Federal Bureau of Investigation

Department of Homeland Security

Strategic Intelligence Assessment and Data on

Domestic Terrorism

Submitted to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on

Homeland Security, and the Committee of the Judiciary of the United States House
of Representatives, and the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee of the Judiciary
of the United States Senate

May 2021

Page 1 of 40
Table of Contents

I. Overview of Reporting Requirement ............................................................................................. 2

II. Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 2
III. Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 2
IV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment ................................................................................................... 5
V. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities ................................................................ 9
VI. FBI Data on Domestic Terrorism .................................................................................................19
VII. Recommendations ..........................................................................................................................27
Appendix.....................................................................................................................................................29

I. Overview of Reporting Requirement

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (the Act) requires the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to jointly produce a report
containing a strategic intelligence assessment and data on domestic terrorism (DT). 1 The Act
requires the report to contain a strategic intelligence assessment, a discussion of activities,
certain data on DT matters, and recommendations.

II. Executive Summary

Preventing terrorist attacks remains a top priority for both the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). The threat posed by international and domestic threat actors has
evolved significantly since 9/11. The greatest terrorism threat to the Homeland we face today is
posed by lone offenders,2 often radicalized online, who look to attack soft targets with easily
accessible weapons. Many of these violent extremists are motivated and inspired by a mix of
socio-political goals and personal grievances against their targets. With this report, we are
providing our strategic intelligence assessments on DT, a detailed discussion of our procedures
and methods to address DT threats, as well as data on DT incidents and our investigations.

III. Introduction
The FBI and DHS are both charged with preventing terrorist attacks in the United States,
including those conducted by Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs).3 This goal drives the FBI’s
mission to proactively lead law enforcement and domestic intelligence efforts to defeat terrorist
attacks against US citizens and US interests through an integrated strategy to detect, penetrate,

1
Public Law 116-92, enacted 20 December 2019.
2
The FBI and DHS defines a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies
who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of unlawful violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies
that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.
3
The FBI and DHS define a Domestic Violent Extremist (DVE) as an individual based and operating primarily
within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other
foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or
violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized
philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

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disrupt, and dismantle criminal DT plots, and the FBI and DHS missions to provide strategic
analysis of the DVE landscape.

DT for the FBI’s purposes is referenced in US Code at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), and is defined as
activities:

• Involving acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United
States or of any State;

• Appearing to be intended to:

o Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

o Influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or
o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or
kidnapping; and

• Occurring primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

In comparison, international terrorism (IT) for the FBI’s purposes is referenced in U.S. Code at
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1), and is defined as activities:

• Involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed
with the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

• Appearing to be intended to:

o Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

o Influence the policy of government by intimidation or coercion; or
o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or
kidnapping; and

• Occurring primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they
appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or
seek asylum.4

The DHS derives its definition of DT from the Homeland Security Act definition of terrorism,
6 U.S.C. 101(18), which is similar to, but not identical, to the 18 U.S.C. 2331(5) definition.
Under the Homeland Security Act, terrorism:

4
In certain instances, a DVE’s conduct may eventually lead to the DVE engaging in international terrorism, as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1).

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• Involves an act that:

o Is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or

key resources; and
o Is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other
subdivision of the United States, and

• Appears to be intended to:

o Intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

o Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
o Affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.

In our discussion of DT threats, we use the words “violent extremism” to define DT threats
because mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric,
or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute violent extremism, and
may be constitutionally protected. Under FBI policy and federal law, no investigative activity
may be based solely on First Amendment activity, or the apparent or actual race, ethnicity,
national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the individual or group.
The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on US persons solely for the
purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

While the majority of DVEs fall into one threat category, some draw upon or are inspired by
ideological themes found in other threat categories, as depicted in the following graphic.

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IV. Strategic Intelligence Assessment
The Act calls for a strategic intelligence assessment of DT in the United States during 2017,
2018, and 2019.

Since 2017, while the FBI successfully investigated and disrupted DVE activities, plots, and
threats, and the FBI and DHS continued to provide strategic warnings and analysis of the
heightened DVE threat, DVE lone offenders acting independently and without direction from
specific groups have been the primary actor in DT lethal attacks. The FBI and DHS assessed
lone offenders would continue to be the primary actor in these attacks, and would continue to
pose significant mitigation challenges due to their capacity for independent radicalization and
mobilization and preference for easily accessible weapons. The FBI and DHS assessed multiple
factors, including perceptions of or responses to political and social conditions and law

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enforcement and government overreach, would also almost certainly continue to contribute to
DVE radicalization, target selection, and mobilization in violation of federal, state, and local law
and hate crime5 statutes.

Strategic Intelligence Assessment for 2017

In 2017, DVEs remained a persistent source of violence, with Racially or Ethnically Motivated
Violent Extremists (RMVEs)6 advocating for the superiority of the white race and Anti-
Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists (AGAAVEs) – primarily Anarchist Violent
Extremists (AVEs),7 Militia Violent Extremists (MVEs),8 and Sovereign Citizen Violent
Extremists (SCVEs)9 – presenting the greatest threats of violence. RMVEs were the primary
sources of lethal and significant violence, with lone offenders conducting lethal attacks against
targets of opportunity, using non-complex tactics and accessible weapons. The FBI and DHS
assessed broad drivers of domestic violent extremism, including perceptions of or responses to
government activity, and social, political, and economic conditions, continued to feed a
consistent level of domestic violent extremism, although trends within individual extremist
movements remained dynamic.

DVE violence in 2017 consisted primarily of attacks or threatening behavior against accessible
targets or individuals, using weapons acquired with relative ease, including firearms and bladed
weapons, or unsophisticated tactics such as physical assaults. Law enforcement and racial
minorities were the prevalent DVE targets in 2017, with race providing a principal focus for
RMVEs espousing the superiority of the white race, and law enforcement and government
continuing to represent key targets of interest for AGAAVEs, specifically MVEs and SCVEs.
Numerous violent encounters also took place between perceived ideological opponents.

5
A hate crime is a criminal offense that was motivated, in whole or in part, by the offender’s bias against a person’s
actual or perceived race/ethnicity/ancestry, national origin gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual
orientation, and was committed against persons, property, or society.
6
As defined by the FBI and DHS, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism encompasses the potentially
unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas derived from bias, often related to
race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others or a given population group. RMVEs purport to use both political
and religious justifications to support their racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal
activities.
7
As defined by the FBI and DHS, anarchist violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of
force or violence in furtherance of an anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideology that considers
capitalism and centralized government to be unnecessary and oppressive.
8
As defined by the FBI and DHS, militia violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or threat of
force or violence in furtherance of an anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideology in response to
perceived abuses of power by the government, especially in regard to suspected infringements on gun rights;
excessive use of force by law enforcement; or bureaucratic incompetence in attending to critical tasks.
9
As defined by the FBI and DHS, sovereign citizen violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or
threat of force or violence in furtherance of anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideological agendas
by those who identify as sovereign citizens. Sovereign citizens are US citizens who claim to have special knowledge
or heritage that renders them immune from government authority and laws.

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Abortion-Related Violent Extremists10 and Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists 11
also remained sources of harm or economic damage through criminal acts of destruction,
sabotage, or arson.

In 2017, DVEs conducted five lethal attacks using bladed weapons, firearms, and a vehicular
ramming that resulted in the deaths of eight individuals. Of those lethal incidents, RMVEs were
responsible for four attacks resulting in seven deaths, and MVEs, a subset of the AGAAVE
threat category, conducted one attack resulting in one death. Of the four attacks conducted by
RMVEs, RMVEs espousing the superiority of the white race conducted two attacks resulting in
two deaths, and RMVEs who used racism or injustice in American society to justify their use of
violence conducted the other two attacks resulting in five deaths.

Both the FBI and DHS continued to work with state and local law enforcement partners in
matters related to domestic violent extremism, including through provision of strategic analysis
of the threat, and enhanced both independent and joint collaborative reporting, collection, and
targeting efforts via human source and technical means.

Strategic Intelligence Assessment for 2018

In 2018, the FBI and DHS assessed DVEs posed a persistent and evolving threat of violence,
with RMVEs advocating for the superiority of the white race and AGAAVEs, specifically
SCVEs, engaging in lethal attacks. Abortion-Related Violent Extremists, Animal
Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists, and Puerto Rican National Violent Extremists,12
which is a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, also caused harm and economic damage
through criminal acts of property destruction and arson. The six fatal DVE attacks in 2018
underscored how DVEs acting as lone offenders continued to advance their extremist ideologies
by engaging in lethal attacks and acts of violence against targets of opportunity, using
rudimentary tactics and readily accessible weapons. DVEs were primarily enabled by their use of
the Internet, including social media platforms, which has increasingly enabled individuals to
radicalize online and engage other DVEs without having to join organized groups.

In 2018, DVE lone offenders conducted six lethal attacks using bladed weapons, firearms, and
violent assaults that resulted in the deaths of 17 individuals. Of those lethal incidents, RMVEs
advocating for the superiority of the white race were responsible for five attacks resulting in 16

10
As defined by the FBI and DHS, abortion-related violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or
threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas relating to abortion, including individuals who
advocate for violence in support of either pro-life or pro-choice beliefs.
11
As defined by the FBI and DHS, animal rights/environmental violent extremism encompasses the potentially
unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas by those seeking to end or mitigate
perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals and/or the perceived exploitation or destruction of natural
resources and the environment.
12
As defined by the FBI, Puerto Rican national violent extremism encompasses the potentially unlawful use or
threat of force or violence in furtherance of anti-government or anti-authority violent extremist ideological agendas
by those seeking independence for Puerto Rico by destabilizing the relationship between the US Government and
the Government of Puerto Rico – which they view as a proxy of the United States. The DHS does not utilize a
separate definition for this activity.

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deaths, and an SCVE, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, was responsible for one attack
resulting in one death.

MVEs, a subset of the AGAAVE threat category, continued to espouse violent rhetoric, often
lacking intent or credibility, to engage in violence against Muslims, political activists, and
protestors to protect their vision of public safety, such as border-related issues. In addition to the
previously mentioned 2018 lethal attack conducted by an SCVE in response to law enforcement
actions, SCVEs also engaged in non-lethal criminal activity in response to law enforcement
actions and criminal activity motivated by perceptions that the US Government is illegitimate,
including identity and financial fraud, property theft, and attempts to institute sovereign citizen
“common law.” AVEs, another subset of the AGAAVE threat category, conducted criminal acts
and may have used improvised incendiary devices to target law enforcement and others during
confrontations.

