BOOK REVIEWS 379

offers an entirely recognizable conception of philosophy in his discussion of moksa.

On p. 280, for instance, he is discussing the issue of whether knowledge of philo-
sophical trudi might lead to the desired goal of spiritual freedom, in a manner
reminiscent of discussions of Plato. The Advaita Vedantists distinguish between
manana or reflective understanding and nididhyasana or contemplation/meditation. He
surely rightly denies that die sort of knowledge diat is claimed to deliver moksa is die
conceptual manana, but is ratfier a knowledge diat depends on contemplation.
However, he takes die task of philosophy to be a reasoning, on die part presumably
of a Vedantist, 'to convince oneself of the trudi of what one has heard and to remove
all doubts ... about its truth' (die truth, for instance that brahman is the only reality
and I am brahman). 'Philosophical knowledge by itself ends widi manana.' But maybe
philosophy can be more cartographical and less apologetic than diis suggests, and
die task of die philosopher may be not to reason our way to a doubtful formula that
knows too much and might prematurely determine the form of experience or intuitive
knowledge, but to allow die development of such knowledge to find its own forms
of expression and representation. Mohanty claims that philosophy 'only demonstrates
the possibility of a practical goal die conception of which is dieoretically internal to
die system' (p. 281). But diis seems recognizably similar to those arguments for die
existence of God founded on religious experience which simply endorse the
conceptualization widiout justifying it. Perhaps only rare philosophers will ever seek
to offer a description of dieir intuitive knowledge of how tilings really are, but diat
does not mean diat such a task is not a task for the philosopher. This leaves open,
of course, the worth of die arguments that are taken to establish die trudi of
brahmanatman, for instance, but it is clear enough, perhaps, diat Western philosophers
would not need to feel diat they were merely spectators of such an enterprise.
As well as die chapters already referred to, Mohanty has chapters on 'Indian
Logic'; 'Indian Theories of Trudi'; 'The Concept of Being and die Ontologies';
'Time, History, Man and Nature'; and 'The Nature of Indian Philosophical Thinking*.
It seems increasingly likely diat more such books will arrive from Indian philosophers
who know our tradition much better dian we know dieirs, philosophers with whom
we can do philosophy, if not business, philosophers we shall have to read. One looks
forward to Mohanty's second volume. This present one is impressive in its range
and scholarship and a significant move towards the possibility of global philosophical
debate.

University of Liverpool MICHAEL M C G H E E

On Ideas: Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Theory of Forms. BY GAIL FINE. (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. x + 366. Price £40.00.)

Gail Fine's book fills an important gap in the scholarship of die Platonic Theory of
Forms and Aristode's criticisms of it. Aristode's work Peri Ideon {On Ideas) receives
detailed analysis in her book, but at die same time serves as a spring-board for a
comprehensive discussion of die Theory of Forms as it is found in die Platonic corpus.
What makes her task especially difficult is diat she undertakes discussion of die
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380 BOOK REVIEWS

