Jurisdiction

Elements of jurisdiction in criminal cases

A court acquires jurisdiction to try a criminal case only when the following requisites concur:
1. The offense is one which the court is by law authorized to take cognizance of;
2. The offense must have been committed within its territorial jurisdiction; and
3. The person charged with the offense must have been brought in to its forum for trial, forcibly
by warrant of arrest or upon his voluntary submission to the court (Antiporda, Jr. v.
Garchitorena, G.R. No. 133289, December 23, 1999).

Venue is a question of jurisdiction; not absolute

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction (Foz, Jr., et al. v. People, G.R.
No. 167764, October 9, 2009). In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is
jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction
to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one
of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of
the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
(Macasaet v. People, G.R. No. 156747, February 3, 2005).

Venue of trial can be transferred to another place

Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order
a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there
are serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of original jurisdiction
from conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of
venue so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice (Navaja vs. De Castro, G.R. No. 182926, June
22, 2015).

Venue in falsification of private documents

It is settled law in criminal actions that the place where the criminal offense was committed not
only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction (U.S. vs.
Pagdayuman, G.R. No. 2008, November 11, 1905).

Thus, in cases of falsification of a private documents, the venue is the place where the
document is falsified to the prejudice of, or with the intent to prejudice, a third person, and this
whether the falsified document is or is not thereafter put to the improper or illegal use for which
it was intended (US v. Barreto, G.R. Nos. L-11447, 11448, 11449, March 31, 1917).

Prescription of offenses
The institution of a criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the
offense charged unless otherwise provided in special laws (ROC, Rule 110, Sec. 1).

Meaning of the phrase “in relation to their Office” involving crimes committed by public
officials and employees
With respect to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, in cases when an offense deemed
committed “in relation to one’s office, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute. The test is whether the offense cannot exist without the office
(Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152398, April 14, 2005).

The determinative fact is that the position of the municipal mayor, is classified as SG 27, and
under the last paragraph of Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, if the position of one of the principal
accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the offense (Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 161784-86, April 26, 2005).

The Omnibus Election Code provides that the RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to
try election offenses (Sec. 268), whether committed by a private individual or public officer or
employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation
to his official duties or not. It is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender
that matters (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, G.R. No. L-62075, April 15, 1987).

It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The salary
grade has no reference for example to provincial governors, vice governors or members of the
SangguniangPanlalawigan, SangguniangPanlungsod, directors or managers of GOCCs, city
mayors, vice mayors, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, trustees of state universities, and
other officials enumerated in Sec. 4 (1) (a) from letters “a”-“g” of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.

Hold Departure Order

A precautionary hold departure order may be issued only by the RTCs in criminal cases within
their exclusive jurisdiction. However, for compelling reasons, the application can be filed with
any RTC within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known. The RTCs in the City of Manila, Quezon City, Cebu City,
Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro City shall also have the authority to act on
applications filed by the prosecutor based on compalints instituted by the NBI, regardless where
the alleged crime was committed (OCA Circular No. 194-2018, September 16, 2018).

Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
1. Violations of:
a. R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act);
b. R.A. No. 1379 (Ill Gotten Wealth);
c. Chapter 2, Section 2, Title 7, Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code (Bribery, etc.)where one
or more of the accused are official occupying the following positions in the government,
whether permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
i. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade “27” and higher of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
ii. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
iii. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
iv. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
v. All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
2. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office.
3. Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A (Sequestration
cases), issued in 1986; and
4. Money laundering cases (R.A. No. 9160, Sec. 5) committed by public officers and private
persons who are in conspiracy with such public officers.

Jurisdiction of Ombudsman
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction in preliminary investigation
1. If the preliminary investigation shall be conducted for a crime cognizable in Sandiganbayan,
the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction. Thus, the Ombudsman can take over any
preliminary investigation being performed in such manner;
2. If the preliminary investigation is conducted for a crime cognizable in any court other than
the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman only has concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, if the
Department of Justice is already performing the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
cannot take over the investigation(Sanchez v. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77, November
9, 1993); or
3. If preliminary investigation is finished and the case is filed in court, the Ombudsman now
has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute the case.