An expansive set of factors, including responses to government activity, in addition to social,

economic, and political conditions, was assessed to very likely contribute to inspire DVE
radicalization, target selection, and mobilization in violation of federal law. As DVE attacks, plot
disruptions, and other criminal acts reflected persistent aspirations for large-scale or mass-
casualty acts of violence by lone offenders, the FBI continued to work with state and local law
enforcement partners to sustain and enhance collaborative efforts to mitigate the DVE threat.
Both the FBI and DHS continued efforts to publish joint analytic products to our shared
stakeholders in this field.

Strategic Intelligence Assessment for 2019

In 2019, the FBI and DHS assessed RMVEs, primarily those advocating for the superiority of the
white race, likely would continue to be the most lethal DVE threat to the Homeland. Our
agencies had high confidence in this assessment based on the demonstrated capability of RMVEs
in 2019 to select weapons and targets to conduct attacks, and the effectiveness of online RMVE
messaging calling for increased violence. Additionally, other DVEs likely would continue to
engage in non-lethal violence and other criminal activity, and DVE reactions to socio-political
events and conditions could increase attacks. The year 2019 represented the most lethal year for
DVE attacks since 1995, with five separate DVE attacks resulting in 32 deaths, 24 of which
occurred during attacks conducted by RMVEs advocating for the superiority of the white race.

Themes like “gamification” and “accelerationism” partly inspired some of the attacks in 2019
and likely will continue to inspire future plots. Gamification is a term where fatality counts in
attacks are referred to as “scores,” as the actor desires to accomplish “achievements” or high kill
counts.13 Messaging from RMVEs espousing the superiority of the white race has furthered this
narrative by framing previous attacks as resulting in a “score.” Additionally, widely disseminated
propaganda on online forums and encrypted chat applications that espouse similar themes
regarding kill counts could inspire future attackers to mobilize faster or attempt increasingly
lethal and more sophisticated attacks. These online forums and chat applications also reference
accelerationism, a belief amongst some neo-Nazi and/or fascist RMVEs that the current system

13
Gamification includes the notion of recording an attack from the attacker’s perspective, similar to a first-person
shooter video game.

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is irreparable, without apparent political solutions, and hence violent action is needed to
precipitate societal collapse to start a race war.

Other DVE criminal activity, such as vandalism and threats of violence, as a perceived means of
achieving social and political goals likely would continue to impact public safety and critical
infrastructure in 2020. In 2019, non-lethal DVE criminal activity was similar to what had been
observed in previous years. The activity was motivated by traditional drivers and targets,
including changes to abortion or environmental laws. However, changes to the political
environment could result in an increase in the frequency of criminal activity or could inspire
some DVEs to attempt to engage in lethal activity.

Both the FBI and DHS assessed DVEs likely would continue to focus on attacking soft targets
and use gamification to encourage higher fatality attacks. The propagation of accelerationism
almost certainly would perpetuate the threat from RMVEs who espouse the superiority of the
white race. Political disagreements within the United States could present opportunities for
DVEs to engage in violence against individuals perceived to have opposing ideologies,
prominent political or public figures, or members of the media covering these events.

V. Discussion and Comparison of Investigative Activities

The Act calls for a discussion and comparison of the following activities:

• The criteria for opening, managing, and closing DT and IT investigations.

• Standards and procedures for the FBI with respect to the review, prioritization, and
mitigation of DT and IT threats in the United States.

• The planning, development, production, analysis, and evaluation of intelligence and

intelligence products relating to terrorism, noting any differences with respect to DT and IT.

• The sharing of information relating to DT and IT by and between the federal government;
state, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign governments; the appropriate congressional
committees; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.

• The criteria and methodology used by the FBI to identify or assign terrorism classifications
to DT investigations.

• Compliance with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections, including
protections against the public release of names or other personally identifiable information
of individuals involved in incidents, investigations, indictments, prosecutions, or convictions
for which data is reported under the Act.

• Information regarding any training or resources provided to assist federal, state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies in understanding, detecting, deterring, and investigating acts
of DT, including the date, type, subject, and recipient agencies of such training or resources.

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Criteria for Opening, Managing, and Closing DT and IT Investigations

Opening: The FBI opens a full investigation14 predicated on an “articulable factual basis” that
reasonably indicates the existence of federal criminal activity or a threat to national security, or
to protect against such activity or threat. The opening of a full investigation must be approved by
a Supervisory Special Agent, and notice to the responsible Headquarters unit must be provided
within 15 days of opening. The FBI may open a preliminary investigation15 on the basis of any
“allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national
security.16 The opening of a preliminary investigation by a Field Office requires the approval of a
Supervisory Special Agent, but does not require notice to the Department of Justice (DOJ),
unless it involves a sensitive investigative matter (SIM).17

For a national security full investigation of a US person, Headquarters must notify the
DOJ/National Security Division within 30 days. The opening of an investigation involving a SIM
must be reviewed by the Field Office’s Chief Division Counsel (CDC), approved by the Special
Agent in Charge, and provided to the responsible Headquarters Unit Chief within 15 days of
opening as notice. The Field Office must notify the US Attorney’s Office within 30 days unless
inappropriate, and in that case, Headquarters must notify and provide an explanation to DOJ
within 30 days.

No investigation may be opened based solely on activities protected by the First Amendment or
the lawful exercise of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The opening of a preliminary or full investigation classified as a DT matter must be approved by

the Field Office’s CDC; however, the opening of a full investigation classified as an IT matter
does not have the same requirement.

Managing: The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-Dom)
authorize all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation. The FBI requires
file reviews of full investigations every 90 days. Some of the investigative methods the FBI is
14
A full investigation may be opened if there is an “articulable factual basis” for the investigation that reasonably
indicates one of the following circumstances exists: an activity constituting a federal crime or a threat to the national
security has or may have occurred, is or may be occurring, or will or may occur, and the investigation may obtain
information relating to the activity or the involvement or role of an individual, group, or organization in such
activity.
15
A preliminary investigation is a type of predicated investigation that may be opened (predicated) on the basis of
any “allegation or information” indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.
Preliminary investigations may be opened to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal
crimes or threats to the national security.
16
The significance of the distinction between the full and preliminary investigation is in the availability of
investigative tools. A preliminary investigation, which is based on the lesser factual predicate, limits the
investigative tools and methods available, while the full investigation, which is based on the more robust factual
predicate, permits the full range of legally available investigative tools and methods. In some instances, cases
opened as preliminary investigations may be converted to full investigations based on the development of additional
facts during the course of the investigation.
17
A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) involves the activities of a domestic public official or political candidate
(involving corruption or a threat to the national security), religious or political organization or individual prominent
in such an organization, or news media, or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing an
investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters and other DOJ officials.

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authorized to use differ between DT and IT investigations. For example, a full investigation of a
DT matter may conduct electronic surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, but a full investigation of an IT matter may conduct
electronic surveillance pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
amended. Additionally, investigations of DT matters may make use of federal grand jury
subpoenas to compel the disclosure of records and other relevant information, but investigations
of IT matters may also use a National Security Letter 18 to compel such records. Finally,
investigations of DT matters must be periodically reviewed by the Field Office’s CDC, and
investigations of IT matters do not have the same requirement.

Closing: A Supervisory Special Agent must approve the closure of both full and preliminary
investigations. A preliminary investigation must be closed within six months of its opening but
may be extended for an additional six months. At the conclusion of either type of investigation,
each of the following items must be documented:

• A summary of the results of the investigation.

• Whether logical and reasonable investigation was completed.

• Whether all investigative methods/techniques initiated have been completed and/or

discontinued.

• Whether all leads set have been completed and/or discontinued.

• Whether all evidence has been returned, destroyed, or retained in accordance with evidence
policy.

• A summary statement of the reason the full investigation will be closed.

At the conclusion of a full investigation, the Field Office must also document whether sufficient
personnel and financial resources were expended on the investigation, or an
explanation/justification for not expending sufficient resources.

There are no substantive differences in how the FBI closes full investigations of DT or IT
matters.

The following chart presents a comparison of FBI policies for both DT and IT preliminary and
full investigations.

18
A National Security Letter is an administrative demand for documents or records that are relevant to a predicated
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.

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 Preliminary Investigation Full Investigation
Predication Information or an allegation indicating Articulable factual basis that
the existence of federal criminal reasonably indicates the existence of
activity or a threat to national security federal criminal activity or a threat to
(or to protect against such activity or national security (or to protect against
threat) such activity or threat)
Approval to Open • Supervisory Special Agent • Supervisory Special Agent
• If a Domestic Terrorism (DT) • Notice to the responsible
matter, Field Office (FO) Chief Headquarters (HQ) unit must be
Division Counsel (CDC) provided within 15 days of
opening
• If a DT matter, FO CDC
Approval to Open: • FO CDC • FO CDC
Sensitive • FO Special Agent in Charge (SAC) • FO SAC
Investigative • Notice to responsible HQ Unit • Notice to responsible HQ Unit
Matter (SIM) Chief within 15 days of opening. Chief within 15 days of opening
• Notice to the US Attorney’s Office • Notice to the USAO within 30
(USAO) within 30 days unless days unless inappropriate, and in
inappropriate, and in that case, that case, HQ must notify and
HQ must notify and provide an provide an explanation to DOJ
explanation to DOJ within 30 days within 30 days
File Review Every 90 calendar days Every 90 calendar days
Examples of In a DT Matter: In a DT Matter:
Authorized • Obtain public information • Obtain public information
Investigative • Physical surveillance • Physical surveillance
Methods • Federal grand jury subpoenas • Federal grand jury subpoenas
• Electronic surveillance pursuant
In an International Terrorism (IT) to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Matter: Control and Safe Streets Act of
• Obtain public information 1968
• Physical Surveillance
• Federal grand jury subpoenas and In an IT Matter:
National Security Letters (NSLs) • Obtain public information
• Physical Surveillance
• Federal grand jury subpoenas and
NSLs
• Electronic surveillance pursuant
to Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978, as
amended
Closure Must be closed within six months but No duration limit
may be extend for an additional six
months
Approval to Close Supervisory Special Agent Supervisory Special Agent
Approval to Close: Supervisory Special Agent, with SAC Supervisory Special Agent, with SAC
SIM approval approval

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Standards and Procedures for Reviewing, Prioritizing, and Mitigating DT and IT Threats

The FBI uses the Threat Review and Prioritization (TRP) process as a standardized method for
reviewing and prioritizing threats within operational programs to inform threat strategies,
mitigation plans, and resource allocation. Headquarters operational divisions use the TRP
process to uniformly define threat issues for the organization, determine their prioritization at the
national level, establish FBI National Threat Priorities (NTPs), and cascade those threat issues
and the national threat strategies for the NTPs to the FBI enterprise. Field Offices then use the
TRP process to prioritize threat issues for their specific areas of responsibility (AORs) and create
threat strategies to mitigate threats. The FBI conducts the TRP process on a biennial basis, but it
may be conducted annually at the discretion of the Field Office or Headquarters operational
division head.

