MODULE 6: EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Republic Act No. 9262 (Re: Battered Woman Syndrome)

Republic Act No. 9262

March 08, 2004

AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children
Act of 2004”.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
Provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention on the Elimination of all forms
of discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human
rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,

(a) “Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited
to, the following acts:

A. “Physical Violence” refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child.
It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to
do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. “Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property,
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing or
allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or
to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. “Economic abuse” refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.

(b) “Battery” refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the
physical and psychological or emotional distress.

(c) “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

(d) “Stalking” refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful
justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly
or indirectly or a combination thereof.

(e) “Dating relationship” refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course
of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business
or social context is not a dating relationship.

(f) “Sexual relations” refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a
common child.

(g) “Safe place or shelter” refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary organization accredited
by the DSWD for the purposes of this Act or any other suitable place the resident of which is willing
temporarily to receive the victim.
(h) “Children” refers to those below eighteen (18) years of age or older but are incapable of taking care
of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it includes the biological
children of the victim and other children under her care.

SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children.

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;

(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;

(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman’s or her child’s freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman’s or her
child’s movement or conduct:

(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately providing the woman’s children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or
controlling the victim’s own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money,
or properties;

(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions
or decisions;

(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does
not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against
the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;

(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his
will;

(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman
or her child; and

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children of access to the woman’s child/children.

SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof
shall be punished according to the following rules:

(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide or
murder or homicide shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be punishable in accordance with the Revised Penal Code;
those constituting serious physical injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor; those constituting
less serious physical injuries shall be punished by prision correccional; and those constituting slight
physical injuries shall be punished by arresto mayor.

Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower than the
prescribed penalty for the consummated crime as specified in the preceding paragraph but shall in no
case be lower than arresto mayor.

(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be punished by prision correccional;

(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be punished by arresto mayor;

(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be punished by prision mayor;

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos (300,000.00);
(b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to
the court.
SECTION 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
compliant.

SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and
granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of
safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and
facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life. The
provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies. The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act are the barangay protection order (BPO), temporary protection order
(TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The protection orders that may be issued under this Act
shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:

(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;

(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;

(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the petitioner, or
permanently where no property rights are violated, and if respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent has
gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;

(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and designated family or household member
at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment,
or any specified place frequented by the petitioner and any designated family or household member;

(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other essential personal
effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law enforcement officer to accompany
the petitioner to the residence of the parties to ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the
possession of the automobile and other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or
respondent’s removal of personal belongings;

(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;

(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate percentage of
the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the respondent’s employer for the
same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay
in the remittance of support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the
respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon and order
him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by the court, including revocation of
license and disqualification to apply for any license to use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law
enforcement agent, the court shall order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the
appropriate authority to investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;

(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not limited to, property
damage, medical expenses, childcare expenses and loss of income;

(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner may need; and

(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and provide for the
safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member, provided petitioner and any
designated family or household member consents to such relief.

Any of the reliefs provided under this section shall be granted even in the absence of a decree of legal
separation or annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.

The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an application for BPO shall not preclude a petitioner from
applying for, or the court from granting a TPO or PPO.

SECTION 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders. – A petition for protection order may be filed by
any of the following:

(a) the offended party;

(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;

(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity;

(d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units (LGUs);

(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s desks;

(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;

(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner;

(h) At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against
women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed.

SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. – Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on
venue under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its implementing rules and
regulations. An application for a TPO or PPO may be filed in the regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over the place of
residence of the petitioner: Provided, however, That if a family court exists in the place of residence of
the petitioner, the application shall be filed with that court.
SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. – The application for a protection order must be in
writing, signed and verified under oath by the applicant. It may be filed as an independent action or as
incidental relief in any civil or criminal case the subject matter or issues thereof partakes of a violence as
described in this Act. A standard protection order application form, written in English with translation to
the major local languages, shall be made available to facilitate applications for protections order, and
shall contain, among other, the following information:

(a) names and addresses of petitioner and respondent;

(b) description of relationships between petitioner and respondent;

(c) a statement of the circumstances of the abuse;

(d) description of the reliefs requested by petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;

(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;

(f) request for waiver of application fees until hearing; and

(g) an attestation that there is no pending application for a protection order in another court.

If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant
attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of
consent given by the victim for the filling of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim
will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall
attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction,
and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

An application for protection order filed with a court shall be considered an application for both a TPO
and PPO.

Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist applicants in the preparation of the application. Law
enforcement agents shall also extend assistance in the application for protection orders in cases brought
to their attention.

SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. – All TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging
from Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six
(6) months.

SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for Protection Order. – If the woman or her child
requests in the applications for a protection order for the appointment of counsel because of lack of
economic means to hire a counsel de parte, the court shall immediately direct the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) to represent the petitioner in the hearing on the application. If the PAO determines that
the applicant can afford to hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate the legal
representation of the petitioner by a counsel de parte. The lack of access to family or conjugal resources
by the applicant, such as when the same are controlled by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to
legal representation by the PAO.

However, a private counsel offering free legal service is not barred from representing the petitioner.

SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist
from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO
is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall
be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct
any barangay official to effect is personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.

SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. – Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination
that such order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in
this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law
enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits
of the issuance of a PPO.

SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. – Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection
order issued by the court after notice and hearing.

Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or his lack of a lawyer, or the non-availability of his
lawyer shall not be a ground for rescheduling or postponing the hearing on the merits of the issuance of
a PPO. If the respondents appears without counsel on the date of the hearing on the PPO, the court shall
appoint a lawyer for the respondent and immediately proceed with the hearing. In case the respondent
fails to appear despite proper notice, the court shall allow ex parte presentation of the evidence by the
applicant and render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The court shall allow the
introduction of any history of abusive conduct of a respondent even if the same was not directed against
the applicant or the person for whom the applicant is made.

The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one
(1) day. Where the court is unable to conduct the hearing within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due
to expire, the court shall continuously extend or renew the TPO for a period of thirty (30) days at each
particular time until final judgment is issued. The extended or renewed TPO may be modified by the
court as may be necessary or applicable to address the needs of the applicant.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs specified in Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be
effective until revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued.
The court shall ensure immediate personal service of the PPO on respondent.

The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of the lapse of time between the
act of violence and the filing of the application.

Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court must determine whether or not
the PPO shall become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as long as there is no clear
showing that the act from which the order might arise did not exist.

SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. – The following statement must be printed in bold-
faced type or in capital letters on the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay or court:

“VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.”

SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on Applications For Protection Orders – Failure to act on an
application for a protection order within the reglementary period specified in the previous section
without justifiable cause shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act
is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply. The court shall proceed on the main case and
other incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing on any application for a protection order
filed by the petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory period specified in this Act.

SECTION 20. Priority of Application for a Protection Order. – Ex parte and adversarial hearings to
determine the basis of applications for a protection order under this Act shall have priority over all other
proceedings. Barangay officials and the courts shall schedule and conduct hearings on applications for a
protection order under this Act above all other business and, if necessary, suspend other proceedings in
order to hear applications for a protection order.

SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act
must be filed directly with any municipal trial court, metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial
court that has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be
punishable by imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon
judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a protection order as it deems necessary without need
of an application.

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of court
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or civil action
that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.

SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to Criminal Cases. – The foregoing provisions on
protection orders shall be applicable in impliedly instituted with the criminal actions involving violence
against women and their children.
SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. – The Court may order any person against whom a protection
order is issued to give a bond to keep the peace, to present two sufficient sureties who shall undertake
that such person will not commit the violence sought to be prevented.

Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required, he shall be detained for a period which shall in
no case exceed six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to
5(f) and not exceeding thirty (30) days, if for acts punishable under Section 5(g) to 5(I).

The protection orders referred to in this section are the TPOs and the PPOs issued only by the courts.

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20)
years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

SECTION 25. Public Crime. – Violence against women and their children shall be considered a public
offense which may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint by any citizen having personal
knowledge of the circumstances involving the commission of the crime.

SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. – Victim-survivors who are found by the courts
to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman
syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.

SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other
mind-altering substance shall not be a defense under this Act.

SECTION 28. Custody of children. – The woman victim of violence shall be entitled to the custody and
support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or physical
disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to support, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody
of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is
suffering from Battered woman syndrome.

SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. – Prosecutors and court personnel should observe
the following duties when dealing with victims under this Act:

a) communicate with the victim in a language understood by the woman or her child; and

b) inform the victim of her/his rights including legal remedies available and procedure, and privileges for
indigent litigants.
SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law Enforcers. – Barangay officials and law enforcers shall
have the following duties:

(a) respond immediately to a call for help or request for assistance or protection of the victim by
entering the necessary whether or not a protection order has been issued and ensure the safety of the
victim/s;

(b) confiscate any deadly weapon in the possession of the perpetrator or within plain view;

(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe place of their choice or to a clinic or hospital;

(d) assist the victim in removing personal belongs from the house;

(e) assist the barangay officials and other government officers and employees who respond to a call for
help;

(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection Orders issued by the Punong Barangy or the courts;

(g) arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a warrant when any of the acts of violence defined by this
Act is occurring, or when he/she has personal knowledge that any act of abuse has just been committed,
and there is imminent danger to the life or limb of the victim as defined in this Act; and

(h) immediately report the call for assessment or assistance of the DSWD, social Welfare Department of
LGUs or accredited non-government organizations (NGOs).

Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report the incident shall be liable for a fine not
exceeding Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable criminal, civil or administrative
liability.

SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse – Any healthcare provider, including, but not
limited to, an attending physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health worker, therapist or counselor who
suspects abuse or has been informed by the victim of violence shall:

(a) properly document any of the victim’s physical, emotional or psychological injuries;

(b) properly record any of victim’s suspicions, observations and circumstances of the examination or
visit;

(c) automatically provide the victim free of charge a medical certificate concerning the examination or
visit;

(d) safeguard the records and make them available to the victim upon request at actual cost; and

(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate notice of rights and remedies provided under this Act,
and services available to them.

SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies and LGUs – Other government agencies and LGUs
shall establish programs such as, but not limited to, education and information campaign and seminars
or symposia on the nature, causes, incidence and consequences of such violence particularly towards
educating the public on its social impacts.

It shall be the duty of the concerned government agencies and LGU’s to ensure the sustained education
and training of their officers and personnel on the prevention of violence against women and their
children under the Act.

SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay, Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an
application for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in any way unduly influence he
applicant for a protection order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs sought in the application
for protection under this Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections 410, 411, 412 and
413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is sought under
this Act.

Failure to comply with this Section shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability. – In every case of violence against women and
their children as herein defined, any person, private individual or police authority or barangay official
who, acting in accordance with law, responds or intervenes without using violence or restraint greater
than necessary to ensure the safety of the victim, shall not be liable for any criminal, civil or
administrative liability resulting therefrom.

SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their rights under existing laws, victims of violence against
women and their children shall have the following rights:

(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;

(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public legal
assistance office;

(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs’

(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code; and

(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to apply for a
protection order.

SECTION 36. Damages. – Any victim of violence under this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory,
moral and exemplary damages.

SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. – The court shall expedite the process of issuance of a hold
departure order in cases prosecuted under this Act.

SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee and Other Expenses. – If the victim is an indigent
or there is an immediate necessity due to imminent danger or threat of danger to act on an application
for a protection order, the court shall accept the application without payment of the filing fee and other
fees and of transcript of stenographic notes.
SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against Women and Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In
pursuance of the abovementioned policy, there is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council on
Violence Against Women and their children, hereinafter known as the Council, which shall be composed
of the following agencies:

(a) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW);

(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);

(d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)

(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);

(g) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);

(i) Department of Health (DOH);

(j) Department of Education (DepEd);

(k) Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE); and

(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and projects to eliminate VAW based on their
mandates as well as develop capability programs for their employees to become more sensitive to the
needs of their clients. The Council will also serve as the monitoring body as regards to VAW initiatives.

The Council members may designate their duly authorized representative who shall have a rank not
lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent. These representatives shall attend Council meetings
in their behalf, and shall receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in accordance with
existing budget and accounting rules and regulations.

SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for Victims. – The DSWD, and LGU’s shall provide the
victims temporary shelters, provide counseling, psycho-social services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation
programs and livelihood assistance.

The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.

SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders. – The DSWD shall provide rehabilitative counseling
and treatment to perpetrators towards learning constructive ways of coping with anger and emotional
outbursts and reforming their ways. When necessary, the offender shall be ordered by the Court to
submit to psychiatric treatment or confinement.
SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in Responding to Violence Against Women and their Children
Cases. – All agencies involved in responding to violence against women and their children cases shall be
required to undergo education and training to acquaint them with:

a. the nature, extend and causes of violence against women and their children;

b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to, victims of violence against women and their children;

c. the services and facilities available to victims or survivors;

d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to make arrest and to offer protection and assistance; and

e. techniques for handling incidents of violence against women and their children that minimize the
likelihood of injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim or survivor.

The PNP, in coordination with LGU’s shall establish an education and training program for police officers
and barangay officials to enable them to properly handle cases of violence against women and their
children.

SECTION 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence
up to ten (10) days in addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and
Regulations, extendible when the necessity arises as specified in the protection order.

Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this section shall be penalized in
accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an
employer who shall prejudice any person for assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall
likewise be liable for discrimination.

SECTION 44. Confidentiality. – All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their
children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and
public or private clinics to hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or
causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address,
employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the
latter’s consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine
of not more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SECTION 45. Funding – The amount necessary to implement the provisions of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the mandated agencies and LGU’s shall be used to
implement services for victim of violence against women and their children.

SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within six (6) months from the approval of this Act,
the DOJ, the NCRFW, the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and the PNP, and three (3) representatives from
NGOs to be identified by the NCRFW, shall promulgate the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
this Act.

SECTION 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other
applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.

SECTION 48. Separability Clause. – If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, the other sections or provisions shall not be affected.

SECTION 49. Repealing Clause – All laws, Presidential decrees, executive orders and rules and
regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

SECTION 50. Effectivity – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

B. Republic Act No. 9344 as amended by Republic Act No. 10630

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9344

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

TITLE I
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

CHAPTER 1
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006." It shall cover the different stages involving children at risk and children in conflict with the law
from prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State policies shall be observed at all times:

(a) The State recognizes the vital role of children and youth in nation building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child through measures that will ensure the
observance of international standards of child protection, especially those to which the Philippines is a
party. Proceedings before any authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child and in a
manner which allows the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely. The participation of
children in the program and policy formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice and
welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government agency.
(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.

(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the State
recognizes the right of every child alleged as, accused of, adjudged, or recognized as having infringed the
penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and
worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability of promoting his/her reintegration. Whenever
appropriate and desirable, the State shall adopt measures for dealing with such children without
resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected. It
shall ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being by providing for,
among others, a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders,
counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to
institutional care.

(e) The administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system shall take into consideration the
cultural and religious perspectives of the Filipino people, particularly the indigenous peoples and the
Muslims, consistent with the protection of the rights of children belonging to these communities.

(f) The State shall apply the principles of restorative justice in all its laws, policies and programs
applicable to children in conflict with the law.

SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of doubt, the interpretation of any of the provisions of
this Act, including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall be construed liberally in favor of
the child in conflict with the law.

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used in this Act shall be defined as follows:

(a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the release of the person in custody of the law, furnished by
him/her or a bondsman, to guarantee his/her appearance before any court. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate security, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the circumstances and conditions which are most
congenial to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to the
child's physical, psychological and emotional development. It also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.

(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years.

(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses
because of personal, family and social circumstances, such as, but not limited to, the following:

(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical, psychological, mental, economic or any other
means and the parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to provide protection for the child;

(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;

(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search and inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot
be found;

(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a parent or guardian;

(5) being out of school;

(6) being a streetchild;

(7) being a member of a gang;

(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or drug abuse; and

(9) living in situations of armed conflict.

(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having
committed an offense under Philippine laws.

(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs provided in a community setting developed for
purposes of intervention and diversion, as well as rehabilitation of the child in conflict with the law, for
reintegration into his/her family and/or community.

(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places where there are no family courts, any regional trial court.

(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of detention or imprisonment, or to the placement of a
child in conflict with the law in a public or private custodial setting, from which the child in conflict with
the law is not permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial or administrative authority.

(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and
treatment of a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her social, cultural, economic,
psychological or educational background without resorting to formal court proceedings.

(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is required to
undergo after he/she is found responsible for an offense without resorting to formal court proceedings.

(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the apprehension or taking into custody of a child in conflict
with the law by law enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time when the child alleged
to be in conflict with the law receives a subpoena under Section 3(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6(a) or Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not
require preliminary investigation or where there is no necessity to place the child alleged to be in
conflict with the law under immediate custody.

(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are designed to address issues that caused the
child to commit an offense. It may take the form of an individualized treatment program which may
include counseling, skills training, education, and other activities that will enhance his/her psychological,
emotional and psycho-social well-being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a system dealing with children at risk and children in
conflict with the law, which provides child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for
prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure their normal growth and
development.

(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the person in authority or his/her agent as defined in Article 152
of the Revised Penal Code, including a barangay tanod.

(0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission whether punishable under special laws or the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in lieu of a bond assumed by a parent or custodian who
shall be responsible for the appearance in court of the child in conflict with the law, when required.

(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a process of resolving conflicts with the
maximum involvement of the victim, the offender and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for
the victim; reconciliation of the offender, the offended and the community; and reassurance to the
offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society. It also enhances public safety by activating the
offender, the victim and the community in prevention strategies.

(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which discriminate only against a child, while an adult does not
suffer any penalty for committing similar acts. These shall include curfew violations; truancy, parental
disobedience and the like.

(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution managed by accredited local
government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or accredited nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
providing short-term residential care for children in conflict with the law who are awaiting court
disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction.

(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-hour residential care facility managed by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), LGUs, licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the
DSWD, which provides care, treatment and rehabilitation services for children in conflict with the law.
Rehabilitation services are provided under the guidance of a trained staff where residents are cared for
under a structured therapeutic environment with the end view of reintegrating them into their families
and communities as socially functioning individuals. Physical mobility of residents of said centers may be
restricted pending court disposition of the charges against them.

(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where there is no private offended party.

CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE

SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Every child in conflict with the law shall have the
following rights, including but not limited to:

(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital punishment or life imprisonment, without the
possibility of release;

(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily, of his/her liberty; detention or imprisonment
being a disposition of last resort, and which shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time;

(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for the inherent dignity of the person, and in a
manner which takes into account the needs of a person of his/her age. In particular, a child deprived of
liberty shall be separated from adult offenders at all times. No child shall be detained together with
adult offenders. He/She shall be conveyed separately to or from court. He/She shall await hearing of
his/her own case in a separate holding area. A child in conflict with the law shall have the right to
maintain contact with his/her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional
circumstances;

(e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge
the legality of the deprivation of his/her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and
impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on such action;

(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate cases;

(g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her own behalf under the rule on examination of a child
witness;

(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all stages of the proceedings;

(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and voluntarily avails of the same;

(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to the gravity of the offense where his/her best
interest, the rights of the victim and the needs of society are all taken into consideration by the court,
under the principle of restorative justice;

(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty limited to the minimum, and where
discretion is given by law to the judge to determine whether to impose fine or imprisonment, the
imposition of fine being preferred as the more appropriate penalty;

(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;

(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment, if qualified under the Probation Law;

(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment or misrepresentation; and

(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws, rules and regulations.

The State further adopts the provisions of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the
Administration of Juvenile Justice or "Beijing Rules", United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of
Juvenile Delinquency or the "Riyadh Guidelines", and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of
Juveniles Deprived of Liberty.
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen
(18) years old or older. The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in
his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the information in
any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the determination of age before the
Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate
pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the appropriate court,
the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same court where the case is
pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.

TITLE II
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE

SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is
hereby created and attached to the Department of Justice and placed under its administrative
supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of this Act and coordination among the
following agencies:

(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);

(b) Department of Education (DepEd);

(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);

(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);

(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);

(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)

(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);

(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.

(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);

(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

(k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA);

(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and

(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and intervention programs.

The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower than director, to be
designated by the concerned heads of the following departments or agencies:

(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);

(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);

(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)

(d) Department of Education (DepEd);

(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)

(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);

(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and

(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be designated by the Secretary of Justice and the other
to be designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development.

The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Justice
and the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall determine the organizational structure and
staffing pattern of the JJWC.

The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the Philippine Judicial
Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its duties and functions,
as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The JJWC shall have the following duties and functions:

(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;

(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies relating to juvenile justice and welfare;

(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and redrafting of existing policies/regulations or in the
formulation of new ones in line with the provisions of this Act;

(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year national juvenile intervention program, with the
participation of government agencies concerned, NGOs and youth organizations;

(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile intervention programs and activities by national
government agencies and other activities which may have an important bearing on the success of the
entire national juvenile intervention program. All programs relating to juvenile justice and welfare shall
be adopted in consultation with the JJWC;

(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in consultation with children for the prevention
of juvenile delinquency and the administration of justice, as well as for the treatment and rehabilitation
of the children in conflict with the law;

(g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing research and support evaluations and studies
on all matters relating to juvenile justice and welfare, such as but not limited to:

(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile intervention programs and by activities of the local
government units and other government agencies;

(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile delinquency and crimes; and

(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law in custody.

The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the improvement of the administration of juvenile justice
and welfare system.

The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children are involved in research and policy
development.

(h) Through duly designated persons and with the assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot
inspections on their own initiative in order to check compliance with the standards provided herein and
to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate agencies;

(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the personnel of the agencies involved in the
administration of the juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile intervention program;

(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the implementation of this Act; and

(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. - All government agencies enumerated
in Section 8 shall, with the assistance of the JJWC and within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act,
draft policies and procedures consistent with the standards set in the law. These policies and procedures
shall be modified accordingly in consultation with the JJWC upon the completion of the national juvenile
intervention program as provided under Section 9 (d).

SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child Rights Center of the Commission on Human Rights
shall ensure that the status, rights and interests of children are upheld in accordance with the
Constitution and international instruments on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen the monitoring of
government compliance of all treaty obligations, including the timely and regular submission of reports
before the treaty bodies, as well as the implementation and dissemination of recommendations and
conclusions by government agencies as well as NGOs and civil society.

TITLE III
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS

SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible for the primary nurturing and rearing of children
which is critical in delinquency prevention. As far as practicable and in accordance with the procedures
of this Act, a child in conflict with the law shall be maintained in his/her family.

SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational institutions shall work together with families, community
organizations and agencies in the prevention of juvenile delinquency and in the rehabilitation and
reintegration of child in conflict with the law. Schools shall provide adequate, necessary and
individualized educational schemes for children manifesting difficult behavior and children in conflict
with the law. In cases where children in conflict with the law are taken into custody or detained in
rehabilitation centers, they should be provided the opportunity to continue learning under an
alternative learning system with basic literacy program or non- formal education accreditation
equivalency system.

SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass media shall play an active role in the promotion of child
rights, and delinquency prevention by relaying consistent messages through a balanced approach.
Media practitioners shall, therefore, have the duty to maintain the highest critical and professional
standards in reporting and covering cases of children in conflict with the law. In all publicity concerning
children, the best interest of the child should be the primordial and paramount concern. Any undue,
inappropriate and sensationalized publicity of any case involving a child in conflict with the law is hereby
declared a violation of the child's rights.

SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local Councils for the Protection of Children. - Local
Councils for the Protection of Children (LCPC) shall be established in all levels of local government, and
where they have already been established, they shall be strengthened within one (1) year from the
effectivity of this Act. Membership in the LCPC shall be chosen from among the responsible members of
the community, including a representative from the youth sector, as well as representatives from
government and private agencies concerned with the welfare of children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to coordinate with and assist the LGU concerned for
the adoption of a comprehensive plan on delinquency prevention, and to oversee its proper
implementation.

One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of barangays, municipalities and cities shall be
allocated for the strengthening and implementation of the programs of the LCPC: Provided, That the
disbursement of the fund shall be made by the LGU concerned.

SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and Development Officer. - All LGUs shall appoint a duly
licensed social worker as its local social welfare and development officer tasked to assist children in
conflict with the law.

SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) shall coordinate with the LCPC in
the formulation and implementation of juvenile intervention and diversion programs in the community.

CHAPTER 2
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE INTERVENTION PROGRAM

SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile Intervention Program. - A Comprehensive juvenile

intervention program covering at least a 3-year period shall be instituted in LGUs from the barangay to
the provincial level.

The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to implement their respective juvenile intervention
programs in their annual budget.

The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on all sectors concerned, particularly the child-
focused institutions, NGOs, people's organizations, educational institutions and government agencies
involved in delinquency prevention to participate in the planning process and implementation of
juvenile intervention programs. Such programs shall be implemented consistent with the national
program formulated and designed by the JJWC. The implementation of the comprehensive juvenile
intervention program shall be reviewed and assessed annually by the LGUs in coordination with the
LCPC. Results of the assessment shall be submitted by the provincial and city governments to the JJWC
not later than March 30 of every year.

SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile Justice and Welfare. - Community-based programs on
juvenile justice and welfare shall be instituted by the LGUs through the LCPC, school, youth
organizations and other concerned agencies. The LGUs shall provide community-based services which
respond to the special needs, problems, interests and concerns of children and which offer appropriate
counseling and guidance to them and their families. These programs shall consist of three levels:

(a) Primary intervention includes general measures to promote social justice and equal opportunity,
which tackle perceived root causes of offending;

(b) Secondary intervention includes measures to assist children at risk; and

(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to avoid unnecessary contact with the formal justice system
and other measures to prevent re-offending.
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with
the child has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or
in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social
welfare and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the
child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives
cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a
duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer;
or when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the
event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise ,known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code".

TITLE V
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM

CHAPTER I
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD

SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. - From the moment a child is taken into custody,
the law enforcement officer shall:

(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect that he/she can understand why he/she is
being placed under custody and the offense that he/she allegedly committed;

(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in
a language or dialect understood by him/her;

(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper identification to the child;

(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual
advances on the child in conflict with the law;

(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs or other instruments of force or restraint,
unless absolutely necessary and only after all other methods of control have been exhausted and have
failed;

(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the law to greater restraint than is necessary for
his/her apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;

(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;

(i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension, turn over custody of the child to
the Social Welfare and Development Office or other accredited NGOs, and notify the child's
apprehension. The social welfare and development officer shall explain to the child and the child's
parents/guardians the consequences of the child's act with a view towards counseling and
rehabilitation, diversion from the criminal justice system, and reparation, if appropriate;

(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and health officer for a thorough physical and
mental examination. The examination results shall be kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by the
Family Court. Whenever the medical treatment is required, steps shall be immediately undertaken to
provide the same;

(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with the law be necessary, the child shall be
secured in quarters separate from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders;

(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:

1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were used, and if so, the reason for such;

2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the DSWD, and the PA0 have been informed of the
apprehension and the details thereof; and

3. The exhaustion of measures to determine the age of a child and the precise details of the physical and
medical examination or the failure to submit a child to such examination; and

(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during investigation shall be witnessed by the child's
parents or guardian, social worker, or legal counsel in attendance who shall affix his/her signature to the
said statement.

A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a law enforcement officer of the same gender
and shall not be locked up in a detention cell.

SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation,
determine where the case involving the child in conflict with the law should be referred.

The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in the presence of the following: (1) child's
counsel of choice or in the absence thereof, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office; (2) the child's
parents, guardian, or nearest relative, as the case may be; and (3) the local social welfare and
development officer. In the absence of the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative, and the local
social welfare and development officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the presence of a
representative of an NGO, religious group, or member of the BCPC.

After the initial investigation, the local social worker conducting the same may do either of the
following:
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is fifteen (15) years or below or above fifteen (15)
but below eighteen (18) years old, who acted without discernment; and

(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment,
proceed to diversion under the following chapter.