RULE 110

Effect if qualifying circumstances are not alleged in the information

The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also
the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be properly appreciated(People v.
Perreras. G.R. No. 139622. July 31, 2001).

Mere averment of use of gun in killing the victim does not per se mean treachery
Although the prosecution has duly proved the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon, they may not be appreciated to qualify
the crime from simple rape to qualified rape.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that for qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be appreciated, it must be alleged in the complaint or
[Link] is in line with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence
of the circumstances, the Court cannot appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the
Information. Hence, although the prosecution has duly established the presence of the aforesaid
circumstances, which, however, were not alleged in the Information, the Court cannot
appreciate the same (People v. Lapore, G.R. No. 191197, June 22, 2015).

Prosecution for hazing, when there is sufficiency of allegations

The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim. There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for
admission or entry into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the
successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as
accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing –
is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and
thus a mere conclusion of law. Section 6, Rule 110 of the ROC, expressly states that the
information must include, inter alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute"
and "the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense." The Special Prosecutor’s
belated argument in his Petition before this Court that the successful completion of the
indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued admission to
the academy does not cure this defect in the Information. Thus, the Information must be
quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing
(People v. Aris, G.R. No. 174786, February 18, 2015).

BP 22 Summary Procedure
Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of RTCs and of the
Sandiganbayan, the MTC shall exercise jurisdiction over summary procedure involving B.P. Blg.
22 cases (A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC).

Effect of discrepancies as to time of occurrence of offense alleged

The failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto
render the informations defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a
material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female
against her will through force or intimidation. Precision as to the time when the rape is
committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of the
commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute
accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed
at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission (People v. Nuyok, supra).

Duplicitous information; nature; exception

A complaint or an information must charge only one offense (ROC, Rule 110, Sec. 13). An
information is defective if it charges two or more distinct or different offenses (People v. Ferrer,
G.R. No. L-8957, April 29, 1957).

The rationale behind the rule enjoining the charging of two or more offenses in an information is
to give the defendant the necessary knowledge of the offense charged to enable, him to prepare
his defense. The State should not heap upon the defendant two or more charges which might
confuse him in his defense (People v. Ferrer, supra).

The following are the exceptions to the rule on duplicity of offenses:

a. Crimes susceptible of being committed in various modes;
b. Special complex crimes;
c. Crimes of which another offense is an element thereof (principle of absorption);
d. Compound and complex crimes;
e. Continuing crimes or delitocontinuado; and
f. Where a single act violates two (2) or more distinct statutes (RIANO, Criminal Procedure:
The Bar Lecture Series (2016), p. 105-111) [hereinafter, RIANO, Criminal Procedure].

RULE 111

Acquittal of accused in estafa case; no crime of estafa committed; effect on civil liability
In a particular kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of
misappropriation or conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is missing,
there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex
delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any civil liability
may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as
to the existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still be awarded. This
means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince
the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to estafa (Dy v. People,
G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016).

Two kinds of acquittal; their concepts and effects

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
[Link] is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and
the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act
or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist" (Lumaptas v, Calapiz, G.R. No.
163753, January 15, 2014).

Civil liability despite acquittal

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases (Lim v. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria, G.R. No. 175851, July 4, 2012).

Extinction of penal action; effect on civil liability

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or "greater
weight of the credible evidence," is required.21 Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still
be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant (Diaz v. People,
G.R. No. 208113, December 2, 2015).

Where the elements of the crime were not proven, the extinguishment of the criminal
carries with it the civil liability that arises out of the crime
The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him (Dayap v.
Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009).

Extinction of penal action does not necessarily extinguish the civil liability
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted (Dayap v. Sendiong, supra).