The TRP process is consensus-based and includes applicable US Attorney’s Office(s) and
stakeholders to determine prioritization (banding) and to develop threat strategies for mitigation
of threat issues. Headquarters operational divisions develop national threat strategies for each
threat issue to guide enterprise-wide mitigation efforts. Field Offices develop threat strategies
annually for all threat issues they band, and they detail the particular steps their Field Office
plans to take to mitigate each banded threat issue in their AOR. These threat strategies must be
used to guide mitigation of each threat issue for the upcoming fiscal year, unless a change in
threat banding or threat strategies occurs during midyear negotiations. The TRP of the FBI is
classified as it incorporates sources and methods as a basis of strategic alignment of national
security resources.

There are no differences in how the FBI reviews and prioritizes DT and IT threats; however, the
threat band dictates priorities within these programs. Investigative methods the FBI is authorized
to use differ between DT and IT investigations, and DT investigations may be subject to
additional legal review.

Planning, Development, Production, Analysis, and Evaluation of Intelligence and Intelligence

Products Relating to DT and IT

The FBI intelligence cycle for both DT and IT matters consists of planning intelligence efforts
around priorities based on national or Field Office threat strategies, collecting raw intelligence
information, processing and synthesizing data, analyzing and crafting assessments into analytic
intelligence products, disseminating those products, briefing analysis to decision makers, and
evaluating disseminated products and the production process to inform future efforts.

Similarly, the DHS began Intelligence Threat Banding in 2019, a process in which DHS
intelligence leadership, as part of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), prioritizes
threat topics. Using the Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework as a foundation,
the HSIC prioritizes threats within multiple mission areas. The process is informed by DHS’
execution of the intelligence cycle – the development of requirements, collection through field
operations or open source collectors, and analysis to produce finished intelligence in the DT
space.

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DHS implements Intelligence Threat Banding across its mission areas. The results drive analytic
production through the program of analysis process and informs intelligence resource allocation
through Intelligence Guidance in the Secretary’s Resource Planning Guidance – DHS’ Planning,
Programming, Budgeting & Execution (PPBE) process.

During the planning phase of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS consider the National
Intelligence Priorities Framework, which documents the Intelligence Community’s priorities;
and the FBI also considers its own standing intelligence and investigative responsibilities, which
are addressed and prioritized in the TRP process. During the TRP process, the FBI identifies the
intelligence needs related to the threat priorities, and those intelligence needs drive the
subsequent stages of the intelligence cycle.

During the collection and processing phases of the intelligence cycle, both the FBI and DHS
obtain raw intelligence from lawful collection methods consistent with their respective
authorities and then synthesize this data into a form intelligence personnel can use. In the
analysis and evaluation phases, analysts examine and evaluate all source intelligence, including
collected information; add context, as needed; and integrate the information into complete
assessments. The analysts make assessments about the implications of the information for the
United States and document the assessments in analytic intelligence products.

Legal review is required for any FBI intelligence product, such as an Intelligence Information
Report (IIR),19 related to a potential SIM or other sensitive information, in accordance with the
guidelines in the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) and identified
“legal review triggers.” One such legal review trigger is information related to DT. DHS finished
intelligence products that involve US persons, Constitutionally-protected activity, and matters
with significant oversight equities also undergo a process of legal and intelligence oversight.

Finally, intelligence analysis is disseminated in either a written intelligence product or a verbal

briefing during the production phase. Intelligence analysis customers include FBI leadership,
policymakers, military leaders, other government officials, private sector partners, and
operational counterparts who then make decisions based on the information. DHS finished
intelligence products are disseminated to customers through various information portals; on the
unclassified networks, the Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence is the primary
means for disseminating both DHS raw and finished intelligence reporting.

Sharing of Information Relating to DT and IT

The FBI’s National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding provides the common
vision, goals, and framework needed to guide information sharing initiatives with our federal,
state, local, and tribal agency partners, foreign government counterparts, and private sector stake
holders. The FBI shares information consistent with the Privacy Act, FBI policy, and any other
applicable laws and memoranda of understanding or agreement with other agencies.

19
An Intelligence Information Report (IIR) is the FBI’s primary document used to share raw, non-compartmented
FBI intelligence information.

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The FBI works closely with our federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement
partners to investigate and disrupt both DT and IT. The front line of the counterterrorism mission
in the United States is the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The FBI maintains
about 200 JTTFs nationwide across all 56 FBI Field Offices and in many of our satellite Resident
Agencies, with the participation of over 50 federal and over 500 state, local, tribal, and territorial
agencies. These relationships are critical to effective information sharing and the leveraging of
local expertise and experience in FBI investigations.

The FBI, in coordination with the DHS and/or the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC),
produces Joint Intelligence Bulletins (JIBs) that communicate updated threat information and
assessments to our federal, state, local, and tribal partners at the Unclassified // Law Enforcement
Sensitive level. JIBs alert our partners to significant arrests – including those accomplished
through collaboration among different law enforcement entities – and trends we have observed in
both the DT and IT arenas.

As previously discussed, legal review is required for FBI intelligence products related to a
potential SIM or other sensitive information, to include information related to DT. This would
include raw reporting, such as IIRs.

As mentioned above, DHS products within the DT and IT spaces are shared with Homeland
Security stakeholders, including the National Network of Fusion Centers, private sector security
officials, and other customers operating at primarily the Unclassified level, via the Homeland
Security Information Network.

Criteria and Methodology to Identify or Assign Terrorism Classifications to FBI DT

Investigations

While classifications, or categories, help the FBI better understand the criminal actors we pursue,
we recognize actors’ motivations vary, are nuanced, and sometimes are derived from a blend of
socio-political goals or personal grievances. Currently, the US Government broadly divides the
DT threat among the following threat categories:

• Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism: This threat encompasses the

potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas
derived from bias, often related to race or ethnicity, held by the actor against others or a
given population group. RMVEs purport to use both political and religious justifications to
support their racially- or ethnically-based ideological objectives and criminal activities.

• Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism: This threat encompasses the

potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas,
derived from anti-government or anti-authority sentiment, including opposition to perceived
economic, social, or racial hierarchies, or perceived government overreach, negligence, or
illegitimacy. This threat category includes the subcategories of SCVEs, MVEs, AVEs, and
Puerto Rican National Violent Extremists.

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• Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremism: This threat encompasses the
potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas
by those seeking to end or mitigate perceived cruelty, harm, or exploitation of animals
and/or the perceived exploitation or destruction of natural resources and the environment.

• Abortion-Related Violent Extremism: This threat encompasses the potentially unlawful

use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas relating to abortion,
including individuals who advocate for violence in support of either pro-life or pro-choice
beliefs.

• All Other Domestic Terrorism Threats: This category encompasses threats involving the
potentially unlawful use or threat of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas
which are not otherwise defined under or primarily motivated by one of the other DT threat
categories. Such agendas could flow from, but are not limited to, a combination of personal
grievances and beliefs, including those described in the other DT threat categories. Some
actors in this category may also carry bias related to religion, gender, or sexual orientation.

Compliance with Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Policies and Protections

The FBI is responsible for protecting the security of our nation and its people from crime and
terrorism while maintaining rigorous obedience to the Constitution and compliance with all
applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. The AGG-Dom establishes a set of basic principles
that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related activities. When these principles are
applied, they demonstrate respect for civil liberties and privacy as well as adherence to the
Constitution and laws of the United States.

The AGG-Dom authorizes all lawful investigative methods in the conduct of a full investigation.
Considering the effect on the privacy and civil liberties of individuals and the potential to cause
harm to, or otherwise damage the reputation of individuals, some of these investigative methods
are more intrusive than others. The least intrusive method is to be used, based upon the
circumstances of the investigation, but the FBI must not hesitate to use any lawful method
consistent with the AGG-Dom. A more intrusive method may be warranted in light of the
seriousness of a criminal or national security threat or the importance of a foreign intelligence
requirement.

By emphasizing the use of the least intrusive means to obtain intelligence or evidence, FBI
employees can effectively execute their duties while mitigating the potential negative impact on
the privacy and civil liberties of all people encompassed within the investigation, including
targets, witnesses, and victims. This principle is not intended to discourage FBI employees from
seeking relevant and necessary intelligence, information, or evidence, but rather is intended to
encourage FBI employees to choose the least intrusive method, that is still reasonable based
upon the circumstances of the investigation, from the available options to obtain the intelligence,
information, or evidence.

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As a matter of FBI policy, law enforcement activities within the scope of DT investigations are
particularly subject to heightened internal legal review and supervisory approvals to ensure
Constitutional rights, privacy, and civil liberties are protected at each juncture. DT investigations
receive more scrutiny through such legal reviews due to the greater likelihood these
investigations may need to navigate First Amendment-protected activities. There are no other
differences in how the FBI complies with policy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and
protections relating to DT or IT.

The DHS is steadfastly committed to the highest standards of conduct across the Department,
especially when it comes to the equitable and transparent enforcement of our laws. Countering
domestic violent extremism is vital to preserving civil rights and civil liberties and can be
accomplished while protecting the rights of all persons and communities. Consistent with the
DHS mission to secure the nation from threats, the DHS recognizes the mission only succeeds if
the Department respects and protects the values of the nation. Since its inception, the DHS has
prioritized civil rights, civil liberties, and individual privacy protections in its efforts. These
rights must be rigorously guarded.

