II.

JURISDICTION of the contract, petitioner no longer entertained

a. Over the parties respondents notice.
2. How jurisdiction over the defendant is
acquired On 30 January 2006, Hertz filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance, Injunction and Damages and/or Sum of
Money with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
G.R. No. 183035 : January 9, 2013 (Complaint for Specific Performance) against Optima. In
that Complaint, Hertz prayed for the issuance of a TRO to
enjoin petitioner from committing acts that would tend to
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HERTZ
disrupt respondents peaceful use and possession of the
PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., Respondent.
leased premises; for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
ordering petitioner to reconnect its utilities; for petitioner to
DECISION be ordered to renegotiate a renewal of the Contract of
Lease; and for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as
SERENO, C.J.: well as attorneys fees and costs.

Before us is a Rule 45 Petition assailing the Decision1 and On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. letter requiring the latter to surrender and vacate the
99890, which reversed the Decision3 and Resolution4 of leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 7, Makati City in Lease on 28 February 2006.17 It likewise demanded
Civil Case No. 06-672. The RTC had affirmed in toto the payment of the sum of ?420,967.28 in rental arrearages,
22 May 2006 Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court unpaid utility bills and other charges.18 Hertz, however,
(MeTC), Branch 64, Makati City in Civil Case No. 90842 refused to vacate the leased premises.19 As a result,
evicting respondent Hertz Phil. Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer
Exclusive Cars, Inc. (Hertz) and ordering it to pay back for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory
rentals and other arrearages to petitioner Optima Realty Injunction (Unlawful Detainer Complaint) against Hertz.20?
Corporation (Optima). r?l1

Optima is engaged in the business of leasing and renting On 14 March 2006, Summons for the Unlawful Detainer
out commercial spaces and buildings to its tenants. On 12 Complaint was served on Henry Bobiles, quality control
December 2002, it entered into a Contract of Lease with supervisor of Hertz, who complied with the telephone
respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a instruction of manager Rudy Tirador to receive the
parking slot in the Optima Building for a period of three Summons.21?r?l1
years commencing on 1 March 2003 and ending on 28
February 2006.6 On 9 March 2004, the parties amended On 28 March 2006, or 14 days after service of the
their lease agreement by shortening the lease period to Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file
two years and five months, commencing on 1 October Answer with Counterclaim and to Admit Answer with
2003 and ending on 28 February 2006.7?r?l1 Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File Answer).22 In that
Motion, Hertz stated that, "in spite of the defective service
Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in of summons, it opted to file the instant Answer with
January and ended in November 2005.8 As a result, Hertz Counterclaim with Leave of Court."23 In the same Motion, it
alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales likewise prayed that, in the interest of substantial justice,
and a significant decrease in its personnels productivity. It the Answer with Counterclaim attached to the Motion for
then requested a 50% discount on its rent for the months Leave to File Answer should be admitted regardless of its
of May, June, July and August 2005.9?r?l1 belated filing, since the service of summons was
defective.24?r?l1
On 8 December 2005, Optima granted the request of
Hertz.10 However, the latter still failed to pay its rentals for On 22 May 2006, the MeTC rendered a Decision,25 ruling
the months of August to December of 2005 and January to that petitioner Optima had established its right to evict
February 2006,11 or a total of seven months. In addition, Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of
Hertz likewise failed to pay its utility bills for the months of rentals and the expiration of the period of lease.26 The
November and December of 2005 and January and dispositive portion of the Decision reads:cralawlibrary
February of 2006,12 or a total of four months.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter to renders judgment for the plaintiff and against the
Hertz,13 reminding the latter that the Contract of Lease defendant, ordering:cralawlibrary
could be renewed only by a new negotiation between the
parties and upon written notice by the lessee to the lessor 1. the defendant corporation and all persons claiming
at least 90 days prior to the termination of the lease rights from it to immediately vacate the leased premises
period.14 As no letter was received from Hertz regarding its and to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
intention to seek negotiation and extension of the lease
contract within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that 2. the defendant corporation to pay the plaintiff the amount
the lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and would not of Four Hundred Twenty Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty
be renewed.15?r?l1 Seven Pesos and 28/100 (P420,967.28) representing its
rentals arrearages and utility charges for the period of
On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly August 2005 to February 2006, deducting therefrom
advising Optima of the formers desire to negotiate and defendants security deposit;
extend the lease.16 However, as the Contract of Lease
provided that the notice to negotiate its renewal must be 3. the defendant corporation to pay the amount of Fifty
given by the lessee at least 90 days prior to the expiration Four Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P54,200.00) as a
reasonable monthly compensation for the use and
occupancy of the premises starting from March 2006 until THE COURTS RULING
possession thereof is restored to the plaintiff; and
We grant the Petition and reverse the assailed Decision
4. the defendant corporation to pay the amount of Thirty and Resolution of the appellate court.
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as and for attorneys fees;
and I

5. the cost of suit. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz.
SO ORDERED.?l1
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
Hertz appealed the MeTCs Decision to the RTC. r?l1 may be acquired either by service of summons or by the
defendants voluntary appearance in court and submission
Finding no compelling reason to warrant the reversal of the to its authority.35?r?l1
MeTCs Decision, the RTC affirmed it by dismissing the
appeal in a Decision dated 16 March 2007. In this case, the MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latters
On 18 June 2007, the RTC denied respondents Motion for voluntary appearance in court.
Reconsideration of its assailed Decision. r?l1
In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses
Hertz thereafter filed a verified Rule 42 Petition for Review Dy,36 we had occasion to state:cralawlibrary
on Certiorari with the CA.31?r?l1
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case
On appeal, the CA ruled that, due to the improper service is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes
of summons, the MeTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in
the person of respondent Hertz. The appellate court court. As a general proposition, one who seeks an
thereafter reversed the RTC and remanded the case to the affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
MeTC to ensure the proper service of summons. jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we
Accordingly, the CA issued its 17 March 2008 Decision, have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
the fallo of which reads:cralawlibrary admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
default with motion for reconsideration, is considered
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 22, 2006
voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This,
Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 90842, and both the March
appearance, such that a party who makes a special
16, 2007 Decision, as well as the June 18, 2007
appearance to challenge, among others, the court's
Resolution, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
Branch 137, in Civil Case No. 06-672, are hereby
submitted to its authority.
REVERSED, ANNULLED and SET ASIDE due to lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant corporation
HERTZ. This case is hereby REMANDED to the Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil that:cralawlibrary
Case No. 90842, which is DIRECTED to ensure that its
Sheriff properly serve summons to only those persons (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the
listed in Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in general rule on voluntary appearance;
order that the MTC could acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant corporation HERTZ. (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made,
SO ORDERED.32?r?l1 i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs Decision (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the
was denied in a Resolution dated 20 May 2008.33?r?l1 jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
Aggrieved by the ruling of the appellate court, petitioner submitted to the court for resolution. (Emphases
then filed the instant Rule 45 Petition for Review on supplied) ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
Certiorari with this Court.34?r?l1
In this case, the records show that the following statement
THE ISSUES appeared in respondents Motion for Leave to File
Answer:cralawlibrary
As culled from the records, the following issues are
submitted for resolution by this Court:cralawlibrary In spite of the defective service of summons, the defendant
opted to file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with
Leave of Court, upon inquiring from the office of the clerk
1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over
of court of this Honorable Court and due to its notice of
the person of respondent Hertz;
hearing on March 29, 2005 application for TRO/Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction was received on March 26, 2006.
2. Whether the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis (Emphasis supplied)37?r?l1
pendentia; and

3. Whether the ejectment of Hertz and the award of

damages, attorneys fees and costs are proper. ???ñr?bl?
š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz On the first ground, the records show that Hertz failed to
never raised the defense of improper service of summons. pay rental arrearages and utility bills to Optima. Failure to
The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pay timely rentals and utility charges is an event of default
pari delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of under the Contract of Lease,42 entitling the lessor to
cause of action.38 Finally, it even asserted its own terminate the lease.
counterclaim against Optima.39?r?l1
Moreover, the failure of Hertz to pay timely rentals and
Measured against the standards in Philippine Commercial utility charges entitles the lessor to judicially eject it under
International Bank, these actions lead to no other the provisions of the Civil Code.43?r?l1
conclusion than that Hertz voluntarily appeared before the
court a quo. We therefore rule that, by virtue of the On the second ground, the records likewise show that the
voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz before the lease had already expired on 28 February 2006 because of
MeTC, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Hertzs failure to request a renegotiation at least 90 days
respondents. prior to the termination of the lease period.

II The pertinent provision of the Contract of Lease

reads:cralawlibrary
The instant ejectment case is not barred by litis pendentia.
Hertz contends that the instant case is barred by litis x x x. The lease can be renewed only by a new negotiation
pendentia because of the pendency of its Complaint for between the parties upon written notice by the LESSEE to
Specific Performance against Optima before the RTC. be given to the LESSOR at least 90 days prior to
termination of the above lease period.44?r?l1
We disagree.
As the lease was set to expire on 28 February 2006, Hertz
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following had until 30 November 2005 within which to express its
elements:cralawlibrary interest in negotiating an extension of the lease with
Optima. However, Hertz failed to communicate its intention
(1) Identity of parties, or at least their representation of the to negotiate for an extension of the lease within the time
same interests in both actions; agreed upon by the parties. Thus, by its own provisions,
the Contract of Lease expired on 28 February 2006.
(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and Under the Civil Code, the expiry of the period agreed upon
by the parties is likewise a ground for judicial ejectment. 45?
r?l1
(3) Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in
the two cases, such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is As to the award of monthly compensation, we find that
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other Hertz should pay adequate compensation to Optima, since
case.40?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ the former continued to occupy the leased premises even
after the expiration of the lease contract. As the lease price
during the effectivity of the lease contract was P54,200 per
Here, while there is identity of parties in both cases, we
month, we find it to be a reasonable award.
find that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for
under the Complaint for Specific Performance and those
under the present Unlawful Detainer Complaint are Finally, we uphold the award of attorney's fees in the
different. As aptly found by the trial court:cralawlibrary amount of P30,000 and judicial costs in the light of Hertz's
unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the leased premises,
thus forcing Optima to file the instant case in order to
The Complaint for Specific Performance] seeks to compel
protect its rights and interest.
plaintiff-appellee Optima to: (1) renegotiate the contract of
lease; (2) reconnect the utilities at the leased premises;
and (3) pay damages. On the other hand, the unlawful From the foregoing, we find that the MeTC committed no
detainer case sought the ejectment of defendant-appellant reversible error in its 22 May 2006 Decision, and that the
Hertz from the leased premises and to collect arrears in RTC committed no reversible error either in affirming the
rentals and utility bills.41?r?l1 MeTC's Decision.

As the rights asserted and the reliefs sought in the two WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Rule
cases are different, we find that the pendency of the 45 Petition for Review is GRANTED. The assailed
Complaint for Specific Performance is not a bar to the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
institution of the present case for ejectment. G.R. SP No. 99890 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
13 7, Makati City in Civil Case No. 06-672 affirming in toto
III
the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 64,
Makati City in Civil Case No. 90842 is hereby
The eviction of respondent and the award of damages, REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

attorneys fees and costs were proper. SO ORDERED.

We find that the RTCs ruling upholding the ejectment of

Hertz from the building premises was proper. First,
respondent failed to pay rental arrearages and utility bills to
Optima; and, second, the Contract of Lease expired OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus-
without any request from Hertz for a renegotiation thereof HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC., Respondent.
at least 90 days prior to its expiration.
G.R. No. 183035, FIRST DIVISION, January 9, 2013,
SERENO, CJ. submission to its authority. In this case, the MeTC acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the of the latter's voluntary appearance in court.
defendant may be acquired either by service of summons
or by the defendant's voluntary appearance in court and Special appearance operates as an exception to
submission to its authority. Special appearance operates the general rule on voluntary appearance. Accordingly,
as an exception to the general rule on voluntary objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
appearance. Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
the court over the person of the defendant must be unequivocal manner. Failure to do so constitutes voluntary
explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner. submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative
jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a relief if filed and submitted to the court for resolution.
pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief if filed and
submitted to the court for resolution. In this case, the In this case, the records show that the following
following statement appeared in respondent's Motion for statement appeared in respondent's Motion for Leave to
Leave to File Answer: “[I]n spite of the defective service of File Answer: “[I]n spite of the defective service of
summons, [it] opted to file the instant Answer with summons, [it] opted to file the instant Answer with
Counterclaim with Leave of Court.” Furthermore, the Counterclaim with Leave of Court.” Furthermore, the
Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the
defense of improper service of summons. Finally, it even defense of improper service of summons. Finally, it even
asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. Hence, by asserted its own counterclaim against Optima. Hence, by
virtue of the voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz virtue of the voluntary appearance of respondent Hertz
before the MeTC, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over before the MeTC, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
respondent. respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Optima Realty Corporation (Optima) is G.R. No. 173379               December 1, 2010
engaged in the business of leasing and renting out
commercial spaces and buildings to its tenants. It entered
into a Contract of Lease with respondent Hertz Phil. ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A.
Exclusive Cars, Inc. (Hertz) for a period of two years and AFDAL, Petitioners,
five months, commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending vs.
on 28 February 2006. On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote ROMEO CARLOS, Respondent.
a letter belatedly advising Optima of the former's desire to
negotiate and extend the lease. However, as the Contract DECISION
of Lease provided that the notice to negotiate its renewal
must be given by the lessee at least 90 days prior to the CARPIO, J.:
expiration of the contract, petitioner no longer entertained
respondent's notice. The Case

On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote This is a petition for review1 of the 3 January 20052 and 16
Hertz a letter requiring the latter to surrender and vacate June 20063 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
the leased premises in view of the expiration of the Biñan, Laguna (RTC) in Civil Case No. B-6721. In its 3
Contract of Lease on 28 February 2006. Hertz, however, January 2005 Order, the RTC ordered the dismissal of
refused to vacate the leased premises. As a result, Optima petitioners Abubakar A. Afdal and Fatima A. Afdal’s
was constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for (petitioners) petition for relief from judgment. In its 16 June
Unlawful Detainer and Damages with Prayer for the 2006 Order, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion for
Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Mandatory reconsideration.
Injunction (Unlawful Detainer Complaint) against Hertz.
Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served
The Facts
on Henry Bobiles, quality control supervisor of Hertz, who
complied with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy
Tirador to receive the Summons. Hertz filed a Motion for On 18 December 2003, respondent Romeo Carlos
Leave of Court to file Answer with Counterclaim and to (respondent) filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and
Admit Answer with Counterclaim (Motion for Leave to File damages against petitioners, Zenaida Guijabar (Guijabar),
Answer). In that Motion, Hertz stated that, "in spite of the John Doe, Peter Doe, Juana Doe, and all persons claiming
defective service of summons, [it] opted to file the instant rights under them docketed as Civil Case No. 3719 before
Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court." In the the Municipal Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna (MTC).
Answer, Hertz raised the defenses of litis pendentia, pari Respondent alleged that petitioners, Guijabar, and all other
delicto, performance of its obligations, and lack of cause of persons claiming rights under them were occupying, by
action. mere tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent’s name
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-530139 4 in
the Registry of Deeds Calamba, Laguna. Respondent
ISSUE: Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction
claimed that petitioner Abubakar Afdal (petitioner
over the person of respondent Hertz. (YES)
Abubakar) sold the property to him but that he allowed
petitioners to stay in the property. On 25 August 2003,
RULING: respondent demanded that petitioners, Guijabar, and all
persons claiming rights under them turn over the property
In civil cases, jurisdiction over the person of the to him because he needed the property for his personal
defendant may be acquired either by service of summons use.5 Respondent further alleged that petitioners refused to
or by the defendant's voluntary appearance in court and heed his demand and he was constrained to file a
complaint before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa (Lupon). Moreover, petitioners said they were not served a copy of
According to respondent, petitioners ignored the notices the summons and the complaint.
and the Lupon issued a "certificate to file action."6 Then,
respondent filed the complaint before the MTC. On 3 January 2005, the RTC issued the assailed Order
dismissing the petition for relief. The RTC said it had no
According to the records, there were three attempts to jurisdiction over the petition because the petition should
serve the summons and complaint on petitioners – 14 have been filed before the MTC in accordance with Section
January, 3 and 18 February 2004.7 However, petitioners 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which provides that a
failed to file an answer. petition for relief should be filed "in such court and in the
same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding
On 2 June 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion and be set aside."
compliance with position paper submitting the case for
decision based on the pleadings on record.8 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 16 June
2006 Order, the RTC denied petitioners’ motion.
In its 23 August 2004 Decision,9 the MTC ruled in favor of
respondent. The dispositive portion of the 23 August 2004 Hence, this petition.
Decision reads:
The Issue
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against defendants as follows: Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the RTC erred in
dismissing their petition for relief from judgment.
1. Ordering defendants Abubakar Afdal, Zenaida
Guijabar and all persons claiming rights under The Ruling of the Court
them to vacate the subject property and peacefully
turn-over possession of the same to plaintiff; Petitioners maintain that the RTC erred in dismissing their
petition for relief. Petitioners argue that they have no other
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the amount recourse but to file the petition for relief with the RTC.
of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) as Petitioners allege the need to reconcile the apparent
rental arrears from August 25, 2003 up to the date inconsistencies with respect to the filing of a petition for
of decision; relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
and the prohibition under the Revised Rule on Summary
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the amount Procedure. Petitioners suggest that petitions for relief from
of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000.00) a judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases can
month thereafter, as reasonable compensation for be filed with the RTC provided that petitioners have
the use of the subject premises until they finally complied with all the legal requirements to entitle him to
vacate the same; avail of such legal remedy.

4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff the amount Section 13(4) of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as
and for attorney’s fees plus ONE THOUSAND SEC. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (₱1,500.00) appearance petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed: x x x
fee;
4. Petition for relief from judgment; x x x
5. Ordering defendants to pay the costs of suit.
Section 19(d) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
SO ORDERED.10 also provides:

On 1 October 2004, the MTC issued a writ of execution.11 SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. - The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
On 30 October 2004, petitioners filed a petition for relief cases covered by this Rule: x x x
from judgment with the MTC.12 Respondent filed a motion
to dismiss or strike out the petition for (d) Petition for relief from judgment; x x x
relief.13 Subsequently, petitioners manifested their intention
to withdraw the petition for relief after realizing that it was a Clearly, a petition for relief from judgment in forcible entry
prohibited pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary and unlawful detainer cases, as in the present case, is a
Procedure. On 10 November 2004, the MTC granted prohibited pleading. The reason for this is to achieve an
petitioners’ request to withdraw the petition for relief.14 expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases
subject of summary procedure.16
On 6 December 2004, petitioners filed the petition for relief
before the RTC.15 Petitioners alleged that they are the Moreover, Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court
lawful owners of the property which they purchased from provides:
spouses Martha D.G. Ubaldo and Francisco D. Ubaldo.
Petitioners denied that they sold the property to
respondent. Petitioners added that on 15 December 2003, SEC. 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order or other
petitioner Abubakar filed with the Commission on Elections proceedings. - When a judgment or final order is entered,
his certificate of candidacy as mayor in the municipality of or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party
Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the 10 May 2004 in any court through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
elections. Petitioners said they only learned of the MTC’s negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in
23 August 2004 Decision on 27 October 2004. Petitioners the same case praying that the judgment, order or
also pointed out that they never received respondent’s proceeding be set aside. (Emphasis supplied)
demand letter nor were they informed of, much less
participated in, the proceedings before the Lupon.
A petition for relief from judgment, if allowed by the Rules Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by
and not a prohibited pleading, should be filed with and personal service first and only when the defendant cannot
resolved by the court in the same case from which the be promptly served in person will substituted service be
petition arose.171avvphi1 availed of.28 In Samartino v. Raon,29 we said:

In the present case, petitioners cannot file the petition for We have long held that the impossibility of personal
relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in an service justifying availment of substituted service should be
unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted
petition for relief with the RTC because the RTC has no towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and
jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of circumstances attendant to the service of summons must
the MTC. Therefore, the RTC did not err in dismissing the be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return;
petition for relief from judgment of the MTC. otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.30

The remedy of petitioners in such a situation is to file a In this case, the indorsements failed to state that prompt
petition for certiorari with the RTC under Rule 65 18 of the and personal service on petitioners was rendered
Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the impossible. It failed to show the reason why personal
MTC over the person of petitioners in view of the absence service could not be made. It was also not shown that
of summons to petitioners. Here, we shall treat petitioners’ efforts were made to find petitioners personally and that
petition for relief from judgment as a petition for certiorari said efforts failed. These requirements are indispensable
before the RTC. because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a suit
action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to even though notice of such action is served not upon him
enforce a personal obligation on the defendant for the but upon another whom the law could only presume would
latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore notify him of the pending proceedings. Failure to faithfully,
physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements of
damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use substituted service renders such service ineffective.31
or occupation of the property.19 In an action in personam,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or in the
for the court to validly try and decide the records of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the
case.20 Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either person on whom substituted service of summons was
upon a valid service of summons or the defendant’s effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion
voluntary appearance in court.21 If the defendant does not residing in petitioners’ residence. In Manotoc v. Court of
voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by Appeals,32 we said:
personal or substituted service of summons as laid out
under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s
which state: house or residence, it should be left with a person of
"suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A
Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever person of suitable age and discretion is one who has
practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is
copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to considered to have enough discernment to understand the
receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the
ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
Sec. 7. Substituted Service. - If, for justifiable causes, the choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful,
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as right or wise may be presupposed." Thus, to be of
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s and understand English to comprehend the import of the
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the
then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest
defendant’s office or regular place of business with some possible time for the person to take appropriate action.
competent person in charge thereof. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at
least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff
Any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over
must therefore determine if the person found in the
the person of the defendant is null and void.22
alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal
age, what the recipient’s relationship with the
The 23 August 2004 Decision of the MTC states: defendant is, and whether said person comprehends
the significance of the receipt of the summons and his
Record shows that there were three attempts to serve the duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at
summons to the defendants. The first was on January 14, least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.
2004 where the same was unserved. The second was on These matters must be clearly and specifically
February 3, 2004 where the same was served to one Gary described in the Return of Summons.33 (Emphasis
Akob and the last was on February 18, 2004 where the supplied)
return was duly served but refused to sign.23
In this case, the process server failed to specify Gary
A closer look at the records of the case also reveals that Acob’s age, his relationship to petitioners and to ascertain
the first indorsement dated 14 January 2004 carried the whether he comprehends the significance of the receipt of
annotation that it was "unsatisfied/given address cannot be the summons and his duty to deliver it to petitioners or at
located."24 The second indorsement dated 3 February 2004 least notify them of said receipt of summons.
stated that the summons was "duly served as evidenced
by his signature of one Gary Acob25 (relative)."26 While the In sum, petitioners were not validly served with summons
last indorsement dated 18 February 2004 carried the and the complaint in Civil Case No. 3719 by substituted
annotation that it was "duly served but refused to sign" service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
without specifying to whom it was served.27
the person of the petitioners and, thus, the MTC’s 23 to sign" without specifying to whom it was served.
August 2004 Decision is void.34 Since the MTC’s 23 August Petitioners failed to file an answer. Hence, the MTC
2004 Decision is void, it also never became final.35 rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a petition for relief before the RTC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET
ASIDE the 3 January 2005 and 16 June 2006 Orders of Petitioners pointed out that they never received
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna. The respondent's demand letter nor were they informed of,
23 August 2004 Decision and the 1 October 2004 Writ of much less participated in, the proceedings before the
Execution, as well as all acts and deeds incidental to the Lupon. Moreover, petitioners said they were not served a
judgment in Civil Case No. 3719, are declared VOID. copy of the summons and the complaint.
We REMAND the case to the Municipal Trial Court, Biñan,
Laguna, for consolidation with the unlawful detainer case in ISSUE: Whether the MTC acquired jurisdiction over the
Civil Case No. 3719 and for the said Municipal Trial Court person of the petitioners. (NO)
to continue proceedings thereon by affording petitioners
Abubakar A. Afdal and Fatima A. Afdal a chance to file
their answer and present evidence in their defense, and
thereafter to hear and decide the case.
RULING:
SO ORDERED.
An action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a
real action and in personam. In an action in personam,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case.

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either

ABUBAKAR A. AFDAL and FATIMA A. AFDAL, upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's
Petitioners, -versus- ROMEO CARLOS, Respondent. voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not
voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by
G.R. No. 173379, SECOND DIVISION, December 1, 2010, personal or substituted service of summons. Service of
summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service
first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly
CARPIO, J.
served in person will substituted service be availed of.
Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by
In this case, the indorsements failed to state that
personal service first and only when the defendant cannot
prompt and personal service on petitioners was rendered
be promptly served in person will substituted service be
impossible. It failed to show the reason why personal
availed of. Here, the indorsements failed to state that
service could not be made. Likewise, nowhere in the return
prompt and personal service on petitioners was rendered
of summons or in the records of the case was it shown that
impossible. Likewise, nowhere in the return of summons or
Gary Acob, the person on whom substituted service of
in the records of the case was it shown that Gary Acob, the
summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and
person on whom substituted service of summons was
discretion residing in petitioners' residence. In sum,
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion
petitioners were not validly served with summons and the
residing in petitioners' residence. Hence, petitioners were
complaint by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to
not validly served with summons and the complaint by
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners.
substituted service.