Effect of the death of the accused

The effects of the death of the accused on civil actions are as follows:
1. If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any
civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the accused (People v. Lipata,
G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016);
2. If the accused dies after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action, the civil
liability arising from the delict shall be extinguished (Revised Penal Code, Art. 89, par. i);
3. If the accused dies during appeal, his civil and criminal liabilities are extinguished (People v.
Alison, G.R. No. L-30612, May 3, 1983); and
4. If the accused dies after final judgment, the pecuniary liabilities of the accused are not
extinguished. Claims shall be filed against the estate of the accused (ROC, Rule 86, Sec. 5).

Exceptions:
1. Where the civil liability is predicated on other sources of obligations such as law, contract,
quasi-contract and quasi-delict, or is an independent civil action, the action may be
continued against the estate of the accused after proper substitution is made either as to the
relatives or the estate; and
2. If the civil action has been reserved and subsequently filed or such civil action has been
instituted when the accused died, such civil action will proceed and substitution of parties
shall be ordered by the court (ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 16).

Prejudicial Question
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal (Domingo v. Spouses Singson, G.R. Nos. 203287 & 207936, April 5,
2017).

It has the following elements:

1. The civil action must be instituted prior to the criminal action;
2. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action; and
3. The resolution of such issue determines whether the criminal action may proceed (ROC,
Rule 111, Sec. 7).

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must
-be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal (Domingo v. Singson, G.R. No. 203287, April
5, 2017).

Effect of bigamy filed ahead of action for nullity of marriage

In People v. Mendoza (G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954), a bigamy case involving an
accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration.
In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first.
When the first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with
bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it
had been contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was
obviously void and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its
nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time (Mercado
v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000).
Concept of independent civil action not applicable in prejudicial questions
Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages in cases provided under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also constitute criminal offenses, may proceed
independently of the criminal action. In instances where an independent civil action is permitted,
the result of the criminal action, whether of acquittal or conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the
civil action (Domingo v. Singson, supra).

RULE 112

Hearsay evidence as basis of probable cause

Probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is "substantial evidence" which cannot rest
entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can
include hearsay evidence (Estrada v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140-41, Janaury 21, 2015).

Dismissal without prejudice of a criminal case; motion to revive is sufficient; no need for
another preliminary investigation
The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside
the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court's docket. Even assuming
the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by
mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another complaint
accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.

A new preliminary investigation is only required in order to accord the accused the right to
submit counter-affidavits and evidence only in the following instances: (a) where the original
witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have
died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b) where
aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for
the same offense or necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the
original charge has been upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability
of the accused is upgraded from being an accessory to that of a principal (Ciron v. Gutierrez,
G.R. No. 194339-41, April 20, 2015).

Effect of long delay in conduct of preliminary investigation

We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process
constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the
due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of speedy disposition of cases as
embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and 1987 Constitution), the
inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long
delay by indulging in the speculative assumption that the delay may be due to a painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official. In the
first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No.
3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such
painstaking and grueling scrutiny as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating
the preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual
issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan
to resolve the case (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-72335-39, March 21, 1998).

The admissibility of evidence cannot be ruled upon in a preliminary investigation

In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; they merely determine whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial (People v. Castillo,
607 Phil. 767 [2009]).

RULE 113

Arrest without warrant; when valid

A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
1. When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
2. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed the crime;
3. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (roc, Rule
113, Sec. 5);
4. Where a person who has been lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued (roc, Rule 113, Sec.
13);
5. When the bondsman arrests a prisoner out on bail for the purpose of bringing him to court;
and
6. Where the accused attempts to leave the country without the permission of the court (ROC,
Rule 114, Sec. 23).

Warrantless arrest not valid; fruit of a poisonous tree

Section 2, Article Ill of the 1987 Constitution requires a judicial warrant based on the existence
of probable cause before a search and an arrest may be effected by law enforcement agents.
Without the said warrant, a search or seizure becomes unreasonable within the context of the
Constitution and any evidence obtained on the occasion of such unreasonable search and
seizure shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.13 "Evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree (Villamayor v.
People, G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017).