CHAPTER 2
DIVERSION

SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the law shall undergo diversion programs
without undergoing court proceedings subject to the conditions herein provided:

(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee is not more than six (6) years imprisonment,
the law enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with the assistance of the local social welfare and
development officer or other members of the LCPC shall conduct mediation, family conferencing and
conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous modes of conflict resolution in accordance with
the best interest of the child with a view to accomplishing the objectives of restorative justice and the
formulation of a diversion program. The child and his/her family shall be present in these activities.

(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years imprisonment, the
local social welfare and development officer shall meet with the child and his/her parents or guardians
for the development of the appropriate diversion and rehabilitation program, in coordination with the
BCPC;

(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment, diversion
measures may be resorted to only by the court.

SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. - Diversion may be conducted at the Katarungang
Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels
and phases of the proceedings including judicial level.

SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A child in conflict with law may undergo
conferencing, mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice system or prior to his entry into said
system. A contract of diversion may be entered into during such conferencing, mediation or conciliation
proceedings.

SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the conferencing, mediation or conciliation, the child
voluntarily admits the commission of the act, a diversion program shall be developed when appropriate
and desirable as determined under Section 30. Such admission shall not be used against the child in any
subsequent judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings. The diversion program shall be
effective and binding if accepted by the parties concerned. The acceptance shall be in writing and signed
by the parties concerned and the appropriate authorities. The local social welfare and development
officer shall supervise the implementation of the diversion program. The diversion proceedings shall be
completed within forty-five (45) days. The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended until
the completion of the diversion proceedings but not to exceed forty-five (45) days.

The child shall present himself/herself to the competent authorities that imposed the diversion program
at least once a month for reporting and evaluation of the effectiveness of the program.
Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the contract of diversion, as certified by the local
social welfare and development officer, shall give the offended party the option to institute the
appropriate legal action.

The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended during the effectivity of the diversion
program, but not exceeding a period of two (2) years.

SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There is No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under
Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion, the
Punong Barangay handling the case shall, within three (3) days from determination of the absence of
jurisdiction over the case or termination of the diversion proceedings, as the case may be, forward the
records of the case of the child to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the appropriate court, as
the case may be. Upon the issuance of the corresponding document, certifying to the fact that no
agreement has been reached by the parties, the case shall be filed according to the regular process.

SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When There is No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall
under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion,
the Women and Children Protection Desk of the PNP, or other law enforcement officer handling the
case of the child under custody, to the prosecutor or judge concerned for the conduct of inquest and/or
preliminary investigation to determine whether or not the child should remain under custody and
correspondingly charged in court. The document transmitting said records shall display the word
"CHILD" in bold letters.

SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion Program. - In determining whether diversion is appropriate
and desirable, the following factors shall be taken into consideration:

(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;

(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;

(c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age, maturity, intelligence, etc.);

(d) The influence of the family and environment on the growth of the child;

(e) The reparation of injury to the victim;

(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;

(g) The safety of the community; and

(h) The best interest of the child.

SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In formulating a diversion program, the individual
characteristics and the peculiar circumstances of the child in conflict with the law shall be used to
formulate an individualized treatment.

The following factors shall be considered in formulating a diversion program for the child:
(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the offense he/she committed;

(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to guide and supervise the child;

(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the measures to be imposed; and

(d) The availability of community-based programs for rehabilitation and reintegration of the child.

SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The diversion program shall include adequate socio-cultural and
psychological responses and services for the child. At the different stages where diversion may be
resorted to, the following diversion programs may be agreed upon, such as, but not limited to:

(a) At the level of the Punong Barangay:

(1) Restitution of property;

(2) Reparation of the damage caused;

(3) Indemnification for consequential damages;

(4) Written or oral apology;

(5) Care, guidance and supervision orders;

(6) Counseling for the child in conflict with the law and the child's family;

(7)Attendance in trainings, seminars and lectures on:

(i) anger management skills;

(ii) problem solving and/or conflict resolution skills;

(iii) values formation; and

(iv) other skills which will aid the child in dealing with situations which can lead to repetition of the
offense;

(8) Participation in available community-based programs, including community service; or

(9) Participation in education, vocation and life skills programs.

(b) At the level of the law enforcement officer and the prosecutor:

(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(9) herein; and

(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime;

(c) At the level of the appropriate court:

(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs(a)and (b) above;

(2) Written or oral reprimand or citation;

(3) Fine:

(4) Payment of the cost of the proceedings; or

(5) Institutional care and custody.

CHAPTER 3
PROSECUTION

SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be a specially trained prosecutor to conduct
inquest, preliminary investigation and prosecution of cases involving a child in conflict with the law. If
there is an allegation of torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict with the law during arrest or
detention, it shall be the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.

SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information. - The prosecutor shall conduct a preliminary
investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for
diversion: (b) when the child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree to diversion as specified in
Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when considering the assessment and recommendation of the social worker,
the prosecutor determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child in conflict with the law.

Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint, the prosecutor shall notify the Public
Attorney's Office of such service, as well as the personal information, and place of detention of the child
in conflict with the law.

Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the information against the child shall be filed
before the Family Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the preliminary investigation.

CHAPTER 4
COURT PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the amount of bail, the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority shall be considered.

SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is detained, the court shall order:

(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to his/her parents and other suitable person;

(b) the release of the child in conflict with the law on bail; or

(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention home/youth rehabilitation center.

The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail pending trial or hearing of his/her case.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. - Children detained pending trial may be released on bail
or recognizance as provided for under Sections 34 and 35 under this Act. In all other cases and
whenever possible, detention pending trial may be replaced by alternative measures, such as close
supervision, intensive care or placement with a family or in an educational setting or home.
Institutionalization or detention of the child pending trial shall be used only as a measure of last resort
and for the shortest possible period of time.

Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be detained in youth detention homes established
by local governments, pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts Act, in the city or municipality where
the child resides.

In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in conflict with the law may be committed to the
care of the DSWD or a local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in the province, city or
municipality within the jurisdiction of the court. The center or agency concerned shall be responsible for
the child's appearance in court whenever required.

SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the offense with which
the child in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years,
regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of the amount, and before arraignment of the child in
conflict with the law, the court shall determine whether or not diversion is appropriate.

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various chcumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.

SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker
who has custody of the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child whose sentence has been
suspended and against whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final discharge
of the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.

The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not affect the civil liability resulting from the
commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in accordance with law.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution
of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in the services
of his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act.

SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a child in conflict with the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation
in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into account the best interest of the child. For this purpose,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby
amended accordingly.

CHAPTER 5
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS

SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and Proceedings. - All records and proceedings involving children in
conflict with the law from initial contact until final disposition of the case shall be considered privileged
and confidential. The public shall be excluded during the proceedings and the records shall not be
disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties or the participants in the proceedings for
any purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child in conflict with the law may have his/hes
sentence suspended or if he/she may be granted probation under the Probation Law, or to enforce the
civil liability imposed in the criminal action.

The component authorities shall undertake all measures to protect this confidentiality of proceedings,
including non-disclosure of records to the media, maintaining a separate police blotter for cases
involving children in conflict with the law and adopting a system of coding to conceal material
information which will lead to the child's identity. Records of a child in conflict with the law shall not be
used in subsequent proceedings for cases involving the same offender as an adult, except when
beneficial for the offender and upon his/her written consent.

A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child shall not be held under any provision of law, to
be guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge
the case or recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him/her for any purpose.

TITLE VI
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. - The objective of rehabilitation and reintegration
of children in conflict with the law is to provide them with interventions, approaches and strategies that
will enable them to improve their social functioning with the end goal of reintegration to their families
and as productive members of their communities.

SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be received in any rehabilitation or training facility
without a valid order issued by the court after a hearing for the purpose. The details of this order shall
be immediately entered in a register exclusively for children in conflict with the law. No child shall be
admitted in any facility where there is no such register.

SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all rehabilitation or training facilities, it shall be mandatory
that children shall be separated from adults unless they are members of the same family. Under no
other circumstance shall a child in conflict with the law be placed in the same confinement as adults.

The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in conflict with the law shall provide a home
environment where children in conflict with the law can be provided with quality counseling and
treatment.

SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with the law placed in an institution shall be given
special attention as to their personal needs and problems. They shall be handled by female doctors,
correction officers and social workers, and shall be accommodated separately from male children in
conflict with the law.

SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of rehabilitation and training facilities shall handle
children in conflict with the law without having undergone gender sensitivity training.

SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The LGUs shall set aside an amount to build youth
detention homes as mandated by the Family Courts Act. Youth detention homes may also be established
by private and NGOs licensed and accredited by the DSWD, in consultation with the JJWC.

SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - The expenses for the care and
maintenance of a child in conflict with the law under institutional care shall be borne by his/her parents
or those persons liable to support him/her: Provided, That in case his/her parents or those persons
liable to support him/her cannot pay all or part of said expenses, the municipality where the offense was
committed shall pay one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof; the province to which the
municipality belongs shall pay one-third (1/3) and the remaining one-third (1/3) shall be borne by the
national government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds (2/3) of said expenses; and in case a
chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue allotments applicable to the
unpaid portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of said obligations: Provided, further,
That in the event that the child in conflict with the law is not a resident of the municipality/city where
the offense was committed, the court, upon its determination, may require the city/municipality where
the child in conflict with the law resides to shoulder the cost.

All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the immediate establishment of local detention
homes for children in conflict with the law.

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child

in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict with the law, whose
sentences are suspended may, upon order of the court, undergo any or a combination of disposition
measures best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the child as provided in the Supreme Court
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child in conflict with the law, he/she shall be
released to parents, guardians, relatives or any other responsible person in the community. Under the
supervision and guidance of the local social welfare and development officer, and in coordination with
his/her parents/guardian, the child in conflict with the law shall participate in community-based
programs, which shall include, but not limited to:

(1) Competency and life skills development;

(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;

(3) Community volunteer projects;

(4) Leadership training;

(5) Social services;

(6) Homelife services;

(7) Health services; .

(8) Spiritual enrichment; and

(9) Community and family welfare services.

In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict with the law shall endeavor to actively
participate in the community-based rehabilitation.

Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final report will be forwarded by the local social
welfare and development officer to the court for final disposition of the case.

If the community-based programs are provided as diversion measures under Chapter II, Title V, the
programs enumerated above shall be made available to the child in conflict with the law.

SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth rehabilitation center shall provide 24-hour group care,
treatment and rehabilitation services under the guidance of a trained staff where residents are cared for
under a structured therapeutic environment with the end view of reintegrating them in their families
and communities as socially functioning individuals. A quarterly report shall be submitted by the center
to the proper court on the progress of the children in conflict with the law. Based on the progress of the
youth in the center, a final report will be forwarded to the court for final disposition of the case. The
DSWD shall establish youth rehabilitation centers in each region of the country.

SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - The objectives of community-based programs are
as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood of the child in conflict with the law in case
he/she is studying, working or attending vocational learning institutions;

(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law from his/her parents/guardians to maintain
the support system fostered by their relationship and to create greater awareness of their mutual and
reciprocal responsibilities;

(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child in conflict with the law and encourage
community support and involvement; and

(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict with the law by preventing jail detention.

SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every LGU shall establish community-based programs
that will focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child. All programs shall meet the criteria to
be established by the JJWC which shall take into account the purpose of the program, the need for the
consent of the child and his/her parents or legal guardians, and the participation of the child-centered
agencies whether public or private.

SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict with the
law whose cases have been dismissed by the proper court because of good behavior as per
recommendation of the DSWD social worker and/or any accredited NGO youth rehabilitation center
shall be provided after-care services by the local social welfare and development officer for a period of
at least six (6) months. The service includes counseling and other community-based services designed to
facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-offending and make the children productive members of the
community.

TITLE VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER 1
EXEMPTING PROVISIONS

SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an
adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt
from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal
Code, of mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential
Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program.

SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
and other special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with
the law.

CHAPTER 2
PROHIBITED ACTS

SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. - In the conduct of the proceedings beginning from
the initial contact with the child, the competent authorities must refrain from branding or labeling
children as young criminals, juvenile delinquents, prostitutes or attaching to them in any manner any
other derogatory names. Likewise, no discriminatory remarks and practices shall be allowed particularly
with respect to the child's class or ethnic origin.

SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and any other similar acts shall be considered prejudicial
and detrimental to the psychological, emotional, social, spiritual, moral and physical health and well-
being of the child in conflict with the law and therefore, prohibited:

(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and nature;

(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and punitive measures such as cursing, beating, stripping, and
solitary confinement;

(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end cruel forms of punishment such as shaving the heads,
pouring irritating, corrosive or harmful substances over the body of the child in conflict with the law, or
forcing him/her to walk around the community wearing signs which embarrass, humiliate, and degrade
his/her personality and dignity; and

(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary servitude in any and all forms under any and all
instances.

CHAPTER 3
PENAL PROVISION

SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or Rules or Regulations in General. - Any person who
violates any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation promulgated in accordance thereof shall, upon
conviction for each act or omission, be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not less
than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the court, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised Penal Code or special laws.
If the offender is a public officer or employee, he/she shall, in addition to such fine and/or
imprisonment, be held administratively liable and shall suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification.

CHAPTER 4
APPROPRIATION PROVISION

SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall
be charged to the Office of the President. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the continued
implementation of this Act shall be included in the succeeding General Appropriations Act.

An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) for the purpose of setting up the JJWC shall be
taken from the proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. - Upon effectivity of this Act,
cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall
immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs as provided
under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.

SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall
also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention.

If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the
transfer of the child to a youth detention home.

SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. - The PNP, the BJMP
and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody.

SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. -
If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the
appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and development officer or
the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict the law has already availed of
probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if
qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.

SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are
serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled
to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly.
They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable law.

TITLE IX
FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue the IRRs for the implementation of the provisions of
this act within ninety (90) days from the effectivity thereof.
SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid by the Supreme Court, the other sections or provisions hereof not dfected by
such declaration shall remain in force and effect.

SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in at least two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.

C. Art. 12, RPC

1. People v. Taneo, G.R. No. L-37673, 31 March 1933
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc,
Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were
entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon,
Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and,
upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound,
and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.

An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced
by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come
down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the
day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when
he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to
stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it seemed to him
that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At
the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his
wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around
him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for
assaulting them.

Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged, were
not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive
for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are
not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden
away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral
perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it.
But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife
whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his
father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his
guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a
lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of
an hallucination and not in his right mind.

We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct
result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the
evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded
his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that
the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was coming
out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his
enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be
confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof
finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

2. People v. Bonoan, G.R. No. L-45130, 17 February 1937

G.R. No. L-45130 February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging
Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said
accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison,
attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of the right
lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the posterior and
lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three
days afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel
forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and
was at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the
Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr.
Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23,
1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the
fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the
defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said
defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for
the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the
other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to place the
latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing
that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for
his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of
the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report,
Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before
the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend
himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.

On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged
from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the
court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On
February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.

After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-
quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.

The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:

A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had dementia only
occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and
immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of abnormality
either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that he was mentally
deranged.

C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the defense to
show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the offense, and that the
defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.

D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting him thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco
Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you."
Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side
of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him
and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso
Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A.
Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report
of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.

As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to
indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set
up being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.

On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in
sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See
Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in
Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance
and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is established, and
the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words,
proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to
acquit the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The
second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence,
and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in
his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C.,
149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third
view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160
U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed.,
1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States
vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the
presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the
crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the
accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil.,
204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case
interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U.
S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this
doctrine.

In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in
fine distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the
accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind
a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard
vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of
derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be
known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and
come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity,
therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil.,
204).

The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the
commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional
or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the
danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We
appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in
law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment.
The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity.
In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to
show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a
particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive
diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other
hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a
conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.

(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears that the
herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to
January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before
the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show
that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any
rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental disease to a
degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal
Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I,
p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms
of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis
(p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes
affected by this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period
of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the general
medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with the question of
irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this
disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to
actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and
Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).

(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an interne at
San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 — the date when the
crime was committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the
symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).

(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on the very
same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by detectives to secure
a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was
sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the
crime. This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the
acused, which doubt found confirmation in the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San
Lazaro Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report was made
within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic
depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL

January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:

(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his bed with his eyes
closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however, but on very rare occassions and at
short intervals he apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic
movements with the extremities and other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times
he refuses to take even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the
hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to have the bath, or to
have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his
medicine, and during some of the intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or
other parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his
fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or
claps his hands strongly without provocation.

(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak, and would not
answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is seen with his eyes closed
apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time
he was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during
the interviews recited passages in the literature as for example the following.

"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and
loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable character.)"

At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.

(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious and rather
irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.

(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented as to place and
person but he did not know the day or the date.

(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he could not sleep he
could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that he should escape. That he was
going to be killed because he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former
sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he could not talk in
his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is
already dead and already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his memory for recent
events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at
all.

(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general information. He could not,
however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.

( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have been insane during
his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight
and judgment were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown
marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a form of physchosis,
called Manic depressive psychosis.

(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.

Assistant Alienist

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another
assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:

I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic Depressive form of
psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to
state, that this person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality
lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking
justice with his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action
over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious, too idealistic has
taste and desires as to make him queer before the average conception of an earthly man.

He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that
upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and
the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant
bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching
for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called and
corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily proof of
the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith,
Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d
ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much
complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that
they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time
he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from
criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such
other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service, there
to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So
ordered.
3. People v. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, 29 November 1950.
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.

Luis Contreras for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children.
From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of
Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a
month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the
stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo
from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling
down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his
arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In
this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help made by his
eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her mother by her
father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he
admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he
used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother
Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his
had become indifferent to him (defendant).

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant
entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of
the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange
and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go stark
naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent to his
surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by
himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted
from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and
we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of
Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said
provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on the
Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there
be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at
the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of
will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.2

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or
insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence
of will are proved.

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs.
Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:

Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was
moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that,
while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to
establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have
been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated
his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of
school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could
feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he suspected of
being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is
that he believed her faithless.

But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to
the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit
D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias
Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the
family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to
sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at
least to his way of thinking.

The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings,
simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up
the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor,
and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he
made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring
his conviction.

Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not
intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the
justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the
doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other
hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action,
defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his
will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The
accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset
them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246
for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to
the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or
composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for
parricide is composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code
refers to the application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible
penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one
applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil.
37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code)
which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief
Justice Arellano said the following:

And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances
of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty
could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the
court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5
of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)

Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which,
under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by
paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be
filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the
exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the
next lower.

Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in
affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for
parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The
Court further observed:

We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral
turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to
executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.

In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower
court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.

Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited,
and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the
attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to
reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
4. People v. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, 29 June 1981 (See Also: J. Makasiar’s Dissent)
[G.R. No. L-33211. June 29, 1981.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ERNESTO PUNO y FILOMENO, Accused whose
death sentence is under review.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and Solicitor
Salvador C. Jacob for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Teodoro D. Regala, for Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting circumstance of
insanity.

There is no doubt that at about two o’clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno, 28, a
jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house
was located in the area known as Little Baguio, Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, Rizal.

On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka, mambabarang,
mayroon kang bubuyog." Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her several times on the head with
a hammer until she was dead.

The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old woman, and
by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno’s eyes were reddish. His look
was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling Kikay.

After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and, according to
Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: "Huag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at
sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or,
according to Lina, Puno said: "Pinatay ko ang iyong matanda. Huag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag
tumawag kayo ng pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko.

After the killing, Puno fled to his parents’ house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then went to the house
of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose, Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in
the evening. How he was able to go that place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.

Disregarding Puno’s threat, Lina after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police of the killing.
Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled on her bed already dead. Her
head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and
Hilaria at the police station. They pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15-17, Record).
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He certified that
the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on the head caused by a hard
instrument. On opening the skull, the doctor found extensive and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of
death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage (Exh. A).

Puno’s father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record). He was charged with
murder in the municipal court. He waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.

On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal. Alleged in
the information as aggravating circumstances were evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex.

Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing, pretended
that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay. He believes that there are persons who are
"mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and "mambubuyog" and that when one is victimized by those
persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swell. Puno believes that a person harmed by a
"mambabarang" might have a headache or a swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack
doctor (herbolaryo). Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang."

Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He finished third
year high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (Exh. B)

Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno’s wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno’s eyes were
reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida
that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any
bee.

Puno went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted to use that cord in
tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished him not to use the cord. Puno tied
the dog to a tree by looping the rope through its mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.

Aida Gabriel, Zenaida’s elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida observed that Puno’s
eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious expression.

Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to their house in
Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in that place. He was cuddling a
puppy that he called "Diablo." He called for Teotimo’s mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not
eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.

Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo asked him to
change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of Teotimo’s father. When told
that Teotimo’s father had been dead for a couple of years already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.

While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning sound until he fell
asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused by persons wading in the flood.
Ernesto thought they were his fellow cursillistas.
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that Puno was insane when he
killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with discernment.

Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, to
whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8, 1966 and July 24, 1970,
testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live with society, although he was afflicted
with "schizophrenic reaction" ; that Puno knew what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight
destruction of the ego. Puno admitted to Doctor Maravilla that one cause of his restlessness,
sleeplessness and irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla
observed that Puno on July 24, 1970 was already cured.

Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first brought to that
hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he laughed alone and exhibited certain
eccentricities such as kneeling, praying and making his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while
Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and
that he could adjust himself to his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor
Maravilla’s testimony.

Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that from his
examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he committed the killing and
that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn January 11, 1971).

Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from any delusion and that he was not
mentally deficient, otherwise, he would not have reached third year high school (8-19 tsn January 11,
1971).

On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors Vicente, Robles
and Victorina V. Manika of the National Mental Hospital submitted the following report on Puno (Exh. B
or 2):

"Records show that he had undergone pyschiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of the National
Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964 a relapse of the same
mental illness when he improved and in 1966 when his illness remained unimproved.

"His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound up to July,
1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for medication. On September 8,
1970, according to information, he was able to kill an old woman. Particulars of the offense are not
given.

"MENTAL CONDITION

". . . Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and without undue
display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when talking with the doctor and other
personnel of the ward. He knows he is accused of murder but refuses to elaborate on it.

x x x
"REMARKS

"In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a mental illness
called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating psychotic symptoms.

"The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated accounts in his life
do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be found in an acutely disturbed and
confused patient or a markedly retarded individual of which-he is not.

"However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia may retain
some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their discernment of right from
wrong of the offense committed."

The foregoing report was submitted pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the order of the trial
court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in the National Mental Hospital to
determine whether he could stand trial and whether he was sane when he committed the killing.

The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was wrong and
that he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina
Pajes, the old woman’s companions who witnessed his dastardly deed.

The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone berserk, he would
have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling Kikay signified that he really disposed
of her because he thought that she was a witch.

Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct and behavior of
the accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on the witness stand" and he was
convinced "that the accused is sane and has full grasp of what was happening" in his environment.

The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of
the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. 509)

His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court erred in not
sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation, abuse of superiority and
disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances.

When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution (U.S. v.
Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by clear and positive evidence (People v. Bascos, 44
Phil. 204)

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had chronic
schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8, 1970, when he
liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which deprives a person of discernment
and freedom of will.
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime
(People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).

"Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, the
accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete absence
of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability." (People v. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980;
People v. Renegado, L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to
"el trastorno mental transitorio" as an exempting circumstance, see 1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 15th
Ed., 1974 pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.).

After evaluating counsel de oficio’s contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated and the
circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno was not legally insane
when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that
on that tragic occasion he was not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will.

In People v. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National Mental Hospital for
thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the paranoid type. His confinement was
recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a
laborer. About one year and two months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to
certify him for reemployment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The qualifying
circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisca Col, Puno, who was armed with a hammer,
took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of the unarmed septuagenarian female victim
who was unable to offer any resistance and who could do nothing but exclaim "Diyos ko."

Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and
defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him and from which the woman was unable to defend herself" (People v.
Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. v. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. v. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757 and
People v. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446).

Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the evidence does not
show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating
that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
(People v. Abletes, L-33304, July 31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).

The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su serenidad o
frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la resolucion de ejecutarlo
firme, fria, reflexiva, meditata y detenida" and (2) "por la persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir
demostrada por el espacio de tiempo transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho."
Premeditation should be evident, meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados y externos, no
de meras sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp. 582-3).
Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should be appreciated
as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not aggravating because there is no evidence
that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest
disrespect to her womanhood (People v. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People v. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31,
1974, 55 SCRA 382, 404; People v. Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. v. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).

However, those two aggravating circumstances are offset by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de oficio, the offender’s mental illness (mild
psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without however depriving him of
consciousness of his acts. (See People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People v. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People
v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)

Thus, it was held that "la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo es un bien el
publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que tienen la obsesion de que
los brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad
morbosa, pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People v.
Balneg, 79 Phil. 805, 810).

It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts. 64[4] and 248,
Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The appellant should not be held liable for the crime of murder. He was mentally ill when he
committed the alleged killing of Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), a 72-year old widow. His medical records, as
properly evaluated and confirmed by the expert testimony of the three physicians/pyschiatrists who
examined and treated him, undeniably establish the fact that appellant had been ailing with a psychotic
disorder medically known as chronic schizophrenia of the paranoid type.

Inevitably, WE must look into the nature of appellant’s mental disease. Thus, Noye’s Modern Clinical
Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, explains:

"Symptomatically, the schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior
apparent in aloofness, suspiciousness, or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and
exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed and considered inappropriate by the observer.
The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by delusional and hallucinatory
material" (p. 355, supra).

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is
the most common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages of 15 and 30 (Encyclopedia
and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860).

For a clear appreciation of appellant’s mental condition, quoted hereunder are pertinent portions of the
discussion on the paranoid type of schizophrenia:

"Paranoid Types. The features that tend to be most evident in this type or phase are delusions, which
are often numerous, illogical, and disregardful of reality, hallucinations, and the usual schizophrenic
disturbance of associations and of affect, together with negativism.

"Frequently the prepsychotic personality of the paranoid schizophrenic is characterized by poor

interpersonal rapport. Often he is cold, withdrawn, distrustful, and resentful of other persons. Many are
truculent, have a chipon-the-shoulder attitude, and are argumentative, scornful, sarcastic, defiant,
resentful of suggestions or of authority, and given to caustic remarks. Sometimes flippant, facetious
responses cover an underlying hostility.

". . . The patient’s previous negative attitudes become more marked, and misinterpretations are
common. Ideas of reference are among the first symptoms. Disorders of association appear. Many
patients show an unpleasant emotional aggresiveness. Through displacement, the patient may begin to
act out of his hostile impulses. His grip on reality begins to loosen. At first his delusions are limited, but
later they become numerous and changeable . . . Delusions of persecution are the most prominent
occurrences in paranoid schizophrenia, but expansive and obviously wish-fulfilling ideas and
hypochondriacal and depressive delusions are not uncommon. With increasing personality
disorganization, delusional beliefs become less logical. Verbal expressions may be inappropriate and
neologistic. The patient is subjected to vague magical forces, and his explanations become extremely
vague and irrational. Imaginative fantasy may become extreme but take on the value of reality.
Repressed aggressive tendencies may be released in a major outburst; some inarticulate paranoids may
manifest an unpredictable assaultiveness. Many paranoid schizophrenics are irritable, discontented,
resentful, and angrily suspicious and show a surly aversion to being interviewed. Some manifest an
unapproachable, aggressively hostile attitude and may live in a bitter aloofness" (Noyes’ Modern Clinical
Psychiatry, Seventh Edition, pp. 380 and 381, Emphasis supplied).

On the prognosis of schizophrenia, the aforenamed source thus further states:

"Occasionally one observes a schizophrenic episode of a mild, fleeting nature with no subsequent
recurrence. In many instances, however, the favorable outcome should be characterized as social
recovery rather than as cured or as full recovery. By this it is meant that the patient is able to return to
his previous social environment and to previous or equivalent occupation, but with minor symptoms
and signs, such as irritability, shyness, or shallowness of affective responses.

