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THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154598             August 16, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appea
1 

Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501 dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction
substance. The dispositive portion read:
2 

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds that: a) this C
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.

Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical
United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jen
Francisco Thornton.

However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to he
"guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was
country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7
respondent left the family home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants t
bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed,
because of the allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabou
respondent and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamita
issued a certification that respondent was no longer residing there.
3 

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondent’s cellular phone bills showing calls from different pla
Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, th
Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the c
that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions
corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pam
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):

Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) has juri
a writ of habeas corpus whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdi
stated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this Court. This jurisdiction f
procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. – The Family Courts shall have exclusive original juris
and decide the following cases:

xxx       xxx       xxx

b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the la

The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902 insofar as the jurisdiction
issue writ of habeas corpus in custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it
there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute the Family Court as the sole c
issue said writ. If a court other than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then
of the former is not exclusive but concurrent – and such an interpretation is contrary to the simple
wording of RA 8369.

Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus invo
of minors, a respondent can easily evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by j
of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has territorial jurisdiction. That m
then jurisdiction is conferred by law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Cou
exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.

Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this Court – or any court fo
to determine. The enactment of a law on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislatu
is a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts but only from the le

The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdictio
petitions.

In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Hab
Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Sect
rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any o
4 

and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. 5

The petition is granted.

The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisd
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family courts
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of hab
the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.

We disagree with the CA’s reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like petitio
legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their res
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case
petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:

Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to "protect the rights and p
welfare of children." The creation of the Family Court is geared towards addressing three major iss
children’s welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the deliberations for the law. The
behind giving Family Courts exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid furthe
regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and specialization in view of the nature of the cas
parties, as well as to guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains protected

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
the Solicitor General:

To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus involving
whose whereabouts are uncertain and transient will not result in one of the situations that the legis
avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte nature of habeas corpus p
not result in disruption of the child’s privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the app
jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the legislature: the child’s welfare and we
prejudiced.

This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive" as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdic
correctly cited by the Solicitor General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation, the heirs of miners killed in a w
6 

accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Workm
Compensation Commissioner had exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.

We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:

While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it supports petitioner’s su
the word "exclusive" in the Family Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of th
other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same manner that the remedies in
case were selective, the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is
The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable only within its territorial jurisdiction
hand, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determine
 the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines, as provided
102 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereo
and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances author
and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made re
the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof f
decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge there
and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district. 
supplied)

In ruling that the Commissioner’s "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the regular courts for damages
the same Floresca case, said that it was merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of soci
1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied the well-established rule that wha
is the spirit and intent, not the letter, of the law:

"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s s
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."

xxx       xxx       xxx

It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as imple
provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering o
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.

Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense. Sometimes,
legislature actually had in mind is not accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation
meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. In the case at bar, a literal interpretation of the word "ex
7 

result in grave injustice and negate the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" under the
8 

and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This mandate must prevail over legal technicalities
the guiding principle in construing the provisions of RA 8369.

Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not favored:

The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqib
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to hav
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be r
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all law
subject."9

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Suprem
issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme C
issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Su
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule
Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involv
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to
 Family Court belongs.

xxx       xxx       xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its mem
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnab
Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may
hearing and decision on the merits. (Emphasis Ours)

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction w
courts in habeas corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.

One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country is not an unreasonable ava
remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor Gen

That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country" does not represent a
insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such a task is no more different from or difficult th
the peace officer in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable anywhere
Philippines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is
hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban,, J., Chairman, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

Penned by Associate Justice Hilarion A. Aquino and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo
1 

Regalado E. Maambong.

CA Decision, p. 3.
2 

Rollo, p. 49.
3 

Article VIII. Section 5. "The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
4 

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction… over petitions for… habeas corpus.

xxx       xxx       xxx."

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus invo
5 

of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region
Family Courts belong.

xxx       xxx       xxx

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or with any of its mem
granted, the writ shall be enforecebale anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be returnable to
 or any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be foun
and decision on the merits.

136 SCRA 141 [1985].

Agpalo Statutory Constitution, 1986, p. 98.

SEC. 2. State and National Policies.- The State shall protect the rights and promote the welfare o
8 

keeping with the mandate of the Constitution and the precepts of the United Nations Convention o
the Child. xxx

Republic vs. Marcopper Mining, 335 SCRA 386 [2000].

10 
Ibid. at 120.

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