Question on legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment

Any question regarding the legality of a warrantless arrest must be raised before arraignment.
Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to question the legality of the arrest especially
when the accused actively participated during trial as in this case. However, the Court clarified
that such waiver is only confined to the defects of the arrest and not on the inadmissibility of the
evidence seized during an illegal arrest (Villamayor v. People, supra).
Rule in case of warrantless arrest is made based on personal knowledge of facts
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely "(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."

In Abelita Ill v. Doria et al. (G.R. No. 170672, August 14, 2009), the Court held that personal
knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest (Pestilos v.
Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014).

Determination of probable cause by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest
Within 10 days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate
the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest. In case of doubt on the existence
of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within 30 days from the filing of
the complaint or information (ROC, Rule 112, Sec. 5).

Independent personal assessment of the judge is necessary; supporting affidavits

It was not correct for the prosecutor to argue that rather than dismiss the case, Judge Yadao
should have ordered the prosecution to present additional evidence. The judge’s first option
under S5 R112 is for it to immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. It is only in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause that the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within 5 days from notice
(People v. Dela Torre-Yadao, 13 November 2012).

Judge to proceed with caution

Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution
in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the evidence on hand absolutely fails to
support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the other hand, if a
judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in
order that justice may be served (Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 197293, April 21, 2014).

RULE 114

Bail granted based on humanitarian reasons

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015).
Where bail is a matter of right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The
existence of a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court
no greater discretion than to increase the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to
assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject, of course,
to the other provision that excessive bail shall not be required (San Miguel v. Judge Maceda,
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1749, April 4, 2007).

Not proper to wait for the termination of the trial before the petition for bail may be acted
upon
To mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail –
whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial
notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting
the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of
the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing
for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
(Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, supra).

Motion to quash may be filed while a petition for bail is pending

RULE 115

Double jeopardy will attach if accused is prosecuted for the same offense
When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the express consent of the accused, the latter cannot
again be charged with the same or identical offense (ROC, Rule 117, Sec. 7).

The requisites for the defense of double jeopardy to prosper are the following:
1. There must be a complaint or Information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction;
2. Filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. After the accused had been arraigned and pleaded to the charge;
4. That the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent; and
5. The second offense charged is the same as the first charge, or of an attempt to commit the
same or a frustration thereof or that the second offense necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense charged (Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Son,
G.R. No. 80268, May 27, 1992).

Information must allege the fact of mental retardation

Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim at the time of the commission of
the crime of rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under Article 266-B,
paragraph 10 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. An allegation
in the information of such knowledge of the offender is necessary, as a crime can only be
qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. A contrary ruling would result in a denial of
the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him, and hence a denial of due
process (People v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 177294, February 19, 2008).

Accused cannot be convicted of offense higher than that alleged

An accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the
complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any
offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily
included therein. He has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is
charged before he is put on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in
the complaint or information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right
(Canceran v. People, G.R. No. 206442, July 1, 2015).

Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the
affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules
require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents. The right of the respondent is only "to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant," as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that "Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the
right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant
and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine." Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure,
read together, only require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the
affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses.1âwphi1 There is no law or rule
requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015).

Rule against self-incrimination does not apply to mechanical acts

The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition
as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act (Teodosio v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124346, June 8, 2004).

Speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases

In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition
of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the
prejudice caused by the delay (Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013).

RULE 116

Searching questions in case of re-arraignment

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.  The accused may
present evidence in his behalf (People v. Magat, G.R. No. 130026, May 31, 2000).

Conditional arraignment
Conditional or provisional arraignment will not give rise to double jeopardy. The arraignment’s
conditions gave the right to the accused to travel abroad but he cannot object to amendments to
information that may be “necessary in light of pending incidents” (Braza v Sandiganbayan, 20
February 2013).

Requirement of conduct of searching questions not satisfied if it was counsel who

explained the consequences of plea

Suspension of arraignment
Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
1. The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effective
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;
2. There exists a prejudicial question; and
3. A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department
of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not
exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office (ROC,
Rule 116, Sec. 11).