In confronting the threat of domestic violent extremism, the DHS must take care to avoid
stigmatizing populations and infringing on Constitutional rights. To that end, the DHS does not
profile, target, or discriminate against any individual for exercising their First Amendment rights.
The DHS’ prevention, intelligence, and law enforcement work is never based solely on First
Amendment-protected activity. DHS policy also prohibits the consideration of race or ethnicity
in our intelligence, investigation, screening, and law enforcement activities in all but the most
exceptional instances. Further, how the DHS identifies and detects DT requires faithful
adherence to fair information practice principles and privacy-focused Departmental policies.
The DHS always incorporates privacy protections in information technology systems,
technologies, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, and other activities that involve the planned
use of personally identifiable information. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the
DHS Privacy Office are involved in every aspect of our counterterrorism and prevention
missions. These offices continue to help oversee and train DHS law enforcement and intelligence
personnel on how to respect the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all people and
communities.

The NCTC ensures its analytic work in support of the FBI and DHS as the lead domestic
counterterrorism agencies is fully consistent with the NCTC’s statutory authorities and
undertaken in accordance with Attorney General-approved guidelines for the protection of US
person information, in consultation with agency legal counsel and privacy and civil liberties
officers. The NCTC’s domestic counterterrorism support to the FBI and DHS focuses on trends,
threats, and actors who have committed or attempted to commit crimes determined by these
partners to come within the pertinent definition of DT, following the same spectrum of threats as
FBI and DHS partners. Analysts work closely with the NCTC’s Legal and Civil Liberties and
Privacy officers to ensure appropriate scoping of analysis and all DT-related products undergo
legal review prior to publication. NCTC officers who support the FBI and DHS in the DT
mission space receive specialized training to conduct their mission while adhering to the
Constitution, other applicable laws, Executive Order 12333, and ODNI Attorney General-
approved guidelines, and must be designated by a supervisor to work on DT-related projects. The

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NCTC is not authorized to and does not collect, access, obtain, or maintain information
concerning US persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First
Amendment or the lawful exercise of other Constitutional rights.

Training or Resources Provided to Federal, State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement
Agencies

The FBI takes a leadership role in identifying and addressing emerging threats, and as such,
actively engages with its federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners
through the JTTFs. The FBI shares and encourages the sharing of intelligence and participates in
multi-agency command posts to ensure maximum coordination. In order to proactively address
threats, especially during ongoing incidents, the FBI has developed and shared best practices that
are implemented across the nation.

The FBI’s Behavioral Threat Assessment Center (BTAC), housed within the FBI’s Critical
Incident Response Group, supports JTTFs as well as state and local law enforcement partners by
providing operational support in the form of tailored threat management strategies. In addition to
operational support for pending threat investigations, the BTAC also trains on lessons learned
from operational experience and research to better aid in prevention efforts. The BTAC is
leading an unfunded national Threat Assessment and Threat Management initiative, which
endeavors to build and develop stronger partnerships between law enforcement and across all
levels of government, in an effort to prevent acts of terrorism and targeted violence.

The FBI, in coordination with the DHS and/or the NCTC, produces JIBs that communicate
updated threat information and assessments to our federal, state, local, and tribal partners at the
Unclassified // Law Enforcement Sensitive level. JIBs alert our partners to significant arrests –
including those accomplished through collaboration among different law enforcement entities –
and trends we have observed in both the DT and IT arenas. In 2019, the FBI produced
approximately 15 DT-related JIBs, which highlighted the DVE threat, including RMVE and
AGAAVE threats.

In 2019, the FBI, the DHS, and the NCTC jointly produced the booklet, Homegrown Violent
Extremist Mobilization Indicators, which contains a broad list of behavioral indicators that might
demonstrate an individual’s likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity.20 The booklet was
published to help law enforcement partners and the public at large recognize potentially
dangerous behaviors to identify terrorists before they conduct deadly attacks. It is important to
note some behavioral indicators may have a lawful or Constitutionally-protected explanation,
and the FBI considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether there is a lawful
basis for investigative activity.

The FBI also maintains the eGuardian system as a resource to facilitate sharing suspicious
activity reports and other terrorism-related information by federal, state, local, tribal, and
territorial law enforcement agencies, local and state fusion centers, and the Department of

20
The 2019 edition served as an update to a prior version published in 2017, and it was published on the ODNI’s
public website.

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Defense. Currently, eGuardian is used by agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia,
including 78 state-level fusion centers and the JTTFs.

Specific to formalized training, the FBI offers the Counterterrorism Baseline Operational
Learning Tool (CT BOLT) course to all new counterterrorism employees, including Task Force
Officers supporting the JTTFs. In addition to operational training and instruction, the course
provides training on applicable privacy and civil liberties law and policy and the fundamentals of
protecting First Amendment rights during the course of FBI investigations. The FBI conducts the
CT BOLT course on a monthly basis, and in 2019, more than 240 students completed the course.

The DHS’ National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program (NTER), established in 2019,
serves as a joint collaborative effort by the DHS and federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial
partners that builds on the success of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Program. It
provides law enforcement and homeland security partners with additional resources and training
to help identify and prevent targeted violence and mass casualty incidents implicating homeland
security, including those associated with terrorism, as well as facilitating a national capacity for
identifying, evaluating, and reporting, and sharing tips and leads related to those threats. The
NTER’s Master Trainer Program trains homeland security partners to assist their local
communities in adapting to an evolving threat landscape. Master Trainers teach behavioral threat
assessment techniques and best practices to local partners, and are equipped to empower state,
local, tribal, and territorial partners to identify and assess risk and warning signs, and manage
potential threats of future, targeted violence regardless of motive.

VI. FBI Data on Domestic Terrorism

The Act calls for the following data and information for the period 1 January 2009 to
20 December 2019, the date of Act’s enactment:

• For each completed or attempted DT incident that has occurred in the United States: a
description of such incident; the date and location of such incident; the number and type of
completed and attempted federal nonviolent crimes committed during such incident; the
number and type of federal and state property crimes committed during such incident,
including an estimate of economic damages resulting from such crimes; and the number and
type of complete and attempted federal violent crimes committed during such incident,
including the number of people killed or injured as a result of such crimes.

• An identification of each assessment,21 preliminary investigation, full investigation, and

enterprise investigation22 with a nexus to DT opened, pending, or closed by the FBI; and the

21
An assessment is an investigative activity, which requires an authorized purpose and articulated objective(s).
Assessments may be carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or protect against federal crimes or
threats to the national security or to collect foreign intelligence.
22
An enterprise investigation is a type of full investigation that examines the structure, scope, and nature of the
group or organization including: its relationship, if any, to a foreign power; the identity and relationship of its
members, employees, or other persons who may be acting in furtherance of its objectives; its finances and resources;
its geographical dimensions; its past and future activities and goals; and its capacity for harm. Enterprise
investigations cannot be conducted as preliminary investigations or assessments, nor may they be conducted for the
sole purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.

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 number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise
investigations associated with each DT investigative classification.

• The number of assessments, preliminary investigations, full investigations, and enterprise

investigations with a nexus to DT initiated as a result of a referral or investigation by a
federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign government of a hate crime.

• The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT, including the number of
indictments and complaints associated with each DT investigative classification; a summary
of the allegations in each such indictment; the disposition of the prosecution; and, if
applicable, the sentence imposed as a result of a conviction on such charges.

• Referrals of DT incidents by or to state, local, tribal, territorial, or foreign governments, to

or by departments or agencies of the federal government, for investigation or prosecution,
including the number of such referrals associated with each DT investigative classification,
and a summary of each such referral that includes the rationale for such referral and the
disposition of the applicable federal investigation or prosecution.

• The number of intelligence products associated with each DT investigative classification.

• With respect to the FBI, the number of staff working on DT matters and a summary of time
utilization by and recordkeeping data for personnel working on such matters, including the
number or percentage of such personnel associated with each DT investigative classification
in the FBI’s Headquarters Operational Divisions and Field Divisions.

• With respect to the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), the number of staff
working on DT matters.

• With respect to the NCTC, the number of staff working on DT matters and the applicable
legal authorities relating to the activities of such staff.

The FBI is providing data for the years 2015 through 2019 to provide the most accurate and
consistent information available for terrorism investigations and assessments. During 2014, the
FBI moved from a primarily paper-based case management system to an electronic record
system, and therefore, information for 2015 and beyond will be the most useful and relevant to
the data requirements of the Act.

Completed or Attempted DT Incidents in the United States

The FBI defines a “DT incident” as a criminal act, including threats or acts of violence made to
specific victims, made in furtherance of a domestic socio-political goal, which has occurred and
can be confirmed. The FBI defines a “DT plot” as a combination of criminal activity and
planning that collectively reflect steps toward criminal action in furtherance of a domestic
political or social goal. Disrupted DT plots are plots which, in the FBI’s assessment, absent law
enforcement intervention could have resulted in a DT incident.

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The FBI makes every effort to proactively document lethal and non-lethal DT incidents, but it is
important to note there is no incident reporting requirement that mandates state and local law
enforcement agencies report criminal activity that appears to be motivated by a socio-political
goal consistent with the DT threat categories. As such, some DT incidents will likely go
unreported by other law enforcement agencies, and those agencies will likely arrest the
individual on state or local charges. These factors make it difficult for the FBI to be aware of
every DT incident that has occurred in the United States. Therefore, the appendix provides
information that represents significant DT incidents and disrupted plots that have occurred in the
United States, of which the FBI has knowledge, but not a comprehensive listing of all incidents.

Identification and Number of Each FBI DT Investigation

The FBI was conducting approximately 1,000 pending DT investigations each year for fiscal
year (FY) 2017 through 2019. The classified annex to this report provides additional data on the
number and threat classification of FBI’s DT investigations.

Identification of FBI DT Assessments and Investigations as a Result of a Hate Crime

Hate crimes and DT incidents are often not mutually exclusive. A hate crime is targeted violence
motivated by the offender’s bias against a person’s actual or perceived characteristics, while a
DT incident as a criminal act, including threats or acts of violence made to specific victims,
made in furtherance of a domestic socio-political goal. Sentencing in a hate crime case or a DT
case can be similar when there is a loss of life. To address the intersection of the FBI
counterterrorism and criminal investigative missions to combat DT and provide justice to those
who are victims of hate crimes, the FBI formally created the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes
Fusion Cell in April 2019.