FACTS:

Respondent Romeo Carlos (respondent) filed a

complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against
petitioners, Zenaida Guijabar (Guijabar), John Doe, Peter
Doe, Juana Doe, and all persons claiming rights under b. Over the subject matter
them before the MTC. Respondent alleged that petitioners,
Guijabar, and all other persons claiming rights under them 1. How jurisdiction is conferred and
were occupying, by mere tolerance, a parcel of land in determined
respondent's name. Respondent demanded that
petitioners, Guijabar, and all persons claiming rights under
them turn over the property to him because he needed the
property for his personal use. Respondent alleged that
petitioners refused to heed his demand and he was G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017
constrained to file a complaint before the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa (Lupon). According to respondent, JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner, v. EMMA DE LA
petitioners ignored the notices and the Lupon issued a RAMA VDA. DE LA PENA,1 JESUSA2 DE LA PENA,
"certificate to file action." Then, respondent filed the JOHNNY DE LA PENA, JOHANNA DE LA PENA, JOSE
complaint before the MTC. DE LA PENA, JESSICA DE LA PENA, AND JAIME
ANTONIO DE LA PENA, Respondents.
There were three attempts to serve the summons
to the defendants. The first indorsement dated 14 January DECISION
2004 carried the annotation that it was "unsatisfied / given
address cannot be located." The second indorsement DEL CASTILLO, J.:
dated 3 February 2004 stated that the summons was "duly
served as evidenced by his signature of one Gary Acob
This Petition for Review on Certiorari  seeks to reverse and
(relative)." The last indorsement dated 18 February 2004
set aside the May 28, 2012 Decision3 of the Court of
carried the annotation that it was "duly served but refused
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02994, which affirmed
the January 20, 2009 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court crop year 1995-1996, which was earlier than the referral of
(RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 98- the matter to Barangay Cansilayan.
10187 for "Recovery of Possession and Damages with
Injunction." On July 31, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It
held that it had jurisdiction over the case because the area
Factual Antecedents of the subject properties was 44 hectares, more or less,
and "it is safe to presume that the value of the same is
Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and more than P20,000.00."14
Jaime Antonio (Jaime) all surnamed de la Pena
(respondents), are the registered owners of two parcels of Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
land with a total area of 44 hectares located in Murcia,
Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot On January 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision
Nos. l38-D and 138-S, and are respectively covered by ordering petitioner to turn over the subject properties to
Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-103187 and T- respondents and to pay them P50,000.00 as attorney's
1031895 (subject properties). fees.

Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent The RTC ratiocinated that the waiver of rights executed by
of respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner) entered, took Jaime to petitioner was coupled with a consideration.
possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject However, petitioner failed to prove that he paid a
properties without paying rent to respondents. In the crop consideration for such a waiver; as such, petitioner was not
year 1995-1996, respondents discovered such illegal entry, entitled to possess the subject properties.
which prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to
vacate the properties but to no avail.6 Both parties appealed to the CA.

Later, the parties appeared before the Barangay Office of On one hand, petitioner reiterated that the RTC had no
Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental but failed to arrive jurisdiction over the case. He also maintained that
at any amicable settlement. On September 29, 1997, respondents already waived their shares and rights over
the Lupon Tagapamayapa of said  Barangay issued a the properties to Jaime, who, in turn, renounced his rights
Certificate to File Action;7 and, on March 9, 1998, to petitioner.
respondents filed a Complaint8 for recovery of possession
and damages with injunction against petitioner.
On the other hand, respondents assailed the RTC Decision
in so far as it failed to award them damages as a result of
In his Answer,9 petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, petitioner's purported illegal entry and possession of the
Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica executed their subject properties.
separate Waivers of Undivided Share of Lands renouncing
their rights and interests over the subject properties in
favor of Jaime. In turn, Jaime subsequently waived his Ruling of the Court of Appeals
rights and interests on the same properties to
petitioner.10 Petitioner claimed that respondents did not On May 28, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
attempt to enter the properties as they already intentionally
relinquished their interests thereon. The CA dismissed respondents' appeal because they did
not establish entitlement to damages. It likewise dismissed
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss11 on the the appeal interposed by petitioner for failing to establish
ground, among others, that the RTC has no jurisdiction that he gave any consideration in relation to Jaime's waiver
over the subject matter of the case. Petitioner posited that of rights in his (petitioner) favor.
based on the allegations in the Complaint, the action
involved recovery of physical possession of the properties In addition, the CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over
in dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year this case considering that the parties stipulated on the
from the date the parties had a confrontation before jurisdiction of the RTC but also because the assessed
the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for Ejectment value of the subject properties is presumed to have
and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial Court exceeded P20,000.00.
(MTC).
Issues
In their Reply,12 respondents alleged that the waiver of
rights in favor of Jaime was conditioned on the payment of Hence, petitioner filed this Petition raising the issues as
their P6.7 million loan with the Republic Planters Bank follows:
(RPB) and Philippine National Bank (PNB); and, in case
the subject properties would be sold, its proceeds shall be
I. DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE
equally distributed to respondents. They further stated that
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
such waiver bestowed rights over the properties solely
OF THE CASE?
upon Jaime. They added that the subsequent waiver
executed by Jaime to petitioner should have been with
II. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING
conformity of the banks where the properties were
THAT PETITIONER SHOULD RETURN
mortgaged; and conditioned on the payment of the P6.7
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT
million loan. They pointed out that neither Jaime nor
OF THIS CASE TO THE RESPONDENTS?
petitioner paid any amount to RPB or PNB; and as a result,
the waivers of rights in favor of Jaime, and later to
petitioner, were void. III. SHOULD THE PETITIONER BE AWARDED
DAMAGES?15
Subsequently, in their Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss,13 respondents contended that the RTC had Petitioner's Arguments
jurisdiction over the case because their demand for
petitioner to vacate the properties was made during the
Petitioner insists that respondents filed their Complaint for Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of
recovery of physical possession of the subject properties action filed but also by the assessed value of the property.
on March 9, 1998 or within one year from the date the It follows that in accion publiciana and  reinvindicatoria, the
parties had their confrontation before the  Barangay of assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional
Cansilayan (September 29, 1997). As such, he maintains element to determine the court that can take cognizance of
that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. the action.22

Petitioner also posits that even granting that this action is In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the
considered a plenary action to recover right of possession, Complaint is one for ejectment; or b) if the same is deemed
the RTC still had no jurisdiction because the tax an accion publiciana, the RTC still lacks jurisdiction as the
declarations of the properties were not submitted, and assessed value of the subject properties was not alleged in
consequently, it cannot be determined whether it is the the Complaint.
MTC or RTC which has jurisdiction over the case.
As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction,
Moreover, petitioner argues that Jaime's waiver in his reference must be made to the averments in the complaint,
(petitioner's) favor was coupled with the following and the law in force at the commencement of the action.
considerations: 1) P400,000.00 cash; 2) a car worth This is because only the facts alleged in the complaint can
P350,000.00; and 3) a convenience store worth be the basis for determining the nature of the action, and
P1,500,000.00. He adds that the delivery of the properties the court that can take cognizance of the case.23
to him confirms that he (petitioner) gave said
considerations to Jaime. Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:

Later, in his Manifestation and Motion,16 petitioner points 2. That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners of
out that although the body of the assailed CA Decision two (2) parcels of land known as Lot. No. 138-D with
made reference to the January 20, 2009 RTC Decision, its Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103187 and Lot No. 138-
dispositive portion pertained to a different case, to wit: S with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- 103189, with a
total land area of 44 hectares, all of Murcia Cadastre x x x;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 29,
2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 3. That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and
in Civil Case No. CEB-30866 is AFFIRMED. consent of herein plaintiffs, the defendant [herein
petitioner] entered into and took possession of the
Costs against both appellants. aforementioned parcels of land and planted sugar cane
without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;
SO ORDERED.17 (Underlining ours)
4. That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and
Consequently, petitioner prays that the dispositive portion occupation by the defendant of the aforementioned
of the CA Decision be rectified to refer to the actual case property and demand to vacate the property was made
subject of the appeal. orally to the defendant sometime in 1995-96 crop year but
defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises;
Respondents' Arguments
5. A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.]
Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental, and before the
On the other hand, respondents contend that the CA did
Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo between herein parties where
not commit any reversible error in rendering the assailed
plaintiffs again demanded orally for the defendant to
Decision. They insist that petitioner's contentions are
vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the
unsubstantial to merit consideration.
premises and no amicable settlement was reached during
the confrontation of the parties, thus a certificate to file
Our Ruling action has been issued x x x;

The Court grants the Petition. 6. That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from
entering the property of the plaintiffs for the latter to take
In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for possession of the same and plant sugar cane thereby
recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment causing damages to the plaintiffs;
(either for unlawful detainer or forcible entry) in case the
dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 7. That because of the refusal of the defendant to allow the
2) accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of real plaintiffs to take possession and control of their own
right of possession when dispossession has lasted for property, plaintiffs were constrained to seek the aid of
more than one year; and, 3)  accion reinvindicatoria or an counsel and consequently thereto this complaint.24
action for recovery of ownership.18
Under Section 1,25 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),19 the proper special jurisdictional facts that must be set forth in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as
Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful
ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, detainer.
and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or
possession of real property, or any interest therein where
In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the
the assessed value of the property does not exceed
plaintiff's prior physical possession of the property; the fact
P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).20 On the other
that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force,
hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action
actions involving title to or possession of real property, or
must be filed within one year from the time the owner or
any interest therein in case the assessed value of the
the legal possessor learned of their dispossession.26 On
property exceeds P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro
the other hand, a complaint for unlawful detainer must
Manila).21
state that the defendant is unlawfully withholding 02994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
possession of the real property after the expiration or Complaint in Civil Case No. 98-10187 is DISMISSED.
termination of his or her right to possess it; and the
complaint is filed within a year from the time such SO ORDERED.
possession became unlawful.27

In the instant case, respondents only averred in the

Complaint that they are registered owners of the subject
properties, and petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner, -versus- EMMA DE
possession. They did not assert therein that they were LA RAMA VDA. DE LA PENA, JESUSA DE LA PENA,
dispossessed of the subject properties under the JOHNNY DE LA PENA, JOHANNA DE LA PENA, JOSE
circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible DE LA PENA, JESSICA DE LA PENA, and JAIME
entry or unlawful detainer. Hence, in the absence of the ANTONIO DE LA PENA, Respondents.
required jurisdictional facts, the instant action is not one for
ejectment.28 G.R. No. 202448, FIRST DIVISION, December 13, 2017,

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while DEL CASTILLO, J.
this case is an accion publiciana, there was no clear
showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be
presumed or implied and must distinctly appear from the
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The material averments in the complaint and the law
law. It cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly in effect at the time of the commencement of action
appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court determine which court has jurisdiction over the case. Here,
by the agreement of the parties; or by the court's there is no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over
erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.29 the case as the complaint did not specify the value of the
subject properties.
To emphasize, when respondents filed the Complaint in
1998, RA 7691 was already in force as it was approved on FACTS:
March 25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994. 30 As
such, it is necessary that the assessed value of the subject Respondents Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose,
properties, or its adjacent lots (if the properties are not Jessica, and Jaime de la Pena were the registered owners
declared for taxation purposes)31 be alleged to ascertain of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares
which court has jurisdiction over the case.32 located in Murcia, Negros Occidental. Sometime in 1994,
petitioner, without the knowledge and consent of the
As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the respondents entered, took possession of, and planted
assessed value of the subject properties. Thus, it is sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to
unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the the respondents. Respondents discovered such entry in
MTC has jurisdiction, over respondents' action. the crop year 1995-6 and promptly demanded petitioner to
vacate the subject properties to no avail.
Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took cognizance
of the Complaint only on the presumption that the The parties appeared before the Barangay Office
assessed value of the properties exceeds P20,000.00. but failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Thus, the
Aside from affirming such presumption, the CA, in turn, Lupon Tagapamayapa issued a certificate to file action
declared that the RTC had jurisdiction because the parties dated September 29, 1997. Respondents filed a case for
stipulated on it. However, as discussed, jurisdiction cannot recovery of possession in the RTC on March 9, 1998.
be presumed. It cannot be conferred by the agreement of Petitioner, in his Answer, claims that respondents already
the parties, or on the erroneous belief of the court that it renounced their rights to the subject properties in favor of
had jurisdiction over a case. Jaime, and Jaime, in turn, waived his rights and interests
therein to petitioner. Petitioner also filed a Motion to
Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the Complaint Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as the case was for
of the assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot ejectment and was filed within a year from the barangay
be determined which court has exclusive original conciliation proceedings, and thus, the MTC has
jurisdiction over respondents' Complaint. Courts cannot jurisdiction. Respondents, in their Reply, argue that the
simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or even waiver of rights to Jaime was conditioned on the payment
market value of the land.33 Resultantly, for lack of of their P6.7 million loan with the Republic Planters Bank
jurisdiction, all proceedings before the RTC, including its and the Philippine National Bank. They further claim that
decision, are void,34 which makes it unnecessary to discuss the subsequent waiver by Jaime to petitioner was also
the other issues raised by petitioner. conditioned on the same consideration. As there was no
payment to the banks, the waivers of right should be
considered void.
As a final note, while the modification of the clerical error in
the dispositive portion of the CA Decision is rendered
irrelevant by the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of Respondents also argue that the demand to
jurisdiction, the Court, nonetheless, reminds the CA and all vacate was already made in the crop year of 1995-6. The
other courts to be more circumspect in rendering their RTC denied the motion to dismiss and held that as the
decision, including ensuring the correctness of the area of the subject properties was 44 hectares, it was safe
information in their issuances. After all, courts are duty- to assume that value is P20,000.00. The RTC ruled in
bound to render accurate decisions, or that which clearly favor of respondents and held that petitioner was not
and distinctly express the facts and the law on which the entitled to the properties as he failed to pay the
same is based.35 consideration. The CA affirmed the RTC and noted that the
latter had jurisdiction over the case because the parties
stipulated the jurisdiction of the RTC, and that the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 28, presumed value of the subject properties exceed
2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. P20,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. PODONAN, FELICISIMO T. RAMILO, FELIPE C.
(NO) REDONDO, FELINO M. REDONDO, CLEMENTE R.
SANGALANG, DOMINGA R. SUAREZ, ARMANDO V.
RULING: VISPO, ALBERTO P. SALVADOR, FRANCISCO S.
CARANDANG, AVELINO L. LLARENA, CELESTINO M.
LLARENA, FRISCO N. LLARENA, GREGORIO N.
The material averments in the complaint and the
LLARENA, CASIANO N. CABRERA, FLA VIANO N.
law in effect at the time of the commencement of action
CABRERA, SEDORO C. CABRERA, SIXTO M.
determine which court has jurisdiction over the case. A
CABRERA, VALERIANO L. CARINGAL, MARITA C.
complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff’s prior
DEJAN, SOFRONIO V. CARAAN, CONRADO K.
possession, and that he was deprived of the same through
MERCADO, LEONIZA N. NARVACAN, JUANITO E.
force, intimidation, thread, strategy, or stealth, and that the
NARV ACAN, FELICIANO N. NARVACAN, FERNANDO
action must be filed within a year of knowledge of
C. MATANGUIHAN, LEONIDES A. MATANGUIHAN,
dispossession. A complaint for unlawful detainer, on the
NILO L. MATANGUIHAN, JUANITO A. NATIVIDAD,
other hand, must state that the defendant is unlawfully
SERGIO M. NATANAUAN, BARTOLOME C.
withholding possession of the real property after the
MATANGUIHAN, MARTIN M. NATANAUAN,
expiration or termination of his right to possess it, and that
FERNANDO G. MEDINA, LUCIA R. NATANAUAN, LOPE
is also filed within a year from such time possession
N. NATANAUAN, JUANA F. NATANAUAN, FRANCISCO
became unlawful. The complaint in this case had none of
G. NATANAUAN, BUENAVENTURA G. NATANAUAN,
these averments. In the absence of the required
ANDRES M. NATANAUAN, CORNELIO L. NARVAEZ,
jurisdiction facts, the case cannot be considered as one for
LEONIZA T. ANNOYO, BRICCIO N. LUMBRES,
ejectment.
CALIXTO R. LUMBRES, RODOLFO U. LLARENA,
BENITA L. MADAJAS, MERCEDES L. MADAJAS,
There is no clear showing that the RTC has REMEDIOS A. MAR UDO, FILOMENA D. MARANAN,
jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not specify ROLANDO N. MEDINA, RICARDO L. MARANAN,
the value of the subject properties. In the absence of this ANGEL A. UMANDAP, LUCIDO G. MEDINA, MENARDO
material fact, it cannot be determined which court has G. MEDINA, MARIANO N. REGALADO, MARCIANO C.
original exclusive jurisdiction over the action. REDONDO, DAMASA D. REDONDO, LEONIDA R.
RAMILO, SERGIO 0. NATIVIDAD, RAFAEL T.
MARANAN, DEMETRIO M. QUIJANO, LITA L.
NARVAEZ, PETRONILO V. ARSENIO, CESARIO N.
LLARENA, JUAN D. NARVAEZ, ANSELMO N.
LLARENA, MACARIO N. DIJAN, FERNANDO M.
ROBLES, LEONARDO N. TERRIBLE, LEONORA N.
G.R. No. 200369
RIVERA, ELENA N. RIVERA, CATALINO P. CARAON,
JUAN S. MARASIGAN, CELSO A. MERCADO, and
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner ERNESTO MANGUIAT, Respondents
vs.
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM
x-----------------------x
OFFICER, THE HONORABLE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM OFFICER, THE HONORABLE MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER, MIGUEL L. G.R. Nos. 203330-31
CARASOCHO, GERARDO G. CARAAN, CATALINO P.
CARAAN, PASCUAL N. CABRERA, FRANCISCO L. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, ,
CABRERA, EMILIANA M. CABRERA, CESAR N. vs.
CABRERA, PONCIANO R. GARCIA, PEDRO R. PETRONILO V. ARSENIO, CATALINO P. CARAAN,
GARCIA, MARCELINO R. GARCIA, AGUSTIN M. FRANCISCO S. CARANDANG, MACARIO N. DEJAN,
MARANAN, EUGENIO J. MARANAN, SILVERIO D. ANSELMO L. LLARENA, ANSELMO T. LLARENA,
MARANAN, ARMANDO T. MARUDO, NENITA L. CELESTINO M. LLARENA, CESARIO M. LLARENA,
MARUDO, GUILLERMO C. NARV ACAN, DAVID M. FRISCO N. LLARENA, GREGORIO N. LLARENA,
TERRENAL, DOROTEO C. TERRENAL, SARDO C. CALIXTO R. LUMBRES, AGUSTIN N. MARANAN,
TERRENAL, CARMELITA M. DELA CRUZ, REMEGIO R. EUGENIO T. MARANAN, JUAN L. MARASIGAN,
VILLAMAYOR, ANICETO C. DEJAN, MACARIO N. ARMANDO T. MAR UDO, MEDARDO G. MEDINA,
DEJAN, EULOGIA L. DIVINA, CELIA C. GARCIA, CELSO A. MERCADO, FELICIANO N. NARV ACAN,
JOSEFA G. LARENA, MIGUEL M. LUMBRES, JUANITO GUILLERMO C. NARVACAN, JUAN E. NARVACAN,
E. NARV ACAN, LUZVIMINDA PEREZ, SEBASTINO C. JUANITO D. NARVAEZ, LITA L. NARVAEZ, DEMETRIO
DELA CRUZ, DANILO P. GARCIA, HERMOGENES L. M. QUIJANO, LEONIDA R. RAMILO, ELENA M. RIVERA,
MARANAN, LEOPOLDO T. MARUDO, MIGUEL, C. FERNANDO M. ROBLES, DAVID M. TERRENAL, and
NATANAUAN, JOSE C. NATANAUAN, ARCADIO C. LEONARDO N. TERRIBLE, Respondents.
RIVERA, MAMERTO B. DEJAN, SEGUNDO C. DEJAN,
GREGORIO N. ENRIQUEZ, SIMEON L. ALCANTARA, DECISION
GAUDENCIO S. ALVEZ, AVELINO G. DE JESUS,
GAUDENCIO P. DIMAPILIS, NEMESIO L. DIVINA, JARDELEZA, J.:
RODOLFO L. GARCIA, VALENTIN N. LERON, LEONA
N. LLARENA, PONCIANO L. LLARENA, SERGIO N.
There are two primary questions raised in these
LLARENA, P ABLITO M. LUMBRES, VICTORIA L.
consolidated petitions. The first is whether the Department
MADAJAS, RODOLFO L. MARANAN, ANDRES S.
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has jurisdiction
MARANAN, MELECIA T. MARANAN, APOLONIA
over petitions for cancellation of Certificates of Land
VILLAMAYOR, JUANITO O. MERCADO, ARSENIO V.
Ownership Award involving parties who do not have a
NATIVIDAD, CRISPIN M. NATIVIDAD, DANTE A.
tenancy relationship. The second is whether the factual
NATIVIDAD, ELADIO U. NATIVIDAD, FULGENCIO U.
findings of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform can be
NATIVIDAD, GAUDENCIO M. NATIVIDAD, JUAN T.
questioned in a petition for review on certiorari.
NATIVIDAD, PEDRO M. NATIVIDAD, JUAN P.
CABRERA, BARTOLOME M. MICO,
EDUARDOM.ONA,LUCAS G. ONA, JULIUS T.
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) is which noted the "presence of multiple crops, ranging from
the duly registered owner of land located at Barangay vegetables, rice/corn to permanent industrial crops in the
Bunggo, Calamba, Laguna covered by Transfer Certificate area."17 Finally, the CA faulted Union Bank for failing to
of Title (TCT) Nos. T-137846 and T-156610 of the Registry present additional evidence during the two-year period
of Deeds of Laguna with areas of 1,083,250 and 260,132 during which its motion for reconsideration with DAR was
square meters, respectively.1 pending.18 The CA subsequently denied Union Bank's
motion for reconsideration.19
Union Bank offered these parcels of land to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) through the B
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) arrangement under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the On December 20, 1996, Union Bank filed a Petition20 for
government. After the DAR and Land Bank of the cancellation of CLO As against the Regional Agrarian
Philippines (LBP) inspected the properties, DAR offered Reform Officer (RARO), PARO, MARO, and 28 agrarian
the amounts of ₱2,230,699.30 and ₱716,672.35 as just reform beneficiaries of the land covered by TCT No. T-
compensation. Union Bank did not agree with the 156610 with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
valuation; thus, the DAR Regional Director requested LBP Adjudicator (P ARAD) of Laguna. The petition, docketed as
to open trust accounts in the name of Union Bank.2 P ARAD Case Nos. R-403-0075-96 to R-403-0102-96, was
dismissed without prejudice on October 9, 1997 for being
In the meantime, the DAR started issuing Certificates of premature in view of Union Bank's pending request for
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in the names of private withdrawal of its VOS and exemption from CARP with
respondents as agrarian reform beneficiaries for the land DAR.21 The PARAD denied Union Bank's motion for
covered by TCT No. T-156610. On September 9, 1993, the reconsideration on December 17, 1997;22 Union Bank
DAR Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) claimed to have received the order of denial only on July
transmitted 7 4 CLO As to the Register of Deeds of 10, 2002.23
Calamba, Laguna for registration.3 On September 14,
1993, the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Union Bank appealed to the Department of Agrarian
transmitted another 115 CLOAs to the same register of Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The appeal was
deeds.4 The land covered by TCT No. 137846 was docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 12313 to 12313-A27.24 On
transferred to the Republic of the Philippines on September 14, 2009, the DARAB denied the appeal for
September 13, 1993.5 lack of merit.25 According to the DARAB, "there has to be a
finding first by the DAR Secretary that the land is really
On June 29, 1995, Union Bank filed a "Motion to Withdraw exempted" from the coverage of CARP; absent this, "the
Voluntary Offer To Sell On Property from CARP Coverage" petition for cancellation of the CLO As is indeed
in the land valuation proceedings for the land covered by prematurely filed."26 The DARAB subsequently. denied
TCT No. T-156610 pending before the Regional Agrarian Union Bank's motion for reconsideration.27
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region IV.6 The RARAD
would later provisionally dismiss the proceedings after Union Bank then filed a petition for review under Rule 43
Union Bank filed a letter request with the DAR to withdraw with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114354. The
the VOS and to exempt the properties from CARP.7 case was consolidated with the aforementioned CA-G.R.
SP No. 114159. The CA Fifteenth Division denied the
A petition in view of its finding that the properties were not
exempt from CARP.28
On August 1, 1996, Union Bank submitted a letter to the
DAR requesting that its VOS be withdrawn and that the After the CA denied its motion for reconsideration,29 Union
properties be exempted from CARP coverage.8 The matter Bank filed a consolidated petition for review
was docketed as A-9999-04-VOS-103-04.9 Union Bank on certiorari assailing the CA' s decision and resolution in
alleged that the properties had a slope exceeding 18% and the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP No. 114159 and
were undeveloped, thus, exempt from CARP pursuant to CA-G.R. SP No. 114354. The consolidated petition is
Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform docketed as G.R. Nos. 203330-31.30
Law10 (CARL).11
C
In its Order dated July 21, 2008, then DAR Secretary
Nasser C. Pangandaman denied Union Bank's request for On January 23, 2004, Union Bank filed a separate petition
CARP exemption and withdrawal of its VOS for lack of for cancellation of the CLOAs, this against 141 agrarian
merit.12 According to the DAR Secretary, Union Bank failed reform beneficiaries, before the PARAD of Laguna. The
to prove by substantial evidence that the prope1iies were case was docketed as Case Nos. R-0403-0016-0023-03 to
both undeveloped and had a slope gradation of more than R-0403-0037-0303-03.31 The PARAD dismissed the
18% because the slope map and land capability map petition for being premature because "there must first be a
submitted by Union Bank were not certified by the positive act from the Secretary of the DAR or his
Department of Environment and Natural Resources authorized representative declaring said property as
(DENR).13 excluded/exempted from coverage."32 On appeal, docketed
as DSCA No. 0379, the DARAB sustained the PARAD's
After the DAR Secretary denied its motion for dismissal of Union Bank's petition for cancellation of the
reconsideration,14 Union Bank filed a petition for review CLOAs.33
under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The case,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114159, was consolidated Union Bank elevated the case to the CA through a petition
with CA-G.R. SP No. 114354.15 In its Decision dated for review under Rule 43, which was docketed as CA-G.R.
October 21, 2011, the CA Fifteenth Division denied the SP No. 116106. In its Decision dated November 18,
petitions.16 The CA agreed with the DAR Secretary's ruling 2011,34 the Special Twelfth Division denied the petition for
that absent the DENR certification, the appraisal maps lack of merit. Citing relevant jurisprudence, the CA held
were "not substantial enough to warrant the conclusion that that for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in cases involving
the properties are not suited for agricultural production." cancellation of the CLOAs, there must be an agrarian
The CA also cited the case report prepared by the MARO dispute between landowner and tenants  who are recipients
of the CLO As. The CA found that "the record is bereft of facie showing that there is a tenurial arrangement or
any evidence showing that petitioner and private tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential
respondents agrarian reform beneficiaries had tenancy requisites of a tenancy relationship are key jurisdictional
relations."35 It also ruled that cancellation of the CLO As allegations that must appear on the face of the complaint.
can only be effected after the DAR Secretary These essential requisites are: (1) the parties are the
administratively declares that the land is exempted or landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
excluded from CARP coverage.36 Since the DAR Secretary land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
was yet to make such determination when Union Bank filed production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
its petition with the P ARAD, the P ARAD correctly sharing of harvests.53
dismissed the petition for being premature. The CA
subsequently denied Union Bank's motion for The records clearly show that the two petitions filed by
reconsideration.37 Union Bank with the PARAD did not involve agrarian
disputes. Specifically, Union Bank's petitions failed to
The CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. sufficiently allege-or even hint at-any tenurial or agrarian
116106 are being assailed by Union Bank in its petition for relations that affect the subject parcels of land. In. both
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 200369. petitions, Union Bank merely alleged that respondents
were beneficiaries of the CLOAs. That Union Bank
Upon motion of Union Bank,38 we consolidated G.R. Nos. questions the qualifications of the beneficiaries suggests
203330-31 with G.R. No. 200369 on March 6, 2013.39 that the latter were not known to, much less tenants of,
Union Bank prior to the dispute. We therefore agree with
the conclusion of the CA that there was no tenancy
II
relationship between the parties. Consequently, the
PARAD did not have jurisdiction over the case.
The main issues in G.R. Nos. 203331 and 200369 are
identical. In both cases, Union Bank assails the dismissal
Union Bank repeatedly cites Section 17 of EO No. 229 to
of its petitions for cancellation of the CLOAs. The common
argue that the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction over the
ground relied upon for the dismissal, first by the respective
case, and that it cannot share jurisdiction with the DAR
P ARADs, and on appeal, by the DARAB and the CA, is
Secretary. Such contention appears to have stemmed from
that the petitions were prematurely filed in view of Union
petitioner's unfamiliarity with the legislative history of
Bank's then pending request for CARP exemption and
agrarian reform laws. Section 17 of EO No. 229, as well as
withdrawal of VOS. In G.R. No. 200369, the CA added that
Section 50 of the CARL, conferred jurisdiction to the DAR-
the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the case because of
not to the DARAB. In fact, at the time EO No. 229 and the
the absence of a tenancy relationship between Union Bank
CARL were enacted, the DARAB did not exist. The
and the agrarian reform beneficiaries. In its petitions before
jurisdiction conferred to the DAR was twofold: (1) primary
us, Union Bank insists that the DARAB is expressly
jurisdiction over the adjudication of agrarian disputes; and
granted quasi-judicial powers by Executive Order (EO) No.
(2) original jurisdiction over agrarian reform
229.40 It posits that the DAR Secretary was "effectively
implementation. EO No. 129-A effectively split these two
ousted" from jurisdiction because the CLOAs were issued
jurisdictions between the newly created DARAS with
upon his determination that the properties were subject to
respect to the former and to the DAR regional offices as
CARP and that the DARAB "cannot share jurisdiction" with
regards the latter.
the DAR Secretary on the issue of the validity of the
issuance of the CLOAs.41 In response, private respondents
argue that the classification and identification of As previously discussed, the jurisdiction conferred to the
landholdings for CARP coverage, including petitions for DARAB is limited to agrarian disputes, which is subject to
lifting of such coverage, are lodged with the DAR the precondition that there exist tenancy relations between
Secretary.42 Hence, the CA correctly upheld the dismissal the parties. This delineation applies in connection with
of the case. cancellation of the CLOAs. In Valcurza v. Tamparong,
Jr.,54 we stated:
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by law.43 Section Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the
5044 of the CARL and Section 1745 of EO No. 229 vested cancellation of registered CLO As relating to an agrarian
upon the DAR primary-jurisdiction to determine and dispute between landowners and tenants.
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original However, in cases concerning the cancellation of CLO
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of As that involve parties who are not agricultural tenants
agrarian reform. Through EO No. 129-A,46 the power to or lessees - cases related to the administrative
adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and
DARAB,47 and jurisdiction over the implementation of regulations – the jurisdiction is with the DAR, and not
agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional the DARAB.
offices.48 In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del
Rosario,49 we held that consistent with the DARAB Rules of Here, petitioner is correct in alleging that it is the DAR and
Procedure,50 the agrarian reform cases that fall within the not the DARAB that has jurisdiction. First, the issue of
jurisdiction of the P ARAD and DARAB are those that whether the CLOA issued to petitioners over respondent's
involve agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL land should be cancelled hinges on that of whether the
defines an "agrarian dispute" as any controversy relating to subject landholding is exempt from CARP coverage by
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, virtue of two zoning ordinances. This question involves the
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to DAR's determination of whether the subject land is indeed
agriculture.51 Given the technical legal meaning of the term exempt from CARP coverage - a matter involving the
"agrarian dispute," it follows that not all cases involving administrative implementation of the CARP Law. Second,
agricultural lands automatically fall within the jurisdiction of respondent's complaint does not allege that the prayer for
the PARAD and DARAB. the cancellation of the CLOA was in connection with an
agrarian dispute. The complaint is centered on the
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the fraudulent acts of the MARO, PARO, and the regional
allegations of the complaint.52 For the PARAD and DARAB director that led to the issuance of the CLOA.55 (Emphasis
to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be a prima supplied; citations omitted.)
Thus, in the absence of a tenancy relationship between not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial
Union Bank and private respondents, the P ARAD/DARAB agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in
has no jurisdiction over the petitions for cancellation of the the first instance. Finally, it is settled that factual findings of
CLOAs. Union Bank's postulate that there can be no administrative agencies are generally accorded respect
shared jurisdiction is partially correct; however, the and even finality by this Court, if such findings are
jurisdiction in this case properly pertains to the DAR, to the supported by substantial evidence, a situation that obtains
exclusion of the DARAB. in this case. The factual findings of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his official position, has
III acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction,
deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought
not to be altered, modified or reversed.61 (Citations
In G.R. No. 203330, Union Bank principally questions the
omitted.)
DAR Secretary's finding that the properties are not exempt
from CARP. It cites the appraisal reports showing that the
properties have an elevated slope of more than 18% and IV
were not irrigated. Effectively, Union Bank is asking us to
weigh the evidence anew. However, as we have held time In support of its position that the CLOAs should be
and again, only questions of law may be put in issue in a cancelled, Union Bank claims that it has not been paid just
petition for review under Rule 45. "We cannot emphasize compensation and that the DAR did not follow the correct
to litigants enough that the Supreme Court is not a trier of procedure in issuing the CLOAs. These, however, are
facts. It is not our function to analyze or weigh the being raised for the first time before us. It is a fundamental
evidence all over again."56 Corollary to this is the doctrine rule that this Court will not resolve issues that were not
that factual findings of administrative agencies are properly brought and ventilated in the lower courts.
generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues
especially when these findings are affirmed by the Court of framed by the parties, and consequently, issues not raised
Appeals.57 in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. An issue, which was neither averred in the
We note that while Union Bank's claim that the properties complaint nor raised during the trial in the lower courts,
exceeded 18% is uncontroverted, this alone is not cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because it
sufficient to claim exemption from the CARP. Section 10 of would be offensive to the basic rule of fair play and justice,
the CARL provides: and would be violative of the constitutional right to due
process of the other party.62 Nonetheless, Union Bank is
not precluded from raising these issues in an appropriate
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. - Lands actually,
case before a competent tribunal.
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for
parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds, and WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision
mangroves, national defense, school sites and campuses dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January
including experimental farm stations operated by public or 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals-Special Twelfth Division
private schools for educational purposes, seeds and in CA-G.R. SP No. 116106, and the Decision dated
seedlings research and pilot production centers, church October 21, 2011 and Resolution dated August 30, 2012 of
sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and the Court of Appeals-Fifteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial 114159 and 114354 are AFFIRMED.
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms
actually worked by the inmates, government and private SO ORDERED.
research and quarantine centers, and all lands with
eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those
already developed shall be exempt from coverage of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

