The concept of religion

Historically, the concept of religion is based on an idea of reality which goes back to the
beginnings of mankind which provides an explanation for the existence of itself as well as the world
surrounding it (the mineral, vegetable and animal world, and, in particular, the world in its most
distant forms – the planets, stars, and other celestial manifestations and presences). The subsequent
and progressive organization of such an idea, seen in terms of structured thought and actions, led to
what can be recorded empirically as religion. Moreover, the diverse forms of religion, their bodies
of knowledge and institutions which derive from this can only reinforce the numerous points of
view held by many people and which are largely accepted so as to form an intrinsic ordered and
operative system (in Durkheimian terms, the church is born on the basis of beliefs and rites and
whose members use the same practices and representations).
Hence, from barely conceived ideas, the transition moves toward more elaborate systems
(there are many ‘sacred’ scriptures or oral traditions that are accepted, orthodox, and
acknowledged), and, from informal interpersonal relationships, toward collective events
(ceremonies which are more or less fixed at ritual level where it is possible to experiment and to
reinforce the agreement between individuals, cognitive attitudes and subsequent behaviors).
It would be misleading, however, to begin with just one definition of religion which would by far
come much later than the birth of religions in general and those which are considered historically
organized (these date back many centuries before the beginning of the Christian era). In fact, the
main reference is Marcus Tullius Cicero who lived in the 1st century BC, and wrote De Natura
Deorum (2, 72) where the concept of religion was linked to the Latin verb relegere, that is, re-read,
read over, to read repeatedly; to consider something with diligence; to check constantly what is
important for the correct veneration of the gods. The ancient Romans carried out their rituals with
great precision and accuracy and their gestures and rites and consolidated in tradition. It could be
said that their rituals were carried out wih great respect for the law, and orthopraxis, to create a
bond of loyalty with the past and not because of any predisposition of the soul. It is for this reason
that religion was seen as a necessary response and reaction to an unfavorable sign from the gods.
Substantially, it was necessary to ingratiate oneself to the gods by carrying out the right actions
which would win their favor. Not surprisingly, the art of divining was well developed and its
practice was used to obtain the necessary information to understand which way the gods were
oriented with respect to an individual or to a particular action.
Another variant, again of Latin origin, of the meaning of the term religion goes back to the
original interpretation of the word religare, that is to tie, attach, unite, or conjoin. This meaning
indicates a relationship, a bond but also that of an obligation, a commitment, a submission. Evident
in this relationship is the position of superiority assumed by the divinity who functions as the
obliger with regards to the human subject who is consequently the obliged. Additionally, one of the
strongest bonds between men and gods is created by a pledge that is when a person makes a
promise to a divinity upon the realization of a wish. If, after the pledge has been made the wish
comes to fruition, it is then undone and the connection between the person and divinity is cancelled
out although there will be further occasions where the pact can be renewed. The real effect though
is a continued association: when the pledge that was made has been respected, there is concrete
evidence of the human demonstrating faith, that is, loyalty and hope. As mentioned, the etymology
of the term religion can be traced to the Latin religare which has been attributed to the Christian
writer Lactantius who lived in the 4th century AD. According to this African writer, the bond
between humans and god exists because humans recognize their creator and therefore obey, follow,
and express pietas, that is, a sense of duty, devotion and respect which is then duly returned by god
in the form of justice, clemency and divine benevolence. This is, in fact, what later lead to Max
Weber’s theory on The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism where divine preference was
given to the elect, the avowed, and those predestined to eternal glory. In reality humankind is
oriented towards the divine but this relationship is expressed through other humans with whom they
share rituals and the bond with the divine.
 Such an approach to the phenomenology of religion may appear to be partial to a
Christianocenrtic view and would hence exclude those religious convictions which preceded and
followed the advent of Christianity. In order to avoid misleading ethnocentrisms a wider, more open
description of religion would aid sociology to break away from the predetermined patterns based
almost exclusively on the preconceptions if not the prejudices of many authors whose interests in
religious matters were limited only to studying the religion they belonged to or in any case that
which was dominant to their geographical context. The central problem nevertheless persists and it
is that of fine-tuning a sociological definition of religion. One which is metaconfessional,
universalistic, scientific, and one whose results in theoretical and empirical research in the field of
the social sciences of religion are precise. In this sense, and in terms of scientific nonjudgemental
attitude, it appears that it would be useful to opt for a dialectic definition of religion.
In order to proceed to clarify a communicative approach, that is, one which is not
instrumental (in Habermas’s terms), it is useful to begin from some of the empirical results which
embody the various contemporary religions.

The principal characteristics of religions

In the so-called primitive religions, the religious relationship is essentially manifested
between humans and nature, and consists of forms of pantheism in which divine presence is found
in every part of the human environment. God is seen to be operating in every facet of reality.
A different approach can be seen in the modern form of Hinduism which, with its oral Vedic
tradition, has its beginnings probably dating back to the third millennium BC, if not earlier, and has
developed a more universalistic outlook compared with its past form. There have been tendencies
towards embracing all believers in god, irrespective of their faith. With Mah tm (the great spirit)
Mohandas G ndh (1869-1948), violence, solidarity, and tolerance became paths towards truth, and
ethical and political commitment. Central to the concept of Hinduism is faith in Brahman, the
supreme being who is also seen as Vishnu, and Shiva and who make up the sacred Trimurti.