The Hate Crime Statistics Program of the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program
collects data regarding criminal offenses that were motivated, in whole or in part, by the
offender’s bias against a person’s actual or perceived race/ethnicity/ancestry, national origin,
gender, gender identity, religion, disability, or sexual orientation, and were committed against
persons, property, or society. The FBI publishes an annual report of hate crime statistics, and in
2019, law enforcement agencies participating in the UCR Program reported 7,314 hate crime
incidents.23

While the FBI collects and reports hate crime statistics, there is no mandatory reporting
requirement to identify hate crime incidents that would also be considered criminal activity that
appears to be motivated by a socio-political goal consistent with the DT threat categories.
Therefore, the FBI does not have the data to be able to determine numbers of DT assessments
and investigations that were opened as a result of a hate crime.

23
The FBI’s Uniform Crime Report, Hate Crime Statistics, 2019, released fall 2020.

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Number of Federal Charges with a DT Nexus

A litany of federal and state charges are used to charge DT subjects for applicable criminal
violations. Federal charges include those related to weapons, explosives, threats, attacks on
federal officials or facilities, hate crimes, arson, violence against animal enterprises, and material
support to terrorists. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, it is a crime to provide material support or
resources to another knowing or intending they will be used in preparation for or carrying out
certain terrorism-related offenses. Unlike a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the recipient of the
material support need not be a designated foreign terrorist organization.

From FY 2015 through FY 2019, approximately 846 DT subjects were arrested by or in

coordination with the FBI, as follows:

• In FY 2015, approximately 211 DT subjects were arrested, with 130 subjects charged
federally and 81 subjects charged with state/local charges.

• In FY 2016, approximately 229 DT subjects were arrested, with 169 subjects charged
federally and 60 subjects charged with state/local charges.

• In FY 2017, approximately 186 DT subjects were arrested, with 109 subjects charged
federally and 77 subjects charged with state/local charges.

• In FY 2018, approximately 113 DT subjects were arrested, with 54 subjects charged

federally, 52 subjects charged with state/local charges, and seven subjects charged with both
federal and state/local charges.

• In FY 2019, approximately 107 DT subjects were arrested, with 63 subjects charged

federally, 42 subjects charged with state/local charges, and two subjects charged with both
federal and state/local charges.

The number of federal criminal charges with a nexus to DT (and the corresponding details of
those matters) is not currently maintained by the FBI or DOJ in a comprehensive manner.

Individuals whose conduct involves DT or a threat thereof may be prosecuted by any US

Attorney’s Office under a wide range of criminal statutes, some of which on their face relate to
DT, and others of which do not.24 While the criminal code includes a definition of DT, see
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), there is no federal DT statute. For example, the DOJ has prosecuted cases
against such individuals using weapons charges, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924; charges relating to
use or possession of explosives, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845, 5861; threat, hoax, or riot charges, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. §§ 871, 875, 876, 1038, 2101; and charges proscribing attacks on federal officials or

24
Several statutes reach conduct that may be associated with terrorism, without regard to whether the offense itself
involves domestic or international terrorism. These include statutes relating to aircraft sabotage, id. § 32; weapons of
mass destruction, e.g., id. §§ 175, 175b, 175c, 229, 831, 832, 2332a, 2332h, 2332i; arson and bombing of federal
property, e.g., id. §§ 844, 2332a, 2332f; and causing injury or death to a federal official, e.g. id. §§ 111, 115, 351,
1114, 1751; among others. It is also a crime to provide material support or resources to another knowing or
intending that they be used in preparation for or carrying out certain terrorism-related offenses. Id. § 2339A.

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facilities, e.g., id. § 111, 115, 351, 844, 930, 1114, 1361, 1751. Hate crimes charges, e.g., id.
§ 249, may be appropriate where individuals engage in DT that is motivated by biases against a
race, religion, ethnicity, or other specified factors. However, not all hate crimes cases involve
DT. Arson, id. § 844, or specific charges relating to violence against animal enterprises, id. § 43,
may apply to Animal Rights/Environmental Violent Extremists. In some cases, drug trafficking,
tax, or state and local charges could also provide a lawful basis to disrupt an individual believed
to be planning or pursuing acts of DT.

The DOJ recognizes the need for coordination and consistency in our efforts to hold accountable
DVEs who engage in criminal conduct. An important part of achieving those goals is to have the
ability to identify and internally track investigations and prosecutions involving conduct related
to domestic violent extremism, and the Department is implementing changes that will allow us to
better identify and track such cases. All federal prosecutors have been provided guidance not
only highlighting the need for effective coordination, but also implementing a plan for better
tracking of the important DVE-related work being done by federal investigators and prosecutors
around the country. Until such changes are institutionalized, the Department can provide
illustrative examples of cases from 2015 through 2019.

Our US Attorney’s Offices, the National Security Division, the Criminal Division, and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms have worked together in recent cases to bring charges
under a variety of statutes, including terrorism-related statutes. In several cases, we have
disrupted, prosecuted, and convicted individuals before violence occurred, as follows:

• David Ansberry was arrested in October 2016 after placing an improvised explosive
device (IED) in the parking lot of the Nederland, Colorado Police Department, believing
that law enforcement had murdered a member of a 1960s-1970s counterculture group of
which he had also been a member. He was indicted for use and attempted use of a weapon
of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a. Ansberry pleaded guilty and, in
January 2019, was sentenced to serve 27 years in prison.

• Jerry Varnell was arrested in August 2017 after trying to detonate an inoperable vehicle
borne explosive device at the BancFirst building in downtown Oklahoma City to send an
anti-government message. He was indicted for attempting to use a weapon of mass
destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a, and attempting to destroy by fire or explosive
a property used in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Varnell was
convicted on both counts in February 2019, and in March 2020, was sentenced to serve
25 years in prison, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release.

• Cesar Sayoc was arrested in October 2018 for mailing 16 IEDs to 13 victims throughout the
United States, including Democratic politicians and a media outlet. He was charged in the
Southern District of New York with use of a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2332a; interstate transportation of explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(d); threatening interstate communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); illegal
mailing of explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1716(j)(2); and use of explosives to
commit a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h). Sayoc pleaded guilty in March 2019
and, in August 2019, was sentenced to serve 20 years in prison.

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• Christopher Hasson was arrested in February 2019 based on a criminal complaint for
firearm and drug charges. In January 2020, he was sentenced to 160 months in federal
prison, followed by four years of supervised release, on four federal charges, including
unlawful possession of unregistered silencers, unlawful possession of firearm silencers
unidentified by serial number, possession of firearms by an addict to and unlawful user of a
controlled substance, and possession of a controlled substance. According to his plea
agreement, Hasson was a Lieutenant in the United States Coast Guard. As detailed in the
government’s sentencing memo, Hasson self-identified as a “White Nationalist” for over
30 years and in writings advocated for “focused violence” in order to establish a white
homeland. Review of Hasson’s e-mail accounts, saved documents, text messages, and
Internet searches show that he was inspired by racist murderers, stockpiled assault weapons,
studied violence, and intended to exact retribution on minorities and those he considered
traitors.

• Jarrett Smith was arrested in September 2019 for distributing explosives information and
threatening interstate communication after providing bombmaking instructions online and
conducting potential target selection. In February 2020, he pleaded guilty to unlawfully
distributing instructions for making explosive devices over social media while he was a
member of the US Army. Smith pleaded guilty to two counts of distributing information
related to explosives, destructive devices, and weapons of mass destruction. The FBI
received information that Smith gave out guidance to others on how to construct IEDs. He
spoke to others on social media about wanting to travel to Ukraine to fight with a violent,
far-right military group. In August 2020, Smith was sentenced to 30 months in prison.

Similarly, the Department’s Civil Rights Division, in partnership with US Attorney’s Offices,
Criminal Division, and National Security Division, has also prosecuted RMVEs in some of the
most serious plots and attacks in recent years:

• In June 2015, Dylann Roof killed nine Black parishioners engaged in religious worship and
Bible study at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
In December 2016, Roof was convicted of 33 counts of federal hate crimes, and firearms
charges, including nine capital counts of obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs
resulting in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 247, and nine capital counts of use of a firearm
to commit murder during and in relation to a federal crime of violence, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924. In January 2017, Roof was sentenced to death on all 18 capital counts. The
sentence of death has been imposed by the court but not yet carried out.

• In 2016, Curtis Allen, Patrick Stein, and Gavin Wright were arrested for plotting to attack an
apartment complex and mosque used by Somali immigrants in Kansas. In April 2018, they
were convicted of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332a—a terrorism-related offense—as well as conspiracy to violate the housing rights of
their victims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. They received sentences to serve between 25
and 30 years in prison.

• In August 2017, James Fields Jr. intentionally drove a car into a diverse crowd of counter-
protestors at the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, killing one woman and

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 injuring dozens. In March 2019, he pleaded guilty to one count of a hate crime act that
resulted in death and 28 other hate crimes charges, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 249. In
June 2019, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

• In November 2019, Richard Holzer was arrested for plotting to blow up the Temple
Emanuel Synagogue in Pueblo, Colorado, conduct that constituted an act of DT. Holzer told
undercover FBI agents he wanted the bombing to send a message to Jewish people that they
must leave his town, “otherwise people will die.” He pleaded guilty to federal hate crime
and explosives charges, and in February 2021, he was sentenced to over 19 years in prison,
followed by 15 years of supervised release.

The Department also supports efforts to prosecute DVEs under state and local laws. For
example, in 2013, the Department secured the first conviction under the District of Columbia’s
Anti-Terrorism Act. Floyd Corkins was charged for an attempted shooting at the Family
Research Council. He was motivated based on disagreement with the organization’s stance
against gay marriage. He was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

Referrals of DT Incidents to the FBI

The eGuardian system is the FBI’s case management system for handling initial threat
information of counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber incidents, criminal complaints,
events, and suspicious activities received from federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial law
enforcement agencies, and the Department of Defense. Threat information is then migrated to the
FBI’s internal Guardian system where it is evaluated to determine whether the information meets
the criteria for an assessment, already exists in FBI holdings, or is for situational awareness only.

Starting in 2019, the FBI implemented a process to “tag” reports of possible DT incidents to
enhance program management and operational oversight. It is important to note the tagging
process has only been in effect since 2019 and is manual and user-dependent. Therefore,
eGuardian reports of incidents referred by our partners that have DT tags may not capture all DT
referrals and may inaccurately label some referrals as DT. The FBI received approximately 675
referrals of possible DT incidents in 2019.

