Balibago Faith Baptist Church v.

Faith in Christ Jesus Baptist Church

G.R. No. 191527

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision dated March 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97292 granting the petition
of herein respondents and dismissing the case for unlawful detainer filed by herein petitioner.

Facts:

On March 7, 1990, a contract of loan was entered into between PBSBC and BFBC where the
latter borrowed money from the former to enable it to purchase the subject property. Thereafter,
respondent BFBC took possession of the subject property and held therein their religious activities.

While BFBC was still in possession of the subject property, Galvan and his companions began
attending BFBC's religious activities at the subject property. BFBC alleged that Galvan apparently was
interested on the property because after some time Galvan formed and incorporated FCJBC and took
control of the subject property.

Galvan's actuations came to the attention of the Luzon Convention of Southern Baptist
Churches, Inc. (LCSBC). Thus, in a Letter dated September 5, 2001, LCSBC upheld BFBC's right over the
subject property and recognized BFBC's pastor, Rev. Rolando T. Santos, as its legitimate pastor.

However, FCJBC continued to occupy the subject property, thus, in a Demand Letter dated
September 4, 2002, BFBC demanded that FCJBC vacate the property within five (5) days from notice and
to pay the amount of P10,000.00 per month beginning October 2001 as reasonable compensation for its
use.

Due to non-compliance with its demand, on September 24, 2003, BFBC and PBSBC filed a
Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against FCJBC and Galvan. (Civil Case No. 02-388)

In its Answer, FCJBC and Galvan contend that it has been in existence since 1984. Allegedly, it
was formerly known as "Faith Baptist Church" (FBC) and held services at the Tacipit family residence at
31-1 Dona Maria St., Diamond Subdivision, Angeles City. FBC eventually moved to a building along
MacArthur Highway in the same subdivision. Sometime in 1990, some of the members of the FBC
availed of the loan from the Church Loan Fund of Foreign Mission Board, SBC, Philippine Baptist Mission
for the purpose of purchasing the subject property. This was embodied in a Contract of Simple Loan or
Mutuum dated March 7, 1990.

Rolando Santos was the pastor of FBC from 1993 to 2000. Due to a misunderstanding within the
church group, Santos left FBC, together with some of its members. In February 2001, Santos' group
formed BFBC, an organization which was duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Meanwhile, FBC continued to occupy the subject property and, on January 9, 2001, organized
themselves into FCJBC.

On May 30, 2001, FCJBC paid installments due on the subject property in the sum of P10,000.00,
leaving a balance of P240,615.53. FCJBC alleged that since June 2001, they were willing and able to pay
the installments due on the subject property, however, PBSBC refused to accept any payment from it.
By September 9, 2002, the installments due had reached P47,232.00.
FCJBC further averred that, prior to BFBC's filing of the present complaint, a Petition for Consignation of
Payment was already filed on October 9, 2002 with the RTC, Branch 62, Angeles City entitled "Carlos
Gelacio, et al. v. Foreign Mission Board, S.B.C. Philippine Baptist Mission, now Philippine Baptist, S.B.C,
Inc." docketed as Civil Case No. 10713. FCJBC prayed that PBSBC be required to accept the amount of
P240,615.53 as full payment of the Contract of Simple Loan or Mutuum.

On October 29, 2002, FCJBC filed a Motion seeking the suspension of proceedings in Civil Case
No. 02-388 pending resolution of the petition for consignation.

On February 9, 2004, the MTC rendered its Decision in favor of respondent BFBC in Civil Case
No. 02-388. The MTC ruled that the case was one of forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. Appeal
was made by both parties to the RTC whereby the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Motion for
reconsideration by FCJBC was denied. A petition for review on certiorari was made to the CA where it
granted the petition and reversed the decision of the RTC dismissing the case for unlawful detainer.
Undaunted, BFBC and PBSBC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

Issue:

1. Whether the case is one of unlawful detainer or a forcible entry case;

Ruling:

1. The case is one of forcible entry.

In Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, the Court differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry
vis-a-vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

“Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal
from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful
detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination
of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action,
the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs’ cause of action is the
termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

From the foregoing, it is then clear that unlawful detainer and forcible entry are entirely distinct causes
of action, to wit: (a) action to recover possession founded on illegal occupation from the beginning -
forcible entry; and (b) action founded on unlawful detention by a person who originally acquired
possession lawfully - unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera, et al. v. Getaruela, et al., the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of
action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;

(2) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination
of the latter's right of possession;

(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and

(4) Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

This case would have to fall under the concept of forcible entry as it has been long settled that in
forcible entry cases, no force is really necessary. The act of going on the property and excluding the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all
that is necessary. However, while BFBC sufficiently alleged that they had prior physical possession of
the subject property, nothing has been said on how FCJBC's entry was effected or when dispossession
started. It is in this light that we rule that the present complaint is similarly defective even if we are to
treat the same as forcible entry as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare
allegation of BFBC that "[i]t turned out that defendants have an interest in the subject premises and
defendant Reynaldo Galvan formed and incorporated the defendant FCJBC and took control of the
subject premises," would not suffice since it only shows that FCJBC entered the land and occupied the
house thereon without BFBC and PBSBC's consent or permission which are constitutive of forcible entry.

2. No, the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.

Unfortunately, BFBC and PBSBC’s failure to allege when the dispossession took place and how it was
effected leaves the complaint wanting in jurisdictional ground.

Suffice it to say, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally
counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when entry was made through stealth,
the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. If the dispossession did not
occur by any of the means stated in Section 1, Rule 70, as in this case, the proper recourse is to file a
plenary action to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court. Consequently, the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case.

We likewise reiterate that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the
court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation.
All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void.