Remedy if allegations are generalized

The accused may file a motion for bill of particulars under Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The
purpose of bill of particular is to clarify the allegations in the information that are indefinite,
vague, or are conclusions of law to enable the accused to prepare for trial, not simply to inform
him of the crime of which he stands accused (Enrile v. People, G.R. 213455, August 11, 2015).

Prohibition against plea bargaining under RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous

Drugs Act of 2002 is unconstitutional
Section 23 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which prohibits plea bargaining for the violation
of the said law is unconstitutional as (a) it violates the rule making power of the Supreme Court
as provided under Sec.5(5) of the Constitution and (b) it violates the principle of separation of
powers (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017).

RULE 117

Procedure of motion to quash is denied

An order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and therefore not appealable. The denial of
the motion to quash means that the criminal information remains pending with the court, which
must proceed with the trial to determine whether the accused is guilty of the crime charged
therein (Miranda v. Sandiganbayan and The Ombudsman, G.R. No. 144760-61, August 2,
2017). The usual course to take is for the accused to proceed with trial, and in case of
conviction, to appeal therefrom and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash (Lalican v.
Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997). The only exception is when the court acts without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case certiorari or prohibition
will lie (Newsweek, Inc. v. IAC, G.R. No. L-63559, May 30, 1986).
Accused convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale; no double jeopardy if
prosecuted for the crime of estafa
An illegal recruiter can be liable for the crimes of illegal recruitment committed in large scale and
estafa without risk of being put in double jeopardy, provided that the accused has been so
charged under separate informations. The elements of estafa as charged are, namely: (1) the
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended
party, or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. In contrast,
illegal recruitment is committed by a person who: (a) undertakes any recruitment activity defined
under Article l 3(b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34 and Article 38 of the
Labor Code; and (b) does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers. It is committed in large scale when it is committed against three or
more persons individually or as a group. Double jeopardy could not result from prosecuting and
convicting the accused-appellant for both crimes considering that they were entirely distinct from
each other not only from their being punished under different statutes but also from their
elements being different (People v. Bayker, G.R. No. 170192, February 10, 2016).

Requisites for the 2-year and 1-year bar rule to apply

The following are the conditions sine qua non for the application of the time-bar rule for
provisional dismissals: first, there must be the express consent of the accused; second, notice
to the offended party must be given; third, the court grants the motion; and fourth, the order of
provisional dismissal must be served to the public prosecutor (People v. Lacson, G.R. No.
149453, April 1, 2003).

Reasons for the time-bar rule in reviving a criminal case that has been dismissed

(Rule 116) Bill of particulars in a criminal case; purpose

A bill of particulars may be requested in order for the accused to be fully apprised of the true
charges against them, and thus avoid any and all possible surprise, which might be detrimental
to their rights and interests (People v. Abad Santos, G.R. No. L-447, June 17, 1946).

(Rule 121) Requisites of newly discovered evidence

Before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the following
requisites must be established: (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) that such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching,
and (4) that the evidence is of such a weight that it would probably change the judgement if
needed (Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011).

(Rule 119) Demurrer to evidence

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss due to the insufficiency of the evidence presented
by the prosecution to overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. If made
with leave of court and the motion is denied, the defense can still present its evidence. On the
other hand, if it was filed without leave of court, it loses the right to present evidence and the
case will be deemed submitted for decision (Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 23).

Section 8
A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and
with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived (Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section
8).

The consequences of a meritorious motion to quash

If the ground of the motion is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, that the officer
who filed the Information had no authority to do so, that it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, or that more than one offense is charged, then, the court may order that
another Information be filed or an amendment thereof be made, as the case may be, within a
definite period. If such order is made, and the accused is in custody, he shall not be discharged
unless admitted to bail. Meanwhile, if such order is not made, or if having been made, another
Information is not filed within the time specified in the order, or within such time as the court may
allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is
also in custody for some other charge.

If the motion to quash is sustained upon the ground that a criminal action or liability has been
extinguished, that it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification, or
that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, the court
must state, in its order granting the motion, the release of the accused if he is in custody or the
cancellation of his bond if he is on bail (Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section 5; PAMARAN,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated (2012), p. 448-9).

Time bars
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived (Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section
8).