Although reports are not available within the eGuardian system to identify the disposition of
each referral, as of 2019, approximately 20 percent of the FBI’s DT investigations were opened
based on information and referrals from our partners.

The FBI does not refer DT incidents where there is an indication of federal criminal activity to
other partners, as the FBI would be the lead investigative agency for those matters.

DT Intelligence Products

From 2015 through 2019, the FBI produced more than 4,000 DT-related intelligence products.
The FBI does not have the data to determine the number of intelligence products associated with

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each DT investigative classification because the FBI tracks intelligence production by program
and not by investigative classification. Additionally, a single intelligence product may contain
threat reporting or case information from subjects associated with multiple investigative
classifications.

From 2016 to 2019, DHS produced 67 DT-related intelligence products and 1,068 DT-related
raw intelligence reports. The DHS does not have reliable data dating back prior to 2016 on this
topic.

Number of Staff Working DT Matters

Since the bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building in 1995, the FBI’s Counterterrorism
Division has maintained dedicated resources to detect, disrupt, and mitigate instances of violence
and criminal activity associated with DVEs. One of the FBI’s most vital assets in the
counterterrorism fight is our ability to remain agile in combatting the threats we face. Staffing for
the FBI’s counterterrorism mission is aligned based on threat priorities and, as is true across the
FBI, can and does realign on a moment’s notice.

The front line of the counterterrorism mission in the United States is represented by the FBI-led
JTTFs, which investigate both DT and IT matters. The FBI established the first JTTF in 1980 in
the New York Field Office, applying the task force concept to the counterterrorism mission.
Today, the FBI leads approximately 200 JTTFs nationwide across all 56 Field Offices and in
many of our satellite Resident Agencies, with participation of over 50 federal and over 500 state,
local, tribal, and territorial agencies. The JTTFs are comprised of approximately 4,400
investigators, including FBI Special Agents and Task Force Officers, and additional analysts and
professional staff who support these JTTF members and the investigations they lead. The JTTF
partnerships at the federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial levels are force multipliers as they
leverage local expertise, experience, and resources in FBI counterterrorism investigations.

In FBI Field Offices, squads are dedicated to the counterterrorism mission and not necessarily
assigned specifically to investigate DT or IT matters. This is significant because the motivation
behind an alleged threat or act of terrorism may not be immediately apparent. Additionally, when
an incident occurs, Field Office personnel from all operational programs – for example, criminal
or counterintelligence – may respond.

Similar to our posture against the IT threat, the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division at Headquarters
has a dedicated Domestic Terrorism Operations Section (DTOS), comprised of Special Agents,
analysts, and professional staff. The FBI’s DTOS oversees and provides operational support to
all 56 Field Offices and their Resident Agencies in investigating the use of violence by
individuals to further socio-political goals in violation of federal criminal statutes. The
Counterterrorism Division also has intelligence and targeting units that work to combat DT
specifically, as well as additional units that provide support across our counterterrorism mission,
not exclusive to DT or IT matters. Further, all FBI counterterrorism investigations are led by the
same Deputy Assistant Director for Operations, who has a unique vantage point from which to

Page 26 of 40
assess the terrorism threat around the globe and prioritize investigations and operations across
the country.

An additional asset in the counterterrorism fight is the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion
Cell, created in April 2019. This Fusion Cell creates more opportunities for investigative
creativity, provides multi-program coordination, helps ensure seamless information sharing, and
enhances investigative resources to combat the DT threat.

Analysis of DT issues within the DHS I&A occurs in the Counterterrorism Mission Center
(CTMC). The CTMC provides intelligence support and analysis that focuses on domestic threat
actors, including DVEs, consistent with the Department’s statutory charges to protect critical
infrastructure and screening and vetting in support of border security operations. Within the
I&A’s CTMC, there is a Domestic Terrorism Branch of analysts dedicated to working within the
domestic threat landscape. These analysts often engage with counterparts at the FBI and NCTC
to jointly author strategic intelligence products on the threat. Additionally, I&A maintains a
presence at state and local fusion centers through its Field Operations Division, and I&A analysts
at DHS Headquarters routinely work with those individuals to author joint products on issues
relevant to their regions, including domestic violent extremism or threats to critical
infrastructure.

The DHS Field Operations Division has approximately 120 personnel deployed to field locations
across the United States, primarily in state and local fusion centers. These officers work across a
range of threat issues and actors, including the DVE mission space. Field Operations Division
officers collect and report intelligence information in serialized raw intelligence reports and
provide regionally-focused analysis, which may include DVE topics.

The NCTC serves as the primary US government organization for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism outside of scenarios in which the threat
pertains exclusively to domestic terrorists and domestic counterterrorism. While the National
Security Act specifies the NCTC has the authority to receive and retain counterterrorism
information that is exclusively domestic, the FBI and DHS are the primary organizations
countering domestic terrorism. The NCTC identifies and monitors international and transnational
trends across a range of violent extremist actors. Domestically, the NCTC can provide
appropriate support to the FBI and DHS consistent with its legal authorities and Attorney
General-approved guidelines for protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of
US persons.

VII. Recommendations
The Act requires the Director of the FBI and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the DNI, to jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on DT
containing recommendations with respect to needing to change authorities, roles, resources, or
responsibilities within the federal government to more effectively prevent and counter DT
activities, and measures necessary to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

Page 27 of 40
The Biden Administration has announced a comprehensive review of domestic violent
extremism, to include a review of resources, and policies within the federal government. The
FBI, DHS, NCTC, and DOJ are actively participating in this review. Pending completion of this
review and further consultation with DOJ leadership, the FBI has no recommendations at this
time.

The DHS is continuing to review authorities, expertise, and resources at its disposal to identify,
prevent, and mitigate threats to the Homeland from DVEs. The DHS is committed to expanding
its ability to collect DVE and DT information that is publicly available through social media and
other platforms, while simultaneously safeguarding privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of all
persons, in order to enhance the Department’s ability to rapidly analyze and communicate DVE
and DT threats so that policy makers and our homeland security partners are enabled to take
appropriate action.

Page 28 of 40
Appendix

FBI-Designated Significant Domestic Terrorism Incidents in the United States from

2015 through 201925

Date and Location Description Category26

22 January 2015 Anti-Government or
Atlanta, Georgia Anti-Authority
An individual was arrested and federally charged with
Violent Extremism
tax evasion. The cumulative estimated losses totaled
(AGAAVE),
$1.5 million. In March 2016, the subject was sentenced
specifically Sovereign
to one year and one day.
Citizen Violent
Extremism (SCVE)
6 February 2015 An unidentified individual(s) allegedly set fire to and Animal
Chicago, Illinois vandalized an occupied building containing horse Rights/Environmental
carriages. The economic damages were estimated at Violent Extremism
$130,000.
9 February 2015 An individual shot and injured two law enforcement AGAAVE, specifically
Orange County, officers in an ambush as the officers responded to a SCVE
Florida domestic incident. The subject died as a result of
engagement with law enforcement.
14 February 2015 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
Elkins, West knowing possession of stolen explosives in interstate Anarchist Violent
Virginia commerce. In April 2015, the subject pleaded guilty, and Extremism (AVE)
in July 2015, was sentenced to eight months.
17 March 2015 An individual was arrested and federally charged for Racially or Ethnically
Stover, Missouri making threats against the President of the United Motivated Violent
States. Extremism (RMVE)
25 March 2015 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
St. Louis, Missouri knowing possession of a machinegun. In AVE
November 2015, the subject pleaded guilty, and in
February 2016, was sentenced to one year and one day.
25 March 2015 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
Livingston, knowing possession of a machinegun and possession of Militia Violent
Montana a firearm that is not registered in the National Firearms Extremism (MVE)
Registration and Transfer Record. In November 2015,
the subject was convicted, and in March 2016, was
sentenced to six years.

25
Unless otherwise noted, some of these matters are active/pending.
26
This column reflects FBI’s categorization for purposes of this report and as required by statute. All defendants are
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

Page 29 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
2 April 2015 Three individuals were arrested on state charges of RMVE
Tallahassee, conspiracy to commit murder of a Black person. In
Florida March 2017, one subject pleaded guilty, and in
April 2017, was sentenced to four years. In August 2017,
the other two subjects were convicted and sentenced to
12 years.
10 April 2015 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
Signal Mountain, solicitation to commit a crime of violence; intentionally MVE
Tennessee defacing, damaging, or destroying any religious real
property, because of the religious character of that
property, or attempting to do so; and transmitting in
interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing any threat to injure the person of another. In
February 2017, the subject was convicted. In September
2020, after going through a lengthy appellate process,
the defendant was resentenced to 10 years.
17 June 2015 An individual shot and killed nine Black people at the RMVE
Charleston, South Emanuel AME Church. The subject was arrested on state
Carolina charges of murder and was federally charged with hate
crime acts resulting in death; hate crime act involving an
attempt to kill; obstruction of free exercise of religious
beliefs resulting in death; obstruction of free exercise of
religious beliefs involving an attempt to kill and use of a
dangerous weapon; and use of a firearm to commit
murder during and in relation to a crime of violence. In
December 2016, the subject was convicted, and in
January 2017, was sentenced to death.
9 July 2015 Two individuals were arrested on state charges for AGAAVE, specifically
Yavapai, Arizona allegedly shooting and injuring a law enforcement SCVE
officer during a routine traffic violation inquiry.
31 July 2015 An individual was arrested on state charges for RMVE
Vestavia Hills, assaulting a Black convenience store clerk, and in
Alabama May 2016, the subject pleaded guilty and received a
12 month suspended sentence.
1 August 2015 Three individuals were arrested and federally charged AGAAVE, specifically
Clover, South with conspiracy to violate laws governing firearms and MVE
Carolina explosive devices. In September 2015, two subjects
pleaded guilty, and in January 2016, were each
sentenced to 21 months. In December 2015, the third
subject pleaded guilty, and in June 2016, was sentenced
to 22 months.
16 September An individual stole a vehicle and shot at law Animal
2015 enforcement officers during their pursuit of the subject. Rights/Environmental
Lawrence County, The subject died as a result of engagement with law Violent Extremism
South Dakota enforcement.