"From what has been said, it is evident that in any given case the effect upon the personality and future
adjustment of the appearance of a schizophrenic reaction may be quite uncertain. In some cases the
course is continuously progressive; in others it is intermittent. More frequently it is a question of
remissions and relapses, in which, although from the first interests and habits tend to be undermined
insidiously, there occur periods of adjustment at a lower level for a considerable period of time. It is
estimated that 40 per cent of the schizophrenic patients who enter public mental hospitals or clinics
recover or improve; the other 60 per cent fail to improve or ultimately suffer that permanent, malignant
disorganization of personality somewhat inaccurately designated as deterioration. Of committed
patients who improve sufficiently to be released, about 80 per cent leave the mental hospital within the
first year of residence. The expectancy of recovery falls with each year of continued illness. Roughly,
about one-third of those patients who are hospitalized during the first year of their illness make a fairly
complete recovery; one-third get a bit better and become able to return to outside life but remain
damaged personalities and may have to return to the hospital from time to time. . . ." (pp. 387-388
supra Emphasis supplied).

When appellant was examined and treated for the first time on July 28, 1962, his father revealed the
patient’s initial symptoms of laughing alone and making gestures, poor sleep and appetite, praying and
kneeling always and making his body rigid (per consultation chart, p. 154, CCC rec.). Upon interview on
aforesaid date, appellant stated that "he could see God" and "That a neighbor is bewitching her"
("pinapakulam ako") Why? "hindi ko alam kung bakit" (p. 156, CCC rec.).

Appellant underwent eighteen (18) treatments and checkups from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 which
covered eight (8) years before the alleged crime was committed on September 8, 1970 (Medical
Certificates, pp. 25 and 26, CCC rec.). In the medical certificate dated September 15, 1970, the following
was reflected:

"Diagnosis — Schizophrenic Reaction — Recovered (1962) Improved (1964) Unimproved (1966)."

Per the same record dated November 22, 1966, appellant’s diagnosis was described as "Schizo-Reaction
Relapse" and his condition of termination was indicated as "Unimproved."

In appellant’s "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated January 31, 1968 (p. 126, CCC, rec.), his
condition of termination was described as merely "improved" neither "recovered" nor" unimproved"

In another "Out-Patient Psychiatric Service Record" dated August 31, 1968, patient’s condition of
termination was also described as "improved" only and "treatment not completed" was noted therein
(p. 137, CCC rec.).

Appellant was treated eighteen (18) times in the National Mental Hospital and Jose Reyes Memorial
Hospital from July 28, 1962 to July 24, 1970 or for a span of 8 years, characteristic of the chronic nature
of his mental disease (pp. 4-5, TSN, November 12, 1970). Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Carlos Vicente
confirmed:

"Q From your study, when he was an out patient at the National Mental Hospital and its extension at the
Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, would you say that he was and has been suffering from chronic
schizophrenia?

"A Yes, chronic, because it started in 1962 and became in remission in 1970, July" (p. 10, TSN, January
11, 1971, Emphasis supplied).

For chronic schizophrenia, the patient does not recover fully in two months’ time. His condition may
simply be "in remission", which term means "social recovery", not cured or fully recovered. Dr. Vicente
thus stated:

"Q How long, if there is any usual period, does a schizophrenic attack last at any given time?
"A That is waivable (sic). There are those who cannot recover and there are those who recover after ten
days or three months" (p. 14, TSN, January 11, 1971, Emphasis supplied).

x x x

On a schizophrenic’s behavior pattern:

"Q Is it possible that a person suffering from chronic schizophrenia can have a violent reaction?

"A Yes, it is possible, if he was at that time. If he is schizophrenic at the time" (Testimony of Dr. Carlos
Vicente, p. 10, TSN, January 20, 1971, Emphasis supplied).

"Q By suffering from schizophrenia, would you say that his suffering has affected his power of control
over his will?

"A During the time that he was suffering, he could not stick to the right. He made mistakes at the time
that he was mentally sick.

"Q His power of control over his will to commit a crime is affected?

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Are you sure of that?

"A Yes, somehow it is controlled by some ideas, example, one who has that (im)pulse to kill will kill"
(Testimony of Dr. Carlos Vicente, p. 17, TSN, January 11, 1971, Emphasis supplied).

On the mental condition of appellant when the alleged crime was committed which is and should be
considered determinative of his liability:

"Q Would you be able to state Doctor whether the accused when he committed the act was suffering
from an onset of schizophrenic reaction from which he has been known to be suffering since 1962?

"A It is possible, sir, that he was already suffering from an onset of the schizophrenic reaction at that
time" (Testimony of Dr. Reynaldo Robles, p. 6, TSN, January 20, 1971, Emphasis supplied).

It should be stressed that between July 24, 1970 when appellant suffered from his last attack or relapse
and September 8, 1970 when he committed the alleged crime, barely 1 month and 15 days had elapsed.
Medically speaking, the interval was not sufficient time for appellant’s full recovery nor did such time
give any guaranty for his mental disease to be "cured."

Appellant was still mentally sick at the time he attacked the victim. He previously suffered from a
"displacement of aggressive and hostile behavior" when he got angry with his wife and when he tied and
boxed their dog. He had the mental delusion that a "mangkukulam" was inflicting harm on him. This
delusion found its mark on the victim whom he believed was the "mangkukulam" and fearing that she
would harm him, appellant had to kill her in self-defense. Simply stated, the victim was a mere
consequence of his mental delusion. He killed the "mangkukulam" as personified by the victim; he did
not kill Aling Kikay herself. And the said fatal act was made by appellant in defending himself from the
"mangkukulam."

While it has been established that appellant was "manageable" and was "presently free from any social
incapacitating psychotic symptoms" during the trial, the fact remains that at the very moment of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still a mentally sick person. No evidence was produced to prove
otherwise against the bulk of appellant’s medical history for 8 years clearly indicative of his mental
psychosis.

As earlier stated, "social recovery" of a schizophrenic does not mean that he is "cured" (totally
recovered) from the disease.

In view of the foregoing, appellant be acquitted of the charge of murder.

5. People v. Dungo, G.R. No. 89420, 31 July 1991

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 89420. July 31, 1991.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROSALINO DUNGO, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Public Attorney’s Office for Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision * of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information charging
Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as follows:

"That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO
DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs.
Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body
thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.

"All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the
generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the
field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the discharge
of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty." (Record, p. 2)

On arraignment, Accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the
merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the hours
of 2:00 and 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the place
where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a
brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several
times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR’s office with blood
stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987; TSN, pp.
5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).

The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan, reveals that the victim
sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February,
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the victim)
in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the
procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my
own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife’s annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the
amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife. (TSN,
pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of
the offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to her,
her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6) months.
Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband
did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical
treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-
up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small
store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed her husband to
be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not used to it before; demanding
another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid; chasing any child when their children
quarreled with other children. There were also times when her husband would inform her that his feet
and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around
noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy
medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store.
When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got worried as he was not in his
proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only when she was informed that her husband had
arrived. While on her way home, she heard from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak"
(translated as "stabbing’ and "has stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law’s house with
people milling around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did
such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband
further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he
chose to live longer even in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by
their neighbor Thelma Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning
to the barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the
barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila.
(TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that the
accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17, 1987, on
August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic
or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was
classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-
33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).

Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able to
finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali Clinic.
However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen
Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail.
(TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)

Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the accused
was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr. Ricardo Lim
testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left side weakness.
Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of
medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at
a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988)

On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of murder,
the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:

"1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;

"2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.

"SO ORDERED." (p. 30, Rollo).

The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act. The
act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to
evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he
committed the crime.

It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-
appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime charged.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful act
is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from
criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least discernment;
that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v. Puno, 105 SCRA
151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is
manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under
the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an
insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A
person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he has lost the
power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency being at the
time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from such perverted
condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right
and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)

So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or conduct, of
disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the
mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of
the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined
above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequence of his act.

Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the alleged deranged person’s general conduct and appearance, his acts and conduct
inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident
bargains.

Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in issue,
at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the act in
question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read the
thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine whether his acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)

In the case at bar, defense’s expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental Health,
concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic mental
disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the commission of
the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by
perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control, impairment
of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused allegedly suffered from
psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is permanent.

Dr. Echavez, defense’s expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and did
not have a period for normal thinking. To quote.

"Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately
are not present, sir.’

(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated
with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent, the
manifestation of insanity is curable.

Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987, thus:

"Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been
mentally ill?

A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my
record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his
contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is
noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of
severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir."
(TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez’s assessment that the accused has been insane since January of 1987
or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion
based on the testimonies of the accused’s wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and
psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in
quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of the offense.

The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane, has
no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of the
crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the latter.
He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the
victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:

"Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?

A yes, sir.

Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.

Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused at
your residence?

A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, Accused told me that he wanted
to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him to be
interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore he wanted to know
why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the landholding of his deceased
father in his name.

x x x

Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen
Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?

A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of me?"

Q What was his answer?

A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a
request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.

Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the accused?

A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of my father and my name."

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987).

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill during
this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person who may
have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the
memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that
the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:

"Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by the
Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he is
waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the
postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do
you consider him insane?

A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

A Yes, sir.

COURT

Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?

A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in short
all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really
insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the illness, the
violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out into
violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this
case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the
members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for example he shouted out
‘Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigual’ at that particular moment he was aware of what he did, he knows the
criminal case.

COURT

Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this case,
Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the act?

A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there." (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; Emphasis
supplied).

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of the
expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of what he
had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act charged. As
stated by the trial court:

"The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was same. The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where
the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern to kill
the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After
the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest.
This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his
acts in stabbing the victim" (Rollo, p. 63)

There is no ground to alter the trial court’s findings and appreciation of the evidence presented. (People
v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor
of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of sanity. The burden of proving the
affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
"In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise is that
the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code; U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305)
Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts
were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288) . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218)" (People v. Aldemita, 145
SCRA 451)

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance, and as such must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the
ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the
presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.

Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby AFFIRMED without costs.

SO ORDERED.

6. People v. Rafanan, G.R. No. L-54135, 21 November 1991

G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.

FELICIANO, J.:

Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant
Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages, and to pay the costs.

The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:

The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant Estelita Ronaya who was
then only fourteen years old was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafanan
alias "Baket Ines" with a salary of P30.00 a month.

The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the same house at Barangay San
Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the mother of the accused
to help in their store which was located in front of their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to
the store at the time was the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the
complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he
suddenly pulled the complainant inside the store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to
which Estelita replied, "I do not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused held a bolo
measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to the throat of the complainant
threatening her with said bolo should she resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed,
removed her pants and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant and
succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle. After the sexual
intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody
in the house, otherwise he would kill her.

Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of
the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept in the house of the accused that evening and the
following morning she scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left the
house in the evening of March 17, 1976.

Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused learned what happened the night
before in the store between Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting
Estelita Ronaya to go back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why she
went home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried and cried. It was only the
following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her mother that she was raped by the
accused. Upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya, immediately
accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force who lives in
Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant.
He advised them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the accused. The accused
was later brought to the police headquarter with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used
in threatening the complainant. 1

At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial and in due
course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.

The instant appeal is anchored on the following:

Assignment of Errors

1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant solely on the testimony of the
complainant and her mother.

2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the prosecution, "Exhibits B and C".

3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert witnesses, as to the mental
condition of the accused-appellant at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape.

4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the alleged rape was suffering from
insanity. 2
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose testimonies he
contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony of complainant on direct
examination that she immediately went home after the rape incident, is at variance with her testimony
on cross examination to the effect that she had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day.
Complainant, in saying that she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have
contradicted her mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March
1979 and brought Estelita home.

The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on cross
examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential details which do not
touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and therefore did not in any way impair
the credibility of the complainant. 3

The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of complainant in
this respect is clear and convincing:

Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you the accused pulled you from the door and
brought you inside the store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after the accused pulled you
from the door and brought you inside the store what happened then?

A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.

Q And what did you say?

A "I do not like," I said.

Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to have sexual intercourse with him?

A I struggled and cried.

Q What did the accused do after that?

A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened and he could do what he wanted to do.
He was able to do what he wanted to do.

Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that knife? Will you please demonstrate, if
any?

A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)

xxx xxx xxx

Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual intercourse with you after he placed the bolo
or that knife [at] your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the accused do immediately
after placing that bolo your throat and before having sexual intercourse you?

A He had sexual intercourse with me.

Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?

A I was wearing pants, sir.

Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?

A Yes, sir, I have a panty.

Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you what, if any, did he do with respect to your
pants and your panty?

A He removed them, sir.

Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what, if any, did you do?

A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants but he was stronger that's why he
succeeded.

Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or pantsuit what else happened?

A He went on top of me, sir.

Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?

A He was wearing pants.

Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed your pantsuit and your panty, was he still
wearing his pants?

A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his pants.

Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did you see which he opened?

A I saw his penis.

Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants and brought out his penis which you saw,
he went on top of you. When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?

A I struggled.

Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when you struggled against the accused when
he was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to get.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed in what he wanted to get?

Fiscal Guillermo:

Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears, may we just be allowed to ask a
leading question which is a follow-up question?

Witness:

A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.

Fiscal Guillermo:

Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what did you feel, if any?

A I felt something that came out from his inside.

Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his penis inside your vagina:?

A Around five minutes maybe, sir.

Q After that what happened then?

A He removed it.

Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina what else happened?

A No more, sir, he sat down.

Q What, if any, did he tell you?

A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my

mother and to anybody in their house.

Q What else did he tell you?

A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.

Q After that where did you go?

A I went home already, sir. 4

The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as
schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At the urging of his counsel, the trial
court suspended the trial and ordered appellant confined at the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was
admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.

During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and physical
condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E. Nerit, physician-in-
charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.

In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning appellant's mental
condition were set forth:

On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would just look up whenever
questioned but refused to answer.

On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired, with dishevelled hair, would
stare vacuously through the window, or look at people around him. He was indifferent and when
questioned, he would just smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and
was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at times would pace the floor,
seemingly in deep thought. Later on when questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko
alam." His affect is dull, he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but cannot
elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was brought here.

The report then concluded:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is found
suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia, manifested by carelessness in grooming,
sluggishness in movements, staring vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to
verbalize, emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation, disorientation, and
perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court
trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 5

The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's mental
condition:

At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses. There is dullness of his affect
and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of
being irritable saying — "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether or
not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said he does not remember having
committed any wrong act

and the following conclusions:

In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. y Gambawa is at present
time still psychotic or insane, manifested by periods of irritability — cursing nobody in particular,
seclusive, underactive, undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles alone by
himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.

He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further hospitalization and treatment. 6

In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become "better behaved,
responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone, in touch with his surroundings
and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the preceding period, appellant had been allowed
to leave the hospital temporarily; he stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the
hospital for check-ups. During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household
chores, conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although,
occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard voices of small
children, talking in a language he could not understand. The report concluded by saying that while
appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was not yet in a position to stand trial since he
needed further treatment, medication and check-ups. 7

In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in household chores
and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed" and "oriented" and as denying
having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was in a "much improved condition" and "in a
mental condition to stand court trial." 8

Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who suggested that
appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the hospital, in effect implying that
appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when he raped complainant. 9 The defense next
presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist engaged in private practice, who testified that she had
examined and treated the appellant.

Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. —

The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same
court.

xxx xxx xxx

Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only in People vs.
Formigones 10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal insanity, quoting extensively
from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the Revised Penal Code, thus:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts
without the least discernment; (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur.
Crim. 413.) that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held
that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be [equated with] imbecility or
insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law
are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in
order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence
of will are proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A linguistic or
grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition — "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,"
and (b) the test of volition — "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw
shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to "freedom of the will;"
examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where this Court has exempted an accused on
the sole ground that he was totally deprived of "freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying
"complete deprivation of intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally
reaches out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show complete impairment
or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in
accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the
exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts." 12

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be the most common form of psychosis an
usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of
the symptoms of schizophrenia in the following manner:

Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of schizophrenia: a disturbance of
association, a disturbance of affect, and a disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic
attitude of the schizophrenic — that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism and the
ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of
schizophrenia is often referred to as the four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.

xxx xxx xxx

Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia that he considered in no
way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank
symptoms include the hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that comment on
the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of having one's thoughts controlled, the
spreading of one's thoughts to others, delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled
or influenced from the outside.

Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on the basis of second-rank
symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other
forms of hallucination, perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional blunting.

Perceptual Disorders

Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .

Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding external stimuli are common
symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most
characteristically, two or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person.
Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and what is going on around
him, or are threatening or obscene and very disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients
experience the hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example, they may be
quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly spoken to them.

Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in schizophrenic patients, but
they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations
primarily at night or during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as much
during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost continuously. They get relief only in sleep.
When visual occur in schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life size, in
three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in one of the other sensory
modalities.

xxx xxx xxx

Cognitive Disorders

Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected by reasoning, and that are
idiosyncratic for the patient — that is, not part of his cultural environment. They are among the
common symptoms of schizophrenia.

Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in the paranoid type of
schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by some unseen mysterious power that exercises its
influence from a distance is almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all,
schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience. The modern schizophrenic
whose delusions have kept up with the scientific times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays,
or spaceships that take control over his mind and body. Also typical for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting circumtance, 15 it has mostly
been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the evidence presented tended to show that if there
was impairment of the mental faculties, such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused
of intelligence or the consciousness of his acts.

The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as follows:

(Fiscal Guillermo:)

Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found him, would you say doctor that he was
completely devoid of any consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident in this case?

A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.

Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of threatening the victim at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape?

A Yes, he was conscious.

Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?

A Yes.

Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim at the time?

A Yes.

Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a vagina upon which he will place his penis?

A Yeah.

Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an erection?

A Yes.

Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether he is schizophrenic which you said, it
deals (sic) some kind of intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?

A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness there in relation to the act is what we
call primitive acts of any individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a normal individual, a
normal individual will use the power of reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society
while an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no longer withstand himself in the
ordinary environment, yet his acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.

Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which you said the accused here is suffering
is capable of planning the commission of a rape?

A Yes, they are also capable.

Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?

A Yes.

Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to plan a rape and to perform all the acts
preparatory to the actual intercourse could be done by an insane person?

A Yes, it could be done.

Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?

A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but yet there
is no inhibition on the individual.

Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to commit is
wrong?

A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition. The
reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death
should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that
Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest,
through Dr. Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains
not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power self-control. We do not
believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently demonstrated the truth of that proposition.
In any case, as already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the
exempting circumstance of insanity is to be found.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been
held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or
at the very moment the act is committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2)
physicians (Dr. Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental
condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to circumtances occurring on
or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on
general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip
who had actually observed and examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental
Hospital, the defense chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.

In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because
it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a
mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which
diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance,
although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in
this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed."

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of moral
damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.

7. People v. Madarang, G.R. No. 132319, 12 May 2000

G.R. No. 132319 May 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled by his mind.
Law is designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of right which is inseparable from
reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by disease that he is totally incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong, he loses responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked
to resolve whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the
crime he committed.

Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA
MADARANG in an Information 1 which reads:

That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante, province of Pangasinan,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident
premeditation and treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4
1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es) long and 3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4
inch(es) lateral to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing upward and
posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2 inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at
its medial aspect, coursing upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M. Madarang.

Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.

At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial court entered a
"not guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5, 1994, the accused's counsel
manifested that his client had been observed behaving in an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail.
Thus, the Court called the accused to the stand but he refused to answer any of the questions
propounded by the court. Hence, on the same date, the Court issued an Order 2 directing the transfer of
the accused to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine
his fitness to stand trial.

The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a form of
psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and was administered
medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2) years of confinement, the accused
was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to the provincial jail as he was already found fit to
face the charges against him. 3

At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded to adduce
evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.

As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and his daughter
LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and Lilia Mirador were legally
married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children. The accused worked as a seaman for
sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a United States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman
in Germany and stayed there for nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in
Infanta, Pangasinan, and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost
his entire fortune due to cockfighting. 4

In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to stay in the
house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family. Moreover, Lilia was then
already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth. 5

On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The accused was
jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the fight and in the presence of
their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her untimely demise. 6

AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused shouting and
crying inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong. She received no reply. Her
nephew barged into the house and brought out the children one at a time, leaving the accused with
Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her nephew warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused
emerge from the house holding a bolo. She scampered for safety. 7

She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she did not
notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering from any mental
illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the accused killed his wife as she never saw the two
engage in any argument while they were living with her. 8

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could not
remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife. It was only
during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife in a coffin that he
learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he
did not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the
NCMH for treatment. 9

DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), declared
that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994 upon order of the court. The NCMH
conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein.
Based on the first medical report, dated August 2, 1994, 10 the accused was found to be suffering from
insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that schizophrenia is a mental
abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning, delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation
with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and
occupational functions. The patient may be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what
he is doing. He may become destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were
violent. 11 A schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able to
distinguish right from wrong. 12 Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental illness may have begun
even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly possible that he was already suffering from
schizophrenia prior to his commission of the crime. 1

By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still suffering from
schizophrenia. After one and a half years of confinement, the third psychiatric evaluation of the accused,
dated May 27, 1996, 14 showed that his mental condition considerably improved due to continuous
medication. The accused was recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail
to stand trial. 15

The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of sanity at the
time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is of the view
that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound mind at the time of the commission of the offense and
that he failed to rebut by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from
criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at the time of the commission
of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED. 16

Hence this appeal.

The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of intelligence,
making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could allegedly be deduced from the
following:

First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely unaware of his acts that
fateful day and must have committed the crime without the least discernment.

Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with schizophrenia. He
cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into extremes — he may be violent and
destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful
day. He killed his wife and Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of
him holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone and
inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are mentally deranged for a
sane person who just committed a crime would have appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing
that what he did was wrong.

Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high possibility that he was
already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime on September 3, 1993. 17 The
defense posits that his mental illness may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware
business, which he started through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up
virtually dependent on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may have been beyond
his capacity to handle.

The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight prior to that
fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when he uncharacteristically
quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her confirms that he was mentally
disturbed when he committed the crime.

Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give birth to their
eighth child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by something beyond his control,
nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is
not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant spouse.

We find these arguments without merit.

In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished as an offense.
The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal law. Man is naturally endowed
with the faculties of understanding and free will. The consent of the will is that which renders human
actions laudable or culpable. Hence, where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free
act of the will. An insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No
purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of his mental state,
he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred from similar behavior in the future.
18

A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the
traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The
M'Naghten rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the
nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong. This rule has been criticized for its ambiguity.
It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal wrong. The importance of the
distinction was illustrated by Stephen 19 as follows: A kills B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to
kill B but under an insane delusion that God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the
human race. A's act is a crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong"
means morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely to intellectual reason and
excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the accused may know in his mind
what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or consequences of his actions. 20 M'Naghten was
condemned as based on an obsolete and misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does
not only affect the intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient, including
his will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality and does
not solely determine man's conduct. 21

Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming
defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by
reason of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would
enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the
accused knew that what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his
mental illness kept him from controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the crime. This
rule rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that impair volition or self-control, even
while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and wrong. 22 This test was likewise criticized on
the following grounds: (1) the "impulse" requirement is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts;
(2) the "irresistible" requirement is also restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of
the will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter criminals as
the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it is difficult to prove whether
the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse. 2

Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." 24 Critics of this test argued
that it gave too much protection to the accused. It placed the prosecution in a difficult position of
proving accused's sanity beyond reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's
act was the result of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case
thus becomes completely dependent on the testimonies of experts. 25

Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law Institute (ALI) in its
Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests. The new rule
stated that a person is not responsible for his criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect,
he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law. 26 Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like
"substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in expert testimonies whether the
accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. 27 Objections were also made to the exclusion of
psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics
observed that psychopaths cannot be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment. 28

In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of the M'Naghten style statutory
formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which made the appreciation test the law
applicable in all federal courts. The test is similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The
accused is not required to prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the
burden of proof to the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of
diminished capacity and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane. 29

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as
it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 30
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not susceptible of the
usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity
of an accused requires opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted
with the accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane based on
the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. 31 The testimony or proof of the accused's insanity must relate to the time preceding or
coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged. 32

In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most
common form of psychosis. 3 Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable through odd
and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive destructiveness and immature and
exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in
the more serious states by delusions and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic
living, withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought disorder and
profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are disregarded. 34 During the initial
stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind barriers of loneliness,
hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may
appear "far away." He does not empathize with the feelings of others and manifests little concern about
the realities of life situations. The schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable
lack of self-respect. He withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself
from painful relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a
loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness. 35 A variety of
subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting anxiety and fears precede the earliest
behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes
distracted in conversation manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations.
Outwardly, this will be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not speak or
respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may appear to stare, as he
does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his attention. 36

None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited any of the myriad
symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing
incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the
part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility
that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also declared
that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing right from
wrong. 37 Hence the importance of adducing proof to show that the appellant was not in his lucid
interval at the time he committed the offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia
a few months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission of the
offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
simultaneous to the commission of the crime. Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time
preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 38
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of
insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the appellant
was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime. The
arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one,
his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general
denial that can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the sight
of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of imagination, prove that
the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither is the appellant's seemingly non-
repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even
criminals of stable mental condition take this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and
his wife were never seen quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's
unstable mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a pregnant
spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been terminated for the flimsiest
reason.

The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and became totally
dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this, however, purely speculative and unsupported
by record. To be sure, there was no showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant
after he lost his fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his mental
illness. In fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time that she knew the appellant
and while he lived in her house, she did not notice anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's
behavior that could have suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness.

An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits committing the
crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time of its commission. Hence, the
accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is
rendered without any trial on the issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime. 39 As
the appellant, in the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the
time he killed his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide is
AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

8. People v. Robios, G.R. No. 138453, 29 May 2002

G.R. No. 138453 May 29, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MELECIO ROBIÑOS y DOMINGO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the present case for
parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in the absence of any aggravating
circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here is reclusion perpetua, not death.

The Case

For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding Melecio Robiños2 y Domingo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing
him to death. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of the victim; and P22,800.00 s actual damages."3

In an Information dated May 31, 1995,4 appellant was accused of killing his pregnant wife and the fetus
inside her. It reads thus:

"That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of Camiling,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Melecio Robinos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab by means of a bladed knife
8 inches long, his legitimate wife Lorenza Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant causing the
instantaneous death of said Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside her womb."5

When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,6 pleaded not guilty.7
After due trial, the RTC convicted him.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecution's version of how appellant assaulted
his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:

"1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo Robiños was in
his parents' house at Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo was cooking, he heard his
parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and the victim Lorenza Robiños, who were at the sala, quarrelling.

"2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?' After
hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters, saw appellant, with a double-
bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood gushed from where Lorenza was hit and she fell
down on the floor. Upon witnessing appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their
house and ran to his grandmother's house where he reported the incident.1âwphi1.nêt
"3. At around eight o'clock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother of the victim
Lorenza Robiños, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at Barangay San Isidro. Benjamin, a
resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went to his mother's house for the purpose of
informing his relatives that on the evening of March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro
Robiños, at Barangay Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mother's house, he received the
more distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by appellant.

"4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he was afraid of
what appellant might do. From his mother's house, which was about 150 meters away from his sister's
home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, 'It's good you would see how your sister died.'

"5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police station at
Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the other members of the
PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay San Isidro. The police, together with
Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime
where they saw blood dripping from the house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to
come out of the house. When appellant failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay
officials, detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. The removal
of the wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant embracing [his] wife.

"6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and holding a
bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his wife. He was uttering the
words, 'I will kill myself, I will kill myself.' Lorenza, who was lying on her back and facing upward, was no
longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.

"7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled appellant away from
Lorenza's body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist
the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the barangay officials
present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from the body
of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a
barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.

"8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale and not
breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take Lorenza's body for autopsy.
Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling, Tarlac. However, he had to be taken to the
Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of a stab wound.

"9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling, Tarlac,
prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:

'The victim Lorenza Robiños was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on the different
parts of her body.