Therefore, to be exempt from the CARP, the land must

have a gradation slope of 18% or more and  must be UNION BANK vs Regional Agrarian Reform Officer
undeveloped. To support its contention that the lands were
undeveloped, Union Bank submitted a certification by the G.R. No. 200369, THIRD DIVISION, March 1, 2017,
National Irrigation Administration stating that the lands
were not irrigated and a land capability map by Asian JARDELEZA, J.
Appraisal stating that the lands were best suited for
pasture.58 On the other hand, the case report prepared by Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
the MARO shows that the properties were already allegations of the complaint. For the PARAD and DARAB
agriculturally developed.59 The weighing of these pieces of to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be a prima
evidence properly falls within the sound discretion of the facie showing that there is a tenurial arrangement or
DAR Secretary. In the absence of any clear showing that tenancy relationship between the parties.
he acted in grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not
interfere with his exercise of discretion.
FACTS:
Our concluding statement in Sebastian v. Morales60  is very
Petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) is
apt:
the duly registered owner of the subject land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-137846 and T-
As a final salvo, petitioners urge us to review the factual 156610. Union Bank offered these parcels of land to the
findings of the DAR Secretary. Settled is the n1le that Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) through the
factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) arrangement under the
by certiorari, as a petition for review under Rule 45 is Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the
limited only to questions of law. Moreover, it is doctrine that government. The DAR started issuing Certificates of Land
the "errors" which may be reviewed by this Court in a Ownership Award (CLOAs) in the names of private
petition for certiorari are those of the Court of Appeals, and respondents as agrarian reform beneficiaries for the land
covered by TCT No. T-156610. Union Bank filed a "Motion Bank with the PARAD did not involve agrarian disputes.
to Withdraw Voluntary Offer To Sell On Property from Specifically, Union Bank's petitions failed to sufficiently
CARP Coverage" in the land valuation proceedings for the allege-or even hint atany tenurial or agrarian relations that
land covered by TCT No. T-156610 pending before the affect the subject parcels of land. In both petitions, Union
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). Union Bank merely alleged that respondents were beneficiaries
Bank submitted a letter to the DAR requesting that its VOS of the CLOAs. That Union Bank questions the
be withdrawn and that the properties be exempted from qualifications of the beneficiaries suggest that the latter
CARP coverage. Union Bank alleged that the properties were not known to, much less tenants of, Union Bank prior
had a slope exceeding 18% and were undeveloped, thus, to the dispute. There was no tenancy relationship between
exempt from CARP pursuant to Section 10 of the the parties. Consequently, the PARAD did not have
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The DAR secretary jurisdiction over the case.
denied Union Bank’s request for failing to prove by
substantial evidence that the properties were As held in Valcurza v. Tamparong, Jr., in cases
underdeveloped. Union Bank filed a petition for review concerning the cancellation of CLO As that involve parties
under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals (CA), which later who are not agricultural tenants or lessees - cases related
on sustained the DAR secretary. In another petition for to the administrative implementation of agrarian reform
cancellation of CLOAs filed by the Union Bank which laws, rules and regulations – the jurisdiction is with the
eventually reached the Court of Appeals, the CA ruled that DAR, and not the DARAB.
the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the case because of
the absence of a tenancy relationship between Union Bank Thus, in the absence of a tenancy relationship
and the agrarian reform beneficiaries. In its petitions before between Union Bank and private respondents, the
us, Union Bank insists that the DARAB is expressly PARAD/DARAB has no jurisdiction over the petitions for
granted quasi-judicial powers by Executive Order (EO) No. cancellation of the CLOAs. Absent a showing that the
229. executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest
injustice or palpable excess of authority," the general rule
ISSUE: Whether PARAD/DARAP has jurisdiction over the applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition
case. (NO) for continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing
mandamus cannot issue
RULING:

The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the

nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law.
Section 50 of the CARL and Section 17 of EO No. 229
vested upon the DAR primaryjurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original G.R. No. 171855               October 15, 2012
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform. Through EO No. 129-A, the power to FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F.
adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR AP
DARAB, and jurisdiction over the implementation of AREJADO, Petitioners,
agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional offices. vs.
To simplify, the jurisdiction conferred to the DAR was HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47,
twofold: (1) primary jurisdiction over the adjudication of Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE
agrarian disputes; and (2) original jurisdiction over agrarian MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS,
reform implementation. EO No. 129-A effectively split CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN
these two jurisdictions between the newly created DARAS and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.
with respect to the former and to the DAR regional offices
as regards the latter. DECISION

In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, the PERALTA, J.:

Court held that consistent with the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall within the Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB are those that under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners Fe
involve agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie Aparejado, · as
defines an "agrarian dispute" as any controversy relating to represented by Edgar Aparejado, seeking to set aside the
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, Orders dated December 6, 20051 and January 11,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to 2006,2 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
agriculture. Given the technical legal meaning of the term Masbate City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 11846.
"agrarian dispute," it follows that not all cases involving
agricultural lands automatically fall within the jurisdiction of
The antecedents are as follows:
the PARAD and DARAB. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
For the PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA
case, there must be a prima facie showing that there is a Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy Flores,
tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are
parties. members of the Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion,
9th Division of the Philippine Army based at Cabangcalan
Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship
are key jurisdictional allegations that must appear on the
face of the complaint. These essential requisites are: (1) Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes
the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and Edwin Aparejado, who
subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the were allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents.
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests. The Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1
records clearly show that the two petitions filed by Union o'clock in the afternoon, they received information about
the presence of armed elements reputed to be New arrested. The JAGO filed a Motion for
People’s Army (NPA) partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Reconsideration,8 and in an Order9 dated December 6,
Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the 2005, the trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the
information, they coordinated with the Philippine National entire records of the case were turned over to the
Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat, they Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division,
encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense Philippine Army, for appropriate action.
firefight. When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons,
namely: Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was
y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y denied by the trial court in an Order11 dated January 11,
Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y 2006.
Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova were found
sprawled on the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of Hence, the present petition with the following arguments:
the Philippine Army states that a legitimate military
operation was conducted and in the course of which, the
victims, armed with high-powered firearms, engaged in a I
shoot-out with the military.
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY
On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
no encounter that ensued and that the victims were EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE
summarily executed in cold blood by respondents. Hence, MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT
they requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO
to investigate the case. After investigation, the NBI THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COURT
recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate City MARTIAL, AS THE SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON
that a preliminary investigation be conducted against FACTS AND IN LAW, HAS NO JURISDICTION
respondents for the crime of multiple murder. In reaching OVER THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.
its recommendation, the NBI relied on the statements of
witnesses who claim that the military massacred helpless II
and unarmed civilians.
IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a AMOUNTING TO EXCESS IN JURISDICTION IF
Resolution3 recommending the filing of an Information for NOT GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ON
Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMINO
with multiple murder in an Information4 dated February 15, ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED
2005, which reads: DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD ONLY BE
REVIEWED THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS THERE
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT YET ON THE
accuses SSGT Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu. CAA Morie INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.12
Flores, CAA Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA
Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom, stationed at Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its
Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division, discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it
Philippine Army, Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents
Masbate, committed as follows: to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over
the same is conferred upon the civil courts by Republic Act
That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the No. 7055 (RA 7055).13 On the other hand, the respondents
afternoon thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that
Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the the acts complained of are service connected and falls
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named within the jurisdiction of the military court.
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with
one another, taking advantage of their superior strength as The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely abused
elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their its discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which
government issued firearms, with intent to kill, by means of actually falls within its jurisdiction.
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction
shoot Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y over the subject matter of the case is conferred by law and
Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y is determined by the allegations of the complaint
Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover
Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them on upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.14 As a
different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon them necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court
multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths. cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
CONTRARY TO LAW. question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon
the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court
Masbate City, February 15, 2005. is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the
On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents matters to be consulted.15
was issued by the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 47, but
before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the In the case at bar, the information states that respondents,
Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus Motion6 dated July 20, "conspiring together and mutually helping with one
2005, with the trial court seeking the cases against another, taking advantage of their superior strength, as
respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their
tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court denied the motion filed by government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of
the JAGO on the ground that respondents have not been treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has
shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their graciously accepted my amendment to her amendment,
bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot subject to refinement and style.
wounds which caused their deaths."16 Murder is a crime
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code The President. Is there any objection? Silence There being
(RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the none, the amendment is approved.19
RTC.17 Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was
actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized:
against the respondents has been vested upon the RTC by
law.
Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of
offenses committed by persons subject to military law ...
Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are
has jurisdiction over the case at bar because the crime service-related or connected. And we specified which
charged was a service-connected offense allegedly would be considered service-related or connected under
committed by members of the AFP. To support their the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No.
position, respondents cite the senate deliberations on R.A. 408.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
7055.
The said amendment was later on reflected in the final
Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by version of the statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1. Section
Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani to define a service- 1 of R.A. 7055 reads in full:
connected offense as those committed by military
personnel pursuant to the lawful order of their superior
officer or within the context of a valid military exercise or Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
mission.18 Respondents maintain that the foregoing and other persons subject to military law, including
definition is deemed part of the statute.1âwphi1 members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Units, who commit crimes or offenses penalized under the
Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
However, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate that the government ordinances, regardless of whether or not
proposed definition was not included as part of the statute. civilians are co-accused, victims, or offended parties which
The proposed definition made by Senator Shahani was not may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the
adopted due to the amendment made by Senator Wigberto proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined
E. Tañada, to wit: before arraignment by the civil court, is service-connected,
in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial:
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
propose to the Sponsor of this amendment to consider, interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by
be under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her the proper civil courts.
consideration the following amendment to her amendment
which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or
SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL offenses shall be limited to those defined in Articles 54 to
BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended. (Emphasis
ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, supplied)
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS AMENDED.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly
This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes
service-related or connected offenses or crimes would be. or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408),
(Emphasis supplied.) as amended,21 to wit:

The President. What will happen to the definition of Articles 54 to 70:

"service-connected offense" already put forward by
Senator Shahani?
Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in
the specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
Articles of War.
Art. 56. False Muster.
SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION
Art. 57. False Returns.
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out
between the two of you? I will suspend the session for a Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
minute, if there is no objection. There was none.
Art. 59. Desertion.
It was 5:02 p.m.
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
The President. The session is resumed.
Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
Defense.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer. Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non- Art. 97 General Article.

Commissioned Officer.
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition. cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since
the offense for which they were charged is not included in
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition. the enumeration of "service-connected offenses or crimes"
as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The said law is
very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and
which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken
to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice
Articles 72 to 92 but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no
room for interpretation, but only application.22 Hence, the
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged
crime of multiple murder.1âwphi1
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. Court of Masbate City, Branch 47, dated December 6,
2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively, in Criminal Case
No. 11846 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate City, is DIRECTED to
reinstate Criminal Case No. 11846 to its docket and
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy. conduct further proceedings thereon with utmost dispatch
in light of the foregoing disquisition.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to
Surrender. SO ORDERED.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public

FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F.
Service.
APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR APAREJADO,
Petitioners, -versus- HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES,
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property. of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL,
CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLIEN
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA LEONARDO
Enemy. CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.

Art. 83. Spies. G.R. No. 171855, THIRD DIVISION, October 15, 2012,

Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, PERALTA, J.

Damage or Wrongful Disposition.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property by law and is determined by the allegations of the
Issued to Soldiers. complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. Here, the information states that respondents are accused
of murder, which is punishable under the RPC. Hence,
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified or
not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the
respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
FACTS:
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu,
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy
Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs members of the Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion,
Redressed. 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at Cabangcalan
Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate. Petitioners, on the other
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo
Villanueva and Edwin Aparejado, who were allegedly killed
Art. 92. Dueling. in cold blood by the respondents.

Articles 95 to 97:
 Respondents alleged that they received This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
information about the presence of armed elements reputed Court, assailing the Decision1 dated May 26, 2008 and
to be New People's Army partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Resolution2 dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of
Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145.
information, they coordinated with the Philippine National
Police and proceeded to the place. Thereat, they Factual Antecedents
encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense
firefight. When the battle ceased, seven persons were Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino
found sprawled on the ground lifeless. The post-incident (Antonino) had been leasing a residential property located
report of the Philippine Army states that a legitimate at Makati City and owned by private respondent Tan Tian
military operation was conducted and in the course of Su (Su). Under the governing lease contract, Antonino was
which, the victims, armed with high-powered firearms, accorded with the right of first refusal in the event Su would
engaged in a shoot-out with the military. On the other decide to sell the subject property.3
hand, petitioners complained that there was no encounter
that ensued and that the victims were summarily executed
in cold blood by respondents. On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document
denominated as Undertaking Agreement4 where Su agreed
to sell to Antonino the subject property for ₱39,500,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether the case falls within the RTC’s However, in view of a disagreement as to who between
jurisdiction. (YES) them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax,
the sale did not proceed as intended.5
RULING:
On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is conferred reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject
by law and is determined by the allegations of the property and payment of damages. The complaint was
complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. In 802.6 Later that same day, Antonino filed an amended
the case at bar, the information states that respondents, complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and
"conspiring together and mutually helping with one compel Su to sell to her the subject property.7
another, taking advantage of their superior strength, as
elements of the Philippine Army, armed with their In an Order8 dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed
government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of Antonino’s complaint on the grounds of improper venue
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees.
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and According to the RTC, Antonino’s complaint is one for
shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their specific performance, damages and sum of money, which
bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot are personal actions that should have been filed in the
wounds which caused their deaths." Murder is a crime court of the place where any of the parties resides.
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila,
(RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue.
RTC. Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was Specifically:
actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged
against the respondents has been vested upon the RTC by
law. The instant case is an action for specific performance with
damages, a personal action, which may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over respondents' defendants resides (Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules of
case since the offense for which they were charged is not Court). Records show that plaintiff is a resident of 706
included in the enumeration of "service-connected offenses Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City
or crimes" as provided for under Section 1 thereof. The while defendant is a resident of 550 Sto. Cristo St.,
said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of Binondo, Manila. Hence, the instant case should have
the AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the been filed in the place of residence of either the plaintiff or
RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the defendant, at the election of the plaintiff. Contrary to the
civil courts. claim of plaintiff, the alleged written agreements presented
by the plaintiff in her Amended Complaint do not contain
any stipulation as to the venue of actions. x x x9

The RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over
Antonino’s complaint in view of her failure to pay the
G.R. No. 185663               June 20, 2012 correct amount of docket fees. Citing Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,10 the RTC
REMEDIOS_ANTONINO, Petitioner, ruled that:
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY and TAN Anent the non-payment of filing fees on the Amended
TIAN SU, Respondents. Complaint, plaintiff alleges that no new assessment was
made when the Amended Complaint was filed since there
RESOLUTION [were] no additional damages prayed for. The Manchester
decision has been recently relaxed as to allow additional
payment of the necessary fees if the Honorable Court so
REYES, J.:
orders an assessment thereof.
Nature of the Case
The Court is not persuaded.
The Amended Complaint, which the Court notes to have The RTC maintained its earlier ruling that Antonino’s
been filed at 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon or few hours Motion for Reconsideration from the December 8, 2004
after the initial complaint was filed, further prays that Order is pro-forma and did not suspend the running of the
judgment be rendered "ordering defendant to sell his period to file an appeal. The RTC also reiterated that
property located at 1623 Cypress, Dasmariñas Village, Antonino’s complaint is a personal action such that the
Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in proper venue therefore is either the City of Manila or
accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in Muntinlupa City.
their agreement dated July 7, 2004 and ordering defendant
to desist from selling his property to any other party other On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for
than plaintiff.", which makes the instant case also an action annulment of judgment.18 Antonino prayed for the
for Specific Performance in addition to the claim for nullification of the RTC’s Order dated December 8, 2004
Damages. However, the value of the described property dismissing her complaint, Order dated January 6, 2005
was not stated in the prayer and no docket fees were paid. denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint
Thus, following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case Resolution dated February 24, 2005 denying her motion for
of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of reconsideration of the January 6, 2005 Order. According to
Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, that the Court Antonino, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that her
of the prescribed docket fee, the instant case is hereby action for the enforcement of the Undertaking Agreement
dismissed.11 is personal and when it deprived her of an opportunity to
pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTC’s grave
On December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise
Motion,12 praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis exhibited by its strict application of the rules on motions
pendens, which Antonino caused to be annotated on the and summary denial of her motion for reconsideration.
title covering the subject property and the issuance of a
summary judgment on his counterclaims. Su, among In its Decision19 dated May 26, 2008, the CA dismissed
others, alleged the propriety of cancelling the notice of lis Antonino’s petition. While the CA recognized Antonino’s
pendens in view of the dismissal of the complaint and faulty choice of remedy, it proceeded to resolve the issues
Antonino’s failure to appeal therefrom. she raised relative to the dismissal of her complaint. Thus:

On January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for It should be stressed that in this case, there is neither
Reconsideration,13 claiming that her complaint is a real allegation in the petition, nor sufficient proof adduced
action and the location of the subject property is showing highly exceptional circumstance to justify the
determinative of its venue. Alternatively, she submitted a failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies of appeal,
certification issued by the Commission on Elections, petition for relief or other appropriate remedy through no
stating that she is a resident of Makati City. She then fault attributable to [her] before filing this petition for
prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance annulment of judgment. In Manipor v. Ricafort, the
of an order directing the clerk of court to assess the proper Supreme Court held, thus:
docket fees. This was denied by the RTC in an
Order14 dated January 6, 2005, holding that there was non- If the petitioner failed to avail of such remedies without
compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules sufficient justification, he cannot avail of an action for
of Court. annulment because, otherwise, he would benefit from his
own inaction or negligence.
Antonino thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration15 dated
January 21, 2005, claiming that there was due observance Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural infirmity, and in
of the rules on motions. Antonino alleged that her motion the interest of justice, we shall look into the issues raised
for reconsideration from the RTC’s December 8, 2004 was and decide the case on the merit.
set for hearing on January 7, 2005 and Su received a copy
thereof on January 6, 2005. Antonino pleaded for a liberal
interpretation of the rules as Su was notified of her motion xxxx
before the hearing thereon and was not in any way
prejudiced. She also reiterated her arguments for the A perusal of the allegations of the complaint
reinstatement of her complaint. unambiguously shows that petitioner seeks to enforce the
commitment of private respondent to sell his property in
In a Joint Resolution16 dated February 24, 2005, the RTC accordance with the terms and conditions of their
denied Su’s Omnibus Motion and Antonino’s January 21, purported agreement dated July 7, 2004. By implication,
2005 Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC refused to petitioner does not question the ownership of private
cancel the notice of lis pendens, holding that: respondent over the property nor does she claim, by any
color of title, right to possess the property or to its
recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement of a
It is quite clear that the dismissal of the Amended supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal
Complaint was anchored on two grounds, e.g. (1) for action.
improper venue and (2) for non-payment of docket fee. It is
elementary that when a complaint was dismissed based on
these grounds[,] the court did not resolve the case on the xxxx
merits. Moreover, "a court cannot acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case unless the docket fees are Guided by the above rule (Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of
paid" x x x. Thus, the cause of action laid down in the Court), petitioner should have filed the case either in
complaint remains unresolved for proper re-filing before Muntinlupa City, where she resides, or in Manila, where
the proper court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court said: private respondent maintains his residence. Other than
"The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is filing the complaint in any of these places, petitioner
therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her case.
ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith
time." x x x17 raised improper venue as an affirmative defense and his
stand was sustained by trial court, thus, resulting to the
dismissal of the case.
Further, it is important to note that in a petition for such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not
annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the attributable to him. This is clearly provided under Section
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The concept
of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does Antonino’s recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously
not embrace abuse of discretion. Petitioner, by claiming flawed and the reasons are patent. There is therefore no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, reason to disturb the questioned issuances of the RTC that
actually concedes and presupposes the jurisdiction of the are already final and executory.
court to take cognizance of the case. She only assails the
manner in which the trial court formulated its judgment in A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a
the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows that petitioner substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal.
cannot use lack of jurisdiction as ground to annul the
judgment by claiming grave abuse of discretion. In this
case where the court refused to exercise jurisdiction due to First, Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the various
improper venue, neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave issuances of the RTC, primary of which is the Order dated
abuse of discretion is available to challenge the assailed December 8, 2004, in order to avoid the adverse
order of dismissal of the trial court.20 (Citations omitted) consequences of their becoming final and executory
because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary remedies
available. Antonino did not proffer any explanation for her
Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration, which was failure to appeal the RTC’s Order dated December 8, 2004
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December 5, and, thereafter, the Order dated January 6, 2005, denying
2008. 21 her Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005.
Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules immediately
Issue indicates that an appeal was already available from the
Order dated December 8, 2004, as this is a final order as
The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the contemplated under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Rule 41 of the
propriety of Antonino’s use of the remedy of a petition for Rules of Court, and there was no legal compulsion for
annulment of judgment as against the final and executory Antonino to move for reconsideration. Nonetheless, since
orders of the RTC. there is no bar for her to file a motion for reconsideration
so as to give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself before
Our Ruling elevating the matter for the appellate courts’ review, appeal
is the prescribed remedy from the denial of such motion
and not another motion for reconsideration. While Section
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr.,22 this Court expounded
1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court includes "an order
that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available
denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration" in the
under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse
enumeration of unappealable matters, this Court clarified in
to the concept of immutability of final judgments:
Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.26 that such refers to a
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order of
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where dismissal is a final order, therefore, appealable. Moreover,
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of a second motion for reconsideration from a final judgment
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs or order is prohibited, hence, can never interrupt the period
actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and to perfect an appeal.
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only
two grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e.,  extrinsic fraud
The RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of
and lack of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable
the three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of the
to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against
Rules of Court contrary to liberal stance taken by this Court
the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and
in cases when the purpose of such rule can be achieved
terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
by giving the opposing party sufficient time to study and
an effective administration of justice that once a judgment
controvert the motion.27 Justice and equity would thus
has become final, the issue or cause involved therein
suggest that the fifteen-day period within which Antonino
should be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment
can appeal should be counted from her receipt on January
is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy
7, 200528 of the Order dated January 6, 2005 denying her
and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the
Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005.
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial
Unfortunately, even liberality proved to be inadequate to
agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
neutralize the adverse consequences of Antonino’s
law.23 (Citations omitted)
negligence as she allowed such period to lapse without
filing an appeal, erroneously believing that a second
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,24 this Court emphasized that motion for reconsideration is the proper remedy. While a
only void judgments, by reason of "extrinsic fraud" or the second motion for reconsideration is not prohibited insofar
court’s lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being as interlocutory orders are concerned,29 the Orders dated
annulled. December 8, 2004 and January 6, 2005 are final orders.

The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments In fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from
which, though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of Antonino’s receipt of the Order dated February 24, 2005
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a denying her second motion for reconsideration, she
party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that interposed no appeal and filed a petition for annulment of
has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to judgment on April 1, 2005 instead. This, for sure,
be discharged from the burden of being bound to a constitutes a categorical admission that the assailed
judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.25 issuances of the RTC had already become final and
executory in view of her omission to perfect an appeal
Apart from the requirement that the existence of "extrinsic within the mandated period. By no means can her petition
fraud" or "lack of jurisdiction" should be amply for annulment of judgment prosper as that would, in effect,
demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must sanction her blatant negligence or sheer obliviousness to
convince that the ordinary and other appropriate remedies, proper procedure.
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail previously signed the day before when plaintiff prevented
of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of him from doing so.
judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition
sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new XV
trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against
said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, Consequently, plaintiff discovered that defendant was
through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of already negotiating to sell the said property to another
those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he Chinese national who incidentally is also one of plaintiff’s
cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule buyers.
47, for otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or
negligence.30 (Citation omitted)
xxxx
"Grave abuse of discretion" is not a ground to annul a final
and executory judgment. Premises considered, in the interest of substantial justice,
it is most respectfully prayed that after due hearing that
judgment be rendered:
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment can only be
based on "extrinsic fraud" and "lack of jurisdiction" and
cannot prosper on the basis of "grave abuse of discretion". 1. Ordering defendant to sell his property located at 1623
By anchoring her petition on the alleged grave abuse of Cypress, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City covered by TCT
discretion that attended the dismissal of her complaint and No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with the terms and
the denial of her two (2) motions for reconsideration, conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004.
Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of "lack of
jurisdiction". As this Court previously clarified in Republic of x x x x35
the Philippines v. "G" Holdings, Inc.,31 "lack of jurisdiction"
as a ground for the annulment of judgments pertains to Antonino’s cause of action is premised on her claim that
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party there has already been a perfected contract of sale by
or over the subject matter of the claim. It does not virtue of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement and
contemplate "grave abuse of discretion" considering that Su had refused to comply with his obligations as seller.
"jurisdiction" is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled However, by claiming the existence of a perfected contract
in Tolentino v. Judge Leviste:32 of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired title to the
subject property. She does not allege otherwise and tacitly
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. acknowledges Su’s title to the subject property by asking
As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, for the consummation of the sale.
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over That there is a private document supposedly evidencing
the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other the alleged sale does not confer to Antonino title to the
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the subject property.1âwphi1 Ownership is transferred when
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in there is actual or constructive delivery and the thing is
the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment considered delivered when it is placed in the control or
which are the proper subject of an appeal.33 (Citation possession of the buyer or when the sale is made through
omitted) a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or
cannot be clearly inferred.36 In other words, Antonino’s
In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err complaint is not in the nature of a real action as ownership
in dismissing Antonino’s complaint. The RTC was correct of the subject property is not at issue.
in classifying Antonino’s cause of action as personal and in
holding that it was instituted in the wrong venue. Personal Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real
action is one that is founded on privity of contracts property does not make Antonino’s complaint real in nature
between the parties; and in which the plaintiff usually in the absence of a contrary claim of title. After a contract
seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of sale is perfected, the right of the parties to reciprocally
of a contract, or recovery of damages. Real action, on the demand performance, thus consummation, arises – the
other hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate, vendee may require the vendor to compel the transfer the
where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of ownership or title to the object of the sale37 and the vendor may require
possession of real property or interest in it.34 Antonino’s the payment of the purchase price.38 The action to cause
following allegations in her amended complaint show that the consummation of a sale does not involve an adverse
one of her causes of action is one for the enforcement or claim of ownership as the vendor’s title is recognized and
consummation of a contract, hence, a personal action: the vendor is simply being asked to perform an act,
specifically, the transfer of such title by any of the
XII recognized modes of delivery.

On July 7, 2004, plaintiff and defendant executed a Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong
document entitled "Undertaking Agreement" (copy of which venue sufficed for the dismissal thereof, it would be
is hereto attached as Annex H) wherein defendant agreed superfluous to discuss if Antonino’s non-payment of the
to sell said property to plaintiff "who has leased said correct docket fees likewise warranted it.
property since March 21, 1978 up to the present" with the
plaintiff paying a downpayment of $50,000.00 US dollars At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal
the following day, July 8, 2004. of her complaint, such had already become final and
executory and will not be disturbed as it had jurisdiction
xxxx and it was not alleged, much less, proved that there was
extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the assailed orders
XIV of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies, such as an
appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of
Antonino’s fault. Litigation should end and terminate
Defendant also refused to accept the $50,000.00 US sometime and somewhere. It is essential to an effective
Dollars and was about to tear up the document they
and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
has become final, the winning party should not be deprived Rules of Court.
of the fruits of the verdict.39
Antonino thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is dated January 21, 2005, claiming that there was due
DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated May 26, observance of the rules on motions. In a Joint Resolution
2008 and Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Antonino's
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are hereby Motion for Reconsideration. On April 1, 2005, Antonino
AFFIRMED. filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment.
Antonino prayed for the nullification of the aforementioned
SO ORDERED. Orders and Joint Resolution by the RTC. According to
Antonino, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that her
action for the enforcement of the Undertaking Agreement
is personal and when it deprived her of an opportunity to
pay the correct amount of docket fees. The RTC's grave
abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise
REMEDIOS ANTONINO, Petitioner, -versus- THE
exhibited by its strict application of the rules on motions
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY and TAN TIAN
and summary denial of her motion for reconsideration.
SU, Respondents.
ISSUE: Whether Antonino's use of the remedy of a petition
G.R. No. 185663, SECOND DIVISION, June 20, 2012,
for annulment of judgment as against the final and
REYES, J. executory orders of the RTC is proper. (NO)

First, a petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as RULING:

a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal. Here,
First, Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the
Antonino did not proffer any explanation for her failure to
various issuances of the RTC in order to avoid the adverse
appeal the RTC's Orders. Secondly, a petition for
consequences of their becoming final and executory
annulment of judgment can only be based on "extrinsic
because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary remedies
fraud" and "lack of jurisdiction" and cannot prosper on the
available. Antonino did not proffer any explanation for her
basis of "grave abuse of discretion."
failure to appeal the RTC's Orders.
FACTS:
Secondly, a petition for annulment of judgment can
Petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been leasing only be based on "extrinsic fraud" and "lack of jurisdiction"
a residential property located at Makati City and owned by and cannot prosper on the basis of "grave abuse of
private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under the governing discretion." "Lack of jurisdiction" as a ground for the
lease contract, Antonino was accorded with the right of first annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over
refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the subject the person of the defending party or over the subject
property. The parties executed a document denominated matter of the claim. It does not contemplate "grave abuse
as Undertaking Agreement where Su agreed to sell to of discretion" considering that "jurisdiction" is different from
Antonino the subject property. However, in view of a the exercise thereof.
disagreement as to who between them would shoulder the
payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed
as intended.

On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against

Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for G.R. No. 181284
the reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject
property and payment of damages. Later that same day, LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO
Antonino filed an amended complaint to enforce the PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA,
Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell to her the JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO,
subject property. VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL,
BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN,
In an Order dated December 8, 2004, the RTC and MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners
dismissed Antonino's complaint on the grounds of improper vs.
venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR
According to the RTC, Antonino's complaint is one for LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A. LOPEZ, MERCEDES L.
specific performance, damages and sum of money, which GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ,
are personal actions that should have been filed in the JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA.
RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ,
court of the place where any of the parties resides.
CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR.,
Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila, ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR
respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue. The ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON,
RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO
Antonino's complaint in view of her failure to pay the ABERASTURI, LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY,
correct amount of docket fees. HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS
A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ,
On January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L.
Reconsideration, claiming that her complaint is a real QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS,
action and the location of the subject property is GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T.
determinative of its venue. This was denied by the RTC in LOPEZ, and as represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON
an Order 14 dated January 6, 2005, holding that there was ABERASTURI, Respondents
DECISION the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.
PERALTA, J.:
On August 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting the
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari  assailing the Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, and
Decision2 dated August 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals declared petitioners’ Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, and the NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic as a
Resolution3 dated July 4, 2007, which denied petitioners' consequence of the grant of the said motion to amend and
motion for reconsideration. supplement complaint.

Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, On August 17, 2004, petitioners filed a Manifestation
are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig praying for an ocular inspection of the disputed land to
Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who determine the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status
claimed to have been living since birth on the land located of the area.
at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao,
which they inherited from their forefathers. On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to
Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss
On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney- the Amended Complaint.
in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the lawful owners
and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition
land (Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D), with an area of 105.7361 and Motion for Judgment by Default.
hectares, which appears to be located within the ancestral
domain of the Talaandig tribe. On February 14, 2005, the RTC issued an Order6 resolving
all pending incidents before it, the dispositive portion of
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion which reads:
Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's [herein
Injunction with Damages4  (original complaint for accion petitioners’] motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP and
reivindicatoria) against petitioners before the Regional Trial its manifestation for an ocular inspection are hereby denied
Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC). Docketed as for being bereft of merit. Further, defendants [petitioners],
Civil Case No. 04-03-01, the petition was raffled off to except Macapayag and Brazil, are hereby declared in
Branch 11. default for their failure to file their Answer to the Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as against
On March 20, 2004, petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed defendants Macapayag and Brazil, be called for pre-trial
their Answer, alleging that respondents have no cause of and ex-parte presentation of evidence as against the rest
action against them. On March 23, 2004, the rest of the of defendants [petitioners] on May 2, 2005 at 9:00 o'clock
petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the in the morning. Furthermore, the injunctive writ prayed for
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners alleged by the plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, Accordingly, defendants [petitioners], their agents and
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act privies, or any other or all persons acting for and in their
(IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe members, behalves, are hereby ordered to observe, maintain and
assisted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples preserve the status quo subject of the action and/or the
(NCIP) in the processing, validation, and delineation of relation between the parties in order to protect the rights of
their Ancestral Domain claim in May 2003. On July 25, the plaintiffs while the case is pending in court and to
2003, Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R- cease and desist from performing any acts that in one way
10-TAL-0703-0010 was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc or another contravene the tenor of this order, while
Resolution No. 08-02003 to the Talaandig tribe over its awaiting final determination of the instant suit or until
ancestral domain in Talakag, Bukidnon, containing an area further orders of this court. Furthermore, to answer for
of 11,105.5657 hectares. On October 30, 2003, President whatever damage that defendants [petitioners] may sustain
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo awarded the said CADT to the by reason of this injunction order if the court should finally
Talaandig tribe. As awardees of a CADT, petitioners decide that plaintiffs [respondents] are not entitled to the
argued that NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction relief it prayed for, plaintiffs [respondents] are hereby
over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute directed to put up a bond in the amount of ONE
and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000.00) executed
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous in favor of the party enjoined.
Peoples (IPs).
SO ORDERED.7
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel,
filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing On April 12, 2005, petitioners filed before the Court of
Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO- Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the for Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a Temporary
subject matter. Restraining Order.

On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision affirming
Supplement Complaint from Accion Reivindicatoria to one the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order, which in turn denied
for "Injunction, Damages, and Other Relief," with the the referral of the case to the NCIP, the dispositive portion
attached Amended and Supplemental of which states:
Complaint5 (amended complaint for injunction). On July 30,
2004, petitioners filed an Opposition thereto. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby partly GRANTED. The assailed Order dated
On August 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss February 14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, alleging that MODIFICATION that the order of default against
petitioners, except Macapayag and Brazil, is hereby exclusive and original jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioners
LIFTED. contend that respondents amended the complaint to one
for injunction to downplay the real issue which is the
SO ORDERED.8 dispute over a land that is within the Talaandig tribe's
ancestral domain, and mainly capitalized on the acts
complained of, such as harassment, threats, acts of
The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the
terrorism, among others, supposedly committed against
amendment of the complaint and properly refused to refer
respondents.
the case to the RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations of
both original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and
amended complaint [injunction], the CA found that the On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling that
subject matter of both complaints is well within the whether the complaint is one for Injunction or Accion
jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA noted that the only Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because nowhere
substantial amendment made was with regard to the in respondents' original and amended complaints is it
nature of the action which originally was one of accion stated that petitioners were members of the ICCs or IPs
reivindicatoria and then changed to one for damages. And and that the disputed property was part of their ancestral
except for some amendments as to petitioners' alleged domain. Petitioners take exception to the rule that
violent acts and the prayer for declaration of their title to jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
the subject property, the rest of the amended complaint allegations of the complaint, as strict adherence thereto
was basically the same as the original one, including the would open the floodgates to the unscrupulous practice of
reliefs prayed for by respondents. Anent the writ of litigants divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction by crafting their
preliminary injunction, the CA held that the RTC's assailed complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on
February 14, 2005 Order is self-explanatory as to why the their court of choice. Petitioners contend that the literal
issuance of the same was proper considering the averments of the complaint are not determinative of the
circumstances of the case. jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actual issues
are evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases,
the real nature and character of the pleadings and issues
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
are not merely found in the complaint, but also in the
reconsideration of its August 17, 2006 Decision.
subsequent pleadings submitted by both parties.
Petitioners stress that although the complaint banners the
Hence, this appeal on certiorari raising the following subject matter as one for injunction, the pleadings of
issues: respondents show that the subject matter is the conflicting
ownership claims over the land. In fact, petitioners point
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING out that the records of the case show that various pieces of
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO OVER A evidence have been presented to prove that the dispute
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION INVOLVING AN involves conflicting claims over a land covered by a CADT.
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OF THE TALAANDIGS.
For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do not
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file this
THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT A QUO ALLOWING petition, since they failed to make prima facie showing that
THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT, THE SOLE they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were
PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER JURISDICTION authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe. Respondents
ON THE LOWER COURT. insist that based on the allegations in their amended
complaint for injunction and damages, the RTC has
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESOLVING jurisdiction over the subject matter which is a purely
THAT EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED BEFORE THE personal action and incapable of pecuniary estimation.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHEN IN THE ORIGINAL Respondents assert that the real issue is whether or not
ACTION FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR petitioners are guilty of wrongful acts of violence, terrorism,
CERTIORARI BEFORE IT, THE COURT A QUO HAS destruction, intimidation, harassment, etc., to justify a
ADMITTED THAT A CADT WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF permanent injunction and hold the latter liable for
PETITIONERS.9 damages. Respondents also point out that petitioners
cannot invoke protection under the IPRA 8731, because
On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has no the conflict does not involve an ancestral domain and they
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 04-03-0 for Injunction, (respondents) are not IPs so the condition precedent
Damages and other Relief, because the 105.7361-hectare before bringing a dispute before the NCIP cannot be
land claimed by respondents is undisputedly within the satisfied, i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary
ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe over which a CADT laws by the parties.
has already been issued. Petitioners insist that, even
granting that the case is purely a personal action, the NCIP The petition has no merit.
has exclusive and original jurisdiction over it as it concerns
a claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs over their On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the Court
ancestral domain. disagrees with their contention that petitioners do not have
legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file the
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the petition, for failure to show that they are members of
amendment of the complaint from accion reivindicatoria to IPs/ICCs, or that they are authorized to represent the
injunction with damages was clearly meant to oust the Talaandig tribe.
NCIP of its jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the
RTC by concealing the real issue in the case, which is the Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court
parties' conflicting claims over the 105.7361-hectare land of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
in Miarayon, Talakag Bukidnon. According to petitioners, governed by the "real parties in interest" rule found in
the cause of action in the complaint for accion Section 2,10 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of
reivindicatoria is the claim of ownership and recovery of real party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2,11 Rule VI of
possession of the said land which is undisputedly found the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP.
within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain covered by That petitioners are the real parties in interest can be
CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with
Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office of such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and
the NCIP12 filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team- boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned
Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU parties through the application of customary laws in the
counsels alleged therein that the respondents' complaint area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is
for recovery of ownership (accion reinvidicatoria) sought to located.
recover an unregistered real property situated in Miarayon,
Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands
exception of Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member- where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the
beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by dispute could not be resolved through customary law
the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the
Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the
support of their allegation, petitioners presented a NCIP to be adopted hereafter.
certification13 that the disputed land is within the area
covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by
Beneficiaries of Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen
Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.14 In (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.17
contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to
dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the
Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents' contention that In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-
petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations
without merit. governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before
it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated
April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its
and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents' jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
amended complaint, foremost in the Court's mind is the ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought
principle in "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for
case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP through its
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited to
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the the following:
ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of (1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or Hearing Officer (RHO):
some of the claims asserted therein."15
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over
Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary prior and informed consent of ICC/IPs;
estimation, and in all civil actions which involve title to,
possession of, real property or any interest therein where c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs
the assessed value of the property or interest therein involving violations of customary laws or desecration of
exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b)
of R.A. 8371; and
On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under
Section 66 of the IPRA as follows:
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided,
however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership,
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes,
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled
certification shall be issued by the Council of under customary laws; and
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a Republic Act No. 8371;
petition with the NCIP.16
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for
enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral
1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states: (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently
acquired by, and issued to, any person or community
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371.
to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs,
Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year harass, intimidate and cause trouble to the prior
from the date of registration. possession of respondents as the owners by virtue of right
of title; (3) to order petitioners to pay moral and exemplary
Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees and costs of
the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13 and suit; and (4) to declare respondents' title as having become
14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide: a vested right, and as such entitled to all right and incident
of an absolute owner.
Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request
of the proper party, members of the indigenous dispute In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, on
settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a the other hand, respondents further alleged that sometime
certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due in November 2003, petitioners harassed, intimidated,
regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon
form so long as it states in substance the failure of respondents' farm workers to drive them away from the
settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under land, without legal or justifiable reason. They added that,
customary law or traditional practices. despite having hired private security guards to secure and
protect their property, these violent incidents were followed
by more acts of violence, lawlessness, harassment,
Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be
terrorism to drive away respondents from the land which
required in the following cases:
they claim to lawfully own and possess.
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following
corporation, partnership, association or juridical
reliefs: (1) to order petitioners and their representatives, to
person or a public officer or employee and the dispute
stop and refrain from committing acts of violence,
is in connection with the performance of his official
destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness and
functions;
terrorism against respondents, and to maintain the
peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 105-hectare
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not land by respondents as an attribute of ownership; (2) to
belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he declare petitioners to have committed acts of violence,
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of harassment, intimidation, destruction, assault and other
Elders/Leaders; forms of lawlessness against respondents, and to
permanently order petitioners to stop and refrain from
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition committing similar acts; and (3) to hold petitioners jointly
seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable and severally liable to pay respondents actual damages,
damage or injury that may result if not acted upon moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
immediately; and litigation expenses and treble costs.

d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both
necessary certification without justifiable reasons.18 original and amended complaints, the Court notes that
respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are
Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute
RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs.
respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint
in the original and amended complaints to find out which make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which
tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this case. involves an interest in a real property with an assessed
value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their
In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil
respondents traced the provenance of their title over said action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the
tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, subject matter of the amended complaint based on
1957. They averred that, together with their predecessor- allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
in-interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes
thereon since 1957 and that they have been in physical, Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere
actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous, public and fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their
adverse possession of said land in the concept of owners ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to
alleged that said land was declared alienable and wit:
disposable since August 3, 1927 per certification of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its
claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
means, petitioners entered the said land, without disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however,
permission and against the consent of the landowners, That no such dispute shall be
caused damages therein and harassed respondents by
indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. They added brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
that petitioners continue such harassment by means of remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
armed men frequenting the campsite and firing M-16 rifles purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
at them during nighttime, causing great fear and threat. Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
reliefs, among others: (1) to cause the preliminary petition with the NCIP.
injunction to be made permanent for the respondents to
enjoy possession of their property, free from threats of A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall
physical harm, harassment and undue obstruction caused have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
by petitioners; (2) to order petitioners to respect and not to of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from
gathered from the qualifying provision that "no such publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral
dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP
have exhausted all remedies provided under their endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed
customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the
in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the
been resolved, which certification shall be a condition Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP." deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and
verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due
such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the
(1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the
parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there
through the said certification by the Council of are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries
Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office
ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them
systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict,
processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the
practices within their respective communities, as may be section below.
compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.19 xxxx

Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of
of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan,
and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and
definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes
to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid arising from the delineation of such ancestral
two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between
case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
have their own separate and distinct customary laws and boundaries of their respective ancestral domains,
Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall
abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry
such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any
bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any
nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the
of the principles of fair play and due process for those application, implementation, enforcement and
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for
subjected to its customary laws and Council of Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days
Elders/Leaders. from receipt of a copy thereof.20

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP 2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent
shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving claims by parties who are not members of the same
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among ICC/IP, to wit:
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims
and disputes arise between or among parties who do not SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral
belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to Domains Office may, upon written request from the
different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non- ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been
ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any
proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued
while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, to, any person or community may be cancelled by the
respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties
if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear concerned.21
to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig
Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the
power to hear, try and decide this case. NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes
and claims between and among members of the same
There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as
shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes the basic administrative law principle that an administrative
even if the parties involved do not belong to the same rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the
ICC/IP, viz.: provisions of the enabling law,22 the Court declares Rule
IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR23, Rule III, Section 524 and
1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules 25 as null
contemplate a situation where a dispute over an ancestral and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the
domain involving parties who do not belong to the same, NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such
but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit: disputes where the parties do not belong to the same
ICC/IP. As the Court held in Paduran v.
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification DARAB,26 "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred
and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield
accordance with the following procedures: to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist
as a matter of law.27 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction
on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure
xxxx
cannot.28 In the abovesaid exceptional cases where one of
the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same Sale. Together with their predecessor-in-interest, they
ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules have religiously paid the real estate taxes and that they
validly dispenses with the requirement of certification have been in possession of said land in the concept of
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated owners for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12,
in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the 1945. They claimed that by means of fraud and stealth,
customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP. petitioners entered the said land, caused damages and
harassed respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of farm workers. In their amended complaint for injunction
Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its and damages, respondents further alleged that petitioners
Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CAG.R. SP No. 00204-
harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired highpowered
MIN, are AFFIRMED.
rifles upon respondents' farm workers to drive them away
from the land, without legal or justifiable reason. After a
SO ORDERED.
perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and
amended complaints, the Court notes that respondents
neither alleged that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs
nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over
ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs.