Brahman is one and all. In every individual there exists the divine and eternal breath, tman, which
is permanent, and the karman which administers retribution for acts committed, and deals with the
cycle of life and rebirth. In order to free oneself from the vicissitudes of reincarnation, one is to
practice self-denial, meditate, or be so devout so as to embrace the essence of oneness between the
infiniteness present in each being, tman, and the absolute which is Brahman, the only truth,
beginning and end of everything.
In Judaism (originating in the 19th century BC, but the foundation of its temple in Jerusalem
dates back to 968 BC), the core trait is community afflatus, thus avoiding centralized dogmatism.
Its main reference is the Torah whose doctrine is passed on from generation to generation and
makes up part of the Pentateuch (the five books relating the teachings of god to Moses). Judaism
places emphasis above all on one’s actions more so than on dogma and relies on the alliance with
god.
Buddhism (whose beginnings date back to the 6th century BC) is surrounded by a
controversy as to whether it is a religion or whether it should be considered merely as a philosophy.
In reality, there are many elements which lead to consider it a form of religion like any other.
Initially Buddhism stemmed from Hinduism and the writings of the Indo-Aryan ‘holy sciences’,
unlike the Vedics. There was no system of sacrifice and any concept of a personal god was negated.
Later developments in Buddhism led to the beginnings of monastic experiences, the search for
perfection, the universalism of the bodhisattva (that is “one whose essence is bodhi, enlightenment);
as well as to principles of wisdom and compassion for human suffering, as well as a variety of kinds
of worship and devotion, together with the pain of existence, detachment from earthly illusions, and
the attainment of illumination. For Buddhism nothing is permanent, not even joy or suffering, so
that even a moment of joy will only intensify the state of illusion of well-being. Buddhism denies
the principles of Hinduism: both Brahman as god and tman as individual reality. The ultimate
objective is to eliminate that which causes pain by creating an awareness of both the transience of
reality and the frailty of the human condition. Only by detaching oneself completely can there be
freedom from suffering and the cycle of birth-death-rebirth. Morality, meditation, and wisdom are
the only roads to control strength of mind along the eight-fold paths of right faith, right purpose,
right speech, right conduct, right means of livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right
meditations. This is the way of attaining nirv na, a state of being which is beyond good and evil.
Confucianism, which also had its beginnings in the 6th century BC, involves more of an
earthly quest based on human relationships. According to Confucius, divineness was present in the
background: the search for god was through humans and their virtues; searching for the answers to
the questions regarding the meaning of life, fate, and the question of good and evil. In fact, in
Confucianism, human nature is essentially good so, to maintain this state, one need only keep one’s
passions at bay.
In Taoism (whose beginnings date back to the 6th century BC) the main principle is the dao
(as with the Buddhist nirv na, it goes beyond the notions of good and evil). It is immanent in the
universe and in humans and so it is evidence of the identity between absolute and relative. Taoism,
a people’s religion, was distinct from Confucianism as the latter was practiced by the elite of the
Chinese government. Complementing the dao are the concepts of yin and yang: female and male,
darkness and light, passive and active, potentiality and action, within and without. The world is
born in five stages which combine with yin and yang: wood, fire, earth, metal, and water.
In Shintoism (whose beginnings go as far back as the 6th century BC when the term shinto
was adopted) there is a combination of thought, rites and institutions which operate at a local level,
within villages, as well as at a national level, within a sovereign state, represented by the emperor of
Japan. The origins of Shintoism lie within the primordial dualism between male and female
represented by the figures of Izanagi and Izanami who create a number of other beings thus creating
a polytheistic religion. There is no real difference between god, humans and nature. The differences
between them are barely perceptible. Shintoism is founded on a variety of doctrines, ceremonial
practices, places of worship, and hierarchies of priests. Gods (kami) are present in mythology and
appear very powerful and mysterious. The popular kunitsukami, earth spirits, are veritable tutelary
deities of the people and enjoy greater familiarity and closeness with people. Shintoism also boasts
a great number of rituals within the community of its followers.
In Christianity, which was born more than 2000 years ago, there is one god in three persons:
father, son, and holy spirit. Christ, the son of god, came to earth, became human and died on the
cross to redeem mankind from original sin. Over the centuries there have been schisms and
separations, and different Christian churches have arisen: Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant.
In Islam (founded by Mohammed, who died in 632 AD) religion is conceived as d n, an
Arabic term (though Persian in origin) meaning ‘custom’ but also ‘tribunal’. Islam embodies a
sense of faith ( m n), customary practices (isl m), and behavior (akl q or ihs n). Also fundamental
to Islam are the notions of testimony, prayer, fasting during Ramad n, contributing to the social
taxation system (zak t) and the pilgrimage to Mecca (hadjj).
In the so-called new religious movements (both in the West and the East) which, in reality,
are based on practices and beliefs rooted in a variety of ancient religions, there is a tendency
towards the esoteric, towards looking internally (with a certain amount of secrecy), which
emphasises the individual needs of its followers but without having to deny a universalistic outlook
- an outlook made evident through pacifism. There are, of course, movements of a different nature
modeled on magic, therapy and mysticism.