'That suspect (Melecio Robiños) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home and
argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and delivered forty
one (41) stab blows.

'Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.
'Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long including
handle.'

"10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who conducted the
autopsy on Lorenza Robiños' body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented as evidence."8

Version of the Defense

Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed killed his wife, but
seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of insanity as follows:

"Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense presented the
testimonies of the following:

"FEDERICO ROBIÑOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robiños, testified that his parents had occasional
quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a person went [sic] inside their
house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he heard his father told the same thing to his
mother and because of this, his parents quarreled and exchanged heated words.

"LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know Melecio Robiños
only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused isolated himself, 'laging
nakatingin sa malayo', rarely talked, just stared at her and murmured alone.

"BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he and the accused
were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes,
he stayed in his cell even if they were required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.

"DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that as the
accused's inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the latter. Accused sometimes was lying
down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and without companion, laughing and sometimes crying.

"MELECIO ROBIÑOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was in their house
and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not know that he was charged for
the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could not remember when he was informed by
his children that he killed his wife. He could not believe that he killed his wife."9

In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically elevated to this Court for
review.10

The Issues

Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:

"I
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric evaluation of Dr.
Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering from psychosis or insanity
classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.

"II

The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellant's defense of insanity."11

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Main Issue

Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance

At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to contravene the allegation
that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC findings on the identity of the culprit and the
commission of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Appellant, however,
interposes the defense of insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability.

Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom
of will at the time of the commission of the crime.12 A defendant in a criminal case who relies on the
defense of mental incapacity has the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment
when the crime was committed.13 Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time
of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.14

The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, every
person is presumed to be of sound mind.15 Accordingly, one who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity has the burden of proving it.16 Failing this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime
was committed.

A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellant's claim of insanity is unsubstantiated and
wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no
substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.

As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic altercation preceded
the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and
without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure, his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and
conscious reaction to the insulting remarks she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son
Lorenzo Robiños. We reproduce Lorenzo's testimony in part as follows:

"Q: Before your father Melecio Robiños stabbed your mother, do you recall if they talked to one and
the other?

A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: Did you hear what they talked about?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you hear?

A: 'Why did you come home, why don't you just leave?', Sir.

COURT:

In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.

ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: After you mother uttered those words, what did your father do?

A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir."17

Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was even bragging to
her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno testified thus:

"ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robiños was already there in the house of
your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already dead?

A: No, Sir.

ATTY. JOAQUIN:

Q: Why?

A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.

COURT:

Q: Why do you know that he was amok?

A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.

Q: How?

A: It's good you would see how your sister died, Sir."18

Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just killed his wife may
have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural sentiment of a husband who had
realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the time of the killing and immediately thereafter is
inconsistent with his claim that he had no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad
Rolando Valdez validated the clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to
the police officers, and even showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Valdez's testimony
proceeded as follows:

"Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio Robiños?

A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robiños, it was closed. We waited for the police officers
to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we started going around the house and when we
saw blood, some of our companions removed the walling of the house and at that time, we saw the wife
of Melecio Robiños lying down as if at that moment, the wife of Melecio Robiños was already dead, Sir.

Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?

A: We talked to Melecio Robiños, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?

A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said he killed his wife
and showing the weapon he used, sir.

Q: What is that weapon?

A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.

COURT:

What is that, knife?

A: It's a double bladed knife, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

He admitted to you that he killed his wife?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog, ilocano or what?

A: What I remember Sir he said, 'Pinatay ko ni baket ko' meaning 'I killed my wife,' Sir."19

Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his awareness of the atrocity of
his act.

Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports his claim of insanity.
The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission
of the crime. Except for appellant's 19-year-old son Federico Robiños,20 all the other defense witnesses
testified on the supposed manifestations of his insanity after he had already been detained in prison.

To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or the accused must
have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be criminally responsible.21 Verily, his
alleged insanity should have pertained to the period prior to or at the precise moment when the
criminal act was committed, not at anytime thereafter. In People v. Villa,22 this Court incisively
ratiocinated on the matter as follows:

"It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the center. But, in all
probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was
without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was troubled by his conscience, the
realization of the gravity of the offenses and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of
these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that
an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the period immediately before or
at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after
that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability.
In fine, this Court needs more concrete evidence on the mental condition of the person alleged to be
insane at the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of insanity
may be appreciated in his favor. x x x."23 (Italics supplied)

Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. If
the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be
acquitted.24

The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an examination of the
mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in determining his state of mind at the time
of the killing. It must be noted that she examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after
the commission of the crime.25 Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history
of his mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to gather data
on the matter.26
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already been suffering from
psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime,27 she likewise admitted that her conclusion was
not definite and was merely an opinion.28 As correctly observed by the trial court, her declarations
were merely conjectural and inconclusive to support a positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:

"The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National Center for
Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused Melecio Robiños was still
mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and suffering from insanity and it is possible
that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine (9) months before examination; and in her opinion
accused was suffering from delusion and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time accused
stabbed himself, he was not in his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxx Aside from being
her opinion, she conducted the mental, physical and neurological examinations on the accused seven (7)
months after the commission of the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given accused an
opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no opportunity to observed
(sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused immediately before, during and immediately after
the commission of the offense. Her finding is conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct background
examination of the mental condition of the accused before the incident by interviewing persons who
had the opportunity to associate with him."29

Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been completely
deprived of reason when he killed the victim.30 Verily, the evidence proffered by the defense did not
indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or freedom of will when he stabbed his
wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and
convincing proof is required to establish its existence.31 Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the
quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity.1âwphi1.nêt

Second Issue:

Proper Penalty

Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death
penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty was not only baseless,
but contrary to the rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even the
Office of the Solicitor General concedes this error in the imposition of the death penalty.32

Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty
to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with
the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, x x x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x."

The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death. In all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, the court is mandated
to impose one or the other, depending on the presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.33 The rules with respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible
penalties are prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is
quoted as follows:
"In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:

xxx xxx xxx

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied." (Italics supplied)

Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be imposed.34 Considering that
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were established in this case, the imposable penalty
should only be reclusion perpetua.35

Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always punishable with
death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death -- two indivisible
penalties, the application of either one of which depends on the presence or the absence of mitigating
and aggravating circumstances.36

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68) in Criminal Case No.
95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua.
Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000
as civil indemnity and P22,800 as actual damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to
costs.

ORDERED.

9. People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, 17 March 2004

G.R. Nos. 147674-75 March 17, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under
separate informations, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:

Criminal Case No. 4693

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle
with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which
wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.1

Criminal Case No. 4703

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon, locally
known as ‘pisao,’ thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.2

After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued.3

The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution
witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason
Masbang were outside sitting side by side with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan
Dacles, who was lying on a bench.4

Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house, shouting: "There’s a long-haired man!" Bambi stood
up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a
knife while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab
wounds on different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi’s house, with
Anacito chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from
entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also
threw stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left.5

With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the
hospital. He saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said:
"Never mind because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced."6 As nobody from among his
neighbors responded to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the
lower portion of the neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi
bring Allan to the hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.7

At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the
latter’s wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw
people running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody.8

After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He
likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near
the so-called "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife
about three to four times.9
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He
then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents’ house, but the latter did not make it because he
collapsed near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house
of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital,
where he died the following day.10

Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the
cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allan’s body, one of which was fatal
because it affected the upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel.11 Demetrio Jr. sustained four
stab wounds and died of pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal
hemorrhage.12

For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He
declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another
barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m.,
eight policemen entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the
police station and detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place and
time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend whom
he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with
prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated
because he was envied and lowly regarded by his accusers.13

Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present
witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the
following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order
authorizing the psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito
underwent a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan
issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a "normal" mental status on
that date but was "suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration," which required further
psychiatric evaluation at Tacloban City.14

The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for the psychiatric
examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.15

On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist
of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the
hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through
interviews. From her interview with Anacito’s sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of
Anacito’s psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found that Anacito had a
psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her
medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission of the crime and even up
to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.16

Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking
"irrelevantly."17 Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne.18
They stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed
the same medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments,
Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the NCMH, however,
referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for
examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada
of the NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then until the
year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he subjected to examination or treatment.19

Anacito’s other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he
heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When
Francisco went out to verify, he did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner
of the street carrying a knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him.
Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios’ house. Before the incident, he
observed Anacito to be "sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes
silent."20

In its decision21 of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It decreed:

WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
specified hereunder, to wit:

Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱43,500.00 by way of
actual damages, and to pay the costs; and

Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.

Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in
disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity.22 He contends that he was suffering from a
psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims.
Even assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would
diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts." He likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio
Jr.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to establish with the
required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished
willpower. The mental state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the
stabbing incidents. Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was
uncertain that Anacito was "unconscious" at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues
that treachery was duly alleged and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a
qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element.
Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty
cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation.
A man’s act is presumed voluntary.23 It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done
unconsciously,24 for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound
mind,25 or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.26 Thus, the
presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code
exempts a person from criminal liability.27

He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it,28 for insanity as a
defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance.29 An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged.30 It is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s
counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack
of insanity immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him.31

Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior.32 Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.33

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct.34 However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.35 As consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so."36 Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of
insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming
three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim;37 slurping the victim’s blood and attempting to
commit suicide after stabbing him;38 crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and jumping off a
jeepney.39

The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones40 requires that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment
because of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.

In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,41 we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the
test of cognition – whether there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal
act" and (b) the test of volition – whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of
volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he
was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy.42
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused
was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.43

Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacito’s defense of insanity. The appellant points to
the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply
stare at the lady boarders a few days before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and
long pants when there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the
testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time interval between
the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive.44

The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of
Anacito two to three days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and
that he was angry with her.45 His brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes
talk to himself, laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet.46 Also relied upon
by the appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and the expert testimony of
the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.

A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambi’s personal perception that there was
no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for
insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing,
talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient
proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual
behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude
imputability.47

Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What
it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to
remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs
were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the
NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the
confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito was never
confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a recommendation for
Anacito’s confinement, there was no indication in the records as to when the recommendation was
made, who made the recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation.48

At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,49 we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to
the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged
insane by the institute. Applying this principle to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to reject
his plea of insanity.

The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was
no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he
needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000
because he was "again noisy in the jail."50 It seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he
was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.

Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations on Anacito were based
on incomplete or insufficient facts.51 For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only
three sessions lasting one to two hours each.52 Her one-page medical report53 reads in part:

Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in appearance, wearing blue
shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with
auditory hallucination, "kabastosan," "kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and
complained of occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse control.

Comments:

From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a psychiatric
disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and during the commission of the crime. He
is presently psychotic and cannot stand trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.

We observe that Dr. Verona’s conclusions have no supporting medical bases or data. She failed to
demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing.54 Further,
she did not have Anacito’s complete behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she
mentioned that Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not
conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of
schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not grossly insane.55

Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Verona’s short psychiatric evaluation report and
her testimony that Anacito’s judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a
conclusion that his mental condition in 1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he
was psychiatrically examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period
after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacito’s mental condition only for said time. It
could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability,
insanity could have been contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without
contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the
realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of
these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium.

It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the
inquiry.56 His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability.57

Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in
the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been held
that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of his
mental faculties.58 Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was
attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory
from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his
earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction59 or an afterthought.60 In any
event, Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed
Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.61

We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance
of diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a
plea of insanity, it was clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental
disease that affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission
of the act he was being held for.62 The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000
that Anacito was diagnosed as "psychotic" with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found
to be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at the
time he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her
report, only at the witness stand.

We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is
concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault.63 For treachery
to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where
no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be
supposed.64

Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim
in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged
from his hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacito’s attack came without warning; it
was deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
opportunity to resist or defend himself.65

We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and
with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by
descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.66

We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua,
the lower of the two indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he
may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and
whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no
modifying circumstances.

Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent ₱43,500 for the wake
and burial of his son, only ₱11,94567 is substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we
shall award to Demetrio Jr.’s heirs temperate damages68 of ₱25,00069 conformably with current
jurisprudence.70

As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent ₱10,000. However,
he failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages
in the amount of ₱10,000 on the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim
incurred expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.

The award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and Allan is affirmed in
line with recent jurisprudence.71 Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.72

Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000 consistent with controlling case law.73 Moral damages are awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family.74

We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000 in
view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery.75

Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the total amount of
₱161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of ₱110,000.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in
Criminal Case No. 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the ₱50,000
civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a)
₱50,000 as moral damages; (b) ₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) ₱25,000 as exemplary damages,
or a total of ₱150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages;
and (b) ₱10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of ₱110,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

10. Verdadero v. People, G.R. No.216021, 2 March 2016

G.R. No. 216021, March 02, 2016

SOLOMON VERDADERO Y GALERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The expectations of a person possessed with full control of his faculties differ from one who is totally
deprived thereof and is unable to exercise sufficient restraint on his. Thus, it is but reasonable that the
actions made by the latter be measured under a lesser stringent standard than that imposed on those
who have complete dominion over their mind, body and spirit.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the July 10, 2014 Decision1 and the
December 15, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35894 which affirmed
the May 30, 2013 Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 03, Tuguegarao City (RTC) in Criminal
Case No. 13283, finding accused Solomon Verdadero y Galera (Verdadero) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

The Facts

In an Information,4 dated September 9, 2009, Verdadero was charged with the crime of murder for
killing Romeo B. Plata (Romeo), the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about March 12, 2009, in the municipality of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused SOLOMON VERDADERO armed with a Rambo
knife, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab ROMEO B. PLATA, thereby inflicting upon him stab
wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

Contrary to law.
On June 3, 2011, Verdadero was arraigned and pleaded "Not Guilty." During the pre-trial, he invoked the
defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Evidence of the Prosecution

The evidence of the prosecution tended to establish the following:

On March 12, 2009, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Maynard Plata (Maynard) and his father
Romeo were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo (Ronnie), they went there to
report that Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of their irrigation pump.

After a confrontation with Verdadero at the police station, the three men made their way home on a
tricycle but stopped at a drugstore as Maynard intended to buy some baby supplies. Romeo proceeded
towards a store near the drugstore while Ronnie stayed inside the tricycle. From the drug store,
Maynard saw Verdadero stabbing Romeo, after he was alerted by the shouts of Ronnie.

Verdadero stabbed Romeo on the left side of the latter's upper back with the use of a Rambo knife. He
again struck Romeo's upper back, just below the right shoulder. Maynard tried to help his father but
Verdadero attempted to attack him as well. He defended himself using a small stool, which he used to
hit Verdadero in the chest.9
Meanwhile, Ronnie ran towards the police station to seek assistance. The responding police officers
arrested Verdadero, while Maynard and Ronnie brought Romeo to a clinic but were advised to bring him
to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center (CVMC). Romeo, however, died upon arrival at the CVMC. Based
on the Post-Mortem Examination Report, his cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
severe hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds and hack wounds.10

Evidence of the Defense

The evidence for the defense did not refute the material allegations but revolved around Verdadero's
alleged insanity, to wit:

Since 1999, Verdadero had been an outpatient of CVMCs Psychiatric Department as he claimed to hear
strange voices and had difficulty in sleeping. Sometime in 2001, Miriam Verdadero (Miriam),
Verdadero's sister, again brought him to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC after he became violent
and started throwing stones at a tricycle with a child on board. Verdadero was confined for two (2)
months and was diagnosed to be suffering from mental depression.

On July 21, 2003, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medications to address his mental
illness. Verdadero would irregularly consult with his doctors as he had a lifelong chronic disease. Then,
in 2009, he was again confined for the fourth (4th) time at CVMC due to a relapse.

On March 12, 2009, Miriam proceeded to CVMC, after she heard of the stabbing incident. There, she
saw Verdadero removing the IV tubes connected to his body and, thereafter, locked himself inside the
comfort room. Eventually, Verdadero was given sedatives and was transferred to an isolation room after
Miriam informed the nurses of the incident.11

On March 20, 2009, he was transferred to the Psychiatry Department after Dr. Leonor Andres-Juliana
(Dr. Andres-Juliana) had diagnosed that he was having difficulty sleeping. Dr. Andres-Juliana opined that
Verdadero suffered a relapse, as evidenced by his violent behaviour.

Acting on the January 4, 2011 Order of the RTC, Dr. Ethel Maureen Pagaddu (Dr. Pagaddu) conducted a
mental examination on Verdadero. She confirmed that as early as 1999, he was already brought to
CVMC and that he was diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003. Dr. Pagaddu agreed with Dr.
Andres-Juliana that Verdadero had suffered a relapse on the day of the stabbing incident.12

The RTC Ruling

On May 30, 2013, the RTC rendered a decision finding Verdadero guilty for the crime of homicide. The
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SOLOMON VERDADERO y Galera
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him:

1. To suffer an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor [as
maximum] as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; and,
2. To pay the heirs of Romeo Plata the amounts of:

a. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;

b. P50,000.00 as moral damages and
c. P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages; and,

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, as the prosecution failed to establish the
presence of treachery and evident premeditation to qualify the killing to murder. The trial court,
however, opined that Verdadero failed to establish insanity as an exempting circumstance. The trial
court posited that Verdadero was unsuccessful in establishing that he was not in a lucid interval at the
time he stabbed Romeo or that he was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the
commission of the crime.

Aggrieved, Verdadero appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its July 10, 2014 Decision, the CA upheld Verdadero's conviction of homicide. The appellate court
agreed that the defense was able to establish that Verdadero had a history of schizophrenic attacks, but
was unable to prove that he was not lucid at the time of the commission of the offense. The decretal
portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. The Judgment, dated May 30, 2013,
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3 in Criminal Case No. 13283, is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Verdadero moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA in its resolution, dated
December 15, 2014.

Hence, this present petition, raising the following

ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
Verdadero insists that he was able to fully support his defense of insanity. He claims that Maynard even
admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind when they were at the police station before the
stabbing took place. Further, it appeared that Verdadero was having hallucinations after the stabbing
incident as testified to by Dr. Andres-Juliana. Verdadero notes that Dr. Pagaddu concluded that he had a
relapse at the time of the stabbing incident on March 12, 2009.

In its Comment,15 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that the present petition
presented a question of fact, which could not be addressed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Moreover, it asserted that the CA did not misapprehend the facts as the evidence
presented failed to completely establish Verdadero's insanity at the time of the stabbing.

In his Manifestation (in Lieu of Reply),16 Verdadero indicated that he would no longer file a reply as his
petition for review already contained an exhaustive discussion of the issues.

The Court's Ruling

The present petition primarily assails the conviction despite his defense of insanity. Before delving into
the merits of the case, a discussion of the procedural issue is in order.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45; Exceptions

The OSG argues that the Court should not entertain Verdadero's petition for review as it principally
revolves around the issue of his insanity — a question of fact which should no longer be addressed in a
petition for review. The Court disagrees.

Generally, questions of fact are beyond the ambit of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court as it is limited to reviewing only questions of law. The rule, however, admits of exceptions wherein
the Court expands the coverage of a petition for review to include a resolution of questions of fact. In
Laborte v. Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers' Cooperative et al.,17 the Court reiterated the following
exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45, to wit: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in
making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.

The present petition mainly delves into Verdadero's state of mind at the time of the stabbing incident.
Obviously, it is a question of fact, which, ordinarily is not entertained by the Court in a petition for
review. As will be discussed below, the Court, nevertheless, finds that the circumstances in the case at
bench warrant the application of the exception rather than the rule.

Insanity must be present at the time the crime had been committed

To completely evade culpability, Verdadero raises insanity as a defense claiming that he had suffered a
relapse of his schizophrenia. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt
from criminal liability, unless the latter had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or
imbecility must be clearly proved for there is a presumption that the acts penalized by law are
voluntary.18

In the case at bench, it is undisputed that (1) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric
Department of CVMC for treatment; (2) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (3) he was
diagnosed with schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (4) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in
2009 due to a relapse; (5) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in
1999 until the stabbing incident; and (6) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20,
2009.

Thus, it is without question that he was suffering from schizophrenia and the only thing left to be
ascertained is whether he should be absolved from responsibility in killing Romeo because of his mental
state.

Schizophrenia is a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and
reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.19 A showing that an accused is suffering
from a mental disorder, however, does not automatically exonerate him from the consequences of his
act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.20

In People v. Florendo,21 the Court explained the standard in upholding insanity as an exempting
circumstance, to wit:

Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant is deprived of reason; he acts without the least
discernment because of complete absence of the power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon him who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

[Emphasis Supplied]
In People v. Isla,22 the Court elucidated that insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which the accused is charged. Otherwise, he
must be adjudged guilty for the said offense. In short, in order for the accused to be exempted from
criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must categorically demonstrate that: (1) he was completely
deprived of intelligence because of his mental condition or illness; and (2) such complete deprivation of
intelligence must be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense.

In raising the defense of insanity, Verdadero admits to the commission of the crime because such
defense is in the nature of a confession or avoidance.23 As such, he is duty bound to establish with
certainty that he was completely deprived, not merely diminished, of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime. Failing which, Verdadero should be criminally punished for impliedly admitting
to have stabbed Romeo to death.

Proving insanity is a tedious task for it requires an examination of the mental state of the accused. In
People v. Opuran24 the Court explained how one's insanity may be established, to wit:

Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can
know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior. Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.

Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. xxx
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused
was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.
In the earlier case of People v. Austria,25 the Court elucidated that evidence of the mental condition of
the accused during a reasonable period before and after the commission of the offense is material, to
wit:

In order to ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of his mental condition during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony is not
required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish insanity as a defense. A person's
mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions
may be evaluated to determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of sound mind. To
prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence would suffice.
Guided by the precepts laid out by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the Court finds that Verdadero
sufficiently proved that he was insane at the time of the stabbing. Thus, the Court takes a view different
from that of the CA as the latter concluded that Verdadero's insanity was not clearly proven.

It is true that there is no direct evidence to show Verdadero's mental state at the exact moment the
crime was committed. This, however, is not fatal to the finding that he was insane. His insanity may still
be shown by circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Further, the expert opinion of
the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu may also be taken into account.

Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the time of the stabbing
incident. During her testimony, she stated as follows:

On direct examination

Atty. Tagaruma
Q: By the way what was the mental condition of the accused referred which involved your diagnosis as a
life long chronic disease?

Witness
A: The accused was diagnosed schizophrenia, sir.

Q: When for the first time Solomon Verdadero was diagnosed with schizophrenia?
A: It was on July 21, 2003, sir. xxx

Q: As an expert witness tell the Honorable Court if a person who has relapse of schizophrenia could
distinguish his act?
A: This mental disorder influence (sic) the impulse. It could at the time of the commission of the crime
that the impulse control and judgment of an individual was affected sir.

Q: Could it be accurate to state that a person who has the relapse of schizophrenia could not distinguish
any act from right or wrong?
A: There is a possibility, sir.

Court
Q: Why did you say that Solomon Verdadero has the possibility of relapse upon admission on March 19,
2009?
A: There was a period of relapse meaning the symptom was present and there must be a remission if
the symptom is abated, your Honor.

xxx

Atty. Tagaruma
Q: You have read for the record the report of Dr. Juliana on the alleged violent behavior of Solomon
Verdadero on March 12, 2009 which is the date of the incident, as an expert psychiatrist is it possible
that the violent behavior of Solomon Verdadero on March 12, 2009 was the basis of Dr. Juliana in
diagnosing that the accused was in relapse upon admission on March 12, 2009?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Following the remark of scientific conclusion of Dr. Juliana, Dr. Janet Taguinod and the conclusion
made by you, is it also your conclusion that Solomon Verdadero was in relapse on March 12, 2009 due
to violent behavior?
A: Yes, sir.

On cross examination

Prosecutor Aquino

Q: But definitely during the disorder of the patient, the relapse would somewhat be continued even
when medications is administered to him?
A: The symptom is controlled although there is a circumstances (sic) that the patient may have relapse
(sic) even with medication, sir.

Q: If a continuous medication was undertaken by the accused-patient in this case could that have a long
effect on his mental condition?
A: Continuous medication could somehow control the symptom and not absolutely eradicate the
symptom.

Q: On March 12 , 2009 the accused-patient was on a lucid interval, in view of the medication undertaken
as of January 19, 2009?
A: It's haphazard, sir.

xxx

Court
Q: Madam witness what type of schizophrenia the accused was diagnosed?
A: Undifferentiated, your honor.26

[Emphases Supplied]
Dr. Paggadu, without any reservations, stated that Verdadero was suffering a relapse of his
schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. In contrast, she was hesitant to opine that Verdadero
might have been in a lucid interval because of the medications taken. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude,
on the basis of the testimony of an expert witness, that Verdadero was of unsound mind at the time he
stabbed Romeo.

Further, the finding of Verdadero's insanity is supported by the observations made by Maynard, a
witness for the prosecution. In his testimony, Maynard gave his opinion on Verdadero's behavior and
appearance when they met at the police station, to wit:

On cross examination

Atty. Tagurama
Q: Having made the report against Solomon Verdadero, do I (sic) correct to say that you are familiar
with Solomon Verdadero even before March 12, 2009?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us why you are familiar to him even prior to March 12, 2009?
A: We are neighbors, sir.

Q: You are immediate neighbors?

A: Yes, sir

Q: Since you are neighbors with Solomon Verdadero you see him almost a (sic) time?
A: Yes, sir. I saw him daily.

Q: When you see Solomon Verdadero daily you see his actuation?
A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: Sometimes he boxes when he is not in his proper mind, what aberrant behavior did you observe from
him?
A: That's the only thing I observed and sometimes he steal (sic), sir.

Q: For a long time that Solomon Verdadero is your neighbor does his relapse or what you called not in
his proper mind occurred often?
A: It occurred once in a while, sir.

Q: When you said it occurred once in a while, this relapse may occur once a week?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Prior to March 12, 2009, when did you first observe that Solomon Verdadero appears not in his
proper mind?
A: He was not in his proper mind for a long time, sir.

Q: Maybe it could be 5 months before March 12, 2009?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx
Court
Q: You testified that you observed the accused not in his proper mind for the passed (sic) years before
this incident was he also violent like what happened on March 12, 2009?

Witness
A: Yes, your honor.

Q: When you went to the police station you allegedly reported the stolen fan belt do I get you right that
Solomon Verdadero was with you at the police station?
A: Yes, your honor.

Q: When he was with you at the police station what did you observe?
A: He was not again in his proper mind (sumro manen), your Honor.

xxx

Q: Can you describe his appearance?

A: His eyes was (sic) very sharp and reddish.

xxx

Q: As far as his appearance is concern (sic) do you remember his actuation or how he was reacting?
A: Yes, your honor. He was somewhat drank (sic).

Q: You said that he was not on his proper mind for the passed (sic) years?
A: Yes, your honor.

[Emphases Supplied]
Maynard was familiar with Verdadero as the latter was his neighbor for a long time. He had observed
that there were times that Verdadero appeared to be of unsound mind as he would sometimes become
violent. On the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound
mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk. Moreover, he was immediately
transferred to the psychiatry department because of his impaired sleep and to control him from
harming himself and others.28

These circumstances are consistent with Dr. Paggadu's testimony that drinking wine, poor sleep and
violent behavior were among the symptoms of a relapse, the same testimony that was used as basis for
his previous diagnosis.29 The evidence on record supports the finding that Verdadero exhibited
symptoms of a relapse of schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus, Dr. Pagaddu
reiterated Dr. Andre-Juliana's conclusion that Verdadero was having a relapse of his illness on that
fateful day.

Further, on March 22, 2009, he was officially diagnosed to have suffered a relapse of schizophrenia.
Generally, evidence of insanity after the commission of the crime is immaterial. It, however, may be
appreciated and given weight if there is also proof of abnormal behavior before or simultaneous to the
crime.30
Indeed, the grant of absolution on the basis of insanity should be done with utmost care and
circumspection as the State must keep its guard against murderers seeking to escape punishment
through a general plea of insanity.31 The circumstances in the case at bench, however, do not indicate
that the defense of insanity was merely used as a convenient tool to evade culpability.