Rather, the allegations in respondents' original

UNDURAN vs. ABERARTURI complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil
action which involves an interest in a real property with an
assessed value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in
G.R. No. 181284, EN BANC, April 18, 2017, their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a
civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
PERALTA, J. mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and
their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred jurisdiction of the NCIP. Pursuant to Section 66 of the
by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint. IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
Here, the allegations in respondents' original complaint disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
involves an interest in a real property with an assessed When such claims and disputes arise between or among
value of P683,760.00, while the allegations in their parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the case
amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of
action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the
Pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not
jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP. While most of the
petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not
belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction.

FACTS: 2. Objections to Jurisdiction over the subject matter

Petitioners except for Brazil and Macapayag are

members of Talaandig tribe who claimed to have been
living since birth on the land in Bukidnon, which they G.R. No. 173021               October 20, 2010
inherited from their forefathers. Respondents claimed to be
the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE
of agricultural land which appears to be located within the VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA,
ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe. Respondents filed represented by EUGENE KITMA, Petitioners,
vs.
an original complaint for accion reivindicatoria against
MARGARITA SEMON DONG-E, Respondent.
petitioners with the RTC. The petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
DECISION
case. Respondents filed a Motion to Amend the complaint
to one for injunction. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject DEL CASTILLO, J.:
matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.
There is laches when a party is aware, even in the early
ISSUE: stages of the proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional
objection, and has every opportunity to raise said
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the objection, but fails to do so, even on appeal.
complaint. (YES)
This is a Petition for Review1 assailing the March 30, 2006
RULING:
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the 78987 as well as its May 26, 2006 Resolution3 which
RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction, the Court considers the denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The
principle “that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint. In their original complaint for accion WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance of their hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment
dated January 8, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
title to a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of
Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4140-R is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.4 Agustin, Lot No. 1 is a public land claimed by the heirs of
Joaquin Smith (not parties to the case).22 The Smiths gave
Factual antecedents their permission for Delfin and Agustin’s parents to occupy
the land sometime in 1969 or 1970. They also presented
their neighbors who testified that it was Delfin and Agustin
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession
as well as their respective parents who occupied Lot No. 1,
over an untitled parcel of land, denominated as Lot No. 1,
not Margarita and her parents.
with an area of 80,736 square meters. The property is
located along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City and is part of
a larger parcel of land with an area of 186,090 square Delfin and Agustin also assailed the muniments of
meters. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot ownership presented by Margarita as fabricated,
No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is unauthenticated, and invalid. It was pointed out that the
seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. Deed of Quitclaim, allegedly executed by all of Ap-ap’s
children, failed to include two – Rita Bocahan and Stewart
Sito.23 Margarita admitted during trial that Rita Bocahan
According to respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E
and Stewart Sito were her uncle and aunt, but did not
(Margarita), her family’s ownership and occupation of Lot
explain why they were excluded from the quitclaim.
No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late
grandfather, Ap-ap.5 Upon Ap-ap’s death, the property was
inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in According to Maynard and Jose, Delfin and Agustin were
1964 of the 186,090-square meter property, which included the ones publicly and openly in possession of the land and
Lot No. 1.6 On the same year, they declared the property who introduced improvements thereon. They also
for taxation purposes in the name of "The Heirs of Ap- corroborated Delfin and Agustin’s allegation that the real
ap."7 The 1964 tax declaration bears a notation that reads: owners of the property are the heirs of Joaquin Smith.24
"Reconstructed from an old Tax Declaration No. 363 dated
May 10, 1922 per true of same presented."8 In order to debunk petitioners’ claim that the Smiths owned
the subject property, Margarita presented a certified copy
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a ₱500.00 of a Resolution from the Land Management Office denying
consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim9 on February 26, 1964 the Smiths’ application for recognition of the subject
in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margarita’s father). property as part of their ancestral land.25 The resolution
explains that the application had to be denied because the
Smiths did not "possess, occupy or utilize all or a portion of
Sometime between 1976 and 1978,10 Gilbert Semon
the property x x x. The actual occupants (who were not
together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws
named in the resolution) whose improvements are visible
Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a
are not in any way related to the applicant or his co-
portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective
heirs."26
families.11 They were allowed to erect their houses,
introduce improvements, and plant trees thereon. When
Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma died sometime in To bolster her claim of ownership and possession,
the 1980s, their children, petitioners Delfin Lamsis (Delfin) Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered
and Agustin Kitma (Agustin), took possession of certain resolution of the Community Special Task Force on
portions of Lot No. 1. Delfin possessed 4,000 square Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of
meters of Lot No. 1, while Agustin occupied 5,000 square Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), acting
meters thereof.12 Nevertheless, the heirs of Gilbert Semon favorably on her and her siblings’ ancestral land claim over
tolerated the acts of their first cousins. a portion of the 186,090-square meter property.27 The said
resolution states:
When Gilbert Semon died in 1983,13 his children
extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves The land subject of the instant application is the ancestral
and allotted Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.14 Since land of the herein applicants. Well-established is the fact
then, Margarita allegedly paid the realty tax over Lot No. that the land treated herein was first declared for taxation
115 and occupied and improved the property together with purposes in 1922 under Tax Declaration No. 363 by the
her husband; while at the same time, tolerating her first applicant’s grandfather Ap-Ap (one name). Said application
cousins’ occupation of portions of the same lot. was reconstructed in 1965 after the original got lost during
the war. These tax declarations were issued and recorded
in the Municipality of Tuba, Benguet, considering that the
This state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and
land was then within the territorial jurisdiction of the said
Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the
municipality. That upon the death of declarant Ap-Ap his
subject property and selling portions thereof.16 Delfin
heirs x x x transferred the tax declaration in their name,
allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to
[which tax declaration is] now with the City assessor’s
petitioner Maynard17 Mondiguing (Maynard) while Agustin
office of Baguio.
sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).18

The land consisting of four (4) lots with a total area of ONE
With such developments, Margarita filed a complaint19 for
HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090)
recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and
SQUARE METERS, is covered by Psu-198317 duly
damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the
approved by the Director of Lands on October 4, 1963 in
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. The case was
the name of Ap-Ap (one name). In 1964, the same land
docketed as Civil Case No. 4140-R and raffled to Branch
was the subject of a petition filed by Gilbert Semon, as
59. The complaint prayed for the annulment of the sales to
petitioner, before the Court of First Instance of the City of
Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to vacate the
Baguio in the reopening of Judicial Proceedings under Civil
portions of the property which exceed the areas allowed to
Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 for the registration and
them by Margarita.20 Margarita claimed that, as they are
the issuance of Certificate of Title of said land. The land
her first cousins, she is willing to donate to Delfin and
registration case was however overtaken by the decision of
Agustin a portion of Lot No. 1, provided that she retains the
the Supreme Court declaring such judicial proceedings null
power to choose such portion.21
and void because the courts of law have no jurisdiction.
Petitioners denied Margarita’s claims of ownership and
possession over Lot No. 1. According to Delfin and
It has been sufficiently substantiated by the applicants that was transferred to the NCIP, Cordillera Administrative
prior to and at the time of the pendency of the land Region, La Trinidad, Benguet and re-docketed as Case
registration case and henceforth up to and including the No. 05-RHO-CAR-03.30 The petitioners filed their protest in
present, the herein applicants by themselves and through the said case before the NCIP. The same has been
their predecessor-in-interest have been in exclusive, submitted for resolution.
continuous, and material possession and occupation of the
said parcel of land mentioned above under claim of Ruling of the Regional Trial Court31
ownership, devoting the same for residential and
agricultural purposes. Found are the residential houses of After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties,
the applicants as well as those of their close relatives, the trial court found that it preponderates in favor of
while the other areas planted to fruit trees, coffee and respondent’s long-time possession of and claim of
banana, and seasonal crops. Also noticeable therein are ownership over the subject property.32 The survey plan of
permanent stone and earthen fences, terraces, clearings, the subject property in the name of the Heirs of Ap-ap
including irrigation gadgets. executed way back in 1962 and the tax declarations
thereafter issued to the respondent and her siblings all
On the matter of the applicant[s’] indiguinity [sic] and support her claim that her family and their predecessors-in-
qualifications, there is no doubt that they are members of interest have all been in possession of the property to the
the National Cultural Communities, particularly the Ibaloi exclusion of others. The court likewise gave credence to
tribe. They are the legitimate grandchildren of Ap-Ap (one the documentary evidence of the transfer of the land from
name) who lived along the Asin Road area. His legal heirs the Heirs of Ap-ap to respondent’s father and, eventually to
are: Orani Ap-Ap, married to Calado Salda; Rita Ap-Ap, respondent herself. The series of transfers of the property
married to Jose Bacacan; Sucdad Ap-Ap, married to were indications of the respondent’s and her predecessors’
Oragon Wakit; and Gilbert Semon, a former vice-mayor of interest over the property. The court opined that while
Tuba, Benguet, [who] adopted the common name of their these pieces of documentary evidence were not conclusive
father Semon, as it is the customary practice among the proof of actual possession, they lend credence to
early Ibalois. x x x respondent’s claim because, "in the ordinary course of
things, persons will not execute legal documents dealing
On the matter regarding the inheritance of the heirs of Ap- with real property, unless they believe, and have the basis
Ap, it is important to state [that] Gilbert Semon to believe, that they have an interest in the property subject
consolidated ownership thereof and became the sole heir of the legal documents x x x."33
in 1964, by way of a "Deed of Quitclaim" executed by the
heirs in his favor. As to the respective share of the In contrast, the trial court found nothing on record to
applicants[’] co-heirs, the same was properly adjudicated in substantiate the allegations of the petititioners that they
1989 with the execution of an "Extrajudicial Settlement/ and their parents were the long-time possessors of the
Partition of Estate with Waiver of Rights." subject property. Their own statements belied their
assertions. Petitioner Maynard and Jose both admitted that
With regard to the overlapping issue, it is pertinent to state they could not secure title for the property from the Bureau
that application No. Bg-L-066 of Thomas Smith has of Lands because there were pending ancestral land
already been denied by us in our Resolution dated claims over the property.34 Petitioner Agustin’s Townsite
November 1997. As to the other adverse claims therein by Sales Application over the property was held in abeyance
reason of previous conveyances in favor of third parties, because of respondent’s own claim, which was eventually
the same were likewise excluded resulting in the reduction favorably considered by the CSTFAL.35
of the area originally applied from ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND NINETY (186,090) SQUARE The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
METERS, more or less to ONE HUNDRED TEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTY TWO (110,342) WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
SQUARE METERS, more or less. Considering the rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the
foregoing developments, we find no legal and procedural [petitioners] –
obstacle in giving due course to the instant application.
(1) Declaring the transfer of a portion of Lot 1 of
Now therefore, we hereby [resolve] that the application for PSU 198317 made by the [petitioner] Delfin
Recognition of Ancestral Land Claim filed by the Heirs of Lamsis to Menard Mondiguing and Jose Valdez,
Gilbert Semon, represented by Juanito Semon, be granted Jr. null and void;
[and] a Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC) be
issued to the herein applicants by the Secretary,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, (2) Ordering the [petitioners] Delfin Lamsis,
Visayas Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, through the Agustin Kitma, Menard Mondiguing and Jose
Regional Executive Director, DENR-CAR, Diego Silang Valdez, Jr., to vacate the area they are presently
Street, Baguio City. The area of the claim stated herein occupying that is within Lot 1 of PSU 198317
above is however subject to the outcome of the final belonging to the [respondent] and to surrender
survey to be forthwith executed. possession thereof to the [respondent];

Carried this 23rd day of June 1998.28 (3) To pay [respondent] attorney’s fees in the
amount of ₱10,000.00; and
The resolution was not signed by two members of the
CSTFAL on the ground that the signing of the unnumbered (4) To pay the costs of suit.
resolution was overtaken by the enactment of the Republic
Act (RA) No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of SO ORDERED.36
1997 (IPRA). The IPRA removed the authority of the
DENR to issue ancestral land claim certificates and It appears that no motion for reconsideration was filed
transferred the same to the National Commission on before the trial court. Nevetheless, the trial court issued an
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).29 The Ancestral Land Order37 allowing the petitioners’ Notice of Appeal.38
Application No. Bg-L-064 of the Heirs of Gilbert Semon
Ruling of the Court of Appeals39 owners for more than 30 years. Respondent’s assertion
that petitioners are merely possessors by tolerance is
The sole issue resolved by the appellate court was unsubstantiated.49
whether the trial court erred in ruling in favor of respondent
in light of the adduced evidence. Citing the rule on Petitioners also maintain that the reivindicatory action
preponderance of evidence, the CA held that the should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of the
respondent was able to discharge her burden in proving enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and exclusive
her title and interest to the subject property. Her jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral lands and
documentary evidence were amply supported by the domains to the NCIP.50 They assert that the customary
testimonial evidence of her witnesses. laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province should be
applied to their dispute as mandated by Section 65,
In contrast, petitioners only made bare allegations in their Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states: "When disputes
testimonies that are insufficient to overcome respondent’s involve ICCs/IPs,51 customary laws and practices shall be
documentary evidence. used to resolve the dispute."

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration40 of the adverse In the alternative that jurisdiction over an accion
decision but the same was denied. reivindicatoria is held to be vested in the trial court, the
petitioners insist that the courts should dismiss the
reivindicatory action on the ground of litis pendentia.52 They
Hence this petition, which was initially denied for failure to
likewise argue that NCIP has primary jurisdiction over
show that the CA committed any reversible error.41 Upon
ancestral lands, hence, the courts should not interfere
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,42 the petition was
"when the dispute demands the exercise of sound
reinstated in the Court’s January 15, 2007 Resolution.43
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal x x x
Petitioners’ arguments In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly
applicable, the court cannot arrogate unto itself the
Petitioners assign as error the CA’s appreciation of the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over
evidence already affirmed and considered by the trial which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
court. They maintain that the change in the presiding special competence."53 The courts should stand aside in
judges who heard and decided their case resulted in the order to prevent the possibility of creating conflicting
appreciation of what would otherwise be inadmissible decisions.54
evidence.44 Petitioners ask that the Court exempt their
petition from the general rule that a trial judge’s Respondent’s arguments
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded
great respect on appeal.
Respondent opines that the appellate court did not commit
any reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision.
To support their claim that the trial and appellate courts The present petition is a mere dilatory tactic to frustrate the
erred in ruling in favor of respondent, they assailed the speedy administration of justice.55
various pieces of evidence offered by respondent. They
maintain that the Deed of Quitclaim executed by the Heirs
Respondent also asserts that questions of fact are
of Ap-ap is spurious and lacks the parties’ and witnesses’
prohibited in a Rule 45 petition.56 Thus, the appreciation
signatures. Moreover, it is a mere photocopy, which was
and consideration of the factual issues are no longer
never authenticated by the notary public in court and no
reviewable.57
reasons were proferred regarding the existence, loss, and
contents of the original copy.45 Under the best evidence
rule, the Deed of Quitclaim is inadmissible in evidence and The issue of lack of jurisdiction is raised for the first time in
should have been disregarded by the court. the petition before this Court. It was never raised before
the trial court or the CA. Thus, respondent insists that
petitioners are now barred by laches from attacking the
Respondent did not prove that she and her husband
trial court’s jurisdiction over the case. Citing Aragon v.
possessed the subject property since time immemorial.
Court of Appeals,58 respondent argues that the
Petitioners argue that respondent admitted possessing and
jurisdictional issue should have been raised at the
cultivating only the land that lies outside the subject
appellate level at the very least so as to avail of the
property.46
doctrine that the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case may be raised at any stage of the
Petitioners next assail the weight to be given to proceedings even on appeal.59
respondent’s muniments of ownership, such as the tax
declarations and the survey plan. They insist that these are
Respondent maintains that there is no room for the
not indubitable proofs of respondent’s ownership over the
application of litis pendentia because the issues in the
subject property given that there are other claimants to the
application for ancestral land claim are different from the
land (who are not parties to this case) who also possess a
issue in a reivindicatory action. The issue before the NCIP
survey plan over the subject property.47
is whether the Government, as grantor, will recognize the
ancestral land claim of respondent over a public alienable
Petitioners then assert their superior right to the property land; while the issue in the reivindicatory case before the
as the present possessors thereof. They cite pertinent trial court is ownership, possession, and right to recover
provisions of the New Civil Code which presume good faith the real property.60
possession on the part of the possessor and puts the
burden on the plaintiff in an action to recover to prove her
Given that the elements of lis pendens are absent in case
superior title.48
at bar, the allegation of forum-shopping is also bereft of
merit. Any judgment to be rendered by the NCIP will not
Petitioners next assert that they have a right to the subject amount to res judicata in the instant case.61
property by the operation of acquisitive prescription. They
posit that they have been in possession of a public land
Issues
publicly, peacefully, exclusively and in the concept of
The petitioners present the following issues for our The fact that respondent’s documents traverse several
consideration: decades, from the 1960s to the 1990s, is an indication that
she and her family never abandoned their right to the
1. Whether the appellate court disregarded property and have continuously exercised rights of
material facts and circumstances in affirming the ownership over the same.
trial court’s decision;
Moreover, respondent’s version of how the petitioners
2. Whether petitioners have acquired the subject came to occupy the property coincides with the same
property by prescription; timeline given by the petitioners themselves. The only
difference is that petitioners maintain they came into
possession by tolerance of the Smith family, while
3. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide
respondent maintains that it was her parents who gave
the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the
permission to petitioners. Given the context under which
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time
the parties’ respective statements were made, the Court is
that the complaint was instituted;
inclined to believe the respondent’s version, as both the
trial and appellate courts have concluded, since her
4. If the trial court retains jurisdiction, whether the version is corroborated by the documentary evidence.
ancestral land claim pending before the NCIP
should take precedence over the reivindicatory
Whether petitioners have acquired the subject property by
action.62
prescription
Our Ruling
Assuming that the subject land may be acquired by
prescription, we cannot accept petitioners’ claim of
Whether the appellate court disregarded material facts and acquisition by prescription. Petitioners admitted that they
circumstances in affirming the trial court’s decision had occupied the property by tolerance of the owner
thereof. Having made this admission, they cannot claim
Both the trial and the appellate courts ruled that that they have acquired the property by prescription unless
respondent has proven her claims of ownership and they can prove acts of repudiation. It is settled that
possession with a preponderance of evidence. Petitioners possession, in order to ripen into ownership, must be in the
now argue that the two courts erred in their appreciation of concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
the evidence. They ask the Court to review the evidence of Possession not in the concept of owner, such as the one
both parties, despite the CA’s finding that the trial court claimed by petitioners, cannot ripen into ownership by
committed no error in appreciating the evidence presented acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first
during trial. Hence, petitioners seek a review of questions expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been
of fact, which is beyond the province of a Rule 45 petition. communicated to the other party. Acts of possessory
A question of fact exists if the uncertainty centers on the character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of
truth or falsity of the alleged facts.63 "Such questions as the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
whether certain items of evidence should be accorded prescription. Possession by tolerance is not adverse and
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or such possessory acts, no matter how long performed, do
spurious, or whether the proofs on one side or the other not start the running of the period of prescription.68
are clear and convincing and adequate to establish a
proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact."64 In the instant case, petitioners made no effort to allege
much less prove any act of repudiation sufficient for the
Since it raises essentially questions of fact, this reckoning of the acquisitive prescription. At most, we can
assignment of error must be dismissed for it is settled that find on record the sale by petitioners Delfin and Agustin of
only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by parts of the property to petitioners Maynard and Jose; but
certiorari.65 There is a question of law when there is doubt the same was done only in 1998, shortly before
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. Questions respondent filed a case against them. Hence, the 30-year
of law can be resolved without having to re-examine the period necessary for the operation of acquisitve
probative value of evidence presented, the truth or prescription had yet to be attained.
falsehood of facts being admitted.66 The instant case does
not present a compelling reason to deviate from the Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the
foregoing rule, especially since both trial and appellate National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
courts agree that respondent had proven her claim of should take precedence over the reivindicatory action
ownership as against petitioners’ claims. Their factual
findings, supported as they are by the evidence, should be
The application for issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral
accorded great respect.
Land Title pending before the NCIP is akin to a registration
proceeding. It also seeks an official recognition of one’s
In any case, even if petitioners’ arguments attacking the claim to a particular land and is also in rem. The titling of
authenticity and admissibility of the Deed of Quitclaim ancestral lands is for the purpose of "officially establishing"
executed in favor of respondent’s father are well-taken, it one’s land as an ancestral land.69 Just like a registration
will not suffice to defeat respondent’s claim over the proceeding, the titling of ancestral lands does not vest
subject property. Even without the Deed of Quitclaim, ownership70 upon the applicant but only recognizes
respondent’s claims of prior possession and ownership ownership71 that has already vested in the applicant by
were adequately supported and corroborated by her other virtue of his and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession
documentary and testimonial evidence. We agree with the of the property since time immemorial. As aptly explained
trial court’s observation that, in the ordinary course of in another case:
things, people will not go to great lengths to execute legal
documents and pay realty taxes over a real property,
It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be
unless they have reason to believe that they have an
confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under
interest over the same.67
the Torrens system does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, the agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law,
any question involving the issue of ownership must be which prevails at the time of the filing of the complaint.
threshed out in a separate suit x x x The trial court will then
conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present An exception to this rule has been carved by
their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.
subject properties to enable the court to resolve the said Sibonghanoy,79 the Court ruled that the existence of laches
issue. x x x72 (Emphasis supplied) will prevent a party from raising the court’s lack of
jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for
Likewise apropos is the following explanation: an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
The fact that the [respondents] were able to secure [TCTs been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
over the property] did not operate to vest upon them right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption
ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a declined to assert it."80 Wisely, some cases81 have
mode of acquiring ownership x x x If the [respondents] cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most
wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a exceptional cases where the factual milieu is similar to
judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to Tijam.
have the land registered under their respective names. x x
x Certificates of title do not establish In Tijam, the surety could have raised the issue of lack of
ownership.73 (Emphasis supplied) jurisdiction in the trial court but failed to do so. Instead, the
surety participated in the proceedings and filed pleadings,
A registration proceeding is not a conclusive adjudication other than a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. When
of ownership. In fact, if it is later on found in another case the case reached the appellate court, the surety again
(where the issue of ownership is squarely adjudicated) that participated in the case and filed their pleadings therein. It
the registrant is not the owner of the property, the real was only after receiving the appellate court’s adverse
owner can file a reconveyance case and have the title decision that the surety awoke from its slumber and filed a
transferred to his name.74 motion to dismiss, in lieu of a motion for reconsideration.
The CA certified the matter to this Court, which then ruled
that the surety was already barred by laches from raising
Given that a registration proceeding (such as the
the jurisdiction issue.
certification of ancestral lands) is not a conclusive
adjudication of ownership, it will not constitute litis
pendentia on a reivindicatory case where the issue is In case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is
ownership.75 "For litis pendentia to be a ground for the called for because the presence of laches cannot be
dismissal of an action, the following requisites must ignored. If the surety in Tijam was barred by laches for
concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who raising the issue of jurisdiction for the first time in the CA,
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of what more for petitioners in the instant case who raised the
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being issue for the first time in their petition before this Court.
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect
to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised
case, regardless of which party is successful, would the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed a
amount to res judicata in the other case."76 The third motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the
element is missing, for any judgment in the certification property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the RTC.
case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into
the ownership issue involved in the reivindicatory case. consideration.
Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the
reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor When the amended complaint was filed in 1998, the
of the certification case. petitioners no longer raised the issue of the trial court’s
lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to trial, all the
Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot time aware of the existence of the IPRA as evidenced by
agree with petitioners’ contention that respondent the cross-examination82 conducted by petitioners’ lawyer
committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that "forum on the CSTFAL Chairman Guillermo Fianza. In the cross-
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are examination, it was revealed that the petitioners were
present or where a final judgment in one case will amount aware that the DENR, through the CSTFAL, had lost its
to res judicata in the other."77 jurisdiction over ancestral land claims by virtue of the
enactment of the IPRA. They assailed the validity of the
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in CSTFAL resolution favoring respondent on the ground that
light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the Indigenous the CSTFAL had been rendered functus officio under the
People’s Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint IPRA. Inexplicably, petitioners still did not question the trial
was instituted court’s jurisdiction.1avvphi1

For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, they
petitioners raise the trial court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction only raised as errors the trial court’s appreciation of the
over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity78 of the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. In
IPRA at the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They their brief, they once again assailed the CSTFAL’s
maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the NCIP which has resolution as having been rendered functus officio by the
jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural enactment of IPRA.83 But nowhere did petitioners assail the
communities and indigenous peoples. trial court’s ruling for having been rendered without
jurisdiction.
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time of the proceedings. This is because It is only before this Court, eight years after the filing of the
jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by complaint, after the trial court had already conducted a full-
blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the
appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, ISSUE: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide
and after petitioners have twice encountered adverse the case in light of the effectivity of RA 8371 or the
decisions from the trial and the appellate courts — that Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the
petitioners now want to expunge all the efforts that have complaint was instituted. (YES)
gone into the litigation and resolution of their case and start
all over again. This practice cannot be allowed. RULING:

As a rule, an objection over subject-matter

Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ theory
about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which need jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings.
not be decided here), they are already barred by laches As an exception to this rule, laches will prevent a party
from raising their jurisdictional objection under the from raising the court's lack of jurisdiction. There is laches
circumstances. when a party is aware, even in the early stages of the
proceedings, of a possible jurisdictional objection, and has
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied every opportunity to raise said objection, but fails to do so,
for lack of merit. The March 30, 2006 Decision of the Court even on appeal.
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78987 and its May 26, 2006
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration are Here, the presence of laches cannot be ignored. It
AFFIRMED. is only before the Supreme Court, eight years after the
filing of the complaint, after the trial court had already
SO ORDERED. conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the
merits, after the appellate court had made a thorough
review of the records, and after petitioners have twice
encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the
appellate courts — that petitioners now want to expunge all
the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution
DELFIN LAMSIS, MAYNARD MONDIGUING, JOSE of their case and start all over again. This practice cannot
VALDEZ, JR. and Heirs of AGUSTIN KITMA, represented be allowed.
by EUGENE KITMA, Petitioners, -versus- MARGARITA
SEMON DONG-E, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173021, FIRST DIVISION, October 20, 2010, 3. Effect of estoppel on objections to jurisdiction
DEL

CASTILLO, J.
G.R. No. 96107 June 19, 1995
As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time of the proceedings. As an exception CORAZON JALBUENA DE LEON, petitioner,
to this rule, laches will prevent a party from raising the vs.
court's lack of jurisdiction. Here, there is laches, for it is HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SECOND
only before the SC, eight years after the filing of the DIVISION) and ULDARICO INAYAN, respondents.
complaint, that petitioners introduced their jurisdictional
objection.