Sociological theories of religion

According to Durkheim, “a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which unite into
one single moral community, called a church, all those who adhere to them” (Durkheim [1912]
1995: 44). In paragraph one, chapter five, of Weber’s Economy and Society ([1922] 1978) the
author assures his readers that he will provide a definition of religion but fails to do so because it
would merely be a ‘peculiar form of behavior within a community’. In his writings on sociology of
religions, however, he refers to the “economic ethos of world religions” and describes “systems for
regulating human existence” capable of “grouping around themselves a large number of faithful”
(Weber 1920-1922).
The difficulty Weber experienced in defining religion is common to many other authors who
preferred to avoid any involvement that might be evaluative, or might risk being biased toward a
particular view regarding the essence of religion (with reference to Christianity, this was an issue
already subject to strong debate between Feuerbach and Marx). The problem constitutes primarily
in finding agreement on the specific contents of religion and these can not be, from a sociological
point of view, those established by the religions themselves given that they are, in their view, the
standard and thus come into conflict with the others. Nor can the contents be those defined by
sociologists given that any such definitions are necessarily expressed on the basis of their own
theoretical and methodological stances. In both cases such a defining operation would seem
unnecessary. This debate stems from the actual sphere of study of the discipline itself: some prefer
to talk about the sociology of religion whilst others about the sociology of religions. The latter opt
for the expression in the plural in order to avoid that their scientific approach be limited to a single
religious confession. But, on the other hand, if one talks about religion in the singular, meaning
every religious manifestation and not merely that which is historically dominant in a given
geographical context, the use of the expression sociology of religion aims to comprise all those
religions which are empirically recognizable in the field of sociological research.
If anything, the most significant and discriminating point is another: whether to take into
consideration every experience bearing similarities to those traditionally conceived as religion, that
is, recognized as classic religions (including Buddhism, notwithstanding the reservations put
forward by some scholars regarding its more philosophical rather than religious characteristics).
The issue is important given that the consequences that depend on it are also of importance, that is,
whether or not to classify as religion those movements whose religious nature is somewhat more
metaphoric than substantial. This however does not mean having to search for the essence of
religion rather to pick out those minimal elements which make of a social phenomenon a religious
fact based on its content, motivations and customs.
Within contemporary societies there exist metaphorical forms of religion which, especially,
by way of their reference to values, seem to substitute traditional religious systems: these could, in
fact, be defined as ‘religions of values’. We are lead to believe that they can replace historical
religions. Thomas Luckman (1967) shares the same view and his The Invisible Religion is based on
the new “modern religious themes” of individual autonomy, the mobility ethos, self-realization,
self-expression, sexuality, familism, and private life. This series of reference values recalls in some
measure the Weberian concept of the ‘polytheism of values’ where variety and sacredness of values
are the result of ethical individualism.
Once the way has been opened to include new expressions of religion in the category of
what is considered a religion, the number of possible alternatives increases but these all depend very
much on the diverse sociological theories of religion. In this context it is important to define as
secular religions those ways of experiencing politics, economy, art, science, and so on, as if they
were a religion with their respective beliefs, relevant rites, and specific structures. Therefore a
funeral intended to be non-religious will actually follow and reiterate those patterns and procedures
which are part of a service in a religious temple; when a political appointment is made, the
ceremony takes on the characteristics of a religious liturgy; a street protest has the semblance of an
open-air religious assembly; and even the opening of new company headquarters has its propitiatory
inauguration ceremony.
In order not to confuse and overlap religions, metaphoric religions, secular religion and
other parareligious forms, it seems correct to establish, as a common point of reference, a taxonomy
which points out the differences in such a way so as to also recognize the affinities.
 Lambert (1991) rightly made the distinction between a substantive definition and a
functional definition of religion where the former refers to the contents of a religion (according to
Durkheim, for example, these relate to its beliefs and rituals), and the latter emphasizes the role and
the function of religion in society (as is the case for Luhmann who considers religion useful in
facing life’s uncertainties). However, within the substantive definitions, the functional aspect is not
completely absent and, moreover, elements pertaining to the content of the functional definition
cannot be completely expunged. All things considered, the substantive and functionalist
perspectives tend to converge in the practical aspects of social life. A careful reading of Durkheim
reveals functional aspects of religion while in Luhmann (and even Luckmann) it is possible to find
substantive elements of religion. All in all, the belief in god, acts of devotion, the eschatological
attitudes (relative to the final destiny for humanity and the universe), and the meaning of life are
recurring themes within the religious experience, but none of these represents just one condition
without which (conditio sine qua non) there can be a religious fact.
In other words, neither the substantive-content related, nor the functional-finalistic represent
the efficient cause (that is the single determinant which directly and actively produces the effect)
and/or the exclusive criterion necessary to recognize the religious feature of a sociological
phenomenon. Here is where Aristotle made the clear distinction between material cause (the
material of which something is made), formal cause (that by which matter is formed), efficient
cause (that which produces a certain outcome), and final cause (the end of the process of
development by which something becomes what it is). The Aristotelic schema provides an answer
to the need to both adapt and contemplate, that is, to include aspects of substance and scope both
formal and content based.