Page 30 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
23 September An individual was arrested and convicted on state AGAAVE, specifically
2015 charges of threatening to commit a terrorist act after SCVE
Wood County, advocating to overthrow the government of West
West Virginia Virginia.
7 October 2015 Three individuals were arrested and federally charged RMVE
Richmond, with conspiracy to commit robbery affecting commerce,
Virginia felon in possession, and conspiracy to commit robbery
affecting commerce for plotting to attack synagogues
and Black churches. Each subject pleaded guilty and
were later sentenced to 17.5 years, 8.75 years, and 7
years, respectively.
27 November An individual was arrested on state charges of first- Abortion-Related
2015 degree murder for allegedly attacking a reproductive Violent Extremism
Colorado Springs, health care facility, shooting and killing three people
Colorado and injuring others. The subject was later federally
charged with violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act and use of a firearm during a crime of
violence resulting in death where the killing is a murder.
In total, three people were killed, including one law
enforcement officer, and eight people were injured,
including four law enforcement officers. The case is
currently pending.
2 January 2016 Multiple individuals seized and occupied the Malheur AGAAVE, specifically
Harney County, National Wildlife Refuge. In total, 18 subjects were MVE and SCVE
Oregon sentenced to crimes associated with the occupation.
19 February 2016 An individual was arrested by local authorities for RMVE
Nashville, Indiana allegedly attacking a Chinese student with a hatchet. In
April 2016, a judge ruled the subject was not competent
to stand trial.
4 March 2016 Three individuals were arrested on state charges of RMVE
Los Angeles, assault with a deadly weapon with special allegations of
California a hate crime for allegedly assaulting five Hispanic
people.
1 May 2016 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
Seattle, unlawful possession of destructive devices for throwing AVE
Washington an improvised incendiary device at law enforcement
officers, injuring one officer, at a May Day protest. In
February 2018, the subject pleaded guilty, and in June
2018, was sentenced to 37 months.

Page 31 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
18 June 2016 An individual was arrested and federally charged with Animal
Salinas, Puerto maliciously damaging or destroying, and attempting to Rights/Environmental
Rico damage or destroy, property by means of fire and Violent Extremism
explosives of a building and vehicle used in interstate
commerce, for allegedly using incendiary devices to
damage an agricultural business and targeting first
responders, including law enforcements officers. In
November 2016, the subject pleaded guilty, and in
March 2017, was sentenced to three years.
22 June 2016 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
Mount Trumbull, attempted destruction of federal property by use of an MVE
Arizona explosive for plotting to destroy a Bureau of Land
Management cabin. In April 2018, the subject pleaded
guilty, and in July 2018, was sentenced to time served.
7 July 2016 An individual shot at law enforcement officers during a RMVE
Dallas, Texas protest. The subject shot and killed five law
enforcement officers, injured six other officers, and
injured two other people. The subject died as a result of
engagement with law enforcement.
7 July 2016 An individual was arrested on state charges for shooting RMVE
Bristol, Tennessee at passing cars on a highway and then at law
enforcement officers who responded. The subject killed
one person and injured one law enforcement officer. In
December 2016, the subject pleaded guilty to state
charges of first-degree murder and attempted first-
degree murder and was sentenced to life.
10 July 2016 An individual was arrested on state charges for the RMVE
Evansville, Indiana attempted murder of a transgender person. In February
2018, the subject pleaded guilty, and in May 2018, was
sentenced to 36 years.
17 July 2016 An individual shot at law enforcement officers, killing RMVE
Baton Rouge, three officers and wounding six others. The subject died
Louisiana as a result of law enforcement engagement.
1 August 2016 An individual barricaded herself and her child in her AGAAVE, specifically
Randallstown, residence when law enforcement officers attempted to SVCE
Maryland serve a bench warrant for her failure to appear in court.
The subject died as a result of law enforcement
engagement.
1 August 2016 Individuals allegedly set fire to seven large vehicles Animal
Mahaska and used in the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline. Rights/Environmental
Jasper Counties, Economic losses were estimated at approximately $3 Violent Extremism
Iowa million.

Page 32 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
16 August 2016 An individual was arrested on state charges of assault in RMVE
Olympia, the second degree and malicious harassment for
Washington stabbing a Black member of an interracial couple. In
October 2017, the subject pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to 50 months.
21 August 2016 An individual was arrested on state murder charges for RMVE
Fort Wayne, murdering a Black person. In July 2017, the subject
Indiana pleaded guilty but mentally ill and was sentenced to 65
years.
13 September An individual was arrested on state charges of attempt RMVE
2016 to commit murder in the first degree, aggravated
Phoenix, Arizona assault with a deadly weapon, endangerment, resisting
arrest, and criminal damage for driving a vehicle into
three white law enforcement officers, injuring two
officers. In April 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in
June 2019, was sentenced to 35 years.
28 September An individual was arrested on state charges of murder RMVE
2016 for shooting at law enforcement officers when they
Zionsville, Indiana attempted to serve the arrest warrant for the murder of
a white person. In February 2019, the subject was found
guilty, and in April 2019, was sentenced to 65 years.
30 September AGAAVE, specifically
2016 An individual fled a routine traffic stop and led law SCVE
Van Buren enforcement officers on a high speed chase. The subject
Township, died as result of law enforcement engagement.
Michigan
7 October 2016 An individual was arrested on state charges of RMVE
Hilliard, Ohio conspiracy to commit murder for plotting to conduct a
shooting at a high school. In January 2018, the subject
plead no contest, and in February 2018, was sentenced
to four years.
4 October 2016 Three individuals were arrested for plotting a mass AGAAVE, specifically
Garden City, casualty attack using explosives against an apartment MVE
Kansas building where multiple Somali immigrants lived and
worshipped. In January 2019, two subjects were found
guilty of federal charges of conspiracy to use a weapon
of mass destruction and conspiracy against civil rights,
and the third subject was found guilty of knowingly and
willingly making false statements. The subjects were
sentenced to 30 years, 26 years, and 25 years,
respectively.
16 October 2016 Individuals allegedly set fire to four pieces of equipment Animal
Jasper County, used in the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline. Rights/Environmental
Iowa Economic losses were estimated at approximately $2 Violent Extremism
million.

Page 33 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
22 October 2016 An individual was arrested on state charges of reckless AGAAVE, specifically
La Pine, Oregon driving, third-degree escape, fourth-degree assault, SCVE
resisting arrest, unlawful use of a weapon and reckless
endangerment for assaulting a law enforcement officer,
attempting to take the officer's weapon, and escaping
custody during a vehicle pursuit. In October 2018, the
subject pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 60 days.
27 October 2016 Individuals allegedly participated in civil disorder, Animal
Morton County, trespassing, and setting property on fire during a Dakota Rights/Environmental
North Dakota Access Pipeline protest. One subject was arrested and Violent Extremism
federally charged with civil disorder and use of fire to
commit a federal felony crime. The subject later plead
guilty to civil disorder, and in May 2018, was sentenced
to three years.
8 November 2016 Individuals allegedly set fire to four pieces of equipment Animal
Buena Vista used in the construction of the Dakota Access pipeline. Rights/Environmental
County, Iowa Economic losses were estimated at approximately $2.5 Violent Extremism
million.
3 December 2016 Two individuals were arrested on state charges of RMVE
Yanceyville, North assault with a deadly weapon for allegedly stabbing and
Carolina injuring their associate.
1 February 2017 Individuals allegedly damaged property and assaulted AGAAVE, specifically
Berkeley, law enforcement officers and attendees at an event AVE
California featuring a political commentator.
15 February 2017 An individual was arrested and federally charged with RMVE
Myrtle Beach, illegal possession of a firearm by a felon. In February
South Carolina 2018, the subject pleaded guilty, and in July 2018, was
sentenced to 33 months.
15 February 2017 Three individuals were arrested for conspiring to break AGAAVE, specifically
Tipton County, an associate out of jail and kidnap a law enforcement SCVE
Tennessee officer and a judge. One subject was arrested by
Canadian authorities in April 2017. The second subject
pleaded guilty to federal charges of conspiracy to
commit an act of violence, to wit, kidnapping, and in
August 2017, was sentenced to 5 years. In December
2017, the third subject pleaded guilty to a federal
charge of misprision of a felony and entered into a pre-
trial diversion agreement.
20 March 2017 An individual was arrested on state charges of first- RMVE
New York City, degree murder in furtherance of an act of terrorism,
New York second-degree murder as a crime of terrorism, second-
degree murder as a hate crime, and fourth-degree
criminal possession of a weapon, for killing a Black
person with a sword. In January 2019, the subject
pleaded guilty, and in February 2019, was sentenced to
life in prison.

Page 34 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
28 March 2017 An individual allegedly shot at law enforcement officers AGAAVE, specifically
Ada County, Idaho during the arrest of his father for alleged sovereign SCVE
citizen fraudulent filings. The subject was injured as a
result of law enforcement engagement.
13 April 2017 An individual believed to be plotting a mass shooting AGAAVE, specifically
Austin, Texas was arrested on federal charges of illegal possession of SCVE
a firearm. In September 2017, the subject pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to five years of probation.
18 April 2017 An individual was arrested on state charges of homicide, RMVE
Fresno, California attempted homicide, discharging a firearm into an
inhabited dwelling, and possession of a firearm by a
felon for shooting and killing three white people.
5 May 2017 An individual allegedly purchased a fully automatic AK- RMVE
Washington, DC 47 and made statements about carrying out violence
against law enforcement officers. The subject was
arrested and federally charged with firearms offenses.
In October 2018, the subject pleaded guilty; the case is
pending.
16 May 2017 Two individuals allegedly shot and killed a law AGAAVE, specifically
Three Forks, enforcement officer during a traffic stop and then led MVE
Montana officers on a high speed chase and shootout. One
subject was arrested on state charges of deliberate
homicide, and the other died as a result of engagement
with law enforcement.
14 June 2017 An individual with a personalized violent ideology Domestic Violent
Alexandria, targeted and shot Republican members of Congress at a Extremist (DVE)
Virginia baseball field and wounded five people. The subject
died as a result of engagement with law enforcement.
5 August 2017 Three individuals were arrested and federally charged AGAAVE, specifically
Bloomington, with unlawful possession of a machine gun, conspiracy MVE
Minnesota to interfere with commerce by threats and violence, and
attempted arson for allegedly bombing a mosque and a
women's health clinic. In January 2019, two of the three
subjects pleaded guilty. In December 2020, the third
defendant was convicted of destruction of religious
property, obstruction of religious beliefs, using a
destructive device in relation to crimes of violence,
possession of an unregistered destructive device, and
conspiracy charges. The case is pending.
7 August 2017 An individual was arrested on state charges of AGAAVE, specifically
Indianapolis, attempted murder and criminal recklessness after SCVE
Indiana allegedly barricading himself in his residence and
shooting at law enforcement officers attempting to
serve him an eviction notice.