Quashal v. Provisional Dismissal

When quashal is granted, a dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The court may
even order the filing of a new complaint or Information because an order sustaining the motion
is generally not a bar to another prosecution. It is a final order which is appealable but subject to
the double jeopardy rule (Lalican v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997). On the other
hand, where the case was dismissed “provisionally" with the consent of the accused, he cannot
invoke double jeopardy in another prosecution therefor or where the case was reinstated on a
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. If no revival of the case is made within the
prescribed period, the dismissal shall be removed from being provisional and becomes
permanent (People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003).

(Rule 116) Enrile’s Plunder Case

When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a
motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars. The purpose of a bill of particulars is to
supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint or information to enable the accused to
properly plead and prepare for trial. It presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the
elements of the crime charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill
of particulars may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if
the Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be resolved
in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally guaranteed
rights.

The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated to bring about a fair verdict.
This becomes more relevant in a case where the crime charged carries with it the severe
penalty of capital punishment and entails the commission of several predicate criminal acts
involving a great number of transactions spread over a considerable period of time. Notably,
conviction for plunder carries with it the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more
process is due, not less. When a person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and
property language recognized in the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all
measures must be taken to ensure the protection of those fundamental rights (Enrile v. People,
G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015).

Motion to Quash vs. Motion for Bill of Particulars

A motion to quash is filed before the accused enters his plea. Prior leave of court is not
required. The grounds may be based on the matters found on the face of the complaint or
Information as when it is alleged that the facts do not constitute an offense. When granted, a
dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The court may even order the filing of a new
complaint or Information because an order sustaining the motion is generally not a bar to
another prosecution (Lalican v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997).

On the other hand, the fact that the allegations in the Complaint or Information are vague or
broad, is not generally a ground for a motion to quash, the remedy being to file a motion for bill
of particulars. It is also filed before arraignment. Prior leave of court is likewise not required. The
purpose is to enable the accused to plead properly and to prepare for trial (Enrile v. People,
G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015).

RULE 118

Effect of admission of liability of client by counsel at pre-trial

*can't find case with same facts*

While plea bargaining during pre-trial is encouraged under the Rules and the Speed Trial Act of
1998, the accused's counsel cannot admit liability on behalf of the accused. The accused must
personally appear during pre-trial and enter his plea.

Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit
Pre-trial shall proceed even in the absence of parties provided, they were notified and the
counsel for the accused and the public prosecutor are present. The documentary evidence for
both parties shall be marked. The pre-trial order shall immediately be served upon the parties
and counsel on the same day after the termination of the pre-trial. Courts must strictly comply
with the rules (Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, OCA Circular No.
101-2017).

RULE 119

When accused discharged to become a state witness

The following requisites must be complied with:
1. The discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness;
2. There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
3. There is no other direct evidence available for the prosecution except the testimony of said
accused;
4. The testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. The accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. The accused has never been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude (ROC, Rule
119, Sec. 17).

Two (2) modes by which one may become a State witness

A person may become a state witness by the virtue of Rule 119, Sec. 7 of the ROC or by the
virtue of RA No. 6981 or the “Witness Protection Security Act.” In the former, the immunity is
granted by the court while the DOJ grants the immunity in the latter.

Effect if demurrer to evidence granted; accused not civilly liable

Grant of demurrer to evidence on ground that the prosecution did not present the informant a
grave abuse of discretion which may be set aside by certiorari; no double jeopardy (People v.
Judge Lagos, G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013).

Demurrer to evidence
The prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits. On the same day, the accused filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the violation of his right to a speedy trial and on the ground that the
trial court has no evidence to consider, that the charge had no leg to stand on, and that the
prosecution witnesses had no knowledge of the accused’s participation or connection in the
crime. The trial court treated the motion to dismiss as a demurrer, denied the same, and
deemed the accused to have waived the right to present evidence since he filed the motion
without leave of court. The Supreme Court held that the motion to dismiss cannot be treated as
a demurrer since a demurrer can only be filed after the prosecution has rested its case pursuant
to S23 R119. The prosecution is deemed to have rested its case only after the court shall have
ruled on its formal offer. The motion is actually a motion to dismiss based on the violation of the
right to a speedy trial (Cabador v. People, G.R. 186001, 2 October 2009).