Classical sociology of religion has opted for more of a substantive stance on religion,
whereas modern sociology of religion has broadened its horizons embracing a functional stance so
much so that it has lost sight of the reference point needed to identify the usual indicators of
religious phenomenology. Perhaps a less dichotomic solution, one which maintains the contents and
does not exclude the objectives, might be considered more adequate for an approach to the research
of religion and religions.
If, from their tasks, sociologists correctly exclude research regarding religious ‘truth’ or the
superiority of one religion over another, then the social scientist whose work is committed to the
scientific study of religion, should strive to: identify the religious actuality from within other
aspects of social structures; distinguish possible varieties pointing out any connections or
divergences; discover any formulations which share consensus as to what is definable as religion;
and always bearing in mind what is real and not being influenced by ideological and/or personal
presuppositions.
Hervieu-Léger (1999) gave emphasis to the lignée croyante (believing descent), that is, the
fact of whether or not there exists a tradition where the faith of the believer can be placed. Tradition
is the justifying authority of the act of believing, therefore also of religion. This happens not only in
terms of continuity with the past but mainly because the way has already been opened for such a
union. The believer is then engendré (generated, originated) into a descendancy of previous
believers, whilst belonging to the community of believers of the present and connected with the
believers of the future, who, will in turn, repeat the same tradition. Thus, the believer recognizes,
and is recognized, is accepted by the institution which presides over the lignée which identifies and
distinguishes the believer from others. Defining religion in such terms would exclude the feasibility
of considering as religious other kinds of religious experience. Therefore, only pre-existing, and
historically set formulations would be accepted as being religious. Hervieu-Léger didn’t exclude
other possibilities which might not necessarily be authorized on an institutional and normative level
of the lignée croyante: an individual may choose to be identified with any tradition or may choose
to invent one ex novo. This is understood as being the transition from regulated to deregulated
belief, guided by the individual, and a new sense of religious modernity. The matter is relevant to
forms which are not quite religious, at least in principle, such as politics, science or other spheres.
However, with these last developments, the further broadening of the definition of religion remains
as problematic as ever requiring further research. For Hervieu-Léger, the gap separating the lignée-
croyante of the religious, historical, traditional institutions, from the lignée-croyante chosen freely
by the individual, is not a novelty for the field of social studies applied to religion. Even with his
different meanings and emphasis, Simmel (1997), in the beginnings of the 20th century, defined the
boundaries between the kind of religion which is founded on history and organized as a product of
culture, and religiousness seen as an openness to being religious, experienced by the individual as
an internal human experience and necessary requisite for a union with god. Equally similar,
however affine, is the position put forth, almost coevally, by William James (1902) in his
reflections on Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Understanding, in which he
outlines a fundamental distinction between institutional religion and personal religion. The first is
characterized as being ritualistic, well-established, corporative, exterior, regulative, theological,
organized, and ecclesiastic, the second, however, is oriented more towards interiority, the
conscience, sentiment, the non-ritual, individuality, experience, the human dimension, mysticism, a
direct rapport between souls, between humans and their creator, and lastly, communion from within
and dialogue with the divine power.

The sociological categories for the analysis and classification of religion

It is debated whether it is worthwhile proceeding with an empirical analysis of religion when
starting with a specific definition of religion in mind or whether it is better to arrive at postulating a
definition only upon completion of the research. Actually, it is the same problem of having to
choose between an approach which presupposes the existence of a pre-formulated theory with
respect to field research, and, an option which allows the researcher to come up with elements
useful in the construction of a theory only after having collected the data. Perhaps the most effective
solution is that which sees an initial conceptualization of the theme in question in order to be guided
(but avoiding any constraints), and which ought to ‘sensitize’ (in the way proposed by Herbert
Blumer). It might be preferable then to opt for definitions which are not too rigid, open and
possibilistic with regards to the outcomes of any empirical work.
Anthony J. Blasi (in Swatos 1998: 129-132) proposes four approaches: substantive,
functional, comprehending (verstehende) and formal. Tylor’s (1871) definition relating to belief in
spiritual things is regarded to be substantive, whilst for other authors the substantive elements are
fear, wonder, reverence, gratitude, and love, as well as, prayer, worship, and sacrifice, or even cult,
norms, the supernatural, ultimate meaning, feelings, divine. The following can be regarded as
functional definitions: religion when it replaces the instinctual part of humans; a need to rationalize
existence; a solidaristic perspective in the manner of Durkheim; a socio-political perspective as in
Bellah’s civil religion; in Parsonsian terms, the intention to integrate into the social system; as a
means of confronting the problems relating to the meaning of life; as a utopia; as compensation for
broken promises (Stark and Bainbridge 1979). The comprehending approach, on the other hand,
makes reference to – and without excluding ‘a very minimal substantive definition’ linked to the
supernatural – the point of view expressed by the same social actor according to its definition of the
situation (and therefore of religion). Finally, formal definitions are those provided explicitly by
various authors, beginning with Durkheim (1899 and 1912), but essentially too rigid to be
acknowledged within society. Simmel is of the same stance when he links religion with moral
obligation and in particular with the individual’s moral response.
There are, however, some fixed features or at least features which lack any uncertainty that
may lead to have doubts about those rather extensive propositions which can be intended as
religion.