FACTS:
ROMERO, J.:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and
possession over an untitled parcel of land, denominated as In this petition for review, we are asked to set aside the
Lot No. 1. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot amended decision of the Court of Appeals dated
No. 1, respondent is claiming ownership thereof and is November 8, 1990 in "Corazon Jalbuena de Leon v.
seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. Uldarico Inayan," (CA-G.R. CV No. 19777) 1 which
reversed its original decision dated May 24, 1990. 2
The complaint was first filed by respondent in
1998. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground The subject property in the case at bench involves two
that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional parcels of irrigated riceland covering an area of 117,785
value for the RTC. When the amended complaint was filed square meters located in Barangays Guintas and Bingke,
in 1998, the petitioners no longer raised the issue of the Napnod, Leganes, Iloilo. Jesus Jalbuena, the owner of the
trial court's lack of jurisdiction. Instead, they proceeded to land, entered into a verbal lease contract in 1970 with
trial. When petitioners recoursed to the appellate court, Uldarico Inayan, for one year renewable for the same
they only raised as errors the trial court's appreciation of period. Inayan, private respondent herein, bound himself to
the evidence and the conclusions that it derived therefrom. deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as rental to be paid
during the first ten days of January. Private respondent
In this Petition for Review before the Supreme who was a godson of Jesus Jalbuena, was allowed to
Court (SC), petitioners maintain that the reivindicatory continue with the lease from year to year.
action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in light of
the enactment of the IPRA, which gives original and Petitioner Corazon Jalbuena de Leon is the daughter of
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving ancestral Jesus Jalbuena and the transferee of the subject property.
lands and domains to the NCIP. They assert that the
customary laws of the Ibaloi tribe of the Benguet Province Although private respondent cultivated the subject property
should be applied to their dispute as mandated by Section through hired men, the cavans of palay were paid annually
65, Chapter IX of RA 8371, which states: "When disputes until 1983 when Inayan ceased paying the agreed rental
and instead, asserted dominion over the land. When asked
involve ICCs/IPs, 51 customary laws and practices shall be
by the petitioner to vacate the land, he refused to do so,
used to resolve the dispute."
prompting the latter to bring an action in court.
In March 1984, herein petitioner filed a complaint against WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
private respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo decision appealed from should be, as it is
City for "Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of hereby AFFIRMED, with a
Possession, Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and Damages." MODIFICATION that the period within
which appellant should be ordered to pay
Private respondent, in his Answer, claimed that the land the rentals in arrears now covers the years
had been tenanted by his father since 1938 and that he 1983 to 1990. Costs against appellant.5
has already been issued Certificates of Land Transfer
(CLT) for the subject property. These Certificates of Land It held that while jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law,
Transfer were subsequently canceled by the then Ministry private respondent's attack on the jurisdiction of the lower
of Agrarian Reform on November 22, 1983 upon a finding court must fail for he is guilty of estoppel. 6 Despite several
that said lands were owned by Jesus Jalbuena and that opportunities to question the jurisdiction of the lower court,
the CLTs were erroneously issued. 3 he failed to do so. Moreover, it was he who insisted,
through his misrepresentations, that the case, involving, as
On April 11, 1984, the lower court issued an order adopting it does, purely agrarian issues, should be referred to the
the procedure in agrarian cases. Ministry of Agrarian Reform. 7 Finally, the appellate court
held that since regional trial courts, by express provision of
B.P. 129, Section 24, now have exclusive original
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision dated
jurisdiction over agrarian cases, but still applying the
February 26, 1988 in favor of petitioner De Leon reads:
special rules of agrarian procedure, it was no error for the
court below, even if acting as an agrarian court, to resolve
WHEREFORE, Premises considered, a controversy involving a civil lease. 8
judgment is hereby rendered:
Private respondent's motion to reconsider the above
1. Declaring the lease contract between decision was granted by the Court of Appeals on
plaintiff and defendant as a civil law lease, November 8, 1990. Respondent court then set aside its
and that the same has already been earlier decision and dismissed the civil case filed by
terminated due to defendant's failure to petitioner below (Civil Case No. 15628) for want of
pay his rentals from 1983 up to the jurisdiction. In its amended decision, the appellate court
present; held that petitioner's complaint below was anchored
on acción interdictal, a summary action for recovery of
2. Ordering defendant Uldarico Inayan and physical possession that should have been brought before
his privies and successors-in-interest to the proper inferior court. To make private respondent a
immediately vacate the land subject-matter deforciant so that the unlawful detainer suit may be
of this complaint and to return possession properly filed, it is necessary to allege when demand to
thereof to plaintiff; pay rent and to vacate were made. The court found that
this requisite was not specifically met in petitioner's
3. Ordering defendant Uldarico Inayan to complaint below. Such failure on her part is fatal to her
pay plaintiff Corazon Jalbuena de Leon, cause since the one-year period within which a detainer
one thousand two hundred sixty (1,260) suit may be instituted had not yet elapsed when Civil Case
cavans of palay representing unpaid No. 15628 was filed. Therefore, the court below was
rentals from 1983 up to 1987, or its money devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the case. 9
equivalent computed at the current market
price of palay, less whatever amount may Hence this petition for review.
have been deposited by defendant with
the Court during the pendency of this It is petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals erred
case, which deposit should be released in in holding that the case below is an unlawful detainer
favor of plaintiff; action. Since the parties did not confine themselves to
issues pertaining solely to possession but also to the
4. Ordering defendant Inayan to pay to nature of the lease contract, the case is not one of unlawful
plaintiff Jalbuena de Leon the sum of detainer but one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
P38,501.28 representing the unpaid
irrigation fees, and all fees thereafter until Next, petitioner argues that the issue of lack of jurisdiction
possession of the land has been should not have been resolved in favor of private
transferred to the plaintiff; respondent who had voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court a quo and raised the issue only
5. Ordering defendant Inayan to pay to after an adverse decision was rendered against him.
plaintiff Jalbuena de Leon the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney' s fees; P1,000.00 Aside from emphasizing the correctness of respondent
as litigation expenses, and P2,000.00 as court's ruling that the case below was a mere ejectment
moral damages, plus costs; and case, private respondent raises the issue of res judicata in
his comment.
6. Dismissing defendant's counterclaim for
lack of merit.4 Private respondent Inayan claims that the issue in the
instant petition, i.e. whether or not the trial court, acting as
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, private respondent an agrarian court, had jurisdiction over the unlawful
raised the sole issue of jurisdiction and alleged that the detainer suit filed by petitioner, had already been ruled
lower court, acting as Court of Agrarian Relations, had no upon by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 15700
jurisdiction over the action. entitled "Uldarico Inayan v. Hon. Alonsagay and Corazon
Jalbuena" and the petition for review of said decision had
The respondent appellate court, on May 24, 1990, affirmed already been denied by this Court in G.R. No. 89312. 10
the trial court's decision, disposing as follows:
The petition is impressed with merit.
The primary issue presented here revolves around the Clearly, the case involves more than just the issue of
jurisdiction of the trial court, then acting as a court of possession. It was necessary for the trial court below to
agrarian relations employing agrarian procedure, to try the determine whether the lease was civil and not an
suit filed by petitioner. agricultural or tenancy relationship and whether its
termination was in order. More specifically, the complaint
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is emphasized, in paragraph 4:
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. 11 It is
determinable on the basis of allegations in the complaint. 12 That in entering into the contract, Jesus
Jalbuena and defendant Uldarico Inayan
An error in jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even definitely agreed that the contract was to
for the first time on appeal. 13 Barring highly meritorious be CIVIL LAW LEASE NOT TENANCY
and exceptional circumstances, 14 neither estoppel nor OR AGRICULTURAL LEASE, for a period
waiver may be raised as defenses to such an error. 15 of one (1) year renewable for the same
period at the option and agreement of the
parties; 24
In order to determine whether the court below had
jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of
the complaint filed before it. As correctly determined by the trial court, one of the issues
in the case below was whether or not the contract entered
into by the plaintiff and defendant was a civil law lease or
A study of the complaint instituted by petitioner in the lower
an agricultural lease. If the former, the next issue was
court reveals that the case is, contrary to the findings of the
whether the lease contract between the parties had been
respondent appellate court, not one of unlawful detainer.
terminated in 1983 for failure of defendant to pay his
annual rental. 25
An unlawful detainer suit (acción interdictal) together with
forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that
A detainer suit exclusively involves the issue of physical
may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside
possession. The case below, however, did not concern
from the summary action of ejectment, acción publiciana or
merely the issue of possession but as well, the nature of
the plenary action to recover the right of possession
the lease contracted by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest
and acción reivindicatoria or the action to recover
and private respondent. It likewise involved the propriety of
ownership which includes recovery of possession, make
terminating the relationship contracted by said parties, as
up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover
well as the demand upon defendant to deliver the premises
possession. 16
and pay unpaid rentals, damages and incidental fees.
Illegal detainer consists in withholding by a person from
Where the issues of the case extend beyond those
another of the possession of a land or building to which the
commonly involved in unlawful detainer suits, such as for
latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of the
instance, the respective rights of parties under various
former's right to hold possession by virtue of a contract,
contractual arrangements and the validity thereof, the case
express or implied. 17 An ejectment suit is brought before
is converted from a mere detainer suit to one "incapable of
the proper inferior court to recover physical possession
pecuniary estimation," thereby placing it under the
only or possession de facto and not possession de jure,
exclusive original jurisdiction of the regional trial courts
where dispossession has lasted for not more than one
(formerly the courts of first instance). 26
year. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are quieting
processes and the one-year time bar to the suit is in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. 18 The use Not being merely a case of ejectment, the regional trial
of summary procedure in ejectment cases is intended to court possessed jurisdiction to try and resolve the case.
provide an expeditious means of protecting actual
possession or right to possession of the property. They are Still on the question of jurisdiction, private respondent
not processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If Inayan, as appellant before the respondent court, claimed
at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question that the trial court, acting as a court of agrarian relations,
of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits, only to did not have jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
resolve the issue of possession. 19 Its determination on the petitioner because the latter did not concern itself with
ownership issue is, however, not conclusive. tenancy or agrarian matters. The Court of Appeals, in its
original decision, ruled that private respondent was guilty
Acción publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of estoppel. Accordingly, he can not successfully raise the
of possession when dispossession has lasted for more issue.
than one year or when dispossession was effected by
means other than those mentioned in Rule 70. 20 Under In the past, the principle of estoppel has been used by the
these circumstances, a plenary action 21 may be brought courts to avoid a clear case of injustice. Its use as a
before the regional trial court.22 defense to a jurisdictional error is more of an exception
rather than the rule. The circumstances outlining estoppel
Acción reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover must be unequivocal and intentional, for it is an exception
ownership, including the recovery of possession, should to standard legal norms and is generally applied only in
also be filed in the regional trial court. highly exceptional and justifiable cases. 27

Petitioner's complaint was for "Termination of Civil Law We find that the situation in the case at bench falls within
Lease; Recovery of Possession; Recovery of Unpaid the ambit of justifiable cases where estoppel may be
Rentals and Damages" 23 After alleging the facts regarding applied. The trial court's recourse to agrarian procedure
the lease of the subject property, including Inayan's refusal was undoubtedly provoked by private respondent Inayan's
to pay rent and to vacate, petitioner prayed that the trial insistence on the existence of a tenancy relationship with
court declare the civil law lease (and not "tenancy or petitioner. Private respondent cannot now use these same
agricultural lease") terminated. Plaintiff likewise prayed that misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction.
defendant be ordered to vacate the premises, pay back He cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure
rentals, unpaid irrigation fees, moral and exemplary affirmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to
damages and litigation fees.
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same On the matter of res judicata  raised by private respondent,
jurisdiction. 28 we conclude that the same does not find application in
instant petition. The issues herein and in the petition in
Participation in judicial proceedings where the court was G.R. No. 89312 30 are not the same. In the latter, the issue
devoid of jurisdiction is not normally considered as involved execution pending appeal granted by the trial
estoppel because the jurisdiction of a court is mandated by court judge to petitioner Jalbuena De Leon. The Court of
law. Estoppel is likewise not appreciated where a mistaken Appeals 31 enjoined the respondent judge from enforcing
belief in the court's jurisdiction is maintained. the execution pending appeal after having found no valid
and compelling reason to justify said execution. Then too,
private respondent asserted, and the appellate court found,
But private respondent's case is different for it does not
that an agrarian court has no jurisdiction in a case where
involve an honest mistake. He is directly responsible for
there exists no tenancy relation between the parties. The
the trial court's use of the special rules of agrarian
court said:
procedure. His insistence brought about the want of
jurisdiction he conveniently asserted before the appellate
court, and only after an adverse decision was leveled In any event, the matter of jurisdiction of
against him. Private respondent cannot be allowed to seek respondent court having been impugned
refuge under the protective mantle of the law after he has and said issue permeating and going as it
abused and made a mockery of it. He is, therefore, does into the very competence of the trial
considered estopped from asserting the court's want of court to act on CAR Case No. 15628, it
jurisdiction to try the case. behooves us to tread softly and give the
benefit of the doubt to petitioner, for should
execution pending appeal be allowed and
Moreover, the case was ostensibly one that involved
the judgment is later ordered vacated on
agrarian matters, as alleged by private respondent. Hence
the ground that the trial court had no
the trial court cannot be faulted for its use of agrarian
jurisdiction to hear the case, then it would
procedure.
be well-nigh impossible to restore
petitioner to his former status. 32
The respondent court also correctly held:
From the foregoing quote, we find that the decision of the
Finally, and more importantly, while it is appellate court did not categorically rule on the matter of
true that when the trial court decreed that jurisdiction but only made mention of it in passing and in
the procedure outlined in P.D. 946 was to ruling upon the real issue of the correctness of execution
be observed at the trial of the case at bar, pending appeal ordered by the respondent judge. The
it, in effect assumed its character as an decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 15700 became final after the
agrarian court which is a court of limited petition for review of said decision was dismissed by the
jurisdiction, and that since agrarian Court for failure to pay the prescribed legal fees and to
matters are solely cognizable by agrarian attach duplicate original or certified true copies of the
courts in the exercise of their limited questioned decision. 33
jurisdiction (Depositario vs. Herbas 121
SCRA 756) conversely, agrarian courts
In sum, we have concluded that the case filed by petitioner
have no jurisdiction in cases where there
below, not being one of unlawful detainer, the regional trial
is no tenancy relation between the parties
court had jurisdiction to hear and try the case.
(Dumlao vs. De Guzman, 1 SCRA 144).
We believe, however, that the dictum
enunciated in the Dumlao case obtains Moreover, as shown in the foregoing paragraphs, private
only when, as before, the then C.F.I. and respondent is estopped from asserting the lower court's
C.A.R. are two separate and distinct lack of jurisdiction.
entities. Consequently, the foregoing legal
principle no longer finds much relevance WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The amended
under the present system, said agrarian decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 8, 1990
courts having been integrated into the in CA G.R. CV No. 19777 ("Corazon Jalbuena de Leon v.
Regional Trial Courts which, by express Uldarico Inayan") is SET ASIDE and the original decision
mandate of Section 24 of B.P. 129, shall dated May 24, 1990 is REINSTATED.
have exclusive original jurisdiction over
agrarian cases although they are ordained Costs against private respondent.
to continue applying the special rules of
procedure provided for said cases. This SO ORDERED.
being the case, it is no error for the court
below, acting as an agrarian court, to
resolve a controversy involving a civil
lease since  it is already a settled rule that
inasmuch as the RTC is a court of general
jurisdiction, whether a particular matter
should be resolved by it in the exercise of CORAZON JALBUENA DE LEON, Petitioner, -versus-
its general jurisdiction, or in its limited HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SECOND
jurisdiction, or in its limited jurisdiction, is DIVISION) and ULDARICO INAYAN, Respondents.
not a jurisdictional question but a
procedural question involving a mode of
G.R. No. 96107, THIRD DIVISION, June 19, 1995,
practice which, therefore, may be
waived  (Manalo vs. Mariano, L-33850,
Jan. 22, 1976; Santos vs. Banayo, L- ROMERO, J.
31854, Sept. 9, 1982). 29 (Emphasis ours.)
The principle of estoppel may be used as a defense to a
jurisdictional error. The case at bench falls within the ambit
of justifiable cases where estoppel may be applied. The
trial court's recourse to agrarian procedure was exception rather than the rule. The circumstances outlining
undoubtedly provoked by private respondent Inayan's estoppel must be unequivocal and intentional, for it is an
insistence on the existence of a tenancy relationship with exception to standard legal norms and is generally applied
petitioner. He cannot now use these same only in highly exceptional and justifiable cases.
misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction.
The case at bench falls within the ambit of
FACTS: justifiable cases where estoppel may be applied. The trial
court's recourse to agrarian procedure was undoubtedly
The subject property in the case at bench involves provoked by private respondent Inayan's insistence on the
two parcels of irrigated Riceland. Jesus Jalbuena, the existence of a tenancy relationship with petitioner. Private
owner of the land, entered into a verbal lease contract in respondent cannot now use these same
1970 with Uldarico Inayan, for one year renewable for the misrepresentations to assert the court's lack of jurisdiction.
same period. Inayan, private respondent herein, bound He cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction to secure
himself to deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as rental affirmative relief against petitioner and, after failing to
to be paid during the first ten days of January. Private obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
respondent who was a godson of Jesus Jalbuena, was jurisdiction.
allowed to continue with the lease from year to year.
Petitioner Corazon Jalbuena de Leon is the daughter of
Jesus Jalbuena and the transferee of the subject property.

Although private respondent cultivated the subject

property through hired men, the cavans of palay were paid G.R. No. L-21450             April 15, 1968
annually until 1983 when Inayan ceased paying the agreed
rental and instead, asserted dominion over the land. When SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
asked by the petitioner to vacate the land, he refused to do vs.
so. Petitioner thus filed a complaint against private MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
"Termination of Civil Law Lease; Recovery of Possession; MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU
Recovery of Unpaid Rentals and Damages." Private BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
respondent, in his Answer, claimed that the land had been
tenanted by his father since 1938. DIZON, J.:

The lower court issued an order adopting the On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity
procedure in agrarian cases. It then ruled in favor of of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of
petitioner De Leon. On appeal to the Court of Appeal, 1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog
private respondents raised the sole issue of jurisdiction commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First
and alleged that the lower court, acting as Court of Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno
Agrarian Relations, had no jurisdiction over the action. The Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date
decision. It held that while jurisdiction must exist as a of the filing of the complaint until the whole obligation is
matter of law, private respondent's attack on the paid, plus costs. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of
jurisdiction of the lower court must fail for he is guilty of attachment was issued by the court against defendants'
estoppel. Despite several opportunities to question the properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the
jurisdiction of the lower court, he failed to do so. Moreover, filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila
it was he who insisted, through his misrepresentation, that Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the
the case, involving, as it does, purely agrarian issues, Surety, on the 31st of the same month.
should be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
After being duly served with summons the defendants filed
Private respondent's motion to reconsider the their answer in which, after making some admissions and
above decision was granted by the Court of Appeals. denials of the material averments of the complaint, they
Respondent court then set aside its earlier decision and interposed a counterclaim. This counterclaim was
dismissed the civil case filed by petitioner for want of answered by the plaintiffs.
jurisdiction. In its amended decision, the appellate court
held that petitioner's complaint was anchored on acció n
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered
interdictal. To make private respondent a deforciant so that
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had
the unlawful detainer suit may be properly filed, it is
become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the
necessary to allege when demand to pay rent and to
Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants.
vacate were made. The court found that this requisite was
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs
not specifically met in petitioner's complaint. Such failure
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the
on her part is fatal to her cause since the one-year period
Surety's bond (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 46-49), against which
within which a detainer suit may be instituted had not yet
the Surety filed a written opposition (Id. pp. 49) upon two
elapsed when the case was filed. Therefore, the court was
grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2) Absence
devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the case.
of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the
amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the
ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting as a court of Surety prayed the Court not only to deny the motion for
agrarian relations employing agrarian procedure, has execution against its counter-bond but also the
jurisdiction to try the suit filed by petitioner. (YES) following affirmative relief  : "to relieve the herein bonding
company of its liability, if any, under the bond in question"
RULING: (Id. p. 54) The Court denied this motion on the ground
solely that no previous demand had been made on the
In the past, the principle of estoppel has been Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter the
used by the courts to avoid a clear case of injustice. Its use necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the
as a defense to a jurisdictional error is more of an Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second
motion for execution against the counterbond. On the date First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. But about
set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the a month prior to the filing of the complaint, more
Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days specifically on June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of
within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First
such answer, the Court granted the motion for execution Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which
and the corresponding writ was issued. the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P2,000.00. (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. No. 296.)
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the
ground that the same was issued without the required We believe, therefore, that the point raised in
summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of appellant's motion is an important one which
the Rules of Court. As the Court denied the motion, the merits serious consideration. As stated, the
Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of complaint was filed on July 19, 1948. This case
denial and from the one denying its motion for therefore has been pending now for almost 15
reconsideration (Id. p. 97). Its record on appeal was then years, and throughout the entire proceeding
printed as required by the Rules, and in due time it filed its appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction
brief raising therein no other question but the ones covered until after receipt of this Court's adverse decision.
by the following assignment of errors:
There are three cases decided by the Honorable
I. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in issuing Supreme Court which may be worthy of
its order dated November 2, 1957, by holding the consideration in connection with this case, namely:
incident as submitted for resolution, without a Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compañia de
summary hearing and compliance with the other Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-10096, March 23, 1956;
mandatory requirements provided for in Section Pindangan Agricultural Co., Inc. vs. Jose P. Dans,
17, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. etc., et al., G.R. No. L-14591, September 26, 1962;
and Alfredo Montelibano, et al. vs. Bacolod-Murcia
II. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-15092, September 29,
ordering the issuance of execution against the 1962, wherein the Honorable Supreme Court
herein bonding company-appellant. frowned upon the 'undesirable practice' of
appellants submitting their case for decision and
then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but
III. That the Honorable Court a quo erred in
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
denying the motion to quash the writ of execution
filed by the herein bonding company-appellant as
well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration, Considering, however, that the Supreme Court has
and/or in not quashing or setting aside the writ of the "exclusive" appellate jurisdiction over "all cases
execution. in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue" (See. 1, Par. 3[3], Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended), we have no choice but to certify, as we
Not one of the assignment of errors — it is obvious —
hereby do certify, this case to the Supreme
raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither directly
Court.1äwphï1.ñët
nor indirectly.

ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to Section 31 of the

Although the appellees failed to file their brief, the Court of
Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended, let the record of
Appeals, on December 11, 1962, decided the case
this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court.
affirming the orders appealed from.

It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by

On January 8, 1963 — five days after the Surety received
appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the
notice of the decision, it filed a motion asking for extension
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of
of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive
The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the
January 10 of the same year. Two days later the Surety
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken
filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging
effect about a month prior to the date when the action was
substantially that appellees action was filed in the Court of
commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the
First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of
subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
the sum of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the
Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be
Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of
raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
which placed within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
considering the facts and circumstances of the present
inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not
opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from
exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of
Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try
annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its
and decide the case. Upon these premises the Surety's
active participation.
motion prayed the Court of Appeals to set aside its
decision and to dismiss the case. By resolution of January
16, 1963 the Court of Appeals required the appellees to As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court
answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so. of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is,
Whereupon, on May 20 of the same year, the Court almost  fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to
resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of
Us. The pertinent portions of its resolution read as follows: jurisdiction  for the first time.

It would indeed appear from the record that the It must be remembered that although the action, originally,
action at bar, which is a suit for collection of money was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the
in the sum of exactly P1,908.00 exclusive of Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948
interest, was originally instituted in the Court of when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of
attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al.,
and assumed specific obligations in connection with the G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al.,
pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young
57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation
Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170). et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas,
100 Phil. p. 277.
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the
counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety
thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
additional affirmative relief  — that it be relieved of its raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of
liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present
upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
the court a quo not being one of them. according to the law then in force, was within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a
against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It
such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
dismiss mentioned heretofore. Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question
the proceedings had in the present case since it was
in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity
of estoppel by laches.
and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
the entire record, We have become persuaded that We
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
can do nothing better than to quote  in toto, with approval,
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
December 11, 1962 as follows:
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
In Civil Case No. R-660 of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, which was a suit for collection of
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon
a sum of money, a writ of attachment was issued
grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
against defendants' properties. The attachment,
society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the
however, was subsequently discharged under
statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
Section 12 of Rule 59 upon the filing by
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
defendants of a bond subscribed by Manila Surety
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
& Fidelity Co., Inc.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction
After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of
of a court to sure affirmative relief against his opponent
plaintiffs.
and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by The writ of execution against defendants having
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the been returned totally unsatisfied, plaintiffs moved,
question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the under Section 17 of Rule 59, for issuance of writ of
subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not execution against Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
important in such cases because the party is barred from to enforce the obligation of the bond. But the
such conduct not because the judgment or order of the motion was, upon the surety's opposition, denied
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the on the ground that there was "no showing that a
reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — demand had been made, by the plaintiffs to the
obviously for reasons of public policy. bonding company for payment of the amount due
under the judgment" (Record on Appeal, p. 60).
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision Hence, plaintiffs made the necessary demand
on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the upon the surety for satisfaction of the judgment,
jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun- and upon the latter's failure to pay the amount due,
Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. plaintiffs again filed a motion dated October 31,
Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And 1957, for issuance of writ of execution against the
in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is surety, with notice of hearing on November 2,
not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the 1957. On October 31, 1957, the surety received
jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an copy of said motion and notice of hearing.
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction
to escape a penalty. It appears that when the motion was called on
November 2, 1957, the surety's counsel asked that
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three he be given time within which to answer the
cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals motion, and so an order was issued in open court,
of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon as follows:1äwphï1.ñët
the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
 As prayed for, Atty. Jose P. Soberano, Jr., motion for reconsideration. Not one of the assignment of
counsel for the Manila Surety & Fidelity errors raises the question of lack of jurisdiction, neither
Co., Inc., Cebu Branch, is given until directly nor indirectly.
Wednesday, November 6, 1957, to file his
answer to the motion for the issuance of a The CA decided the case affirming the orders
writ of execution dated October 30, 1957 appealed from. After the Surety received notice of the
of the plaintiffs, after which this incident decision, it filed a pleading entitled MOTION TO DISMISS,
shall be deemed submitted for resolution. alleging substantially that appellees' action was filed in the
CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum
SO ORDERED. of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic
Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948,
had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all
civil actions where the value of the subject matter or the
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00,
exclusive of interest and costs; that the CFI therefore had
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., Plaintiffs-appellees, -versus- no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY ALIAS GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY, ET AL., Defendants, MANILA SURETY ISSUE: Whether the Surety is barred from raising the
AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding jurisdictional issue by laches. (YES)
Company and Defendant-Appellant.
RULING:
G.R. No. L-21450, EN BANC, April 15, 1968,
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
DIZON, J. question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus,
we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general
by laches, which is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
earlier. Here, the Surety could have raised the issue of negligence or omission to assert a right within a
lack of jurisdiction in the trial court, but it only did so after reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
receiving the appellate court's adverse decision. Hence, it entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
is barred by laches. assert it.

FACTS: The facts of this case show that from the time the
Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
On July 19, 1948 — barely one month after the effectivity have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the
of Republic Act No. 296 known as the Judiciary Act of CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by
1948 — the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog reason of the sum of money involved which, according to
commenced a case in the Court of First Instance (CFI) the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at
Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00, with several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as
legal interest thereon. As prayed for in the complaint, a writ well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts
of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final
properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. hereinafter referred to as the raise the question of jurisdiction. If such conduct is to be
Surety, on the 31st of the same month. sanctioned, the SC would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present case since it was
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the CFI commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the creditors to go up their Calvary once more.
same had become final and executory, upon motion of the
latter, the CFI issued a writ of execution against the
defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution ATTY. RESTITUTO G. CUDIAMAT, ERLINDA P.
against the Surety's bond against which the Surety filed a CUDIAMAT and CORAZON D. CUDIAMAT, Petitioners,
written opposition. The CFI denied this motion on the -versus- BATANGAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, INC.,
ground solely that no previous demand had been made on and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, NASUGBU,
the Surety for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, BATANGAS, Respondents.
the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the
Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second
G.R. No. 182403, FIRST DIVISION, March 9, 2010,
motion for execution against the counter-bond. Upon the
Surety’s failure to file an answer to the motion, the CFI
granted the motion for execution and the corresponding CARPIO MORALES, J.
writ was issued.
While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction on the
Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by
on the ground that the same was issued without the estoppel by laches, the present case is an exception. To
required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims
Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the CFI denied the before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already
motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) been given the opportunity to present their respective
from such order of denial and from the one denying its evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which
had, in fact, decided petitioners complaint would be an promulgated on August 6, 2004,[1] whereby the Court of
exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners. Appeals (CA) denied its petition for review against the
adverse ruling of the Office of the President (OP).
FACTS:

Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto

were the registered co-owners of the disputed property Antecedents
located in Balayan, Batangas. Perfecto mortgaged the said
property to Batangas Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (the
bank) as security for a loan he obtained therefrom but this Petitioner TGN Realty Corporation owned and developed
was made without the knowledge and consent of Atty. & starting on August 22, 1966 the Villa Teresa Subdivision
Mrs. Restituto Cudiamat. Eventually, the same was on a parcel of land situated in Barangays Sto. Rosario and
foreclosed. A complaint for quietingof title with damages Cutcut, Angeles City, Pampanga. The project soon had
was consequently filed by Restituto, et al with the RTC of many lot buyers who built or bought residential units
Balayan. In its Answer, the bank alleged that the Balayan thereon. Respondent Villa Teresa Homeowners
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the bank had Association, Inc. (VTHAI) was the association of the
been placed under receivership and under liquidation by residents and homeowners of the subdivision.
the PDIC to which a petition for assistance in the
liquidation has been filed with the RTC of Nasugbu. Thus, In a letter dated September 2, 1997,[2] VTHAI, through
it is the latter court which jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed
counsel, made known to the petitioner the following
claims against it. The Balayan RTC rendered a judgment in
complaints and demands, to wit:
favor of Restituto et al. Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor
of the bank. Hence, this petition.
Immediate opening of Aureo St. and the closed
ISSUE: Whether the Balayan RTC had jurisdiction over the 1.1.
section of Flora Avenue;
complaint for quieting of title. (NO)
Completion of all fencing at the perimeter of Villa
RULING: Teresa, including the perimeter fencing along property
line from Gate #2 to Sto. Rosario (section of the Flora
1.2.
Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of Avenue) which is being used, against the objection of
lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC. In the present the residents, as parking for vehicles which constricts
case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general the entry and exit to and from the subdivision;
jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over the complaint for quieting
of title filed by petitioners in 1999. The Nasugbu RTC, as a Closure of all openings at the perimeter fence (Pritil
1.3.
liquidation court, assumed jurisdiction over the claims gate);
against the bank only in 2000, when PDICs petition for
assistance in the liquidation was raffled thereat and given Construction of adequate drainage at Ma. Cristina
1.4.
due course. While it is well-settled that lack of jurisdiction and along Flora Avenue;
on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not Construction of a Guard House and gate at the
lost by estoppel by laches, the present case is an
1.5. 2nd Gate and reimburse the VTHA, Inc. for the costs
exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate
(sic) construction of a Guard House at 3rd gate;
their claims before the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had
already been given the opportunity to present their 1.6. Completion of all sidewalks;
respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan
RTC which had, in fact, decided petitioners complaint 1.7. Development of the open space;
(about two years before the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision) would be an exercise in futility and Use of residential lots not for residential purposes
1.8.
would unjustly burden petitioners. (HAU) in clear violation of restrictions in the title;
Plan of HAU to construct an overpass across Flora
1.9.
Ave.;

C. OVER THE ISSUES Severe pruning of all Talisay trees along the
1.10 perimeter of HAU resulting in the death of several
. trees. (These trees have been here for about 20 years
now)
[ G.R. No. 164795, April 19, 2017 ] Allegedly, VTHAI tried to discuss the complaints and
demands but the petitioner failed and refused to meet in
TGN REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. VILLA
evident disregard of the latter's obligations as the owner
TERESA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
and developer of the project.
RESPONDENT.
In its letter dated September 22, 1997,[3] the petitioner
DECISION
specifically answered the complaints and demands of
BERSAMIN, J.: VTHAI by explaining thusly:

This case concerns the dispute between the land

developer and the residents of its subdivision development 1.1. Opening of Aureo St. and Flora Avenue
regarding the state of improvements on the subdivision.
Having been declared by the forum of origin to have not Aureo St. and a portion of Flora Avenue have always been
completed the development of the subdivision, and the part and parcel of the Holy Angel University even before
declaration having been upheld on appeal, the land their construction and development of Villa Teresa
developer persists in urging the undoing of the decision Subdivision. Said streets have long been turned-over to
the University, and were never opened to the public, much playground near the Teresa water tank. However, children
less, the residents of Villa Teresa. Hence, for all legal from nearby barangay Cutcut would climb the fence and
intents and purposes, said streets are not part of the play at the park, to the dismay of some residents. Hence,
subdivision and are now under the control and supervision the former officers at VTHA requested T.G.N. Realty to
of the University. remove these playground equipments and it was agreed
that the same be donated to Barangay Cutcut.
1.2. Completion of Fencing
8. Use of Residential Lots for Other Purposes
The whole length of the perimeter fence, especially at the
back portion, was already constructed prior to the Mt. There was no violation of the restrictions when T.G.N.
Pinatubo eruption. It was only in 1992 that flash floods Realty donated the whole Block No. 5 to the Holy Angel
destroyed a small portion thereof, particularly the lots near University, which is now the site of the school gym. This is
the David's residence and Marissa Drive opposite Villa a prerogative of the T.G.N. as the owner. Besides, a
Dolores Subdivision. careful perusal of the titles would readily show that these
lots are for educational, and not residential purposes.
Fencing the entrance of Flora Avenue fronting the Jimenez
property is a foolish and vindictive way of solving the 9. Plan of HAU to Construct Overpass
alleged constricted entry and exit. It will do more harm than
good, and result in a legal, if not social and political We suggest that you direct your request to the school
problem. At most, this is a temporary inconvenience which administration as the proper party.
poses no serious problem.
10. Pruning of Trees
3. Closure of Openings (Pritil Gate)
T.G.N. Realty has nothing to do with the pruning of Talisay
Pritil Gate serves as an emergency entry/exit to the trees around the perimeter of Holy Angel University.
subdivision, and is not supposed to be fenced by a However, T.G.N. was informed that the matter has been
concrete wall. Moreover, the adjacent landowner, Rafael properly explained to VTHA by the school authorities and
Nunag, has threatened to close all our drainage lines that 75 new Mahogany trees were planted to eventually
passing through his property before it drains to the nearby replace 47 live and 14 dead trees.
Matua Creek, if this gate will be fenced. If this happens,
water from the upper portion of the subdivision will The truth of the matter is that about two years ago, our
overflow from the manholes and catch basins, and will client had already dealt with the present officers of VTHA
flood low lying streets like Aurora Drive and Flora Avenue. on the control, supervision and maintenance of these
facilities, and in fact. a Memorandum of Agreement was
4. Construction of Adequate Drainage prepared for signing by the parties. Among the many
conditions that VTHA voluntarily agreed to undertake was
The drainage system designed by Engr. Victor Valencia payment of realty tax on the road lots and open space, and
along Cristina Drive and Flora Avenue has been maintenance and repair of all facilities in the subdivision. A
functioning effectively for thirty (30) years. It was only verification with the Office of the City Treasurer, however,
recently that manholes on low portions of Cristina Drive are revealed that VTHA has been delinquent in the payment of
slow in absorbing the unusual amount of rain water, but taxes for the past two years.
takes only about an hour to fully drain.
xxxx
5. Construction of Guard House
In view of the failure and refusal of the pet1t10ner to heed
A guard house was constructed at the Flora Avenue exit, its demands, VTHAI filed with the Housing and Land Use
but was transferred by VTHA. As far as reimbursement of Regulatory Board (HLURB) its complaint for specific
costs of guard house at Don Juan Nepomuceno Avenue is performance and for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
concerned, T.G.N. Realty has never agreed to reimburse No. 957 and P.D. No. 1216 on October 17, 1997, docketed
the same, nor does it intend to. as HLURB Case No. REM-C0-03-7-1133.[4]

6. Completion of Sidewalks On December 10, 1997, the petitioner filed its answer with
counterclaim,[5] whereby it reiterated the explanations
All sidewalks of the subdivision were constructed except contained in its letter dated September 22, 1997, and
that portion of Flora Avenue along the open space, urged that the complaint be dismissed. It insisted that it
because it was leveled by heavy equipments contracted by should be granted moral damages of 100,000.00 for
the VTHA. The gutter along the full frontage of the open discrediting its goodwill, and attorney's fees of P30,000.00
space is halved or low, and used by residents as parking plus P2,000.00/appearance per hearing because the
for their vehicles. If you will observe, very few people use complaint was malicious.
the sidewalks, especially in this pm1of the subdivision.
On September 25, 1998, HLURB Arbiter Jose A. Atencio,
7. Development of the Open Space Jr. rendered his decision,[6] relevantly holding and ruling
thusly:
Records will show that T.G.N Realty did not advertise nor
commit to develop the open space when it opened the
To verify the status of development in the subdivision an
subdivision and sold the lots therein. It was never its
ocular inspection was conducted on March 13, 1998, and
intention to put up amenities/facilities that some residents
the findings revealed among others that:
arc expecting. It may be recalled that T.G.N. Realty
provided several playground equipments in the provisional
Background:
Villa Teresa Subdivision is a first class subdivision ... It likewise violated the same Section when it caused the
construction of a gate (Pritil) as the same is part of the
Development Description: perimeter fence of the subdivision.

Road Network: Per approved plan all roads will be paved The transfer of the whole Block 5 under the name of Holy
with concrete ... the Aureo and Flora Ave., which is (sic) University (sic) and its subsequent conversion into a
near the Holy Angel University is (sic) closed to the compound of the said school is an alteration in violation of
subdivision residents and allegedly appropriated by the the above-mentioned Section of PD 957.
school.
Said. Section 22 of PD 957 states that:
Curbs, Gutters and sidewalk: The curb, gutters and
sidewalks were not yet fully completed specially at the side
of the open space. Section 22. Alteration of Plans - No owner or developer
shall change or alter roads, open space, infrastructures,
Drainage System: ... Per inspection the subdivision facilities for public use and/or other form of subdivision
drainage were completed but the canal at the Cristina Ave. developments as contained in the approved subdivision
were (sic) clogging and the road and some houses were plan and/or represented in its advertisements, without the
submerged with 1-2 feet of water during rainy season as permission of the Authority (now this Board) and the
alleged by the residents at the site. Because the flow of written conformity or consent of the duly organized
water coming from the Holy Angel University cannot be homeowners association or in the absence of the latter by
accommodated in the canal, that's why it goes to the road the majority of the lot buyers in the subdivision.
(sic). (Underscoring ours).

And Section 33 of the said decree provides as follows:

Electrical installation: ... were already completed.

Water System: ... will be provided by a centralized water "Section 33. Nullity of waivers Any condition, stipulation or
system. Installation of water pipe (sic) were already provision in a contract of Sale whereby any person waives,
completed. compliance with any provisions of this Decree or of any
rule or regulation issues thereunder shall be void."
Open Space: The designated open space is already
operational and a clubhouse is already constructed with a The planned construction of an overpass across Flora
basketball (sic) (which) is on-going construction including Avenue without complying with the requirements above-
the guardhouses and the nan1e of the subdivision (sic). As cited is likewise illegal.
stated by the members and officer of the association,
construction of the basketball court, clubhouse and the Let us now discuss the development and/or construction of
name of the subdivision is funded by the Homeowners the common facilities of the subdivision.
Assn.
It cannot be denied that the respondent is obliged to
Recommendation: Proper development and maintenance complete the construction of the roads drainage and
of all subdivision facilities should be undertaken by the perimeter fence and "... other forms of development
owner/developer. And fencing of unfinished perimeter represented or promised in the brochures, advertisement
fence especially those leading to the squatter area. and other sales propaganda, disseminated by the owner or
Cleaning of clogging canal and help the association in developer or his agents and the same shall form part of the
maintaining the subdivision a safe, clean and healthy place sales warrants enforceable against said owner or
to live in (are) the request of the residents. developer, jointly and severally. Failure to comply with
these warranties shall be punishable in accordance with
Based on the allegations in the pleadings and the position the penalties provided for in this Decree." (Section 19, PD
papers of the parties the issues to be resolved are whether 957).
or not:
Respondent is oblige (sic) to construct and maintain the
1.1. Respondent has violated PD 957, otherwise known as subdivision facilities until proper donation to the city is
subdivision lot and condominium unit buyer protective made. There is no clear proof however that respondent
decree and PD 1216, the law defining open space in a shall construct a guard house at Don Nepomuceno Ave.,
subdivision. or reimburse complainant of the cost of its construction.

1.2. The parties are liable for damages and the payments Maintenance by the respondent is still required despite of
of administrative fines, insofar as the respondent is its alleged donation of the roads of the subdivision of the
concerned. City of Angeles because the respondent failed to secure
the required Certificate of Completion (COC) as mandated
As to the first issue. by Rule IV, Section 9 1st Par. of the implementing rules and
regulations of P.D. 1216.
A perusal of the evidence presented, records of the
subdivision, as well as the facts and circumstances Said Section IV, Section 9, 1st paragraph provides, to wit:
obtaining in the case, it cannot be denied that respondent
violated Section 22 of PD 957 when it allowed Flora
Avenue and Aureo Street which are part of the subdivision "Section 9 Effects. One the registered owner or developer
to be closed and exclusively appropriated for the use of has secured the Certificate of Completion and has
Holy Angel University. executed a Deed of Donation of road lots and open
spaces, he/she shall be deemed relieved of the By petition for review,[7] the petitioner elevated the adverse
responsibility of maintaining the roadlots and open space decision to the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB
of the subdivision notwithstanding the refusal of the (docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-A-990210-0039)
City/Municipality concerned to accept the donation." based on the following grounds:[8]

Road lots shall include road, sidewalks, alleys and planting

strips and its gutters, drainage and sewerage. (Section 1.1. That the Honorable Hearing Officer committed grave
4(d), supra.) abuse of discretion when it declared the petitioner has
violated provisions of PD 957;
As to the second issue. Due to the contained failure and
refusal of the respondent to comply with the just and valid 1.2. The Honorable Hearing Officer committed errors in the
demands of the complainant compelling them to hire a findings of facts and in conclusions in law when it found the
lawyer to enforce its rights respondent is liable for the petitioner liable for pruning trees and closing streets and
payment of actual damages and attorneys fees. finding that there was no completion yet of the fence and
the roads and alleys, and ordering the petitioner to
Likewise, for violating the provisions of PD 957, under maintain the roads; for attributing to it a cease and desist
Section 38 of the Decree respondent is also liable for order from constructing an overpass;
administrative fine.
1.3. The Honorable Hearing officer committed grave abuse
PREMISES considered it is ordered that the respondent of discretion when it ordered the petitioner to pay
shall immediately: P30,000.00 as and by way of actual damages.

On September 3, 1999, the Board of Commissioners of the

Open Aureo St. and the closed Section of Flora Avenue. HLURB affirmed the HLURB arbiter with modification,
[9]
 viz.:[10]

Complete the perimeter fence of the subdivision.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Office below dated
September 25, 1998 is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the
Close all opening at the perimeter fence (Pritil Gate). directive to pay actual damages, and in lieu thereof, a new
directive is hereby entered as follows:

Construct and maintain adequate drainage at Ma. Cristina "10. Pay to the complainant the sum of 15,000.00 as
Drive and along Flora Ave. moderate damages."

All other aspects of the decision dated September 25,

Construct and maintain all sidewalks, roads and gutters as
1998 are hereby AFFIRMED.
well as the (maintenance of) open space.
SO ORDERED.
Cease and desist from using residential lots for non- Ruling of the OP
residential purposes until the requirements of Section 22 of
PD 957 shall have been complied with.
On October 25, 1999, the petitioner appealed the adverse
decision to the OP (docketed as OP Case No. 20-A-8933)
Cease and desist from constructing or allowing to be on "grounds of errors in the finding of facts and
constructed an overpass across Flora Avenue or any appreciation of evidence and, grave abuse of discretion."[11]
portion of the subdivision until the requirements of Section
22 of PD 957 shall have been complied with. On June 19, 2003, however, the OP, through Sr. Deputy
Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores, ruled thusly:[12]

Cease and Desist from pruning trees, particularly the

Talisay trees along the perimeter of HAU until the This resolves the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant from
necessary permits have been acquired from the the Decision of the Board of Commissioners Second
appropriate government agency. Division, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board dated
September 3, 1999, affirming in toto the Decision of the
Housing and Land Use Arbiter, Atty. Emmanuel T.
Pay an administrative fine of P10,000.00 to this Board for Pontejos, dated June 23, 1998.[13]
violating Sections 19 and 22 of PD 957.
After a careful and thorough evaluation and study of the
records of this case, this Office hereby adopts by reference
Pay actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
HLURB decisions.
Pay attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00.
A copy of the said HLURB Decision is attached hereto as
Failure to comply as ordered shall compel this Board to Annex "A".
endorse the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the filing
of appropriate criminal case. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.
On July 29, 2003, the petitioner moved for reconsideration manifestation, and consider the Certificate of Completion
"on the ground of grave abuse of discretion in merely as part of the records of the case, and to render judgment
adopting the findings of facts and conclusions of law of the nullifying the adverse decision of the CA and to direct the
HLURB decision which amounts to excess of jurisdiction dismissal of the complaint filed by VTHAI against it
and if not corrected would cause irreparable damage upon (HLURB Case No. REM-C0-03-7-1133).
the petitioner-appellant."[14]
On November 17, 2004, the Court required VTHAI to
The OP denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration comment on the petition for review on certiorari (not to file
on September 10, 2003,[15] stating: a motion to dismiss); and noted the petitioner's
manifestation dated October 6, 2004.[20]

