
Olongapo City. Rodrigo Dacanay brought Gemma to James L. Gordon Memorial Hospital for
treatment, and informed Dr. Tamayo, the attending physician, of what Jose did to his wife. Due to
severity of injuries, Gemma died on Dec. 5, 1998 of multiple organ failure secondary to thermal
bums.

An Information was filed against Jose for parricide.

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The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: SPO1 Garcia, Dr. Tamayo, and PO1
Belisario.

On Dec. 1, 1998, at around 1 PM, prior to Gemma’s death, SPO1 Garcia was able to
interview her while lying on the hospital bed. During the interview, although speaking slowly with
eyes closed and feeling like dying, Gemma was able to give a statement about the incident and
identified her husband, Jose, as the assailant. SPO1 Garcia reduced her statement into writing and
was attested thru Gemma’s thumbmark. A nurse present during the interview signed as witness.

Dr. Tamayo testified that he gave medical treatments to Gemma and that he was informed
by Dacanay that Jose was the one who set Gemma on fire. Dr. Tamayo also authenticated the
medical certificate he issued on the victim’s injuries.

Meanwhile, PO1 Belisario testified that at the crime scene, he was told by Gemma and
Jose’s daughter, Ginalyn, that it was Jose who set ablaze Gemma. However, PO1 Belisario failed
to reduce Ginalyn’s statement in writing.

For his part, Jose narrated that from 5 PM of Nov. 30, 1998 until 2 AM of Dec. 1, 1998, he
went on fishing in Kalakhan with Rommel. That when he arrived home, there was a commotion
going on, which he did know what was all about. There were many people around the vicinity of
their house, and he learned that Gemma was brought to the hospital, but was not informed why.
When he was about to go to the hospital, he was stopped by the people from the barangay, and
was instead brought to the police precinct and was detained. Later on, he learned that he was a
suspect in Gemma’s death. He believed that Gemma pointed him as the culprit, because Gemma
suspected him of womanizing while he was working. That they had petty quarrels, Gemma was
always hot tempered, and even asked him to choose between work and family. This prompted Jose
to just ignore his wife and took a vacation instead. While on vacation, he earned a living by fishing.

The trial court found Jose guilty of parricide.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the Jose based on a dying declaration and
circumstantial evidence, and not giving credence in Jose’s defense of alibi

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RULING:

NO.

Conviction based on dying declaration:

A report in open court of a dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception to the

rule against hearsay if it is “made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject
of inquiry in the case”. It is considered “as evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible: (1) the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (2) at
the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending
death; (3) the declarant is competent as witness; (4) the declaration must be offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.

In the precent case, all the above-mentioned requisites were present. Gemma’s statements
constituted a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the cause and circumstances of her
death and taking into consideration the severity of her wounds, it may be reasonably presumed that
she uttered the same under the belief that her own death was already imminent.

Conviction based on circumstantial evidence:

Circumstantial evidence is adequate for conviction if: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

All these requisites were present in the instant case. The testimonies of SPO1 Belisario,
Dr. Tamayo, and SPO1 Garcia could be all admitted as circumstantial evidence, and were in the
nature of an independently relevant statement, where what is relevant is the fact the Ginnalyn and
Dacanay made such statement, and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the
statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.

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Appelant’s defense of alibi:

The Supreme Court did not find credence in Jose’s defense of alibi. An alibi is an inherently
weak defense and may only be considered if: (a) he was somewhere else when the crime occurred;
and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
alleged crime. The requirements of time and place must be strictly met.

Under the circumstances, it was possible that Jose could have been present at the locus
criminis at the time of the incident, considering that where he claimed to have gone fishing and his
residence were both in Kalakhan.

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