The Court notes that at the very first opportunity, Verdadero already raised the defense of insanity and
remained steadfast in asserting that he was deprived of intelligence at the time of the commission of
the offense. He no longer offered any denial or alibi and, instead, consistently harped on his mental
incapacity. Unlike in previous cases32 where the Court denied the defense of insanity as it was raised
only when the initial defense of alibi failed to prosper, Verdadero's alleged insanity was not a mere
afterthought.

In exonerating Verdadero on the ground of insanity, the Court does not totally free him from the
responsibilities and consequences of his acts. Article 12(1) of the RPC expressly states that "[w]hen an
insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony, the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not
be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court." Instead of
incarceration, Verdadero is to be confined in an institution where his mental condition may be
addressed so that he may again function as a member of society. He shall remain confined therein until
his attending physicians give a favorable recommendation for his release.

Verdadero still liable for damages in spite of his exoneration

In appreciating insanity in favor of Verdadero, the Court absolves him from criminal responsibility. He is,
nevertheless, responsible to indemnify the heirs of Romeo for the latter's death. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from
the criminal liability.33

The amount of damages awarded, however, must be modified in order to conform to recent
jurisprudence.34 The P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages awarded by the RTC
must each be increased to P75,000.00. In addition, an interest at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum
should be imposed on all damages awarded computed from the finality of the decision until the same
have been fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition and ACQUITS accused-appellant Solomon Verdadero y Galera
of Homicide by reason of insanity. He is ordered confined at the National Center for Mental Health for
treatment and shall be released only upon order of the Regional Trial Court acting on a recommendation
from his attending physicians from the institution.

He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Romeo B. Plata the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as stipulated actual damages, plus interest on all
damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this decision until the same
shall have been fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

11. People v. Genosa, 341 SCRA 493, 419 SCRA 537

G.R. No. 135981 January 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the
"battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts,
however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.

Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological paralysis"
she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9
and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.

Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on
parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during
the pendency of this case.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa
y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic
aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the
penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2

The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:

'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and
tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of
the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of
the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."4

With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3,
1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:

"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter,
they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's younger brother,
Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben rented from
Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.

"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their salary. They
each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's house before reaching
his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look
for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the
evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home
passing the side of the Genosas' rented house, he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which
Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also
noticed that since then, the Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.

"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living about
fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for a pregnancy
check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan
who unfortunately had no money to buy it.

"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when
he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one carrying a bag, locking the
gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters
behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc.
They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.

"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor emanating from
his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the cause of the stench but
the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed
the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only
after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked
bedroom where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his
side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head.
Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of
[her] son.

"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at
Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented house. Together with
SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin proceeded to the house and went
inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet.
There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at
the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall.
The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2)
inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in
disarray.

"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken outside at
the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence
of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo
found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The
postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later
filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'

"Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15, 1995, she
got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling since it was a payday.
With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel,
Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel
went home despite appellant's request for her to sleep in their house.

"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly
ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework. Apparently
disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the
television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about
to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell
on the side of the bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes
because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew
into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and
told her 'You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware
that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long
blade cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop
the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick
up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.

"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She supposedly
'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot, though, but in the
bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:

"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage,
Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business
Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death, as a Secretary to the Port
Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.

"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in Bilwang;
they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were against their
relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting her. Their closeness
developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.

"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's brother, Alex,
in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But apparently, soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent.

"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and Marivic
married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk,
Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a
kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the
house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben's forgiveness. In another incident
in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood
from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had
apparently again asked for Ben's forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in
'1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage went along, Marivic
became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth of Marivic's two sons,
there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife
through his left arm; the second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead 'using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and
her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already
transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'

"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.

"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we collected our
salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three (3) hours, after which
they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking they bought
barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben,
after which he went across the road to wait 'for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because
during that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners
so that I can place my bet.' On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas
arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his
fighting cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am innocent.'
Basobas thought they were joking.

"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence. Basobas
admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he
once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa' that he should leave her
and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him 'so many times'.

"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had been
quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the couple for only one
(1) year.

"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a habitual
drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her down on the bed,
and sometimes beat her.

"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but Ben would
follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness. She said after she
would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These
doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would
beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.

"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and
violence she received at the hands of Ben.

'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on November
15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting for help and through
the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He
did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that
testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )

'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he
heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped through the window
of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses grappling with each other
then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said
after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he
went back to work as he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again,
please note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).

'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte.
His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece and he knew them to be
living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that
Ben would pawn items and then would use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and
they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified
that while Ben was alive 'he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and
he will say, 'Teody' because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and
look for a whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see bruises and
one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he
voluntarily testified only that morning.

'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon
of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for Ben. They searched in
the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She accompanied
Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa house 'because she might be
battered by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano
said that 'her husband was already there and was drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his
staggering walking and I can also detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel
noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano
testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be
afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was
awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very noisy in the sala and
I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked the
door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and 'showed us the knife through the window
grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no one came. On cross-examination,
she said that when she left Marivic's house on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.

'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel,
Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received treatment from other doctors. Dr.
Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical
injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS
Hospital. The prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.'

xxx xxx xxx

'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23)
separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic
which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries
reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'

"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries
were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is qualified to examine
the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.'

'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified that about
two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening. She sought his help
to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family troubles'. He told Marivic to
return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and assumed 'that they might have settled
with each other or they might have forgiven with each other.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who
began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she
wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born
prematurely on December 1, 1995.

"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was
violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x
x Rubillos.'

"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the bedroom;
that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that
she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented
herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not
tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she
was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.

'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did not know
what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist
with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked her 'ass' and dragged her
towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'

"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was made of the
foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses
and some defense witnesses during the trial.

"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of
the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as
the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She
merely took the medical board exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw
Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was
wearing only a brief.

xxxxxxxxx

"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of the
head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3
days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.

"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.

"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with the
crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'

"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997,
12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.

"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito
L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty
'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an aggravating
circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of DEATH.

"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of 24
January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as
counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant's Briefs he had
prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.

"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.

"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the
Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief
Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to the Court.

"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.

"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable Court on
19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable
Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to
take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified
forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death wound (as culled from
the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.

"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted Marivic's URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome' plea, within ninety (90) days from notice,
and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the
TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.'

"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L.
Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic
Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal Institution in 1999, but
that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at her clinic.

"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private
clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before this, she was the Head
of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the
Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and was the counseling psychologist of the
National Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master
of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past
president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American
Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about
68 countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing
on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence and nullity
cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military Psychology. She has written a
book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology' (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa
case is the first time she has testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that
nature.

"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and psychological
profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at about 500 cases over a
period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables that cause all of this marital
conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.'

"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal
abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of herself.
She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think very lowly of
themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke it, that they
were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and
even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional
family or from 'broken homes.'

"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion of himself.
But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very arrogant, very hostile, very
aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they
are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become violent.' The batterer also
usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do
anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of
aggression in the family.'

"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her husband:
poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which makes her hope her
husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs for the sake of the
children.

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or lock
themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence on both of
them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these are 'not consistent,
not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal marital relationship,' the abuse
occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even
death on the victim.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was her
opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her feeling of self-
confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of humiliation
which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time she still has the
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for nullity or
legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic then thought of
herself as a victim.

xxx xxx xxx

"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away, appeared and
testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.

"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of
Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the practice of psychiatry for
thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial
Medical Centre where he gained his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to
active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six
(26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General.
He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the
Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.

"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from
the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international congresses. He also authored 'The
Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was likewise published
internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-
Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use
of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and neurology
deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the other hand, is a
bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a specialist in
psychiatry.

"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered
a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In
those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with
domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under
Atty. Nenita Deproza.

"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where there is
physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a woman even to an
unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and
physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.'

"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were
real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but the suffering.'

xxx xxx xxx

"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and
she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent. She has higher sensitivity
and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such as the
deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally 'internalizes
what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own personality. He is very
competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong façade 'but in it there are
doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who
administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual
cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend themselves, and
'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is available in the immediate
surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the household.' He said a victim resorts to
weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on
her but to act decisively.'

xxx xxx xxx

"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for two (2)
hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social case studies as a
help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.

xxx xxx xxx

"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her
husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said 'that we are
trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will
just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things happened when the re-experiencing
of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was
not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'

xxx xxx xxx

"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public prosecutor.
Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a
quo were elevated."9

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back
of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.

Supervening Circumstances

On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had
killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower
court to admit the experts' testimonies.

On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion, remanding
the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
"battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the
proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.

Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic violence.
Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the
lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case.12

The Issues

Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:

"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the
evidence adduced as to self-defense.

"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally married
and that she was therefore liable for parricide.

"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.

"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial and
unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further
gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.

"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.

"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.

"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of treachery.

"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in determining the
existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic
Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and
in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Collateral Factual Issues

The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of
the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect
the outcome of the case.14

In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In
any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.

First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the
basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and
conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.

Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion
of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch
should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial
compliance with his constitutional obligation.15

Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally
married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court
held:

"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide
of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage
certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to."

Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased spouse
-- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these
testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her
marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it,
except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2)
no admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage
contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of
her marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by a
gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September
29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and
the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court
believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive
of the guilt or defense of appellant.

Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised
the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant.
Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly,
the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with
the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his
past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.

Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As
correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence
are necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution
prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower
court for not requiring them to testify.

Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and
her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of
her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has little
bearing on the final resolution of the case.

First Legal Issue:

Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus

Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense
of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any
claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in
criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the defense.22

The Battered Woman Syndrome

In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new
in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-
defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant
is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state
of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time."24

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."25

Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about
the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the
tendency to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve.26

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.28

During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or
another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself
to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of
the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her
"placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first
place.

However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful,
and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the
growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws
emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry,
oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of control" and
leads to an acute battering incident.29

The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes,
death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable
as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.

At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may
later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past
painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out
of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this
tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries
to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand,
the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom
she loves.

A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer.
Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the
chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she
remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly
tormented psychologically.

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this

phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness,"
each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.31

History of Abuse
in the Present Case

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She
herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:

"ATTY. TABUCANON

Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?

A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior
of habitual drinker.

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In
what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?

A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down on the
bed and sometimes beat me.

Q How many times did this happen?

A Several times already.

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?

A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?

A He is following me, after that he sought after me.

Q What will happen when he follow you?

A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him and he
said 'sorry'.

Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband,
were you able to see a doctor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who are these doctors?

A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who inflicted these injuries?

A Of course my husband.

Q You mean Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

[Court] /to the witness

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after
your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?

A Three times a week.

Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32

Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing
bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:

"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your clinic?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?

A I did.

Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.

A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of eye.
Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion (R) breast.
Attending physician: Dr. Canora;

3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;

5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora.

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician, is that
correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do you
mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?

A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if force is
applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?

A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning
there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?

xxx xxx xxx

Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did she tell you?

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told me that it
was done to her by her husband.

Q You mean, Ben Genosa?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month of
November, 1995 when this incident happened?

A As per record, yes.

Q What was the date?

A It was on November 6, 1995.

Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?

A Yes, sir.

Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?

A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?

A Eight (8) months pregnant.

Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy or for
some other findings?

A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy.

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?

A Yes, sir.

Q For how many days?

A One day.

Q Where?

A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her
personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant.

What is this all about?

A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I have a
record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23)
times.

Q For what?

A Tension headache.

Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?

A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not response
when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less stress related and
emotional in nature.

Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in line of
giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all
comes from the domestic problem.

Q You mean problem in her household?

A Probably.

Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is
unfortunately does not response to the medication.

Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the accused?

A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

Q Is this considered hypertension?

A Yes, sir, severe.

Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?

A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34

Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified
that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to
him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35

Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the
Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple
"were very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into
Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
knife.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they
were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid
that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel
hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.

On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or
heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when
life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:

"ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I boarded the
service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his
father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried because that was payday, I was
anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I
prepared dinner for my children.

Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?

A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.

Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you come back to your house?

A Yes, sir.

Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?

A Bilwang.

Q Is this your house or you are renting?

A Renting.

Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?

A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.

Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?

A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time because I
had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so I requested my
cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will happen again
last year.

Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?

A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.

Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?

A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.

Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?

A Yes, 8 months.

Q How advance was your pregnancy?

A Eight (8) months.

Q Was the baby subsequently born?

A Yes, sir.

Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?

A Marie Bianca.

Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?

A Yes, sir.

Q What time?

A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.

Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.

Q What was he yelling all about?

A His usual attitude when he got drunk.

Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if any?

A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.

Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?

A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he might be
overly drunk and he would beat me again.

Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?

A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that
he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he
switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when the children were there.' At
that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me
for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to
stop me from watching television.

Q What did he do with the bolo?

A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.

Q What else happened after he cut the wire?

A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was already
holding the bolo.

Q How do you described this bolo?

A 1 1/2 feet.

Q What was the bolo used for usually?

A For chopping meat.

Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?

A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?

A I screamed for help and then he left.

Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?

A Yes, sir.

Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?

A Outside perhaps to drink more.

Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?

A I packed all his clothes.

Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?

A I wanted him to leave us.

Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?

A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his clothes, then he
dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.

Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT INTERPRETER:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that 'you
might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.'

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(At this juncture the witness started crying).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long
and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to
pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?

A Outside.

Q In what part of the house?

A Dining.

Q Where were the children during that time?

A My children were already asleep.

Q You mean they were inside the room?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches
long, how does it look like?

A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.

Q Is it a flexible blade?

A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38

In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the
court a quo as follows:

"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term describe to
this Court what her life was like as said to you?

A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering emotional
anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical
abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even
womanizing being involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger a lot of
physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the
husband even accused her of infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not
his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware,
almost like living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39

In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put
forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:

"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about three
hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?

A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important information were
escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life.

Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts of the
case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?

A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as substantial.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of
battering their wives?

A I also heard that from her?

Q You heard that from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of battering
their wives?

A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.

Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her
husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?
A She told me about that.

Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?

A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.

Q Several times in that room?

A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really happened.

Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that is the
first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?

A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I
also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a disordered person.
She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and that is why it happened because of all the
physical battering, emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had experienced from her
husband.

Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?

A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40

Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

"Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?

A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to
find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.

Q What do you mean by that?

A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate
or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]

Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?

A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That the data
that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41

The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that
during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine,
normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his
wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he became
physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he
got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband
went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than eight
years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband whenever he was
drunk."

Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her
feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x."43

From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.

Effect of Battery on Appellant

Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife
syndrome.'"44

To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an
ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.45

The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has had
a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of
cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist
explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the
latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no
means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the
point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."47

Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the
violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them."48

According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an
abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and
that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.49

The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits
involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family
disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the
physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50

Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely
abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to
escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will have
a predictable positive effect."52

A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that
"even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to
respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this
phenomenon as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important
than the individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible,
because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will
alter their terrible circumstances."54

Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of
her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered
women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a
shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-
support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence
that would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to
the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described
the tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the
syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern.

How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did
Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?

Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply
mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek
her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return
to their common abode.

Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe
that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional
stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped
in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?

In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.

The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they
were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled from
their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded
that she had BWS.

We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in
order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the
essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.

BWS as Self-Defense

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.59

From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is
the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have actually feared
imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.

Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a
real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:

"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past
violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver
harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the
brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time
of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require
the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the
victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.66 Considering
such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.

Mitigating Circumstances Present

In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that
would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that
mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly
for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.69

From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:

"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic experienced with
her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down her psychological
resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed heightened sensitivity to sight of
impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her
abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her
part." 70

Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain
taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:

"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?

A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the battering.
Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the public and social support
available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....

xxx xxx xxx

Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?

A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to
the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is pregnant, she is very
susceptible because the woman will not only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.

Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?

A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.

Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?

A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest now a
severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most
[acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking of suicide.

Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?

A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer
than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you
become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one
is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you
get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72

Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her
mental capacity?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?

A Of course obfuscated."73

In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,"
"psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."

Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness
that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence
or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76

In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this
state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might
recover her normal equanimity.78

Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being
killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet
in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time.
The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression
which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and
obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her
emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled
with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she
pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of
time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's
testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality
[or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the
trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the
control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the
brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her
will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on
her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child
was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such
perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part.

Second Legal Issue:

Treachery

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods
or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended
party might make.81 In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be
proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures,
which have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.83

Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon
appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had
been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As
to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:

"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

COURT:

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)

A And he dragged me towards the door backward.

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Where did he bring you?

A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me that 'you
might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What is there in the drawer?

A I was aware that it was a gun.

COURT INTERPRETER

(At this juncture the witness started crying)

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?

A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not open it
because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long
and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet and the blade
fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that long, and when he was about to
pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment
everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same
when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.

COURT INTERPRETER

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about 3 inches
long, how does it look like?

A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.

Q It is a flexible blade?

A It's a cutter.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?

A Yes, because he once used it to me.

Q How did he do it?

A He wanted to cut my throat.

Q With the same blade?

A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?

A Yes, because I smashed him.

Q What happened?

A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the
other room.

Q What else happened?

A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was
about to die because of my blood pressure.

COURT INTERPRETER:

(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the same time
pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).

ATTY. TABUCANON:

Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I
was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.

COURT

/to Atty. Tabucanon

Q You shot him?

A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84

The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the
victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule
that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant.85

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have
been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing,
though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87

Proper Penalty

The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have
attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to
Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the
penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the
commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall
be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be
within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.

Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to
reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
detention on parole.91

Epilogue

Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple
to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on how
to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which
decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To
give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted
here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of
the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor
general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.

While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of
law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised
Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs
de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

12. People v. Doqueña, G.R. No. 46539, 27 September 1939, 68 Phil. 580
G.R. No. 46539 September 27, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEÑA, defendant-appellant.

Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with a knife on November 19,
1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after trying the case, held that the accused
acted with discernment in committing the act imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered
him to be sent to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding that he had
acted with discernment and in not having dismissal the case.

On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five days old. The
incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the deceased is narrated in the appealed
order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased Juan Ragojos and
one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the intermediate school of the municipality of
Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching
the ball, tossed it at Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos
chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape. Said accused then
turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude, for which the reason said deceased struck
him on the mouth with his fist, returning immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order
to continue playing with him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of Juan
Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a stone with which to
attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he approached a cousin of his named
Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the
accused had been asking his cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he might
attack Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the knife which
was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife, Valentin Doqueña approached
Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him another blow with his fist, to which the deceased
answered that he did not want to do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan
Ragojos, ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus unprepared
and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused stabbed him in the chest with the
knife which he carried.

The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at liberty to
alter, not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the appeal before us, by
section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3:

Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doqueña committed the crime in question,
he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such
pupil, he was one of the brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps
thereof, and during the time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is
convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the
nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was
testifying in his behalf during the trial of this case.

The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that the appeal taken
from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to determine discernment by the means
resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine
whether or not a minor acted with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time
the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on
the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It is clear
that the attorney for the defense mistakes the discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating
circumstance, is included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial (U.S. vs.
Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion arrived at by it is correct.

Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.

13. Ortega v. People, G.R. No. 151085, 20 August 2008

G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in
toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999,
convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.

The Facts

Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations
both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory
portions thereof respectively state:

Criminal Case No. 98-19083

That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of
and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her
will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.9 Thus,
trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution

On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM.10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD,
EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family members
were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors. However,
BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their
mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times
on three (3) different occasions.

The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old
and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner,
for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick.13
During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together
with Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner
raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence.
Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and raped her there.
AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances,
petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her
parents about her ordeal.

The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house
of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time,
Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA
to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a
kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's
shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described
petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated
that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16

This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in their
kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked from
their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping
motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB
reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17

MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his
fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner
molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her
ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the
matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go
to sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish
and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night. The
following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house.
MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she
demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination.18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested.20
Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson),
Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report21
showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at
the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were
relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4
days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of
the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.

Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.23 As such, petitioner stayed with a
certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in
order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and
confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only
filed the two (2) instant cases.

Version of the Defense

Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega.24 He is the
second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations
made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left
AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with BBB
and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never touched or raped
AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any instance; he did not rape
AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she
defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's
anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house;25 they were
dancing and playing together with all the other children at the time; while they were dancing, petitioner
hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported the matter to
MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could not have
done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated
AAA like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor
did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine
o'clock in the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents were
summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being maltreated by
his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to
bring AAA to a doctor for examination.28

Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of
the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of
her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM entrusted
AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest daughter
in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house watching television
and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from
where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and
dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were
conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon
hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for them, but both
mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the dining area;
Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not
examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they
peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF
was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who molested
her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a
doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no indication that
AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination
conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that
MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped
AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they should
seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an amicable settlement
wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the
locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come home to visit his
parents and to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home, FFF bad-mouthed
petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein FFF
allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.29

The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to
impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the
RTC disposed of this case in this wise:

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day
of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is
condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2)
rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending
appeal.31

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense
of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held
that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus,
hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the
factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND VALUE
WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE CASE.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.

III.

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-
APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE
RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED
VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN
AUGUST 1996.34

Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we
are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from
the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and
his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations
on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's
penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day
after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or
indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error
when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of
the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio
who is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to
human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose
reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was
MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the
petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that
were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period
of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996,
or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed
the instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed
against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to
depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner
submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories.35

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since
despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of
the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her
in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's
age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established that
the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG
relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had
the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness
was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he
committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.36

However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted
into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive
system to manage children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child-appropriate
procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to
ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and functions42 such as the formulation of
policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile
justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also

provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of R.A.
No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43

The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:

Title VIII
Transitory Provisions

SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — Upon effectivity of
this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime
shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as
provided under this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth
rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.

SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the Family Court
shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults, the court shall
immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth detention home.

SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. — The PNP, the
BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody.

SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and court
proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social welfare and
development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and Counseling Division
(SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate disposition. In case
the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the law
has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may
apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation Law.

SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other applicable
laws.

Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the
advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises, namely,
whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time
he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.

In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for
rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis.44 The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous
crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to
BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such
assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to
the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would
damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.45 We find petitioner's claim
that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money
from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape
committed against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's
organ is improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of
the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required.46 Therefore, it is not necessary for
conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the
lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.47

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of
the act, no criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:

[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied
in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a
criminal act.

In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC and
the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the
petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.
Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is applicable only if
the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also
asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 3851 of R.A. No. 9344 providing
for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a
recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such
principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.

We are not persuaded.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:

SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the
time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at
the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore,
with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to
the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law -
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of
Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.

In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the
bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:

Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions

Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose
that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:

ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF
THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE
YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.

The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?

Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the capability at the
moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children who do not
have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who currently have criminal liability,
but because of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a
diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.

Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that. That is
why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process,
except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to just craft it
to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to
be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the amendment.

The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all those children
in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will now not
be subject to incarceration under this law, will be immediately released. Is that the understanding?

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .

Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Yes.

The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?

Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for
example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These
methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of infrastructure,
meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must
be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this measure.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.

Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.

The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago amendment is
accepted.55

xxxx

PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS

xxxx
Senator Pimentel.

xxxx

Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would like to
suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make this
law apply also to those who might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of
their penalties as adults when, in fact, they are juveniles.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein
we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity
of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the commission of the crime
shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.

Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite the
instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.

Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment, subject to
style.

Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to address,
otherwise injustice will really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.

The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at
the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of
the law.

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.56

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a
statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:

The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and
intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a
law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the
strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to

a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes
in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.57

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused.58 In this case, the plain meaning of
R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to
herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL.

It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.

However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape
committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption
from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that
petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the
nature of actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.

The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each
count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or
proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.59

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect
our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL
and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that
major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, it was found that:

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of
criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment
of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and
the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using
children 15 years old or below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act
No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are
proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use
and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability
under the new law. 60
The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of
rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she
was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this
consequence is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject
to review by this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise
should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined
only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case.62

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless,
the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Council (JJWC).

SO ORDERED.

14. People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011.

G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment2 dated September 14, 2005, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding
appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.

The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from
an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was selling
shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized,
composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two
(2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.

Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two
poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu.
PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a
sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant.
The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been
completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was
leaving the place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials Richard S.
Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also
pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of ₱100 bill, thrown by the appellant on
the ground.

After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers made an
inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and
(3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-
request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2)
sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as
well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1 Pajo
and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately conducted the examination. The
laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange
ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately
marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against appellant for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:

Criminal Case No. 10250

That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3

Criminal Case No. 10251

That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three one (0.6131)
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender
is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of
the commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly
sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor
and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.6

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated September 14, 2005
appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt
with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.7

Thus, the present appeal.

Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime
charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-buyer. He also
argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he asserts that an
accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution.

The petition is unmeritorious.

Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took place.
However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust operation was
successfully conducted, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you conduct your buy-bust
operation at the time?

A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets that Allen
Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we evaluated this Information we
informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this accused for possible apprehension.

Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?

A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a request for
powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.

Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?

xxxx

Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?

A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.

Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?

A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu there should be a
pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.

Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked moneys, approached the guy
who was selling shabu at that time?

A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.

Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?

A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer and the suspect.

Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?

A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal because in the pre-arranged
signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap
at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the suspect and considering also that that
was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to us and informed us
that the shabu was already given by the suspect.

Q: What did you do next after that?

A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline]
substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was he alone or did he
had (sic) any companion at that time?

A: He was alone.

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?

A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this constitutional rights and we
immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not
immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the
suspect.

Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust operation?

A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.

xxxx

Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of 100 peso bills as
marked moneys.8

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the
concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.9 From
the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements have been
satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous
drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also
clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.

To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police Inspector
Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing white
crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in
possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:

Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the sachets of suspected
shabu?

A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated specimen, the result was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
xxxx

Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused, as well as the marked
money mentioned in this report?

A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan Mantalaba is positive to the
test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet flourescent powder. x x x10

The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court stresses
that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of
trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.12 In People v. Roa,13
this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling
that:

In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police
authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8614 of Republic Act No.
9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close
coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make
PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a
form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 11315 of the Rules of the Court, which police
authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.

Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite instructive:

In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by
their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer.
Granting that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in
People v. Tranca,19 that there is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.20

The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect
because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify. This
is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.21

In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the appellant is
equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of dangerous drug. As an
incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the
arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the
appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from him.
However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit reasonable
doubt, thus:

PROS. RUIZ:

Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they recovered from your possession
one sachet of shabu?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched they also found another
sachet of shabu also in your pocket?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution that no money
was taken from you because you have none at that time, is it not?

A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.

Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your possession?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you were arrested by the
police?

A: No, sir.

Q: It was taken from your possession?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands tested for ultra-
violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the presence of the said powder?

A: Yes, sir.23

Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up must be
proved with strong and convincing evidence.24

Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of custody
of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who
signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the
buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team.25 Its non-
compliance will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.26 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.27 In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members
of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the
letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of the items
confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been observed. As testified to by
PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation of the buy-bust operation:

Prosecutor

Q: What did you do next after that?

A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white [crystalline] in
substance, we immediately approached the suspect.

xxxx

Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?

A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this [constitutional] rights and
immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect, we did not
immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials to witness the search of the
suspect.
xxxx

Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the barangay officials. Now,
when these barangay officials were present, what did you do on the suspect?

A: We immediately searched the suspect.

Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of ₱100.00 peso bills
as marked moneys.

Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where were the marked
moneys?

A: On the ground.

Q: Who picked these marked moneys?

A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.

Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2 pieces of sachets of
shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the search, what did you do [with] these 2
pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked moneys?

A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of Inventory.28

As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item
which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking29 of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.30

Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the effect
of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-
bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the
time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on
this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend
the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code31 and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,32 the laws that were
applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of
Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.

It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.

xxxx

Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and
are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides
that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the
same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The
provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution
of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.

Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already
moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case was
under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant
filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006,
appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38
of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34

Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of RA No. 9344,
which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:35

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, the
RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 9836 of the same law. A violation
of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is
provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to
death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the
penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in
the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v. Simon,37 thus:

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses
under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals
that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for
the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those
in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not
provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to
consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of
the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the
graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since
the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a
prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished
under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of
penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.

xxxx

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of
the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in
Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused.
However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the
penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second paragraph of
section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been
contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not
specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy
therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be
imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties
which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex
penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional,
prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and
arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must
each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the
scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for
this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be
prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est
ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to
have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.38

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be appreciated in fixing the
penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating
circumstance.40 The ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been
originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a
divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen
Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on
appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.

15. Samahan Ng Mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City. G.R. No. 225442, 8 August 2017. (See
Also: J. Leonen’s Separate Opinion)
August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS,
minor, for herself and as represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as represented by
MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,,
Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued
by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary
restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey
Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the
City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas
City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang
'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours
from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths
Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated
October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of
2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00
P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of

young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that
the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that
the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities
exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students
with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair
the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors
of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the
strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable
relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours
will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes
Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the
penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of
the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve
the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-
circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the
parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the
dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to
the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up
to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were
legally demandable and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court
"are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any
act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been
promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts'
expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be
used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of
Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground
that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to
travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits
the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of
discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light of the foregoing,
petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental
actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of
legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners'
direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked
court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this
jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation
of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a
law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately affects the
social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort
to the Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34
In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting - is the
presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction
under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie showing
of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A

question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case
given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances
impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against
the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce
impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication,
considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the TRO39
enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing
the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they
have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the
enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be
material - an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being
merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a
person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance,
he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights,
namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right
of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise
the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the
petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of
apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted
in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they
are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a
consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the
parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that
Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the
Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his
minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an
action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to
allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the
minors, to file this case on their behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel,
but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the
petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case.
"In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing,
especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show
that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed
under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the
right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine
the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly,
this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their
children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient
enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out
their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They
maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on
their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere
does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show
his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they
do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so
that one may act accordingly.49 The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural
due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due
process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give
adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for
adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates
the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no
constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in
the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what
conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of
enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are,
however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily,
the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness
analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from
an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular
conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due
process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits
and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on
individual impressions and personal predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the
Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot
be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected
curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters,
law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when
implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law
that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-
A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children
at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with
law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a
minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew
Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In
the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of
the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate
action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this
regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go
home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically
be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The
duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth
would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it
is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare
the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious
beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring
by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but
also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the
upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their
children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an
additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over children is that
"the child is not [a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."65 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions concerning
the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may act to
promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or mental health
of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests
may override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these
rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental
supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in
protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis
other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of
parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral development of
their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In
Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role,
may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly
conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances
further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of
juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children.
Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to
potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are
not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This
serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and
the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over
their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality,
the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow
minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this
respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their
minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As
such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a
parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend
more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a
more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US
court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to
protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of
those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time
on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no
less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the
nocturnal curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to
rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to
travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the
application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State
interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the
Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that
petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-
related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free
speech cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to
the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling
is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free
speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not
recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that
claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or
speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85

In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can
only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated
how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the
basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there
being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90
Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be
free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best
pursue the ends of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as
the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the
right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94
as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require
one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be
exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has eloquently
pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of
travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to
worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of
assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the
streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement
is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or
getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation
"be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special
protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA
10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government
units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew hours for
children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve
upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have
done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to
travel.

The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always
subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of
their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112
and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are
required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These
limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar
actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116
Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations
do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of
the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of the
parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust
its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ...
paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations
on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions
by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society
meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers
on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and
dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the
crippling effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising
from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that
legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against
the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in
such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in
other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel
rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny,
such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be
emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has
broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of
scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of
minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that
rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential
analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile
curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling
state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than adults, we
do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors'
fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)

The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of
minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their
well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict
scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government
has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest,
and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored
to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133 This
Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them as
parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in
Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this
compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as
to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas
clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes
that:

[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance,
education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers,
street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private
roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming
around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various
infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children
during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint
on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in
the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not
provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City
Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to
our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement
of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of
night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first
stated interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of
information from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of
public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports,
and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to
conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer
community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome character at night than
during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure
them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an early
age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is
beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly
did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with
criminal influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and
crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila
presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes
involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to
their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on
public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the
enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if
the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive
means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens
should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights.
While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be
so narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as
they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social,
religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to
ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being
narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion
and to free speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local
Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would
likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches.
Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their
minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council
meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to
repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx

[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly
drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to
pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a
motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association
activities. (Emphases supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the
Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a)
minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful
errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and
the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the
streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b)
those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a
specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running
errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over
them; (j) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew
during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night
before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good
Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147

This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are
inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be
fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from
school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater
extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected
liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging in
legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus,
their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate
activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional,
and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such as
simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This
legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore
effectively curtailed.

Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or
attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble
and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew
hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities
during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect
minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal
activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's
interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its
limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions,
which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate
to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid,
the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the
presence150 of any separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;

(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-
curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond
their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school,
or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises
the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or
stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is
more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items
given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed
during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of religion is
sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses
even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants
to move to and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions,
the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the
well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is
perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful
errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found
in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive
sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to
reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but
only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents'
right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is
dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent
due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it
was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily
be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of
her actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and
balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably
justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions
are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police
power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as
long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to further discuss the
validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under Section 8
thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the
minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service
either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or
in addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions
to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for
the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental
authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty
shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions in
case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10) days, or a Fine
of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the
complaint shall be filed by the PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions
- i.e., (a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an
adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning
juvenile status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience,
anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or
safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and
trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the
barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in
conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling,
attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of
minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status
offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for
violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment

or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or
negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement,
or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in
violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based programs161
recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program
that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative
mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders.
More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members of society and
thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-
A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's
misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning
against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively
issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly
reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of
authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct
of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the
latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment
imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not
restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public
and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to
which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a
formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply
criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or
violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our
jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our
various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o
penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for
imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations,
portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language
of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute
penalties.

CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for
the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the
prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of
the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to
include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the
local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while
the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing
reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be
struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by
the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by
the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance
with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should have been struck down for failing to ground
themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least restrictive means to achieve
their aims, and for failing to show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by law
enforcers. The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine enables
state intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not transgress the constitutionally
enshrined natural and primary right of parents to rear their children.

However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance to the effect that parental permission in any form for any minor is also an exception will have
the effect of narrowly tailoring the application of that curfew regulation.

The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-021 was passed on
August 26, 1999. City of Manila Ordinance No. 80462 was passed on October 14, 2002. Quezon City
Ordinance No. SP-23013 was passed on July 31, 2014.
The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized, strict implementation of these curfew
ordinances as part of police operations under the broad umbrella of "Oplan Rody." These operations
were in fulfillment of President Rodrigo Duterte' s campaign promise for a nationwide implementation
of a curfew for minors.4

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SP ARK), an association of youths and minors for "the
protection of the rights and welfare of youths and minors," and its members Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John
Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), and Clarissa
Joyce Villegas (Villegas) filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the
ordinances are unconstitutional and in violation of Republic Act No. 9344.5

Constitutional challenges against local legislation

Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge against the assailed ordinances.

They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared unconstitutional as the lack of expressed
standards for the identification of minors facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.6

Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly restrict a minor's liberty, in general, and
right to travel, in particular.7

Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the assailed ordinances intrude into or deprive
parents of their "natural and primary right"8 to rear their children.

Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power"9in that legislative power is delegated by the
national legislature to local government units. They are presumed constitutional and, until judicially
declared invalid, retain their binding effect. In Tana v. Hon. Gov. Socrates:10

It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict
with the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-
founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.11

The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect that the judiciary must accord to the
legislature. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:12

This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one
branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said
that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch -
the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance.13

The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative bodies, whose members are equally
presumed to have acted conscientiously and with full awareness of the constitutional and statutory
bounds within which they may operate. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of
Manila 14 explained:

As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity . . . The
action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."15

The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be
sustained upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for invalidating a law. In Smart
Communications v. Municipality of Malvar:16

To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a
doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing
unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on . . .
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.17

Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica 's
College, 18 outlined the test for determining the validity of an ordinance:

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.19

The first consideration hearkens to the primacy of the Constitution, as well as to the basic nature of
ordinances as products of a power that was merely delegated to local government units. In City of
Manila v. Hon. Laguio:20

Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution
and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be
constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local government units are able
to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power from the
national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter.21 (Citations omitted)

II

Appraising due process

and equal protection challenges

At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws."22 There are two (2) dimensions to this: first, is an enumeration of objects of protection-life,
liberty and property; second, is an identification and delimitation of the legitimate mechanism for their
modulation or abnegation-due process and equal protection. The first dimension lists specific objects
whose bounds are amorphous; the second dimension delineates action, and therefore, requires
precision.

Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological subsistence. It is not just a
proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its protection does not merely involve a lack
of physical restraint. The objects of the constitutional protection of due process are better understood
dynamically and from a frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise better understood
integrally, operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.

"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life, liberty, and security of
person"23 and the American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."24 As the
American Declaration of Independence postulates, they are "unalienable rights" for which
"[g]ovemments are instituted among men" in order that they may be secured.25 Securing them denotes
pursuing and obtaining them, as much as it denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an
aspirational declaration, not merely operating on factual givens but enabling the pursuit of ideals.

"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential: not merely organic,
physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled and effected not only by freedom
from bodily restraint but by facilitating an empowering existence.26 "Life and liberty," placed in the
context of a constitutional aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this
empowering existence. This is not an inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the
bedrock of our social and political conceptions. As Justice George Malcolm, speaking for this Court in
1919, articulated:

Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common
welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and
essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the
guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the
right of locomotion.27

It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the objects of due process protection admits
amorphous bounds. The constitutional protection of life and libe1iy encompasses a penumbra of
cognate rights that is not fixed but evolves-expanding liberty-alongside the contemporaneous reality in
which the Constitution operates. People v. Hernandez28 illustrated how the right to liberty is multi-
faceted and is not limited to its initial formulation in the due process clause:

[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of
our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8} (11), (12), (13), (14 ), (15), (16), (17), (18),
and (21) of said section (1 )2 to the protection of several aspects of freedom.30

While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and liberty is dynamic, evolving, and expanding
with contemporaneous realities, the mechanism for preserving life and liberty is immutable: any
intrusion into it must be with due process of law and must not run afoul of the equal protection of the
laws.

Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation to the due process and equal protection
clauses invokes three (3) levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly as we do now with the task of appraising
local ordinances, White Light Corporation v. City of Manila31 discussed:

The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carotene
Products. Footnote 4 of the Carotene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a
"fundamental right". Consequently, two standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for
laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational basis
standard of review for economic legislation.

A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. While the
test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been
applied in all substantive due process cases as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges.
Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and
the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the
presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest.

In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of
fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict
scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.32 (Citations
omitted)

An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges against government regulation must admit
that the gravity of interests invoked by the gove1nment and the personal liberties or classification
affected are not uniform. Hence, the three (3) levels of analysis that demand careful calibration: the
rational basis test, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. Each level is typified by the dual
considerations of: first, the interest invoked by the government; and second, the means employed to
achieve that interest.

The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest and that there is a
reasonable connection between it and the means employed to achieve it.

Intermediate review requires an important government interest. Here, it would suffice if government is
able to demonstrate substantial connection between its interest and the means it employs. In
accordance with White Light, "the availability of less restrictive measures [must have been]
considered."33 This demands a conscientious effort at devising the least restrictive means for attaining
its avowed interest. It is enough that the means employed is conceptually the least restrictive
mechanism that the government may apply.

Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what is involved are suspect
classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the means employed to
effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually-not only conceptually-being the least restrictive means for
effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government contemplated on the
means available to it. Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the inefficacy of all possible
alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all possible avenues but to even debunk the viability
of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course of action is the sole effective means. To the extent
practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering mechanisms.

Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas34 further explained:

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be
given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation
of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought
to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn
duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government itself or
one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless of the character or nature of
the actor.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of fundamental rights and the non-
discrimination of protected classes. Thus, in these cases, the burden falls upon the government to prove
that it was impelled by a compelling state interest and that there is actually no other less restrictive
mechanism for realizing the interest that it invokes:

Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and the
burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.36

III

The present Petition entails fundamental rights and

defines status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is proper.

By definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the assailed ordinances, this restriction applies
daily at specified times and is directed at minors, who remain under the authority of their parents.

Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present Petition is the right to travel. Article III,
Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this right is not absolute. The Constitution itself
states that the right may be "impaired" in consideration of: national security, public safety, or public
health.37 The ponencia underscores that the avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is "the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime. "38 The assailed ordinances, therefore,
seem to find justification as a valid exercise of the State's police power, regulating-as opposed to
completely negating-the right to travel.

Given the overlap of the state's prerogatives with those of parents, equally at stake is the right that
parents hold in the rearing of their children.

There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v. Torres39 identified the right of persons to be
secure "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,"40 the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures,41 liberty of abode,42 the right to form associations,43 and the right against self-
incrimination44 as among these facets.

While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents
with respect to the family is no less a fundamental right and an integral aspect of liberty and privacy.
Article II, Section 12 characterizes the right of parents in the rearing of the youth to be "natural and
primary."45 It adds that it is a right, which shall "receive the support of the Government. "46

Imbong v. Ochoa,47 affirms the natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of children as a facet
of the right to privacy:
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-
child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose
of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family.48

This Court's 2009 Decision in White Light49 unequivocally characterized the right to privacy as a
fundamental right. Thus, alleged statutory intrusion into it warrants strict scrutiny.50

If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on
the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law which we are
capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would
warrant the application of the most deferential standard - the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated,
we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons -
those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.

….

The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of
Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare." . . . In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty ...

It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior.
The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of
'prostitution, adultery and fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers"'. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that
legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults which is
constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding
therein retains significance for our purposes:

The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect ...

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which
should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.51
(Citations omitted)
In determining that the interest invoked by the State was not sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion
of the patrons' privacy rights, this Court weighed the State's need for the "promotion of public morality"
as against the individual patrons' "liberty to make the choices in [their] lives," thus:

The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement
of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect ...

….

[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong
distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest.
Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our
part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the
choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.52 (Citation omitted)

Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed ordinances define status offenses. They
identify and restrict offenders, not purely on the basis of prohibited acts or omissions, but on the basis
of their inherent personal condition. Altogether and to the restriction of all other persons, minors are
exclusively classified as potential offenders. What is potential is then made real on a passive basis, as the
commission of an offense relies merely on presence in public places at given times and not on the doing
of a conclusively noxious act.

The assailed ordinances' adoption and implementation concern a prejudicial classification. The assailed
ordinances are demonstrably incongruent with the Constitution's unequivocal nurturing attitude
towards the youths and whose mandate is to "promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being."53

This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, which takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children. Republic Act No. 9344
meticulously defines a "child at risk" and a "child in conflict with the law" and distinguishes them from
the generic identification of a "child" as any "person under the age of eighteen (18) years."54 These
concepts were adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction to a wholesale and indiscriminate
concept, consistent with the protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The assailed ordinances'
broad and sweeping determination of presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies
warranting the imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated attitude of Republic
Act No. 9344 and the protection that the Constitution mandates. For these, a strict consideration of the
assailed ordinances is equally proper.

IV

The apparent factual bases for the

assailed ordinances are tenuous at best.

To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances, respondents City of Manila and Quezon City
provide statistical data on the number of Children in Conflict with the Law (CICL). 55 Quezon City's data
is summarized as follows:56

Year No. of
Barangays Barangay with submissions Barangay without submissions No. of Baran gays with
Zero CICL Total
no.of
CICL
2013 142 102
(January to June)
44
(July to December) 40
(January to June)
98
(July to December) Not provided 2677
2014 142 119
(January to June)
82
(July to December) 23
(January to June)
60
(July to December) 32
(January to June)
25
(July to December) 2937
2015 142 142 0 51 4778
The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that the city is so overrun by juvenile crime that it
may as well be totally rid of the public presence of children at specified times. While there is a
perceptively raised number of CICLs in Quezon City, the data fails to specify the rate of these figures in
relation to the total number of minors and, thus, fails to establish the extent to which CICLs dominate
the city. As to geographical prevalence that may justify a city-wide prohibition, a substantial number of
barangays reported not having CICLs for the entire year. As to prevalence that stretches across the
relative maturity of all who may be considered minors (e.g., grade-schoolers as against adolescents),
there was also no data showing the average age of these CICLs.

The City of Manila's data, on the other hand, is too conflicting to be authoritative. The data reports of
the Manila Police Department, as summarize m t e ponencia,57 state:

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2014 74
2015 30
January to June 2016 75
The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the City of Manila has vastly different numbers.
As summarized in the ponencia:58

YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2015 845
January to June 2016 524
The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for January to August 2016, there was a total
of 480 CICLs as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.59 Of the 480 minors, 210 minors were
apprehended for curfew violations, not for petty crimes.60 Again, the data fails to account for the
percentage of CICLs as against the total number of minors in Manila.
The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville,61 a United States Court of Appeals case, as basis for
examining the validity of curfew ordinances in Metro Manila. Far from supporting the validity of the
assailed ordinances, Shleifer discounts it. Shleifer relies on unequivocally demonstrated scientific and
empirical data on the rise of juvenile crime and the emphasis on juvenile safety during curfew hours in
Charlottesville, Virginia. Here, while local government units adduced data, there does not appear to
have been a well-informed effort as to these data's processing, interpretation, and correlation with
avowed policy objectives.

With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local government units' justifications of
reducing crime and sweeping averments of "peace and order" hardly sustain a rational basis for the
restriction of minors' movement during curfew hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso
facto equate to the reduction of CICLs appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than
logical. Lacking in even a rational basis, it follows that there is no support for the more arduous
requirement of demonstrating that the assailed ordinances support a compelling state interest.

It has not been demonstrated that the curfews

effected by the assailed ordinances are the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed purposes.

The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law be narrowly tailored in order to achieve
compelling governmentalinterests, it also requires that the mechanisms it adopts are the least
burdensome or least drastic means to achieve its ends:

Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of procreation, the right to marry,
the right to exercise First Amendment freedoms such as free speech, political expression, press,
assembly, and so forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.

Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect
characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the presumption of constitutionality is
reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates
otherwise. The government must show that the statute is supported by a compelling governmental
interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther
explains as follows:

…The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands a demand not
only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit
between classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated
by the old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely
"reasonably related." Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in
the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the
wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.

Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic means available for
achieving the governmental objective.62 (Citations omitted)
The governmental interests to be protected must not only be reasonable. They must be compelling.
Certainly, the promotion of public safety is compelling enough to restrict certain freedoms. It does not,
however, suffice to make a generic, sweeping averment of public safety.

To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to prove that an imposition of curfew lessens
the number of CICLs. Respondents further fail to provide data on the frequency of crimes against
unattended minors during curfew hours. Without this data, it cam1ot be concluded that the safety of
minors is better achieved if they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew hours.

While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila Ordinances tend to restrict minors' fundamental
rights, it found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives. The Quezon
City Ordinance's statement of its objectives reads:

WHEREAS ... the children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and
guidance, education, and moral development, which led them into exploitation, drug addiction, and
become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

….

WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-
standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public
or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups, without lawful purpose or
justification;

WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and supervision of the barangay officials and other
authorities, these misguided minor children preferred to converge or flock together during the night
time until the wee hours of the morning resorting to drinking on the streets and other public places,
illegal drug use and sometimes drug peddling, engaging in troubles and other criminal activities which
often resulted to bodily injuries and loss of lives;

WHEREAS, reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children
roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various
infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor
children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse, cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;

WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a
restraint on the tendency of a growing number of the youth spending their nocturnal activities
wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements in society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]63

In order to achieve these objectives,64 the ponencia cites the ordinances' exemptions, which it found to
be "sufficiently safeguard[ing] the minors' constitutional rights":65

SECTION 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance:
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-
curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond
their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents;

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity, without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay, school
or other similar private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises
the activity or when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or
stop; and

(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.66

The ponencia states:

[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to
the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is
perceivably more prominent.67

The ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization. It generalizes unattended minors out in the
streets during curfew hours as potentially, if not actually, engaging in criminal activities, merely on the
basis that they are not within the bounds of the stated exemptions. It is evident, however, that the
exemptions are hardly exhaustive.

Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when she goes out at night to buy food from a
convenience store because the rest of her family is already asleep.68 As a Quezon City resident, she
violates the curfew merely for wanting to buy food when she gets home from school.

It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was told to make a purchase at a nearby sari-sari
store. None of these is within the context of a "party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other
extra-curricular activities of their school and organization" or part of an "official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity." Still, these activities are
not criminal or nefarious. To the contrary, socializing with friends, unsavorily portrayed as mere loafing
or loitering as it may be, contributes to a person's social and psychological development. Doing one's
chores is within the scope of respecting one's elders.

Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that it can keep them safe from crime is not the
least restrictive means to achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street lighting programs, installation
of CCTVs in street comers, and visible police patrol.69 Public safety is better achieved by effective police
work, not by clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in broad
daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an environment. Efficient law enforcement, more
than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will be safe regardless of what time they
are out on the streets.

The assailed ordinances' deficiencies only serve to highlight their most disturbing aspect: the imposition
of a curfew only burdens minors who are living in poverty.

For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who are not traditionally employed as the
exemptions require that the minor be engaged in "an authorized employment activity." Curfew violators
could include minors who scour garbage at night looking for food to eat or scraps to sell. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development of Manila reports that for 2016, 2, 194 minors were
turned over as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.70 The greater likelihood that most, if not all,
curfew violators will be street children-who have no place to even come home to-than actual CICLs. So
too, those caught violating the ordinance will most likely have no parent or guardian to fetch them from
barangay halls.

An examination of Manila Police District's data on CICLs show that for most of the crimes committed,
the motive is poverty, not a drive for nocturnal escapades.71 Thus, to lessen the instances of juvenile
crime, the government must first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty alleviation programs,
not curfews, are the least restrictive means of preventing indigent children from turning to a life of
criminality.

VI

The assailed ordinances give

unbridled discretion to law enforcers.

The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to provide the least restrictive means for
achieving their avowed ends but also in failing to articulate safeguards and define limitations that
foreclose abuses.

In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying mmor, petitioners invoke the void for
vagueness doctrine.72

The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario:73

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.74

While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is permitted only in cases involving
alleged transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws may nevertheless be invalidated for
vagueness "as applied." In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:75

[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing
"on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to
such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only]
'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face;: and in its entirety.76

The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge is settled. As explained in
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council.77

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a
facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the
basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.78 (Citation omitted)

Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the assailed ordinances, as-applied parties must
assert actual violations of their rights and not prospective violations of the rights of third persons. In
lmbong v. Ochoa: 79

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.80

The ponencia states that petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper. It
reasons that petitioners failed to point out any ambiguous provision in the assailed ordinances.81 It
then proceeds to examine the provisions of the ordinances, vis-a-vis their a1leged defects, while
discussing how these defects may affect minors and parents who are not parties to this case. In effect,
the ponencia engaged in a facial examination of the assailed ordinances. This facial examination is an
improper exercise for the assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do not ostensibly involve the
right to free speech.

The more appropriate stance would have been to examine the assailed ordinances, not in isolation, but
in the context of the specific cases pleaded by petitioners. Contrary to the ponencia's position, the lack
of specific provisions in the assailed ordinances indeed made them vague, so much so that actual
transgressions into petitioner's rights were made.
The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do not state any guidelines on how law
enforcement agencies may determine if a person apprehended is a minor.

For its part, Section 5(h) of the Quezon City ordinance provides:

(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;82

However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines on the identification of age. It merely states
that any member of the community may call the attention of barangay officials if they see minors during
curfew hours:

SECTION 7. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT/PARTICIPATION - Any person who has personal knowledge of

the existence of any minor during the wee hours as provided under Section 3 hereof, must immediately
call the attention of the barangay.83

The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section 784 addresses the lacunae as it articulates
measures for determining age. However, none of the assailed ordinances actually refers law enforcers to
extant statutes. Their actions and prerogatives are not actually limited whether by the assailed
ordinances' express provisions or by implied invocation. True, Republic Act No. 9344 states its
prescriptions but the assailed ordinances' equivocation by silence reduces these prescriptions to mere
suggestions, at best, or to mere afterthoughts of a justification, at worst.

Thus, the lack of sufficient guidelines gives law enforcers "unbridled discretion in carrying out [the
assailed ordinances'] provisions."85 The present Petition illustrates how this has engendered abusive
and even absurd situations.

Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-old-no longer a minor-student, recalled that
when he was apprehended for violating the curfew, he showed the barangay tanod his registration card.
Despite his presentation of an official document, the barangay tanod refused to believe him. Delos
Reyes had to resort to showing the barangay tanod his hairy legs for the tanod to let him go.86

Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends were apprehended by 10 barangay tanods
for violating curfew even though he was already 19 years old at that time. He alleged that he and his
friends were told to perform 200 squats and if they refused, they would be framed up for a crime. They
were released only when the aunt of one (1) of his friends arrived.87

These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by enforcing the assailed ordinances have not
been resolved by "simply presenting any competent proof of identification"88 considering that
precisely, the assailed ordinances state no mandate for law enforcers to check proof of age before
apprehension. Clear and explicit guidelines for implementation are imperative to foreclose further
violations of petitioners' due process rights. In the interim, the assailed statutes must be invalidated on
account of their vagueness.

VII

The doctrine of parens patriae

does not sustain the assailed ordinances.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions into parental prerogatives made by the
assailed ordinances. The State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors only when there is a
clear showing of neglect, abuse, or exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children are to be
reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents.

The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law origin. It was understood to have
"emanate[d] from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects who were unable to protect
themselves."89 It was the King's "royal prerogative"90 to "take responsibility for those without capacity
to look after themselves. "91 At its outset, parens patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable
persons had no means to support or protect themselves. Given this, it was the duty of the State, as the
ultimate guardian of the people, to safeguard its citizens' welfare.

The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even as it gained independence and developed its
own legal tradition. In Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ v. United States ,92 the United States
Supreme Court explained parens patriae as a beneficent state power and not an arbitrary royal
prerogative:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power
is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are
sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people and the destruction
of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised in
the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.93
(Emphasis supplied.)

In the same case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the exercise of parens patriae
applies "to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of vindicating their rights, and justly
look for protection to the sovereign authority."94 It is from this reliance and expectation of the people
that a state stands as "parent of the nation."95

American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal traditions that it entailed facilitated our own
jurisdiction's adoption of the doctrine of parens patriae.96 Originally, the doctrine was understood as
"the inherent power and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a
person non sui juris."97

However, significant developments have since calibrated our own understanding and application of the
doctrine.

Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:

Section 12 .... The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied.)

It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the qualifier "primary." The present Article II, Section
12's counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution merely referred to "[t]he natural right and duty of
parents":
Section 4 .... The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the Govemment.98

As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also merely spoke of "[t]he natural right and duty
of parents":

Section 4. The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency should
receive the aid and support of the government.99

The addition of the qualifier "primary" unequivocally attests to the constitutional intent to afford
primacy and preeminence to parental responsibility. More plainly stated, the Constitution now
recognizes the superiority of parental prerogative. It follows, then, that state interventions, which are
tantamount to deviations from the preeminent and superior rights of parents, are permitted only in
instances where the parents themselves have failed or have become incapable of performing their
duties.

Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize Nery v. Lorenzo,100 the authority cited by ponencia
in explaining the State's role in the upbringing of children.101 In Nery, this Court alluded to the State's
supreme authority to exercise parens patriae.Nery was decided in 1972, when the 1935 Constitution
was in operation.102 It stated:

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual[s] who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-
vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare.1âwphi1 This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust.103

This outmoded temperament is similarly reflected in the 1978 case of Vasco v. Court of Appeals,104
where, without moderation or qualification, this Court asserted that "the State is considered the parens
patriae of minors."105

In contrast, lmbong v. Ochoa,106 a cased decided by this Court in 2014, unequivocally characterized
parents' rights as being "superior" to the state:

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 193 5 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be ''primary, " that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.107 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents cannot fulfill their role, as in cases of neglect,
abuse, or exploitation:

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years. Through its laws, the State safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end
that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony.108

As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute or supplement to parents' authority over
their children. It operates only when parental authority is established to be absent or grossly deficient.
The wisdom underlying this doctrine considers the existence of harm and the subsequent inability of the
person to protect himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of parents and/or legal
guardians to protect a child.

To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost absolute power to the State; to allow the
Government to arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power might as well render the superior
Constitutional right of parents inutile.

More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this position. In these instances where the State
exercised its powers over minors on account of parens patriae, it was only because the children were
prejudiced and it was without subverting the authority of the parents themselves when they have not
acted in manifest offense against the rights of their children.

Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo,109 parens patriae was exercised in order to give the minor his day in court.
This is a matter beyond the conventional capacities of parents, and therefore, it was necessary for the
State to intervene in order to protect the interests of the child.

In People v. Baylon110 and other rape cases,111 this Court held that a rigorous application of the penal
law is in order, since "[t]he state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm
to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully."112 In these
criminal cases where minor children were victims, this Court, acting as the representative of the State
exercising its parens patriae power, was firm in imposing the appropriate penalties for the crimes-no
matter how severe-precisely because it was the only way to mitigate further harm to minors. Parens
patriae is also the reason why "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to
any lascivious act or sexual intercourse," as this Court held in People v. Malto.113 Again, these State
actions are well outside the conventional capabilities of the parents and in no way encroach on the
latter's authority.

Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this case.

VIII

In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance
will sufficiently narrowly tailor its application so as to save it from its otherwise apparent breach of
fundamental constitutional principles. Thus, in the ponencia of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe:

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful
errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found
in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive
sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to
reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but
only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents'
right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter review in a factual case whose factual ambient
will be different.

Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the result.

16. US v. Tañedo, G.R. No. L-5418, 12 February 1910

G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.

O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information,
as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing
Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation
shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and
afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is
unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his plans to take the deceased
to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards secretly in order
that the crime should remain unpunished.

The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories,
indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.

There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts.
The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino
Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on
his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild
chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then
went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the
malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his
shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his
mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season.
The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild
chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a
young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance from
the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased
answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which
stood the shack. There is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the
accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation.
The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did
the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate
the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to anybody except the
accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:

And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to be
found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have
something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And
after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I
heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went back toward the malecon, where my
companions were working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree
not far from where my companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about
the occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was a
relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead
body.

Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers
were found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident
occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon
where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called
Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa
says that they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to
the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it
would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon grass.
During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were working, probably to
hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the
chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who testified
that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening
the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon
grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place
where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning
straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused
dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of
the death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his
participation in the death of the deceased and told the story substantially as above.

So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the
deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused.
There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any.
There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has
not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the
deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is
wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been
only one shot fired.

Article 1 of the Penal Code says:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary shall
appear.

Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:

He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without
liability or intention of causing it.

Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:

A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in
case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.

The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or
accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am.
Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher,
37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)

In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there
any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred.
Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The
only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.

In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense
by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is
upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that
for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was
accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is relied upon, the
prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was
intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an
accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to
be erroneous.

In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which must be
submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent)
which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative
by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.

We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.

The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from
custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

17. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 172695, 29 June 2007

G.R. No. 172695 June 29, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, Appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In an Information1 dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was charged with the
crime of parricide, committed as follows:

That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y Completo, while conveniently armed with
illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he
was united in lawful wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side of her neck
causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial thereafter ensued.

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:

There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the evening of
November 5, 1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage due to "laceration of the jugular
vein of her neck". According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who
conducted the autopsy on the victim’s body, the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument
like a nail". There is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife
hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The letters written by the accused from his
detention cell addressed to his mother-in-law, to his father-in-law, and lastly, the victim’s sister, speak
so eloquently of someone who accepts the fault for the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness
from the close relatives of the victim is a clear admission of authorship of the fatal act.

In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the fatal harm to his wife. This
is the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim
was accidental.

xxxx

Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of November 5, 1993,
between 9:00 o’clock to 10:00 o’clock, the accused came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The
accused kicked the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by
Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his
sling and arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to
the adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying
and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was
happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the
hospital but to no avail.

From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a
quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the accused’s version that he was practicing the
use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecution’s
contention that the shooting was intentional.

x x x To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the
incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the
accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.

It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the hospital and while on
the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified that while the victim was
being attended to by the medical personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital
premises, then he disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside
the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The accused’s omission to surrender himself
to the authorities is a clear indication of guilt.3

After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision,4 the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y COMPLETO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and hereby sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5

Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a Decision6 dated February 28, 2005, the Court
of Appeals denied appellant’s appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, to
wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24 of Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Isaias
Castillo y Completo is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.7

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 16, 2005.

Hence, this appeal.

Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his conviction was based did not
sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the prosecution failed to prove his motive
in killing his wife; or that they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident.

Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who shot his wife with a
deadly arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all engaged
in target shooting using the sling and arrow. Hence, he surmised that any one of them could have shot
the victim. At any rate, even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental
and not intentional.

Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining barangay, while his wife was
being treated in the hospital, likewise does not prove his complicity since the prosecution did not prove
that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.

Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law where he asked for
forgiveness should not be considered as admission of guilt.

The petition lacks merit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may
draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence
provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.8 Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind" is required.9
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, are
present. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence
indubitably established that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent behavior of her (Consortia)
husband, herein accused-appellant. And even if Consortia would not tell Leticia about the beatings, the
latter would see her face with black eyes as evident proofs of maltreatment.

2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk and displaying violent
behavior, kicking the door and table.

3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and arrow.

4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.

5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and unconscious, to be brought
to the hospital where she later died.

6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound in the neck which fatally
lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the wound was a pointed object.

7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister of Consortia asking for
forgiveness.

Also notable is accused-appellant’s behavior immediately after the incident. He disappeared and did not
enter the clinic where Consortia was rushed for treatment. And when Consortia’s sister later sought
police assistance in searching for accused-appellant, the latter was found by the police hiding inside a
toilet at a nearby barangay.10

There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove motive in killing his wife.
Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which his conviction rests.11
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by
the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.12

In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill his
wife:

First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and his wife. Leticia, the
victim’s sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent behavior of the appellant who
would often lay hand on the victim during their marital squabbles.

Guillermo, appellant’s father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident, appellant arrived in their
conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door and table and threw away the electric fan.
Guillermo tried to prevail upon appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and arrow which
he kept near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellant’s house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law, Yolanda, located about
four meters away; but he could still hear the victim and appellant arguing and shouting at each other.
After a while, Guillermo requested Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda met the
appellant carrying Consorcia soaked in blood.

Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature.13 In the instant
case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed to the hospital. This is indeed contrary
to human nature. A husband is expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this
case, however, appellant took flight. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent
evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be drawn.14

Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining barangay is not an
indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately hid in order to evade
being arrested.15

The contention lacks merit.

As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying wife, more so if his
absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation for his flight. In appellant’s brief, he
claimed that in "all probability, it might have happened that he (appellant) was merely answering the
call of nature at the precise time when he was arrested."16 However, we find it is highly illogical for
appellant to go as far as the adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially since he could do
so inside the premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was fearful of reprisal coming
from the victim’s relatives17 is contrary to his claim of innocence.

Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellant’s intent to kill the victim. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the neck, a vital organ, which
fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted
on the deceased manifests appellant’s intention to extinguish life.18

Fourth: As regards appellant’s act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and bringing her to the
hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an indication of an act of repentance or
contrition on the part of appellant.19

In fine, all these circumstances prove appellant’s intent to harm his wife.

There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that he was not the one who shot the deadly arrow
because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all playing and practicing target
shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.

Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was alone with his wife
inside their house when the incident happened. This completely discounts the possibility that other than
appellant, there could be another person or persons who could have perpetrated the crime. There is no
paucity of evidence because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the victim up to the time
Yolanda saw him carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony of defense witness
Galang supports the prosecution’s contention that appellant was alone with his wife at the time of the
incident. As noted by the Court of Appeals:

Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies and headed home at
about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00 p.m. when he saw that Consortia was
being rushed to the hospital. Instead of weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galang’s testimony
even supports the prosecution’s version that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night,
accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably going home from that drinking session with
his friends. x x x20

There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that assuming he was the one who killed his wife,
the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable
in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal
liability:

xxxx

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.

"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for
this exempting circumstance, are:

1. A person is performing a lawful act;

2. With due care;

3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;

4. Without fault or intention of causing it.22

By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s defense of accident must be struck
down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial
court:

Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the
legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict
injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the
standards as an instrument for archery competitions. To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed
to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his
house.23
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of proof of
establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to prove
justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing.24 Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to
prove the same.

Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellant’s contention that the letters he wrote to his parents-in-
law and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not be considered as an implied admission
of guilt. He claimed that he wrote the letters in order to explain that what happened was an accident
and that he was to be blamed for it because he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the sling and
arrow.

Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law
to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise.25 Under the present circumstances, appellant’s plea for forgiveness should be received as
an implied admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the killing of Consorcia was
deliberate, and not by accident.

Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the lower court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our
function to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground
to believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal via certiorari is
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
Court of Appeals.26

Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, civil
indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 were properly
awarded by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005
which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24,
finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

18. People v. Retubado, G.R. No. 124058, 10 December 2003

[G.R. No. 124058. December 10, 2003.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. JESUS G. RETUBADO alias "JESSIE," Appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case
No. TCS-2153 convicting the appellant Jesus G. Retubado of murder, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Emmanuel Cañon the sum of
P50,000.00.

The appellant was indicted for murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on the 5th day of November, 1993 at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Barangay I
Poblacion, Municipality of Tuburan, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Emmanuel Cañon with the use of unlicensed revolver of
unknown caliber, thereby hitting the latter on his forehead, resulting to the instantaneous death of the
said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger
brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to
Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was having dinner with his
father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Cañon, Jr., The Cañons and
the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who
conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Cañon, Jr. was not the culprit. The barangay
captain considered the matter closed. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel
Cañon, Jr.

On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Cañon, Sr., a pedicab driver called it a
day and decided to go home after a day’s work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the junction of
Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was conversing with Marcial
Luciño saw him. "Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my brother?" Emmanuel ignored the
appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and
pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again ignored the appellant and pedaled
on until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta Cañon was in the balcony of their house, above the
porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Undeterred, the
appellant continued following Emmanuel.

Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The appellant
told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the appellant that his
son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husband’s
shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the
forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted for
help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to the Tuburan
District Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar G. Arellano, the Municipal Health Officer,
performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Emmanuel and prepared a report thereon with the following
findings:

Examination in Detail:

On detailed examination, a gunshot wound was found at the left side of the forehead, measuring 1 cm.
in diameter. At the skin surrounding this wound was found powder burns which measured 3 cms. in
diameter as the skin had been blackened and burned by powder of the bullet. The underlying frontal
bone was fractured and depressed. The underlying meninges of the brain as well as the frontal area of
the brain was traumatized and injured. Blood and cerebrospinal fluid were leaking from this wound. The
edges of this bullet wound was inverted thus this was the gunshot entry wound. The wound was found
to be circular in shape. The exit wound was found at the left parietal bone measuring 1.2 cm. in size or
diameter for this wound communicated with the entry wound of the left side of the forehead. The
connection from the wound of entry to the exit wound measured 8 cms. The parietal bone was
fractured and was depressed and the parietal part of the brain and meninges was traumatized. Blood
and cerebrospinal fluid as well as brain tissues leaked out from this wound.

Possible cause of death:

1. Gunshot wound at the head (left side) with injury to brain and meninges

2. Hypovolemic shock secondary to loss of blood (Severe loss of blood)

(Sgd.) Ivar G. Arellano

MUN. Health Officer 3

Dr. Charity Patalinghug and the victim’s daughter Loreta C. Claro signed Emmanuel’s Certificate of
Death. 4 The appellant surrendered to the police authorities but failed to surrender the firearm he used
to kill the victim. Forensic Officer Myrna P. Areola of the PNP Regional Office subjected the appellant to
paraffin tests. The Chemical Analysis of the paraffin casts gave the following results:

FINDINGS:

x x x

1. POSITIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his left hand cast.

2. NEGATIVE for the presence of gunpowder residue on his right hand cast.
Norberta also testified on the expenses incurred by her family due to her husband’s death. No
documentary evidence was, however, offered to support the same. She declared that she felt sad and
lonely as a result of her husband’s death.

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with
due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victim’s death. He testified that when he
insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a
handgun with his right hand. Emmanuel’s trigger finger was outside the trigger guard, and he held the
firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant took hold of
Emmanuel’s right hand with his left, and pulled the gun towards Emmanuel’s stomach. The appellant
grabbed Emmanuel’s free hand with his right hand, and the old man almost fell on his knees to the
ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and
the gun suddenly went off. The bullet hit Emmanuel’s forehead. Norberta fled from the house. For his
part, the appellant rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table before
entering his bedroom. When he went back to the dining room to get the gun, his younger sister, Enrica
told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun. He found Edwin outside their house near the
church, and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun into the sea. When the appellant asked
his brother to show him where he threw the gun, Edwin refused to do so.

Marcial Luciño corroborated the appellant’s testimony. He testified that he was talking with the
appellant at around 9:00 p.m. at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets when the victim Emmanuel
passed by in his pedicab. When the appellant called the victim, the latter ignored the call, prompting the
appellant to chase the victim, and eventually push the pedicab into a canal.

The appellant’s father, Iñigo Retubado, testified that on the evening of November 5, 1993, he was in
their house with Edwin, his son who was mentally-ill. It was already late when the appellant arrived. The
appellant was disheveled, and laid down the gun he was carrying on the table. The appellant told his
father that he would surrender to the police because he had shot somebody. 6 The appellant thereafter
went to his room to change clothes while Iñigo went to the comfort room to answer the call of nature.
When he was done, he saw the appellant frantically looking for the gun. As Edwin was also nowhere to
be found, Iñigo concluded that Edwin might have taken the gun with him. He also testified on Edwin’s
mental imbalance and on the latter’s confinement at the Psychiatric Department of the Don Vicente
Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City sometime in 1991. 7

On November 6, 1993, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Although he was required by
the municipal trial court to file his counter-affidavit, the appellant refused to do so.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. TCS-2153, convicting the
appellant of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder under Art. 248 R.P.C. and sentences the accused to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00.

However, Accused is given full credit of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

First Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED AS CAUSED BY MERE
ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF CAUSING IT WHILE THE ACCUSED WAS PERFORMING A
LAWFUL ACT WITH DUE CARE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, IT ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING HIM JUST
MERELY OF HOMICIDE INSTEAD OF MURDER.

II

Second Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE VERY RELEVANT AND MATERIAL CONTENTS OF
EXHIBIT "B" OF THE PROSECUTION — CHEMISTRY REPORT, PARAFFIN TEST — WHICH ARE FAVORABLE
TO THE ACCUSED.

III

Third Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION IS SATISFACTORY AND SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED OF MURDER.

IV

Fourth Assignment of Error

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE ACCUSED HAS EXPLAINED WHY HE
FAILED TO SURRENDER THE GUN WHICH HE GOT FROM THE DECEASED. 9

The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending himself when he grabbed
the victim’s hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the bullet hit the victim’s forehead.
The accident was not the appellant’s fault. The appellant asserts that when he wrestled with the victim
for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He contends that he had no intention of
killing the victim, as he merely wanted to talk to his son. If he had wanted to kill the victim, he could
have easily done so when he met the latter for the first time that fateful night of November 5, 1993.
Moreover, the appellant submits, he did not commit any felony; hence, under paragraph 4 of Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code, he is not criminally liable for the death of the victim. 10 In the alternative,
the appellant asserts that he should be convicted only of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery is wanting. He and the victim had a
heated exchange of words before they grappled for the possession of the gun. Such heated discussion
had already forewarned the victim and placed him on guard; thus, treachery cannot be legally
considered.

The contention of the appellant has no merit. Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code reads:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. —

x x x

4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another
provided that the following requisites are present:

First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;

Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The provision was taken from Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:

ARTICULO 8.

7. El que para evitar un mal ejecuta un hecho que produzca dañ en la propiedad ajena, siempre que
concurran las circumstancias siguientes:

Primera. Realidad del mal que se trata de evitar.

Segunda. Quesea mayor que el causado para evitarlo.

Tercera. Que no haya otro medio practicable y menos perjudicial para impedirlo.

Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not an accurate translation of the Spanish Penal
Code. The phrase "an injury" does not appear in the first paragraph in the Spanish Penal Code. Neither
does the word "injury" appear in the second subparagraph of the Spanish Penal Code.

The justification is what is referred to in the Spanish Penal Code as el estado de necessidad:

Es una situation de peligro, actual o immediato para bienes, juridicamente protegides que solo puede
ser evitada mediante, la lesion de bienes, tambien juridicamento protegidos, pertenecientes a otra
personas.

The phrase "state of necessity" is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical theory
of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril (un
mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights
(bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of one’s body, and property (la vida, la
integridad corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. 12

It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation
of the party invoking the same. 13

A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of necessity is
justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a "state
of necessity" is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not commit a crime in legal contemplation;
hence, is not criminally and civilly liable. Civil liability is borne by the person/persons benefited by the
act of the accused. Crimes cannot exist unless the will concurs with the act, and when, says Blackstone,
"a man intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful, the deed and the will act separately"
and there is no conjunction between them which is necessary to constitute a crime. 14 Others are of the
view that such act is a cause for exclusion from being meted a penalty; still others view such act as a
case of excluding the accused from culpability.

According to Groizard, rights may be prejudiced by three general classes of acts, namely, (a) malicious
and intentional acts; (b) negligent or reckless acts; (c) acts which are neither malicious, imprudent nor
negligent but nevertheless cause damages.

Nuestra propiedad puede ser perjudicada, puede sufrir detrimentos por tres clases de hechos. Por actos
maliciosos, intencionales, encaminados directamente a causarnos daño; por actos que, sin llevar ese
malicioso fin y por falta de prudencia, por culpa o temeridad del que los ejecuta, den ese mismo
resultado, y por actos que, sin concurrir en su ejecucion un proposito doloso, ni culpa, ni negligencia sin
embargo produzcan menocabo en nuestros bienes.

The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and
convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on
the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if
such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no
longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a question of fact, which
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts by
the trial court, its calibration of the testimony of the witnesses of the parties and of the probative
weight thereof as well as its conclusions based on its own findings are accorded by the appellate court
high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misapplied cogent
facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. We
have meticulously reviewed the records and find no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court
that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and
malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.

First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch of their
house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the latter’s
shoulders. She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot the victim
on the forehead, thus:

Q Now, you said that when your husband was about to go out again in order to see his trisicad and as he
opened the door he saw Jesus Retubado near the door. What happened after that?
A He asked Jesus Retubado why Jesus Retubado chased him when he was driving his trisicad.

Q Now, as your husband was asking this question to the accused Jesus Retubado what was the distance
to your husband at the time?

A Just very near to him.

Q And you to the accused at that very moment what was more or less your distance?

A About an armslength.

Q When your husband asked Jesus Retubado why the latter chased him while your husband was driving
his trisicad what was the answer of Jesus Retubado, if any?

A My husband asked the accused Jesus Retubado what is his grudge to him and Jesus Retubado
answered that it is not you who has a grudge to me but it is your son.

Q When Jesus Retubado uttered that statement what transpired after that?

A He immediately pointed his firearm that he was bringing (sic) to my husband Emmanuel Cañon.

Q By the way considering that you were just near to both your husband and the accused where did that
firearm that you said was pointed by the accused to your husband come (sic) from?

A While the accused was standing in front of our door his hands were placed inside his T-shirt covered
by his T-shirt.

Atty. Pepito:

We move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive, Your Honor. The question was, where did it come
from?

COURT:

Let the answer stay in the record but let the witness answer again.

A From the hands of accused Jessie.

Fiscal Pansoy:

Q Now, just a while ago you were making a motion using your hand placed inside your T-shirt. Now,
when you saw the firearm for the first time where did you saw (sic) the firearm for the first time where
did the firearm come from as you saw it from the hands of the accused?

Atty. Pepito:

Already answered. It came from the hands of the accused.

Fiscal Pansoy:

I will reform.

Q Before you saw the firearm in the hands of the accused where did the firearm come from?

Atty. Pepito:

She is incompetent. We object.

COURT:

Reform the question.

Fiscal Pansoy:

Q Now, Mrs. Witness, before this question was asked to you as to where the firearm came from you
were making a motion by placing your hands inside your shirt when you were only asked as to where
the firearm came from?

A That was what the position of the accused when he was standing in front of our door and I do not
know what was inside his T-shirt. I only know that he was carrying a firearm when it fired.

Q Now, when the accused pointed the firearm to your husband and fired the same more or less what
was the distance between the accused and your husband at the very precise time when the firing was
made?

A It was just very near because his hand did not bend. (Witness demonstrating by pointing to her
forehead).

Q Now, more or less, describe to the Court the approximate distance between the firearm that was
pointed to your husband and the forehead of your husband at the time when the firing was done?

A It touched the forehead of my husband.

Q That was the very time that you heard the gunburst?

A Yes.

Q When the accused fired the firearm that was carried by him, what happened to your husband?

A My husband fell down backward to the ground inside the house.

Q By the way, what was the flooring of your house where your husband fell backward to the ground?

A Cemented.
Q By the way considering that you were just very near to where the incident occurred can you describe
the length of the firearm that was used by the accused in firing your husband?

A It was a short firearm about 6 inches.

Q Now, as your husband fell down to the floor where did the accused proceed and what did the accused
do?

A He was just casually walking away as if nothing had happened.

Q Now, what did you do to your husband, if any, after he fell down to the floor?

A I have done nothing because I was somewhat shocked. I could not move because I was shocked. 16

Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the
police authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the victim.
The appellant’s claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to change
his clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he
killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea. The
appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the victim in a state of
necessity.

Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim. The victim ignored the appellant as the
latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the poblacion of Tuburan. The
appellant was incensed at the effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The appellant followed
the victim to his house where the appellant again confronted him. The appellant insisted on talking with
the victim’s son but the victim refused to wake up the latter. The appellant, exasperated at the victim’s
intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt and shot the victim on the forehead. It was
impossible for the victim to survive. With the appellant’s admission that he shot the victim, the matter
on whether he used his right or left hand to shoot the latter is inconsequential.

We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present case to
qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a)
the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 17 The
prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned
conditions. Thus, the appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although the Information alleges that the appellant used an unlicensed firearm to shoot the victim, the
prosecution failed to prove that the appellant had no license to possess the same. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm to commit homicide should not be
appreciated against the appellant.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned himself in to
the police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his arrest.

The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity 18 to the heirs of the deceased. In addition, the
heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 19 and the temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of actual damages was offered. 20
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Jesus G.
Retubado alias "Jessie" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and penalized
by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the victim, Emmanuel Cañon,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

19. Pomoy v. People, G.R. No. 150647, 29 September 2004,

G.R. No. 150647 September 29, 2004

ROWENO POMOY, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are misinterpreted and
the innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual conclusions, the Supreme
Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful reexamination convinces this Court
that an "accident" caused the victim’s death. At the very least, the testimonies of the credible witnesses
create a reasonable doubt on appellant’s guilt. Hence, the Court must uphold the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the February
28, 2001 Decision2 and the October 30, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–GR CR No.
18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)5 of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of
homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner] ROWENO
POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4) months and ten (10)
days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects."6

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:

"That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with his .45
service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any justifiable cause or
motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one TOMAS
BALBOA with the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the
vital parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim thereafter."7

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondent’s version of the facts as follows:

"Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion,
Iloilo.

"On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at the Concepcion College to
arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in the municipality in December
1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by the Concepcion Elementary School
where his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with other School Administrators. When his wife
asked him, ‘Why will you be arrested?’ [H]e answered ‘[Even I] do not know why I am arrested. That is
why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for my arrest.’

"Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company
at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar Samudio, another
suspect in the robbery case.

"Later that day, about a little past 2 o’clock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went
near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly for
tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa: ‘Let’s go to the investigation room.’
The investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is located. The jail guard
on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation room.

"At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the side
of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding from
the holster.

"When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation room, two (2)
gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45
caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa be
brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not provided) happened to be at the crime scene as he
was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr. Palma)
said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.

"Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the medico-
legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an autopsy on the
remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
‘Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.

‘Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by sutures, surrounded by
abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From left heel,
directed medially backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5th intercostals space into
thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating left ventricular wall causing
punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x 0.8 cm. Edges,
modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0 cms. From right heel (2)
ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm. on its widest portion, at
infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From anterior midline, 105.0 cms. From
left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating thru and thru,
stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid, 1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially
upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9th intercostal space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline,
110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.

‘CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.

‘REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.’

"Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboa’s body were gunshot wounds.
The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and exited to the
right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to right. As to the possible
position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was probably in front of the
victim and was more to the left side, and the gun must have been a little bit higher than the entrance
wound. Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of the ribs, left side. Its direction was
backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was inflicted, the assailant must
have pointed the gun’s nozzle to the right side front of the victim. The distance between the entrance
points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0 centimeters."8

Version of the Defense

The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them from
the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone
eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:

"Erna Basa:

"x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon; at about
past 2 o’clock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of
words which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify
and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she was inside the
room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters
away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out
from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun. x x x.

"Eden Legaspi:
"x x x [A]s early as 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the investigation room
of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 o’clock that same afternoon while there inside, she
heard a commotion outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the commotion started they
were seated on the bench and after the commotion that woman soldier (referring to Erna Basa) stood
up and opened the door and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of a gun and immediately
two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place where she was seated but she just stood up;
after the shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.

"Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:

"He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then attached to
the defunct 321st PC Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2 o’clock or past
that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation; as he
was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it, all of a
sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa
was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by the police of Concepcion and then turned
over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard to let Balboa out of
the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa walking with him, he had his .45 caliber
pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was holding the doorknob with
his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away from him, suddenly approached
him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his gun with his left hand; he released
his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa
was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from
holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry the move of Balboa; after he held the
handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds, he felt somebody was holding his right
hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds the gun was drawn from its holster as both of
them held the gun; more grappling followed and five seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it
fired, the victim was to his right side when the attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right
when the gun was drawn from its holster until it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun
was already loaded in its chamber and cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired;
during the grappling he used his left hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used
his right hand in trying to reach the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and
Balboa fell; he is taller than Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine
who of them was stronger; after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying ‘stop that’ and he saw Sgt. Alag
approaching; sometime after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and
said that the case be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when his gun was put in its
holster only its handle protrudes or comes out from it.

"Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that happened during the
first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of San Dionisio and that
case involves other persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also the chance to
invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he took his lunch that
day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took Balboa from the
stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the investigation room which was
housed in the main building which is fifty meters, more or less, from the stockade, likewise houses the
administrative office, the office of the commanding officer, officer of the operations division and that of
the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim tried to grab it (gun); from the time he
sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the victim; the hand of the victim was on top of
his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his gun; that the entire handle of his gun was
exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell whether the victim, while struggling with him, was
able to hold any portion of his gun from the tip of its barrel to the point where its hammer is located;
during the incident his gun was fully loaded and cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed
them and probably reported the incident to their commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt.
Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense; when his commanding officer came some five to ten
minutes later and took away his gun he did not tell him anything.

"Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.