First of all, the historical aspect should be given the utmost consideration. If behind a
religion there is a history dating back centuries, if not millennia, it would be difficult to deny its
status. Such a religion would be acknowledged and accepted to the point of there not being any
hesitation to accredit it sociologically. Consequently, in the case of phenomena which clearly
belong to a historically rooted religious context, their nature as a religion is therefore accepted
beyond any doubt. Even those marginal, dissenting and minor forms of the great religions of the
contemporary world are to be counted as religious forms in their own right.
The problem becomes more complex when qualifying as religious or not those
manifestations with no historical precedent and which diverge significantly from the more
accredited and accepted religious systems. Obviously, no judgment of a theological or confessional
nature can impede that these be considered as religious if they exhibit aspects which are commonly
accepted as particular to a religion. Even so, as Emile Poulat sustains (in Le Grand Atlas des
Religions, 1992) “being able to say what is or what is not religious is not an academic problem: it is
a question of politics, a continually renewed social debate, and one which produces countless
answers and is divided into two extremes: the theocratic regime and the atheist regime”.
Undoubtedly, defining that which is religious also assumes a political nature though this does not
solve the basic scientific problem of whether or not to at least produce broad boundaries of the
proprium of religion. Such boundaries can not have an absolute or definitive meaning forever. In
fact, religion is part of culture and therefore changes with it and the context in which it develops.
Every attempt to define religion is subject to criticism, also because belief, church, myth,
rite, prayer, and more, can be understood and interpreted only within their specific field of
reference. Any generalization would seem unfounded. Furthermore, the proposition put forth here is
of a temporary nature even though it is based on a vast amount of research.
Even with so much reservation surrounding this argument, it would be useful to consider
having parameters as points of reference which can be commonly acceptable and conventionally
agreed upon.

The sociological concept of religion

A first criterion for defining religion is derived largely from a metaphysical, metaempirical
reference, which recognizes from within something (a divine form or superior being with divine
characteristics which cannot be subjected to rational or scientific proof) the origin and control of the
fate of humankind. Such a criterion, as is, is not sufficient as there can be attitudes and behavior
which present themselves as religions though are not inspired by a god but find from within nature
strength, and ubiquitous and creative power equal to that of the divine. Furthermore, even without
presupposing the presence of a god, one’s existence can be lived in a religious and metaphysical
manner by a commitment to oneself, to others in a spirit of profound alterity, and a commitment to
the problems of humanity.
A second criterion could be constituted by beliefs and convictions, irrespective of how deep
they might be, based largely on spiritual and not material content.
A third criterion sees the significant contribution of rituals deeply inspired by faith, and
surrender to a divinity or, at any rate, a supernatural being.
In a fourth criterion it is possible to contemplate behavioral norms as dictated by a
charismatic leader and by its followers and on the basis of a series of written texts and the
observance of commandments.
As fifth a criterion there are the various actions which denote subscribing to defined
religious views professed in a clear manner.
The personal effort in observing the major principles of a faith in identifying the coherent
religious orientation which should be lived out, more or less, as a basic point of reference and as an
ethical principle: this is the sixth criterion.
Religion can be expressed on a level of emotions, feelings. This seventh criterion was
widely developed in, and is the fruit of, recent research, both theoretical and empirical, and recalls
specifically the new religious tendencies, the so-called new religious movements which are based
on the peculiar emphasis of a subject’s aspect.
In some cases, as with the eighth criterion, there is a reverential attitude with respect to the
divinity and generally that which is sacred.
 The ninth, a qualifying criterion, is one where even principles, dogmas, and official
teachings represent a significant corpus which can not be disregarded.
A tenth criterion is based on the observance of norms and rules considered fundamental and
demanding much attention, so much so that oaths are made to the respect of these rules.
As can easily be concluded from this simple list of criteria, it is in no way possible to
prescind, in an abstract way, from specific cultural situations that are radicated in a history. The
idea of religare, that is, of maintaining a link, is about obligation towards laws, traditions, praxis,
but also towards belonging, content of faith, and confessional orientation. At the same time, it can
mean belief in god but also rendering service to god.
There still remains a principle for which none of the above criteria completely satisfies the
requisites for recognizing something in terms of religion. Otherwise stated, for a group,
organization or movement, it is not necessary to have a precise concept of god, nor to take part in
any rites, nor observe dogmas of faith, and not even to respect ethical norms.
We should not forget the sociolinguistic weight of the term religion: it originates from the
defined framework of the Latin language but we can assume that it can be applied indiscriminately
to every kind of ethnicity. The relationship with the divine, the holy, is undoubtedly a widely
accepted notion and has the intent of attributing the characteristics of ‘religion’ to a specific social
phenomenon. It should be noted that its origins are also a limitation, its ‘original sin’, as it were: its
beginnings and its christianocentric disposition have ideological repercussions which privilege the
existence of god, the belief in an immortal soul and the existence of a universal ethic – prime
indicators of a religious fact. If adding to the ‘natural’ almost spontaneous characteristics of a
religion the preponderant weight of a ‘supernatural’ religion revealed by god, any scientific activity
would be hindered and forced to stop before prerequisites that are loaded with mystery, filled with
unfathomable, divine will, and which are not subjectable to any attempt of corroboration through
information gathered in field work.