This refers to the motion of TGN Realty Corporation (TGN) On December 29, 2004, VTHAI filed its comment[21] and a
seeking reconsideration of the Decision of this Office dated counter-manifestation,[22] both of which were noted on
June 19, 2003, and accordingly prays for the dismissal of January 24, 2005.[23]
the complaint of the private respondent-appellee.
On January 12, 2005, the petitioner moved to strike the
It will be recalled that this Office, in the assailed Decision, comment and counter-manifestation,[24] alleging that such
dismissed TGN's appeal from the decision of the Housing filings were in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the
and Land Use Regulatory Board and affirmed in toto the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and that although VTHAI
findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the asserted that no inspection had been conducted by the
HLURB decisions. Movant argues that there was a grave HLURB Regional Office, it did not dispute the genuineness
abuse of discretion in merely adopting the findings of facts of the Certificate of Completion.
and conclusions of law of the HLURB decision which
amounts to excess of jurisdiction and if not corrected would On February 10, 2005, VTHAI opposed the petitioner's
cause irreparable damage upon the petitioner-appellant. motion to strike,[25] countering that the requisite written
explanations and affidavits of service had appeared on
Upon due consideration, this Office finds no cogent reason page 25 of its comment and on page 5 of its counter-
to disturb its earlier Decision. We have carefully reviewed manifestation, respectively. VTHAI stressed that no
the arguments raised in the instant motion and find the inspection had been conducted by the HLURB Regional
same to be a mere reiteration of matters previously Office; that the approved subdivision plan had not been
considered and found to be without merit in the assailed completed; and that the petitioner had not yet complied
decision. A motion for reconsideration which does not with the decision of the HLURB Regional Office as of the
make out "any new matter sufficiently persuasive to induce time of its filing of the opposition to the motion to strike.
modification of judgment will be denied" (Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin, 67 SCRA On March 2, 2005,[26] the Court held in abeyance its action
202). on: (1) the petitioner's motion to strike; and (2) VTHAI's
comment on and opposition to the petitioner's motion to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for strike. It reiterated the resolution of January 24, 2005
reconsideration is hereby DENIED. requiring the petitioner to submit proof of authority of Juan
S. Nepomuceno to sign the conforme and to clarify if it was
SO ORDERED. only Atty. Lester Cusi or the entire law firm who was
withdrawing appearance as counsel.
Decision of the CA
The petitioner submitted its reply to the comment and
The petitioner then appealed to the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. opposition on February 24, 2005,[27] its reply to comment
79506), urging the review and reversal of the OP's decision on March 4, 2005,[28] and its compliance with the January
on the "ground that there are serious errors in the findings 24, 2005 resolution on March 16, 2005.[29]
of facts and grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
Decision and Order which if not corrected would cause In the meantime, on April 11, 2005, the petitioner
irreparable damage and cause grave legal consequences submitted its manifestation to the effect that in the
for the petitioner."[16] compliance dated March 4, 2005, Atty. Cusi clarified that it
was his entire law firm that was withdrawing its
As mentioned, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on appearance as counsel.[30]
August 6, 2004, affirming the OP.[17]
On June 22, 2005, the Court resolved to: (1) note the
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari. manifestation of the Villanueva De Leon Hipolito Law
Offices that it had already complied with the resolution of
It is significant to note that even before the Court could act January 24, 2005; (2) deny the petitioner's motion to strike
on the petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner filed a VTHAI's comment on the petition for review
manifestation on October 6, 2004,[18] stating that "in a on certiorari and counter-manifestation; and (3) note
certificate of completion dated 28 September 2004, the VTHAI's opposition to the motion to strike of the petitioner.
[31]
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board ("HLURB") has
duly certified that upon inspection, the subdivision project
of the instant case has been completed in accordance with On August 30, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for leave
the approved development plan." The petitioner wanted the and to admit[32] its reply to comment.[33] On October 17,
Court to appreciate the fact that the project had been 2005, the Court denied the petitioner's motion for leave
completed, thereby rendering the demands of VTHAI and to admit, noted without action the reply to comment "in
ventilated in the HLURB as "bereft of any basis in fact and view of the denial of the motion to file the same and
in law."[19] It prayed that the Court should take note of the considering that it would in effect be a second reply as
petitioner's earlier reply dated March 4, 2005 had been the pruning of Talisay trees along the perimeter of the Holy
noted in the resolution of April 25, 2005."[34] Angel University; and that the petitioner had not complied
with its obligations to complete the development of the
project - are essentially factual in nature

Issues Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for review

on certiorari should not involve the consideration and
resolution of factual issues. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
The petitioner raises the following issues,[35] namely:
of Court limits the appeal to questions of law because the
Court, not being a trier of facts, should not be expected to
(a) re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in
the fora below.[36] For this purpose, the distinction between
a question of law and a question of fact is well defined.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS In Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas,[37] this Court has
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO ORDER THE stated:
DISMISSAL OF THE SUBJECT COMPLIANT (sic)
DESPITE THE CLEAR SHOWING THAT THE SAID
COMPLAINT IS BEREFT OF ANY FACTUAL AND/OR A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
LEGAL BASIS law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question
must not involve an examination of the probative value of
(b) the evidence presented by the litigants or any or them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
DISCRETION WHEN IT SIMPLY AFFIRMED THE
the question posed is one of fact.
DECISION AND ORDER OF THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact
WERE ISSUED WITHOUT EVEN EXPLAINING THE
is not the appellation given to such question by the party
FACTS AND LAW UPON WHICH THE SAME WERE
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court
BASED.
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise it is a question of fact.
(c) There may be exceptions to the limitation of the review to
question of law, such as the following: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
REFUSED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
COMPLAINT FILED UNDER HLURB CASE NO. REM-C0-
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
03-7-1133 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME DID
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are
NOT CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went
SHOPPING.
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial
(d) court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
REFUSED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
COMPLAINT FILED UNDER HLURB CASE NO. REM-C0- supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
03-7-1133 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly
FILED WITHOUT ANY AUTHORITY FROM HEREIN overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
RESPONDENT. parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[38]
Ruling of the Court
Yet, none of the foregoing exceptions to the limitation
The petition for review on certiorari is granted. applies to this case. As a consequence it seems foregone
that the Court would be justified in now rejecting the appeal
The issues being raised by the petitioner that VTHAI did of the petitioner, and in upholding the CA adversely against
not cite any basis for its demands; that VTHAI did not the petitioner.
present any evidence to show that the approved
subdivision plan required its demands; that VTHAI did not But the attention of the Court has been directed to the
establish that the petitioner had violated Section 22 of P.D. conflict in the findings on the state of the development of
No. 957; that VTHAI did not present evidence proving that the project.
the petitioner was the party responsible for the acts being
attributed to it, like the closure of Aureo Street and a According to the decision dated September 25, 1998 of the
section of Flora Avenue, the use of residential lots for other HLURB arbiter, an ocular inspection of the premises was
purposes, the proposed construction of an overpass, and conducted on March 13, 1998 in order to verify the status
of the development of the project. It was found at the time
that "proper development and maintenance of all
subdivision facilities should be undertaken by the EDITHA U.
 
owner/developer. And fencing of unfinished perimeter BARRAMEDA
fence especially those leading to the squatter area. Regional
Cleaning of clogging canal and help the association in  
Officer[41]
maintaining the subdivision a safe, clean and healthy place
to live in (are) the requests of the residents." Being the A certificate of completion certifies that a subdivision
agency that has acquired the expertise on the matter in project has been completed in accordance with the
question, the HLURB's findings should be respected.[39] approved development plan. This is clear from Section 8 of
the Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No. 953,
As adverted to earlier, however, the Regional Office of the pursuant to Article IV, Section 51 of Executive Order No.
HLURB meanwhile issued the Certificate of Completion 648, to wit:
dated September 28, 2004 stating that "upon inspection,
the subdivision project of the instant case has been
completed in accordance with the approved development ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE OF
plan."[40] The Certificate of Completion is reproduced in full COMPLETION - No Certificate of Completion
Section
hereinbelow: (COC) shall be issued by the HLRB unless the
8.
subdivision owner/developer complies with the
provisions of these Rules and Regulations.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION
The Certificate of Completion dated September 28, 2004,
being the issuance of the HLURB itself, cannot be ignored.
Its significance derives from the law itself. Section 31 of
Name of Presidential Decree No. 957, as amended by Presidential
:VILLA TERESA SUBDIVISION
Project Decree No. 1216,[42] reads:
Location :Sto. Rosario; Cutcut, Angeles City
Owner :Peter G. Nepomoceno/T.G.N. Realty Corp. Section 31. Roads, Alleys, Sidewalks and Open spaces.
The owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide
Project adequate roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision
Classificatio :PD 957 projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner or developer
n shall reserve thirty percent (30%) of the gross area for
CR No./Date open space. such open space shall have the following
:RS-056/July 14, 1977 standards allocated exclusively for parks, playgrounds and
Issued
recreational use:
LS No./Date
:LS-0514/July 14, 1977
Issued
(a) 9% of gross area for high density or social housing (66
Area No. of to 100 family lot per gross hectare).
:637,335 square meter
Lots
(b) 7% of gross area for medium-density or economic
BE IT KNOWN that the above-described project upon housing (21 to 65 family lot per gross hectare).
inspection has been completed in accordance with the
approved development plan. Accordingly, upon (c) 3.5 % of gross area low-density or open market housing
recommendation of the Inspection Team, said project is (20 family lots and below per gross hectare).
hereby certified as completed.
These areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and
Let it be known further that this office interposes no
non-buildable. The plans of the subdivision project shall
objection to the donation/tum over of the facilities of the
include tree planting on such parts of the subdivision as
said subdivision project to the Local Government of
may be designated by the Authority.
Angeles City.
Upon their completion as certified to by the Authority,
IN WITNESS the roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be
WHEREOF, I donated by the owner or developer to the city or
have hereunto municipality and it shall he mandatory for the local
set my hand and governments to accept provided, however, that the
the seal of this parks and playgrounds may be donated to the
Board to be Homeowners Association of the project with the
  consent of the city or municipality concerned. No
affixed at San
Fernando City, portion of the parks and playgrounds donated
Pampanga thereafter shall be converted to any other purpose or
this 28th Day of purposes. (Bold emphasis supplied)
September In this connection, the last paragraph of the Certificate of
2004. Completion issued by the HLURB Regional Office reflected
    as follows:

  (signed)
   
Let it be known further that this Office interposes no determine the rights of private parties under such
objection to the donation/turnover of the facilities of the contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uniquely
said subdivision project to the Local Government of judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.
Angeles City.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sees no need to dwell at
We note, too, that under Section 9 of the Rules and length on and resolve the remaining issues submitted for
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 957, as consideration.
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1216, the registered
owner or developer of the subdivision who has secured the WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision
certificate of completion and has executed the deed of promulgated by the Court of Appeals on August 6, 2004;
donation in favor of the city or municipality "shall be and ORDERS the remand of this case (HLURB Case No.
deemed relieved of the responsibility of maintaining the REM-C0-03-7-1133) to the Housing and Land Use
road lots and open space of the subdivision Regulatory Board for further proceedings, particularly to
notwithstanding the refusal of [the] City/Municipality determine whether or not the petitioner had already fully
concerned to accept the donation." Moreover, Section 1 (2) complied with the approved development plan for its Villa
of Presidential Decree No. 953[43] specifically states: Teresa Subdivision situated in Sto. Rosario, Cutcut,
"(E)very owner of an existing subdivision shall plant trees Angeles City.
in the open spaces required to be reserved for the
common use and enjoyment of the owners of the lots No pronouncement on costs of suit.
therein as well as along all roads and service streets. The
subdivision owner shall consult the Bureau of Forest SO ORDERED.
Development as to the appropriate species of trees to be
planted and the manner of planting them."

The obvious conflict between, on the one hand, the earlier

findings made by the HLURB arbiter that undoubtedly
became the basis for the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
the OP and the CA to successively rule adversely against
the petitioner, and, on the other, the recitals to the contrary TGN Realty Corporation v. Villa Teresa Homeowners
of the Certificate of Completion issued by the Regional Association (VTHA) G.R. No. 164795,THIRD DIVISION,
Officer of the HLURB must not be ignored. Justice April 19, 2017,
demands that the conflict be resolved and settled
especially considering that the findings and the Certificate BERSAMIN, J.:
of Completion were both issued by the HLURB itself,
through its agents. Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari
should not involve the consideration and resolution of
The resolution and settlement of the conflict require the factual issues. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
evaluation and re-evaluation of factual matters. Yet, the limits the appeal to questions of law because the Court,
Court cannot itself resolve and settle the conflict in this not being a trier of facts, should not be expected to re-
appeal because it is not a trier of facts. Moreover, the evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the
proper resolution and just settlement of the conflict will fora below.
probably require the conduct of a hearing to be conducted
by an official or office with the competence to determine FACTS:
the factual dispute involved. That office is the HLURB, the
agency of the Government in which the expertise to Petitioner TGN Realty Corporation owned and
monitor the completion of subdivision projects has been developed starting on August 22, 1966 the Villa Teresa
Subdivision on a parcel of land situated in Barangays Sto.
lodged by law. A remand to the HLURB becomes
Rosario and Cutcut, Angeles City, Pampanga. The project
necessary, therefore, in order that an objective but full
soon had many lot buyers who built or bought residential
inquiry into the level of completion of the improvements in units thereon. Respondent Villa Teresa Homeowners
the project can be assured. Association, Inc. (VTHAI) was the association of the
residents and homeowners of the subdivision. In a letter
The expertise and competence of the HLURB for the dated September 2, 1997,2 VTHAI, through counsel, made
purpose has been aptly expounded in Peralta v. De Leon, known to the petitioner the following complaints and
[44]
 citing Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, demands, such as the immediate opening of Aureo St. and
[45]
 viz.: the closed section of Flora Avenue, completion of all
fencing at the perimeter of Villa Teresa, including the
perimeter fencing along property line from Gate #2 to Sto.
The provisions of P.D. No. 957 were intended to Rosario (section of the Flora Avenue) which is being used,
encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and against the objection of the residents, as parking for
condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for vehicles which constricts the entry and exit to and from the
an appropriate government agency, the HLURB, to which subdivision, etc.
all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions
and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to Allegedly, VTHAI tried to discuss the complaints
said category of real estate may take recourse. The and demands but the petitioner failed and refused to meet
in evident disregard of the latter's obligations as the owner
business of developing subdivisions and corporations
and developer of the project. In its letter dated September
being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question
22, 1997,3 the petitioner specifically answered the
arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be complaints and demands of VTHAI. In view of the failure
brought to the HLURB which has the technical know-how and refusal of the pet1t10ner to heed its demands, VTHAI
on the matter. fn the exercise of its powers, the HLURB filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
must commonly interpret and apply contracts and (HLURB) its complaint for specific performance and for
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 and P.D. overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
No. 1216. parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.
On December 10, 1997, the petitioner filed its
answer with counterclaim,5 whereby it reiterated the Yet, none of the foregoing exceptions to the
explanations contained in its letter dated September 22, limitation applies to this case. As a consequence it seems
1997, and urged that the complaint be dismissed. It foregone that the Court would be justified in now rejecting
insisted that it should be granted moral damages of the appeal of the petitioner, and in upholding the CA
100,000.00 for discrediting its goodwill, and attorney's fees adversely against the petitioner. But the attention of the
of P30,000.00 plus P2,000.00/appearance per hearing Court has been directed to the conflict in the findings on
because the complaint was malicious. On September 25, the state of the development of the project. According to
1998, HLURB Arbiter Jose A. Atencio, Jr. rendered his the decision dated September 25, 1998 of the HLURB
decision in favor of respondents. By petition for review,7 arbiter, an ocular inspection of the premises was
the petitioner elevated the adverse decision to the Board of conducted on March 13, 1998 in order to verify the status
Commissioners of the HLURB. On September 3, 1999, the of the development of the project. It was found at the time
Board of Commissioners of the HLURB affirmed the that "proper development and maintenance of all
HLURB arbiter with modification. he petitioner appealed subdivision facilities should be undertaken by the
the adverse decision to the OP (docketed as OP Case No. owner/developer. And fencing of unfinished perimeter
20-A-8933) on "grounds of errors in the finding of facts and fence especially those leading to the squatter area.
appreciation of evidence and, grave abuse of discretion."
On June 19, 2003, however, the OP affirmed the Cleaning of clogging canal and help the
judgement. The CA affirmed the OP. association in maintaining the subdivision a safe, clean
and healthy place to live in (are) the requests of the
ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the residents." Being the agency that has acquired the
decision of the OP (YES) expertise on the matter in question, the HLURB's findings
should be respected.
RULING:

Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for review on

certiorari should not involve the consideration and
resolution of factual issues. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE PLACIDO C.
of Court limits the appeal to questions of law because the
Court, not being a trier of facts, should not be expected to MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in 40, Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE
the fora below.36 For this purpose, the distinction between SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
a question of law and a question of fact is well defined. In Respondents.
Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Banas, this Court has stated a
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the G.R. No. 163416, SECOND DIVISION,January 31, 2006,
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question AZCUNA, J
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case,
must not involve an examination of the probative value of even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a
the evidence presented by the litigants or any or them. The nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law the res, as when the action involves the personal status of
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
the plaintiff or property in the Philippines in which the
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of
summons by publication and notice to the defendant is
merely to comply with due process requirements. Under
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law
or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign
the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the corporation doing business in the Philippines without a
appellate court can determine the issue raised without license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a be sued or proceeded against before our courts or
question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. administrative tribunals.

Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow

There may be exceptions to the limitation of the
petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without submitting
review to question of law, such as the following: (1) when
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge.
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
FACTS:
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that
CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in
appellee; (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those
Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315,
by the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that
in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable
the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by against him and his co-accused.
the evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the
the defendant (No) court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction

HELD:

In addition, it may not be amiss to note that D. OVER THE RES OR PROPERTY IN LITIGATION
petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor
from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender
and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR v. REPUBLIC/ IMELDA
Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. REPUBLIC
jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction,
thus: G.R. No. 189434/ G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014,

x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and Sereno, J.

how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
In order that the court may exercise power over the res, it
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is is not necessary that the court should take actual custody
acquired by the filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient.
pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner. There is potential custody when, from the nature of the
action brought, the power of the court over the property is
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: impliedly recognized by law.
This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or
submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or Facts:
by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally
The Supreme Court rendered a decision affirming
by the service of summons.
the decision of Sandiganbayan declaring all the assets of
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is Arelma, S.S., an entity created by the late Ferdinand
conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or The anti graft court found that the totality of assets and the
agreement of the parties. properties acquired by the Marcos spouses was manifestly
and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is public officials and that the petitioners were unable to
determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten wealth,
case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial pursuant to Sec. 2 of RA 1379 (forfeiture law). Petitioners
order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as seek reconsideration of the denial of their petition,
by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue reiterating among others, that the Sandiganbayan does not
not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the Arelma
10. e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing proceeds which are held by Merill Lynch in the United
which is the subject of the litigation). This is acquired by States.
the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing
in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which the Arelma proceeds.
recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property
Ruling:
or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land
registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or Yes. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction despite
real property in the Philippines of a non-resident the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held
defendant. Justice Regalado continues to explain: abroad. To rule otherwise contravenes the intent of the
forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are
In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try
able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the
the case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
courts and their recovery by the State. Forfeiture
person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has
proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively
jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the
in our Decision, are actions considered to be in the nature
personal status of the plaintiff or property in the Philippines
of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that
in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases,
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
the service of summons by publication and notice to the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
defendant is merely to comply with due process
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of
requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code,
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of
while a foreign corporation doing business in the
the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter
Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any
condition, the property, though at all times within the
action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before
potential power of the court, may not be in the actual
our courts or administrative tribunals.
custody of said court.
Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case
The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res,
to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts without
advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As early as
submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued
Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident,
refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this
the Court held that in order that the court may exercise
Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent
power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should
judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the
take actual custody of the property, potential custody
accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial of
thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody when,
the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an
from the nature of the action brought, the power of the
intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal
court over the property is impliedly recognized by law
 respondent was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8)
of BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive
E. JURISDICTION OF COURTS original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further
averred in said motion that although another person,
Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner in
G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986 the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and
distinct from that of the other respondent. At the hearing of
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner, said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion
vs. joined in moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner
IGNACIO BINONGCAL & FERNANDO opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As above stated, the trial
CALION, respondents. court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Lucio A. Dixon for respondent F. Calion. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has jurisdiction
over the case following the "novel" totality rule introduced
in Section 33(l) of BP129 and Section 11 of the Interim
Rules.
FERIA, J.:
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads as
follows:
The Court rules that the application of the totality rule
under Section 33(l) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules is subject to the ... Provided,That where there are several
requirements for the permissive joinder of parties under claims or causes of action between the
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows: same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons
in all the causes of action, irrespective of
in whom or against whom any right to relief
whether the causes of action arose out of
in respect to or arising out of the same
the same or different transactions. ...
transaction or series of transactions is
alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally,
or in the alternative, may, except as Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides
otherwise provided in these rules, join as thus:
plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or Application of the totality rule.-In actions
fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all where the jurisdiction of the court is
such defendants may arise in the action; dependent on the amount involved, the
but the court may make such orders as test of jurisdiction shall be the aggregate
may be just to prevent any plaintiff or sum of all the money demands, exclusive
defendant from being embarrassed or put only of interest and costs, irrespective of
to expense in connection with any whether or not the separate claims are
proceedings in which he may have no owned by or due to different parties. If any
interest. demand is for damages in a civil action,
the amount thereof must be specifically
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of alleged.
Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions with the
dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner pertinent portion of the former rule under Section 88 of the
did not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which reads as follows:
erroneous belief that the entire original record of the case
shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second ... Where there are several claims or
paragraph of Section 39 of BP129. This provision applies causes of action between the same parties
only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the embodied in the same complaint, the
Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim Rules). amount of the demand shall be the totality
Appeals to this Court by petition for review on certiorari are of the demand in all the causes of action,
governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Section 25 of irrespective of whether the causes of
the Interim Rules). action arose out of the same or different
transactions; but where the claims or
However, the order appealed from states that the first causes of action joined in a single
cause of action alleged in the complaint was against complaint are separately owned by or due
respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the to different parties, each separate claim
amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires shall furnish the jurisdictional test. ...
which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various
occasions from August to October, 1981; and the second and argues that with the deletion of the proviso in the
cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion former rule, the totality rule was reduced to clarity and
for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 brevity and the jurisdictional test is the totality of the claims
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on in all, not in each, of the causes of action, irrespective of
credit from petitioner on several occasions from March, whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
1981 to January, 1982. different transactions.

On December 15, 1983, counsel for respondent Binongcal This argument is partly correct. There is no difference
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of between the former and present rules in cases where a
jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against said plaintiff sues a defendant on two or more separate causes
of action. In such cases, the amount of the demand shall where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly sued the
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court also held that the
irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of municipal court had jurisdiction because the amount of
the same or different transactions. If the total demand each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its
exceeds twenty thousand pesos, then the regional trial jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of
court has jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of parties plaintiff under Section 6 of Rule 3.
action are separate and independent, their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and any cause Under the present law, the two cases above cited
of action where the amount of the demand is twenty (assuming they do not fall under the Labor Code) would be
thousand pesos or less may be the subject of a separate under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. Similarly, in
complaint filed with a metropolitan or municipal trial court. the abovecited cases of Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs.
Martinez (supra), if the separate claims against the several
On the other hand, there is a difference between the defendants arose out of the same transaction or series of
former and present rules in cases where two or more transactions and there is a common question of law or fact,
plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a they would now be under the jurisdiction of the regional
defendant join in a single complaint. Under the former rule, trial court.
"where the claims or causes of action joined in a single
complaint are separately owned by or due to different In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties,
parties, each separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of
test" (Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the
amended,  supra). This was based on the ruling in the case jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace, 99 Phil. 693. joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions
As worded, the former rule applied only to cases of are filed by or against the parties, the amount demanded in
permissive joinder of parties plaintiff. However, it was also each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
applicable to cases of permissive joinder of parties
defendant, as may be deduced from the ruling in the case In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the
of  Brillo vs. Buklatan, thus: jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties
pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of
Furthermore, the first cause of action is the Rules of Court and that, after a careful scrutiny of the
composed of separate claims against complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties
several defendants of different amounts for the reason that the claims against respondents
each of which is not more than P2,000 and Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither
falls under the jurisdiction of the justice of of which falls within its jurisdiction.
the peace court under section 88 of
Republic Act No, 296. The several claims WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed,
do not seem to arise from the same without pronouncement as to costs.
transaction or series of transactions and
there seem to be no questions of law or of
fact common to all the defendants as may SO ORDERED.
warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section
6. Therefore, if new complaints are to be
filed in the name of the real party in
interest they should be filed in the justice
of the peace court. (87 Phil. 519, 520,
reiterated in Gacula vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. Flores v. Mallare-Phillips, 144 SCRA 377, SECOND
142, 146) DIVISION, September 24, 1986,

FERIA, J.:
Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to
cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes FACTS:
of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as
well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of Petitioner Remegio Flores filed a complaint against
action against two or more defendants joined in a single respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the
complaint. However, the causes of action in favor of the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires
two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or occasions. In the same complaint, and as second cause of
series of transactions and there should be a common action, petitioner alleges that respondent Fernando Calion
question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3. for allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased on
The difference between the former and present rules in credit from petitioner on several occasions. The counsel for
cases of permissive joinder of parties may be illustrated by respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
the two cases which were cited in the case of Vda. de ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amount of the
Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace (supra) as exceptions to
demand against said respondent was only P11, 643.00,
the totality rule. In the case of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86
and under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court
Phil. 523), where twenty-nine dismissed employees joined
in a complaint against the defendant to collect their shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of
respective claims, each of which was within the jurisdiction the demand is more than twenty thousand pesos
of the municipal court although the total exceeded the (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that
jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly
then the municipal court had jurisdiction. In said case, indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00, his
although the plaintiffs' demands were separate, distinct obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other
and independent of one another, their joint suit was respondent. At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss,
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the
claim furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil. 470),
jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
of jurisdiction. Court and that after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it
appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion
of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within
Court of Baguio City which dismissed his complaint for lack its jurisdiction.
of jurisdiction. Petitioner maintains that the lower court has
jurisdiction over the case following the "novel" totality rule
introduced in Section 33(1) of BP 129 and Section 11 of
the Interim Rules.

ISSUE: Whether applying the totality rule is proper and

thus, the court has jurisdiction

HELD:

This argument is partly correct. Where a plaintiff

sues a defendant on two or more separate causes of
action, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of
the claims in all the causes of action irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions. If the total demand exceeds twenty
thousand pesos, then the regional trial court has
jurisdiction. Needless to state, if the causes of action are
separate and independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is twenty thousand pesos
or less may be the subject of a separate complaint filed
with a metropolitan or municipal trial court.

Under the present law, the totality rule is applied

also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single
complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more defendants
joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of action
in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or
more defendants should arise out of the same transaction
or series of transactions and there should be a common
question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6 of Rule 3.

The application of the totality rule under Section

33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and Section 11 of the
Interim Rules is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3
which provides as follows: "Permissive joinder of parties. -
All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except
as otherwise provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be
joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or
to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the
court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any
plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to
expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest."

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether

as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3,
the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional
test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being
joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test. In the case at
bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to