principles that shape the theory across the various stages of development of Plato's
thought. This leads to the introduction of a range of versions of the theory and an
examination of the assets and defects of each of them. The reading becomes difficult
at times, especially because of Fine's use of many abbreviations of the principles in
terms of which she analyses Plato's thought. The book is not pitched at introductory
level teaching, but advanced students and researchers will find it rewarding.
Fine begins by comparing the Socratic to the Platonic position on Forms and finds
substantial similarities between die two. For Socrates, Forms are the non-linguistic
correlates of real definitions in things. She defines a notion of narrow compresence
as an entity's being both F and not F, and finds that Socratic Forms can avoid it in
two ways: either by being neither F nor not F, or by being F without being not F.
She believes that Socrates opts for Forms' being F without being not F. This shows
Socrates to be espousing self-predication (SP), namely, mat any form of F is F (p.
52). Fine then distinguishes between two kinds of SP: narrow self-predication (NSP)
and broad self-predication (BSP). NSP entails that the Form of F is F in the way
that the sensible particulars are F. BSP entails that the Form of F is F, but in a
different way from the F things. For example, a diing is equal by being the same
length as something, but the Form of the Equal is equal because it explains why
sensible things are equal (p. 62). For Fine, both Socrates and Plato are best understood
as adhering to BSP (p. 64).
Both Socrates and Plato, according to Fine, posit Forms as universals whose
existence explains, and is a requirement for the possibility of, knowledge (p. 59).
Furthermore, Socrates is not committed to the separation of the Forms from the
sensible particulars, but Plato is, at least in Timaeus.
Turning to On Ideas, Fine examines die first set of arguments, the Arguments from
die Sciences. She concentrates on arguing against the existing interpretations, which
take the arguments to»be claiming that because sensibles are always changing diey
are unknowable. Fine reads die arguments as showing that we cannot explain the
nature of F-ness widiout appeal to some relevant basic objects. The Arguments from
die Sciences purport to show diat this role cannot be played by the sensible particulars,
but Forms need to be posited as die special objects of knowledge. Yet, Fine points
out, Forms are not the only objects of knowledge. Simply, if anydiing else is to be
known, it has to be explained in terms of the only objects of die sciences, the Forms
(p. 67).
The next argument is the One over Many Argument, according to which there
are Forms mat correspond to every general term in language diat is true of diings
in me world. Aristode objects that such a proof for the existence of Forms would
prove far too much. Among other things, it would prove tiiat there are Forms of
'negations and of things mat are not', which he argues would be an unacceptable
result. Aristode further argues that the One over Many Argument can be reconstrued
to prove diat there are universals, only more of an Aristotelian kind radier than
Forms (p. 102). Commentators have argued that Plato does, in fact, want Forms of
negations, despite Aristode's claim that Plato does not. Fine argues that Plato does
not want Forms of negations, nor is he committed to them, nor do his arguments
imply that there are such Forms (pp. 113-16). Furthermore, she argues that the One
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over Many Argument does not entail the separation of die Forms; nor does the
perfection of the Forms, which she reads as requiring only diat die Forms play a
particular explanatory role (pp. 118-19).
The Object of Thought Argument requires diat diere must be Forms if diought
is possible at all. But dien, Aristode objects, diere would be Forms of perishable
objects and fictional entities. But die Object of Thought Argument, argues Aristode,
does not prove diat diere are any Forms at all. Hence, it does not prove too much
for die Platonist, but too litde. Fine examines die various passages in die Platonic
dialogues where Plato uses arguments mat would appear to be Object of Thought
variants, and argues diat Plato is not in fact committed to diis argument (pp. 129-39).
Nor, according to Fine, is Plato committed to the position diat one can diink only
of what exists. From diis, Fine concludes diat Plato is not committed to die familiar
version of die referential theory of meaning (p. 139). She holds diat Plato, like
Aristode, does not give an adequate explanation of die possibility of diought about
non-existent tilings. Such contexts, far from requiring Forms to be meanings in order
for die terms of language to be meaningful, require simply diat die world be in a
certain way, and diat diere be properties diat are exhibited in die world. Such a
line of reasoning takes Forms to be properties radier dian meanings of linguistic
entities.
Coming to die Argument of Relatives, which occupies Fine tiirough four chapters,
she offers a useful summary of some of die main results she has argued for in die
book so far. She has argued diat when Plato, and Aristode in die relevant passages
referring to Plato, argue diat die possibility of change requires Forms, diey should
be understood as claiming diat it is die phenomenon of compresence diat requires
positing Forms. Furthermore, she has claimed diat Plato's flux argument is a meta-
physical and epistemological, but not a semantic argument. Finally, Fine has argued
diat die fact diat Plato takes die Forms to be self-predicative perfect paradigms does
not require diem to be particulars. The self-predicativeness and perfection of die
Forms can be explained in terms of dieir status as explanatory properties. These
positions are reviewed because diey are put to die test in die case of die Argument
from Relatives, which is standardly taken to advert to succession radier dian to
compresence of properties, to be a semantic argument radier dian epistemo-meta-
physical, and to treat Forms as perfect paradigms radier dian properties (pp. 142-3).
Fine's study of die Argument from Relatives leads her to explain it in terms of
compresence, not succession, as an epistemological and metaphysical rather dian a
semantic argument, as an argument diat regards Forms as properties, not as
particulars. She explores Aristode's objections to die Argument from Relatives, and
concludes, here too, that his strategy is to interpret Plato and criticize die result,
which does not generate an inescapable criticism for Plato (pp. 183-90).
Fine's two concluding chapters are devoted to die examination of die Third Man
Argument (TMA). She examines in turn four versions of it: two by Plato (in Parmenidts),
one by Aristode in On Ideas, and one by Eudemus. Her examination is detailed,
lengdiy, and not easy to follow. On die interpretation of die Platonic TMA which
has received much attention in die past forty years, die first Parmenidts TMA, she
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382 BOOK REVIEWS