If speaking about natural religion as the result of an action of human reason, it belongs more
to the realm of theology than that of sociology, even if Hume (fundamentally a deist) is accredited
for detracting religion from the control of religious institutions, favoring a less conditioned
approach.
Unlike the philosophy of religion, the sociology of religion does not attempt to seek out the
essence of religion, it does not question whether a spirit exists or not, nor does it assess the justness
of any religious aspirations, it simply records its effects in a social context. Moreover, this does not
imply that sociology need espouse the idea of necessary atheism, nor is desirable a direct and
operational involvement of a religiously militant nature. It can also be said to be true for any forced
choice which is agnostic, indifferent, areligious, as if it were the unavoidable condition necessary to
carry out scientific research on religious phenomena. However, any other option would give rise to
atheistic religion which is not at all mandatory for scientific research inasmuch as it would lead to
the idea of a slide of the unknowability of the divine absolute towards the unknowability of a
religious fact purely because it is linked to the divine. Schleiermacher sustained, philosophically,
the feasibility of a religion without a god.
But it was another philosopher, Henri-Louis Bergson, who, in 1932, in his work Two
Sources of Moral and Religion favored a distinction between static religion and dynamic religion.
The former was considered a reduced historical version of the view regarding the survival instinct
humans beings opt for in order to solve the problem of death by inventing divine figures, with a
human likeness, and which serve as tutelary deities. The latter, on the other hand, was regarded as
not being the work of humans but of god, where humans enter the realm of god in a mysterious
way, and allow themselves to be lead by their god towards forms of institution and dogma. The
characteristics of static religion are more human, earthly and natural, whereas those of dynamic
religion are more metaphysical, superterrestrial, and divine. Bergson, twenty years after Rudolph
Otto (1912), is far from the idea of humankind’s concerns about the numinous. For him humans are
directed towards a god who is far more than human inasmuch as it is a mysterious superior being,
majestic, irascible, tremendum (frightening), and fascinans (enchanting).
Indeed, little do these philosophical perspectives influence sociological thought which tends
not to subscribe to a transcendental explanation, it does not question objective truth and excludes
itself from any salvific implication of religious activity. That which truly interests sociology is the
socio-religious activity humans are involved in within their community and society.
Needless to say, a sociological definition of religion can not be restricted nor limiting, it
does however open itself to every possible aspect within the variety of phenomena that can be
identified empirically. It is because of this that it is deeply interconnected with many other forms of
social experience ranging from family to economic life, from political choices to moral choices,
from ideology to the meaning of symbols and from art to technology.
The starting point, hence, is that a sociological definition of religion should be an
observation which brings about a necessarily comparative approach between similar religious
systems but in different societies. This is possible by perhaps identifying connotations which
corroborate the idea of a natural religion which is more of human than divine origins, divided and
channeled into different eras and into different societies. In the second half of the nineteenth
century, Max Müller pointed out, and not by chance, that the Indo-European roots of religion go
back as far as the Vedic traditions, and date back even further than the beginnings of Hinduism. He
emphasized how the personification of gods was the result of the human tendency to
anthropomorphize every phenomenon. Tylor (1871) followed the same line of thinking stating that
the religions of the so-called primitive peoples created the roots for every expression of religion that
followed, which moved towards animism, then polytheism, and finally monotheism.
Monotheism, in its contemporary forms, bases itself on unicity and the truth of a single god.
It offers an opportunity to the so-called rational choice (or the “new paradigm”, tied to Peter
Berger’s idea of the religious market), applied to the economic model in order to prove that the “one
true god” theory (Stark 2001) works convincingly in the context of the religious market. This
happens because it is privileged by the “exclusive exchange relationship” accompanied by a kind of
lifetime guarantee. Hence, the only true god is to be seen as a successful product also because it is a
common affair related to groups. But such a point of view necessarily presupposes a supernatural
dimension, and this, inevitably, is not applicable to all religions in their manifestations.
In addition, the one, true, convincing explanation would exclude other evidence: religion is
able to explain but it also mystifies; it creates peace but also conflict; it consoles and strikes fear; it
is governed by an elite few but practiced largely by the masses (this is the point where the continual
contrast between official and popular religion stems). Not to mention the continuing dialectic
between religion and culture which shapes the attitudes and behavior of social actors.
After all, the two prevailing perspectives are those which compare religion to a relationship
between human subjects and a divine being or, contrarily, which insist that the religious dimension
is an “earthly” social construct created by social actors in response to needs which are by no means
metaphysical but totally human.
From magic to pre-animism, from animism to totemism, from fetishism to polytheism, and
from mythology to monotheism, the religious processes are many, overlapping, and not necessarily
linear or evolutive, but in general they produce beliefs, rites, symbols and institutions. The
conformations which come as a result appear so distinct from each other that every sociologist of
religion attempts to give a personal definition of the contents and forms of religion. The result,
however, is almost always incomplete, vague, or circumscribed. Therefore a sociological definition
of religion is, at most, applicable to a limited context and to a short time frame.