"He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas Balboa
that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he made an autopsy report
he said he found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with trajectory medially
downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory somewhat going
upward; at the same time of his examination he saw this victim to be wearing a light-colored T-shirt and
a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any powder burns and marks
and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to be powder burns as they look like
one; he also found a deformed slug in the pocket of the jacket of the victim."9

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful in his
attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were fired;
2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went off; it
was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3) the
location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of petitioner
that there had been a grappling for the gun.

To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of Balboa
resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,10 the CA maintained that "a revolver is not prone to
accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because of the nature
of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger in the
process of allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied
on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have been intentional
because pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire."11

Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:

"[Petitioner’s] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been shot only once.
In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby establishing
[petitioner’s] determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming
without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been followed by another
shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was
hit on two different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles, means
that there was an intent to cause the victim’s death, contrary to [petitioner’s] pretensions of the alleged
accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that the location, number and gravity of the wounds
inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the incident. x x x.12
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had miserably
failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this justifying
circumstance.

While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion of the
trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the commission of
the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate court in this
manner:

"x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must use
his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the accused
could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public
position.’ (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is no showing that the
[petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former fetched the latter from the
stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the
commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the said aggravating circumstance that
[petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the crime cannot be sustained. Hence, there
being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum of the penalty shall be taken
from the medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for the crime of homicide. x x x."13

Hence, this Petition.14

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Court’s consideration:

"I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioner’s conviction
despite the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to
petitioner’s overwhelming evidence to support his theory/defense of accident.

"II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of the
petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full control
of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the petitioner
reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in forceful efforts
to wrest the gun from each other.

"III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor general’s observation that the fact that
petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioner’s determined effort to kill the victim.

"IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented when it ruled
that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and the
victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling ensued.

"V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioner’s reaction to the incident when it
stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly argues against his claim
of accidental shooting.
"VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in determining
the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at the victim when the same
was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.

"VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-defense are
inconsistent.

"VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages."15

In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas Balboa
was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Accidental Shooting

Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, are conclusive.16 Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact finding. But
where some facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may overturn the
erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in dispute are crucial
to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual reexamination is imperative.

Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:

"Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from
criminal liability:

xxx xxx xxx

‘4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intent of causing it.’"

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due to the
fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled.17 Thus, in determining whether an "accident" attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This determination
inevitably brings to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in control of the .45
caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?

Petitioner Not in Control

of the Gun When It Fired

The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident
firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful afternoon
of January 4, 1990 as follows:

"ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That commotion
which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion which you heard?

A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be understood.

Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?

A. No, sir.

Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you were inside
the investigation room as part of that commotion?

A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking somewhat
like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.

COURT:

Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this case? Am I
correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?

A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw both of them
grappling for that gun.

Q. Where was the gun at that time?

A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)

Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It was Sgt.
Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?

A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt. Pomoy.
COURT:

Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?

A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the possession of the
gun.

Q. How many hands did you see?

A. Two.

Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY TEODOSIO:

Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?

A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.

Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?

A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboa’s hand was also there. Both of them
were holding the gun.

Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?

A. The handle.

Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?

A. At first they were not directly facing each other.

Q. So later, they were facing each other?

A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were grappling
for the possession of the gun force against force.

COURT:

Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?

A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.

Q. What was the distance?

A. Very close to each other.

Q. How close?

A. Very near each other.

Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?

A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would touch each
other.

Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?

A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.

Q. And they were directly facing each other?

A. Yes, sir.

COURT:

Proceed.

Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?

A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was released from its
holster and then there was an explosion.

Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were grappling
for the possession of the gun.

Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?

A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.

Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?

A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the gun was
turning.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?

A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one holding
the gun.

Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was then that I
saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the handle of the gun?
Am I correct?

A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.

Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?

A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.

Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you testified?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?

A. Left hand.

Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front of Sgt.
Pomoy?

A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoy’s right and Balboa’s left sides [were]
towards each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards each other.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?

A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun and the right hand
of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.

Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held by Tomas
Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the trigger?

A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the gun with his right
hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same hand holding the gun.

Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?

A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore whose hand was
holding the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.

Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, ‘Daw duha na sila nagakapot’, what you really mean?

A. Both of them were holding the gun.

Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?

A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.

Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have previously said
when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoy’s right hand was still on the handle of
the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating
by showing his right hand with her left hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of
the left hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)

COURT:

Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its holster and
while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?

A. Left hand.

Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up to the time
when the gun was pulled out from its holster?

A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand of Pomoy was used
by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab the handle of the gun.

COURT:

Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away from him?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?

A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using his left hand to
protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.

COURT:

Proceed.

ATTY. TEODOSIO:

Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of Sgt. Pomoy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?

A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.

COURT:

Q. That was before the gun fired?

A. Yes, sir."18

The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the scuffle.
The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried to thwart
those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon was
categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of petitioner
were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while his left was
warding off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, petitioner would
coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately aim and fire it at the
victim.

It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: "[Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the
left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely
lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the
gun."19

Release of the Gun’s Safety Lock and

Firing of the Gun Both Accidental

Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless
released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence showed
that the weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this fact
could only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This
conclusion appears to be non sequitur.

It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This frenzied
grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was fierce and
vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be dismissed:
that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and the shots
accidentally fired.

That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the claim
that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the mechanism of
the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in question, explained
how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:

"x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when fired,
immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying again a
live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location of, and
distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim of the
petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing Balboa’s upper
body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioner’s hand over the gun; the second shot
hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboa’s body as he was falling down and
releasing his hold on petitioner’s hand x x x."20

Thus, the appellate court’s reliance on People v. Reyes41 was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it over to
the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that the gun
accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present case
involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a revolver, the
gun used in Reyes.22 Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described by petitioner, is
prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.

Alleged Grappling Not Negated

by Frontal Location of Wounds

On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all frontal,
the appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It held
that "if there was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x each
other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead to an
inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta."23

Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the precise
moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination of the
existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.

In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes
inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for possession
of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the trajectory of
the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the eyewitness
account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties’ positions were unsteady, and that the
nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We quote the
eyewitness testimony as follows:

"Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?

A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were grappling
for the possession of the gun.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?

A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the gun was
turning."24

xxx xxx xxx

"Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?

A At first, they were not directly facing each other.

Q So later, they were facing each other?

A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were grappling
for the possession of the gun force against force."25

In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:

"x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First, because the
position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons holding the gun
when it fired. This is especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession of the gun
when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.

"[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the victim during the
grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit
Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45 pistol. But
he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun down as he was
going down. When the gun went off the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of the bullet in
Balboa’s body was going upward because his upper body was pushed downward twisting to the left. It
was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination, petitioner testified, what I noticed was
that after successive shots we separated from each other. This sequence of events is logical because the
protagonists were grappling over the gun and were moving very fast. x x x."26

Presence of All the

Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act with due
care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused, there was
no fault or no intent to cause the injury.27 From the facts, it is clear that all these elements were
present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the investigators --
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company. Thus, it
was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the instructions of his
superior, he fetched the victim from the latter’s cell for a routine interrogation.

Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer
of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone,
especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape
and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.

Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent his
service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept
his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially within
the premises of his working area.

At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the deceased,
much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of Balboa, did
not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm the victim
while being fetched from the detention cell.

The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victim’s death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from its
holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led to the
death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of circumstances
beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create serious doubt on
the latter’s culpability.

Petitioner’s Subsequent Conduct

Not Conclusive of Guilt

To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident was
indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was "dumbfounded,"
according to the CA; was "mum, pale and trembling," according to the trial court. These behavioral
reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After all, a
minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating room;
and, in the next breath, he was looking at his companion’s bloodied body. His reaction was to be
expected of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and ended so regrettably.

Second Issue:

Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot Balboa,
he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.

Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger.28 Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not occur
out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose of
self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental result
of both parties’ attempts to possess the firearm.

Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner -- an
exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further discussion of
whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

20. Us v. Caballeros, G.R. No. 1352, 29 March 1905

[G.R. No. 1352. March 29, 1905. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

Hipolito Magsalin, for Appellants.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

DECISION

MAPA, J. :

The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven
years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated
on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and
Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they
took part in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal the crime.

The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this,
but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a
witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed; that
Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but that he was in a banana
plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to run; that
he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and
striking him the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force
(par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are
charged against him.

As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way
in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary,
since Baculi, as well as on of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that
he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place
of occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before
an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when
testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof, because the same witness says that Roberto
Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides,
from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of
Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that
nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and
voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial.
(Sec. 4 Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission.)

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems
to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his
judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants
criminally liable according to law.

By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we
acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.

21. People v. Loreno, G.R. No. L-54414, 9 July 1984

[G.R. No. L-54414. July 9, 1984.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY

MARANTAL y LONDETE, Accused-Appellants.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Reynaldo Herrera for Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:

In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Accused Eustaquio Loreno y
Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with the crime of Robbery with Double Rape,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe, and Ricky Doe,
who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better accomplish their
purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and use violence and
intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the hands of the members of
his family and on the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the floor, the herein accused
take, rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner thereof, of the following
properties, to wit:

One camera with trademark Olympus worth P 400.00

Two birthstones rings worth 700.00

One wedding ring with name ‘MONDING’ 100.00

One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00

Two pieces of necklace gold worth 400.00

Two pieces of mosquito net 70.00

Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00

Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50

One beach towel, with decoration 35.00

One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00

One caserole 15.00

Two pieces of pillow case 12.00

Two cans of rice 70.00

One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00

Two bottles of Johnny Walker wine 450.00

Two T-shirts one mark Marlboro and plain white 20.00

Five bags of assorted sizes 200.00

One lady wrist watch Bulova 50.00

One men’s wrist watch Enclock 17 jewels 150.00

One eagle pin US gold 200.00

One baby wallet containing cash 57.00

Three live chickens 30.00

One waterproof jacket reversible 40.00

Cash money in assorted denominations all paper bills 7,000.00

———

TOTAL P10,619.50

all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the
aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused, with lewd design, and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina Monge, all
against their will." 1

Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a
plea of not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of which
read:

"ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by Par. 5
of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the
maximum penalty provided by law.

Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty ranging
from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present.

Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias Monge in
the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment. In addition, Eustaquio Loreno shall indemnify
Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of P20,000.00 as damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment.

The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each." 2

The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, are as follows:

"In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio
Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica Monge, single,
then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend the dance
to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his wife, Beata
Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter of Cristina
Monge. The other occupants present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then 11 years old,
and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name of Francisco
Fabie. Cristina was then vacationing at her parents’ house. Her husband, Raymundo Baybayon, was in
Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM; pp. 2-4, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp.
2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

At about 7:40 o’clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fabie saw
at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call Elias
Monge saying that there was a letter from the chief (hepe). Fabie called Elias Monge who was in the
sala, informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red clothes
and the other in dark sweater, came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the balcony the man
in dark sweater handed to him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias Monge invited the man in
dark sweater to come inside the sala. The other man in red clothes posted himself near the post of the
balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM;
pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

When he and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica to
fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami mga
NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her just what she came to
know about their visitors. Cristina Monge attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo but she was held
back by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to make any scandal. When
Elias Monge turned to look at him, the man in dark sweater poked his gun at him, and ordered all those
inside to lie on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; p. 7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 4, 12-13, tsn,
Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

In the meantime, outside at the balcony the man in red clothes asked Fabie for a glass of water, and the
latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of water, but Mario did not obey and instead went to the sala.
Hence, Fabie himself went inside the house to fetch the glass of water. But, as he went inside the sala,
he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the man in red
clothes poked his gun on Fabie’s back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and then he was
pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which was lighted, Fabie saw and recognized the man
in red clothes to be Eustaquio Loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw
and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as one of the companions of the man in dark
sweater. All the occupants of the house were ordered by the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain
lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979
AM; pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM;
p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied
them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby’s hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with
which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim’s hands together behind their backs.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog away.
Loreno held Fabie and brought him downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp. 8-9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM; p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).

On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on the
person of Jimmy Marantal. Fabie immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors who
remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fabie, and
seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the
ground. Marantal kicked Fabie who managed to roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a
while, Loreno lifted Fabie bodily from the ground, and brought him back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 19,
1979 AM; pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).

After Loreno and Fabie returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and
dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied. Inside
the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said there was
none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized Monica and forcibly
removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He boxed and slapped her.
Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then made her lie on the floor near the bed.
After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on struggling and shouting for help,
but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt pain. He proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with her. She could not do anything to stop him from consummating his lust as she was still
tied. When he was through with her, she noticed blood in her private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM;
p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp, 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM; pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

Below in the sala, Monica Monge’s parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle she
put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them, telling
them not to rise if they wanted to live. Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters room and
then to the teacher’s room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open the aparador
and the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to the sala,
holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms were poured
on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 7-13, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM; pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).

Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose hair was
dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of the sala. He reached for a
can of pineapple juice from the aparador in the sala and drank its contents. Not long thereafter, he
turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then rented by
school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City).

Inside the room, the man in dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and struggled
although her hands were still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye which
caused her to lose consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she regained
consciousness, the man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with her (pp. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM;
pp. 11-12, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher’s room, a third man
entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found instead
a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded to the kitchen, and
when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth man entered the sala and
he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him to get it from his pocket
as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge’s reply, the fourth man boxed him, hitting him on his breast and
solar plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked Elias Monge to accompany him to
the house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias Monge protested and refused to
accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck, pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge
protested, telling her husband not to go along. Loreno desisted from his plan to go to the nearby
neighbor’s house. Elias Monge did not recognize the identities of both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-
15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM; pp.
7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).

Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in dark
sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch her
private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man was
approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to breastfeed her
daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from the house one by
one, bringing along all the things they robbed from their victims. The man in dark sweater returned to
the sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her shorts, and he told
them not to tell anybody what happened to them, otherwise he will kill them. And then all the
malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was on the ground near the fence of the house
calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall. Elias Monge replied from upstairs that he was not
feeling well, and Agapito left. Elias Monge was able to untie himself, and then he also untied the others.
Fabie then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno, he (Fabie) saw and
recognized Jimmy Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for the group that had just
robbed them. Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father that they were abused by the man in
dark sweater when they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the night, they remained on
guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 10-11, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; p.
7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal
properties: jewelry valued at P1,000.00, two mosquito nets, P70.00; three blankets, P200.00; one
caldero of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one
beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500.00; and several others, all in the total of P10,305.00,
more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).

Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter’s daughter married a member of the
youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already known
Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place bobby traps in his
(Monge’s) place to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house. Monica Monge
and Cristina Monge also had already known Loreno because his daughter married a neighbor near their
house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse the playground of the Magsaysay Elementary School where he
was studying. Fabie had also known Jimmy Marantal because the latter often attended dances held by
the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even married one of its members. He had engaged
Marantal in conversations many times (p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM; pp. 2-
3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM;
pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).

Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful evening, Elias
Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC
detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters at
Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors in tying him and his
family during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a written recommendation from the PC to the
hospital with instructions to have himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined. Cristina
Monge was informed that there was no need for her to submit for physical examination because she
was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM; p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; p. 8, tsn., Oct. 29,
1979 PM).

Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company, stationed at
Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He was informed by
Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters were raped by the
robbers in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was able to identify two of
the robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal of Barrio Calabnigan,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular inspection of the place on
that same day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy
Marantal and brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp on January 17, 1978, the two suspects were
duly identified upon confrontation as two of the robbers by the above-mentioned barrio captain, his
daughters Monica and Cristina Monge, and their helper Fabie. During the investigation, the two suspects
refused to give their written statements. Thus, Sgt. del Socorro was able to secure the written
statements of Elias Monge, Francisco Fabie, Monica Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape
incident. Upon being identified both said suspects told their victims if they could just talk and settle the
matter, but Elias Monge replied that what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against
him and his family. The two suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM;
pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM; pp. 1-5, 6, 8-12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).

Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City,
examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination’s result was negative. But the doctor
found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma, right cestal
region", a close wound, already spread out but in the process of healing, located on the right side of the
middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to stop the bleeding
as there was still slight bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave the corresponding
medical certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit "A" ; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; p. 19, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 AM).

Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital, examined Monica Monge
on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining her hymen,
she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o’clock locations and,
inserting her index finger inside her patient’s sex orifice, it easily admitted her forefinger. She had the
patient’s vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory examination. The doctor
observed that the lacerations did not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the lacerated
portions were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been
caused by the forcible penetration of a male’s penis into the patient’s vagina. The doctor further
explained that the laceration of the hymen heals after five days. She also explained that male
spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated that, admitting there
was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm must have already disappeared when she
examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978 which was already beyond 72 hours since she was raped
in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3

Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They
admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were
only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five companions who claimed to be members of the
New People’s Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants
and their families would be killed. We, however, find the contention untenable.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act
with freedom. The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5

A perusal of the appellants statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief
(pp. 3-10), showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and
rape against Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent
with appellant s claim of having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, to wit:

1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark sweater
went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun to the victims which
enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM).

2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned himself
next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias Monge.
Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near the post of the
balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary participation in the criminal acts.

3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock.
Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he got from inside the
house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).

4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where she was
earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno’s immediate reaction was to point his gun to the
victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn, Id.).

The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the
master’s room and the teacher’s room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her
keys and got the contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted
alone, without the threat and assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater
consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher’s room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on
the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and touch her private parts.

When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fabie went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the
flashlight of Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his
flashlight on the approaching Fabie. Upon seeing Fabie, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing
him (Fabie) to fall to the ground. Marantal’s reaction towards Fabie was due to the fact that Fabie had
recognized him and the blows which he gave to Fabie who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a
warning to Fabie not to report his presence and participation in the robbery-rape incident to the
authorities.

Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of
Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two
companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his
companions effective means and encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was
no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the
crimes.

All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing
acts, though separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their
community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which
constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be
inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when said acts point to joint purpose
and concert of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to
establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of actual participation by each of the
conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been established, all the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law,
the act of one is the act of all. 9

The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was committed on January 7, 1978 by more than three
persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of
band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767, promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by
death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the accused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
With costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

22. People v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, 14 April 1999

[G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL, Accused-

Appellant.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual
guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, and to pay the
heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. 1

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias "Jun." Virgilio Santos alias "Boy Santos" and John
Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having
robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the
occasion thereof shot and killed her. 2

While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, 3 , Virgilio "Boy" Santos and John Doe alias
"Dodong" remained at large. Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del
Rosario was tried.

These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver Paul
Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by
the side of Nita’s Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked
at a distance of about one and a-half (1½) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused
Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a
bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was
trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon
after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head.
The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside
received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar.
When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He
also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the
incident. 4

Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the afternoon he was hired
for P120.00 5 by a certain "Boy" Santos, 6 his co-accused. Their original agreement was that he would
drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. 7 However despite their earlier arrangement Boy
Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. He
(del Rosario) acceded. 8 Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at
the public market. 9 Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and
General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted
the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted
from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya. 10 Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but "Boy
Santos" who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.

Meanwhile, "Dodong" Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim’s bag, but before boarding the tricycle "Jun"
Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After the
shooting, "Dodong" Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while "Jun" Marquez rode behind del
Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del
Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there were
cogon grasses. 11 Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to
inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. 12 Del
Rosario then went home. 13 Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner
of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. 14

As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and sentenced him
to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the
presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos,
Ernesto "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the
conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to commit the crime of
Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional rights as an accused;
and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule
113, of the Rules of Court. 15

The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability under Art.
12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force must be
sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by
his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was
only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. 16

But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not be
considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force because it
fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. 17

We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because
he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my
will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere
instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation
must be present, imminent and impending; and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough.
The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat, 18

As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those less
powerful than a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do what an
armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened
with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under
the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than
the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day. 19

Corollary with the defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was
"Boy" Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the
head, instantly killing her. 20 A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the
case, particularly the testimonies of witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was "Jun"
Marquez who ran after the victim’s helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct
examination —
Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?

A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir . . .

Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by two men?

A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.

Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?

A: He was the one holding the gun, sir . . .

Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men who grappled the
same from her?

A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other man was then
kicking the lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir.

Q: What happened to the lady who fell to the ground?

A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman who was then lying on
the ground, sir . . .

Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?

A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.

Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the tricycle which was at a distance of
about one a half meter?

A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir . . .

Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the possession of the
bag?

A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.

Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?

A: They went away, sir . . .

Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in the tricycle?

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the other man entered the
sidecar, sir. 21
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene conducted
by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated —

Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then holding the gun fired
at the victim?

A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion holding a gun chased the
helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir.

Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?

A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this spot the man holding
a gun shot the victim, sir. 22

On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified —

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?

x x x

Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.

x x x

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the gun?

A: Yes, sir. 23

On the other hand, Accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that —

Q: . . .On the evening of May 13,1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as testified to by Eduardo
Nalagon?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nita’s Drugstore at Gen.
Tinio St.?

A: Yes, sir.
x x x

Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the assailants?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Then what did you do?

A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.

Q: When you said "they" to whom are you referring?

A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.

Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?

A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.

Q: And what about Jun Marquez?

A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.

Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?

A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.

Q: And after that what happened?

A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.

Court: Did you not see any shooting?

A: There was, sir.

Q: Who was shot?

A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir . . .

Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was transpiring was wrong and
illegal?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: But you did not try to leave?

A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?

A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the possession of Boy
Santos . . .

Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?

A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.

Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you tried to escape that
was the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your family?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?

A: Dodong Visaya, sir .

Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your back?

A: Yes, sir. 24

On cross-examination, Accused further stated —

Q: After stopping in that place for one minute what else happened?

A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.

Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the
bag of the woman?

A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.

Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?

A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down . . .

Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?

A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.

Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the old woman?

A: No, sir . . .

Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling for the possession of
the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir . . .

Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area where the incident
occurred is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you should not
do anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will be killed also, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded by your other three
co-accused in this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim going
towards the public market along Burgos Street?

A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.

Court: Are you quite sure of that?

A: Yes, sir. 26

Del Rosario maintains that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at him
and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserts that it was "Jun" Marquez who shot the
victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.

From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was
grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot
the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, that the bag was given to a person who
was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del
Rosario, it can be deduced that "Jun" Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he
mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased "by the other man," and that this "other man" could not
be "Boy" Santos .who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion
gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that "Boy" Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation
that "Boy" Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and to prevent him
from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for "Boy" Santos to stay in the
tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that "Boy" Santos could have just left the tricycle and
helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with "Dodong"
Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that "Boy" Santos opted to remain inside the
tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape
and leave them behind. 27

Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1-½) in front of the tricycle of
witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were
transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by "Boy" Santos at del Rosario simultaneously
with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the
back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. 28

There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at him
was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos, making
him for the moment an automation without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be
any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily and against his will. He is therefore exempt from
criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his
co-accused away from the crime scene.

On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosario’s conviction on his participation in the
orchestrated acts of "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya. According to the trial court, del
Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between
accused and his passengers was evident because "while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the
helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening, Accused
Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was running;" 29 that the
"accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was hired and used by his co-
accused in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the
incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the crime." 30

We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their
intent. There is need for "concurrence of wills" or "unity of action and purpose" or for "common and
joint purpose and design." Its manifestation could be shown by "united and concerted action." 31

Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is planned
in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Consequently, the presence of the
concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. 32 Nevertheless, mere
knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be
established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of
proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal
conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 33

In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver of the
getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he had no
inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing
thereof . He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at
gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.

In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an agreement
concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same." 34 Therefore, in order to
convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is
insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy. 35 The only
incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he has amply
explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by the
prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-
accused that he would be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is
absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and shooting
although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. 36

That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his employer or
to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most people to get
involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. 37 It must be recalled that del Rosario was merely a
tricycle driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did
not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with
physical harm should he squeal.

Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these
rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 38 As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon, the
prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident,
during his cross-examination —

Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver’s
name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to
name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, Accused informed them of the
bag and lunch kit’s location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these
findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma
composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding
a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, Accused del Rosario was at the back of the
school, after which they went back to the police station. The investigator took the statement of the
accused on May 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the
police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge
Talavera. 39

A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and
they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. 40

Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled
that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41 This concept of custodial
investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a
person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2
of the same Act further provides that —

. . . Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains
or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known
and understood by him, of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own
counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation.
From the time he was invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already
under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the
investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already
a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to
establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation
in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the
safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful
since there was no warrant therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: 43

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SP04 De Leon during the police raid at the place of
"Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs Sucro 44 we held that when a police
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds
at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a),
Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence, Sec. 5,
par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught immediately after
the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the purview of the
aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the robbery with
homicide.

On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before a
warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and, (2) the person making
the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it.
Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and
the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is
also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts
indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. 45 Again, the arrest of del
Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after
the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
committed’’ at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were
not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as
the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
However, the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario’s arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court a
quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and
any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without any
objection, as in this case. 46

A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and property in
the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused Joselito del
Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly
used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario’s defense of
"irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand,
conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the
prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused JOSELITO
DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to
report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

23. People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, 30 September 1936 (See Also: Separate Opinion of J. Villareal)
G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.

Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said
sentence alleging that the trial court erred:

I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had
thrown away her newborn babe, and

II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion
perpetua, with costs.

The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw
the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of
nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes
later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front
and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid
and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house
and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what
happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with
the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help
them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon
the appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe
near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked
whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the
affirmative.

Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and
found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the
bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had
previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had
admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date
above-stated.

The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose
testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the
prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court
furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree
with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor
under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the
death of the minor allegedly abandoned.

By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously,

or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said
circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in
order that he may be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause
to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with
Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so
testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb
was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The
appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom
that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the
appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the
extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly
appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these
the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time
she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly
caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the
circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to
childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she,
like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated and
could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her,
undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to
her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or
insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her
child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the
danger of losing its life.

The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to
her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was
perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place
and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by
mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12,
subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the
appellant was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child
therefrom, having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be
held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that
under such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her
favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio,
and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released
immediately. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:

I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is exempt from
criminal liability but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.

The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a
year of marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her
said lover knew that she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the
fruit of their love should be born. Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and
dizzy. On January 31, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, she went down from her house and entered a
thicket about four or five brazas away, where the residents of said place responded to the call of nature.
After some minutes the accused emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently unable to support
herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to
help her, supported her and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what
happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he alone was unable to
attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to take
bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when
he saw the body of a newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a
few moments before. Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to
bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to her was
hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an autopsy had been made of the body, it was
found that the child was born alive.

Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among young primiparæ
who, by reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of
fetus, are not aware that they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr.
A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926,
page 530; Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that
the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when she went into the thicket to defecate and
being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon defecating she was also
expelling the child she was carrying in her womb. Believing that she did nothing more to respond to an
urgent call of nature which brought her there, she returned home staggering for lack of strength to
support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was leaving a newborn child behind her,
and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the already dead child with wounds on
the body produced by the bites of pigs.

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies,
which may be committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there
being deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.

As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been exposed to the
rough weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed the crime
of infanticide or that of abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision
there is deceit when the act punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever
and from dizziness, the appellant under the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and,
consequently, she could not have deliberately intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was
ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals. Neither can it be held that she
faultily committed it because, as already stated, not knowing for lack of experience in childbirth that in
defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural — she might expel the child she carried
in her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails to use
his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge
of the fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it would
die as a consequence of the rough weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be considered
negligent because negligence is the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which
implies knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the compliance with the obligation.
Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate complying with
her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked
foresight because, having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not foresee that by
abandoning her child in a thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of lack of
skill because she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery,
and as defecation is a natural physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.

We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
which reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural
physiological necessity accidentally provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the
exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements and of the animals which cased its death. As the child
was born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery and she had deliberately abandoned the
child, her accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because then the death of said
child no longer would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting
circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required
by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting circumstance
implies knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or
insuperable cause, that is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do
what the law commands. In the present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with
respect to the child, is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery
and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever which
consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and her illness not being of such
gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable impediment
required by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was
subjectively no cause for the law to impose a duty for her to comply with.

Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its exposure to
the rough weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she had
neither deceitfully nor faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the child.