follows the line of interpretation of S.M. Cohen (in 'The Logic of the Third Man',
Philosophical Review, 80 (1971), pp. 448-75). Accordingly, she offers a version of the
TMA premises which renders diem consistent. But this is at the cost of not fully
including die information given to us by Plato in his first TMA. The reason why
Cohen's premises are consistent is diat, in his version of the One over Many premise,
which Fine follows (premise OM-TMA, p. 210), he leaves out of his premise-set
what is explicit in die Platonic text, namely the causal efficacy of participation in
me Forms. As a consequence, it remains a mystery why it is diat Plato requires in
each step n diat it be die n+1 Form by which die entities in step n will be Large. Plato
says: 'will not some one large appear again, by which all these will appear large?'
(132b 1). The inconsistency in the premises of die TMA is a direct result of die
incompatible roles diat Plato assigns to participation in Form F. Leaving out die
causal role of die Form, as in Fine's and Cohen's version, avoids the inconsistency,
but produces an argument that is only remotely related to Plato's Third Man
Argument.
In die last chapter of die book, Fine questions whedier Plato is vulnerable to die
TMA. She concentrates die discussion on whedier diere is any evidence in Plato's
writings diat he is not committed to the NI (Non-Identity) premise or to die OM-
TMA (One over Many) premise, eidier of which would offer an escape route for
Plato. She finds evidence of non-commitment in what she names die Imperfection
Argument: 'If a group of tilings are all of diem imperfecdy F, diey are F in virtue
of a perfect form of F' (p. 227). The Imperfection Argument, to which Plato is
committed in Republic according to Fine, provides reasons for positing Forms widiout
commitment to NI and OM-TMA. Thus it allows for die possibility of somediing
being Fin virtue of itself (p. 227), which is all diat is required for blocking die TMA
regress of Forms.
Aldiough Fine is right in pointing out diat Plato can posit die Forms widiout
commitment to die premises diat invite die TMA regress, I do not diink diat diis
frees Plato's system from die dieoretical pressures diat generated die regress. Plato
is led to die premises of die TMA in an attempt to come to grips widi die semantic
notion of ^-predication, and die metaphysical notion of similarity between two F
tilings. These are notions that die Theory of Forms attempts to explain, and die
explanatory route diat Plato follows (which had enjoyed a long tradition in ancient
Greek philosophy) entangles him in the premises diat generate the TMA regress.
Fine is right in claiming diat Plato can provide existential arguments for die Forms
mat escape die regress. But certain dominant strands of explanation (I do not supply
diem here), strands diat Plato respects, prevent him from being satisfied widi self-
causation - i.e., widi an entity's being Fin virtue of itself- which is why he is led
to die TMA regress.
Gail Fine's book will deservedly be studied by die scholars and philosophers who
are students of Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics.

University of Edinburgh THEODORE SCALTSAS

C The Editors of The Philosophical QfarUrly, 1994.