From Kant’s social morality to the conception of the universe as seen by Hegel, to the
emotions referred to by Schleiermacher, and to the search for security analyzed by Fromm, religion
nevertheless constitutes a desire in one way directed to the divine and yet in another it is addressed
to humankind and sometimes towards both. For this reason, one of the most convincing definitions
appears to be Geertz’s (1973) which explains religion as a system of symbols which provide
humankind with an ongoing, realistic and factual justification through concepts pertaining to a
general order of existence. This final attempt at a definition put forth by Geertz seems to end the
diatribe between substantive and functional definitions and that between restrictive and more open
perspectives.
Peter Beyer (2001) also searched for a solution by proposing an idealtypical typology (and
therefore not empirically verifiable) organized into three meanings: analytical, theological, and
popular/official. Beyer (2001) rightly observed that the formation and development of some
religions (such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism and Hinduism) are clearer and
more noticeable than others (like Taoism, Shintoism and Confucianism) although, they all share an
unquestionable social concreteness. The analytical approach strives to discover similar institutions
and attributes from the various religions even when they belong to different periods in history. This
approach therefore attempts to identify universal elements in all societies but can not exclude the
fact that there are other forms of religion which do not have such aspects in common. On the other
hand, the theological approach, which concerns a universal ontological truth, postulates something
which in itself escapes empirical observation in that it deals with the a metaphysical reality but this
does not hinder the existence of different kinds of knowledge and forms of communication. Finally,
it appears to be quite similar to the religious model within the popular/official views of religion
given these views are not characterized by universality but by that which the members of a religious
movement or religious organization ask to be considered as religion. In other terms, it deals with a
specific form of religion which has its own distinctive institutional traits as well as a series of
human experiences. It is no coincidence then that religion is a personal affair, which is practiced in
groups, but often it is done so indipendently, compared to organized religious manifestations (as is
demonstrated by pilgrimages or large gatherings, communal liturgies, or localistic or domestic
religiousness).
The different degrees of religiousness, that is, the amount of fervor and commitment in a
religion, depend on historical and personal factors which, sociologically, are not easily identifiable
and interpretable due to: the vastness of possible religious manifestations; the socio-cultural
influences taking place; economic, political, and ideological relationships; as well as emotional,
sentimental and psychological interaction. This web of interferences and relationships does not
allow for an aprioristic definition of religion, and nevertheless - as Assad (1993) notes - “there
cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and
relationships are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of
discursive processes”.
In the meantime, however, Talcott-Parsons sees a number of answers in religion: an answer
to humanity’s desires (in the sense of salvation versus suffering), to the need for values (in the sense
of justice versus injustice), the affirmation of ideas (truth versus fallacy).
One of the most accredited Chinese scholars of religion, Lü (1998), is of a very different
opinion stating that “religion is a kind of social consciousness regarding superhuman and
supernatural forces, and its consequent believing and worshipping behaviors toward such forces; it
is the normalized and institutionalized social-cultural system that synthesizes this consciousness and
the behaviors”. This definition is not dissimilar from those rather open, well known propositions,
but coming from a non-Western socio-cultural framework,. Lü’s definition is worthy of particular
attention also “for its scientific nature and liberating effect” in an environment, such as China’s,
which until not long ago did not favor the development of scientific study of religion (Yang 2004).
Not so easy is that sphere which includes religions and para-religions or quasi-religions,
those which include therapies, systems for healing the body, diets, martial arts, methods of self-
help, sports, and many more phenomena which describe themselves as religious, and which may
share some of the same characteristics typical of a religion. A distinction can be made between
para-religion and quasi-religion. Para-religion possesses some religious features and thus resembles
a religion (without giving itself that definition). A quasi-religion only barely manifests any affinity
with religion. The real problem is not whether to establish what share of religion is present in these
phenomenologies, but to ascertain whether there any relationships have been established with the
entire belief system (including religious beliefs) that each individual controls and manifests.
The variability of religion does not allow for steel cages, peremptory definitions or
inescapable criteria: “far from being a fixed or unitary phenomenon, religion is a social construct
that varies in meaning across time and place” (Beckford 2003). A formulation like Gustafson’s
(1990: 10), “a patterning of social relationships around a belief in supernatural powers, creating
ethical considerations”, might be considered efficient: it is synthetic and allows for a great number
of scholars from every cultural and intellectual background to share its content. In this case as well,
it is also obviously necessary to ensure to avoid unfounded empirical absolutizations. Intrinsic to
this definition is the suggestion to not confuse religion with faith (an individual issue), or morals. In
addition, the supernatural is distinct from the transcendent in that the former may possess a
characteristic which could be also immanent (in nature, for instance, as strength or as entity),
whereas the latter refers to a god. Indeed religion has a characteristic indicative of action. It
possesses its own conceptual vocabulary common to all those who belong, it furthermore involves
subjective experiences which may or may not be extensive or intense. It is clear that no firm,
dogmatic definition can be given to religion because of the extreme variability of its manifestations.
These can be evaluated and interpreted according to a situation bearing in mind the definition of a
situation as given by the social actors. In short, a possible operative definition should be
“grounded” (Glaser, Strauss 1967), that is, based on data. A possible starting point for such a
definition may even make use of a “sensitizing” (Blumer 1954) characteristic in order to approach
the actor’s point of view.