Page 35 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
12 August 2017 An individual was arrested and federally charged with a RMVE
Charlottesville, hate crime resulting in death, hate crime acts involving
Virginia attempt to kill, and bias-motivated interference with
federally protected activity resulting in death on state
charges for driving a vehicle into a crowd of protestors,
killing one person and injuring at least 19 others. In
December 2018, the subject pleaded guilty and was
subsequently sentenced to life in prison.
12 August 2017 An individual was arrested on state charges of RMVE
Charlottesville, discharging a firearm within one thousand feet of a
Virginia school for shooting at a Black person at a protest. In
May 2018, the subject pleaded no contest, and in
August 2018, was sentenced to eight years.
12 August 2017 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
Oklahoma City, malicious attempted destruction of a building used in MVE
Oklahoma and affecting interstate commerce by means of an
explosive and attempted use of a weapon of mass
destruction for plotting to detonate what he believed
was a vehicle borne improvised explosive devise at a
bank headquarters. In February 2019, the subject was
found guilty. In March 2020, the subject was sentenced
to 25 years.
18 August 2017 An individual was arrested on state charges of RMVE
Kissimmee, premeditated murder for shooting and killing two law
Florida enforcement officers. In December 2019, the subject
was convicted and was sentenced to death.
20 August 2017 An individual was arrested on a state charge of using, AGAAVE, specifically
Livonia, Louisiana carrying, and/or possessing a firearm during a crime of MVE
violence and federally charged with carjacking for taking
a hostage at gun point, discharging a firearm at the
hostage and a convenience store clerk, robbing the
convenience store, and attempting to rape two women.
In September 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in
February 2020, was sentenced to 20 years.
20 October 2017 Three individuals were arrested on state charges of RMVE
Gainesville, attempted homicide for shooting at a group of
Florida protesters at a speaking event. In August 2018, one
subject pleaded guilty to a state charge of accessory
after the fact to attempted first degree murder, and in
March 2019, was sentenced to 5 years. In February
2019, the second subject pleaded guilty to state charges
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and
possession of a firearm by a felon, and was sentenced to
15 years. In October 2019, the third subject pleaded
guilty to assault and was sentenced to 5 years.

Page 36 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
3 December 2017 An incarcerated individual allegedly attempted to kill a RMVE
Somerset, corrections officer because the officer was friendly with
Pennsylvania Black prisoners. The subject had an extensive criminal
history and was serving multiple life sentences.
2 January 2018 An individual was arrested on state charges of murder RMVE
Orange County, with a hate crime enhancement for allegedly killing a
California homosexual Jewish college student.
9 February 2018 An individual shot at three law enforcement officers, AGAAVE, specifically
Locust Grove, killing one and injuring two, who were attempting to SCVE
Georgia arrest him. The subject died as a result of engagement
with law enforcement.
17 March 2018 An individual was arrested on state charges of homicide RMVE
Murfreesboro, for killing his Black housemate by setting the victim on
Tennessee fire. In July 2019, the subject pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to life.
19 August 2018 An individual was arrested on state charges of homicide RMVE
Pittsburgh, for allegedly stabbing and killing a Black person outside
Pennsylvania of a bar.
1 October 2018 Law enforcement officers attempted to arrest an DVE
Oklahoma individual with a personalized violent ideology on state
charges related to allegedly making online threats to kill
law enforcement. During the arrest, the subject
allegedly engaged in gunfire with law enforcement and
was injured before being taken into custody.
23 October 2018 AGAAVE, specifically
Individuals were arrested for allegedly throwing rocks
San Juan, Puerto Puerto Rican
and other objects toward law enforcement officers and
Rico National Violent
vandalizing property.
Extremism
24 October 2018 An individual was arrested on state charges of murder, RMVE
Jeffersontown, wanton endangerment, and attempted murder for
Kentucky allegedly shooting and killing two Black people in a
grocery store. The subject was later federally charged
with a hate crime resulting in death, use and discharge
of a firearm to commit murder during and in relation to
a crime of violence, and a hate crime with attempt to
kill. In March 2021, the subject pleaded guilty to hate
crimes and firearms offenses; the case is pending.

Page 37 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
27 October 2018 An individual was arrested and federally charged with RMVE
Pittsburgh, obstruction of exercise of free religious beliefs resulting
Pennsylvania in death, use of a firearm to commit murder during and
in relation to a crime of violence, obstruction of free
exercise of religious beliefs resulting in bodily injury to a
public safety officer, and use and discharge of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence for
allegedly shooting and killing multiple people at a
synagogue during a religious service. In January 2019,
the subject was charged with additional hate crimes and
firearms offenses. In total, 11 people were killed, and at
least six others were injured. The case is pending.
26 October 2018 An individual with a personalized violent ideology was DVE
Plantation, Florida arrested and federally charged with use of weapons of
mass destruction; transport or receive, in interstate or
foreign commerce any explosive with the knowledge or
intent that it will be used to kill, injure, or intimidate;
transmit in interstate or foreign commerce any
communication containing any threat to injure;
knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, or knowingly
causes to be delivered by mail, anything declared non-
mailable, with intent to kill or injure; uses/carries an
explosive to commit or during the commission of any
felony, for mailing possible improvised explosive devices
to US representatives, former US government officials,
private citizens, and national media figures. In March
2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in August 2019,
was sentenced to 20 years.
10 December Two individuals were arrested and federally charged for AGAAVE, specifically
2018 their involvement in planning terrorist attacks against a AVE
Toledo, Ohio local bar and an interstate pipeline. The subjects
pleaded guilty and in November and December 2019,
they were sentenced to 15 years and 6 years,
respectively.
18 January 2019 Three individuals were arrested on state charge for RMVE
Islamberg, New plotting to attack Muslim residents of Islamberg, New
York York. In June 2019, one subject pleaded guilty to
attempted illegal possession of a weapon, and in
September 2019, was sentenced to seven years. In June
2019, the other two subjects pleaded guilty to
conspiracy in support of terrorism, and in August 2019,
were sentenced to four to 12 years.

Page 38 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
15 February 2019 An individual was arrested and federally charged with RMVE
Silver Spring, unlawful possession of unregistered firearm silencers,
Maryland unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a
controlled substance. In October 2019, the subject
pleaded guilty, and in January 2020, was sentenced to
160 months.
25 March 2019 Two individuals were arrested and federally charged RMVE
and 4 April 2019 with making a material false statement to the FBI in
New York and connection with their alleged plot to attack a mosque or
Missouri synagogue. In July 2019, one subject pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to time served. In August 2019, the
other subject pleaded guilty, and in December 2019 was
sentenced to probation.
24 April 2019 An individual was arrested and federally charged with AGAAVE, specifically
San Diego, malicious destruction of a building by means of fire for AVE
California driving a vehicle into a building occupied by a cleared
defense contractor and then setting the vehicle on fire.
In June 2019, the subject pleaded guilty, and in
November 2019, was sentenced to seven years. The
subject was also ordered to pay $93,633 to the victim.
27 April 2019 An individual was arrested on state charges of murder RMVE
Poway, California and attempted murder for allegedly conducting a
shooting at a synagogue, killing one person and injuring
three others. The subject was later federally charged
with obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs
resulting in death and bodily injury, involving attempt to
kill, use of a deadly weapon; hate crime acts, and
damage to real religious property involved the use of a
dangerous weapon or fire.
6 June 2019 An individual was arrested on state charges of making RMVE
Brownsville, Texas terroristic threats on social media toward a synagogue,
mosque, and a federal building. The subject was later
federally charged with making a threat with explosive
materials and false information and hoaxes. In August
2020, the subject pleaded guilty, and in November
2020, was sentenced to two years.
17 June 2019 An individual shot at people and buildings, including a AGAAVE
Dallas, Texas US Federal Courthouse. The subject died as a result of
engagement with armed security officers.
18 June 2019 RMVE
An individual was arrested for allegedly planning to
Jacksonville,
conduct a mass shooting targeting synagogues.
North Carolina

Page 39 of 40
Date and Location Description Category26
13 July 2019 An individual threw incendiary devices at vehicles and AGAAVE, specifically
Takoma, outbuildings at a federal detention center and engaged AVE
Washington responding law enforcement officers with an AR-style
rifle. The subject died as a result of engagement with
law enforcement.
28 July 2019 An individual with a personalized violent ideology DVE
Gilroy, California attacked a festival, shooting and killing three people and
injuring 16 others. The subject died as a result of
engagement with law enforcement.
3 August 2019 An individual was arrested on state charges of capital RMVE
El Paso, Texas murder for allegedly attacking a retail store, shooting
and killing 22 people and injuring 25 others.
8 August 2019 An individual was arrested and charged federally with RMVE
Las Vegas, Nevada possession of an unregistered firearm or explosive
device after discussing threats against multiple targets
including a synagogue and an LGBTQ nightclub. In
February 2020, the subject pleaded guilty, and in
November 2020, was sentenced to two years.
21 September An individual was arrested and federally charged with RMVE
2019 distributing explosives information and threatening
Fort Riley, Kansas interstate communication after providing bombmaking
instructions online and conducting potential target
selection. In February 2020, the subject pleaded guilty,
and in August 2020, was sentenced to 30 months.
10 December Two individuals shot and killed one law enforcement RMVE
2019 officer, and then attacked a kosher supermarket,
Jersey City, New shooting and killing three people and injuring three
Jersey others, including two responding officers. The subjects
died as a result of engagement with law enforcement.
28 December An individual was arrested and charged federally with a RMVE
2019 hate crime act involving an attempt to kill, and
Monsey, New obstruction of free exercise of religious beliefs involving
York an attempt to kill and use of a dangerous weapon, and
resulting in bodily injury, for allegedly attacking the
home of a Hasidic rabbi with a machete during a
Hanukkah celebration, killing one person and injuring
four others. The case is pending.

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