If an accused files a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order admitting the prosecution
evidence, the 5-day period to file a motion for leave of court to file demurrer is reckoned from
the notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, not from notice of the order
admitting the prosecution evidence (Reyes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148607, September 5,
2012).

When accused filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, the whole case was
submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution as the
accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. Hence even if the demurrer is
granted, the trial court may hold the accused civilly liable and he can no longer adduce evidence
on the civil aspect because of his waiver. (Alferez v. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31,
2011).

RULE 120

Variance between allegation and testimony; no objection to information

The accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and proved. If it is not
charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the accused cannot be
convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation contained in the Information
and the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for either the offense charged or
the offense proved unless either is included in the other (Malabanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 186329, 186584-86 & 198598, August 2, 2017). However, when the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 4).

Variance between what was alleged and what was proved

When the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 4).

Effect if accused fails to appear at promulgation; warrant of arrest; mere notice of appeal
is not considered as surrender
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice (ROC, Rule 120, Sec. 6).

Modification of judgment
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation (ROC, Rule 120 Sec. 7).

When probation may be availed of; when accused entitled to probation even if he
appealed
The trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant for a probationable
penalty and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal,
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period
and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. No application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction
(P.D. 968 as amended, Sec. 4).

Nunc pro tunc judgment

The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering of a new judgment and the
ascertainment and determination of new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record,
the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to make it
show what the judicial action really was, not to correct judicial errors, such as to render a
judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render,
nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment may have been (One
Shipping Corp. v. Penafiel, G.R. No. 192406, January 21, 2015).

Rationale of the probation law

This Decree shall be interpreted so as to:
a. Promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized
treatment;
b. Provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less
probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
c. Prevent the commission of offenses (P.D. 968, Sec. 2).

RULE 122

Effects of appeal if there are several accused, but one or more appealed
An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal. In
the case of the co-accused who did not appeal, the judgment of the trial court insofar as it
relates to him becomes final, and the appellate court has no power to interfere therewith.
Nevertheless, if the verdict of the appellate court is favorable or applicable to him, the same
may be given effect (ROC, Rule 122, Sec. 11).

Effects of appeal if there are several accused

The well-established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open
for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show that
Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11(a) of Rule
122 of the ROC provides that an appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellant court is
favorable and applicable to the latter (Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147524, June 20,
2006).

RULE 126

Proceedings for application of search warrant are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that
venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of whether the application
should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because,
as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in
all courts.

Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally flawed, because as

pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994), and
reiterated in the more recent Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines, to wit: an
application for a search warrant is a “special criminal process,” rather than a criminal action. The
basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a
search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would
thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in
all courts (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Petron Corp., G.R. No. 189669, February 16,
2015).

“Knock and Announce Principle”

Officers executing the search must do the following acts: (a) announce their presence; (b)
identify themselves to the accused and to persons who rightfully have possession of the
premises to be searched; (c) show to them the search warrant; and (d) Explain the warrant in a
language or dialect known and understood by them (People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No.
139301, Sept. 29, 2004).

Witnesses in buy-bust operation?

Despite noncompliance with the requirements in Section 21, there is no showing of a break in
the chain in the custody of the seized item, later on determined to be shabu, from the moment of
its seizure by the entrapment team, to the investigating officer, to the time it was brought to the
forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory [Link] prosecution’s
failure to submit in evidence the required photograph and inventory conducted in the presence
of the accused and witnesses of the seized drugs pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 will not exonerate Bulotano. Noncompliance with the requirements is not fatal and
will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
[Link] is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused (People v. Bulotano, G.R. No. 190177, June 11, 2014).

Revival of the case with respect to effect of amnesty; Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall
be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from
henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are
blotted out. Hence, it is that statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and
grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to
it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt (Romualdez v. Marcelo, G.R.
Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006).