The procedure with which a definition of religion is constructed begins with the collection
of empirical data, some indicative concepts are put forth and then strategies for research are
established. Accordingly, any existing taxonomy is to be avoided and it would be preferable to have
the individual express its orientation. By thus doing, both pure descriptivism and theoretical
prospectivism can be avoided. And so one operates within the framework arranged contemporarily
by the social actors, who create their religion hence their experiences of religion, and by the
sociologists, who construct their analytical points of view in order to make their observations of
religion and religions. There is, in effect, a return of the social actor to the field of religion. The
actor is no longer governed by confessional concepts or concepts which may be irrelevant to the
object of scientific research. Both concepts are destined generally to cancel out the social
individual’s point of view. Also in order to avoid any impediments and misinterpretations, it is
opportune for the sociologist of religion to declare explicitly not only personal religious tendencies
but also basic values, choices of behavior, underlying attitudes (for example the author of this paper
should mention that he is not only a believer in Catholicism but must also add that he regularly
practices his faith, and, at times, is directly involved in socio-religious activities and it is perhaps
even due to this that he is rather critical towards Catholic institutions and especially drawn to a
continuing involvement with religious experiences that are different from Catholicism).
Within many sociological definitions of religion there is a significant amount of
overinterpretation, that is, interpretation that disregards the facts. But, on the other hand, self-
definition given by social actors is not the only possible point of reference in that it should be
compared with other definitions put forward by other subjects and within different contexts and
with different emphases. The task of the sociologist, then, is to scientifically coordinate and
recompose the different concepts observed.
To this it is possible to add as a fundamental premise the careful and thorough study of
practice, and the value influences which guide them. The most difficult question to solve concerns
the distinction (if any) between belief and experience. Nevertheless it should be taken into
consideration that there are ways of interpreting religion without referring to either: belief without
experience and experience without belief or as Davie (1990) put it, “believing without belonging”,
or contrarily “belonging or experiencing without believing”.
 At this point it should be clear that sociological analysis of religion does not have as its aim
the task to confirm the plausibility concerning that which is metaphysical, transcendent, or
supernatural, but rather how the men and women of the contemporary world live their personal and
social experience of religion. According to his scientific solution, Beckford (2003) suggests
experimenting with a socioconstructionist approach to religion thus tending to analyze “the ways in
which human beings express what they regard as religious ideas and sentiments in social and
cultural forms” independent of the fact whether or not religion be a socioanthropological need to be
gratified in order to solve existential problems (according to the way Luhmann speaks of
interdetermination reduction, or Berger and Luckmann’s social construction of meaning). Hence,
definitions of religion which appeal to common sense would be of little use, indeed it would be
more effective to observe the processes of the social construction of religion as it happens. If not,
any attempts to define what religion is would be destined to fail because they would find no
adequate scientific consensus. Nonetheless, typological attempts should be made, with the intent of
at least being indicative, sensitizing, and creating awareness. After all, the field is not entirely
empty, much has already been sowed, although some areas left fallow (using a term dear to
Beckford), but it has borne good fruits and with the fertility of cumulative knowledge, research can
then begin with an essential point of reference in mind. So, for religion, the following approaches to
research can be considered, that is, either separately, or combined with other approaches according
to the logic dictated by one’s experience and one’s chosen method of analysis.
Firstly, religion is made up of interpersonal experiences with other humans and/or with one
or more divinities. Such relations are made up principally of convictions (beliefs), sentiments
(emotions), principles (values), and practice (rituals, that is, cultural acts and also actions, whether
they occur daily or on specific occasions), all of which are more or less interconnected coherently.
The subject’s freedom to be unpredictable produces unexpected events as well as one off
conjunctions. In the meantime, however, the traditions of historically recognized religions continue
to reaffirm their most significant features through notions, precepts, ceremonies, and according to
the circumstances of the time and their environment. What does not pertain to sociological research
are the questions of whether or not god exists, the immortality of the soul, the cycle of
reincarnation, premial or sanctionary behavior, life beyond death, nor divine revelation to humanity,
but each of these elements can be used as a qualifier for whatever religion and can therefore be part
of a defining framework (accurately contextualized) but not subject to empirical proof. It goes
without saying that none of the religions appears to be a religion par excellence, therefore removing
any doubt from the use of the wording sociology of religion instead of sociology of religions.
Secondly, religion is expressed as a connection with the divinity, which gives humans unity,
in the universal sense, by means of devotion towards a god, and the respect due to it. Moreover, the
object of such veneration becomes sacred, something significantly different, untouchable, and
superior; and great care is taken to observe with deference and reverence every correct rule and
praxis according to the pre-established precepts.
Thirdly, religion is the manifestation of profound and undoubting belief; it is professing
one’s faith with determination and not reflectively; it is not necessarily critical, compared with
those concepts of life which have a feature which is cogent and paradigmatic, and accepted almost
unconditionally. Faith is expressed indeed by entrusting the values one considers fundamental and
unfaltering, and these preside over almost all decisions, however small.
Fourth, religion is fervor, dedication, ongoing practice, devout behavior, and pity; it is
religiousness outwardly expressed through recollection, repentance, meditation, reflection, and
silence.
These distinctive features of religion are simply a dialogic and open path to be used as a
guide for theoretical and empirical research, and not further tokens to add to the great cemetery of
definitions of religion (Poulat 1992).

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